

# Certifying Trapdoor Permutations, Revisited <sup>\*</sup>

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## Abstract

The modeling of trapdoor permutations has evolved over the years. Indeed, finding an appropriate abstraction that bridges between the existing candidate constructions and the needs of applications has proved to be challenging. In particular, the notions of certifying permutations (Bellare and Yung, 96), enhanced and doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations (Goldreich, 04, 08, 11, Goldreich and Rothblum, 13) were added to bridge the gap between the modeling of trapdoor permutations and needs of applications.

We identify an additional gap in the current abstraction of trapdoor permutations: Previous works implicitly assumed that it is easy to recognize elements in the domain, as well as uniformly sample from it, even for illegitimate function indices. We demonstrate this gap by using the (Bitansky-Paneth-Wichs, 15) doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutation family to instantiate the Feige-Lapidot-Shamir (FLS) paradigm for constructing non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) protocols, and show that the resulting proof system is unsound.

To close this gap, we propose a general notion of *certifiably injective* doubly enhanced trapdoor functions, which provide a way of certifying that a given key defines an injective function over the domain defined by it, even when that domain is not efficiently recognizable and sampleable. We show that this notion suffices for instantiating the FLS paradigm; more generally, we argue that this notion is needed whenever the generation process of the function is not trusted.

We then show two very different ways to realize this notion: One is via the traditional method of RSA/Rabin with the Bellare-Yung certification mechanism, and the other using indistinguishability obfuscation and injective pseudorandom generators. In particular the latter is the first candidate injective trapdoor function from assumptions other than factoring, that suffices for the FLS paradigm.

**Keywords:** Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge, Trapdoor Permutations, Indistinguishability Obfuscation

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# 1 Introduction

In the late-1970s, Rivest, Shamir and Adelman [RSA78] and Rabin [Rab79] suggested functions which are easy to evaluate, easy to invert when given a suitable secret trapdoor key, but are presumably hard to invert when only given the function description without the trapdoor. Both of these constructions use the same source of computational hardness: the hardness of factoring. These constructions were later abstracted to a formal notion of trapdoor functions [Yao82], which became one of the pillars of modern cryptography. In particular, trapdoor permutations were used as building blocks for public key encryption [Yao82, GM84, BG84], oblivious transfer [EGL85] and zero-knowledge protocols [FLS90].

Non-interactive zero knowledge (NIZK) protocols [BFM88] are perhaps the quintessential application for trapdoor permutations. Indeed, trapdoor permutations are the first general cryptographic primitive that implies NIZK. Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [FLS90] gave the first construction for NIZK proof systems in the common reference string model, which was later formalized by Goldreich [Gol04]. Their construction, which we refer to as the FLS protocol, treats the common reference string as a sequence of blocks, representing images of a trapdoor permutation selected by the prover. The prover is able to select a subset of these images and invert them using the secret trapdoor. The verifier can validate that the pre-images it was given are correct by forward-evaluating the trapdoor function, but is unable to invert any other image due to the hardness of inverting the function without the secret trapdoor. By treating the common string as a series of sealed off boxes, the prover is able to provide a NIZK proof for an NP-Hard language. Soundness is based on the fact that, for any given permutation, each block in the reference string defines a unique pre-image. This construction assumes that the trapdoor permutation in use is *ideal*, namely its domain is  $\{0, 1\}^n$  for some  $n$ , hardness holds with respect to uniformly chosen  $n$ -bit strings, and any key (index) in an efficiently recognizable set describes a permutation.

Next, Bellare and Yung [BY96] consider the case where it is not known how to recognize whether a given index defines a permutation, but the domain is still  $\{0, 1\}^n$ . This relaxation is essential, as even the first TDP candidates suggested by [RSA78, Rab79] do not give efficiently recognizable keys (while their domains are efficiently recognizable and sampleable for any key). They observe that in this case a malicious prover may be able to choose a key which evaluates to a many-to-one function, breaking the soundness of the protocol, and suggest a NIZK protocol for certifying that a given index describes a permutation. Their protocol is based on the prover providing the verifier with pre-images of a set of random images, which are taken from the common reference string. We refer to this protocol as the Bellare-Yung protocol. We note however that this protocol crucially needs the verifier to be able to detect whether an element is in the domain of the permutation (which is not an issue in their case of full domain).

Goldreich and Rothblum [Gol04, Gol08, Gol11, GR13] point out that when the domain of the permutation is comprised of elements of specific structure (and not just the full do-

main  $\{0, 1\}^n$ ), additional mechanisms are required in order to sample from the domain in a way that still guarantees secrecy. They define the notions of enhanced and doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations, which require the existence of a domain sampling algorithm such that finding the pre-image of a sampled element is hard, even given the random coins used by the sampler, and it is possible to sample pairs of pre-image and random coins for the domain sampler, which both map to the same image (one under the forward evaluation and one via the domain sampler). They use enhanced and doubly enhanced TDPs to construct a number of applications where domain sampling is required, such as 1-out-of-2 and 1-out-of-3 oblivious transfer, and NIZK. For the latter, they show that the FLS protocol remains sound and zero-knowledge when using doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations — as long as the verifier is able to efficiently detect if the function described by the key is a permutation. To verify that this is the case, they suggest using the Bellare-Yung protocol.

Bitansky et. al. [BPW16] give the first doubly enhanced TDP constructions based on general assumptions which are not known to imply the hardness of factoring (specifically, sub-exponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions). The [BPW16] construction is also the first candidate TDP where the domain is not efficiently recognizable given the public index. Specifically, their construction has a key set which is not efficiently recognizable, along with a sparse, key-dependent domain. This puts to light a hidden gap in the current modeling: The current definition of TDP’s, even doubly enhanced ones, only considers the case where the index generation algorithm is executed as specified. The way proposed in the literature to protect against maliciously generated indices is the Bellare-Yung protocol, which is only guaranteed to work when the domain defined by an index is publicly recognizable, even for dishonestly generated indices. The current formalism does not propose a way to protect against dishonestly generated indices when the domain is not efficiently recognizable.

We note that this gap extends also to other methods for obtaining NIZK, both by realizing the hidden-bit model and in other ways. See discussion in section 1.2.

## 1.1 Our Contribution

We start by demonstrating that the above gap is significant: We show that, when instantiated with the [BPW16] doubly enhanced trapdoor permutation family, the FLS protocol is unsound, even when combined with the [BY96] certification protocol. We attribute the loss of soundness to the fact that the notion of doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations does not make sufficient requirements on indices that were not legitimately generated.

We then formulate a general property for trapdoor permutations, called *certifiable injectivity*. We show that this requirement suffices for the FLS paradigm even when the TDP does not have publicly recognizable domain. Furthermore, assuming indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and injective pseudorandom generators, we construct a doubly enhanced injective trapdoor function family. Indeed, the codomain of our function is not efficiently recognizable. Still, we show that our function family is certifiable injective, hence it suf-

fices for the FLS paradigm.

**Unsoundness of FLS+BY with the [BPW16] trapdoor permutations:** We instantiate the FLS+BY protocols using the the [BPW16] iO-based doubly enhanced trapdoor function family, whose domain is not efficiently recognizable. We demonstrate how a malicious prover could choose an index  $\alpha$  which describes a many-to-one function, wrongly certify it as a permutation by having the sampler sample elements only out of a restricted domain  $D_\alpha$  which is completely invertible, but then invert any image in  $D_\alpha$  into two pre-images - one in  $D_\alpha$  and another outside of it. The verifier cannot detect the lie since  $D_\alpha$  is not efficiently recognizable.

**Regaining the soundness of BY+FLS using Public-Domain Trapdoor Permutations:** We note that the BY+FLS combination regains its soundness when the following additional properties are met by the function family, with respect to *any index* (in particular illegitimate ones): First, the domain of the permutation, as well as the forward evaluation and sampling algorithms, should be well defined for any index. Second, there must exist an polynomial-time algorithm that decides, given some string, whether it represents an element in that domain. Last, the domain sampler of the function family should guarantee an almost uniform sample out of that domain. If all three requirements are met by the trapdoor permutation family, we say that it is *public-domain*. We note that the RSA and Rabin trapdoor permutations are indeed public-domain, while the [BPW16] permutation is not.

**Certifiable Injective Trapdoor Functions:** We formulate a new notion of *Certifiable Injectivity*, which captures a general abstraction of certifiability for doubly-enhanced injective trapdoor functions. This notion requires the function family to be accompanied by algorithms for generation and verification of certificates for indices, along with an algorithm for certification of individual points from the domain. It is guaranteed that if the index certificate is verified then, except for negligible probability, randomly sampled range points have only a single pre-image that passes the pointwise certification. We show that certifiable injectivity suffices for the FLS paradigm.

We additionally suggest a strengthened notion of *Perfectly Certifiable Injectivity*, which guarantees that no point generated by the range sampler has two pre-images that pass the pointwise certification. We show that by implementing FLS using this notion, the resulting error in soundness is optimal, in that it is equal to the error incurred by implementing the FLS protocol with ideal trapdoor permutations.

**Doubly Enhanced Perfectly Certifiable Trapdoor Functions from iO+:** We construct a doubly-enhanced family of trapdoor functions which is perfectly certifiable injective. Our construction, inspired by the work of [SW14], is based on indistinguishability obfuscation and pseudorandom generators, and is perfectly certifiable injective under the additional

assumption that the underlying pseudorandom generator is (a) injective and (b) its domain is either full, or efficiently sampleable and recognizable.

The public trapdoor index for our construction is an indistinguishability obfuscation of a circuit  $T_k$  which, on input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , outputs  $(x \oplus f_k(g(x)), g(x))$ , where  $g$  is a length-doubling pseudorandom generator and  $f_k$  is a puncturable pseudorandom function. The private key is the PRF key  $k$ . We implement a doubly-enhanced range sampler for our construction, based on a simple re-randomization technique. The sampling algorithm evaluates an obfuscated circuit  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_{k,w})$ , which, given random coins  $r$ , takes  $x = h_w(r)$  and outputs  $T_k(x)$ , where  $h_w$  is a length-preserving PRF. Using another round of re-randomization we augment our construction into a doubly-enhanced TDF. Our re-randomization technique can be applied to any trapdoor function with an efficiently sampleable domain to obtain a doubly-enhanced domain sampler, at the cost of using iO.

Finally, we show how using the assumption that the pseudorandom generator  $g$  is injective and that its domain is efficiently recognizable, we are able to provide a perfect pointwise certification algorithm for our trapdoor functions, proving it is perfectly certifiable injective. We then show how to construct such generators from standard assumptions (such as, e.g., hardness of discrete log). This makes our construction sufficient for NIZK.

**Discussion.** The treatment in this paper concentrates on the requirements from TDPs for realizing the FLS paradigm for constructing NIZK protocols. However, we argue that certifiable injectivity is a notion that’s needed in general, whenever TDP’s are used in a setting where the index generation process is not trusted. In particular, this notion frees the user of the TDP from addressing implementation details such as whether the domain is efficiently recognizable.

## 1.2 Related Work

**Other Applications of Trapdoor Permutations.** The gap between ideal and general trapdoor permutations imposes a problem in other applications as well. [Rot10, GR13] discuss the security of the [EGL85] trapdoor-permutations-based 1-out-of- $k$  oblivious transfer protocol, which breaks in the presence of partial-domain trapdoor functions when  $k \geq 3$ , and show how doubly enhanced trapdoor functions can be used to overcome this. The concern of certifying keys is irrelevant in the oblivious transfer applications, as the parties are assumed to be trusted. Still, certifiability concerns apply whenever dishonesty of one or more of the parties is considered an issue, such as the case of interactive proofs and multi-party computation. We note however that requiring that the trapdoor be certifiable does not suffice for making the [EGL85] protocol secure against Byzantine attacks.

**Alternative Approaches for Constructing NIZK.** [DN00] suggest a different path for realizing the hidden-bit model, by using the notion of *verifiable random generators*. This

notion provide the guarantee that every pre-image has only one (verified) image, in the sense that one cannot invert two different images into the same pre-image. They then suggest a construction of verifiable random generators from a particular type of trapdoor permutations, specifically from families of *certified* trapdoor permutations where all the functions in a given family share a common, efficiently recognizable and efficiently (publicly) sampleable. The latter assumption is crucial for this construction to work, or else the same attack we describe in our work would work in that case too. As we show in our work, assuming an efficiently recognizable and sampleable domain is indeed sufficient to soundly certify the permutation, however this assumption adds some limitation to the generalized abstraction of trapdoor permutations.

[BGRV09] use the notion of (*weak*) *verifiable random functions* to obtain NIZK using a very similar technique to that of [DN00]. Here too, they construct verifiable random functions from trapdoor permutations, but in this case the only assumption is that the trapdoor permutations are doubly enhanced<sup>1</sup>. Their construction assumes that the trapdoor permutation is efficiently certifiable, and that this construction can be made to work with any (doubly enhanced) trapdoor permutation, using the certification procedure of Bellare and Yung. However, as we show in our current work, the latter is not true, in that certifying that an enhanced trapdoor permutation is indeed injective requires additional assumptions.

