

Cryptanalysis of GGH Map^{*}

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Abstract. Multilinear map is a novel primitive which has many cryptographic applications, and GGH map is a major candidate of K -linear maps for $K > 2$. GGH map has two classes of applications, which are respectively applications with public tools of encoding and with hidden tools of encoding. In this paper we show that applications of GGH map with public tools of encoding are not secure, and that one application of GGH map with hidden tools of encoding is not secure. We present an efficient attack on GGH map, aiming at multipartite key exchange (MKE) and the instance of witness encryption (WE) based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem. First, we use special modular operations, which we call modified encoding/decoding, to filter the decoded noise much smaller. Such filtering is enough to break MKE. Moreover, such filtering negates K -GMDDH assumption, which is the security basis of an ABE scheme. The procedure almost breaks away from those lattice attacks and looks like an ordinary algebra. The key point is our special tools for modular operations. Second, under the condition of public tools of encoding, we break the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem. To do so, we not only use modified encoding/decoding, but also introduce and solve “combined 3-exact cover problem”, which is a problem never hard to be solved. The attack on the instance of WE is under an assumption, which seems at least nonnegligible. Third, for hidden tools of encoding, we break the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem. To do so, we construct level-2 encodings of 0, used as tools of encoding. This attack is under several stronger assumptions, which seem nonnegligible. Finally, we present cryptanalysis of a simple revision of GGH map, aiming at MKE. We show that MKE can be broken under the assumption that 2^K is polynomially large. To do so, we generalize our modified encoding/decoding.

Keywords: Multilinear maps, Multipartite key exchange (MKE), Witness encryption (WE), Lattice based cryptography.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and Our Contributions

Multilinear map is a novel primitive. It is the solution of a long-standing open problem [1], and has many novel cryptographic applications, such as multipartite

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key exchange (MKE) [2], witness encryption (WE) [3–9], obfuscation [7–10], and so on. It also has several advantages in traditional cryptographic area, such as IBE, ABE [11], Broadcasting encryption, and so on. The first candidate of multilinear map is GGH map [2], and GGHLite map [12] is a special version of GGH map, for the purpose of improving the efficiency. Up to now, GGH map is a major candidate of K -linear maps for $K > 2$. It uses noised encoding to obtain the trapdoor, and its security was seemingly based on the hardness of several problems over lattices. GGH map has two classes of applications. The first class is applications with public tools of encoding/decoding, for example, MKE [2], IBE, ABE, Broadcasting encryption, and so on. The second class is applications with hidden tools of encoding and public tools of decoding, for example, GGHSW obfuscation [7]. WE can be of the first and the second classes. For the first class, WE tools of encoding are generated and published by the system, and can be used by any user. For the second class, WE tools of encoding are generated and hidden by unique encrypter, and can only be used by himself. Authors of GGH map [2] provided a survey of relevant cryptanalysis techniques from the literature, and also provided two new attacks on GGH map, as a reminding. We emphasize that they presented weak-DL attack which is primary version of our attack, and which did not find major danger.

In this paper we show that applications of GGH map with public tools of encoding are not secure, and that one application of GGH map with hidden tools of encoding is not secure. We present an efficient attack on GGH map, aiming at MKE and the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem. As a preparing step, for the secret of each user, we obtain an equivalent secret, which is the sum of original secret and a noise. The noise is an element of the specific principal ideal, but its size is not small. To do so, we use weak-DL attack [2]. Then our contributions are as follows.

First, We use special modular operations, which we call modified encoding/decoding, to filter the decoded noise much smaller. Such filtering is enough to break MKE. Moreover, such filtering negates K -GMDDH assumption (Assumption 5.1 of [11]), which is the security basis of the ABE scheme [11]. The procedure almost breaks away from those lattice attacks and looks like an ordinary algebra. The key point is our special tools for modular operations.

Second, under the condition of public tools of encoding, we break the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem. To do so, we not only use modified encoding/decoding, but also introduce and solve “combined 3-exact cover problem”, which is a problem never hard to be solved. The attack on the instance of WE is under an assumption, which seems at least nonnegligible.

Third, for hidden tools of encoding, we break the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem. To do so, we construct level-2 encodings of 0, used as tools of encoding. This attack is under several stronger assumptions, which seem nonnegligible.

Finally, we check whether GGH structure can be simply revised to avoid our attack. We present cryptanalysis of a simple revision of GGH map, aiming

at MKE. We show that MKE can be broken under the assumption that 2^K is polynomially large. To do so, we generalize our modified encoding/decoding.

1.2 Principles and Meanings of Our Attack

Quite different from original DH maps and bilinear maps, all candidates of multilinear maps have a common security worry that decoding tools are public. This makes the adversary decode messages freely. The adversary can choose those decoded messages that are small enough, without protection of the modular operation. Such security worry has been used to break CLT map [13–17], which is another major candidate of multilinear maps, and which is simply over integers. Multilinear maps over the integer polynomials (GGH map [2] and GGHLite map [12]) haven't been broken because (1) (NTRU declaration) the product of a short polynomial and modular inverse of another short polynomial seems unable to be decomposed; and (2) the product of several short polynomials seems unable to be decomposed. However, the product of several short polynomials is a somewhat short polynomial. Although it cannot be decomposed, it can be used as a modulus to filter the noise. On the other hand, breaking applications of GGH map does not mean solving users' secrets. It only means solving "high-order bits of decoding of the product of encodings of users' secrets", a weaker requirement. Therefore, by using our modified encoding/decoding, we can easily migrate between modular operations and real number operations to find vulnerabilities which have not been found before. All of the above form the first principle of our attack. The second principle is that, if one uses GGH map for constructing the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem, special structure of GGH map can simplify the 3-exact cover problem into a combined 3-exact cover problem.

Authors of GGH map [2] presented three variants, which are "asymmetric encoding", "providing zero-test security" and "avoiding principal ideals". We find the first and the second variants never immune to our attack, as long as they are used for MKE and the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem. The third variant is under study. A new consideration is removing multiplication commutability, but the application will be greatly limited. For example, the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem can only use multiplication commutable ideal lattices.

1.3 The Organization

In subsection 1.4 we review recent works related to multilinear map. In section 2 we review GGH map and two applications, MKE and the instance of WE on 3-exact cover. In section 3 we define special tools for our attack, which are special polynomials used for our modular operations. Also in this section, for the secret of each user, we generate an equivalent secret, which is not small. It is immediate that we obtain an "equivalent secret" of the product of users' secrets, which just is the product of users' equivalent secrets. In section 4 we present modified encoding/decoding. We show how can "high-order bits of decoding of the product

of encodings of users' secrets" be solved, so that MKE is broken. In section 5 we show how to break the instance of WE on 3-exact cover problem with public tools of encoding. In this section we first introduce and solve "combined 3-exact cover problem", then solve "high-order bits of decoding of the product of encodings of users' secrets". In section 6 we present an attack on the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem with hidden tools of encoding. We show that this instance can be broken under several stronger assumptions. In section 7 we present cryptanalysis of a simple revision of GGH map, aiming at MKE. We show that MKE can be broken under the assumption that 2^K is polynomially large.

1.4 Related Works

Arita and Handa [5] presented two applications of multilinear maps: group key exchange and witness encryption. Their witness encryption scheme (called AH scheme) has the security claim based on the hardness of Hamilton Cycle problem. The novelty is that they used an asymmetric multilinear map over integer matrices. Bellare and Hoang [6] presented adaptive witness encryption, with stronger security than soundness security, named adaptive soundness security. Garg et al. [7] presented witness encryption by using indistinguishability obfuscation and Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzle, a simplified variant of multilinear maps. Extractable witness encryption was presented [8–10]. Gentry et al. designed multilinear maps based on graph [18]. Coron et al. presented efficient attack on CLT map for hidden tools of encoding [19]. Coron et al. designed CLT15 map [20].

