Fully Homomorphic Public-key Encryption Based on Discrete Logarithm Problem

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Abstract. In this paper I propose the new fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme without bootstrapping that is based on the discrete logarithm assumption and computational Diffie–Hellman assumption of multivariate polynomials on octonion ring. The key size of this scheme and complexity for enciphering /deciphering become to be not so large to handle.
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§1. Introduction

A cryptosystem which supports both addition and multiplication (thereby preserving the ring structure of the plaintexts) is known as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and is very powerful. Using such a scheme, any circuit can be homomorphically evaluated, effectively allowing the construction of programs which may be run on encryptions of their inputs to produce an encryption of their output. Since such a program never decrypts its input, it can be run by an untrusted party without revealing its inputs and internal state. The existence of an efficient and fully homomorphic cryptosystem would have great practical implications in the outsourcing of private computations, for instance, in the context of cloud computing.

With homomorphic encryption, a company could encrypt its entire database of e-mails and upload it to a cloud. Then it could use the cloud-stored data as desired-for example, to calculate the stochastic value of stored data. The results would be downloaded and decrypted without ever exposing the details of a single e-mail.

Gentry's bootstrapping technique is the most famous method of obtaining fully homomorphic encryption. In 2009 Gentry

has created a homomorphic encryption scheme that makes it possible to encrypt the data in such a way that performing a mathematical operation on the encrypted information and then decrypting the result produces the same answer as performing an analogous operation on the unencrypted data[5],[6]. Some fully homomorphic encryption schemes were proposed until now [7], [8], [9], [10], [11].

But Gentry's solution was to use a second layer of encryption, essentially to protect intermediate results when the system broke down and needed to be reset. In Gentry's scheme and so on a task like finding a piece of text in an e-mail requires chaining together thousands of basic operations.

In cloud computing system the fully homomorphic public-key system which runs fast is strongly required now.

§2. Preliminaries for octonion operation

In this section we describe the operations on octonion ring and properties of octonion ring.

§2.1 Multiplication and addition on the octonion ring *O*

Let q be a fixed modulus to be as large prime as 2^{2000}. Later (in section 6) we discuss the size of the system parameter q.

Let O be the octonion [4] ring over a finite field Fq.

$$O=\{(a_0,a_1,\ldots,a_7) \mid a_j \in Fq\ (j=0,1,\ldots,7)\} \tag{1}$$

We define the multiplication and addition of $A,B \in O$ as follows.

$$A=(a_0,a_1,\ldots,a_7),\ a_j \in Fq\ (j=0,1,\ldots,7), \tag{2}$$

$$B=(b_0,b_1,\ldots,b_7),\ b_j \in Fq\ (j=0,1,\ldots,7). \tag{3}$$

$$AB \bmod q$$

$$\begin{aligned}
&= (\ a_0b_0 - a_1b_1 - a_2b_2 - a_3b_3 - a_4b_4 - a_5b_5 - a_6b_6 - a_7b_7 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_1 + a_1b_0 + a_2b_4 + a_3b_7 - a_4b_2 + a_5b_6 - a_6b_5 - a_7b_3 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_2 - a_1b_4 + a_2b_0 + a_3b_5 + a_4b_1 - a_5b_3 + a_6b_7 - a_7b_6 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_3 - a_1b_7 - a_2b_5 + a_3b_0 + a_4b_6 + a_5b_2 - a_6b_4 + a_7b_1 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_4 + a_1b_2 - a_2b_1 - a_3b_6 + a_4b_0 + a_5b_7 + a_6b_3 - a_7b_5 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_5 - a_1b_6 + a_2b_3 - a_3b_2 - a_4b_7 + a_5b_0 + a_6b_1 + a_7b_4 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_6 + a_1b_5 - a_2b_7 + a_3b_4 - a_4b_3 - a_5b_1 + a_6b_0 + a_7b_2 \bmod q,\\
&\quad a_0b_7 + a_1b_3 + a_2b_6 - a_3b_1 + a_4b_5 - a_5b_4 - a_6b_2 + a_7b_0 \bmod q)
\end{aligned} \tag{4}$$

$$A+B \bmod q$$

$$=(a_0+b_0 \bmod q,\ a_1+b_1 \bmod q,\ a_2+b_2 \bmod q,\ a_3+b_3 \bmod q\ ,$$

$$a_4+b_4 \bmod q,\ a_5+b_5 \bmod q,\ a_6+b_6 \bmod q,\ a_7+b_7 \bmod q\ ). \qquad (5)$$

Let

$$|A|^2= a_0^2+a_1^2+\ldots+a_7^2 \bmod q. \qquad (6)$$

If $|A|^2\neq 0 \bmod q$, we can have A^{-1}, the inverse of A by using the algorithm **Octinv(*A*)** such that

$$A^{-1}= (a_0/|A|^2 \bmod q,\ -a_1/|A|^2 \bmod q,\ldots,\ -a_7/|A|^2 \bmod q) \leftarrow \text{Octinv}(A)\,. \qquad (7)$$

Here details of the algorithm **Octinv(*A*)** are omitted and can be looked up in the **Appendix A**.

§2.2 Order of the element in *O*

In this section we describe the order "*J*" of the element "*A*" in octonion ring, that is,

$$A^{J+1}=A \bmod q \in O.$$

Theorem 1

Let $A:=(a_{10},a_{11},\ldots,a_{17})\in O$, $a_{1j}\in Fq \quad (j=0,1,\ldots,7)$.

Let $(a_{n0},a_{n1},\ldots,a_{n7}) := A^n \in O$, $a_{nj}\in Fq \quad (n=1,2,\ldots;j=0,1,\ldots,7)$.

a_{00} , a_{nj}'s$(n=1,2,\ldots;j=0,1,\ldots)$ and b_n's$(n=0,1,\ldots)$ satisfy the equations such that

$$N:= a_{11}^2+\ldots+a_{17}^2 \quad \bmod q$$

$$a_{00}:=1,\ b_0:=0,\ b_1:=1,$$

$$a_{n0}= a_{n-1,0}\,a_{10} - b_{n-1}N \bmod q\ ,(n=1,2,\ldots), \qquad (8)$$

$$b_n = a_{n-1,0}+ b_{n-1}a_{10} \bmod q\ ,(n=1,2,\ldots), \qquad (9)$$

$$a_{nj}= b_n a_{1j} \bmod q\ ,(n=1,2,\ldots;j=1,2,\ldots,7)\ . \qquad (10)$$

(*Proof*:)

Here proof is omitted and can be looked up in the **Appendix B**.

Theorem 2

For an element $A=(a_{10},a_{11},\ldots,a_{17})\in O$,

$$A^{J+1}=A \bmod q,$$

where

$$J= \mathrm{LCM}\ \{q^2\text{-}1,\ q\text{-}1\}=q^2\text{-}1,$$

$$N:=a_{11}{}^2+ a_{12}{}^2+\ldots+a_{17}{}^2\neq 0 \bmod q.$$

(*Proof*:)

Here proof is omitted and can be looked up in the **Appendix C**.

§2.3. Property of multiplication over octonion ring *O*

A, B, C etc.$\in O$ satisfy the following formulae in general where *A,B* and *C* have the inverse A^{-1}, B^{-1} and C^{-1} mod *q*.

1) Non-commutative

$$AB\neq BA \mod q.$$

2) Non-associative

$$A(BC)\neq(AB)C \mod q.$$

3) Alternative

$$(AA)B=A(AB) \mod q, \tag{11}$$

$$A(BB)=(AB)B \mod q, \tag{12}$$

$$(AB)A=A(BA) \mod q. \tag{13}$$

4) Moufang's formulae [4],

$$C(A(CB))=((CA)C)B \mod q, \tag{14}$$

$$A(C(BC))=((AC)B)C \mod q, \tag{15}$$

$$(CA)(BC)=(C(AB))C \mod q, \tag{16}$$

$$(CA)(BC)=C((AB)C) \mod q. \tag{17}$$

5) For positive integers *n,m*, we have

$$(AB)B^n =((AB)B^{n-1})B=A(B(B^{n-1}B))=AB^{n+1} \mod q, \tag{18}$$

$$(AB^n)B =((AB)B^{n-1})B=A(B(B^{n-1}B))=AB^{n+1} \mod q\ , \tag{19}$$

$$B^n\ (BA) =B(B^{n-1}(BA))= ((BB^{n-1})B)A=B^{n+1}A \mod q\ , \tag{20}$$

$$B(B^n A)=B(B^{n-1}(BA))= ((BB^{n-1})B)A=B^{n+1}A \mod q. \quad (21)$$

From (15) and (19), we have

$$(AB^n)B^2=[((AB)B^{n-1})B]B=[(A(B(B^{n-1}B))] =[AB^{n+1}]B= AB^{n+2} \mod q,$$

$$(AB^n)B^3=[((AB)B^{n-1})B]B^2=(A(B(B^{n-1}B)))B^2= (AB^{n+1})B^2= AB^{n+3} \mod q,$$

… …

$$(AB^n)B^m= AB^{n+m} \mod q.$$

In the same way we have

$$B^m(B^n A)= B^{n+m}A \mod q.$$

6) **Lemma 1**

$$A(B((AB)^n))=(AB)^{n+1} \mod q,$$

$$(((AB)^n)A)B =(AB)^{n+1} \mod q.$$

where n is a positive integer and B has the inverse B^{-1}.

(*Proof*:)

From (14) we have

$$B(A(B((AB)^n)=((BA)B)(AB)^n=(B(AB))(AB)^n=B(AB)^{n+1} \mod q.$$

Then

$$B^{-1}(B(A(B(AB)^n)))= B^{-1}(B(AB)^{n+1}) \mod q,$$

$$A(B(AB)^n)= (AB)^{n+1} \mod q.$$

In the same way we have

$$(((AB)^n)A)B=(AB)^{n+1} \mod q. \quad \text{q.e.d.}$$

7) **Lemma 2**

$$A^{-1}(AB)= B \bmod q,$$

$$(BA)A^{-1}= B \bmod q.$$

(*Proof*:)

Here proof is omitted and can be looked up in the **Appendix D**.