[CHK03] provides yet another alternative path for realizing the hidden-bit model. They suggest the notion of publicly-verifiable trapdoor predicates, which they construct based on the decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption. Not to confuse with our notion of certifiability, here the "verifiability" concerns the ability to check, given a pair  $(x, y)$ , that  $x$  is indeed a pre-image of  $y$  (not necessarily the *sole* pre-image). This notion is suggested as a relaxation of the notion of trapdoor permutations, which suffices for NIZK. Still, it has the same weakness as the one pointed out here re DETDPs, namely it implicitly assumes that the trapdoor index is generated honestly (or that the domain of the predicate is efficiently recognizable and sampleable), thus it does not suffice in of itself for realizing the hidden-bit model.

Recently, [BP15] showed how to construct invariant signatures [BG90] from indistinguishability obfuscation and one-way functions. This, together with the technique of [GO92], gives yet another path for realizing the hidden-bit model from assumptions other than factoring. (Previously, the only known construction of invariant signatures was from NIZK.) Their construction not only gives an arguably more natural realization of the hidden-bit model than that obtained by trapdoor permutation, but also avoids the certification problems altogether (as invariant signatures handle the certification problem by definition). Still, the trapdoor-permutations-based paradigm of [FLS90] remains the textbook method for realizing non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs.

Over the years, additional approaches were suggested to obtaining non-interactive zero-

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<sup>1</sup>In their original work, [BGRV09] only required that the trapdoor permutations be *enhanced*. Regardless of the findings in our work, in light of [GR13], this requirement should have been strengthened into *doubly-enhanced* to support the Bellare-Yung certification.

knowledge proofs which are not based on the hidden-bit model. [GOS06] constructed non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs for circuit satisfiability with a short reference string, and non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments for any NP language. [GS08] constructed non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs from assumptions on bilinear groups. [GOS12] and [SW14] constructed non-interactive zero-knowledge arguments with a short reference string for any NP language. All of these protocols either use a structured CRS whose generation requires additional randomness that's trusted to never be revealed, or achieve zero-knowledge *arguments*, where the soundness holds only with respect to computationally bounded adversaries. Moreover, these constructions are based on highly controversial assumption. This leaves the hidden-bit paradigm the only known way to achieve zero-knowledge proofs for any NP language in the uniform reference string model.

**Alternative Notions of Certifiability for TDPs.** [Abu13] define and discuss two notions of verifiability for doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations, which indeed allow verifying, or certifying, that a given trapdoor index indeed describes an injective function: a strong (errorless) one, in which the verification is not allowed to accept any function which is not injective, and a weaker variant, with negligible error. The strong notion indeed suffices for realizing the hidden-bit model, but is overly strong - in particular the existing constructions from RSA and BY do not satisfy it. On the other hand, the weak notion suffers from the same weakness as the prior notions, in that it implicitly assumes that the range of the function is efficiently recognizable. In contrast, we provide a single notion that suffices for realizing the HBM model and is realizable by the factoring-based constructions, by the IO-based construction, and by the gap-DH based construction.

### 1.3 Paper Organization

In section 2 we define the basic notions used in the paper, and describe in general the FLS protocol for NIZK for NP from trapdoor permutations, including the enhancements suggested by Bellare-Yung [BY96] and Goldreich-Rothblum [Gol04, Gol08, Gol11, GR13]. In section 3 we demonstrate how the soundness of the FLS protocol may be compromised when using general TDPs, and discuss the additional assumptions required to avoid this problem. In section 4 we suggest the alternative notion of *certifiably injective* trapdoor functions, and use it to overcome the limitations of the FLS+BY combination and regain the soundness of the FLS protocol. In section 5 we construct a doubly-enhanced, certifiable injective trapdoor function family based on indistinguishability obfuscation and injective pseudorandom generators.

## 2 Preliminaries

The cryptographic definitions in this paper follow the convention of modeling security against non-uniform adversaries. A protocol  $P$  is said to be secure against (non-uniformly) polynomial-time adversaries, if it is secure against any adversary  $A = \{A_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ , such that each circuit  $A_\lambda$  is of size polynomial in  $\lambda$ .

### 2.1 Notations

For a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm  $A$  which operates on input  $x$ , we sometimes denote  $A(x; r)$  as the (deterministic) evaluation  $A$  using random coins  $r$ .

We use the notation  $\Pr[E_1; E_2; \dots; E_n; R]$  to denote the probability of the resulting boolean event  $R$ , following a sequence of probabilistic actions  $E_1, \dots, E_n$ . In other words, we describe a probability experiment as a sequence of actions from left to right, with a final boolean success predicate. We sometime combine this notion with the stacked version  $\Pr_S[E_1; E_2; \dots; E_n; R]$  in which case the sampling steps taken in  $S$  precede  $E_1, \dots, E_n$ , and the random coins used for  $S$  are explicitly specified. (The choice of which actions are described in a subscript and which are described within the brackets is arbitrary and is done only for visual clarity.)

### 2.2 Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions

We consider a simple case of puncturable pseudorandom functions (PPRFs) where any PRF may be punctured at a single point. The definition is formulated as in [SW14], and is satisfied by the GGM PRF [GGM86, BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14].

**Definition 2.1.** (Puncturable PRFs). Let  $n, k$  be polynomially bounded length functions. An efficiently computable family of functions:

$$PRF = \{PRF_S : \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda : S \in \{0, 1\}^{k(\lambda)}, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}\}$$

associated with a PPT key sampler  $K_{PRF}$ , is a puncturable PRF if there exists a polynomial-time puncturing algorithm  $Punc$  that takes as input a key  $S$  and a point  $x^*$  and outputs a punctured key  $S^* = S\{x^*\}$ , so that the following conditions are satisfied:

1. **Functionality is preserved under puncturing:** For every  $x^* \in \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}$ ,

$$\Pr[S \leftarrow K_{PRF}(1^\lambda); S^* = Punc(S, x^*); \forall x \neq x^* : PRF_S(x) = PRF_{S^*}(x)] = 1$$

2. **Indistinguishability at punctured points:** for any PPT distinguisher  $D$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  such that for all  $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ , and any  $x^* \in \{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}$ ,



$$\Pr[D(x^*, S^*, PRF_S(x^*)) = 1] - \Pr[D(x^*, S^*, u) = 1] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

where the probability is taken over the choice of  $S \leftarrow K_{PRF}(1^\lambda)$ ,  $S^* = \text{Punc}(S, x^*)$ ,  $u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ , and the random coins of  $D$ .

## 2.3 Indistinguishability Obfuscation

We define indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) with respect to a given class of circuits. The definition is formulated as in [BGI<sup>+</sup>01].

**Definition 2.2.** (Indistinguishability Obfuscation [BGI<sup>+</sup>01]). A PPT algorithm  $iO$  is said to be an indistinguishability obfuscator for a class of circuits  $\mathcal{C}$ , if it satisfies:

1. **Functionality:** for any  $C \in \mathcal{C}$ ,

$$\Pr_{iO}[\forall x : iO(C)(x) = C(x)] = 1$$

2. **Indistinguishability:** for any PPT distinguisher  $D$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$ , such that for any two circuits  $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}$  that compute the same function and are of the same size  $\lambda$ :

$$\Pr[D(iO(C_0)) = 1] - \Pr[D(iO(C_1)) = 1] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

Where the probability is taken over the coins of  $D$  and  $iO$ .

## 2.4 Injective TDFs and TDPs

**Definition 2.3.** (Trapdoor Functions). A family of one-way trapdoor functions, or TDFs, is a collection of finite functions, denoted  $f_\alpha : \{D_\alpha \rightarrow R_\alpha\}$ , accompanied by PPT algorithm  $I$  (*index*),  $S_D$  (*domain sampler*),  $S_R$  (*range sampler*) and two (deterministic) polynomial-time algorithms  $F$  (*forward evaluator*) and  $B$  (*backward evaluator or inverter*) such that the following condition holds:

1. On input  $1^n$ , algorithm  $I(1^n)$  selects at random an index  $\alpha$  of a function  $f_\alpha$ , along with a corresponding trapdoor  $\tau$ . Denote  $\alpha = I_0(1^n)$  and  $\tau = I_1(1^n)$ .
2. On input  $\alpha = I_0(1^n)$ , algorithm  $S_D(\alpha)$  samples an element from domain  $D_\alpha$ .
3. On input  $\alpha = I_0(1^n)$ , algorithm  $S_R(\alpha)$  samples an image from the range  $R_\alpha$ .
4. On input  $\alpha = I_0(1^n)$  and any  $x \in D_\alpha$ ,  $F(\alpha, x) = f_\alpha(x)$ .
5. On input  $\tau = I_1(1^n)$  and any  $y \in R_\alpha$ ,  $B(\tau, y)$  outputs  $x$  such that  $F(\alpha, x) = y$ .

The standard hardness condition refers to the difficulty of inverting  $f_\alpha$  on a random image, sampled by  $S_R$  or by evaluating  $F(\alpha)$  on a random pre-image sampled by  $S_D$ , when given only the image and the index  $\alpha$  but not the trapdoor  $\tau$ . That is, it is required that, for every polynomial-time algorithm  $A$ , it holds that:

$$\Pr[\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n); x \leftarrow S_D(\alpha); y = F(\alpha, x); A(\alpha, y) = x' \text{ s.t. } F(\alpha, x') = y] \leq \mu(n) \quad (1)$$

Or, when sampling an image directly using the range sampler:

$$\Pr[\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n); y \leftarrow S_R(\alpha); A(\alpha, y) = x' \text{ s.t. } F(\alpha, x') = y] \leq \mu(n) \quad (2)$$

for some negligible function  $\mu$ .

Additionally, it is required that, for any  $\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n)$ , the distribution sampled by  $S_R(\alpha)$  should be *close* to from that sampled by  $F(S_D(\alpha))$ . In this context we require that the two distributions be computationally indistinguishable. We note that this requirement implies that the two hardness requirements given in equations 1 and 2 are equivalent. The issue of closeness of the sampling distributions is discussed further at the end of this section.

If  $f_\alpha$  is injective for all  $\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n)$ , we say that our collection describes an **injective trapdoor function family**, or iTDFs (in which case  $B(\alpha, \cdot)$  inverts any image to its sole pre-image). If additionally  $D_\alpha$  and  $R_\alpha$  coincide for any  $\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n)$ , the resulting primitive is a trapdoor permutation.

If for any  $\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n)$ ,  $D_\alpha = \{0, 1\}^{p(n)}$  for some polynomial  $p(n)$ , that is, every  $p(n)$ -bit string describes a valid domain element, we say the function is full domain. Otherwise we say the domain is partial. Full and partial range and keyset are defined similarly. We say that a TDF (or TDP) is **ideal** if it has a full range and a full keyset.

**Definition 2.4.** (Hard-Core Predicate)  $p$  is a **hard-core predicate** for  $f_\alpha$  if its value is hard to predict for a random domain element  $x$ , given only  $\alpha$  and  $f_\alpha(x)$ . That is, if for any PPT adversary  $A$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  such that:

$$\Pr[\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n); x \leftarrow S_D(\alpha); y = F(\alpha, x); A(\alpha, y) = p(x)] \leq 1/2 + \mu(n)$$

### 2.4.1 Enhancements

A trivial range-sampler implementation may just sample a domain element  $x$  by applying  $S_D(\alpha)$ , and then evaluate the TDF on it by applying  $F(\alpha, x)$ . This sampler, while fulfilling the standard one-way hardness condition, is not good enough for some applications. Specifically, for the case of NIZK, we require the ability to obviously sample a range element in a way that does not expose its pre-image (without using the trapdoor). This trivial range sampler obviously does not qualify for this case.

Goldreich [Gol04] suggested the notion of **enhanced TDPs**, which can be used for cases where sampling is required to be available in a way that does not expose the pre-image. They then demonstrate how enhanced trapdoor permutations can be used to obtain NIZK proofs (as we describe later in sections 2.5). We revisit this notion, while extending it to the case of injective TDF (where the domain and range are not necessarily equal).

**Definition 2.5.** (Enhanced injective TDF, [Gol04]). Let  $\{f_\alpha : D_\alpha \rightarrow R_\alpha\}$  be a collection of injective TDFs, and let  $S_D$  be the domain sampler associated with it. We say that the collection is **enhanced** if there exists a range sampler  $S_R$  that returns random samples out of  $R_\alpha$ , and such that, for every polynomial-time algorithm  $A$ , it holds that:

$$\Pr[\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n); r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n; y = S_R(\alpha; r); A(\alpha, r) = x' \text{ s.t. } F(\alpha, x') = y] \leq \mu(n) \quad (3)$$

where  $\mu$  is some negligible function.

The range sampler of an enhanced injective TDF has the property that its random coins do not reveal a corresponding pre-image, i.e. an adversary which is given an image along with the random coins which created it, still cannot inverse it with all but negligible probability.

[Gol11] additionally suggested enhancing the notion of hard-core predicates in order to adapt the FLS proof (that uses traditional hard-core predicates) to the case of enhanced trapdoor functions. Loosely speaking, such a predicate  $p$  is easy to compute, but given  $\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n)$  and  $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ , it is hard to guess the value of the predicate on the pre-image of the image sampled by the range sampler using the coins  $r$ :

**Definition 2.6.** (Enhanced Hard-Core Predicate, [Gol11]) Let  $\{f_\alpha : D_\alpha \rightarrow R_\alpha\}$  be an enhanced collection of injective TDFs, with domain sampler  $S_D$  and range sampler  $S_R$ . We say that the predicate  $p$  is an **enhanced hard-core predicate** of  $f_\alpha$  if it is efficiently computable and for any PPT adversary  $A$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  such that

$$\Pr[\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n); r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n; y = S_R(\alpha; r); x = B(\alpha, y); A(\alpha, r) = p(\alpha, x)] \leq 1/2 + \mu(n)$$

Or, equivalently, if the following two distribution ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:

1.  $\{(\alpha, r, p(\alpha, B(\alpha, S_R(\alpha; r)))) : \alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n), r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$
2.  $\{(\alpha, r, u) : \alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n), r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n, u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$

The hard-core predicates presented in [GL89] satisfy this definition without changes (as they do not use the trapdoor index).

