

SEVDSI: Secure, Efficient and Verifiable Data Set Intersection

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Abstract. Private set intersection is one of the most well studied and useful secure computation protocols. Many specific two party secure computation protocols have been constructed for such a functionality, but all of them incur large communication between the parties. A cloud assisted protocol was also considered to provide better efficiency, but with the potential risk of leaking more information to the cloud. In this paper, we achieve the best of the two worlds: We design and analyze SEVDSI: a Secure, Efficient and Verifiable Data Set Intersection protocol which is non-interactive and cloud based in a stronger security model. Our protocol assures privacy on data set inputs in case of a *malicious* cloud and enforces authorized only computations by the users. Moreover, the computation is verifiable and the asymptotic communication cost for the computation of the intersection is linear on the common elements k . Last, SEVDSI is provably secure in the random oracle model.

1 Introduction

Private Set Intersection (PSI) protocols allow two users to learn the intersection of their dataset, without revealing information for the elements not in the intersection set. PSI is applicable to a variety of real world scenarios:

- Airline companies in order to determine whether specific flight passengers appear in a black list, perform a private set intersection operation between the private passenger list and the government’s list.
- National agencies (e.g., the FBI) need to obtain information on suspects from other agencies, e.g., local police departments, the military, DMV, IRS, or employers. The FBI may wish to search suspects on other agencies’ lists, but no agency wants to divulge members of its suspect list unnecessarily to others.
- In an online advertisement setting, a content provider G has information about users, who access content online. A transaction provider T keeps a log of users with all the online purchases a user did. In the end, G wants to jointly compute the common users with T , in order to learn the percentage of users who access its content and proceed to a purchase, to further analyze how much the viewing of some content affects spending.

Over the years, due to its importance, researchers have designed numerous PSI protocols [4,7–11,13,16–18,23,24,26–28]. Alas, for any two users to jointly compute the set intersection, there is a communication burden at least proportional to the size of their datasets. Thus, each user must have large network bandwidth to run PSI with others. Communication costs become of paramount importance when the intersection is computed over multiple datasets of many users. Another issue with jointly computing the set intersection is that a malicious user may change its dataset every time it computes the intersection in order to gradually learn others’ datasets over time.

A cloud infrastructure with its cost effective storage and computation resources may alleviate the communication burden two users need to exchange. However, the advantage in communication costs with the incorporation of a cloud infrastructure is dampened as the cloud may act maliciously and try to infer plaintext of users’ datasets even if datasets are encrypted. The most crucial attacks to infer plaintext datasets from encrypted datasets are brute-force attacks, whereby a malicious or semi-honest adversary leverages public information, such as the ciphertexts of the datasets, to compromise data set privacy. These adversaries are able to recover any user’s dataset after guessing the plaintext from a non-random distribution of the ciphertext. As such users’ privacy should be taken into account.

Recent research surveys [3, 15] have shown that the cloud cannot be fully trusted and it may misbehave by exposing or tampering with users’ sensitive data, or changing the results of the computation. It is essential though, for users not only to protect the confidentiality of their outsourced data, but also to verify the integrity of the data and the result of the computation delegated to the cloud.

State of the art work in cloud-based or interchangeable dubbed server-aided solutions enable efficient PSI computation without linear size information to be exchanged in between users [32]. However, to achieve that improvement the cloud has to run the computations with the aid of some auxiliary information, forwarded by each data owner. We realize this information renders the protocol vulnerable to brute-force attacks. In order to address the above limitations, we re-randomize the final ciphertext with an extra secret key (x_a for user A). Later, x_a is canceled out by the cloud using some auxiliary information that is sent by the users to allow the cloud run the PSI protocol between the encrypted datasets. The auxiliary information is a function of x_a and a common secret value, tk (secret to the malicious cloud) in the exponent that is computed by the users independently. Thanks to tk value that appears in the ciphertexts, the malicious cloud is not able to launch a brute force attack. The secret value tk is a Diffie-Hellman key exchange value. Each user evaluates a function of his secret key and other users’ public key. This conversion helps the cloud to compare the ciphertexts of the users with respect to the intersection operation.

Our scheme also uses a multi-accumulator primitive that allows a verifier to test if multiple dataset values that are sent by the cloud are truly part of the original dataset. While a single accumulator scheme allows a verifier to test data item existence one-by-one, the multi-accumulator scheme allows verifier to test

multi data items at once. The multi-accumulator value is further signed in order to protect from tampering.

Contributions Our major contributions are threefold.

- First, we design a verifiable PSI protocol, which is communication efficient, without requiring heavy communication in between the users; in contrast with previous work [2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 17–20]. Such an improvement in communication bandwidth is of crucial importance as it will allow deployment of PSI protocol in critical infrastructures as federal institutions and big on-line advertisement companies with millions of users, whereby the private intersection is computed over many users and not between two users.
- Second, the proposed scheme does not allow malicious cloud to apply brute-force attacks on the encrypted data sets. As such private information about users data sets is kept secret without compromising its confidentiality.
- Third, in contrast with previous work on cloud based PSI protocols, our PSI protocol does not allow a malicious cloud to run the PSI protocol at will in an unauthorized way without users’ permission.

In this paper, we present a Secure, Efficient and Verifiable Data Set Intersection protocol, dubbed SEVDSI, with the following salient features:

1. *Verifiability*: Users can check that the cloud has honestly computed the set intersection. Moreover, the verification for each user requires an amount of computation at most linear in the cardinality of the set intersection.
2. *Communication Efficiency*: Any two users outsource their encrypted datasets and afterwards they are engaged in a communication round with the cloud which is constant. We call this constant size information as auxiliary information. Moreover, the cloud sends the intersection result, whose size is linear in the set intersection cardinality.
3. *Computational Efficiency*: The verification computation complexity for users is at most linear to the intersection cardinality, i.e. $O(k)$. This is more efficient than the straightforward solution whereby each user needs to access all the encrypted inputs and perform verification operations linear to the number of inputs, i.e. $O(n)$ if $k \ll n$, where n is the number of values in a users dataset, k is the set intersection cardinality.
4. *Non-Interactive PSI*: Users encrypt, upload and learn the private set intersection of their datasets with the aid of a cloud, avoiding the need to interact with each other during the protocol execution.
5. *Privacy*: Users learn nothing beyond the intersection about other users’ datasets. The cloud learns nothing about either dataset or their intersection, beyond the dataset and intersection size.
6. *Authorized PSI*: The cloud is allowed to run PSI between datasets owned by users who have granted permission to it. In other words, the cloud needs to be authorized by both users to execute the PSI protocol.

Outline: In Section 2 we introduce state-of-art PSI schemes in Two-Party Computation (2PC), and cloud settings. We present the overview of the cryptographic

primitives and assumptions used for SEVDSI in Section 3. Section 4 formulates the problem, the security guarantees. In Section 5, we present an overview of the protocol, its full details and the security and efficiency analysis.

2 Related Work

Two-Party Computation (2PC) based PSI: The first study that introduces PSI [11] is based on oblivious polynomial evaluation (OPE). Then, a plethora protocols of PSI [4, 7–10, 13, 16–18, 23, 27, 28] has been proposed with different adversarial models: Semi-honest, malicious, and covert adversarial models. In the semi-honest adversarial model, users faithfully follow the protocol specification and do not change the content of their datasets. In the malicious adversarial model, malicious users can arbitrarily deviate from the protocol. They can change their inputs or respond with different outputs. In the covert adversarial model, adversaries are willing to actively cheat (and as such are not semi-honest), but only if they will not be caught (and as such they are not arbitrarily malicious) [5]. The protocols in [4, 6, 9, 16, 23, 27, 28] are secure in the presence of semi-honest adversaries, while solutions in [7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 17, 18, 29] are secure in the presence of malicious adversaries and [13] is secure against covert adversaries. The studies in [4, 6] hide the users’ input sets size. Authors in [13] propose a different approach, designing a PSI protocol based on oblivious pseudorandom function evaluation, which is later improved by [9, 17]. Garbled circuits for PSI introduced in [16], while [10] employs garbled bloom filters and has $O(n)$ communication and computation complexity but introduces false positives. In [6], users need an extra round of communication. The size of communication is linear in a bound t that is chosen by the user. The user is able to check at most t of his data values against the other user’s datasets. The recent study in [31] proposed t -threshold private set intersection. Using this primitive, two parties, a server and a client can perform the PSI computation using their datasets as long as the intersection is larger than a pre-agreed threshold value t . A tailored solution for unequal datasets is proposed in [22]. The authors proposed 4 protocols based on blind RSA signatures, Diffie-Hellman, garbled circuits and oblivious PRF in order to eliminate online computational and communication costs and push the linear to the size of the smallest dataset costs in an offline phase.

