

New Approach to Practical Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Cryptography

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Abstract. We present a new approach to construct several leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, including public-key encryption (PKE) schemes, authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols and low-latency key exchange (LLKE) protocols. To this end, we develop a new primitive called *leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange* (LR-NIKE). We introduce a new generic security model for LR-NIKE protocols, which can be instantiated in both bounded-and-continuous-memory leakage setting. We then show a secure construction of LR-NIKE protocol in the bounded-memory leakage setting, that achieves an optimal leakage rate, i.e., $1 - o(1)$. We then show how to construct the aforementioned leakage-resilient primitives from such a LR-NIKE. In particular,

- We show how to construct a leakage-resilient IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme in the bounded-memory leakage setting, from LR-NIKE protocol. Our construction differs from the state-of-the-art constructions of leakage-resilient IND-CCA-2-secure PKE, which use hash proof techniques to achieve leakage resiliency. Moreover, our transformation preserves the leakage-rate of the underlying LR-NIKE and admits more efficient construction than the previous such PKE constructions.
- We introduce a new leakage model for AKE protocols, in the bounded-memory leakage setting. We show how to construct a leakage-resilient AKE protocol starting from LR-NIKE protocol.
- We introduce the first-ever leakage model for LLKE protocols, in the bounded-memory leakage setting, and the first construction of such a leakage-resilient LLKE from LR-NIKE protocol.

Keywords: leakage-resilient, public-key encryption, key exchange protocols

1 Introduction and Related Works

Traditional cryptographic primitives are provably analyzed in a black-box model, where the adversary has restricted access to the primitive via well-defined interfaces. However, this does not truly reflect the real-world scenario where the adversary may attack the implementation of the cryptosystem itself, which is not accounted for in its analysis in the aforementioned well-defined interfaces. More precisely, the adversary may obtain lots of unintended information through side-channel attacks like power analysis attacks [28], electromagnetic attacks [22], timing attacks [9] etc. Leakage-resilient cryptography emerged as a theoretical foundation to address side-channel attacks, when a significant fraction of the secret key is leaked to the adversary. Note that, there must be some restrictions that must be imposed on the class of allowable leakage functions, as otherwise an adversary can simply read off the entire secret key from memory. Depending upon the restrictions that are put on the leakage functions, many theoretical models for addressing leakage has been introduced in the literature [1, 5, 8, 12, 14, 29]. In this work we focus on leakage-resilient public-key cryptography in the *bounded-memory leakage* model [1, 5]. In the bounded leakage model the adversary chooses an arbitrary polynomial time leakage function, f and sends it to the leakage oracle. The leakage oracle returns $f(sk)$ to the adversary, where sk is the secret key. The only restriction here is that the sum of output length of all the leakage functions that an adversary can obtain is bounded by some parameter λ , which is smaller than the size of sk . Refer Appendix A for details.

From the beginning of public-key cryptography in 1976 with the ground-breaking paper of Diffie and Hellman [11], authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols arose as an important cryptographic primitive. The Diffie-Hellman key exchange primitive can be viewed as a non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) protocol, where the public-keys are pre-distributed among the parties and they agree on some common global parameters. NIKE is very useful in any band-width-critical, power-critical, resource-critical systems such as embedded devices, wireless and sensor networks, where the communication must be at its minimum. Despite its real-world applications, NIKE has mostly been overlooked until recently [16]. In 2013, Freire et al. [16] discussed about the formal security models for NIKE and the constructions of efficient NIKE schemes. However, we show that this construction is completely *insecure* if the adversary obtains even a single bit of leakage from the secret key of a party. Much research has been carried out on analyzing leakage resiliency of interactive key exchange protocols [2–4, 10], but the leakage resiliency of NIKE remains largely unstudied. Therefore, it is really important to thoroughly study on the leakage resiliency of NIKE.

As one of the central applications of leakage-resilient NIKE (LR-NIKE), we show how to construct leakage-resilient IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme generically from LR-NIKE (in the bounded-memory leakage setting). Our construction deviates significantly from all the state-of-the-art constructions of LR-IND-CCA-2-secure PKE schemes. All the previous constructions of practical leakage-resilient IND-CCA-2 (LR-IND-CCA-2) secure PKE schemes relies solely on hash proof techniques to achieve leakage resiliency. However, the generic approach of constructing leakage-resilient CCA secure PKE scheme *solely* using hash proof system (HPS) systems is inherently limited to leakage rate below $1/2$, as pointed out by Dodis et al. [13]. The leakage rate of the state-of-the-art constructions of LR-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme was later improved in the subsequent works of Qin et al. [31, 32], which achieved leakage rates of $1/2 - o(1)$ and $1 - o(1)$ respectively. They could achieve the leakage rate of $1/2 - o(1)$ by using HPS and one-time lossy filters (OTLF)³, and the optimal rate of $1 - o(1)$ by cleverly instantiating the underlying primitives, namely HPS and OTLF. However, the complexity assumption they make for their construction is rather non-standard, namely refined subgroup indistinguishability (RSI) assumption over composite order groups.

We deviate significantly from this HPS based approach of constructing LR-IND-CCA-2-secure PKE schemes, and show that this connection is not inherent. To this end, we develop a new primitive called *leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange* (NIKE). Our construction of leakage-resilient NIKE relies solely on leakage-resilient chameleon hash function (which in turn relies only on strong collision-resistant hash function) and only a few pairing operations. We then show a very simple and generic construction of LR-IND-CCA-2-secure PKE schemes achieving the optimal leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$, based solely on the assumption that the leakage-resilient NIKE exists. Our construction significantly *improves* the efficiency of LR-IND-CCA-2 secure PKE schemes compared to their state-of-the-art constructions (which use the HPS-based approach) (please refer to Table 1 for details). Besides, our LR-IND-CCA-2 secure PKE scheme also achieves the optimal leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$.

³ Note that this circumvents the impossibility result of Dodis et al. [13], since the analysis of [13] considered the fact that the LR-IND-CCA-secure PKE was constructed solely from HPS; whereas in [31, 32] they do not solely use HPS and instead relies on both HPS and OTLF for their construction.

We also show the applicability of leakage-resilient NIKE to construct leakage-resilient authenticated key exchange (AKE) protocols and leakage-resilient low-latency key exchange (LLKE) protocols (in the bounded-memory leakage setting). All the previous constructions of leakage-resilient AKE protocols [3,4,10] either implicitly rely on HPS (by using leakage-resilient PKE as their building block) or explicitly by using the properties of HPS. Our generic construction of leakage-resilient AKE gives an alternate way to construct AKE protocols, different from the previous constructions of leakage-resilient AKE protocols, achieving the optimal leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$. Low-latency key exchange (LLKE) are one of the most practical key exchange protocols that permits the transmission of cryptographically protected data, without prior key exchange, while providing perfect forward secrecy (PFS). This concept was discussed in the Google’s QUIC ⁴ protocol. Further, a low-latency mode is currently under discussion for inclusion in TLS 1.3 version. Although, the first formal model of LLKE was studied by Hale et al. [20], leakage resiliency of LLKE remains unstudied until present. Being a candidate for TLS 1.3, it is important to explore the leakage resiliency of LLKE protocols, as side-channel attacks widely exist.

Technical Contributions. Following are the main technical contributions:

Leakage-resilient NIKE. As our *first* major contribution we study the leakage resiliency of NIKE protocols. We present a leakage security model for NIKE protocols, defining the notion of leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange. Our model is generic and can be instantiated in the bounded-memory leakage model and in continuous-memory leakage model. We then show how to construct secure a NIKE protocol in the bounded-memory leakage model. Our constructions rely only on leakage-resilient chameleon hash functions, which in turn admits very efficient instantiations based on leakage-resilient hard relations [35,36].

Our model: Our model of leakage-resilient NIKE generalizes the CKS-heavy model of NIKE proposed of Freire et al. [16], in the setting of leakage. Our model is a very strong model allowing the adversary to register arbitrary public keys into the system, corrupt honest parties to obtain their secret keys, issue extract queries to obtain shared keys between two honest parties and also between one honest party and another corrupt party. Besides this, we also allow the adversary to obtain additional leakage from both the parties involved in the Test/challenge query. We also introduce the notion of *validity* of a test query reminiscent of the notion of freshness of a test session for (interactive) key exchange protocols. Finally, in the (valid) test query between two honest parties, the adversary has to distinguish the shared key between them from a random shared key. In the bounded leakage instantiation of our generic security model of NIKE, the adversary can obtain bounded leakages from the secret keys of all parties including those involved in the test query also. Differently, in the continuous leakage instantiation of our model the secret is refreshed periodically. The adversary can obtain unbounded and arbitrary leakage from the secret keys of the parties, provided the leakage from the secret key per invocation (between two successive refreshes) is bounded.

Our construction: The starting point of our construction is the NIKE scheme of Freire et al. [16]. However, as shown in Section 3.2, the above scheme is completely insecure if the adversary obtains even a *single* bit of leakage from the secret key. The main point where the construction breaks down is the exponentiation operation. Our attack exploits the fact that if exponentiation is done in the normal way, then it is completely insecure in the presence of leakage. A common countermeasure against this is masking where one does a multiplicative secret sharing to share the secret key and the exponentiation is done step-wise using each of these shares. However, for arguing security one necessarily needs to make additional restrictions on the leakage functions. In particular, all these masking schemes are proven secure in the *Only Computation leaks Information* (OCLI) axiom of Micali and Reyzin [29] or the *split-state* assumption [19,21,24]. The OCLI axiom essentially tells that the secret state leaks only during the actual computations, i.e., only actual computations are supposed to leak sensitive information, and leakage never happens from the entire memory of the device. This is in contrast to our model, where we consider a global leakage model where the adversary can leak from the entire memory. So our model captures side-channel attacks like cold boot attacks which are not captured by the OCLI framework.

To this end, we use the ideas from twisted-pair PRF trick [17], but careful adopted to deal with leakage for our leakage-resilient NIKE construction. In particular we add strong randomness extractors as pre-processors to the original twisting technique [17]. The main idea behind the twisted-pair PRF trick is that, it involves two PRFs F and F' with reversing keys. The output of the twisting function is simply the output of the two PRFs that are combined together in special way. The guarantee is that

⁴ <https://www.chromium.org/quic>

output of the twisting function looks computationally indistinguishable from a uniform value over the same range. For our construction of leakage-resilient twisted-pair PRF trick, we add strong randomness extractors as pre-processors to the original twisting technique. The guarantee is that the output of our leakage-resilient twisted-pair PRF function is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform value over the same range, even if the adversary knows the key of one PRF in full and obtains bounded leakage from the key of the other PRF. For our construction of NIKE in the bounded leakage model, the strong randomness extractor (when appropriately parameterized) takes care of the (bounded) leakage and then we can extract randomness from the secret key of the NIKE and use the extracted key as the key in one of the PRF. The key for the other PRF is included as part of the public key of the party. The output of the leakage-resilient twisting function is then used to do secure exponentiation in the presence of leakage. By appropriately parameterizing the extractor we can obtain a leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$. So we can achieve leakage-resilient exponentiation with optimal leakage rate in the (global) bounded-memory leakage model. Combined with a bounded leakage-resilient CHF tolerating leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$, we can achieve a leakage-resilient NIKE in the bounded-memory leakage model with overall leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$.

Leakage-resilient CCA-2-secure PKE. As one of the central applications of leakage-resilient NIKE (LR-NIKE), we show how to construct leakage-resilient IND-CCA-2 (LR-IND-CCA-2) secure PKE generically from LR-NIKE. As already mentioned in the introduction, our approach to LR-IND-CCA-2-secure PKE is completely different from the hash-proof framework of constructing LR-IND-CCA-2-secure PKE schemes in the bounded-memory leakage model. Our construction achieves the optimal leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$ and at the same time is much more efficient and hence practical than the state-of-the-art constructions.

Our construction: Our generic transformation from LR-NIKE to LR-IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme essentially follows and adapts the ideas of Freire et al. [16]. We observe that the same transformation of Freire et al. [16] from (standard) NIKE to CCA-2-secure PKE works even in the presence of leakage provided we have an appropriate leakage-resilient NIKE as the starting point of our transformation. The main idea behind the transformation is as follows: the public-secret key pair of the LR-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme is same as the public-secret key pair of the underlying LR-NIKE protocol. While encrypting, another public-secret key pair of the NIKE is sampled independently and the shared key generation algorithm of the NIKE is run among the two key pairs yielding a shared key. This key is used as the encapsulation key of the underlying IND-CCA-2-secure key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and the ciphertext is set to be the new sampled public key. Decryption is straightforward and the decryptor can recover the same shared key by running the shared key generation algorithm with the original secret key and the new sampled public key. Now from the IND-CCA-2-KEM one can easily get a full fledged IND-CCA-2-secure PKE using standard techniques.