2 GGH map and two applications

2.1 Notations and Definitions

We define the rational numbers by \mathbb{Q} and the integers by \mathbb{Z} . We specify that n -dimensional vectors of \mathbb{Q}^n and \mathbb{Z}^n are row vectors. We consider the $2n$ 'th cyclotomic polynomial ring $R = \mathbb{Z}[X]/(X^n + 1)$, and identify an element $u \in R$ with the coefficient vector of the degree- $(n-1)$ integer polynomial that represents u . In this way, R is identified with the integer lattice \mathbb{Z}^n . We also consider the ring $R_q = R/qR = \mathbb{Z}_q[X]/(X^n + 1)$ for a (large enough) integer q . Obviously, addition in these rings is done component-wise in their coefficients, and multiplication is polynomial multiplication modulo the ring polynomial $X^n + 1$. In some cases we also consider the ring $\mathbb{K} = \mathbb{Q}[X]/(X^n + 1)$, which is likewise associated with the linear space \mathbb{Q}^n . We redefine the operation "mod q " as the follow: if q is an odd, $a(\text{mod } q)$ is within $\{-(q-1)/2, -(q-3)/2, \dots, (q-1)/2\}$; if q is an even, $a(\text{mod } q)$ is within $\{-q/2, -(q-2)/2, \dots, (q-2)/2\}$. For $x \in R$, $\langle x \rangle = \{x \cdot u : u \in R\}$ is the principal ideal in R generated by x (alternatively, the sub-lattice of \mathbb{Z}^n corresponding to this ideal). For $x \in R$, $y \in R$, $y(\text{mod } x)$ is such vector: $y(\text{mod } x) = ax$, each entry of a is within $[-0.5, 0.5)$, and $y - y(\text{mod } x) \in \langle x \rangle$.

2.2 Parameter Setting and Map

We secretly sample a short element $g \in R$. Let $\langle g \rangle$ be the principal ideal in R . g itself is kept secret, and no “good” description of $\langle g \rangle$ is made public. Another secret element $z \in R_q$ is chosen at random, and hence is not short.

An element y is called encoding parameter, or called level-1 encoding of 1, and is set as the follow. We secretly sample a short element $a \in R$, and let $y = (1 + ag)z^{-1}(\text{mod } q)$. Elements $\{x^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$ are called randomizers, or called level-1 encodings of 0, and are set as the follow. We secretly sample a short element $b^{(i)} \in R$, and let $x^{(i)} = b^{(i)}gz^{-1}(\text{mod } q)$, $i = 1, 2$. Public element p_{zt} is called level- K zero-testing parameter, where $K \geq 3$ is an integer. p_{zt} is set as the follow. We secretly sample a “somewhat small” element $h \in R$, and let $p_{zt} = (hz^K g^{-1})(\text{mod } q)$. Simply speaking, parameters y and $\{x^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$ are tools of encoding, while public parameter p_{zt} is tool of decoding. $\{g, z, a, \{b^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}, h\}$ are kept from all users. For MKE, y and $\{x^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$ are public. For WE, they can be either public or hidden.

Suppose a user has a secret $v \in R$, which is a short element. He secretly samples short elements $\{u^{(i)} \in R, i = 1, 2\}$. He computes noised encoding $V = vy + (u^{(1)}x^{(1)} + u^{(2)}x^{(2)})(\text{mod } q)$, where $vy(\text{mod } q)$ and $(u^{(1)}x^{(1)} + u^{(2)}x^{(2)})(\text{mod } q)$ are respectively encoded secret and encoded noise. He publishes V . Then GGH K -linear map includes $K, y, \{x^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}, p_{zt}$, and all noised encoding V for all users.

We call g grade 1 element, and denote σ as the standard deviation for sampling g . We call $\{a, \{b^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}\}$ and $\{v, \{u^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}\}$ grade 2 elements, and denote σ' as the standard deviation for sampling $\{a, \{b^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}\}$ and $\{v, \{u^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}\}$. Both σ and σ' are greatly smaller than \sqrt{q} , and GGH K -linear map [2] suggests $\sigma' = n\sigma$. Finally, we call h grade 3 element, and take $\sigma'' = \sqrt{q}$ as the standard deviation for sampling h . We say that $g, \{a, \{b^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}\}$ and $\{v, \{u^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}\}$ are “very small”, and that h is “somewhat small”. h can not be taken “very small” for the security concern.

2.3 Application 1: MKE

Suppose that $K + 1$ users want to generate a common shared key by public discussion. To do so, each user k generates his secret $v^{(k)}$, and publishes the noised encoding $V^{(k)}, k = 1, \dots, K + 1$. Then each user can use his secret and other users' noised encodings to compute KEY , the common shared key. KEY is high-order bits of any decoded message. For example, user k_0 first computes $v^{(k_0)}p_{zt} \prod_{k \neq k_0} V^{(k)}(\text{mod } q)$, then KEY is high-order bits of $v^{(k_0)}p_{zt} \prod_{k \neq k_0} V^{(k)}(\text{mod } q)$. That is, he first computes

$$v^{(k_0)}p_{zt} \prod_{k \neq k_0} V^{(k)}(\text{mod } q) =$$

$$h(1 + ag)^K g^{-1} \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)} +$$

$$hv^{(k_0)} \sum_{\substack{S \subset \{1, \dots, K+1\} \\ -\{k_0\}, |S| \geq 1}} (1+ag)^{K-|S|} g^{|S|-1} \prod_{\substack{k \in \{1, \dots, K+1\} \\ -\{k_0\} - S}} (v^{(k)}) \prod_{t \in S} (u^{(t,1)}b^{(1)} + u^{(t,2)}b^{(2)}) \pmod{q}.$$

It is modular sum of two terms, decoded message and decoded noise. Decoded message is

$$h(1+ag)^K g^{-1} \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)} \pmod{q}.$$

Decoded noise is

$$hv^{(k_0)} \sum_{\substack{S \subset \{1, \dots, K+1\} \\ -\{k_0\}, |S| \geq 1}} (1+ag)^{K-|S|} g^{|S|-1} \prod_{\substack{k \in \{1, \dots, K+1\} \\ -\{k_0\} - S}} (v^{(k)}) \prod_{t \in S} (u^{(t,1)}b^{(1)} + u^{(t,2)}b^{(2)}).$$

Notice that decoded noise is the sum of $3^K - 1$ terms. For example, $h(1+ag)^{K-1}b^{(1)}u^{(1,1)} \prod_{k=2}^{K+1} (v^{(k)})$ is a term of the decoded noise. Each term is the product of a “somewhat small” element and several “very small” elements. Therefore decoded noise is “somewhat small”, and it can be removed if we only extract high-order bits of $v^{(k_0)} p_{zt} \prod_{k \neq k_0} V^{(k)} \pmod{q}$. In other words, *KEY* actually is high-order bits of decoded message $h(1+ag)^K g^{-1} \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)} \pmod{q}$.

2.4 Application 2: the Instance of WE on 3-Exact Cover

3-Exact Cover Problem [3, 21] If we are given a subset of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$ including 3 integers, we call it a piece. If we are given a collection of K pieces without intersection, we call it a 3-exact cover of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$. The 3-exact cover problem is that, for randomly given $N(K)$ different pieces with a hidden 3-exact cover, find it. It is clear that $1 \leq N(K) \leq C_{3K}^3$. If $N(K) = O(K)$, the 3-exact cover problem is not hard. In this case we can efficiently use subtraction, that is, exclude those pieces which are not included in any 3-exact cover. Generally we take $N(K) = O(K^2)$ to make 3-exact cover problem hard enough.

Encryption The encrypter samples short elements $v^{(1)}, v^{(2)}, \dots, v^{(3K)} \in R$. He computes the encryption key as the follow. He first computes $v^{(1)}v^{(2)} \dots v^{(3K)} y^K p_{zt} \pmod{q}$, then takes *EKEY* as its high-order bits. In fact, *EKEY* is high-order bits of $v^{(1)}v^{(2)} \dots v^{(3K)} (1+ag)^K h g^{-1} \pmod{q}$. He can uses *EKEY* and an encryption algorithm to encrypt any plaintext. Then he hides *EKEY* into pieces as follows. He randomly generates $N(K)$ different pieces of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$, with a hidden 3-exact cover called *EC*. For each piece $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ he computes noised encoding of the product $v^{(i_1)}v^{(i_2)}v^{(i_3)}$, that is, secretly samples short elements $\{u^{\{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}, i\}} \in R, i = 1, 2\}$, then computes and publishes $V^{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}} = v^{(i_1)}v^{(i_2)}v^{(i_3)}y + (u^{\{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}, 1\}}x^{(1)} + u^{\{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}, 2\}}x^{(2)}) \pmod{q}$.

Decryption The one who knows *EC* computes the decoding of $\prod_{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \in EC}$

$V^{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}}(\bmod q)$, that is, he computes $p_{zt} \prod_{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \in EC} V^{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}}(\bmod q)$. Then $EKEY$ is its high-order bits. In other words, $p_{zt} \prod_{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \in EC} V^{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}}(\bmod q)$ is modular sum of two terms, the first term is decoded message $v^{(1)}v^{(2)} \dots v^{(3K)}(1+ag)^K h g^{-1} (\bmod q)$, while the second term is decoded noise which doesn't affect high-order bits of $p_{zt} \prod_{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \in EC} V^{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}}(\bmod q)$.