**Definition 2.7.** (Doubly Enhanced injective TDF, [Gol08]). Let  $\{f_\alpha : D_\alpha \rightarrow R_\alpha\}$  be an enhanced collection of injective TDFs, with domain sampler  $S_D$  and range sampler  $S_R$ . We say that this collection is **doubly-enhanced** if it provides another polynomial-time algorithm  $S_{DR}$  with the following properties:

- **Correlated pre-image sampling:** for any  $(\alpha, \tau) \leftarrow I(1^n)$ ,  $S_{DR}(\alpha; 1^n)$  outputs pairs of  $(x, r)$  such that  $F(\alpha, x) = S_R(\alpha; r)$
- **Pseudorandomness:** for any PPT distinguisher  $D$  there exists a negligible  $\mu$  such that:

$$\Pr[(\alpha, \tau) \leftarrow I(1^n); (x, r) \leftarrow S_{DR}(\alpha); D(x, r, \alpha) = 1] - \Pr[(\alpha, \tau) \leftarrow I(1^n); r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*; y = S_R(\alpha; r); x = B(\alpha, y); D(x, r, \alpha) = 1] \leq \mu(n)$$

$S_{DR}$  provides a way to sample pairs of an element  $x$  in the function’s domain, along with random coins  $r$  which explain the sampling of the image  $y = f_\alpha(x)$  in the function’s range. Note that since the collection is enhanced,  $r$  must not reveal any information of  $x$ .

[GR13] review these enhanced notions of trapdoor permutations in light of applications for which they are useful, specifically oblivious transfer and NIZK, providing a comprehensive picture of trapdoor permutations and the requirements they should satisfy for each application. They additionally suggested a number of intermediate notions between idealized TDPs, enhanced TDPs and doubly-enhanced TDPs, and discussed notions of enhancements for general trapdoor and one-way functions.

**On the uniformity of distributions sampled by the domain, range and correlated pre-image samplers:** in definitions 2.3 and 2.7 we required that the distribution sampled by (a) running the domain sampler  $S_D$ , (b) inverting images sampled by the range sampler  $S_R$ , and (c) taking pre-images sampled by the correlated pre-image sampler  $S_{DR}$ , are all *computationally indistinguishable*. This is a relaxation of the definition given in [Gol11, GR13], which require that all three of these distributions be *statistically close*. The relaxed notion is adapted from [BPW16], which indeed define and implement the computational-indistinguishable variant. While samplers that are statistically close to uniform are often needed in situations where the permutation is applied repeatedly, computational closeness suffices in our setting.

## 2.5 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge

### 2.5.1 Definition

**Definition 2.8.** (Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge, Blum-Feldman-Micali [BFM88]) A pair of PPT algorithms  $(P, V)$  provides an (efficient-prover) Non-Interactive Zero Knowl-

edge (NIZK) proof system for language  $L \in NP$  with relation  $R_L$  in the *Common Reference String* (CRS) Model if it provides:

- **Completeness:** for every  $(x, w) \in R_L$  we have that:

$$\Pr_{P, crs} [\pi \leftarrow P(x, w, crs); V(x, crs, \pi) = 0] \leq \mu(|x|)$$

where the probability is taken over the coins of  $P$  and the choice of the CRS as a uniformly random string, and  $\mu(n)$  is some negligible function.

- **Soundness:** for every  $x \notin L$ :

$$\Pr_{crs} [\exists \pi : V(x, crs, \pi) = 1] \leq \mu(|x|)$$

where the probability is taken over the choice of the CRS as a uniformly random string, and  $\mu(n)$  is some negligible function.

- **Zero-Knowledge:** there exists a PPT algorithm  $S$  (simulator) such that the following two distribution ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:

- $\{(x, crs, \pi) : crs \leftarrow U, \pi \leftarrow P(x, w, crs)\}_{(x,w) \in R_L}$
- $\{S(x)\}_{(x,w) \in R_L}$

Here  $U$  denotes the set of uniformly random strings of length polynomial in  $|x|$ .

While it sometimes makes sense to have a computationally unbounded prover, it should be stressed that the verifier and simulator should both be polynomial-time.

The common reference string is considered the practical one for NIZK proof systems, and is the one widely accepted as the appropriate abstraction. When discussing NIZK proof systems, we sometime omit the specific model being assumed, in which case we mean the CRS model.

## 2.5.2 NIZK in the Hidden-Bit Model

A fictitious abstraction, which is nevertheless very helpful for the design of NIZK proof systems, is the hidden-bits model. In this model the common reference-string is uniformly selected as before, but only the prover can see all of it. The prover generates, along with a proof  $\pi$ , a subset  $I$  of indices in the CRS, and passes them both to the verifier. The verifier may only inspect the bits of the CRS that reside in the locations that have been specified by the prover in  $I$ , while all other bits of the CRS are hidden to the verifier.

**Definition 2.9.** (NIZK in the Hidden-Bit Model [FLS90, Gol98]). For a bit-string  $s$  and an index set  $I$  denote by  $s_I$  the set of values of  $s$  in the indexes given by  $I$ :  $s_I := \{(i, s[i]) : i \in I\}$ . A pair of PPT algorithms  $(P, V)$  constitute an (efficient-prover) NIZK proof system for language  $L \in NP$  with relation  $R_L$  in the *Hidden-Bit* (HB) Model if it provides:

- **Completeness:** for every  $(x, w) \in R_L$  we have that:

$$\Pr_{P, crs} [(\pi, I) \leftarrow P(x, w, crs); V(x, I, crs_I, \pi) = 0] \leq \mu(|x|)$$

where the probability is taken over the coins of  $P$  and the choice of the CRS as a uniformly random string, and  $\mu(n)$  is some negligible function.

- **Soundness:** for every  $x \notin L$ :

$$\Pr_{crs} [\exists \pi, I : V(x, I, crs_I, \pi) = 1] \leq \mu(|x|)$$

where the probability is taken over the choice of the CRS as a uniformly random string, and  $\mu(n)$  is some negligible function.

- **Zero-Knowledge:** there exists a PPT algorithm  $S$  (simulator) such that the following two distribution ensembles are computationally indistinguishable:

- $\{(x, crs_I, \pi) : crs \leftarrow U, (\pi, I) \leftarrow P(x, w, crs)\}_{(x,w) \in R_L}$
- $\{S(x)\}_{(x,w) \in R_L}$

Here  $U$  denotes the set of uniformly random strings of length polynomial in  $|x|$ .

While the hidden-bit model is an unrealistic one, its importance lies in two facts. Firstly, it provides a clean abstraction for NIZK systems, which facilitates the design of "clean" proof systems. Efficient-prover NIZK proof systems for NP-hard languages exist unconditionally in the hidden-bit model [FLS90, Gol98]:

**Theorem 2.1.** ([FLS90]) *There exists a NIZK proof system in the hidden-bit model for any NP language (unconditionally). Furthermore, the protocol is statistical zero-knowledge and statistically sound.*

Secondly, proof systems in the hidden-bit model can be easily transformed into proof systems in the more realistic CRS model, using general hardness assumptions. Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [FLS90] suggests such a transformation. In the rest of this section, we describe their construction and the details of the underlying hardness assumptions. We remark that in the hidden-bit model, we can obtain both perfect soundness (with a negligible completeness error) and perfect completeness (with a negligible soundness error).

### 2.5.3 From Hidden-Bit to CRS

The following is a review of the full details of the FLS protocol and the enhancement that followed to adapt it to general trapdoor permutations. This follows the historic line of research by [FLS90, BY96, Gol98, Gol11, GR13].

**The FLS Protocol:** Assuming the existence of one-way permutations, Feige, Lapidot and Shamir [FLS90] constructed a NIZK proof-system in the CRS model for any NP language. They also offer an efficient implementation of the prescribed prover, using trapdoor permutations. We refer to this construction, described next, as the FLS protocol:

Let:

- $(P_{HB}, V_{HB})$  be a hidden-bit proof system for language  $L$  (which exists unconditionally by theorem 2.1).
- $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is an injective one-way function, and  $p$  a hard-core predicate for it.

Let  $(P, V)$  be the following proof system for input  $x$ :

- CRS: a sequence of  $m$  random items  $y_1, \dots, y_m$  where each  $y_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ .
- Prover ( $P$ ):
  1. Compute  $x_i := f^{-1}(y_i)$  and  $r_i = p(x_i)$  for  $i \in [m]$ .
  2. Emulate  $P_{HB}$  to obtain  $(I, \pi) = P_{HB}(x, r_1 \cdots r_m)$
  3. Output  $(\pi, \Sigma)$ , where  $\Sigma := \{(i, x_i) : i \in I\}$ .
- Verifier ( $V$ ): given the proof  $(\pi, \Sigma = \{(i, x_i) : i \in I\})$ :
  1. check that  $x_i = f(y_i)$  for each  $i \in I$ . Otherwise reject.
  2. compute  $r_i = p(x_i)$  for  $i \in I$ , let  $r_I = \{(i, r_i) : i \in I\}$
  3. emulate  $V_{HB}$  on  $(x, r_I, \pi)$ , and accept if and only if it accepts.

[FLS90] showed that the resulting construction is a NIZK proof system for  $L$  in the CRS model:

**Theorem 2.2.** ([FLS90]) *Assuming the existence of one-way permutations, there exists a NIZK proof system in the CRS model with an inefficient prover for any NP language.*

**Implementing an Efficient Prover using Ideal Trapdoor Permutations:** In order for the prover  $P$  in the FLS system to be efficient, it must be able to efficiently invert  $f$ . On the other hand, the verifier  $V$  must not be able to efficiently invert  $f$  in order to preserve the zero-knowledge property of the system. The obvious solution is to use a family of trapdoor permutations, and let the prover choose the permutation. The prover invokes the generation algorithm of the TDP to receive an index  $\alpha$  and a trapdoor  $\tau$ . It then uses  $\tau$  to invert the  $y_i$ 's. The verifier receives  $\alpha$  from the prover and uses it to evaluate  $f$  and  $p$ . As we can no longer assume that the permutation key chosen by the prover is truly random, we consider the probability of success of the prover for any specific choice of permutation, and then union

bound over all possible permutations. This means that in order to guarantee soundness, the initial soundness error must be smaller than inverse the number of permutations. We guarantee that by enhancing the soundness error via repetition. We omit the rest of the details.

**Theorem 2.3.** ([FLS90]) *Assuming the existence of an **ideal trapdoor permutation** family, there exists a NIZK proof system in the CRS model (with an efficient prover) for any NP language.*

As shown by [FLS90], the FLS protocol provides a NIZK proof system assuming that the underlying TDP is ideal. However, existing instantiations of TDPs are *not* ideal, and in fact are far from it. Most reasonable constructions of TDPs have both partial keysets and partial domains. This leads to two gaps which arise when using general TDPs, in place of ideal ones.

**Ideal Domains + General Keys: The Bellare-Yung Protocol:** The first hurdle, discovered by Bellare and Yung [BY96], involves the use of general trapdoor keys (rather than ideal ones). The problem is that the soundness of the FLS protocol relies on the feasibility of recognizing permutations in the collection. If the permutation is ideal then every key describes a permutation, and therefore detecting a permutation is trivial. However, existing instantiations of TDPs require sampling keys of a certain form using a specific protocol. This brings us to the problem of *certifying permutations*, which aims to answer the question of how to certify that a given key indeed describes a valid permutation. Bellare and Yung [BY96] suggested a certification procedure for permutations, assuming nothing of the keyset, but requiring that the range remains full. We refer to this procedure as the Bellare-Yung protocol. The following is an overview of the construction and proof given in section 4 of [BY96].

**Definition 2.10.** (Almost-Permutations). Let  $C(f)$ , the *Collision Set* of  $f$ , be the set of all  $n$ -bit strings which have more than one pre-image:

$$C(f) := \{y \in \{0, 1\}^n : \exists x_1 \neq x_2 \in \{0, 1\}^n . f(x_1) = f(x_2) = y\} \quad (4)$$

We say that  $f$  is an  $\varepsilon$ -permutation (for  $0 \leq \varepsilon \leq 1$ ) if its collision set is at most an  $\varepsilon$ -fraction of the entire domain, i.e.  $|C(f)| \leq \varepsilon 2^n$ . If  $f$  is a 0-permutation then it is by definition a permutation. We say that  $f$  is an *almost* permutation if it is an  $\varepsilon(n)$ -permutation for some negligible  $\varepsilon(n)$ .

For general functions (with different domain and range), we define *almost injectivity* in a similar way: if  $Range(f) \subseteq \{0, 1\}^m$ , then the collision set is defined as the set of all  $m$ -bit strings which have more than one pre-image. Next, we say that  $f$  is  $\varepsilon$ -injective if  $|C(f)| \leq \varepsilon \cdot |Domain(f)|$ , and that it is almost injective if it is  $\varepsilon(n)$ -injective for some negligible  $\varepsilon(n)$ .



