# Cryptanalysis of Indistinguishability Obfuscations of Circuits over GGH13<sup>\*</sup>

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#### Abstract

Annihilation attacks, introduced in the work of Miles, Sahai, and Zhandry (CRYPTO 2016), are a class of polynomial-time attacks against several candidate indistinguishability obfuscation  $(i\mathcal{O})$  schemes, built from Garg, Gentry, and Halevi (EUROCRYPT 2013) multilinear maps. In this work, we provide a *general* efficiently-testable property for two single-input branching programs, called *partial inequivalence*, which we show is sufficient for our variant of annihilation attacks on several obfuscation constructions based on GGH13 multilinear maps.

We give examples of pairs of natural  $NC^1$  circuits, which – when processed via Barrington's Theorem – yield pairs of branching programs that are partially inequivalent. As a consequence we are also able to show examples of "bootstrapping circuits," used to obtain obfuscations for all circuits (given an obfuscator for  $NC^1$  circuits), in certain settings also yield partially inequivalent branching programs. Prior to our work, no attacks on any obfuscation constructions for these settings were known.

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# 1 Introduction

An obfuscator is a program compiler which hides all partial implementation details of a program, intuitively. This is formalized via the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation [BGI+01]: we say an obfuscator  $\mathcal{O}$  is an indistinguishability obfuscator if it holds for every pair  $C_0, C_1$  of functionally equivalent circuits (i.e. computing the same function) that  $\mathcal{O}(C_0)$  and  $\mathcal{O}(C_1)$  are indistinguishable. A recent surge of results has highlighted the importance of this notion: virtually "any cryptographic task" can be achieved assuming indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions [SW14].

All known candidate constructions of indistinguishability obfuscation, e.g.  $[GGH^+13b, BGK^+14, AB15]$ , are based on multilinear-maps  $[GGH13a, CLT13, GGH15]^1$ , which have been the subjects of various attacks  $[CHL^+15, CGH^+15a, CFL^+16, HJ16, CLLT16a]$ . Among them, the attacks (e.g. [GGH13a, HJ16]) on GGH13 [GGH13a] multilinear maps required explicit access to "low-level" encodings of zero, or differently represented low-level encodings of zero, in the form of an encoded matrix with a zero eigenvalue  $[CGH^+15b]$ ; such low-level zero-encodings do not appear naturally in obfuscation constructions(except for a few specially designed programs  $[CGH^+15a]$ ). Recently Miles, Sahai, and Zhandry [MSZ16] introduced a new class of polynomial-time<sup>2</sup> attacks without requiring low-level zeros against several obfuscation constructions  $[BR14, BGK^+14, AGIS14, MSW14, PST14]$  and [BMSZ16a], when instantiated with the GGH13 multilinear maps.

More specifically, Miles et al. [MSZ16] exhibit two simple *branching programs* (and also programs padded with those) that are functionally equivalent, yet their BGKPS-obfuscations (put forward by Barak et al. in [BGK<sup>+</sup>14]) and similar constructions [BR14, AGIS14, MSW14, PST14, BMSZ16b] are efficiently distinguishable.<sup>3</sup> Additionally they show that their attacks extend to any two branching programs with those two simple programs (respectively) padded into them. However, the branching programs considered there, in particular the *all-identity* branching program, do not appear "in the wild". More specifically, obfuscation constructions for circuits first convert an  $NC^1$  circuit into a branching program (e.g. via Barrington's transformation) that possibly results in programs with complex structures, even if one starts with simple circuits. This brings us to the following open question:

Is it possible to attack obfuscations of complex branching programs generated from  $NC^1$  circuits?

### 1.1 Our Contributions

In this work, we are able to answer the above question affirmatively. In particular, our main contributions are:

• We first define a *general* and efficiently-testable property of two single-input<sup>4</sup> branching programs called *partial inequivalence* (discussed below) and demonstrate an annihilation attack

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>The work of  $[AJN^+16]$  might be seen as an exception to this: Assuming the (non-explicit) existence of indistinguishability obfuscation, they provide an explicit construction of an indistinguishability obfuscator.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup>Several subexponential-time or quantum-polynomial-time [CDPR16, ABD16, CJL16] attacks on GGH13 multilinear maps also have been considered. We do not consider these in this paper.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup>To avoid repetitions, from now on we will refer to the obfuscation constructions of [BGK<sup>+</sup>14, BR14, AGIS14, MSW14, PST14] by BGKPS-like constructions.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>The branching programs, where any pair of matrices in the sequence depends on a single input location, are called single-input branching programs. Such branching programs naturally evolve from Barrington's transformation on circuits.

against BGKPS-like obfuscations of any two (large enough) branching programs that satisfy this property.

- Next, using implementation in Sage [S<sup>+</sup>16] (see Appendix A for details on the implementation) we give explicit examples of pairs of (functionally equivalent) natural NC<sup>1</sup> circuits, which when processed via Barrington's Theorem yield pairs of branching programs that are partially inequivalent and thus, attackable.
- As a consequence of the above result, we are also able to show that the "bootstrapping circuit(s)" technique used to boost  $i\mathcal{O}$  for NC<sup>1</sup> to  $i\mathcal{O}$  for P/poly, for a certain choice of the universal circuit, yield partially inequivalent branching programs in a similar manner and are, thus, also attackable.

Our general partial inequivalence condition is broad and seems to capture a wide range of natural single-input branching programs. However, we require the program to be large enough.<sup>5</sup> Additionally, we need the program to output 0 on a large number of its inputs.

Finally, our new annihilation attacks are essentially based on linear system solvers and thus quite *systematic*. This is in contrast with the attacks of Miles et al. [MSZ16] which required an exhaustive search operation rendering it hard to extend their analysis for branching programs with natural structural complexity. Therefore, at a conceptual level, our work enhances the understanding of the powers and the (potential) limits of annihilation attacks.

One limitation of our technique is that they do *not* extend to so-called dual-input branching programs. We leave it as an interesting open question.

A Concurrent and Independent work. Concurrent and independent to our work,<sup>6</sup> Chen et al. [CGH16a] provides a polynomial time attack against the GGHRSW construction [GGH<sup>+</sup>13b] based on GGH13 (and also GGH15 [GGH15]) maps that works for so-called "input-partitioning" branching programs. Nonetheless, their attacks are not known to extend [CGH16b] for complex branching programs evolved from  $NC^1$  circuits (e.g. via Barrington's Transformation). Hence, our work stands as the *only* work that breaks obfuscations of  $NC^1$  circuits based on GGH13 till date.

**Change in Obfuscation landscape.** Given our work and the work of Chen et al. [CGH16a] the new *attack landscape against GGH13-based obfuscators* is depicted in Figure 1. We refer the reader to  $[AJN^+16, Figure 13]$  for the state of the art on obfuscation constructions based on CLT13 and GGH15 multilinear maps.

### 1.2 Technical Overview

Below, after providing some additional backgrounds on multilinear maps and known attacks, we provide a overview of our annihilation attacks.

Multilinear Maps: Abstractly. As a first approximation, one can say that a cryptographic multilinear map system encodes a value  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  (where p is a large prime) by using a homomorphic encryption scheme equipped with some additional structure. In other words, given encodings of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>Note that, for our implementation we consider circuits that are quite small, only depth 3, and the resulting Barrington programs are of length 64. However, using the implementation we then "boost" the attack to a much larger  $NC^1$  circuits that suffice for the real-world attack (discussed in Section 6)to go through.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>The first draft of this paper appeared online concurrently as their first draft [CGH16a]. At the same time another independent work [CLLT16b] appeared that provided attacks against several CLT13 based obfuscators for a broader class of programs.

	Branching Programs	NC <sup>1</sup> Circuits (Barrington's)	NC <sup>1</sup> -to-P/poly [GGH <sup>+</sup> 13b, App14] [BGL <sup>+</sup> 15, GIS <sup>+</sup> 10]
$GGHRSW[GGH^+13b]$	$\otimes$	0	$\bigcirc$
BGKPS-like constructions [BR14, BGK <sup>+</sup> 14, AGIS14] [PST14, MSW14, BMSZ16a]	×	$\otimes$	$\otimes$
Obfuscations from weak multilinear maps [GMM <sup>+</sup> 16, DGG <sup>+</sup> 16]	0	0	0

Figure 1: The Attack Landscape for GGH13-based Obfuscators. In all cases, the multilinear map is [GGH13a].  $\bigcirc$  means no attack is known.  $\times$  means a prior attack is known, and we present more general attacks for this setting.  $\bigotimes$  means we give the first known attack in this setting and  $\bigotimes$  means a new attack is discovered concurrently to ours (namely [CGH16a]).

a and b, one can perform homomorphic computations by computing encodings of a + b and  $a \cdot b$ . Additionally, each multilinear map encoding is associated with some *level* described by a value  $i \in \{1 \dots \kappa\}$  for a fixed universe parameter  $\kappa$ . Encodings can be added only if they are at the same level:  $\operatorname{Enc}_i(a) \oplus \operatorname{Enc}_i(b) \to \operatorname{Enc}_i(a+b)$ . Encodings can be multiplied:  $\operatorname{Enc}_i(a) \odot \operatorname{Enc}_j(b) \to \operatorname{Enc}_{i+j}(a \cdot b)$  if  $i + j \leq \kappa$  but is meaningless otherwise. We naturally extend the encoding procedure and the homomorphic operations to encode and to compute on matrices, respectively, by encoding each term of the matrix separately. Finally, the multilinear map system comes equipped with a *zero test*: an efficient procedure for testing whether the input is an encoding of 0 at level- $\kappa$ . However, such zero-test procedure is not perfect as desired when instantiated with concrete candidate multilinear maps. In particular we are interested in the imperfection in GGH13 map.

An Imperfection of the GGH13 Multilinear Maps. Expanding a little on the abstraction above, a fresh multilinear map encoding of a value  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_p$  at level *i* is obtained by first sampling a random value  $\mu$  from  $\mathbb{Z}_p$  and then encoding  $\mathsf{Enc}_i(a + \mu \cdot p)$ . Homomorphic operations can be performed just as before, except that the randomnesses from different encodings also get computed on. Specifically,  $\mathsf{Enc}_i(a + \mu \cdot p) \oplus \mathsf{Enc}_i(b + \nu \cdot p)$  yields  $\mathsf{Enc}_i(a + b + (\mu + \nu) \cdot p)$  and multiplication  $\mathsf{Enc}_i(a + \mu \cdot p) \odot \mathsf{Enc}_j(b + \nu \cdot p)$  yields  $\mathsf{Enc}_{i+j}(a \cdot b + (b \cdot \mu + a \cdot \nu + \mu \cdot \nu \cdot p) \cdot p)$  if  $i + j \leq \kappa$  but is meaningless otherwise. An imperfection of the zero-test procedure is a feature characterized by two phenomena:

- 1. On input  $\mathsf{Enc}_{\kappa}(0+r \cdot p)$  the zero-test procedure additionally reveals r in a somewhat "scrambled" form.
- 2. For certain efficiently computable polynomials f and a collection of scrambled values  $\{r_i\}$  it is efficient to check if  $f(\{r_i\}) = 0 \mod p$  or not for any choice of  $r_i$ 's.<sup>7</sup>

This imperfection has been exploited to perform attacks in prior works, such as the one by Miles

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>One can alternatively consider the scrambled values as polynomials over  $\{r_i\}$  and then check if  $f(\{r_i\})$  is identically zero in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ .

et al. [MSZ16].<sup>8</sup>

Matrix Branching Programs. A matrix branching program of length  $\ell$  for *n*-bit inputs is a sequence  $BP = \left\{A_0, \left\{A_{i,0}, A_{i,1}\right\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, A_{\ell+1}\right\}$ , where  $A_0 \in \{0, 1\}^{1 \times 5}, A_{i,b}$ 's for  $i \in [\ell]$  are in  $\{0, 1\}^{5 \times 5}$  and  $A_{\ell+1} \in \{0, 1\}^{5 \times 1}$ . Without providing details, we note that the choice of  $5 \times 5$  matrices comes from Barrington's Theorem [Bar86]. We use the notation [n] to describe the set  $\{1, \ldots, n\}$ . Let inp be a fixed function such that  $inp(i) \in [n]$  is the input bit position examined in the  $i^{th}$  step of the branching program. The function computed by this matrix branching program is

$$f_{BP}(x) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } A_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} A_{i,x[\mathsf{inp}(i)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1} = 0\\ 1 & \text{if } A_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} A_{i,x[\mathsf{inp}(i)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1} \neq 0 \end{cases},$$

where  $x[inp(i)] \in \{0, 1\}$  denotes the  $inp(i)^{th}$  bit of x.

The branching program described above inspects one bit of the input in each step. More generally, multi-arity branching programs inspect multiple bits in each step. For example, dualinput programs inspect two bits during each step. Our strategy only works against single-input branching programs, hence we restrict ourselves to that setting.