Cloud-based PSI: The studies in [19, 20] show that users share some secrets interactively to encrypt their datasets. Later, they send their encrypted datasets to a cloud. The cloud computes the set intersection on behalf of the users. Kerschbaum [20] and Kamara et al. [19] propose protocols whereby the users need to agree on a common secret key and to send $O(n)$ information to the cloud for each intersection operation. Another flaw of these schemes is that a honest but curious user can brute force other users’ datasets. To alleviate the brute force attacks a trusted third party authorizes users’ datasets to prevent them from changing their input values. The protocols in [19, 20] need linear $O(n)$ communication complexity between cloud and the user. The protocol in [19] introduces extra interaction between users ($O(n)$). Our scheme does not require any collaborative

	Scheme	Verify	PP	FP	U-U	CS-U	U-CS	Leakage
2PC	[11]	yes	no	no	$O(n\lambda)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[23]	no	no	no	$O(n\lambda)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[8]	yes	no	no	$O(n\lambda^2 \log^2 n)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[17]	yes	yes	no	$O(n\lambda)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[18]	yes	no	no	$O(n\lambda)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[7]	yes	yes	no	$O(n\lambda)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[14]	yes	no	no	$O(n\lambda)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[9]	no	yes	no	$O(n\lambda)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[4]	no	yes	no	$O(n\lambda)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[16]	no	no	no	$O(n\lambda \log n)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[10]	yes	no	yes	$O(n\lambda^2)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[28]	no	no	no	$O(n\lambda \log n)$	n/a	n/a	no
	[27]	no	no	no	$O(n\lambda \log n)$	n/a	n/a	no
[6]	no	no	no	$O(n\lambda)$	n/a	n/a	no	
Cloud	[20]	yes	yes	no	no	$O(n\lambda)$	$O(n\lambda)$	no
	[19]	yes	yes	no	$O(k\lambda)$	$O(n\lambda)$	$O(n\lambda)$	no
	[21]	no	yes	yes	no	$O(n\lambda)$	$O(n^2 \lambda t)$	no
	[25]	no	no	no	no	$O(n\lambda)$	$O(n\lambda)$	$ D_a \cap D_b $
	[32]	yes	no	no	no	$O(k\lambda)$	$O(1)$	$ D_a \cap D_b , D_a, D_b$
	[1]	no	yes	no	$O(n\lambda)$	$O(n\lambda)$	$O(n\lambda)$	no
	[2]	yes	yes	no	$O(n\lambda)$	$O(n\lambda)$	$O(n\lambda)$	no
SEVDSI	yes	no	no	no	$O(k\lambda)$	$O(1)$	$D_a \cap D_b$	

Table 1. Comparison of protocols in the 2PC, and Cloud settings: λ is the security parameter, n is the number of values in a user’s dataset, k is the set intersection cardinality. The column $U-CS$ denotes the size of the information sent to the cloud from users after outsourcing of the encrypted dataset, the column $CS-U$ is the size of the information sent to users from the cloud. The column PP applies to protocols where users share secret values with each other interactively or there is a trusted third party that provides secret values to users to encrypt their datasets. The column $U-U$ indicates the total communication between two users and the column FP indicates whether a protocol introduces false positives. Some of the protocols use a bloom filter. In those cases, t represents the number of hash functions that are used in the bloom filter. Since all the schemes in the table leak the sizes of the datasets (except [4, 6]), we do not mention it in the leakage column. $|D_a \cap D_b|$ is the size of the intersection of two sets D_a and D_b .

preprocessing. Users outsource their encrypted datasets only once and only need to engage in minimal communication with the cloud on a per-intersection basis.

The studies in [21, 25] propose PSI protocols, in which the cloud is semi-honest. Furthermore, the authors in [21] proposed a protocol that may yield false positives and requires quadratic communication complexity. Authors in [32] suggest a verifiable set intersection protocol secure under a malicious cloud: If the cloud dishonestly executes the set intersection protocol, it is caught with high probability at the cost of $O(k)$ communication complexity between users and the cloud, where k is the set intersection cardinality. However, their protocol

leaks plaintexts and does not have the authorized PSI property. In this paper we mitigate these shortcomings.

The study in [1] proposes a secure private set intersection protocol, which does not provide verifiability. A later study by the same authors in [2] provides verifiability, but it is not efficient. Specifically, if user A wants to know which data items are common with user B 's data items, A sends a secret value and $O(n)$ information to B . Then, B performs $O(n)$ internal computations in order to embed the secret value (chosen by A) in his dataset, and then sends the resulting values to the cloud. An inherent drawback of this scheme is that B may not agree on the secret information chosen by A . The second drawback in [1] is that B performs $O(n)$ computation and sends $O(n)$ information to the cloud on behalf of A . In other words, user B does the heavy work. Even worse in case m users want to engage in a PSI with A or B , the latter needs to perform $O(mn)$ computations and send $O(mn)$ information to the cloud.

3 Preliminaries and Complexity Assumptions

In this section we present the cryptographic primitives used in our protocol and the underlying mathematical assumptions.

3.1 Cryptographic primitives

Bilinear Maps: Let G and G' denote two multiplicative cyclic groups of prime order p and let g be a generator of G . A map $e : G \times G \rightarrow G'$ is *bilinear* if it has the following properties: (1) for all $u, v \in G$ and $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, we have $e(u^a, v^b) = e(u, v)^{ab}$; (2) the map is not degenerate, i.e., $e(g, g) \neq 1$, and (3) e is an efficiently computable function.

Unforgeable Digital Signature [12]: A digital signature scheme, Sig , consists of three algorithms, $\text{Sig} = (\text{sigKeyGen}, \text{sigSign}, \text{sigVerify})$, where sigKeyGen generates public and private keys $\text{sigPK}, \text{sigSK}$, sigSign generates a signature for a message, and sigVerify determines if a signature is generated under the corresponding message. We say that a digital signature scheme is secure if the signature scheme is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack (UF-CMA). UF-CMA means that an adversary who is given signatures for some messages of its choice adaptively should not be able to produce a signature for a new message. Any signature scheme satisfying the standard definition of UF-CMA can be used in our construction.

Multi-Accumulator [32] We present the details of the multi-accumulator scheme that we use in our protocol as presented in [32]. A multi-accumulator scheme can be based on a single-accumulator scheme that supports both membership and non-membership proofs, as follows: the cloud generates a witness for each element of D_b showing the element is a member or non-member of D_a and simply puts them together as the witness for $acRslt = D_b \cap D_a$. However, this straightforward approach is costly because both the computational and communication complexities are linear to $|D_b|$. We present a multi-accumulator scheme,

where the size of the witness is constant which does not depend on the cardinality of the sets, D_a (D_b). Suppose user A 's data set is $D_a = \{d_{a,1}, \dots, d_{a,n}\}$, user B 's data set is $D_b = \{d_{b,1}, \dots, d_{b,m}\}$ (we assume that $n = m$), and $acRslt = D_a \cap D_b$. We can encode D_a via polynomial $R(x) = \prod_{t \in D_a} (x + t)$, encode D_b via polynomial $W(x) = \prod_{t \in D_b} (x + t)$, encode the intersection set $acRslt$ via polynomial $T(x) = \prod_{t \in acRslt} (x + t)$, and encode the subset $D_b - acRslt$ via polynomial $Q(x) = \prod_{t \in (D_b - acRslt)} (x + t)$. These polynomials satisfy the following: (i) $T(x)Q(x) = W(x)$, (ii) $T(x)$ is a divisor of $R(x)$, and (iii) $Q(x)$ is co-prime to $R(x)$. For the special case $acRslt = \emptyset$, the three conditions also hold since $T(x) = 1$, $Q(x) = W(x) = \prod_{t \in D_b} (x + t)$ and $R(x) = \prod_{t \in D_a} (x + t)$. Therefore, based on this idea, the multi-accumulator scheme allows the cloud to show the correctness of the intersection set, which can be either empty or non-empty. It can be constructed as follows:

- **acKeyGen**(λ): This algorithm takes security parameter λ , outputs system parameters $acPk = (g^\alpha, g^{\alpha^2}, \dots, g^{\alpha^q})$, where random $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, $acSk = (\alpha)$, where q is bounded by a polynomial in security parameter λ .
- **acGen**($acPk, D_a$): Given user A 's data set $D_a = \{d_{a,1}, \dots, d_{a,n}\} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, where $n \leq q$, compute his digest as $s_a = g^{\prod_{i=1}^n (d_{a,i} + \alpha)}$.
- **acProve**($acPk, D_b, D_a$): Given user B 's data set $D_b = \{d_{b,1}, \dots, d_{b,m}\} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^m$, where $m \leq q$, compute $acRslt = D_b \cap D_a$, and generate a witness as follows:
 - Let $T'(x) = \prod_{t \in (D_a - acRslt)} (x + t)$ and compute $g^{T'(\alpha)}$ by substituting x with α .
 - Let $Q(x) = \prod_{t \in (D_b - acRslt)} (x + t)$ and $R(x) = \prod_{t \in D_a} (x + t)$, and find two polynomials $Q'(x), R'(x)$ such that $Q(x)Q'(x) + R(x)R'(x) = 1 \pmod p$ by taking advantage of $\gcd(Q(x), R(x)) = 1$. Compute $(g^{Q(\alpha)}, g^{Q'(\alpha)}, g^{R(\alpha)})$ by substituting x with α . Set $acRslt = D_b \cap D_a$ and $acWit = (g^{Q(\alpha)}, g^{Q'(\alpha)}, g^{R(\alpha)}, g^{T'(\alpha)})$.
- **acVerify**($acPk, s_b, acRslt, acWit, s_a$): Given $acWit$ and $acRslt$ from the prover, the verifier proceeds as follows:
 1. If $acRslt \neq \emptyset$, compute $g^{T(\alpha)}$ according to $T(x) = \prod_{t \in acRslt} (x + t)$. Otherwise, let $T(x) = 1$ and $g^{T(\alpha)} = g$.
 2. If $e(g^{Q(\alpha)}, g^{T(\alpha)}) \neq e(s_b, g)$, return 0; otherwise, proceed to next step.
 3. If $e(g^{T(\alpha)}, g^{T'(\alpha)}) \neq e(s_a, g)$, return 0; otherwise, proceed to next step.
 4. If $e(g^{Q(\alpha)}, g^{Q'(\alpha)})e(s_a, g^{R(\alpha)}) \neq e(g, g)$, return 0; otherwise, return 1.

Definition 1. A multi-accumulator scheme is correct if the following holds:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \forall D_a, D_b, \\ (acSk, acPk) \leftarrow acKeyGen(\lambda), \\ s_b \leftarrow acGen(acPk, D_b), \\ s_a \leftarrow acGen(acPk, D_a), \\ (acRslt, acWit) \leftarrow acProve(acPk, D_b, D_a) : \\ 1 \leftarrow acVerify(acPk, s_b, acRslt, acWit, s_a) \end{array} \right] = 1$$

Definition 2. A multi-accumulator scheme is secure if

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (acPk, acSk) \leftarrow acKeyGen(\lambda), \\ D_a \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{acProve, acVerify}(acPk), \\ s_a \leftarrow acGen(acSk, D_a), \\ (D_b, acRslt, acWit) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{acProve, acVerify}(acPk, D_a) : \\ s_b \leftarrow acGen(acPk, D_b), \\ 1 \leftarrow acVerify(acPk, s_b, acRslt, acWit, s_a), \\ acRslt \neq D_b \cap D_a \end{array} \right] \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$$

The security proof is based on the q -SDH assumption. For the details of the proof the reader can defer to Zheng *et al.* paper [32, Theorem 1].

3.2 Assumptions

We denote as λ the security parameter and $\epsilon(\lambda)$ a negligible function on input the security parameter λ .

Bilinear q -strong Diffie-Hellman assumption (q -SDH): For given $(g, g^\alpha, \dots, g^{\alpha^q})$, where $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and q is bounded by a polynomial in λ , there exists no PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} that can compute $(s, e(g, g)^{1/(\alpha+s)})$, where $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ with non-negligible probability ϵ . The probability is defined over the random choices of parameters and random coins used by \mathcal{A} . The advantage of \mathcal{A} is

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(g, g^\alpha, \dots, g^{\alpha^q}) = (s, e(g, g)^{1/(\alpha+s)})]$$

Definition 3. q -SDH holds over bilinear groups G, G' if no polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} has advantage in breaking q -SDH greater than $\epsilon(\lambda)$.

Variant Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (VDDH): For given

$$T = \left(g, v, g^{\gamma_a}, g^{\gamma_b}, g^{\beta_a}, g^{\beta_b}, g^{r\beta_a}, g^{r\beta_b}, g^{r\frac{\beta_a}{\gamma_a}}, g^{r\frac{\beta_b}{\gamma_b}}, Z \right)$$

, $\gamma_a, \gamma_b, \beta_a, \beta_b, r$ uniformly at random elements in \mathbb{Z}_p , generator $g \in G$ of prime order p and v any element in G , VDDH assumption asks an adversary \mathcal{A} to distinguish $Z = v^r$ from a value $g^c \in G, c \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ with non-negligible probability ϵ . The advantage of an algorithm \mathcal{A} in distinguishing v^r from $g^c, c \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$ is

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(T, v^r) = 0] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(T, g^c) = 0]|.$$

Definition 4. VDDH holds in G if no polynomial time adversary can achieve non-negligible advantage in deciding correctly the VDDH assumption.

To provide some security confidence for the VDDH assumption we show a lower bound on the computational complexity of an adversary \mathcal{A} attacking the VDDH problem in the generic group model (GGM) as presented by Shoup [30]. The idea of the GGM model is to “mirror” the elements of bilinear groups with random encodings accessible to an adversary through random encoding injective function $\xi : \mathbb{Z}_p \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ for elements in G . That is, ξ maps elements from \mathbb{Z}_p through G to random encoding string in $\{0, 1\}^*$. We write $\xi(x)$ to represent the encoding of g^x . Let $\beta_a, \beta_b, \gamma_a, \gamma_b, c, r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p, T_0 = v^r, T_1 = g^c$ and $d \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. \mathcal{A} receives the encodings of $g, v, g^{\gamma_a}, g^{\gamma_b}, g^{\beta_a}, g^{\beta_b}, g^{r\beta_a}, g^{r\beta_b}, g^{r\frac{\beta_a}{\gamma_a}}, g^{r\frac{\beta_b}{\gamma_b}}, T_d, T_{d-1}$. Finally we show that after at most q queries, \mathcal{A} can guess d with a probability no greater than $\frac{1}{2} + O(\frac{q^2}{p})$.

Theorem 1. *Suppose \mathcal{A} is an algorithm that solves the VDDH problem, making at most q oracle queries for the group operations in G and G' . Suppose that the integers $\beta_a, \beta_b, \gamma_a, \gamma_b, r$ and the encoding function ξ are chosen at random. Then*

$$Pr \left[\mathcal{A} \left(\begin{array}{l} p, \xi(1), \xi(u), \xi(\beta_a), \xi(\beta_b), \xi(\gamma_a), \\ \xi(\gamma_b), \xi(r\beta_a), \xi(r\beta_b), \xi(\frac{r\beta_a}{\gamma_a}), \\ \xi(\frac{r\beta_b}{\gamma_b}), \xi(t_0), \xi(t_1) \\ c, r, \beta_a, \beta_b, \gamma_a, \gamma_b, \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^*, \\ d \leftarrow \{0, 1\}, t_d \leftarrow v^r, t_{1-d} \leftarrow g^c \end{array} \right) = d : \right] - \frac{1}{2} \leq \frac{(q+11)^2}{p}$$

Proof. We show how a challenger \mathcal{B} interacts with \mathcal{A} . During the interaction \mathcal{B} encodes elements with the random encoding function and answers algebraic operations in group G with the encoding of the result.