The main observation is that  $f$  is an  $\varepsilon$ -permutation if and only if at most  $\varepsilon$ -fraction of  $\{0, 1\}^n$  has no pre-image. Given a trapdoor permutation family described by  $(I, S_D, F, B)$  (where  $S_D$  just samples a string from  $\{0, 1\}^n$ ), Bellare-Yung described the following protocol for certifying that some  $(\alpha, \tau)$  describe an almost-permutation. The prover and verifier treat the CRS as a sequence of some  $l$  range items  $y_1, \dots, y_l$  (where  $y_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ). The prover provides the verifier with a list of pre-images  $x_1, \dots, x_l$  such that  $x_i = B(\tau, y_i)$  (where  $B$  is the backwards-evaluation or inversion algorithm of the TDP family). The verifier accepts if  $y_i = F(\alpha, x_i)$  for all  $i$  (where  $F$  is the forward evaluator). By asking the prover to invert sufficiently many random domain element, the verifier is convinced that the collision set is small enough, meaning that the given index describes an almost-permutation. Finally, as it turns out, being an almost-permutation is sufficient for the purpose of the FLS protocol.

**Theorem 2.4.** ([BY96]) *Assuming the existence of a **full-domain trapdoor permutation family** (whose keys may be hard to recognize), there exists a NIZK proof system in the CRS model for any NP language (with an efficient prover).*

**General Domains: Doubly Enhanced TDPs:** The second gap concerns the case of partial domains, where the function’s domain is comprised of elements of specific structure (and not just  $\{0, 1\}^n$ ). The FLS protocol treats the CRS as a sequence of range elements. In the case of the general abstraction of trapdoor permutations, an additional domain sampling algorithm is required. This problem is solved by requiring the use of doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations. Given the permutation index  $\alpha$ , both the prover and the verifier use the enhanced sampling algorithm  $S_R(\alpha)$  to sample elements from the permutation’s range. They treat the CRS as a sequence  $r_1, \dots, r_l$ , where each  $r_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$  is handled as random coins for the range sampler. They create a list of range items  $y_i = S_R(\alpha; r_i)$  and use them for the rest of the FLS protocol. Using the range sampler solves the completeness issue of NIZK in the CRS model for permutations with general domains. However, the resulting protocol may no longer be zero-knowledge, as the verifier now obtains a list of random pairs  $(x_i, r_i)$  such that  $f_\alpha(x_i) = S_\alpha(r_i)$ , but it is not clear that it could have generated such pairs itself. The two enhancements solve just that, and allow the verifier to obtain such pairs on its own.

**Theorem 2.5.** ([GR13]) *Assuming the existence of a general **doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutation family** with **efficiently recognizable keys**, there exists a NIZK proof system in the CRS model for any NP language (with an efficient prover).*

Moreover, in order to certify general keys, [Gol11, GR13] suggested combining between doubly enhanced permutations and the Bellare-Yung protocol, by using the doubly-enhanced domain sampler to sample images by the Bellare-Yung prover and verifier. We reexamine this suggestion in section 3.

**Basing FLS on Injective Trapdoor Functions:** Before moving on, we mention that while the FLS protocol is originally described using (trapdoor) permutations, it may just as well be described and implemented using general injective trapdoor functions. In this case, since the CRS is used to generate range elements, there is no useful notion of "ideal" injective trapdoor functions; if  $f$  maps  $n$ -bit strings into  $m$ -bit strings, where  $m > n$ , then there must exist some  $m$ -bit strings which do not have a pre-image under  $f$ . However, using a doubly-enhanced general injective trapdoor function, the FLS protocol and the generalization into general TDPs will work without any changes, under assuming the keys are efficiently recognizable. In section 5 we will show an example for such a injective TDF and its application to NIZK proof systems.

### 3 On the Unsoundness of FLS with General Doubly Enhanced TDPs

We begin with a careful reexamination of the FLS protocol, in light of the work of [Gol11, GR13]. We discuss a crucial problem yet to be detected when applying the Bellare-Yung protocol on general TDPs, which have both partial domains and partial keysets. Specifically, we identify that the soundness of the FLS protocol may be compromised when using such trapdoor functions.

#### 3.1 The Counter Example

We once again sketch the full details of the Bellare-Yung protocol, this time allowing both partial range and partial keyset for our TDPs, as suggested by [GR13]. To simplify matters, we limit this part of the discussion to the case of trapdoor permutations (rather than any injective trapdoor functions), which is consistent with the efforts done by previous work.

Recall that we are provided with a doubly-enhanced TDP family, described using the algorithms  $I(1^n) \rightarrow (\alpha, \tau)$ ,  $F(\alpha, x) \rightarrow y$ ,  $B(\tau, y) \rightarrow x$ ,  $S(\alpha; r) \rightarrow x$ . We treat the CRS as a sequence of random coins for the sampler  $S$ , and apply  $S$  both on the prover and on the verifier side to obtain range elements.

- Input:  $(\alpha, \tau) \leftarrow I(1^n)$
- CRS: a sequence of  $l$  random strings  $r_1, \dots, r_l$ , each acts as random coins for  $S$
- Prover: is given  $(\alpha, \tau)$  and does the following:
  1. Calculate  $y_i := S(\alpha; r_i)$  for each  $1 \leq i \leq l$ .
  2. Calculate  $x_i := B(\tau, y_i)$  for each  $1 \leq i \leq l$ .
  3. Output  $\{(i, x_i) : 1 \leq i \leq l\}$

- Verifier: is given  $\alpha$  and  $\{(i, x_i) : 1 \leq i \leq l\}$ , and does the following
  1. Calculate  $y_i := S(\alpha; r_i)$  for each  $1 \leq i \leq l$ .
  2. Validate that  $y_i = F(\alpha, x_i)$  for each  $1 \leq i \leq l$ . If any of the validations fail, reject the proof. Otherwise, accept it.

Looking into the details of the protocol, we detect a potential problem. We demonstrate it by instantiating the FLS+BY protocols using a specific family of doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations, which was proposed by [BPW16]:

Let  $PRF_k$  be a pseudorandom function family, and  $iO$  an indistinguishability obfuscator. Let  $C_k$  be the circuit that, on input  $(i, t)$ , if  $t = PRF_k(i)$  outputs  $(i + 1, PRF_k(i + 1))$  (where  $i + 1$  is computed modulo some  $T$ ) and otherwise outputs  $\perp$ . Denote by  $\tilde{C} := iO(C_k)$  the obfuscation of  $C_k$ . The BPW construction gives  $\tilde{C}$  as the public permutation index, and keeps  $k$  as the trapdoor. To evaluate the permutation on a domain element  $(i, PRF_k(i))$ , just apply  $\tilde{C}$ . To invert  $(i + 1, PRF_k(i + 1))$  given  $k$ , return  $(i, PRF_k(i))$ . The range sampler is given as an obfuscation of a circuit which samples out of a (sparse) subset of the function's range. One-wayness holds due to a hybrid puncturing argument: the obfuscation of the cycle  $(i, PRF_k(i)) \rightarrow (i + 1, PRF_k(i + 1))$  (where  $i + 1$  is computed module  $T$ ) is indistinguishable from that of the same cycle when punctured on a single spot  $i^*$ , by replacing the edge  $(i^*, PRF_k(i^*)) \rightarrow (i^* + 1, PRF_k(i^* + 1))$  with a self loop from  $(i^*, PRF_k(i^*))$  to itself. By repeating the self-loops technique we obtain a punctured obfuscated cycle where arriving from  $(i, PRF_k(i))$  to its predecessor  $(i - 1, PRF_k(i - 1))$  cannot be done efficiently without knowing  $k$  itself.<sup>2</sup>

Suppose that the [BPW16] construction is used to instantiate the FLS+BY protocols, and consider the following malicious prover: Let  $C'_k$  be a circuit which, given input  $(i, t)$ , does the following: if  $t = PRF_k(i)$  or  $t = PRF_k(i - 1)$ , output  $(i + 1, PRF_k(i + 1))$ . Otherwise, output  $\perp$ . Denote  $\tilde{C}' := iO(C'_k)$ . We give out  $\tilde{C}'$  as the public key and keep  $k$  as the trapdoor. We keep the domain sampler as it is, that is, it returns only items of the form  $(i, PRF_k(i))$ .

Denote  $D_k = \{(i, PRF_k(i)) : i \in [1..T]\}$  and  $\tilde{D}_k = \{(i, PRF_k(i)) : i \in [1..T]\} \cup \{(i, PRF_k(i - 1)) : i \in [1..T]\}$ . It is easy to see that  $C'_k$  is a permutation when restricted to the domain  $D_k$ , but it many-to-one when evaluated on the domain  $\tilde{D}_k$ : each item  $(i + 1, PRF_k(i + 1)) \in D_k$  has 2 pre-images:  $(i, PRF_k(i))$  and  $(i, PRF_k(i - 1))$ . Note that the one-wayness of the trapdoor function is maintained even when extended to the domain  $\tilde{D}_k$ : For each image  $(i + 1, PRF_k(i + 1))$  we now have two pre-images, one is  $(i, PRF_k(i))$  which is hard to invert to due to the same puncturing argument as in the

<sup>2</sup>In order to add an enhanced domain sampler, the BPW construction returns elements of the form  $(PRG(r), PRF_k(PRG(r)))$ , where  $PRG$  is a pseudorandom generator which lengthens the input by a significant factor. The domain sampler is just an obfuscation of a circuit which outputs the above pair on some random  $r$ . By augmenting the sampler even more, they were able to doubly-enhance their TDP, at the cost of creating a very sparse part of the domain which is sampleable. We leave the rest of the details to the reader.

original BPW paper, and the second is  $(i, PRF_k(i-1))$  which has no pre-image of its own, and therefore no path on the cycle can lead to it (keeping the same one-wayness argument intact).

Finally, our cheating prover can wrongly "certify" the function as a permutation. The domain sampler will always give an image in  $D_k$  as it was not altered. During the Bellare-Yung certification protocol, the prover can invert  $y = (i+1, PRF_k(i+1)) \in D_k$  to, say,  $(i, PRF_k(i))$ , which will pass the validation. However, during the FLS protocol, the verifier can choose to invert any  $y \in D_k$  to one of its two distinct pre-images, one from  $D_k$  and another from  $\tilde{D}_k \setminus D_k$ , which breaks the soundness of the protocol.

## 3.2 Discussion

We attribute the loss in soundness when applying the FLS+BY combination on the [BPW16] construction to a few major issues.

First, we observe that both the sampling and forward evaluation algorithms are required to operate even on illegitimate keys. However, the basic definition of trapdoor permutations (c.f. [Gol98]) does not address this case at all. Ignoring this case may make sense in settings where the party generating the index is trusted, but this is not so in the case of NIZK proof systems. We therefore generalize the basic definition of trapdoor permutations so that the forward evaluation and domain sampling definitions generalize to any  $\alpha$ , rather than just those which were generated by running the index-generation algorithm. That is, for every  $\alpha$ ,  $D_\alpha$  is some domain over which  $F(\alpha, \cdot)$  is well defined, and  $S(\alpha; r)$  returns elements from that domain.

We next claim that in order for the soundness of the complete FLS+BY protocol to be preserved, two additional requirements are needed: First, membership in  $D_\alpha$  should be efficiently recognizable given  $\alpha$ . That is, there should exist a polynomial-time algorithm which, given  $\alpha$  and some string  $x$ , decides if  $x$  represents an element in  $D_\alpha$  or not. Second, the domain sampler  $S$  should be guaranteed to sample (almost) uniformly out of  $D_\alpha$ . We stress that both these requirements should hold with respect to *any* index  $\alpha$ , in particular indices that were not generated truthfully. Furthermore, they are made *on top of* the existing requirements from doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations.

We call doubly enhanced trapdoor permutations that have these properties *public domain*. We formalize this notion in Definition 4.4 and prove that it indeed suffices for regaining the soundness of the FLS+BY combination in theorem 4.2 (see section 4.3).

In the rest of this section, we show that these two requirements are indeed necessary, by demonstrating that if either of the two do not hold then the resulting proof system is not sound.

First, consider the case where  $S$  does not sample almost uniformly from  $D_\alpha$ . The soundness of Bellare-Yung depends on the observation that if the function is not an almost-permutation, then by sampling enough random images from the function's domain, there must be a sample which cannot be inverted (with all but negligible probability). However,

if the sampler does not guarantee uniformity this claim no longer holds, as the prover may give out a sampler which samples only out of that portion of the range which is invertible.

Secondly, assume  $S$  indeed samples uniformly from the domain, and consider the case where  $D_\alpha$  is not efficiently recognizable. As it turns out, both the Bellare-Yung protocol and the original FLS protocol require the verifier to determine whether pre-images provided by the prover are indeed in  $D_\alpha$ . Otherwise, a malicious prover could certify the permutation under a specific domain, but later provide pre-images taken out of an entirely different domain, thus enabling it to invert some images to two or more pre-images of its choice.

