Efficient Round-Optimal Blind Signatures in the Standard Model

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Abstract. Blind signatures are at the core of e-cash systems and has numerous other applications. In this work we construct efficient blind and partially blind signature schemes over bilinear groups in the standard model. Our schemes yield short signatures consisting of only a couple of elements from the shorter source group and have very short communication overhead consisting of 1 group element on the user side and 3 group elements on the signer side. At 80-bit security, our schemes yield signatures consisting of only 40 bytes which is 67% shorter than the most efficient existing scheme with the same security in the standard model. Verification in our schemes requires only a couple of pairings. Our schemes compare favorably in every efficiency measure to all existing counterparts offering the same security in the standard model. In fact, the efficiency of our signing protocol as well as the signature size compare favorably even to many existing schemes in the random oracle model. For instance, our signatures are shorter than those of Brands' scheme which is at the heart of the U-Prove anonymous credential system used in practice. The unforgeability of our schemes is based on new intractability assumptions of a "one-more" type which we show are intractable in the generic group model, whereas their blindness holds w.r.t. malicious signing keys in the information-theoretic sense. We also give variants of our schemes for a vector of messages.
Keywords. Blind Signatures, Round-Optimal, Partial Blindness, E-Cash.

1 Introduction

Blind signatures introduced by Chaum [23] are an interactive protocol that allows a user to obtain signatures on messages of her choice without revealing the messages to the signer. Blindness in these schemes ensures that it is infeasible for a malicious signer to link the final signatures to their corresponding signing requests. Blindness can be either proven in the honest-key model where the key pair is produced by the challenger and then revealed to the adversary or in the stronger malicious-key model [1, 48] where the key pair is chosen by the adversary herself and she is not required to reveal the signing key to the challenger. On the other hand, unforgeability ensures that it is infeasible for a malicious user to obtain more valid signatures on distinct messages than the number of completed interactions with the honest signer. Such a primitive is at the core of e-cash systems [23] where the bank acts as the signer; the privacy requirement comes from the non-traceability requirement of cash. It also finds applications in e-voting [34], anonymous credentials [8] and direct anonymous attestation [20, 12]. The primitive is very relevant to practice, besides its prominent role in realizing e-cash systems, blind signatures are the backbone of some anonymous credentials systems deployed in practice, which include the U-Prove system [19].

Measures of importance when designing such schemes include their round complexity, i.e. the number of moves between the parties before the user can derive a signature. Round-optimal schemes [27] consisting of only two moves are known to imply security under concurrent executions.

Related Work. After their introduction by Chaum [23], a long line of research on blind signatures has evolved. Constructions of blind signatures relying on random oracles [26] include

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[23, 53, 18, 51, 2, 15, 11, 52, 8]. Most of the early constructions relying on random oracles are essentially Full-Domain-Hash (FDH) style signatures. The user sends a blinded message digest of the message to the signer who in turn returns a signature on such a digest. Upon receiving the signature, thanks to the homomorphic property of the underlying signature scheme, the user is able to transform such a signature to one on the message. This is the underlying idea behind the original (RSA based) scheme in [23] which was proven secure in [51]. The same applies to the (DLog based) scheme in [15].

Constructions dispensing with relying on random oracles but at the expense of assuming a trusted common reference string (CRS) include [21, 45, 6, 39]. Fischlin [27] gave a generic construction of two-move schemes in the CRS model satisfying blindness in the malicious-key model. His construction requires the user to send a commitment to her message which in turn gets signed by the signer. The final signature is then merely a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge of a signature on the (hidden) commitment to the message. Most subsequent constructions in the CRS model are either direct instantiations of Fischlin's construction, e.g. [5, 3], or variations thereof, e.g. [30, 3]. The scheme in [30, 3] adopts a similar approach as Fischlin's but instead of hiding the signed commitment, it exploits a feature of the underlying signature scheme to transform a signature on the commitment to a direct signature on the message itself. Other round-optimal constructions is the CRS model include [47, 13, 14, 56].

Round-optimal constructions not relying on either of the aforementioned assumptions, i.e. in the standard model, are preferable. However, it is well-known that such schemes are harder to design. Lindell [46] showed that it is impossible to design round-optimal schemes in the standard model if simulation-based (rather than game-based) security definitions are used. However, Hazay et al. [43] showed that (non-round-optimal) realizations are possible if game-based definitions are deployed. Abe and Ohkubo [6] showed that universally composable blind signatures even non-committing ones are impossible in the standard model. Okamoto [48] gave a non-round-optimal construction in the standard model which satisfies blindness in the malicious-key model. Fischlin and Schröder [29] proved that it is impossible to reduce the security of a standard-model blind signature scheme in a blackbox manner to the intractability of a non-interactive assumption if the scheme has any of the following properties: i) the signing protocol has less than 4 moves. ii) its blindness holds statistically iii) the signing transcript allows one to check if a valid signature can be derived from it.

Existing constructions in the standard model [37, 36] circumvent the impossibility result by making use of a non-blackbox reduction to the underlying primitive. Garg et al. [37] gave the first round-optimal construction in the standard model solving a long-standing open problem. Their scheme combines fully homomorphic encryption with two-move witness-indistinguishable proofs known otherwise as ZAPs [25]. Their scheme is inefficient and is only considered as a feasibility result. Recently, Garg and Gupta [36] gave a more-efficient round-optimal construction which combines structure-preserving signature schemes [3] and Groth-Sahai NIZK proofs [40]. To eliminate the need for a trusted party, they use two CRSs which are part of the signer's public key. The signer is forced to choose those honestly as otherwise she needs to solve an exponential-time problem in order to cheat. The security of their scheme holds w.r.t. non-uniform adversaries and relies on complexity leveraging. Consequently, it suffers from a large communication overhead and a rather large computational cost.

Recently, Fuchsbauer et al. [33] gave a semi-generic construction of round-optimal schemes in the standard model which combines the Pedersen commitment scheme [49] with structure-preserving signatures on equivalence classes [41]. Their construction satisfies blindness against malicious keys. They gave an efficient instantiation whose security relies on a couple of interactive assumptions where they used the optimal construction of signature on equivalence classes from [32]. More recently, Fuchsbauer et al. [31] weakened the assumptions on which the

instantiation in [33] is based by eliminating one of the interactive assumptions on which the blindness in [33] was relying. However, the unforgeability of the new variant still relies on an interactive intractability assumption. Hanzlik and Kluczniak [42] gave a construction in the standard model in the honest-key model. The downside of their construction is that it uses an encryption scheme over composite-order groups which requires groups of a large order as well as a strong non-standard "knowledge" assumption [9]. Very recently, Döttling et al. [24] showed that blind signatures in the standard model can be constructed from maliciously circuit-private homomorphic encryption for logarithmic depth circuits.

Baldimtsi and Lysyanskaya [8] showed that existing techniques fall short for proving the security of some existing blind signatures lacking a security proof in the random oracle model. Concerned constructions include Schnorr's [53] and Brands' [18] schemes. The latter is at the core of the U-Prove system.

Abe and Fujisaki [4] put forward the notion of partially blind signatures which extends blind signatures to allow some part of the message to be public. This makes it possible to attach some public attributes, e.g. an expiration date, to the signatures. Recently, Fuchsbauer et al. [33, 31] gave the first efficient round-optimal partially blind schemes in the standard model.

Our Contribution. We construct two efficient blind signature schemes in the standard model satisfying blindness in the malicious-key model. Our schemes yield very short signatures consisting of only a pair of elements from the shorter source group. At 80-bit security, our signatures are only 40 bytes long which means they are 67% shorter than the best existing scheme offering the same security [33]. Verifying signatures in our schemes involves evaluating a couple of pairings. The latter matches the verification overhead of the most efficient existing (non-blind) signature schemes over bilinear groups [17, 16]. Such desirable efficiency means that our schemes can even be deployed on devices with limited computational power if the evaluation of pairings required for verification is outsourced to a third party, e.g. using techniques from [22]. Our schemes have a very low communication overhead on both sides. The blindness of our schemes holds in the information-theoretic sense whereas their unforgeability relies on new intractability assumptions which we show hold in the generic group model [57]. Note that it is well-known that blind signature schemes in the standard model based solely on non-interactive assumptions, e.g. [37, 36], are much less efficient. Furthermore, all existing efficient round-optimal schemes in the standard model offering the same security as ours [33, 31] also rely on interactive intractability assumptions.

We also construct efficient partially blind signature schemes and efficient blind signature schemes for a vector of messages. The techniques underlying our constructions are akin to the blind-unblind paradigm which usually forms the basis of the efficient constructions in the random oracle model. However, to obtain the desired efficiency in the standard model, we apply various techniques. Similarly to [39, 33, 31], our constructions do not require expensive zero-knowledge proofs.

Paper Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give some preliminary definitions. In Section 3, we introduce and prove intractability of two new assumptions. In Section 4, we recall the syntax and security of blind signatures. In Section 5, we give our blind signature constructions. We show in Section 6 how to extend our schemes to sign a vector of messages. In Section 7, we give our partially blind signature constructions.

Notation. We write $b = \mathsf{Alg}(a; r)$ when algorithm Alg on input a and randomness r outputs b. We write $b \leftarrow \mathsf{Alg}(a)$ for the process of setting $b = \mathsf{Alg}(a; r)$ where r is sampled at random. For an algorithm Alg and an oracle $\mathcal{O}$, $\mathsf{Alg}^{\mathcal{O}^k(\cdot)}$ denotes that Alg can access $\mathcal{O}$ at most k times on inputs of Alg's choice. We write $a \leftarrow \mathcal{S}$ for sampling a uniformly at random from the set $\mathcal{S}$. A function $\nu(.) : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}^+$ is negligible (in λ) if for every polynomial $\rho(\cdot)$ and all sufficiently large

values of λ, it holds that $\nu(\lambda) < \frac{1}{\rho(\lambda)}$. PPT stands for running in probabilistic polynomial time in the relevant security parameter. For $\ell \in \mathbb{N} \setminus \{0\}$, by $[\ell]$ we denote the set $\{1, \ldots, \ell\}$.

2 Preliminaries

In this section we provide some preliminary definitions.

2.1 Bilinear Groups

A bilinear group is a tuple $\mathcal{P} := (\mathbb{G}, \hat{\mathbb{G}}, \mathbb{T}, p, G, \hat{G}, e)$ where $\mathbb{G}$, $\hat{\mathbb{G}}$ and $\mathbb{T}$ are groups of a prime order p, and G and $\hat{G}$ generate $\mathbb{G}$ and $\hat{\mathbb{G}}$, respectively. The function e is a non-degenerate bilinear map $e : \mathbb{G} \times \hat{\mathbb{G}} \longrightarrow \mathbb{T}$. To distinguish between elements of $\mathbb{G}$ and $\hat{\mathbb{G}}$, the latter will be accented with $\hat{}$. We use multiplicative notation for all the groups. We let $\mathbb{G}^{\times} := \mathbb{G} \setminus \{1_{\mathbb{G}}\}$ and $\hat{\mathbb{G}}^{\times} := \hat{\mathbb{G}} \setminus \{1_{\hat{\mathbb{G}}}\}$. In this paper, we work in the efficient Type-III setting [35], where $\mathbb{G} \neq \hat{\mathbb{G}}$ and there is no efficiently computable isomorphism between the groups in either direction. We assume there is an algorithm $\mathcal{BG}$ that on input a security parameter λ, outputs a description of bilinear groups. Without loss in generality and similarly to e.g. [33, 31] in this work we will assume $\mathcal{BG}$ is deterministic, which as argued by [33, 31] is the case for instance in the most widely used groups based on BN curves [10].

2.2 Pedersen Commitment Scheme

We use a generalized variant of the Pedersen commitment scheme [49] which allows committing to a vector of messages at once. The scheme is information-theoretically hiding and computationally binding under the discrete logarithm assumption. The generalized variant is defined by the following algorithms:

Setup$(1^{\lambda}, n)$ On input the security parameter λ and the size of the vector n, this algorithm chooses a cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$ of prime order p where $\log p \in \Theta(\lambda)$. It also samples the elements $G_1, \ldots, G_n, H \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$. It returns the commitment key $\mathsf{ck} := (G_1, \ldots, G_n, H)$ which we assume is an implicit input to the rest of the algorithms.

Commit$(\boldsymbol{m}, r)$ On input a message vector $\boldsymbol{m} = (m_1, \ldots, m_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ and a randomness $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, this algorithm returns the commitment $\mathsf{Co} := H^r \prod_{i=1}^n G_i^{m_i}$ and the opening information $d := (\boldsymbol{m}, r)$.

Open$(\mathsf{Co}, d = (\boldsymbol{m}, r))$ On input a commitment Co and its associated opening information d, this algorithm verifies whether such opening information is a valid one by checking that $\mathsf{Co} = H^r \prod_{i=1}^n G_i^{m_i}$ returning 1 or 0 accordingly.

Since the hiding property of the scheme holds in the information-theoretic sense, such a property still holds even if we let the recipient runs the Setup algorithm which is otherwise usually run by a trusted third party. The above argument holds as long as $H \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ which is easy to check.

3 New Intractability Assumptions

In this section we introduce two new assumptions of a "one-more" type where the adversary interacts with an oracle k times and is tasked with outputting $k + 1$ valid tuples. They are similar in nature to the E-LRSW assumption introduced by Ghadafi and Smart [39].

3.1 The BSOM Assumption

Our first new assumption which we refer to as the BSOM (short for Blind Signature One More) assumption will form the basis for the unforgeability of our first blind signature construction. It is inspired in part by the assumption underlying the recent signature scheme by Ghadafi [38].