3 Weak-DL Attack: Generating Equivalent Secrets

Table 1 is a comparison between processing routines of GGH map and our work. It is a note of our claim that we can achieve same purpose without knowing the secret of any user.

Table 1. Processing routines

GGH map	secrets \rightarrow encodings \rightarrow product \rightarrow decoding \rightarrow high-order bits
Our work	equivalent secrets \rightarrow product \rightarrow modified encoding/decoding \rightarrow high-order bits

As the start of our attack, we will find equivalent secrets. The method is weak-DL attack [2].

3.1 Generating an Equivalent Secret for One User

We can obtain special decodings $\{Y, X^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$, where

$$\begin{aligned} Y &= y^{K-1} x^{(1)} p_{zt}(\bmod q) = h(1+ag)^{K-1} b^{(1)}, \\ X^{(i)} &= y^{K-2} x^{(i)} x^{(1)} p_{zt}(\bmod q) = h(1+ag)^{K-2} (b^{(i)} g) b^{(1)}, \\ &i = 1, 2. \end{aligned}$$

Notice that right sides of these equations have no operation “mod q ”. More precisely, each of $\{Y, X^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$ is a factor of a term of decoded noise. For example, $Y u^{(1,1)} \prod_{k=2}^{K+1} (v^{(k)})$ is a term of the decoded noise. Therefore each of $\{Y, X^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$ is far smaller than a term of the decoded noise. However, they are not small enough because of the factor h . We say they are “somewhat small”, and take them as our tools.

Take the noised encoding V (corresponding to the secret v and unknown $\{u^{(1)}, u^{(2)}\}$), and compute special decoding

$$W = V y^{K-2} x^{(1)} p_{zt}(\bmod q) = vY + (u^{(1)} X^{(1)} + u^{(2)} X^{(2)}).$$

Notice that right side of this equation has no operation “mod q ”. Then compute

$$W(\bmod Y) = (u^{(1)} X^{(1)}(\bmod Y) + u^{(2)} X^{(2)}(\bmod Y))(\bmod Y).$$

Step 1 By knowing $W \pmod{Y}$ and $\{X^{(1)} \pmod{Y}, X^{(2)} \pmod{Y}\}$, obtain $W' \in \langle X^{(i)}, i = 1, 2 \rangle$ such that $W - W' \pmod{Y} = 0$. This is quite an easy algebra, and we present the detail in Appendix A. Notice that $W - W'$ is not a short vector. Denote $W' = u^{(1)}X^{(1)} + u^{(2)}X^{(2)}$.

Step 2 Compute $v^{(0)} = (W - W')/Y$ (division over the real numbers, with the quotient which is an integer vector). Then

$$\begin{aligned} v^{(0)} &= v + ((u^{(1)}X^{(1)} + u^{(2)}X^{(2)}) - W')/Y \\ &= v + ((u^{(1)} - u'^{(1)})X^{(1)} + (u^{(2)} - u'^{(2)})X^{(2)})/Y \\ &= v + ((u^{(1)} - u'^{(1)})b^{(1)} + (u^{(2)} - u'^{(2)})b^{(2)})g/(1 + ag). \end{aligned}$$

By considering another fact that g and $1 + ag$ are coprime, we have $v^{(0)} - v \in \langle g \rangle$. We call $v^{(0)}$ an equivalent secret of v , and call residual vector $v^{(0)} - v$ the noise. Notice that $v^{(0)}$ is not a short vector.

3.2 Generating an ‘‘Equivalent Secret’’ for the Product of Secrets

Suppose that each user k has his secret $v^{(k)}$, and we generate $v^{(0,k)}$, an equivalent secret of $v^{(k)}$, where $k = 1, \dots, K + 1$. For the product $\prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)}$, we have an ‘‘equivalent secret’’ $\prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(0,k)}$, where the noise is $\prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(0,k)} - \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)} \in \langle g \rangle$. Notice that $\prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(0,k)}$ is not a short vector.

4 Modified Encoding/Decoding

In this section we transform $\prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(0,k)}$ by our modified encoding/decoding. The procedure has three steps, which are multiplication by Y , mod $X^{(1)}$ operation, and mod q multiplication by $y(x^{(1)})^{-1}$ (or by $Y(X^{(1)})^{-1}$). Denote $\eta = \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(0,k)}$. Then $\eta = \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)} + \xi g$, where $\xi \in R$.

Step 1 Compute $\eta' = Y\eta$. By noticing that Y is a multiple of $b^{(1)}$, we have a fact that $\eta' = Y \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)} + \xi' b^{(1)} g$, where $\xi' \in R$.

Step 2 Compute $\eta'' = \eta' \pmod{X^{(1)}}$. There are 3 facts as follows.

- (1) $\eta'' = Y \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)} + \xi'' b^{(1)} g$, where $\xi'' \in R$. Notice that η'' is the sum of η' and a multiple of $X^{(1)}$, and that $X^{(1)}$ is a multiple of $b^{(1)}g$.
- (2) η'' has the size similar to that of $\sqrt{n}X^{(1)}$. In other words, η'' is smaller than one term of decoded noise. Notice standard deviations for sampling various variables.
- (3) $Y \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)}$ has the size similar to that of one term of decoded noise.

Above 3 facts result in a new fact that $\xi'' b^{(1)} g = \eta'' - Y \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)}$ has the size similar to that of one term of decoded noise.

Step 3 Compute $\eta''' = y(x^{(1)})^{-1} \eta'' \pmod{q}$. There are 3 facts as follows.

- (1) $\eta''' = (h(1 + ag)^K g^{-1}) \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)} + \xi'''(1 + ag) \pmod{q}$. Notice fact (1) of Step 2, and notice the definitions of Y and $X^{(1)}$.

- (2) $\xi''(1+ag)$ has the size similar to that of one term of decoded noise. In other words, $\xi''(1+ag)$ is smaller than decoded noise. This fact is clear by noticing that $\xi''b^{(1)}g$ has the size similar to that of one term of decoded noise, and by noticing that $1+ag$ and $b^{(1)}g$ have similar size.
- (3) $(h(1+ag)^K g^{-1}) \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k)} \pmod{q}$ is decoded message, therefore its high-order bits are what we want to obtain.

Above 3 facts result in a new fact that η''' is modular sum of decoded message and a new decoded noise which is smaller than original decoded noise. Therefore high-order bits of η''' are what we want to obtain. MKE has been broken. More important is that K -GMDDH assumption (Assumption 5.1 of [11]) is negated.

5 Breaking the Instance of WE Based on the Hardness of 3-Exact Cover Problem with Public Tools of Encoding

Our modified encoding/decoding can not directly break the instance of WE based on the hardness of 3-exact cover problem, because the 3-exact cover is hidden. In this section we show that special structure of GGH map can simplify the 3-exact cover problem into a combined 3-exact cover problem, then show how to use a combined exact cover to break the instance under the condition that low-level encodings of zero are made publicly available.

5.1 Combined 3-Exact Cover Problem: Definition and Solution

Suppose we are given $N(K) = O(K^2)$ different pieces of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$. A subset $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$ is called a combined piece, if

- (1) $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ is not a piece;
- (2) $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} = \{j_1, j_2, j_3\} \cup \{k_1, k_2, k_3\} - \{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$;
- (3) $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$, $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ and $\{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$ are pieces.

(Then $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ and $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ don't intersect, and $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\} \cup \{k_1, k_2, k_3\} \supset \{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$).

A subset $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$ is called a second-order combined piece, if

- (1) $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ is neither a piece nor a combined piece;
- (2) $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} = \{j_1, j_2, j_3\} \cup \{k_1, k_2, k_3\} - \{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$;
- (3) $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$, $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ and $\{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$ are pieces or combined pieces.

K pieces or combined pieces or second-order combined pieces without intersection are called a combined 3-exact cover of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$. The combined 3-exact cover problem is that, for randomly given $N(K) = O(K^2)$ different pieces, find a combined 3-exact cover. More specifically, we take $N(K) = K^2$ without loss of generality. We will show that the combined 3-exact cover problem is never hard.

