

Finding Collisions in a Quantum World: Quantum Black-Box Separation of Collision-Resistance and One-Wayness

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Abstract

Since the celebrated work of Impagliazzo and Rudich (STOC 1989), a number of black-box impossibility results have been established. However, these works only ruled out classical black-box reductions among cryptographic primitives. Therefore it may be possible to overcome these impossibility results by using quantum reductions. To exclude such a possibility, we have to extend these impossibility results to the quantum setting.

In this paper, we initiate the study of black-box impossibility in the quantum setting. We first formalize a quantum counterpart of fully-black-box reduction following the formalization by Reingold, Trevisan and Vadhan (TCC 2004). Then we prove that there is no quantum fully-black-box reduction from collision-resistant hash function to one-way permutation (or even trapdoor permutation). This is an extension to the quantum setting of the work of Simon (Eurocrypt 1998) who showed a similar result in the classical setting.

keywords post-quantum cryptography, one-way permutation, one-way trapdoor permutation, collision resistant hash function, fully black-box reduction, quantum reduction, impossibility

1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Black-box impossibility. Reductions among cryptographic primitives are fundamental in cryptography. For example, we know reductions from pseudorandom generator, pseudorandom function, symmetric key encryption, and digital signatures to one-way function (OWF). On the other hand, there are some important cryptographic primitives including collision-resistant hash function (CRH), key-exchange, public key encryption (PKE), oblivious transfer, and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, for which there are no known reductions to OWF. Given this situation, we want to ask if it is impossible to reduce these primitives to OWF. We remark that under the widely believed assumption that these primitives exist, OWF “implies” these primitives (i.e., these primitives are “reduced” to OWF) in a trivial sense. Therefore to make the question meaningful, we have to somehow restrict types of reductions.

For this purpose, Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] introduced the notion of *black-box reductions*. Roughly speaking, a black-box reduction is a reduction that uses an underlying primitive and an adversary in a black-box manner (i.e., use them just as oracles).¹ They proved that there does not exist a black-box reduction from key-exchange protocol (and especially PKE) to one-way permutation (OWP). They also observed that most existing reductions between cryptographic primitives are black-box. Thus their result can be interpreted as an evidence that we cannot construct key-exchange protocol based on OWP based on commonly used techniques. After their seminal work, there have been numerous impossibility results of black-box reductions (See Section 1.3 for details).

Post-quantum and quantum cryptography. In 1994, Shor [Sho94] showed that we can efficiently compute integer factorization and discrete logarithm, whose hardness are bases of widely used cryptographic systems, by using a quantum computer. After that, post-quantum cryptography, which treats classically computable cryptographic schemes that resist quantum attacks, has been intensively studied (e.g., [McE78, Ajt96, Reg05, JF11]). Indeed, NIST has recently started a standardization of post-quantum cryptography [NIST]. We refer more detailed survey of post-quantum cryptography to [BL17].

As another direction to use quantum computer in cryptography, there have been study of quantum cryptography, in which even honest algorithms also use quantum computers. They include quantum key distribution [BB84], quantum encryption [ABF⁺16, AGM18], quantum (fully) homomorphic encryption [BJ15, Mah18, Bra18], quantum digital signatures [GC01], quantum money [Wie83, AC12, Zha17], quantum copy-protection [Aar09] etc. We refer more detailed survey of quantum cryptography to [BS16].

Our motivation: black-box impossibility in a quantum world. In this paper, we consider black-box impossibility in a quantum setting where primitives and adversaries are quantum, and a reduction accesses to them quantumly.

Quantum reductions are recognized to be more powerful than classical reductions. For example, Regev [Reg05] gave a quantum reduction from the learning with errors (LWE) problem to the decision version of the shortest vector problem (GapSVP) or the shortest independent vectors problem (SIVP). We note that there are some follow-up works that give classical reduction between these problems in some parameter settings [Pei09, BLP⁺13], we still do not know any classical reduction that works in the same parameter setting as the quantum one by Regev. This example illustrates that quantum reductions are often more powerful than classical reductions even if all

¹This is an explanation for *fully-black-box reduction* using the terminology of Reingold, Trevisan, and Vadhan [RTV04]. Since we only consider fully-black-box reductions in this paper, in this introduction, we just say black-box reduction to mean fully-black-box reduction.

problem instances are classical. Therefore it may be possible to overcome black-box impossibility results shown in the classical setting by using quantum reductions.

We observe that most existing black-box impossibility results crucially rely on the fact that a reduction only classically calls underlying primitives and adversaries, and cannot be simply extended to the quantum case. (We will discuss this issue in more detail for the case considered in this paper in Section 2.) Hence if we also want to rule out quantum black-box reductions, we have to give impossibility results considering quantum setting with a new technique. Especially, in this paper, we focus on the impossibility of quantum black-box reductions from CRH to one-way permutation (OWP), which was originally shown by Simon [Sim98] in the classical setting, and revisited in some follow-up works [HR04, HHRS07, AS15]. Since both CRH and OWP are fundamental cryptographic primitives, it is a theoretically important problem to study the relation of them in the quantum setting.

1.2 Our Results

First, we formally define the notion of quantum black-box reduction based on the work by Reingold, Trevisan and Vadhan [RTV04], which gave a formal framework for the notion of black-box reductions in the classical setting. Then we prove the following theorem.

Theorem 1.1 (informal). *There does not exist a quantum black-box reduction from CRH to OWP.*

We note that though we do not know any candidate of OWP that resists quantum attacks, the above theorem is still meaningful since it also rules out quantum black-box reductions from CRH to OWF (since OWP is also OWF).

We also extend the result to obtain the following theorem.

Theorem 1.2 (informal). *There does not exist a quantum black-box reduction from CRH to trap-door permutation (TDP).*

At high-level, we rely on the two-oracle technique introduced by Hsiao and Reyzin [HR04] to obtain the above theorems though there are many difficulties to deal with quantum reductions. See Sections 5 and 6.1 for more details of our techniques.

1.3 Related Work

Black-box impossibility. Here, we review existing works on black-box impossibility in the classical setting. We refer more details of these works to [Fis12]. Reingold, Trevisan and Vadhan [RTV04] introduced several notions of black-box reductions (later revisited by Baecher, Brzuska and Fischlin [BBF13]). We only consider *fully-black-box reductions* using their terminology.

Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89] ruled out black-box reductions from key-exchange to OWP by using the *relativizing technique*. In this technique, we construct an oracle O such that there exists a primitive \mathcal{P} relative to O but does not exist \mathcal{Q} relative to O . If such an oracle exists, then there does not exist black-box reduction from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{Q} .² The relativizing technique can also be found in [Sim98, Rud92, Hof11] etc.

Hsiao and Reyzin [HR04] proposed an extension of the relativizing technique called the *two-oracle technique*. In this technique, we construct an oracle O_1 that gives an “ideal” implementation of a primitive \mathcal{P} and another oracle O_2 that trivially breaks any implementation of a primitive \mathcal{Q} ,

²In fact, they ruled out *relativizing reduction* which is a more general type of reductions than fully-black-box reduction.

and prove that the security of \mathcal{P} implemented by O_1 still holds even if an adversary is given access to the oracle O_2 in addition to O_1 . If we prove this, then there does not exist black-box reduction from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{Q} .³ The two-oracle technique can also be found in [DOP05, FLR⁺10, FS12, AS15] etc.

Boneh and Venkatesan [BV98] introduced another technique to rule out black-box reductions called *meta-reduction*. In this technique, we construct a trivial inefficient adversary A against a primitive \mathcal{P} and a simulator S which is computationally indistinguishable from A via oracle accesses by a polynomial-time algorithm. Then a reduction algorithm from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{Q} works well even if it accesses to the simulator S instead of the adversary A . This means that we can break the security of \mathcal{Q} in polynomial-time. Therefore such a reduction does not exist as long as \mathcal{Q} is secure. Meta-reductions can also be found in [Cor02, Pas11, GW11] etc.

Recently, Rotem and Segev [RS18] showed a limitation of black-box impossibility by giving an example that overcomes the black-box impossibility result by Rudich [Rud88] by using a non-black-box reduction. Nonetheless, black-box impossibility results are still meaningful since we know very limited number of non-black-box techniques. Indeed, they left it as an open problem to overcome the black-box separation of CRH and OWP shown by Simon [Sim98].

CRH from strong OWF. Recently, Holmgren and Lombardi [HL18] gave a construction of CRH based on a stronger variant of OWF which they call one-way product function (OWPF). However, since they do not give a construction of OWPF from OWF (or OWP) even with exponential security, their result does not overcome the impossibility result by Simon [Sim98].

Impossibility of quantum reduction from OWP to NP hardness. Recently, Chia, Hallgren, and Song [CHS18] considered the problem of separating OWP from NP hardness in the quantum setting. They ruled out a special type of quantum reductions called locally random reductions under a certain complexity theoretic assumption. We note that in our work, we do not put any restriction on a type of a reduction as long as it is quantum fully-black-box, and we do not assume any unproven assumption. Also, they focus on the separation of OWP from NP hardness, and do not give a general definition of black-box reduction in the quantum setting. Thus their work is incomparable to ours.