**Exploiting the Imperfection/Weakness.** At a high level, obfuscation of a branching program  $BP = \{A_0, \{A_{i,0}, A_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, A_{\ell+1}\}$  yields a collection of encodings  $\{M_0, \{M_{i,0}, M_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, M_{\ell+1}\}$ , say all of which are obtained at level-1.<sup>9</sup> We let  $\{Z_0, \{Z_{i,0}, Z_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, Z_{\ell+1}\}$  denote the randomnesses used in the generation of these encodings, where each Z corresponds to a matrix of random values (analogous to r above) in  $\mathbb{Z}_p$ . For every input x such that BP(x) = 0, we have that  $M_0 \odot \bigcirc_{i=1}^{\ell} M_{i,x[inp(i)]} \odot M_{\ell+1}$  is an encoding of 0, say of the form  $\operatorname{Enc}(0 + r_x \cdot p)$  from which  $r_x$  can be learned in a scrambled form. The crucial observations of Miles et al. [MSZ16] are: (1) for every known obfuscation construction,  $r_x$  is a program dependent function of  $\{Z_0, \{Z_{i,0}, Z_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, Z_{\ell+1}\}$ , and (2) for a large enough  $m \in \mathbb{Z}$  the values  $\{r_{x_k}\}_{k=1}^m$  must be correlated, which in turn implies that there exists a (program-dependent) efficiently computable function  $f^{BP}$  and input choices  $\{x_k^{BP}\}_{k=1}^m$  such that for all  $k \in [m]$ ,  $BP(x_k^{BP}) = 0$  and  $f^{BP}(\{r_{x_k^{BP}}\}_{k=1}^m) = 0 \mod p.^{10}$  Further, just like Miles et al. we are interested in constructing an attacker for the *indistinguishability* notion of obfuscation. In this case, given two arbitrarily distinct programs BP and BP' (such that  $\forall x, BP(x) = BP'(x)$ ) an attacker needs to distinguish between the obfuscations of BP and BP'. Therefore, to complete the attack, it suffices to argue that for the sequence of  $\{r'_{x_k^{BP'}}\}$  values obtained from execution of BP' it holds that,  $f^{BP}(\{r'_{x_k^{BP'}}\}_{k=1}^m) \neq 0 \mod p$ . Hence, the task of attacking any obfuscation scheme reduces to the task of finding such distinguishing function  $f^{BP}$ .

Miles et al. [MSZ16] accomplishes that by presenting specific examples of branching programs, both of which implement the constant zero function, and a corresponding distinguishing function. They then extend the attack to other related branching programs that are padded with those

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Recent works such as [GMM<sup>+</sup>16, DGG<sup>+</sup>16], have attempted to realize obfuscation schemes secure against such imperfection and are provably secure against our attacks. We refer to them as obfuscations from weak multilinear maps (see Figure 1).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup>Many obfuscation constructions use more sophisticate leveling structure, typically referred to as so-called "straddling sets". However we emphasize that, this structure does not affect our attacks. Therefore we will just ignore this in our setting.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup>This follows from the existence of an annihilating polynomial for any over-determined non-linear systems of equations. We refer to [Kay09] for more details.

constant-zero programs. The details of their attack [MSZ16] is quite involved, hence we jump directly to the intuition behind our envisioned more general attacks.

**Partial Inequivalence of Branching Programs and Our Attacks.** We start with the following observation. For BGKPS-like-obfuscations for any branching program  $BP = \{A_0, \{A_{i,0}, A_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, A_{\ell+1}\}$  the value  $s_x = r_x \mod p$  looks something like: <sup>11</sup>

$$s_x \simeq \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \alpha_{i,x[\operatorname{inp}(i)]} \underbrace{\left[ \sum_{i=0}^{\ell+1} \left( \prod_{j=0}^{i-1} A_{j,x_{\operatorname{inp}(j)}} \cdot Z_{i,x[\operatorname{inp}(i)]} \cdot \prod_{j=i+1}^{\ell+1} A_{j,x_{\operatorname{inp}(j)}} \right) \right]}_{t},$$

where  $\{Z_0, \{Z_{i,0}, Z_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, Z_{\ell+1}\}$  are the randomnesses contributed by the corresponding encodings. Let  $\overline{x}$  denote the value obtained by flipping every bit of x (a.k.a. the bitwise complement). Now observe that the product value  $\Lambda = \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \alpha_{i,x[inp(i)]} \cdot \alpha_{i,\overline{x}[inp(i)]}$  is independent of x. Therefore,  $u_x = s_x \cdot s_{\overline{x}} = \Lambda \cdot t_x \cdot t_{\overline{x}}$ . Absorbing  $\Lambda$  in the  $\{Z_{i,0}, Z_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}$ , we have that  $u_x$  is quadratic in the randomness values  $\{Z_0, \{Z_{i,0}, Z_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, Z_{\ell+1}\}$ , or linear in the random terms ZZ' obtained by multiplying every choice of  $Z, Z' \in \{Z_0, \{Z_{i,0}, Z_{i,1}\}_{i=1}^{\ell}, Z_{\ell+1}\}$ . In other words if BP evaluates to 0 both on inputs x and  $\overline{x}$ , the values revealed by two zero-test operations give one linear equation where the coefficients of the linear equations are program dependent. Now, if BP implements a "sufficiently non-evasive" circuit, (e.g. a PRF) such that there exist sufficiently many such inputs  $x, \overline{x}$  for which  $BP(x) = BP(\overline{x}) = 0$ , then collecting sufficiently many values  $\{x_k^{BP}, u_{x_k^{BP}}\}_{k=1}^m$ , we get a dependent system of linear relations. Namely, there exist  $\{\nu_k^{BP}\}_{k=1}^m$  such that  $\sum_{k=1}^m \nu_k^{BP} \cdot u_{x_k^{BP}} = 0$ . In other words,  $\sum_{k=1}^m \nu_k^{BP} \cdot r_{x_k^{BP}} \cdot r_{\overline{x_k^{BP}}} = 0 \mod p$ , where  $\{\nu_k^{BP}\}_{k=1}^m$  depends only on the description of the branching program BP.

We remark that, in the process of linearization above we increased (by a quadratic factor) the number of random terms in the system. However, this can be always compensated by using more equations, because the number of random terms is O(poly(n)) (*n* is the input length) whereas the number of choices of input *x* is  $2^{O(n)}$  which implies that there are exponentially many  $r_x$  available.

Note that for any branching program BP' that is "different enough" from BP, we could expect that  $\sum_{k=1}^{m} \nu_k^{BP} \cdot r'_{x_k^{BP}} \neq 0 \mod p$  where  $r'_{x_k^{BP}}$  are values revealed in executions of an obfuscation of BP'. This is because the values  $\{\nu_k^{BP}\}_{k=1}^m$  depend on the specific implementation of BP through terms of the form  $\prod_{j=0}^{i-1} A_{j,x[inp(i)]}$  and  $\prod_{j=i+1}^{\ell+1} A_{j,x[inp(i)]}$  in  $s_x$  above. Two branching programs that differ from each other in this sense are referred to as partially inequivalent.<sup>12</sup>

What Programs are Partially Inequivalent? Attack on NC<sup>1</sup> circuits. The condition we put forth seems to be fairly generic and intuitively should work for large class of programs. In particular, we are interested in the programs generated from NC<sup>1</sup> circuits. However, due to complex structures of such programs the analysis becomes quite non-trivial.<sup>13</sup> Nonetheless, we manage to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup>Obtaining this expression requires careful analysis that is deferred to the main body of the paper. Also, by abuse of notation let  $A_{0,x_{inp}(0)} = A_0$ ,  $A_{\ell+1,x_{inp}(\ell+1)} = A_{\ell+1}$ ,  $Z_{0,x_{inp}(0)} = Z_0$  and  $Z_{\ell+1,x_{inp}(\ell+1)} = Z_{\ell+1}$ . <sup>12</sup>Note that the only other constraint we need is that both *BP* and *BP'* evaluates to 0 for sufficiently many inputs,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup>Note that the only other constraint we need is that both BP and BP' evaluates to 0 for sufficiently many inputs, which we include in the definition (c.f. Def. 4.2) of partial inequivalence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup>Note that, the analysis of Miles et al. uses  $2 \times 2$  matrices in addition to using simple branching programs. These simplifications allow them to base their analysis on many facts related to the structures of these programs. Our aim here is to see if the attack works for programs obtained from NC<sup>1</sup> circuits, in particular via Barrington's Theorem. So, unfortunately it is not clear if their approach can be applicable here as the structure of the programs yielded via Barrington's Theorem become much complex structurally (and also much larger in size) to analyze.

show via implementation in Sage [S<sup>+</sup>16] (c.f. Appendix A) that the attack indeed works on a pair of branching programs obtained from a pair of simple NC<sup>1</sup> circuits, (say  $C_0, C_1$ ) (see Sec. 7 for the circuit descriptions) by applying Barrington's Theorem. The circuits take 4 bits of inputs and on any input they evaluate to 0. In our attack we use all possible 16 inputs. Furthermore, we can escalate the attack to any pair of NC<sup>1</sup> circuits ( $E_0, E_1$ ) where  $E_b = \neg C_b \wedge D_b$  ( $b \in \{0, 1\}$ ) for practically any two NC<sup>1</sup> circuits  $D_0, D_1$  (we need only one input x for which  $D(x) = D(\bar{x}) = 0$ ). We now take again a sequence of 16-inputs such that we vary the parts of all the inputs going into  $C_b$  and keep the part of inputs read by  $D_b$  fixed to x. Intuitively, since the input to  $D_b$  is always the same, each evaluation chooses the exactly same randomnesses (that is  $Z_i$ 's) always. Hence in the resulting system all the random variables can be replaced by a single random variable and hence  $\neg C_b \wedge D_b$  can be effectively "collapsed" to a much smaller circuit  $\neg C_b \wedge 0$  (0 refers to the smallest trivial circuit consisting of only identities). Finally, again via our Sage-implementation we show that for circuits  $\neg C_0 \wedge 0$  and  $\neg C_1 \wedge 0$  the corresponding branching programs are partially inequivelent.

As a consequence of the above we are also able to show examples of universal circuits  $U_b$  for which the same attack works. Since the circuit D can be almost any arbitrary NC<sup>1</sup> circuit, we can, in particular use any universal circuit U' and carefully combine that with C to obtain our attackable universal circuit U that results in partially inequivalent Barrigton programs when compiled with any two arbitrary NC<sup>1</sup> circuits. The details are provided in Section 7.3.

### 1.3 Roadmap

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We provide basic definitions in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3 we formalize our abstract-attack model that is mostly similar to the attack model considered by Miles et al. [MSZ16]. In Sec. 4 we formalize partial inequivalence of two branching programs. In Sec. 5 we describe our annihilation attack in the abstract model for two partially inequivalent branching programs. In Sec. 6 we then extend the abstract attack to real-world attack in GGH13 setting. Finally in Sec. 7 we provide details on our example  $NC^1$  circuits for which the corresponding branching programs generated via Barrington's Theorem are partially inequivalent.

Additionally, in Appendix A we provide some details on our implementations in Sage.

# 2 Notations and Preliminaries

### 2.1 Notations

We denote the set of natural numbers  $\{1, 2, \ldots\}$  by  $\mathbb{N}$ , the set of all integers  $\{\ldots, -1, 0, 1\ldots\}$  by  $\mathbb{Z}$  and the set of real numbers by  $\mathbb{R}$ . We use the notation [n] to denote the set of first n natural numbers, namely  $[n] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{1, \ldots, n\}$ .

For any bit-string  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  we let x[i] denotes the *i*-th bit. For a matrix A we denote its *i*-th row by  $A[i, \star]$ , its *j*-th column by  $A[\star, j]$  and the element in the *i*-th row and *j*-th column by A[i, j]. The *i*-th element of a vector  $\boldsymbol{v}$  is denoted by  $\boldsymbol{v}[i]$ .

**Bit-Strings.** The compliment of  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  is denoted by  $\overline{x}$  and defined as:  $\overline{x} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} 1^n \oplus x$ , where  $\oplus$  denotes the bitwise XOR operation. The hamming weight of  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  denoted by  $\mathsf{Ham}(x)$  is equal to  $\sum_i x[i]$ .

**Matrices.** The transpose of A is denoted by  $A^T$ . We denote matrix multiplications between two matrices A and B by  $A \cdot B$  whereas scalar multiplications between one scalar a with a matrix (or scalar) A by aA. A boolean matrix is a matrix for which each of its entries is from  $\{0, 1\}$ . A permutation matrix is a boolean matrix such that each of its rows and columns has exactly one 1. Concatenation of two matrices A, B of dimensions  $d_1 \times d_2$  and  $d_1 \times d'_2$  is a  $d_1 \times (d_2 + d'_2)$  matrix denoted by  $[A \mid B]$ . For multiple matrices  $A_1, A_2, \ldots, A_m$  the concatenation is denoted as  $[\Pi_{i \in [n]} A_i]$ . **Vectors.** Matrices of dimension  $1 \times d$  and  $d \times 1$  are referred to as row-vectors and column-vectors, respectively. Unless otherwise mentioned, by default we assume that a vector is a row-vector. Any matrix operation is also applicable for vectors. For example, the inner product  $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b}$  is a scalar defined as  $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{b} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \sum_{i=1}^{d} \mathbf{a}[i]\mathbf{b}[i]$ , where  $\mathbf{a}$  and  $\mathbf{b}$  are row and column vectors of dimension  $d_1 \times d_2$  to be a column vector of dimension  $d_1 d_2 \times 1$  that is obtained by concatenating the rows of the matrix M and then taking the transpose. We denote:

$$\mathbf{vec}\left(M\right) = \begin{bmatrix} M[1,\star] \mid M[2,\star] \mid \cdots \mid M[d_1,\star] \end{bmatrix}^T.$$

Note that if M is a column-vector then  $\mathbf{vec}(M) = M$  and if M is a row-vector then  $\mathbf{vec}(M) = M^T$ .

