

An extended abstract of this paper has been published in the proceedings of the Cryptographers' Track RSA Conference - CT-RSA 2018[4]. This is the full version.

Asynchronous provably-secure hidden services

Philippe Camacho and Fernando Krell
{philippe.camacho,fernando.krell}@dreamlab.net

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Abstract

The client-server model is one of the most widely used architectures in the Internet due to its simplicity and flexibility. In practice the server is assigned a public address so that its services can be consumed. This makes the server vulnerable to a number of attacks such as Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), censorship from authoritarian governments or exploitation of software vulnerabilities.

In this work we propose asynchronous protocols for allowing a client to issue requests to a server without revealing any information about the location of the server. Our solution reveals limited information about the network topology, leaking only the distance from the client to the corrupted participants.

We also provide a simulation-based security definition capturing the requirement described above. Our initial protocol is secure in the semi-honest model against any number of colluding participants, and has linear communication complexity.

We extend our solution to handle active adversaries, showing that malicious participants can only trigger a premature termination of this new protocol, in which case they are identified. For this solution the communication complexity becomes quadratic.

To the best of our knowledge this is the first study of asynchronous protocols that provide strong security guarantees for the hidden server problem.

1 Introduction

1.1 Motivation

The client-server architecture is one of the most widely used in the Internet for its simplicity and flexibility. In practice the server is assigned a domain name and one or more IP addresses so that its services can be consumed. This makes the server vulnerable to a number of attacks such as DDoS, censorship from authoritarian governments or exploitation of software vulnerabilities. Thus, it would be desirable to hide the location of the server in the network. By doing so, an attacker will not be able to attack directly the host containing the server's code nor interrupt the execution of its services by non-technical means. While the literature is abundant on the topic of anonymous channels [7, 6, 25, 26], the problem of hiding the location of a server remains of great interest. Tor hidden services [8] is without a doubt the most popular alternative for this purpose. Unfortunately, the security provided by Tor is not guaranteed; in fact, several practical attacks have been discovered [21, 18, 29, 35].

We observe that simple solutions for the problem described above do not work. Standard end-to-end encryption is vulnerable to tracing the ciphertext across the network, and hence, an adversary that is powerful enough to corrupt several nodes is very likely to detect the origin or destination of the message. Other approaches like using multicast are not enough either since clients that are close to the server will notice that the response comes back within short time. The main challenge is to prevent nodes to distinguish whether the server is close or far away.

In this work we focus on solving the following problem. A client wishes to establish a communication with a server, yet we want to hide the location of this server in the network. We also expect the client’s queries and server’s responses to remain private.

At a high level our protocol implements two phases: (1) a client issues a *request* to the server, and then (2) the server returns a *response*. The first phase of the protocol is straightforward to implement: the client encrypts the request using the public key of the server and then multicasts the message across the network. Note that the server must still forward the request as if it were any other node, otherwise its neighbors may infer its location. The second phase is much more complex because as mentioned above the client or other nodes could detect the presence of the server by a simple timing attack. To circumvent this difficulty we rely on the following idea: we force all the nodes to behave as the server. We achieve this by using a secret sharing scheme where every participant holds a share of the response. To perform this split-and-reconstruct phase, every node (including the server) generates a random share, and then all these are propagated to the server. At this stage the server replaces its share by a value that enables to reconstruct the response. Finally all the participants send their shares to the client.

In order to improve performance, we use an arbitrary spanning tree¹ over the network graph. This allows us to optimize multicast invocations and shares aggregation. We emphasize that our protocol is *asynchronous*, which means that participants *do not rely a on shared clock* to run the protocol, but rather act upon the reception of neighbors messages. Unfortunately, asynchronism comes at price: Since nodes do not know when a participant initiates a request, it is impossible to hide the requesters activity. Hence our protocol leaks proximity information of the requester to other nodes.

1.2 Contributions

Our contributions are the following:

- To the best of our knowledge we provide the first simulation-based security definition capturing the requirement of hiding a server in a network. This definition considers the full interaction (request and response) between the client and the server.
- We provide a protocol (and implementation alternatives) for the hidden server problem in the semi-honest adversarial mode.
- Our protocol is secure against any number of corrupted participants. In particular, if the adversary controls all nodes but two (one of them being the server), then it will not be able to guess the right location with probability better than $\frac{1}{2}$.
- Our solution has linear communication complexity. Although, this is may not be practical in large environments, it is *asymptotically optimal*: a sublinear protocol would leak the fact that silent nodes cannot be the server.
- Finally, we extend our solution to handle active adversaries. We show that malicious participants can only trigger a premature termination of the protocol, in which case they are identified. For this solution the communication complexity becomes quadratic in the number of participants.
- To the best of our knowledge the proposed protocols are the first to provide strong security guarantees in an asynchronous setting (see Figure 1).

¹which we borrow from Dolev and Ostrovsky [9].

1.3 Related Work

While the problem of hiding the physical location of a server in a network is not exactly an anonymity problem (we do not want to hide the fact that a specific client connects to the server) the techniques and concepts we use are borrowed from the area of anonymity. Since Chaum’s two seminal papers on mixes [7, 6], a large body of work has been written in order to enable communications that do not reveal the identity of participants. An alternative to mixers for achieving anonymity has been introduced by Reiter *et al.* with a protocol named Crowds[27] and consists of using random paths among a set of “dummy” nodes a.k.a. *jondo* before reaching a specific destination (the server). In this protocol – contrary to our setting – the location of the server is public and the goal is to hide the clients. This solution is simple, efficient and provide some level of anonymity for the client. Beyond the protocol itself, the authors highlight some fundamental problems that arise with these types of constructions where traffic is routed through possible corrupted nodes: In particular, preserving the initiator’s anonymity turns out to be more complex than expected [34, 30]. Indeed in our case, we have to solve a similar problem where we must hide the location of the server during the phase of responding a request. Hordes [19] is an improvement to Crowds where the reply from the server is done using multicast. This change makes passive attacks consisting in tracing back messages harder while adding only a reasonable operational cost. While Crowds and Hordes do not aim to hide the server like we do, these protocols highlight the difficulty of hiding nodes in a network where the adversary controls a subset of the participants and can leverage traffic analysis. Another approach to establish anonymous channels between client and servers is onion routing [11]. An onion is obtained by encrypting the message in a layered fashion using the public keys of the nodes on a path from sender to receiver. By doing so, a node on the circuit will not be able to identify the original source, the final destination, nor the message itself. The most popular onion routing protocol is without a doubt Tor [8]. Tor not only enables to preserve the anonymity of clients but also provides a mechanism to hide the location of the server through a *rendez-vous* node where both client and server meet. Unfortunately, as in Crowds and Hordes, a number of practical attacks based on traffic analysis are possible [18, 29, 35, 23]: In particular if a node manages to be the first relay between the server and the *rendez-vous* node, it will likely detect the server presence [23]. In case managing a Public-Key Infrastructure is too complex, one can use Katti *et al.*’s protocol [17] that relies on the idea of splitting the routing information in such a way that only the right nodes on the circuit are able to reconstruct it correctly. In our protocol we also leverage secret-sharing techniques, but for splitting and reconstructing the message only. Also our solution does not require a sender to control different nodes as in the onion slicing approach.

Early attempts to counter traffic analysis attacks were not practical as they assumed the existence of some broadcast channel or ad-hoc topology and required a synchronous execution [6, 26, 32]. The more general problem of hiding the topology of a network has been solved recently in the secure multi-party computation setting [1, 20, 15]. However, these solutions involve a lot of communication and computational overhead. One of the most promising attempts for hiding the location of a server was due to Dolev and Ostrovsky [9]: Indeed our solution borrows some of the techniques of their work, in particular we also use spanning-trees to make the multicast communications more efficient. Nonetheless our solution has two major advantages: it is asynchronous and it is secure against any number of corrupted nodes.

In Figure 1 we compare our work with other proposals that allow arbitrary topologies.