Definition 1 (BSOM Assumption). *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbb{G}, \hat{\mathbb{G}}, \mathbb{T}, G, \hat{G}, e, p)$ be the description of Type-III bilinear groups output by $\mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$, and let $H := G^h$, $\hat{H} := \hat{G}^h$, $\hat{X} := \hat{G}^x$, $\hat{Y} := \hat{G}^y$ for some $h, x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Let $\mathcal{O}BSOM_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot)$ be an oracle that on input a message $M = G^m$ (for some possibly unknown $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$) returns a triple $\left(A := G^a, B := (G^x M)^{\frac{a}{y}}, C := H^{\frac{a}{y}}\right) \in \mathbb{G}^3$ for some $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. We say the BSOM assumption holds if for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, the following advantage is negligible (in λ):*

$$
\Pr \left[
\begin{array}{l}
\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda); \ h, x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; \ (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}) := (G^h, \hat{G}^h, \hat{G}^x, \hat{G}^y); \\
\{(A_i, B_i, m_i)\}_{i=1}^{k+1} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}BSOM^k_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot)}\left(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}\right) : \\
\left|\{m_i\}_{i=1}^{k+1}\right| = k+1 \ \wedge \ \forall i \in [k+1] : \ A_i \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}} \wedge e(B_i, \hat{Y}) = e(A_i, \hat{X}\hat{G}^{m_i})
\end{array}
\right]
$$

We now show that the assumption is intractable in the generic group model [57]. Our proof makes use of the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [55].

Theorem 1. *For any generic adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against the BSOM assumption, if p is the (prime) order of the bilinear group and $\mathcal{A}$ makes q_G group operation queries, q_P pairing queries and q_O queries to the BSOM oracle $\mathcal{O}BSOM_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}$, then the probability of $\mathcal{A}$ against the BSOM assumption is $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q_G^2 q_O + q_P^2 q_O + q_O^3}{p})$.*

Proof. Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ interacts with the group operations, pairing and BSOM oracles via group handles. The challenger keeps three lists $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2$ and $\mathcal{L}_T$ of pairs (τ, F), where τ is a "random" encoding of the group element chosen from some set $\mathcal{S}$ where $|\mathcal{S}| > 3p$, and F is some Laurent polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, H, X, Y^{\pm 1}]$.

To each list we associate an Update operation that takes as input the specific list $\mathcal{L}_i$ and a polynomial F. It then searches the list $\mathcal{L}_i$ for an entry with a second component equal to F: if it finds one, it returns the first component as a result. Otherwise, a new element τ (different from all elements of $\mathcal{S}$ used so far) is selected from $\mathcal{S}$, and the entry (τ, F) is added to the list $\mathcal{L}_i$. The encoding τ is then returned. The encodings τ are the handles used to represent group elements.

At the start of the game, the challenger initializes the empty lists by executing $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, 1)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, H)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, 1)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, H)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, X)$, and $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, Y)$. The adversary interacts with these lists via the following oracles:

- **Group Operations Oracles:** Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can make up to q_G such queries. The oracles $\mathcal{O}_1, \mathcal{O}_2$ and $\mathcal{O}_T$ allow $\mathcal{A}$ to perform group operations in the respective groups via addition/subtraction operations. On a call $\mathcal{O}_i(\tau_1, \tau_2, \pm)$, the challenger searches list $\mathcal{L}_i$ for pairs of the form (τ_1, F_1) and (τ_2, F_2). If both pairs exist, the result of the operation $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_i, F_1 \pm F_2)$ is returned to the adversary. Otherwise, the symbol $\perp$ is returned.
- **Pairing Oracle:** Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can make up to q_P such queries. On a call $\mathcal{O}_P(\tau_1, \tau_2)$, the challenger searches $\mathcal{L}_1$ for a pair (τ_1, F_1) and $\mathcal{L}_2$ for a pair (τ_2, F_2). If both pairs exist, the result of $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_T, F_1 F_2)$ is returned to $\mathcal{A}$. Otherwise, the symbol $\perp$ is returned.
- **BSOM Oracle:** Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can make up to q_O queries to the oracle $\mathcal{O}BSOM_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}$. To answer the i-th such query $\mathcal{O}BSOM_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\tau_i)$, the challenger searches $\mathcal{L}_1$ for a pair (τ_i, F_i).

If no such pair exists, the challenger returns the symbol $\bot$. Otherwise, the challenger returns (τ_A, τ_B, τ_C) computed as follows to $\mathcal{A}$ where A_i, X, H and Y^{-1} are indeterminates as above.

$$\tau_A \leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, A_i),$$
$$\tau_B \leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, (X + F_i)A_iY^{-1}),$$
$$\tau_C \leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, A_iHY^{-1})\cdot$$

At the end of the game, the total number of (non-constant) Laurent polynomials contained in the lists $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2$ and $\mathcal{L}_T$ is μ where $\mu \leq 6 + q_G + q_P + 3q_O$.

Using the above oracles, we can simulate the entire run of $\mathcal{A}$. We show that the probability of $\mathcal{A}$ succeeding is negligibly small.

If $\mathcal{A}$ is successful, she outputs $q_O + 1$ tuples $\left\{m_i, \tau_A^{(i)}, \tau_B^{(i)}\right\}_{i=1}^{q_O+1}$ where $m_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are distinct and $\tau_A^{(i)}, \tau_B^{(i)}$ are handles on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$. Let $F_A^{(i)}$ and $F_B^{(i)}$ denote their associated (formal) Laurent polynomials. Since $\mathcal{A}$'s output must correspond to a solution to the BSOM problem, we must have for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$

$$F_B^{(i)}Y - F_A^{(i)}(X + m_i) \equiv 0 \tag{1}$$
$$F_A^{(i)} \not\equiv 0 \tag{2}$$

We first argue that for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$, we have that $F_B^{(i)}$ satisfies that $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$. First of all note that at the start of the game, there is no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ satisfying $\deg_X(F) \neq 0$. Thus, on the first oracle call $\mathcal{O}\mathsf{BSOM}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\tau_1)$, it follows that $\deg_X(F_1) = 0$ where F_1 is the polynomial corresponding to the encoding τ_1. After the oracle has computed its response to the first query, the only polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of X different from 0 is $F_{B_1} = (X + F_1)A_1Y^{-1}$ corresponding to τ_{B_1}. It is clear that $\deg_X(F_{B_1}) = 1$ since as we argued $\deg_X(F_1) = 0$. Even if the encoding corresponding to F_{B_1} has been used in a subsequent query to the BSOM oracle, the resulting polynomial F_{B_i} corresponding to the encoding τ_{B_i} retuned to the adversary satisfy $\deg_X(F_{B_i}) = 1$. From this it follows that the polynomials F_{B_j} for all $j > 1$ satisfy $\deg_X(F_{B_j}) = 1$. In turn this means that for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$, for $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to satisfy the verification equation, we must have $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$ and $\deg_X(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. We now argue that we must have for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ that $\deg_Y(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. First note that at the start of the game there exists no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ where $\deg_Y(F) \neq 0$. The only polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of Y different from 0 are those corresponding to the encodings τ_B and τ_C resulting from the response of the BSOM oracle. Note that none of the queries result in a polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with the monomial HXY^i. Thus, if for any $i \in [q_O + 1]$, the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ has a term containing the monomial HY^k, for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid BSOM pair, we must have that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial HXY^{k-1} which is a contradiction. Similarly, if for any $i \in [q_O + 1]$ the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ has a term containing the monomial Y^k for some $k \neq 0$, we must also have that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial XY^{k-1}. Note that the only Laurent polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a monomial H^0Y^k are those corresponding to linear combinations of the polynomials F_{B_i} (associated with the encodings τ_{B_i}) returned by the BSOM oracle. This implies that for $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, we must have $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 2$ which as argued earlier is impossible. We now argue that for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ we must have that $\deg_H(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. Note that none of the queries result in a polynomial with the monomial H^jX^k for $j \neq 0$ and $k \neq 0$. If for any $i \in [q_O + 1]$ we have $\deg_H(F_A^{(i)}) = j \neq 0$ then for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid BSOM pair, the polynomial $F_B^{(i)}$ must have a term with the monomial H^jX which as argued is impossible.

Therefore, it is clear we must have for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$, that

$$F_A^{(i)} = \alpha_i + \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \beta_{i,j} A_j.$$

If for any $i \in [q_O + 1]$ we have that $\alpha_i \neq 0$, then it must be the case that $F_B^{(i)}$ has a term of the form $\alpha_i X$ which is not possible since no linear combination of the polynomials the adversary obtains in the game can lead to a polynomial with such term on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$. Therefore, it is clear we must have for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ that

$$F_A^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \beta_{i,j} A_j \qquad\qquad F_B^{(i)} = \gamma_i + \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} F_{B_j}$$

Since by (2) we must have that $F_A^{(i)} \not\equiv 0$, if for any $i \in [q_O + 1]$ we have $\gamma_i \neq 0$, then we must have that $F_A^{(i)}$ contains a term of the form $\gamma_i Y$ which is impossible. Thus, it follows that we must have $\gamma_i = 0$ for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ which implies

$$F_B^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} F_{B_j} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} \left(A_j X Y^{-1} + F_j A_j Y^{-1} \right).$$

The check (2) implies we must have for at least one value of j that $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$. Now for (1) to hold, by the monomial $A_j X$ we must have that for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $\beta_{i,j} = \delta_{i,j}$, and by the monomial A_j we must have that for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $F_j \delta_{i,j} = m_i \beta_{i,j}$. Since we already must have for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $\beta_{i,j} = \delta_{i,j}$, it follows that we have for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $F_j = m_i$. Thus, if for more than one value of j we have $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$ then it must be the case that the corresponding queries to BSOM oracle used in the linear combination were on the same encoding corresponding to the same polynomial F in which case it is obvious that it is impossible to output $q_O + 1$ valid BSOM tuples on $q_O + 1$ distinct messages after only q_O queries. So the best the adversary can do is to only have for a single value of $j \in [q_O]$ that $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$. Even in this case it is clear that the adversary can at most output q_O valid BSOM tuples on q_O distinct messages.

Thus far, we showed that the equalities in (1) and (2) do not hold identically. We now bound the probability of the challenger's simulation failing and show that such a probability is negligible (in the security parameter λ). The simulation fails if for any two Laurent polynomials F and F' on the list $\mathcal{L}_k$ for $k \in \{1, 2, T\}$ it holds that $F \neq F'$ but $F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y)$ for some $a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. In other words, the adversary wins if any of the following happens:

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_1 \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) \qquad (3)$$

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_2 \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) \qquad (4)$$

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_T \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) \qquad (5)$$

Note that the only indeterminate in those Laurent polynomials with a negative power is Y. Thus, for all Laurent polynomials F on those lists we can view F as a fraction of polynomials of the form $F = \frac{R}{S}$ where $R \in \mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, H, X, Y]$ and $S \in \mathbb{Z}_p[Y]$. Note that $\mathbb{Z}_p[Y] \subset \mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, H, X, Y]$. In fact in our case we are only working with simpler polynomials S which are monic monomials, i.e. polynomials of the form Y^k for some $k \geq 0$. We can thus substitute the check

$$F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y)$$

with the check
$$R(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y)S'(y) = R'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y)S(y).$$

We first give a bound on the degree of such polynomials. Note that before the first BSOM oracle query, the only non-constant polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ is the polynomial H. At the end of the game, the Laurent polynomial F corresponding to polynomials R and S with the largest degrees in the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ is the polynomial resulting from calling the oracle BSOM oracle first time on the encoding corresponding to the polynomial H and then repeatedly querying the oracle on the polynomial corresponding to the encoding τ_B returned by the oracle. Such a polynomial has the form $F = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{q_O} \beta_i \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j X Y^{-(q_O-i+1)} + \gamma \prod_{i=1}^{q_O} A_i H Y^{-q_Q}$. Thus, we have $R = \alpha Y^{q_Q} + \sum_{i=1}^{q_O} \beta_i \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j X Y^{i-1} + \gamma \prod_{i=1}^{q_O} A_i H$ and $S = Y^{q_Q}$. This ensures that for any Laurent polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ it holds that $\deg(R) \leq q_O + 1$ and $\deg(S) \leq q_O$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the probability that (3) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{2q_O+1}{p}$.

The polynomials that one can obtain on the list $\mathcal{L}_2$ at the end of the game have degrees $\in \{0, 1\}$, i.e. for any $F = \frac{R}{S}$ on the list $\mathcal{L}_2$ we have that $S = 1$ and hence $\deg(S) = 0$ and $\deg(R) = 1$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the probability that (4) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{1}{p}$.

From the above two bounds on the degrees of polynomials in $\mathcal{L}_1$ and $\mathcal{L}_2$, it follows that we have that all Laurent polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_T$ correspond to polynomial fractions $\frac{R}{S}$ where $\deg(R) \leq q_O + 2$ and $\deg(S) \leq q_O$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the probability that (5) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{2q_O+2}{p}$.

Summing over all choices of F and F' in each case we have that the probability ϵ of the simulation failing for this reason is

$$\epsilon \leq \binom{|\mathcal{L}_1|}{2} \frac{2q_O+1}{p} + \binom{|\mathcal{L}_2|}{2} \frac{1}{p} + \binom{|\mathcal{L}_T|}{2} \frac{2q_O+2}{p}$$
$$\leq \frac{(6 + q_G + 3q_O + q_P)^2 (2q_O + 2)}{p}.$$

An issue that arises when working with Laurent polynomials instead of standard polynomials is that if we happen to sample the root of the polynomial in the denominator then such a value is not defined and the simulation will fail. Therefore, we also need to bound the probability of such an event happening. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma we have that the probability of this happening is bounded by $\frac{(6+q_G+3q_O+q_P)q_O}{p}$.

The probability of the simulation failing is $\leq \frac{(6+q_G+3q_O+q_P)^2(2q_O+2)+(6+q_G+3q_O+q_P)q_O}{p}$, i.e. $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q_G^2 q_O + q_P^2 q_O + q_O^3}{p})$.

Since by definition we have that q_O, q_G and q_P are all polynomial in λ whereas $\log p \in \Theta(\lambda)$, it follows that the adversary's advantage is negligible.

$\square$

3.2 The BSOMI Assumption

Our second new assumption which we refer to as the BSOMI assumption will form the basis for the unforgeability of our second blind signature construction. It is inspired in part by the assumption underlying the recent signature scheme by Pointcheval and Sanders [50].