### 2.2 Matrix Products

Below, we provide additional notation and background on matrix products that will be needed in our technical sections.

**Definition 2.1** (Matrix Tensor Product (Kronecker Product)). The Tensor Product of a  $d_1 \times d_2$  matrix A and a  $d'_1 \times d'_2$  matrix B is a  $d_1d'_1 \times d_2d'_2$  matrix defined as:

$$A \otimes B = \begin{bmatrix} A[1,1]B & \cdots & A[1,d_2]B\\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots\\ A[d_1,1]B & \cdots & A[d_1,d_2]B \end{bmatrix}$$

where A[i, j]B is a matrix of dimension  $d'_1 \times d'_2$  that is a scalar product of the scalar A[i, j] and matrix B.

**Property 2.2** (Rule of Mixed Product). Let A, B, C and D be matrices for which the matrix multiplications  $A \cdot B$  and  $C \cdot D$  is defined. Then we have:

$$(A \cdot B) \otimes (C \cdot D) = (A \otimes C) \cdot (B \otimes D).$$

**Property 2.3** (Matrix Equation via Tensor Product). Let A, X and B be matrices such that the multiplication  $A \cdot X \cdot B$  is defined, then we have that:

$$\operatorname{vec}\left(A \cdot X \cdot B\right) = \left(A \otimes B^{T}\right) \cdot \operatorname{vec}\left(X\right)$$

We define a new matrix product.

**Definition 2.4** (Row-wise Tensor Product of Matrices). Let A and B be two matrices of dimensions  $d_1 \times d_2$  and  $d_1 \times d'_2$  respectively. Then the row-wise tensor product of A and B is a matrix C of dimension  $d_1 \times d_2 d'_2$  such that each row of C is a tensor product of rows of A and B. Formally,

$$C = A \boxtimes B$$
 where  $C[i, \star] \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} A[i, \star] \otimes B[i, \star].$ 

The following fact is straightforward to see.

**Fact 2.5** (Concatenation of Row-wise Tensors). Let  $A \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [A_1 | A_2 | \cdots | A_m]$  and  $B \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [B_1 | B_2 | \cdots | B_n]$  be two matrices, then we have:

$$A \boxtimes B = [\mathbf{I}_{i \in [m], j \in [n]} A_i \boxtimes B_j]$$

**Definition 2.6** (Permutation Equivalence). Let A, B be matrices with dimensions  $d_1 \times d_2$ , then A and B are called permutation equivalent if there exists a permutation matrix P such that  $A = B \cdot P$ . We denote by  $A \stackrel{\text{per}}{=} B$ 

**Property 2.7.** For any two matrices A and B of dimensions  $d_1 \times d_2$  and  $d_1 \times d'_2$  respectively we have that:

 $A\boxtimes B\stackrel{\rm per}{=}B\boxtimes A$ 

*Proof.* Let  $C \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} A \boxtimes B$  then for any  $k \in [d_2d'_2]$  the k-th column of C can be written as:

$$C[\star, k] = \begin{bmatrix} A[1, j]B[1, i] \\ \vdots \\ A[d_1, j]B[d_1, i], \end{bmatrix}$$

where  $i = k \mod d'_2$  and  $j = \frac{k-i}{d'_2} + 1$ . For  $\ell \in [d'_2]$ , define the matrix

$$D_{\ell} = [C[\star, \ell] \mid C[\star, \ell + d'_2] \mid \dots \mid C[\star, \ell + d'_2(d_2 - 1)]].$$

Observe that we can express  $B \boxtimes A$  as follows:

$$B \boxtimes A = [D_1 \mid \ldots \mid D_{d'_n}] = (A \boxtimes B) \cdot P$$

where P is a permutation matrix that maps the k-th column of  $A \boxtimes B$  to the  $d_2(i-1)+j$ -th column where  $i = k \mod d'_2$  and  $j = \frac{k-i}{d'_2} + 1$ .

### 2.3 Column Space of a Matrix

Our attacks will require certain properties on the column space of certain matrices which we elaborate on below.

**Definition 2.8** (Column Space of a matrix). Let A be a matrix of dimension  $d_1 \times d_2$ . Then the column space of A is defined as the vector space generated by linear combinations of its columns, formally the column space contains all vectors generated as  $\sum_{i=1}^{d_2} c_i A[\star, i]$  for all choices of  $c_i \in \mathbb{R}$ . We denote the column-space of A by colsp (A).

**Definition 2.9** (Null-space of a matrix). <sup>14</sup> Let A be a matrix of dimension  $d_1 \times d_2$ . Then the null-space of A consists of all vectors  $\boldsymbol{v}$  of dimension  $1 \times d_1$  for which  $\boldsymbol{v} \cdot A = 0$ . We denote the null-space of A by nullsp(A).

We state some basic property of the above vector spaces.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup>Traditionally such space is called left-null space or co-kernel.

**Property 2.10** ([Ogu16]). Let A and B be two matrices of dimensions  $d_1 \times d_2$ . Then the following statements are equivalent:

- $\operatorname{colsp}(A) = \operatorname{colsp}(B)$ .
- $\operatorname{nullsp}(A) = \operatorname{nullsp}(B).$
- There exists an invertible square matrix C such that  $A \cdot C = B$ .

**Corollary 2.11.** Since  $A \stackrel{\text{per}}{=} B$  is a special case of item-3 in the above property, we have that  $A \stackrel{\text{per}}{=} B \implies \operatorname{colsp}(A) = \operatorname{colsp}(B)$ .

Combining above corollary along with Property 2.7 we can get the following corollary.

**Corollary 2.12.** For any two matrices A and B having equal number of rows we have that

$$\operatorname{colsp}\left(A\boxtimes B\right) = \operatorname{colsp}\left(B\boxtimes A\right)$$

Next we prove the following lemma that will be useful later in Sec. 7.

**Lemma 2.13.** Let A and B be two boolean matrices of dimensions  $d_1 \times d_2$  and  $d_1 \times d'_2$  such that both A and B have equal number of 1's in each of its rows. Then we have:

 $\operatorname{colsp}(A) \subseteq \operatorname{colsp}(A \boxtimes B)$  and  $\operatorname{colsp}(B) \subseteq \operatorname{colsp}(A \boxtimes B)$ 

*Proof.* For each column  $A[\star, j]$  of A, we define the matrix  $W_j \in \{0, 1\}^{d_1 \times d'_2}$  as a row-wise tensor product between  $A[\star, j]$  and B:

$$W_j = A[\star, j] \boxtimes B$$
.

Summing up the columns of  $W_i$  we get:

$$\sum_{j'} W_j[\star, j'] = \begin{bmatrix} A[1, j] \sum_{j'} B[1, j'] \\ \vdots \\ A[d_1, j] \sum_{j'} B[d_1, j'] \end{bmatrix} = c(A[\star, j]).$$

for some integer c. Moreover we can write  $A \boxtimes B$  as:

$$A \boxtimes B = [W_1 \mid W_2 \mid \ldots \mid W_{d_2}].$$

Hence there is a linear combination of columns of  $A \boxtimes B$  that generates the *j*-th column of A for any  $j \in [d_2]$ . This allows us to conclude that  $\operatorname{colsp}(A) \subseteq \operatorname{colsp}(A \boxtimes B)$ . Now similar to the proof of the statement  $\operatorname{colsp}(A) \subseteq \operatorname{colsp}(A \boxtimes B)$  we can prove that:

$$\mathsf{colsp}\,(B)\subseteq\mathsf{colsp}\,(B\boxtimes A)$$
 .

From Corollary 2.12 we get that  $\operatorname{colsp}(A \boxtimes B) = \operatorname{colsp}(B \boxtimes A)$ . This allows us to conclude that  $\operatorname{colsp}(B) \subseteq \operatorname{colsp}(A \boxtimes B)$ .

### 2.4 Branching Programs

In this subsection, we recall definitions of branching programs.

**Definition 2.14** (w-ary Input-Oblivious Matrix Branching Program [BGK<sup>+</sup>14]). A w-ary input oblivious matrix branching program of dimension d, length  $\ell$  over n-bit inputs is given by a tuple,

$$\mathbf{A} = (\mathsf{inp}, A_0, \{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}^w}, A_{\ell+1})$$

where  $\operatorname{inp}(\cdot) : [\ell] \to [n]^w$  is a function such that  $\operatorname{inp}(i)$  is the set of w bit locations of the input examined in step i;  $A_{i,b}$  are permutation matrices over  $\{0,1\}^{d\times d}$  and  $A_0 \in \{0,1\}^{1\times d} \setminus (0^d)^T$ ,  $A_{\ell+1} \in \{0,1\}^{d\times 1} \setminus 0^d$  are fixed bookend vectors such that:

$$A_0 \cdot A \cdot A_{\ell+1} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if and only if } A = I_{d \times d} \\ 1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
(1)

The output of the matrix branching program on an input  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  is given by:

$$\mathbf{A}(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } A_0 \left( \prod_{i \in [\ell]} A_{i,x[\mathsf{inp}(i)]} \right) A_{\ell+1} = 1 \\ 0 & \text{if } A_0 \left( \prod_{i \in [\ell]} A_{i,x[\mathsf{inp}(i)]} \right) A_{\ell+1} = 0 \end{cases},$$

where inp(i) denotes the set of locations that are inspected at step i of **A** and x[inp(i)] denotes the bits of x at locations inp(i). A w-ary branching program is said to be input-oblivious if the function inp is fixed and independent of the program **A**.

**Remark 2.15.** A 1-ary branching program is also called a single-input branching program. Unless otherwise stated we will always assume that any branching program is single-input and inputoblivious.

Barrington [Bar86] showed that all circuits in  $NC^1$  can be equivalently represented by a branching program of polynomial length. We provide the theorem statement below adapted to our definition of branching programs.

**Theorem 2.16** (Barrington's Theorem[Bar86]). For any depth-D, fan-in-2 boolean circuit C, there exists an input oblivious branching program of matrix-dimension 5 and length at most  $4^D$  that computes the same function as the circuit C.

Given a circuit C of depth D, Barrington's Theorem provides yield a single-input branching program of matrix dimension 5 implementing circuit C. We stress that the specific implementation obtained by use of Barrigton's depends on the specific choices made in its implementation and therefore the obtained implementation is *not* unique. Sometimes the branching program obtained via applying Barrington's Theorem to a circuit is called the Barrington-implementation of that circuit. We choose a specific one for our Sage-implementation. The details are provided in Appendix. A.

### 2.5 Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Below, we recall the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation  $(i\mathcal{O})$ .

**Definition 2.17** (Indistinguishability Obfuscator  $(i\mathcal{O})[\text{GGH}^+13b]$ ). A uniform PPT machine  $i\mathcal{O}$  is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class  $\{\mathcal{C}_{\lambda}\}$  if the following conditions are satisfied:

• For all security parameters  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , for all  $C \in \mathcal{C}_{\lambda}$ , for all inputs x, we have that

$$\Pr[C'(x) = C(x) : C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C)] = 1$$

• For any (not necessarily uniform) PPT distinguisher D, there exists a negligible function  $\alpha$ such that the following holds: For all security parameters  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , for all pairs of circuits  $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_{\lambda}$ , we have that if  $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$  for all inputs x, then

$$\left| \Pr\left[ D(i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_0)) = 1 \right] - \Pr\left[ D(i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_1)) = 1 \right] \right| \le \alpha(\lambda)$$

# 3 Attack Model for Investigating Annihilation Attacks

Miles, Sahai, and Zhandry [MSZ16] describe an abstract obfuscation scheme, designed to encompass the main ideas of BGKPS-like-obfuscations [BGK<sup>+</sup>14, BR14, AGIS14, PST14, MSW14, BMSZ16a] for the purposes of investigating annihilation attacks. We use the same abstract attack model as the starting point for our new attacks. Below, we first describe the model, obfuscation in this model and what violating indistinguishability obfuscation security means.

