

Learning Parity with Noise Implies Collision Resistant Hashing

Yu Yu^{1,2}, Jiang Zhang², Jian Weng³, Chun Guo¹, and Xiangxue Li⁴

¹ Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Shanghai Jiao Tong University

² State Key Laboratory of Cryptology, P.O. Box 5159, Beijing 100878, China

³ Jinan University, Guangzhou, China

⁴ East China Normal University, Shanghai, China

E-mail: {yuyuathk, jiangzhang09}@gmail.com

Abstract. The Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) problem has recently found many cryptographic applications such as authentication protocols, pseudorandom generators/functions and even cryptomania tasks including public-key encryption (PKE) schemes and oblivious transfer (OT) protocols. It however remains a long-standing open problem whether LPN implies collision resistant hash (CRH) functions. In this paper, we answer this question affirmatively by showing that CRH is implied by (the two most common variants of) LPN. More specifically, for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, assume that

1. the low-noise LPN problem (i.e., at noise rate $1/\sqrt{n}$) is $2^{4\sqrt{n}/\log n}$ -hard given $q = n^{3+\epsilon}$ samples,
2. or that the constant-noise LPN problem is $2^{n^{0.5+\epsilon}}$ -hard,

then there exists CRH functions with constant (resp., poly-logarithmic) shrinkage, which can be implemented using polynomial-size depth-3 circuits with NOT, (unbounded fan-in) AND and XOR gates. Our technical route LPN \rightarrow bSVP \rightarrow CRH is reminiscent of the known reductions for the large-modulus analogue, i.e., LWE \rightarrow SIS \rightarrow CRH, where the binary Shortest Vector Problem (bSVP) was recently introduced by Applebaum et al. (ITCS 2017) that enables CRH in a similar manner to Ajtai's CRH functions based on the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem.

In addition to the feasibility established, we discuss also the practical relevance of the CRH functions constructed (from the hardness of LPN). Interestingly, the SHA-3 proposal Fast Syndrome Based (FSB) hash resembles a concrete (but aggressive) instantiation of the LPN-based CRH construction. Furthermore, we show how to implement the polynomially shrinking CRH functions more efficiently using idealized heuristics such as a block cipher (keyed by a public random string) behaves like a random permutation.

Keywords: Foundations, Learning Parity with Noise, Binary Shortest Vector Problem, Collision Resistant Hash Functions, Post-quantum Cryptography.

1 Introduction

1.1 Learning Parity with Noise

LEARNING PARITY WITH NOISE. The computational version of the Learning Parity with Noise (LPN) assumption with secret size $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and noise rate $0 < \mu < 1/2$ postulates that given any number of samples $q = \text{poly}(n)$ it is computationally infeasible for any probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm to recover the random secret $\mathbf{x} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ given $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e})$, where \mathbf{A} is a random $q \times n$ Boolean matrix, \mathbf{e} follows $\mathcal{B}_\mu^q = (\mathcal{B}_\mu)^q$, \mathcal{B}_μ denotes the Bernoulli distribution with parameter μ (i.e., $\Pr[\mathcal{B}_\mu = 1] = \mu$ and $\Pr[\mathcal{B}_\mu = 0] = 1 - \mu$), ‘ \cdot ’ and ‘ $+$ ’ denote (matrix-vector) multiplication and addition over $\text{GF}(2)$ respectively. The decisional version of LPN simply assumes that $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e})$ is pseudorandom. The two versions are polynomially equivalent [16,45,6].

HARDNESS OF LPN. The computational LPN problem can be seen as the average-case analogue of the NP-complete problem “decoding random linear codes” [10]. LPN has been also extensively studied in learning theory, and it was shown in [33] that an efficient algorithm for LPN would allow to learn several important function classes such as 2-DNF formulas, juntas, and any function with a sparse Fourier spectrum. When the noise rate μ is constant (i.e., independent of secret size n), Blum, Kalai and Wasserman [17] showed how to solve LPN with time/sample complexity $2^{O(n/\log n)}$. Lyubashevsky [49] observed that one can produce almost as many LPN samples as needed using only $q = n^{1+\epsilon}$ LPN samples (of a lower noise rate), which implies a variant of the BKW attack [17] with time complexity $2^{O(n/\log \log n)}$ and sample complexity $n^{1+\epsilon}$. If one is restricted to $q = O(n)$ samples, then the best attack has exponential complexity $2^{O(n)}$ [53]. Under low noise rate $\mu = 1/\sqrt{n}$, the best attacks [19,13,48,9] solve LPN with time complexity $2^{O(\sqrt{n})}$. The low-noise LPN is mostly believed a stronger assumption than constant-noise LPN. In noise regime $\mu = 1/\sqrt{n}$, LPN can be used to build public-key encryption (PKE) schemes [2] and oblivious transfer (OT) protocols. Quantum algorithms are not known to have any advantages over classic ones in solving LPN, which makes LPN a promising candidate for “post-quantum cryptography”. Furthermore, LPN enjoys simplicity and is more suited for weak-power devices (e.g., RFID tags) than other quantum-secure candidates such as Learning with Errors (LWE) [60] as the many modular additions and multiplications in LWE would be simplified to AND and XOR gates in LPN.

CRYPTOGRAPHY IN `minicrypt`⁵. LPN was used as a basis for building lightweight authentication schemes (e.g. [40,44,45], just to name a few). Kiltz et al. [47] and Dodis et al. [27] constructed randomized MACs from LPN, which implies a two-round authentication scheme with security against active adversaries. Lyubashevsky and Masny [50] gave a more efficient three-round authentication scheme

⁵ `minicrypt` refers to Impagliazzo’s [42] hypothetical world where one-way functions exist but public-key cryptography does not, and `cryptomania` is the more optimistic world where public-key cryptography and multiparty computation are possible.

from LPN and recently Cash, Kiltz, and Tessaro [20] reduced the round complexity to 2 rounds. Applebaum et al. [4] used LPN to construct efficient symmetric encryption schemes with certain key-dependent message (KDM) security. Jain et al. [43] constructed an efficient perfectly binding string commitment scheme from LPN. We refer to the survey [58] about cryptography from LPN.

CRYPTOGRAPHY BEYOND minicrypt. Alekhnovich [2] constructed the first **cryptomania** object from LPN, in particular, he showed that LPN with noise rate $1/\sqrt{n}$ implies CPA secure public-key encryption (PKE) schemes. Döttling et al. [31] and Kiltz et al. [46] further showed that low-noise LPN alone already suffices for PKE schemes with CCA (and KDM [30]) security. Once we obtain a PKE, it is perhaps not so surprising to build an oblivious transfer (OT) protocol. That is, LPN-based PKE uses pseudorandom public keys (so that one can efficiently fake random public keys that are computationally indistinguishable from real ones) and in this scenario Gertner et al. [36] showed how to construct an OT protocol in a black-box manner. This observation was made explicit in [24], where universally composable OT protocols were constructed from low-noise LPN. All the above schemes are based on LPN of noise rate $1/\sqrt{n}$. Recently, Yu and Zhang [67] showed that PKE and OT can be based on constant-noise LPN with hardness $2^{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}$. To summarize, it remains open whether LPN implies more advanced cryptographic objects, such as fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) and collision resistant hash (CRH) functions [58]. As for LPN-based FHE, Brakerski [18] reported some negative result that straightforward LPN-based encryptions are unlikely to achieve full homomorphism. We tackle the case of LPN-based CRH.

