

Tightly-Secure Key-Encapsulation Mechanism in the Quantum Random Oracle Model [★]

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Abstract. Key-encapsulation mechanisms secure against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA-secure KEMs) in the quantum random oracle model have been proposed by Boneh, Dagdelen, Fischlin, Lehmann, Schafner, and Zhandry (CRYPTO 2012), Targhi and Unruh (TCC 2016-B), and Hofheinz, Hövelmanns, and Kiltz (TCC 2017). However, all are non-tight and, in particular, security levels of the schemes obtained by these constructions are less than half of original security levels of their building blocks.

In this paper, we give a conversion that tightly converts a weakly secure public-key encryption scheme into an IND-CCA-secure KEM in the quantum random oracle model. More precisely, we define a new security notion for deterministic public key encryption (DPKE) called the disjoint simulatability, and we propose a way to convert a disjoint simulatable DPKE scheme into an IND-CCA-secure key-encapsulation mechanism scheme without incurring a significant security degradation. In addition, we give DPKE schemes whose disjoint simulatability is tightly reduced to post-quantum assumptions. As a result, we obtain IND-CCA-secure KEMs tightly reduced to various post-quantum assumptions in the quantum random oracle model.

keywords: Tight security, chosen-ciphertext security, post-quantum cryptography, KEM.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Indistinguishability against chosen ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA-security) is considered to be a *de facto* standard security notion of a public key encryption (PKE) and a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM). For constructing efficient IND-CCA-secure PKEs and KEMs, an idealized model called the random oracle model (ROM) [BR93] is often used. In the ROM, a hash function is idealized to be a publicly accessible oracle that simulates a truly random function. There are many known generic constructions of efficient IND-CCA-secure PKE/KEM in the ROM; Bellare-Rogaway (BR) [BR93], OAEP [BR95, FOPS04], REACT [OP01], GEM [CHJ⁺02], Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) [FO99, FO13], etc. KEM variants of these constructions were studied by Dent [Deno3], which is summarized in Figure 12 in section B.

Quantum Random Oracle Model. Though the ROM has been widely used to heuristically analyze security of cryptographic primitives, Boneh et al. [BDF⁺11] pointed out that the ROM is rather problematic when considering a *quantum* adversary. The problem is that in the ROM, an adversary is only given a classical access to a random oracle. Since a random oracle is an idealization of a real hash function, a quantum adversary should be able to quantumly compute it. On the basis of this observation, they proposed a new model called the quantum random oracle model (QROM) where an adversary can quantumly access a random oracle. Since many techniques used in the ROM including adaptive programmability or extractability cannot be directly translated into the ones in the QROM, proving security in the QROM often requires different techniques from proofs in the ROM (see [BDF⁺11] for more details). Nonetheless, some above mentioned IND-CCA-secure PKE/KEMs in the ROM (and their variants) can be shown to also be secure in the QROM: Boneh et al. [BDF⁺11] proved that a variant of Bellare-Rogaway is IND-CCA-secure in the QROM. Targhi and Unruh [TU16] proposed variants of the Fujisaki-Okamoto and OAEP and proved that they are IND-CCA-secure in the QROM.

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Tight Security. When proving the security of a primitive P under the hardness of a problem S , we usually construct a reduction algorithm \mathcal{R} that uses an adversary \mathcal{A} against the security of P as a subroutine and solves the problem S . Let (T, ϵ) and (T', ϵ') denote running times and success probabilities of \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{R} , respectively. We say that a reduction is tight if we have $T' \approx T$ and $\epsilon' \approx \epsilon$. Tight security is desirable since it ensures that breaking the security of P is as hard as solving an underlying hard problem S . Conversely, if a security reduction is non-tight, we cannot immediately conclude that breaking the security of a primitive P is hard even if an underlying problem S is hard. For example, Menezes [Men12] shows an example of a provably secure primitive with non-tight security that is insecure with a realistic parameter setting. Therefore, tight security is important to ensure the real security of a primitive.

From that perspective, the above mentioned IND-CCA-secure PKE/KEMs in the QROM do not serve as satisfactory solutions for constructing post-quantum IND-CCA-secure PKE/KEMs because they are non-tight. To clarify this, we give more details on these results below, where (T, ϵ) and (T', ϵ') denote running times and success probabilities of an adversary and a reduction algorithm, respectively, q_H denotes the number of random oracle queries, and t_{RO} denotes the time needed to simulate one evaluation of a random oracle (for further explanation of t_{RO} , see subsection 2.2).

- Boneh et al. [BDF⁺11] proved that a KEM variant of Bellare-Rogaway based on a one-way trapdoor function is IND-CCA-secure in the QROM.¹ According to their security proof, we have $T' \approx T + q_H \cdot t_F + (q_H + q_{Dec}) \cdot t_{RO}$ and $\epsilon' \approx \epsilon^2 / q_H^2$ where t_F denotes the time needed for evaluating an underlying one-way trapdoor function and q_{Dec} denotes the number of decryption queries.
- Targhi and Unruh [TU16] proposed a variant of Fujisaki-Okamoto and proved that their construction is secure in the QROM assuming OW-CPA security of an underlying PKE scheme. According to their security proof, we have $T' \geq T + O(q_H^2)$ and $\epsilon' \approx \epsilon^4 / q_H^6$. We note that Hofheinz et al. [HHK17] subsequently gave a modular analysis for the conversion but did not improve the tightness.
- Targhi and Unruh [TU16] proposed a variant of OAEP and proved that their construction is secure in the QROM assuming a partial domain one-way function. According to their security proof, we have $T' \geq T + O(q_H^2)$ and $\epsilon' \approx \epsilon^8 / \text{poly}(q_H)$.

As seen above, known constructions of IND-CCA-secure PKE/KEMs in the QROM incur at least quadratic security loss, and their security degrades rapidly as q_H grows. For example, in the Bellare-Rogaway KEM, if we start from a trapdoor function with 128-bit security (i.e., $\epsilon' = 2^{-128}$) and set $q_H = 2^{60}$, then the bound given by Boneh et al. [BDF⁺11] only ensures 4-bit security (i.e., $\epsilon = 2^{-4}$) for a resulting KEM. Conversely, if we want to ensure 128-bit security (i.e., $\epsilon = 2^{-128}$) for a resulting KEM, we have to start from a trapdoor function with 376-bit security ($\epsilon' = 2^{-376}$) which incurs significant blowup of parameters. The other two constructions are even worse in regard to tightness. Therefore, to obtain an efficient construction of post-quantum IND-CCA-secure PKE/KEM, we need a construction with tighter security reduction that does not incur a quadratic security loss.

1.2 Our Contributions

In this paper, we give a construction of an IND-CCA-secure KEM based on a deterministic PKE (DPKE) scheme that satisfies a newly introduced security notion that we call the disjoint simulatability. Our security reduction is much tighter than those of existing constructions of IND-CCA-secure PKE schemes and does not incur quadratic security loss. By using the same notations as in the previous subsection, we have $T' \approx T + q_H \cdot t_{Enc} + (q_H + q_{Dec}) \cdot t_{RO}$ and $\epsilon' \approx \epsilon$ where t_{Enc} denotes a time needed for encryption of an underlying DPKE scheme. We note that t_{Enc} is a fixed polynomial of the security parameter, and thus we believe that this blowup is much less significant than the quadratic (or quartic/octic) blowup for ϵ as in the previous constructions.

Moreover, we construct some DPKE schemes whose disjoint simulatabilities are tightly reduced to some post-quantum assumptions like learning with errors (LWE) and some other assumptions related to NTRU, the McEliece PKE, and the Niederreiter PKE. As a result, we obtain the first IND-CCA-secure KEMs that do not incur a quadratic security loss in the QROM based on these assumptions. We also construct a disjoint simulatable DPKE scheme from any IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme on an exponentially large message space or any OW-CPA-secure DPKE scheme with quadratic security loss. This gives a construction of an IND-CCA-secure KEM based on an

¹ More precisely, they proved that a hybrid encryption variant of the Bellare-Rogaway PKE scheme based on a one-way trapdoor function plus a CCA-secure symmetric-key encryption scheme is IND-CCA-secure in the QROM. Their proof is easily turned into the proof for the KEM variant of the Bellare-Rogaway conversion.




Fig. 1: Transformations among PKE, DPKE and KEM in the QRM: D-LWE and S-LWE denote the decisional and search learning-with-errors assumptions; P-LWE denotes the polynomial-LWE assumption; DSPR denotes the decisional small polynomial ratio assumption; LPN denotes the learning-parity-with-noise assumption; McEliece KI and Niederreiter KI denote the McEliece-key-indistinguishability and Niederreiter-key-indistinguishability assumptions, respectively; NTRU OW, McEliece OW, and Niederreiter OW denote onewayness of the NTRU, McEliece encryption, and Niederreiter encryption, respectively; OW-CPA, OW-PCA, IND-CPA, and IND-CCA denote onewayness under chosen-plaintext attacks, onewayness under plaintext-checking attacks, indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks, and indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks, respectively; SPR denotes the sparse pseudorandomness; and DS denotes the disjoint simulatability. Solid arrows indicate quantum tight reductions, dashed arrows indicate quantum non-tight reductions, thin arrows indicate existing reductions, thick arrows indicate our new reductions, and gray arrows indicate trivial implications.

IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme on an exponentially large message space or a OW-CPA-secure DPKE scheme with quadratic (rather than quartic as in previous works) security loss. Our results are summarized in [Figure 1](#).

We implement an instantiation based on NTRU-HRSS [[HRSS17](#)] on a desktop PC and a RasPi. Assuming that NTRU-HRSS is disjoint simulatable, the obtained KEM is CCA secure in the QROM. See [section 5](#).

1.3 Technical Overview

Here, we give a technical overview of our results.

Disjoint Simulatability and Sparse Pseudorandomness. Let \mathcal{D}_M be a distribution over a message space \mathcal{M} . We say that a DPKE scheme is \mathcal{D}_M -disjoint simulatable if a ciphertext of a message that is distributed according to \mathcal{D}_M can be simulated by a simulator that does not know a message, and simulated ciphertext is invalid (i.e., out of the range of an encryption algorithm) with overwhelming probability. For an intermediate step to construct a disjoint simulatable DPKE scheme, we consider another security notion that we call sparse pseudorandomness and show that this is a sufficient condition for disjoint simulatability. We say that a DPKE scheme is \mathcal{D}_M -sparse pseudorandom if a ciphertext of a message that is distributed according to \mathcal{D}_M is pseudorandom and the range of an encryption algorithm is sparse in a ciphertext space. The \mathcal{D}_M -sparse pseudorandomness implies the \mathcal{D}_M -disjoint simulatability because if the sparse pseudorandomness is satisfied, then a simulator that simply outputs a random element of a ciphertext space suffices for the disjoint simulatability ².

Instantiations of Disjoint Simulatable DPKE. We construct DPKE schemes based on the concepts of the Gentry–Peikert–Vaikuntanathan (GPV) trapdoor function for LWE [[GPV08](#)], NTRU [[HPS98](#)], the McEliece PKE [[McE78](#)], and the Niederreiter PKE [[Nie86](#)] and prove that they are sparse pseudorandom (and thus disjoint simulatable) w.r.t. a certain message distribution under the LWE assumption, or other related assumptions to an underlying PKE scheme. Moreover, the reductions are tight. See [subsection 3.3](#) for details of instantiations from concrete assumptions

We also construct a disjoint simulatable DPKE scheme based on any perfectly-correct IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme with an exponentially large message space in the QROM. Unfortunately, this reduction is not tight and incurs a square security loss. See [subsection 3.4](#) for details.

In addition, we also construct a disjoint simulatable DPKE scheme based on any perfectly-correct OW-CPA-secure DPKE scheme in the QROM. Again, unfortunately, this reduction is not tight and incurs a square security loss. See [subsection 3.5](#) for details.

Previous Construction: BR-KEM. Before describing our construction, we review the construction and security proof of the Bellare-Rogaway KEM (BR-KEM), which was proven IND-CCA-secure in the QROM by Boneh et al. [[BDF⁺11](#)] because our construction is based on their idea. BR-KEM is a construction of an IND-CCA-secure KEM based on a one-way trapdoor function with an efficiently recognizable range ³. For compatibility with ours, we treat a one-way trapdoor function as a perfectly correct OW-CPA-secure DPKE scheme by considering a function and an inversion to be an encryption and a decryption, respectively. Let $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ denote algorithms of an underlying DPKE scheme. Then $\text{BR-KEM} = (\text{Gen}_{\text{BR}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{BR}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{BR}})$ is described as follows:

- Gen_{BR} is exactly the same as Gen .
- Enc_{BR} , given a public key ek as an input, chooses a randomness m from a message space uniformly at random, computes a ciphertext $C := \text{Enc}(ek, m)$ and a key $K := H(m)$ where H is a hash function modeled as a random oracle, and outputs (C, K) .
- Dec_{BR} , given a ciphertext C and a decryption key dk as an input, checks if C is in the valid ciphertext space and returns \perp if not. Otherwise it computes $K := H(\text{Dec}(dk, C))$ and returns K .

In the security proof in the QROM, we first replace a random oracle H with $H_q \circ \text{Enc}(ek, \cdot)$ where H_q is another random oracle that is not given to an adversary. Since $\text{Enc}(ek, \cdot)$ is injective due to its perfect correctness, $H_q \circ \text{Enc}(ek, \cdot)$ still works as a random oracle from the view of an adversary. After this replacement, we notice that a decryption oracle can be simulated by using H_q without the help of a decryption key because we have

² In Fact, we have to additionally assume that a ciphertext space is efficiently sampleable.

³ The efficient recognizability of a range was not explicitly assumed in [[BDF⁺11](#)] but is actually needed for their proof.

$H(\text{Dec}(dk, c)) = H_q \circ \text{Enc}(ek, \text{Dec}(dk, c)) = H_q(c)$. For proving IND-CCA security, we have to prove that $H_q(c^*)$ is pseudorandom from the view of an adversary. If we were in a classical world, then this could be proven quite easily: the only way for an adversary to obtain any information of $H_q(c^*)$ is to query m^* such that $c^* = \text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$, in which case the adversary breaks the OW-CPA security of an underlying DPKE scheme. In a quantum world, things do not go as easily because even if an adversary queries a quantum state whose magnitude on m^* is large, a reduction algorithm cannot notice that immediately. Nonetheless, by using the One-Way to Hiding (OW2H) lemma proven by Unruh [Unr15] (Lemma 2.1), we can show that the advantage for an adversary to distinguish $H_q(c^*)$ from a truly random string is at most a square root of the probability that measurement of a randomly chosen adversary’s query to H is equal to m^* . Hence, we can reduce the IND-CCA security of BR-KEM to the OW-CPA security of the underlying DPKE scheme with a quadratic security loss. On the other hand, to avoid the quadratic security loss, it seems that we have to avoid the usage of the OW2H lemma because the lemma inherently incurs a quadratic security loss.