Indeed, the attack described in section 3.1 takes advantage of the loophole resulting from the fact that the domain of the [BPW16] is neither efficiently recognizable nor efficiently sampleable. The exact reason for the failure depends on how the domain of [BPW16] is defined with respect to illegitimate indices. Say for  $\alpha = \tilde{C}$ , we give out  $D_\alpha$  which includes only pairs  $(i, x)$  such that  $x = PRF_k(i)$  (for the specific  $k$  used to construct  $\tilde{C}$ ). In that case,  $S$  indeed samples uniformly from  $D_\alpha$ . However since  $D_\alpha$  is not efficiently recognizable, the prover cannot check that the pre-image it was given is from  $D_\alpha$ . In particular it cannot tell if it is from  $D_k = D_\alpha$  or from  $\tilde{D}_k$ . On the other hand, if  $D_\alpha = \{0, 1\}^*$ , then  $D_\alpha$  may be trivially recognizable for any index, but  $S$  does not guarantee a uniform sample from  $D_\alpha$ . Indeed,  $S$  may sample only from that subset of  $D_\alpha$  which is invertible, thus breaking the soundness.

## 4 Certifying Injectivity of Trapdoor Functions

We go back to the original problem of certifying permutations in a way that is sufficient for the FLS protocol, while addressing the more general problem of certifying injectivity of trapdoor functions (which may or may not be permutations). We note that although this problem is motivated by the need to fill in the gaps in the FLS protocol, a solution for it might be interesting on its own.

In section 4.1 we define the notion of *Certifiable Injectivity* as a general abstraction of certifiability for doubly-enhanced injective trapdoor functions. In section 4.2 we prove that this notion indeed suffices for regaining the soundness of the FLS protocol. In section 4.3 we show how certifiable injectivity can be realized by any trapdoor permutations whose domain provides certain additional properties, by using the Bellare-Yung certification protocol. In section 4.4 we suggest the notion of *Perfectly Certifiable Injectivity* as a specific variant of certifiable injectivity, where there is no longer need for a certification protocol and the resulting soundness is optimal.

### 4.1 Certifiable Injectivity - Definition

We define a general notion of certifiability for injective trapdoor functions, which requires the existence of a general prover and verifier protocol for the function family. The verifier

in our notion provides two levels of verification: a general verification procedure  $V$  for an index  $\alpha$ , and then a pointwise certification procedure  $ICert$  which, on index  $\alpha$  and an image  $y$ , "certifies" that with all but negligible probability  $y$  has only one pre-image under  $\alpha$ . The purpose of this protocol is to guarantee that if the verifier accepts the proof given by the prover on a certain index  $\alpha$ , then with all but negligible probability (over the coins of the range sampler), the range sampler cannot sample images which are certified by  $ICert$  and can be inverted to any two pre-images. We note that this certification must not assume recognizability of the domain.

**Definition 4.1.** (Certifiable Injective Trapdoor Functions (CITDFs)). Let  $F = \{f_\alpha : D_\alpha \rightarrow R_\alpha\}$  be a collection of doubly enhanced injective trapdoor functions, given using algorithms  $I, F, B, S_D, S_R$ . We say that  $F$  is *certifiably injective* (in the common reference string model) if there exists a polynomial-time algorithm  $ICert$  and a pair of PPT algorithms  $(P, V)$ , which provides the following properties:

- **Completeness:** for any  $(\alpha, \tau) \leftarrow I(1^n)$  we have:
  1.  $\Pr_{P, V, crs}[\pi \leftarrow P(\alpha, \tau, crs); V(\alpha, crs, \pi) = 1] = 1$ , where the probability is taken over the coins of  $P$  and  $V$  and the choice of the CRS, and
  2. For any  $x \in D_\alpha$ ,  $ICert(\alpha, x) = 1$ .
- **Soundness:** there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  such that for any  $\alpha$  the following holds:

$$\Pr_{crs, V, r} [\exists \pi, x_1 \neq x_2 \in \{0, 1\}^* : V(\alpha, crs, \pi) = 1, F(\alpha, x_1) = F(\alpha, x_2) = S_R(\alpha; r), \\ ICert(\alpha, x_1) = ICert(\alpha, x_2) = 1] \leq \mu(n)$$

where the probability is taken over the coins of  $V$  the choice of the CRS, and the random coins given to the range sampler. Note that this must hold for any  $\alpha$ , including those that  $I$  cannot output, and that  $\pi$  can be chosen adaptively given the common reference string.

- **Enhanced Hardness (even) given the Proof:** for any polynomial-time algorithm  $A$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$ , such that the following holds

$$\Pr_{P, crs, r} [(\alpha, \tau) \leftarrow I(1^n); \pi \leftarrow P(\alpha, \tau, crs); x \leftarrow A(\alpha, r, crs, \pi); \\ F(\alpha, x) = S_R(\alpha; r)] \leq \mu(n)$$

where the probability is taken over the coins of  $P$ , the choice of the CRS and the randomness  $r$  for the range sampler.

Certifiable injectivity gives a general way to certify that a given key describes an injective function, even when using general, partial-domain/range functions. The proof generated by  $P$  and verified by  $F$  is used to certify that the given key  $\alpha$  is indeed injective, in the sense that if  $V$  accepts it then no two acceptable pre-images can map to the same image (with all but negligible probability). Note that our hardness condition only requires that inversion remains hard. Partial information on the preimage  $x$  can be leaked, and there is no "zero-knowledge-like" property.

We additionally extend the definition of enhanced hard-core predicates to hold with respect to the CI proof (as well as the index):

**Definition 4.2.** (CI-Enhanced Hard-Core Predicate) Let  $\{f_\alpha\}$  be a collection of doubly-enhanced certifiably injective trapdoor functions, with  $P$  being a CI-prover for it and  $S_R$  the enhanced range sampler. We say that the predicate  $p$  is a CI-enhanced hard-core predicate of  $f_\alpha$  if it is efficiently computable, and for any PPT adversary  $A$  there exists a negligible function  $\mu$  such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{(\alpha, \tau) \leftarrow I(1^n); \\ \pi \leftarrow P(\alpha, \tau, crs); \\ r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n;}} [A(\alpha, crs, \pi, r) = p(\alpha, f_\alpha^{-1}(S_R(\alpha; r)))] \leq 1/2 + \mu(n)$$

Similarly to (plain) enhanced hard-core predicates, this definition is unconditionally realizable for any doubly-enhanced certifiably injective TDF (e.g. using the [GL89] hard-core predicate, which does not use the function index).

## 4.2 Certifiable Injectivity Suffices for the Soundness of FLS

Our key theorem, stated next, shows how combining certifiable injectivity with the FLS protocol and doubly-enhanced permutations, we overcome the existing problems and obtain NIZK for NP from general permutations. The intuition is simple: we take a doubly-enhanced, certifiably injective collection of trapdoor permutations, and treat the CRS as two separate strings. The first string is used to certify the injectivity of the trapdoor function, using the CI-prover and verifier, while the second is used for the FLS protocol. Moreover, we add a certification step to the FLS protocol itself, by having the verifier run  $ICert$  on any pre-image provided to it by the prover. The soundness guarantee of CI notion ensures that a malicious prover must choose a trapdoor index which describes a permutation (or at least an almost-permutation) over the domain of elements accepted by  $ICert$ , or otherwise the CI verifier would reject the first part of the proof. The hardness guarantee ensures that the FLS proof remains zero-knowledge, even in the presence of the CI proof.

**Theorem 4.1.** (*CIDETDFs*  $\rightarrow$  *NIZK*) *Assuming the existence of doubly-enhanced, certifiably injective trapdoor functions, there exists a NIZK proof system in the CRS model for any NP language.*

*Proof.* Recall that by Theorem 2.1, there exists a hidden-bit-model proof system for  $L$ , denote it  $(P_{HB}, V_{HB})$ .

Let  $F = \{f_\alpha : D_\alpha \rightarrow R_\alpha\}$  be a collection of doubly-enhanced, certifiably injective trapdoor functions, and let  $L$  be an NP language. Let  $p$  be a CI-enhanced hard-core predicate for  $f_\alpha$ .

We treat the common reference string as two separate substrings  $c_{CI}, c_{FLS}$ .  $c_{CI}$  will be used by the CI-prover and CI-verifier  $(P_{CI}, V_{CI})$  for  $F$ .  $c_{FLS}$  will be used by the prover-verifier pair from the FLS protocol, which is adapted to the use of doubly-enhanced trapdoor functions (based on the adaptation suggested by [Gol11]).

Let  $(P, V)$  be the following protocol:

- The prover  $P$ : given an instance-witness pair  $(x, w) \in R_L$ :
  1. Selects  $(\alpha, \tau) \leftarrow I(1^n)$
  2. Invoke  $P_{CI}(\alpha, \tau, c_{CI})$  to obtain a proof  $\pi_{CI}$  for the injectivity of  $f_\alpha$ .
  3. Treat  $c_{FLS}$  as a sequence of random strings  $r_1, \dots, r_l$ , where each  $r_i$  is of length needed for the random coins for  $S_R$  (which is polynomial in  $n$ ). For  $i = 1, \dots, l$ , let  $y_i = S_R(\alpha; r_i)$ ,  $x_i = B(\tau, y_i)$ , and  $\sigma_i = p(x_i)$ .
  4. Invoke  $P_{HB}$  on  $\sigma = (\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_l)$ , to obtain  $(I, \pi_{HB})$  -  $I$  is a list of indices to reveal, and  $\pi_{HB}$  is the hidden-bit-model proof. Let  $\pi_{FLS}$  be the pair  $(\pi_{HB}, \{(i, x_i) : i \in I\})$ .
  5. Output  $(\alpha, \pi_{CI}, \pi_{FLS})$ .
- The verifier  $V$ : given an instance  $x$  and a proof  $(\alpha, \pi_{CI}, \pi_{FLS})$ :
  1. Invoke  $V_{CI}(\alpha, c_{CI}, \pi_{CI})$  to check the proof  $\pi_{CI}$  for the injectivity of  $f_\alpha$ . If the validation failed, reject the proof.
  2.  $\pi_{FLS} := (\pi_{HB}, \{(i, x_i) : i \in I\})$ . Treat  $c_{FLS}$  as a sequence of random strings  $r_1, \dots, r_m$ .
  3. Check that, for every  $i \in I$ ,  $y_i := S_R(\alpha; r_i) = F(\alpha, x_i)$  and  $ICert(\alpha, x_i)$  accepts. If any of the validations failed, reject the proof.
  4. Let  $\sigma_i = p(x_i)$  for all  $i \in I$ . Let  $\sigma_I = (i, \sigma_i)_{i \in I}$ . Invoke  $V_{HB}$  on  $x, \sigma_I, \pi_{HB}$ , and accepts if and only if it accepts.

We next prove that  $(P, V)$  provide a NIZK proof system for  $L$  in the CRS model.

**Completeness** follows immediately from the completeness of the CI notion and of the FLS protocol.

For **Soundness**, we follow the line of [BY96], of bounding the extra error in soundness induced when the trapdoor function is not a permutation, adapting it to the notion of CIDETDFs:



**Definition 4.3.** Let  $F = \{f_\alpha : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}$  be a CIDETDF family. The *Certified Collision Set* of an index  $\alpha$  is the set of all  $n$ -bit strings which have more than one *certified* pre-image under  $f_\alpha$ :

$$CIC(\alpha) := \{y \in \{0, 1\}^n : \exists x_1 \neq x_2 \in \{0, 1\}^m \text{ s.t. } f_\alpha(x_1) = f_\alpha(x_2) = y \text{ and } ICert(\alpha, x_1) = ICert(\alpha, x_2) = 1\} \quad (5)$$

We say that  $f_\alpha$  is (certified) almost-injective if  $|CIC(\alpha)|$  is negligible.

**Lemma 4.1.** *Let  $F$  be a CIDETDF family with a CI verifier  $V_{CI}$ , and let  $\alpha$  be some index such that  $f_\alpha$  is not (certified) almost-injective. Then  $\Pr_{crs, V}[\exists \pi : V_{CI}(\alpha, crs, \pi) = 1] \leq \mu(n)$  for some negligible function  $\mu$ , where the probability is taken over the choice of the  $crs$  and the random coins of  $V$ .*

*Proof.* Follows directly from the soundness condition of definition 4.1.  $\square$

Next, suppose  $x \notin L$ , and let  $(\alpha, \pi_{CI}, \pi_{FLS})$  be some proof given to  $V$ . We split our proof to cases:

- $f_\alpha$  is not (certified) almost-injective: then by lemma 4.1,  $V_{CI}(\alpha, crs, \pi)$  rejects with all but negligible probability.
- $f_\alpha$  is (certified) almost-injective. As shown by [FLS90], if  $y_i \notin CIC(\alpha)$  for all  $i = 1, \dots, l$ , then  $V_{HB}$  rejects the proof on  $x$  with all but negligible probability. This is so because on every presumed pre-image  $x_i$  presented to it by the prover, the verifier checks that  $f_\alpha(x_i) = y_i$  and  $ICert(\alpha, x_i) = 1$ . As  $y_i \notin CIC(\alpha)$ , there can only exist one pre-image  $x_i$  that passes both certifications, thus each hidden-bit can be opened into only one certified pre-image, preserving the soundness of the underlying hidden-bit proof. Finally, we bound the additional error induced by the case where  $y_i \in CIC(\alpha)$  for some  $i$ , by  $\Pr[\exists 1 \leq i \leq l : y_i \in CIC(\alpha)]$ . By our assumption,  $|CIC(\alpha)|$  is negligible in  $n$ , thus the additional error is negligible as well.

This completes the proof of the soundness condition.

For **Zero Knowledge**, we follow the zero-knowledge proof given in [Gol11]. The proof is given using a hybrid argument, based on the security of the doubly-enhanced injective trapdoor function, and while handling the issue of additionally simulating the certifiable injectivity proof.