1.4 Organization of the paper

This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces definitions and notations. The abstract functionality capturing the secure interaction between client and server is introduced in Section 3. We describe a protocol secure against semi-honest adversaries in Section 4 formally proving

Protocol	Asynchronous	Collusion-resistant	Communication complexity
Tor [8]	YES	NO	$O(D \cdot M)$
Dolev and Ostrovsky [9]	NO	Up to $\lfloor (N-1)/2 \rfloor$	$O(N \cdot M)$
MPC-Hiding topology [1]	NO	YES	$O(\kappa(\kappa + \log N) \cdot N^5 \cdot M)$
Our work	YES	YES	$O(N \cdot M)$

Figure 1: **Comparison of protocols for hiding a node location.** In this table N is the number of participants, D is the diameter of the graph representing the network, $|M|$ is the number of bits of the message and κ is the security parameter. Tor is not collusion-resistant because some attacks can succeed with only two corrupted nodes [23]. Regarding communication complexity, we do not take into account the setup phase occurring in Dolev and Ostrovsky’s construction and ours.

its security. Then, in Section 5 we present a protocol secure against malicious players in which deviation of the protocol is either harmless or identifiable. Finally, we conclude in Section 6.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Definitions and notations

Let $n \in \mathbb{N}$ be an integer, we denote by $[n]$ the set $\{1, 2, 3, \dots, n\}$. Let B be a set, we write $b \in_R B$ to denote a value b chosen uniformly at random from B .

For a graph $G = \langle V, E \rangle$ the distance $d(u, v)$ between two vertices u and v is the length of the shortest path between u and v . Let (M, \circ) be an abelian group and $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ the security parameter. A (single-operation) homomorphic encryption scheme over message space M is a tuple of algorithms $\mathcal{H}_{\text{Enc}} = \langle \text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Add} \rangle$ in which $\langle \text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec} \rangle$ is a public-key encryption scheme and algorithm Add satisfy the following property: For every key-pair $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$, and for every pair of messages $m_1, m_2 \in M$:

$$\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(\text{Add}_{\text{pk}}(\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_1), \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_2))) = m_1 \circ m_2$$

For some arbitrary ciphertext set $C = \{c_i = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_i)\}_{i \in I}$, we abuse notation by using $\sum_{i \in I} c_i$ or $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\sum_{i \in I} m_i)$ to denote the result of a sequential computation of Add_{pk} over C . We denote by $\Pi_{\text{Sign}} = \langle \text{SGen}, \text{SSign}, \text{SVerify} \rangle$ a standard signature scheme [13].

2.2 Modeling networks

We can think of a regular communication network as a graph G , composed by a set of nodes V and a set of edges E between them. Participants (nodes) v_i and v_j cannot communicate directly unless there is an edge (v_i, v_j) in E . To allow communication between distant participants, nodes can forward incoming messages to neighbor nodes following some protocol.

We use the approach of [15] in which the participants in the real protocol are restricted to use a *network* functionality to communicate. The network functionality is specified in Figure 2, and allows any participant to send messages to a neighbor at an arbitrary time². It provides two services, **Setup** and **Comm**. On the setup phase, the communication graph is specified. This can be done by an off-line operator, or by the participant itself describing their neighbors (or their pseudonyms as inputs). The **Comm** service allows for neighbor participant to exchange messages. We require that **Setup** is called before any **Comm** service can be processed.

²The network functionality of [15] is rather different in the sense that all participants call it at same time, and all have messages to all its neighbors.




Figure 2: Physical Network Functionality




Figure 3: $\Pi_{\text{MCast}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}}$

We will use this functionality as the basic mechanism to send message throughout the network. Protocols in this model will be called $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ -restricted, meaning that the only way participants can communicate is via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$.

2.3 Multicast protocol

In this section we describe a simple multicast protocol (see Figure 3) that uses functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ as its basic communication mechanism. We assume that a trusted party has already instantiated the network functionality, and hence each participant knows the vertex label associated with its neighbors for functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$. When a participant issues a multicast, it sends the message to its neighbors using functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$. Each participant, upon reception of a multicast message, first checks if the message has not been seen before. In this case, it forwards the message to its neighbors and outputs the message. Jumping ahead, our main protocol will use this functionality on a subgraph of the network graph to efficiently broadcast the client's encrypted requests.

3 Request Response Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$

In this section we formally describe a request-response functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$.

The functionality is executed between a set of participant $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, P_3, \dots, P_N\}$. A server node, which we denote as $P_{j^*} = \mathcal{S}$, provides an arbitrary polynomial-time request-response service




Figure 4: Hidden-Server Request-Response functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$ over an incomplete network with leakage profile $\mathcal{L}(\cdot)$.

for all participants. A protocol realizing this functionality needs to hide which of the participant is the server node. A secondary goal is to hide the requests and the responses.

In Figure 4, the functionality is parametrized by a public graph G . During a setup phase, the operator participant Op specifies the server node, its service Turing machine ProcessReq , and a mapping M between graph nodes and participants. As a result of this setup phase, every node gets its graph label, and the server node gets the Turing machine ProcessReq .

4 A semi-honest protocol for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$

4.1 Overview

For a set of participants $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_N\}$ communicating over an arbitrary network graph G , the goal of our protocol is to hide the location of a server $\mathcal{S} = P_{j^*}$ in G while enabling other participants to consume its services. The main difficulty is to make it impossible for an adversary to leverage timing information to obtain (or estimate) the distance between \mathcal{S} and some other corrupted nodes in G .

The protocol proceeds in two high level steps. The first step corresponds to enabling a client P_i to send a request req to the server \mathcal{S} . This step can be easily implemented using a multicast protocol (see Section 2.3): The client encrypts req using \mathcal{S} 's public key and multicasts the ciphertext $c = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}}(\text{req})$. Indeed, \mathcal{S} 's location is not leaked³.

The second step consists of letting the server \mathcal{S} to send the response res back to P_i . This turns out to be more challenging. Indeed, proceeding as in the first step is not secure since nodes that are close to \mathcal{S} would detect \mathcal{S} 's activity and be able to deduce its location or some information about it (as for example the subnet that contains \mathcal{S}). In order to circumvent this difficulty we introduce the following high level idea: each node P_j sends a random share s_j to the server \mathcal{S} (including the \mathcal{S} itself). The server will obtain all the shares $\{\text{share}_j\}_{j \neq i}$ and recompute its share share_{j^*} so that combination of all shares reconstruct to res . Then, all the participants send their shares to the requester P_i , and finally, P_i reconstructs and outputs the response.

³Note that messages needs to be forwarded once – and only once – to neighbors, even when the message has arrived to its destination.




Figure 5: $\Pi_{\text{ESR}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}}$

Since shares on the last step reconstruct the response, it is clear that they need to be encrypted under P_i 's public-key. As the initial shares sent to the server reconstruct to a random value, it is tempting to send these in plaintext. However, an adversary that controls the requester can see the shares both times, and therefore notice when a share was updated, inferring information on \mathcal{S} 's location.

We take the approach of [9] and restrict the communication to an (arbitrary) spanning-tree on the network graph. This allows us to efficiently communicate the messages on all phases. In particular, we use the following mechanism to send the shares to \mathcal{S} and P_i : First, the shares are sent up to the root node of the spanning tree, and then the root node multicasts the shares down the tree. By using n -out-of- n information-theoretic secret sharing, we note that nor the server or the requester need to know every individual share. In fact, they only need to learn the final secret. Our idea, hence, is to use homomorphic encryption on the shares, and have each internal node to “add-up” its share to the shares computed by its children, and then send a single result up the tree (rather than the individual shares of every node in its subtree). The root node then obtains an encrypted secret, which is sent down the tree to reach the server or the requester. This efficient procedure allows our protocol to have linear communication complexity, and is formally described in Section 4.2.

Our full protocol implementing functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$ is specified in Section 4.3.

4.2 Encrypted Share Reconstruction Protocol

In this section we describe an important sub-protocol of our solution. This protocol, denoted Π_{ESR} , allows to efficiently and privately reconstruct a secret out of each participant share. In a nutshell, each party encrypts its share under the public-key of the recipient, and sends the ciphertext up into a spanning tree of the network graph. The participant at the root node of this tree can homomorphically compute the encrypted secret, and then send the result down the tree to reach the recipient. We do this efficiently in the following way: Each internal node privately reconstructs part of the secret by homomorphically combining its encrypted share with the ciphertext obtained from its children. Hence, each internal node needs to send a single ciphertext up the tree. Furthermore, we use n -out-of- n information-theoretic secret sharing so that we only need a single homomorphic operation for the encryption scheme. Protocol Π_{ESR} is specified in Figure 5.