8) **Lemma 3**

$$A(BA^{-1})= (AB)A^{-1} \bmod q.$$

(*Proof*:)

From (17) we substitute A^{-1} to C, we have

$$(A^{-1}A)(B\,A^{-1})= A^{-1}\,((AB)\,A^{-1}) \bmod q,$$

$$(B\,A^{-1})= A^{-1}\,((AB)\,A^{-1}) \bmod q.$$

We multiply A from left side ,

$$A(B\,A^{-1})= A(A^{-1}\,((AB)\,A^{-1}))= (AB)\,A^{-1} \bmod q. \qquad \text{q.e.d.}$$

We can express $A(BA^{-1})$, $(AB)A^{-1}$ such that

$$ABA^{-1}.$$

9) From (13) and **Lemma 2** we have

$$A^{-1}((A(BA^{-1}))A)= A^{-1}(A((BA^{-1})A))= (BA^{-1})A=B \bmod q,$$

$$(A^{-1}((AB)A^{-1}))A=((A^{-1}(AB))A^{-1})A= A^{-1}(AB)=B \bmod q\,.$$

10) **Lemma 4**

$$(BA^{-1})(AB)=B^2 \bmod q\,.$$

(*Proof*:)

From (17),

$$(BA^{-1})(AB)=B((A^{-1}A)B)=B^2 \bmod q. \qquad \text{q.e.d.}$$

11) **Lemma 5**

$$(ABA^{-1})(\,ABA^{-1}\,)= AB^2A^{-1} \bmod q.$$

(*Proof*:)

From (17),

$$(ABA^{-1})(\,ABA^{-1}\,) \quad \bmod q$$

$$=[A^{-1}\,(A^2(BA^{-1}))][(AB)A^{-1}]= A^{-1}\,\{[(A^2(BA^{-1}))(AB)]A^{-1}\} \quad \bmod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\,\{[(A(A(BA^{-1})))(AB)]A^{-1}\} \quad \bmod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{[(A((AB)A^{-1}))(AB)]A^{-1}\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{[(A(AB))A^{-1}))(AB)]A^{-1}\} \mod q.$$

We apply (15) to inside of [.],

$$= A^{-1}\{[(A((AB)(A^{-1}(AB)))]A^{-1}\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{[(A((AB)B))]A^{-1}\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{[A(A(BB))]A^{-1}\} \mod q$$

$$=\{ A^{-1}[A(A(BB))]\}A^{-1} \mod q$$

$$=(A(BB))A^{-1} \mod q$$

$$=AB^2A^{-1} \mod q. \qquad \text{q.e.d.}$$

12) **Lemma 6**

$$(AB^mA^{-1})(AB^nA^{-1})= AB^{m+n}A^{-1} \mod q.$$

(*Proof*:)

From (16),

$$[A^{-1}(A^2(B^mA^{-1}))][(AB^n)A^{-1}]= \{A^{-1}[(A^2(B^mA^{-1}))(AB^n)]\}A^{-1} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{[(A(A(B^mA^{-1}))(AB^n)]A^{-1}\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{[(A((AB^m)A^{-1}))(AB^n)]A^{-1}\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{[((A(AB^m))A^{-1}))(AB^n)]A^{-1}\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{[((A^2B^m)A^{-1}))(AB^n)]A^{-1}\} \mod q.$$

We apply (15) to inside of { . },

$$= A^{-1}\{(A^2B^m)[A^{-1}((AB^n)A^{-1})]\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{(A^2B^m)[A^{-1}(A(B^nA^{-1}))]\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{(A^2B^m)(B^nA^{-1})\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1}\{(A^{-1}(A^3B^m))(B^nA^{-1})\} \mod q.$$

We apply (17) to inside of { . },

$$= A^{-1}\{A^{-1}([(A^3B^m)B^n]A^{-1})]\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1} \{ A^{-1}((A^3B^{m+n})A^{-1})\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1} \{ (A^{-1}(A^3B^{m+n}))A^{-1}\} \mod q$$

$$= A^{-1} \{ (A^2B^{m+n})A^{-1}\} \mod q$$

$$=\{ A^{-1} (A^2B^{m+n})) \}A^{-1} \mod q$$

$$=(AB^{m+n})A^{-1} \mod q$$

$$=AB^{m+n}A^{-1} \mod q. \quad \text{q.e.d}$$

13) $A \in O$ satisfies the following theorem.

Theorem 3

$$A^2=w\mathbf{1}+vA \mod q,$$

where

$$^{\exists}w,v \in Fq,$$

$$\mathbf{1}=(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0) \in O,$$

$$A=(a_0,a_1,\ldots,a_7) \in O.$$

(*Proof*:)

$$A^2 \mod q$$

$$=(a_0a_0-a_1a_1- a_2a_2- a_3a_3-a_4a_4- a_5a_5-a_6a_6-a_7a_7 \mod q,$$

$$a_0a_1+a_1a_0+a_2a_4+a_3a_7-a_4a_2+a_5a_6-a_6a_5-a_7a_3 \mod q,$$

$$a_0a_2-a_1a_4+a_2a_0+a_3a_5+a_4a_1-a_5a_3+a_6a_7-a_7a_6 \mod q,$$

$$a_0a_3-a_1a_7-a_2a_5+a_3a_0+a_4a_6+a_5a_2-a_6a_4+a_7a_1 \mod q,$$

$$a_0a_4+a_1a_2-a_2a_1-a_3a_6+a_4a_0+a_5a_7+a_6a_3-a_7a_5 \mod q,$$

$$a_0a_5-a_1a_6+a_2a_3-a_3a_2-a_4a_7+a_5a_0+a_6a_1+a_7a_4 \mod q,$$

$$a_0a_6+a_1a_5-a_2a_7+a_3a_4-a_4a_3-a_5a_1+a_6a_0+a_7a_2 \mod q,$$

$$a_0a_7+a_1a_3+a_2a_6-a_3a_1+a_4a_5-a_5a_4-a_6a_2+a_7a_0 \mod q)$$

$$=(2a_0^2- L \mod q, 2a_0a_1 \mod q, 2a_0a_2 \mod q, 2a_0a_3 \mod q,$$

$$2a_0a_4 \mod q, 2a_0a_5 \mod q\ 2a_0a_6 \mod q, 2a_0a_7 \mod q)$$

where

$$L= a_0^2+a_1^2+a_2^2+a_3^2+a_4^2+a_5^2+a_6^2+a_7^2 \bmod q.$$

Now we try to obtain $u, v \in Fq$ that satisfy $A^2=w\mathbf{1}+vA \bmod q$.

$$w\mathbf{1}+vA= w(1,0,0,0,0,0,0,0)+v(a_0,a_1,\ldots,a_7) \bmod q,$$

$$A^2= (2a_0^2- L \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_1 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_2 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_3 \bmod q,$$

$$2a_0a_4 \bmod q,2\ a_0a_5 \bmod q,2a_0a_6 \bmod q,\ 2a_0a_7 \bmod q).$$

Then we have

$$A^2=w\mathbf{1}+vA=-L\mathbf{1}+2\ a_0A \bmod q,$$

$$w= -L \bmod q,$$

$$v=2a_0 \bmod q. \qquad \text{q.e.d.}$$

14) **Theorem 4**

$$A^t =w_t\mathbf{1}+v_tA \bmod q$$

where t is an integer and $w_t, v_t \in Fq$.

(*Proof*:)

From **Theorem 3**

$$A^2=w_2\mathbf{1}+v_2A=-L\mathbf{1}+2a_0A \bmod q.$$

If we can express A^t such that

$$A^t=w_t\mathbf{1}+v_tA \bmod q \in O\ ,\ w_t, v_t \in Fq,$$

Then

$$A^{t+1}=(w_t\mathbf{1}+v_tA)A \bmod q$$

$$=w_tA+v_t(-L\mathbf{1}+2\ a_0A\ ) \bmod q$$

$$=-Lv_t\mathbf{1}+(\ w_t+2a_0v_t)A \bmod q.$$

We have

$$W_{t+1}= -L\ v_t \bmod q \in Fq,$$

$$V_{t+1}= w_t+2a_0v_t \bmod q \in Fq. \quad \text{q.e.d.}$$

We can use **Power**(A,n,q) to obtain $A^n \bmod q$. (see the **Appendix E**)

15) **Theorem 5**

$D \in O$ does not exist that satisfies the following equation.

$$B(AX)=DX \bmod q\ ,$$

where $B,A,D \in O$, and X is a variable.

(*Proof*:)

When X=**1**, we have

$$BA=D \bmod q.$$

Then

$$B(AX)=(BA)X \bmod q.$$

We can select $C \in O$ that satisfies

$$B(AC) \neq (BA)C \bmod q. \qquad (22)$$

We substitute $C \in O$ to X to obtain

$$B(AC)=(BA)C \bmod q. \qquad (23)$$

(23) is contradictory to (22). q.e.d.

16) **Theorem 6**

$D \in O$ does not exist that satisfies the following equation.

$$C(B(AX))=DX \bmod q \qquad (24)$$

where $C,B,A,D \in O$, C has inverse $C^{-1} \bmod q$ and X is a variable.

B, A, C are non-associative, that is,

$$B(AC) \neq (BA)C \bmod q. \qquad (25)$$

(*Proof*:)

If D exists, we have at X=**1**

$$C(BA)=D \bmod q.$$

Then

$$C(B(AX))=(C(BA))X \bmod q.$$

We substitute C to X to obtain

$$C(B(AC))=(C(BA))C \bmod q.$$

From (13)

$$C(B(AC))=(C(BA))C=C((BA)C) \bmod q$$

Multiplying C^{-1} from left side,

$$B(AC)=(BA)C \bmod q \quad (26)$$

(26) is contradictory to (25). q.e.d.

17) **Theorem 7**

D and $E \in O$ do not exist that satisfy the following equation.

$$C(B(AX))= E\ (DX) \bmod q$$

where C,B,A,D and $E \in O$ have inverse and X is a variable.