1.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions

A **CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH FUNCTION** $\{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a deterministic function that maps arbitrarily (or at least polynomially) long bit strings into digests of a fixed length. The function was originally introduced in the seminal work of Diffie and Hellman [26] to produce more efficient and compact digital signatures. As exemplified by MD5 and SHA-1/2/3, it is now one of the most widely used cryptographic primitives in security applications and protocols, such as SSL/TLS, PGP, SSH, S/MIME, IPsec and Bitcoin. Merkle [56] formulated three main security properties (that still remain in use to date) of a cryptographic hash function: preimage resistance, second preimage resistance and collision resistance, of which collision resistance seems the most essential and suffices for many aforementioned applications ⁶. Similar to the mode of operations for data encryption, the design of cryptographic hash functions proceeds in two steps: one first designs a compression function that operates on

⁶ Unlikely collision resistance whose definition is unique and unambiguous, there are several variants of (second) preimage resistance for which people strive to find a compromise that facilitates security proofs yet captures the needs of most applications. Some variants of (second) preimage resistance are implied by collision resistance in the conventional or provisional sense [62].

fixed-length inputs and outputs, and then applies a domain extender to accept messages of arbitrary length. This dates back to the independent work of Merkle [57] and Damgård [23], who proposed a domain extender, and showed that if the underlying compression function is collision resistant then so is the hash function based on the Merkle-Damgård construction. We refer to [3] for a survey about various domain extenders for cryptographic hash functions. For the rest of this paper we will focus on such length-regular compression functions, termed collision resistant hash (CRH) functions.

COLLISION RESISTANT HASHING. Theoretical constructions of CRH functions can be based on the hardness of factoring and discrete logarithm (via the construction of claw-free permutations [22]), which are however far from practical. Ajtai [1] introduced an elegant and (conceptually) simple construction: $f_{\mathbf{A}} : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^n$ that for a random $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^{n \times m}$ and some (at least polynomially) large p and on input $\mathbf{z} \in \{0, 1\}^m$ it computes

$$f_{\mathbf{A}}(\mathbf{z}) = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{z} \pmod{p} , \quad (1)$$

which is collision resistant via a security reduction from the Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem, and is thus at least as hard as lattice problems such as GapSVP and SIVP. Lyubashevsky et al. [51] gave a ring-based variant of Ajtai's construction, called SWIFFT, which admits FFT and precomputation techniques for improved efficiency and at the same time it preserves an asymptotic security proof from ideal lattices. Despite a big gap between the claimed security level and the actual security bounds proved, SWIFFT [51] and its modified version (as a SHA-3 candidate) SWIFFTX [7] are among the very few hash function designs combining the best of two worlds (i.e., practical efficiency and rigorous security proof).

THE EXPAND-THEN-COMPRESS APPROACH. Recently, Applebaum et al. [5] constructed a function $h_{\mathbf{M}} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ keyed by a random $n \times \alpha n$ binary matrix \mathbf{M} as:

$$h_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{M} \cdot \text{Expand}(\mathbf{y}) , \quad (2)$$

where Expand is an injective function that expands a k -bit string into an αn -bit one of weight no greater than $\delta \alpha n / 2$ for some small $\delta < 1$. Note that $h_{\mathbf{M}}$ can be viewed as a binary version of Ajtai's $f_{\mathbf{A}}$ (see (1)), where matrix \mathbf{A} over \mathbb{Z}_p is simplified to a binary matrix \mathbf{M} , and binary vector \mathbf{z} is further flattened to a sparse binary vector $\text{Expand}(\mathbf{y})$. As suggested in [5] (and already used in the FSB hash [8]), $\text{Expand} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\alpha n}$ can be implemented efficiently and in parallel as follows: assume that δ is a negative power of 2 and $L|k$ (i.e., $L = \log(2/\delta), k/L \in \mathbb{N}$) and let $\alpha = k2^L/Ln$, then Expand parses the k -bit input into L -bit blocks as

$$\mathbf{y} = y_1 \cdots y_L \| y_{L+1} \cdots y_{2L} \| \cdots \| y_{L(k/L-1)+1} \cdots y_k$$

and produces as output

$$\text{Expand}(\mathbf{y}) = \text{DeMul}(y_1 \cdots y_L) \| \cdots \| \text{DeMul}(y_{L(\frac{k}{L}-1)+1} \cdots y_k) ,$$

where $\text{DeMul} : \{0, 1\}^L \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2^L}$ is a demultiplexer function that on input $z \in \{0, 1\}^L$ outputs a 2^L -bit string which is 1 in exactly the z -th location (and 0 elsewhere). This yields an output of length $\alpha n = k2^L/L$ and Hamming weight $k/L = \delta\alpha n/2$. Thanks to the simplification to the binary field, $h_{\mathbf{M}}$ can be implemented rather efficiently both in the asymptotic sense and in practice. For any specified \mathbf{M} , $h_{\mathbf{M}}$ can be directly translated to a polynomial-size circuit of NOT, (unbounded fan-in) XOR and AND gates in depth 3 (or even depth 2 if the input includes not only the individual bits of \mathbf{y} but also their respective complements). The original FSB hash proposal [8] and its improved version the RFSB hash [14] can be seen as concrete instantiations of the Expand-then-Compress hash (although they appeared earlier than [5]). The FSB and RFSB hash functions were shown to be only 8 times slower or even faster than SHA-256 respectively (see the evaluations in [11,14]).