4.3 Request-Response Server Protocol

In this section we introduce an $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ -hybrid protocol achieving functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$. Our protocol is divided in an off-line setup phase and three on-line phases. In the setup phase, a trusted party T chooses a server participant \mathcal{S} and generates for it a key-pair $(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}, \text{sk}_{\mathcal{S}})$. T also chooses an arbitrary rooted spanning-tree in order to instantiate the protocol Π_{ESR} . On the first on-line phase, the requester P_i encrypts its query req under the server's public key, and uses protocol Π_{MCast} to propagate the ciphertext across the network. Then, on the second on-line phase every participant (including the server) generates a random string of length outlen (used as a share for the response) and sends it to the server using protocol Π_{ESR} . Upon receiving the combined shares $cs = \sum_{j \neq i} \text{share}_j$, \mathcal{S} recomputes its share share_{j^*} as $\text{res} - (cs - \text{share}_{j^*})$ so that the reconstruction procedure outputs the response res . On the third on-line phase, every participant P_j use Π_{ESR} to send its share_j (encrypted under P_i 's public key), so that the response can be homomorphically reconstructed and sent to P_i . P_i decrypts and output the response.

Notice that these three phases can be executed in a pipeline. In fact, each encrypted share sent on the second on-line phase can be sent as soon as the participant sees the request multicast message issued by P_i on the first phase. Similarly, each participant can send its share in the third phase as soon as the participant sees the multicast-down message issued by the root node in the second phase. Therefore, our protocol is *asynchronous*.

We also note that the initial multicast of the encrypted request leaks the direction towards the requester node to each participant. Therefore, the encrypted response on the third phase, can be sent efficiently from the root to the requester. In fact, when a participant receives the request message from neighbor u , this is saved so that at the final phase, each participant knows where to send the encrypted response.

Since all participants act according to the same communication pattern, and all messages are encrypted, our protocol does not reveal the location of the server, nor the request or response. We can observe that every participant send a constant number of messages during the execution of the protocol and thus the communication complexity is equal to $O(N \cdot \max(|\text{req}|, |\text{res}|))$. Our protocol is formally described in Figure 6.

4.4 Proof of Security

In this Section we prove the security of the protocol against semi-honest adversaries. That is, we present a polynomial-time algorithm Sim that can simulate the view of corrupted participants knowing only some limited leakage that does not contain the location of the server. We refer the reader to Appendix B.1 for a formal definition of security in the semi-honest model.

We begin by defining the leakage of our protocol.

Leakage 1. $\mathcal{L}(G, \text{ST}, M, P_i, \mathcal{C})$ On input a graph $G = \langle V, E \rangle$, a spanning tree $\text{ST} = \langle \text{root} \in V, T \subset E \rangle$ over G , a mapping $M := \mathcal{P} \leftrightarrow V$, a requester participant $P_i \in \mathcal{P}$, and a set of corrupted participants $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{P}$, output, for each P in \mathcal{C} , the distance and direction (edge to children or parent) from $M(P)$ to $M(P_i)$ in ST , its depth (distance to ST 's root node), and the height of each of its children nodes (distance to further leaf on subtree).

Theorem 1. Let $\mathcal{H}_{\text{Enc}} = \langle \text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Add} \rangle$ be a semantically secure homomorphic public-key encryption scheme. Then, protocol Π_{ReqResp} privately realizes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$ in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ -restricted model under Leakage 1.

In the following proof we analyze the case in which the server is not corrupted and there is at least one other honest node (otherwise, the location of the server node is known anyway).

Proof. Let \mathcal{C} be the set of corrupted participants, and \mathcal{H}_{Enc} be the public key encryption scheme as in protocol Π_{ReqResp} . We next specify the behavior of the ideal adversary (simulator) on each of

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}}$

Participants. On-line $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, P_2, \dots, P_N\}$, and an off-line trusted party T .

Parameters. A security parameter κ and an homomorphic encryption scheme $\mathcal{H}_{\text{Enc}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Add})$.

Requirement. Off-line trusted party T has initialized $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ functionality for \mathcal{P} on a graph G .

Setup. a) T chooses a server participant $\mathcal{S} \in \mathcal{P}$ and an arbitrary spanning tree ST on graph G . b) T instantiate protocols $\Pi_{\text{MCast}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}}$ and $\Pi_{\text{ESR}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}}$ on input ST , c) T generates server's key pair $(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}, \text{sk}_{\mathcal{S}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$ and securely distributes \mathcal{S} 's public key $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}$ to every participant. d) Finally, T securely sends $(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{S}}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}})$ and a Turing Machine ProcessReq to \mathcal{S} .

(In what follows, let j^* denote the index of \mathcal{S} in \mathcal{P} .)

Req. On input $\text{req} \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{inlen}}$, participant P_i chooses a session key-pair $(\text{pk}_{\text{sid}}, \text{sk}_{\text{sid}})$ and a fresh session id sid , and invokes multicast protocol $\Pi_{\text{MCast}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}}$. $\text{MCast}(\langle \text{request_to_server}, \text{sid}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}}(\text{req}), \text{pk}_{\text{sid}} \rangle)$ over the spanning tree.

Response phase. Every participant P_j (including \mathcal{S}):

1. Upon receiving $\Pi_{\text{MCast}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}}$'s output $\langle \text{request_to_server}, \text{sid}, C, \text{pk}_{\text{sid}} \rangle$ from neighbor u , pick a random share $\text{share}_j \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{outlen}}$ and invoke Π_{ESR} . $\text{SendUp}(\text{share}_j, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}, \text{sid})$, and store $\langle \text{sid}, \text{pk}_{\text{sid}}, \text{share}_j, u \rangle$. In addition, if P_j is \mathcal{S} , compute $\text{req} = \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}_{\mathcal{S}}}(C)$ and $\text{res} \leftarrow \text{ProcessReq}(\text{req})$, and store $\langle \text{sid}, \text{req}, \text{res} \rangle$.
2. (Root node) Upon receiving Π_{ESR} . SendUp 's output $(C = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}}(\sum_{j \neq i} \text{share}_j), \text{sid})$, invoke Π_{ESR} . $\text{SendDown}(C, \text{sid})$.
3. Upon receiving Π_{ESR} . SendDown 's output (C, sid) , use sid to get pk_{sid} and share_j from local storage, and:
 - If P_j is $\mathcal{S} = P_{j^*}$, decrypt C to get $\text{share}_{\text{sum}} = \sum_{j \neq i} \text{share}_j$, and update share_{j^*} to $\text{res} - (\text{share}_{\text{sum}} - \text{share}_{j^*})$.
 - Invoke Π_{ESR} . $\text{SendUp}(\text{share}_{j^*}, \text{pk}_{\text{sid}}, \text{sid})$
4. (Root node) Upon receiving Π_{ESR} . SendUp 's output $(C = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\text{sid}}}(\sum_{j \neq i} \text{share}_j), \text{sid})$, use sid to get neighbor label u , and invoke $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$. $\text{Comm}(\langle C, \text{sid} \rangle, u)$.
5. Upon receiving $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$. Comm 's output (C, sid) do:
 - If P_j is P_i , use sid to get sk_{sid} from local storage, and output $\text{res} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}_{\text{sid}}}(C)$.
 - Otherwise, use sid to get u , and invoke $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$. $\text{Comm}(C, u)$.

Figure 6: $\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}}$

the protocol phases (see Figure 7).

Simulating Setup. In the setup phase, the corrupted participants only receive their key-pairs, the server's public key $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}$.

1. Instantiate network functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ using graph G for the participant set.
2. Generate server public key $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}$.
3. For each corrupted party, assign its spanning tree edges (to children and parent) and $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}$.