\mathcal{B} defines polynomial $F_i \in \mathbb{Z}_p[B_a, B_b, \Gamma_a, \Gamma_b, T_0, T_1], i \in \{1, \tau\}$ with determinants $B_a, B_b, \Gamma_a, \Gamma_b, T_0, T_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. It also stores the list $L_1 = \{F_{1,i}, \xi_{1,i} : i = 0, \dots, \tau_1\}$, with the invariant that at each step $\tau, \tau_1 = \tau + 11$. Initially $F_{1,0} = 1, F_{1,1} = B_a, F_{1,2} = B_b, F_{1,3} = \Gamma_a, F_{1,4} = \Gamma_b, F_{1,5} = RB_a, F_{1,6} = RB_b, F_{1,7} = R\frac{B_a}{\Gamma_a}, F_{1,8} = R\frac{B_b}{\Gamma_b}, F_{1,9} = T_0, F_{1,10} = T_1$, so as to $\tau_1 = 11$.

At the beginning of the game \mathcal{A} gets the random encodings $\xi_{1,2}, \dots, \xi_{1,13}, \xi_{\tau,1} = \xi'(t_0)$. These random encodings are mapped to the random polynomial F_{1,τ_1} by \mathcal{B} . The polynomial is kept secret and never exposed to \mathcal{A} . Whenever \mathcal{A} asks for group operations \mathcal{B} simulates it as follows:

Group Operations: For any two operands ξ_i, ξ_j with $0 \leq i, j < \tau_1$ \mathcal{B} computes $F_{1,\tau_1} \leftarrow F_{1,\tau_i} + / - F_{1,\tau_j}$ depending the sign action be it multiplication or division. \mathcal{B} checks if $F_{1,\tau}$ exists in the list L_1 and returns that ξ_{τ_1} to \mathcal{A} . Otherwise sets $\tau_1 = \tau_1 + 1$, returns $\xi_{\tau_1} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^*$ to \mathcal{A} and adds $(F_{1,\tau_1}, \xi_{\tau_1})$ to the list L_1 .

Eventually \mathcal{A} outputs its guess $d' \in \{0, 1\}$. Notice that at any time the maximum degree of any F_1 is at most 2. \mathcal{B} assigns random elements $\beta_a, \beta_b, \gamma_a, \gamma_b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$

and sets $t_0 \leftarrow v^r, t_1 \leftarrow g^c$ for the variables $B_a, B_b, \Gamma_a, \Gamma_b, T_0, T_1$. We will bound the success probabilities of randomly assigning values to the polynomial F_1 with the SchwartzZippel lemma. Namely, in order \mathcal{A} to guess correctly the following should hold:

$$F_{1,i}(\beta_a, \beta_b, \gamma_a, \gamma_b, r, c) - F_{1,j}(\beta_a, \beta_b, \gamma_a, \gamma_b, r, c) = 0$$

, for $F_{1,i} \neq F_{1,j}$. The success probability of \mathcal{A} is thus: $\epsilon \leq \frac{\binom{\tau_1}{2}}{p}$. It is also true that: $\tau_1 \leq \tau + 11$. Plugging $q = \tau$ where q represents the total number of queries it holds that:

$$\epsilon \leq \frac{(q + 11)^2}{p}$$

□

4 Definitions

In this section we give the definitional framework of our secure and efficient verifiable set intersection protocol (SEVDSI) and we present its privacy and security definitions.

4.1 SEVDSI Function Definition

Users first send their encrypted datasets to the cloud, later they run the PSI protocol with the help of it. Let $D_a = \{d_{a,0}, \dots, d_{a,n}\}$ denote A 's plaintext dataset and let $D_b = \{d_{b,0}, \dots, d_{b,n}\}$ denote B 's plaintext dataset. We assume that users A and B have the same number of elements in their datasets, for the sake of simplicity. User A (B) outsources his encrypted dataset C_a (C_b) to the cloud. When users A and B want to compute $D_a \cap D_b$, they delegate the computation to the cloud by providing auxiliary information au_a (au_b) to compute the set intersection. As an important note, the common elements do not leak any information about any plain data to the cloud. These values are still encrypted.

Definition 5. A SEVDSI scheme comprises seven algorithms:

- $pm \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda)$: This algorithm is run by a trusted third party. It takes a security parameter λ and outputs system public parameters pm .
- $(pk_a, sk_a) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pm)$: It is a randomized algorithm run by user A . It takes the system public parameter (pm) and outputs a pair of public and private keys (pk_a, sk_a) , where pk_a is made public and sk_a is kept secret by A . Similarly, user B generates his public and private key pairs, (pk_b, sk_b) .
- $C_a \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_a, pk_a), D_a)$: This algorithm takes dataset D_a , public/secret key pair, (sk_a, pk_a) of A and outputs ciphertext C_a , which is outsourced to the cloud. B can generate C_b similarly.
- $(au_a, s_a) \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_a, D_a, pm, pk_b)$: User A authorizes the cloud to conduct the set intersection operation on the outsourced ciphertexts C_a and C_b with AuGen algorithm. This algorithm takes as input (sk_a, D_a, pm, pk_b) and

it outputs some auxiliary information au_a and an internal secret s_a . Then au_a is sent to the cloud through the authenticated user-to-cloud private communication channel while s_a is kept as a secret. Similarly, user B can generate au_b by taking (sk_b, D_b, pm, pk_a) as input. Then, B sends au_b to the cloud.

- $\{(rslt_a, proof_a), (rslt_b, proof_b)\} \leftarrow SetInt(C_a, au_a, C_b, au_b)$: This algorithm runs by the cloud. It takes C_a, au_a, C_b, au_b as input and outputs $(rslt_a, proof_a)$ and $(rslt_b, proof_b)$. Then, the cloud sends $(rslt_a, proof_a)$ to A and $(rslt_b, proof_b)$ to B , where $proof_a$ and $proof_b$ are proofs to demonstrate faithful private set intersection computation by the cloud.
- $\{D, \perp\} \leftarrow Dec(sk_a, rslt_a)$: Each user A, B individually executes this algorithm to decrypt the intersection result. It takes ciphertext $rslt_a$ as input, which is the output of the delegated set intersection operation computed by the cloud on ciphertexts C_a and C_b , and sk_a and it outputs the intersection set $D = D_a \cap D_b$. If $D_a \cap D_b = \emptyset$, the algorithm outputs \perp . Similarly, B obtains $D_a \cap D_b$.
- $\{0, 1\} \leftarrow Verify(sk_a, s_a, rslt_a, proof_a)$: A runs this algorithm to verify whether $rslt_a$ is honestly generated. It takes $(sk_a, s_a, rslt_a, proof_a)$ and outputs 1 if the $rslt_a$ is honestly generated. It outputs 0 if the cloud is cheating. Similarly, B verifies that if the outputs of the computation is correct.

4.2 Adversarial model and Security Guarantees

We assume that users are honest-but-curious adversaries, meaning that they use their benign inputs for the protocol, but they are curious about other users' data. We assume that the cloud is malicious: It can arbitrarily deviate from the prescribed protocols in any way. The malicious cloud can manipulate the integrity of the outsourced data. We also assume that the cloud does not collude with any data owners. This is a reasonable assumption that is also explained in [1]. If the cloud is controlled by an adversary, the adversary also has control over all the communication channels. SEVDSI scheme leaks only the set intersection size of two datasets.

Function Output Secrecy. Function output secrecy assures that even if previous information about any data $v \in D_a \cup D_b$ is given to the malicious cloud, it will not be able to perform brute-force attacks to figure out if any ciphertext has encoding of v in $C_a \cup C_b$. In order to eliminate the brute-force attacks that are performed by the cloud, the resulting ciphertexts C_a, C_b should have a common secret value in order to allow the cloud to compare ciphertexts in the set intersection phase. Moreover, having this common secret value also prevents the adversary (cloud) to run the PSI protocol between different users without having their permission. In SEVDSI, this secret element is the Diffie-Hellman key $tk_{ab} = g^{\gamma_a \gamma_b}$ of A and B .

The function outputs secrecy game between a challenger \mathcal{B} and an attacker \mathcal{A} is the following,

Setup. Challenger \mathcal{B} runs Setup algorithm, it outputs public/secret key pair pk_a, sk_a for user A and pk_b, sk_b for user B . Then, it gives pk_a, pk_b to attacker \mathcal{A} .