Our Conversion, SXY. In the above proof, we used the fact that the only way for an adversary to obtain any information of $H_q(c^*)$ is to query m^* to H such that $c^* = \text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$. Our key idea is based on the observation that if such m^* does not exist, i.e., c^* is out of the range of $\text{Enc}(ek, \cdot)$, then it is information-theoretically impossible for an adversary to obtain any information of $H_q(c^*)$. Indeed, though c^* is in the range of $\text{Enc}(ek, \cdot)$ in the real game, if we choose an encryption randomness m according to a distribution \mathcal{D}_M , then we can replace c^* with a simulated ciphertext that is out of the range of $\text{Enc}(ek, \cdot)$ by using the \mathcal{D}_M -disjoint simulatability. After replacing c^* with a simulated one, we can information-theoretically bound an adversary’s advantage and need not use the OW2H lemma. This seems to simply resolve the problem, and we obtain an IND-CCA-secure KEM without a quadratic security loss. However, another problem arises here: a valid ciphertext space of a disjoint simulatable DPKE scheme is inherently not efficiently recognizable (otherwise real and simulated ciphertexts are easy to distinguish), whereas the simulation of decryption algorithm has to first verify if a given ciphertext is valid or not. To resolve the problem, we modify the decryption algorithm so that if a ciphertext is invalid, then it returns a random value rather than \perp . In the security proof of BR-KEM, a decryption oracle is simulated just by evaluating a random oracle H_q for a ciphertext, and this enables a reduction algorithm to simulate a decryption oracle for both valid and invalid ciphertexts even though it cannot determine if a given ciphertext is valid. Hence, we can reduce the IND-CCA security of the resulting KEM without using the OW2H lemma and thus without a quadratic security loss.

Curiously, this conversion is essentially the same as the conversion in Persichetti’s thesis [Per12, Table 5.4] and U_m^\perp in [HHK17]. This means that we can remove an “additional” hash from QU_m^\perp assuming a stronger underlying DPKE in the QROM. In addition, this means that the obtained KEM is tightly secure assuming that the underlying DPKE is OW-CPA secure in the ROM as shown in [HHK17].

1.4 Related Work

In a concurrent and independent work, Jiang, Zhang, Chen, Wang, and Ma [JZC⁺17] proposed two new constructions of an IND-CCA-secure KEM based on a OW-CPA-secure PKE scheme with quadratic security loss. However, both constructions incur quadratic security loss.

1.5 Version Notes

We have revised our paper thoroughly so that some presentations in the current version are different from the previous versions. We summarize differences below.

- The 2017-Oct. version. This is the original version.
- The 2017-Dec. version.
 - In the previous versions, we defined a security notion called PR-CPA for DPKE, and our conversion SXY was presented as a conversion from a PR-CPA-secure DPKE scheme to an IND-CCA-secure KEM. In the current version, instead of defining the PR-CPA-security, we define the disjoint simulatability because this notion is simpler and captures an essential property needed for our conversion. We note that the disjoint simulatability implies the PR-CPA-security (see section E), and all instantiations of a PR-CPA-secure DPKE scheme presented in the previous versions are actually also disjoint simulatable under the same assumption.

- In the previous versions, a reduction algorithm was not given a random oracle, and it simulated a random oracle by using a PRF, which made our proofs somehow involved. In the current version, we assume that a reduction is given a random oracle access. We remark that this is not a modification of the model since a reduction can simulate a random oracle in several ways. (See [subsection 2.2](#) for more details.)
 - In the previous versions, we gave the conversion THalf that converts an IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme to a PR-CPA-secure DPKE scheme. In the conversion THalf, the message space of the resulting scheme is a half of a message space of an underlying scheme. We notice that actually we need not make a message space half, and puncturing by one message (say, 0) suffices. Based on this idea, we give another conversion TPunc instead of THalf, and prove that the resulting scheme is disjoint simulatable (which also implies the PR-CPA-security).
- The 2018-Feb. version
- In the previous versions, we call our conversion XYZ. We re-name it SXY.
 - In the previous versions, for warming up, we gave a somewhat loose *classical* reduction for SXY from a PR-CPA-secure DPKE scheme to an IND-CCA-secure KEM scheme and did not state a tight classical reduction for SXY from a OW-CPA-secure DPKE scheme to an IND-CCA-secure KEM scheme, which immediately follows from [[HHK17](#), Theorem 3.6]. In the current version, we explicitly give a statement on the tight classical reduction as [Theorem 4.1](#).
- The 2018-May version
- We refer the conversion in Persichetti’s thesis in Sec.1.3.
 - We explicitly give the security proof for TPunc in the ROM.
 - We propose a new conversion KC that converts a perfectly-correct OW-CPA-secure DPKE scheme into a perfectly-correct disjoint-simulatable DPKE scheme with a quadratic loss in the QROM. In the ROM, the security proof is tight.
 - We report implementation results of NTRU-HRSS-SXY with AVX2.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notation

A security parameter is denoted by κ . We use the standard O -notations: O , Θ , Ω , and ω . DPT and PPT stand for deterministic polynomial time and probabilistic polynomial time. A function $f(\kappa)$ is said to be *negligible* if $f(\kappa) = \kappa^{-\omega(1)}$. We denote a set of negligible functions by $\text{negl}(\kappa)$. For two finite sets \mathcal{X} and \mathcal{Y} , $\text{Map}(\mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ denote a set of all functions whose domain is \mathcal{X} and codomain is \mathcal{Y} .

For a distribution χ , we often write “ $x \leftarrow \chi$,” which indicates that we take a sample x from χ . For a finite set S , $U(S)$ denotes the uniform distribution over S . We often write “ $x \leftarrow S$ ” instead of “ $x \leftarrow U(S)$.” For a set S and a deterministic algorithm A , $A(S)$ denotes the set $\{A(x) \mid x \in S\}$.

If inp is a string, then “ $\text{out} \leftarrow A(\text{inp})$ ” denotes the output of algorithm A when run on input inp . If A is deterministic, then out is a fixed value and we write “ $\text{out} := A(\text{inp})$.” We also use the notation “ $\text{out} := A(\text{inp}; r)$ ” to make the randomness r explicit.

For the Boolean statement P , $\text{boole}(P)$ denotes the bit that is 1 if P is true, and 0 otherwise. For example, $\text{boole}(b' \stackrel{?}{=} b)$ is 1 if and only if $b' = b$.

2.2 Quantum Computation

We refer to [[NC00](#)] for basic of quantum computation.

Quantum Random Oracle Model. Roughly speaking, the quantum random oracle model (QROM) is an idealized model where a hash function is modeled as a publicly and quantumly accessible random oracle. See [[BDF⁺11](#)] for a more detailed description of the model.

Lemmas. We review some useful lemmas regarding the quantum random oracles. The first one is called the oneway-to-hiding (OW2H) lemma, which is proven by Unruh [Unr15, Lemma 6.2]. Roughly speaking, the lemma states that if any quantum adversary issuing at most q queries to a quantum random oracle H can distinguish $(x, H(x))$ from (x, y) , where y is chosen uniformly at random, then we can find x by measuring one of the adversary’s queries even it causes a quadratic security loss.

The lemma of the following form is a slightly generalized version of the OW2H lemma taken from [HHK17].

Lemma 2.1 (Algorithmic Oneway to Hiding [Unr15, HHK17]). *Let $H : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ be a quantum random oracle, and let \mathcal{A} be an adversary issuing at most q queries to H that on input $(x, y) \in \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ outputs either 0/1. Let $\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}$ be a some distribution over \mathcal{X} . For all (probabilistic) algorithms F whose input space is $\mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{Y}$ and which do not make any hash queries to H , we have*

$$\begin{aligned} & \left| \frac{\Pr[\mathcal{A}^H(\text{inp}) \rightarrow 1 \mid x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}; y \leftarrow H(x); \text{inp} \leftarrow F(x, y)]}{\Pr[\mathcal{A}^H(\text{inp}) \rightarrow 1 \mid x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}; y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}; \text{inp} \leftarrow F(x, y)]} \right| \\ & \leq 2q \cdot \sqrt{\Pr[\text{EXT}^{\mathcal{A}, H}(\text{inp}) \rightarrow x \mid x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}; y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}; \text{inp} \leftarrow F(x, y)]}, \end{aligned}$$

where EXT picks $i \leftarrow \{1, \dots, q\}$, runs $\mathcal{A}^H(\text{inp})$ until i -th query $|\hat{x}\rangle$ to H , and returns $x' := \text{Measure}(|\hat{x}\rangle)$ (when \mathcal{A} makes fewer than i queries, EXT outputs $\perp \notin \mathcal{X}$).

Unruh’s original statement is recovered by letting F be an identity function and letting $\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{X}$ be the uniform distribution over \mathcal{X} . Reading the proof in [Unr15] carefully, we found that $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$ can be replaced with any distribution over \mathcal{X} . We finally note that Jiang et al. [JZC⁺17] generalized the OW2H lemma more.

The second one claims that a random oracle can be used as a pseudorandom function even in the quantum setting.

Lemma 2.2. *Let ℓ be an integer. Let $H : \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and $H' : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ be two independent random oracles. If an unbounded time quantum adversary \mathcal{A} makes a query to H at most q_H times, then we have*

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{H, H(s, \cdot)}() \rightarrow 1 \mid s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{H, H'}() \rightarrow 1] \right| \leq q_H \cdot 2^{-\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$$

where all oracle accesses of \mathcal{A} can be quantum.

Though this seems to be a folklore, we give a proof of this lemma in [section C](#) for completeness. ⁴

Simulation of Random Oracle. In the original quantum random oracle model introduced by Boneh et al. [BDF⁺11], they do not allow a reduction algorithm to access a random oracle, so it has to simulate a random oracle by itself. In contrast, in this paper, we give a random oracle access to a reduction algorithm. We remark that this is just a convention and not a modification of the model since we can simulate a random oracle against quantum adversaries in several ways.

1. The first way is a simulation by a $2q$ -wise independent hash function, where q denotes the number of random oracle queries by an adversary, as introduced by Zhandry [Zha12b]. The simulation is perfect, that is, no adversary can distinguish the real QRO from the simulated one. A drawback of this simulation is a $O(q^2)$ blowup for a running time of a reduction algorithm since it has to compute a $2q$ -wise independent hash function for each random oracle query.
2. The second way is a simulation by a quantumly secure PRF as used in [BDF⁺11]. If we use this simulation, then the blowup of a running time of a reduction algorithm is $O(q \cdot t_{\text{PRF}})$ where t_{PRF} is the time needed for evaluating a PRF, which is usually much smaller than $O(q^2)$. However, we have to additionally assume the existence of a quantumly secure PRF, which is known to exist if a quantumly secure one-way function exists [Zha12a].
3. The third way is a simulation by a real hash function like SHA-2 and to think that this is a “random oracle.” Since we adopt the QROM, we idealize a real hash function as a random oracle in the construction of primitives. Thus, it may be natural to assume the same thing even in a *reduction*, that is, the reduction algorithm implements the random oracle by a concrete hash function. If we use this simulation, then the blowup of a

⁴ Jiang et al. [JZC⁺17] also gave a proof of an essentially identical lemma.

running time of a reduction algorithm is $O(q \cdot t_{\text{hash}})$ where t_{hash} denotes a time to evaluate a hash function. This gives a tightest reduction at the expense of additional idealization of a hash function. We note that a similar convention is also used by Kiltz et al. [KLS18].

We finally note that this way strengthens the assumption, that is, we need to assume that some problem is hard in the QROM.

We use t_{RO} to denote a time needed to simulate a random oracle. We have $t_{\text{RO}} = O(q)$, t_{PRF} , or t_{hash} , if we use the first, second, or third way, respectively. We note that in the proof of quantum variants of Fujisaki-Okamoto and OAEP [TU16, HHK17], we have to simulate a random oracle in the 1st way, because a simulator has to “invert” a random oracle in a simulation.

2.3 Public-Key Encryption

The model for PKE schemes is summarized as follows:

Definition 2.1. A PKE scheme PKE consists of the following triple of polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec).

- $\text{Gen}(1^\kappa; r_g) \rightarrow (ek, dk)$: a key-generation algorithm that on input 1^κ , where κ is the security parameter, outputs a pair of keys (ek, dk) . ek and dk are called the encryption key and decryption key, respectively.
- $\text{Enc}(ek, m; r_e) \rightarrow c$: an encryption algorithm that takes as input encryption key ek and message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and outputs ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
- $\text{Dec}(dk, c) \rightarrow m/\perp$: a decryption algorithm that takes as input decryption key dk and ciphertext c and outputs message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ or a rejection symbol $\perp \notin \mathcal{M}$.

Definition 2.2. We say a PKE scheme PKE is deterministic if Enc is deterministic. DPKE stands for deterministic public key encryption.

Definition 2.3 (Correctness). We say $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ has perfect correctness if for any (ek, dk) generated by Gen and for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, we have that

$$\Pr[\text{Dec}(dk, c) = m \mid c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(ek, m)] = 1.$$

An additional property, γ -spread, is defined in [section A](#)

Security: Here, we define onewayness under chosen-plaintext attacks (OW-CPA), indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), and indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) for a PKE.

Definition 2.4 (Security notions for PKE). Let $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ be a distribution over the message space \mathcal{M} . For any adversary \mathcal{A} , we define its OW-CPA, IND-CPA, and IND-CCA advantages against a PKE scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa) &:= \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa) = 1], \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) &:= \left| 2 \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) = 1] - 1 \right|, \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa) &:= \left| 2 \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa) = 1] - 1 \right|, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa)$, $\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa)$, and $\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa)$ are experiments described in [Figure 2](#). For $\text{GOAL-ATK} \in \{\text{OW-CPA}, \text{IND-CPA}, \text{IND-CCA}\}$, we say that PKE is GOAL-ATK-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{goal-atk}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} . We omit $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ from OW-CPA security if $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ is the uniform distribution over \mathcal{M} .