### 3.1 Annihilation Attack Model

We describe the abstract annihilation attack model. An abstract model is parameterized with narbitrary secret variables  $X_1, ..., X_n, m$  random secret variables  $Z_1, ..., Z_m$ , a special secret variable g. Then the public variables  $Y_1, ..., Y_m$  are such that  $Y_i := q_i(\{X_j\}_{j \in [n]}) + gZ_i$  for some polynomials  $q_i$ . The polynomials are defined over a field  $\mathbb{F}^{15}$ . An abstract model attacker  $\mathcal{A}$  may adaptively make two types of queries:

• Type 1: Pre-Zeroizing Computation. In a Type 1 query, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  submits a "valid" polynomial  $p_k$  on the public  $Y_i$ . Here, valid polynomials are those polynomials as enforced by the graded encodings.<sup>16</sup>

Then, we expand the representation of the (public) polynomial on  $Y_i$  in order to express  $p_k$  as a polynomial of the (private) formal variables  $X_i, Z_i, g$  stratified in the powers of g as follows:

$$p_k = p_k^{(0)} + g \cdot p_k^{(1)} + g^2 \cdot p_k^{(2)} + \dots$$

If  $p_k$  is identically 0 or if  $p_k^{(0)}$  is not identically 0, then the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  receives  $\perp$  in return. Otherwise, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  receives a new handle to a new variable  $W_k$ , which is set to be

$$W_k := p_k/g = p_k^{(1)} + g \cdot p_k^{(2)} + g^2 \cdot p_k^{(3)} + \dots$$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup>Looking ahead, the arbitrary variables represent the plain-texts (the branching program or circuit to be obfuscated) of encoding, the random variables represent the randomness of encodings generated by the obfuscator, the variable g represents the "short" generator g of the ideal lattice and the public variables represent the encodings available to the attacker.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup>For example, for a branching program obfuscation it must be a correct (and complete) evaluation of a branching program on some specific input as directed by the inp function of the program.

• Type 2: Post-Zeroizing Computation. In a Type 2 query, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  is allowed to submit *arbitrary* polynomials r of polynomial degree, on the  $W_k$  that it has seen so far. We again view  $r(\{W_k\})$  as a polynomial of the (secret) formal variables  $X_j, Z_i, g$ , and write it as:

$$r = r^{(0)} + g \cdot r^{(1)} + g^2 \cdot r^{(2)} + \dots$$

If  $r^{(0)}$  is identically 0, then the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  receives 0 in return. Otherwise, the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  receives 1 in return.

Comparing the Abstract Model to other Idealized Models. We briefly compare the Abstract Model described above to the ideal graded encoding model that has traditionally been used to argue about obfuscation security in prior works, e.g. as in the [BR14, BGK<sup>+</sup>14]. All adversarial behavior allowed within the Ideal Graded Encoding model is captured by **Type 1** queries in the Abstract Model and the **Type 2** queries are not considered. The works of [GMM<sup>+</sup>16, DGG<sup>+</sup>16] argue security in this new model also referred to as the *Weak Multilinear Map Model*.

### 3.2 Obfuscation in the Annihilation Attack Model

The abstract obfuscator  $\mathcal{O}$  takes as input a single-input branching program A of length  $\ell$ , input length n. We describe our obfuscation using notation slightly different from Miles et al. [MSZ16] as it suits our setting better and is closer to notation of branching programs (Def. 2.4). The branching program has an associated input-indexing function  $\operatorname{inp} : [\ell] \to [n]$ . The branching program has  $2\ell+2$ matrices  $A_0, \{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}}, A_{\ell+1}$ . In most generality, in order to evaluate a branching program on input x, we compute the matrix product

$$A(T) = A_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} A_{i,x[\operatorname{inp}(i)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1},$$

where x[inp(i)] denotes the bit of x at locations described by the set inp(i). Finally the program outputs 0 if and only if A(T) = 0.

The abstract obfuscator randomizes its input branching program by sampling random matrices  $\{R_i\}_{i \in [\ell+1]}$  (Killian randomizers) and random scalars  $\{\alpha_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}}$ , then setting

$$\widetilde{A_0} := A_0 \cdot R_1^{adj}, \qquad \widetilde{A_{i,b}} := \alpha_{i,b} (R_i \cdot A_{i,b} \cdot R_{i+1}^{adj}), \qquad \widetilde{A_{\ell+1}} := R_{\ell+1} \cdot A_{\ell+1}.$$

that are the abstract model's arbitrary secret variables. Here  $R^{adj}$  denotes the adjugate matrix of R that satisfies  $R^{adj} \cdot R = det(R) \cdot I$ . Then the obfuscator defines the public variables to be

$$Y_0 := \widetilde{A_0} + gZ_0; \quad Y_{i,b} := \widetilde{A_{i,b}} + gZ_{i,b}; \quad Y_{\ell+1} := \widetilde{A_{\ell+1}} + gZ_{\ell+1},$$

where g is the special secret variable and  $Z_i$ s are the random variables. This defines the abstract obfuscated program  $\mathcal{O}(A) = \{Y_i\}_i$ . The set of valid **Type 1** polynomials consists of all the honest evaluations of the branching program. This is, the allowed polynomials are

$$p_x = Y_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} Y_{i,x[\mathsf{inp}(i)]} \cdot Y_{\ell+1},$$

for all  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ .<sup>17</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup>Looking ahead, the  $Z_i$ s are random noise component sampled in the encoding procedure of GGH13 maps and g is a "short" generator of the ideal lattice. The abstract model is agnostic to the exact choice of those variables, but only depends on the structure of the variables.

### 3.3 Abstract Indistinguishability Obfuscation Security

We define security of  $i\mathcal{O}$  in the abstract model. Formally consider the following indistinguishability game consisting of three phases.

- Set Up. The adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  comes up with a pair of matrix branching programs  $(\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1)$  that are (i) functionally equivalent, (ii) of same length and (iii) input oblivious and some auxiliary information aux.  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs the pair  $(\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1)$  to the challenger.
- **Challenge.** The challenger applies the abstract obfuscator  $\mathcal{O}$  to a branching program, uniformly chosen as  $\mathbf{A}_b \leftarrow {\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1}$  and returns the public variables  ${Y_0, {Y_{i,b}}, Y_{\ell+1}}$ , generated by applying  $\mathcal{O}$  to  $\mathbf{A}_b$ , to the adversary.
- **Pre-zeroing (Type-1) Queries.** In this phase the adversary makes several type-1 valid queries  $p_k$  and gets back handles  $\{W_1, W_2, \ldots\}$ .
- **Post-zeroing (Type-2) Query.** In this phase the adversary makes one type-2 query r with some degree  $poly(\lambda)$  polynomial Q over the formal variables corresponding to handles  $\{W_1, W_2, \ldots\}$  and receives a bit as a response from the challenger. Finally  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs its guess  $b' \in \{0, 1\}$ .

**Definition 3.1** (Abstract  $i\mathcal{O}$  Security). An abstract obfuscation candidate  $\mathcal{O}$  is called an indistinguishability obfuscator if for any probabilistic polynomial time adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  the probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  guesses the choice of  $\mathbf{A}_b$  correctly is negligibly close to 1/2. Formally, in the above game

$$|\Pr[b=b'] - 1/2| \le negl(\lambda)$$

for any security parameter  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , where the probability is over the randomness of  $\mathcal{A}$  and the challenger.

# 4 Partially Inequivalent Branching Programs

In this section, we provide a formal condition on two branching programs, namely partial inequivalence, that is sufficient for launching a distinguishing attack in the abstract model. In Section 5 we prove that this condition is sufficient for the attack.<sup>18</sup>

All the below definitions consider single-input branching programs, but they naturally extends to multi-input setting.

**Definition 4.1** (Partial Products). Let  $\mathbf{A} = (inp, A_0, \{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}}, A_{\ell+1})$  be a single-input branching program of matrix-dimension d and length  $\ell$  over n-bit input.

1. For any input  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  and any index  $i \in [\ell+1] \cup \{0\}$  we define the vectors  $\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)}$  as follows:

$$\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} \left(A_0 \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]}\right) \otimes \left(\prod_{j=i+1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1}\right)^T \in \{0,1\}^{1 \times d^2} & \text{if } i \in [\ell] \\ \left(\prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1}\right)^T \in \{0,1\}^{1 \times d} & \text{if } i = 0 \\ A_0 \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \in \{0,1\}^{1 \times d} & \text{if } i = \ell+1 \end{cases}$$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup>We note that this condition is not necessary. Looking ahead, we only consider first order partially inequivalent programs in paper and remark that higher order partially inequivalent programs could also be distinguished using our techniques.

Additionally, define  $\widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)}$  for any such branching program as:

$$\widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{cases} [\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \mid 0^{d^2}] & \text{ if } i \in [\ell] \text{ and } x[\operatorname{inp}(i)] = 0\\ [0^{d^2} \mid \phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)}] & \text{ if } i \in [\ell] \text{ and } x[\operatorname{inp}(i)] = 1 \\ \phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} & \text{ if } i = 0 \text{ or } \ell + 1 \end{cases}$$

where inp is a function from  $[\ell] \rightarrow [n]$  and that x[inp(i)] denotes the bit of x corresponding to location described by inp(x).

2. Then the linear partial product vector  $\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}$  and the quadratic partial product vector  $\psi_{\mathbf{A},x}$  of  $\mathbf{A}$  with respect to x are defined as:

$$\begin{split} \boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [\widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \mid \cdots \mid \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)}] \in \{0,1\}^{1 \times (2d+2\ell d^2)}.\\ \boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{A},x} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x} \otimes \boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}} \in \{0,1\}^{1 \times (2d+2\ell d^2)^2}, \end{split}$$

where  $\overline{x} = x \oplus 1^n$  is the compliment of x.

3. For a set of inputs  $X = \{x_1, x_2, ..., x_m\}$  the the linear partial product matrix  $\Phi_{\mathbf{A},X}$  and the quadratic partial product matrix  $\Psi_{\mathbf{A},X}$  of  $\mathbf{A}$  with respect to X are defined as:

$$\Phi_{\mathbf{A},X} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{bmatrix} \phi_{\mathbf{A},x_1} \\ \phi_{\mathbf{A},x_2} \\ \vdots \\ \phi_{\mathbf{A},x_m} \end{bmatrix} \in \{0,1\}^{m \times (2d+2\ell d^2)}$$

$$\Psi_{\mathbf{A},X} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \Phi_{\mathbf{A},X} \boxtimes \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}} + \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}} \boxtimes \Phi_{\mathbf{A},X} = \begin{bmatrix} \psi_{\mathbf{A},x_1} + \psi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_1} \\ \psi_{\mathbf{A},x_2} + \psi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_2} \\ \vdots \\ \psi_{\mathbf{A},x_m} + \psi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_m} \end{bmatrix} \in \{0,1\}^{m \times (2d+2\ell d^2)^2},$$

where  $\overline{X} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\overline{x}_1, \overline{x}_2, \ldots\}.$ 

**Definition 4.2** (Partial Inequivalence). Let  $\mathbf{A}_0$  and  $\mathbf{A}_1$  be two single-input matrix branching programs of matrix-dimension d and length  $\ell$  over n-bit input. Then they are called **partially in**equivalent if there exists a polynomial in security parameter sized set X of inputs such that:

- For every  $x \in X$ , we have that  $\mathbf{A}_0(x) = \mathbf{A}_1(x) = 0$  and  $\mathbf{A}_0(\overline{x}) = \mathbf{A}_1(\overline{x}) = 0$ .
- $\operatorname{colsp}(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_0,X}) \neq \operatorname{colsp}(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_1,X}).$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup>Note that in the above definition we add the row-wise tensors. Looking ahead, this is done to capture the commutativity in the polynomial multiplications. Namely since for any two ring elements  $z_1, z_2$  we have  $z_1z_2 = z_2z_1$ , their coefficients add up. Also note that the sum in the above expression equivalently double the coefficients of the quadratic terms  $z_1^2, z_2^2$ . But, due to our choices of inputs  $x, \overline{x}$  we would only have such terms for the bookends which are nonetheless always stays the same (in fact they are independent of the actual program) and does not affect the column-space.

**Lemma 4.3.** For any matrix branching program **A** we have that for any two inputs x, x' the linear partial product vectors  $\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}$  and  $\phi_{\mathbf{A},x'}$  contain the same number of 1's.

*Proof.* Note that for any input x and index i, via definition of  $\phi_{\mathbf{A},r}^{(i)}$ , we have:

$$\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} = \left(A_0 \cdot P_{x,1} \otimes A_{\ell+1}^T \cdot P_{x,2}\right)$$

for some x dependent permutations  $P_{x,1}$  and  $P_{x,2}$ . Note that  $A_0$  is a row vector and therefore  $A_0 \cdot P_{x,1}$  is also a row vector. Since  $P_{x,1}$  is a permutation, we conclude that  $\operatorname{Ham}(A_0 \cdot P_{x,1}) = \operatorname{Ham}(A_0)$  where  $\operatorname{Ham}(A_0)$  is the hamming weight of the vector  $A_0$  (specifically, the number of locations at which it is 1). Similarly,  $\operatorname{Ham}(P_{x,2} \cdot A_{\ell+1}) = \operatorname{Ham}(A_{\ell+1})$ . Hence, the  $\operatorname{Ham}(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}) = \operatorname{Ham}(A_0)\operatorname{Ham}(A_{\ell+1})$  which is independent of x. Consequently,  $\operatorname{Ham}(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}) = (\ell+2)\operatorname{Ham}(A_0)\operatorname{Ham}(A_{\ell+1})$  which is also independent of x. This concludes the proof.

### 5 Annihilation Attack for Partially Inequivalent Programs

In this section, we describe an abstract annihilation attack against any two branching programs that are partially inequivalent. In this section, we show an attack only in the abstract model and provide details on how it can be extended to the real GGH13 setting in Section 6. Formally we prove the following theorem.