Query. \mathcal{A} issues encryption queries. For query q , \mathcal{A} outputs D'_a, D'_b . \mathcal{B} runs $(C'_a, C'_b) \leftarrow \text{Enc}$ algorithm and gives (C'_a, C'_b) to \mathcal{A} .

SetInt. \mathcal{A} issues set intersection queries. \mathcal{B} runs $(au'_a, s'_a, au'_b, s'_b) \leftarrow \text{AuGen}$ algorithm and gives (au'_a, au'_b) to \mathcal{A} .

Challenge. \mathcal{A} outputs (D_a, D_b, v) to be challenged upon, where v is any dataset element in $D_a \cup D_b$. \mathcal{B} randomly chooses a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and sends $C_{a,v}$ and au_a (assuming that v is in D_a) to \mathcal{A} , where if $b = 0$; Otherwise, it sends $C_{a,v'}$, au_a , where v' is a random element in G and $C_{a,v}$ is the encryption of v with keys pk_a and sk_a .

Guess. \mathcal{A} outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.

Definition 6 (Function Output Secrecy). We say that SEVDSI assures Function Output Secrecy if the advantage of \mathcal{A} in winning the aforementioned game is $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}} = \Pr[b = b'] \leq 1/2 + \epsilon(\lambda)$, for a negligible function ϵ and security parameter λ .

Verifiability. In order to assure that the cloud honestly computes the set intersection, the users ask the malicious cloud to generate a proof about the result of the computation. With the proof and the result users are able to check whether the malicious cloud has honestly executed the delegated set intersection operations or not. Verifiability exposes to the user malicious private set intersection computations performed by a malicious cloud server. We use the same security game for verifiability as in [32], defined between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a challenger \mathcal{B} as follows:

- **KeyGen:** Given public parameters pm , \mathcal{B} runs $\text{KeyGen}(pm)$ algorithm to obtain encryption/decryption keys (pk_a, sk_a) for user A , (pk_b, sk_b) for user B and gives pk_a, pk_b to \mathcal{A} .
- **Phase 1:** \mathcal{A} issues the following queries:
 - **Enc:** Given the dataset D'_a , \mathcal{B} runs $C'_a \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_a, pk_a), D'_a)$ and returns C'_a to \mathcal{A} .
 - **Enc:** Given the dataset D'_b , \mathcal{B} runs $C'_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_b, pk_b), D'_b)$ and returns C'_b to \mathcal{A} .
 - **AuGen:** \mathcal{B} runs $au'_a, s'_a \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_a, D'_a, pm, pk_b)$ and returns au'_a to \mathcal{A} .
 - **AuGen:** \mathcal{B} runs $au'_b, s'_b \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_b, D'_b, pm, pk_a)$ and returns au'_b to \mathcal{A} .
 - **Verify:** \mathcal{B} runs $\text{Verify}(sk_a, s'_a, rslt_a, proof_a)$ and returns the output to \mathcal{A} .
 - **Verify:** \mathcal{B} runs $\text{Verify}(sk_b, s'_b, rslt_b, proof_b)$ and returns the output to \mathcal{A} .
- Challenge:** \mathcal{A} selects D_a, D_b of its choice, and sends them to \mathcal{B} . \mathcal{B} runs $C_a \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_a, pk_a), D_a)$ and $C_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_b, pk_b), D_b)$, $au_a, s_a \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_a, D_a, pm, pk_b)$ and $au_b, s_b \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_b, D_b, pm, pk_a)$, and returns C_a, au_a, C_b, au_b to \mathcal{A} .
- Phase 2:** \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{B} follow the similar steps as that are in Phase 1.
- Guess:** \mathcal{A} outputs $(rslt_a, proof_a), (rslt_b, proof_b)$ to \mathcal{B} .

The adversary wins the game if

- $\text{Verify}(sk_a, s_a, rslt_a, proof_a) = 1$ is valid and
- $\text{Verify}(sk_b, s_b, rslt_b, proof_b) = 1$ is valid and
- $\text{Dec}(sk_a, rslt_a) \neq \text{Dec}(sk_b, rslt_b) \vee \text{Dec}(sk_a, rslt_a) \neq (D_a \cap D_b)$.

Definition 7. A SEVDSI scheme satisfies the verifiability functionality if the following holds:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (pm) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda), \\ (pk_a, sk_a) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pm), \\ (pk_b, sk_b) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pm) \\ (D_a, D_b) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc, AuGen, SetInt, Verify}}(pk_a, pk_b) \\ C_a \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_a, pk_a), D_a), C_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_b, pk_b), D_b), \\ au_a, s_a \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_a, D_a, pm, pk_b), \\ au_b, s_b \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_b, D_b, pm, pk_a) \\ \{(rslt_a, proof_a), (rslt_b, proof_b)\} \leftarrow \\ \mathcal{A}^{\text{Enc, SetInt, Verify}}(pk_a, au_a, D_a, C_a, pk_b, au_b, D_b, C_b) : \\ 1 \leftarrow \text{Verify}(sk_a, s_a, rslt_a, proof_a) \wedge \\ 1 \leftarrow \text{Verify}(sk_b, s_b, rslt_b, proof_b) \wedge \\ \text{Dec}(sk_a, rslt_a) \neq \text{Dec}(sk_b, rslt_b) \\ \vee \text{Dec}(sk_a, rslt_a) \neq (D_a \cap D_b) \end{array} \right] \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$$

for a negligible function ϵ and security parameter λ .

5 SEVDSI Protocol

5.1 Solution Overview

The PSI protocol in [32] is vulnerable to brute force attacks: the malicious cloud is able to infer users' plain datasets from ciphertexts by checking all possible dataset values. Another issue in [32] is that the malicious cloud is allowed to do set intersection operation between any two users, without having any permission by them. The cloud can proceed as follows: (1) In time t_0 , users A and user B wish to run the set intersection protocol with the aid of the cloud by sending their corresponding auxiliary information to it. (2) In time t_1 , users A and C run the set intersection protocol with the help of the cloud by sending their corresponding auxiliary information to it. (3) In time t_2 , where $t_2 > t_1 \wedge t_2 > t_0$, the cloud is able to perform PSI operation on the encrypted datasets of user B and user C , without their permission. This contradicts their protocol specifications, whereby users are required to send auxiliary information to the cloud in order the latter conduct the set intersection protocol.

Before delving into SEVDSI protocol, we present the idea for resiliency to cloud-side brute-force attacks. Also, we demonstrate how to achieve authorized and verifiable PSI.

- In order to build a system resilient against the cloud side brute force attacks, the ciphertexts are blinded with an extra random value x_a by user A (x_b by user B). Later, x_a, x_b is converted to a common random tk_{ab} that is independently computed by user A and user B to allow the cloud to do set intersection operation. tk_{ab} prevents the malicious cloud to perform brute force attacks on the datasets in order to infer the users' plaintext values.
- To avoid permissionless PSI by the malicious cloud on behalf of two users without getting any permission by them, users agree on a common random tk_{ab} which is Diffie-Hellman key exchange value. This value is unique for each pair of users. According to the given example above, the cloud is not able to perform PSI protocol on behalf of user B and user C without getting any authorization (permission) from them. The only way the malicious cloud can perform PSI is to extract tk_{bc} .
- The auxiliary information that is sent to the cloud by user A consists of two parts. The first part is a function of x_a and tk_{ab} . The second part is the aggregated user A 's dataset values (s_a) that is masked under user B 's public key. User A also signs this masked value and appends it to the second part of the auxiliary information which is directly forwarded to user B later by the cloud.
- In order to allow user B to verify if the set intersection result that is computed by the cloud is correct, the cloud sends a $(proof_b, result_b)$ tuple to user B . $proof_b$ consists of two parts: The first part is a *witness* that is generated by the cloud. The second part is the second part of user A 's auxiliary information.
- In our scheme user A (B) also uses $d_{a,0}$ ($d_{b,0}$) random data value as in [32] to randomize his accumulated dataset, s_a . This is because to prevent semi-honest user B (A) to infer useful information about A 's (B 's) dataset items.