Additional definitions are in [section A](#)

$\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_M, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa)$	$\text{DEC}_a(c)$
$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$	$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$	if $c = a$, return \perp
$m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_M$	$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	$m := \text{Dec}(dk, c)$
$c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$	$(m_0, m_1, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(ek)$	$(m_0, m_1, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{DEC}_\perp(\cdot)}(ek)$	return m
$m' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ek, c^*)$	$c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(ek, m_b)$	$c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(ek, m_b)$	
return $\text{boole}(m' \stackrel{?}{=} \text{Dec}(dk, c^*))$	$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(c^*, st)$	$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\text{DEC}_{c^*}(\cdot)}(c^*, st)$	
	return $\text{boole}(b' \stackrel{?}{=} b)$	return $\text{boole}(b' \stackrel{?}{=} b)$	

Fig. 2: Games for PKE schemes

2.4 Key Encapsulation

The model for KEM schemes is summarized as follows:

Definition 2.5. A KEM scheme KEM consists of the following triple of polynomial-time algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{Encaps}, \text{Decaps})$:

- $\text{Gen}(1^\kappa; r_g) \rightarrow (ek, dk)$: a key-generation algorithm that on input 1^κ , where κ is the security parameter, outputs a pair of keys (ek, dk) . ek and dk are called the encapsulation key and decapsulation key, respectively.
- $\text{Encaps}(ek; r_e) \rightarrow (c, K)$: an encapsulation algorithm that takes as input encapsulation key ek and outputs ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$ and key $K \in \mathcal{K}$.
- $\text{Decaps}(dk, c) \rightarrow K/\perp$: a decapsulation algorithm that takes as input decapsulation key dk and ciphertext c and outputs key K or a rejection symbol $\perp \notin \mathcal{K}$.

Definition 2.6 (Correctness). We say $\text{KEM} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Encaps}, \text{Decaps})$ has perfect correctness if for any (ek, dk) generated by Gen , we have that

$$\Pr[\text{Decaps}(dk, c) = K : (c, K) \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(ek)] = 1.$$

Security: We define indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks (denoted by IND-CPA and IND-CCA) for KEM, respectively.

Definition 2.7. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , we define its IND-CPA and IND-CCA advantages against a KEM scheme $\text{KEM} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Encaps}, \text{Decaps})$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) &:= \left| 2 \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) = 1] - 1 \right|, \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa) &:= \left| 2 \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa) = 1] - 1 \right|, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Expt}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Expt}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa)$ are experiments described in [Figure 3](#).

For $\text{ATK} \in \{\text{CPA}, \text{CCA}\}$, we say that KEM is IND-ATK-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{ind-atk}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} .

2.5 eXtendable-Output Functions

An eXtendable-Output Function (XOF) is a function on input bit strings in which the output can be extended to an arbitrary desired length. An XOF is denoted by $\text{XOF}(X, L)$, where X is the input bit string and L is the desired output length. We modeled the XOF as a quantumly-accessible random oracle. We employ SHAKE256, standardized as an XOF by NIST [\[NIS15\]](#).

$\text{Expt}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa)$	$\text{DEC}_{c^*}(c)$
$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$	$b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$	if $c = c^*$, return \perp
$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	$K := \text{Decaps}(dk, c)$
$(c^*, K_0^*) \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(ek)$;	$(c^*, K_0^*) \leftarrow \text{Encaps}(ek)$;	return K
$K_1^* \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$	$K_1^* \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$	
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ek, c^*, K_b^*)$	$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{DEC}_{c^*}(\cdot)}(ek, c^*, K_b^*)$	
return $\text{boole}(b' \stackrel{?}{=} b)$	return $\text{boole}(b' \stackrel{?}{=} b)$	

Fig. 3: Games for KEM schemes

2.6 Assumptions

Preliminaries: Let $\rho_s(x) = \exp(-\pi\|x\|^2/s^2)$ for $x \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be a Gaussian function scaled by a factor s . For any real $s > 0$ and lattice Λ , we define the discrete Gaussian distribution $D_{\Lambda, s}$ over Λ with parameter s by

$$D_{\Lambda, s}(x) = \rho_s(x) / \rho_s(\Lambda) \text{ for } x \in \Lambda,$$

where $\rho_s(\Lambda) = \sum_{x \in \Lambda} \rho_s(x)$. The following norm bound is useful.

Lemma 2.3 (Adapted version of [MR07, Lemma 4.4]). *For $\sigma = \omega(\sqrt{\log(n)})$, it holds that*

$$\Pr_{e \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^n, \sigma}} [\|e\| > \sigma\sqrt{n}] \leq 2^{-n+1}.$$

LWE and its variants: We review the assumptions for lattice-based PKEs. The most basic one is the learning-with-errors (LWE) assumption [Reg09], which is a generalized version of the learning-parity-with-noise assumption [BFKL93, KSS10].

Definition 2.8 (LWE assumption in matrix form). *For all κ , let $n = n(\kappa)$ and $q = q(\kappa)$ be integers and let χ be a distribution over \mathbb{Z} .*

The decisional learning-with-errors (LWE) assumption $\text{LWE}_{n, q}$ states that, for any $m = \text{poly}(\kappa)$, the following two distributions are computationally hard to distinguish:

- $A, sA + e$, where $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and $e \leftarrow \chi^m$
- A, u , where $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$.

We also review its polynomial version [LPR10, BV11]. We here use the Hermite-normal form of the assumption [ACPS09, LPR10, BV11], where secret s is chosen from the noise distribution.

Definition 2.9 (Poly-LWE assumption – Hermite normal form). *For all κ , let $\Phi(x) = \Phi_\kappa(x) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$ be a polynomial of degree $n = n(\kappa)$, let $q = q(\kappa)$ be an integer, let $R := \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\Phi(x))$ and $R_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(\Phi(x))$, and let χ denote a distribution over the ring R .*

The decisional polynomial learning-with-errors (Poly-LWE) assumption $\text{PolyLWE}_{\Phi, q, \chi}$ states that, for any $\ell = \text{poly}(\kappa)$, the following two distributions are hard to distinguish:

- $\{(a_i, a_i s + e_i)\}_{i=1, \dots, \ell}$, where $a_i \leftarrow R_q$, $s, e_i \leftarrow \chi$
- $\{(a_i, u_i)\}_{i=1, \dots, \ell}$, where $a_i, u_i \leftarrow R_q$.

Next, we recall the decisional small polynomial ratio (DSPR) assumption defined by López-Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan [LTV12]. We here employ an adapted version of the DSPR assumption.

Definition 2.10 (DSPR assumption). *For all κ , let $\Phi(x) = \Phi_\kappa(x) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$ be a polynomial of degree $n = n(\kappa)$, let $q = q(\kappa)$ be a positive integer, let $R := \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\Phi(x))$ and $R_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(\Phi(x))$, and let χ denote a distribution over the ring R .*

The decisional small polynomial ratio (DSPR) assumption $\text{DSPR}_{\Phi, q, \chi_g, \chi_f}$ says that the following two distributions are hard to distinguish:

- a polynomial $h := g \cdot f^{-1} \in R_q$, where $g \leftarrow \chi_g$ and $f \leftarrow \chi_f$.
- a polynomial $u \leftarrow R_q$.

Remark 2.1. Stehlé and Steinfeld [SS11] showed that $\text{DSPR}_{\Phi, q, \chi}$ is statistically hard if n is a power of two, $\Phi(x) = x^n + 1$, and $\chi_g = \chi_f = D_{\mathbb{Z}^n, r}$ for $r > \sqrt{q} \cdot \text{poly}(\kappa)$.

3 Disjoint Simulatability of Deterministic PKE

Here, we define a new security notion, *disjoint simulatability*, for DPKE. We also define another security notion called *sparse pseudorandomness* and prove that it implies the disjoint simulatability. Then we give some instantiations of sparse pseudorandom (and thus disjoint simulatable) deterministic PKE schemes based on the LWE assumption or various assumptions related to NTRU, the McEliece PKE, and the Niederreiter PKE with tight reductions. We also construct a disjoint simulatable DPKE scheme from any IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme with a sufficiently large message space in the QROM, though the reduction is non-tight.

3.1 Definition

We define a new security notion, *disjoint simulatability*, for DPKE. Intuitively, a deterministic PKE scheme is disjoint simulatable if there exists a simulator that is only given a public key and generates a “fake ciphertext” that is indistinguishable from a real ciphertext of a random message. Moreover, we require that a fake ciphertext falls in a valid ciphertext space with negligible probability. The formal definition is as follows.

Definition 3.1 (Disjoint simulatability). Let $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ denote an efficiently sampleable distribution on a set \mathcal{M} . A deterministic PKE scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with plaintext and ciphertext spaces \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{C} is $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ -disjoint simulatable if there exists a PPT algorithm \mathcal{S} that satisfies the following.

- (Statistical disjointness:)

$$\text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) := \max_{(ek, dk) \in \text{Gen}(1^\kappa; \mathcal{R})} \Pr[c \in \text{Enc}(ek, \mathcal{M}) \mid c \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(ek)]$$

is negligible, where \mathcal{R} denotes a randomness space for Gen .

- (Ciphertext-indistinguishability:) For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) := \left| \begin{array}{l} \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(ek, c^*) \rightarrow 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa); m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}; \\ c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*) \end{array} \right] \\ - \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(ek, c^*) \rightarrow 1 \mid (ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa); c^* \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(ek) \right] \end{array} \right|$$

is negligible.

3.2 Sufficient Condition: Sparse Pseudorandomness

Here, we define another security notion for DPKE called *sparse pseudorandomness*, which is a sufficient condition to be disjoint simulatable. Intuitively, a deterministic PKE scheme is sparse pseudorandom if valid ciphertexts are sparse in a ciphertext space and pseudorandom when a message is randomly chosen. In other words, an encryption algorithm can be seen as a pseudorandom generator (PRG). The formal definition is as follows.

Definition 3.2 (Sparse pseudorandomness). Let $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ denote an efficiently sampleable distribution on a set \mathcal{M} . A deterministic PKE scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with plaintext and ciphertext spaces \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{C} is $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ -sparse pseudorandom if the following two properties are satisfied.

- (Sparseness:)

$$\text{Sparse}_{\text{PKE}}(\kappa) := \max_{(ek, dk) \in \text{Gen}(1^\kappa; \mathcal{R})} \frac{|\text{Enc}(ek, \mathcal{M})|}{|\mathcal{C}|}$$

is negligible where \mathcal{R} denotes a randomness space for Gen .

- (Pseudorandomness:) For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr}}(\kappa) := \left| \begin{array}{l} \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(ek, c^*) \rightarrow 1 \mid \begin{array}{l} (ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa); m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}; \\ c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*) \end{array} \right] \\ - \Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(ek, c^*) \rightarrow 1 \mid (ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa), c^* \leftarrow \mathcal{C} \right] \end{array} \right|$$

is negligible.

Then we prove that the sparse pseudorandomness implies the disjoint simulatability if a ciphertext space is efficiently sampleable.

Lemma 3.1. *If a deterministic PKE scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with plaintext and ciphertext spaces \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{C} is $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ -sparse pseudorandom and \mathcal{C} is efficiently sampleable, then PKE is also $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ -disjoint simulatable. In particular, there exists a PPT simulator \mathcal{S} such that $\text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) = \text{Sparse}_{\text{PKE}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) = \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr}}(\kappa)$.*

Proof. Let \mathcal{S} be an algorithm that outputs a random element of \mathcal{C} . Then we clearly have $\text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) = \text{Sparse}_{\text{PKE}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) = \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr}}(\kappa)$. \square

3.3 Instantiations

Here, we give examples of a DPKE scheme that is disjoint simulatable. In particular, we construct a DPKE scheme that has the sparse pseudorandomness based on the LWE assumption or some other assumptions related to NTRU. (We further construct them based on the McEliece PKE and the Niederreiter PKE in [section D](#).) We remark that the reductions are tight. By combining those with [Lemma 3.1](#), we obtain disjoint simulatable DPKE schemes based on any of these assumptions with tight security.

LWE-based DPKE. We review the GPV trapdoor function for LWE [[GPV08](#), [Peio9](#), [MP12](#)]. The LWE assumption (in matrix form) states that $(A, sA + e)$ and (A, u) are computationally indistinguishable, where $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, $e \leftarrow \chi^m$, and $u \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$. The GPV trapdoor function for LWE exploited that if we have a “short” matrix T satisfying $AT \equiv O \pmod{q}$, we can retrieve s and e from $c = sA + e$. The trapdoor T for A is generated by an algorithm TrapGen:

Theorem 3.1 ([\[Ajt99, AP11\]](#)). *For any positive integers n and $q \geq 3$, any $\delta > 0$ and $m \geq (2 + \delta)n \lg q$, there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm TrapGen that outputs a pair $T \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ and $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ such that: the distribution of A is within a negligible statistical distance of uniform over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, T is non-singular (over the rationals), $\|t_i\| \leq L = O(m \lg m)$ for every column vector t_i of T , and $AT \equiv O \pmod{q}$.*

Let us construct a DPKE scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ as follows:

Parameters: We require several parameters: the dimension $n = n(\kappa)$, the modulus $q = q(\kappa)$, and $m = m(\kappa)$. We also employ $L = O(m \lg m)$, $\sigma = \omega(\sqrt{\lg n})$, $\beta = \sigma\sqrt{n}$. We require that $\beta L < q/2$ and $q^m \gg q^n \cdot (2\beta + 1)^m$.

- The plaintext space $\mathcal{M} := \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times B_m(\beta)$, where $B_m(\beta) := \{e \in \mathbb{Z}^m \mid \|e\| \leq \beta\}$.
- The sampler $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ samples $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $e \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma}$ conditioned on $\|e\| \leq \beta$.
- The ciphertext space $\mathcal{C} := \mathbb{Z}_q^m$

Key Generation: $\text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$ invokes $\text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$ and obtains $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $T \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$. It outputs $ek = A$ and $dk = (A, T)$.

Encryption: $\text{Enc}(ek, (s, e))$ outputs $c = sA + e \pmod{q}$.

Decryption: $\text{Dec}(dk, c)$ computes $e = (c \cdot T \pmod{q}) \cdot T^{-1}$ and $s = (c - e) \cdot A^+ \pmod{q}$, where $A^+ := A^\top \cdot (A \cdot A^\top)^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$, the left inverse of A .