Let  $S$  be the following simulator which, given input  $x \in L$ :

1. Sample  $(\alpha, \tau) \leftarrow I(1^n)$
2. Sample a random string  $c_{CI}$ , and invoke  $P_{CI}(\alpha, \tau, c_{CI})$  to obtain a proof  $\pi_{CI}$ .

3. Invoke  $S_{HB}$ , the hidden-bit-model simulator, on  $x$ , to obtain  $(\sigma_I, \pi_{HB})$ , where  $I \subset \{1, \dots, l\}$  is the set of reveal indices and  $\sigma_I = \{(i, \sigma_i)\}_{i \in I}$  are the values they should open to, and  $\pi_{HB}$  the hidden-bit-model proof.
4. For every  $i \in I$ , generate a random pair  $(x_i, r_i)$  such that  $F(\alpha, x_i) = S_R(\alpha; r_i)$  and  $p(x_i) = \sigma_i$ . This can be done efficiently using the doubly-enhanced correlated pre-image sampler  $S_{DR}$  to sample pairs of  $(x_i, r_i)$ . We repeat the sampling until  $p(x_i) = \sigma_i$  (which should happen in expected constant time).
5. For every index  $i \in \{1, \dots, l\} \setminus I$ , uniformly select  $r_i$  (random coins for the range sampler).
6. Let  $c_{FLS} = (r_1, \dots, r_l)$ , and  $\pi_{FLS} = (\{(i, x_i)\}_{i \in I}, \pi_{HB})$ .
7. Output  $(c_{CI}, c_{FLS}, \alpha, \pi_{CI}, \pi_{FLS})$ .

We prove that the output distribution of  $S$  on random instances  $x \in L$  is indistinguishable from the following distribution ensemble:

$$\{(c_{CI}, c_{FLS}, \alpha, \pi_{CI}, \pi_{FLS}) : (c_{CI}, c_{FLS}) \leftarrow U, (\alpha, \pi_{CI}, \pi_{FLS}) \leftarrow P(c_{CI}, c_{FLS}, x, w)\}_{(x,w) \in R_L}$$

The only difference, in the verifier's view, between the simulator output and the real view, is that in the former distribution the values  $r_i$  on the actual reference string do not necessarily match the values of the corresponding hidden-bits seen by the hidden-bit prover  $P_{HB}$ . We use the hardness of predicting  $p$  along with the doubly-enhanced property of the trapdoor permutation family to show that this difference is computationally indistinguishable.

We prove that it is infeasible to distinguish a sequence of  $l$  uniformly-selected  $n$ -bit strings, from a corresponding sequence of  $l$  random  $n$ -bit strings  $r_1, \dots, r_l$  which (partially) fit a given sequence of hidden-bits  $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_k$  for some  $k \leq l$ , that is such that  $\sigma_i = p(f^{-1}(S_R(\alpha; r_i)))$  for any  $1 \leq i \leq k$ . This holds even with respect to an adversary which sees  $\alpha$  as well as  $\pi_{CI}$ .

Denote  $R = (r_1, \dots, r_{k+1})$  a sequence of  $k+1$   $n$ -bit strings, and let  $\sigma_i = p(f^{-1}(S_R(\alpha; r_i)))$  be the correlated hard-core bits for them. We show that an adversary which sees  $R$  along with  $\{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^k$  cannot distinguish  $\sigma_{k+1}$  from a random bit, which suffices to prove our claim.

Assume otherwise, and let  $A$  be such an adversary which guesses  $\sigma_{k+1}$  with a good probability (non-negligibly over half). We use  $A$  to show an adversary  $B$  for the hardness of predicting the hard-core predicate  $p$  (even given the CI proof and the random coins for the range sampler).  $B$  accepts  $\alpha, c_{CI}, \pi_{CI}$  and random coins  $r^*$  for the range sampler. It then uses the correlated pre-image sampler  $S_{DR}$  to generate  $k$  pairs of pre-image-and-coins  $x_i, r_i$  such that  $\sigma_i = p(x_i)$ . Let  $R = (r_1, \dots, r_k, r^*)$ .  $B$  activates  $A$  on  $(\alpha, \pi_{CI}, R, \{\sigma_i\}_{i=1}^k)$ , and outputs the value returned by  $A$ . Since  $A$  predicts  $\sigma_{k+1} = p(r^*)$  with non-negligible probability, so does  $B$ .

This completes the proof of the zero-knowledge condition. □

### 4.3 Certifiable Injectivity for Public-Domain TDPs using Bellare-Yung

Building on the discussion in section 3.2, we formalize the notion of *public-domain* trapdoor permutations. We then show that, when applied to public-domain permutation, the BY certification mechanism suffices for guaranteeing Certifiably Injectivity (and, thus, also soundness of the FLS paradigm.)

**Definition 4.4.** (Public-Domain Trapdoor Permutations.) Let  $f_\alpha : \{D_\alpha \rightarrow D_\alpha\}$  be a trapdoor permutation family, given by  $(I, S, F, B)$ . We say that it is public-domain if the following two additional properties hold:

- **The domain is efficiently recognizable:** that is, there exists an polynomial-time algorithm  $Rec$  which, for any index  $\alpha$  and any string  $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ , accepts on  $(\alpha, x)$  if and only if  $x \in D_\alpha$ . In other words,  $D_\alpha$  is defined as the set of all strings  $x$  such that  $Rec(\alpha, x)$  accepts.
- **The domain is efficiently sampleable:** that is, for any index  $\alpha$ ,  $S(\alpha)$  samples almost uniformly from  $D_\alpha$ .

We stress that both properties should hold with respect to any  $\alpha$ , including ones that were not generated by running  $I$ .

We show that indeed, for the case of public-domain doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations, Bellare-Yung can be used to obtain certifiable injectiveness.

**Theorem 4.2.** *Any doubly-enhanced public-domain trapdoor permutation family is certifiably injective.*

*Proof.* Let  $F$  be a doubly enhanced public-domain trapdoor permutation. Let  $(P, V)$  the prover and verifier from the enhanced Bellare-Yung protocol for  $F$ , that is, the version of Bellare-Yung that uses the enhanced range sampler to generate images from the random coins given in the common reference string, as described in section 3.1. Let  $Rec$  be a polynomial-time domain recognizer for  $D_\alpha$ , for any index  $\alpha$  (which exists since the permutation family is public-domain). We claim that  $F$  is certifiably injective, with  $ICert(\alpha, x) = Rec(\alpha, x)$  and  $(P, V)$  giving the CI prover and verifier.

As shown by [BY96] for the case of full-domain trapdoor permutations,  $(P, V)$  provide soundness, certifiable injectivity and zero-knowledge (which implies the hardness requirement of CI). Moreover, if  $V$  accepts the proof then the size of the collision set is negligible, which implies that the probability that a random image has two pre-images is indeed negligible. In the case of general doubly-enhanced trapdoor permutations, the only property

at risk is soundness. We prove that it is indeed maintained for public-domain trapdoor permutations.

Let  $\alpha$  be an index such that  $F(\alpha, \cdot)$  is not almost-injective over  $D_\alpha$ . Let  $C_\alpha$  be the collision set of  $\alpha$  out of  $D_\alpha$ :  $C(\alpha) = \{y \in D_\alpha : \exists x_1 \neq x_2 \in D_\alpha \text{ s.t. } F(\alpha, x_1) = F(\alpha, x_2)\}$ . Then  $|C_\alpha| \geq \varepsilon(n) \cdot |D_\alpha|$  for some non-negligible  $\varepsilon(n)$  (where  $n$  is the security parameter), hence there exist at least  $\varepsilon(n) \cdot |D_\alpha|$  range items with no pre-image in  $D_\alpha$ . Moreover,  $ICert(\alpha, x) = Rec(\alpha, x)$  is polynomial-time and recognizes  $D_\alpha$ ,  $V$  will not accept any pre-image outside of  $D_\alpha$ , hence there exists at least  $\varepsilon(n) \cdot |D_\alpha|$  range items with no pre-image that  $V$  accepts (in  $D_\alpha$  or outside of it). Denote that uninvertible portion of  $D_\alpha$  as  $U(\alpha)$ .

The prover and the verifier apply  $S(\alpha; r_i)$  on a series of random coins  $r_1, \dots, r_l$  taken from the common reference string. Using a similar argument to that presented in [BY96], for a large enough  $l$  (polynomial in the security parameter), with all but negligible probability (over the CRS), there must exist at least one  $y_i = S(\alpha; r_i) \in U(\alpha)$ . This holds since the  $S(\alpha; \cdot)$  is guaranteed to generate uniform samples out of  $D_\alpha$ , meaning given enough samples, one has to fall into the non-negligible part  $U(\alpha)$ . Hence, for a large enough  $l$ ,  $V$  rejects  $\pi$  with all but negligible probability. □

We note that some existing candidate constructions, such as ones on the line of [BPW16], are not public-domain, as they inherently need the sampling algorithm to hold secrets. Indeed, as demonstrated in section 3, Bellare-Yung does not suffice to guarantee soundness when instantiating FLS with such a candidate. On the other hand, the RSA TDPs are public-domain: the domain  $Z_N^*$  is indeed efficiently recognizable for any public index  $N$ , and a PPT certifiably uniform domain sampler can be described for any public key  $N$  of RSA, by mapping strings in  $\{0, 1\}^n$  to  $Z_N^*$  in a way that obtains (almost) uniform samples in  $Z_N^*$ <sup>3</sup>. For those constructions the FLS+BY combination is indeed sound.

## 4.4 Perfectly Certifiable Injectivity

While certifiable injectivity seems to capture the minimal requirement for a trapdoor permutation that suffices for FLS, the requirement of a prover and verifier algorithms are somewhat cumbersome when viewed purely in the context of trapdoor permutations. We thus suggest a strengthened notion of **Perfectly Certifiable Injectivity**, which is a variant of certifiable injectivity in which the pointwise certification algorithm  $ICert$  provides a stronger guarantee, eliminating the need for an additional prover-verifier protocol.

**Definition 4.5.** (Perfectly Certifiable Injective TDFs). A doubly-enhanced injective TDF family is *perfectly certifiable injective* if, in addition to the standard set of algorithms  $I, S_D, S_R, F, B$ , it defines a certification algorithm  $ICert$ .

<sup>3</sup>Full details can be found in [BY96] and [GR13], appendix B

$ICert$  is given a permutation index  $\alpha$  and a pre-image  $x$ , and accepts or rejects, providing the following two guarantees:

- **Completeness:** If  $\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n)$  and  $x \leftarrow S_D(\alpha)$  then  $ICert(\alpha, x) = 1$ .
- **Perfect Soundness:** For any index  $\alpha$ , there do not exist any  $x_1 \neq x_2 \in \{0, 1\}^*$  such that  $F(\alpha, x_1) = F(\alpha, x_2)$  and  $ICert(\alpha, x_1) = ICert(\alpha, x_2) = 1$ .

Note that  $\alpha$  needs not be generated honestly by  $I$ .

The standard hardness condition is required as usual (and must apply even in the presence of  $ICert$ ).

Perfect CI is a special case of general CI, where the soundness of  $ICert$  is absolute; for any  $\alpha, x_1$ , if  $ICert(\alpha, x_1) = 1$  then it is guaranteed that there exists no second pre-image  $x_2$  which maps to  $F(\alpha, x_1)$  and accepted by  $ICert(\alpha, \cdot)$ . It turns out that in the specific case where the trapdoor function family in use is perfectly certifiable injective with, the index certification protocol can be completely avoided. Indeed, the soundness requirement of definition 4.1 is trivially fulfilled, as:

$$\Pr_r[\exists x_1, x_2 : F(\alpha, x_1) = F(\alpha, x_2) = S_R(\alpha; r), ICert(\alpha, x_1) = ICert(\alpha, x_2) = 1] = 0$$

An important property of this technique is that the soundness it provides is perfect, in that it is identical to the soundness obtained by using ideal trapdoor permutations. No additional error is incurred, since for every image there exists a single acceptable pre-image (unconditionally).

## 5 Doubly Enhanced Perfectly Certifiable Injective Trapdoor Functions from $iO+$

We construct doubly-enhanced injective trapdoor functions using  $iO+$  pseudorandom generators (which can be constructed from one way functions). Additionally, assuming the pseudorandom generator is injective, we show that the injectivity of our construction is perfectly certifiable. Using the additional certification procedure, our construction suffices for general NIZK proofs for NP-languages. This construction is motivated by the [SW14] CPA-secure public key encryption system.

For simplicity, in sections 5.1-5.4, we assume that the PRGs and PPRFs being used by our construction are *full domain*; that is, every string in  $\{0, 1\}^{p(n)}$  (for some  $p(n)$  polynomial in the security parameter  $n$ ), can be mapped to a pre-image of the function. This assumption makes sense in the context of general pseudorandom generators and puncturable pseudorandom functions, where natural full-domain candidates exist (c.f. [GGM86]). However this is not the case for *injective* PRGs, which are required for our certifiable injectivity

proof. In section 5.5 we show how this assumption can be relaxed, by allowing injective PRGs with a domain which is efficiently sampleable and recognizable. We additionally demonstrate how these requirements can be realized by existing candidates.