Definition 2 (BSOMI Assumption). *Let* $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbb{G}, \hat{\mathbb{G}}, \mathbb{T}, G, \hat{G}, e, p)$ *be the description of Type-III bilinear groups output by* $\mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$, *and let* $H := G^h$, $\hat{H} := \hat{G}^{\frac{1}{h}}$, $\hat{X} := \hat{G}^x$, $\hat{Y} := \hat{G}^y$ *for some* $h, x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. *Let* $\mathcal{O}BSOMI_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot)$ *be an oracle that on input a message* $M := G^m$ *(for some possibly unknown* $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$*) returns a triple* $(A := G^a, B := A^x M^{ay}, C := H^{ay}) \in \mathbb{G}^3$ *for*

some $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. *We say the BSOMI assumption holds if for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, the following advantage is negligible (in λ):*

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda); \ h, x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; \ (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}) := (G^h, \hat{G}^{\frac{1}{h}}, \hat{G}^x, \hat{G}^y); \\ \{(A_i, B_i, m_i)\}_{i=1}^{k+1} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}BSOMI_{H,\hat{H}',\hat{X},\hat{Y}}^k(\cdot)} \left(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y} \right) : \\ \left| \{m_i\}_{i=1}^{k+1} \right| = k + 1 \ \wedge \ \forall i \in [k+1] : \ A_i \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}} \wedge e(B_i, \hat{G}) = e(A_i, \hat{X}\hat{Y}^{m_i}) \end{bmatrix}$$

We now show that the assumption is intractable in the generic group model [57].

Theorem 2. *For any generic adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against the BSOMI assumption, if p is the (prime) order of the bilinear group and $\mathcal{A}$ makes q_G group operation queries, q_P pairing queries and q_O queries to the BSOMI oracle $\mathcal{O}BSOMI_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}$, then the probability of $\mathcal{A}$ against the BSOMI assumption is $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q_G^2 q_O + q_P^2 q_O + q_O^3}{p})$.*

Proof. Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ interacts with the group operations, pairing and BSOMI oracles via group handles. The challenger keeps three lists $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2$ and $\mathcal{L}_T$ of pairs (τ, F), where τ is a "random" encoding of the group element chosen from some set $\mathcal{S}$ where $|\mathcal{S}| > 3p$, and F is some Laurent polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, X, Y, H^{\pm 1}]$.

At the start of the game, the challenger initializes the empty lists by executing $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, 1)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, H)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, 1)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, H^{-1})$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, X)$, and $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, Y)$.

The group operations and pairing oracles are dealt with in an identical manner to that in the proof of the BSOM assumption whereas BSOMI oracle queries are dealt with as follows:

- **BSOMI Oracle:** $\mathcal{A}$ can make up to q_O queries to this oracle. To answer the i-th such query $\mathcal{O}\mathrm{BSOMI}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\tau_i)$, the challenger searches $\mathcal{L}_1$ for a pair (τ_i, F_i). If no such pair exists, the challenger returns the symbol $\bot$. Otherwise, the challenger returns (τ_A, τ_B, τ_C) computed as follows to $\mathcal{A}$ where A_i, X, Y and H are indeterminates as above.

$$\tau_A \leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, A_i),$$
$$\tau_B \leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, (X + F_i Y)A_i),$$
$$\tau_C \leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, A_i H Y).$$

At the end of the game, the total number of (non-constant) Laurent polynomials contained in the lists $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2$ and $\mathcal{L}_T$ is μ where $\mu \leq 6 + q_G + q_P + 3q_O$.

Using the above oracles, we can simulate the entire run of $\mathcal{A}$. We show that the probability of $\mathcal{A}$ succeeding is negligibly small.

If $\mathcal{A}$ is successful, she outputs $q_O + 1$ tuples $\left\{ m_i, \tau_A^{(i)}, \tau_B^{(i)} \right\}_{i=1}^{q_O+1}$ where $m_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are distinct and $\tau_A^{(i)}, \tau_B^{(i)}$ are handles on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$. Let $F_A^{(i)}$ and $F_B^{(i)}$ denote their associated (formal) Laurent polynomials. Since $\mathcal{A}$'s output must correspond to a solution to the BSOMI problem, we must have for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$

$$F_B^{(i)} - F_A^{(i)}(X + m_i Y) \equiv 0 \tag{6}$$

$$F_A^{(i)} \not\equiv 0 \tag{7}$$

We first argue that for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$, we have that $F_B^{(i)}$ satisfies that $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$. First of all note that at the start of the game, there is no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ satisfying $\deg_X(F) \neq 0$. Thus, on the first oracle call $\mathcal{O}\mathrm{BSOMI}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\tau_1)$, it follows that $\deg_X(F_1) = 0$ where F_1 is the polynomial corresponding to the encoding τ_1. After the oracle has computed

its response to the first query, the only polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of X different from 0 is $F_{B_1} = (X + F_1 Y)A_1$ corresponding to τ_{B_1}. It is clear that $\deg_X(F_{B_1}) = 1$ since as we argued $\deg_X(F_1) = 0$. Even if the encoding corresponding to F_{B_1} is used in a subsequent query to the BSOMI oracle, the resulting polynomial F_{B_i} corresponding to the encoding τ_{B_i} retuned to the adversary satisfies $\deg_X(F_{B_i}) = 1$. From this it follows that the polynomials F_{B_j} for all $j > 1$ satisfy $\deg_X(F_{B_j}) = 1$. In turn this means that for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$, for $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to satisfy the verification equation, we must have $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$ and $\deg_X(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$.

We now argue that we must have for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ that $\deg_Y(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. First note that at the start of the game there exists no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ where $\deg_Y(F) \neq 0$.

The only polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of Y different from 0 are those corresponding to the encodings τ_B and τ_C resulting from the response of the BSOMI oracle. Note that none of the queries in the game result in a polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with the monomial HXY^i. Thus, if for any $i \in [q_O + 1]$ the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ has a term containing the monomial HY^k, for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid BSOMI pair, we must have that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial HXY^k which is a contradiction. Similarly, if for any $i \in [q_O + 1]$ the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ has a term containing the monomial Y^k for some $k \neq 0$, we must also have that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial XY^k. Note that the only Laurent polynomials with a monomial $H^0 Y^k$ are those corresponding to linear combinations of the polynomials F_{B_i} (associated with the encodings τ_{B_i}) returned by the BSOMI oracle. This implies that for $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, we must have $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 2$ which as argued earlier is impossible. Thus, it follows that we must have for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ that the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ satisfy $\deg_Y(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$ from which it follows that for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, it must be the case that $\deg_Y(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$.

We now argue that for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$, we have that $\deg_H(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. Note that none of the operations on the polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ results in a polynomial with the monomial $H^j X^k$ for $j \neq 0$ and $k \neq 0$. Thus, if for any $i \in [q_O + 1]$ it holds that the polynomials $F_A^{(i)}$ contains a monomial of the form H^j for $j \neq 0$, for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid BSOMI pair, it must be the case that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial $H^j X$ which as argued above is impossible. Thus, it follows that for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$, we have that $\deg_H(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$ from which it follows that $\deg_H(F_B^{(i)}) = 0$.

From the above, it is clear we must have for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ that

$$F_A^{(i)} = \alpha_i + \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \beta_{i,j} A_j.$$

If for any $i \in [q_O + 1]$ we have that $\alpha_i \neq 0$, then it must be the case that $F_B^{(i)}$ has a term of the form $\alpha_i X$ which as argued above is not possible since no linear combination of the polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ the adversary obtains in the game can lead to a polynomial with such a term. Therefore, it is clear we must have for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ that

$$F_A^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \beta_{i,j} A_j$$

$$F_B^{(i)} = \gamma_i + \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} F_{B_j}.$$

For the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to satisfy (6), we must have that for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ that $\gamma_i = 0$. Therefore, it follows that for all $i \in [q_O + 1]$ we have

$$F_B^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} F_{B_j} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} \left(A_j X + F_j A_j Y\right).$$

The check (7) implies that we must have for at least one value of j that $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$. Now for (6) to hold, by the monomial $A_j X$ we must have that for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $\beta_{i,j} = \delta_{i,j}$, and by the monomial $A_j Y$ we must have that for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $\delta_{i,j} F_j = \beta_{i,j} m_i$. Since we already must have for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $\beta_{i,j} = \delta_{i,j}$, it follows that we have for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $F_j = m_i$. If for more than one value of j we have $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$ then it must be the case that the corresponding queries to the BSOMI oracle used in the linear combination were on the same encoding corresponding to the same polynomial F in which case it is obvious that it is impossible to output $q_O + 1$ valid BSOMI tuples on $q_O + 1$ distinct messages after only q_O queries. So the best the adversary can do is to only have for a single value of $j \in [q_O]$ that $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$. Even in this case it is clear that the adversary can at most output q_O valid BSOMI tuples on q_O distinct messages.

Thus far, we showed that the equalities in (6) and (7) do not hold identically. We now bound the probability of the challenger's simulation failing and show that such a probability is negligible (in the security parameter λ). The simulation fails if for any two Laurent polynomials F and F' on the list $\mathcal{L}_k$ for $k \in \{1, 2, T\}$ it holds that $F \neq F'$ but $F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y)$ for some $a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. In other words, the adversary wins if any of the following happens:

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_1 \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) \tag{8}$$

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_2 \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) \tag{9}$$

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_T \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) \tag{10}$$

Note that the only indeterminate in those Laurent polynomials with a negative power is H. Thus, for all Laurent polynomials F on those lists we can view F as a fraction of polynomials of the form $F = \frac{R}{S}$ where $R \in \mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, H, X, Y]$ and $S \in \mathbb{Z}_p[H]$. Note that $\mathbb{Z}_p[H] \subset \mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, H, X, Y]$. In fact in our case we are only working with simpler polynomials S which are monic monomials, i.e. polynomials of the form H^k for some $k \geq 0$. We can thus substitute the check

$$F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y)$$

with the check

$$R(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) S'(h) = R'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, x, y) S(h).$$

We first give a bound on the degree of such polynomials.

Note that before the first BSOMI oracle query, the only non-constant polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ is the polynomial H. At the end of the game, the Laurent polynomial F corresponding to polynomials R and S with the largest degrees in the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ is the polynomial resulting from calling the oracle BSOMI oracle first time on the encoding corresponding to the polynomial H and then repeatedly querying the oracle on the polynomial correspondence to the encoding τ_B returned by the oracle. Such a polynomial is of the form $F = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{q_O} \beta_i \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j X Y^{q_O - i} + \gamma \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j H Y^{q_O}$. This ensures that for any polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ it holds that $\deg(R) \leq 2q_O + 1$ and $\deg(S) = 0$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma the probability that (8) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{2q_O + 1}{p}$.

The polynomials that one can obtain on the list $\mathcal{L}_2$ at the end of the game are linear combinations of the (Laurent) polynomials X, Y and H^{-1}. Thus, for any $F = \frac{R}{S}$ on the list

$\mathcal{L}_2$, we have that $\deg(S) \in \{0,1\}$ and $\deg(R) \in \{0,1,2\}$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma the probability that (9) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{3}{p}$.

From the above two bounds on the degrees of polynomials in $\mathcal{L}_1$ and $\mathcal{L}_2$, it follows that we have that all Laurent polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_T$ correspond to polynomial fractions $\frac{R}{S}$ where $\deg(R) \leq 2q_O + 3$ and $\deg(S) \in \{0,1\}$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma the probability that (10) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{2q_O+4}{p}$.

Summing over all choices of F and F' in each case we have that the probability ϵ of the simulation failing for this reason is

$$\epsilon \leq \binom{|\mathcal{L}_1|}{2}\frac{2q_O+1}{p} + \binom{|\mathcal{L}_2|}{2}\frac{3}{p} + \binom{|\mathcal{L}_T|}{2}\frac{2q_O+4}{p}$$
$$\leq \frac{(6 + q_G + 3q_O + q_P)^2(2q_O+4)}{p}.$$

By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma and the above bounds on the degrees of the polynomials, we have that the probability of sampling the root of a polynomial in the denominator is bounded from above by $\frac{6+q_G+3q_O+q_P}{p}$.

The probability of the simulation failing is $\leq \frac{(6+q_G+3q_O+q_P)^2(2q_O+4)+(6+q_G+3q_O+q_P)}{p}$, i.e. $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q_G^2 q_O + q_P^2 q_O + q_O^3}{p})$.

Since by definition we have that q_O, q_G and q_P are all polynomial in λ whereas $\log p \in \Theta(\lambda)$, it follows that the adversary's advantage is negligible.

$\square$

3.3 The Extended BSOM (E-BSOM) Assumption

This assumption extends the BSOM assumption by allowing the adversary to query the oracle on pairs of the form $(M,t) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{Z}_p$ and wins if she outputs $t^* \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $k+1$ tuples of the form $(m_i, A_i, B_i)_{i=1}^{k+1}$ where $e(B_i, \hat{Y}) = e(A_i, \hat{X}\hat{G}^{m_i}\hat{W}^{t^*})$ after querying the oracle at most k times on $(\cdot, t^*)$.

Definition 3 (E-BSOM Assumption). *Let $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbb{G}, \hat{\mathbb{G}}, \mathbb{T}, G, \hat{G}, e, p)$ be the description of Type-III bilinear groups output by $\mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$, and let $H := G^h$, $\hat{H} := \hat{G}^h$, $\hat{W} := \hat{G}^w$, $\hat{X} := \hat{G}^x$, $\hat{Y} := \hat{G}^y$, for some $h, w, x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Let $\mathcal{O}E\text{-}BSOM_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}$ be an oracle that on input a pair $(M,t) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{Z}_p$ returns a triple $\left(A := G^a, B := (MG^{x+wt})^{\frac{a}{y}}, C := H^{\frac{a}{y}}\right) \in \mathbb{G}^3$ for some $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. We say the E-BSOM assumption holds if for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$, the following advantage is negligible (in λ):*

$$\Pr\left[\begin{array}{l} \mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda);\ h,w,x,y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p;\ (H, \hat{H}, \hat{W}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}) := (G^h, \hat{G}^h, \hat{G}^w, \hat{G}^x, \hat{G}^y); \\ \left(t^*, (A_i, B_i, m_i)_{i=1}^{k+1}\right) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}E\text{-}BSOM_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot,\cdot)}\left(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{W}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}\right): \\ \left|\{m_i\}_{i=1}^{k+1}\right| = k+1 \ \wedge\ \forall i \in [k+1]:\ A_i \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}} \ \wedge\ e(B_i, \hat{Y}) = e(A_i, \hat{X}\hat{G}^{m_i}\hat{W}^{t^*}) \\ \wedge\ \mathcal{A} \text{ made at most } k \text{ queries of the form } (\cdot, t^*) \end{array}\right]$$

Note here that the E-BSOM assumption is stronger than the BSOM assumption since a tuple breaking the BSOM assumption along with $t^* = 0$ is tuple breaking the E-BSOM assumption.