The properties of PKE are summarized as follows:

Perfect Correctness: We know $c \cdot T \equiv sAT + eT \equiv eT \pmod{q}$. If $\|eT\|_\infty < q/2$, then $c \cdot T \pmod{q} = eT \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ holds and e is recovered by $e = (c \cdot T \pmod{q}) \cdot T^{-1}$. Once correct e is obtained, s is recovered by $(c - e) \cdot A^+ \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. The condition $\|eT\|_\infty < q/2$ is satisfied because $\|eT\|_\infty \leq \max_i \|e\| \cdot \|t_i\| \leq \beta L < q/2$, where t_i is the column vectors of T .

Sparseness: $|\mathcal{C}| = q^m$ and $|\text{Enc}(ek, \mathcal{M})| \leq \mathcal{M} = |\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times B_m(\beta)| \leq q^n \cdot (2\beta + 1)^m$. Sparseness follows from the fact $q^m \gg q^n \cdot (2\beta + 1)^m$.

Pseudorandomness: We consider the following hybrid games:

- (Original game 1:) The adversary is given (A, c^*) , where $(A, T) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$, $(s, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$, and $c^* := sA + e \pmod{q}$.
- (Hybrid game 1:) Let us replace the public key A . We consider (A, c^*) , where $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $(s, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$, and $c^* := sA + e \pmod{q}$. This change is justified by [Theorem 3.1](#).
- (Hybrid game 2:) Let us replace the sampler $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$. We consider (A, c^*) , where $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $(s, e) \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^n) \times D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma}$, and $c^* := sA + e \pmod{q}$. This replacement is justified by [Lemma 2.3](#).
- (Hybrid game 3:) We next replace the ciphertext c^* . We consider (A, c^*) , where $A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$. This game is computationally indistinguishable from the previous game under the LWE assumption $\text{LWE}_{n, q, D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma}}$.
- (Original game 2:) We replace the public key A . We consider (A, c^*) , where $(A, T) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$ and $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$. This change is justified by [Theorem 3.1](#).

Remark 3.1. For simplicity, we employ the simple version of the GPV trapdoor function for LWE. Further improvements are available, e.g., [[MP12](#), Section 5].

NTRU-based DPKE. We next review the original version of NTRUEncrypt [HPS98]. Let $\Phi(x) = x^n - 1 \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$, let $p < q$ be positive integers with $\gcd(p, q) = 1$, and let $R := \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\Phi(x))$ and $R_q := \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/(\Phi(x))$. We often set $p = 3$ and $q = 2^k$ for some k . Let \mathcal{T} be a set of ternary-coefficient polynomials in R , that is, $\mathcal{T} := \{t = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} t_i x^i \in R \mid t_i \in \{-1, 0, +1\}\}$. Let $\mathcal{L}_f, \mathcal{L}_g, \mathcal{L}_r, \mathcal{L}_m \subseteq \mathcal{T}$. The public key is $h = g/f$, where $f \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_f, g \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_g$ with f has inverses in R_p and R_q . The the ciphertext of $m \in \mathcal{L}_m$ with randomness $r \in \mathcal{L}_r$ is $c = prh + m$. Roughly speaking, we can retrieve m if we know f ; $cf = prg + mf \in R_q$ and it holds in R .

Parameters: We require that $\|prg + mf \bmod q\|_\infty < q/2$ for any g, f, m, r in their domains, where, for $t = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} t_i x^i \in R$, we define $\|t\|_\infty := \max_i |t_i|$. For simplicity, we assume that $\mathcal{L}_m = \mathcal{L}_r$.

- The plaintext space is $\mathcal{M} := \mathcal{L}_m \times \mathcal{L}_r$.
- The sampler $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ samples $(m, r) \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_m \times \mathcal{L}_r$.
- The ciphertext space is $\mathcal{C} := R_q$.

Key Generation: $\text{Gen}()$ chooses $g \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_g$ and $f \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_f$ until f is invertible in R_q and R_p . It outputs $ek = h = g/f \in R_q$ and $dk = (h, f)$.

Encryption: $\text{Enc}(ek, (m, r))$ outputs $c = prh + m \in R_q$.

Decryption: $\text{Dec}(sk, c)$ computes $m := (fc \bmod q) \cdot f^{-1} \bmod p$ and $r := (c - m) \cdot (ph)^{-1} \bmod q$.

The properties of this DPKE are summarized as follows:

Perfect correctness: Note that $fc \equiv prg + mf \pmod{q}$. Since $\|prg + mf \bmod q\|_\infty < q/2$ from our requirement, we have $(fc \bmod q) = prg + mf \in R$. Hence, we have $(fc \bmod q) \cdot f^{-1} \equiv (prg + mf) \cdot f^{-1} \equiv m \pmod{p}$ as we wanted. r is also recovered because $(c - m) \cdot (ph)^{-1} \equiv prh \cdot (ph)^{-1} \equiv r \pmod{q}$.

Sparseness: Sparseness follows from $|\mathcal{C}| = q^n \gg 3^{2n} = |\mathcal{T}^2| \geq |\mathcal{L}_m \times \mathcal{L}_r| = |\text{Enc}(ek, \mathcal{M})|$.

Pseudorandomness: What we want to show is

$$(h, c = prh + m) \approx_c (h, u),$$

where $h = g/f$ is a public key with $f \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_f, g \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_g$ with condition f has inverses R_p and R_q , $(m, r) \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_m \times \mathcal{L}_r$, and $u \leftarrow R_q$. Let $\chi_g := U(\mathcal{L}_g)$ and $\chi_f := U(\mathcal{L}_f \cap R_p^* \cap R_q^*)$, where R_k^* for $k \in \{p, q\}$ denotes $\{f \in R \mid f \text{ has an inverse in } R_k\}$. Let $\chi := U(\mathcal{L}_m) = U(\mathcal{L}_r)$.

- We first replace $h = g/f$ with random h' , which is justified by the DSPR assumption $\text{DSPR}_{\Phi, q, \chi_f, \chi_g}$.
- We next replace $c = prh' + m$ with random c' , which is justified by the Poly-LWE assumption $\text{PolyLWE}_{\Phi, q, \chi}$. Given \tilde{h} and $c = r\tilde{h} + m$ or random, we convert them into $h' = p^{-1}\tilde{h}$ and c . Since p is co-prime to q , h' is truly random. If $c = r\tilde{h} + e$, then $c = pr \cdot p^{-1}\tilde{h} + e = prh' + e$ as we wanted.
- We then go backward by replacing random h' with $h = g/f$, which is justified by the DSPR assumption $\text{DSPR}_{\Phi, q, \chi_f, \chi_g}$ again.

3.4 Conversion from IND-CPA-Secure PKE to DS-secure DPKE

Here, we show that any perfectly-correct IND-CPA-secure PKE whose plaintext space is sufficiently large can be converted into a disjoint-simulatable DPKE scheme in the quantum random oracle model. We note that the conversion is *non-tight*.

Intuitively, we replace randomness of an underlying IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme with a hash value of a message similarly to the conversion T given in [HHK17] (which is in turn based on the Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion). The difference from the conversion T is that we “puncture” a message space by 0⁵. That is, if a message space of an underlying IND-CPA-secure PKE scheme is \mathcal{M} , then a message space of the resulting scheme is $\mathcal{M}' := \mathcal{M} \setminus \{0\}$. In this meaning, we call our conversion TPunc. We give the concrete description of the conversion TPunc below.

Let \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{R} be the message and randomness spaces of PKE, respectively, and let $\mathcal{M}' := \mathcal{M} \setminus \{0\}$. Then the resulting DPKE scheme $\text{PKE}_1 = \text{TPunc}[\text{PKE}, G]$ is described in Figure 4 where $G: \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{R}$ denotes a random oracle. Here, we remark that the message space of PKE_1 is restricted to $\mathcal{M}' := \mathcal{M} \setminus \{0\}$. The security of PKE_1 is stated as follows.

⁵ We assume that $0 \in \mathcal{M}$. In fact, we can replace 0 with an arbitrary message in \mathcal{M} . We assume that $0 \in \mathcal{M}$ for notational simplicity.

$\text{Gen}_1(1^\kappa)$	$\text{Enc}_1(ek, m)$, where $m \in \mathcal{M}'$	$\text{Dec}_1(dk, c)$	$\mathcal{S}(ek)$
$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	$r := G(m)$	$m := \text{Dec}(dk, c)$	$r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$
return (ek, dk)	$c := \text{Enc}(ek, m; r)$	if $m \notin \mathcal{M}'$ return \perp	$c := \text{Enc}(ek, 0; r)$
	return c	else return m	return c

Fig. 4: $\text{PKE}_1 = (\text{Gen}_1, \text{Enc}_1, \text{Dec}_1) = \text{TPunc}[\text{PKE}, G]$ with simulator \mathcal{S} .

Theorem 3.2 (Security of TPunc in the ROM). *Let \mathcal{S} be the algorithm described in Figure 4. If PKE is perfectly correct, then we have $\text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) = 0$. Moreover, for any classical adversary \mathcal{A} against PKE_1 issuing at most q_G queries to G , there exist a classical adversary \mathcal{B} and C against IND-CPA security of PKE such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{M}'}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, C}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) + \frac{q_G}{|\mathcal{M}'|},$$

where $\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{M}'}$ denotes the uniform distribution on \mathcal{M}' , and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(C) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_G \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

The security proof in the ROM is in [subsection C.2](#).

Theorem 3.3 (Security of TPunc in the QROM). *Let \mathcal{S} be the algorithm described in Figure 4. If PKE is perfectly correct, then we have $\text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) = 0$. Moreover, for any quantum adversary \mathcal{A} against PKE_1 issuing at most q_G quantum queries to G , there exist quantum adversaries \mathcal{B} and C against IND-CPA security of PKE such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{M}'}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) \leq 2q_G \sqrt{\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) + \frac{2}{|\mathcal{M}'|}} + \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, C}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa)$$

where $\mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{M}'}$ denotes the uniform distribution on \mathcal{M}' , and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(C) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_G \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

Table 1: Summary of Games for the Security Proof of Theorem 3.3

Game	m^*	r^*	c^*	justification
Game ₀	\mathcal{M}'	$G(m^*)$	$\text{Enc}(ek, m^*; r^*) = \text{Enc}_1(ek, m^*)$	
Game ₁	\mathcal{M}'	r^*	$\text{Enc}(ek, m^*; r^*)$	OW-CPA security of PKE and the OW2H lemma
Game ₂	0	r^*	$\text{Enc}(ek, 0; r^*) = \mathcal{S}(ek)$	IND-CPA security of PKE

Security Proof in the QROM. We obviously have $\text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) = 0$ since PKE is perfectly correct.

To prove the rest of the theorem, we consider the following sequence of games. See [Table 1](#) for the summary of games and justifications.

Game₀: This game is defined as follows:

$$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa); m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{M}'; r^* \leftarrow G(m^*); c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*; r^*); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{G(\cdot)}(ek, c^*); \text{return } b'.$$

Game₁: This game is the same as Game₀ except that a randomness to generate a challenge ciphertext is freshly generated:

$$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa); m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{M}'; r^* \leftarrow \mathcal{R}; c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*; r^*); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{G(\cdot)}(ek, c^*); \text{return } b'.$$

$F(m^*, r^*)$	$\mathcal{B}^G(ek, c^*) :$
$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^K)$	$\text{inp} := (ek, c^*)$
$c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*; r^*)$	$i \leftarrow [q_H]$
$\text{inp} := (ek, c^*)$	Run $\mathcal{A}^G(\text{inp})$ until i -th query $ \hat{x}\rangle$ to G
return inp	if $i >$ number of queries to G , return \perp
	else return $x' := \text{Measure}(\hat{x}\rangle)$

Fig. 5: Algorithm F and adversary \mathcal{B}

Game₂: This game is the same as **Game₁** except that a challenge ciphertext is generated by $\text{Enc}(ek, m^*; r^*)$, where $m^* := 0$ rather than $m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{M}'$:

$$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^K); r^* \leftarrow \mathcal{R}; c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, 0; r^*); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{G(\cdot)}(ek, c^*); \text{return } b'.$$

This completes the descriptions of games. It is easy to see that we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{M}'}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1]|.$$

We give an upperbound for this by the following lemmas.

Lemma 3.2. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{B} such that*

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq 2q_G \sqrt{\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) + \frac{2}{|\mathcal{M}|}}$$

and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_G \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

Proof. Let F be an algorithm described in **Figure 5**. It is easy to see that **Game₀** can be restated as

$$m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{M}'; r^* \leftarrow G(m^*); \text{inp} := F(ek, m^*; r^*); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{G(\cdot)}(\text{inp}); \text{return } b'.$$

and **Game₁** can be restated as

$$m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{M}'; r^* \leftarrow \mathcal{R}; \text{inp} := F(ek, m^*; r^*); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{G(\cdot)}(\text{inp}); \text{return } b'.$$

Then applying the Algorithmic-OW2H lemma (**Lemma 2.1**) with $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{M}'$, $\mathcal{Y} = \mathcal{R}$, $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{X}} = \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{M}'}$, $x = m^*$, $y = r^*$, and algorithms \mathcal{A} and F, we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq 2q_G \sqrt{\Pr[m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^G(ek, c^*)]}.$$

where \mathcal{B}^G is an algorithm described in **Figure 5**, $(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^K)$, $m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{M}'$, $r^* \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$, and $c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*; r^*)$. Since the statistical distance between uniform distributions on \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{M}' is $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|}$, we have $\Pr[m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^G(ek, c^*)] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa) + \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|}$ where the probability in the left-hand side is taken as in the above. (Note that additional $\frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|}$ appears because m^* is taken from $\mathcal{M}' = \mathcal{M} \setminus \{0\}$ in the left-hand side probability.) Moreover, we have $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) + \frac{1}{|\mathcal{M}|}$ in general. By combining these inequalities, the lemma is proven. \square

Lemma 3.3. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{C} such that $|\Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{C}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{C}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_G \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.*

Proof. We construct an adversary \mathcal{C} against the IND-CPA security of PKE as follows.

$\mathcal{C}^G(ek)$: It chooses $m_0 \leftarrow \mathcal{M}'$ and sets $m_1 := 0$. Then it queries (m_0, m_1) to its challenge oracle and obtains $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(ek, m^*; r^*)$, where m^* is m_b for a random bit b chosen by the challenger. It invokes $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^G(ek, c^*)$ and outputs b' .