THE SECURITY OF ETC AND BINARY SVP. An early version of FSB [34] for some concrete parameter settings was broken by Saarinen [63], who showed that using too many blocks (large k/L compared with n) may cause linearization attacks and suggested adjusted parameter choices. Another attack by Fouque and Leurent [35] targets at a quasi-cyclic version of FSB, where a quasi-cyclic (instead of random) matrix and a wrong parameter choice (violating the assumption) were used in [34], and is thus irrelevant to the EtC methodology. The official version of FSB [8] fixed these problems and remains unbroken to date (except for attacks on its scale-downed version [12]). In order to study the asymptotic security of the EtC hash, Applebaum et al. [5] introduced the binary Shortest Vector Problem (binary SVP or bSVP in short). Informally, the (α, δ) -bSVP assumption asserts that given a random matrix distribution⁷ $\mathbf{M} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{n \times \alpha n}$, it is computationally infeasible to find a non-zero $\mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^{\alpha n}$ of low Hamming weight $|\mathbf{x}| \leq \delta\alpha n$ such that $\mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{2}$. From a code-theoretic perspective, \mathbf{M} specifies the $n \times \alpha n$ parity check matrix of a random binary linear code of rate $1 - 1/\alpha$, where the rows of \mathbf{M} are linearly independent (except with negligible probability), and therefore the bSVP postulates that finding a short codeword (of weight at most $\delta\alpha n$) is hard. Meaningful regimes (i.e., upper and lower bounds) for δ were discussed in [5]: for $\delta < \mathbf{H}^{-1}(1/\alpha)$ such short codes do not exist (except with exponentially small probability), and for $\delta \geq 1/2\alpha$ the b-SVP assumption is falsified by an efficient attack, where $\mathbf{H}^{-1}(\cdot)$ denotes the inverse of the binary entropy function, i.e., $\mathbf{H}(v) = v \log 1/v + (1 - v) \log 1/(1 - v)$ for $0 < v \leq 1/2$. Therefore, b-SVP could only live in the range of $\delta \in (\mathbf{H}^{-1}(1/\alpha), 1/2\alpha)$, and the authors of [5] further show that one-way functions and collision resistant hash functions exist if the bSVP is hard for $\delta > \mathbf{H}^{-1}(1/\alpha)$ and $\delta > 2\mathbf{H}^{-1}(1/\alpha)$ respectively. To see that collision resistant hash functions are possible for $\delta > \mathbf{H}^{-1}(1/\alpha)$, consider $h_{\mathbf{M}}$ as defined in (2). Note that $h_{\mathbf{M}}$ can be made shrinking since $k \approx \log \binom{\alpha n}{\delta\alpha n/2} \approx \alpha n \cdot \mathbf{H}(\delta/2) > n$ (Lemma 4). The rationale is that any efficient algorithm that comes up with a collision $h_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{y}) = h_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{y}')$ for $\mathbf{y} \neq \mathbf{y}'$ immediately

⁷ For our convenience, the matrix \mathbf{M} in our consideration has dimension $n \times \alpha n$ instead of $\alpha n \times n$ in [5]. Thus, we adjust parameters accordingly when citing [5].

implies a solution to bSVP, i.e., $\mathbf{M} \cdot \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$, where $\mathbf{x} = \text{Expand}(\mathbf{y}) + \text{Expand}(\mathbf{y}')$ has weight no greater than $\delta\alpha n$. We mention that in the worst case, it is NP-hard to compute (or even to approximate by a constant factor) the distance of linear code [66,32]. However, as an average-case hardness assumption, bSVP is relatively new and deserves further investigation. A shortcut and promising direction is to see whether bSVP is reducible from the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem since they are both related to random binary linear codes, and the average-case hardness of the latter is well understood. However, the authors of [5] only showed a weak connection between bSVP and LPN. That is, they show that at least one of the following is true:

1. There exists $a > 1$ for which (α, δ) -bSVP holds for $\alpha = n^{1/(a-1)}$ and $\delta = 8/(\alpha \log(\alpha))$, which implies CRH functions of constant shrinkage factor and logarithmic degree.
2. One can achieve an arbitrary polynomial speedup over the BKW algorithm [17], i.e., for every constant $c > 0$ and there exists an algorithm that solves the n -dimensional constant-noise LPN with time and sample complexity $\text{poly}(n) \cdot 2^{\frac{cn}{\log n}}$ for infinitely many n 's.

Otherwise stated, assume that the BKW algorithm cannot be further improved in the asymptotic sense, then bSVP (for certain parameters) and CRH are implied. It remains open whether under much relaxed hardness assumptions about LPN there exist efficient CRH functions, which we will tackle in this paper.

1.3 Our Work

OUR CONTRIBUTION. We summarize the contributions as follows. Assume that

- the LPN problem at noise rate $1/\sqrt{n}$ is at least $2^{4\sqrt{n}/\log n}$ -hard given $q = n^{3+\epsilon}$ samples,
- or that the LPN problem at any constant noise rate $0 < \mu < 1/2$ is at least $2^{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}$ -hard,

for any constant $\epsilon > 0$, then there exists a CRH function with constant (or poly-logarithmic for the latter assumption) shrinkage, which can be constructed following the Expand-then-Compress approach and can be implemented by a polynomial-size depth-3 circuit with NOT, (unbounded fan-in) AND and XOR gates⁸. We remark that the $2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n}/\log n)}$ -hardness assumption for LPN of noise rate $1/\sqrt{n}$ is quite reasonable as the current best attacks need complexity $2^{\Omega(\sqrt{n})}$ [13,48,9], and the $2^{n^{0.501}}$ -hardness assumption about constant-noise LPN offers even more generous security margins as the best attack goes even beyond complexity $2^{n^{0.999}}$ [17]. We establish the results by showing that the hardness of LPN implies that of bSVP (for certain parameter settings), which in turn implies EtC-based CRH functions. Informally, assume for contradiction that a useful bSVP solver succeeds in finding a sparse vector \mathbf{x} with respect to $n \times \alpha n$ matrix \mathbf{M} ,

⁸ The circuit falls into the class $\text{AC}^0(\text{MOD}2)$. See Section 2 for a formal definition.

then this leads to a distinguishing attack against cn LPN samples $(\mathbf{M}^\top, \mathbf{M}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e})$ by computing

$$\mathbf{x}^\top(\mathbf{M}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}) = \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{e}$$

which is a biased bit (and thus distinguishable from uniform) due to the sparseness of \mathbf{x} . This already constitutes a contradiction to the decisional LPN, and one can repeat the above on sufficiently many independent samples (with a majority voting) to gain a constant advantage, and further transform it into a key-recovery attack using the same number of samples [6]. Difficulties arise when transforming bSVP into CRH under the EtC framework, which are solved via a tradeoff between efficiency and security.

PRACTICAL CONSTRUCTIONS. We establish the feasibility that collision resistant hash functions can be based on the hardness of LPN, which was a longstanding open problem [58]. The construction follows a parallel and conceptually simple approach and resembles a binary version of Ajtai’s SIS-based construction, of which the FSB hash and its variants fall into concrete (but over optimistic) instantiations.⁹ Our second CRH construction from constant-noise LPN is not practical, so we provide a more efficient and polynomially shrinking CRH construction by additionally relying on the idealized heuristic that a block cipher on a public random key behaves like a random permutation. In contrast, most previous blockcipher-based compression functions (e.g. [57,59,15]) reside in the (much stronger) Ideal Cipher Model that a block cipher on every key behaves like an independent random permutation. Moreover, existing permutation-based solutions either only offer a constant shrinkage factor (typically 1/2) [65,54], or require permutations with a large domain (e.g., [29] needs a large permutation over $\{0, 1\}^{n^2}$ to obtain a CRH function with shrinkage factor 1/n).