We show in Appendix A that the assumption is intractable in the generic group model.

3.4 The Extended BSOMI (E-BSOMI) Assumption

This assumption extends the BSOMI assumption to allow the adversary to query the oracle on pairs of the form $(M,t) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{Z}_p$.

Definition 4 (E-BSOMI Assumption). *Let* $\mathcal{P} = (\mathbb{G}, \hat{\mathbb{G}}, \mathbb{T}, G, \hat{G}, e, p)$ *be the description of Type-III bilinear groups output by* $\mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$, *and let* $H := G^h$, $\hat{H} := \hat{G}^{\frac{1}{h}}$, $\hat{W} := \hat{G}^w$, $\hat{X} := \hat{G}^x$, $\hat{Y} := \hat{G}^y$ *for some* $h, w, x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. *Let* $\mathcal{O}E\text{-}BSOMI_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}$ *be an oracle that on input a pair* $(M, t) \in \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{Z}_p$ *returns a triple* $\left(A := G^a, B := M^{ay}G^{a(x+wt)}, C := H^{ay}\right) \in \mathbb{G}^3$ *for some* $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. *We say the E-BSOMI assumption holds if for all PPT adversaries* $\mathcal{A}$, *the following advantage is negligible (in* λ):

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} \mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda); \; h, w, x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p; \; (H, \hat{H}, \hat{W}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}) := (G^h, \hat{G}^{\frac{1}{h}}, \hat{G}^w, \hat{G}^x, \hat{G}^y); \\ \left(t^*, (A_i, B_i, m_i)_{i=1}^{k+1}\right) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}E\text{-}BSOMI_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot,\cdot)} \left(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{W}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}\right) : \\ \left|\{m_i\}_{i=1}^{k+1}\right| = k+1 \; \wedge \; \forall i \in [k+1] : \; A_i \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}} \wedge e(B_i, \hat{G}) = e(A_i, \hat{X}\hat{Y}^{m_i}\hat{W}^{t^*}) \\ \wedge \; \mathcal{A} \text{ made at most } k \text{ queries of the form } (\cdot, t^*) \end{bmatrix}$$

It is easy to see that the E-BSOMI assumption is stronger than the BSOMI assumption since a tuple breaking the BSOMI assumption along with $t^* = 0$ is a valid solution for the E-BSOMI assumption. We show is Appendix B that the assumption is intractable in the generic group model.

4 Syntax & Security of Blind Signatures

In this section, we define the syntax and security of blind signatures. Since we are interested in round-optimal blind signatures, we will specialize our definitions to this case. A blind signature scheme BS (with a two-move signature request) consists of the following polynomial-time algorithms:

KeyGen$_{\mathsf{BS}}(1^\lambda)$ On input a security parameter 1^λ, this probabilistic algorithm outputs a pair $(\mathsf{vk_{BS}}, \mathsf{sk_{BS}})$ of public/secret keys for the signer. Without loss of generality we assume the security parameter is an implicit input to the rest of the algorithms.

Request$_{\mathsf{BS}}^0(\mathsf{vk_{BS}}, m)$: This algorithm run by the user takes as input a message m in the message space $\mathcal{M}$ and the public key $\mathsf{vk_{BS}}$, and produces a signature request ρ, plus some state st (which is assumed to contain m).

Issue$_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{sk_{BS}}, \rho)$: This probabilistic algorithm run by the signer takes as input the secret key $\mathsf{sk_{BS}}$ and the signature request ρ, and produces a pre-signature β.

Request$_{\mathsf{BS}}^1(\mathsf{vk_{BS}}, \beta, \mathsf{st})$: On input the public key $\mathsf{vk_{BS}}$, the pre-signature β, and the state st, this algorithm produces a blind signature σ on m, or it outputs $\bot$ if it does not accept the transcript.

Verify$_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk_{BS}}, m, \sigma)$: This deterministic algorithm outputs 1 if σ is a valid signature on the message m, or 0 otherwise.

(Perfect) correctness of blind signatures requires that for all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and all $m \in \mathcal{M}$, we have

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} (\mathsf{vk_{BS}}, \mathsf{sk_{BS}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen_{BS}}(1^\lambda); \; (\rho, \mathsf{st}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Request}_{\mathsf{BS}}^0(\mathsf{vk_{BS}}, m); \\ \beta \leftarrow \mathsf{Issue_{BS}}(\mathsf{sk_{BS}}, \rho); \sigma \leftarrow \mathsf{Request}_{\mathsf{BS}}^1(\mathsf{vk_{BS}}, \beta, \mathsf{st}) : \mathsf{Verify_{BS}}(\mathsf{vk_{BS}}, m, \sigma) = 1 \end{bmatrix} = 1.$$

Security of blind signatures [44, 51] which was strengthened by [28, 54] requires blindness and unforgeability.

Unforgeability. Unforgeability requires that it is infeasible for an adversarial user who interacts with an honest signer on k occasions to output $k+1$ valid signatures on $k+1$ distinct messages.

Experiment: $\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{Unforge}}(\lambda)$	Experiment: $\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{Blind}}(\lambda)$
- $(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}_{\mathsf{BS}}(1^\lambda)$	- $(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, m_0, m_1, \mathsf{st}_{\mathsf{find}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{find}}(\lambda)$
- $\{(m_i, \sigma_i)\}_{i=1}^{k+1} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{Issue}_{\mathsf{BS}}^k(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \cdot)}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}})$	- $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
- Return 0 if any of the following holds:	- $(\rho_b, \mathsf{st}_b) \leftarrow \mathsf{Request}_{\mathsf{BS}}^0(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, m_0)$
- $\exists i, j \in [k+1]$, with $i \neq j$ but $m_i = m_j$	- $(\rho_{1-b}, \mathsf{st}_{1-b}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Request}_{\mathsf{BS}}^0(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, m_1)$
- $\exists i \in [k+1]$ s.t. $\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, m_i, \sigma_i) = 0$	- $(\beta_0, \beta_1, \mathsf{st}_{\mathsf{issue}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{issue}}(\rho_0, \rho_1, \mathsf{st}_{\mathsf{find}})$
- Return 1	- $\sigma_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{Request}_{\mathsf{BS}}^1(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \beta_b, \mathsf{st}_b)$
	- $\sigma_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{Request}_{\mathsf{BS}}^1(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \beta_{1-b}, \mathsf{st}_{1-b})$
	- If $\sigma_0 = \bot$ or $\sigma_1 = \bot$ Then Return 0
	- $b^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{\mathsf{guess}}(\sigma_0, \sigma_1, \mathsf{st}_{\mathsf{issue}})$
	- Return 1 if $b = b^*$ Else Return 0

Fig. 1. The security experiments for unforgeability (left) and blindness w.r.t. malicious keys (right)

Definition 5 (Unforgeability). *A blind scheme* BS *satisfies unforgeability if for all* $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, *for all PPT adversaries* $\mathcal{A}$, *the advantage* $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{Unforge}(\lambda)$ *against the game* $\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{Unforge}$ *defined in Fig. 1. is negligible (in* λ*) where*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{Unforge}(\lambda) = \Pr[\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{Unforge}(\lambda) = 1].$$

Blindness. Blindness (w.r.t. malicious keys [1, 48]) requires that an adversarial signer who freely chooses two messages m_0 and m_1 as well as the keys and then takes part in interactions with an honest user to generate signatures on those messages cannot tell the order in which the messages were signed.

Definition 6 (Blindness w.r.t. malicious keys). *A blind scheme* BS *satisfies blindness w.r.t. malicious keys if for all* $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, *for all PPT adversaries* $\mathcal{A}$, *the advantage* $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{Blind}(\lambda)$ *against the game* $\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{Blind}$ *defined in Fig. 1 is negligibly close to* $\frac{1}{2}$ *where*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{Blind}}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr[\mathsf{Exp}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{Blind}}(\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right|.$$

5 Blind Signature Constructions

Here we present our two constructions of blind signatures satisfying blindness in the malicious-key model.

5.1 Construction I

Here we present our first construction whose unforgeability is based on the BSOM assumption. The high-level idea is that when requesting a blind signature on the message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the user uses the Pedersen commitment scheme to commit to m as $\mathsf{Co} := G^m H^r$ and sends the commitment Co to the signer. Unlike many existing constructions, neither the user nor the signer in our construction are required to produce expensive zero-knowledge proofs to prove correctness of their computation. Note that since the Pedersen commitment is perfectly hiding, the commitment Co reveals no information about the committed message. We can think of such a commitment as the message M on which the oracle in the BSOM assumption is queried. Now the signer, playing the role of the oracle in the definition of the BSOM assumption, returns the tuple (A', B', C'). The user can check whether such a tuple corresponds to a valid pre-signature by first verifying that the last element (which is independent of the message) is

constructed correctly. This is achieved by verifying that $e(C', \hat{Y}) = e(A', \hat{H})$. If such a check does not pass, the user returns $\bot$. Otherwise, since the user already knows the randomness r she used in constructing the commitment Co, she can now adapt the pre-signature (A', B') on the commitment Co to one on the message m by letting $B' := B'(C'^r)^{-1}$ and then randomizing the signature (A', B') into a new one (A, B) so that the two pairs are unlinkable. Similarly to e.g. [33, 31], by assuming that the bilinear group generator $\mathcal{BG}$ is deterministic combined with the fact that the Pedersen commitment remains hiding even if the commitment key is generated maliciously, we achieve blindness w.r.t. malicious keys. The construction is detailed in Fig. 2.

$\underline{\mathsf{KeyGen}_{\mathsf{BS}}(1^\lambda)}$	$\underline{\mathsf{Request}^1_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \beta = (A', B', C'), \mathsf{st} = (m, r))}$
- $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda);\ h, x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$	- Parse $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}$ as $(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y})$
- $(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}) := (G^h, \hat{G}^h, \hat{G}^x, \hat{G}^y)$	- Return $\bot$ if $A' = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ or $e(C', \hat{Y}) \neq e(A', \hat{H})$
- $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}} := (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}), \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}} := (h, x, y)$	- Set $B' := B'(C'^r)^{-1}$
- Return $(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}})$	- Return $\bot$ if $e(B', \hat{Y}) \neq e(A', \hat{X}\hat{G}^m)$
	- $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times;$ Return $\sigma = (A, B) := (A'^a, B'^a)$
$\underline{\mathsf{Request}^0_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}} = (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}), m)}$	$\underline{\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, m, \sigma = (A, B))}$
- $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$	- If $A = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ or $e(B, \hat{Y}) \neq e(A, \hat{X}\hat{G}^m)$ Then
- Return $\bot$ if $H = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ or $e(H, \hat{G}) \neq e(G, \hat{H})$	Return 0
- $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times;\ \mathsf{Co} := G^m H^r$	- Else
- Return $(\rho := \mathsf{Co}, \mathsf{st} := (m, r))$	Return 1
$\underline{\mathsf{Issue}_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}} = (h, x, y), \rho = \mathsf{Co})}$	
- $a' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times;\ A' := G^{a'};\ B' := (G^x \mathsf{Co})^{\frac{a'}{y}};\ C' := H^{\frac{a'}{y}}$	
- Return $\beta := (A', B', C')$	

Fig. 2. Our 1st blind signature construction

Note that the checks performed in the $\mathsf{Request}^0_{\mathsf{BS}}$ algorithm to verify well-formedness of the signer's verification key need only be performed once when requesting the first signature and not each time a signature is requested.

Theorem 3. *The construction is a secure blind signature scheme in the malicious-key model in the standard model.*

Proof. We first show that the scheme is correct. We have that $\mathsf{Co} = G^m H^r$, $B' = (G^x \mathsf{Co})^{\frac{a'}{y}} = G^{\frac{a'x}{y}} \mathsf{Co}^{\frac{a'}{y}} = G^{\frac{a'x}{y}}(G^m H^r)^{\frac{a'}{y}}$ and $C' = H^{\frac{a'}{y}}$. We have that $B' = B'(C'^r)^{-1} = G^{\frac{a'x}{y}}(G^m H^r)^{\frac{a'}{y}} H^{\frac{-a'r}{y}} = G^{\frac{a'x}{y}} G^{\frac{ma'}{y}}$. Thus, (A', B') satisfy $e(B', \hat{Y}) = e(A', \hat{X}\hat{G}^m)$.

The following 2 lemmata complete the proof.

Lemma 1 (Unforgeability). *The construction is unforgeable if the BSOM assumption is intractable.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against the unforgeability of the scheme. We show how to use $\mathcal{A}$ to construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the BSOM assumption. Adversary $\mathcal{B}$ gets the tuple $(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y})$ from her game and she has access to the oracle $\mathcal{O}\mathsf{BSOM}_{H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}}(\cdot)$ which she can query polynomially many times. $\mathcal{B}$ starts $\mathcal{A}$ on $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}} := (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y})$. When queried on Co_i, $\mathcal{B}$ forwards such query to her oracle and returns the answer to $\mathcal{A}$. Eventually, when $\mathcal{A}$ outputs her $k + 1$ message-signatures tuples $\{(m_i, A_i, B_i)\}_{i=1}^{k+1}$, $\mathcal{B}$ returns that as the answer in her game. It is clear that $\mathcal{B}$ wins her game with the same advantage as that of $\mathcal{A}$ in her game. Thus, we have $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{BS}, \mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{Unforge}} = \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{BSOM}, \mathcal{B}}$.