Quantum Generic Attacks. Grover [Gro96] developed the famous database-search algorithm that, given black-box access to a function $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$, finds an element x such that $f(x) = 1$ with $O(2^{n/2})$ quantum queries (if such x exists). Brassard, Boyer, Høyer, and Tapp developed a generalized version of the Grover search, which can be used to find a preimage of an n -bit random permutation with $O(2^{n/2})$ queries [BBHT98]. In particular, any n -bit (trapdoor) permutations can be inverted with $O(2^{n/2})$ queries. They also showed that $O(2^{n/2})$ is the tight bound for the database-search problem. Brassard, Høyer, and Tapp [BHT98] developed a quantum collision-finding algorithm that finds a collision of a 2-to-1 function with $O(2^{n/3})$ queries. Actually their algorithm can be used to find collisions of random functions, and Zhandry [Zha15] showed that $O(2^{n/3})$ is the tight bound to find collisions of random functions in the quantum setting.

1.4 Future Direction

Here, we give two possible future directions. The first is to strengthen the black-box separation for CRH from other cryptographic primitives. In the classical setting, Asharov and Segev [AS15] proved that there does not exist a black-box reduction from CRH to OWP (or TDP) and indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) [GGH⁺13].⁴ Since IO and OWP implies many strong cryptographic

³We note that this technique only rules out fully-black-box reduction unlike the relativizing technique.

⁴Since a certain type of non-black-box construction is inherent in many IO-based constructions, they actually also ruled out reductions using “commonly used” non-black-box techniques.

primitives including functional encryption [GGH⁺13], witness encryption [GGSW13], deniable encryption [SW14] etc., their result means that it is difficult to construct CRH from these primitives. Though it would be nice if we obtain a similar result in the quantum setting, it is not clear how we can define IO and “black-box access” to it in the quantum setting. Thus we consider simpler cases to separate CRH from OWP (or TDP) as a first step. We leave it as an interesting open problem to extend our result to separate CRH from OWP (or TDP) and IO.

The second is to give quantum analogues of black-box impossibility results shown in the classical setting. As seen in Section 1.3, there are many known black-box impossibility results shown in the classical setting. However, we observe that many of them crucially relies on the fact that all algorithms are classical, and it seems not easy to extend them to ones in the quantum setting. Especially, a theoretically important question is if we can rule out a quantum black-box reduction from classical-communication key-exchange to OWP (or OWF) in the quantum setting. (If quantum communications are allowed, then the protocol in [BB84] is unconditionally secure. Therefore we only consider the case of classical-communication for making the question meaningful.) We note that this can be done if we prove that there does not exist a classical-communication key-exchange protocol (with super-polynomial security) in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). In the classical setting, a similar statement was proven by Impagliazzo and Rudich [IR89], followed by Barak and Mahmoody [BMG09] who gave the optimal security bound. On the other hand, in the quantum setting, we do not know any non-trivial security bound. We note that though Brassard et al. [BHK⁺11] gave a classical-communication key-exchange protocol in the QROM that is secure against adversary making $q^{5/3}$ queries to the random oracle where q is the number of queries by honest parties, they did not show their protocol is optimal in regard to security.

2 Technical Overview

This section gives a technical overview of this paper. In Section 2.1 we review technical backgrounds and previous works in the classical setting. In particular, we explain how to show the separation of CRH from OWP in the classical setting, following the formalization by Asharov and Segev [AS15]. In Section 2.2 we review our results and techniques in the quantum setting.

2.1 Previous Works in the Classical Setting

Primitives. In the classical setting, a primitive \mathcal{P} is defined as a pair of a set of algorithms $F_{\mathcal{P}}$ and a relation $R_{\mathcal{P}}$ over pairs $\langle \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{A} \rangle$, where $\mathcal{I} \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$ and \mathcal{A} is an algorithm. Each element of $F_{\mathcal{P}}$ is called an *implementation* of \mathcal{P} , and we say that \mathcal{A} *\mathcal{P} -breaks* \mathcal{I} if $\langle \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{A} \rangle \in R_{\mathcal{P}}$. For example, one-way permutations, or shortly OWP, is defined as follows: F_{OWP} is the set of algorithms that compute permutations, and for $\mathcal{I} \in F_{\text{OWP}}$ and an algorithm \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{A} OWP-breaks \mathcal{I} if and only if \mathcal{A} inverts the permutation implemented by \mathcal{I} . An implementation \mathcal{I} is called a *secure implementation* if there exists no efficient algorithm \mathcal{A} such that \mathcal{A} \mathcal{P} -breaks \mathcal{I} .

Black-Box Reductions. In the classical setting, black-box reductions are defined as follows. Note that, in this paper we treat only so called *fully-black-box reductions* [RTV04, Def. 2.3]. A primitive \mathcal{P} is (fully-black-box) reduced to \mathcal{Q} if and only if there exists a pair of efficient oracle-aided algorithms (G, S) such that:

1. For each implementation \mathcal{I} of \mathcal{Q} , $G^{\mathcal{I}}$ is an implementation of \mathcal{P} .
2. For each implementation \mathcal{I} of \mathcal{Q} and an algorithm \mathcal{A} that \mathcal{P} -breaks $G^{\mathcal{I}}$, $S^{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}}$ \mathcal{Q} -breaks \mathcal{I} .

Intuitively, the first condition says that there is an implementation of \mathcal{P} that accesses to an implementation of \mathcal{Q} in a black-box manner, and the second condition says that the security reduction can be done in a black-box manner.

The Two Oracle Technique. To show impossibility of black-box reductions from a primitive \mathcal{P} to another primitive \mathcal{Q} , we can use the *two oracle technique* developed by Hsiao and Reyzin [HR04]. Suppose that there exist oracles Φ and Ψ^Φ that satisfy the following conditions.

1. (Existence of \mathcal{Q} , informal.) There exists an efficient oracle-aided algorithm \mathcal{J}_0 such that \mathcal{J}_0^Φ implements \mathcal{Q} , and for any efficient oracle-aided algorithm \mathcal{B} , $\mathcal{B}^{\Phi, \Psi^\Phi}$ does not \mathcal{Q} -breaks \mathcal{J}_0^Φ .
2. (Non-existence of \mathcal{P} , informal.) For any efficient oracle-aided algorithm \mathcal{I} such that \mathcal{I}^Φ implements \mathcal{P} , there exists an efficient oracle-aided algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}}$ such that $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\Psi^\Phi}$ \mathcal{P} -breaks \mathcal{I}^Φ .

Then we can show that there exists no black-box reduction from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{Q} .

2.1.1 Separation of CRH from OWP in the Classical Setting.

In what follows, we review how to show impossibility of black-box reductions from CRH to OWP with the two oracle technique. First we set Φ as a random permutation f . Technical efforts are mainly devoted to constructing a suitable oracle $\Psi^\Phi = \Psi^f$ that satisfies the two conditions (i.e., the condition that CRH does not exist relative to Ψ^f but OWP exists relative to $\Phi = f$ and Ψ^f), and proving that in fact Ψ^f satisfies them. In the classical setting, the oracle ColFinder^f is used as Ψ^f , which was originally defined by Simon [Sim98] and generalized by Haitner et al. [HHR07] and Asharov and Segev [AS15] to separate CRH from OWP (and additional primitives). Next we review the definition of the oracle ColFinder^f , following the formalization by Asharov and Segev.

The Oracle ColFinder. First, each input to ColFinder^f is an oracle-aided circuit C that computes a function $F_C^f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ relative to the oracle of a permutation $f \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$. Here, $\text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$ is the set of permutations on the set $\{0, 1\}^n$, and m and ℓ are independent of f . Before an algorithm \mathcal{A} runs relative to ColFinder^f , two permutations $\pi_C^1, \pi_C^2 \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^m)$ are chosen uniformly at random for each circuit C . Let $\Pi = \{\pi_C^1, \pi_C^2\}_C$ denote the set of randomly chosen permutations. On each input C , ColFinder^f runs the following procedures:

1. Set $w_{Cf}^1 \leftarrow \pi_C^1(0^m)$.
2. Compute $u = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1)$ by running the circuit C relative to f on the input w_{Cf}^1 .
3. Find the minimum t such that $F_C^f(\pi_C^2(t)) = u$ by running the circuit C relative to f on the input $\pi_C^2(i)$ and checking whether $F_C^f(\pi_C^2(i)) = u$ holds for $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$, in a sequential order (here we identify integers $0 \leq i \leq 2^m - 1$ and elements in $\{0, 1\}^m$). Set $w_{Cf}^2 \leftarrow \pi_C^2(t)$.
4. Return (w_{Cf}^1, w_{Cf}^2, u) .

Since π_C^1 and π_C^2 are chosen uniformly at random, w_{Cf}^1 is uniformly distributed on $\{0, 1\}^m$, and w_{Cf}^2 is uniformly distributed on $(F_C^f)^{-1}(F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1))$. In particular, if $m > \ell$, the oracle ColFinder^f will find a collision of F_C^f with a high probability.

The Technically Hardest Part. If f and ColFinder^f satisfy the conditions of the two oracle technique, it follows that there does not exist black-box reductions from $\mathcal{P} = \text{CRH}$ to $\mathcal{Q} = \text{OWP}$. The second condition, i.e., non-existence of CRH, follows by definition of ColFinder . For the first part of the first condition (existence of an implementation of OWP), \mathcal{J}_0 is constructed in such a

way that, given an input x , \mathcal{J}_0 queries it to f to compute $f(x)$, and just returns $f(x)$. Since f is a random permutation, \mathcal{J}_0^f obviously implements OWP. What is technically hardest to prove is the latter part of the first condition, which follows from the proposition below. (In fact Asharov and Segev also showed a similar proposition [AS15, Thm. 3.20].)