Our transformation preserves the leakage rate, in the sense that if the starting point of our construction is a LR-NIKE with leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$, then the LR-CCA-2-secure PKE constructed from it also enjoys the *same* leakage rate. Hence we obtain the most efficient and practical construction of LR-IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme achieving optimal leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$ following a completely different approach from the hash proof techniques.

In Table 1, we show the comparison of our scheme with the state-of-the-art constructions of LR-IND-CCA secure PKE schemes in terms of both *computational* and *communication* complexity. We obtain these complexity figures by instantiating all of the compared schemes with the state-of-the-art constructions of the required underlying primitives. As we can see, the number of group elements involved in our ciphertext is *far lesser* than the number of group elements involved in the ciphertexts of the other schemes. With regard to the number of exponentiations and multiplication operations also, our scheme is much more efficient compared to others, hence improving the computational complexity of the state-of-the-art LR-IND-CCA secure PKE schemes by a significant margin. However, note that we do require a constant number of pairing operations (to be precise only 3) in the encryption side and also in the decryption side. In the table, $n \in \mathbb{N}$, and is usually the number of generators required for the construction. Also [32] works over composite order groups of the form $\mathbb{G} = \mathbb{G}_{\tau_1} \times \mathbb{G}_{\tau_2}$. Here \mathcal{T}_c denotes the tag space in the encryption scheme of [32], and $\{0, 1\}^s$ denote the seed space of a strong randomness extractor.

Leakage-resilient AKE. As our next contribution, we show how to obtain a generic construction of a leakage-resilient authenticated key exchange (LR-AKE) protocol, starting from a leakage-resilient NIKE. Our construction of the LR-AKE protocol also gives a new and alternate construction from LR-NIKE.

Scheme	#Exponentiations			#Multiplications			#Pairings			Size of ciphertext C	Leakage rate.	Complexity Assumptions
	KeyGen	Enc.	Dec.	KeyGen	Enc.	Dec.	KeyGen	Enc.	Dec.			
Qin and Liu [31]	n^2	$(n^2 + n + 2)$	$(n^2 + 2n)$	$(n^2 + n)$	$2n^2$	$(2n^2 + n)$	NA	NA	NA	$\mathbb{G}^2 \times \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \{0, 1\}^m \times \tilde{\mathbb{G}}^{n^2 \times n^2}$	$\frac{1}{2} - o(1)$	DDH
Qin and Liu [32]	$(n^2 + n + 1)$	$(3n + 2)$	$(3n + 1)$	n	$2n$	$2n$	NA	NA	NA	$\mathbb{G}_{\tau_1} \times \{0, 1\}^m \times \mathbb{G}^{n+1} \times \mathcal{T}_c$	$1 - o(1)$	RSI over composite order groups
Ours	$(n + 5)$	$(2n + 8)$	$(n + 3)$	$(n + 3)$	$(2n + 6)$	$(n + 3)$	NA	3	3	$\mathbb{G}^2_{\mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}} \times \{0, 1\}^s$	$1 - o(1)$	DBDH

Table 1. Comparison among the LR-IND-CCA PKE schemes

We first formulate a new security model for LR-AKE protocols, which we call *Bounded-memory Before-the-Fact Leakage eCK* (BBFL-eCK) model. We then show a generic construction of BBFL-eCK-secure AKE protocol using a LR-NIKE in the bounded-memory leakage setting.

Our model: Our security model for LR-AKE is a strong security model which addresses (bounded) leakage from the entire memory, which is stronger than the Only computation leaks information axiom [29]. We present an eCK-style [26] security model, suitably adjusted to the leakage setting.

Our construction: We give the generic construction of leakage-resilient AKE from leakage-resilient NIKE in the bounded-memory leakage model. We adapt the construction of Bergsma et al. [6] to the setting of leakage. In particular Bergsma et al. [6] showed a construction of AKE protocols from a standard NIKE protocol and an existentially unforgeable signature scheme. We replace the standard NIKE with our leakage-resilient NIKE and the existentially unforgeable signature scheme with a signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable under chosen message and leakage attacks [23]. It is then straightforward to see that the constructed AKE protocol is secure in our BBFL-eCK security model. The leakage rate of our construction is $1 - o(1)$, under appropriate choice of parameters.

Leakage-resilient LLKE. As our final contribution we show an extremely important practical application of leakage-resilient NIKE protocols. We study the leakage resiliency of low-latency key exchange (LLKE) protocols. In this paper we give a suitable leakage security model for LLKE protocols which we call the Bounded-memory leakage LLKE-ma (BL-LLKE-ma) model where “ma” stands for mutual authentication. We then present a generic construction of leakage-resilient LLKE (LR-LLKE) construction based on our new LR-NIKE protocol in the bounded-memory leakage setting.

Our model: The security of (standard) LLKE protocols has been recently analyzed by Hale et al. [20], under mutual authentication of the client well as the server. We give a leakage analogue of their security model. Our model allows the adversary to activate arbitrary protocol sessions between the clients and servers. Besides, the adversary can obtain the temporary or the main keys of a session of both the clients as well as the server, obtain the long-term secret key of clients and servers and also obtain bounded leakage from both the client and the server involved in the Test query. Finally in the test query (satisfying some freshness/validity conditions) the adversary has to guess the requested key from a random key.

Our construction: Adopting the construction of Hale et al. [20] we show a generic construction of leakage-resilient LLKE protocol from a leakage-resilient NIKE protocol. In particular, we require a LR-NIKE scheme and a UF-CMLA secure signature scheme. Plugging them appropriately in our context we obtain the construction of leakage-resilient LLKE protocol. Moreover, the leakage rate enjoyed by our LLKE protocol is also optimal, i.e., $1 - o(1)$, under appropriate choice of parameters.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Notations

For $a, b \in \mathbb{R}$, we let $[a, b] = \{x \in \mathbb{R} : a \leq x \leq b\}$; for $a \in \mathbb{N}$, we let $[a] = \{1, 2, \dots, a\}$. If x is a string, we denote $|x|$ as the length of x . When x is chosen randomly from a set \mathcal{X} , we write $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{X}$. When A is an algorithm, we write $y \xleftarrow{\$} A(x)$ to denote a run of A on input x and output y ; if A is randomized, then y is a random variable and $A(x; r)$ denotes a run of A on input x and randomness r . We denote the security parameter throughout by κ . An algorithm A is probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) if A is randomized and for any input $x, r \in \{0, 1\}^*$; the computation of $A(x; r)$ terminates in at most $\text{poly}(|x|)$ steps. Let \mathbb{G} be a group of prime order p such that $\log_2(p) \geq \kappa$. Let g be a generator of \mathbb{G} , then for a (column/row) vector $C = (C_1, \dots, C_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, we denote by g^C the vector $C = (g^{C_1}, \dots, g^{C_n})$. Furthermore, for a vector $D = (D_1, \dots, D_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^n$, we denote by C^D the group element $X = \prod_{i=1}^n g^{C_i D_i} = g^{\sum_{i=1}^n C_i D_i}$.

2.2 Entropy and Randomness Extraction

We begin with some definitions and useful result.

Definition 1 (Min-Entropy). The *min-entropy* of a random variable X , denoted as $H_\infty(X)$ is defined as $H_\infty(X) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} -\log(\max_x \Pr[X = x])$. This is a standard notion of entropy used in cryptography, since it measures the worst-case predictability of X .

Definition 2 (Average Conditional Min-Entropy). The *average-conditional min-entropy* of a random variable X conditioned on a (possibly) correlated variable Z , denoted as $\tilde{H}_\infty(X|Z)$ is defined as

$$\tilde{H}_\infty(X|Z) = -\log(\mathbb{E}_{z \leftarrow Z} [\max_x \Pr[X = x|Z = z]]) = -\log(\mathbb{E}_{z \leftarrow Z} [2^{H_\infty(X|Z=z)}]).$$

This measures the worst-case predictability of X by an adversary that may observe a correlated variable Z .

The following bound on average min-entropy was proved in Dodis et al. [15].

Lemma 1. [15] For any random variable X , Y and Z , if Y takes on values in $\{0, 1\}^\ell$, then

$$\tilde{H}_\infty(X|Y, Z) \geq \tilde{H}_\infty(X|Z) - \ell \quad \text{and} \quad \tilde{H}_\infty(X|Y) \geq \tilde{H}_\infty(X) - \ell.$$

Definition 3 (Randomness Extractor). We say that an efficient randomized function $\text{Ext}: \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{S} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ is an (v, ϵ) -extractor if for all (correlated) random variables X, Z such that the support of X is \mathcal{X} and $\tilde{H}_\infty(X|Z) \geq v$, we get $(Z, S, \text{Ext}(X; S)) \approx_\epsilon (Z, S, U_{\mathcal{Y}})$, where S is uniform over \mathcal{S} , and $U_{\mathcal{Y}}$ denotes the uniform distribution over the range of the extractor \mathcal{Y} .

2.3 Bounded Leakage-resilient (LR) Chameleon Hash Functions

In this section we give the definition of LR chameleon hash functions (CHF) in the *bounded-memory leakage model* [35].

LR-CHF in bounded leakage model: Informally, a chameleon hash function (CHF) is a collision-resistant hash function, the only difference being that it is easy to find collision given a trapdoor. Without knowing the trapdoor it is hard to find any collision. Leakage-resilient chameleon hash functions (LR-CHF) postulate that it is hard to find collisions, even when the adversary learns bounded leakage/information about the secret key. Formally, an λ -LR-CHF $\text{ChamH}: \mathcal{D} \times \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$, where \mathcal{D} is the domain, $\mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$ the randomness space and \mathcal{I} the range, consists of the algorithms (Cham.KeyGen , Cham.Eval , Cham.TCF).

1. $\text{Cham.KeyGen}(1^\kappa, \lambda)$: The key generation algorithm takes as input 1^κ and the leakage bound λ as parameters and output an evaluation key along with a trapdoor (hk, ck) . The public key hk defines a chameleon hash function, denoted $\text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(\cdot, \cdot)$.
2. $\text{Cham.Eval}(\text{hk}, m, r)$: The hash function evaluation algorithm that takes as input hk , a message $m \in \mathcal{D}$, and a randomizer $r \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$ and outputs a hash value $h = \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(m, r)$.
3. $\text{Cham.TCF}(\text{ck}, (m, r), m')$: The trapdoor collision finder algorithm takes as the trapdoor ck , a message-randomizer pair (m, r) , an additional message m' , and outputs a value $r' \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$ such that $\text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(m, r) = \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(m', r')$.

A λ -LR-CHF must satisfy the following three properties:

- **Reversibility:** The reversibility property is satisfied if $r' = \text{Cham.TCF}(\text{ck}, (m, r), m')$ is equivalent to $r = \text{Cham.TCF}(\text{ck}, (m', r'), m)$.
- **Random Trapdoor Collisions:** The random trapdoor collision property is satisfied if for a trapdoor ck , an arbitrary message pair (m, m') , and a randomizer r , $r' = \text{Cham.TCF}(\text{ck}, (m, r), m')$ has uniform probability distribution on the randomness space $\mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$.
- **LR-collision resistance:** The LR collision-resistance property is satisfied if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , we have that the following advantage in negligible:

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ChamH}}^{\text{coll}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[(\text{hk}, \text{ck}) \leftarrow \text{Cham.KeyGen}(1^\kappa, \ell); (m, r), (m', r') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{O_{\text{ck}}^{\kappa, \lambda}}(\text{hk}) : (m, r) \neq (m', r') \wedge \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(m, r) = \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(m', r')]|$$

where $O_{\text{ck}}^{\kappa, \lambda}$ is the leakage oracle to which \mathcal{A} can adaptively query to learn at most λ bits of information about the trapdoor ck .

2.4 Pseudo-random Functions

$F : \Sigma^k \times \Sigma^m \rightarrow \Sigma^n$ is a $(\epsilon_{\text{prf}}, s_{\text{prf}}, q_{\text{prf}})$ secure pseudo-random function (PRF) if no adversary of size s_{prf} can distinguish F (instantiated with a random key) from a uniformly random function, i.e., for any \mathcal{A} of size s_{prf} making q_{prf} oracle queries we have:

$$\left| \Pr_{K \xleftarrow{\$} \Sigma^k} [\mathcal{A}^{F(K, \cdot)} \rightarrow 1] - \Pr_{R_{m,n}} [\mathcal{A}^{R_{m,n}(\cdot)} \rightarrow 1] \right| \leq \epsilon_{\text{prf}}, \text{ where } R(m, n) \text{ is the set of all functions from } \Sigma^m \rightarrow \Sigma^n.$$

2.5 UF-CMLA-Secure Signature Schemes

We review the definition of UF-CMLA security according to Katz et al. [23]. The leakage function f_i is an adversary chosen efficiently computable adaptive leakage function, which leaks $f_i(sk)$ from a secret key sk .