Obtaining Combined Pieces Suppose that K^2 pieces are sufficiently random

distributed, and in them there is a hidden 3-exact cover. We take $P(E)$ as the probability of the event E , and $P(E|E')$ as the conditional probability of E under the condition E' . Arbitrarily take a subset $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ which is not a piece. In Appendix B we show that $P(\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}) \approx e^{-2}$. Now we construct all combined pieces from K^2 pieces, then we have a result: there are about $(1 - e^{-2})C_{3K}^3$ different subsets of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$, each including 3 elements, which are pieces or combined pieces.

Obtaining Second-Order Combined Pieces There are about $e^{-2}C_{3K}^3$ different subsets of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$, each including 3 elements, which are neither pieces nor combined pieces. Arbitrarily take one subset $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ from them. By similar deduction procedure to Appendix B, we can show that $P(\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a second-order combined piece})$ is negatively exponential in K . Now we construct all second-order combined pieces from $(1 - e^{-2})C_{3K}^3$ pieces or combined pieces, then we are almost sure to have a result: all C_{3K}^3 different subsets of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$, each including 3 elements, are pieces or combined pieces or second-order combined pieces. Therefore the combined 3-exact cover problem is solved.

5.2 Positive/Negative Factors

Definition 1. *Take a fixed combined 3-exact cover. Take an element $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ of this combined 3-exact cover.*

- (1) *If $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ is a piece, we count it as a positive factor.*
- (2) *If $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ is a combined piece, $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} = \{j_1, j_2, j_3\} \cup \{k_1, k_2, k_3\} - \{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$, we count pieces $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ and $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ as positive factors, and count the piece $\{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$ as a negative factor.*
- (3) *Suppose $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ is a second-order combined piece, $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} = \{j_1, j_2, j_3\} \cup \{k_1, k_2, k_3\} - \{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$, where $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$, $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ and $\{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$ are pieces or combined pieces.*
 - (3.1) *If $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ is a piece, we count it as a positive factor; if $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ is a combined piece, we count 2 positive factors corresponding to it as positive factors, and the negative factor corresponding to it as a negative factor.*
 - (3.2) *Similarly, if $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ is a piece, we count it as a positive factor; if $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ is a combined piece, we count 2 positive factors corresponding to it as positive factors, and the negative factor corresponding to it as a negative factor.*
 - (3.3) *Oppositely, if $\{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$ is a piece, we count it as a negative factor; if $\{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$ is a combined piece, we count 2 positive factors corresponding to it as negative factors, and the negative factor corresponding to it as a positive factor.*

Positive and negative factors are pieces. All positive factors form a collection, and all negative factors form another collection (notice that we use the

terminology “collection” rather than “set”, because it is possible that one piece is counted several times). Take CPF as the collection of positive factors, NPF as the number of positive factors. Take CNF as the collection of negative factors, NNF as the number of negative factors. Notice that some pieces may be counted repeatedly. It is easy to see that $NPF - NNF = K$. On the other hand, from C_{3K}^3 different subsets of $\{1, 2, \dots, 3K\}$, there are K^2 different pieces, about $(1 - e^{-2})C_{3K}^3 - K^2$ different combined pieces, and about $e^{-2}C_{3K}^3$ different second-order combined pieces. Each piece is a positive factor, each combined piece is attached by 2 positive factors and a negative factor, each second-order combined piece is attached by at most 5 positive factors and 4 negative factors. Therefore, for a randomly chosen combined 3-exact cover, it is almost sure that $NPF \leq 3K$, resulting in $NNF \leq 2K$.

5.3 Our Construction

Randomly take a combined 3-exact cover. Obtain CPF , the collection of positive factors, and CNF , the collection of negative factors. For a positive factor $pf = \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$, we denote $v^{(pf)} = v^{(i_1)}v^{(i_2)}v^{(i_3)}$ as the secret of pf , and $v'^{(pf)}$ as the equivalent secret of $v^{(pf)}$ obtained in subsection 3.1. Similarly we denote $v^{(nf)}$ and $v'^{(nf)}$ for a negative factor nf . Denote $PPF = \prod_{pf \in CPF} v'^{(pf)}$ as the product of equivalent secrets of all positive factors. Denote $PNF = \prod_{nf \in CNF} v'^{(nf)}$ as the product of equivalent secrets of all negative factors. Denote $PTS = \prod_{k=1}^{3K} v^{(k)}$ as the product of true secrets. The first clear equation is $\prod_{pf \in CPF} v^{(pf)} = PTS \times \prod_{nf \in CNF} v^{(nf)}$. Then we have

Proposition 1

- (1) $PPF - \prod_{pf \in CPF} v^{(pf)} \in \langle g \rangle$.
- (2) $PNF - \prod_{nf \in CNF} v^{(nf)} \in \langle g \rangle$.
- (3) $PPF - PNF \times PTS \in \langle g \rangle$.

Proof. By considering subsection 3.1, we know that

- (1) $PPF = \prod_{pf \in CPF} v^{(pf)} + \beta_{PF}$, where $\beta_{PF} \in \langle g \rangle$.
- (2) $PNF = \prod_{nf \in CNF} v^{(nf)} + \beta_{NF}$, where $\beta_{NF} \in \langle g \rangle$.

On the other hand, (3) is true from

$$\prod_{pf \in CPF} v^{(pf)} = PTS \times \prod_{nf \in CNF} v^{(nf)}.$$

Proposition 1 is proved. \square

Maybe it is hoped to solve PTS . However, we can not filter off β_{PF} and β_{NF} , because no “good” description of $\langle g \rangle$ is made public. Fortunately we don’t need to solve PTS for breaking the instance. We only need to find an equivalent secret of PTS , without caring the size of the equivalent secret. Then we can filter decoded noise much smaller by our modified encoding/decoding. Proposition 2 describes the shape of the equivalent secret of PTS , under an assumption.

Proposition 2

- (1) If PTS' is an equivalent secret of PTS , then $PPF - PNF \times PTS' \in \langle g \rangle$.
- (2) Assume that PNF and g are coprime. If $PPF - PNF \times PTS' \in \langle g \rangle$, then PTS' is an equivalent secret of PTS .

Proof. (1) is clear by considering (3) of Proposition 1. If $PPF - PNF \times PTS' \in \langle g \rangle$, then $PNF \times (PTS' - PTS) \in \langle g \rangle$. According to our assumption, we have $(PTS' - PTS) \in \langle g \rangle$, (2) is proved. \square

Now we want to find an equivalent secret of PTS . Under our assumption, we only need to find a vector $PTS' \in R$ such that $PPF - PNF \times PTS' \in \langle g \rangle$, without caring the size of PTS' . To do so we only need to obtain “bad” description of $\langle g \rangle$. That is, we only need to obtain a public basis of the lattice $\langle g \rangle$, for example, Hermite normal form. This is not a difficult task, and in Appendix C we will present our method for doing so. After obtaining a public basis G , the condition $PPF - PNF \times PTS' \in \langle g \rangle$ is transformed into an equivalent condition

$$PPF \times G^{-1} - PTS' \times \overline{PNF} \times G^{-1} \in R,$$

where G^{-1} is the inverse matrix of G , and

$$\overline{PNF} = \begin{bmatrix} PNF_0 & PNF_1 & \cdots & PNF_{n-1} \\ -PNF_{n-1} & PNF_0 & \cdots & PNF_{n-2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -PNF_1 & -PNF_2 & \cdots & PNF_0 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Take each entry of $PPF \times G^{-1}$ and $\overline{PNF} \times G^{-1}$ as the form of reduced fraction, and take lcm as the least common multiple of all denominators, then the condition is transformed into another equivalent condition

$$\begin{aligned} & (lcm \times PPF \times G^{-1})(\text{mod } lcm) \\ & = PTS' \times (lcm \times \overline{PNF} \times G^{-1})(\text{mod } lcm). \end{aligned}$$

This is a linear equation modular lcm , and it is easy to obtain a solution PTS' . After that we take our modified encoding/decoding, just same as in section 4. Denote $\eta = PTS'$. Compute $\eta' = Y\eta$. Compute $\eta'' = \eta'(\text{mod } X^{(1)})$. Compute $\eta''' = y(x^{(1)})^{-1}\eta''(\text{mod } q)$. Then high-order bits of η''' are what we want to obtain. The instance has been broken.

A question left is whether the assumption “ PNF and g are coprime” is a nonnegligible case. It means that g and each factor of PNF are coprime. The answer is seemingly yes. A test which we haven't made is that we take two different combined 3-exact covers, so that we obtain two different values of PNF . If they finally get same high-order bits of η''' , we can believe the assumption true for two values of PNF .