**Theorem 5.1.** Let  $\mathcal{O}$  be the generic obfuscator described in Sec. 3.2. Then for any two functionally equivalent same length single-input branching programs  $\mathbf{A}_0$ ,  $\mathbf{A}_1$  that are partially inequivalent there exists a probabilistic polynomial time attacker that distinguishes between between  $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{A}_0)$  and  $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{A}_1)$  with noticeable probability in the abstract attack model (violating Definition 3.1).

Proof of Theorem 5.1. Below we provide the proof.

Setup for the attack. The given branching programs  $\mathbf{A}_0$  and  $\mathbf{A}_1$  are provided to be functionally equivalent and partially inequivalent. Therefore there exists a set X such that: (1) for all  $x \in X$ ,  $\mathbf{A}_0(x) = \mathbf{A}_0(\overline{x}) = \mathbf{A}_1(x) = \mathbf{A}_1(\overline{x}) = 0$ , and (2)  $\operatorname{colsp}(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_0,X}) \neq \operatorname{colsp}(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_1,X})$ . We will assume that the adversary has access to X as auxiliary information.

**Challenge.**  $\mathcal{A}$  receives as a challenge the obfuscation of the branching program:  $\mathbf{A} \in {\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1}$  by the challenger. Recall from the description of the abstract obfuscator that, the obfuscation of program  $\mathbf{A} = (\inf p, A_0, {A_{i,b}}_{i \in [\ell], b \in {0,1}}, A_{\ell+1})$ , denoted by  $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{A})$  consists of the following public variables:

$$Y_0 := A_0 \cdot R_1^{adj} + gZ_0, \quad Y_{i,b} := \alpha_{i,b}R_i \cdot A_{i,b} \cdot R_{i+1}^{adj} + gZ_{i,b}, \quad Y_0 := R_{\ell+1} \cdot A_{\ell+1} + gZ_0,$$

where the arbitrary secret variables are:

$$\widetilde{A}_0 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} A_0 \cdot R_1^{adj}, \quad \widetilde{A}_{i,b} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \alpha_{i,b} (R_{i,b} \cdot A_{i,b} \cdot R_{i,b}^{adj}), \quad \widetilde{A}_{\ell+1} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} R_{\ell+1} \cdot A_{\ell+1};$$

for random variables (i.e. Killian randomizers)  $R_1, \{R_i\}, R_{\ell+1}$  and the random secret variables are denoted by  $Z_0, \{Z_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}}, Z_{\ell+1}$  and the special secret variable is g. Via change of variables we can equivalently write:

$$Y_0 := (A_0 + gZ_0) \cdot R_1^{adj}; \quad Y_{i,b} := \alpha_{i,b}R_i \cdot (A_{i,b} + gZ_{i,b}) \cdot R_{i+1}^{adj}; \quad Y_{\ell+1} := R_{\ell+1} \cdot (A_{\ell+1} + gZ_{\ell+1}).$$

**Pre-Zeroizing Computation (Type-1 queries).** On receiving the obfuscation of  $\mathbf{A} \in {\{\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1\}}$ ,  $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{A}) = {Y_0, {Y_{i,b}}, Y_{\ell+1}}$  the attacker, in the pre-zeroizing step, performs a "valid" Type-1 queries on all the inputs  $X, \overline{X}$  where  $X = {x_1, \ldots, x_m}, \overline{X} = {\overline{x}_1, \ldots, \overline{x}_m}$ . That is, for any  $x \in {\{0, 1\}}^n$ , and the abstract obfuscation  $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{A})$ , the attacker queries the polynomial:

$$P_{\mathbf{A},x} = Y_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} Y_{i,x[\mathsf{inp}(i)]} \cdot Y_{\ell+1}.$$

Then, expressing  $P_{\mathbf{A},x}$  stratified as powers of g we obtain:

$$P_{\mathbf{A},x} = P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)}(\{Y_i\}_i) + g \cdot P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)}(\{Y_i\}_i) + \dots + g^{\ell+2} \cdot P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+2)}(\{Y_i\}_i)$$

for some polynomials  $P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(j)}(\{Y_i\}_i)$   $(j \in \{0, ..., \ell+1\})$ . However, by Lemma 5.2 we have that:

$$P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_x \mathbf{A}(x)$$

for  $\rho \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_i \det(R_i)$  (or  $\rho I = \prod_i R_i^{adj} R_i$ ) and  $\widehat{\alpha}_x \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \alpha_{i,x_{\text{inp}(i)}}$ . Since for  $x \in X$  we have that  $\mathbf{A}(x) = 0$ , the polynomial  $P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)}$  is identically 0. Consequently, for each such Type 1 query the attacker receives a new handle to a variable  $W_{\mathbf{A},x}$  that can be expressed as follows:

$$W_{\mathbf{A},x} = P_{\mathbf{A},x}/g = P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} + g \cdot P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(2)} + \dots + g^{\ell+1} \cdot P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+2)}$$

Analogously, the attacker obtains handles  $W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}$ . After obtaining handles

$$\{(W_{\mathbf{A},x_1}, W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_1}), ... (W_{\mathbf{A},x_m}, W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_m})\}$$

the attacker starts the post-zeroizing phase.

**Post-Zeroizing Computation.** The goal of post-zeroizing computation is to find a polynomial  $Q^{\text{ann}}$  of degree  $poly(\lambda)$  such that following holds for some  $b \in \{0, 1\}$ :

(i)  $Q^{\mathsf{ann}}(P^{(1)}_{\mathbf{A}_{b},x_{1}}, P^{(1)}_{\mathbf{A}_{b},\overline{x}_{1}}..., P^{(1)}_{\mathbf{A}_{b},x_{m}}, P^{(1)}_{\mathbf{A}_{b},\overline{x}_{m}}) \equiv 0.$ (ii)  $Q^{\mathsf{ann}}(P^{(1)}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b},x_{1}}, P^{(1)}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b},\overline{x}_{1}}..., P^{(1)}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b},x_{m}}, P^{(1)}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b},\overline{x}_{m}}) \neq 0.$ 

Clearly, this leads to an attack on the obfuscation security (c.f. Definition 3.1) as  $\mathcal{A}$  would receive 0 from the challenger if and only if  $Q^{\mathsf{ann}}(P_{\mathbf{A},x_1}^{(1)}, P_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x_1}}^{(1)}, \dots, P_{\mathbf{A},x_m}^{(1)}, P_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x_m}}^{(1)})$  is identically zero, hence it would receive 0 if and only if  $\mathbf{A}_b$  is chosen by the challenger in the challenge phase. To find such  $Q^{\mathsf{ann}}$  the attacker continues as follows. Observe that by Lemma 5.2, for every  $x \in X$  we have that:

$$P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_x (\boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T)$$
(2)

$$P_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}^{(1)} = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{\overline{x}} (\boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T)$$
(3)

Next, multiplying the polynomials  $P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)}$  and  $P_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}^{(1)}$  (Eq. 2 and Eq. 3) we get:

$$\widetilde{P}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} P_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}^{(1)} = \rho^2 \widehat{\alpha} \left( (\boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T) \otimes (\boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T) \right)$$
(4)

$$= \rho^{2} \widehat{\alpha} \left( (\boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x} \otimes \boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}) \cdot (\boldsymbol{z}^{T} \otimes \boldsymbol{z}^{T}) \right)$$

$$= \rho^{2} \widehat{\alpha} (\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{A},x} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^{T} \otimes \boldsymbol{z}^{T})$$
(5)

where  $\widehat{\alpha} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \widehat{\alpha}_x \widehat{\alpha}_{\overline{x}}$  is now independent of input x.<sup>20</sup> Similarly we can also have:

$$\widetilde{P}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}^{(1)} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} P_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}^{(1)} P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} = \rho^2 \widehat{\alpha} \left( (\boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T) \otimes (\boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T) \right) \\ = \rho^2 \widehat{\alpha} \left( (\boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}} \otimes \boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}) \cdot (\boldsymbol{z}^T \otimes \boldsymbol{z}^T) \right) \\ = \rho^2 \widehat{\alpha} (\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T \otimes \boldsymbol{z}^T)$$

However, since field multiplication is commutative, adding we get:

$$\begin{split} \widetilde{P}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} + \widetilde{P}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}^{(1)} &= 2P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)}P_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}^{(1)} = \rho^2 \widehat{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{A},x} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T \otimes \boldsymbol{z}^T) + \rho^2 \widehat{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T \otimes \boldsymbol{z}^T) \\ &= \rho^2 \widehat{\alpha}(\boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{A},x} + \boldsymbol{\psi}_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}}) \cdot (\boldsymbol{z}^T \otimes \boldsymbol{z}^T) \end{split}$$

Using the given conditions that  $\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_0,X}$  and  $\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_1,X}$  have distinct column spaces (and hence distinct left-kernel) the attacker can efficiently compute (e.g. via Gaussian Elimination) a vector  $\boldsymbol{v}_{\mathsf{ann}} \in \{0,1\}^{1 \times m}$  that belongs to it left-kernel, call it the *annihilating vector*, such that for some  $b \in \{0,1\}$  we have:

$$\boldsymbol{v}_{\mathsf{ann}} \cdot \Psi_{\mathbf{A}_b, X} = 0$$
 but  $\boldsymbol{v}_{\mathsf{ann}} \cdot \Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b}, X} \neq 0.$ 

The corresponding annihilation polynomial  $Q^{ann}$  can be written as:

$$Q_{\boldsymbol{v}_{\mathsf{ann}}}^{\mathsf{ann}}(W_{\mathbf{A},x_1}, W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_1}, \dots, W_{\mathbf{A},x_m}, W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_m}) = \boldsymbol{v}_{\mathsf{ann}} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} W_{\mathbf{A},x_1}W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_1} \\ \vdots \\ W_{\mathbf{A},x_m}W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_m} \end{bmatrix}$$

Observe that the coefficient of  $g^0$  in the expression  $Q_{\boldsymbol{v}_{ann}}^{ann}(W_{\mathbf{A},x_1}, W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_1}, \ldots, W_{\mathbf{A},x_m}, W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_m})$  from above is equal to  $Q_{\boldsymbol{v}_{ann}}^{ann}(P_{\mathbf{A}_b,x_1}^{(1)}, P_{\mathbf{A}_b,\overline{x}_1}^{(1)}, \ldots, P_{\mathbf{A}_b,\overline{x}_m}^{(1)})$ . Moreover this value for  $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{A}_b$  is:

$$Q_{\boldsymbol{v}_{\mathsf{ann}}}^{\mathsf{ann}}(P_{\mathbf{A}_{b},x_{1}}^{(1)},P_{\mathbf{A}_{b},\overline{x}_{1}}^{(1)}...,P_{\mathbf{A}_{b},x_{m}}^{(1)},P_{\mathbf{A}_{b},\overline{x}_{m}}^{(1)}) = \boldsymbol{v}_{\mathsf{ann}}\cdot\frac{\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{b},X}}{2}\cdot(\boldsymbol{z}\otimes\boldsymbol{z})^{T}\equiv 0$$

but for  $\mathbf{A}_{1-b}$ :

$$Q_{\boldsymbol{v}_{ann}}^{ann}(P_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b},x_{1}}^{(1)},P_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b},\overline{x}_{1}}^{(1)}...,P_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b},x_{m}}^{(1)},P_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b},\overline{x}_{m}}^{(1)}) = \boldsymbol{v}_{ann} \cdot \frac{\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{1-b},X}}{2} \cdot (\boldsymbol{z} \otimes \boldsymbol{z})^{T} \neq 0.$$

Hence, the response to Type 2 query is sufficient to distinguish between obfuscation of  $\mathbf{A}_b$  and  $\mathbf{A}_{1-b}$  in the abstract model. This concludes the proof.

**Evaluations of**  $P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)}$  and  $P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)}$ . Below we provide a lemma that described what the terms  $P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)}$  and  $P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)}$  look like.

**Lemma 5.2.** For every  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ , we have that:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} &= \rho \widehat{\alpha}_x \mathbf{A}(x) \\ P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} &= \rho \widehat{\alpha}_x (\boldsymbol{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x} \cdot \boldsymbol{z}^T), \end{aligned}$$

where  $\rho \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_i \det(R_i)$  and  $\widehat{\alpha}_x \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \alpha_{i,x_{\text{inp}(i)}}$  and z is a vector consisting of the random terms  $Z_0, Z_{i,b}$ , and  $Z_{\ell+1}$  used to generate the obfuscation terms  $Y_0, Y_{i,b}$ , and  $Y_{\ell+1}$  in an appropriate sequence.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup>Here, we use the fact that the branching programs are single-input. For multi-input programs we do *not* know how to make  $\hat{\alpha}$  independent of x. The rest of the analysis does not require the programs to be single-input.