Definition 4 (Unforgeability Against Chosen Message Leakage Attacks (UF-CMLA)). Let κ be the security parameter and λ be the leakage parameter. Let LR-SIG = (SIGkg, SIGsign, SIGvfy) be a signature scheme, we define $\text{Adv}_{\text{LR-SIG}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{sig}}}^{\text{UF-CMLA}}(\kappa)$ as the advantage of any PPT adversary \mathcal{B}_{sig} , winning the following game:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $(sk^{\text{sig}}, pk^{\text{sig}}) \xleftarrow{\\$} \text{SIGkg}(1^\kappa)$ 2. $(m^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}(\cdot, \cdot)}(pk^{\text{sig}})$ 3. If $\text{SIGvfy}(pk^{\text{sig}}, m^*, \sigma^*) = \text{“true”}$ and m^* is not been previously signed, then \mathcal{B}_{sig} wins. | <p>Oracle $\mathcal{O}(m, f_i)$</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • $\sigma \xleftarrow{\\$} \text{SIGsign}(sk^{\text{sig}}, m)$ • $\gamma_i \leftarrow f_i(sk^{\text{sig}})$ • If $\sum_{i=1}^{\lambda} \gamma_i \leq \lambda$ <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - $\gamma \leftarrow \gamma_i$ - $\gamma \leftarrow \perp$ • Return (σ, γ) |
|--|--|

We say the signature scheme LR-SIG is UF-CMLA-secure, if $\text{Adv}_{\text{LR-SIG}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{sig}}}^{\text{UF-CMLA}}(\kappa)$ is negligible.

2.6 Assumptions in Bilinear Group

In this paper we will consider *Type-2* pairings. We let \mathcal{G}_2 be a *type 2 pairing parameter generation* algorithm. It takes as input the security parameter 1^κ and outputs $gk = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1, g_2, p, e, \psi)$ such that p is a prime, $(\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T)$ are description of multiplicative cyclic groups of same order p , g_1, g_2 are generators of \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 respectively, $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is a non-degenerate efficiently computable bilinear map, and ψ is an efficiently computable isomorphism $\psi : \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_1$, and that $g_1 = \psi(g_2)$.

The Decisional Bilinear Assumption over Type-2 Pairings (DBDH-2). Let $gk = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1, g_2, p, e, \psi)$ be the output of the parameter generation algorithm \mathcal{G}_2 as above. We consider the following version of the DBDH-2 problem introduced by Galindo [18] and also used in Freire et al. [16]. Formally, we say that the DBDH-2 assumption holds for type-2 pairings if the advantage of the adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ denoted by $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}, \mathcal{G}_2}}^{\text{dbdh-2}}(\kappa)$ is negligible, where

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}, \mathcal{G}_2}}^{\text{dbdh-2}}(\kappa) = |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(g_2, g_2^a, g_2^b, g_1^c, e(g_1, g_2)^{abc}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(g_2, g_2^a, g_2^b, g_1^c, e(g_1, g_2)^z) = 1]|.$$

where the probability is taken over the random choices of the algorithm \mathcal{G}_2 and the internal coin tosses of the algorithm \mathcal{A} .

3 Leakage-resilient Non-interactive Key Exchange

In this section we give our definition of leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange (LR-NIKE). We assume that all the public keys in the system are distinct and each of them uniquely represents an user/identity in the system. In other words, the adversary is *not* allowed to register the same public key more than once. In practice, this can easily be ensured by requiring the Certification Authority (CA) to check for consistency whenever an individual attempts to register a public key in the system. So, w.l.o.g, when we write pk_i for the i -th public key, we mean that pk_i is associated with the user with identifier $ID_i \in \mathcal{IDS}$, where \mathcal{IDS} denotes the identity space. In the leakage-free scenario, this setting was also considered in the work of Freire et al. [16], which they called the Simplified(S)-NIKE. Also, we denote by \mathcal{PK} , \mathcal{SK} and \mathcal{SHK} the space of public keys, secret keys and shared keys respectively. Formally, a LR-NIKE scheme, LR-NIKE, consists of a tuple of algorithms (NIKEcommon_setup, NIKEgen, NIKEkey) with the functionalities specified below:

1. $\text{NIKEcommon_setup}(1^\kappa, \lambda)$: The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter κ and the overall leakage bound λ that can be tolerated by the NIKE scheme, and outputs a set of global parameters of the system denoted by $params$.
2. $\text{NIKEgen}(1^\kappa, params)$: The key generation algorithm is probabilistic and can be executed independently by all the users. It takes as input the security parameter κ and $params$ and outputs a public/secret key pair $(pk, sk) \in \mathcal{PK} \times \mathcal{SK}$.
3. $\text{NIKEkey}(pk_i, sk_j)$: The shared key generation algorithm takes the public key of user ID_i , namely pk_i and the secret key of user ID_j , namely sk_j , and outputs a shared key $shk_{ij} \in \mathcal{SHK}$ for the two keys or a failure symbol \perp if $i = j$, i.e., if sk_j is the secret key corresponding to pk_i .

The *correctness* requirement states that for any two pairs (pk_i, sk_i) and (pk_j, sk_j) , the shared keys computed by them should be identical, i.e., $\text{NIKEkey}(pk_i, sk_j) = \text{NIKEkey}(pk_j, sk_i)$.

3.1 The Generic Leakage-resilient Non-interactive Key Exchange ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy) Security Model

In this section we present the formal security model for leakage-resilient non-interactive key exchange (LR-NIKE). Our security models of LR-NIKE can be seen as generalization of the CKS-heavy security model introduced in Freire et al. [16] to appropriately model key leakage attacks. Our generic LR-NIKE ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy) security model can be instantiated in two different ways which leads to two different security models, namely- *bounded* LR-CKS-heavy (BLR-CKS-heavy) model and *continuous* LR-CKS-heavy (CLR-CKS-heavy) model.

Our model allows the adversary to register *arbitrary* public keys into the system, provided they are distinct from each other and from the public keys of the honestly registered parties. The adversary can also issue **Extract** queries to learn the private keys corresponding to the honestly generated public keys. The adversary can also learn the shared key between two honestly generated parties (via **HonestReveal** query) as long as both of them are not involved in the challenge/Test query. We also allow the adversary to learn the shared key between an honest party and a corrupt party (via **CorruptReveal** query). Apart from the above queries, the BLR-CKS-heavy model allows the adversary to obtain a *bounded* amount of leakage of the secret/private keys of the parties. Differently, the CLR-CKS-heavy model allows the adversary to continuously obtain *arbitrarily* large amount of leakage from the secret keys of the parties, enforcing the restriction that the amount of leakage per observation is bounded. Finally, in the Test query, the adversary has to distinguish the real shared key between two honest parties from a random shared key. To prevent trivial wins, we enforce some natural restrictions on the Test query which we call the *validity* conditions. We also note that once the test query is asked by the adversary, he is not allowed to make further leakage queries on the corresponding parties involved in the test query (modeling *before-the-fact* leakage).

Remark 1. (Extract query vs. Leakage queries). By issuing **Extract** query, the adversary can learn the secret key of a party entirely. Separately, by issuing leakage queries the adversary gets bounded/continuous amount of leakage from the secret key. It may seem paradoxical to consider both **Extract** as well as **Leakage** queries at the same time. However, there are good reasons to consider both.

A non-leakage version of the ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy) model allow the adversary to corrupt the honest parties to obtain the corresponding secret keys. However, it disallows the adversary to corrupt any of the parties involved in the Test query. This is a natural restriction, since corrupting any of the parties involved in the test session will also allow the adversary to reconstruct the shared key of the test session and hence win the security game with certainty. But note that in our ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy) model the adversary can also obtain (bounded/continuous) leakage from the secret keys of the parties involved in the test session in *addition* to corrupting other (non-test) honest parties in the system.

Hence, the ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy) model allows the adversary to obtain more information than a non-leakage version of ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy) model, namely CKS-heavy model [16] and hence is necessarily *stronger* than the CKS-heavy model.

Adversarial Powers. The ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy) security model is stated in terms of a security game between a challenger \mathcal{C} and an adversary \mathcal{A} . The adversary \mathcal{A} is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm. We denote by $\Pi_{U,V}$ the protocol run between principal U , with intended principal V . Initially, the challenger \mathcal{C} runs the NIKEcommon_setup algorithm to output the set of public parameters $params$, and gives $params$ to \mathcal{A} . The challenger \mathcal{C} also chooses a random bit b in the beginning of the

security game and answers all the legitimate queries of \mathcal{A} until \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' . \mathcal{A} is allowed to ask the following queries:

1. **RegisterHonest queries**($1^\kappa, params$): This query allows the adversary to register honest parties in the system. The challenger runs the **NIKEgen** algorithm to generate a key pair (pk_U, sk_U) and records the tuple $(honest, pk_U, sk_U)$. It then returns the public key pk_U to \mathcal{A} . We refer to the parties registered via this query as *honest* parties.
2. **RegisterCorrupt queries**(pk_U): This query allows the adversary to register arbitrary corrupt parties in the system. Here, \mathcal{A} supplies a public key pk_U . The challenger records the tuple $(corrupt, pk_U, \perp)$. We demand that all the public keys involved in this query are distinct from one another and from the honestly generated public keys from above. The parties registered via this query are referred to as *corrupt*.
3. **Extract queries**(pk_U): In this query the adversary \mathcal{A} supplies the public key pk_U of a honest party. The challenger looks up the corresponding tuple $(honest, pk_U, sk_U)$ and returns the secret key sk_U to \mathcal{A} .
4. **Reveal queries**(pk_U, pk_V): This query can be categorized in to two types– **HonestReveal** queries and **CorruptReveal** queries. Here the adversary supplies a pair of public keys pk_U and pk_V . In the **HonestReveal** query, both pk_U and pk_V are honestly registered, i.e., both of them correspond to honest parties; whereas in **CorruptReveal** query, one of the public key is registered as honest while the other is registered as corrupt. The challenger runs the **NIKEkey** algorithm using the secret key of the honest party (in case of **HonestReveal** query using the secret key of any one of the parties) and the public key of the other party, and returns the result to \mathcal{A} .
5. **Test** (pk_U, pk_V): Here \mathcal{A} supplies two distinct public keys pk_U and pk_V , that were both registered as *honest*. If $pk_U = pk_V$, the challenger aborts and returns \perp . Otherwise, it uses the bit b to answer the query. If $b = 0$, the challenger runs the **NIKEkey** algorithm using the public key of one party say pk_U , and the private key of the other party sk_V and returns the result to \mathcal{A} . If $b = 1$, the challenger samples a random shared key from \mathcal{SHK} , and returns that to \mathcal{A} .
6. **Leakage queries**: The leakage queries can further be categorized into two types depending upon the particular instantiation of our generic (\cdot) LR-CKS-heavy model.
 - (a) *Bounded leakage queries*: In the BLR-CKS-heavy security model the total amount of leakage from the secret key of the underlying cryptographic primitives is bounded by leakage parameter $\lambda = \lambda(\kappa)$. Here the adversary \mathcal{A} supplies the description of an arbitrary polynomial time computable functions f_i and a public key pk . The challenger computes $f_i(sk)$, where sk is the secret key corresponding to pk , and returns the output to \mathcal{A} . The adversary \mathcal{A} can specify multiple such leakage functions as long as the leakage bound is not violated, i.e., $\sum_i |f_i(sk)| \leq \lambda(\kappa)$. Note that \mathcal{A} can obtain λ bits of information/leakage from the secret key from each of the honest parties, *including* those involved in the **Test** queries.
 - (b) *Continuous leakage queries*: In the CLR-CKS-heavy model the adversary can obtain unbounded leakage of the secret key of honest parties, with the only restriction that the amount of leakage per occurrence is bounded by leakage parameter. If the leakage bound of the secret keys of the parties per occurrence is $\lambda(\kappa)$ and the leakage function f_i outputs leakage bits of the i^{th} secret key, then for leakage resilience of the i^{th} secret key we need that $|f_i(sk_i)| \leq \lambda(\kappa)$.