Proposition 2.1 (Informal). *Let \mathcal{A} be a $q(n)$ -query oracle-aided algorithm. Suppose that there is a function $\eta(n)$ such that, for each circuit C that \mathcal{A}_n queries to ColFinder, C makes at most $\eta(n)$ queries. If*

$$\Pr_{f,y,\Pi} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{f, \text{ColFinder}^f}(y) : f(x) = y \right] \geq \epsilon(n) > 0 \quad (1)$$

holds for infinitely many n , then there exists positive constants c_1 and c_2 , where $c_2 \geq 1$, such that

$$\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} > c_1 \cdot \epsilon(n) \cdot \sqrt[2]{2^n}$$

holds for infinitely many n .

The above proposition guarantees that, if \mathcal{B} is an efficient algorithm and q is a polynomial in n , then $\epsilon(n)$ is negligible, which implies existence of $\mathcal{Q} = \text{OWP}$ relative to f and ColFinder^f . Showing such a proposition is the technical core for proving separation of CRH from OWP. For simplicity, below we consider the case that $q(n) = \eta(n)$.

In brief, what we want to show is that random permutations are hard to invert even if additional information (i.e., additional oracle ColFinder) is available to adversaries. There exists a technique to prove such claims in which we construct an information theoretic encoding scheme to compress the truth tables of permutations. In the classical setting, it is used to show that random permutation is hard to invert even if the oracle ColFinder^f is available [HHR07, AS15] or adversaries are non-uniform [GT00, DTT10], for example.

A Proof technique: Encoding and Compressing Permutations. Proofs that use the technique proceed as follows. Suppose that an adversary \mathcal{A} can invert a permutation $f \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$ with a probability $\epsilon(n) > 0$ if f is chosen uniformly at random, and \mathcal{A} is given access to additional information (e.g., an additional oracle O^f that leak some information of the random permutation f), for infinitely many n . By increasing the number of queries by $c/\epsilon(n)$ times for a sufficiently large constant c , we can assume that a Q -query algorithm $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ ($Q = cq/\epsilon$) can invert permutations with at least a constant probability p_0 , for infinitely many n . Below we consider this algorithm $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ instead of \mathcal{A} . Then we can show that there exists a (relatively large) set of permutations $X \subset \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$ that satisfies the following conditions: (i) $|X|$ is lower bounded as $|X| \geq p_1 |\text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)| = p_1 2^n!$ for a constant p_1 , and (ii) for each $f \in X$, there exists a set $I \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ such that, given the additional information, $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ can invert y in f with a constant probability (e.g., at least $2/3$) for all $y \in I$. We construct an encoder $E : X \rightarrow Y$ that compresses the truth tables of permutations $f \in X$ to output compressed truth tables described as elements of a set Y , and decoder $D : Y \rightarrow X$ that recovers the original truth table from a compressed truth table by using $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ as follows.

Encoder E.

1. Take a permutation $f \in X$ as input.
2. Choose a subset $G \subset I \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ and “forget” values $f(x)$ for $x \in G$. Let \tilde{f} be the resulting partial, incomplete truth table of f which has no information about the pairs $(x, f(x))$ for $x \in G$. Set $\tilde{G} := f(G)$.
3. Return (\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) . (The set Y is defined to be the set of all elements of this form.)

Decoder D.

1. Take a pair (\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) as an input, where \tilde{f} is a partially defined permutation on $\{0, 1\}^n$ and \tilde{G} is a subset of $\{0, 1\}^n$ such that $\tilde{G} \cup (\text{Image of } \tilde{f}) = \{0, 1\}^n$ holds. (The goal of D is to recover the complete truth table of a permutation f .)
2. Define $f(x) := \tilde{f}(x)$ for each x in the domain of \tilde{f} .
3. For each $y \in \tilde{G}$, recover $x = f^{-1}(y)$ by running \mathcal{A} . Here, D simulates oracle f (and possibly additional oracle O^f) and answers to oracle queries made by \mathcal{A} with only the partial truth table \tilde{f} and the set \tilde{G} .

If the encoder E and the decoder D work well, e.g., $D(E(f)) = f$ holds with a high probability, we can deduce that $|Y|$ cannot be much smaller than $|X|$ by general information theoretic arguments. ($|Y|$ will be lower bounded as $|Y| \geq p \cdot |X|$ for a constant p .) How much E can compress data will depend on the number of queries Q made by $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ (in addition to n), and we will get an inequality $\gamma(n, Q) \geq |Y|$ for a function γ . From this, and the inequalities $\gamma(n, Q) \geq |Y|$ and $|X| \geq p_1 2^n$, we will obtain an inequality $\gamma(n, Q) \geq p \cdot p_1 \cdot 2^n$, from which we will obtain a lower bound of Q such that $Q(n) \geq \beta(n)$ for a suitable function β . Since $Q = cq/\epsilon$, finally we will obtain a lower bound $q \geq \epsilon/c \cdot \beta(n)$.

Whether we can obtain a good lower bound of Q (and q) depends on how well we can construct encoder E and decoder D . In particular, if $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ has an access to the additional oracle O^f , it is highly non-trivial even in the classical setting how to construct a good simulator of f and O^f in the third step of decoder D .

The decoder of Asharov and Segev. Here we review the idea by Asharov and Segev [AS15] to construct a decoder under the condition that the ColFinder^f oracle is available to $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$, in the classical setting. To construct a decoder, we have to avoid or deal with the following situations.

1. To the oracle f , $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ queries x such that D does not know the value $f(x)$.
2. To the oracle ColFinder^f , $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ queries a circuit C such that D cannot compute the value $\text{ColFinder}^f(C) = (w_{Cf}^1, w_{Cf}^2, u)$ with only the data that D knows.

To deal with the second situation, Asharov and Segev defined *bad* circuits: A circuit C is called *bad* if, on the inputs w_{Cf}^1 or w_{Cf}^2 , C queries x such that D does not know the value $f(x)$. If a circuit is not bad, then it is called a *good* circuit.

If a circuit C is good, then D can compute the value $\text{ColFinder}^f(C) = (w_{Cf}^1, w_{Cf}^2, u)$ with only the incomplete truth table \tilde{f} and the set \tilde{G} (Here we assume that suitable permutations π_C^1 and π_C^2 are fixed for each circuit C): First, it is trivial that D can compute $w_{Cf}^1 = \pi_C^1(0^m)$. Since C is a good circuit, on the input w_{Cf}^1 it does not query x such that D does not know the value $f(x)$, thus D can compute $u = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1)$. Next, D has to compute $w_{Cf}^2 = \pi_C^2(t)$, where t is the minimum number such that $F_C^f(\pi_C^2(t)) = u$. To find the minimum number t , D computes $F_C^f(\pi_C^2(i))$ by running the circuit C on the input $\pi_C^2(i)$ and checks whether it is equal to u , for $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ in a sequential order. If C queries x such that D does not know the value $f(x)$, D skips the number i and move to the next number $(i + 1)$. Since C is a good circuit, on the input $w_{Cf}^2 = \pi_C^2(t)$ it does not query x such that D does not know the value $f(x)$. Thus D can find t and compute w_{Cf}^2 . In the above argument, we used the fact that, while D is searching for the minimum number t ,

D can detect the event that C makes a query x such that D does not know the value $f(x)$,

which is crucial to construct a decoder D in the classical setting.

Asharov and Segev showed that for each algorithm $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ that can invert random permutation f given oracle access to f and ColFinder^f , there exists another algorithm \mathcal{B} such that (1) the ability of \mathcal{B} to invert f is almost the same as that of $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$, and (2) \mathcal{B} never queries a bad circuit to ColFinder^f . This is how they dealt with the second situation.

Moreover, they showed that the first situation can be avoided for \mathcal{B} by ingeniously arranging the elements of \tilde{G} so that D can recover $f^{-1}(y_{i+1})$ for the $(i+1)$ -th element $y_{i+1} \in \tilde{G}$ with only (\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) , which is the input to D , in addition to the data $(f^{-1}(y_1), y_1), \dots, (f^{-1}(y_i), y_i)$. Here they make full use of the fact that, without loss of generality, \mathcal{B} can be assumed to be a deterministic algorithm, by choosing a suitable random coin of \mathcal{B} .

2.2 Our Impossibility Results in the Quantum Setting

Next we overview our techniques in the quantum setting. We define quantum counterparts of primitive, black-box reductions, and the two oracle technique (see Section 4 for details and formal descriptions). The goal of this paper is to show impossibility of black-box reductions from CRH to OWP (resp., TDP) in the quantum setting. The technically most difficult part in the quantum setting is again showing (the quantum version of) Proposition 2.1. We use the technique of encoding (compressing) schemes also in the quantum setting. See Section 5 for more details. This section reviews only the proof idea for separation of CRH from OWP. See Sections 6 and A for an extension to trapdoor permutations.

The idea of Asharov and Segev is ingenious, but we cannot make our encoder and decoder based on their idea since our decoder has to run quantum algorithms and simulating quantum oracles, while their decoder make full use of properties of classical algorithms and classical oracles. Instead, we construct our encoder and decoder based on the idea by Nayebi et al. [NABT15], who showed that random permutations are hard to invert for quantum query algorithms even if they are given *classical* advice depending on the permutation before making queries.