## 5.1 Construction

Let:

- $g : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$  be a  $n$ -to- $2n$ -bits pseudorandom generator
- $d : \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a  $n/2$ -to- $n$  pseudorandom generator
- $\{f_k : \{0, 1\}^{2n} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}_{k \in K}$  be a puncturable pseudorandom function family
- $\{h_w : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}_{w \in W}$  be a length-preserving puncturable PRF family
- $iO$  be an indistinguishability obfuscation scheme.

Let  $T_k$ ,  $S_{k,w}$  and  $Q_w$  be the following circuits:

```

 $T_k(x)$ : // (Forward evaluator)
  constants:
    puncturable PRF key  $k$ 
   $t = g(x)$ 
   $s = f_k(t)$ 
  return  $(x \oplus s, t)$ 

```

```

 $S_{k,w}(r)$ : // (Range Sampler)
  constants:
    puncturable PRF key  $k$  for  $f$ 
    puncturable PRF key  $w$  for  $h$ 
   $x = h_w(r)$ 
  return  $T_k(x)$ 

```

```

 $Q_w(\rho)$ : // (Correlated Image Sampler)
  constants:
    puncturable PRF keys  $w$  for  $h$ 
   $r = d(\rho)$ 
   $x = h_w(r)$ 
  return  $(x, r)$ 

```

We define our injective TDF in the following way:

- $I(1^n)$ : Choose  $k \leftarrow K$  as a PRF key for  $f$ , and  $w \leftarrow W$  as a PRF key for  $h$ . Denote  $\tilde{T} := iO(T_k)$ ,  $\tilde{S} := iO(S_{k,w})$ ,  $\tilde{Q} := iO(Q_w)$ . Output  $\alpha := (\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q})$  as the public TDP index, and  $\tau := k$  as the trapdoor.
- $F(\alpha = (\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}), x \in \{0, 1\}^n)$ : output  $\tilde{T}(x)$ .
- $B(\tau = k, y = (c \in \{0, 1\}^n, t \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}))$ : output  $c \oplus f_k(t)$ .
- $S_D(\alpha = (\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}), r \in \{0, 1\}^n)$ : output  $r$ .
- $S_R(\alpha = (\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}), r \in \{0, 1\}^n)$ : output  $\tilde{S}(r)$ .

**Motivation:**  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_k)$  is used as the forward evaluation algorithm, with the secret key  $k$  used to invert it.  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_{k,w})$  is used as a range sampler providing the first enhancement, with  $h_w$  being used to re-randomize the random coins provided to in to create a secret pre-image.  $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_w)$  will be used to provide the second enhancement, using yet another round of re-randomization on the coins provided to it.

**Theorem 5.1.** (Completeness / Injectivity) *The above construction describes an injective function family over  $\{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ . Furthermore,  $B$  calculates the inversion of  $F$  over the above domain and range.*

*Proof.* Suppose  $(c_1, t_1) = (c_2, t_2)$ . Then  $t_1 = t_2$ , hence for  $s_1 = f_k(t_1)$  and  $s_2 = f_k(t_2)$  we have  $s_1 = s_2$ . So  $c_1 = s \oplus x_1$ ,  $c_2 = s \oplus x_2$ , and  $c_1 = c_2$ , hence  $x_1 = x_2$ .

For  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $F(\alpha, x)$  outputs  $y = (x \oplus s, t)$ .  $B(\tau, y)$  outputs  $x \oplus s \oplus f_k(t) = x$ .  $\square$

## 5.2 Hardness

**Theorem 5.2.** (Hardness) *The function family described by the above construction is one-way.*

*Proof.* We define the TDF hardness using a game between a game-master  $GM$  and an adversary  $A$ :

1.  $GM$  chooses random keys  $k, w$  and a random pre-image  $x^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ . It takes  $t^* = g(x^*)$ ,  $s^* = f_k(t^*)$ ,  $z^* = x^* \oplus s^*$ ,  $y^* = (z^*, t^*)$ ,  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_k)$ ,  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_{k,w})$ ,  $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_w)$ .
2.  $A$  receives  $\alpha = (\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q})$  and  $y^*$ , and outputs  $x'$ .

We define the advantage of  $A$  as  $adv(A) = \Pr[\tilde{T}(x') = y^*]$  (where the probability is taken over the coins of  $I$  and the selection of  $x^*$ ). We require that for any PPT adversary  $A$ ,  $adv(A) \leq \mu(n)$  for a negligible function  $\mu$ . It is easy to see that this definition is equivalent to the standard hardness definition given in section 2.4.

We now continue the proof using a hybrid argument. We define a series of hybrids, each describing a game between the game master  $GM$  and the adversary  $A$ . We show that in each pair of consecutive hybrids, denoted  $H_i$  and  $H_{i+1}$ , the advantage obtained by the adversary must be computationally close, denoted  $H_i \approx H_{i+1}$ , or otherwise some underlying hardness assumption will break. In the last hybrid we will show that no adversary can win with non-negligible advantage (unconditionally), thus proving the hardness of the TDF obtained by the construction. Note that the key  $w$  remains unpunctured and  $\tilde{Q}$  remains unchanged throughout the hybrids.

- $H_0$ : the game is played between  $A$  and  $GM$  as described above.
- $H_1$ : same as in  $H_0$ , only  $GM$  replaces  $\tilde{T}$  and  $\tilde{S}$  with obfuscation of two different programs. That is,  $GM$  chooses random keys  $k, w$ , a random pre-image  $x^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^*$  and  $t^* = g(x^*), s^* = f_k(t^*), z^* = x^* \oplus s^*, y^* = (z^*, t^*)$  as before. Let  $k^* = k(\{t^*\})$  be the punctured PRF key at point  $t^*$ . Let  $T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\}$  be the following program:

```

 $T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\}(x)$ :
  constants:
    punctured PRF key  $k^*$ 
    points  $t^* \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}, z^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ 
   $t = g(x)$ 
  if  $t = t^*$  then  $z = z^*$ 
  else
     $s = f_{k^*}(t)$ 
     $z = x \oplus s$ 
  return  $(z, t)$ 

```

and let  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\})$ .

Let  $S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\}$  be the result of replacing the call to  $T_k$  in  $S_{k,w}$  with a call to  $T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\}$ :

```

 $S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\}(r)$ :
  constants:
    punctured PRF key  $k^*$ 
    points  $t^* \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}, z^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ 
    puncturable PRF key  $w$  for  $h$ 
   $x = h_w(r)$ 
  return  $T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\}(x)$ 

```

and let  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\})$ .



Let  $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_w)$ .  $GM$  gives  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}$  and  $y^*$  to  $A$ .  $A$  returns  $x'$  and wins if  $\tilde{T}(x') = y^*$ .

$H_0 \approx H_1$ : under our selection of  $k^*, t^*, z^*$ , it is clear that  $T_k$  and  $T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\}$  have the exact same functionality, and so do  $S_{k,w}$  and  $S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\}$ . Therefore, any significant difference between the advantage of  $A$  in  $H_0$  and  $H_1$  could be used to break the security of the iO scheme: let  $B$  an adversary for the iO scheme which runs  $GM$  in both hybrids to obtain  $T_k$  and  $T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\}$ , outputs them both and accepts back  $\tilde{T}$  which is an obfuscation of one of the two, and similarly for  $\tilde{S}$ . It runs  $A$  on the programs it got and outputs 1 if  $A$  wins. If  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}$  are obfuscations of  $T_k, S_{k,w}$  then  $A$  is in  $H_0$ , and if they are of  $T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\}$  and  $S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\}$  then  $A$  is in  $H_1$ .

- $H_2$ : Same as in  $H_1$ , only  $GM$  replaces  $s^* = f_k(t^*)$  with a truly random  $s^*$ . That is,  $GM$  chooses keys  $k, w$ , a pre-image  $x^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $t^* = g(x^*)$ ,  $s^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $z^* = x^* \oplus s^*$ ,  $y^* = (z^*, t^*)$ ,  $k^* = k(\{t^*\})$ ,  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\})$ ,  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\})$  and  $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_w)$ .  $GM$  gives  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, y^*$  to  $A$ .  $A$  returns  $x'$  and wins if  $\tilde{T}(x') = y^*$ .

$H_1 \approx H_2$ : assume otherwise, and let  $B$  be the following adversary for the security of the punctured PRF key  $k^* = k(\{t^*\})$  at the punctured point  $t^*$ :  $B$  chooses  $x^*$  and takes  $t^* = g(x^*)$ . It gives out  $t^*$ , and gets back  $k^* = k(\{t^*\})$  and a challenge  $s^*$  which is either  $f_k(t^*)$  or random.  $B$  chooses  $w$ , generates  $z^* = x^* \oplus s^*$ ,  $y^* = (z^*, t^*)$ ,  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\})$ ,  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\})$  and  $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_w)$ . It runs  $A$  on  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, y^*$  and outputs 1 if  $A$  wins. If  $s^* = f_k(t^*)$  then  $A$  is in  $H_1$ , and if  $s^*$  is random then  $A$  is in  $H_2$ .

Note that  $s^*$  is random in  $H_3$ , and is no longer in the adversary's view. Therefore we can completely remove it and treat  $z^*$  as truly random instead. That is,  $GM$  can choose keys  $k, w$ , a pre-image  $x^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $t^* = g(x^*)$ ,  $z^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $y^* = (z^*, t^*)$ ,  $k^* = k(\{t^*\})$ ,  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\})$ ,  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\})$ ,  $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_w)$  and give  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, y^*$  to  $A$ .

- $H_3$ : same as in  $H_2$ , only  $GM$  replaces  $t^* = g(x^*)$  with a random  $t^*$ . That is,  $GM$  chooses keys  $k, w$ ,  $t^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ ,  $z^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $y^* = (z^*, t^*)$ ,  $k^* = k(\{t^*\})$ ,  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\})$ ,  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\})$ ,  $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_w)$  and give  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, y^*$  to  $A$ .  $A$  returns  $x'$  and wins if  $\tilde{T}(x') = y^*$ .

$H_2 \approx H_3$ : Assume otherwise, and let  $B$  be the following adversary for the security of the pseudorandom generator  $g$ .  $B$  gets a value  $t^*$  which is either  $g(x^*)$  on a random  $x^*$ , or a random  $2n$ -bits value.  $B$  then chooses  $k, w$ ,  $z^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $y^* = (z^*, t^*)$ ,  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*\})$ ,  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_1\{k^*, t^*, z^*, w\})$ ,  $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_w)$ , runs  $A$  on  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, y^*$ , and outputs 1 if  $A$  wins. If  $t^* = g(x^*)$  then  $A$  is in  $H_2$ , and if it is random then  $A$  is in  $H_3$ .

Finally, in  $H_3$ , the adversary  $A$  sees  $y^* = (z^*, t^*)$  for random  $z^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  and  $t^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ , and the obfuscated programs, and needs to guess an  $x'$  such that

$g(x') = t^*$  and  $x' \oplus f_{k^*}(t^*) = z^*$ . But, as  $g$  maps  $n$  bits to  $2n$  bits, at most  $2^n$  items in  $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$  have a pre-image. Hence, for a random  $t^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ , with all but negligible probability there exists no  $x'$  such that  $g(x') = t^*$ , and in particular  $A$  cannot guess any such  $x'$ . So, with all but negligible probability over the coins of  $y^*$ ,  $A$  absolutely cannot invert it, meaning the advantage of  $A$  in  $H_3$  is negligible.

□

### 5.3 Enhancements

**Theorem 5.3.** *The TDF family describes an **enhanced** injective TDF.*

*Proof.* We will show that for any PPT adversary  $A$ , it holds that:

$$\Pr[\alpha \leftarrow I_0(1^n); r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n; y = S_R(\alpha; r); A(\alpha, r) = x' \text{ s.t. } F(\alpha, x') = y] \leq \mu(n) \quad (6)$$

for some negligible function  $\mu$ .

We describe the first enhancement as a game between a game master  $GM$  and an adversary  $A$ :

1.  $GM$ :

- generates random  $k \leftarrow K, w \leftarrow W$
- $\alpha = (\tilde{T} = iO(T_k), \tilde{S} = iO(S_{k,w}), \tilde{Q} = iO(Q_w))$  and  $\tau = k$
- $r^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$
- Give  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, r^*$  to  $A$

2.  $A$  sees  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, r^*$ , outputs  $x$ , and wins if  $\tilde{T}(x) = \tilde{S}(r^*)$ .

We denote by  $adv(A) = \Pr[\tilde{T}(x) = \tilde{S}(r^*)]$  the advantage of  $A$  in the above game. We next describe a series of hybrids. The first hybrid describes the first enhancement game between  $GM$  and  $A$ , as above. We show that the advantage on  $A$  between each two consecutive hybrids must be negligibly close, and that the advantage in the last hybrid must be negligible, which proves our claim. Note that  $k$  remains unpunctured and  $\tilde{T}$  remains unchanged throughout the hybrids.