5.2 Protocol Description

We now present SEVDSI in full details:

- **Setup**(λ): Given security parameter λ , the trusted party runs $(acPk, acSk) \leftarrow acKeyGen(\lambda)$ and outputs system parameters $pm = acPk, g, e(\cdot, \cdot), G, G', p, H_1, H_2$, where g is the generator of the group G of prime order p , $H_1 : G \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $H_2 : G' \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$.
- **KeyGen**(pm): Users A and B take system public parameters, pm , and generate their secret and public keys. The secret and public keys for users A and B are:

$$\begin{aligned} (sk_a, pk_a) &= ((x_a, \beta_a, \gamma_a, sigSK_a), (g^{\beta_a}, g^{\gamma_a}, sigPK_a)), \\ (sk_b, pk_b) &= ((x_b, \beta_b, \gamma_b, sigSK_b), (g^{\beta_b}, g^{\gamma_b}, sigPK_b)) \end{aligned}$$

, where $sigPK$ and $sigSK$ are secret and public keys of a signature: $(sigPK, sigSK) \leftarrow sigKeyGen(\lambda)$.

- **Enc** $((sk_a, pk_a), D_a)$: User A takes $D_a = (d_{a,1}, \dots, d_{a,n})$, his secret and public key pair (sk_a, pk_a)
 - picks a random $d_{a,0} \in G$ and two random values $r_{a,i1}, r_{a,i2}$ for each $i = \{0, \dots, n\}$,
 - computes

$$\begin{aligned} cph_{a,i} &= (g^{r_{a,i2}}, g^{r_{a,i1}\gamma_a}, d_{a,i}^{x_a} g^{(r_{a,i1}+r_{a,i2})x_a\beta_a}) \\ &= C_{a,i,1}, C_{a,i,2}, C_{a,i,3} \end{aligned}$$

and sets $C_a = \{cph_{a,0}, \dots, cph_{a,n}\}$.

Similarly, user B with $D_b = (d_{b,0}, d_{b,1}, \dots, d_{b,n})$ where $d_{b,i} \in G$ for $0 \leq i \leq n$, can compute:

$$C_b = \{cph_{b,0}, \dots, cph_{b,n}\}$$

- **AuGen** (sk_a, D_a, pm, pk_b) : Once two users (A and B) agree on set intersection operation that is delegated to the cloud, user A
 - generates rekey:

$$\begin{aligned} rk_a &= (g^{H_1(tk_{ab})\beta_a/\gamma_a}, g^{H_1(tk_{ab})\beta_a}, g^{H_1(tk_{ab})/x_a}) \\ &= (RK_{a,1}, RK_{a,2}, RK_{a,3}), \end{aligned}$$

where $tk_{ab} = g^{\gamma_a\gamma_b}$.

- computes, for $0 \leq i \leq n$,

$$T_i = H_2\left(e\left(d_{a,i}^{H_1(tk_{ab})}, g\right)\right)$$

and $s_a = s_a \leftarrow acGen(acPk, \{T_0, \dots, T_n\})$

- masks the secret information s_a using user B 's public key pk_b to obtain $cph_b = (g^{r_2}, g^{\gamma_b r_1}, s_a g^{\beta_b(r_1+r_2)})$, where $r_1, r_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Then, user A runs $\rho_a \leftarrow sigSign(sigSK_a, cph_b)$ to obtain a signature ρ_a on message cph_b . Finally, user A sets $au_a = (rk_a, cph_b, \rho_a)$ and sends it to the cloud. Similarly, user B can generate $au_b = (rk_b, cph_a, \rho_b)$ and send it to the cloud.

- **SetInt** (C_a, au_a, C_b, au_b) :

- the Cloud transforms ciphertexts $cph_{a,i}$ for $0 \leq i \leq n$ into $T_{a,i}$ using au_a and computes T_a as follows: for $r_{ab} = r_{a,i1} + r_{a,i2}$,

$T_{a,i}$ equals

$$\begin{aligned}
&= \frac{e(C_{a,i,3}, RK_{a,3})}{e(C_{a,i,2}, RK_{a,1}) e(C_{a,i,1}, RK_{a,2})} \\
&= \frac{e(d_{a,i}^{x_a} g^{x_a \beta_a (r_{ab})}, g^{H_1(tk_{ab})/x_a})}{e(g^{\gamma_a r_{a,i1}}, g^{H_1(tk_{ab})\beta_a/\gamma_a}) e(g^{r_{a,i2}}, g^{H_1(tk_{ab})\beta_a})} \\
&= \frac{e(d_{a,i}^{x_a}, g^{H_1(tk_{ab})/x_a}) e(g^{x_a \beta_a (r_{ab})}, g^{H_1(tk_{ab})/x_a})}{e(g, g)^{r_{a,i1} H_1(tk_{ab})\beta_a} e(g, g)^{r_{a,i2} H_1(tk_{ab})\beta_a}} \\
&= \frac{e(d_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})} e(g, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})\beta_a (r_{ab})}}{e(g, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})\beta_a (r_{ab})}} \\
&= e(d_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})}
\end{aligned}$$

$$T_a = \{H_2(T_{a,0}), \dots, H_2(T_{a,n})\}$$

The cloud follows the same steps to compute T_b .

- generates the intersection sets $rslt_a, rslt_b$ and the proofs $proof_a, proof_b$ with respect to C_a and C_b as follows: $(acRslt, acWit_a) \leftarrow \text{acProve}(acPk, T_a, T_b)$ and set $rslt_a = \{cph_{a,i} \mid H_2(T_{a,i}) \in acRslt\}$, $proof_a = (acWit_a, cph_a, \rho_b)$ and $(acRslt, acWit_b) \leftarrow \text{acProve}(acPk, T_b, T_a)$ and set $rslt_b = \{cph_{b,i} \mid H_2(T_{b,i}) \in acRslt\}$, $proof_b = (acWit_b, cph_b, \rho_a)$.
- **Dec**($sk_a, rslt_a$): Given the cloud-generated ciphertext intersection set $rslt_a = \{cph_{a,j}, \dots, cph_{a,k}\}$ where $0 \leq j, k \leq n$, user A decrypts ciphertexts $cph_{a,i}$ for $j \leq i \leq k$ as follows:

$$\frac{(C_{a,i,3})^{x_a^{-1}}}{(C_{a,i,1}^{\beta_a})(C_{a,i,2}^{\beta_a/\gamma_a})} = \frac{(d_{a,i}^{x_a} g^{x_a \beta_a (r_{a,i1} + r_{a,i2})})^{x_a^{-1}}}{(g^{r_{a,i2}\beta_a})(g^{\gamma_a r_{a,i1}\beta_a/\gamma_a})} = d_{a,i}.$$

The decryption of $rslt_a$ is $D_a \cap D_b = \{d_{a,j}, \dots, d_{a,k}\}$. Note that this algorithm can also be used to decrypt C_a without involving any delegated set operations. Similarly, user B can decrypt the cloud-generated ciphertext intersection set $rslt_b = \{cph_{b,j}, \dots, cph_{b,k}\}$ where $j \leq i \leq k$ to obtain $D_a \cap D_b$.

- **Verify**($sk_a, s_a, rslt_a, proof_a$): Given $rslt_a$ and $proof_a$, user A verifies that the cloud faithfully executed the SetInt protocol as follows:
 - verifies the integrity of cph_a by running $\text{sigVerify}(sigPK_b, cph_a, \rho_b)$. If the signature verification fails the protocol halts, otherwise, proceed to the next step.
 - decrypts cph_a using private key sk_a according to $s_b = \frac{s_b g^{\beta_a (r_1 + r_2)}}{(g^{r_2 \beta_a})(g^{\gamma_a r_1 \beta_a / \gamma_a})}$.
 - if $rslt_a$ is not empty, decrypts $rslt_a$ to obtain the plaintexts and computes $Y_a = \{e(d_{a,i}^{H_1(tk_{ab})}, g) \mid cph_{a,i} \in rslt_a\}$. Otherwise, let $Y_a = \emptyset$.
 - runs $\text{acVerify}(acPk, s_a, Y_a, acWit_a, s_b)$. If the multi-accumulator fails to verify the protocol halts. Otherwise, the algorithm runs call $\text{Dec}(sk_a, rslt_a)$ to obtain $D_a \cap D_b$. Similarly, user B runs the same algorithm to verify that the cloud faithfully computed the set intersection computation.