Nayebi et al.’s Encoder and Decoder. Below we briefly review the core idea by Nayebi et al., for the simplest case that no additional classical advice is available. (That is, below we explain just an idea of how to prove that a random permutation is hard to invert for quantum query adversaries.) Unlike that the compressing scheme by Asharov and Segev is a *deterministic* compressing scheme, one by Nayebi et al. is a *randomized* compressing scheme. The idea of using randomized compressing scheme originally comes from the work by De et al [DTT10].

Here we intuitively explain the notion of *quantum query magnitude* and the *swapping lemma*, which are our basic technical tools to prove “quantum” properties. Let \mathcal{A} be an oracle-aided quantum algorithm, and f be a quantum oracle. The *query magnitude of \mathcal{A} to f at z on input x* is, intuitively, defined as the “total probability (in a quantum meaning)” that \mathcal{A} queries z to the oracle f while running, when we run \mathcal{A} on input x relative to the oracle f . See Definition 3.5 for a formal description. Let g be another oracle and $\Delta(f, g)$ denote the set of z such that $f(z) \neq g(z)$. The *swapping lemma* is the lemma that guarantees our intuition that, if query magnitude of \mathcal{A} to f at $z \in \Delta(f, g)$ on an input x is sufficiently small, then \mathcal{A} cannot notice whether f is replaced with g , while \mathcal{A} is running on the input x , which implies that the output distributions of \mathcal{A}^f and \mathcal{A}^g (on input x) will be the almost same. The lemma is formalized by Vazirani [Vaz98, Lem. 3.1], and proved by using the hybrid argument which was developed by Bennet et al [BBBV97]. See Lemma 3.3 for more details and formal descriptions.

In the second step of their encoder E , they first take a subset $R \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ randomly (this R will be the randomness of E), and then take G as the set of $x \in I \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ that satisfies (a) $x \in R$, and (b) the query magnitude of $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ to f at $z \in R \setminus \{x\}$ is small. Here, I is the set such that $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ inverts y in f with a constant probability for all $y \in I$. In the third step in D , to recover

$f^{-1}(y)$ for each $y \in \tilde{G}$, D simulates f as follows: D defines a function h_y by $h_y(x) := f(x)$ if D knows the value $f(x)$, and $h_y(x) = y$ if D does not know the value $f(x)$. If \hat{A} makes a query to f , D answers by using h_y . The value $h_y(x)$ may differ from the original value $f(x)$ for $x \in G$. However, due to the condition (b), \hat{A} cannot distinguish whether it is given the original oracle f or the simulator h_y by the swapping lemma, and D can easily simulate f without knowing $f(x)$ for $x \in G$. Therefore the $\hat{A}^{h_y}(y)$ outputs $x = f^{-1}(y)$ with a high probability, which implies that D can recover x .

It would be good if we could prove our proposition just by replacing the classical advice in Nayebi et al.'s proof with our oracle ColFinder^f , but we cannot: Adversaries are given only classical advice before making queries in Nayebi et al.'s setting. On the other hand, we consider the situation that an adversary \hat{A} has oracle access to the additional oracle ColFinder^f , and \hat{A} makes quantum superposition queries to ColFinder^f adaptively. What makes things complicated is that inputs to ColFinder^f are also quantum circuits which may make queries to f . Hence more complicated techniques are required to prove the quantum version of Proposition 2.1.

Our Encoder and Decoder. Below we explain our idea of how to construct suitable encoder and decoder in such a complicated situation. First we explain how to construct our encoder E . In what follows, we fix a suitable set of permutations $\Pi = \{\pi_C^1, \pi_C^2\}_C$ such that $\hat{A}^{f, \text{ColFinder}^f}$ inverts f with respect to this fixed Π when f is randomly chosen. Based on the strategy of Nayebi et al. introduced above, we randomly choose additional subset $R' \subset \{0, 1\}^n$, in addition to R . We define a set $\text{badC}(R', x)$ of which elements are “bad” inputs (oracle-aided quantum circuits) to ColFinder^f , and construct $G \subset I$ as the set of elements $x \in I \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ that satisfies (A) $x \in R \cap R'$, (B) the query magnitude of \hat{A} to f at $z \in R \setminus \{x\}$ on input $f(x)$ is small, and (C) the query magnitude of \hat{A} to ColFinder^f at $C \in \text{badC}(R', x)$ on input $f(x)$ is small. We postpone explanation of how to define $\text{badC}(R', x)$, since it is closely related to the problem of how to construct our decoder D .

Next we explain how to construct our decoder D . To simulate f in the third phase of D , we use the same h_y as Nayebi et al.'s. The most difficult point is how to construct a simulator that simulates ColFinder^f , which we denote by SimCF^{h_y} .

Here, we briefly review how the oracle ColFinder^f works. Note that now permutations $\pi_C^1, \pi_C^2 \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^m)$ are fixed for each oracle-aided circuit C which may query to f , where $\{0, 1\}^m$ is the domain of F . Given an input C , ColFinder^f computes $\pi_C^1(0^m)$, which is denoted by w_{Cf}^1 . Next, ColFinder^f searches the minimum t such that $F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(\pi_C^2(t))$ by checking if $F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(\pi_C^2(i))$ for $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ in a sequential order. Finally ColFinder^f outputs $(w_{Cf}^1, w_{Cf}^2 := \pi_C^2(t), F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1))$.

The reason that D cannot correctly compute ColFinder^f is that D cannot evaluate the function F_C^f for each input C . Thus, in the third step of D , we construct a subroutine CalC_y that approximately computes $F_C^f(w)$ for each input C (oracle-query circuit) to ColFinder^f and each w , with only a partial truth table of f . Roughly speaking, our oracle SimCF^{h_y} will be defined to be the same as ColFinder^f , except that each evaluation of $F_C^f(w)$ will be replaced with that of $\text{CalC}_y(C, w)$.

Now the problems that we have to solve are summarized as follows.

1. How should we construct the subroutine CalC_y ?
2. How should we define the set of “bad” circuits $\text{badC}(R, x)$?

Below we explain our idea of how to solve these problems.

The First Problem: Construction of CalC_y . First, we want SimCF^{h_y} to compute the correct value $\text{ColFinder}^f(C)$ on each input circuit C which are good. This is because, if SimCF^{h_y} has such

a property, then $\Delta(\text{ColFinder}^f, \text{SimCF}^{h_y})$ becomes a subset of the set of bad circuits, and we can prove that $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ cannot distinguish the simulator SimCF^{h_y} from ColFinder^f by using the swapping lemma and the condition (C) that the query magnitude of $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ to ColFinder is small at bad circuits.

To make SimCF^{h_y} have such a property, we informally require CalC_y to satisfy the following conditions:

1. $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1)$ and $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{Cf}^2) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^2)$ for each circuit C which are good.
2. If CalC_y cannot compute the correct value $F_C^f(w)$ on an input (C, w) , CalC_y outputs \perp . In other words, CalC_y never outputs incorrect guess.

The first condition is obviously necessary to enable SimCF^{h_y} to output correct values on good input circuits. Here we explain why the second condition is necessary. If it is not satisfied, $F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) = \text{CalC}_y(C, \pi_C^2(t'))$ may hold even though $F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) \neq F_C^f(\pi_C^2(t'))$, for some t' which is less than the correct minimum value t that satisfies $F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(\pi_C^2(t))$. This will lead to misjudgement by SimCF^{h_y} that “the minimum value is t' but not t ”. Thus the second condition is also necessary. In the classical proof by Asharov and Segev, they avoid such misjudgement by making use of the fact that D can detect the event that C makes a query x such that D does not know the value $f(x)$: If C makes such a query and their D detects the event while checking if $F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(\pi_C^2(i))$ holds, then D just skips the unsuitable number i and move to the $(i+1)$ -th procedure that checks whether $F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(\pi_C^2(i+1))$ holds. However, in the quantum setting, we cannot use such a property since measuring what C queries breaks quantum states. Moreover, there is a possibility that t becomes exponential in n . Hence it is highly non-trivial how to avoid such misjudgement, and this is the technically most difficult part in this paper.

To satisfy the second condition, our function CalC_y takes a very conservative strategy: When SimCF^{h_y} feed CalC_y with (C, w) as an input, CalC_y first computes the value $F^{h'}(w)$ for all candidate permutations h' of f such that $h'(x) = h_y(x)$ holds for $\{0, 1\}^n \setminus G$, by calculating the output distribution of $C_F^{h'}$ on input w . If there exists a value u such that $F^{h'}(w) = u$ for *all* candidate h' , CalC_y outputs $\text{CalC}_y(C, w) = u$, and otherwise output \perp . By doing so, since the correct f itself is one of the candidates of f , CalC_y can avoid misjudgement and output a value $u \neq \perp$ if and only if $F_C^f(x) = u$ holds (it is formally shown as a part of Lemma 5.3).

The Second Problem: Definition of “bad” Circuits. Here we explain how to define “Bad” circuits. To enable CalC_y to satisfy the first condition that $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1)$ and $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{Cf}^2) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^2)$ for each circuit C which are good, while keeping the conservative strategy described above, we define that C is *bad* if and only if the query magnitude of C to f at $z \in R' \setminus \{f^{-1}(x)\}$ on inputs w_{Cf}^1 or w_{Cf}^2 is large .