A, B, C are non-associative, that is,

$$C(BA) \neq (CB)A \bmod q. \quad (27)$$

(*Proof*:)

If D and E exist, we have at $X=\mathbf{1}$

$$C(BA)=ED \bmod q \quad (28)$$

We have at $X=(ED)^{-1}=D^{-1}E^{-1} \bmod q$.

$$C(B(\mathrm{A}(D^{-1}E^{-1})))= E\ (D(D^{-1}E^{-1})) \bmod q=\mathbf{1},$$

$$(C(B(A(D^{-1}E^{-1})))^{-1} \bmod q=\mathbf{1},$$

$$((ED)A^{-1})B^{-1})C^{-1} \bmod q=\mathbf{1},$$

$$ED =(CB)A \bmod q. \quad (29)$$

From (28) and (29) we have

$$C(BA) = (CB)A \bmod q. \tag{30}$$

(30) is contradictory to (27). q.e.d.

18) **Theorem 8**

$D \in O$ does not exist that satisfies the following equation.

$$A(B(A^{-1}X)) = DX \bmod q$$

where $B,A,D \in O$, A has inverse $A^{-1} \bmod q$ and X is a variable.

(*Proof*:)

If D exists, we have at X=**1**

$$A(BA^{-1}) = D \bmod q.$$

Then

$$A(B(A^{-1}X)) = (A(BA^{-1}))X \bmod q. \tag{31}$$

We can select $C \in O$ such that

$$(BA^{-1})(CA^2) \neq (BA^{-1})C)A^2 \bmod q. \tag{32}$$

That is, (BA^{-1}), C and A^2 are non-associative.

Substituting $X=CA$ in (31), we have

$$A(B(A^{-1}(CA))) = (A(BA^{-1}))(CA) \bmod q.$$

From **Lemma 3**

$$A(B((A^{-1}C)A))) = (A(BA^{-1}))(CA) \bmod q.$$

From (17)

$$A(B((A^{-1}C)A))) = A([(BA^{-1})C]A) \bmod q.$$

Multiply A^{-1} from left side we have

$$B((A^{-1}C)A)) = ((BA^{-1})C)A \bmod q.$$

From **Lemma 3**

$$B(A^{-1}(CA)) = ((BA^{-1})C)A \bmod q.$$

Transforming CA to $((CA^2)A^{-1})$, we have

$$B(A^{-1}((CA^2)A^{-1}))=((BA^{-1})C)A \bmod q.$$

From (15) we have

$$((BA^{-1})(CA^2))A^{-1}=((BA^{-1})C)A \bmod q.$$

Multiply A from right side we have

$$((BA^{-1})(CA^2)=((BA^{-1})C)A^2 \bmod q. \quad (33)$$

(33) is contradictory to (32). q.e.d.

§3. Preparation for fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme

§3.1 Definition of homomorphic public-key encryption

A homomorphic public-key encryption scheme **HPKE**:= (**KeyGen; Enc; Dec; Eval**) is a quadruple of PPT (Probabilistic polynomial time) algorithms.

In this work, the plaintext $p \in Fq$ of the encryption schemes will be the element in finite field, and the functions to be evaluated will be represented as arithmetic circuits over this ring, composed of addition and multiplication gates. The syntax of these algorithms is given as follows.

-Key-Generation. The algorithm **KeyGen**, on input the security parameter 1^{λ},

outputs (**pk**, **sk**) ← **KeyGen**(1^{λ}) , where **pk** is a public encryption key and **sk** is a secret decryption key.

-Encryption. The algorithm **Enc**, on input system parameter (q, h,T,$F(X)$), public key **pk**, and a plaintext $p \in Fq$, outputs a ciphertext $C \in O[X]$ ←**Enc**(**pk**; p) where q is a large prime, $h \in Fq$, $T \in O$, $F(X) \in O[X]$.

-Decryption. The algorithm **Dec**, on input system parameter (q, h,T,$F(X)$), secret key **sk** and a ciphertext $C \in O[X]$, outputs a plaintext $p^* \leftarrow$**Dec**(**sk**;C).

-Homomorphic-Evaluation. The algorithm **Eval**, on input system parameter (q, h,T,$F(X)$), an arithmetic circuit ckt, and a tuple of n ciphertexts $(C_1,\ldots, C_n) \in \{O[X]\}^n$,

outputs a ciphertext $C' \in O[X] \leftarrow$**Eval**(ckt; $C_1,\ldots, C_n$).

§3.2 Definition of fully homomorphic public-key encryption

A scheme FHPKE is fully homomorphic if it is both compact and homomorphic with respect to a class of circuits. More formally:

Definition (**Fully homomorphic public-key encryption**). A homomorphic public-key

encryption scheme FHPKE :=(**KeyGen; Enc; Dec; Eval**) is fully homomorphic if it satisfies the following properties:

1. Homomorphism: Let $CR = \{CR_\lambda\}_{\lambda\in N}$ be the set of all polynomial sized arithmetic circuits. On input (**pk**,**sk**) ←**KeyGen**(1^λ), $\forall$ ckt $\in$ CR_λ, $\forall (p_1,\ldots, p_n)\in Fq^n$ where $n = n(\lambda)$, $\forall (C_1,\ldots,C_n)$ where $C_i\leftarrow$ **Enc**(**pk**;p_i), it holds that:

$$\Pr[\textbf{Dec}(\textbf{sk};\textbf{Eval}(\text{ckt}; C_1,\ldots,C_n)) \neq \text{ckt}(p_1,\ldots, p_n)] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

2. Compactness: There exists a polynomial $\mu = \mu(\lambda)$ such that the output length of **Eval** is at most μ bits long regardless of the input circuit ckt and the number of its inputs.

§3.3 Basic function

We consider the basic function before we propose a fully homomorphic public-key encryption (FHPKE) scheme based on the enciphering/deciphering functions on octonion ring over ***Fq***.

First we define the medium text M as follows. We select the element $T=(t_0,t_1,t_2,\ldots,t_7) \in O$ such that,

$$L_T:=|T|^2= t_0^2+t_1^2+\ldots+t_7^2\neq 0 \bmod q,$$

$$t_0\neq 0 \bmod q,$$

$$t_1\neq 0 \bmod q,$$

$-(t_1^2+\ldots+t_7^2)$ is a quadratic residue of q, that is, some $s\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ exists such that

$$s^2=-(t_1^2+\ldots+t_7^2) \bmod q.$$

We have from **theorem 3**

$$T^2=-L_T\mathbf{1}+2t_0T \bmod q. \tag{34}$$

Let $u,v\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ be sub-plaintexts and $h\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ be a constant system parameter where a plaintext p is given such that

$$p:=u+hv \bmod q,$$

$$h:=t_0+(-t_1^2-\ldots-t_7^2)^{1/2} \bmod q. \tag{35}$$

We define the medium text M by

$$M:= u\mathbf{1}+vT\in O, \tag{36}$$

Then

$$|M|^2=|u\mathbf{1}+vT|^2 \bmod q$$

$$=(u+t_0v)^2+v^2(t_1^2+\ldots+t_7^2) \bmod q,$$

$$=(u+t_0v)^2-v^2(h-t_0)^2 \bmod q,$$

$$=(u+vh)(u-vh+2t_0v) \bmod q.$$

Let

$$p_1= u_1+hv_1 \bmod q,$$

$$M_1:=u_1\mathbf{1}+v_1B\in O,$$

$$p_2= u_2+hv_2 \bmod q,$$

$$M_2:=u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2B\in O\ .$$

Then we have

$$M_1M_2=M_2M_1 = [u_1\mathbf{1}+v_1T][u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2T] \bmod q$$

$$= u_1u_2+(u_1\ v_2+\ v_1\ u_2)T+v_1\ v_2T^2$$

$$=u_1u_2+(u_1\ v_2+\ v_1\ u_2)T+v_1v_2(-L_T\mathbf{1}+2t_0T)$$

$$= u_1u_2\mathbf{1}- v_1v_2L_T\mathbf{1}+(u_1\ v_2+\ v_1\ u_2\ +2t_0v_1v_2)T \bmod q.$$

We can obtain the plaintext p_1p_2 from M_1M_2 as follows.

$$v_{12}:=[\ M_1M_2]_1/t_1=u_1\ v_2+\ v_1\ u_2\ +2t_0v_1v_2 \bmod q$$

$$u_{12}:=[\ M_1M_2]_0 - v_{12}t_0 = u_1u_2- v_1v_2L_T \bmod q$$

$$u_{12}+h\ v_{12}= u_1u_2- v_1v_2L_T+h(u_1v_2+\ v_1u_2\ +2t_0v_1v_2) \bmod q$$

$$= u_1u_2+h(u_1\ v_2+\ v_1\ u_2\ ) + (-L_T\ +2\ h\ t_0)\ v_1v_2 \bmod q$$

$$= u_1u_2+h(u_1\ v_2+\ v_1\ u_2\ ) + h^2\ v_1v_2 \bmod q$$

$$=(\ u_1+h\ v_1)\ (\ u_2+h\ v_2) \bmod q$$

$$= p_1p_2.$$

where we denote the i-th element of octonion $M=(m_0,m_1,\ldots,m_7)$ such as

$$[M]_i=m_i.$$

Here I define the some parameters for describing FHPKE.

Let q be as a large prime as 2^{2000}.

Let $p:=u\mathbf{1}+hv\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ be the plaintext where

$$u,v\in \boldsymbol{Fq},$$

$$h:=t_0+(-t_1^2-\ldots-t_7^2)^{1/2} \bmod q,$$

then

$$h^2=2ht_0-L_T \bmod q.$$

Let $M=(m_0,m_1,\ldots,m_7):= u\mathbf{1}+vT\in O$ be the medium plaintext.

Let $X=(x_0,\ldots,x_7)\in O[X]$ be variable.

Let $F(X)$ be a basic function.

A_i , $Z_i\in O$ is selected randomly such that $A_i^{-1} \bmod q$ and $Z_i^{-1} \bmod q$ exist (i=1,...,k).

Basic function $F(X)$ is defined as follows.

$$F(X):= ((A_k((\ldots((A_1X)Z_1))\ldots))Z_k \bmod q\in O[X] ,$$

$$=(f_{00}x_0+f_{01}x_0+ \ldots+f_{07}x_7,$$

$$f_{10}x_0+f_{11}x_0+ \ldots+f_{17}x_7,$$

$$\ldots. \qquad \ldots.$$

$$f_{70}x_0+f_{71}x_0+ \ldots+f_{77}x_7) \bmod q, \tag{37}$$

$$=\{f_{ij}\}(i,j=0,\ldots,7) \tag{38}$$

with $f_{ij}\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ (i,j=0,…,7) which is published.