This completes the description of C . It is obvious that C perfectly simulates Game_{b+1} depending on the challenge bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Therefore, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, C}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) &= |2 \Pr[b' = b] - 1| \\ &= |(1 - \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 0]) + \Pr[b' = 1 \mid b = 1] - 1| \\ &= |1 - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1] + \Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1] - 1| \\ &= |\Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \end{aligned}$$

as we wanted. \square

3.5 Conversion from OW-CPA-Secure DPKE to DS-Secure DPKE

We show that any perfectly-correct OW-CPA-secure DPKE whose plaintext space is sufficiently large can be converted into a sparse pseudorandom (and, thus, disjoint-simulatable) DPKE scheme in the QROM by attaching so-called “key confirmation” or “additional hash.” We note that the conversion is *non-tight* because we invoke the OW2H lemma in the proof.

Adding a hash value of a message into a ciphertext makes the space of the valid ciphertext *sparse*. In addition, intuitively speaking, the hash function $H'(\cdot)$ can be considered as the hard-core function in the QROM; that is, given $\text{Enc}(ek, m)$, $H'(m)$ cannot be distinguished from a sample from the uniform distribution if the underlying DPKE is OW-CPA-secure.

Let \mathcal{M} be the message spaces of PKE. Then the resulting DPKE scheme $\text{PKE}_1 = \text{KC}[\text{PKE}, H']$ is described in [Figure 6](#) where $H': \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{H'}}$ denotes a random oracle. The security of PKE_1 is stated as follows.

$\text{Gen}_1(1^\kappa)$	$\text{Enc}_1(ek, m)$	$\text{Dec}_1(dk, (c, d))$	$\mathcal{S}(ek)$
$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	$c := \text{Enc}(ek, m)$	$m := \text{Dec}(dk, c)$	$m \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$
return (ek, dk)	$d := H'(m)$	if $m \notin \mathcal{M}$ return \perp	$c := \text{Enc}(ek, m)$
	return (c, d)	if $H'(m) \neq d$ return \perp	$d \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{H'}}$
		else return m	return (c, d)

Fig. 6: $\text{PKE}_1 = (\text{Gen}_1, \text{Enc}_1, \text{Dec}_1) = \text{KC}[\text{PKE}, H']$ with simulator \mathcal{S} .

Theorem 3.4 (Security of KC in the ROM). *Let \mathcal{S} be the algorithm described in [Figure 6](#). If PKE is perfectly correct, then we have $\text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) = 2^{-\ell_{H'}}$. Moreover, for any classical adversary \mathcal{A} against PKE_1 issuing at most $q_{H'}$ quantum queries to H' , there exists a classical adversary \mathcal{B} against OW-CPA security of PKE such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa),$$

where $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_{H'} \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

The security proof in the ROM is in [subsection C.3](#).

Theorem 3.5 (Security of KC in the QROM). *Let \mathcal{S} be the algorithm described in [Figure 6](#). If PKE is perfectly correct, then we have $\text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) = 2^{-\ell_{H'}}$. Moreover, for any quantum adversary \mathcal{A} against PKE_1 issuing at most $q_{H'}$ quantum queries to H' , there exists a quantum adversary \mathcal{B} against OW-CPA security of PKE such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) \leq 2q_{H'} \sqrt{\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa)},$$

where $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_{H'} \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

Security Proof. We obviously have $\text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) = 2^{-\ell_{H'}}$ since H' is the random oracle.

To prove the rest of the theorem, we consider the following sequence of games. See [Table 1](#) for the summary of games and justifications.

Table 2: Summary of Games for the Security Proof of Theorem 3.5

Game	m^*	c^*	d^*	justification
Game ₀	\mathcal{M}'	$\text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$	$H'(m^*)$	
Game ₁	\mathcal{M}'	$\text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$	random	OW-CPA security of PKE and the OW ₂ H lemma

$F(m^*, d^*)$	$\mathcal{B}^{H'}(ek, c^*) :$
$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	$d^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{H'}}$
$c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$	$\text{inp} := (ek, c^*, d^*)$
$\text{inp} := (ek, c^*, d^*)$	$i \leftarrow [q_{H'}]$
return inp	Run $\mathcal{A}^{H'}(\text{inp})$ until i -th query $ \hat{x}\rangle$ to H' if $i >$ number of queries to H' , return \perp else return $x' := \text{Measure}(\hat{x}\rangle)$

Fig. 7: Algorithm F and adversary \mathcal{B}

Game₀: This game is defined as follows:

$$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa); m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}; c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*); d^* := H'(m^*); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{H'(\cdot)}(ek, (c^*, d^*)); \text{return } b'.$$

Game₁: This game is the same as Game₀ except that a challenge ciphertext is generated by $\text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$ and $d^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{H'}}$:

$$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa); m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}; c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*); d^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{H'}}; b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{H'(\cdot)}(ek, (c^*, d^*)); \text{return } b'.$$

This completes the descriptions of games. It is easy to see that we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]|.$$

We give an upperbound for this by the following lemmas.

Lemma 3.4. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{B} such that*

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq 2q_{H'} \sqrt{\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa)}$$

and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_{H'} \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

Proof. Let F be an algorithm described in Figure 7. It is easy to see that Game₀ can be restated as

$$m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}; d^* \leftarrow H'(m^*); \text{inp} := F(ek, m^*, d^*); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{H'(\cdot)}(\text{inp}); \text{return } b'.$$

and Game₁ can be restated as

$$m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}; d^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{H'}}; \text{inp} := F(ek, m^*, d^*); b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{H'(\cdot)}(\text{inp}); \text{return } b'.$$

Then applying the Algorithmic-OW₂H lemma (Lemma 2.1) with $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{M}$, $\mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{H'}}$, $x = m^*$, $y = d^*$, and algorithms \mathcal{A} and F, we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq 2q_{H'} \sqrt{\Pr[m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{H'}(ek, c^*)]}.$$

where $\mathcal{B}^{H'}$ is an algorithm described in Figure 7, $(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$, $m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$, and $c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$. Obviously, we have $\Pr[m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{H'}(ek, c^*)] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa)$. By combining these inequalities, the lemma is proven. \square

$\overline{\text{Gen}}(1^\kappa)$	$\overline{\text{Enc}}(ek')$	$\overline{\text{Dec}}(dk, c)$, where $dk = (dk', ek', s)$
$(ek', dk') \leftarrow \text{Gen}_1(1^\kappa)$	$m \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_M$	$m := \text{Dec}_1(dk', c)$
$s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$	$c := \text{Enc}_1(ek', m)$	if $m = \perp$, return $K := H'(s, c)$
$dk \leftarrow (dk', ek', s)$	$K := H(m)$	if $c \neq \text{Enc}_1(ek', m)$, return $K := H'(s, c)$
return (ek', dk)	return (K, c)	else return $K := H(m)$

Fig. 8: $\text{KEM} := \text{SXY}[\text{PKE}_1, H, H']$.

Table 3: Summary of Games for the Proof of [Theorem 4.2](#)

Game	H	c^*	K_0^*	K_1^*	Decryption of valid c	invalid c	justification
Game ₀	$H(\cdot)$	$\text{Enc}_1(ek', m^*)$	$H(m^*)$	random	$H(m)$	$H'(s, c)$	
Game ₁	$H(\cdot)$	$\text{Enc}_1(ek', m^*)$	$H(m^*)$	random	$H(m)$	$H_q(c)$	Lemma 2.2
Game _{1.5}	$H_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek', \cdot))$	$\text{Enc}_1(ek', m^*)$	$H(m^*)$	random	$H(m)$	$H_q(c)$	Perfect correctness
Game ₂	$H_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek', \cdot))$	$\text{Enc}_1(ek', m^*)$	$H(m^*)$	random	$H(m)$	$H_q(c)$	Conceptual
Game ₃	$H_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek', \cdot))$	$\text{Enc}_1(ek', m^*)$	$H_q(c^*)$	random	$H_q(c)$	$H_q(c)$	Perfect correctness
Game ₄	$H_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek', \cdot))$	$\mathcal{S}(ek')$	$H_q(c^*)$	random	$H_q(c)$	$H_q(c)$	DS-IND

4 Conversion from Disjoint Simulatability to IND-CCA

In this section, we convert a disjoint simulatable DPKE scheme into an IND-CCA-secure KEM. Let $\text{PKE}_1 = (\text{Gen}_1, \text{Enc}_1, \text{Dec}_1)$ be a deterministic PKE scheme and let $H: \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$ and $H': \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$ be random oracles. Our conversion SXY is described in [Figure 8](#). The securities of our conversion can be stated as follows.

Theorem 4.1 (Security of SXY in the ROM (an adapted version of [\[HHK17, Theorem 3.6\]](#))). *Let PKE_1 be a perfectly correct DPKE scheme. For any IND-CCA adversary \mathcal{A} against KEM issuing q_H and $q_{H'}$ quantum random oracle queries to H and H' and $q_{\overline{\text{Dec}}}$ decryption queries, there exists an OW-CPA adversary \mathcal{B} against PKE_1 , such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa) + q_{H'} \cdot 2^{-\ell}$$

and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_H \cdot \text{Time}(\text{Enc}_1) + (q_H + q_{H'} + q_{\overline{\text{Dec}}}) \cdot t_{\text{CRO}}$, where t_{CRO} is the running time to simulate the classical random oracle.

Theorem 4.2 (Security of SXY in the QROM). *Let PKE_1 be a perfectly correct DPKE scheme that satisfies the \mathcal{D}_M -disjoint simulatability with a simulator \mathcal{S} . For any IND-CCA quantum adversary \mathcal{A} against KEM issuing q_H and $q_{H'}$ quantum random oracle queries to H and H' and $q_{\overline{\text{Dec}}}$ decryption queries, there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} against the disjoint simulatability of PKE_1 such that*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa) \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{D}_M, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) + \text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) + q_{H'} \cdot 2^{-\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$$

and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_H \cdot \text{Time}(\text{Enc}_1) + (q_H + q_{H'} + q_{\overline{\text{Dec}}}) \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

The proof of [Theorem 4.2](#) follows.

Remark 4.1. We also note that our reduction enables the decapsulation oracle $\overline{\text{Dec}}$ to quantumly queried.

Security Proof. We use game-hopping proof. The overview of all games is given in [Table 3](#).

Game₀: This is the original game, $\text{Expt}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa)$.

Game₁: This game is the same as Game₀ except that $H'(s, c)$ in the decryption oracle is replaced with $H_q(c)$ where $H_q: \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{K}$ is another random oracle. We remark that \mathcal{A} is not given direct access to H_q .

Game_{1.5}: This game is the same as Game₁ except that the random oracle $H(\cdot)$ is simulated by $H'_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek, \cdot))$ where H'_q is yet another random oracle. We remark that a decryption oracle and generation of K_0^* also use $H'_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek, \cdot))$ as $H(\cdot)$ and that \mathcal{A} is not given direct access to H'_q .

Game₂: This game is the same as Game_{1.5} except that the random oracle $H(\cdot)$ is simulated by $H_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek, \cdot))$ instead of $H'_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek, \cdot))$. We remark that a decryption oracle and generation of K_0^* also use $H_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek, \cdot))$ as $H(\cdot)$.

Game₃: This game is the same as Game₂ except that K_0^* is set as $H_q(c^*)$ and the decryption oracle always returns $H_q(c)$ as long as $c \neq c^*$. We denote the modified decryption oracle by $\overline{\text{Dec}}'$.

Game₄: This game is the same as Game₃ except that c^* is set as $\mathcal{S}(ek')$.

The above completes the descriptions of games. We clearly have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KEM}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa) = |2\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - 1|$$

by the definition. We upperbound this by the following lemmas.

Lemma 4.1. *We have*

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq q_{H'} \cdot 2^{-\frac{\ell+1}{2}}.$$

Proof. This is obvious from [Lemma 2.2](#). □

Lemma 4.2. *We have*

$$\Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1] = \Pr[\text{Game}_{1.5} = 1].$$

Proof. Since we assume that PKE_1 has a perfect correctness, $\text{Enc}_1(ek', \cdot)$ is injective. Therefore, if $H'_q(\cdot)$ is a random function, then $H'_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek, \cdot))$ is also a random function. Remarking that access to H'_q is not given to \mathcal{A} , it causes no difference from the view of \mathcal{A} if we replace $H(\cdot)$ with $H'_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek, \cdot))$. □

Lemma 4.3. *We have*

$$\Pr[\text{Game}_{1.5} = 1] = \Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1].$$

Proof. We call a ciphertext c valid if we have $\text{Enc}_1(ek', \text{Dec}_1(dk', c)) = c$ and invalid otherwise. We remark that H_q is used only for decrypting an invalid ciphertext c as $H_q(c)$ in Game_{1.5}. This means that a value of $H_q(c)$ for a valid c is not used at all in Game_{1.5}. On the other hand, any output of $\text{Enc}_1(ek', \cdot)$ is valid due to the perfect correctness of PKE_1 . Since H'_q is only used for evaluating an output of $\text{Enc}(ek', \cdot)$, a value of $H_q(c)$ for a valid c is not used at all in Game_{1.5}. Hence, it causes no difference from the view of \mathcal{A} if we use the same random oracle H_q instead of two independent random oracles H_q and H'_q . □

Lemma 4.4. *We have*

$$\Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1] = \Pr[\text{Game}_3 = 1].$$

Proof. Since we set $H(\cdot) := H_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek', \cdot))$, for any valid c and $m := \text{Dec}_1(dk', c)$, we have $H(m) = H_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek', m)) = H_q(c)$. Therefore, responses of the decryption oracle are unchanged. We also have $H(m^*) = H_q(c^*)$ for a similar reason. □

Lemma 4.5. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{B} such that*

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_3 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_4 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{D}_{M^*}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa).$$

and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_H \cdot \text{Time}(\text{Enc}_1) + (q_H + q_{H'} + q_{\overline{\text{Dec}}'}) \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

Proof. We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} , which is allowed to access two random oracles H_q and H' , against the disjoint simulatability as follows ⁶.

⁶ We allow a reduction algorithm to access the random oracles. See [subsection 2.2](#) for details.

$\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{H}_q, \mathcal{H}'}(ek', c^*)$: It picks $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, sets $K_0^* := H_q(c^*)$ and $K_1^* \leftarrow \mathcal{K}$, and invokes $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}, \mathcal{H}', \overline{\text{Dec}'}}(ek', c^*, K_b^*)$ where \mathcal{A} 's oracles are simulated as follows.

- $\mathcal{H}(\cdot)$ is simulated by $H_q(\text{Enc}_1(ek', \cdot))$.
- \mathcal{H}' can be simulated because \mathcal{B} has access to an oracle \mathcal{H}' .
- $\overline{\text{Dec}'}$ is simulated by forwarding to $H_q(\cdot)$.