\mathcal{A} 's queries may be made adaptively and are arbitrary in number. However, to prevent trivial wins the adversary should not be allowed to make certain queries to the parties involved in the **Test** query. We model this by requiring the **Test** query to be *valid*. We next give the definition of validity in our (\cdot) LR-CKS-heavy model (see Def. 5).

Our condition of *validity* of the **Test** query is split into two parts depending on the particular instantiation of our (\cdot) LR-CKS-heavy model.

Definition 5 (λ -BLR-CKS-heavy validity). *We say that the **Test** query $\Pi_{U,V}$ between two parties U and V with public-secret key pairs (pk_U, sk_U) and (pk_V, sk_V) respectively is valid in the BLR-CKS-heavy model if the following conditions hold:*

1. *The adversary \mathcal{A} is not allowed to ask **Extract**(pk_U) or **Extract**(pk_V) queries.*
2. *The adversary \mathcal{A} should not be allowed to ask **HonestReveal**(pk_U, pk_V) or **HonestReveal**(pk_V, pk_U) queries.*

3. The total output length of all the Bounded Leakage queries queried by \mathcal{A} to each party involved in the Test query, i.e., U and V is at most $\lambda(\kappa)$, i.e., $\sum_i |f_i(sk_U)| \leq \lambda(\kappa)$ and $\sum_i |f_i(sk_V)| \leq \lambda(\kappa)$.
4. After the Test query $\Pi_{U,V}$ is activated, the leakage functions $f_i(sk_U)$ and $f_i(sk_V)$ may not be asked by the adversary.

Definition 6 (λ -CLR-CKS-heavy validity). We say that the Test query is valid in the CLR-CKS-heavy model if: Conditions (1)-(2) of Definition 5 hold, and

3. The output length of the Continuous Leakage queries made by \mathcal{A} per occurrence to each party involved in the Test query is at most $\lambda(\kappa)$, i.e., $|f_i(sk_U)| \leq \lambda(\kappa)$ and $|f_i(sk_V)| \leq \lambda(\kappa)$.
4. After the Test query $\Pi_{U,V}$ is activated, the leakage functions $f_i(sk_U)$ and $f_i(sk_V)$ may not be asked by the adversary.

Remark 2. Note that in our validity conditions defined above (Defs. 5 and 6) we *do not* allow the adversary to make leakage queries to either of the parties involved in the Test query *after* the Test query is activated. This is because if the adversary is allowed to leak from the secret key after the Test query he can simply encode the specification of the shared key derivation function and other public keys into the leakage function. This reveals some information about the shared key allowing the adversary to successfully answer the challenge (distinguishing real from random). Such an impossibility result was also shown in the context of public-key encryption [30] and (interactive) key exchange protocols [3].

Security Game and Security Definition.

Definition 7 ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy security game). Security of a NIKE protocol in the generic ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy model is defined using the following security game, which is played by a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} against the protocol challenger \mathcal{C} .

- **Stage 1:** The challenger \mathcal{C} runs LR-NIKEcommon_setup algorithm to output the global parameters *params* and return it to \mathcal{A} .
- **Stage 2:** \mathcal{A} may ask any number of RegisterHonest, RegisterCorrupt, Extract, HonestReveal, CorruptReveal, and Leakage queries.
- **Stage 3:** At any point of the game \mathcal{A} may ask a Test query that is λ -(\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy valid. The challenger chooses a random bit b to respond to this queries. If $b = 0$, the actual shared key between the respective pairs of parties involved in the corresponding test query is returned to \mathcal{A} . If $b = 1$, the challenger samples a random shared key from \mathcal{SHK} , records it for later and returns that to \mathcal{A} .
- **Stage 4:** \mathcal{A} may continue asking RegisterHonest, RegisterCorrupt, Extract, HonestReveal, CorruptReveal, and Leakage queries provided the Test query is still *valid*.
- **Stage 5:** At some point \mathcal{A} outputs the bit $b' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ which is its guess of the value b . \mathcal{A} wins if $b' = b$.

Let $Succ_{\mathcal{A}}$ denote the event that \mathcal{A} wins the above security game (Definition 7).

Definition 8 ((\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy-security). Let q_H , q_C , q_E , q_{HR} , and q_{CR} denote the number of RegisterHonest, RegisterCorrupt, Extract, HonestReveal, and CorruptReveal queries respectively. A NIKE protocol π is said to be (\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy-secure if there is no PPT algorithm \mathcal{A} that can win the above (\cdot)LR-CKS-heavy security game with non-negligible advantage. The advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} is defined as:

$$\text{Adv}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}}^{(\cdot)\text{LR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa, q_H, q_C, q_E, q_{HR}, q_{CR}) = |2 \Pr(Succ_{\mathcal{A}}) - 1|.$$

3.2 Constructions of Leakage-resilient Non-interactive key exchange

In this section we show our constructions of leakage-resilient NIKE in the bounded-memory leakage model. But, before presenting the constructions, we show an attack against the the NIKE scheme of [16] in the setting of leakage, which will motivate us for new constructions of leakage-resilient NIKE.

Attack on the NIKE protocol of [16] in the bounded-leakage setting. In this section we show that the NIKE protocol of Freire et al. [16] from pairings in the standard model is completely insecure, even if the adversary is given only a single bit of leakage on the secret key. The attack exploits the fact that the adversary can ask any arbitrary leakage function as long as the output of the function is length shrinking in its input size. In particular, the secret key of a party in the NIKE protocol in Freire et al. [16] is a field element, i.e., $x \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and one of the components of the public key is $Z = g^x$. The shared key between two parties ID_i and ID_j has the structure $e(S^{x_i}, Z_j)$, where S is a public element, $Z_j = g^{x_j}$ and x_i and x_j are the secret keys of parties ID_i and ID_j respectively.

Now, given the public-key, the adversary can encode the function that leaks the hardcore bit of the discrete logarithm of Z . In other words, he can specify the leakage function in such a way such that it leaks exactly the most significant bit (MSB) of x . Note that the MSB of x is actually the hardcore bit of the discrete logarithm function. So, with a single bit of leakage the adversary can recover x completely and hence he can distinguish the shared secret key from a random key with probability 1 and win the indistinguishability game. In fact here with only a single bit of leakage the adversary can perform key recovery attack, which is stronger than the attack on the indistinguishability game.

Protocol BLR-NIKE: Construction of NIKE in the bounded-memory leakage model. Table 2 shows our construction of NIKE in the bounded-memory leakage model. The starting point of our construction is the NIKE protocol of [16]. Let \mathcal{G}_2 be a type 2 pairing parameter generation algorithm, i.e., it outputs $gk = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1, g_2, p, e, \psi)$, $\text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}} : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ be a (bounded) leakage-resilient chameleon hash function tolerating leakage bound up to $\lambda(\kappa)$ (denoted as λ -LR-CHF) indexed with the evaluation/hashing key hk and $\mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$ denotes the randomness space of the hash function. Also let $F : \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\kappa)} \times \mathbb{Z}_p \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$, $F' : \mathbb{Z}_p \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ be $(\epsilon_{\text{prf}}, s_{\text{prf}}, q_{\text{prf}})$ and $(\epsilon'_{\text{prf}}, s'_{\text{prf}}, q'_{\text{prf}})$ secure PRF families $\text{Ext} : \mathbb{Z}_p \times \{0, 1\}^s \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\kappa)}$ be an average-case (v, ϵ) -extractor, with $v \ll \log p$. Namely, it has $\log p$ bits of input, s bit seed, and $\ell(\kappa)$ -bit outputs, and for a random seed and input with v bits of min-entropy, the output is ϵ -away from a uniform $\ell(\kappa)$ -bit string.

Party ID_A	Party ID_B
NIKEcommon_setup(1^κ)	
$gk \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{G}_2(1^\kappa)$ where $gk = (\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, g_1, g_2, p, e, \psi)$ $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}_1^*$ $(\text{hk}, \text{ck}) \leftarrow \text{Cham.KeyGen}(1^\kappa, \lambda)$ $params \xleftarrow{\$} (gk, \alpha, \beta, \gamma, \delta, \text{hk})$ Return $params$	
NIKEgen($1^\kappa, params$)	
$x_A, r_A \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p; r'_A \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}};$ $\widehat{x}_A \leftarrow \text{Ext}(x_A, s_A);$ where $s_A \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^s$ $x'_A \leftarrow F_{\widehat{x}_A}(r_A) + F'_{r'_A}(1^\kappa);$ $Z_A \leftarrow g_2^{x'_A};$ $t_A \leftarrow \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(Z_A ID_A; r'_A);$ $Y_A \leftarrow \alpha \beta^{t_A} \gamma^{t_A^2}; X_A \leftarrow Y_A^{x_A}$ $pk_A \leftarrow (X_A, Z_A, r'_A, r_A); sk_A \leftarrow x_A$	$x_B, r_B \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p; r'_B \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}};$ $\widehat{x}_B \leftarrow \text{Ext}(x_B, s_B);$ where $s_B \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^s$ $x'_B \leftarrow F_{\widehat{x}_B}(r_B) + F'_{r'_B}(1^\kappa);$ $Z_B \leftarrow g_2^{x'_B};$ $t_B \leftarrow \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(Z_B ID_B; r'_B);$ $Y_B \leftarrow \alpha \beta^{t_B} \gamma^{t_B^2}; X_B \leftarrow Y_B^{x_B}$ $pk_B \leftarrow (X_B, Z_B, r'_B, r_B); sk_B \leftarrow x_B$
NIKEkey(pk_B, sk_A)	NIKEkey(pk_A, sk_B)
If $pk_A = pk_B$, return \perp Parse pk_B as $(X_B, Z_B, r'_B, r_B);$ $t_B \leftarrow \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(Z_B ID_B; r'_B);$ If $e(X_B, g_2) \neq e(\alpha \beta^{t_B} \gamma^{t_B^2}, Z_B)$ then $sk_{A,B} \leftarrow \perp$ else $sk_{AB} \leftarrow e(\delta^{x_A}, Z_B)$	If $pk_B = pk_A$, return \perp Parse pk_A as $(X_A, Z_A, r'_A, r_A);$ $t_A \leftarrow \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(Z_A ID_A; r'_A)$ If $e(X_A, g_2) \neq e(\alpha \beta^{t_A} \gamma^{t_A^2}, Z_A)$ then $sk_{A,B} \leftarrow \perp$ else $sk_{AB} \leftarrow e(\delta^{x_B}, Z_A)$

Table 2. LR-NIKE Protocol in the Bounded Leakage model(BLR-NIKE)

Theorem 1. Let ChamH_{hk} be a family of bounded leakage-resilient chameleon hash function (BLR-CHF), F and F' be $(\epsilon_{\text{prf}}, s_{\text{prf}}, q_{\text{prf}})$ and $(\epsilon'_{\text{prf}}, s'_{\text{prf}}, q'_{\text{prf}})$ secure PRFs and Ext be a (v, ϵ) -strong average case randomness extractor where p is the order of the underlying groups $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ and \mathbb{G}_T . Then the above NIKE

protocol BLR-NIKE is BLR-CKS-heavy-secure assuming the intractability of the DBDH-2 assumption with respect to the parameter generator \mathcal{G}_2 . In particular, let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against the NIKE protocol BLR-NIKE in the BLR-CKS-heavy security model making q_H number of RegisterHonest user queries. Then using it we can construct an adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ against the DBDH-2 problem such that:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{BLR-NIKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa) \leq q_H^2 \left(2\varepsilon + 2\varepsilon_{\text{prf}} + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ChamH}}^{\text{coll}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}, \mathcal{G}_2}^{\text{dbdh-2}}(\kappa) \right).$$

Proof. The proof of this theorem will proceed via the game hopping technique [34]: define a sequence of games and relate the adversary's advantage of distinguishing each game from the previous game to the advantage of breaking one of the underlying cryptographic primitive. Let $\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_\delta}(\mathcal{A})$ denote the advantage of the adversary \mathcal{A} in Game δ .

Game 0: This is the original security game with adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$. When the Test query is asked, the Game 0 challenger chooses a random bit $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$. If $b = 0$, the real shared key is given to \mathcal{A} , otherwise a random value chosen from the shared key space is given.

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_0}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{Adv}_{\text{BLR-NIKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa).$$

Game 1: Initially $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ chooses two identities $ID_A, ID_B \in [q_H]$, where q_H denotes the number of RegisterHonest queries made by $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$. Effectively $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ is guessing that ID_A and ID_B to be honestly registered by $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ will be involved in the Test query later. When $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ makes its Test query on a pair of identities $\{ID_I, ID_J\}$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ checks if $\{ID_I, ID_J\} = \{ID_A, ID_B\}$. If so, it continues with the simulation and gives the result to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$; else it aborts the simulation.