§4. Fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme

§4.1 Fully homomorphic public-key encryption scheme

Here we construct the public-key encryption scheme by using the basic function $F(X)$

$$F(X)=(A_k((\ldots((A_1X)Z_1))\ldots))Z_k \bmod q\in O[X] ,$$

$$=\{f_{ij}\}(i,j=0,\ldots,7).$$

Anyone can calculate $F^{-1}(X)$, the inverse function of $F(X)$ such that

$$F^{-1}(X) := A_1^{-1}((\ldots((A_k^{-1}(XZ_k^{-1}))\ldots))\, Z_1^{-1}) \bmod q \in O[X],$$

$$= (g_{00}x_0 + \ldots + g_{07}x_7,$$

$$g_{10}x_0 + \ldots + g_{17}x_7,$$

$$\ldots \quad \ldots$$

$$g_{70}x_0 + \ldots + g_{77}x_7) \bmod q,$$

$$= \{g_{ij}\}(i,j=0,\ldots,7)$$

with $g_{ij} \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ $(i,j = 0,\ldots,7)$.

ALINVF denote the algorithm for calculating the inverse function of $F(X)$.

We can calculate $F^{-1}(X) \in O[X]$ which is the inverse function of $F(X)$,given $F(X) \in O[X]$.

[**ALINVF**]

Given $F(X)$ and q,

$$F(F^{-1}(X)) = F^{-1}(F(X)) = X \bmod q \in O[X]$$

$$= (f_{00}(g_{00}x_0 + \ldots + g_{07}x_7) + \ldots + f_{07}(g_{70}x_0 + \ldots + g_{77}x_7),$$

$$f_{10}(g_{00}x_0 + \ldots + g_{07}x_7) + \ldots + f_{17}(g_{70}x_0 + \ldots + g_{77}x_7),$$

$$\ldots \quad \ldots$$

$$f_{70}(g_{00}x_0 + \ldots + g_{07}x_7) + \ldots + f_{77}(g_{70}x_0 + \ldots + g_{77}x_7)) \bmod q,$$

$$= ((f_{00}g_{00} + \ldots + f_{07}g_{70})x_0 + \ldots + (f_{00}g_{07}x_0 + \ldots + f_{07}g_{77})x_7,$$

$$(f_{10}g_{00} + \ldots + f_{17}g_{70})x_0 + \ldots + (f_{10}g_{07}x_0 + \ldots + f_{17}g_{77})x_7,$$

$$\ldots \quad \ldots$$

$$(f_{70}g_{00} + \ldots + f_{77}g_{70})x_0 + \ldots + (f_{70}g_{07}x_0 + \ldots + f_{77}g_{77})x_7) \bmod q,$$

$$= X = (x_0,\ldots,x_7).$$

Then we obtain

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} f_{00}g_{00}+\ldots+f_{07}g_{70}=1 \bmod q \\ f_{10}g_{00}+\ldots+f_{17}g_{70}=0 \bmod q \\ \quad\ldots\quad\ldots \\ f_{70}g_{00}+\ldots+f_{77}g_{70}=0 \bmod q \end{array}\right\}$$

$g_{i0}(i=0,\ldots,7)$ is obtained by solving above simultaneous equation.

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} f_{00}g_{01}+\ldots+f_{07}g_{71}=0 \bmod q \\ f_{10}g_{01}+\ldots+f_{17}g_{71}=1 \bmod q \\ \quad\ldots\quad\ldots \\ f_{70}g_{01}+\ldots+f_{77}g_{71}=0 \bmod q \end{array}\right\}$$

$g_{i1}(i=0,\ldots,7)$ is obtained by solving above simultaneous equation.

$$\begin{array}{ll} \ldots. & \ldots. \\ \ldots. & \ldots. \\ \ldots. & \ldots. \end{array}$$

$$\left.\begin{array}{l} f_{00}g_{07}+\ldots+f_{07}g_{77}=0 \bmod q \\ f_{10}g_{07}+\ldots+f_{17}g_{77}=0 \bmod q \\ \quad\ldots\quad\ldots \\ f_{70}g_{07}+\ldots+f_{77}g_{77}=1 \bmod q \end{array}\right\}$$

$g_{i7}(i=0,\ldots,7)$ is obtained by solving above simultaneous equations.

Then we have $F^{-1}(X)$ from $F(X)$. □

We define $F^m(X)$ as follows where m is an integer.

$$F^2(X):=F(F(X)) \bmod q,$$

$$\ldots. \quad \ldots.$$

$$F^m(X):=F(F^{m-1}(X)) \bmod q,$$

$$\ldots. \quad \ldots. \quad .$$

We consider the communication between user A and user B. User A downloads the basic function $F(X)$ from cloud data centre. User A selects the random integer a to be secret and generates the public function $F^{a}(X)$ by using algorithm **Power**$(F(X),a,q)$. (see the **Appendix F**)

User A sends the coefficient of $F^{a}(X)$, $f_{aij} \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ $(i,j=0,\ldots,7)$ to cloud data centre as the public-key of user A.

On the other hand user B selects the random integer b to be secret and generates the public function $F^{b}(X)$ by using algorithm **Power**$(F(X),b,q)$. User B sends the coefficient of $F^{b}(X)$, $f_{bij} \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ $(i,j=0,\ldots,7)$ to cloud data centre as the public-key of user B.

User B tries to send to user A the ciphertexts of the plaintexts which user B possesses. User B downloads the public-key of user A, $F^{a}(X)$, $f_{aij} \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ $(i,j=0,\ldots,7)$ from cloud data centre.

User B calculates $F^{-a}(X)$ from $F^{a}(X)$ by using **ALINVF**.

User B generates the common encryption function $F_{\mathrm{BA}}(X,Y)$ between user A and user B as follows. By using algorithm **Power**$(F^{a}(X),b,q)$ user B obtain $F^{ab}(X)$.

User B obtain $F^{-ab}(X)$ from $F^{ab}(X)$ by using **ALINVF**.

Then user B generates $F_{\mathrm{BA}}(X,Y)$, the common enciphering function of user A and user B such that

$$F_{\mathrm{BA}}(X,Y) := F^{-ab}(YF^{ab}(X)) \bmod q \in O[X,Y]$$

In the same manner user A generates the common encryption function

$$F_{\mathrm{AB}}(X,Y) := F^{-ba}(YF^{ba}(X)) \quad \bmod q \in O[X,Y]$$

where

$$F_{\mathrm{BA}}(X,Y) = F_{\mathrm{AB}}(X,Y) \bmod q.$$

We notice that

$$F_{\mathrm{BA}}(X,\mathbf{1}) = F^{-ba}(\mathbf{1}F^{ba}(X)) = F^{-ba}(F^{ba}(X)) = X \bmod q.$$

[Enciphering]

User A and B can obtain ciphertext $F_{AB}(X,M)$ or $F_{BA}(X,M)$ by substituting plaintext $M \in O$ to Y

$$F_{BA}(X,M)$$

$$=(c_{00}x_0+\ldots+c_{07}x_7 ,$$

$$\ldots \quad \ldots ,$$

$$c_{70}x_0+\ldots+c_{77}x_7) \bmod q.$$

[Deciphering]

User A deciphers $C(p,X):=F_{BA}(X,M)$ to obtain p as follows.

$$F^{ba}(F_{BA}(F^{-ba}(\mathbf{1}),M))$$

$$= F^{ba}(F^{-ab}(MF^{ab}(F^{-ba}(\mathbf{1})))) \bmod q$$

$$=M=(m_0,\ldots,m_7),$$

$$v:=m_1/t_1 \bmod q,$$

$$u:= m_0-vt_0 \bmod q,$$

$$p=u+hv \bmod q.$$

User B also deciphers $C(p,X):=F_{AB}(X,M)$ to obtain p in the same manner.

Theorem 9

For any $p,p' \in O$,

if $C(p,X)= C(p', X) \bmod q$, then $p= p' \bmod q$.

That is , if $p \neq p' \bmod q$, then $C(p, X) \neq C(p', X) \bmod q$

where

$$C(p, X)= F_{AB}(X,M),\ C(p',X)= F_{AB}(X,M'),$$

$$M= u\mathbf{1}+vT \bmod q,\ M'= u'\mathbf{1}+v'T \bmod q,$$

$$p= u+hv \bmod q,\ p'= u'+hv' \bmod q.$$

(*Proof*)

If $C(p, X)= C(p', X) \bmod q$, then

$$F_{AB}(X,M) = F_{AB}(X,M'),$$

$$F^{-ab}(MF^{ab}(X))= F^{-ab}(M'F^{ab}(X))$$

$$F^{-ab}(MF^{ab}(F^{-ab}(\mathbf{1})))= F^{-ab}(M'F^{ab}(F^{-ab}(\mathbf{1})))$$

$$F^{-ab}(M)= F^{-ab}(M')$$

$$F^{ab}(F^{-ab}(M))= F^{ab}(F^{-ab}(M')) \bmod q,$$

$$M=M' \bmod q$$

where

$$u\mathbf{1}+vT = u'\mathbf{1}+v'T \bmod q.$$

$$[u+vT]_1=[u'B+v'T]_1 \bmod q,$$

$$vt_1=v't_1 \bmod q,$$

As $t_1 \neq 0 \bmod q$,

$$v=v' \bmod q,$$

$$[u+vT]_0=[u'+v'T]_0 \bmod q,$$

$$(u+vt_0) =(u'+v't_0) \bmod q,$$

$$u=u' \bmod q,$$

Then we have

$$p= u +hv = u'+hv' = p'.$$ q.e.d.