Then \mathcal{B} returns $\text{boole}(b \stackrel{?}{=} b')$.

This completes the description of \mathcal{B} . It is easy to see that \mathcal{B} perfectly simulates Game_3 if $c^* = \text{Enc}_1(ek, m^*)$ and Game_4 if $c^* = S(ek')$. Therefore, we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_3 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_4 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{D}_M, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa)$$

as wanted. Since \mathcal{B} invokes \mathcal{A} once, \mathcal{H} is simulated by one evaluation of Enc_1 plus one evaluation of a random oracle, and \mathcal{H}' and $\overline{\text{Dec}'}$ are simulated by one evaluation of random oracles, we have $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_{\mathcal{H}} \cdot \text{Time}(\text{Enc}_1) + (q_{\mathcal{H}'} + q_{\overline{\text{Dec}'}}) \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$. \square

Lemma 4.6. *We have*

$$|2 \Pr[\text{Game}_4 = 1] - 1| \leq \text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa).$$

Proof. Let Bad denote an event in which $c^* \in \text{Enc}_1(ek', \mathcal{M})$ in Game_4 . It is easy to see that we have

$$\Pr[\text{Bad}] \leq \text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa).$$

When Bad does not occur, i.e., $c^* \notin \text{Enc}_1(ek', \mathcal{M})$, \mathcal{A} obtains no information about $K_0^* = H_q(c^*)$. This is because queries to \mathcal{H} only reveal $H_q(c)$ for $c \in \text{Enc}_1(ek', \mathcal{M})$, and $\overline{\text{Dec}'}(c)$ returns \perp if $c = c^*$. Therefore, we have

$$\Pr[\text{Game}_4 = 1 \mid \overline{\text{Bad}}] = 1/2.$$

Combining the above, we have

$$\begin{aligned} & |2 \Pr[\text{Game}_4 = 1] - 1| \\ &= \left| \Pr[\text{Bad}] \cdot (2 \Pr[\text{Game}_4 = 1 \mid \text{Bad}] - 1) + \Pr[\overline{\text{Bad}}] \cdot (2 \Pr[\text{Game}_4 = 1 \mid \overline{\text{Bad}}] - 1) \right| \\ &\leq \Pr[\text{Bad}] + \left| 2 \Pr[\text{Game}_4 = 1 \mid \overline{\text{Bad}}] - 1 \right| \\ &\leq \text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa) \end{aligned}$$

as we wanted. \square

5 Implementation

We report the implementation results on a desktop PC and on a RasPi, which are based on the previous implementation of a variant of NTRU [HRSS17].

5.1 NTRU-HRSS

We review a variant of NTRU, which we call $\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}}$, developed by Hülsing, Rijneveld, Schanck, and Schwabe [HRSS17].

Let $\Phi_m(x) \in \mathbb{Z}[x]$ be the m -th cyclotomic polynomial. We have $\Phi_1 = x - 1$. If m is prime, then we have $\Phi_m = 1 + x + \dots + x^{m-1}$. Define $S_n := \mathbb{Z}[x]/(\Phi_n)$ and $R_n := \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n - 1)$. For prime n , we have $x^n - 1 = \Phi_1 \Phi_n$ and $R_n \simeq S_1 \times S_n$. We define $\text{Lift}_p: S_n/(p) \rightarrow R_n$ as

$$\text{Lift}_p(v) := [\Phi_1[v/\Phi_1]_{(p, \Phi_n)}]_{(x^n - 1)}.$$

By definition, we have $\text{Lift}_p(v) \equiv 0 \pmod{\Phi_1}$ and $\text{Lift}_p(v) \equiv v \pmod{(p, \Phi_n)}$. Let $\mathfrak{p} = (p, \Phi_n)$ and $\mathfrak{q} = (q, x^n - 1)$. Let

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{T} &:= \{a \in \mathbb{Z}[x] : a = [a]_{\mathfrak{p}}\} = \{a \in \mathbb{Z}[x] : a_i \in (p) \text{ and } \deg(a) < \deg(\Phi_n)\}, \\ \mathcal{T}_+ &:= \{a \in \mathcal{T} : \langle xa, a \rangle \geq 0\}. \end{aligned}$$

The definition of $\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}}$ is in [Figure 9](#). Note that all ciphertexts are equivalent to 0 modulo (q, Φ_1) , which prevents a trivial distinguishing attack.

Hülsing et al. choose $(n, p, q) = (701, 3, 8192)$: The scheme is perfectly correct, and they claimed 128-bit post-quantum security of this parameter set. The implementation of $\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}}$ and $\text{QFO}^\perp[\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}}, \mathcal{G}, \mathcal{H}, \mathcal{H}']$ is reported in [HRSS17].

$\text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	$\text{Enc}(h, m), m \in \mathcal{T}$	$\text{Dec}(f, c)$
$g, f \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_+$	$r \leftarrow \mathcal{T}$	$m' := \lceil [cf]_q f^{-1} \rceil_{\mathfrak{p}}$
$f_q := \lceil [1/f]_{(q, \Phi_n)} \rceil_q$	$c := \lceil [prh + \text{Lift}_p(m)]_q \rceil_q$	return m'
$h := \lceil [\Phi_1 g f_q]_q \rceil_q$	return c	
return $dk = f, ek = h$		

Fig. 9: $\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}}$

$\text{Gen}'(1^\kappa) = \text{Gen}$	$\text{Enc}'(h, (m, r)), (m, r) \in \mathcal{T}^2$	$\text{Dec}'(f, c)$
$g, f \leftarrow \mathcal{T}_+$	$c := \lceil [prh + \text{Lift}_p(m)]_q \rceil_q$	$m' := \lceil [cf]_q f^{-1} \rceil_{\mathfrak{p}}$
$f_q := \lceil [1/f]_{(q, \Phi_n)} \rceil_q$	return c	$r' := \lceil [(c - \text{Lift}_p(m')) \cdot (ph)^{-1}]_q \rceil_{\mathfrak{p}}$
$h := \lceil [\Phi_1 g f_q]_q \rceil_q$		return (m', r')
return $dk = f, ek = h$		

Fig. 10: Our Modification $\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}'}$

Our Modification. We want PKE_1 to be *deterministic*. Hence, we consider a pair of (m, r) as a plaintext and make the decryption algorithm output (m, r) rather than m . The modification $\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}'}$ is summarized in [Figure 10](#).

The properties of this DPKE are summarized as follows:

Perfect Correctness: This follows from the perfect correctness of the original PKE.

Sparseness: This follows from the parameter setting of the original PKE.

Pseudorandomness: We assume that the modified PKE $\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}'}$ satisfies pseudorandomness.

We also implement $\text{SXY}[\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}'}, H, H']$, where H and H' are implemented by SHAKE256 . We define

$$H(m, r) := \text{XOF}((r, m, 0), 256) \text{ and } H'(s, c) := \text{XOF}((c, (s\|00 \cdots 00), 1), 256),$$

where we treat $r \in R_n/(q)$ and the last bit is the context string.

To avoid the inversion of polynomials in decapsulation, we add f^{-1} modulo \mathfrak{p} to dk as Hüsling et al. did [[HRSS17](#)]. This requires 139 extra bytes. In addition, we put $(ph)^{-1}$ modulo q in dk , which requires 1140 extra bytes. Thus, our decapsulation key is 2557 bytes long.

5.2 Experimental Results

We preform the experiment with

- one core of an Intel Core i7-6700 at 3.40GHz on a desktop PC with 8GB memory and Ubuntu16.04 and
- a RasPi3 with 32-bit Rasbian.

We use `gcc` to compile the programs with option `-O3`. We generate 200 keys and ciphertexts to estimate the running time of key generation, encryption, and decryption.

The experimental results are summarized in [Table 4](#). ($\text{Gen}_1, \text{Enc}_1, \text{Dec}_1$) and $(\overline{\text{Gen}}, \overline{\text{Enc}}, \overline{\text{Dec}})$ indicate $\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}'}$ and $\text{SXY}[\text{NTRU}_{\text{HRSS17}'}$. The results reflect Hüsling et al.'s constant-time implementation and ours. Our conversion adds only small extra costs for hashing in encryption and adds about T_{Enc_1} for re-encrypting in decryption.

Note that our implementations are for reference and we have started to optimize them. Further optimizations will speed up the algorithms as Hüsling et al. did [[HRSS17](#)]. The source code is available at <https://info.isl.ntt.com/jp/crypt/eng/archive/contents.html#sxy>.

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Table 4: Experimental Results: We have $|ek| = 1140$ bytes, $|dk| = 2557$ bytes, and $|c| = 1140$ bytes. All times in milliseconds.

(a) Our Experiments on a PC without AVX2					(b) Our Experiments on a PC with AVX2				
	min.	med.	avg.	max.		min.	med.	avg.	max.
Gen ₁	1 754	1 772	1 807	2 620	Gen ₁	78	84	85	116
Enc ₁	328	329	328	336	Enc ₁	12	13	15	23
Dec ₁	958	959	959	1 002	Dec ₁	17	18	17	23
	min.	med.	avg.	max.		min.	med.	avg.	max.
$\overline{\text{Gen}}$	2 553	2 572	2 576	2 669	$\overline{\text{Gen}}$	107	109	110	188
$\overline{\text{Enc}}$	334	335	335	478	$\overline{\text{Enc}}$	19	19	19	25
$\overline{\text{Dec}}$	1 281	1 282	1 284	1 452	$\overline{\text{Dec}}$	24	25	25	38

(c) Our Experiments on a RasPi				
	min.	med.	avg.	max.
Gen ₁	33 675	33 685	33 687	45 460
Enc ₁	3 085	3 089	3 091	3 121
Dec ₁	8 839	8 851	8 850	8 880
	min.	med.	avg.	max.
$\overline{\text{Gen}}$	49 151	49 169	49 174	49 263
$\overline{\text{Enc}}$	3 200	3 205	3 207	3 232
$\overline{\text{Dec}}$	11 837	11 841	11 843	11 888

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A Missing Definitions

Definition A.1 (γ -spread). Let $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a PKE scheme. We say PKE is γ -spread if for every (ek, dk) generated by $\text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$ and for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, we have that

$$-\lg \left(\max_{c \in \mathcal{C}} \Pr_{r \leftarrow \mathcal{R}} [c = \text{Enc}(ek, m; r)] \right) \geq \gamma.$$

(In other words, the min entropy of $\text{Enc}(ek, m; U(\mathcal{R}))$ is at least γ .) We say PKE is well-spread in κ if $\gamma = \gamma(\kappa) = \omega(\lg \kappa)$.

We additionally review the definitions of onewayness under validity-checking attacks (OW-VA), onewayness under plaintext-checking attacks (OW-PCA), and onewayness under plaintext and validity checking attacks (OW-PCVA) for PKE.

Definition A.2 (Security notions for PKE). Let $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a PKE scheme with message space \mathcal{M} . For any adversary \mathcal{A} and for $\text{ATK} \in \{\text{VA}, \text{PCA}, \text{PCVA}\}$, we define the experiments $\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-va}}(\kappa)$, $\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-pca}}(\kappa)$, and $\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-pcva}}(\kappa)$ as in [Figure 11](#), where

$$\mathcal{O}_{\text{ATK}} := \begin{cases} \text{Cvo}(\cdot) & (\text{ATK} = \text{VA}) \\ \text{Pco}(\cdot, \cdot) & (\text{ATK} = \text{PCA}) \\ \text{Cvo}(\cdot), \text{Pco}(\cdot, \cdot) & (\text{ATK} = \text{PCVA}). \end{cases}$$

For any adversary \mathcal{A} , we define its OW-VA, OW-PCA, and OW-PCVA advantages as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{ow-va}}(\kappa) &:= \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-va}}(\kappa) = 1], \\ \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{ow-pca}}(\kappa) &:= \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-pca}}(\kappa) = 1], \\ \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{ow-pcva}}(\kappa) &:= \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-pcva}}(\kappa) = 1]. \end{aligned}$$

For $\text{ATK} \in \{\text{VA}, \text{PCA}, \text{PCVA}\}$, we say that PKE is OW-ATK-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{ow-atk}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} .

$\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ow-atk}}(\kappa)$	$\text{Pco}(m \in \mathcal{M}, c)$	$\text{Cvo}(c)$
$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$	return $\text{boole}(m \stackrel{?}{=} \text{Dec}(dk, c))$	if $c = c^*$, return \perp
$m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$		$m := \text{Dec}(dk, c)$
$c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$		return $\text{boole}(m \in \mathcal{M})$
$m' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{OATK}}(ek, c^*)$		
return $\text{boole}(m' \stackrel{?}{=} \text{Dec}(dk, c^*))$		

Fig. 11: Games for PKE schemes

B Transformations in the Random Oracle Model

We summarize transformations among PKE, DPKE and KEM in the ROM in [Figure 12](#).

GOAL-ATTACKG indicate the class of PKEs that is GOAL-ATTACK-secure and $2^{-\omega(\lg \kappa)}$ -uniformity [[FO00](#), [FO99](#)], or equivalently $\omega(\lg \kappa)$ -spreading [[FO13](#)]. Solid arrows indicate tight reductions, dashed arrows indicate non-tight reductions, thin arrows indicate trivial reductions, thick black arrows indicate reductions in [[FO00](#)], thick green arrows indicate reductions in [[Deno3](#)], and thick blue arrows indicate reductions in [[HHK17](#)].

- The transformation R is in [[FO00](#), Remark 5.5]; R converts $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with randomness space \mathcal{R} into $\text{PKE}' = (\text{Gen}', \text{Enc}', \text{Dec}')$ with randomness space $\mathcal{R} \times \mathcal{R}'$. They defined $\text{Gen}' := \text{Gen}$, $\text{Enc}'(ek, x; (r, r')) := (\text{Enc}(ek, x; r), r')$ and $\text{Dec}'(dk, (c, r')) := \text{Dec}(dk, c)$. This change amplifies γ -uniformity of PKE into $(\gamma/|\mathcal{R}'|)$ -uniformity.
- The transformations Dent1, Dent2, Dent3, Dent4, and Dent5 are given in [[Deno3](#)].
- The transformations S^ℓ , T, U^\perp , U_m^\perp , U_m^\perp , U_m^\perp , and QU_m^\perp are given in [[HHK17](#)].