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_1}(\mathcal{A}) \geq \text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_0}(\mathcal{A})/q_H^2.$$

Game 2: This game is identical to the previous game, except that the challenger changes the way how the output of the extractor is computed. In particular, instead of computing $\widehat{x}_A \leftarrow \text{Ext}(x_A, s_A)$ and $\widehat{x}_B \leftarrow \text{Ext}(x_B, s_B)$, the challenger chooses a uniformly random $\widehat{x}_A, \widehat{x}_B \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\kappa)}$. Game 0 and Game 1 are indistinguishable by the property of the strong average case randomness extractor. Suppose that the adversary obtains at most $\lambda = \lambda(\kappa)$ bits of leakage from the secret keys x_A and x_B of parties A and B respectively. Since Ext can work with inputs that have min-entropy $v \ll \log p$, even given the bounded leakage of λ bits, we have that $(x_A, s_A, \text{Ext}(x_A, s_A)) \approx_\varepsilon (x_A, s_A, U_{\ell(\kappa)})$ and $(x_B, s_B, \text{Ext}(x_B, s_B)) \approx_\varepsilon (x_B, s_B, U_{\ell(\kappa)})$, where $U_{\ell(\kappa)}$ denotes the uniform distribution over $\{0, 1\}^{\ell(\kappa)}$.

$$|\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_2}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_1}(\mathcal{A})| \leq 2\varepsilon.$$

Game 3: This game is identical to the previous game, except that the challenger changes the way how the PRFs are computed. In particular, instead of computing $x'_A \leftarrow F_{\widehat{x}_A}(r_A) + F'_{r_A}(1^\kappa)$ and $x'_B \leftarrow F_{\widehat{x}_B}(r_B) + F'_{r_B}(1^\kappa)$, the challenger computes $x'_A \leftarrow RF(r_A) + F'_{r_A}(1^\kappa)$ and $x'_B \leftarrow RF(r_B) + F'_{r_B}(1^\kappa)$, where RF is random function with the same range as F . If \mathcal{A} can distinguish the difference between Game 2 and Game 3, then \mathcal{A} can be used as a subroutine to construct a distinguisher \mathcal{D} between the PRF $F : \{0, 1\}^{\ell(\kappa)} \times \mathbb{Z}_p \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and a random function RF .

$$|\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_3}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_2}(\mathcal{A})| \leq 2\varepsilon_{\text{prf}}.$$

Game 4: This game is identical to the previous game, except that the challenger now samples x'_A and x'_B randomly. In particular, instead of computing $x'_A \leftarrow F_{\widehat{x}_A}(r_A) + F'_{r_A}(1^\kappa)$ and $x'_B \leftarrow F_{\widehat{x}_B}(r_B) + F'_{r_B}(1^\kappa)$, the challenge samples $x'_A, x'_B \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p$. Note that x'_A and x'_B are identically distributed in both Game 3 and Game 4, and hence both these games are identical from the view of an adversary.

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_4}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_3}(\mathcal{A}).$$

Game 5: In this game the challenger changes the way in which it answers RegisterCorrupt queries. In particular let, ID_A and ID_B be identities of two honest parties involved in the Test query with public keys $(X_A, Z_A, r'_A, r_A, s_A)$ and $(X_B, Z_B, r'_B, r_B, s_B)$ respectively. Let ID_D be the identity of the party with public key (X_D, Z_D, r'_D, r_D) that is subject to a RegisterCorrupt query. If $t_D = \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(Z_A || ID_A; r'_A)$ or $t_D = \text{ChamH}_{\text{hk}}(Z_B || ID_B; r'_B)$, the challenger aborts. Note that if the above happens, then the challenger has successfully found a collision of the chameleon hash function. By the difference lemma [33] we have:

$$|\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_4}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_3}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ChamH}}^{\text{coll}}(\kappa).$$

Game 5: In this game the DBDH-2 adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ receives as input $(g_2, g_2^a, g_2^b, g_1^c, T)$ as input, and its objective is to determine if $T = e(g_1, g_2)^{abc}$ or a random element from \mathbb{G}_T , where g_1 and g_2 are generators of the group \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 respectively and a, b, c are random elements from \mathbb{Z}_p . We now describe how $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ sets up the environment for $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ and simulates all its queries properly.

$\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ runs $\text{Cham.KeyGen}(1^\kappa, \lambda)$ to obtain a key pair for a chameleon hash function, (hk, ck) . It then chooses two messages $m_1, m_2 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ and $r_1, r_2 \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$, where $\mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$ is the randomness space of the chameleon hash function. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ then computes the values $t_A = \text{Cham.Eval}(m_1; r_1)$ and $t_B = \text{Cham.Eval}(m_2; r_2)$.

Let us define a polynomial of degree 2 $p(t) = p_0 + p_1t + p_2t^2$ over \mathbb{Z}_p such that t_A and t_B are the roots of $p(t)$, i.e., $p(t_A) = 0$ and $p(t_B) = 0$. Also, let $q(t) = q_0 + q_1t + q_2t^2$ be a random polynomial of degree 2 over \mathbb{Z}_p . $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ then sets $\alpha = (g_1^c)^{p_0} \cdot g_1^{q_0}$, $\beta = (g_1^c)^{p_1} \cdot g_1^{q_1}$, $\gamma = (g_1^c)^{p_2} \cdot g_1^{q_2}$ and $\delta = g_1^c$ (g_1^c was obtained as input of the hard problem instance). Note that, since $p_i, q_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ are randomly chosen, the values of α , β and γ are also random. Also note that $\alpha\beta^t\gamma^{t^2} = (g_1)^{p_1t}g_1^{q(t)}$. In particular $Y_A = g_1^{q(t_A)}$ and $Y_B = g_1^{q(t_B)}$ (since $p(t_A) = p(t_B) = 0$). $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ then simulates all the queries of $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ as follows:

- **RegisterHonest:** When $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ receives as input a RegisterHonest user query from $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ for a party with identity ID , it first checks whether $ID \in \{ID_A, ID_B\}$. Depending upon the result it does the following:
 - If $ID \notin \{ID_A, ID_B\}$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ runs NIKE.gen to generate a pair of keys (pk, sk) , and makes returns pk to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$.
 - If $ID \in \{ID_A, ID_B\}$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ does the following. Without loss of generality let $ID = ID_A$. Now, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ uses the trapdoor ck of the chameleon hash to produce $r'_A \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$ such that $\text{Cham.Eval}(g_2^a || ID_A; r'_A) = \text{Cham.Eval}(m_1; r_1)$. Note that, by the random trapdoor collision property of the chameleon hash function, r'_A is uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$ and also independent of r_1 . Similarly when $ID = ID_B$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ uses the trapdoor ck to produce $r'_B \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$ such that $\text{Cham.Eval}(g_2^b || ID_B; r'_B) = \text{Cham.Eval}(m_2; r_2)$. The value r'_B is also uniformly distributed over $\mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$ and also independent of r_2 . $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ then sets:

$$pk_A = (\psi(g_2^a)^{q(t_A)}, g_2^a, r'_A, r_A) \text{ and } pk_B = (\psi(g_2^b)^{q(t_B)}, g_2^b, r'_B, r_B).$$

where $r_A, r_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Note that these are correct public keys since $p(t_A) = p(t_B) = 0$.

- **RegisterCorrupt:** Here $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ receives as input a public key pk and an identity string ID from $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$. If $ID \in \{ID_A, ID_B\}$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ aborts as in the original attack game.
- **HonestReveal:** When $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ supplies identities of two honest parties, ID and ID' say, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ checks if $\{ID, ID'\} = \{ID_A, ID_B\}$. If this happens, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ aborts. Else, if $\{ID, ID'\} \cap \{ID_A, ID_B\} \leq 1$, there are three cases:
 - $ID \cap \{ID_A, ID_B\} \neq \emptyset$ and $ID' \cap \{ID_A, ID_B\} = \emptyset$. In this case, the challenger $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ runs $\text{NIKE.key}(pk_{ID}, sk_{ID'})$ to produce the shared key $shk_{ID, ID'}$. Note that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ can do this since it knows the secret key $sk_{ID'}$ of the party ID' . $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ then gives $shk_{ID, ID'}$ to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$.
 - $ID \cap \{ID_A, ID_B\} = \emptyset$ and $ID' \cap \{ID_A, ID_B\} \neq \emptyset$. In this case, the challenger $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ runs $\text{NIKE.key}(pk_{ID'}, sk_{ID})$ to produce the shared key $shk_{ID, ID'}$. Note that $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ can do this since it knows the secret key sk_{ID} of the party ID . $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ then gives $shk_{ID, ID'}$ to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$.
 - $\{ID, ID'\} \cap \{ID_A, ID_B\} = \emptyset$. In this case, the challenger $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ runs $\text{NIKE.key}(pk_{ID'}, sk_{ID})$ (it can use $sk_{ID'}$ also) to produce the shared key $shk_{ID, ID'}$. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ then gives $shk_{ID, ID'}$ to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$.
- **CorruptReveal:** When $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ supplies two identities ID and ID' where ID was registered as corrupt and ID' was registered as honest, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ checks if $ID' \in \{ID_A, ID_B\}$. If $ID' \notin \{ID_A, ID_B\}$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ runs $\text{NIKE.key}(pk_{ID}, sk_{ID'})$ to obtain $shk_{ID, ID'}$ and returns it to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$. However, if $ID' \in \{ID_A, ID_B\}$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ checks whether the public key $pk_{ID} = (X_{ID}, Z_{ID}, r'_{ID}, r_{ID})$ by checking the pairing. This makes sure that pk_{ID} is of the form $(Y_{ID}^d, g_2^d, r'_D, r_D)$ for some $d \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, where $Y_D = (g_1^c)^{p(t_{ID})}g_1^{q(t_{ID})}$, $r_D \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and $r'_D \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\text{cham}}$. This means that $X_{ID} = (g_1^{cd})^{p(t_{ID})}g_1^{dq(t_{ID})}$. From this the value g_1^{cd} can be computed as:

$$g_1^{cd} = (X_{ID} / \psi(Z_{ID})^{q(t_{ID})})^{1/p(t_{ID})} \pmod p.$$

Note that the value $1/p(t_{ID})$ is well defined since $p(t_{ID}) \neq 0 \pmod p$. Also note that $t_{ID} \neq t_A, t_B$, since we have already eliminated the hash collisions.

Assume w.l.o.g. that $ID' = ID_A$. So writing the public key of ID_A as (Y_A, Z_A, r'_A, r_A) , the shared key between ID_A and ID is given by:

$$shk_{ID_A, ID} = e(g_1^{cd}, Z_A).$$

- **Leakage queries:** The adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ may specify arbitrary polynomial time computable function(s) f_i to leak from the secret keys x_A and x_B . The challenger $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ forwards the functions f_i to its leakage oracle and forwards the answers to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$.
- **Test query:** Here, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ returns T .

This completes the description of simulation by $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$. If $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ can distinguish between real and random key in Game 4, then it is equivalent to solving the DBDH-2 problem. To see this, note that for user ID_A we have $Z_A = g_2^a$ and $X_A = \psi(Z_A)^{q(t_A)}$, and for user ID_B we have $Z_B = g_2^b$ and $X_B = \psi(Z_B)^{q(t_B)}$. Hence, $shk_{ID_A, ID_B} = e((g_1^c)^b, Z_A) = e((g_1^c)^a, Z_B) = e(g_1, g_2)^{abc}$.