§4.2 Addition/subtraction scheme on ciphertexts

Let

$$M_1:= u_1\mathbf{1}+v_1T \in O,$$

$$M_2:= u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2T \in O$$

be medium texts to be encrypted where

$$p_1=(u_1+hv_1) \bmod q,$$

$$p_2=(u_2+ hv_2) \bmod q,$$

$$p_1 \pm p_2 = u_1 \pm u_2 + h(v_1 \pm v_2) \bmod q.$$

Let $C_1(p_1,X) := F_{AB}(X,M_1)$ and $C_2(p_2,X) := F_{AB}(X,M_2)$ be the ciphertexts.

$$C_1(p_1,X) \pm C_2(p_2,X) \bmod q = F_{AB}(X,M_1) \pm F_{AB}(X,M_2) \bmod q$$

$$= F_{AB}(X, M_1 \pm M_2) \bmod q$$

$$= F_{AB}(X, (u_1 \pm u_2)\mathbf{1} + (v_1 \pm v_2)T) \bmod q$$

$$= C((u_1 \pm u_2) + h(v_1 \pm v_2)), X) \bmod q$$

$$= C(p_1 \pm p_2, X) \bmod q.$$

§4.3 Multiplication scheme on ciphertexts

Here we consider the multiplicative operation on the ciphertexts.

Let $C_1(p_1,X) := F_{AB}(X,M_1)$ and $C_2(p_2,X) := F_{AB}(X,M_2)$ be the ciphertexts.

$$C(p_1, C(p_2,X)) \bmod q = F_{AB}(F_{AB}(X,M_2),M_1) \bmod q$$

$$= F^{-ba}(M_1 F^{ba}(F^{-ba}(M_2 F^{ba}(X)))) \bmod q$$

$$= F^{-ba}(M_1(M_2 F^{ba}(X))) \bmod q$$

Substituting $u_1\mathbf{1}+v_1T$, $u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2T$ to M_1, M_2,

$$= F^{-ba}([u_1\mathbf{1}+v_1T]\,([u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2T]F^{ba}(X)))) \bmod q$$

$$= F^{-ba}([u_1\mathbf{1}]\,([u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2T]F^{ba}(X)))) \bmod q$$

$$+ F^{-ba}([v_1T]\,([u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2T]F^{ba}(X)))) \bmod q$$

$$= F^{-ba}([u_1u_2\mathbf{1} + u_1v_2T]F^{ba}(X)))) \bmod q$$

$$+ F^{-ba}([v_1u_2T + v_1v_2T^2]F^{ba}(X)))) \bmod q$$

$$= F^{-ba}([u_1u_2\mathbf{1} + u_1v_2T + v_1u_2T + v_1v_2T^2]F^{ba}(X)))) \bmod q$$

$$= F^{-ba}([u_1\mathbf{1}+v_1T][u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2T](F^{ba}(X))) \bmod q$$

$$= F^{-ba}([M_1M_2](F^{ba}(X))) \bmod$$

$$= F_{AB}(F_{AB}(X, \mathbf{1}), M_1M_2)) \bmod q.$$

Substituting $u_1\mathbf{1}+v_1T$, $u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2T$ to M_1, M_2,

we have

$$M_1M_2=M_2M_1 = [u_1\mathbf{1}+v_1T][u_2\mathbf{1}+v_2T] \bmod q$$

$$= u_1u_2\mathbf{1}+(u_1 v_2+ v_1 u_2)T+v_1 v_2T^2$$

$$=u_1u_2\mathbf{1}+(u_1 v_2+ v_1 u_2)T+v_1v_2(-L_T\mathbf{1}+2t_0T)$$

$$= (u_1u_2- v_1v_2L_T)\mathbf{1}+(u_1 v_2+ v_1 u_2 +2t_0v_1v_2)\, T \bmod q.$$

We obtain the plaintext p_1p_2 as follows.

$$v_{12}:=[\, M_1M_2]_1/t_1=u_1 v_2+ v_1 u_2 +2t_0v_1v_2 \bmod q$$

$$u_{12}:=[\, M_1M_2]_0 - v_{12}t_0 = u_1u_2- v_1v_2L_T \bmod q$$

$$u_{12}+h\, v_{12}= u_1u_2- v_1v_2L_T+h(u_1v_2+ v_1u_2 +2t_0v_1v_2) \bmod q$$

$$= u_1u_2+h(u_1 v_2+ v_1 u_2) + (-L_T +2\, h\, t_0)\, v_1v_2 \bmod q$$

$$= u_1u_2+h(u_1 v_2+ v_1 u_2) + h^2\, v_1v_2 \bmod q$$

$$=(\, u_1+h\, v_1)\, (\, u_2+h\, v_2) \bmod q$$

$$= p_1p_2.$$

where we denote the i-th element of octonion $M=(m_0,m_1,\ldots,m_7)$ such as

$$[M]_i=m_i.$$

Then we have

$$C(p_1,C(p_2,X)) = F_{\mathrm{AB}}(F_{\mathrm{AB}}(X,\mathbf{1}),M_1M_2)) \bmod q$$

$$= F_{\mathrm{AB}}(X,M_1M_2)) \bmod q$$

$$= F_{\mathrm{AB}}(X,(u_1u_2- v_1v_2L_T)\mathbf{1}+(u_1 v_2+ v_1 u_2 +2t_0v_1v_2)\, T)) \bmod q$$

$$= C(u_1u_2- v_1v_2L_T+h(u_1 v_2+ v_1 u_2 +2t_0v_1v_2),X)) \bmod q$$

$$= C(\, (u_1+h\, v_1)\, (\, u_2+h\, v_2),X)) \bmod q$$

$$=C(p_1p_2,X)) \bmod q.$$

It has been shown that in this method we have the multiplicative homomorphism of the plaintext p.

§4.4 Discrete logarithm assumption DLA(F,$F^{\,a}$;q)

Here we describe the assumption on which the proposed public-key scheme bases.

Let q be a prime more than 2. Let k, a , b and n be integer parameters. Let $\boldsymbol{A}:=(A_1,\ldots,A_k) \in O^k$, $\boldsymbol{Z}:=(Z_1,\ldots,Z_k)\in O^k$ such that A_1^{-1} ,…, A_k^{-1} and Z_1^{-1} ,…, Z_k^{-1} exist.

Let $F(X)=(A_k((\ldots((A_1X)Z_1))\ldots))Z_k \bmod q\in O[X]$ be basic function.

Let $F^a(X) \bmod q\in O[X]$ be the public function.

In the **DLA($\boldsymbol{F,F^a;q}$)** assumption, the adversary A_d is given $F^a(X)=\{ f_{aij} \}$ $(i,j=0,\ldots,7)$, system parameters $(q,h,T, F(X))$ where $F(X)= \{f_{ij}\}(i,j=0,\ldots,7)$and his goal is to find the integer $0<a<q^2$. For parameters $k = k(\lambda)$, $a= a(\lambda)$ defined in terms of the security parameter λ and for any PPT adversary A_d we have

$$\Pr [F(X)= \{ f_{ij} \}, F^a(X)=\{ f_{aij} \}: a \leftarrow A_d (1^\lambda, \{ f_{ij} \}, \{ f_{aij} \})]= \mathrm{negl}(\lambda).$$

To solve directly **DLA($\boldsymbol{F,F^a;q}$)** assumption is known to be the discrete logarithm problem on the multivariate polynomial.

§4.5 Computational Diffie–Hellman assumption CDHA($\boldsymbol{F,F^a,F^b;q}$)

Let q be a prime more than 2. Let k, a , b and n be integer parameters. Let $\boldsymbol{A}:=(A_1,\ldots,A_k) \in O^k$, $\boldsymbol{Z}:=(Z_1,\ldots,Z_k)\in O^k$ such that A_1^{-1} ,…, A_k^{-1} and Z_1^{-1} ,…, Z_k^{-1} exist.

Let $F(X)=(A_k((\ldots((A_1X)Z_1))\ldots))Z_k \bmod q\in O[X]$ be basic function.

Let $F^a(X) \bmod q\in O[X]$ be the public function of user A.

Let $F^b(X) \bmod q\in O[X]$ be the public function of user B.

Let $C(p_i,X)=F_{AB}(X, M_i)= F^{-ab}(M_iF^{ab}(X)) \bmod q \in O[X]$ be the ciphertext where $M_i=(m_{i0},\ldots, m_{i7})=u_i\mathbf{1}+v_iT \bmod q\in O$, $p_i= u_i +hv_i \bmod q$, u_i ,$v_i\in Fq$, X is a variable.

In the **CDHA($\boldsymbol{F,F^a,F^b;q}$)** assumption, the adversary A_d is given $F^a(X)=\{ f_{aij} \}$, $F^b(X) =\{ f_{bij} \}$ $(i,j=0,\ldots,7)$, system parameters $(q,h,T;F(X))$ and his goal is to find $F_{AB}(X, M_i)= F^{-ab}(M_iF^{ab}(X)) \bmod q$. For parameters $k = k(\lambda)$, $a= a(\lambda)$,and $b= b(\lambda)$ defined in terms of the security parameter λ and for any PPT adversary A_d we have

$$\Pr [F(X)= \{ f_{ij} \},F^a(X)=\{ f_{aij} \}, F^b(X)=\{ f_{bij} \}: F_{AB}(X,Y)=F^{-ab}(YF^{ab}(X)) \leftarrow A_d (1^\lambda, \{ f_{ij} \}, \{ f_{aij} \} , \{ f_{bij} \})]= \mathrm{negl}(\lambda).$$

To solve directly **CDHA($\boldsymbol{F,F^a,F^b;q}$)** assumption is known to be the computational Diffie–Hellman assumption on the multivariate polynomial.

§4.6 Syntax of proposed algorithms

The syntax of proposed scheme is given as follows.

-Key-Generation. The algorithm **KeyGen**, on input the security parameter 1^{λ} and system parameter (q, h,T; $F(X)$), outputs (**pk**,**sk**)←**KeyGen**(1^{λ}), where **pk**=[{ f_{aij} } (i,j=0,…,7)] is a public key and **sk=**(a) is a secret key.

-Encryption. The algorithm **Enc**, on input system parameter (q, h,T;$F(X)$), public key **pk**={ f_{aij} } (i,j=0,…,7) and a plaintext $p=u+hv \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$, outputs a ciphertext $\boldsymbol{C}(p, X)$ ←**Enc**(**pk,**;p) where $M=u+vT \bmod q$.