6 Breaking the Instance of WE Based on the Hardness of 3-Exact Cover Problem with Hidden Tools of Encoding

6.1 Preparing Work (1): Finding Level-2 Encodings of 0

Take two pieces $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ and $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ which do not intersect. From other pieces randomly choose two pieces $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ and $\{l_1, l_2, l_3\}$, then the probability that $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\} \cup \{l_1, l_2, l_3\} = \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \cup \{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ is about $\frac{1}{C_{3K}^6}$, which is polynomially small. From all of $N(K) = O(K^2)$ pieces, we construct all sets of 4 pieces, and we estimate average number of such sets of 4 pieces $\{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}, \{j_1, j_2, j_3\}, \{k_1, k_2, k_3\}, \{l_1, l_2, l_3\}\}$ that $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ and $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ do not intersect, and $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\} \cup \{l_1, l_2, l_3\} = \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \cup \{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$. This number is of the order of magnitude $\frac{C_{3K}^{4O(K^2)}}{C_{3K}^6}$, meaning that we have “many” such sets. Take one of such sets $\{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}, \{j_1, j_2, j_3\}, \{k_1, k_2, k_3\}, \{l_1, l_2, l_3\}\}$ and corresponding encodings $\{V^{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}}, V^{\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}}, V^{\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}}, V^{\{l_1, l_2, l_3\}}\}$, then

$$(V^{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}}V^{\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}} - V^{\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}}V^{\{l_1, l_2, l_3\}})(\text{mod } q) = ugz^{-2}(\text{mod } q),$$

where u is very small. We call it a level-2 encoding of 0. According to the statement above, we have “many” level-2 encodings of 0. Here we fix and remember one such encoding of 0, and call it V^* . Correspondingly we fix and remember u .

6.2 Preparing Work (2): Supplement and Division

Take a combined 3-exact cover. Obtain CPF and CNF , collections of positive and negative factors. Suppose $NPF < 2K - 2$ (Therefore $NNF = NPF - K < K - 2$. It is easy to see that this case is nonnegligible). Take a piece $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$, and supplement it $2K - NPF$ times into CPF , so that we have new $NPF = 2K$. Similarly, supplement such piece $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ $K - NNF = 2K - NPF$ times into CNF , so that we have new $NNF = K$. We fix and remember the piece $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$.

Then we divide the collection CPF into two subcollections, $CPF(1)$ and $CPF(2)$, where

- (1) $\|CPF(1)\| = \|CPF(2)\| = K$. That is, $CPF(1)$ and $CPF(2)$ have equal size.
- (2) $CPF(2)$ includes $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ at least twice.
- (3) $CPF(1)$ includes two pieces $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ and $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ which do not intersect. We fix and remember these two pieces $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ and $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$.

The purpose of such supplement and division is the convenience for level- K decoding.

6.3 Preparing Work (3): Constructing the Equation

We have fixed and remembered five elements: V^* (a level-2 encoding of 0), u ($V^* = uz^{-2} \pmod{q}$), $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ (a piece included by $CPF(2)$ at least twice), $\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}$ and $\{k_1, k_2, k_3\}$ (they are from $CPF(1)$, and do not intersect each other). Now we define four elements as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} Dec(P(1)) &= p_{zt}V^* \prod_{pf \in CPF(1) - \{\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}, \{k_1, k_2, k_3\}\}} V^{(pf)} \pmod{q}, \\ Dec(P(2)) &= p_{zt}V^* \prod_{pf \in CPF(2) - \{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}, \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}\}} V^{(pf)} \pmod{q}, \\ Dec(N) &= p_{zt}V^* \prod_{nf \in CNF - \{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}, \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}\}} V^{(nf)} \pmod{q}, \\ Dec(Original) &= hV^*g^{-1}z^2 \prod_{k \in \{1, \dots, 3K\} - \{j_1, j_2, j_3, k_1, k_2, k_3\}} v^{(k)} \pmod{q}. \end{aligned}$$

We can rewrite $Dec(P(1))$, $Dec(P(2))$, $Dec(N)$, $Dec(Original)$, as follows.

$$\begin{aligned} Dec(P(1)) &= hu \prod_{pf \in CPF(1) - \{\{j_1, j_2, j_3\}, \{k_1, k_2, k_3\}\}} (v^{(pf)} + u^{(pf,1)}x^{(1)} + u^{(pf,2)}x^{(2)}), \\ Dec(P(2)) &= hu \prod_{pf \in CPF(2) - \{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}, \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}\}} (v^{(pf)} + u^{(pf,1)}x^{(1)} + u^{(pf,2)}x^{(2)}), \\ Dec(N) &= hu \prod_{nf \in CNF - \{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}, \{i_1, i_2, i_3\}\}} (v^{(nf)} + u^{(nf,1)}x^{(1)} + u^{(nf,2)}x^{(2)}), \\ Dec(Original) &= hu \prod_{k \in \{1, \dots, 3K\} - \{j_1, j_2, j_3, k_1, k_2, k_3\}} v^{(k)}. \end{aligned}$$

Four facts about $\{Dec(P(1)), Dec(P(2)), Dec(N), Dec(Original)\}$ are as follows.

- (1) They are all somewhat small.
- (2) $Dec(P(1))$, $Dec(P(2))$, $Dec(N)$ can be obtained, while $Dec(Original)$ can not.
- (3) We have the equation

$$Dec(P(1)) \times Dec(P(2)) - Dec(N) \times Dec(Original) \in \langle (hu)^2g \rangle.$$

This equation is clear by considering encoding procedure and definitions of $\{Dec(P(1)), Dec(P(2)), Dec(N), Dec(Original)\}$.

- (4) Conversely, suppose there is $D' \in \langle (hu)^2g \rangle$ such that

$$\frac{Dec(P(1)) \times Dec(P(2)) - D'}{Dec(N)} \in R.$$

Then $\frac{Dec(P(1)) \times Dec(P(2)) - D'}{Dec(N)}$ is the sum of $Dec(Original)$ and an element of $\langle hug \rangle$. Here we use a small assumption that $\frac{Dec(N)}{(hu)}$ and (hu) are coprime,

which is nonnegligible. In other words, if we can obtain such D' , we can obtain “an equivalent secret” of $Dec(Original)$, although such “equivalent secret” is not small.

6.4 Solving the Equation: Finding “An Equivalent Secret”

We want to obtain “an equivalent secret” of $Dec(Original)$, without caring the size. To do so we only need to find $D' \in \langle (hu)^2g \rangle$ such that $\frac{Dec(P(1)) \times Dec(P(2)) - D'}{Dec(N)} \in R$. In other words, we only need to find $D' \in \langle (hu)^2g \rangle$ such that

$$Dec(P(1)) \times Dec(P(2)) \equiv D' \pmod{Dec(N)}.$$

Such D' certainly exists. So that, if we can generate any element of $\langle (hu)^2g \rangle$, finding D' is quite an easy algebra, as in Appendix A. More specifically, if we can obtain a basis of the lattice $\langle (hu)^2g \rangle$ (Of course a “bad” basis), we can easily obtain such a D' . A weaker requirement is that, if we can obtain a generalized basis (a group of vectors by which any element of $\langle (hu)^2g \rangle$ can be integer-linearly expressed, although the expression may not be unique), we can easily obtain such a D' . Arbitrarily take $K-4$ pieces $\{piece(1), piece(2), \dots, piece(K-4)\}$, without caring whether they are repeated. Then

$$p_{zt}(V^*)^2 \prod_{k=1}^{K-4} V^{(piece(k))} \pmod{q} = (hu)^2g \prod_{k=1}^{K-4} (v^{(piece(k))} + u^{(piece(k),1)}x^{(1)} + u^{(piece(k),2)}x^{(2)}) \in \langle (hu)^2g \rangle.$$

So many elements of $\langle (hu)^2g \rangle$ imply that finding a D' may be easy, therefore “an equivalent secret” of $Dec(Original)$ may be easy to be obtained.

6.5 Filtering the Decoded Noise Much Smaller

Suppose we have obtained “an equivalent secret” of $Dec(Original)$, and we call it V^{**} . V^{**} is the sum of $Dec(Original)$ and an element of $\langle (hu)^2g \rangle$, and V^{**} is not small. Arbitrarily take an element of $\langle (hu)^2g \rangle$ which is somewhat small, and call it V^{***} . Compute $V^{****} = V^{**} \pmod{V^{***}}$. Two facts about V^{****} are as follows.

- (1) $V^{****} = Dec(Original) + V^{*****}$, where $V^{*****} \in \langle (hu)^2g \rangle$.
- (2) Both V^{****} and $Dec(Original)$ are somewhat small, so that V^{*****} is somewhat small.