Since the simulation done by $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ is perfect, we have:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_5}(\mathcal{A}) = \text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_4}(\mathcal{A})$$

Game 6. In this game the challenger $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ chooses T randomly from the target group \mathbb{G}_T . Since T is now completely independent of the challenge bit, we have $\Pr(\text{Succ}_{\text{Game}_6}) = 1/2$. Game 5 and Game 6 are identical unless adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}$ can distinguish $e(g_1, g_2)^{abc}$ from a random element. So, we have,

$$|\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_6}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_5}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}, \mathcal{G}_2}^{\text{dbdh-2}}(\kappa).$$

By combining all the above expression from Game 0- Game 6 we have:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{BLR-NIKE}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa) &= \text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_0}(\mathcal{A}) \\ &\leq q_H^2 \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_1}(\mathcal{A})) \\ &\leq q_H^2 \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_2}(\mathcal{A}) + \varepsilon) \\ &\leq q_H^2 \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_3}(\mathcal{A}) + \varepsilon + \epsilon_{\text{prf}} + \epsilon'_{\text{prf}}) \\ &\leq q_H^2 \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_4}(\mathcal{A}) + \varepsilon + \epsilon_{\text{prf}} + \epsilon'_{\text{prf}} + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ChamH}}^{\text{coll}}(\kappa)) \\ &\leq q_H^2 \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_5}(\mathcal{A}) + \varepsilon + \epsilon_{\text{prf}} + \epsilon'_{\text{prf}} + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ChamH}}^{\text{coll}}(\kappa)) \\ &\leq q_H^2 \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{Game}_6}(\mathcal{A}) + \varepsilon + \epsilon_{\text{prf}} + \epsilon'_{\text{prf}} + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ChamH}}^{\text{coll}}(\kappa)) \\ &\quad + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}, \mathcal{G}_2}^{\text{dbdh-2}}(\kappa) \\ &\leq q_H^2 \cdot (\varepsilon + \epsilon_{\text{prf}} + \epsilon'_{\text{prf}} + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ChamH}}^{\text{coll}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}, \mathcal{G}_2}^{\text{dbdh-2}}(\kappa)) \end{aligned}$$

Thus we have,

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{BLR-NIKE}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa) \leq q_H^2 \cdot \left(\varepsilon + \epsilon_{\text{prf}} + \epsilon'_{\text{prf}} + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ChamH}}^{\text{coll}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}_{\text{DBDH-2}}, \mathcal{G}_2}^{\text{dbdh-2}}(\kappa) \right).$$

□

Leakage Tolerance of Protocol BLR-NIKE. The order of the groups \mathbb{G}_1 , \mathbb{G}_2 and \mathbb{G}_T are p . Note that although the secret key in our protocol BLR-NIKE may appear to be a single field element, but in the actual instantiation of the protocol the secret key is a tuple of $n + 1$ field elements. This is because the secret key of the concrete instantiation of the BLR-CHF of Wang and Tanaka [35] consists of n field elements which also corresponds to the number of generators in the construction of [35]. The leakage tolerance of the BLR-CHF is $\lambda' = ((n - 1) \log(p) - \omega(\log \kappa))$ as shown in [35]. The size of the secret key of the BLR-CHF is $L = n \log p$. So, for sufficiently large n , the leakage rate $\eta = \lambda'/L$ of the BLR-CHF approaches $1 - o(1)$.

We also consider a very good randomness extractor that can work with inputs that have min-entropy $v \ll \log p$ and produces outputs whose distance from uniform $\ell(\kappa)$ -bit strings is $\varepsilon < 2^{-\ell(\kappa)}$. The size of the secret key x_A (respectively x_B) of our NIKE construction is $\log p$ (apart from the size of the secret key of λ' -LR-CHF, i.e, $n \log p$). So the leakage tolerated from x_A (respectively x_B) is at least $\log p - v \approx \log p$. Hence, the overall leakage tolerated by our construction is $\lambda \approx ((n-1) \log(p) - \omega(\log \kappa)) + \log p \approx n \log(p) - \omega(\log \kappa)$. The overall size of the secret key of our construction is $L' = (n + 1) \log p$. So the overall leakage rate of our construction is $\eta' = \lambda/L' = 1 - o(1)$, for sufficiently large n .

4 Constructions of various cryptographic primitives from leakage-resilient NIKE

We show many potential applications of leakage-resilient NIKE, demonstrating its usefulness as an important cryptographic primitive.

4.1 Leakage-resilient Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext secure PKE

We now present our construction of LR-IND-CCA-2-secure PKE scheme from a BLR-CKS-heavy-secure LR-NIKE scheme. Actually, here we show how to construct a LR-IND-CCA-2-secure key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) given such a NIKE. Before proceeding with the construction, we give the LR-IND-CCA-2 security model for KEMs.

Leakage-resilient Chosen-Ciphertext security for KEM. We say that a KEM $\Gamma = (\text{KEM.Setup}, \text{KEM.Gen}, \text{KEM.Encap}, \text{KEM.Decap})$ satisfies *correctness* if for all $pub \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^\kappa)$, $(pk_{\text{KEM}}, sk_{\text{KEM}}) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^\kappa, pub)$, and $(C, K) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk_{\text{KEM}})$, it holds that $\Pr[\text{Decap}(sk_{\text{KEM}}, C) = K] = 1$ (where the randomness is taken over the internal coin tosses of algorithm KEM.Gen and KEM.Encap).

LR-IND-CCA-2 security. We now turn to defining indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks in the bounded-memory leakage setting (BLR-IND-CCA-2).

Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\Gamma, A}^{\text{BLR-IND-CCA-2}}(\kappa, \lambda)$	Oracle $\text{Decap}^*(C)$
$pub \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Setup}(1^\kappa);$	If $C = C^*$, abort
$(pk, sk) \xleftarrow{\$} \text{Gen}(1^\kappa, pub), \quad b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\};$	Return $\text{Decap}(sk, C)$
$(C^*, K_1^*) \leftarrow \text{Encap}(pk); \quad K_0^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K};$	Oracle $O_{sk}^\lambda(L)$
$b' \leftarrow A^{\text{Decap}^*, O_{sk}^\lambda(\cdot)}(pk, C^*, K_b^*);$	Return $L(sk)$
If $b' = b$, then return 1, else return 0	

Table 3. Experiment defining LR-CCA-2 security of KEM

Definition 9 (BLR-IND-CCA-2 security). Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\lambda = \lambda(\kappa)$ be parameters. We say that KEM $\Gamma = (\text{Setup}, \text{Gen}, \text{Encap}, \text{Decap})$ is λ -BLR-CCA-2-secure if for all PPT adversaries A there exists a negligible $\nu : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow [0, 1]$ such that

$$\left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\Gamma, A}^{\text{BLR-IND-CCA-2}}(\kappa, \lambda) = 1] \right| \leq \nu(\kappa).$$

where the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\Gamma, A}^{\text{BLR-IND-CCA-2}}(\kappa, \lambda)$ is defined in Table 3.

Generic Construction of leakage-resilient KEM. We now show the construction of leakage-resilient CCA-2-secure KEM $\Gamma = (\text{KEM.Setup}, \text{KEM.Gen}, \text{KEM.Encap}, \text{KEM.Decap})$ from a leakage-resilient NIKE (see Figure 1).

Note that the *correctness* of the above construction follows from the correctness of the NIKEkey algorithm. The LR-IND-CCA-2 security of the KEM scheme Γ follows from the following theorem:

Let LR-NIKE = (NIKEcommon_setup, NIKEgen, NIKEkey) be a BLR-CKS-heavy NIKE with leakage rate $1 - o(1)$.

1. $\text{KEM.Setup}(1^\kappa)$: This algorithm runs the NIKEcommon_setup(1^κ) algorithm to obtain the system parameters $params$. It then sets the public parameters of the KEM pub as $params$.
2. $\text{KEM.Gen}(1^\kappa, pub)$: This algorithm runs the algorithm NIKEgen($1^\kappa, pub$) to obtain a pair of public-private key (pk, sk) . It then sets $pk_{\text{KEM}} = pk$ and $sk_{\text{KEM}} = sk$.
3. $\text{KEM.Encap}(pk_{\text{KEM}})$: This algorithm parses pk_{KEM} as pk , samples another key pair $(pk', sk') \leftarrow \text{NIKEgen}(1^\kappa, pub)$. Then it runs NIKEkey(pk, sk') to produce the shared key shk . It then sets the encapsulated key $K = shk$ and the ciphertext $C = pk'$.
4. $\text{KEM.Decap}(sk_{\text{KEM}}, C)$: This algorithm parses the ciphertext C as pk' and the secret key sk_{KEM} as sk . It then runs NIKEkey(pk', sk) and obtains the result.

Figure 1. Construction of LR-CCA-2 secure KEM Γ

Theorem 2. Suppose the leakage-resilient NIKE scheme LR-NIKE is BLR-CKS-heavy-secure with leakage rate $1 - o(1)$. Then the KEM scheme Γ is BLR-IND-CCA-2-secure KEM. More formally, let \mathcal{A}_{KEM} be an adversary against Γ making q_D number of decapsulation queries and q_L number of leakage queries.

Then using \mathcal{A}_{KEM} , we can construct another adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ in the BLR-CKS-heavy security model who makes two RegisterHonest queries, q_D number of RegisterCorrupt queries, q_D number of CorruptReveal queries, and q_L number of Leakage queries and the running time of $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ is roughly same as that \mathcal{A}_{KEM} . Moreover the leakage rate of Γ is $1 - o(1)$.

Proof. Let \mathcal{A}_{KEM} be an adversary against the BLR-IND-CCA-2-secure KEM Γ . We now show how to use \mathcal{A}_{KEM} to construct another adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ against LR-NIKE, thereby contradicting its BLR-CKS-heavy security. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ simulates the environment to \mathcal{A}_{KEM} in the following way:

- KEM.Setup: On input the public parameters $params$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ sets the public parameters pub of the KEM scheme as $params$.
- KEM.Gen: $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ makes two RegisterHonest queries, receiving as input two honestly registered public keys pk_1 and pk_2 . It then sets $pk_{\text{KEM}} = pk_1$ and $sk_{\text{KEM}} = \perp$.
- KEM.Encap(pk): To simulate the challenge phase, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ makes a Test(pk_1, pk_2) query. It receives as reply a shared key K which is either the real key, i.e., $K = \text{NIKE.key}(pk_1, sk_2)$, or a random shared $K \leftarrow \mathcal{SHK}$. It then sets the encapsulated key $K^* = K$ and $C^* = pk_2$.
- Leakage queries: When \mathcal{A}_{KEM} queries with leakage functions f , the challenger $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ forwards f to the leakage oracle $O_{sk_1}^\lambda(\cdot)$, and receives as response $f(sk_1)$. It then returns $f(sk_1)$ to \mathcal{A}_{KEM} .
- Decapsulation queries: \mathcal{A}_{KEM} makes decapsulation queries to $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ with ciphertexts C . $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ parses C as pk' , and since we have $C \neq C^*$, we have $pk' \neq pk_2$. If $pk' = pk_1$, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ outputs \perp . This is consistent with the rejection rule of the KEM Γ and also LR-NIKE. Else, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ makes a RegisterCorrupt query on pk' . Here we assume that all of \mathcal{A}_{KEM} 's decapsulation queries are distinct without loss of generality and hence all of the RegisterHonest queries are distinct. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ then makes a CorruptReveal(pk_1, pk') query to get a shared key $K \in \mathcal{SHK}$ or a symbol \perp . It then returns K to \mathcal{A}_{KEM} .

This completes the description of $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$'s simulation. From the description it is clear than the above simulation is perfect. Note that, if K^* is the real shared key, i.e., it is the output of NIKE.key algorithm, then it is properly simulating the Encap algorithm in the $\text{Exp}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{BLR-IND-CCA-2}}(\kappa, \lambda)$ security experiment; else if K^* is chosen randomly it also properly simulates the fact that it is chosen randomly in the experiment. Finally, when \mathcal{A}_{KEM} outputs a bit b' as its guess for b in the experiment, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ also outputs the same bit b' . So the advantage of $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ in breaking the BLR-CKS-heavy security of LR-NIKE is exactly the same as the advantage of \mathcal{A}_{KEM} in breaking the BLR-IND-CCA-2 security of the KEM scheme Γ . Also note that the number of RegisterCorrupt and CorruptReveal queries made by $\mathcal{A}_{\text{NIKE}}$ is same as the number of decapsulation queries asked by \mathcal{A}_{KEM} . This completes the proof of the above theorem. \square

4.2 Leakage-Resilient Authenticated Key Exchange

The work of Bergsma et al. [6] shows a generic construction of eCK-secure AKE protocol, using an UF-CMA-secure signature scheme, CKS-light-secure NIKE scheme and a pseudo-random function as underlying primitives.

In this paper, we present a construction of a leakage-resilient NIKE protocol, which is secure in the CKS-heavy model, under bounded-memory leakage, i.e. BLR-CKS-heavy-secure NIKE protocol (Table 2). Since the CKS-heavy-security implies the CKS-light-security, our leakage-resilient NIKE protocol can work as a bounded-memory-leakage-resilient CKS-light-secure NIKE protocol. Further, in the literature we can find UF-CMLA-secure signature schemes [23], which are UF-CMA-secure signature schemes under the bounded-memory leakage model. Thus, we can find the necessary primitives from the literature to transform our leakage-resilient NIKE to a leakage-resilient AKE, following the NIKE to AKE transformation of Bergsma et al [6], in the bounded-memory leakage model.