2 Preliminaries

NOTATIONS AND DEFINITIONS. Column vectors are represented by bold lower-case letters (e.g., \mathbf{s}), row vectors are denoted as their transpose (e.g., \mathbf{s}^\top), and matrices are denoted by bold capital letters (e.g., \mathbf{A}). $|s|$ refers to the Hamming weight of binary string s . We use \mathcal{B}_μ to denote the Bernoulli distribution with parameter μ , i.e., $\Pr[\mathcal{B}_\mu = 1] = \mu$, $\Pr[\mathcal{B}_\mu = 0] = 1 - \mu$, while \mathcal{B}_μ^q denotes the concatenation of q independent copies of \mathcal{B}_μ . We use $\log(\cdot)$ to denote the binary logarithm. $\mathbf{x} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{X}$ refers to drawing \mathbf{x} from set \mathcal{X} uniformly at random, and $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow X$ means drawing \mathbf{x} according to distribution X . We use U_n to denote a uniform distribution over $\{0, 1\}^n$ and independent of any other distribution in consideration. $\mathbf{a} \parallel \mathbf{b}$ denotes the concatenation of \mathbf{a} and \mathbf{b} . A function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ is negligible if for any constant N_c we have that $\text{negl}(n) < n^{-N_c}$ for all sufficiently large n . AC^0 refers to the class of polynomial-size, constant-depth circuit families

⁹ However, our results do not immediately constitute security proofs for the FSB-style hash functions as there remains a substantial gap between the security proved and security level claimed by the FSB instantiation.

with unbounded fan-in AND and OR gates, where NOT gates are allowed only at input level. $\text{AC}^0(\text{MOD}2)$ refers to the class of polynomial-size, constant-depth circuit families with unbounded fan-in AND, OR and XOR gates.

Definition 1 (Learning Parity with Noise). *The decisional LPN problem with secret length n and noise rate $0 < \mu < 1/2$, denoted by (n, μ) -DLPN, is hard if for every $q = \text{poly}(n)$ and every PPT algorithm \mathcal{D} we have*

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(\mathbf{A}, U_q) = 1]| = \text{negl}(n) , \quad (3)$$

and the computational LPN problem with the same n and μ , denoted by (n, μ) -LPN, is hard if for every $q = \text{poly}(n)$ and every PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} we have

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{e}) = \mathbf{x}] = \text{negl}(n) , \quad (4)$$

where $q \times n$ matrix $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{q \times n}$, $\mathbf{x} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ and $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_\mu^q$.

CONCRETE HARDNESS. For $T = T(n)$, we say that the (n, μ) -DLPN (resp., (n, μ) -LPN) is T -hard if for every $q \leq T$ and every probabilistic adversary of running time T the distinguishing (resp., inverting) advantage in (3) (resp., (4)) is upper bounded by $1/T$. In certain scenario, we use (n, μ, q) -DLPN or (n, μ, q) -LPN, where $q \ll T$ is explicitly stated as a constraint on the number of samples. Finally, note that the T -hardness also applies to other hardness assumptions such as [Definition 2](#) and [Definition 3](#).

Definition 2 (binary SVP). For parameters $\alpha = \alpha(n)$ and $\delta = \delta(n)$, the (α, δ) -bSVP assumption asserts that for every probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm \mathcal{A} it holds that

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{M} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{n \times \alpha n}} [\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{M}) \in \{0, 1\}^{\alpha n} : 0 < |\mathbf{x}| \leq \delta \alpha n \wedge \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}] = \text{negl}(n) .$$

Unlike other primitives (such as one-way functions, pseudorandom generators and functions) whose security parameter is typically the input/key length, the security strength of collision resistant hash functions are more often represented as a function of the output length n and it is upper bounded by $2^{n/2}$ due to birthday attacks. In practice, a fixed output size (e.g. 128, 160) typically corresponds to a single function (e.g., MD5, SHA1) instead of a collection of ones ¹⁰. One can just stick to a $h_{\mathbf{M}}$ for some pre-fixed random \mathbf{M} .

Definition 3 (Collision Resistant Hash Functions). A collection of functions

$$\mathcal{H} = \left\{ h_z : \{0, 1\}^{k(n)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n, z \in \{0, 1\}^{s(n)} \right\}$$

is a collision-resistant hash (CRH) function if the following hold:

¹⁰ Recall that a non-uniform attacker can have polynomial-size non-uniform advice. Thus, if every security parameter corresponds to only a single function h then the attacker can include a pair of x and x' with $h(x) = h(x')$ as part of the advice.

- (**Shrinking**). The shrinkage factor of \mathcal{H} , defined as ratio $\frac{n}{k}$, is less than 1 for every n .
- (**Efficient**). There are efficient algorithms H and \mathcal{G} : (1) on input $z \in \{0, 1\}^s$ and $y \in \{0, 1\}^k$, H outputs $h_z(y)$; and (2) given 1^n as input \mathcal{G} returns an index $z \in \{0, 1\}^s$.
- (**Collision-resistant**). For every probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary \mathcal{A}

$$\Pr_{z \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^n)} [(y, y') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(z) : y \neq y' \wedge h_z(y) = h_z(y')] = \text{negl}(n) .$$

The shrinkage is linear if $n/k \leq 1 - \epsilon$, and it is poly-logarithmic (resp., polynomial) if $n/k \leq 1/\log^\epsilon n$ (resp., $n/k \leq 1/n^\epsilon$) for some positive constant $\epsilon > 0$.

The indifferentiability framework [52,21] is widely adopted to analyze and prove the security of the construction of one idealized primitive from another, typically in settings where the underlying building blocks have no secrets.

Definition 4 (Indifferentiability [21]). A Turing machine C with oracle access to an ideal primitive P is (q, σ, t, ϵ) -indifferentiable from an ideal primitive R , if there exists a simulator S with oracle access to R such that for any distinguisher D that makes at most q queries, it holds that

$$\left| \Pr[D^{C^P, P} = 1] - \Pr[D^{R, S^R} = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon,$$

where S makes σ queries and runs in time t when interacting with D and R .

The implication is that C^P can safely replace R in many security scenarios. We refer to the discussions [61,25] on the (in)applicability of indifferentiability results.

Lemma 1 (Chernoff bound). For any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, let X_1, \dots, X_n be independent random variables taking values in $[0, 1]$ and denote their sum by $\bar{X} = \sum_{i=1}^n X_i$. Then, for any $\epsilon > 0$ it holds that

$$\Pr[|\bar{X} - \mathbb{E}[\bar{X}]| > n\epsilon] < 2^{-\epsilon^2 \cdot n} .$$

Lemma 2 (Piling-up lemma). For $0 < \mu < 1/2$ and random variables E_1, E_2, \dots, E_ℓ that are i.i.d. to \mathcal{B}_μ we have

$$\Pr \left[\bigoplus_{i=1}^{\ell} E_i = 0 \right] = \frac{1}{2} (1 + (1 - 2\mu)^\ell) = \frac{1}{2} + 2^{-c_\mu \ell - 1} ,$$

where $c_\mu = \log \frac{1}{1-2\mu}$.