Simulating Req. Let $P_{j^*} = \mathcal{S} \notin \mathcal{C}$ be the server participant. The simulation proceeds as follows:

1. Sample session id sid , key-pair $(\text{sk}_{\text{sid}}, \text{pk}_{\text{sid}})$.
2. If $P_i \in \mathcal{C}$, then upon receiving input req from P_i , run real adversary on input req , P_i to obtain possibly updated request req' . Send req' to P_i as its input and get its output res . Otherwise set req' and res to arbitrary value.
3. Using distance and direction from corrupted participants to P_i (obtained from leakage profile), simulate a P_i started multicast protocol on spanning tree with message $\langle \text{request_to_server}, \text{sid}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}}(\text{req}'), \text{pk}_{\text{sid}} \rangle$ where sid and pk_{sid} are fresh values. (That is, the corrupted participants get $\langle \text{request_to_server}, \text{sid}, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\mathcal{S}}}(\text{req}'), \text{pk}_{\text{sid}} \rangle$ at the "right moment" and through the expected graph edge.)




Figure 7: **Real v/s Ideal world:** on the left-hand picture the real-world protocol is executed and the adversary controls a subset of the nodes (in red) that in this example include the client C . The goal of the simulator (right-hand picture) is to reproduce the real-world communication patterns of the real-adversary *without* knowing the location of the server S .

4. Simulate the `to_server_UP` messages by assigning a random share share_j to each corrupted participant, and assigning an arbitrary share to the honest children of each corrupted participant. Then, the simulation is done by adding the incoming message $\langle c_i, \text{sid}, \text{to_server_UP}, S_{c_i} \rangle$ in the transcript at the right place, meaning children c_i sent his share $S_{c_i} = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_S}(\text{share}_{c_i})$.
5. Use corrupted participant depth to simulate the `to_server_DOWN` message by adding the message $\langle \text{sid}, \text{to_server_DOWN}, S \rangle$ to each corrupted participant simulated transcript at the right moment, like in the previous step. If the root of the tree is corrupted, then S must match the homomorphic computed value of the sum of the nodes shares. Otherwise, S can encrypt an arbitrary value.
6. Simulate each participant sending the `to_requester_UP` message where shares are identical as in step 4, except the honest participants, whose share are updated so that reconstruction yields res .
7. Simulate `to_requester_DOWN` by adding $\langle \text{sid}, \text{to_requester_DOWN}, C \rangle$ to the simulated transcript of each corrupted participants in the path root-to-requester, where $C = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\text{sid}}}(\text{res})$.

The simulation above is perfect in terms of communication patterns (timing, length and type of messages). This is because the leakage profile contains all the information to “deliver” the messages to the corrupted participants at the right time and through the correct graph edges. Hence, the security of the protocol relies on the ability to simulate the content of the messages seen by the corrupted nodes. We next analyze the content by message type:

- Request multicast. If the request is known to the simulator, it can produce a ciphertext identically distributed to the real message. Otherwise, the simulator produces the encryption of 0^{inlen} (computationally indistinguishable to the real message by the semantic security of the encryption scheme).
- `to_server_UP` and `to_server_DOWN` messages. There is no secret information to simulate. Hence, the simulator produces ciphertexts identically distributed to the real protocol messages.

- `to_requester_UP` and `to_requester_DOWN` messages. Here, the shares corresponding to honest participant are updated so that the reconstruction produces `res`. In the worst case that the adversary controls P_i , then it can decrypt these shares. However, these cannot be correlated with the ones sent to the server in the `to_server_UP`/`to_server_DOWN` messages, since these were encrypted under the server’s public key (which is assumed not to be corrupted). In addition, shares are uniformly distributed, $(n - 1)$ -wise independent, and they reconstruct to the same valid output `res`. Therefore, the simulated shares in plaintext cannot be distinguished from the ones used in the real execution.

A simple hybrid-argument⁴ over the security of the encryption scheme proves that the real and simulated views are computationally indistinguishable. □

4.5 Variants of the protocol

Avoiding an off-line trusted party. Protocol 6 relies on a trusted party to set up the initial parameters of each participant. By using state-of-the-art topology-hiding secure computation protocols [20, 15, 2, 1] we can achieve a secure distributed setup without any trusted party.

Precomputing shares using PRG. It is possible to simplify the protocol described in Figure 6 by having the server computing the other participant shares locally. In practice, all the participants would receive a secret seed R_j to generate its seed, and the server receives the secret seeds of every participant. This means that the second on-line phase of the protocol can be removed, and hence save $2N$ in communication complexity and N homomorphic operations. The other steps remain unchanged.

Response recipient. Our protocol can be modified so that the recipient of the response can be any arbitrary participant (or set of participants). This is achieved as follows: (a) the client chooses the public key of another participant as the session public key, and (b) because the location of the recipient is not necessarily known, the root node multicasts the encrypted response down the tree instead of sending it directly to the originator of the request.

Avoiding the use of the spanning tree. In a practical environment, the spanning tree could affect the resilience of the protocol and can be hard to maintain or configure. In such a scenario, the steps (`SendUp`,`SendDown`) can be replaced by multicast operations of the shares for each participant.

5 An id-abort protocol for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$

5.1 Overview

In this section we overview the changes needed for our protocol in order to cope with active adversaries. Our goal is twofold: first, we want to ensure that a malicious adversary is not able to gain any useful information about the location of the server. And second, we enable the detection and identification of malicious players that abort or send malformed messages. We refer the reader to Appendix B.2 for a formal security definition of this adversarial model.

Our new protocol has to account for the following malicious behaviors:

- Full or partial aborts (e.g. following a multicast protocol through a subset of its edges).

⁴Changing at each hybrid step the honest participant updated shares in the `to_requester_UP` messages from the ideal distribution to the corresponding ciphertext on the real distribution. Note that the fact we are in the multi-user setting (a message is encrypted under two different public keys) can be reduced to the single-user setting (standard IND-CPA security definition)[3].

- Malformed or inconsistent messages.

We will assume that honest parties form a connected subgraph of the entire network graph G^5 . That is, the adversary is not able to cut off honest nodes from their well-behaving peers. Under this assumption, we can make sure that full aborts are detectable and partial ones are harmless: we replace the “up-and-down” messages on the spanning-tree with multicast invocations on the entire graph. The recipient now receives all encrypted shares and combine them in plaintext (we do not rely on homomorphic encryption in this protocol). In order to keep hiding the location of the server, each participant needs to send its share for the client after it has seen all of the encrypted shares for the server in the previous phase. Consequently, the communication pattern of honest nodes (which includes the server) are identical.

A harder task is to detect malformed or inconsistent messages. These can have the following forms:

1. Client issues different requests through its edges.
2. Participants actively create new requests.
3. Corrupted nodes change the multicast message they receive before forwarding.
4. Participants send unexpected messages.
5. Participants send different or malformed shares during phase 2 (shares to the server) and phase 3 (shares to the client), causing error on the reconstruction procedure.

On case 1 above, the client is corrupted. If the she issues requests with different session identifiers (sid’s), then this behavior is seen by other participant as different protocol instances, in which on each of these the client is partially aborting. Hence, this is not considered a security breach. On the other hand, a corrupted client can use same sid for different requests. In order to handle this, the participants will use the complete request message as the session id.

In case 2, we consider the behavior in which corrupted participants can also create new request at any point during the execution of other instances. This is problematic since a corrupted set of participants can try to learn the response the client would have gotten by just changing the session public key. Although honest participants will see two different requests, they cannot detect which one is valid. We solve this by forcing the client to sign its request. In addition, we make the participants in the multicast protocol account for the messages they issue by signing them as well. This way, the honest nodes have the ability to detect, identify, and prove the malicious activity of corrupted nodes. Note that these verifications solve case 3 too.

For case 4 above, we require that each message contains the session identifier of the protocol instance and the description of the executing phase (`Request`, `to_server`, or `to_client`). Unexpected messages can be discarded and treated as a simple harmless abort (as discussed above).