Remark 1. When users A and B wish to learn their intersection on new datasets, D_a^{new}, D_b^{new} , user A uses a new value y_a instead of using x_a to encrypt D_a^{new} (B uses y_b to encrypt D_b^{new}) and generates a new rk_a^{new} (rk_b^{new} for user B). To generate a new rk_a , the users agree on a new common secret key, tk_{ab} . Therefore, au_a^{new} (au_b^{new} for user B) is generated. The reason to use new y_a to encrypt D_a^{new} and choose new rk_a is to eliminate the compatibility of C_a^{new} and au_a^{old} . Otherwise, the cloud with (C_a^{new}, au_a^{old}) and (C_b^{new}, au_b^{old}) can compute the set intersection operation on users' new datasets in a permissionless manner.

5.3 Efficiency Analysis

In Table 2 we analyze the computation efficiency of SEVDSI. As for the multi-accumulator operations acGen and acProve commit to n exponentiations and acVerify results in k exponentiations + 7 pairings. We assume that $|D_a| = |D_b| = n$ and $|D_a \cap D_b| = k$. We also present in table 2 the overhead of VDSI scheme [32]. Overall, SEVDSI requires $3n + 2k + 4$ more exponentiations than VDSI [32] as a result of the extra x_a, tk, rk values embedded to each ciphertext, for datasets of size n , with k common elements.

Algorithm	VDSI [32]	SEVDSI
Enc	$3n$ E + n P + acGen	$4n$ E
Dec	$2n$ E	$3n$ E
AuGen	4 E + sigSign	$(n + 7)$ E + n P + sigSign + acGen
SetInt	$6n$ P + 2 acProve	$6n$ P + 2 acProve
Verify	$2(k + 1)$ E + k P + acVerify + sigVerify	$(4k + 3)$ E + k P + acVerify + sigVerify

Table 2. Computational complexity comparison of the protocol in [32] and ours (SEVDSI), where E denotes the exponentiation operation, P denotes the pairing operation

SEVDSI outperforms asymptotically in the communication overhead compared with 2PC PSI solutions. More specifically assuming m is the total number of users in the system, n is the total number of dataset items that each user has, k is the intersection size of two different datasets then:

1. Each user outsources n data items to the cloud. Therefore, m users outsource mn data items to the cloud in outsourcing phase.
2. During AuGen and SetInt phases user u_i sends $7(m - 1)$ group elements to the cloud in order allow all the other users u_j , $1 \leq i \neq j \leq m$ to perform PSI with all the other users, by running AuGen algorithm. The cloud sends $(k + 6)(m - 1)$ elements to each user u_i (k is the intersection size and 6 is the proof size for each PSI), for $i = 1, \dots, m$, as the intersection results by using SetInt algorithm. The total communication complexity between the users and the cloud is $(k + 13)(m - 1)m = O(km^2)$.
3. Thus from 1) and 2) we conclude that the overall communication complexity for SEVDSI is $O(km^2 + mn)$.

Table 3 shows the total communication complexities between SEVDSI and the most efficient 2PC based PSI protocols [10, 24, 27–29]. In 2PC based PSI solutions, all the user’s data items needs to be exchanged (communication complexity is linear in the size of user’s dataset). Each user u_i needs to send n data items to all the other $m - 1$ users. The total communication complexity between user u_i and u_j , where $1 \leq i \neq j \leq m$, is $O(mn)$. The overall communication complexity in case of multi-party PSI with in between all users is $mO(mn) = O(nm^2)$. When the intersection size for each PSI is $k \ll m$ for Case-1 and $k \ll m^2$ for Case-2, SEVDSI is very efficient.

	SEVDSI	2PC PSI
Case-1 ($n = m$)	$O(km^2)$	$O(m^3)$
Case-2 ($n = m^2$)	$O(km^2 + m^3)$	$O(m^4)$

Table 3. Communication complexity comparison of the most communication efficient 2PC based PSI protocols and ours (SEVDSI).

5.4 Security

In this section we analyze the security of SEVDSI scheme that is formally defined in Section 4. SEVDSI protocol adheres to two security guarantees: function output secrecy and verifiability. We model H_1 as a random function and H_2 as a collision resistant hash function.

Theorem 2. *SEVDSI scheme assures function output secrecy under the VDDH and the DLIN assumptions holds.*

Theorem 3. *If Sig is an unforgeable signature scheme, multi-accumulator scheme is secure under q -SDH assumption, H_1 is a random function and H_2 is a collision resistance hash function, SEVDSI scheme assures the verifiability property.*

Due to space limits we defer the proofs in the Appendix.

6 Conclusion

We designed and analyzed SEVDSI: a secure and efficient verifiable private set intersection protocol that incorporates novel security guarantees, which to the best of our knowledge are not assured at any of the existing work. In contrast with previous studies, our protocol outperforms with the most efficient 2PC protocols in communication efficiency in case of multi-party PSI between multiple users. SEVDSI is non-interactive without the need of interactions between the users after the initial setup phase. Furthermore, SEVDSI protocol does not allow a malicious cloud to perform dictionary attacks on the encrypted datasets and the

result of the computation is verifiable. Moreover, we mitigate unauthorized set intersection protocols on datasets by incorporating authorization information during the protocol execution. Our protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model based on standard and a new assumption, whose security guarantee is analyzed in the generic group model.

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A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Theorem 2

The reductionist proof is based on the VDDH assumption. We establish that if there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} winning the function output secrecy game with non-negligible probability ϵ , then there is an adversary \mathcal{B} breaking the VDDH assumption in G with non-negligible probability.

Proof. The VDDH oracle chooses a uniformly random $t \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ and passes $T = \left(g, v, g^{\gamma^a}, g^{\gamma^b}, g^{\beta^a}, g^{\beta^b}, g^{r\beta^a}, g^{r\beta^b}, g^{r\frac{\beta^a}{\gamma^a}}, g^{r\frac{\beta^b}{\gamma^b}}, Z \right)$ to \mathcal{B} , where $Z = v^r$ if $t = 0$ and Z some random element in G if $t = 1$. \mathcal{B} simulates \mathcal{A} 's queries during the game as follows:

Setup. \mathcal{B} obtains $sigPK_a$ and $sigSK_a$ using $(sigPK_a, sigSK_a) \leftarrow sigKeyGen(\lambda)$; $sigPK_b$ and $sigSK_b$ are generated similarly. \mathcal{B} gives $pk_a = (g^{\gamma^a}, g^{\beta^a}, sigPK_a)$ and $pk_b = (g^{\gamma^b}, g^{\beta^b}, sigPK_b)$ to attacker \mathcal{A} .

Query. \mathcal{A} issues encryption queries. For query q , \mathcal{A} outputs $D'_a = \{d'_{a,0}, \dots, d'_{a,n}\}$, $D'_b = \{d'_{b,0}, \dots, d'_{b,n}\}$. \mathcal{B} runs $(C'_a, C'_b) \leftarrow Enc$ algorithm as follows:

- \mathcal{B} finds the corresponding data items from T such that $d'_{a,i} = v_{a,i}$ and $d'_{b,j} = v_{b,j}$,
- picks random values $r', r_{a,i,1}, r_{a,i,2}, x_a, x_b \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, where $i = 0, \dots, n$,
- computes
$$cph_{a,i} = g^{r_{a,i,2}}, g^{r_{a,i,1}\gamma_a}, v_{a,i}^{r_{a,i,1}x_a} g^{(r_{a,i,1}+r_{a,i,2})x_a r\beta_a} = (C_{a,i,1}, C_{a,i,2}, C_{a,i,3})$$
- computes $(C_{b,i,1}, C_{b,i,2}, C_{b,i,3})$ by the same way above and gives (C'_a, C'_b) to \mathcal{A} .

SetInt. \mathcal{A} issues set intersection queries for D'_a, D'_b . \mathcal{B} runs $(au'_a, s'_a, au'_b, s'_b) \leftarrow \text{AuGen}$ algorithm as follows:

- generates rekey, $rk'_a = (g^{rr'\beta_a/\gamma_a}, g^{rr'\beta_a}, g^{r'/x_a}) = (RK_{a,1}, RK_{a,2}, RK_{a,3})$.
- computes, for $0 \leq i \leq n$, $T_i = H_2(e(v_{a,i}^{rr'}, g))$ and $s'_a \leftarrow \text{acGen}(\text{acPk}, \{T_0, \dots, T_n\})$.
- encrypts the secret information s'_a using user B 's public key pk_b to obtain ciphertext $cph'_b = (g^{r_5}, g^{\gamma_b r_6}, s'_a g^{\beta_b(r_5+r_6)})$, where $r_5, r_6 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Then, user A runs $\rho'_a \leftarrow \text{sigSign}(\text{sigSK}_a, cph'_b)$ to obtain a signature ρ'_a on message cph'_b . Finally, user A sets $au'_a = (rk'_a, cph'_b, \rho'_a)$. Similarly, user B can generate $au'_b = (rk'_b, cph'_a, \rho'_b)$. Then, it gives (au'_a, au'_b) to \mathcal{A} .