Fact 1 For any $0 \leq x \leq 1$ it holds that $\log(1+x) \geq x$; and for any $x \geq 0$ we have $\log(1+x) \leq x/\ln 2$.

3 Collision Resistant Hash Functions

3.1 The Expand-then-Compress Construction

We give a high-level overview about the EtC construction from [5] (see [Construction 1](#)). Fix a random $n \times \alpha n$ matrix \mathbf{M} which specifies the function. On input \mathbf{y} , $h_{\mathbf{M}}$ first stretches (by a factor of b) it into a long-but-sparse vector, i.e., $\text{Expand}(\mathbf{y})$, and then multiply it with \mathbf{M} , which compresses by a factor of $1/\alpha$. Thus, the overall shrinkage factor is b/α .

Definition 5. A function $\text{Expand} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ is (b, β) -expanding if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. Expand is injective;
2. the expansion factor $\ell/k \leq b$;
3. and for any $\mathbf{x} \in \{0, 1\}^k$ the output has Hamming weight $|\text{Expand}(\mathbf{x})| \leq \beta \ell$.

Construction 1 Let $k = k(n)$ and $\ell = \ell(n)$ be integer valued functions, and let $\text{Expand} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ be an expanding function ([Definition 5](#)). A collection of functions $\mathcal{H}_{k,n} = \{h_{\mathbf{M}} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell, \mathbf{M} \in \{0, 1\}^{n \times \ell}\}$ is defined as

$$h_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{M} \cdot \text{Expand}(\mathbf{x})$$

where the key-sampler $\mathcal{G}(1^n)$ samples an $n \times \ell$ matrix $\mathbf{M} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{n \times \ell}$.

A couple of proposals on efficient constructions of $\text{Expand}(\cdot)$ were given in [5]. We use the one stated below and reproduce its constructive proof for completeness. The construction assumes WLOG^{11} β to be a negative power of 2.

Lemma 3 (The Expand function [5]). For any integer valued functions $L = O(\log k)$, $\ell = \text{poly}(k)$ and $\beta = 2^{-L}$, there exists an efficient ($b = \frac{1}{\beta \log(1/\beta)}$, β)-expanding function $\text{Expand} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell(k)}$ in AC^0 .

Proof. For $L = \log(1/\beta)$, Expand parses the k -bit input into L -bit blocks as

$$\mathbf{y} = y_1 \cdots y_L \| y_{L+1} \cdots y_{2L} \| \cdots \| y_{L(k/L-1)+1} \cdots y_k$$

and produces as output

$$\text{Expand}(\mathbf{y}) = \text{DeMul}(y_1 \cdots y_L) \| \cdots \| \text{DeMul}(y_{L(\frac{k}{L}-1)+1} \cdots y_k)$$

where $\text{DeMul} : \{0, 1\}^L \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2^L}$ is a demultiplexer function that on input $z \in \{0, 1\}^L$ outputs a 2^L -bit string which is 1 in exactly the z -th location (and 0 elsewhere). It is easy to see that the output is of length $\ell = k2^L/L = \frac{k}{\beta \log(1/\beta)}$ and Hamming weight $k/L = \beta \ell$.

¹¹ For arbitrary β we simply let $\beta' = 2^{-L} \leq \beta < 2^{-L+1}$ and use β' in place of β , which changes the resulting parameters by a factor of less than 2.

Note that the construction is almost optimal as the injection condition of `Expand` implies $k \leq \log \binom{\ell}{\beta\ell}$, and the construction achieves $k = \beta\ell \log(1/\beta)$, which is very close to the upper bound $\log \binom{\ell}{\beta n} \approx \ell \mathbf{H}(\beta) - \log \ell/2 = \beta\ell(\log(1/\beta) + O(1))$ (see [Lemma 4](#) and [Fact 2](#)).

Lemma 4 (Asymptotics for binomial coefficients (e.g. [37], p.492)). *For any $0 < \mu = \mu(n) < 1/2$ we have*

$$\binom{n}{\mu n} = 2^{n\mathbf{H}(\mu) - \frac{\log n}{2} + O(1)}$$

where $\mathbf{H}(\mu) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mu \log(1/\mu) + (1-\mu) \log(1/(1-\mu))$ is the binary entropy function.

Fact 2 ([67]) *For any $0 < \mu \leq 1/2$, $\mu \log(1/\mu) < \mathbf{H}(\mu) < \mu(\log(1/\mu) + 3/2)$.*

Theorem 1 (The EtC CRH Construction [5]). *Assume that (α, δ) -bSVP is hard, then [Construction 1](#) instantiated with a (b, β) -expanding function `Expand` with $b/\alpha < 1$ and $2\beta \leq \delta$ gives rise to a collision-resistant hash function \mathcal{H} with shrinkage factor b/α .*

Proof. Any algorithm that finds out a collision $h_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{y}) = h_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{y}')$ for $\mathbf{y} \neq \mathbf{y}'$ immediately implies a solution to bSVP, i.e., $\mathbf{M} \cdot \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$, where $\mathbf{x} = \text{Expand}(\mathbf{y}) + \text{Expand}(\mathbf{y}') \neq \mathbf{0}$ since the distinctiveness of y and y' are preserved when being applied on any injective function, and

$$|\mathbf{x}| \leq |\text{Expand}(\mathbf{y})| + |\text{Expand}(\mathbf{y}')| \leq 2\beta\alpha n \leq \delta\alpha n .$$

ON CHOOSING PARAMETERS. We explain the intuition on how to choose the parameters for basing CRH functions on bSVP (which in turn relies on LPN). We first substitute the parameters to make the shrinkage factor dependent only on the parameters of bSVP, i.e.,

$$\frac{b}{\alpha} = \frac{1}{\alpha\beta \log(1/\beta)} = \frac{2}{\alpha\delta \log(2/\delta)}$$

where $b = \frac{1}{\beta \log(1/\beta)}$ and $2\beta = \delta$ (see [Lemma 3](#) and [Theorem 1](#)). Then, our first construction in [Section 3.2](#) sets $\alpha = n^{2+\epsilon}$ and $\delta = \frac{1}{n^{2+\epsilon} \log n}$ such that the corresponding (α, δ) -bSVP is implied by low-noise LPN, and our second construction in [Section 3.3](#) reduces constant-noise LPN to $(\alpha = \frac{2\sqrt{n}}{n}, \delta = \frac{n^{(1+\epsilon)/2}}{2\sqrt{n}})$ -bSVP constant-noise LPN.

3.2 Low-noise LPN Implies CRH functions

We start with an easy and straightforward construction from low-noise LPN.