Then compute

$$V^{*****} = V^{****} V^{(j_1, j_2, j_3)} V^{(k_1, k_2, k_3)} (V^*)^{-1} \pmod{q} =$$

$$\left[\left(Dec(Original) \times V^{(j_1, j_2, j_3)} V^{(k_1, k_2, k_3)} (V^*)^{-1} \right) + \left(V^{*****} \times V^{(j_1, j_2, j_3)} V^{(k_1, k_2, k_3)} (V^*)^{-1} \right) \right] \pmod{q}.$$

Two facts about V^{*****} are as follows.

(1)

$$\begin{aligned}
& \left(Dec(Original) \times V^{(j_1, j_2, j_3)} V^{(k_1, k_2, k_3)} (V^*)^{-1} \right) \pmod{q} \\
&= hg^{-1} V^{(j_1, j_2, j_3)} V^{(k_1, k_2, k_3)} z^2 \prod_{k \in \{1, \dots, 3K\} - \{j_1, j_2, j_3, k_1, k_2, k_3\}} v^{(k)} \\
&= hg^{-1} \left((v^{(j_1, j_2, j_3)} + u^{((j_1, j_2, j_3), 1)} x^{(1)} + u^{((j_1, j_2, j_3), 2)} x^{(2)}) \right. \\
&\quad \left. (v^{(k_1, k_2, k_3)} + u^{((k_1, k_2, k_3), 1)} x^{(1)} + u^{((k_1, k_2, k_3), 2)} x^{(2)}) \right) \prod_{k \in \{1, \dots, 3K\} - \{j_1, j_2, j_3, k_1, k_2, k_3\}} v^{(k)}
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore its high-order bits are the secret key.

(2) $\left(V^{*****} \times V^{(j_1, j_2, j_3)} V^{(k_1, k_2, k_3)} (V^*)^{-1} \right) \pmod{q}$ is somewhat small.

These two facts mean that high-order bits of V^{*****} are the secret key. The instance has been broken.

6.6 A Note

We have assumed that original $NPF < 2K - 2$, and have supplemented pieces to make new $NPF = 2K$. In fact, we can assume that original $NPF < 3K - 2$, and supplement pieces to make new $NPF = 3K$. In this case, we can still break the instance, but our attack will be a little more complicated.

7 Cryptanalysis of a Simple Revision of GGH Map

7.1 A Simple Revision of GGH Map and Corresponding MKE

All parameters of GGH map are reserved, except that we change encoding parameter y into encoding parameters $\{y^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$, and accordingly we change Level- K zero-testing parameter p_{zt} into Level- K zero-testing parameters $\{p_{zt}^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$. Our encoding parameters are $\{y^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$, where $y^{(i)} = (y^{(0, i)} + a^{(i)} g) z^{-1} \pmod{q}$, $\{y^{(0, i)}, a^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$ are very small, and are kept secret. We can see that $\{y^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$ are encodings of secret elements $\{y^{(0, i)}, i = 1, 2\}$, rather than encodings of 1. Accordingly our level- K zero-testing parameters are $\{p_{zt}^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$, where $p_{zt}^{(i)} = hy^{(0, i)} z^K g^{-1} \pmod{q}$.

Suppose a user has a secret $(v^{(1)}, v^{(2)}) \in R^2$, where $v^{(1)}$ and $v^{(2)}$ are short elements. He secretly samples short elements $\{u^{(i)} \in R, i = 1, 2\}$. He computes noised encoding $V = (v^{(1)} y^{(1)} + v^{(2)} y^{(2)}) + (u^{(1)} x^{(1)} + u^{(2)} x^{(2)}) \pmod{q}$. He publishes V . Then the revision of GGH map includes K , $\{y^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$, $\{x^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$, $\{p_{zt}^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$, and all noised encoding V for all users. To guarantee our attack work, we assume that 2^K is polynomially large.

Suppose that $K + 1$ users want to generate KEY , a common shared key by public discussion. To do so, each user k generates his secret $(v^{(k, 1)}, v^{(k, 2)})$, and publishes the noised encoding $V^{(k)}$, $k = 1, \dots, K + 1$. Then each user can use his

secret and other users' noised encodings to compute KEY , the common shared key. For example, user k_0 first computes $(v^{(k_0,1)}p_{zt}^{(1)} + v^{(k_0,2)}p_{zt}^{(2)}) \prod_{k \neq k_0} V^{(k)}(\text{mod } q)$, then takes KEY as its high-order bits. It is easy to see that

$$(v^{(k_0,1)}p_{zt}^{(1)} + v^{(k_0,2)}p_{zt}^{(2)}) \prod_{k \neq k_0} V^{(k)}(\text{mod } q) = (A + B^{(k_0)})(\text{mod } q),$$

such that

$$A = hg^{-1} \sum_{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1}) \in \{1,2\}^{K+1}} v^{(K+1, j_{K+1})} y^{(0, j_{K+1})} \prod_{k=1}^K v^{(k, j_k)} (y^{(0, j_k)} + a^{(j_k)} g)(\text{mod } q),$$

which has no relation with user k_0 ; $B^{(k_0)}$ is the sum of several terms which are somewhat small. If related parameters are small enough, KEY is high-order bits of $A(\text{mod } q)$.

7.2 Generating "Equivalent Secret"

For the secret $(v^{(1)}, v^{(2)}) \in R^2$, we construct "equivalent secret $(v'^{(1)}, v'^{(2)}) \in R^2$ ", such that

$$(v^{(1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g) + v^{(2)}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)) - (v'^{(1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g) + v'^{(2)}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g))$$

is a multiple of g . An equivalent requirement is that $(v^{(1)}y^{(0,1)} + v^{(2)}y^{(0,2)}) - (v'^{(1)}y^{(0,1)} + v'^{(2)}y^{(0,2)})$ is a multiple of g . That is enough, and we do not need $(v'^{(1)}, v'^{(2)})$ small. Take V , the noised encoding of $(v^{(1)}, v^{(2)})$, we compute special decoding

$$\begin{aligned} W^* = V(y^{(1)})^{K-2} x^{(1)} p_{zt}^{(1)}(\text{mod } q) &= hy^{(0,1)} [v^{(1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-1} b^{(1)} \\ &\quad + v^{(2)}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2} b^{(1)} \\ &\quad + u^{(1)}(b^{(1)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2} b^{(1)} \\ &\quad + u^{(2)}(b^{(2)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2} b^{(1)}]. \end{aligned}$$

Notice that

- (1) Right side of this equation has no operation "mod q ", therefore W^* is somewhat small.
- (2) Four vectors $hy^{(0,1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-1} b^{(1)}$, $hy^{(0,1)}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2} b^{(1)}$, $hy^{(0,1)}(b^{(1)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2} b^{(1)}$ and $hy^{(0,1)}(b^{(2)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2} b^{(1)}$ can be obtained.

Now we start to find $(v'^{(1)}, v'^{(2)})$. First, compute $W^*(\text{mod } hy^{(0,1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-1} b^{(1)})$. Second, compute $\{v'^{(2)}, u'^{(1)}, u'^{(2)}\}$ such that

$$\begin{aligned} W^*(\text{mod } h y^{(0,1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-1} b^{(1)}) &= \\ h y^{(0,1)} [v'^{(2)}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2} b^{(1)} + \end{aligned}$$

$$u^{(1)}(b^{(1)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2}b^{(1)} + \\ u^{(2)}(b^{(2)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2}b^{(1)} \pmod{hy^{(0,1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-1}b^{(1)}}.$$

Solving this modular equation is quite an easy algebra, as in Appendix A. Solutions are not unique, therefore $\{v^{(2)}, u^{(1)}, u^{(2)}\} \neq \{v^{(2)}, u^{(1)}, u^{(2)}\}$. Third, compute $v^{(1)}$ such that

$$W^* = hy^{(0,1)}[v^{(1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-1}b^{(1)} \\ + v^{(2)}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2}b^{(1)} \\ + u^{(1)}(b^{(1)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2}b^{(1)} \\ + u^{(2)}(b^{(2)}g)(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{K-2}b^{(1)}],$$

which is another easy algebra. Finally we obtain $(v^{(1)}, v^{(2)})$, and can easily check that $(v^{(1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g) + v^{(2)}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)) - (v^{(1)}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g) + v^{(2)}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g))$ is a multiple of g , although $v^{(1)}$ and $v^{(2)}$ are not small.