Note that $\text{Dent1} \approx U_m^\perp$, which is a KEM variant of BR93; $\text{Dent2} \approx U^\perp$, which is a KEM variant of REACT/GEM; $\text{Dent4} \approx \text{QU}_m^\perp$; $\text{Dent5} \approx \text{FO}_m^\perp = U_m^\perp \circ \text{T}$, which is a KEM variant of FO.

Albrecht, Orsini, Paterson, Peer, and Smart [[AOP⁺17](#)] gave the tight security proof for Dent5 when the underlying PKE is a certain Ring-LWE-based PKE scheme. We also observe that Dent5 is decomposed into $U_m^\perp \circ \text{T}$. Thus, starting from IND-CPAG-secure PKE, we obtain the similar proof by combining reductions in [[HHK17](#)].

C Omitted Proofs

C.1 Proof of [Lemma 2.2](#)

Here, we prove [Lemma 2.2](#). Before proving the lemma, we introduce another lemma, which gives a lower bound for a decisional variant of Grover's search problem.

Lemma C.1 ([\[SY17, Lemma C.1\]](#)). *Let $g_s : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ denotes a function defined as $g_s(s) := 1$ and $g_s(s') := 0$ for all $s' \neq s$, and $g_\perp : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ denotes a function that returns 0 for all inputs. Then for any unbounded time adversary \mathcal{A} that issues at most q quantum queries to its oracle, we have*

$$\Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{g_s}() \mid s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{g_\perp}()] \leq q \cdot 2^{-\frac{\ell+1}{2}}.$$

Then we prove [Lemma 2.2](#) relying on the above lemma.

Proof. (of [Lemma 2.2](#)) To prove the theorem, we consider the following sequence of games for an algorithm \mathcal{A} .

Game 0: This game returns as $\mathcal{A}^{\text{H}, \text{H}(s, \cdot)}()$ outputs, where $s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and $\text{H} : \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ are random functions.

Game 1: This game returns as $\mathcal{A}^{\text{O}[s, \text{H}_0, \text{H}_1], \text{H}_1(\cdot)}()$ outputs, where $s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$, $\text{H}_0 : \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and $\text{H}_1 : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ are independent random functions, and $\text{O}[s, \text{H}_0, \text{H}_1]$ is a function defined as

$$\text{O}[s, \text{H}_0, \text{H}_1](s', x) := \begin{cases} \text{H}_0(s', x) & \text{if } s' \neq s, \\ \text{H}_1(x) & \text{if } s' = s. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$




Fig. 12: Transformations in the ROM. GOAL-ATTACKG indicates the class of PKEs that is GOAL-ATTACK-secure and $2^{-\omega(\lg \kappa)}$ -uniformity [FOoo, FO99], or equivalently $\omega(\lg \kappa)$ -spreading [FO13]. Solid arrows indicate tight reductions, dashed arrows indicate non-tight reductions, thin arrows indicate trivial reductions, thick black arrows indicate reductions in [FOoo], thick green arrows indicate reductions in [Deno3], and thick blue arrows indicate reductions in [HHK17]. The transformation R is in [FOoo, Remark 5.5]. The transformations Dent1, Dent2, Dent3, Dent4, and Dent5 are given in [Deno3]. The transformations S^ℓ , T, U^\perp , U_m^\perp , U_m^\perp , and QU_m^\perp are given in [HHK17].

Game 2: This game returns as $\mathcal{A}^{H_0, H_1}()$ outputs, where $H_0: \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and $H_1: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ are independent random functions.

This completes the descriptions of games. We want to prove that $|\Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1]| \leq q_H \cdot 2^{-\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$. It is easy to see that we have $\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] = \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]$. What is left is to prove that $|\Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq q_H \cdot 2^{-\frac{\ell+1}{2}}$. We prove this by a reduction to Lemma C.1. We consider the following algorithm \mathcal{B} that has access to g that is g_s for randomly chosen $s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ or g_\perp where g_s and g_\perp are as defined in Lemma C.1.

\mathcal{B}^g : It picks two random functions $H_0: \{0, 1\}^\ell \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ and $H_1: \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$, and runs \mathcal{A}^{O, H_1} where \mathcal{B} simulates O as follows: If \mathcal{A} queries (s', x) to O , \mathcal{B} queries s' to its own oracle g to obtain a bit b . If $b = 0$, then \mathcal{B} returns $H_0(s', x)$ to \mathcal{A} and if $b = 1$, then \mathcal{B} returns $H_1(x')$ to \mathcal{A} .

This completes the description of \mathcal{B} . It is easy to see that if $g = g_s$ for randomly chosen $s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$, then \mathcal{B} perfectly simulates Game₁, and if $g = g_\perp$, then \mathcal{B} perfectly simulates Game₂. Therefore, we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1]| = |\Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{g_s}() \mid s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{g_\perp}()]|.$$

On the other hand, by Lemma C.1, we have

$$|\Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{g_s}() \mid s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{g_\perp}()]| \leq q_H \cdot 2^{-\frac{\ell+1}{2}},$$

since the number of \mathcal{B} 's queries to its own oracle is exactly the same as the number of \mathcal{A} 's queries to O , which is equal to q_H . This completes the proof of Lemma 2.2. \square

C.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2

Let us employ the same games as those in the security proof in the QROM. It is easy to see that we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{U}_{M'}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1]|.$$

We give an upperbound for this by the following lemmas.

Lemma C.2. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{B} such that*

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) + \frac{q_G}{|\mathcal{M}'|}$$

and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_G \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

This proof mainly follows that in [HHK17, Proof of Theorem 3.2].

Proof. We note that if the adversary \mathcal{A} does not access to m^* , then the value $G(m^*)$ is not determined from \mathcal{A} 's view. Therefore, \mathcal{A} cannot distinguish two games and we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq \Pr[\text{QUERY}],$$

where QUERY denotes the event that \mathcal{A} queries m^* to G.

We define an adversary $\mathcal{B} = (\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2)$ following [HHK17, Proof of Theorem 3.2]. On input ek , \mathcal{B}_1 picks $m_0^*, m_1^* \leftarrow \mathcal{M}'$ and outputs $m_0^*, m_1^*, st = (ek, m_0^*, m_1^*)$. \mathcal{B}_2 receives $(c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m_b^*; r^*), st)$, runs \mathcal{A} on (ek, c^*) and simulates the game. \mathcal{B}_2 outputs $b' := 0$ if m_0^* is queried to G but m_1^* is not queried; outputs $b' := 1$ if m_1^* is queried to G but m_0^* is not queried; outputs random b' otherwise.

Let us denote by BadG the event that \mathcal{A} queries m_{1-b}^* to G. Since m_{1-b}^* is *completely hidden* from \mathcal{A} , we have $\Pr[\text{BadG}] \leq \frac{q_G}{|\mathcal{M}'|}$. In the following, we assume BadG never occurs.

If QUERY happens, then \mathcal{A} queries m_b^* to G and \mathcal{B} outputs $b' = b$. Otherwise, then \mathcal{A} never queries m_b^* to G and \mathcal{B} outputs a random b' . Eliminating the case that the event BadG happens, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa) + \frac{q_G}{|\mathcal{M}'|} &\geq |2 \Pr[b' = b] - 1| \\ &= \left| 2 \cdot \left(1 \cdot \Pr[\text{QUERY}] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot \Pr[\neg \text{QUERY}] \right) - 1 \right| \\ &= \left| 2 \cdot \left(1 \cdot \Pr[\text{QUERY}] + \frac{1}{2} \cdot (1 - \Pr[\text{QUERY}]) \right) - 1 \right| \\ &= \Pr[\text{QUERY}] \end{aligned}$$

as we wanted. □

Lemma C.3. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{C} such that*

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_2 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{C}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(\kappa)$$

and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{C}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_G \cdot t_{\text{RO}}$.

Proof. Consider an adversary \mathcal{C} that on input ek , outputs $m_0 = 0$ and $m_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{M}'$, receives $c^* = \text{Enc}(ek, m_b)$, invokes $\mathcal{A}(ek, c^*)$, and outputs b' as \mathcal{A} . Apparently, if $b = 0$, then \mathcal{C} perfectly simulates Game₁ and, else if $b = 1$, then \mathcal{C} perfectly simulates Game₂. Thus, the lemma holds obviously. □

C.3 Proof of Theorem 3.4

Let us employ the same games as those in the security proof in the QROM. It is easy to see that we have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}_1, \mathcal{U}_{\mathcal{M}'}, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]|.$$

We give an upperbound for this by the following lemmas.

Lemma C.4. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{B} such that*

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}'}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa)$$

and $\text{Time}(\mathcal{B}) \approx \text{Time}(\mathcal{A}) + q_{H'} \cdot t_{\text{RO}} + q_{H'} \cdot \text{Time}(\text{Enc})$.

Proof. We note that if the adversary \mathcal{A} does not access to m^* , then the value $H'(m^*)$ is not determined from \mathcal{A} 's view. Therefore, \mathcal{A} cannot distinguish two games and we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Game}_0 = 1] - \Pr[\text{Game}_1 = 1]| \leq \Pr[\text{QUERY}],$$

where QUERY denotes the event that \mathcal{A} queries m^* to H' .

We define an adversary \mathcal{B} as follows: On input ek and $c^* := \text{Enc}(ek, m^*)$, where $m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_M$, \mathcal{B} picks $d^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{H'}}$. It also initialize the table to simulate H' . It then runs \mathcal{A} on (ek, c^*, d^*) and simulates the game. On each query m to H' , if (m, d) is in the table, then it returns d ; otherwise, \mathcal{B} computes $c := \text{Enc}(ek, m)$; if $c = c^*$, then \mathcal{B} outputs m and halts; otherwise, it picks random $d \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{H'}}$, returns d to \mathcal{A} , and add (m, d) to the table. If \mathcal{A} halts, then \mathcal{B} outputs \perp and halts.

If QUERY happens, then \mathcal{A} queries m satisfying $\text{Enc}(ek, m) = c^*$ to H' . Since PKE is perfectly correct, c^* is decrypted into m and, thus, $m = m^*$. Therefore, \mathcal{B} outputs m^* and wins the OW-CPA game. Otherwise, then \mathcal{A} never queries m^* to H' and \mathcal{B} outputs an error symbol \perp . We have

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{B}}^{\text{ow-cpa}}(\kappa) = \Pr[\text{QUERY}]$$

as we wanted. □

D Instantiations of DPKE from Codes

D.1 Preliminaries

\mathbb{F} denotes $\text{GF}(2)$. For a vector $e \in \mathbb{F}^n$, $\text{wt}(e)$ denotes the Hamming weight of e , that is, the number of 1s in e . Let $S(n, t)$ be the set of n -dimensional vectors of Hamming weight at most t , that is, $S(n, t) := \{e \in \mathbb{F}^n \mid \text{wt}(e) \leq t\}$. Let $\text{GL}(n, \mathbb{F})$ and $\text{Perm}(n, \mathbb{F})$ denotes the general-linear group of degree n over \mathbb{F} and the group of permutation matrices of degree n over \mathbb{F} .

We assume that, for appropriately chosen integers $n = n(\kappa)$, $k = k(\kappa)$, and $t = t(\kappa)$, there exist PPT algorithms CodeGen and Decode satisfying the followings:

- CodeGen($1^\kappa, n, k, t$) outputs $G \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times n}$ and Γ , where G is a generator matrix of a $[n, k]_{\mathbb{F}}$ linear code.
- Decode($\Gamma, mG + e$) outputs e if $e \in S(n, t)$.

For a $[n, k]_{\mathbb{F}}$ linear code with a generator matrix $G \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times n}$ of rank k , its parity-check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}^{(n-k) \times n}$ of rank $n - k$ satisfies $G \cdot H^\top = O$. We assume that there exist a deterministic algorithm G2H that, on input G , outputs its parity-check matrix H and a deterministic algorithm H2G that, on input H , outputs its generator matrix G . For example, the algorithm G2H computes a systematic form $G' = [I_k \mid A] \cdot P$ of G , where $A \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times n}$ and $P \in \text{Perm}(n, \mathbb{F})$, and outputs $H = [-A^\top \mid I_{n-k}]P^{-\top}$.⁷

Let B_τ be the Bernoulli distribution with parameter $\tau \in (0, 1/2)$, that is, $\Pr_{x \leftarrow B_\tau}[x = 1] = \tau$ and $\Pr_{x \leftarrow B_\tau}[x = 0] = 1 - \tau$. Let $\tau = t/n - \epsilon$ and $\alpha = \epsilon n$ for $\epsilon > 0$. Applying the Hoeffding bound, we obtain

$$\Pr_{e \leftarrow B_\tau^n} \left[\text{wt}(e) - E[\text{wt}(e)] \geq \alpha \right] \leq \exp(-2n\alpha^2).$$

Since $E[\text{wt}(e)] = \tau n = t - \alpha$, the statement $\text{wt}(e) - E[\text{wt}(e)] \geq \alpha$ implies $\text{wt}(e) \geq E[\text{wt}(e)] + \alpha = t - \alpha + \alpha = t$. The RHS $\exp(-2n(\epsilon n)^2)$ is negligible. Thus, we obtain the following bound:

Lemma D.1. *For $\tau = t/n - \epsilon$ with $\epsilon > 0$, it holds that*

$$\Pr_{e \leftarrow B_\tau^n} [\text{wt}(e) \geq t] \leq \exp(-2\epsilon^2 n^3).$$

⁷ Letting $G = [G_{\text{left}} \mid G_{\text{right}}] \cdot P$ with $G_{\text{left}} \in \text{GL}(k, \mathbb{F})$ and $P \in \text{Perm}(n, \mathbb{F})$, we have $G' = G_{\text{left}}^{-1} G P = [I_k \mid G_{\text{left}}^{-1} \cdot G_{\text{right}}] P$ and set $A = G_{\text{left}}^{-1} \cdot G_{\text{right}}$. We obtain $G \cdot H^\top = G_{\text{left}} G' P \cdot ([-A^\top \mid I_{n-k}] P^{-\top})^\top = G_{\text{left}} [I_k \mid A] \cdot P \cdot P^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} -A \\ I_{n-k} \end{pmatrix} = G_{\text{left}} (-A + A) = O$.

Assumptions: Blum et al. [BFKL93] introduced the learning-parity-with-noise (LPN) problem. Its decisional version is formalized by Katz, Shin and Smith [KSS10].