-Decryption. The algorithm **Dec**, on input system parameter (q, h,T; $F(X)$), secret key **sk=**(a) and a ciphertext $\boldsymbol{C}(p, X)$, outputs plaintext p=**Dec**(**sk**; $\boldsymbol{C}(p, X)$) where $\boldsymbol{C}(p, X)$ ←**Enc**(**pk**; p).

-Homomorphic-Evaluation. The algorithm **Eval**, on input system parameter (q, h,T;$F(X)$), an arithmetic circuit ckt, and a tuple of n ciphertexts (C_1,…, C_n), outputs an evaluated ciphertext C'←**Eval**(ckt; C_1,…, C_n) where C_i=$\boldsymbol{C}(p_i , X)$ (i=1,…,n).

§4.7 Property of proposed fully homomorphic public-key encryption

(**Fully homomorphic encryption**). Proposed fully homomorphic public-key encryption =(**KeyGen; Enc; Dec; Eval**) is fully homomorphic because it satisfies the following properties:

1. Homomorphism: Let $CR = \{CR_{\lambda}\}_{\lambda \in N}$ be the set of all polynomial sized arithmetic circuits. On input (**pk**,**sk**) ←**KeyGen**(1^{λ}), $\forall$ ckt $\in$ CR_{λ}, $\forall (p_1,\ldots,p_n) \in P^n$ where $n = n(\lambda)$, $\forall (C_1,\ldots,C_n)$ where C_i ←E(**pk**; p_i), $M_i=u_i\mathbf{1}+v_iT \bmod q$, $p_i=u_i+hv_i \bmod q$, (i =1,…,n), we have **Dec**(**sk**;**Eval**(ckt; C_1,…,C_n)) = ckt(p_1,…,p_n).

Then it holds that:

$$\Pr[\textbf{Dec}(\textbf{sk}; \textbf{Eval}(\text{ckt}; C_1,\ldots,C_n)) \neq \text{ckt}(p_1,\ldots, p_n)] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

2. Compactness: As the output length of **Eval** is at most $r\log_2 q = r\lambda$ where r is a positive integer, there exists a polynomial $\mu = \mu(\lambda)$ such that the output length of **Eval** is at most μ bits long regardless of the input circuit ckt and the number of its inputs.

§5. Analysis of proposed scheme

Here we analyze the proposed fully homomorphic pulic-key encryption scheme described in section 4.

§5.1 Computing plaintext *p* from coefficients of ciphertext $F_{AB}(X, M)$ to be published

Ciphertext $F_{AB}(X, M_r)$ (r=0,…,7) is published by cloud data centre such that

$$F_{AB}(X, M)= F^{-ba}(M_r F^{ba}(X)) \bmod q \in O[X]$$

$$=(c_{r00}x_0+c_{r01}x_1+ \ldots +c_{r07}x_7,$$

$$c_{r10}x_0+c_{r11}x_1+ \ldots +c_{r17}x_7,$$

$$\ldots \quad \ldots$$

$$c_{r70}x_0+c_{r71}x_1+ \ldots +c_{r77}x_7) \text{ moc } q,$$

$$=\{c_{rij}\}(r=0,\ldots,7;i,j=0,\ldots,7)$$

with $c_{rij} \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ (r=0,…,7;i,j=0,…,7) which is published,

where

$$M= u\mathbf{1}+vT \bmod q \in O,$$

$$p=u+hv \bmod q \in \boldsymbol{Fq}.$$

Let $F_{AB}(X, Y):= \{d_{ijk}\}(i,j,k=0,\ldots,7)$ such taht

$$F_{AB}(X, Y)= F^{-ba}(YF^{ba}(X)) \bmod q \in O[X,Y]$$

$$=(d_{000}x_0y_0+d_{001}x_0y_1+ \ldots +d_{077}x_7y_7,$$

$$d_{100}x_0y_0+d_{101}x_0y_1+ \ldots +d_{177}x_7y_7,$$

$$\ldots \quad \ldots$$

$$d_{700}x_0y_0+d_{701}x_0y_1+ \ldots +d_{777}x_7y_7,) \bmod q,$$

$$=\{d_{ijk}\}(i,j,k=0,\ldots,7)$$

with $d_{ijk} \in \boldsymbol{Fq}$ (i,j,k=0,…,7) which is secret.

Anyone except user A and user B does not know $\{d_{ijk}\}$ (i,j,k=0,…,7). Here we try to find $M_r=(m_{r0},\ldots,m_{r7})$ from $\{c_{rij}\}(i,j=0,\ldots,7)$ in condition that $d_{ijk}(i,j=0,\ldots,7)$ are unkown. We have the following simultaneous equations from $F_{AB}(X, Y)$ and $F_{AB}(X, M_r)$ (r=0,…,7).

$$d_{i00}m_{r0}+d_{i01}m_{r1}+\ldots+d_{i07}m_{r7}=c_{ri0} \bmod q$$
$$d_{i10}m_{r0}+d_{i11}m_{r1}+\ldots+d_{i17}m_{r7}=c_{ri1} \bmod q$$
$$\ldots$$
$$\ldots$$
$$d_{i70}m_{r0}+d_{i71}m_{r1}+\ldots+d_{i77}m_{r7}=c_{ri7} \bmod q$$
$$(i=0,\ldots,7)$$

For $M_r(r=0,\ldots,7)$ we obtain the same equations, the number of which is 512. We also obtain the 8 equations such as

$$|F_{AB}(\mathbf{1}, M_r)|^2= c_{r00}^2+ c_{r10}^2+\ldots+c_{r70}^2 \bmod q$$
$$=|M_r|^2= m_{r0}^2+m_{r1}^2+\ldots+m_{r7}^2 \bmod q(r=0,\ldots,7).$$

The number of unknown variables $M_r(r=0,\ldots,7)$ and d_{ijk} $(i,j,k=0,\ldots,7)$ is 576(=512+64). The number of equations is 520(=512+8). Then the complexity G_{reb} required for solving above simultaneous quadratic algebraic equations by using Gröbner basis is given such as

$$G_{reb} > G_{reb}'=({}_{520+dreg}C_{dreg})^w =({}_{780}C_{260})^w=2^{1699} >> 2^{80},$$

where G_{reb}' is the complexity required for solving 520 simultaneous quadratic algebraic equations with 519 variables by using Gröbner basis,

where w=2.39, and

$$d_{reg} = 260(=520*(2-1)/2 - 0\sqrt{}(520*(4-1)/6))$$

It is thought to be difficult computationally to solve the above simultaneous algebraic equations by using Gröbner basis.

§5.2 Attack by using the ciphertexts of *p* and -*p*

I show that we cannot easily distinguish the ciphertexts of p and $-p$. We try to attack by using "p and $-p$ attack". We select medium texts M and M_- for plaintexts p and $-p$ as follows.

$$M= u\mathbf{1}+vT \bmod q \in O,$$
$$p=u+hv \bmod q$$

$$M_{-}=u'\mathbf{1}+v'T \bmod q \in O,$$

$$-p=u'+hv' \bmod q$$

where u,v,u' and $v' \in \boldsymbol{F}q$.

As

$$F_{AB}(X, M)= F^{-ba}(M F^{ba}(X)) \bmod q \in O[X]$$

$$F_{AB}(X, M_{-})= F^{-ba}(M_{-} F^{ba}(X)) \bmod q \in O[X],$$

we have

$$F_{AB}(X, M)+ F_{AB}(X, M_{-})= F_{AB}(X, M+M_{-}).$$

From $p=u+hv \bmod q$ and $-p=u'+hv' \bmod q$, we have

$$p-p =0=(u+u')+ h(v+v') \bmod q.$$

Then we have

$$M + M_{-}$$

$$=u\mathbf{1}+vT +u'\mathbf{1}+v'T \bmod q$$

$$= (u+u')\mathbf{1}+(v+v')T \bmod q$$

$$= (v+v') (-h\mathbf{1}+T) \bmod q$$

$$\neq \mathbf{0} \bmod q \text{ (in general).}$$

We have

$$F_{AB}(\mathbf{1}, M)+ F_{AB}(\mathbf{1}, M_{-})$$

$$= F^{-ba}((M + M_{-})F^{ba}(\mathbf{1})) \bmod q$$

$$\neq \mathbf{0} \bmod q \text{ (in general).}$$

Next we show " p and $-p$ attack" is not efficient even if we can calculate $| F_{AB}(\mathbf{1}, M)+ F_{AB}(\mathbf{1}, M_{-}) |^2$ as follows.

$$| F_{AB}(\mathbf{1}, M)+ F_{AB}(\mathbf{1}, M_{-})|^2$$

$$= | M + M_{-} |^2 \bmod q$$

$$= | (v+v') (-h\mathbf{1}+T) |^2 \bmod q$$

$$= (v+v')^2 ((-h+t_0)^2+t_1^2+\ldots+t_7^2) \bmod q$$

$$=0 \bmod q. \text{ (From (35))}$$

But we can find many M_- such that

$$|M + M_-|^2 \bmod q=0,$$

because

$$|M + M_-|^2 =| (u+u')\mathbf{1}+(v+v')T |^2$$

$$=(u+u'+t_0(v+v'))^2+(v+v')^2(t_1^2+\ldots+t_7^2) \bmod q$$

From (35), we have

$$=(u+u'+t_0(v+v'))^2-(v+v')^2(t_0-h)^2$$

$$=(u+u'+(2t_0-h)(v+v'))(u+u'+h(v+v'))=0 \bmod q.$$

We can select many set of u' and v' such that

$$u+u'+(2t_0-h)(v+v')=0 \bmod q$$

and

$$p+p'= u+u'+h(v+v') \neq 0 \bmod q.$$

That is, even if

$$| F_{AB}(\mathbf{1}, M)+ F_{AB}(\mathbf{1}, M_-)|^2=0 \bmod q,$$

it does not always hold that

$$p+p' =0 \bmod q.$$

It is said that the attack by using "p and $-p$ attack" is not efficient.

Then we cannot easily distinguish the ciphertexts of p and $-p$.

§6. The size of the modulus q and the complexity for enciphering/deciphering

We consider the size of the system parameter q.