7.3 Generalization of Modified Encoding/Decoding: Our Attack on MKE

Suppose $K + 1$ users hide $(v^{(k,1)}, v^{(k,2)})$ and publish $V^{(k)}, k = 1, \dots, K + 1$, and for each user k we have obtained equivalent secret $(v^{(k,1)}, v^{(k,2)})$. For each “ $K + 1$ -dimensional boolean vector” $(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1}) \in \{1, 2\}^{K+1}$, we define two products

$$v^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} = \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v^{(k, j_k)}, \\ v'^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} = \prod_{k=1}^{K+1} v'^{(k, j_k)}.$$

$v^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}$ is clearly smaller than “somewhat small”, because it is only a factor of a term of the decoded noise. $v'^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}$ is not small. $v^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}$ can not be obtained, while $v'^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}$ can. Suppose former K entries $\{j_1, \dots, j_{K+1}\}$ include N_1 1s and N_2 2s, $N_1 + N_2 = K$. We define the supporter $s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}$ as the follow.

$$s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} = hy^{(0, j_{K+1})}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{N_1-1}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)^{N_2}b^{(1)} \quad \text{for } N_1 \geq N_2,$$

$$s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} = hy^{(0, j_{K+1})}(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)^{N_1}(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)^{N_2-1}b^{(1)} \quad \text{for } N_1 < N_2.$$

$s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}$ can be obtained. If $N_1 \geq N_2$, $s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} = p_{zt}^{j_{K+1}}(y^{(1)})^{N_1-1}(y^{(2)})^{N_2}x^{(1)} \pmod{q}$, and if $N_1 < N_2$, $s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} = p_{zt}^{j_{K+1}}(y^{(1)})^{N_1}(y^{(2)})^{N_2-1}x^{(1)} \pmod{q}$. $s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}$ is somewhat small. Then we denote

$$V^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} = \sum_{j_{K+1}=1}^2 \sum_{N_1 \geq N_2} v^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})},$$

$$\begin{aligned}
V^{(N_1 < N_2)} &= \sum_{j_{K+1}=1}^2 \sum_{N_1 < N_2} v^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}, \\
V'^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} &= \sum_{j_{K+1}=1}^2 \sum_{N_1 \geq N_2} v'^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}, \\
V'^{(N_1 < N_2)} &= \sum_{j_{K+1}=1}^2 \sum_{N_1 < N_2} v'^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})} s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}.
\end{aligned}$$

$V^{(N_1 \geq N_2)}$ and $V^{(N_1 < N_2)}$ are somewhat small, while $V'^{(N_1 \geq N_2)}$ and $V'^{(N_1 < N_2)}$ are not small. $V^{(N_1 \geq N_2)}$ and $V^{(N_1 < N_2)}$ can not be obtained, while $V'^{(N_1 \geq N_2)}$ and $V'^{(N_1 < N_2)}$ can be obtained under the assumption that 2^K is polynomially large. Another fact is that ξ^* is a multiple of $b^{(1)}g$, where

$$\xi^* = (y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)(V'^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} - V^{(N_1 \geq N_2)}) + (y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)(V'^{(N_1 < N_2)} - V^{(N_1 < N_2)}).$$

There are two reasons: (1) By considering definitions of equivalent secrets, we know that ξ^* is a multiple of g . (2) By considering definition of $s^{(j_1, \dots, j_{K+1})}$, we know that ξ^* is a multiple of $b^{(1)}$. Here we use a small assumption that $b^{(1)}$ and g are coprime. Notice that ξ^* is not small, and that ξ^* can not be obtained. Then we compute a tool for modular operations,

$$M = hy^{(0,1)}(b^{(1)})^K g^{K-1} = p_{zt}^{(1)}(x^{(1)})^K \pmod{q}.$$

For the same reason, M is somewhat small. Then we compute the modular operations

$$\begin{aligned}
V''^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} &= V'^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} \pmod{M}, \\
V''^{(N_1 < N_2)} &= V'^{(N_1 < N_2)} \pmod{M}.
\end{aligned}$$

Both $V''^{(N_1 \geq N_2)}$ and $V''^{(N_1 < N_2)}$ are somewhat small. Therefore both $V''^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} - V^{(N_1 \geq N_2)}$ and $V''^{(N_1 < N_2)} - V^{(N_1 < N_2)}$ are somewhat small. Therefore both $(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)(V''^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} - V^{(N_1 \geq N_2)})$ and $(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)(V''^{(N_1 < N_2)} - V^{(N_1 < N_2)})$ are somewhat small. Therefore

$$\xi^{**} = (y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)(V''^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} - V^{(N_1 \geq N_2)}) + (y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)(V''^{(N_1 < N_2)} - V^{(N_1 < N_2)})$$

is somewhat small. On the other hand, ξ^{**} is a multiple of $b^{(1)}g$, because ξ^* is a multiple of $b^{(1)}g$. Therefore $\xi^{**}/(b^{(1)}g)$ is somewhat small. Finally

$$\begin{aligned}
\frac{\xi^{**}}{(b^{(1)}g)} &= \xi^{**}(b^{(1)}g)^{-1} \pmod{q} \\
&= \left[\left((y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)V''^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} + (y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)V''^{(N_1 < N_2)} \right) (b^{(1)}g)^{-1} - A \right] \pmod{q},
\end{aligned}$$

which means that KEY is high-order bits of

$$\left[\left((y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)V''^{(N_1 \geq N_2)} + (y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)V''^{(N_1 < N_2)} \right) (b^{(1)}g)^{-1} \right] \pmod{q},$$

which can be obtained, because $(y^{(0,1)} + a^{(1)}g)(b^{(1)}g)^{-1} \pmod{q}$ and $(y^{(0,2)} + a^{(2)}g)(b^{(1)}g)^{-1} \pmod{q}$ can be obtained.

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Appendix

A

Suppose $W(\bmod Y) = W'''Y$, $X^{(1)}(\bmod Y) = X'^{(1)}Y$, $X^{(2)}(\bmod Y) = X'^{(2)}Y$. We want to obtain a solution $u^{(i)} \in R$, $i = 1, 2$, such that $W'''Y = (u^{(1)}X'^{(1)} + u^{(2)}X'^{(2)})Y(\bmod Y)$. First, the equation has solution, because $\{u^{(i)} \in R, i = 1, 2\}$ is a solution. Second, the equation can be modified as an equivalent equation $W''' = (u^{(1)}X'^{(1)} + u^{(2)}X'^{(2)})(\bmod 1)$. Third, take each entry of W''' , $X'^{(1)}$, $X'^{(2)}$ as the form of reduced fraction, and take LCM as the least common multiple of all denominators, then the equation can be modified as an equivalent equation, which is a linear equation modular LCM :

$$(LCM)W''' = (u^{(1)}((LCM)X'^{(1)}) + u^{(2)}((LCM)X'^{(2)}))(\bmod (LCM)).$$

B

Arbitrarily take a subset $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ which is not a piece. We will compute $P(\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece})$. We define $N\{i_1, i_2\}$ as the number of those pieces which include $\{i_1, i_2\}$. Similarly we define $N\{i_1, i_3\}$ and $N\{i_2, i_3\}$. We have

Proposition 3

$$\begin{aligned} &P(\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}) = \\ &P(N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0, N\{i_1, i_3\} = 0, N\{i_2, i_3\} = 0) + \\ &P(N\{i_1, i_2\} > 0, \text{ and } \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}) + \\ &P(N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0, N\{i_1, i_3\} > 0, \text{ and } \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}) + \\ &P(N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0, N\{i_1, i_3\} = 0, N\{i_2, i_3\} > 0, \text{ and } \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}). \square \end{aligned}$$

$N\{i_1, i_2\}$ has the binomial distribution $b\left(K^2, \frac{3K-2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)$. So that

$$\text{Proposition 4 } P(N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0) = \left(1 - \frac{3K-2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)^{K^2} \approx e^{-2/3}. \quad \square$$