If we define bad and good circuits as above, for *all* candidate permutation h' such that $h'(x) = h_y(x)$ for $x \in \{0, 1\}^n \setminus G \supset \{0, 1\}^n \setminus R'$, a good circuit C cannot notice whether or not f is replaced with h' during computations on inputs w_{Cf}^1 and w_{Cf}^2 by the swapping lemma. Hence the outputs of $C_F^{h'}$ on the inputs w_{Cf}^1 and w_{Cf}^2 always match those of C^f for all candidate permutation h' , which implies that CalC_y satisfies the first condition that $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1)$ and $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{Cf}^2) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^2)$ hold for a good circuit C (it is formally shown as a part of Lemma 5.3).

3 Preliminaries

A classical algorithm is a classical Turing machine, and an efficient classical algorithm is a probabilistic efficient Turing machine. We denote the set of positive integers by \mathbb{N} . We write A instead of $A \otimes I$ for short, for any linear operator A . For sets X and Y , let $\text{Func}(X, Y)$ denote the set of functions from X to Y , and $\text{Perm}(X)$ denote the set of permutations on X . Let $\Delta(f, g)$ denote the set $\{x \in X \mid f(x) \neq g(x)\}$ for any functions $f, g \in \text{Func}(X, Y)$. We say a that a function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is negligible if, for any positive integer c , $f(n) \leq n^{-c}$ holds for all sufficiently large n , and we write $f(n) \leq \text{negl}(n)$. Moreover, we say that f is non-negligible if, there exists a positive integer c such that $f(n) \geq n^{-c}$ for infinitely many n .

3.1 Quantum Algorithms

We refer basics of quantum computation to [NC10, KSV02]. In this paper, we use the computational model of quantum circuits. Let \mathcal{Q} be the standard basis of quantum circuits [KSV02]. We assume that quantum circuits (without oracle) are constructed over the standard basis \mathcal{Q} , and define the size of a quantum circuit as the total number of elements in \mathcal{Q} used to construct it. Let $|C|$ denote the size of each quantum circuit C . An oracle-aided quantum circuit is a quantum circuit with oracle gates. When an oracle-aided quantum circuit is implemented relative to an oracle O represented by a unitary operator U_O , the oracle gates are replaced by U_O . When there are multiple oracles, each oracle gate should specify an index of an oracle. In this paper, we assume that all oracles are stateless, that is, the behavior of the oracle is independent from a previous history and the same for all queries. For a stateless quantum oracle O , we often identify the oracle and a unitary operator that represents the oracle, and use the same notation O for both of them. Note that each classical algorithm can be regarded as a quantum algorithm. We fix an encoding \mathcal{E} of (oracle-aided) quantum circuits to bit strings, and we identify $\mathcal{E}(C)$ with C . For a quantum circuit C , we will denote the event that we measure an output z when we run C on an input x and measure the final state by $C(x) = z$.

First, we define a quantum algorithm. We note that we only consider classical-input-output quantum algorithms.

Definition 3.1 (Quantum algorithms). *A quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} is a family of quantum circuits $\{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ that acts on a quantum system $\mathcal{H}_n = \mathcal{H}_{n,in} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{n,out} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{n,work}$ for each n . When we feed \mathcal{A} with an input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, \mathcal{A} runs the circuit \mathcal{A}_n on the initial state $|x\rangle|0\rangle|0\rangle$, measures the final state with the computational basis, and outputs the measurement result of the register which corresponds to $\mathcal{H}_{n,out}$. We say that \mathcal{A} is an efficient quantum algorithm if it is a family of polynomial-size quantum circuits, i.e., there is a polynomial $\lambda(n)$ such that $|\mathcal{A}_n| \leq \lambda(n)$ for all sufficiently large n .*

Remark 3.1. *Though we use a Turing machine for a computational model of classical computation, we use a quantum circuit for a computational model of quantum computation. This is just because quantum circuits are well-studied than quantum Turing machines [Yao88], and is easier to treat. We remark that we do not intend to rule out reductions with full non-uniform techniques as was done in [CLMP13].*

Next, we define oracle-aided quantum algorithms, which are quantum algorithms that can access to oracles.

Definition 3.2 (Oracle-aided quantum algorithms). *An oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} is a family of oracle aided quantum circuits $\{\mathcal{A}_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ that acts on a quantum system $\mathcal{H}_n = \mathcal{H}_{n,in} \otimes$*

$\mathcal{H}_{n,\text{out}} \otimes \mathcal{H}_{n,\text{work}}$ for each n . Let $O_1 = \{O_{1,i}\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}, \dots, O_t = \{O_{t,i}\}_{i \in \mathbb{N}}$ be families of quantum oracle gates. When we feed \mathcal{A} with an input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ relative to oracles (O_1, \dots, O_t) , \mathcal{A} runs the circuit $\mathcal{A}_n^{O_1, n, \dots, O_t, n}$ on the initial state $|x\rangle |0\rangle |0\rangle$, measures the final state with the computational basis, and outputs the measurement result of the register which corresponds to $\mathcal{H}_{\text{out}, n}$. We note that an oracle-aided quantum circuit $\mathcal{A}_n^{O_1, n, \dots, O_t, n}$ that makes q queries can be described by a unitary operator

$$\mathcal{A}_n^{O_1, n, \dots, O_t, n} = \left(\prod_{j=1}^{q(n)} (U_{j,t,n} O_{t,n} \dots U_{j,1,n} O_{1,n}) \right) U_{0,n}, \quad (2)$$

where $(U_{0,n}, \{U_{j,1,n}, \dots, U_{j,t,n}\}_{j \in [q]})$ are some unitary operators.

Remark 3.2. We also often consider an oracle access to a quantum algorithm. This is interpreted as an oracle access to a unitary operator that represents \mathcal{A} .

Next, we define *randomized quantum oracles*, which are quantum oracles that flip classical random coins before algorithms start.

Definition 3.3 (Randomized quantum oracles). Let R_n be a finite set for each n , and $R := \prod_{n=1}^{\infty} R_n$ (note that each element $r \in R$ is an infinite sequence (r_1, r_2, \dots)). A randomized quantum oracle $O := \{O_r\}_{r \in R}$ is a family of quantum oracles such that $O_{r,n} = O_{r',n}$ if $r_n = r'_n$. When we feed \mathcal{A} with an input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ relative to O , first r_n is randomly chosen from the finite set R_n (according to some distribution), and then \mathcal{A} runs the circuit $\mathcal{A}_n^{O_{r,n}}$ on the initial state $|x\rangle |0\rangle |0\rangle$. We denote $O_{r,n}$ by O_{r_n} and $\{O_{r_n}\}_{r_n \in R_n}$ by O_n , respectively, and identify O with $\{O_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$.

Similarly, when \mathcal{A} is given oracle access to multiple randomized oracles (O_1, \dots, O_t) , we consider that an oracle gate is randomly chosen and fixed for each of the t oracles before \mathcal{A} starts. The distributions of O_1, \dots, O_t can be highly dependent.

Remark 3.3. Later we consider the situation that a quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} has access to a randomized quantum oracle O , and another quantum algorithm \mathcal{B} has access to \mathcal{A}^O . This is interpreted as follows: Before \mathcal{B} starts, $r_n \in R_n$ is chosen uniformly at random, and \mathcal{B} is given an oracle access to the unitary operator that represents $\mathcal{A}_n^{O_{r_n}}$. In particular we do not change r_n while \mathcal{B} is running.

Finally, we define what ‘‘a quantum algorithm computes a function’’ means.

Definition 3.4 (Functions computed by quantum algorithms). A quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} computes a function $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ if we have $\Pr[\mathcal{A}(x) = f(x)] > 2/3$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$. An oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} computes a function $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ relative to an oracle Γ if we have $\Pr[\mathcal{A}^\Gamma(x) = f(x)] > 2/3$ for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$.

3.2 Technical Lemmas

This section introduces some technical lemmas for later use. First, we use the following lemma as a fact.

Lemma 3.1 ([ARU14], Lemma 36). $\text{trD}(|\psi_1\rangle\langle\psi_1|, |\psi_2\rangle\langle\psi_2|) \leq \| |\psi_1\rangle - |\psi_2\rangle \|$ holds for any pure states $|\psi_1\rangle$ and $|\psi_2\rangle$, where trD denotes the trace distance function.

By applying the above claim, we can show the following lemma.

Lemma 3.2. Let $\Gamma = (f_1, \dots, f_t), \Gamma' = (f'_1, \dots, f'_t)$ be sequences of oracles, and assume that \mathcal{A} is given oracle access to either Γ or Γ' . Then,

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}^\Gamma(x) = z] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\Gamma'}(x) = z] \right| \leq \left\| \mathcal{A}_n^\Gamma |x, 0, 0\rangle - \mathcal{A}_n^{\Gamma'} |x, 0, 0\rangle \right\| \quad (3)$$

holds for any input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and output z .