There are numerous leakage versions of the eCK model, under OCLI axiom [2–4], and the memory leakage model [10]. Further, they address after-the-fact leakage. With our new BLR-CKS-heavy-secure NIKE protocol, following the Bergsma et al. [6] transformation, we can achieve leakage-resilient AKE in an eCK-style model,

- under the memory leakage (stronger than the OCLI axiom),
- addressing before-the-fact leakage (weaker than the after-the-fact leakage).

Bounded-memory Before-the-fact Leakage eCK Model. We present a suitable security model to analyze the leakage resiliency of AKE protocols, considering the aforementioned points, i.e. eCK-style security model [26] addressing before-the-fact, bounded-memory leakage.

Let κ be the security parameter. Let $\mathcal{U} = \{U_1, \dots, U_n\}$ be a set of n parties. We use the term *principal* to identify a party involved in a protocol instance. Each party U_i where $i \in [1, N_P]$ has a pair of long-term public and secret-keys, (pk_{U_i}, sk_{U_i}) . The term *session* is used to identify a protocol instance at a principal. Each principal may have multiple sessions and they may run concurrently. The oracle $\Pi_{U,V}^s$ represents the s^{th} session at the owner principal U , with intended partner principal V . The principal which sends the first protocol message of a session is the *initiator* of the session, and the principal which responds to the first protocol message is the *responder* of the session.

Partner sessions in BBFL-eCK model. Two oracles $\Pi_{U,V}^s$ and $\Pi_{U',V'}^{s'}$ are said to be partners, if all the conditions of Alawatugoda et al. [3, Def. 3] hold.

Modelling Leakage. We consider the bounded-memory leakage setting for modelling the leakage, where the adversary is allowed to obtain totally a bounded amount of leakage from each of the long-term secret keys, issuing arbitrary number of leakage queries at will, before the session key is established. This leakage model maps with the real world scenarios, where the adversary can install a malware on the victim's computer and steal some amount of secret information from the memory, launch a cold-boot attack, as well as learns some amount of secret information during the computations on secret keys (power analysis attacks, timing attacks etc). The adversary is allowed to issue leakage queries with arbitrary number of polynomial time functions f_i and obtain the leakage $f_i(sk)$, of the secret key sk . As mentioned above the constraint is $\sum_{i=1} |f_i(sk)| \leq \lambda$, where λ is the leakage parameter.

Adversarial Powers.

- **Send**(U, V, s, m) query: The oracle $\Pi_{U,V}^s$, computes the next protocol message according to the protocol specification and sends it to the adversary. \mathcal{A} can also use this query to activate a new protocol instance with blank m .
- **SessionKeyReveal**(U, V, s) query: \mathcal{A} is given the session key of the oracle $\Pi_{U,V}^s$.
- **EphemeralKeyReveal**(U, V, s) query: \mathcal{A} is given the ephemeral keys (per-session randomness) of the oracle $\Pi_{U,V}^s$.
- **Corrupt**(U) query: \mathcal{A} is given the long-term secrets of the principal U .
- **Test**(U, s) query: When \mathcal{A} asks the **Test** query, the challenger first chooses a random bit $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$ and if $b = 1$ then the actual session key is returned to \mathcal{A} , otherwise a random string chosen from the same session key space is returned to \mathcal{A} .
- **Leakage**(U, f_i) query: The leakage $f_i(sk_U)$ is computed and returns to the adversary if and only if $\sum_{i=1} |f_i(sk_U)| \leq \lambda$.

λ -BBFL-eCK-freshness. Let λ be the leakage parameter. An oracle $\Pi_{U,V}^s$ is said to be λ -BBFL-eCK-fresh if and only if the conditions (1)-(3) of Alawatugoda et al. [3, Def.4] hold, and

4. Before $\Pi_{U,V}^s$ is activated, for all **Leakage**(U, f_i) queries, $\sum_{i=1} |f_i(sk_U)| \leq \lambda$, and for all **Leakage**(V, f_i) queries, $\sum_{i=1} |f_i(sk_V)| \leq \lambda$.
5. After $\Pi_{U,V}^s$ is activated no leakage allowed from U and V .

The BBFL-eCK security game. The adversary \mathcal{A} interacts with the challenger by issuing any combination of **Send**(\cdot), **SessionKeyReveal**(\cdot), **EphemeralKeyReveal**(\cdot), **Leakage**(\cdot) and **Corrupt**(\cdot) queries at will. At some point the adversary chooses a λ -BBFL-eCK-fresh oracle and issues a **Test**(\cdot) query. Then, the adversary may continue asking the **Send**(\cdot), **SessionKeyReveal**(\cdot), **EphemeralKeyReveal**(\cdot), **Leakage**(\cdot) and **Corrupt**(\cdot) queries while preserving the freshness of the test session, and finally outputs answer bit b' for the challenge. \mathcal{A} wins if $b' = b$. Let $Succ_{\mathcal{A}}$ is the event that the adversary \mathcal{A} wins the above security game.

Definition 10 (BBFL-eCK-security). A protocol π is said to be BBFL-eCK-secure if there is no PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that can win the BBFL-eCK security game with non-negligible advantage. The advantage of an adversary \mathcal{A} is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{BBFL-eCK}}(\kappa) = |2 \Pr(Succ_{\mathcal{A}}) - 1|$.

Constructing BBFL-eCK-secure Key Exchange Protocols. In Table 4, we show the generic leakage-resilient variant of the Bergsma et al. [6] AKE protocol. We replace the CKS-light-secure NIKE with a BLR-CKS-heavy-secure NIKE, and the UF-CMA-secure signature scheme with a UF-CMLA-secure signature scheme in the bounded-memory leakage model, to come up with the generic BBFL-eCK-secure AKE protocol. In this protocol, the final shared key is obtained by xor-ing the intermediate keys. Since the adversary learns the leakage only from the long-term secret parameters, it is not necessary to use leakage-resilient PRFs for the construction of LR-AKE, following NIKE to AKE transformation of Bergsma et al.

Let LR-NIKE = (NIKEcommon_setup, NIKEgen, NIKEkey) be the underlying BLR-CKS-heavy-secure NIKE protocol, LR-SIG = (SIGkg, SIGsign, SIGvfy) be the underlying UF-CMLA-secure signature scheme and PRF be a secure pseudo-random function.

A (Initiator)	B (Responder)
$((sk_A^{\text{nike}}, sk_A^{\text{sig}}), (pk_A^{\text{nike}}, pk_A^{\text{sig}}))$	$((sk_B^{\text{nike}}, sk_B^{\text{sig}}), (pk_B^{\text{nike}}, pk_B^{\text{sig}}))$
$r_A \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$	$r_B \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\kappa$
$(sk_A^{\text{tmp}}, pk_A^{\text{tmp}}) \leftarrow \text{NIKEgen}(1^\kappa, r_A)$	$(sk_B^{\text{tmp}}, pk_B^{\text{tmp}}) \leftarrow \text{NIKEgen}(1^\kappa, r_B)$
$\sigma_A \leftarrow \text{SIGsign}(sk_A^{\text{sig}}, pk_A^{\text{tmp}})$	$\sigma_B \leftarrow \text{SIGsign}(sk_B^{\text{sig}}, pk_B^{\text{tmp}})$
If: $\text{SIGvfy}(pk_B^{\text{sig}}, pk_B^{\text{tmp}}, \sigma_B) = 1;$	If: $\text{SIGvfy}(pk_A^{\text{sig}}, pk_A^{\text{tmp}}, \sigma_A) = 1;$
$T := \text{sort}(pk_A^{\text{tmp}}, pk_B^{\text{tmp}})$	$T := \text{sort}(pk_A^{\text{tmp}}, pk_B^{\text{tmp}})$
$k_{\text{nike,nike}} = \text{PRF}(\text{NIKEkey}(sk_A^{\text{nike}}, pk_B^{\text{nike}}), T)$	$k_{\text{nike,nike}} = \text{PRF}(\text{NIKEkey}(sk_B^{\text{nike}}, pk_A^{\text{nike}}), T)$
$k_{\text{nike,tmp}} = \text{PRF}(\text{NIKEkey}(sk_A^{\text{nike}}, pk_B^{\text{tmp}}), T)$	$k_{\text{nike,tmp}} = \text{PRF}(\text{NIKEkey}(sk_B^{\text{nike}}, pk_A^{\text{tmp}}), T)$
$k_{\text{tmp,nike}} = \text{PRF}(\text{NIKEkey}(sk_A^{\text{tmp}}, pk_B^{\text{nike}}), T)$	$k_{\text{tmp,nike}} = \text{PRF}(\text{NIKEkey}(sk_B^{\text{tmp}}, pk_A^{\text{nike}}), T)$
$k_{\text{tmp,tmp}} = \text{PRF}(\text{NIKEkey}(sk_A^{\text{tmp}}, pk_B^{\text{tmp}}))$	$k_{\text{tmp,tmp}} = \text{PRF}(\text{NIKEkey}(sk_B^{\text{tmp}}, pk_A^{\text{tmp}}))$
$k_{A,B} := k_{\text{nike,nike}} \oplus k_{\text{nike,tmp}} \oplus k_{\text{tmp,nike}} \oplus k_{\text{tmp,tmp}}$	$k_{B,A} := k_{\text{nike,nike}} \oplus k_{\text{nike,tmp}} \oplus k_{\text{tmp,nike}} \oplus k_{\text{tmp,tmp}}$

Table 4. Leakage-resilient AKE Protocol LR-AKE

Since, the generic construction of the AKE protocol remains unchanged with respect to the Bergsma et al. [6], except the replacement of the leakage-resilient advancements of the underlying primitives, in the bounded-memory leakage setting, the security of the resulting AKE still preserves the eCK-style with the advancements of leakage resiliency in the bounded-memory leakage setting. Therefore, the security theorem and the flow of the security proof is similar to the theorem and proof of the Theorem 1 of Bergsma et al. [6, Appendix A].

Theorem 3. *If the underlying NIKE protocol, LR-NIKE, is BLR-CKS-heavy-secure, the signature scheme, LR-SIG, is UF-CMLA-secure in the bounded-memory leakage model, and the pseudo-random property holds for the PRF, then the LR-AKE protocol is BBFL-eCK-secure.*

Let d be the number of parties. Each party U_i owns at most ℓ number of protocol sessions. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against the above protocol LR-AKE. We construct attackers $\mathcal{B}_{\text{sig}}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{nike}}^{(1)}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{nike}}^{(0)}$ and \mathcal{B}_{prf} against the underlying leakage-resilient signature scheme, leakage-resilient NIKE protocol (matching session exists and no matching session exists respectively), and the pseudo-random function s.t.,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{LR-AKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{BBFL-eCK}}(\kappa) &\leq 4 \cdot d^2 \ell^2 \cdot \left(\text{Adv}_{\text{LR-NIKE}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{nike}}^{(1)}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{PRF}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{prf}}}^{\text{prf}}(\kappa) \right) \\ &\quad + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{LR-NIKE}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{nike}}^{(0)}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa) + 4 \cdot d \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{LR-SIG}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{sig}}}^{\text{UF-CMLA}}(\kappa). \end{aligned}$$

Proof Sketch. To prove the Theorem 3, we need to consider four types of attackers.

- A1-type attacker never asks EphemeralKeyReveal query for the test session. If there exists a partner to the test session it will also never asks EphemeralKeyReveal query for the partner session.
- A2-type attacker never asks EphemeralKeyReveal query for the test session. If there exists a partner to the test session it also never asks Corrupt query for the owner of the partner session.
- A3-type attacker never asks Corrupt query to the owner of the test session. If there exists a partner to the test session it also never asks the EphemeralKeyReveal query to the partner session.
- A4-type attacker never asks Corrupt query to the owner of the test session. If there exists a partner to the test session it also never asks the Corrupt query to the owner of the partner session.

Each legitimate attacker according to the freshness definition falls into at least one of these categories.

In the LR-AKE protocol the session key is computed as $k := k_{\text{nike,nike}} \oplus k_{\text{nike,tmp}} \oplus k_{\text{tmp,nike}} \oplus k_{\text{tmp,tmp}}$. The main intuition behind this construction is that we need to reduce the indistinguishability of the shared key of LR-AKE to the indistinguishability of LR-NIKE. In this simulation we can easily simulate the leakage, by giving the adversary \mathcal{A} the leakage obtained from the underlying leakage-resilient NIKE-challenger and the signature scheme challenger. In the security experiment against the leakage-resilient NIKE, the NIKE-adversary gets two challenge public-keys from the leakage-resilient NIKE-challenger. In the reduction, we need to embed them into the view of the adversary \mathcal{A} , in a way that we can embed the leakage-resilient NIKE-challenge key into k while successfully answering all the legitimate `Corrupt` and `EphemeralKeyReveal` queries.