**Proof of Lemma 5.2.** For each  $x \in \{0,1\}^n$  note that:

$$P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} = \widetilde{A}_0 \cdot \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{A}_{i,x[\mathsf{inp}(i)]} \cdot \widetilde{A}_{\ell+1}$$
$$= A_0 \cdot R_1^{adj} \times \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \left( \alpha_{i,x_{\mathsf{inp}(i)}} R_i \cdot A_{i,x[\mathsf{inp}(i)]} \cdot R_{i+1}^{adj} \right) \times R_{\ell+1} \cdot A_{\ell+1}$$
$$= \rho \widehat{\alpha}_x \mathbf{A}(x)$$

for  $\rho \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_i \det(R_i)$  (or  $\rho I = \prod_i R_i^{adj} R_i$ ) and  $\widehat{\alpha}_x \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_{i=1}^{\ell} \alpha_{i, x_{\text{inp}(i)}}$ . Also, note that for any  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$  we can express  $P_{\mathbf{A}, x}^{(1)}$  as:

$$P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} = Z_0 \cdot R_1^{adj} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{A}_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot \widetilde{A}_{\ell+1}$$

$$+ \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \left( \widetilde{A}_0 \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} \widetilde{A}_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot \left( \alpha_{i,x[\operatorname{inp}(i)]} R_i \cdot Z_{i,x[\operatorname{inp}(i)]} \cdot R_{i+1}^{adj} \right) \cdot \prod_{j=i+1}^{\ell} \widetilde{A}_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot \widetilde{A}_{\ell+1} \right)$$

$$+ \widetilde{A}_0 \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{A}_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot R_{\ell+1} \cdot Z_{\ell+1}$$

$$= \rho \widehat{\alpha}_x \left( Z_0 \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1} \right)$$

$$+ \rho \widehat{\alpha}_x \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \left( A_0 \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot Z_{i,x[\operatorname{inp}(i)]} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1} \right)$$

$$+ \rho \widehat{\alpha}_x \left( A_0 \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot Z_{\ell+1} \right)$$

$$(6)$$

Now, define:

$$\mathbf{z}_0 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{vec} \left( Z_0 \right) \in \{0, 1\}^{d \times 1} \quad , \quad \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{vec} \left( Z_{\ell+1} \right) \in \{0, 1\}^{d \times 1},$$

and

$$\mathbf{z}_{i,b} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{vec} \left( Z_{i,b} \right) \in \{0,1\}^{d^2 \times 1}$$

Now, we set

$$oldsymbol{z}_i = egin{bmatrix} oldsymbol{z}_{i,0} & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = egin{bmatrix} oldsymbol{z}_{i,0} & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = egin{bmatrix} oldsymbol{z}_{i,0} & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = egin{bmatrix} oldsymbol{z}_{i,0} & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = egin{bmatrix} oldsymbol{z}_{i,0} & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = oldsymbol{z}_{i,1} & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_{i,1}^T \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_i \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i = oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_i \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & oldsymbol{z}_i \end{bmatrix} egin{array}{c} oldsymbol{z}_i & \mid & ol$$

And finally set, as

$$m{z} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [m{z}_0 \mid m{z}_1 \mid \ldots \mid m{z}_\ell \mid m{z}_{\ell+1}] \in \{0,1\}^{1 \times (2\ell+2)d^2}$$

where z consists of all random secret variables involved in  $\mathcal{O}(\mathbf{A})$ . Next using the property of tensor products (Property 2.3) we can rewrite Eq. 6 as:

$$P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} = \operatorname{vec}\left(P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x} \operatorname{vec}\left(Z_{0} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1}\right) + \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x} \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \operatorname{vec}\left(A_{0} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot Z_{i,x[\operatorname{inp}(i)]} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1}\right) + \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x} \operatorname{vec}\left(A_{0} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot Z_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1}\right)^{T} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0} + \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x} \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \left(A_{0} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]}\right) \otimes \left(\prod_{j=i+1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]} \cdot A_{\ell+1}\right)^{T} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i,x[\operatorname{inp}(i)]} + \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(A_{0} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]}\right) \otimes \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}$$

$$= \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(A_{0} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{\ell} A_{j,x[\operatorname{inp}(j)]}\right) \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}$$

$$= \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0} + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i,x[\operatorname{inp}(i)]} + \phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0} + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i} + \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0} + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i} + \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0} + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i} + \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0} + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i} + \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0} + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i} + \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0}\right) + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i} + \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0}\right) + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i} + \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{0}\right) + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i} + \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(\ell+1)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{\ell+1}\right) = \rho \widehat{\alpha}_{x}\left(\phi_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i}\right) + \sum_{i=1}^{\ell} \widetilde{\phi}_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(i)} \cdot \mathbf{z}_{i}\right)$$

### 6 Extending the Abstract Attack to GGH13 Multilinear Maps

In this section, we show that an attack in abstract model described in Section 3.1 can be translated to an attack in the GGH13 setting. This part of the attack is heuristic and analogous to some of the previous attacks on GGH13 such as in [GGH13a, MSZ16, CHL<sup>+</sup>15].

### 6.1 The GGH13 Scheme: Background

In the GGH13 scheme [GGH13a], the plaintext space is a quotient ring R/gR, where R is the ring of integers in a cyclotomic number field and  $g \in R$  is a "small prime element." The space of encodings is  $R_q = R/qR$  for a large (exponential in the security parameter  $\lambda$ ) modulus q. We write  $[\cdot]_q$  to denote operations are done in  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ .

A uniformly random secret  $z_1 \dots z_k \in R_q$  is chosen, and used to encode plaintext values as follows: A plaintext element  $a \in R/gR$  is encoded at the level-1 as  $u = [c/z]_q$ , where the numerator c is a "small" element in the coset of a; i.e. c = a + gr for a small random term  $r \in R$ , chosen from an appropriate distribution. We describe the GGH13 and our attack assuming use of "symmetric" multilinear maps just for simplicity of notation. Note that in our attacks we compute on provided multilinear maps encodings in a prescribed manner. Furthermore, the z always vanish in our attacks. Therefore, the attack immediately generalize to the "asymmetric GGH" setting, with many distinct choices of z's and we continue to use the "symmetric" notation for simplicity.

Addition and subtraction of encodings at the same level is performed by addition in  $R_q$ , and outputs an encoding of the sum of the encoded plaintext values at the same level. Multiplication of encodings at levels  $t_1$  and  $t_2$  yields a new level- $t_1 + t_2$  encoding of the product of the corresponding plaintexts.

The level-k encodings of the zero plaintext,  $0 \in R/gR$ , have the form  $\boldsymbol{u} = [\boldsymbol{gr}/\boldsymbol{z}^k]_q$ . Public parameter of the GGH13 multilinear maps include a public zero-testing parameter  $\boldsymbol{p}_{zt} = [\boldsymbol{h}\boldsymbol{z}^k/\boldsymbol{g}]_q$ , for a "somewhat small' element  $\boldsymbol{h} \in R$ , which is roughly of size  $\sqrt{q}$ . The zero-test operation involves multiplying  $\boldsymbol{p}_{zt}$  by a level-k encoding  $\boldsymbol{u}$ , and checking if the result  $[\boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \cdot \boldsymbol{u}]_q$  is much smaller than the modulus q. Note that if  $\boldsymbol{u}$  is indeed an encoding of zero then we have that  $[\boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \cdot \boldsymbol{u}]_q = [\boldsymbol{h}\boldsymbol{r}]_q$ . If  $\boldsymbol{h}, \boldsymbol{r}$ , are much smaller than q then we have that this computed value will also be much smaller than q. On the other hand if  $\boldsymbol{u} = [\boldsymbol{c}/\boldsymbol{z}^k]_q$  is not an encoding of zero, then we have that  $[\boldsymbol{p}_{zt} \cdot \boldsymbol{u}]_q = [\boldsymbol{c}/\boldsymbol{g}]_q$ will be large.

### 6.2 Translating the Abstract Attack to GGH13

In this section, we assume that we are provided programs  $\mathbf{A}_0$  and  $\mathbf{A}_1$ , set of inputs X and a vector  $\mathbf{v}_{\mathsf{ann}}$  such that  $\mathbf{v}_{\mathsf{ann}} \cdot \Psi_{\mathbf{A}_0,X} \cdot (\mathbf{z} \otimes \mathbf{z})^T \equiv 0$  and  $\mathbf{v}_{\mathsf{ann}} \cdot \Psi_{\mathbf{A}_1,X} \cdot (\mathbf{z} \otimes \mathbf{z})^T \not\equiv 0$ . Recall that  $\mathbf{v}_{\mathsf{ann}}$  is sufficient to complete an attack in the abstract model. Given the above we describe an attack strategy of distinguishing between obfuscations of  $\mathbf{A}_0$  and  $\mathbf{A}_1$  generated using GGH13 multilinear maps. We do this in two steps. In the first step, we will use the abstract attack to compute an element  $\mathbf{u}$  whose distribution depends on whether  $\mathbf{A}_0$  was used or  $\mathbf{A}_1$  was used. We explain this step in this subsection below. The second step that involves efficiently testing the distribution from which  $\mathbf{u}$  is sampled is described in the next subsection.

Our attack is provided an obfuscation of either  $\mathbf{A} \in {\{\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1\}}$  and it proceeds as follows. It mimics the abstract attack for the pre-zeroing computation queries by computing the values using the provided encodings. Since only "valid" queries were made in the abstract model, therefore the corresponding computation can be done locally. Specifically, for each  $x \in X$ , we obtain

$$\left[\frac{P_{\mathbf{A},x}}{\boldsymbol{z}^k}\right]_q = \left[\frac{P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} + \boldsymbol{g}P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} + \boldsymbol{g}^2(\ldots)}{\boldsymbol{z}^k}\right].$$

Since,  $P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(0)} = 0$ , zero-testing on this value yields a value that is unreduced mod q. In particular, zero-test reveals the value:

$$W_{\mathbf{A},x} = \boldsymbol{h}\left(P_{\mathbf{A},x}^{(1)} + \boldsymbol{g}(\ldots)\right).$$

Using these values, we set  $\boldsymbol{u} = \boldsymbol{v}_{\mathsf{ann}} \cdot \widetilde{W}_{\mathbf{A},X}$  where

$$\widetilde{W}_{\mathbf{A},X} = \begin{bmatrix} W_{\mathbf{A},x_1} W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_1} \\ \vdots \\ W_{\mathbf{A},x_m} W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_m} \end{bmatrix}$$

Note that if  $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{A}_0$  then we have that  $\boldsymbol{u} \in \langle \rho^2 \hat{\alpha} \boldsymbol{h}^2 \boldsymbol{g} \rangle$ , where  $\rho \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \prod_i \det(R_i)$  and  $\hat{\alpha} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \hat{\alpha}_x \hat{\alpha}_x$  both of which are fixed terms. On the other hand, if  $\mathbf{A} = \mathbf{A}_1$  then we have that  $\boldsymbol{u} \notin \langle \rho^2 \hat{\alpha} \boldsymbol{h}^2 \boldsymbol{g} \rangle$  with overwhelming probability by Schwartz-Zippel Lemma.

### 6.3 Completing the Attack for Large Enough Circuits

In order to complete the attack we need to check if  $\boldsymbol{u}$  obtained in the previous step is in the ideal  $\langle \rho^2 \hat{\alpha} \boldsymbol{h}^2 \boldsymbol{g} \rangle$  or not. Below we describe a method to compute several (heuristically) linearly independent elements is in the ideal  $\mathcal{J} = \langle \rho^4 \hat{\alpha}^2 \boldsymbol{h}^4 \boldsymbol{g} \rangle$ . Note that if  $\boldsymbol{u} \in \langle \rho^2 \hat{\alpha} \boldsymbol{h}^2 \boldsymbol{g} \rangle$  then  $\boldsymbol{u}^2 \in \mathcal{J}$  as well. However, since  $\boldsymbol{g}$  is prime, if  $\boldsymbol{u} \notin \langle \rho^2 \hat{\alpha} \boldsymbol{h}^2 \boldsymbol{g} \rangle$  then  $\boldsymbol{u}^2$  will not be in  $\mathcal{J}$ .

Let  $X_1, X_2, \ldots$  be disjoint sets of inputs such that for each *i* we have that  $X_i \cap (X \cup \overline{X}) = \emptyset$ ,  $|X_i| = (2d + 2^{\ell}d^2)^2$  and that  $\forall x \in X_i$  we have that  $\mathbf{A}(x) = \mathbf{A}(\overline{x}) = 0.^{21}$  Since, the number of inputs is  $2^n$  for a large enough circuit we can define any polynomial number of such sets  $X_i$ .

Note that for each *i*, since the number of equations is larger than the number of variables, therefore  $\exists a_i, b_i$  such that  $a_i \cdot \Psi_{\mathbf{A}_0, X_i} = 0$  and  $b_i \cdot \Psi_{\mathbf{A}_1, X_i} = 0$ . Therefore, for  $\mathbf{A} \in \{\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1\}$  we can conclude that  $(a_i \cdot \widetilde{W}_{\mathbf{A}, X_i})(b_i \cdot \widetilde{W}_{\mathbf{A}, X_i}) \in \mathcal{J} = \langle \rho^4 \hat{\alpha}^2 \mathbf{h}^4 \mathbf{g} \rangle$  where

$$\widetilde{W}_{\mathbf{A},X_{i}} = \begin{bmatrix} W_{\mathbf{A},x_{i,1}}W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_{i,1}} \\ \vdots \\ W_{\mathbf{A},x_{i,m}}W_{\mathbf{A},\overline{x}_{i,m}} \end{bmatrix}$$

and  $X_i = \{x_{i,1}, x_{i,2}, \ldots, x_{i,m}\}$ . Repeating this process for each choice of *i* we obtain several elements in  $\mathcal{J}$ . Note that these values are linearly independent except that some of these values (possibly all of them) might actually be in  $\mathcal{J}' = \langle \rho^4 \hat{\alpha}^2 \mathbf{h}^4 \mathbf{g}^2 \rangle$ . However, this doesn't affect our attack because  $u^2$  is in  $\mathcal{J}'$  as well.