Proof of Lemma 3.2. Let $|\phi\rangle = \mathcal{A}_n^\Gamma |x, 0, 0\rangle$ and $|\phi'\rangle = \mathcal{A}_n^{\Gamma'} |x, 0, 0\rangle$. In addition, let D, D' be (classical) distributions of outputs of \mathcal{A}^Γ and $\mathcal{A}^{\Gamma'}$ on input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, respectively. Then the left hand side of eq. (3) is upper bounded by $\text{TD}(D, D')$, where TD denotes the total variational distance function, and $\text{TD}(D, D') \leq \text{trD}(|\phi\rangle\langle\phi|, |\phi'\rangle\langle\phi'|)$ holds by the basic property of trace distance (see Theorem 9.1 in [NC10], for example). From Lemma 3.1, $\text{trD}(|\phi\rangle\langle\phi|, |\phi'\rangle\langle\phi'|) \leq \|\phi\rangle - |\phi'\rangle\|$ follows, and the claim holds. \square

3.2.1 Swapping Lemma for Multiple Oracles.

Next we introduce a generalized version of the *swapping lemma* [Vaz98, Lem. 3.1] for multiple oracles. The original swapping lemma formalizes our intuition that the measurement outcome of oracle-aided algorithm will not be changed so much even if the output values of the oracles are changed on a small fraction of inputs. Since this paper considers the situation that multiple oracles are available to adversaries, we extend the original lemma to a generalized one so that we can treat multiple oracles. To simplify notation, below often omit the parameter n when it is clear from context (e.g., we write just q instead of $q(n)$). Here we introduce an important notion called *query magnitude*.

Query Magnitude. Let $\Gamma = (f_1, \dots, f_g)$ be a sequence of quantum oracles, where each f_i is a fixed oracle and not randomized. Let \mathcal{A} be a q -query oracle-aided quantum algorithm relative to the oracle Γ .

Fix an input x , and let $|\phi_j^{f_i}\rangle$ be the quantum state of \mathcal{A}^Γ on input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ just before the j -th query to f_i . Without loss of generality, we consider that the unitary operator O_{f_i} acts on the first $(m_i(n) + \ell_i(n))$ -qubits of the quantum system. (Here we assume that f_i is a function from $\{0, 1\}^{m_i(n)}$ to $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_i(n)}$.) Then $|\phi_j^{f_i}\rangle = \sum_{z \in \{0, 1\}^{m_i(n)}} \alpha_z |z\rangle \otimes |\psi_z\rangle$ holds for some complex numbers α_z and quantum states $|\psi_z\rangle$. If we measure the first $m_i(n)$ qubits of the state $|\phi_j^{f_i}\rangle$ with the computational basis, we obtain z with probability $|\alpha_z|^2$. Intuitively, this probability corresponds the “probability” that z is sent to f_i as the j -th quantum query by \mathcal{A} .

Definition 3.5 (Query magnitude to f_i).

1. The query magnitude of the j -th quantum query of \mathcal{A} to f_i at z on input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ is defined by

$$\mu_{z,j}^{\mathcal{A},f_i}(x) := |\alpha_z|^2. \quad (4)$$

2. The (total) query magnitude of \mathcal{A} to f_i at z on input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ is defined by

$$\mu_z^{\mathcal{A},f_i}(x) := \sum_j \mu_{z,j}^{\mathcal{A},f_i}(x). \quad (5)$$

The following lemma can be proven in the same way as the original swapping lemma [Vaz98, Lem. 3.1], using the hybrid argument introduced by Bennet et al. [BBBV97], but we give a proof for completeness.

Lemma 3.3 (Swapping lemma with multiple oracles). *Let $\Gamma = (f_1, \dots, f_t), \Gamma' = (f'_1, \dots, f'_t)$ be sequences of oracles, where each f_i and f'_i are fixed oracles and not randomized. Assume that \mathcal{A} is given oracle access to either Γ or Γ' . Then*

$$\left\| \mathcal{A}_n^\Gamma |x, 0, 0\rangle - \mathcal{A}_n^{\Gamma'} |x, 0, 0\rangle \right\| \leq 2 \sum_{1 \leq i \leq t} \sqrt{q(n) \sum_{z \in \Delta(f_i, f'_i)} \mu_z^{\mathcal{A}, f_i}(x)} \quad (6)$$

holds for $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$

Proof. In this proof we write q instead of $q(n)$, for simplicity. For $1 \leq k \leq q$ and $1 \leq \ell \leq t$, let $\Gamma_{(k, \ell)}$ be an intermediate oracle between Γ and Γ' : When we run an oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} relative to $\Gamma_{(k, \ell)}$, first \mathcal{A} queries to Γ until the k -th query to $f_{\ell-1}$ (or the $(k-1)$ -th query to f_t if $\ell = 1$), and then \mathcal{A} queries to Γ' from the k -th query to f_ℓ until the last query to f_t . Then, the corresponding unitary operator $\mathcal{A}_n^{\Gamma_{(k, \ell)}}$ is described as

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{A}_n^{\Gamma_{(k, \ell)}} = & \left(\prod_{j=k+1}^q \left(U_{j,t,n} O_{f'_t,n} \dots U_{j,1,n} O_{f'_1,n} \right) \right) \\ & \cdot U_{k,t,n} O_{f'_t,n} \dots O_{f'_\ell,n} U_{k,\ell-1,n} O_{f_{\ell-1,n}} \dots U_{k,1,n} O_{f_{1,n}} \\ & \cdot \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k-1} \left(U_{j,t,n} O_{f_t,n} \dots U_{j,1,n} O_{f_1,n} \right) \right) U_{0,n}. \end{aligned} \quad (7)$$

Let $|\phi_{(i,j)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle$ be the quantum state of \mathcal{A} just before the i -th query to f_j or f'_j , when we run \mathcal{A} relative to $\Gamma_{(k,\ell)}$ on input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$. By $|\phi_{(q+1,1)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle$ we denote the final quantum state of \mathcal{A} when we run \mathcal{A} relative to $\Gamma_{(k,\ell)}$ on input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$. Let $\Gamma_{(q+1,1)}$ denote Γ . Below we regard that $f_{t+1} = f_1$, $f'_{t+1} = f'_1$, and $(k, t+1) = (k+1, 1)$, for simplicity. Then, since unitary operators preserve norms of vectors, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \left\| \mathcal{A}_n^\Gamma |x, 0, 0\rangle - \mathcal{A}_n^{\Gamma'} |x, 0, 0\rangle \right\| &= \left\| |\phi_{(q+1,1)}^{(q+1,1)}\rangle - |\phi_{(q+1,1)}^{(1,1)}\rangle \right\| \\ &\leq \sum_{1 \leq \ell \leq t} \sum_{1 \leq k \leq q} \left\| |\phi_{(q+1,1)}^{(k,\ell+1)}\rangle - |\phi_{(q+1,1)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle \right\| \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

and

$$\left\| |\phi_{(q+1,1)}^{(k,\ell+1)}\rangle - |\phi_{(q+1,1)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle \right\| = \left\| O_{f_\ell} |\phi_{(k,\ell)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle - O_{f'_\ell} |\phi_{(k,\ell)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle \right\| \quad (9)$$

hold. Let $\Pi_{\Delta(f_\ell, f'_\ell)}$ be the projector onto the space spanned by the vectors that correspond to elements of $\Delta(f_\ell, f'_\ell)$. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} \left\| O_{f_\ell} |\phi_{(k,\ell)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle - O_{f'_\ell} |\phi_{(k,\ell)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle \right\| &= \left\| (O_{f_\ell} - O_{f'_\ell}) \Pi_{\Delta(f_\ell, f'_\ell)} |\phi_{(k,\ell)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle \right\| \\ &\leq 2 \cdot \left\| \Pi_{\Delta(f_\ell, f'_\ell)} |\phi_{(k,\ell)}^{(k,\ell)}\rangle \right\| = 2 \sqrt{\sum_{z \in \Delta(f_\ell, f'_\ell)} \mu_{z,k}^{\mathcal{A}, f_\ell}(x)}. \end{aligned} \quad (10)$$

From inequalities (8), (9), and (10), it follows that

$$\begin{aligned}
\left\| \mathcal{A}_n^\Gamma |x, 0, 0\rangle - \mathcal{A}_n^{\Gamma'} |x, 0, 0\rangle \right\| &\leq 2 \sum_{1 \leq \ell \leq t} \sum_{1 \leq k \leq q} \sqrt{\sum_{z \in \Delta(f_\ell, f'_\ell)} \mu_{z,k}^{\mathcal{A}, f_\ell}(x)} \\
&\leq 2 \sum_{1 \leq \ell \leq t} \sqrt{q \sum_{1 \leq k \leq q} \sum_{z \in \Delta(f_\ell, f'_\ell)} \mu_{z,k}^{\mathcal{A}, f_\ell}(x)} \\
&= 2 \sum_{1 \leq \ell \leq t} \sqrt{q \sum_{z \in \Delta(f_\ell, f'_\ell)} \mu_z^{\mathcal{A}, f_\ell}(x)}, \tag{11}
\end{aligned}$$

where we used the concavity of the square root function for the second inequality. \square

4 Quantum Primitives and Black-Box Quantum Reductions

Here, we define quantum primitives, which is a quantum counterpart of a primitive [RTV04, Def. 2.1], in addition to the notion of fully-black-box reduction [RTV04, Def. 2.3] in quantum regime.