Theorem 2. *Assume that $(n, \mu = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}, q = n^{3+\epsilon})$ -DLPN is $2^{4\sqrt{n}/\log n}$ -hard for any $\epsilon > 0$, then $(\alpha = n^{2+\epsilon}, \delta = \frac{1}{n^{2+\epsilon} \log n})$ -bSVP is $2^{\sqrt{n}/\log n}$ -hard and $2^{\sqrt{n}/\log n}$ -hard CRH functions with constant shrinkage exist in $\text{AC}^0(\text{MOD}2)$.*

Proof. Assume for contradiction there exists an algorithm \mathcal{A} of time $2^{\sqrt{n}/\log n}$ such that the following holds for infinitely many n 's:

$$\Pr[\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{M}) \in \{0,1\}^{n^{3+\epsilon}} : 0 < |\mathbf{x}| \leq \frac{n}{\log n} \wedge \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}] \geq 2^{-\frac{\sqrt{n}}{\log n}},$$

$$\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \mathbb{S}_{\{0,1\}^{n \times n^{3+\epsilon}}}$$

then \mathcal{A} can be used to solve the $(n, \mu = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}, q = n^{3+\epsilon})$ -DLPN problem. That is, apply distinguisher \mathcal{D}_1 (as defined in [Algorithm 1](#)) on input $(\mathbf{M}^\top, \mathbf{z})$, where $\mathbf{M}^\top \leftarrow \mathbb{S}_{\{0,1\}^{n^{3+\epsilon} \times n}}$, and either $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{M}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ or $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow \mathbb{S}_{\{0,1\}^{n^{3+\epsilon}}}$, $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{S}_{\{0,1\}^n}$ and $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_\mu^{n^{3+\epsilon}}$. When $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{M}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ and \mathcal{A} succeeds in finding such \mathbf{x} , we have by [Lemma 2](#) and [Fact 1](#)

$$\Pr[\mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{e} = 0] = \frac{1}{2} + 2^{-\frac{c\mu n}{\log n} - 1} \geq \frac{1}{2} + 2^{-\frac{2}{\ln 2(1-\frac{2}{\sqrt{n}})} \frac{n}{\log n} - 1} \geq \frac{1}{2} + 2^{-\frac{3\sqrt{n}}{\log n}}.$$

Therefore, \mathcal{D}_1 achieves advantage

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\mathcal{D}_1(\mathbf{M}^\top, \mathbf{M}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}) = 0] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}_1(\mathbf{M}^\top, U_{n^{3+\epsilon}}) = 0] \\ & \geq 2^{-\frac{\sqrt{n}}{\log n}} \cdot 2^{-\frac{3\sqrt{n}}{\log n}} \geq 2^{-\frac{4\sqrt{n}}{\log n}}, \end{aligned}$$

which is a contradiction to the assumption. We have by [Theorem 1](#) and [Lemma 3](#) that there exists a $2^{\sqrt{n}/\log n}$ -hard CRH function $\mathcal{H} = \{h_{\mathbf{M}} : \{0,1\}^k \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n\}$ with $2\beta = \delta = \frac{1}{n^{2+\epsilon} \log n}$, $b = \frac{1}{\beta \log(1/\beta)}$, $\alpha = n^{2+\epsilon}$ and shrinkage factor

$$\frac{n}{k} \leq \frac{b}{\alpha} = \frac{1}{\alpha \beta \log(1/\beta)} = \frac{2n^{2+\epsilon} \log n}{n^{2+\epsilon}((2+\epsilon) \log n + \log \log n + 1)} < \frac{2}{2+\epsilon}.$$

Algorithm 1 A distinguisher \mathcal{D}_1 for $(n, \mu = \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}, q = n^{3+\epsilon})$ -DLPN

Input: $(\mathbf{M}^\top, \mathbf{z})$, where $\mathbf{M}^\top \in \{0,1\}^{n^{3+\epsilon} \times n}$ and $\mathbf{z} \in \{0,1\}^{n^{3+\epsilon}}$
 $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{M})$;
if $0 < |\mathbf{x}| \leq \frac{n}{\log n} \wedge \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$ **then**
 $v = \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{z}$
else
 $v \leftarrow \mathbb{S}_{\{0,1\}}$
end if
Output: v

3.3 Constant-noise LPN Implies CRH functions

The case of constant-noise LPN is slightly more complicated. The reduction from LPN to bSVP (see [Lemma 6](#)) is mostly adapted from [Theorem 2](#), but a direct construction of CRH from bSVP seems hard, and we (see [Theorem 3](#)) establish the feasibility via a tradeoff between efficiency and security.

Theorem 3. Assume that (n, μ) -DLPN is $2^{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}$ -hard for any constants $0 < \mu < 1/2$ and $\epsilon > 0$, then CRH functions with poly-logarithmic shrinkage factors exist in $\text{AC}^0(\text{MOD}2)$.

Proof. It follows from Lemma 6 that $2^{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}$ -hard constant-noise DLPN implies $2^{\frac{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}{3}}$ -hard $(\alpha = \frac{2^{\sqrt{n}}}{n}, \delta = \frac{n^{(1+\epsilon)/2}}{2^{\sqrt{n}}})$ -bSVP, which in turns (by Theorem 1 and Lemma 3) implies for $\alpha = \frac{2^{\sqrt{n}}}{n}$ and $2\beta = \delta = \frac{n^{(1+\epsilon)/2}}{2^{\sqrt{n}}}$ there exists $2^{\frac{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}{3}}$ -hard $\mathcal{H} = \{h_{\mathbf{M}} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n, \mathbf{M} \in \{0, 1\}^{n \times 2^{\sqrt{n}}}\}$ with

$$\frac{n}{k} \leq \frac{b}{\alpha} = \frac{1}{\alpha\beta \log(1/\beta)} = \frac{1}{\Omega(n^{\epsilon/2})} .$$

However, we have to use $\lambda = 2^{\sqrt{n}}$ (instead of n as $h_{\mathbf{M}}$ is not computable in $\text{poly}(n)$ -time) as the main security parameter and represent other parameters as functions of λ , e.g., $n = \log^2 \lambda$ and $k = \Omega(n^{1+\epsilon/2}) = \Omega(\log^{2+\epsilon} \lambda)$. That is, $\mathcal{H} = \{h_{\mathbf{M}} : \{0, 1\}^{\Omega(\log^{2+\epsilon} \lambda)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\log^2 \lambda}, \mathbf{M} \in \{0, 1\}^{\log^2 \lambda \times \lambda}\}$ is a $\lambda^{\frac{\log^2 \epsilon \lambda}{3}}$ -hard CRH function, which (by Lemma 5) implies a domain/range-extended CRH $\mathcal{H}' = \{h'_{\mathbf{M}} : \{0, 1\}^{\Omega(\lambda \log^{\epsilon} \lambda)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}, \mathbf{M} \in \{0, 1\}^{\log^2 \lambda \times \lambda}\}$.