For case 5 we append a zero-knowledge proof in the `to_client` message proving that the ciphertext in phases 2 and 3 encrypt the same message under different, but known, public keys. Unfortunately, this is not sufficient since the server has to change its share on phase 3. Hence, this zero-knowledge proof needs to convince that *either* the ciphertexts encrypt the same message, **OR** the sender is the server. Participants that see these messages can verify the proofs and continue the propagation as evidence of the malicious behavior of the message’s issuer. Note that in our protocol several zero-knowledge proofs are executed concurrently and thus we need to rely on a Universal Composable (UC) functionality [5] for proving the consistency of shares (see Section 5.2). Indeed security of zero-knowledge proofs is not necessarily preserved with sequential composition, even relying on the random oracle methodology[33].

⁵Otherwise the adversary would be able to perform eclipse attacks [31] on some subset(s) of honest nodes which would yield honest nodes to be tagged as malicious.

\mathcal{F}_{tZK}
<p>Parameters: Relation $R \subset \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^*$ where $(x, w) \in R$ can be checked in polynomial-time regarding $w \leq p(x)$. \mathcal{F}_{tZK} involves a prover P, and verifier V and an adversary Sim.</p> <p>Prove: On input $(\text{prove}, \text{sid}, x, w)$ from party P ignore if $(x, w) \notin R$ Send (prove, x) to Sim and wait for answer (proof, π). Upon receiving the answer store (x, π) and send $(\text{proof}, \text{sid}, \pi)$ to P.</p> <p>Verification: On input $(\text{verify}, \text{sid}, x, \pi)$ from V check whether (x, π) is stored. If not send (verify, x, π) to Sim and wait for an answer $(\text{witness}, w)$. Upon receiving the answer, check whether $(x, w) \in R$ and in that case, store (x, π). If (x, π) has been stored return $(\text{verification}, \text{sid}, 1)$ to V, else return $(\text{verification}, \text{sid}, 0)$.</p>

Figure 8: NIZK argument functionality \mathcal{F}_{tZK} [14].

Note that due to our use of digital signatures, our new protocol reveals the identity of the client and the distance of each honest node to each corrupted node. Also, given that we replaced spanning-tree up-and-down messages with multicast invocations, the communication complexity increases by a $O(N)$ factor.

5.2 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge Functionality

We use here the functionality \mathcal{F}_{tZK} (see Figure 8) introduced by Groth *et al.*[14] in order to cope with the fact that non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are inherently non-deniable[24]. Note that in our case transferability is not a limitation but on the contrary a useful feature as it allows honest participants to verify all the proofs emitted by the other players. Pass [24] showed how to transform Σ -protocols in order to obtain UC secure ZKPoK with non-programmable random oracle. This transformation involve increasing the size of the proof by a factor L so that soundness holds with probability $\frac{1}{2^L}$.

The Σ -protocol to prove the consistency of the encrypted shares corresponds to the relation $R_{g,\delta} := \{(A, B; r) : A = (\delta)^r \wedge B = g^r\} \cup \{(D; s) : D = g^s\} = R_0 \cup R_1$ where $\delta = \text{pk}_C \cdot \text{pk}_S^{-1}$ and $D = g^s$ is some public key such that the corresponding private key s is only known by the server \mathcal{S} . Indeed if the two ciphertexts C_1, C_2 encrypt the same message m then $\frac{C_1}{C_2}$ will be the encryption of 0 for some public key $\delta = \text{pk}_C \cdot \text{pk}_S^{-1}$. In case the participant is the server, then the proof will involve the knowledge of s . The full description of the Σ -protocol can be found in appendix A.

5.3 Protocol Specification

Time-out. We add to the above protocol a reasonable timeout in order to catch malicious players that simply abort.

Phase 1: Request. The protocol starts when a participant P_i inputs a request. P_i starts a multicast protocol invocation with an encrypted request to the server. In order to avoid dishonest participants to change this message, the request is signed by the requester. As an adversary can replace the signature (and hence trying to use the server's response to learn the request), P_i appends the signature and its identifier to the request before encrypting it. Moreover, we use a CCA⁶ scheme in order to make this ciphertext non-malleable. A participant that sees this message continues with the multicast execution if it hasn't been seen before.

Phase 2: Share-to-Server. After seeing a new valid request message on Phase 1, a participant P_j prepares a `to_server` message as follows: sample a uniformly random value from the secret sharing scheme domain. This share is then encrypted under the server's public key and the resulting

⁶Such as defined in [22].




Figure 9: Setup for protocol $\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\text{id-abort}}$ realizing functionality $[\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}]_{\text{id-abort}}$.




Figure 10: Phase 1 of protocol $\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\text{id-abort}}$.

ciphertext is signed under P_j signing key. The encrypted share and signature are propagated via a multicast protocol execution, and the share saved for Phase 3. Participants that sees `to_server` messages issued by others continue the multicast protocol on these only if they contain a valid signature. In addition, the ciphertext and the identity of the issuer are saved for Phase 3.

Phase 3: Share-to-Client. Upon seeing all participant's `to_server` messages, non-server players encrypt their shares under the client's public key, and compute a proof that this ciphertext and the one propagated in Phase 2 encrypt the same message. The ciphertext and proof pair is signed and sent to the client via an additional multicast invocation. On the other hand the server masks the response using all shares received in Phase 2, encrypts the resulting share under the client's public key, and creates a *fake proof* that the ciphertext encrypts the same value as the fake share sent in Phase 2. Participants that see others' `to_client` message as part of multicast protocol invocation, continue the propagation only if the signature is valid, and also check the proof against phase 2 and 3 ciphertexts. If the proof is invalid, the participant saves issuer's identity in set $\text{DetectedCorrupted}_j$ before continuing with the multicast invocation.

Phase 4: Output. Participants waits until seeing all other participants `to_client` messages or until a time-out expires. If $\text{DetectedCorrupted}_i = \emptyset$, then the requester P_i uses the `to_client` shares to compute and output the response res . Otherwise output $\langle \text{abort}, \text{DetectedCorrupted}_i \rangle$. Other participants output their set of caught malicious players, $\text{DetectedCorrupted}_j$.

5.4 Security proof

Theorem 2. *Let $\Pi_{\mathcal{E}} = \langle \text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec} \rangle$ be a semantically secure public-key encryption scheme, $\overline{\Pi_{\mathcal{E}}} = \langle \overline{\text{Gen}}, \overline{\text{Enc}}, \overline{\text{Dec}} \rangle$ be a CCA public-key encryption scheme and $\Pi_{\text{Sign}} = \langle \text{SGen}, \text{SSign}, \text{SVerify} \rangle$ an unforgeable signature scheme. Then, protocol $\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\text{id-abort}}$ securely realizes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$ with identifiable aborts in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ -restricted/ \mathcal{F}_{ZK} -hybrid model under Leakage 1.*

Proof. (Sketch)

$\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\text{id-abort}}$ **Phase 2**

Phase 2: To Server. Upon receiving message $M = \langle \text{sid}, \sigma_{\text{sid}} \rangle$ from neighbor P_j (as part of a multicast protocol execution), participant P_u discards the message if M has been seen before, or if $\text{SVerify}_{\text{vk}_j}(\text{sid}, \sigma_{\text{sid}}) = 0$ (where identity of issuer is taken from sid). Otherwise,

1. Sample uniformly random share share_u from the encryption scheme message space.
2. Compute ciphertext $S_u = \text{Enc}_{\text{ek}_S}(\text{share}_u, r)$, where r is the randomness used by Enc .
3. Store tuple $\langle \text{sid}, S_u, \text{share}_u, r \rangle$.
4. Compute signature $\sigma_u = \text{Sign}_{\text{sk}_u}(M_u^{\text{to-server}})$ where $M_u^{\text{to-server}} = \langle \text{sid}, \text{to-server}, S_u, u \rangle$.
5. Invoke multicast protocol on input $\langle M_u^{\text{to-server}}, \sigma_u \rangle$

The server computes $\langle \tilde{\text{rid}} || \tilde{i} || \text{req}, \sigma \rangle \leftarrow \overline{\text{Dec}}_{\text{dk}_S}(\text{sereq})$, verifies σ on message $(\tilde{\text{rid}} || \tilde{i} || \text{req})$, and checks that \tilde{i} and $\tilde{\text{rid}}$ match $\text{sid}.i$ and sid.rid respectively. If all verifications succeed, then save the request req , otherwise save $\text{req} = \perp$.