Lemma 2. *The construction is perfectly blind in the malicious-key model.*

Proof. Since the Pedersen commitment is perfectly hiding, it is clear that Co sent by the user reveals no information about the committed message. Now the check we perform on the pre-signatures ensures that each pre-signature is valid on its respective commitment. If any of those pre-signatures is invalid, we return $(\bot, \bot)$. It is obvious in the latter case the adversary gains no information about the order in which the messages were signed. If the checks on the pre-signatures pass, it means the first pre-signature is a valid signature on the the message m_b committed in Co_b whereas the second signature is valid on the message m_{1-b} committed in Co_{1-b}. From the adversary's point of view each signature could be on either message since the commitment could have been on either message. What remains now is to show that (A', B', C') are unlinkable to (A, B). By definition we have that $A'_0 \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ and $A'_1 \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$. Now each final signature is computed by raising the corresponding pre-signature to a random exponent from $\mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}$. Thus, each final signature is uniformly distributed over the space of possible signatures and it follows that the final signature is independent of the pre-signature. $\square$

5.2 Construction II

Here we present our second construction whose unforgeability is based on the BSOMI assumption. The high-level idea is similar to that of the first construction. When requesting a blind signature on the message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, the user uses the Pedersen commitment scheme to commit to m as $\mathsf{Co} := G^m H^r$ and sends the commitment Co to the signer. Here we view the commitment as the message M on which the oracle in the BSOMI assumption is queried. Now the signer, playing the role of the oracle in the definition of the BSOMI assumption, returns the tuple (A', B', C'). The user can check whether such a tuple corresponds to a valid pre-signature by first verifying that the last element (which is independent of the message) is constructed correctly. This is achieved by verifying that $e(C', \hat{H}) = e(A', \hat{Y})$. If such a check does not pass, the

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$\mathsf{KeyGen}_{\mathsf{BS}}(1^{\lambda})$	$\mathsf{Request}^1_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \beta = (A', B', C'), \mathsf{st} = (m, r))$
- $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^{\lambda})$; $h, x, y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ - $(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}) := (G^h, \hat{G}^{\frac{1}{h}}, \hat{G}^x, \hat{G}^y)$ - $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}} := (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}), \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}} := (h, x, y)$ - Return $(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}})$	- Parse $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}$ as $(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y})$ - Return $\bot$ if $A' = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ or $e(C', \hat{H}) \neq e(A', \hat{Y})$ - Set $B' := B'(C'^r)^{-1}$ - Return $\bot$ if $e(B', \hat{G}) \neq e(A', \hat{X}Y^m)$ - $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}$; Return $\sigma = (A, B) := (A'^a, B'^a)$
$\mathsf{Request}^0_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}} = (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}), m)$	$\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, m, \sigma = (A, B))$

- $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^{\lambda})$
 - Return $\bot$ if $H = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ or $e(H, \hat{H}) \neq e(G, \hat{G})$
 - $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}$; $\mathsf{Co} := G^m H^r$
 - Return $(\rho := \mathsf{Co}, \mathsf{st} := (m, r))$
	- If $A = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ or $e(B, \hat{G}) \neq e(A, \hat{X}\hat{Y}^m)$ Then
	     Return 0
	 - Else
	     Return 1

$\mathsf{Issue}_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}} = (h, x, y), \rho = \mathsf{Co})$	
- $a' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}$; $A' := G^{a'}$; $B' := A'^x \mathsf{Co}^{a'y}$; $C' := H^{a'y}$ - Return $\beta := (A', B', C')$	

Fig. 3. Our 2nd blind signature construction

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user returns $\bot$. Otherwise, since the user already knows the randomness r she used in constructing the commitment Co, she can now adapt the pre-signature (A', B') on the commitment Co to one on the message m by letting $B' := B'(C'^r)^{-1}$ and then randomizing the signature (A', B') into a new one (A, B) so that the two pairs are unlinkable. Again as in our first construction, by assuming that the bilinear group generator $\mathcal{BG}$ is deterministic combined with the fact that the Pedersen commitment remains hiding even if the commitment key is generated maliciously, we achieve blindness w.r.t. malicious keys. The construction is detailed in Fig. 3.

Note that the checks performed in the $\mathsf{Request}^0_{\mathsf{BS}}$ algorithm to verify well-formedness of the signer's verification key need only be performed once when requesting the first signature and not each time a signature is requested.

Theorem 4. *The construction is a secure blind signature scheme in the malicious-key model in the standard model.*

Proof. We first show that the scheme is correct. We have that $\mathsf{Co} = G^m H^r$, $B' = A'^x \mathsf{Co}^{a'y} = G^{a'x}\mathsf{Co}^{a'y} = G^{a'x}(G^m H^r)^{a'y}$ and $C' = H^{a'y}$. We have that $B' = B'(C'^r)^{-1} = G^{a'x}(G^m H^r)^{a'y}H^{-a'yr} = G^{a'x}G^{ma'y}$. Thus, (A', B') satisfy $e(B', \hat{G}) = e(A', \hat{X}\hat{Y}^m)$.

The following 2 lemmata complete the proof.

Lemma 3 (Unforgeability). *The construction is unforgeable if the BSOMI assumption is intractable.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against the unforgeability of the scheme. We show how to use $\mathcal{A}$ to construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the BSOMI assumption. Adversary $\mathcal{B}$ gets the tuple $(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y})$ from her game and she has access to the oracle $\mathcal{O}\mathrm{BSOMI}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot)$ which she can query polynomially many times. $\mathcal{B}$ starts $\mathcal{A}$ on $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}} := (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y})$. When queried on Co_i, $\mathcal{B}$ forwards such query to her oracle and returns the answer to $\mathcal{A}$. Eventually, when $\mathcal{A}$ outputs her $k+1$ message-signatures tuples $\{(m_i, A_i, B_i)\}_{i=1}^{k+1}$, $\mathcal{B}$ returns that as the answer in her game. It is clear that $\mathcal{B}$ wins her game with the same advantage as that of $\mathcal{A}$ in her game. Thus, we have $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathrm{Unforge}}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}} = \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathrm{BSOMI},\mathcal{B}}$.

Lemma 4. *The construction is perfectly blind in the malicious-key model.*

Proof. Since the Pedersen commitment is perfectly hiding, it is clear that Co sent by the user reveals no information about the committed message. Now the check we perform on the pre-signatures ensures that each pre-signature is valid on its respective commitment. If any of those pre-signatures is invalid, we return $(\bot, \bot)$. It is obvious in the latter case the adversary gains no information about the order in which the messages were signed. If the checks on the pre-signatures pass, it means the first pre-signature is a valid signature on the the message m_b committed in Co_b whereas the second signature is valid on the message m_{1-b} committed in Co_{1-b}. From the adversary's point of view each signature could be on either message since the commitment could have been on either message. What remains now is to show that (A', B', C') are unlinkable to (A, B). By definition we have that $A'_0 \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ and $A'_1 \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$. Now each final signature is computed by raising the corresponding pre-signature to a random exponent from $\mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}$. Thus, each final signature is uniformly distributed over the space of possible signatures and it follows that the final signature is independent of the pre-signature. $\square$

Efficiency Comparison. We compare in Table 1 the efficiency of our blind signature constructions with the most efficient existing schemes offering the same security in the standard model [33, 31]. As can be seen from the table, our schemes outperform existing schemes in every efficiency metric. At 80-bit security, the size of our signatures is 40 bytes, i.e. 67% shorter than those of [33]. Also, blindness in our schemes holds in the information-theoretic sense which is another advantage. All schemes in the table including ours involve an interactive intractability assumption. Note that the most efficient scheme based on non-interactive assumptions in the standard model [36] is much less efficient than the schemes in the table, e.g. the signature size in [36] is 183 group elements in symmetric bilinear groups. In the table, P stands for pairing, A for point addition, and MKM for the malicious-key model.

$\mathsf{KeyGen}_{\mathsf{BS}}(1^\lambda, n)$	$\mathsf{Request}^1_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \beta = (A', B', C'), \mathsf{st} = (\boldsymbol{m}, r))$
- $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda);\ h, x, y, z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ - $(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}) := (G^h, \hat{G}^h, \hat{G}^x, \hat{G}^y)$ - $(Z_i, \hat{Z}_i) := (G^{z_i}, \hat{G}^{z_i})$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n-1$ - Set $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}} := (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1})$ - Set $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}} := (h, x, y, \{z_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1})$ - Return $(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}})$	- Parse $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}$ as $\left(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$ - Return $\perp$ if any of the following hold: $\quad A' = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ $\quad e(C', \hat{Y}) \neq e(A', \hat{H})$ - Set $B' := B'(C'^r)^{-1}$ - Return $\perp$ if $e(B', \hat{Y}) \neq e(A', \hat{X}\hat{G}^{m_1} \prod\limits_{i=2}^{n} \hat{Z}_{i-1}^{m_i})$ - $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times;$ Return $\sigma = (A, B) := (A'^a, B'^a)$
$\mathsf{Request}^0_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \boldsymbol{m} = (m_1, \ldots, m_n))$	$\mathsf{Verify}_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}, \boldsymbol{m}, \sigma = (A, B))$
- Parse $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}$ as $\left(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$ - $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$ - Return $\perp$ if $H = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ or $e(H, \hat{G}) \neq e(G, \hat{H})$ - Return $\perp$ if $e(Z_i, \hat{G}) \neq e(G, \hat{Z}_i)$ for any $i \in [n-1]$. - $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times;\ \mathsf{Co} := G^{m_1} \prod\limits_{i=2}^{n} Z_{i-1}^{m_i} H^r$ - Return $(\rho := \mathsf{Co}, \mathsf{st} := (\boldsymbol{m}, r))$	- Parse $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}}$ as $\left(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$ - Return 1 if all the following hold: $\quad A \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ $\quad e(B, \hat{Y}) = e(A, \hat{X}\hat{G}^{m_1} \prod\limits_{i=2}^{n} \hat{Z}_{i-1}^{m_i})$
$\mathsf{Issue}_{\mathsf{BS}}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{BS}} = (h, x, y, z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1}), \rho = \mathsf{Co})$	
- $a' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times;\ A' := G^{a'};\ B' := (G^x\mathsf{Co})^{\frac{a'}{y}};\ C' := H^{\frac{a'}{y}}$ - Return $\beta := (A', B', C')$	

Fig. 4. A blind signature scheme I for a vector of messages $\in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$

6 Blind Schemes for a Vector of Messages

In this section we give constructions of blind signatures for a vector of messages. These constructions are extensions of their single-message counterparts in which we replace the single-message Pedersen commitment scheme by its generalized variant which allows committing to a vector of messages at once, and make the necessary changes.

6.1 Construction I

We show in Fig. 4 that we can without affecting the signature size or the number of pairings involved in the verification extend our scheme from Sections 5.1 to blindly sign a vector of messages. This variant is unforgeable under the same assumption as the single-message scheme.

All the checks performed in the $\mathsf{Request}^0_{\mathsf{BS}}$ algorithm to verify well-formedness of the signer's verification key need only be performed once when requesting the first signature and not each time a signature is requested.

Theorem 5. *The scheme in Fig. 4 is a secure blind signature.*

Scheme	σ		vk		Communication				Verification	MKM	Blindness
	$\mathbb{G}$	$\hat{\mathbb{G}}$	$\mathbb{G}$	$\hat{\mathbb{G}}$	User		Signer				
					$\mathbb{G}$	$\hat{\mathbb{G}}$	$\mathbb{G}$	$\hat{\mathbb{G}}$			
[33]	4	1	1	4	2	-	2	1	7P	Y	Computational
[31]	7	3	-	4	4	-	2	1	15P	Y	Computational
Ours I	2	-	1	3	1	-	3	-	2P + 1A	Y	Perfect
Ours II	2	-	1	3	1	-	3	-	2P + 1A	Y	Perfect

Table 1. Efficiency comparison

$\mathsf{KeyGen}_{BS}(1^\lambda, n)$	$\mathsf{Request}^1_{BS}(\mathsf{vk}_{BS}, \beta = (A', B', C'), \mathsf{st} = (\boldsymbol{m}, r))$
- $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$; $h, x, y, z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$	- Parse vk_{BS} as $\left(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$
- $(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}) := (G^h, \hat{G}^{\frac{1}{h}}, \hat{G}^x, \hat{G}^y)$	- Return $\perp$ if any of the following hold:
- $(Z_i, \hat{Z}_i) := (G^{z_i}, \hat{Y}^{z_i})$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n-1$	$\quad A' = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$
- Set $\mathsf{vk}_{BS} := \left(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$	$\quad e(C', \hat{H}) \neq e(A', \hat{Y})$
- Set $\mathsf{sk}_{BS} := (h, x, y, \{z_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1})$	- Set $B' := B'(C'^r)^{-1}$
- Return $(\mathsf{vk}_{BS}, \mathsf{sk}_{BS})$	- Return $\perp$ if $e(B', \hat{G}) \neq e(A', \hat{X}\hat{Y}^{m_1} \prod_{i=2}^{n} \hat{Z}_{i-1}^{m_i})$
$\mathsf{Request}^0_{BS}(\mathsf{vk}_{BS}, \boldsymbol{m} = (m_1, \ldots, m_n))$	- $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$; Return $\sigma = (A, B) := (A'^a, B'^a)$
- Parse vk_{BS} as $\left(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$	$\mathsf{Verify}_{BS}(\mathsf{vk}_{BS}, \boldsymbol{m}, \sigma = (A, B))$
- $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$	- Parse vk_{BS} as $\left(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$
- Return $\perp$ if $H = 1_{\mathbb{G}}$ or $e(H, \hat{H}) \neq e(G, \hat{G})$	- Return 1 if all the following hold:
- Return $\perp$ if $e(Z_i, \hat{Y}) \neq e(G, \hat{Z}_i)$ for any $i \in [n-1]$	$\quad A \neq 1_{\mathbb{G}}$
- $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$; $\mathsf{Co} := G^{m_1} \prod_{i=2}^{n} Z_{i-1}^{m_i} H^r$	$\quad e(B, \hat{G}) = e(A, \hat{X}\hat{Y}^{m_1} \prod_{i=2}^{n} \hat{Z}_{i-1}^{m_i})$
- Return $(\rho := \mathsf{Co}, \mathsf{st} := (\boldsymbol{m}, r))$	- Else Return 0
$\mathsf{Issue}_{BS}(\mathsf{sk}_{BS} = (h, x, y, z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1}), \rho = \mathsf{Co})$	
- $a' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$; $A' := G^{a'}$; $B' := A'^x \mathsf{Co}^{a'y}$; $C' := H^{a'y}$	
- Return $\beta := (A', B', C')$	

Fig. 5. A blind signature scheme II for a vector of messages $\in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$

Proof. Correctness is straightforward to verify. Perfect blindness in the malicious-key model also holds similarly to the perfect blindness of the single-message scheme. The following lemma proves unforgeability of the scheme.