- $H_0$ : the 1st enhancement game is played as described above.
- $H_1$ : The game is the same as in  $H_0$ , only  $S_{k,w}$  and  $Q_w$  are replaced other obfuscated programs,  $S_1\{\tilde{T}, w^*, r^*, y^*\}$  and  $Q_1\{w^*\}$ , as described below:

1.  $GM$ :

- generates random  $k \leftarrow K, w \leftarrow W$

- $\tilde{T} = iO(T_k)$
- $r^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$
- $w^* = w(\{r^*\})$  is the punctured PRF key  $w$  at point  $r^*$ .
- $x^* = h_w(r^*), y^* = T_k(x^*)$
- $\tilde{S} = iO(S_1\{\tilde{T}, w^*, r^*, y^*\})$  (described below)
- $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_1\{w^*\})$  (described below)
- Give  $(\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, r^*)$  to  $A$

2.  $A$  sees  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, r^*$ , outputs  $x$ , and wins if  $\tilde{T}(x) = \tilde{S}(r^*)$ .

where  $S_1\{\tilde{T}, w^*, r^*, y^*\}$  and  $Q_1\{w^*\}$  are the following programs:

$S_1\{\tilde{T}, w^*, r^*, y^*\}$ :

constants:

obfuscated program  $\tilde{T}$

punctured PRF key  $w^*$  for  $h$

$r^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$

$y^* \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$

if  $r = r^*$  then

return  $y^*$

$x = h_{w^*}(r)$

return  $\tilde{T}(x)$

$Q_1\{w^*\}(\rho)$ :

constants:

punctured PRF key  $w^*$  for  $h$

$r = d(\rho)$

$x = h_{w^*}(\rho)$

return  $(x, r)$

$H_0 \approx H_1$ :  $S_{k,w}$  and  $S_{\tilde{T},w^*,r^*,y^*}^*$  are functionally equivalent: on all  $r \neq r^*$  they both take  $x = h_w(r) = f_{w^*}(r)$  and return  $T_k(x)$ . For  $r^*$ ,  $S_{k,w}$  returns  $T_k(h_w(r^*))$ , and  $S_1\{\tilde{T}, w^*, r^*, y^*\}$  returns  $y^*$ , which is chosen by  $GM$  to be  $T_k(h_w(r^*))$ . As per  $Q_w$  and  $Q_1\{w^*\}$ :  $d$  is length-doubling, hence for a randomly selected  $r^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ , the probability that there exists a  $\rho \in \{0, 1\}^{n/2}$  such that  $d(\rho) = r^*$  is negligible. Therefore, with all but negligible probability over the choice of  $r^*$ ,  $Q_w$  and  $Q_1\{w^*\}$  are functionally equivalent as well. So, if  $A$ 's advantage between the two hybrids is non-negligible, we can construct an adversary  $B$  for the security of the iO scheme.

- $H_2$ : the same as in  $H_1$ , only  $x^*$  (the pre-image of  $y^*$ ) is taken to be a truly random string (rather than  $h_w(r^*)$ ).

1. *GM*:
  - generates random  $k \leftarrow K, w \leftarrow W$
  - $\tilde{T} = iO(T_k)$
  - $r^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$
  - $w^* = w(\{r^*\})$  is the punctured PRF key  $w$  at point  $r^*$ .
  - $x^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n, y^* = T_k(x^*)$
  - $\tilde{S} = iO(S_1\{\tilde{T}, w^*, r^*, y^*\})$
  - $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_1\{w^*\})$
  - Give  $(\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, r^*)$  to  $A$
2.  $A$  sees  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, r^*$ , outputs  $x$ , and wins if  $\tilde{T}(x) = \tilde{S}(r^*)$ .

$H_1 \approx H_2$ : suppose otherwise, and let  $B$  be the following adversary for the selective security of the punctured PRF key  $w^*$  at the punctured point  $r^*$ .  $B$  gives out  $r^*$  and gets the punctured key  $w^* = w(\{r^*\})$  along with either  $x^* = h_w(r^*)$  or a random  $x^*$ . It then selects  $k$ , generates  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_k)$ ,  $y^* = T_k(x^*)$ , and generates  $\tilde{S} = iO(S_1\{\tilde{T}, w^*, r^*, y^*\})$  and  $\tilde{Q} = iO(Q_1\{w^*\})$ . It runs  $A$  on  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, r^*$  and returns 1 if  $A$  wins.

Finally, we claim that if the advantage of  $A$  in  $H_2$  is non-negligible, then the one-wayness of the trapdoor function is compromised, contradicting the hardness proof of our construction (section 5.2). Indeed, suppose  $A$  is able to provide  $x$  such that  $\tilde{T}(x) = \tilde{S}(r^*)$ , and let  $B$  be the following adversary for the hardness of the trapdoor function.  $B$  is given  $\tilde{T} = iO(T_k), \tilde{S} = iO(S_{k,w^*}), \tilde{Q} = iO(Q_{w^*}), y^*$  and should output  $x'$  such that  $\tilde{T}(x') = y^*$ .  $B$  samples a key  $w \leftarrow W$ , takes  $r^* \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n, w^* = w(\{r^*\})$ , generates  $\tilde{S} = iO(S\{\tilde{T}, w^*, r^*, y^*\}), \tilde{Q} = iO(Q_1\{w^*\})$  and runs  $A$  on  $\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q}, r^*$ .  $A$  outputs some value  $x'$  which, with non-negligible probability, provides  $\tilde{T}(x') = \tilde{S}(r^*)$ . By definition of  $S_1$ , we have that  $\tilde{S}_1(r^*) = S_1\{\tilde{T}, w^*, r^*, y^*\}(r^*) = y^*$ . So, by outputting  $x'$ ,  $B$  is able to invert  $y^*$  with non-negligible probability.

□

**Theorem 5.4.** *The TDF family describes a **doubly-enhanced** injective TDF.*

*Proof.* We claim that  $\tilde{Q}$  provides a correlated-preimage sampler  $S_{DR} = \tilde{Q}(\rho)$ . Clearly,  $\tilde{Q}(\rho)$  returns pairs of  $(x, r)$  such that  $x = h_w(r)$ , that is  $\tilde{T}(x) = \tilde{T}(h_w(r)) = \tilde{S}(r)$ .

The pseudorandomness of  $r$ , conditioned on  $\alpha = (\tilde{T}, \tilde{S}, \tilde{Q})$  and  $x$  (which is either sampled along with  $r$  by running  $Q$  or inverted from  $S_R(\alpha; r)$ ), follows directly from the pseudorandomness of  $d$ .

□

An interesting point about our construction is that both enhancements do not depend at all on the structure of our original TDF. In fact, all the enhancements need in order to work is any full-domain, or even efficiently sampleable domain, TDF, and the proof remains the same. Hence, our technique of re-randomizing the input via a length-preserving PRF can be considered as a generic method for doubly-enhancing any efficiently-sampleable-domain TDF, using iO and one-way functions.

## 5.4 Certifiable Injectivity

We show that our construction is perfectly certifiable injective, under the assumption that the PRG  $g$  is injective. Moreover, the soundness of the certification protocol is perfect. This shows that our construction is sufficient for realizing the FLS paradigm.

Recall that, on input  $x$ , our TDF evaluation returns  $(x \oplus s, t)$ , where  $t = g(x)$  (and  $s$  is determined by the secret trapdoor). The certifier  $ICert$  is given  $x$ , obtains  $y = F(\alpha, x)$ , and compares the last  $2n$  bits of  $y$  to  $g(x)$ . If they are equal,  $ICert$  accepts. Otherwise it rejects.

**Theorem 5.5.** *Assuming  $g$  is a full-domain injective PRG, our TDF family, along with  $ICert$ , is perfectly certifiable injective.*

*Proof.* For  $y \in \{0, 1\}^{3n}$ , denote by  $y[n+1 : \dots 3n]$  the last  $2n$  bits of  $y$ .

1. **Completeness:** if  $y = F(\alpha, x)$  for an honestly created  $\alpha$ , then by the definition of our TDF we have  $y = (c, t)$  for  $t = g(x)$  and  $c = x \oplus f_k(t)$ . So  $y[n+1 : \dots 3n] = t = g(x)$  and  $ICert$  accepts.
2. **Soundness:** Suppose  $x_1, x_2, y$  such that  $F(\alpha, x_1) = F(\alpha, x_2) = y$  and  $ICert(\alpha, x_1) = ICert(\alpha, x_2) = 1$ . By definition, since  $ICert(\alpha, x_i) = 1$  for both  $x_1$  and  $x_2$ , we have that  $g(x_1) = y[n+1 : \dots 3n] = g(x_2)$ . Since  $g$  is injective, this means  $x_1 = x_2$ .

The soundness, hardness and enhancements proofs for the TDF are not harmed, as  $ICert$  does not depend on the private key  $k$ .  $\square$

## 5.5 On the Assumption of Full-Domain iPRGs

As mentioned in the opening of section 5, our construction and security proof rely on the assumption that the underlying PRGs and PPRFs are full-domain; That is, every string in  $\{0, 1\}^{p(n)}$  (for some  $p(n)$  polynomial in the security parameter  $n$ ) can be mapped to a pre-image of the function. This assumption makes sense in the case of general PRGs and PPRFs, where natural full-domain candidates exists. However this is not the case for injective PRGs, which are required for our certifiable injectivity proof.

We first note that for the completeness, security and enhancements, the full-domain assumption can be relaxed by allowing functions with an efficiently sampleable domain.

The domain sampler is then used to map random coins, as well as the output of some of the primitives we use, into domain items.

Secondly, we show that the certifiable injectivity of our construction is maintained under the relaxed assumption of an injective PRG with a domain which is *efficiently recognizable* (as well as sampleable). That is, we require that there exists a polynomial-time global domain recognizer algorithm  $Rec$  which, given some string  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , decides if that string is in the domain or not, and  $g$  is injective over the set of all strings which  $Rec$  accepts. Assuming the existence of such a recognizer algorithm  $Rec$ , we modify  $ICert$  such that given a supposed pre-image  $x$ ,  $ICert$  first runs  $Rec(x)$ . Only after,  $ICert$  continues to compare the last  $2n$  bits of  $y = F(\alpha, x)$  to  $g(x)$ . It accepts only if both conditions passed. The CI soundness requirement follows directly.

We point out that the recognizable domain requirement is indeed necessary for certifiable injectivity. Without it, a malicious prover might be able to cheat using a similar attack to the one described in section 3: the prover can give pre-images taken outside of the PRG's supposed domain, on which  $ICert$  might arbitrarily accept, and the verifier won't be able to tell the difference.

Finally, we demonstrate how injective pseudorandom generators with efficiently recognizable and sampleable domains can be constructed based on standard assumptions. We suggest two alternatives; one using a black-box construction from another primitive (one-way permutations), and another based on specific algebraic structure (the DDH assumption).

**iPRGs form OWPs:** Assuming one-way permutations with an efficiently sampleable domain, an injective length-doubling pseudorandom generator can be obtained using the textbook construction (c.f. [Gol98]). That is, let  $owp$  be a one-way permutation over domain  $D_n \subseteq \{0, 1\}^n$ , and let  $p$  be a hard-core predicate for it. Then  $prg_1(x) = (owp(x), p(x))$  is a pseudorandom generator which is single-bit expending. For  $i > 1$ , let  $prg_i(x) := prg_{i-1}(owp(x)), p(x)$  be the result of recursively applying  $prg_q$  on the first  $n$  bits of the output. Using a hybrid argument,  $prg_n(x)$  is an injective length-doubling PRG. Constructing an injective pseudorandom generator from primitives weaker than one-way permutations remains an open question<sup>4</sup>.

For the certifiable injectivity of our TDP construction, we require that the PRG's domain,  $D_n$ , be efficiently recognizable. However when this is the case additional attention is required, since the first  $n$  bits of  $f(x)$  describe an element in that domain, and hence they are clearly distinguishable from just any  $n$ -bit string. We circumvent this issue by defining our PRG as pseudorandom with respect to  $D_n \circ U_n := \{(x, s) : x \leftarrow D_n, s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n\}$ . That is, we adapt the security requirement of the PRG to the following: for any PPT adversary  $A$ ,  $\Pr[x \leftarrow D_n : A(prg_n(x)) = 1] - \Pr[x \leftarrow D_n, s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n : A((x, s)) = 1] \leq \mu(n)$ ,

<sup>4</sup>[Rud84, KSS00, MM11] give a black-box separation between one-way permutations and weaker primitives, such as one-way functions

where  $\mu(n)$  is negligible. Under the revised definition, our security proof remains sound, with the change that when replacing  $t^* = \text{prg}_n(x^*)$  with a random  $t^*$ , the replaced value is taken out of  $D_n \circ U_n$  (instead of a random  $2n$ -bit string).

An injective one-way permutation with an efficiently recognizable domain can be obtained, e.g., based on the discrete log assumption.

**iPRGs from DDH:** Based on the DDH assumption [DH76], [Bon98] suggested the following candidate for injective PRGs. Let  $G_p = \{x^2 : x \in Z_p\}$ , where  $p$  is a safe prime (that is  $p = 2q + 1$  for some prime  $q$ ). We define the following enumeration from  $G_q$  to  $Z_q$  (see e.g. [CS03, CFGP05]):

$$i(x) = \begin{cases} x & \text{if } 1 \leq x \leq q \\ p - x & \text{if } q + 2 \leq x \leq p \\ 0 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Let  $g$  be a generator for  $G_p$ . For  $a, b \in Z_q$ , let:

$$\text{prg}(a, b) = i(g^a), i(g^b), i(g^{ab})$$

Then by the DDH assumption,  $\text{prg}$  is an injective pseudorandom generator from  $Z_q^2 \rightarrow Z_q^3$ . Using the same technique, an injective length-doubling PRG from  $Z_q^3 \rightarrow Z_q^6$  can be constructed by using

$$\text{prg}(a, b, c) = i(g^a), i(g^b), i(g^c), i(g^{ab}), i(g^{ac}), i(g^{bc})$$

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