# 7 Example of Partially Inequivalent Circuits

In this section, we show examples of pairs of  $NC^1$  circuits such that the corresponding Barringtonimplemented<sup>22</sup> branching programs are partially inequivalent and therefore are subject to the abstract annihilation attacks shown in Section 5. Note that here we extend the notion of partial inequivalence from branching programs to circuits in a natural way. Unless otherwise mentioned, partial inequivalence of circuits specifically imply that the corresponding branching programs generated via applying Barrington's Theorem are partially inequivalent.

### 7.1 Simple Pairs of Circuits that are Partially Inequivalent

Consider the following pair of circuits  $(C_0, C_1)$  each of which implements a boolean function  $\{0, 1\}^4 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ :

$$C_0(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (x[1] \land 1) \bigwedge (x[2] \land 0) \bigwedge (x[3] \land 1) \bigwedge (x[4] \land 0),$$
$$C_1(x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (x[1] \land 0) \bigwedge (x[2] \land 0) \bigwedge (x[3] \land 0) \bigwedge (x[4] \land 0).$$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup>Since the programs are functionally equivalent we have this condition.

 $<sup>^{22}</sup>$ Recall that by Barrington-implementation of a circuit we mean the single-input branching program produced as a result of Barrington Theorem on the circuit. Also we implicitly assume that the branching programs are inputoblivious.

Define the set  $X \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{0,1\}^4$ . Now, we provide an implementation (see Appendix A for more details on the implementation) in Sage[S<sup>+</sup>16] that evaluates the column spaces of matrices produced via applying a Barrington-implementation to the above circuits. The outcome from the implementation led us to conclude the following claim:

Claim 7.1. Let  $\mathbf{A}_{C_0}, \mathbf{A}_{C_1}$  be the Barrington-Implementation of the circuits  $C_0, C_1$  respectively, then we have that:  $\operatorname{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{C_0},X}\right) \neq \operatorname{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{C_1},X}\right)$ .

**Remark 7.2.** We emphasize that we use branching programs generated with a particular Barringtonimplementation that makes a set of specific choices. We remark that Barrington's construction can be implemented in many different ways. However, since in this section we aim to find one concrete example for which the condition of our abstract attack satisfies, we restrict ourselves to this specific program. We refer the reader to Appendix A for the details of our implementation. Throughout this section we refer to this particular Barrington-implementation.

The circuits presented above are of constant size. Looking ahead, though, they are partially inequivalent and hence (by Theorem 5.1) are susceptible to the abstract attack that does not translate to a real-world attack in GGH13 setting immediately. For that we need to consider larger (albeit  $NC^{1}$ ) circuits which we construct next based on the above circuits.

### 7.2 Larger Pairs of Circuits that are Partially Inequivalent

We construct pairs of  $NC^1$  circuits (in fact, exponentially many of them) that build on the constantsize circuits described in Sec. 7.1.

Consider any pair of functionally equivalent  $NC^1$  circuits  $(D_0, D_1)$  and an input  $x^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that  $D_0(x^*) = D_1(x^*) = D_0(\overline{x^*}) = D_1(\overline{x^*}) = 0$ . Now define the circuits  $E_0, E_1$  each of which computes a boolean function  $\{0, 1\}^{n+4} \to \{0, 1\}$  as follows:

$$E_0(y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \neg C_0(x) \land D_0(x'),$$
$$E_1(y) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \neg C_1(x) \land D_1(x')$$

 $(\neg C \text{ is the circuit } C \text{ with output negated})$  such that for each  $y \in \{0,1\}^{n+4}$  we have  $y = x \circ x'$  (o denotes concatenation) where  $x \in \{0,1\}^4$  and  $x' \in \{0,1\}^n$ . Define the input-sequence  $Y \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{x \circ x^* \mid x \in \{0,1\}^4\}$  (consisting of 16 inputs). Then we show the following statement.

**Lemma 7.3.** Let  $\mathbf{A}_{E_0}$ ,  $\mathbf{A}_{E_1}$  be the Barrington-implementations of  $E_0$ ,  $E_1$  respectively, then we have that:  $\operatorname{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{E_0},Y}\right) \neq \operatorname{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{E_1},Y}\right)$ .

*Proof.* As a first step, similar to Claim 7.1 we also verify the following claim via our Sage-implementations (c.f. Appendix A for more details on the implementation).

**Claim 7.4.** Let  $\mathbf{A}_{\neg C_0 \land 0}$ ,  $\mathbf{A}_{\neg C_1 \land 0}$  be the Barrington-implementations of the circuits  $\neg C_0 \land 0$ ,  $\neg C_1 \land 0$  respectively, then we have that:  $\mathsf{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C_0 \land 0}, X}\right) \neq \mathsf{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C_1 \land 0}, X}\right)$ .

Now, recall (Def. 2.4) that any branching program  $\mathbf{A}$  has the following representation:

$$\mathbf{A} = (\mathsf{inp}, A_0, \{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}}, A_{\ell+1}).$$

Let us call the "core" of **A** as:  $\mathbf{A}' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{A_{1,b}, \ldots, A_{\ell,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$ .<sup>23</sup> For any such  $\mathbf{A}'$  we define the inverse as  $\mathbf{A}'^{-1} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{A_{\ell,b}^{-1}, A_{\ell-1,b}^{-1}, \ldots, A_{1,b}^{-1}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$ . Furthermore, for any permutation matrix  $\boldsymbol{\rho} \in S_5$  (recall that Barrington-implementation works with matrices in the symmetric group  $S_5$ ). we define an operation on  $\mathbf{A}'$ :

$$\boldsymbol{\rho}(\mathbf{A}')\boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1} = \left\{ (\boldsymbol{\rho} \cdot A_{1,b}), \{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell]}, (A_{\ell,b} \cdot \boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1}) \right\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$$

Now recall that using the construction from Barrington's Theorem with the above notations we can write for any choice of  $E \in (E_0, E_1)$  (where  $E = C \wedge D$ )

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{A}'_{\neg C \land D}}_{\Phi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land D},Y}} = \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\rho}(\mathbf{A}'_{\neg C})\boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1})}_{M_{0}} \circ \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\varrho}(\mathbf{A}'_{D})\boldsymbol{\varrho}^{-1})}_{M_{1}} \circ \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\rho}(\mathbf{A}'_{\neg C})^{-1}\boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1})}_{M_{2}} \circ \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\varrho}(\mathbf{A}'_{D})^{-1}\boldsymbol{\varrho}^{-1})}_{M_{3}}$$
(9)

where  $\rho, \rho \in S_5$  are specific to the Barrington-implementation (see Appendix A for the exact values we used) and fixed for a particular implementation. Now we can split the linear partial matrix of  $\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land D}$  into four parts:

$$\Phi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land D}, Y} \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} [M_0 \mid M_1 \mid M_2 \mid M_3]$$

where each  $M_i$  is corresponding to a part of the core  $\mathbf{A}'_{C \wedge D}$  as shown in Eq. 9. However, since we have  $D_{x^*} = 0$  for all  $y = x \circ x^*$  in Y and for any two inputs  $y_1, y_2 \in Y$  the sub-input to the circuit D (corresponding to parts  $M_1$  and  $M_3$ ) is same (equal to  $x^*$ ) clearly when i is in the range of  $M_1$  or  $M_3$  we get that:

$$\phi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land D}, y_1}^{(i)} = \phi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land D}, y_2}^{(i)}.$$

which implies that  $M_1, M_3 \in \mathcal{T}$  where  $\mathcal{T}$  is a family of all "trivial matrices" with columns which are either all 0 or all 1 as follows:

$$\begin{bmatrix} \cdots & 1 \cdots & 0 & \cdots \\ \cdots & 1 \cdots & 0 & \cdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots & \vdots \\ \cdots & 1 \cdots & 0 & \cdots \end{bmatrix}$$

Again, using Barrington's Theorem for the circuit  $\neg C \land 0$  we have that:

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{A}'_{\neg C \land 0}}_{\Phi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land 0}, X}} = \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\rho}(\mathbf{A}'_{\neg C})\boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1})}_{N_{0}} \circ \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\varrho}(ID)\boldsymbol{\varrho}^{-1})}_{N_{1}} \circ \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\rho}(\mathbf{A}'_{\neg C})^{-1}\boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1})}_{N_{2}} \circ \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\varrho}(ID)^{-1}\boldsymbol{\varrho}^{-1})}_{N_{3}} \circ \underbrace{(\boldsymbol{\varrho}(ID)^{-1}\boldsymbol{\varrho}^{-1})}_{N_{3}}$$
(10)

for  $X = \{0, 1\}^4$  where we again have  $N_1, N_3 \in \mathcal{T}$  that follows using similar arguments.

Moreover, using again the fact that for any  $y = x \circ x^*$  in Y we have that  $D(x^*) = 0$ , the core of D would always evaluates to ID on any choice of  $y \in Y$ . Hence when *i* lies in the range of  $M_0, M_2$  the partial vectors  $\phi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land D}, Y}^{(i)}$  are independent of the part of the program corresponding to the ranges of  $M_1, M_3$ . Therefore, we can conclude that the *i*-th partial vectors corresponding to ranges  $M_0, M_2$  would be equal to the *i*-th partial vectors corresponding to ranges  $N_0, N_2$ . Hence,

$$M_0 = N_0$$
 and  $M_2 = N_2$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup>The order of the matrices are taken into account here and the evaluation of branching program depends on that. So, essentially we abuse notations of sets to denote an ordered tuple here. Unless otherwise mentions we assume that the set  $\{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}}$  is ordered as  $\{A_{1,b}, \ldots, A_{\ell,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$ 

On the other hand, via exactly the same analysis for the inputs  $\overline{Y} = \{\overline{y} \mid \overline{x} \circ \overline{x^{\star}}\}_{x \in \{0,1\}^4}$  we have that:

$$\Phi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land D}, \overline{Y}} = [\overline{M}_0 \mid \overline{M}_1 \mid \overline{M}_2 \mid \overline{M}_3]$$
$$\Phi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land 0}, \overline{X}} = [\overline{N}_0 \mid \overline{N}_1 \mid \overline{N}_2 \mid \overline{N}_3]$$

where  $\overline{M_1}, \overline{M_3}, \overline{N_1}, \overline{N_3} \in \mathcal{T}$  and

$$\overline{M}_0 = \overline{N}_0$$
 and  $\overline{M}_2 = \overline{N}_2$ 

Hence we conclude:

$$\operatorname{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land D}, Y}\right) = \operatorname{colsp}\left(\left[\Pi_{i,j}[M_i \boxtimes \overline{M}_j]\right] + \left[\Pi_{i,j}[\overline{M}_i \boxtimes M_j]\right]\right)$$
(11)

$$= \operatorname{colsp}\left(\left[\tau \mid \Pi_{i,j \in \{0,2\}}[M_i \boxtimes \overline{M}_j]\right] + \left[\tau' \mid \Pi_{i,j \in \{0,2\}}[\overline{M}_i \boxtimes M_j]\right]\right)$$
(12)

for some  $\tau, \tau' \in \mathcal{T}$ . Note that, in the above equations the first step follows from Fact 2.5. In the second step we first observe that for  $\tau, \tau' \in \mathcal{T}$  and any matrix  $M_i, \overline{M}_i$  we have that  $\operatorname{colsp}(\tau \boxtimes M_i) = \operatorname{colsp}(M_i)$  (resp.  $\operatorname{colsp}(\tau \boxtimes \overline{M}_i) = \operatorname{colsp}(\overline{M}_i)$ ). Also applying Lemma 4.3 it is straightforward to verify that each of the matrices  $\{M_i, \overline{M}_i\}_{i \in [3] \cup \{0\}}$  has the same number of 1's in each row. Hence, then we use Lemma 2.13 to obtain the final expression. Similarly we get:

$$\operatorname{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land 0}, X}\right) = \operatorname{colsp}\left(\left[\Pi_{i, j}[N_i \boxtimes \overline{N}_j]\right] + \left[\Pi_{i, j}[\overline{N}_i \boxtimes N_j]\right]\right)$$
(13)

$$= \operatorname{colsp}\left(\left[\sigma \mid \Pi_{i,j \in \{0,2\}}[N_i \boxtimes \overline{N}_j]\right] + \left[\sigma' \mid \Pi_{i,j \in \{0,2\}}[\overline{N}_i \boxtimes N_j]\right]\right)$$
(14)

for some  $\sigma, \sigma' \in \mathcal{T}$ .

Using the facts,  $M_k = N_k$  and  $\overline{M}_k = \overline{N}_k$  for  $k \in \{0, 2\}$  from Eq. 12 and Eq. 14 we get:

$$\mathsf{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land D},Y}
ight) = \mathsf{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{\neg C \land 0},X}
ight).$$

Now combining this equation with Claim 7.4 the lemma follows.