Lemma 5 (Unforgeability). *The scheme is unforgeable if the BSOM assumption is intractable.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against the unforgeability of the scheme. We show how to use $\mathcal{A}$ to construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the BSOM assumption. Adversary $\mathcal{B}$ gets the tuple $(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y})$ from her game and she has access to the oracle $\mathcal{O}\mathsf{BSOM}_{H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}}(\cdot)$ which she can query polynomially many times. $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$ and computes $(Z_i, \hat{Z}_i) := (G^{z_i}, \hat{G}^{z_i})$ for all $i \in [n-1]$. She then starts $\mathcal{A}$ on $\mathsf{vk}_{BS} := (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1})$. When queried on Co_i, $\mathcal{B}$ forwards such query to her oracle and returns the answer to $\mathcal{A}$. Eventually, when $\mathcal{A}$ outputs her $k+1$ message-signature tuples $\{(\boldsymbol{m}_i = (m_{i,1}, \ldots, m_{i,n}), A_i, B_i)\}_{i=1}^{k+1}$ where the vectors $\boldsymbol{m}_i$ are distinct, $\mathcal{B}$ computes $m'_i = m_{i,1} + \sum_{j=2}^{n} z_{j-1} m_{i,j}$ for all $i \in [k+1]$ and returns the $k+1$ tuples $\{(m'_i, A_i, B_i)\}_{i=1}^{k+1}$ as the answer in her game. It is clear that $\mathcal{B}$ wins her game with the same advantage as that of $\mathcal{A}$ in her game. Thus, we have $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{Unforge}}_{BS, \mathcal{A}} = \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{BSOM}, \mathcal{B}}$. $\qquad\square$

6.2 Construction II

We show in Fig. 5 that we can without affecting the signature size or the number of pairings involved in the verification extend our scheme from Sections 5.2 to blindly sign a vector of messages. This variant is unforgeable under the same assumption as the single-message scheme.

All the checks performed in the $\mathsf{Request}^0_{BS}$ algorithm to verify well-formedness of the signer's verification key need only be performed once when requesting the first signature and not each time a signature is requested.

Theorem 6. *The scheme in Fig. 5 is a secure blind signature.*

Proof. Correctness is easy to verify and the proof for perfect blindness is similar to that of the schemes in 5.2 and 6.1. The following lemma proves unforgeability of the scheme.

Lemma 6 (Unforgeability). *The scheme is unforgeable if the BSOMI assumption is intractable.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against the unforgeability of the scheme. We show how to use $\mathcal{A}$ to construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the BSOMI assumption. Adversary $\mathcal{B}$ gets the tuple $(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y})$ from her game and she has access to the oracle $\mathcal{O}\mathrm{BSOMI}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot)$ which she can query polynomially many times. $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}$ and computes $(Z_i, \hat{Z}_i) := (G^{z_i}, \hat{Y}^{z_i})$ for all $i \in [n-1]$. She then starts $\mathcal{A}$ on $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{BS}} := (H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1})$. When queried on Co_i, $\mathcal{B}$ forwards such query to her oracle and returns the answer to $\mathcal{A}$. Eventually, when $\mathcal{A}$ outputs her $k+1$ message-signature tuples $\{(\boldsymbol{m}_i = (m_{i,1}, \ldots, m_{i,n}), A_i, B_i)\}_{i=1}^{k+1}$ where the vectors $\boldsymbol{m}_i$ are distinct, $\mathcal{B}$ computes $m_i' := m_{i,1} + \sum_{j=2}^{n} z_{j-1} m_{i,j}$ for all $i \in [k+1]$ and returns the $k+1$ tuples $\{(m_i', A_i, B_i)\}_{i=1}^{k+1}$ as the answer in her game. It is clear that $\mathcal{B}$ wins her game with the same advantage as that of $\mathcal{A}$ in her game. Thus, we have $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{BS},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{Unforge}} = \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathrm{BSOMI},\mathcal{B}}$. □

7 Partially Blind Signature Schemes

Here we show how to modify our schemes in Sections 6.1 & 6.2 to obtain partially blind signature schemes. For more generality, we give schemes where the public information is also a vector $\boldsymbol{\tau} = (\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_{n'}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{n'}$. This allows to attach multiple attributes to the signature.

7.1 Construction I

To realize our first construction, we modify the blind scheme on vector messages from Section 6.1 to attach a vector $\boldsymbol{\tau} = (\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_{n'}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{n'}$ of public information to the signature. To do so, we add to the public key of the scheme in Fig. 4 the elements $\hat{W}_i := \hat{G}^{w_i}$ for some randomly chosen elements $w_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ for $i = 1, \ldots, n'$. When asked to sign $(\mathsf{Co}, \boldsymbol{\tau})$, the signer chooses $a' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{\times}$ and returns the pre-signature

$$\beta = (A', B', C') := \left(G^{a'}, \left(\mathsf{Co}G^{x + \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \tau_i w_i}\right)^{\frac{a'}{y}}, H^{\frac{a'}{y}} \right).$$

Upon receiving the pre-signature β, the user first checks that it is valid. If it is not valid, she aborts by returning the symbol $\perp$. Otherwise, using the randomness r, she recovers a signature $\sigma' = (A', B')$ on $(\boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{\tau})$ which she then re-randomizes to obtain a blind signature $\sigma = (A, B)$.

The details of the construction are in Fig. 6. All the checks performed in the $\mathsf{Request}_{\mathsf{BS}}^0$ algorithm to verify well-formedness of the signer's verification key need only be performed once when requesting the first signature and not each time a signature is requested.

Theorem 7. *The scheme in Fig. 6 is a secure partially blind signature.*

Proof. Correctness is straightforward to verify. Perfect partial blindness in the malicious-key model also holds similarly to the perfect blindness of the blind scheme in Fig. 4. Note that in the blindness game the same public information $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ is used for both challenge signatures. The following lemma proves unforgeability of the scheme.

Lemma 7 (Unforgeability). *The scheme is unforgeable if the E-BSOM assumption is intractable.*

KeyGen$_{\text{PBS}}(1^\lambda, n, n')$	Issue$_{\text{PBS}}\left(\text{sk}_{\text{PBS}} = (h, x, y, \{w_i\}_{i=1}^{n'}, \{z_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}), \rho = \text{Co}, \boldsymbol{\tau}\right)$
- $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$ - $h, w_1, \ldots, w_{n'}, x, y, z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ - $(H, \hat{H}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}) := (G^h, \hat{G}^h, \hat{G}^x, \hat{G}^y)$ - $(Z_i, \hat{Z}_i) := (G^{z_i}, \hat{G}^{z_i})$ for all $i \in [n-1]$ - $\hat{W}_i := \hat{G}^{w_i}$ for all $i \in [n']$ - $\text{vk}_{\text{PBS}} := \left(H, \hat{H}, \{\hat{W}_i\}_{i=1}^{n'}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$ - $\text{sk}_{\text{PBS}} := \left(h, \{w_i\}_{i=1}^{n'}, x, y, \{z_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$ - Return $(\text{vk}_{\text{PBS}}, \text{sk}_{\text{PBS}})$	- $a' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$; $A' := G^{a'}$; $B' := \left(\text{Co}G^{x + \sum_{i=1}^{n'} \tau_i w_i}\right)^{\frac{a'}{y}}$; $C' := H^{\frac{a'}{y}}$ - Return $\beta := (A', B', C')$
	Request$^1_{\text{PBS}}(\text{vk}_{\text{PBS}}, \beta = (A', B', C'), \text{st} = (\boldsymbol{m}, r), \boldsymbol{\tau})$
	- Parse vk_{PBS} as $\left(H, \hat{H}, \{\hat{W}_i\}_{i=1}^{n'}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$ - Return $\perp$ if $A' = 1_\mathbb{G}$ or $e(C', \hat{Y}) \neq e(A', \hat{H})$ - Set $B' := B'(C'^r)^{-1}$ - Return $\perp$ if $e(B', \hat{Y}) \neq e(A', \hat{X}\hat{G}^{m_1} \prod_{i=2}^{n} \hat{Z}_{i-1}^{m_i} \prod_{i=1}^{n'} \hat{W}_i^{\tau_i})$ - $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$; Return $\sigma = (A, B) := (A'^a, B'^a)$
Request$^0_{\text{PBS}}(\text{vk}_{\text{PBS}}, \boldsymbol{m} = (m_1, \ldots, m_n), \boldsymbol{\tau} = (\tau_1, \ldots, \tau_{n'}))$	Verify$_{\text{PBS}}(\text{vk}_{\text{PBS}}, \boldsymbol{m}, \boldsymbol{\tau}, \sigma = (A, B))$
- Parse vk_{PBS} as $\left(H, \hat{H}, \{\hat{W}_i\}_{i=1}^{n'}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$ - $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \mathcal{BG}(1^\lambda)$ - Return $\perp$ if $H = 1_\mathbb{G}$ or $e(H, \hat{G}) \neq e(G, \hat{H})$ - Return $\perp$ if $e(Z_i, \hat{G}) \neq e(G, \hat{Z}_i)$ for any $i \in [n-1]$ - $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$; $\text{Co} := G^{m_1} \prod_{i=2}^{n} Z_{i-1}^{m_i} H^r$ - Return $(\rho := \text{Co}, \text{st} := (\boldsymbol{m}, r))$	- Parse vk_{PBS} as $\left(H, \hat{H}, \{\hat{W}_i\}_{i=1}^{n'}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$ - Return 1 if the following holds and 0 otherwise: $A \neq 1_\mathbb{G}$ and $e(B, \hat{Y}) = e(A, \hat{X}\hat{G}^{m_1} \prod_{i=2}^{n} \hat{Z}_{i-1}^{m_i} \prod_{i=1}^{n'} \hat{W}_i^{\tau_i})$

Fig. 6. A partially blind signature scheme I for a vector of messages $\in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against the unforgeability of the scheme. We show how to use $\mathcal{A}$ to construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the E-BSOM assumption. Adversary $\mathcal{B}$ gets the tuple $(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{W}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y})$ from her game and she has access to the oracle $\mathcal{O}\text{E-BSOM}_{H, \hat{H}, \hat{W}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}}(\cdot, \cdot)$ which she can query polynomially many times. Adversary $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1}, w_2, \ldots, w_{n'} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$ and computes $(Z_i, \hat{Z}_i) := (G^{z_i}, \hat{G}^{z_i})$ for all $i \in [n-1]$, $\hat{W}_1 := \hat{W}$ and $\hat{W}_i := \hat{W}^{w_i}$ for all $i \in \{2, \ldots, n'\}$. She then starts $\mathcal{A}$ on $\text{vk}_{\text{PBS}} = \left(H, \hat{H}, \{\hat{W}_i\}_{i=1}^{n'}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}\right)$. When queried on $(\text{Co}_i, \boldsymbol{\tau}_i)$, $\mathcal{B}$ forwards $\left(\text{Co}_i, \tau_i' := \tau_{i,1} + \sum_{j=2}^{n'} w_j \tau_{i,j}\right)$ to her oracle and returns the answer to $\mathcal{A}$.

Eventually, when $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $\left(\boldsymbol{\tau}^* = (\tau_1^*, \ldots, \tau_{n'}^*), \left(\boldsymbol{m_i^*}, (A_i, B_i)\right)_{i=1}^{k+1}\right)$ where the vectors $\boldsymbol{m_i^*}$ are distinct, adversary $\mathcal{B}$ computes $\tau' := \tau_1^* + \sum_{j=2}^{n'} w_j \tau_j^*$ and $m_i' = m_{i,1}^* + \sum_{j=2}^{n} z_{j-1} m_{i,j}^*$ for all $i \in [k+1]$ and returns $\left(\tau', (m_i', (A_i, B_i))\right)_{i=1}^{k+1}$ as the answer in her game. It is clear that $\mathcal{B}$ wins her game with the same advantage as that of $\mathcal{A}$ in her game. Thus, we have $\text{Adv}_{\text{PBS}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{Unforge}} = \text{Adv}_{\text{E-BSOM}, \mathcal{B}}$.

$\square$

7.2 Construction II

Our second partially blind signature construction shown in Fig. 7 is an extension of our blind construction from Fig. 5 in a similar manner to the first construction.

Theorem 8. *The scheme in Fig. 7 is a secure partially blind signature.*

Proof. Correctness is straightforward to verify. Perfect partial blindness in the malicious-key model also holds similarly to the perfect blindness of the blind signature scheme in Fig. 5. Note that in the blindness game the same public information $\boldsymbol{\tau}$ is used for both challenge signatures. The following lemma proves unforgeability of the scheme.

Fig. 7. A partially blind signature scheme II for a vector of messages $\in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$

Lemma 8 (Unforgeability). *The scheme is unforgeable if the E-BSOMI assumption is intractable.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary against the unforgeability of the scheme. We show how to use $\mathcal{A}$ to construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the E-BSOMI assumption. Adversary $\mathcal{B}$ gets the tuple $\left(\mathcal{P}, H, \hat{H}, \hat{W}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}\right)$ from her game and she has access to the oracle $\mathcal{O}\text{E-BSOMI}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot, \cdot)$ which she can query polynomially many times. $\mathcal{B}$ chooses $z_1, \ldots, z_{n-1}, w_2, \ldots, w_{n'} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^\times$ and computes $(Z_i, \hat{Z}_i) := (G^{z_i}, \hat{Y}^{z_i})$ for all $i \in [n-1]$, $\hat{W}_1 := \hat{W}$, and $\hat{W}_i := \hat{W}^{w_i}$ for all $i \in \{2, \ldots, n'\}$. She then starts $\mathcal{A}$ on $\mathsf{vk_{PBS}} := \left(H, \hat{H}, \{\hat{W}_i\}_{i=1}^{n'}, \hat{X}, \hat{Y}, \{Z_i, \hat{Z}_i\}_{i=1}^{n-1}, \right)$. When queried on $(\mathsf{Co}_i, \boldsymbol{\tau}_i)$, $\mathcal{B}$ computes $\tau_i' := \tau_{i,1} + \sum_{j=2}^{n'} w_j \tau_{i,j}$ and forwards (Co_i, τ_i') to her oracle and returns the answer to $\mathcal{A}$.