Upon seeing $\langle M_v^{\text{to-server}}, \sigma_v \rangle$ as part of a multicast execution, participant P_u discards the message if $\text{SVerify}_{\text{vk}_v}(M_v^{\text{to-server}}, \sigma_v) = 0$. Otherwise, save tuple $\langle S_v, v \rangle$ and continue the multicast protocol for $\langle M_v^{\text{to-server}}, \sigma_v \rangle$.

Figure 11: Phase 2 of protocol $\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\text{id-abort}}$.

We start by describing how an ideal adversary Sim can simulate the communication pattern to corrupted players during each multicast invocation. In order to perfectly simulate a multicast protocol invocation, Sim makes use of the underlying network functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ over the participant network topology. Hence, the simulator does not need to take care of issues like network latency, but only needs to run $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ with inputs that are indistinguishable from the real world execution.

Multicast simulation. When the simulator Sim is invoked by the functionality with input the network topology, Sim simulates the setup for network functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ (That is, Sim controls/simulates every participant). In order to simulate a multicast started from honest player P_j , Sim invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ for each of P_j 's neighbors. When some simulated honest party P receives a message (m, P_j) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$, Sim checks that m has not been seen before. Otherwise, it continues the multicast by calling $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ on input m for each of P_j 's neighbors except P_j . On the other hand, when corrupted party P receives a message (m, P_j) from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$, we execute adversary simulating P receiving a message m from P_j . When adversary instructs to send message m_e , to neighbor P_e , \mathcal{S} executes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ on input (m_e, P_e) coming from simulated party P . Similarly, when the adversary initiates a multicast execution indicating pairs $\{(m_e, P_e)\}$ (each message m_e should be delivered to neighbor P_e), \mathcal{S} executes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{network}}$ on input (m_e, P_e) coming from simulated party P , and proceeds analogously.

Protocol simulation. During the simulation, Sim stops any multicast simulation of a message m , if m is directed to an honest party and it is not correctly signed.

Simulating Setup: Generate server's encryption keys $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\kappa)$, $(\overline{\text{ek}}_S, \overline{\text{dk}}_S) \leftarrow \overline{\text{Gen}}(1^\kappa)$ and participants signature keys $(\text{vk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{SGen}(1^\lambda)$. Get set \mathcal{C} of corrupted players from the adversary and give $(\text{ek}, \overline{\text{ek}}_S, \{\text{vk}_i\}_{i \in [N]}, \{\text{sk}_k\}_{k: P_k \in \mathcal{C}})$ to the adversary. Also, give \mathcal{C} to the functionality⁷.

Simulating Phase 1: When protocol starts on requester P_i , simulate a requester generated multicast for Phase 1 message: If the requester is honest, then simulate initial request message on

⁷For simplicity we model static corruption, but a complete proof would handle adaptive adversaries.

$\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\text{id-abort}}$ **Phase 3**

Phase 3: To Client.

After seeing all participants' **to-server** messages on session ID **sid**:

- Each participant $P_u \neq \mathcal{S}$ does:
 1. Load saved $\langle \text{share}_u, S_u, r \rangle$ corresponding to **sid**.
 2. Compute ciphertext $C = \text{Enc}_{\text{sid}, \text{ek}_{\text{rid}}}(\text{share}_u, r)$.
 3. Sample new session id zksid_u and invoke $\mathcal{F}_{\text{tZK}}(\text{Prove}, \text{zksid}_u, \langle S_u, C_u, \text{ek}_{\text{rid}}, \text{ek}_{\mathcal{S}} \rangle, \langle \text{share}_u, r \rangle)$ to get proof π .
 4. Compute signature σ_u for message $M_u^{\text{to-client}} = \langle \text{sid}, \text{to-client}, C_u, \text{zksid}_u, \pi, u \rangle$.
 5. Invoke multicast protocol on input $\langle M_u^{\text{to-client}}, \sigma_u \rangle$.
- For $P_{j^*} = \mathcal{S}$ does:
 1. Compute $\text{res} = \text{ProcessReq}(\text{req})$.
 2. Compute $\text{share}_v = \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}_{\mathcal{S}}}(S_v)$ for all $v \neq j^*$.
 3. Compute share $\text{share}_{j^*}^{\text{real}} = \text{res} - \sum_{v=1: v \neq j^*}^N \text{share}_v$.
 4. Create ciphertext $C_{j^*} = \text{Enc}_{\text{ek}_{\text{rid}}}(\text{share}_{j^*}^{\text{real}})$.
 5. Sample new session id zksid_{j^*} and invoke $\mathcal{F}_{\text{tZK}}(\text{Prove}, \text{zksid}_{j^*}, \langle S_{j^*}, C_{j^*}, \text{ek}_{\text{rid}}, \text{ek}_{\mathcal{S}} \rangle, \langle \text{sk}_{\mathcal{S}} \rangle)$ to get π .
 6. Create signature σ_{j^*} on message $M_{j^*}^{\text{to-client}} = \langle \text{sid}, \text{to-client}, C_{j^*}, \text{zksid}_{j^*}, \pi, j^* \rangle$.
 7. Invoke multicast protocol on input $\langle M_{j^*}^{\text{to-client}}, \sigma_{j^*} \rangle$.

Figure 12: Phase 3 of protocol $\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\text{id-abort}}$.

$\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\text{id-abort}}$ **Phase 4**

Phase 4: Output. As soon as the running party P_j has seen all participants' **to-client** messages on session ID **sid**, check if all Phase 3 messages seen so far contain a valid proof by invoking the verification service of functionality \mathcal{F}_{tZK} , on input $(\langle S_u, C_u, \text{ek}_{\mathcal{S}}, \text{sk}_{\mathcal{S}} \rangle, \pi)$ for each $M_u^{\text{to-client}}$ received.

- All proofs are correct: If $P_j = P_i$, then it decrypts all shares using dk_{rid} , computes and outputs the response $\text{res} = \sum_{u=1}^N \text{share}_u$. Other participants output \perp .
- There is an invalid proof: Output $\langle \text{abort}, \text{DetectedCorrupted}_j \rangle$ where $\text{DetectedCorrupted}_j$ contains the identities of participants that issued a **to-client** message with an invalid proof.

If the time-out expires, then output $\langle \text{abort}, \text{DetectedCorrupted}_j \rangle$ (where $\text{DetectedCorrupted}_j$ contain the identities of participants for which the participant has not seen its **to-client** message or for which an invalid proof was detected).

Figure 13: Phase 4 of protocol $\Pi_{\text{ReqResp}}^{\text{id-abort}}$.

input $\text{req} = 0^\ell$, otherwise wait for adversary's generated Phase 1 message(s)).

Simulating Phase 2: For each honest party P_j that sees a valid the request message during this multicast simulation, generate also the “to-server” message using a uniformly random share share_j . For each dishonest party, P_k wait for the adversary to produce “to-server” messages

$\langle \text{to-server}, S_k, \sigma_k \rangle$ for each of P_k 's outgoing edges. If signature is not valid for a message directed to an honest neighbor, then discard the message. Otherwise, continue multicast simulation.

Simulating Phase 3: The simulator, which has the simulated server's decryption key and can query the functionality to get the request's response, decrypts all shares sent by the corrupted nodes, and recompute the shares of the honest nodes so that reconstruction produce the correct response (this is only when the requester is corrupted, otherwise they can use arbitrary shares). In addition using the server's secret key the simulator produces valid zero-knowledge proof for all the honest players. When all simulated honest players have seen all others **to-server** messages at least once, simulate this player starting the **to-client** using the share as described above. Continue simulating phase 3 multicast invocation but checking the zero-knowledge proof of each dishonest party generated message, saving the identity of the ones in which the proof failed (without aborting).

Simulating Phase 4: As soon as a simulated honest participant has seen all **to-client** messages, or a time-out has expired, inform the functionality that the output of this player is the set of detected corrupted participants together with the identity of players that have not sent a **to-client** message. If the requester is honest, and has seen correct **to-client** messages from all participants during the simulation, then inform the functionality to give output to the requester. Otherwise, inform the functionality that requester aborts with the set of detected corrupted participants.