### 7.3 Universal Circuit Leading to Partially Inequivalent Branching Programs

In this section we present constructions of  $(NC^1)$  universal circuits that, when compiled with two arbitrary distinct  $(NC^1)$  but functionally equivalent circuits as inputs, then the obfuscations of the Barrington-implementation of the compiled circuits are distinguishable by the abstract attack.

For any circuit C, its description is denoted by a bit-string, abusing notation slightly we use the same symbol C to represent the description of C.

**Definition 7.5** (Universal Circuits). An universal circuit U is a boolean circuit that computes a function  $\{0,1\}^{\lambda} \times \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$  which takes two inputs, a  $\lambda$ -bit circuit-description of some boolean circuit  $C : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}$  and a n-bit input x to output C(x). We denote  $U(C,x) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} C(x)$ . We also denote the compiled universal circuit with the description of C hard-coded into it by U[C]. **Theorem 7.6.** There exists a family of  $NC^1$  universal circuits  $\mathcal{U} = \{U_1, U_2, \ldots, U_v\}$  of size  $v = O(poly(\lambda))$  such that: given two arbitrary functionally equivalent  $NC^1$  circuits  $G_0, G_1$  that computes arbitrary boolean function  $\{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}$  satisfying (i)  $|G_0| = |G_1| = v$  and (ii) there exists an input  $x^*$  such that  $G_0(x^*) = G_1(x^*) = G_0(\overline{x^*}) = G_1(\overline{x^*}) = 0$ ; then for at least one  $i \in [v]$  the Barrington-implementations of the circuits  $U_i[G_0]$  and  $U_i[G_1]$  are partially inequivalent.

*Proof.* Our construction of the family  $\mathcal{U}$  is similar to the construction of circuits  $E_0, E_1$  constructed in Section 7.1

Construction of the family  $\mathcal{U}$ . Given a universal circuit U' we construct a family of  $\mathsf{NC}^1$  universal circuits  $\mathcal{U} = \{U_1, \ldots, U_v\}$  where each  $U_i$  is described as follows for any circuit  $G : \{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}$  we define  $U_i[G]$ 

$$U_i[G](y,x) = \neg C(y) \land U'_i(G,x) \text{ where } C = (y[1] \land \underline{G[i]}) \bigwedge (y[2] \land \underline{0}) \bigwedge (y[3] \land \underline{G[i]}) \bigwedge (y[4] \land \underline{0}),$$

as the circuit from  $\{0,1\}^{n+4} \to \{0,1\}$ . Since the given circuits must have different descriptions, they differ by at least one bit location, say  $i^{th}$  location. Clearly, assuming that  $G_0[i] = 1$  and  $G_1[i] = 0$  the circuit  $U_i[G_b]$  is the same as the circuit  $E_b$  as described in Sec. 7.2. Hence applying Lemma 7.3 we conclude that, if  $G_0[i] = 1$  and  $G_1[i] = 0$  then,

$$\operatorname{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{U_{i}[G_{0}]},X}\right)\neq\operatorname{colsp}\left(\Psi_{\mathbf{A}_{U_{i}[G_{1}]},X}\right),$$

where  $X = \{x \circ x^* \mid x \in \{0, 1\}^4\}.$ 

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# A Some details on our implementation

In this section we provide details on our Barrington-implementation and discuss some optimizations in the Sage-code. **Overview of Barrington's Programs** [Bar89]. Barrington's construction works over permutations in the symmetric group  $S_5$ . We assume that permutations are represented as matrices for all practical purpose. A Barrington-implementation specifies permutations  $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \rho, \varrho \in S_5$  such that the following holds:

- $\alpha, \beta$  are 5-cycles.
- $\gamma = \alpha \beta \alpha^{-1} \beta^{-1}$  and one can verify that  $\gamma$  is also a cycle.
- $\boldsymbol{\rho} \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma} \cdot \boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1} = \boldsymbol{\alpha}.$
- $\boldsymbol{\varrho} \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma} \cdot \boldsymbol{\varrho}^{-1} = \boldsymbol{\beta}.$

We define some syntaxes for branching programs. Some of them are redefinitions from Sec. 7.2 (provided in the proof of Lemma 7.3 as it uses some details on Barrington-implementations).

**Core of a Branching Program.** Recall (Def. 2.4) that any branching program **A** has the following representation:

$$\mathbf{A} = (\mathsf{inp}, A_0, \{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}}, A_{\ell+1}).$$

Let us call the "core" of **A** as:  $\mathbf{A}' \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{A_{1,b}, \ldots, A_{\ell,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$ . For any such  $\mathbf{A}'$  we define the inverse as  $\mathbf{A}'^{-1} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{A_{\ell,b}^{-1}, A_{\ell-1,b}^{-1}, \ldots, A_{1,b}^{-1}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$ . Furthermore, for any permutation matrix  $\boldsymbol{\rho} \in S_5$  we define an operation on  $\mathbf{A}'$ :

$$\boldsymbol{\rho}(\mathbf{A}')\boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left\{ (\boldsymbol{\rho} \cdot A_{1,b}), \{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell]}, (A_{\ell,b} \cdot \boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1}) \right\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$$

 $\gamma$ -computation. Any branching program  $\mathbf{A}_C = (inp, A_0, \{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}}, A_{\ell+1})$  is said to be  $\gamma$ -computes a boolean circuit C if the following holds:

$$\prod_{i=1}^{\ell} A_{i,x[\mathsf{inp}(i)]} = \begin{cases} \gamma & when \ C(x) = 1\\ ID^{5 \times 5} & when \ C(x) = 0 \end{cases}$$

If  $\mathbf{A}_{C_0}$ ,  $\mathbf{A}_{C_1}$   $\gamma$ -computes  $C_0$ ,  $C_1$  then one can construct  $\mathbf{A}_{C_0 \wedge C_1}$  that  $\gamma$ -computes  $C = C_0 \wedge C_1$  as follows:

$$\mathbf{A}'_{C_0 \wedge C_1} = (\boldsymbol{\rho}(\mathbf{A}'_{C_0})\boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1}) \circ (\boldsymbol{\varrho}(\mathbf{A}'_{C_1})\boldsymbol{\varrho}^{-1}) \circ (\boldsymbol{\rho}(\mathbf{A}'_{C_0})^{-1}\boldsymbol{\rho}^{-1}) \circ (\boldsymbol{\varrho}(\mathbf{A}'_{C_1})^{-1}\boldsymbol{\varrho}^{-1})$$

and with the same bookends.  $^{25}$ 

Let us also define the operation  $(\mathbf{A}') \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma}$  as  $(\mathbf{A}') \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{A_{1,b}, \ldots, A_{\ell_b} \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$  that has the final pairs right-multiplied with  $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ . Then one can construct another branching program  $\mathbf{A}_{\neg C}$  that  $\boldsymbol{\gamma}$ -computes the circuit  $\neg C$  as follows:

$$\mathbf{A'}_{\neg C} = (\mathbf{A'}_C^{-1}) \cdot \boldsymbol{\gamma}$$

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup>The order of the matrices are taken into account here and the evaluation of branching program depends on that. So, essentially we abuse notations of sets to denote an ordered tuple here. Unless otherwise mentioned we assume that the set  $\{A_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\ell], b \in \{0,1\}}$  is ordered as  $\{A_{1,b}, \ldots, A_{\ell,b}\}_{b \in \{0,1\}}$ 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup>Our input function is a fixed one and designed as suggested by Barrington's Theorem. Namely to compute a program of size 4 on 2-bit input,  $\alpha\beta\alpha^{-1}\beta^{-1}$  we use input function inp =  $(1 \rightarrow 1, 1 \rightarrow 2, 3 \rightarrow 1, 4 \rightarrow 2)$ , that is the first position of the program reads the first bit, the fourth position the second and so on. Similarly for AND operation the input-functions can be extended with adjusted indexes. For more details we refer to Barrington's result [Bar86].

Since any boolean circuit can be converted to a circuit containing only NOT  $(\neg)$  and AND  $(\wedge)$  gates Barrington's theorem [Bar86] follows.

**Our Barrington-implementation.** In our implementations the branching programs are singleinput and input-oblivious. We stress that the input-obliviousness comes automatically from our choice of circuits.

We choose the following permutations for our implementation:

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (1 \to 2 \to 3 \to 4 \to 5) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\ \beta \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (1 \to 3 \to 5 \to 4 \to 2) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\ \gamma \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (1 \to 3 \to 2 \to 5 \to 4) = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 0 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\ \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\alpha \to \gamma) = (1 \to 1, 2 \to 3, 3 \to 2, 4 \to 5, 5 \to 4) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\ \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\beta \to \gamma) = (1 \to 1, 3 \to 3, 5 \to 2, 4 \to 5, 2 \to 4) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \\ \frac{\text{def}}{=} (\beta \to \gamma) = (1 \to 1, 3 \to 3, 5 \to 2, 4 \to 5, 2 \to 4) = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \end{bmatrix}$$

We fix the bookends to:

ρ

ρ

$$A_0 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \end{bmatrix} \text{ and } A_{\ell+1} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \begin{bmatrix} 0\\1\\1\\1\\1\\1\\1 \end{bmatrix}$$

Source Code and Experimental Set-Up. We provide an implementation in Sage [S<sup>+</sup>16]. The sage-executable file named implementations.sagews and a corresponding pdf file (implementations.pdf) of our source-code can be found at https://people.eecs.berkeley.edu/~pratyay85/ Implementations.zip. The code can be run on the SageMath cloud server ( https://sagemath. cloud/). The approximate performance for the 2 circuits on the SageMath cloud are given below:

Circuit	Approx time	Approx memory
C	$3100 \sec (\sim 55 \text{ minutes})$	4  GB
$\neg C \land 0$	$33400 \text{ sec} (\sim 10 \text{ hours})$	$9~\mathrm{GB}$

**Optimizations.** Our source-code is not low-level optimized. However, to run the quadratic attack in practical time we required some algorithmic optimization in order to get the program terminated in reasonable time. In particular, since the number of columns for the quadratic partial matrix,  $\Psi_{\mathbf{A},X}$  becomes squared compared to number of columns in the linear matrices  $\Phi_{\mathbf{A},X}, \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}}$ , even for the case of the simplest circuits ( $\mathbf{A}_C$  or  $\mathbf{A}_{\neg C}$ ) the estimated time to compute directly  $\Psi_{\mathbf{A},X}$ as ( $\Phi_{\mathbf{A},X} \boxtimes \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}} + \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}} \boxtimes \Phi_{\mathbf{A},X}$ ) becomes huge. Instead, we first remove the columns that are all-zero in both  $\Phi_{\mathbf{A},X}, \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}}$  since the corresponding random variables  $\mathbf{z}_{i,b}$  appear in neither of the linear partial matrices. Then we observe that, even after performing that removal, there are many columns that are all-zero in exactly one of  $\Phi_{\mathbf{A},X}, \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}}$ . Hence we first collect those that appear in both and then those appear in one of them. Let us call these three parts  $M_X, M_{\overline{X}}$  and  $M_{X,\overline{X}}$ . Then we have:

$$\Phi_{\mathbf{A},X}^{\star} = [M_X \mid M_{X,\overline{X}}] \quad \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}}^{\star} = [M_{\overline{X}} \mid M_{X,\overline{X}}]$$

where  $\Phi_{\mathbf{A},X}^{\star}$  (resp.  $\Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}}^{\star}$ ) is the same as  $\Phi_{\mathbf{A},X}$  (resp.  $\Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}}$ ) but without some all 0 columns (those appear in none).

Then we compute

$$N = M_X \boxtimes \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}} + M_{\overline{X}} \boxtimes \Phi_{\mathbf{A},X} + \Phi_{\mathbf{A},X} \boxtimes \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}} + \Phi_{\mathbf{A},X} \boxtimes \Phi_{\mathbf{A},\overline{X}} \stackrel{\text{per}}{=} \Psi_{\mathbf{A},X}$$

by combining Fact 2.5 with the above observation. This reduced the number of row-wise tensor product by at least 2 (even after removing the all-zero columns) as we are not computing tensor products from both directions for the matrices containing columns that appear only once.

# **B** Definition of Indistinguishability Obfuscation.

### **B.1** Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Below, we recall the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation  $(i\mathcal{O})$ .

**Definition B.1** (Indistinguishability Obfuscator  $(i\mathcal{O})[\text{GGH}^+13\text{b}]$ ). A uniform PPT machine  $i\mathcal{O}$  is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class  $\{\mathcal{C}_{\lambda}\}$  if the following conditions are satisfied:

• For all security parameters  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , for all  $C \in \mathcal{C}_{\lambda}$ , for all inputs x, we have that

$$\Pr[C'(x) = C(x) : C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C)] = 1$$

• For any (not necessarily uniform) PPT distinguisher D, there exists a negligible function  $\alpha$ such that the following holds: For all security parameters  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , for all pairs of circuits  $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_{\lambda}$ , we have that if  $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$  for all inputs x, then

$$\left| \Pr\left[ D(i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_0)) = 1 \right] - \Pr\left[ D(i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_1)) = 1 \right] \right| \le \alpha(\lambda)$$