Eventually, when $\mathcal{A}$ outputs $\left(\boldsymbol{\tau}^* = (\tau_1^*, \ldots, \tau_{n'}^*), \left(\boldsymbol{m}^*_i = (m_{i,1}^*, \ldots, m_{i,n}^*), (A_i, B_i)\right)_{i=1}^{k+1}\right)$ where the vectors $\boldsymbol{m}^*_i$ are distinct, adversary $\mathcal{B}$ computes $\tau' := \tau_1^* + \sum_{j=2}^{n'} w_j \tau_j^*$ and $m_i' := m_{i,1}^* + \sum_{j=2}^{n} z_{j-1} m_{i,j}^*$ for all $i \in [k+1]$ and returns $\left(\tau', (m_i', (A_i, B_i))_{i=1}^{k+1}\right)$ as the answer in her game. It is clear that $\mathcal{B}$ wins her game with the same advantage as that of $\mathcal{A}$ in her game. Thus, we have $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{PBS},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathrm{Unforge}} = \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathrm{E\text{-}BSOMI},\mathcal{B}}$.

$\square$

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A Intractability of the E-BSOM Assumption

We now show that the assumption is intractable in the generic group model. The proof is similar to that of the BSOM assumption, bar some differences.

Theorem 9. *For any generic adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against the E-BSOM assumption, if p is the (prime) order of the bilinear group and $\mathcal{A}$ makes q_G group operation queries, q_P pairing queries and q_O queries to the E-BSOM oracle $\mathcal{O}E\text{-}BSOM_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}$, then the probability of $\mathcal{A}$ against the E-BSOM assumption is $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q_G^2 q_O + q_P^2 q_O + q_O^3}{p})$.*

Proof. At the start of the game, the challenger initializes the empty lists by executing $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, 1)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, H)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, 1)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, H)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, W)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, X)$, and $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, Y)$.

The way group operation and pairing queries are handled is identical to that in the BSOM assumption proof so we will ignore those details here.

Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can make up to q_O queries to the oracle $\mathcal{O}\text{E-BSOM}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}$. To answer the i-th such query $\mathcal{O}\text{E-BSOM}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\tau_i, t_i)$, the challenger searches $\mathcal{L}_1$ for a pair (τ_i, F_i). If no such pair exists, the challenger returns the symbol $\perp$. Otherwise, the challenger returns (τ_A, τ_B, τ_C) computed as follows to $\mathcal{A}$ where A_i, H, W, X, and Y^{-1} are indeterminates as above.

$$
\begin{aligned}
\tau_A &\leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, A_i), \\
\tau_B &\leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, (X + F_i + t_i W)A_i Y^{-1}), \\
\tau_C &\leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, A_i H Y^{-1}).
\end{aligned}
$$

At the end of the game, the total number of (non-constant) Laurent polynomials contained in the lists $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2$ and $\mathcal{L}_T$ is μ where $\mu \leq 7 + q_G + q_P + 3q_O$.

If $\mathcal{A}$ is successful, she outputs t^* and $k + 1$ tuples $\left(m_i, \tau_A^{(i)}, \tau_B^{(i)}\right)_{i=1}^{k+1}$ where $m_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are distinct and $\tau_A^{(i)}, \tau_B^{(i)}$ are handles on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ and $\mathcal{A}$ made no more than k queries of the form $\mathcal{O}\text{E-BSOM}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot, t^*)$.

Let $F_A^{(i)}$ and $F_B^{(i)}$ denote the associated (formal) Laurent polynomials with $\tau_A^{(i)}$ and $\tau_B^{(i)}$, respectively. Since $\mathcal{A}$'s output must correspond to a solution to the E-BSOM problem, we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$

$$F_B^{(i)} Y - F_A^{(i)}(X + m_i + t^* W) \equiv 0 \tag{11}$$

$$F_A^{(i)} \not\equiv 0 \tag{12}$$

We first argue that for all $i \in [k+1]$, we have that $F_B^{(i)}$ satisfies that $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$. Note that at the start of the game, there is no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ satisfying $\deg_X(F) \neq 0$. Thus, on the first oracle call $\mathcal{O}\text{E-BSOM}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\tau_1, t_1)$, it follows that $\deg_X(F_1) = 0$ where F_1 is the polynomial corresponding to the encoding τ_1. After the oracle has computed its response to the first query, the only polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of X different from 0 is $F_{B_1} = (X + F_1 + t_1 W)A_1 Y^{-1}$ corresponding to τ_{B_1}. It is clear that $\deg_X(F_{B_1}) = 1$ since as we argued $\deg_X(F_1) = 0$. Even if the encoding corresponding to F_{B_1} has been used in a subsequent query to the E-BSOM oracle, the resulting polynomial F_{B_i} corresponding to the encoding τ_{B_i} retuned to the adversary satisfies $\deg_X(F_{B_i}) = 1$. From this it follows that the polynomials F_{B_j} for all $j > 1$ satisfy $\deg_X(F_{B_j}) = 1$. In turn this means that for all $i \in [k+1]$, for $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to satisfy the verification equation, we must have $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$ and $\deg_X(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$.

We now argue that we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$ that $\deg_Y(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. First note that at the start of the game there exists no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ where $\deg_Y(F) \neq 0$. The only polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of Y different from 0 are those corresponding to the encodings τ_B and τ_C resulting from the response of the E-BSOM oracle. Note that none of the queries result in a polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with the monomial HXY^i. Thus, if for any $i \in [k+1]$, the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ has a term containing the monomial HY^k, for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, we must have that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial HXY^{k-1} which is a contradiction. Similarly, if for any $i \in [k+1]$ the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ has a term containing the monomial Y^k for some $k \neq 0$, we must also have that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial XY^{k-1}. Note that the only Laurent polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a monomial $H^0 Y^k$ are those

corresponding to linear combinations of the polynomials F_{B_i} (associated with the encodings τ_{B_i}) returned by the E-BSOM oracle. This implies that for $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, we must have $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 2$ which as argued earlier is impossible.

We now argue that for all $i \in [k+1]$ we must have that $\deg_H(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. Note that none of the queries result in a polynomial with the monomial $H^j X^k$ for $j \neq 0$ and $k \neq 0$. If for any $i \in [k+1]$ we have $\deg_H(F_A^{(i)}) = j \neq 0$ then for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid E-BSOM pair, the polynomial $F_B^{(i)}$ must have a term with the monomial $H^j X$ which as argued earlier is impossible.

We now argue that for all $i \in [k+1]$ we must have that $\deg_W(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. Note that at the start of the game, there is no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ satisfying $\deg_W(F) \neq 0$. Thus, on the first oracle call $\mathcal{O}\text{E-BSOM}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\tau_1, t_1)$, it follows that $\deg_W(F_1) = 0$ where F_1 is the polynomial corresponding to the encoding τ_1. After the oracle has computed its response to the first query, the only polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of W different from 0 is $F_{B_1} = (X + F_1 + t_1 W)A_1 Y^{-1}$ corresponding to τ_{B_1}. It is clear that $\deg_W(F_{B_1}) = 1$ (unless $t_1 = 0$) since as we argued $\deg_W(F_1) = 0$. Even if the encoding corresponding to F_{B_1} has been used in a subsequent query to the E-BSOM oracle, the resulting polynomial F_{B_i} corresponding to the encoding τ_{B_i} retuned to the adversary satisfy $\deg_W(F_{B_i}) \in \{0, 1\}$. From this it follows that the polynomials F_{B_j} for all $j > 1$ satisfy $\deg_W(F_{B_j}) \in \{0, 1\}$. In turn this means that for all $i \in [k+1]$, for $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to satisfy the verification equation, we must have $\deg_W(F_B^{(i)}) \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\deg_W(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$.

Therefore, it is clear we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$, that

$$F_A^{(i)} = \alpha_i + \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \beta_{i,j} A_j.$$

If for any $i \in [k+1]$ we have that $\alpha_i \neq 0$, then it must be the case that $F_B^{(i)}$ has a term of the form $\alpha_i X$ which is not possible since no linear combination of the polynomials the adversary obtains in the game can lead to a polynomial with such term on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$. Therefore, it is clear we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$ that

$$F_A^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \beta_{i,j} A_j \qquad\qquad F_B^{(i)} = \gamma_i + \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} F_{B_j}$$

Since by (12) we must have that $F_A^{(i)} \not\equiv 0$, if for any $i \in [k+1]$ we have $\gamma_i \neq 0$, then we must have that $F_A^{(i)}$ contains a term of the form $\gamma_i Y$ which is impossible. Thus, it follows that we must have $\gamma_i = 0$ for all $i \in [k+1]$ which implies

$$F_B^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} F_{B_j} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} \left(A_j X Y^{-1} + t_j A_j W Y^{-1} + F_j A_j Y^{-1} \right).$$

The check (12) implies we must have for at least one value of j that $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$. Now, for (11) to hold, by the monomial $A_j X$ we must have that for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $\beta_{i,j} = \delta_{i,j}$, and by the monomial $A_j W$ we must have that for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $t_j \delta_{i,j} = t^* \beta_{i,j}$ since we have $\beta_{i,j} = \delta_{i,j}$, we have that $t_j = t^*$, i.e. $F_B^{(i)}$ can only be a linear combination of polynomials F_{B_j} returned by the E-BSOM oracle as response to queries of the form $(\cdot, t^*)$ whose number by the definition of the assumption cannot exceed k. Now, by the monomial A_j, we have $F_j \delta_{i,j} = m_i \beta_{i,j}$ from which it follows that we have for all $j \in [k]$ that $F_j = m_i$. Thus, if for more than one value of j we

have $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$ then it must be the case that the corresponding queries to E-BSOM oracle used in the linear combination were on the same encoding corresponding to the same polynomial F in which case it is obvious that it is impossible to output $k + 1$ valid tuples on $k + 1$ distinct messages after only k oracle queries involving t^*. So the best the adversary can do is to only have for a single value of $j \in [k]$ that $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$. Even in this case it is clear that the adversary can at most output k valid E-BSOM tuples w.r.t. t^* on k distinct messages.

Thus far, we showed that the equalities in (11) and (12) do not hold identically.

We now bound the probability of the challenger's simulation failing and show that such a probability is negligible (in the security parameter λ). The simulation fails if for any two Laurent polynomials F and F' on the list $\mathcal{L}_k$ for $k \in \{1, 2, T\}$ it holds that $F \neq F'$ but $F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y)$ for some $a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. In other words, the adversary wins if any of the following happens:

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_1 \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) \tag{13}$$

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_2 \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) \tag{14}$$

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_T \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) \tag{15}$$

Note that the only indeterminate in those Laurent polynomials with a negative power is Y. Thus, for all Laurent polynomials F on those lists we can view F as a fraction of polynomials of the form $F = \frac{R}{S}$ where $R \in \mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, H, W, X, Y]$ and $S \in \mathbb{Z}_p[Y]$. Note that $\mathbb{Z}_p[Y] \subset \mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, H, W, X, Y]$. In fact in our case we are only working with simpler polynomials S which are monic monomials, i.e. polynomials of the form Y^k for some $k \geq 0$. We can thus substitute the check

$$F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y)$$

with the check

$$R(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y)S'(y) = R'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, , w, x, y)S(y) \cdot$$

We first give a bound on the degree of such polynomials. Note that before the first E-BSOM oracle query, the only non-constant polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ is the polynomial H. At the end of the game, the Laurent polynomial F corresponding to polynomials R and S with the largest degrees in the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ is the polynomial resulting from calling the oracle E-BSOM oracle first time on $(\tau_H, \cdot)$ where τ_H is the encoding corresponding to the polynomial H and then repeatedly querying the oracle on $(\tau_{B_{j-1}}, \cdot)$ where the encoding $\tau_{B_{j-1}}$ corresponds to the polynomial $\tau_{B_{j-1}}$ returned by the E-BSOM oracle from in the previous query. Such a polynomial has the form

$$F = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{q_O} \beta_i \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j X Y^{-(q_O - i + 1)} + \gamma \prod_{i=1}^{q_O} A_i H Y^{-q_Q} + \sum_{i=1}^{q_O} \delta_i \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j W Y^{-(q_O - i + 1)}$$

which corresponds to $R = \alpha Y^{q_Q} + \sum_{i=1}^{q_O} \beta_i \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j X Y^{i-1} + \gamma \prod_{i=1}^{q_O} A_i H + \sum_{i=1}^{q_O} \delta_i \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j W Y^{i-1}$ and $S = Y^{q_Q}$. This ensures that for any Laurent polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ it holds that $\deg(R) \leq q_O + 1$ and $\deg(S) \leq q_O$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the probability that (13) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{2q_O + 1}{p}$. The polynomials that one can obtain on the list $\mathcal{L}_2$ at the end of the game have degrees $\in \{0, 1\}$, i.e. for any $F = \frac{R}{S}$ on the list $\mathcal{L}_2$ we have that $S = 1$ and hence $\deg(S) = 0$ and $\deg(R) = 1$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma, the probability that (14) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{1}{p}$. From the above two bounds on the degrees of polynomials in $\mathcal{L}_1$ and $\mathcal{L}_2$, it follows that we have that all Laurent polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_T$ correspond to polynomial fractions $\frac{R}{S}$ where $\deg(R) \leq q_O + 2$ and $\deg(S) \leq q_O$. By the Schwartz-Zippel

lemma, the probability that (15) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{2q_O+2}{p}$. Summing over all choices of F and F' in each case we have that the probability ϵ of the simulation failing for this reason is

$$\epsilon \leq \binom{|\mathcal{L}_1|}{2}\frac{2q_O+1}{p} + \binom{|\mathcal{L}_2|}{2}\frac{1}{p} + \binom{|\mathcal{L}_T|}{2}\frac{2q_O+2}{p}$$

$$\leq \frac{(7+q_G+3q_O+q_P)^2(2q_O+2)}{p}.$$

An issue that arises when working with Laurent polynomials instead of standard polynomials is that if we happen to sample the root of the polynomial in the denominator then such a value is not defined and the simulation will fail. Therefore, we also need to bound the probability of such an event happening. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma we have that the probability of this happening is bounded by $\frac{(7+q_G+3q_O+q_P)q_O}{p}$.