As in the semi-honest case, the above simulation is perfect with the following three exceptions:

- The shares of the response corresponding to honest players are changed. However, as argued in the semi-honest case proof, these are a) encrypted with a semantically secure encryption scheme, and b) the shares are uniformly distributed, $(n - 1)$ -independent, and reconstruct to the exact same value. Hence, even if even if the requester is corrupted and can decrypt them, no algorithm can distinguish real-world protocol shares from ideal-world simulated shares, with noticeable probability.
- Simulated honest players zero-knowledge proof input are build with the server's secret key, rather than the two ciphertext encrypting the same message. The simulation proceedd by calling (a simulator for) the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{tZK} .
- If the requester is honest, then the encrypted request is simulated by the encryption of 0^ℓ concatenated with a valid signature from the requester. Hence, the security of the protocol relies on the secrecy of the request and the security of the signature scheme. These are encrypted with a CCA-secure encryption scheme. Therefore, an adversary cannot use the server as a decryption oracle and gain knowledge of the original request.

□

6 Conclusion

We have introduced a new protocol that enables to hide a server in a network in the semi-honest model. This protocol has several advantages other previous proposals: it is efficient, asynchronous and collusion-resistant. To the best of our knowledge this is the first solution with these characteristics. In addition, we provided an extension of our protocol to cope with active adversaries. In this setting, our solution allows honest participants to identify corrupted ones. In fact, dishonest nodes can only force a premature termination of the protocol.

We believe that this work is an important step towards designing practical and provably secure systems that enable to hide relevant meta-data (such as the identity or location of participants) in a controllable way. Future work directions include reducing the communication complexity of the extended protocol for active adversaries, improve the resilience of our solution against termination

attempts, and prove our results in stronger security models (such as the UC framework [5] with adaptive corruption).

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A Proving that two ciphertexts encrypt the same plaintext or the participant is the server

In this section we describe the scheme that enables to check the consistency of the encrypted shares. At a conceptual level we need to prevent a malicious participant from sending shares that are not equal to the server and client. At the same time we need to deal with the restriction that the server indeed uses different shares in the protocol. Obviously this fact cannot be revealed to the other participants without leaking the server’s location⁸

In order to achieve these two apparently contradictory goals we use the following approach: each participant will prove in zero-knowledge that (1) the encrypted shares correspond to the same plaintext OR (2) the encrypted shares have been produced by the server.

We use the following algorithms: $\text{Prove}(\text{aux}, C^1, C^2, \text{pk}_C, \text{pk}_S)$ takes as input some auxiliary information aux , ciphertexts C^1, C^2 and public keys pk_C, pk_S of the client and server respectively. The output is some proof π . Then, given two ciphertexts C^1, C^2 , the public key of the client pk_C , the public key of the server pk_S and the proof π computed earlier, it is possible to verify the consistency of the ciphertexts by running $\text{Check}(C^1, C^2, \text{pk}_C, \text{pk}_S, \pi)$ that will return **ACCEPT** in case the verification is successful or \perp otherwise.

We instantiate our construction using the Elgamal [10] encryption scheme: Let \mathbb{G} be a cyclic group of prime order p and generator $g \in \mathbb{G}$. Let $\text{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ be a private key and $\text{pk} := g^{\text{sk}}$ be the corresponding public key. We define the encryption of a plaintext $m \in \mathbb{G}$ using randomness $r \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ as $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m) := (m \cdot \text{pk}^r, g^r) = (C_1, C_2)$. To decrypt a ciphertext (C_1, C_2) using private key sk , one needs to compute $\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}((C_1, C_2)) := C_1 \cdot C_2^{-\text{sk}} = m \cdot (g^{\text{sk}})^r \cdot (g^r)^{-\text{sk}} = m$. Let $A := g^s$ be an element of \mathbb{G} for some $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$. The discrete logarithm of A in base g is denoted $\text{Dlog}_g(A) := s$. Let $R = \{(v; w)\} \subseteq V \times W$ be a NP-relation. We denote by $PK\{(w) : (v, w) \in R\}$ a protocol where a prover is able to convince a verifier of the knowledge of some witness w that satisfies some relation R , i.e $(v, w) \in R$ for some public value v . For example $PK\{(s) : A = g^s\}$ denotes the proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm of $A \in \mathbb{G}$ in base g . A Σ -protocol is a three rounds interaction between the prover and verifier that can be used to prove in zero-knowledge the knowledge of some witness without revealing this witness.

The idea of our construction is as follows: given two Elgamal ciphertexts $C^1 = (C_1^1, C_2^1) = (m_1 \cdot \text{pk}_C^r, g^r)$ and $C^2 = (C_1^2, C_2^2) = (m_2 \cdot \text{pk}_S^r, g^r)$ encrypted with the same randomness r , the prover will either show that (1) $m_1 = m_2$ by proving the equality of discrete logarithm of $C_1^1 \cdot (C_1^2)^{-1} = (\text{pk}_C \cdot \text{pk}_S^{-1})^r$ and g^r in bases $\text{pk}_C \cdot \text{pk}_S^{-1}$ and g respectively, OR (2) the knowledge of some secret s known to the server (e.g. s such that $D = g^s$, for some public D). Let $\delta = \text{pk}_C \cdot \text{pk}_S^{-1}$.

Construction 1. [*Proof of shares consistency*]
 $\text{Prove}(\text{aux}, C^1, C^2, D, \text{pk}_C, \text{pk}_S)$:

⁸Detecting that a specific message comes from the server implies in practice that the server’s location will be leaked at some point.




Figure 14: Σ -protocol for relation $R_{g,\delta} = \{(A, B; r) : A = \delta^r \wedge B = g^r\} \cup \{(D; s) : D = g^s\}$.

- Let $C^1 = (C_1^1, Y)$ and $C^2 = (C_1^2, Y)$.
- Compute $\Delta := C_1^1 \cdot (C_1^2)^{-1}$ ($= \delta^r$).
- If the prover is the server \mathcal{S} then $\text{aux} := s = \text{Dlog}_g(D)$ otherwise $\text{aux} := r = \text{Dlog}_\delta(\Delta) = \text{Dlog}_g(Y)$.
- Compute and return π for $PK\{(r, s) : [\Delta = \delta^r \wedge Y = g^r] \vee [s : D = g^s]\}$.

$\text{Check}(C^1, C^2, \text{pk}_C, \text{pk}_S, \pi)$:

- Let $C^1 = (C_1^1, Y_1)$ and $C^2 = (C_1^2, Y_2)$.
- Check that $Y_1 = Y_2$. If not return \perp .
- Compute $\Delta := C_1^1 \cdot (C_1^2)^{-1}$.
- Verify π using $\Delta, \text{pk}_C, \text{pk}_S$. If the verification is successful return **ACCEPT** otherwise return \perp .

The reader can verify that if, indeed, $g^{\text{Dlog}_s(\Delta)} = g^r$, then $\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}_C}((C_1^1, g^r)) = \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}_S}((C_1^2, g^r))$.

The Σ -protocol $PK\{(r, s) : [\Delta = \delta^r \wedge Y = g^r] \vee [s : D = g^s]\}$ that corresponds to the relation $R_{g,\delta} := \{(A, B; r) : A = (\delta)^r \wedge B = g^r\} \cup \{(D; s) : D = g^s\} = R_0 \cup R_1$ is described in Figure 14. In this protocol, values A and B correspond to Δ and g^r respectively, and D to g^s , where s is the server's secret.

The completeness of the protocol can be verified by inspection. Soundness can be shown as follows⁹. Assume that we obtain two conversations

$(a_1, a_2, a_3; c; c_0, c_1, r_0, r_1)$ and $(a_1, a_2, a_3, c', c_0', c_1', r_0', r_1')$ such that $c \neq c'$. Given that $c = c_0 + c_1$ and $c' = c_0' + c_1'$ then either $c_0 \neq c_0'$ or $c_1 \neq c_1'$. Moreover we have that $g^{r_0} = a_2 B^{c_0}, g^{r_1} = a_3 D^{c_1}, \delta^{r_0} = a_1 A^{c_0}, g^{r_0'} = a_2 B^{c_0'}, g^{r_1'} = a_3 D^{c_1'}$, and $\delta^{r_0'} = a_1 A^{c_0'}$. We can deduce that:

⁹See Berry Schoenmakers' lectures notes[28] for a security definition of Σ -protocols.