Lemma 5 (Parallel repetitions of CRH). Let $k = k(\lambda)$, $d = d(\lambda)$ and $T = T(\lambda)$ be integer valued functions. If $\mathcal{H}_{k, \lambda} = \{h_{\mathbf{s}} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\lambda}, \mathbf{s} \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}\}$ is a T -hard CRH function, then $\mathcal{H}'_{dk, d\lambda} = \{h'_{\mathbf{s}} : \{0, 1\}^{dk} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{d\lambda}, \mathbf{s} \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}\}$, where

$$h'_{\mathbf{s}}(\mathbf{y}_1, \dots, \mathbf{y}_d) = (h_{\mathbf{s}}(\mathbf{y}_1), \dots, h_{\mathbf{s}}(\mathbf{y}_d)), \quad \mathbf{y}_1, \dots, \mathbf{y}_d \in \{0, 1\}^k ,$$

is a (T/d) -hard CRH function.

In the proof of Lemma 6 below, we show a stronger reduction that any algorithm that breaks the bSVP implies another algorithm that breaks the decisional LPN problem with time complexity $2^{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}$ and advantage nearly $1/2$ (instead of $2^{-n^{1/2+\epsilon}}$ as needed by the statement).

Lemma 6. Assume that (n, μ) -DLPN is $2^{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}$ -hard for any constants $0 < \mu < 1/2$ and $\epsilon > 0$, then $(\alpha = \frac{2^{\sqrt{n}}}{n}, \delta = \frac{n^{(1+\epsilon)/2}}{2^{\sqrt{n}}})$ -bSVP is $2^{\frac{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}{3}}$ -hard.

Proof. Assume for contradiction there exists an algorithm \mathcal{A} of time $2^{n^{1/2+\epsilon}/3}$ s.t. the following holds for infinitely many n 's:

$$\Pr_{\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n \times 2^{\sqrt{n}}}} [\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{M}) \in \{0, 1\}^{2^{\sqrt{n}}} : 0 < |\mathbf{x}| \leq n^{1/2+\epsilon/2} \wedge \mathbf{M}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}] \geq 2^{-\frac{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}{3}} ,$$

then we show that it implies a distinguisher \mathcal{D}_2 (see Algorithm 2) that solves (with constant advantage) the constant-noise DLPN problem (for any $0 < \mu < 1/2$) using sample complexity $q < 2^{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}$ and time complexity $T < 2^{n^{1/2+\epsilon}}$. As

stated in [Algorithm 2](#), if \mathcal{D}_2 is applied to $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e})$, where $\mathbf{A} \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}^{q \times n}$ and $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_\mu^q$, then every i -th vote v_i satisfies (for all large enough n 's)

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[v_i = 0] &= \Pr[\mathcal{E}_i] \Pr[\mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{z} = 0] + \frac{\Pr[\neg \mathcal{E}_i]}{2} \\ &\geq \frac{1}{2} + 2^{-\frac{n^{\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon}}{3}} \cdot 2^{-c_\mu n^{\frac{1+\epsilon}{2}} - 1} > \frac{1}{2} + 2^{-0.4n^{\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon}}. \end{aligned}$$

where \mathcal{E}_i denotes the event that \mathcal{A} succeeds on \mathbf{M}_i and c_μ is a constant dependent on μ (see [Lemma 2](#)). It follows by the Chernoff bound ([Lemma 1](#)) that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{D}_2(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}) = 0] \geq 1 - 2^{-n}$$

and in contrast $\Pr[\mathcal{D}_2(\mathbf{A}, U_q) = 0] = 1/2$, which completes the proof.

Algorithm 2 A distinguisher \mathcal{D}_2 for constant-noise DLPN

Input: (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{z}) , where $\mathbf{A} \in \{0, 1\}^{q \times n}$, $\mathbf{z} \in \{0, 1\}^q$, $l = n2^{0.8n^{\frac{1}{2}+\epsilon}}$ and $q = l \cdot 2^{\sqrt{n}}$
 parse \mathbf{A}^\top as a number of $n \times 2^{\sqrt{n}}$ matrices $\mathbf{M}_1, \mathbf{M}_2, \dots, \mathbf{M}_l$
 parse \mathbf{z} as $2^{\sqrt{n}}$ -bit blocks $\mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{z}_2, \dots, \mathbf{z}_l$ accordingly
for $i = 1$ to l **do**
 $\mathbf{x}_i \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{M}_i)$;
 if $0 < |\mathbf{x}_i| \leq n^{1/2+\epsilon/2} \wedge \mathbf{M}_i \mathbf{x}_i = \mathbf{0}$ **then**
 $v_i = \mathbf{x}_i^\top \mathbf{z}_i$
 else
 $v_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{0, 1\}$
 end if
end for
Output: the majority bit of v_1, \dots, v_l

3.4 More Efficient Heuristic-based CRH from Constant-Noise LPN

Notice that the CRH immediately implied by constant-noise LPN (see [Lemma 6](#)) is inefficient as \mathbf{M} is of dimension $n \times 2^{\sqrt{n}}$ and thus the resulting hash function has computation time far beyond polynomial (in the security parameter n). This motivates us (see the proof of [Theorem 3](#)) to switch to another parameter $\lambda = 2^{\sqrt{n}}$ such that hash function is computable in time polynomial in λ but at the same time it dramatically downgrades the security from $2^{\Omega(n^{1/2+\epsilon})}$ to $\lambda^{\Omega(\log^{2\epsilon} \lambda)}$, and deteriorates the shrinkage factor from polynomial to poly-logarithmic. Otherwise said, [Theorem 3](#) mainly establishes feasibility results about basing CRH on constant-noise LPN. We discuss an alternative to void the loss, i.e., to preserve security, polynomial shrinkage and efficiency at the same time. This relies on idealized assumptions (i.e., a block cipher keyed with a random public string behaves like a random permutation) in addition to constant-noise LPN.

THE INTUITION. We recall that the CRH function $h_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{M} \cdot \text{Expand}(\mathbf{y})$ for an $n \times \alpha n$ matrix \mathbf{M} and that Expand parses \mathbf{y} into k/L blocks and produces same number of output blocks accordingly, where $\alpha n = k2^L/L$. We also parse \mathbf{M} into k/L equal-size submatrices $\mathbf{M}_1, \dots, \mathbf{M}_{k/L}$, each of dimension $n \times 2^L$. Let $R : \{0, 1\}^{\log(\alpha n)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a random function that describes \mathbf{M} , i.e., for every $j \in \{0, 1\}^{\log(\alpha n)}$ the output $R(j)$ corresponds to the j -th column of \mathbf{M} . We thus have

$$h_{\mathbf{M}}(\mathbf{y}) = \underbrace{[\mathbf{M}_1 \cdots \mathbf{M}_{k/L}]}_{\mathbf{M}} \cdot \underbrace{\begin{bmatrix} \text{DeMul}(\mathbf{y}_1) \\ \vdots \\ \text{DeMul}(\mathbf{y}_{k/L}) \end{bmatrix}}_{\text{Expand}(\mathbf{y})} = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{k/L} R(i||\mathbf{y}_i) \quad (5)$$

where $R(i||\mathbf{y}_i) = \mathbf{M}_i \cdot \text{DeMul}(\mathbf{y}_i)$ simply follows the definition of R and DeMul . Therefore, the task of constructing polynomially shrinking CRH functions from constant-noise LPN is now reduced to instantiating a small-domain random function $R : \{0, 1\}^{\log(\alpha n)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ (recall $\log(\alpha n) \ll n$). One may want to replace R with a pseudorandom function (with key made public), but in general the security cannot be argued in the standard model due to the distinction between public-coin and secret-coin CRH functions [41].