Definition 4.1 (Quantum primitives). *A quantum primitive \mathcal{P} is a pair $\langle F_{\mathcal{P}}, R_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$, where $F_{\mathcal{P}}$ is a set of quantum algorithms \mathcal{I} , and $R_{\mathcal{P}}$ is a relation over pairs $\langle \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{A} \rangle$ of a quantum algorithms $\mathcal{I} \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$ and \mathcal{A} . A quantum algorithm \mathcal{I} implements \mathcal{P} or is an implementation of \mathcal{P} if $\mathcal{I} \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$. If $\mathcal{I} \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$ is efficient, then \mathcal{I} is an efficient implementation of \mathcal{P} . A quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} \mathcal{P} -breaks $\mathcal{I} \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$ if $\langle \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{A} \rangle \in R_{\mathcal{P}}$. A secure implementation of \mathcal{P} is an implementation \mathcal{I} of \mathcal{P} such that no efficient quantum algorithm \mathcal{P} -breaks \mathcal{I} . The primitive \mathcal{P} quantumly exists if there exists an efficient and secure implementation of \mathcal{P} .*

Definition 4.2 (Quantum primitives relative to oracle). *Let $\mathcal{P} = \langle F_{\mathcal{P}}, R_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$ be a quantum primitive, and $\Gamma = (O_1, \dots, O_t)$ be a family of (possibly randomized) quantum oracles. An oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{I} implements \mathcal{P} relative to Γ or is an implementation of \mathcal{P} relative to Γ if $\mathcal{I}^\Gamma \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$. If $\mathcal{I}^\Gamma \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$ is efficient, then \mathcal{I} is an efficient implementation of \mathcal{P} relative to Γ . A quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} \mathcal{P} -breaks $\mathcal{I} \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$ relative to Γ if $\langle \mathcal{I}^\Gamma, \mathcal{A}^\Gamma \rangle \in R_{\mathcal{P}}$. A secure implementation of \mathcal{P} is an implementation \mathcal{I} of \mathcal{P} relative to Γ such that no efficient quantum algorithm \mathcal{P} -breaks \mathcal{I} relative to Γ . The primitive \mathcal{P} quantumly exists relative to Γ if there exists an efficient and secure implementation of \mathcal{P} relative to Γ .*

Remark 4.1. *In the above definition, \mathcal{I}^Γ and \mathcal{A}^Γ are considered to be a quantum algorithm (rather than oracle-aided quantum algorithm) once an oracle Γ is fixed so that $\mathcal{I}^\Gamma \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$ and $\langle \mathcal{I}^\Gamma, \mathcal{A}^\Gamma \rangle \in R_{\mathcal{P}}$ are well-defined. This is possible since we assume that an oracle Γ is stateless. (If Γ is randomized, we regard that the randomness of Γ as a part of the randomness of the quantum algorithms \mathcal{I}^Γ and \mathcal{A}^Γ . See also Remark 3.3.)*

Next we define quantum fully-black-box reductions, which is a quantum counterpart of fully-black-box reductions [RTV04, Def. 2.3].

Definition 4.3 (Quantum fully-black-box reductions). *A pair (G, S) of efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithms is a quantum fully-black-box reduction from a quantum primitive $\mathcal{P} = \langle F_{\mathcal{P}}, R_{\mathcal{P}} \rangle$ to a quantum primitive $\mathcal{Q} = \langle F_{\mathcal{Q}}, R_{\mathcal{Q}} \rangle$ if the following two conditions are satisfied:*

1. *For every implementation $\mathcal{I} \in F_{\mathcal{Q}}$, we have $G^{\mathcal{I}} \in F_{\mathcal{P}}$.*

2. For every implementation $\mathcal{I} \in F_Q$ and every quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} , if \mathcal{A} \mathcal{P} -breaks $G^{\mathcal{I}}$, then $S^{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{I}}$ \mathcal{Q} -breaks \mathcal{I} .

Hsiao and Reyzin showed that if there exists an oracle (family) that separates primitives \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{Q} , then there is no fully-black-box reduction from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{Q} [HR04, Prop. 1]. The following lemma guarantees that a similar claim holds in the quantum setting. Although we need no arguments which is specific to the quantum setting, we give a proof for completeness.

Lemma 4.1 (Two oracle technique). *There exists no quantum fully-black-box reduction from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{Q} if there exist families of quantum oracles Γ_1 and $\Gamma_2 = \{\Psi_\lambda^\Phi\}_{\Phi \in \Gamma^1, \lambda \in \Lambda}$, where Λ is a non-empty set, and the following two conditions hold.*

1. **Existence of \mathcal{Q} .** *There exists an efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{J}_0 that satisfies the following conditions:*

1. $\mathcal{J}_0^\Phi \in F_Q$ holds for any $\Phi \in \Gamma_1$.
2. For any efficient oracle-aided algorithm \mathcal{B} and any $\lambda \in \Lambda$, there exists $\Phi \in \Gamma_1$ such that $\mathcal{B}^{\Phi, \Psi_\lambda^\Phi}$ does not \mathcal{Q} -break \mathcal{J}_0^Φ .

2. **Non-Existence of \mathcal{P} .** *For any efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{I} such that $\mathcal{I}^\Phi \in F_P$ holds for any $\Phi \in \Gamma_1$, there exists an efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithm $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}}$ and $\lambda \in \Lambda$ such that $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\Psi_\lambda^\Phi}$ \mathcal{P} -breaks \mathcal{I}^Φ for any $\Phi \in \Gamma_1$.*

Proof. Suppose that there exists a quantum fully-black-box reduction (G, S) from $\mathcal{P} = \langle F_P, R_P \rangle$ to $\mathcal{Q} = \langle F_Q, R_Q \rangle$. Then, by the first property of quantum fully-black-box reduction and the first condition of Lemma 4.1, $G^{\mathcal{J}_0^\Phi} \in F_P$ holds for any $\Phi \in \Gamma_1$. Thus, if we set $\mathcal{I}_0 := G^{\mathcal{J}_0}$, from the second condition of Lemma 4.1, it follows that there exists an efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} and $\lambda \in \Lambda$ such that $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}_0}^{\Psi_\lambda^\Phi}$ \mathcal{P} -breaks \mathcal{I}_0^Φ for any $\Phi \in \Gamma_1$. Therefore, from the second property of quantum fully-black-box reduction, it follows that $S^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}_0}^{\Psi_\lambda^\Phi}, \mathcal{J}_0^\Phi}$ \mathcal{Q} -breaks \mathcal{J}_0^Φ for any $\Phi \in \Gamma_1$. Since G , $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}_0}$, and \mathcal{J}_0 are all efficient, there exists an efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{B} such that $\mathcal{B}^{\Phi, \Psi_\lambda^\Phi} = S^{\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}_0}^{\Psi_\lambda^\Phi}, \mathcal{J}_0^\Phi}$. Now we have that there exists an efficient oracle-aided algorithm \mathcal{B} and $\lambda \in \Lambda$ such that $\mathcal{B}^{\Phi, \Psi_\lambda^\Phi}$ \mathcal{Q} -breaks \mathcal{J}_0^Φ for any $\Phi \in \Gamma_1$. However, it contradicts the second part of the first condition of Lemma 4.1, which completes the proof. \square

Remark 4.2. *Remember that each fixed (resp., randomized) quantum oracle O is a family of infinite unitary gates $\{O_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ (resp., $O = \{O_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $O_n = \{O_{r_n}\}_{r_n \in R_n}$, where R_n is the set of random coins), where O_n is used when an oracle-aided algorithm runs relative to O on an input in $\{0, 1\}^n$. For example, (the quantum oracle of) a permutation $f \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^*)$ is represented as a family $\{f_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$, where $f_n = f|_{\{0, 1\}^n}$. We implicitly assume that $\Psi_{\lambda, n}^\Phi$ depends only on Φ_n and is independent of Φ_m for $m \neq n$.*

Later, to prove impossibility of quantum fully-black-box reductions from collision resistant hash functions to one-way permutations, we will apply this lemma with the condition that Λ is the set of all polynomials in n , $\Gamma_1 = \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^*)$, and $\Gamma_2 = \{\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f\}_{f \in \Gamma_1, \lambda \in \Lambda}$. Here, $\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f$ is a randomized oracle that takes, as inputs, oracle-aided quantum circuits that computes functions, and returns collision of the functions. The number $\lambda(n)$ denotes the maximum size of circuits that $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, n}^f$ takes as inputs for each $n \in \mathbb{N}$.

4.1 Concrete Primitives

This section defines concrete quantum primitives. Namely, we define one-way permutations, trapdoor permutations, and collision-resistant hash functions.

We define two quantum counterparts for each classical primitives. One is the *classical-computable* primitive that can be implemented on classical computers, and the other is the *quantum-computable* primitive that can be implemented on quantum computers but may not be implemented on classical computers. Here we note that, in this paper, all adversaries are quantum algorithms for both classical-computable and quantum-computable primitives.

Definition 4.4 (One-way permutation). *Quantum-computable (resp., classical-computable) quantum-secure one-way permutation QC-qOWP (resp., CC-qOWP) is a quantum primitive defined as follows: Implementation of QC-qOWP (resp., CC-qOWP) is an efficient quantum (resp., classical) algorithm Eval that computes a function $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ such that $f_n := f|_{\{0, 1\}^n}$ is a permutation over $\{0, 1\}^n$. For an implementation \mathcal{I} of QC-qOWP (resp., CC-qOWP) that computes f and a quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} , we say that \mathcal{A} QC-qOWP-breaks \mathcal{I} (resp., CC-qOWP-breaks \mathcal{I}) if and only if*

$$\Pr \left[x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n; y \leftarrow f_n(x); x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(y) : x' = x \right] \quad (12)$$

is non-negligible.