Definition D.1 (LPN assumption in matrix form). For all κ , let $k = k(\kappa)$ and $q = q(\kappa)$ be integers and let $\tau = \tau(\kappa)$ be a real in $(0, 1/2)$. The decisional learning-parity-with-noise (LPN) assumption $\text{LPN}_{k,\tau}$ states that for any $n = \text{poly}(\kappa)$, it is computationally hard to distinguish the following two distributions:

- $A, sA + e$, where $A \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^{k \times n}$, $s \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^k$, and $e \leftarrow B_\tau^n$
- A, u , where $A \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^{k \times n}$ and $u \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^n$.

The McEliece-key-indistinguishability assumption is introduced in [CFS01] for signature context. The statements states the public key of the McEliece encryption scheme is pseudorandom. See e.g., [DDMQN12].

Definition D.2 (McEliece-key-indistinguishability assumption with respect to CodeGen). For all κ , let $k = k(\kappa)$, $n = n(\kappa)$, and $t = t(\kappa)$ be positive integers. The McEliece-key-indistinguishability assumption with respect to CodeGen, denoted by $\text{McE}_{k,n,t,\text{CodeGen}}$, states that it is computationally hard to distinguish the following two distributions:

- $\tilde{G} := SGP$, where $(G, \Gamma) \leftarrow \text{CodeGen}(k, n)$, $S \leftarrow \text{GL}(k, \mathbb{F})$, and $P \leftarrow \text{Perm}(n, \mathbb{F})$.
- $\tilde{G} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^{k \times n}$

We additionally introduce the Niederreiter-key-indistinguishability assumption with respect to CodeGen, in which we employ parity-check matrices instead of generator matrices. See e.g., [FGK⁺13]. We notice that the Niederreiter-key-indistinguishability assumption with respect to CodeGen is equivalent to the McEliece-key-indistinguishability assumption with respect to CodeGen.

Definition D.3 (Niederreiter-key-indistinguishability assumption with respect to CodeGen). For all κ , let $k = k(\kappa)$, $n = n(\kappa)$, and $t = t(\kappa)$ be positive integers. The Niederreiter-key-indistinguishability assumption with respect to CodeGen, denoted by $\text{Nie}_{k,n,t,\text{CodeGen}}$, states that it is computationally hard to distinguish the following two distributions:

- $\tilde{H} := MHP$, where $(G, \Gamma) \leftarrow \text{CodeGen}(k, n)$, $H := \text{G2H}(G)$, $M \leftarrow \text{GL}(n - k, \mathbb{F})$, and $P \leftarrow \text{Perm}(n, \mathbb{F})$.
- $\tilde{H} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^{(n-k) \times n}$

D.2 Code-based DPKEs

McEliece-based DPKE. We review the McEliece PKE [McE78]. Let n , k , and t be positive integers with $n > k$. We consider $[n, k]_{\mathbb{F}}$ -linear code with an efficient decoder that can correct any patten of up to t errors.

The public key is $\tilde{G} = SGP$, where S is a random non-singular $k \times k$ matrix, G is a generator matrix in $\mathbb{F}^{k \times n}$ of $[n, k]_{\mathbb{F}}$ -linear code, and P is a random $n \times n$ permutation matrix. The ciphertext of $m \in \mathbb{F}^k$ with randomness $e \in \mathcal{S}_t$ is $c = m\tilde{G} + e \in \mathbb{F}^n$. We can retrieve m using a secret key because we compute $yP^{-1} = mSG + eP^{-1}$, decode it into mS , and obtain m . Observe that we can retrieve e also by computing $e := c - m\tilde{G}$. Thus, we interpret (m, e) as plaintext and obtain DPKE.

Correctly speaking, $\text{Decode}(\Gamma, yP^{-1})$ in our definition outputs eP^{-1} . Thus, we obtain $e := eP^{-1} \cdot P$ and $mSG = yP^{-1} - eP^{-1}$, and so on. Now, we describe the McEliece-based DPKE.

Parameters: Let n, k, t, τ be parameters with $\tau = t/n - \epsilon$ for $\epsilon > 0$.

- The plaintext space is $\mathcal{M} := \mathbb{F}^k \times \mathcal{S}_t$.
- The sampler $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ samples $m \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^k$ and $r \leftarrow B_\tau^n$ until $\text{wt}(r) \leq t$.
- The ciphertext space is $\mathcal{C} := \mathbb{F}^n$.
- We require $2^n \gg 2^k \cdot \sum_{i=0}^t \binom{n}{i}$. E.g., $2^{n-k} \gg t \cdot n^t \geq \sum_{i=0}^t \binom{n}{i}$.

Key Generation: $\text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$ generates $(G, \Gamma) \leftarrow \text{CodeGen}(1^\kappa, n, k, t)$, a random non-singular $k \times k$ matrix S , and a random $n \times n$ permutation matrix P . It outputs $ek = \tilde{G} = SGP \in \mathbb{F}^{k \times n}$ and $dk = (S, G, P, \Gamma)$.

Encryption: $\text{Enc}(ek, (m, e))$ outputs $c = m\tilde{G} + e \in \mathbb{F}^n$.

Decryption: $\text{Dec}(sk, c)$ computes $y := cP^{-1}$, our decoder outputs $e' := \text{Decode}(\Gamma, y)$, computes $d' := y - e'$, computes m' such that $m' \cdot G = d'$, and computes $m := m'S^{-1}$.

The properties of this DPKE are summarized as follows:

Perfect correctness: If $c = mSGP + e$, then $y = cP^{-1} = mSG + eP^{-1}$, which is a codeword of mS plus error vector eP^{-1} of weight at most t . Thus, Decode on input Γ and y outputs $e' = eP^{-1}$. Now, we have $d' = y - e' = mSG$ and $m' = mS$. Hence, we get $m = m'S^{-1}$ as we wanted.

Sparseness: Sparseness follows from $|C| = 2^n \gg 2^k \cdot \sum_{i=0}^t \binom{n}{i} = |\mathcal{M}| = |\text{Enc}(ek, \mathcal{M})|$.

Pseudorandomness: What we want to show is

$$(\tilde{G}, c = m\tilde{G} + e) \approx_c (\tilde{G}, u),$$

where $(\tilde{G}, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^k)$, $(m, e) \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$, and $u \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^n$.

- We first replace \tilde{G} with random \tilde{G} . This is justified by the McEliece assumption with respect to CodeGen.
- We next replace e with random $e' \leftarrow B_t^n$. This is justified by [Lemma D.1](#) with our parameter setting.
- We next replace $c = m\tilde{G} + e'$ with random u . This is justified by the LPN assumption $\text{LPN}_{k,\tau}$.
- We then go backward by replacing random \tilde{G} with \tilde{G} . This is justified by the McEliece assumption with respect to CodeGen again.

Niederreiter-based DPKE. It is well-known that the Niederreiter PKE is the dual of the McEliece PKE [[LDW94](#)].⁸ Let us consider $(n, k)_q$ -code C with error-decoder up to t errors. The public key is $\tilde{H} = MHP$, where M is a random non-singular $(n - k) \times (n - k)$ matrix, H is an $(n - k) \times n$ parity-check matrix of code C , and P is a random $n \times n$ permutation matrix. The ciphertext of $e \in \mathcal{S}_t$ is $c = e\tilde{H}^T \in \mathbb{F}^{n-k}$. We can retrieve e using a secret key because we compute $cM^{-T} (= e\tilde{H}^T M^{-T} = eP^T H^T)$, decode it into eP^T , and compute $eP^{-T} = e$.

Parameters: Let n, k, t, τ be parameters with $\tau = t/n - \epsilon$ for $\epsilon > 0$.

- The plaintext space is $\mathcal{M} := \mathcal{S}_t$.
- The sampler $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ samples $e \leftarrow B_t^n$ until $\text{wt}(e) \leq t$.
- The ciphertext space is $\mathcal{C} := \mathbb{F}^n$.
- We require $2^n \gg 2^k \cdot \sum_{i=0}^t \binom{n}{i}$. E.g., $2^{n-k} \gg t \cdot n^t \geq \sum_{i=0}^t \binom{n}{i}$.

Key Generation: $\text{Gen}(1^k)$ generates $(G, \Gamma) \leftarrow \text{CodeGen}(1^k, n, k, t)$, $H := G^*$, a random non-singular $(n - k) \times (n - k)$ matrix M , and a random $n \times n$ permutation matrix P . It outputs $ek = \tilde{H} = MHP \in \mathbb{F}^{(n-k) \times n}$ and $dk = (M, H, P, \Gamma)$.

Encryption: $\text{Enc}(ek, e)$ outputs $c = e\tilde{H}^T \in \mathbb{F}^{n-k}$.

Decryption: $\text{Dec}(sk, c)$ computes $c' := cM^{-T}$, decodes it into $e' := \text{Decode}(\Gamma, c')$, and computes $e := e'P^{-T}$.

The properties of this DPKE are summarized as follows:

Perfect correctness: This is obvious.

Sparseness: Sparseness follows from $|C| = 2^{n-k} \gg \sum_{i=0}^t \binom{n}{i} = |\mathcal{M}| = |\text{Enc}(ek, \mathcal{M})|$.

Pseudorandomness: What we want to show is

$$(\tilde{H}, c = e \cdot \tilde{H}^T) \approx_c (\tilde{H}, u),$$

where $(\tilde{H}, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^k)$, $e \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$, and $u \leftarrow \mathbb{F}^{n-k}$.

- We first replace \tilde{H} with random \tilde{H} . This is justified by the Niederreiter assumption with respect to CodeGen.
- We next replace e with random $e' \leftarrow B_t^n$. This is justified by [Lemma D.1](#) with our parameter setting.
- We next replace $c = e \cdot \tilde{H}^T$ with random u . This is justified by the LPN assumption $\text{LPN}_{k,\tau}$. (See [[LDW94](#)].)
- We then go backward by replacing random \tilde{H} with \tilde{H} . This is justified by the Niederreiter assumption with respect to CodeGen.

⁸ Li, Deng, and Wang showed that the onewayness of the Niederreiter PKE is equivalent to that of the McEliece PKE [[LDW94](#)].

E PR-CPA security

Here, we recall the security notion of DPKE called PR-CPA defined in previous versions of this paper. Then we prove that PR-CPA-security is implied by the disjoint simulatability. For PR-CPA security, we require a DPKE scheme to have two additional PPT algorithms $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}$ and $\widetilde{\text{Enc}}$: $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}$ is a PPT algorithm that takes the security parameter as input and outputs a fake encryption key \widetilde{ek} , which is indistinguishable from a real encryption key. This means that the original encryption algorithm Enc should be able to encrypt a message even with a fake encryption key. $\widetilde{\text{Enc}}$ is a PPT algorithm that takes a fake encryption key as input and outputs a random fake ciphertext, which is indistinguishable from a random real ciphertext with a fake encryption key. We further require that the probability that a random fake ciphertext with a fake encryption key falls in the range of a real ciphertext with a fake encryption key is negligible. For example, this condition is satisfied if a set of real ciphertexts is sufficiently sparser than a set of fake ciphertext or a set of real ciphertexts is disjoint with a set of fake ciphertext. The formal definition follows:

Definition E.1. Let \mathcal{D}_M be a distribution on \mathcal{M} . A deterministic PKE scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with plaintext and ciphertext spaces \mathcal{M} and \mathcal{C} is \mathcal{D}_M -PR-CPA secure if the following properties hold; There exist two PPT algorithms $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}$ and $\widetilde{\text{Enc}}$ that satisfy the followings:

- (Statistical Disjointness:) for any \widetilde{ek} generated by $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}(1^\kappa)$, the probability that a fake ciphertext is in the range of a real ciphertext generated by $\text{Enc}(\widetilde{ek}, \cdot)$ is negligible, that is,

$$\Pr[c \in \text{Enc}(\widetilde{ek}, \mathcal{M}) \mid c \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Enc}}(\widetilde{ek})]$$

is negligible.

- (PR-Key Security:) for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , its advantage to distinguish a real key from a fake key, denoted by $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{pr-key}}(\kappa)$, is negligible;

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{pr-key}}(\kappa) := \left| \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(ek) \mid (ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)] - \Pr[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\widetilde{ek}) \mid \widetilde{ek} \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Gen}}(1^\kappa)] \right|$$

is negligible.

- (PR-Ciphertexts Security:) for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , its advantage to distinguish a real ciphertext from a fake ciphertext with a fake key, denoted by $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{D}_M, \text{PKE}}^{\text{pr-cipher}}(\kappa)$, is negligible;

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{D}_M, \text{PKE}}^{\text{pr-cipher}}(\kappa) := \left| \Pr \left[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\widetilde{ek}, c^*) \mid \widetilde{ek} \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Gen}}(1^\kappa); m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_M; c^* := \text{Enc}(\widetilde{ek}, m^*) \right] - \Pr \left[1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\widetilde{ek}, c^*) \mid \widetilde{ek} \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Gen}}(1^\kappa); c^* \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Enc}}(\widetilde{ek}) \right] \right|$$

is negligible.

Remark E.1. Though the above definition is essentially the same as the one in previous versions, there are some notational differences described below.

- In previous versions, we implicitly assumed that message space \mathcal{M} is associated with a certain distribution, and used $m \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$ to mean m is sampled according to this distribution. To clarify this, we explicitly denote a distribution \mathcal{D}_M , and define the PR-CPA-security respect to the distribution.
- In previous versions, we used a (T, ϵ) -type definition. For compatibility to the other part of the current version, we quit it.

We prove that the disjoint simulatability implies the PR-CPA-security

Lemma E.1. If a DPKE scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is \mathcal{D}_M -disjoint simulatable, then PKE is \mathcal{D}_M -PR-CPA-secure.

Proof. Let \mathcal{S} be a simulator that satisfies the properties in [Definition 3.1](#). Then we construct $\widetilde{\text{Gen}}$ and $\widetilde{\text{Enc}}$ as follows.

$\widetilde{\text{Gen}}(1^\kappa)$: This algorithm runs $(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$ and outputs $\widetilde{ek} := ek$.

$\widetilde{\text{Enc}}(ek)$: This algorithm runs $c \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(ek)$ and outputs c .

It is easy to see that we have

- $\Pr[c \in \text{Enc}(\widetilde{ek}, \mathcal{M}) \mid c \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Enc}}(\widetilde{ek})] = \text{Disj}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{S}}(\kappa)$,
- $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PKE}}^{\text{pr-key}}(\kappa) = 0$,
- $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{D}_M, \text{PKE}}^{\text{pr-cipher}}(\kappa) = \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{D}_M, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}}^{\text{ds-ind}}(\kappa)$.

Therefore the lemma follows.