- if $c_0 \neq c_0'$ then $g^{r_0-r_0'} = B^{c_0-c_0'}$ and $\delta^{r_0-r_0'} = A^{c_0-c_0'}$ which implies that $r = \frac{r_0-r_0'}{c_0-c_0'}$.
- if $c_1 \neq c_1'$ then $g^{r_1-r_1'} = D^{c_1-c_1'}$ which implies that $s = \frac{r_1-r_1'}{c_1-c_1'}$.

To show that the protocol is zero-knowledge let us consider a challenge c . Let us assume that the prover knows r . Then the honest-verifier distribution is $\{(a_1, a_2, a_3, c; c_0, c_1, r_0, r_1) : u_0, r_1, c_1 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p; a_1 = \delta^{u_0}; a_2 = g^{u_0}; c_0 = c - c_1; r_0 = u_0 + c_0 r\}$. The simulated distribution is set as $\{(a_1, a_2, a_3, c; c_0, c_1, r_0, r_1) : c_0, r_0, r_1 \in_R \mathbb{Z}_p; c_1 = c - c_0, a_1 = \delta^{r_0} A^{-c_0}, a_2 = g^{r_0} B^{-c_0}, a_3 = g^{r_1} D^{-c_1}\}$. These distributions are identical. The case where the prover knows s is similar.

B Security definitions

B.1 Semi-honest adversaries

As standard in cryptographic protocols, we define security in terms of a real-versus-ideal world procedures. That is, we first specify a desired functionality for our protocol. Then, we say that a protocol computing the functionality is *secure* if its real-world execution realizes an ideal procedure. In this ideal procedure, the participants get their outputs by sending their inputs to a trusted party computing the functionality on behalf of them. More specifically, we say that our protocol *privately computes* the functionality if whatever can be achieved by adversary interacting in the real execution of the protocol, can also be obtained with only inputs and outputs of the corrupted participants in an ideal execution.

In this section we provide a security definition for *semi-honest static* adversaries. In what follows we let algorithms Sim , Adv , and \mathcal{Z} be stateful.

$\text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{Z}, \text{Sim}}^{\mathcal{F}}(\kappa)$: 1) Run $\mathcal{Z}(1^\kappa)$ to produce participant inputs $\{\text{in}_j\}_{j \in [N]}$ and adversary input in_{Sim} . 2) Run $\text{Sim}(1^\kappa, \text{in}_{\text{Sim}})$ to get the index set of corrupted parties $I_C \subseteq [N]$. 3) Run $\text{Sim}(\{\text{in}_k\}_{k \in I_C})$ to obtain modified input $\{\text{in}'_k\}_{k \in I_C}$ for the corrupted parties. 4) Call functionality \mathcal{F} on previous inputs to obtain output $\{\text{out}_j\}_{j \in [N]}$. 5) Run $\text{Sim}(\{\text{out}_k\}_{k \in I_C})$ to get adversary's output out_{Sim} . 6) Run $\mathcal{Z}(\{\text{out}_j\}_{j \in [N] \setminus I_C}, \text{out}_{\text{Sim}})$ to obtain output bit b . 7) Return b as the output of the ideal-world execution.

$\text{Real}_{\mathcal{Z}, \text{Adv}}^{\Pi}(\kappa)$: 1) Run $\mathcal{Z}(1^\kappa)$ to produce participant inputs $\{\text{in}_j\}_{j \in [N]}$ and adversary input in_{Adv} . 2) Run $\text{Adv}(1^\kappa, \text{in}_{\text{Adv}})$ to get set of corrupted parties $I_C \subseteq [N]$. 3) Run $\text{Adv}(\{\text{in}_k\}_{k \in I_C})$ to obtain modified input $\{\text{in}'_k\}_{k \in I_C}$ for the corrupted parties. 4) Execute protocol Π with previously computed inputs, saving the view of every corrupted participant, $\{\text{view}_k\}_{k \in I_C}$. When every participant finishes the protocol execution, recollect output of every uncorrupted participants, $\{\text{out}_j\}_{j \in [N] \setminus I_C}$. 5) Run $\text{Adv}(\{\text{view}_k\}_{k \in I_C})$ to get adversary's output out_{Adv} . 6) Run $\mathcal{Z}(\{\text{out}_j\}_{j \in [N] \setminus I_C}, \text{out}_{\text{Adv}})$ to obtain output bit b . 7) Return b as the output of the real-world execution.

Definition 1. A protocol Π privately computes functionality \mathcal{F} if for every PPT algorithm Adv , there exists a PPT algorithm Sim such that for every PPT algorithm \mathcal{Z} the random variables $\text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{Z}, \text{Sim}}^{\mathcal{F}}(1^\kappa)$ and $\text{Real}_{\mathcal{Z}, \text{Adv}}^{\Pi}(1^\kappa)$ are computationally indistinguishable, for all sufficiently long κ .

In our work it is sufficient to show a PPT simulator Sim that can produce a view that is computationally indistinguishable from the corrupted participants view. Then, the simulator can run \mathcal{A} to produce a simulated output to \mathcal{Z} .

We slightly modify the ideal world to include a leakage function, \mathcal{L} , whose output is leaked to the simulator Sim . This leakage function models the fact the protocol may reveal some partial private information to the adversary (for example, the length of the messages to encrypt). It also allows for the specification of trade-offs between protocol features or efficiency and security. This leakage information is added to the simulator's input on step 3.

B.2 Active adversaries

In order to capture detectable and identifiable malicious activity we based our definition on [16]: we modify an ideal functionality to allow the ideal world adversary to specify if the requester gets a valid output or aborts indicating the identity of at least one corrupted participants. Similarly, other honest participant may also identify malicious players; however we do not force agreement on it. This definition is different from [16] since we do not require honest participants to agree on the correct termination of the protocol nor identity of detected malicious participants [12]. Analogously to the semi-honest case described in section B.1, an external environment chooses the client participant and its input.

Ideal-world with identifiable aborts. The environment chooses adversary's input in_{Sim} , client participant P_i , and P_i 's input req . The adversary then informs the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$ about corrupted participant set $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{P}$. The client P_i forwards its input req to the functionality. If $P_i \in \mathcal{C}$, then $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$ request new input req to the adversary¹⁰. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$ then submits leakage profile $\mathcal{L}(G, \text{req}, P_i)$ to adversary. When the adversary informs the output K_j of honest participant $P_j \neq P_i$, the functionality set K_j as the output of P_j . When the adversary informs the output K_i of P_i , then if $K_i = \emptyset$, functionality outputs response res and sends it to P_i , otherwise, it sends K_i to P_i . Let $\text{ID} - \text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{Z}, \text{Sim}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}}(\kappa)$ be the random variable denoting the joint output of the honest participants and the adversary Sim .

Real-World. As in the ideal world above, the environment chooses adversary's input, the client and its input. The adversary then chooses the corrupted participant set, and executes an arbitrary (yet polynomially bounded strategy) on behalf of them. The honest participants follow the prescribed protocol. Let $\text{Real}_{\mathcal{Z}, \text{Adv}}^{\Pi}(\kappa)$ be the random variable denoting the joint output of the honest participants and the adversary Adv .

Definition 2. *A protocol Π securely computes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}$ with identifiable aborts if for every PPT algorithm Adv , there exists a PPT algorithm Sim such that for every PPT algorithm \mathcal{Z} the random variables $\text{ID} - \text{Ideal}_{\mathcal{Z}, \text{Sim}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{ReqResp}}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Real}_{\mathcal{Z}, \text{Adv}}^{\Pi}(\kappa)$ are computationally indistinguishable.*

¹⁰We do not consider the trivial case in which the adversary abort before submitting its input.