The probability of the simulation failing is $\leq \frac{(7+q_G+3q_O+q_P)^2(2q_O+2)+(7+q_G+3q_O+q_P)q_O}{p}$, i.e. $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q_G^2 q_O + q_P^2 q_O + q_O^3}{p})$. Since by definition we have that q_O, q_G and q_P are all polynomial in λ whereas $\log p \in \Theta(\lambda)$, it follows that the adversary's advantage is negligible.

$\square$

B   Intractability of the E-BSOMI Assumption

We now show that the assumption is intractable in the generic group model. The proof is similar to that of the BSOMI assumption, bar some differences.

Theorem 10. *For any generic adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against the E-BSOMI assumption, if p is the (prime) order of the bilinear group and $\mathcal{A}$ makes q_G group operation queries, q_P pairing queries and q_O queries to the E-BSOMI oracle $\mathcal{O}\text{E-BSOMI}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}$, then the probability of $\mathcal{A}$ against the E-BSOMI assumption is $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q_G^2 q_O + q_P^2 q_O + q_O^3}{p})$.*

Proof. At the start of the game, the challenger initializes the empty lists by executing $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, 1)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, H)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, 1)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, H^{-1})$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, W)$, $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, X)$, and $\mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_2, Y)$.

The way group operation and pairing queries are handled is identical to that in the BSOMI assumption proof so we will ignore those details here. Adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can make up to q_O queries to the E-BSOMI oracle. To answer the i-th such query $\mathcal{O}\text{BSOMI}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\tau_i, t_i)$, the challenger searches $\mathcal{L}_1$ for a pair (τ_i, F_i). If no such pair exists, the challenger returns the symbol $\perp$. Otherwise, the challenger returns (τ_A, τ_B, τ_C) computed as follows to $\mathcal{A}$ where A_i, W, X, Y and H are indeterminates as above.

$$\tau_A \leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, A_i),$$
$$\tau_B \leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, (X + F_i Y + t_i W)A_i),$$
$$\tau_C \leftarrow \mathsf{Update}(\mathcal{L}_1, A_i H Y)\cdot$$

At the end of the game, the total number of (non-constant) Laurent polynomials contained in the lists $\mathcal{L}_1, \mathcal{L}_2$ and $\mathcal{L}_T$ is μ where $\mu \leq 7 + q_G + q_P + 3q_O$.

If $\mathcal{A}$ is successful, she outputs t^* and $k+1$ tuples $\left(m_i, \tau_A^{(i)}, \tau_B^{(i)}\right)_{i=1}^{k+1}$ where $m_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are distinct and $\tau_A^{(i)}, \tau_B^{(i)}$ are handles on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$, and $\mathcal{A}$ made no more than k queries of the form $\mathcal{O}\text{BSOMI}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\cdot, t^*)$. Let $F_A^{(i)}$ and $F_B^{(i)}$ denote the (formal) Laurent polynomials associated with $\tau_A^{(i)}$ and $\tau_B^{(i)}$, respectively.

Since $\mathcal{A}$'s output must correspond to a solution to the E-BSOMI problem, we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$

$$F_B^{(i)} - F_A^{(i)}(X + m_iY + t^*W) \equiv 0 \tag{16}$$
$$F_A^{(i)} \not\equiv 0 \tag{17}$$

We first argue that for all $i \in [k+1]$, we have that $F_B^{(i)}$ satisfies that $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$. Note that at the start of the game, there is no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ satisfying $\deg_X(F) \neq 0$. Thus, on the first oracle call $\mathcal{O}\text{E-BSOMI}_{H,\hat{H},\hat{W},\hat{X},\hat{Y}}(\tau_1, t_1)$, it follows that $\deg_X(F_1) = 0$ where F_1 is the polynomial corresponding to the encoding τ_1. After the oracle has computed its response to the first query, the only polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of X different from 0 is $F_{B_1} = (X + F_1Y - t_1W)A_1$ corresponding to τ_{B_1}. It is clear that $\deg_X(F_{B_1}) = 1$ since as we argued $\deg_X(F_1) = 0$. Even if the encoding corresponding to F_{B_1} is used in a subsequent query to the E-BSOMI oracle, the resulting polynomial F_{B_i} corresponding to the encoding τ_{B_i} retuned to the adversary satisfies $\deg_X(F_{B_i}) = 1$. From this it follows that the polynomials F_{B_j} for all $j > 1$ satisfy $\deg_X(F_{B_j}) = 1$. In turn this means that for all $i \in [k+1]$, for $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to satisfy the verification equations, we must have $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$ and $\deg_X(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$.

We now argue that we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$ that $\deg_Y(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. First note that at the start of the game there exists no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ where $\deg_Y(F) \neq 0$. The only polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of Y different from 0 are those corresponding to the encodings τ_B and τ_C resulting from the response of the E-BSOMI oracle. Note that none of the queries in the game result in a polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with the monomial HXY^i. Thus, if for any $i \in [k+1]$ the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ has a term containing the monomial HY^k, for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, we must have that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial HXY^k which is a contradiction. Similarly, if for any $i \in [k+1]$ the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ has a term containing the monomial Y^k for some $k \neq 0$, we must also have that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial XY^k. Note that the only Laurent polynomials with a monomial H^0Y^k are those corresponding to linear combinations of the polynomials F_{B_i} (associated with the encodings τ_{B_i}) returned by the E-BSOMI oracle. This implies that for $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, we must have $\deg_X(F_B^{(i)}) = 2$ which as argued earlier is impossible. Thus, it follows that we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$ that the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ satisfy $\deg_Y(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$ from which it follows that for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, it must be the case that $\deg_Y(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$ unless $m_i = 0$ in which case $\deg_Y(F_B^{(i)}) = 0$. Note that in the latter case by the condition that the messages m_i are distinct, only one at most m_i for some $i \in [k+1]$ can satisfy $m_i = 0$.

We now argue that we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$ that $\deg_W(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. First note that at the start of the game there exists no polynomial F on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ where $\deg_W(F) \neq 0$. The only polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with a degree of W different from 0 are those corresponding to the encodings τ_B resulting from the response of the E-BSOMI oracle on queries of the form $(\cdot, t_j \neq 0)$. Note that none of the queries in the game result in a polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ with the monomial WX. Thus, if for any $i \in [k+1]$ the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ has a term containing the monomial W, for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, we must have that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial WX which is a contradiction. Thus, it follows that we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$ that the polynomial $F_A^{(i)}$ satisfy $\deg_W(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$ from which it follows that for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, it must be the case that $\deg_Y(F_B^{(i)}) = 1$ unless $t^* = 0$ in which case $\deg_W(F_B^{(i)}) = 0$.

We now argue that for all $i \in [k+1]$, we have that $\deg_H(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$. Note that none of the operations on the polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ results in a polynomial with the monomial $H^j X^k$ for $j \neq 0$ and $k \neq 0$. Thus, if for any $i \in [k+1]$ it holds that the polynomials $F_A^{(i)}$ contains a monomial of the form H^j for $j \neq 0$, for the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to be a valid pair, it must be the case that $F_B^{(i)}$ contains a term with the monomial $H^j X$ which as argued above is impossible. Thus, it follows that for all $i \in [k+1]$, we have that $\deg_H(F_A^{(i)}) = 0$ from which it follows that $\deg_H(F_B^{(i)}) = 0$.

From the above, it is clear we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$ that

$$F_A^{(i)} = \alpha_i + \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \beta_{i,j} A_j.$$

If for any $i \in [k+1]$ we have that $\alpha_i \neq 0$, then it must be the case that $F_B^{(i)}$ has a term of the form $\alpha_i X$ which as argued above is not possible since no linear combination of the polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ the adversary obtains in the game can lead to a polynomial with such a term. Therefore, it is clear we must have for all $i \in [k+1]$ that

$$F_A^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \beta_{i,j} A_j,$$

$$F_B^{(i)} = \gamma_i + \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} F_{B_j}.$$

For the pair $(F_A^{(i)}, F_B^{(i)})$ to satisfy (??), we must have that for all $i \in [k+1]$ that $\gamma_i = 0$. Therefore, it follows that for all $i \in [k+1]$ we have

$$F_B^{(i)} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} F_{B_j} = \sum_{j=1}^{q_O} \delta_{i,j} \left(A_j X + F_j A_j Y + t_j A_j W \right).$$

The check (17) implies that we must have for at least one value of j that $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$. Now for (16) to hold, by the monomial $A_j X$ we must have that for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $\beta_{i,j} = \delta_{i,j}$. By the monomial $A_j W$, we must have $t^* \beta_{i,j} = t_j \delta_{i,j}$ from which it follows that we must have for all $j \in [q_O]$ that $t^* = t_j$, i.e. $F_B^{(i)}$ can only be a linear combination of polynomials F_{B_j} returned by the E-BSOMI oracle as response to queries of the form $(\cdot, t^*)$ whose number by the definition of the assumption cannot exceed k. Now, by the monomial $A_j Y$, we have $F_j \delta_{i,j} = m_i \beta_{i,j}$ from which it follows that we have for all $j \in [k]$ that $F_j = m_i$. Thus, if for more than one value of j we have $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$ then it must be the case that the corresponding queries to E-BSOMI oracle used in the linear combination were on the same encoding corresponding to the same polynomial F in which case it is obvious that it is impossible to output $k+1$ valid tuples on $k+1$ distinct messages after only k oracle queries involving t^*. So the best the adversary can do is to only have for a single value of $j \in [k]$ that $\beta_{i,j} \neq 0$. Even in this case it is clear that the adversary can at most output k valid E-BSOMI tuples w.r.t. t^* on k distinct messages.

Thus far, we showed that the equalities in (16) and (17) do not hold identically. We now bound the probability of the challenger's simulation failing and show that such a probability is negligible (in the security parameter λ). The simulation fails if for any two Laurent polynomials F and F' on the list $\mathcal{L}_k$ for $k \in \{1, 2, T\}$ it holds that $F \neq F'$ but $F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y)$ for some $a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. In other words, the adversary wins

if any of the following happens:

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_1 \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) \tag{18}$$

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_2 \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) \tag{19}$$

$$F, F' \in \mathcal{L}_T \text{ and } F \neq F' \text{ but } F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) \tag{20}$$

Note that the only indeterminate in those Laurent polynomials with a negative power is H. Thus, for all Laurent polynomials F on those lists we can view F as a fraction of polynomials of the form $F = \frac{R}{S}$ where $R \in \mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, H, W, X, Y]$ and $S \in \mathbb{Z}_p[H]$. Note that $\mathbb{Z}_p[H] \subset \mathbb{Z}_p[A_1, \ldots, A_{q_O}, H, W, X, Y]$. In fact in our case we are only working with simpler polynomials S which are monic monomials, i.e. polynomials of the form H^k for some $k \geq 0$. We can thus substitute the check

$$F(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) = F'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y)$$

with the check

$$R(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) S'(h) = R'(a_1, \ldots, a_{q_O}, h, w, x, y) S(h).$$

We first give a bound on the degree of such polynomials.

Note that before the first E-BSOMI oracle query, the only non-constant polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ is the polynomial H. At the end of the game, the Laurent polynomial F corresponding to polynomials R and S with the largest degrees in the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ is the polynomial resulting from calling the oracle E-BSOMI oracle first time on $(\tau_H, \cdot)$ where τ_H is the encoding corresponding to the polynomial H and then repeatedly querying the oracle on $(\tau_{B_{j-1}}, \cdot)$ where the encoding $\tau_{B_{j-1}}$ corresponds to the polynomial $\tau_{B_{j-1}}$ returned by the E-BSOMI oracle in the previous query. Such a polynomial is of the form

$$F = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{q_O} \beta_i \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j X Y^{q_O - i} + \gamma \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j H Y^{q_O} \sum_{i=1}^{q_O} \delta_i \prod_{j=i}^{q_O} A_j W Y^{q_O - i}.$$

This ensures that for any polynomial on the list $\mathcal{L}_1$ it holds that $\deg(R) \leq 2q_O + 1$ and $\deg(S) = 0$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma the probability that (18) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{2q_O + 1}{p}$.

The polynomials that one can obtain on the list $\mathcal{L}_2$ at the end of the game are linear combinations of the (Laurent) polynomials X, Y and H^{-1}. Thus, for any $F = \frac{R}{S}$ on the list $\mathcal{L}_2$, we have that $\deg(S) \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\deg(R) \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma the probability that (19) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{3}{p}$.

From the above two bounds on the degrees of polynomials in $\mathcal{L}_1$ and $\mathcal{L}_2$, it follows that we have that all Laurent polynomials on the list $\mathcal{L}_T$ correspond to polynomial fractions $\frac{R}{S}$ where $\deg(R) \leq 2q_O + 3$ and $\deg(S) \in \{0, 1\}$. By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma the probability that (20) occurs is bounded from above by $\frac{2q_O + 4}{p}$.

Summing over all choices of F and F' in each case we have that the probability ϵ of the simulation failing for this reason is

$$\epsilon \leq \binom{|\mathcal{L}_1|}{2} \frac{2q_O + 1}{p} + \binom{|\mathcal{L}_2|}{2} \frac{3}{p} + \binom{|\mathcal{L}_T|}{2} \frac{2q_O + 4}{p}$$

$$\leq \frac{(7 + q_G + 3q_O + q_P)^2 (2q_O + 4)}{p}.$$

By the Schwartz-Zippel lemma and the above bounds on the degrees of the polynomials, we have that the probability of sampling the root of a polynomial in the denominator is bounded from above by $\frac{7+q_G+3q_O+q_P}{p}$.

The probability of the simulation failing is $\leq \frac{(7+q_G+3q_O+q_P)^2(2q_O+4)+(7+q_G+3q_O+q_P)}{p}$, i.e. $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q_G^2 q_O + q_P^2 q_O + q_O^3}{p})$.

Since by definition we have that q_O, q_G and q_P are all polynomial in λ whereas $\log p \in \Theta(\lambda)$, it follows that the adversary's advantage is negligible.

$\square$