In order to explore more efficient constructions, we use more aggressive yet still reasonable (in respect of the current state-of-the-art attacks [17]) hardness assumption about LPN to obtain Lemma 7 below.

Lemma 7. *Assume that (n, μ) -DLPN is $2^{\frac{5}{4}n^{0.8}}$ -hard under noise rate $\mu = 1/4$, then $(\alpha = \frac{2^{n^{0.8}}}{n}, \delta = \frac{n^{0.8}}{2^{n^{0.8}+2}})$ -bSVP is $2^{n^{0.8}}$ -hard. Further, assume in addition that $R : \{0, 1\}^{n^{0.8}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ behaves like a random function, then $h_R : \{0, 1\}^{\frac{n^{1.6}}{9}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ defined as below is a $2^{n^{0.8}}$ -hard CRH function, where*

$$h_R(\mathbf{y}) = \bigoplus_{i=1}^{\frac{n^{0.8}}{9}} R(i||\mathbf{y}_i) ,$$

and input \mathbf{y} is parsed as $n^{0.8}$ -bit blocks $\mathbf{y}_1, \dots, \mathbf{y}_{n^{0.8}/9}$.

Proof. The proof of the first statement is almost the same (up to choices of parameters) as Theorem 2 and Lemma 6 and we thus omit the redundancy. The statement about CRH follows from Theorem 1 and (5), where parameters k for $h_R : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ and L as in Lemma 3 satisfy the following (for all $n \geq 128$):

$$\frac{n}{k} \leq \frac{2}{\alpha \delta \log(2/\delta)} = \frac{8n^{0.2}}{n^{0.8} + 3 - 0.8 \log n} \leq \frac{9}{n^{0.6}} ,$$

$$n^{0.8} \geq \left(L = \log(2/\delta) = n^{0.8} + 3 - 0.8 \log n \right) \geq 0.9n^{0.8} ,$$

which completes the proof.

RANDOM FUNCTIONS VS. PERMUTATIONS. The small-domain random function (to be instantiated) is not commonly found in practice, but it is implied by a large-domain random function for free, i.e., $R(x) = F(0^l \| x)$ is a random function if F is a random one. Thus, we simply consider a length-preserving random function, which can be in turn based on a random permutation (and instantiated with block ciphers). For example, for random permutations π, π_1, π_2 , we have that $\pi \oplus \pi^{-1}$ [28] (or $\pi_1 \oplus \pi_2$ [55]) is indifferentiable from a length-preserving random function. This means that R on input x can be instantiated as

$$\text{AES}_k(0^l \| x) \oplus \text{AES}_k^{-1}(0^l \| x) \text{ or } \text{AES}_{k_1}(0^l \| x) \oplus \text{AES}_{k_2}(0^l \| x)$$

where $l = n - \log(\alpha n)$ bits are padded to fit into a permutation, k, k_1 , and k_2 are public random keys. Intuitively, the XOR of a permutation and its inverse (or two independent permutations) is to destroy the permutation structure as its invertibility could give the adversary additional advantages in collision finding. The former instantiation relies on the assumption that a practical block cipher like AES on a random key behaves like a random permutation. We state below the indistinguishability of $\pi \oplus \pi^{-1}$ from a random function by Dodis et al. [28].

Lemma 8 (Lemma 4 from [28]). *Let n be the security parameter, let $q = q(n)$ and let π be a random permutation over $\{0, 1\}^n$. We have that $\pi \oplus \pi^{-1}$ is $(q, q, O(nq), O(\frac{q^2}{2^n}))$ -indifferentiable from an n -to- n -bit random function.*

SECURITY AND EFFICIENCY. With Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 now we can have a rough estimation about the (asymptotic) security of the blockcipher-based CRH. Assume that the LPN problem for noise rate $\mu = 1/4$ is $2^{\frac{5}{4}n^{0.8}}$ -hard and a block cipher (with a random key) is a perfect instantiation of a random permutation, then any adversary whose running time (and also q) is bounded by, say $2^{0.8n^{0.8}}$, succeeds in finding a collision for the CRH function with probability less than

$$2^{-0.8n^{0.8}} + O(1) \cdot 2^{1.6n^{0.8} - n} .$$

Moreover, the CRH function compresses $\frac{n^{1.6}}{9}$ bits into n bits with a shrinkage factor $\frac{9}{n^{0.6}}$ and invokes the underlying block cipher $2n^{0.8}/9$ times.

ASYMPTOTIC VS. CONCRETE. The above bounds are asymptotic, whose concrete values are meaningful only for “all sufficiently large n ”. For modern block cipher instantiations, $n = 128$ seems not large enough as: 1) we are not sure if LPN on secret size $n = 128$ and noise rate $1/4$ can have $\frac{5}{4}n^{0.8} \approx 60$ bits of security; 2) for $n = 128$ the shrinkage factor $\frac{9}{n^{0.6}} \approx 1/2$ does not reach the large rate as can be expected from “polynomial shrinkage”. Fortunately, there are a few cryptographic permutation candidates of larger sizes (e.g., $n = 400, 800, 1600$), such as the permutation family underlying SHA-3 [39] and the Simpira family [38], for which our constructions can offer efficient and parallel domain extensions (by a polynomial factor). Further, just like most provable security statements, our results provide only the lower bound of security that “the CRH is at least as hard as the underlying LPN”, which could be quite loose. A similar situation is the

case of SWIFFT [51], where the authors of [51] showed that SWIFFT is at least as hard as an ideal lattice problem, but SWIFFT turns out to be significantly harder than its underlying instantiation of the lattice problem (which can be broken in a moderate amount of time).

ON RELATED WORKS. We offer a new construction of CRH functions from *fixed-key block ciphers/random permutations*. Compared with the traditional blockcipher-based compression functions, e.g. [57,59,15], our solution avoids the key-setup costs and eliminates the need for related-key security on a large space of keys. That is, (using AES-128 as an example) we only assume that “AES on a single random key behaves like a random permutation”, instead of that “AES on 2^{128} keys yields 2^{128} independent random permutations”, as imposed by the Ideal Cipher Model. On the other hand, existing permutation-based solutions either only offer a constant shrinkage factor (typically 1/2) [65,54], or require permutations with a large domain (e.g., [29] needs a large permutation on n^2 -bit strings to obtain a CRH function with shrinkage factor $1/n$), and in contrast our construction runs in parallel and compresses polynomially.

4 Concluding Remarks

We resolve the open problem whether CRH functions can be based on the hardness of LPN and we show that under commonly believed hardness assumptions about LPN efficient CRH functions exist in polynomial-size constant-depth circuits. We also discuss how to improve the efficiency using idealized heuristics.

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