Theorem2 shows that the order l of an element $A \in O$ is q^2-1 in general. The complexity required for obtaining the discrete logarithm of $A^t \in O$ is O(*sqrt*(l)) where l is the order of an element $A \in O$[12] and t is an integer. We select the size of q such that O(*sqrt*(l))

is larger than 2^{2000}. Then we need to select modulus q such as O (q)= 2^{2000}.

We select k=8 where $\boldsymbol{A}$:=(A_1,…,A_k)$\in O^k$, $\boldsymbol{Z}$:=(Z_1,…,Z_k)$\in O^k$.

1) The size of $f_{ij}\in \boldsymbol{F}q$ (i,j=0,…,7) which are the coefficients of elements in $F(X)$ mod $q\in O[X]$ is (64)($\log_2 q$)bits =128kbits,
2) The size of $f_{aij}\in \boldsymbol{F}q$ (i,j=0,…,7) which are the coefficients of elements in $F^{a}(X)$ mod $q\in O[X]$ is (64)($\log_2 q$)bits =128kbits,

   and the size of system parameters (q,h,T;$A(X)$) is as large as 148kbits.

3) The complexity G1 to obtain $F(X)$ is

   $(64*8*15)(\log_2 q)^2= 2^{35}$ bit-operations.

4) The size of $F_{AB}(X,M) = F^{-ba}(YF^{ba}(X))\in O[X,Y]$ is (512)($\log_2 q$)bits =1024kbits.
5) The complexity G3 to obtain $F^{a}(X)$, $f_{aij}\in \boldsymbol{F}q$ (i,j =0,…,7) from $F(X)$ and a, is

   $(8*8*8)*2*(\log_2 q)*(\log_2 q)^2= 2^{43}$ bit-operations.

6) The complexity G4 to obtain $F^{-1}(X)$ from $F(X)$ is

   $8*(8+7+6+\ldots+2+8^2+7^2+6^2+\ldots+2^2+1^2+1+2+3+\ldots+8)(\log_2 q)^2+8*36*(\log_2 q)^3$

   $=8*275*(\log_2 q)^2+ 8*36*(\log_2 q)^3=2^{41}$ bit-operations.

7) The complexity G5 to obtain $F^{ab}(X)$ from $F^{a}(X)$ and b, is

   $(8*8*8)*2*(\log_2 q)*(\log_2 q)^2 = 2^{43}$ bit-operations.

8) The complexity G6 to obtain $F_{AB}(X,Y):= F^{-ba}(YF^{ba}(X))$ from $F^{ba}(X)$ is

   $(512*8)*(\log_2 q)^2 +8*275*(\log_2 q)^2+ 8*36*(\log_2 q)^3= 2^{41}$ bit-operations.

9) The complexity G7 to obtain $F_{AB}(X,M)$ from $F_{AB}(X,Y)$and M is

   $(64*8)*(\log_2 q)^2 = 2^{31}$ bit-operations.

   We notice that the complexity G7 required for enciphering every plaintext M is only 2^{31} bit-operations.

10) The complexity $G_{decipher}$ required for deciphering from $F_{AB}(X,M)$, $F^{ba}(X)$ and $F^{-ba}(X)$ is given as follows.

$$F^{ba}(F_{AB}((F^{-ba}(\mathbf{1}),M))=M \bmod q$$

$$M=(m_0,m_1,\ldots,m_7)= (u\mathbf{1}+vT) \bmod q$$

$$[M]_1/t_1 = v \bmod q,$$

$$[M]_0 - v\, t_0 = u \bmod q.$$

Then we obtain p such that

$$p = u + hv \bmod q.$$

Then the complexity G_{decipher} is

$(2*64+3)(\log_2 q)^2 + (1)*(\log_2 q)^3 = 2^{33}$ bit-operations.

On the other hand the complexity of the enciphering a plaintext and deciphering a ciphertext in RSA scheme is

$$O(2(\log_2 n)^3) = O(2^{34}) \text{ bit-operations each}$$

where the size of modulus n is 2048bits.

Then our scheme requires smaller complexity to encipher a plaintext and decipher a cipher text than RSA scheme.

§7. Conclusion

We proposed the new fully homomorphism public-key encryption scheme based on the discrete logarithm problem on octonion ring that requires not too large complexity to encipher and decipher. It was shown that our scheme is immune from "p and $-p$ attack"**.**

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Appendix A:

Octinv(*A*) ----------

S ← $a_0^2+a_1^2+\ldots+a_7^2$ mod *q*.
% S^{-1} mod *q*
q[1] ← q div S ;% integer part of q/S
r[1] ← q mod S ;% residue
k ←1
q[0] ← q
r[0] ← S
while r[k] ≠ 0
begin
k← k + 1
q[k] ← r[k−2] div r[k−1]
r[k] ← r[k−2] mod [rk−1]
end
Q [k−1] ← (-1)∗q[k−1]
L[k−1] ← 1
i ← k−1
while i > 1
begin
Q[i−1] ← (-1)∗Q[i] ∗q[i−1] + L[i]
L[i−1] ← Q[i]
i← i−1
end

invS ← Q[1] mod *q*
invA[0] ← a_0∗invS mod *q*
For *i*=1,…,7,
invA[*i*] ← (-1)∗a_i∗invS mod *q*
Return A^{-1}= (invA[0], invA[1],…, invA[7])

Appendix B:

Theorem 1

Let $A=(a_{10},a_{11},\ldots,a_{17})\in O$, $a_{1j}\in$ ***Fq*** (*j=0,1,…,7*).
Let $A^n=(a_{n0},a_{n1},\ldots,a_{n7})\in O$, $a_{nj}\in$ ***Fq*** (*n*=1,…,7;*j=0,1,…,7*).

a_{00} ,a_{nj} 's(n=1,2,…;j=0,1,…)and b_n's (n=0,1,…) satisfy the equations such that

$N= a_{11}^2+…+a_{17}^2 \bmod q$

$a_{00}=1$, $b_0=0$, $b_1=1$,

$a_{n0}= a_{n-1,0}\, a_{10} - b_{n-1}N \bmod q$,(n=1,2,...) (8)

$b_n= a_{n-1,0}+ b_{n-1}a_{10} \bmod q$,(n=1,2,...) (9)

$a_{nj}= b_n a_{1j} \bmod q$,(n=1,2,...;j=1,2,…,7) . (10)

(*Proof*:)

We use mathematical induction method.

[step 1]

When n=1, (8) holds because

$a_{10}= a_{00}\, a_{10} - b_0 N = a_{10} \bmod q$.

(9) holds because

$b_1= a_{00}+ b_0 a_{10} = a_{00} = 1 \bmod q$.

(10) holds because

$a_{1j}= b_1 a_{1j} = a_{1j} \bmod q$,(j=1,2,…,7)

[step 2]

When $n=k$,

If it holds that

$a_{k0}= a_{k-1,0}\, a_{10} - b_{k-1}N \bmod q$,(k=2,3,4,…) ,

$b_k= a_{k-1,0}+ b_{k-1}a_{10} \bmod q$,

$a_{kj}= b_k a_{1j} \bmod q$,(j=1,2,…,7),

from (9)

$b_{k-1}= a_{k-2,0}+ b_{k-2}a_{10} \bmod q$,(k=2,3,4,...),

then

$A^{k+1}=A^k A=(a_{k0} , b_k a_{11},..., b_k a_{17})(a_{10},a_{11},...,a_{17})$

$=(a_{k0}\, a_{10} - b_k N, a_{k0}\, a_{11}+ b_k a_{11}\, a_{10},…, a_{k0}\, a_{17}+ b_k a_{17}\, a_{10})$

$=(a_{k0}\, a_{10} - b_k N, (a_{k0} + b_k a_{10}) a_{11},…, (a_{k0} + b_k a_{10}) a_{17})$

$=(a_{k+1,0}, b_{k+1,0}\, a_{11},…, b_{k+1,0}\, a_{17})$,

as was required. q.e.d.

Appendix C:

Theorem 2

For an element $A=(a_{10},a_{11},...,a_{17}) \in O$,

$A^{J+1}=A \bmod q$,

where

$J:= LCM\ \{q^2-1,q-1\}=q^2-1$,

$N:=a_{11}^2+ a_{12}^2+…+a_{17}^2 \neq 0 \bmod q$.

(*Proof*:)

From (8) and (9) it comes that
$a_{n0}= a_{n-1,0}\, a_{10} - b_{n-1}N \bmod q$,
$b_n= a_{n-1,0}+ b_{n-1}a_{10} \bmod q$,
$a_{n0}\, a_{10} + b_n\, N= (a_{n-1,0}\, a_{10} - b_{n-1}N)\, a_{10} +(a_{n-1,0}+ b_{n-1}a_{10})N= a_{n-1,0}\, a_{10}^2 + a_{n-1,0}\, N \bmod q$,
$b_n\, N= a_{n-1,0}\, a_{10}^2 + a_{n-1,0}\, N- a_{n0}\, a_{10} \bmod q$,
$b_{n-1}\, N= a_{n-2,0}\, a_{10}^2 + a_{n-2,0}\, N- a_{n-1,0}\, a_{10} \bmod q$,
$a_{n0}= 2\, a_{10}a_{n-1,0} - (\, a_{10}^2 +N)\, a_{n-2,0} \bmod q$, $(n=1,2,\dots)$.

1) In case that $-N \neq 0 \bmod q$ is quadratic non-residue of prime q,
Because $-N \neq 0 \bmod q$ is quadratic non-residue of prime q,
$(-N)^{(q-1)/2}=-1 \bmod q$.
$a_{n0} - 2\, a_{10}\, a_{n-1,0} +(\, a_{10}^2 +N)\, a_{n-2,0}=0 \bmod q$,
$a_{n0}=(\beta^n(a_{10}-\alpha) + (\beta- a_{10})\alpha^n)/(\, \beta- \alpha)$ *over* $Fq[\alpha]$
$b_n=(\beta^n-\alpha^n)/(\, \beta- \alpha)$ *over* $Fq[\alpha]$
where α,β are roots of algebraic quadratic equation such that

$t^2-2a_{10}t+a_{10}^2+N=0$.