A1-type attacker never asks `EphemeralKeyReveal` queries to the test session and the partner to the test session. Thus, it is possible to embed the public keys from the leakage-resilient NIKE-challenger, as the ephemeral public keys of the test session. Then, use the challenge key from the leakage-resilient NIKE challenger as $k_{\text{tmp,tmp}}$.

For the case of A2-type attacker, embed the public keys from the leakage-resilient NIKE-challenger, one as the ephemeral public key and the other one as the long-term public-key of the test session. Then, use the challenge key as $k_{\text{tmp,nike}}$. Since this embedding involves a long-term secret of one party of the test session, we need to use an additional PRF, and this long-term secret is used in many protocol executions involving the corresponding party. Similarly, A3 and A4-type attackers can be handled by embedding the leakage-resilient NIKE-challenger's public and challenge keys accordingly.

Thus, the four attackers correspond to all possible combinations of `Corrupt` and `EphemeralKeyReveal` queries, that are allowed in our BBFL-eCK security model. \square

Leakage Tolerance of the Generic LR-AKE Protocol. This generic protocol can tolerate the leakage according to the leakage tolerance of the underlying leakage-resilient NIKE and the leakage-resilient signature scheme. Our LR-NIKE can tolerate $1 - o(1)$ leakage and the UF-CMLA signature scheme of Katz et al. [23] can tolerate $n - n^\epsilon$ leakage, for n bit key and $1 > \epsilon > 0$, which approaches $1 - o(1)$ leakage rate for sufficiently large n and small enough ϵ . Thus, the corresponding instantiation can tolerate an overall leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$.

4.3 Leakage-resilient Low-latency Key Exchange

Low-latency key exchange (LLKE) can be considered as one of the important practical usages of NIKE protocols, which permits the transmission of cryptographically protected data, without prior key exchange, while providing perfect forward secrecy (PFS). Leakage resiliency of LLKE remains unstudied.

Bounded-memory Leakage LLKE-ma Model. We refer the security model under mutual authentication of Hale et al. [20, Section 5] as LLKE-ma model. In this work, we introduce bounded-memory leakage model on top of LLKE-ma model (We use the notation BL-LLKE-ma to identify our model whenever necessary).

Let d be the number of clients and ℓ be the number of servers. Each client is represented by a collection of n oracles $C_{i,1}, \dots, C_{i,n}$ and each server is represented by a collection of k oracles $S_{j,1}, \dots, S_{j,k}$. Each oracle represents an instance of the protocol. Each principal has a long-term key pair (sk_i, pk_i) . Let κ be the security parameter and λ be the leakage parameter. Each oracle $C_{i,s} \in [d] \times [n]$ (or $S_{j,t} \in [\ell] \times [k]$, respectively), maintains:

1. two variables k_i^{tmp} and k_i^{main} to store the temporary and main keys of a session,
2. a variable Partner_i contains the identity of the intended communication partner, and
3. variables $\mathcal{M}_{i,s}^{\text{in}}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{i,s}^{\text{out}}$ containing messages sent and received by the oracle.

Adversarial Powers.

- `Send`($C_{i,s}/S_{j,t}, m$): The adversary sends the message m to the requested oracle, the oracle processes m according to the protocol specification, and the response is returned to the adversary.
- `Reveal`($C_{i,s}/S_{j,t}, \text{tmp/main}$): This query returns the key of the given stage if it has been already computed, or \perp otherwise.
- `Corrupt`(i/j): This query returns the long-term secret key of the server or the client accordingly. If `Corrupt`(j/i) is the τ -th query issued by the adversary, we say a party is τ -corrupted. For the parties that are not corrupted we define $\tau := \infty$.

- $\text{Test}(C_{i,s}/S_{j,t}, \text{tmp}/\text{main})$: This query is used to test a key. If the variable for the requested key is not empty, the challenger chooses $b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}$, and if $b = 0$ then the requested key is returned, else a random key is returned. Otherwise, \perp is returned.
- $\text{Leakage}(i/j, f_i)$: The leakage $f_i(sk_{i/j})$ is computed and returns to the adversary if and only if $\sum_{i=1} |f_i(sk_{i/j})| \leq \lambda$.

BL-LLKE-ma *security game*. The adversary interacts with the challenger by issuing any combination of $\text{Send}()$, $\text{Corrupt}()$, $\text{Reveal}()$, $\text{Leak}()$ queries. At some point the adversary issues a $\text{Test}()$ query, to an oracle that holds the conditions in Def. 11. Then, the adversary may continue asking the $\text{Send}()$, $\text{Corrupt}()$, $\text{Reveal}()$, $\text{Leak}()$ queries, without violating the conditions of the Def. 11, and finally outputs answer bit b' for the challenge. \mathcal{A} wins if $b' = b$. Let $\text{Succ}_{\mathcal{A}}$ is the event that the adversary \mathcal{A} wins the above security game.

Definition 11 (Leakage-Resilient Key-security (under Mutual Authentication)). *A protocol π is said to be BL-LLKE-ma-secure if there is no PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that can win the BL-LLKE-ma security game with non-negligible advantage, while holding the following conditions:*

- All the conditions [20, Def. 8].
- Before activation of the test session on C_i , $\forall \text{Leakage}(i, f_i)$ queries, $\sum_{i=1} |f_i(sk_i)| \leq \lambda$, and before activation of the test session on $S_j \forall \text{Leakage}(j, f_i)$ queries, $\sum_{i=1} |f_i(sk_j)| \leq \lambda$.
- After activation of the Test session on C_i ; no leakage allowed from sk_i (same as to the case of S_j).

The advantage of \mathcal{A} is defined as $\text{Adv}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{BL-LLKE-ma}}(\kappa) = |2 \Pr(\text{Succ}_{\mathcal{A}}) - 1|$.

Generic Construction of BL-LLKE-ma-secure LLKE from NIKE. In the work of Hale et al., they have used a CKS-light-secure NIKE scheme NIKE and UF-CMA-secure signature scheme SIG. We simply replace those primitives with their respective leakage-resilient versions.

Let LR-NIKE = (NIKEcommon_setup, NIKEgen, NIKEkey) be a BLR-CKS-heavy-secure NIKE scheme, LR-SIG = (SIGkg, SIGsign, SIGvfy) be an UF-CMLA-secure signature scheme. Then we construct a LLKE protocol LR-LLKE=(Gen, KE_{init}^{client}, KE_{refresh}^{client}, KE_{refresh}^{server}) same as the description in Hale et al. [20, Section 6.1].

Since, the generic construction of the LLKE protocol remains unchanged with respect to the Hale et al., except the replacement of the leakage-resilient advancements of the underlying primitives (in the bounded-memory leakage model), the security of the resulting AKE still preserves the LLKE-ma-style with the advancements of leakage resiliency in the bounded-memory leakage model. Therefore, the security theorem and the flow of the security proof is similar to the theorem and proof of the Theorem 2 of Hale et al. [20, Appendix 6.2].

Theorem 4. *If the underlying NIKE protocol, LR-NIKE, is BLR-CKS-heavy-secure, the signature scheme, LR-SIG, is UF-CMLA-secure in the bounded-memory leakage model, then the LR-LLKE protocol is BK-LLKE-ma-secure.*

Let d be the number of clients and ℓ be the number of servers. Each client and each server is represented by a collection of n and k oracles respectively. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against the above protocol LR-LLKE. We construct attackers \mathcal{B}_{sig} and $\mathcal{B}_{\text{nike}}$ against the underlying leakage-resilient signature scheme and the leakage-resilient NIKE protocol such that,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{LR-LLKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{BK-LLKE-ma}}(\kappa) &\leq d\ell n \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{LR-NIKE}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{nike}}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa) + 2\text{Adv}_{\text{LR-SIG}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{sig}}}^{\text{UF-CMLA}}(\kappa)) \\ &\quad + d\ell n \cdot (k \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{LR-NIKE}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{nike}}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa) + 2\text{Adv}_{\text{LR-SIG}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{sig}}}^{\text{UF-CMLA}}(\kappa)) \\ &\quad + 2kd\ell n \cdot (\text{Adv}_{\text{LR-NIKE}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{nike}}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa) + 2\text{Adv}_{\text{LR-SIG}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{sig}}}^{\text{UF-CMLA}}(\kappa)) + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{LR-NIKE}, \mathcal{B}_{\text{nike}}}^{\text{BLR-CKS-heavy}}(\kappa) . \end{aligned}$$

Proof Sketch. We distinguish between four different attackers:

- A1-type attacker asks Test query to a client oracle and the temporary key.
- A2-type attacker asks Test query to a client oracle and the main key.
- A3-type attacker asks Test query to a server oracle and the temporary key.
- A4-type attacker asks Test query to a client oracle and the main key.

The four different attackers correspond to all possible combinations of queries, that are allowed in our BK-LLKE-ma security model. The four distinct lines of the equation in Theorem 4 corresponds to each of above cases respectively. We can easily simulate the leakage, by giving the adversary \mathcal{A} the leakage obtained from the underlying leakage-resilient NIKE-challenger and the signature scheme challenger. Apart from that, the simulation is same as to the Hale et al. [20] \square

Leakage Tolerance of the Generic LR-LLKE Protocol. This generic protocol can tolerate the leakage according to the leakage tolerance of the underlying leakage-resilient NIKE and the leakage-resilient signature scheme. Our LR-NIKE can tolerate $1 - o(1)$ leakage and the UF-CMLA signature scheme of Katz et al. [23] can tolerate $n - n^\epsilon$ leakage, for n bit key and $1 > \epsilon > 0$, which approaches $1 - o(1)$ leakage rate for sufficiently large n and small enough ϵ . Thus, the corresponding instantiation can tolerate an overall leakage rate of $1 - o(1)$.

5 Conclusion and Future Works

In this paper, we present a new approach to construct several leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives, such as leakage-resilient PKE schemes, AKE protocols and LLKE protocols, based on leakage-resilient NIKE protocols. Our construction of LR-NIKE in the bounded leakage setting achieves an optimal leakage rate, i.e., $1 - o(1)$, and the resulting leakage-resilient constructions from that also preserve the same leakage-rate, upon the appropriate choice of parameters. As for future works, we can briefly emphasize the following main directions:

- Leakage-resilient NIKE in the $1 - o(1)$ -continuous-memory leakage model.
- Leakage-resilient NIKE in after-the-fact leakage model.
- On leakage-resilient LLKE, as this paper opens up that direction, we hope there is much work to be done in future.

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Appendix

A Leakage-resilient Cryptography and Leakage Models

During the past two decades side-channel attacks have arisen as a popular method of attacking cryptographic systems. Timing attacks [7, 9, 25], EM radiation analysis attacks [22], and power analysis attacks [28] are some popular methods of side-channel attacks. In order to abstractly model the side-channel attacks and analyze the security of cryptographic primitives against them, cryptographers have proposed the notions of *leakage-resilient* cryptography, introducing various leakage models. [1, 5, 27, 29], introducing various leakage models.

Only computation leaks information (OCLI) axiom. In the work of Micali and Reyzin [29], a general framework was introduced to model the leakage, that occurs during computation with secret parameters, which is widely known as *Only computation leaks information (OCLI) axiom*. They mentioned that the leakage only occurs from the secret memory portions which are actively involved in computations. The

leakage amount is bounded per computation, though the adversary is allowed to obtain the leakage from many computations. Therefore, the overall leakage amount is unbounded. Since, this assumption enforces that the leakage is only occurred due to computations, this does not cover the attacks that happen due to the leakage from the memory such as malware attacks, cold-boot attacks etc.

Inspired by the cold-boot attacks, Akavia et al. [1] constructed a general framework to model bounded leakage attacks, which is widely known as *bounded-memory leakage* model. The adversary chooses an arbitrary polynomial time leakage function, f and sends it to the leakage oracle. The leakage oracle returns $f(sk)$ to the adversary, where sk is the secret key. The only restriction here is that the sum of output length of all the leakage functions that an adversary can obtain is bounded by some parameter λ , which is smaller than the size of sk . This leakage model does not address the continuous leakage from the memory, which can often happen due to attacks such as malware attacks.

Previous works of Zvika et al. [8] and Dodis et al. [12] presented a *continual-memory leakage* model, in which it is assumed that the leakage happens from the entire secret memory. The other characteristics of this model is same as the OCLI model. This leakage model is stronger than the OCLI model, because here the adversary can obtain the leakage from the entire memory regardless of computations.

Differently, Dodis et al. [14] introduced a leakage model, where the adversary is allowed to obtain the leakage as any computationally uninvertible function of the secret key as auxiliary input. That model eliminates the concept of leakage parameter, but enforcing the hardness parameter instead.