Now suppose $N\{i_1, i_2\} = u > 0$ and denote $\{\{i_1, i_2, t_1\}, \{i_1, i_2, t_2\}, \dots, \{i_1, i_2, t_u\}\}$

as u different pieces. From them we randomly take a piece $\{i_1, i_2, t\}$. Take $N\{i_3; i_1, i_2, t\}$ as the number of those pieces which include i_3 and do not include i_1, i_2 and t (In other words, $N\{i_3; i_1, i_2, t\}$ is the number of those pieces which include i_3 and do not intersect with $\{i_1, i_2, t\}$). $N\{i_3; i_1, i_2, t\}$ has the binomial distribution $b\left(K^2 - u, \frac{C_{3K-4}^2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)$, and $P(N\{i_3; i_1, i_2, t\} = 0) = \left(1 - \frac{C_{3K-4}^2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)^{K^2 - u}$. Under the condition $N\{i_1, i_2\} = u$, the conditional probability that $\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ is not a combined piece is

$$\begin{aligned} & P(\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece} | N\{i_1, i_2\} = u) \\ &= P(N\{i_3; i_1, i_2, t_1\} = 0, N\{i_3; i_1, i_2, t_2\} = 0, \dots, N\{i_3; i_1, i_2, t_u\} = 0 | N\{i_1, i_2\} = u) \\ &< P(N\{i_3; i_1, i_2, t_1\} = 0 | N\{i_1, i_2\} = u) \\ &= P(N\{i_3; i_1, i_2, t_1\} = 0) \\ &= \left(1 - \frac{C_{3K-4}^2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)^{K^2 - u}. \end{aligned}$$

Then we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} & P(N\{i_1, i_2\} > 0, \text{ and } \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}) \\ &= \sum_{u=1}^{K^2} P(N\{i_1, i_2\} = u) \cdot P(\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece} | N\{i_1, i_2\} = u) \\ &< \sum_{u=1}^{K^2} C_{K^2}^u \left(\frac{3K-2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)^u \left(1 - \frac{3K-2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)^{K^2 - u} \left(1 - \frac{C_{3K-4}^2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)^{K^2 - u} \\ &= \left(1 - \left(1 - \frac{3K-2}{C_{3K}^3}\right) \cdot \frac{C_{3K-4}^2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)^{K^2} - \left(1 - \frac{3K-2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)^{K^2} \left(1 - \frac{C_{3K-4}^2}{C_{3K}^3}\right)^{K^2} \\ &\approx \left(1 - \frac{1}{K}\right)^{K^2} - \left(1 - \frac{1}{K}\right)^{K^2} \\ &= 0. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore we have

Proposition 5

$$\begin{aligned} & P(N\{i_1, i_2\} > 0, \text{ and } \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}) \approx 0. \\ & P(N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0, N\{i_1, i_3\} > 0, \text{ and } \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}) \approx 0. \\ & P(N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0, N\{i_1, i_3\} = 0, N\{i_2, i_3\} > 0, \text{ and } \{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}) \approx 0. \square \end{aligned}$$

By combining Proposition 3~5, we have

Proposition 6 If $\{N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0\}$, $\{N\{i_1, i_3\} = 0\}$, $\{N\{i_2, i_3\} = 0\}$ are independent each other, then

$$\begin{aligned} & P(\{i_1, i_2, i_3\} \text{ is not a combined piece}) \\ &\approx P(N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0, N\{i_1, i_3\} = 0, N\{i_2, i_3\} = 0) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} &\approx (e^{-2/3})^3 \\ &= e^{-2}. \end{aligned}$$

□

In practical parameter setting, $\{N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0\}$, $\{N\{i_1, i_3\} = 0\}$, $\{N\{i_2, i_3\} = 0\}$ are not independent each other. They are usually negatively correlated, that is, larger value of $N\{i_1, i_2\}$ tends to companion smaller value of $N\{i_1, i_3\}$, larger values of $N\{i_1, i_2\}$ and $N\{i_1, i_3\}$ tend to companion smaller value of $N\{i_2, i_3\}$, and vice-versa. This negative correlation feature makes $P(N\{i_1, i_2\} = 0, N\{i_1, i_3\} = 0, N\{i_2, i_3\} = 0)$ even smaller than e^{-2} . This fact is not important for our attack, and we can roughly take e^{-2} as the probability of the event $\{\{i_1, i_2, i_3\}$ is not a combined piece $\}$.

C

We need to obtain Hermite normal form $G = \begin{bmatrix} G_0 & & & \\ G_1 & 1 & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ & & & 1 \end{bmatrix}$, where each row of G is an element of $\langle g \rangle$, G_0 is absolute value of the determinant of the matrix $\begin{bmatrix} g_0 & g_1 & \cdots & g_{n-1} \\ -g_{n-1} & g_0 & \cdots & g_{n-2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -g_1 & -g_2 & \cdots & g_0 \end{bmatrix}$, and $G_i \pmod{G_0} = G_i$ for $i = 1, \dots, n-1$.

For a principal ideal $\langle g' \rangle$, we call the determinant of $\begin{bmatrix} g'_0 & g'_1 & \cdots & g'_{n-1} \\ -g'_{n-1} & g'_0 & \cdots & g'_{n-2} \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ -g'_1 & -g'_2 & \cdots & g'_0 \end{bmatrix}$ corresponding determinant of $\langle g' \rangle$. We use the definition of parallel piped [22]. For a vector $\alpha \in R$, we call the set $PP(\alpha) = \{z \in R : z \pmod{\alpha} = z\}$ parallel piped of α .

Two Facts We have $\{Y, X^{(i)}, i = 1, 2\}$, therefore we can obtain hermite normal forms of the principal ideals $\{\langle Y \rangle, \langle X^{(i)} \rangle, i = 1, 2\}$.

Suppose hermite normal form of the principal ideal $\langle g' \rangle$ is $\begin{bmatrix} G'_0 & & & \\ G'_1 & 1 & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ & & & 1 \end{bmatrix}$, $g \in R$ is a factor of g' , and absolute value of corresponding determinant of $\langle g \rangle$ is G_0 . Then hermite normal form of the principal ideal $\langle g \rangle$ is $\begin{bmatrix} G_0 & & & \\ G'_1 \pmod{G_0} & 1 & & \\ & & \ddots & \\ & & & 1 \end{bmatrix}$.

Computing Hermite Normal Form of $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2}b^{(1)} \rangle$ We take a trivial assumption that $1+ag$ and $b^{(1)}g$ are coprime.

Step 1 By using $\{Y, (-Y_{n-1}, Y_0, \dots, Y_{n-2}), \dots, (-Y_1, \dots, -Y_{n-1}, Y_0)\}$ as the

basis, Gaussian sample Z , with sufficiently large deviation.

Step 2 Compute $Z' = Z \pmod{X^{(1)}}$. Then Z' is uniformly distributed over the intersection area $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2b^{(1)}} \rangle \cap PP(X^{(1)})$. Algebra and Gaussian sampling theory have proved this result.

Step 3 Compute absolute value of corresponding determinant of $\langle Z' \rangle$.

Step 4 Repeat Step 1~3 polynomially many times, so that we obtain polynomially many absolute values of corresponding determinant.

Step 5 Compute the greatest common divisor of these polynomially many absolute values. Then the greatest common divisor should be absolute value of corresponding determinant of $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2b^{(1)}} \rangle$. By considering a fact stated in last subsection, we obtain hermite normal form of $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2b^{(1)}} \rangle$.

Computing Hermite Normal Form of $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2b^{(1)}}g \rangle$ We take a trivial assumption that $b^{(1)}$ and $b^{(2)}$ are coprime. The procedure is similar to last subsection.

Step 1 By using $\{X^{(2)}, (-X_{n-1}^{(2)}, X_0^{(2)}, \dots, X_{n-2}^{(2)}, \dots, (-X_1^{(2)}, \dots, -X_{n-1}^{(2)}, X_0^{(2)})\}$ as the basis, Gaussian sample Z , with sufficiently large deviation.

Step 2 Compute $Z' = Z \pmod{X^{(1)}}$. Then Z' is uniformly distributed over the intersection area $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2b^{(1)}}g \rangle \cap PP(X^{(1)})$.

Step 3 Compute absolute value of corresponding determinant of $\langle Z' \rangle$.

Step 4 Repeat Step 1~3 polynomially many times, so that we obtain polynomially many absolute values of corresponding determinant.

Step 5 Compute the greatest common divisor of these polynomially many absolute values. Then the greatest common divisor should be absolute value of corresponding determinant of $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2b^{(1)}}g \rangle$, therefore, we obtain hermite normal form of $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2b^{(1)}}g \rangle$.

Obtaining Hermite Normal Form of $\langle g \rangle$ Divide absolute value of corresponding determinant of $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2b^{(1)}}g \rangle$ by absolute value of corresponding determinant of $\langle h(1+ag)^{K-2b^{(1)}} \rangle$. Then we obtain absolute value of corresponding determinant of $\langle g \rangle$, therefore we obtain hermite normal form of $\langle g \rangle$.