$\alpha = \mathrm{a}_{10} + \sqrt{-N}\ over\ Fq[\alpha]$,

$\beta = \mathrm{a}_{10} - \sqrt{-N}$ *over* $Fq[\alpha]$.

We can calculate β^{q^2} as follows.

$\beta^{q^2} = (\mathrm{a}_{10} - \sqrt{-N})^{q^2}$ *over* $Fq[\alpha]$

$= (\mathrm{a}_{10}{}^{q} - \sqrt{-N}(-N)^{(q-1)/2})^{q}$ *over* $Fq[\alpha]$

$= (\mathrm{a}_{10} - \sqrt{-N}(-N)^{(q-1)/2})^{q}$ *over* $Fq[\alpha]$

$= (\mathrm{a}_{10}{}^{q} - \sqrt{-N}(-N)^{(q-1)/2}(-N)^{(q-1)/2})\ over\ Fq[\alpha]$

$= \mathrm{a}_{10} - \sqrt{-N}(-1)(-1)$ *over* $\boldsymbol{Fq}[\alpha]$

$= \mathrm{a}_{10} - \sqrt{-N}$ *over* $\boldsymbol{Fq}[\alpha]$

$= \beta\ over\ Fq[\alpha]$.

In the same manner we obtain

$\alpha^{q^2} = \alpha\ over\ \boldsymbol{Fq}[\alpha]$.

$a_{q^2,0} = (\beta^{q^2}(a_{10} - \alpha) + (\beta - a_{10})\alpha^{q^2})/(\beta - \alpha)$

$=(\beta(a_{10}-\alpha) + (\beta- a_{10})\alpha)/(\beta- \alpha)=a_{10} \mod q.$

$b_{q^2} = (\beta^{q^2} - \alpha^{q^2})/(\beta - \alpha) = 1 \mod q.$

Then we obtain

$A^{q2}=(a_{q2,0},b_{q2}a_{11},\ldots,b_{q2}a_{17})$

$=(a_{10}, a_{11},\ldots,a_{17})=A \mod q$

2) In case that $-N\neq 0 \mod q$ is quadratic residue of prime q

$a_{n0}=(\beta^n(a_{10}-\alpha) + (\beta- a_{10})\alpha^n)/(\beta- \alpha) \mod q,$

$b_{n0}=(\beta^n-\alpha^n)/(\beta- \alpha) \mod q ,$

As $\alpha,\beta\in \boldsymbol{Fq}$, from Fermat's little Theorem

$\beta^q=\beta \mod q,$

$\alpha^q=\alpha \mod q.$

Then we have

$a_{q0}=(\beta^q(a_{10}-\alpha) + (\beta- a_{10})\alpha^q)/(\beta- \alpha) \mod q$

$=(\beta(a_{10}-\alpha) + (\beta- a_{10})\alpha)/(\beta- \alpha) \mod q$

$=a_{10} \mod q$

$b_q=(\beta^q-\alpha^q)/(\beta- \alpha)=1 \mod q.$

Then we have

$a^q=(a_{q0},b_qa_{11},\ldots,b_qa_{17})$

$=(a_{10}, a_{11},\ldots,a_{17})=a \mod q.$

We therefore arrive at the equation such as

$A^{J+1}=A \mod q$ for arbitrary element $A\in O,$

where

$J=$ LCM $\{ q^2-1,q-1\}=q^2-1,$

as was required. q.e.d.

We notice that
in case that $-N=0 \bmod q$

$a_{00}=1$, $b_0=0$, $b_1=1$,

From (8)

$a_{n0}= a_{n-1,0}\, a_{10} \bmod q$,$(n=1,2,\ldots)$,

then we have

$a_{n0}= a_{10}{}^{n} \bmod q$,$(n=1,2,\ldots)$.

$a_{q0}= a_{10}{}^{q}= a_{10} \bmod q$.

From (9),

$b_n= a_{n-1,0}+ b_{n-1}a_{10} \bmod q$,$(n=1,2,\ldots)$

$= a_{10}{}^{n-1}+ b_{n-1}a_{10} \bmod q$

$= 2a_{10}{}^{n-1}+ b_{n-2}a_{10}{}^{2} \bmod q$

… …

$= (n-1)a_{10}{}^{n-1}+ b_1 a_{10}{}^{n-1} \bmod q$

$= na_{10}{}^{n-1} \bmod q$.

Then we have

$a_{nj}= na_{10}{}^{n-1}a_{1j} \bmod q$,$(n=1,2,\ldots;j=1,2,\ldots,7)$.

$a_{qj}= qa_{10}{}^{q-1}a_{1j} \bmod q =0$,$(j=1,2,\ldots,7)$.

Appendix D:
Lemma 2

$A^{-1}(AB)= B$

$(BA)A^{-1}= B$

(*Proof*:)

$A^{-1}= (a_0/|A|^2 \bmod q, -a_1/|A|^2 \bmod q,\ldots, -a_7/|A|^2 \bmod q)$.

$AB \bmod q$

$= (a_0b_0-a_1b_1- a_2b_2- a_3b_3-a_4b_4- a_5b_5-a_6b_6-a_7b_7 \bmod q,$

$a_0b_1+a_1b_0+a_2b_4+a_3b_7-a_4b_2+a_5b_6-a_6b_5-a_7b_3 \bmod q,$

$a_0b_2-a_1b_4+a_2b_0+a_3b_5+a_4b_1-a_5b_3+a_6b_7-a_7b_6 \bmod q,$

$a_0b_3-a_1b_7-a_2b_5+a_3b_0+a_4b_6+a_5b_2-a_6b_4+a_7b_1 \bmod q,$

$a_0b_4+a_1b_2-a_2b_1-a_3b_6+a_4b_0+a_5b_7+a_6b_3-a_7b_5 \bmod q,$

$a_0b_5-a_1b_6+a_2b_3-a_3b_2-a_4b_7+a_5b_0+a_6b_1+a_7b_4 \bmod q,$

$a_0b_6+a_1b_5-a_2b_7+a_3b_4-a_4b_3-a_5b_1+a_6b_0+a_7b_2 \bmod q,$

$a_0b_7+a_1b_3+a_2b_6-a_3b_1+a_4b_5-a_5b_4-a_6b_2+a_7b_0 \bmod q).$

$[A^{-1}(AB)]_0$

$=\{ a_0(a_0b_0-a_1b_1- a_2b_2- a_3b_3-a_4b_4- a_5b_5-a_6b_6-a_7b_7)$

$+a_1(a_0b_1+a_1b_0+a_2b_4+a_3b_7-a_4b_2+a_5b_6-a_6b_5-a_7b_3)$

$+ a_2(a_0b_2-a_1b_4+a_2b_0+a_3b_5+a_4b_1-a_5b_3+a_6b_7-a_7b_6)$

$+a_3(a_0b_3-a_1b_7-a_2b_5+a_3b_0+a_4b_6+a_5b_2-a_6b_4+a_7b_1)$

$+a_4(a_0b_4+a_1b_2-a_2b_1-a_3b_6+a_4b_0+a_5b_7+a_6b_3-a_7b_5)$

$+ a_5(a_0b_5-a_1b_6+a_2b_3-a_3b_2-a_4b_7+a_5b_0+a_6b_1+a_7b_4)$

$+a_6(a_0b_6+a_1b_5-a_2b_7+a_3b_4-a_4b_3-a_5b_1+a_6b_0+a_7b_2)$

$+a_7(a_0b_7+a_1b_3+a_2b_6-a_3b_1+a_4b_5-a_5b_4-a_6b_2+a_7b_0)\} /|A|^2 \bmod q$

$=\{(a_0^2+a_1^2+\ldots+a_7^2) b_0\} /|A|^2 =b_0 \bmod q$

where $[M]_n$ denotes the n-th element of $M \in O$.

$[A^{-1}(AB)]_1$

$=\{ a_0(a_0b_1+a_1b_0+a_2b_4+a_3b_7-a_4b_2+a_5b_6-a_6b_5-a_7b_3)$

$-a_1(a_0b_0-a_1b_1- a_2b_2- a_3b_3-a_4b_4- a_5b_5-a_6b_6-a_7b_7)$

$-a_2(a_0b_4+a_1b_2-a_2b_1-a_3b_6+a_4b_0+a_5b_7+a_6b_3-a_7b_5)$

$-a_3(a_0b_7+a_1b_3+a_2b_6-a_3b_1+a_4b_5-a_5b_4-a_6b_2+a_7b_0)$

$+a_4(a_0b_2-a_1b_4+a_2b_0+a_3b_5+a_4b_1-a_5b_3+a_6b_7-a_7b_6)$

$- a_5(a_0b_6+a_1b_5-a_2b_7+a_3b_4-a_4b_3-a_5b_1+a_6b_0+a_7b_2)$

$+a_6(a_0b_5-a_1b_6+a_2b_3-a_3b_2-a_4b_7+a_5b_0+a_6b_1+a_7b_4)$

$+a_7(a_0b_3-a_1b_7-a_2b_5+a_3b_0+a_4b_6+a_5b_2-a_6b_4+a_7b_1)\}\ /|A|^2 \bmod q$

$=\{(a_0^2+a_1^2+\ldots+a_7^2)\ b_1\}\ /|A|^2=b_1 \bmod q.$

Similarly we have

$[A^{-1}(AB)]_i=b_i \bmod q\ (i=2,3,\ldots,7).$

Then

$A^{-1}(AB)= B \bmod q.$ q.e.d.

Appendix E:

$P=A^n \bmod q \in O$

Power(A,n,q) ----------

P ← 1
while $n \neq 0$
begin
if *n* is even then $A \leftarrow A*A \bmod q$, $n \leftarrow n/2$
otherwise $P \leftarrow A*P \bmod q$, $n \leftarrow n-1$
end
Return *P*

Appendix F:

$P(X)=A^n(X) \bmod q \in O[X]$

Power$(A(X),n,q)$ ----------

$P(X) \leftarrow \mathbf{1} \in O$
while $n \neq 0$
begin
if n is even then $A(X) \leftarrow A(A(X)) \bmod q$, $n \leftarrow n/2$
otherwise $P(X) \leftarrow A(P(X)) \bmod q$, $n \leftarrow n\text{-}1$
end
Return $P(X)$