Challenge. \mathcal{A} outputs $D_a = \{d_{a,0}, \dots, d_{a,n}\}, D_b = \{d_{b,0}, \dots, d_{b,n}\}, v$ to be challenged upon. \mathcal{B} randomly chooses $y_a, r'' \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Then, if $v \in D_a$ and $v = v_{a,n}$, \mathcal{B}

- randomly chooses a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and sets $Z = v_{a,n}^r$ if $b = 0$. Then, it finds the corresponding data items for T such that $d_{a,i} = v_{a,i}$,
- uniformly at random selects two values $r_{a,1}, r_{a,2}$, and sends $C_v = (g^{r_{a,1}}, g^{r_{a,2}\gamma_a}, (Zy_a = v_{a,n}^{ry_a})(g^{ry_a\beta_a(r_{a,1}+r_{a,2})})$ to \mathcal{A} .
- generates rekey, $rk_a = (g^{r''r\beta_a/\gamma_a}, g^{r''r\beta_a}, g^{r''/y_a}) = (RK_{a,1}, RK_{a,2}, RK_{a,3})$.
- computes, $T_i = H_2(e(v_{a,i}^{r''r}, g))$ and $s_a \leftarrow \text{acGen}(\text{acPk}, \{T_0, \dots, T_n\})$ for $0 \leq i \leq n$.
- encrypts the secret information s_a using other user's public key pk_b to obtain ciphertext $cph_b = (g^{r_7}, g^{\gamma_b r_8}, s_a g^{\beta_b(r_7+r_8)})$, where $r_7, r_8 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Then, \mathcal{B} runs $\rho_a \leftarrow \text{sigSign}(\text{sigSK}_a, cph_b)$ to obtain a signature ρ_a on message cph_b . Finally, \mathcal{B} sets $au_a = (rk_a, cph_b, \rho_a)$.

Guess. \mathcal{A} outputs $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and sends it to \mathcal{B} . If $t = b$ then \mathcal{A} wins the game. As the game is perfectly simulated by \mathcal{B} , then if \mathcal{A} chooses the correct b then \mathcal{B} also chooses as $t = b$ and breaks the VDDH assumption, with non-negligible probability $\geq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon'(\lambda)$. \square

A.2 Proof of Theorem 3

Proof. We show that if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary \mathcal{A} who breaks the verifiability of the SEVDSI scheme with a non-negligible probability ϵ , then we show how a probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathcal{B} can

break the assumption that Sig is an unforgeable signature scheme or Ac is a secure multi-accumulator. In the proof we assume H_1 is a random function and H_2 is a collision resistant hash function. \mathcal{B} proceeds as follows.

Setup: \mathcal{B} runs $pm \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\lambda)$ and makes pm publicly known. It then runs $\text{KeyGen}(pm)$ to obtain $sk_a = (\text{sigSK}_a, \beta_a, \gamma_a, x_a)$ and $pk_a = (\text{sigPK}_a, g^{\beta_a}, g^{\gamma_a})$, runs $\text{KeyGen}(pm)$ to obtain $sk_b = (\text{sigSK}_b, \beta_b, \gamma_b, x_b)$, $pk_b = (\text{sigPK}_b, g^{\beta_b}, g^{\gamma_b})$, and returns pk_a, pk_b to \mathcal{A} .

Phase 1: \mathcal{A} can make the following queries polynomially many times.

- **Enc:** Given the dataset D'_a , \mathcal{B} runs $C'_a \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_a, pk_a), D'_a)$ and returns C'_a to \mathcal{A} .
- **Enc:** Given the dataset D'_b , \mathcal{B} runs $C'_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_b, pk_b), D'_b)$ and returns C'_b to \mathcal{A} .
- **AuGen:** \mathcal{B} runs $au'_a, s'_a \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_a, D'_a, pm, pk_b)$ and returns au_a to \mathcal{A} .
- **AuGen:** \mathcal{B} runs $au'_b, s'_b \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_b, D'_b, pm, pk_a)$ and returns au_b to \mathcal{A} .
- **Verify:** \mathcal{B} runs $\text{Verify}(sk_a, s'_a, rslt_a, proof_a)$ and returns the output to \mathcal{A} .
- **Verify:** \mathcal{B} runs $\text{Verify}(sk_b, s'_b, rslt_b, proof_b)$ and returns the output to \mathcal{A} .

Challenge: \mathcal{A} selects D_a, D_b of its choice, and sends them to \mathcal{B} . \mathcal{B} runs $C_a \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_a, pk_a), D_a)$ and $C_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}((sk_b, pk_b), D_b)$, $au_a, sa \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_a, D_a, pm, pk_b)$ and $au_b, sb \leftarrow \text{AuGen}(sk_b, D_b, pm, pk_a)$, and returns C_a, au_a, C_b, au_b to \mathcal{A} .

Phase 2: \mathcal{A} issues queries in the same way as in Phase 1.

Guess: \mathcal{A} outputs $(rslt_a, proof_a), (rslt_b, proof_b)$ to \mathcal{B} . This completes the simulation. First let us consider the verification for $(rslt_a, proof_a)$. Note that cph_a specified by $proof_a$ cannot be manipulated, otherwise it breaks the unforgeability of Sig. \mathcal{B} decrypts cph_a to obtain s_b . In addition, \mathcal{B} decrypts $\text{Dec}(sk_a, rslt_a)$, and obtains

$T_a = H_2(e(d'_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})}) \mid cph_{a,i} \in rslt_a)$ where $d'_{a,i}$ is the plaintext with respect to $cph_{a,i}$ and $H_1(tk_{ab})$ is a random value.

$$T = H_2(e(d_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})}) \mid (d_{a,i} \in D_a) \wedge (tk_{ab} = g^{\gamma_a \gamma_b})) \cap$$

$$H_2(e(d_{b,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})}) \mid (d_{b,i} \in D_b) \wedge (tk_{ab} = g^{\gamma_a \gamma_b}))$$

. If \mathcal{A} breaks the verifiability with $(rslt_a, proof_a)$, then at least one of the following cases should hold:

Case 1:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &\leftarrow \text{acVerify}(acPk, s_a, T_a, acWit_a, s_b) \\ 1 &\leftarrow \text{acVerify}(acPk, s_a, T, acWit_a, s_b) \\ T &= T_a \\ \exists d'_{a,i} \neq d_{a,i}, H_2(e(d'_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})}) &= H_2(e(d_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})}), \end{aligned}$$

Case 2:

$$\begin{aligned} 1 &\leftarrow \text{acVerify}(acPk, s_a, T_a, acWit_a, s_b) \\ 1 &\leftarrow \text{acVerify}(acPk, s_a, T, acWit_a, s_b) \\ T &\neq T_a \end{aligned}$$

If \mathcal{A} breaks the verifiability regarding $(rslt_a, proof_a)$ with respect to case 1, then it breaks the assumption that H_2 is collision resistant: $(d'_{a,i} \neq d_{a,i})$

leads to $e(d'_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})} \neq e(d_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})}$ while $H_2(e(d'_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})}) = H_2(e(d_{a,i}, g)^{H_1(tk_{ab})})$.

If \mathcal{A} breaks the verifiability regarding $(rslt_a, proof_a)$ with respect to case 2, then it breaks the security of the multi-accumulator scheme by presenting $acRslt = T_a$, which is different from T .

Therefore, we proved that \mathcal{A} breaks the verifiability of SEVDSI scheme with respect to $(rslt_a, proof_a)$ or $(rslt_b, proof_b)$ with negligible probability under the assumptions that Sig is unforgeable, H_1 is a random function, H_2 is a collision resistant hash function and Ac is a secure multi-accumulator scheme. \square