Remark 4.3. *Since there is no function generation algorithm Gen in the above definition, this captures “public-coin” one-way permutations. This makes the definition of one-way permutations stronger, and thus makes our negative result stronger.*

Definition 4.5 (Trapdoor permutation). *Quantum-computable (resp., classical-computable) quantum-secure trapdoor permutation QC-qTDP (resp., CC-qTDP) is a quantum primitive defined as follows: Implementation of QC-qTDP (resp., CC-qTDP) is a triplet of efficient quantum (resp., classical) algorithms (Gen, Eval, Inv). In addition, we require (Gen, Eval, Inv) to satisfy the following:*

1. *For any (pk, td) generated by $\text{Gen}(1^n)$, $\text{Eval}(\text{pk}, \cdot)$ computes a permutation $f_{\text{pk}, n} : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$.*
2. *For any (pk, td) generated by $\text{Gen}(1^n)$ and any $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, we have $\Pr[\text{Inv}(\text{td}, f_{\text{pk}, n}(x)) = x] > 2/3$ (i.e., $\text{Inv}(\text{td}, \cdot)$ computes $f_{\text{pk}, n}^{-1}(\cdot)$).*

For an implementation $\mathcal{I} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Inv})$ of QC-qTDP (resp., CC-qTDP) and a quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} , we say that \mathcal{A} QC-qTDP-breaks \mathcal{I} (resp., CC-qTDP-breaks \mathcal{I}) if and only if

$$\Pr \left[(\text{pk}, \text{td}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n); x \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n; y \leftarrow f_{\text{pk}, n}(x); x' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{pk}, y) : x' = x \right] \quad (13)$$

is non-negligible.

Definition 4.6 (Collision-resistant hash function). *Quantum-computable (resp., classical-computable) quantum-collision-resistant hash function QC-qCRH (resp., CC-qCRH) is a quantum primitive defined as follows: Implementation of QC-qCRH (resp., CC-qCRH) is a pair of efficient quantum (resp., classical) algorithms (Gen, Eval).*

Gen(1^n): *This algorithm is given 1^n as input, and outputs a function index σ .*

Eval(σ, x): *This algorithm is given a function index σ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^{m(n)}$ as input, and outputs $y \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$.*

In addition, we require $(\text{Gen}, \text{Eval})$ to satisfy the following:

1. We have $m(n) > \ell(n)$ for all sufficiently large $n \in \mathbb{N}$.
2. For any σ generated by $\text{Gen}(1^n)$, $\text{Eval}(\sigma, \cdot)$ computes a function $H_\sigma : \{0, 1\}^{m(n)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$.

For an implementation $\mathcal{I} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Eval})$ of QC-qCRH (resp., CC-qCRH) and a quantum algorithm \mathcal{A} , we say that \mathcal{A} QC-qCRH-breaks \mathcal{I} (resp., CC-qCRH-breaks \mathcal{I}) if and only if

$$\Pr [\sigma \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n); (x, x') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\sigma) : H_\sigma(x) = H_\sigma(x')] \quad (14)$$

is non-negligible.

Remark 4.4. Though trapdoor permutations and collision-resistant hash functions are defined to be a tuple of algorithms, we can capture them as quantum primitives as defined in Definition 4.1 by considering a unified quantum algorithm that runs either of these algorithms depending on prefix of its input. We also remark that any classical algorithm can be seen as a special case of quantum computation, and thus classical-computable variants are also captured as quantum primitives.

5 Impossibility of Reduction from QC-qCRH to CC-qOWP

The goal of this section is to show the following theorem.

Theorem 5.1. *There exists no quantum fully-black-box reduction from QC-qCRH to CC-qOWP.*

To show this theorem, we define two (families of) oracles that separate QC-qCRH from CC-qOWP. That is, we define an oracle that implements CC-qOWP, in addition to an oracle that finds collisions of functions, and then apply the two oracle technique (Lemma 4.1). Our oracles are quantum analogues of those in previous works on impossibility results [Sim98, HHRS07, AS15] in the classical setting. Roughly speaking, we simply use random permutations f to implement one-way permutations. As for an oracle that finds collisions of functions, we use a randomized oracle ColFinder.

Remark 5.1. *The statement of Theorem 5.1 is the strongest result among possible quantum (fully-black-box) separations of CRH from OWP, since it also excludes reductions from CC-qCRH to CC-qOWP, reductions from QC-qCRH to QC-qOWP, and reductions from CC-qCRH to QC-qOWP.*

5.0.1 Oracle ColFinder.

Intuitive Idea. Intuitively, our oracle ColFinder^f works as follows for each fixed permutation f . As an input, ColFinder^f takes an oracle-aided quantum circuit C . We say that C is a *valid* input if it computes a function $F_C^{f'} : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ relative to the oracle f' , for each permutation f' (here we assume that m and ℓ are independent of the permutation f'). We say that C is *invalid* if it is not valid. Given the input C , first ColFinder^f checks whether C is invalid, and return \perp if it is. Second, ColFinder^f chooses $w_{C^f}^1 \in \{0, 1\}^m$ uniformly at random, and compute $y = F_C^f(w_{C^f}^1)$ by running the circuit C on input $w_{C^f}^1$ relative to f . Third, ColFinder^f chooses $w_{C^f}^2$ from $(F_C^f)^{-1}(y)$ uniformly at random. Finally ColFinder^f returns $(w_{C^f}^1, w_{C^f}^2, y)$. If $F_C^f : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ has many collisions (for example, if $m > \ell$), ColFinder^f returns a collision of F_C^f with a high probability. The idea of the above oracle ColFinder originally comes from the seminal work by Simon [Sim98]. Below we give a formal description of ColFinder, following the formalization of Asharov and Segev [AS15].

Formal Description. Here we give a formal description of ColFinder. Let valid and invalid denote the set of valid and invalid circuits, respectively. Let $\lambda : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}_{\geq 0}$ be a function, and $\text{Circ}(\lambda(n))$ denote the set of oracle-aided quantum circuits C of which size is less than or equal to $\lambda(n)$. Note that $\text{Circ}(\lambda(n))$ is a finite set for each n . Let $\Pi_n = \{\pi_C^1, \pi_C^2\}_{C \in \text{Circ}(\lambda(n)) \cap \text{valid}}$ be a set of permutations, where π_C^1 and π_C^2 are permutations on $\{0, 1\}^m$, which is the domain of F_C that the circuit C computes. It can be regarded that Π_n assigns each circuit in $\text{Circ}(\lambda(n)) \cap \text{valid}$ two permutations. Let $R_{\lambda, n}$ be the set of all possible such assignments Π_n , and R_λ be the product set $\prod_{n=1}^{\infty} R_{\lambda, n}$.

For each fixed permutation f and a function λ , we define a randomized quantum oracle $\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f = \{\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi}^f\}_{\Pi \in R_\lambda}$, where $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi}^f = \{\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$ is a fixed quantum oracle for each Π . When we feed an algorithm \mathcal{A} with an input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ relative to $\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f$, first $\Pi_n \in R_{\lambda, n}$ is chosen uniformly at random (i.e., two permutations π_C^1, π_C^2 are chosen uniformly at random for each oracle-aided quantum circuit $C \in \text{Circ}(\lambda(n)) \cap \text{valid}$), and then \mathcal{A} runs the circuit $\mathcal{A}_n^{\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f}$ on the initial state $|x\rangle|0\rangle|0\rangle$. For each fixed n and Π_n , the deterministic function $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f$ is defined by the following procedures:

1. Take an input C , where C is an oracle-aided quantum circuit.
2. Check if C is a valid input by checking whether there exists $y \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ such that $\Pr[C^{f'_n}(x) = y] > 2/3$ holds for any $f'_n \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$ and $x \in \{0, 1\}^m$, and whether the size of C is less than or equal to $\lambda(n)$. If C is an invalid input, return \perp .
3. Compute $w_{C^f}^1 := \pi_C^1(0^m)$.
4. Compute $F_C^f(w_{C^f}^1)$. That is, compute the output distribution of C^f on input $w_{C^f}^1$, find the element y such that $\Pr[C^f(w_{C^f}^1) = y] > 2/3$, and set $u \leftarrow y$.
5. Search for the minimum $t \in \{0, 1\}^m$ such that $F_C^f(\pi_C^2(t)) = u$ by checking whether

$$\Pr \left[C^f \left(F_C^f \left(\pi_C^2(i) \right) \right) = u \right] > 2/3$$

holds for $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ in a sequential order, and set $w_{C^f}^2 \leftarrow \pi_C^2(t)$.

6. Return $(w_{C^f}^1, w_{C^f}^2, u)$.

Later we will apply Lemma 4.1 with $\Gamma_1 := \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^*)$ and $\Gamma_2 := \{\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f\}_{f \in \Gamma_1, \lambda \in \Lambda}$, where Λ is the set of polynomials in n .

5.0.2 Proof of Theorem 5.1.

It can be proven that Theorem 5.1 follows from the following proposition. Note that the oracle gate $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f$ is (and thus the circuit $\mathcal{A}_n^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f}$ is) fixed once f_n and Π_n are fixed, since the output values of $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f$ are independent of f_m and Π_m for $m \neq n$.

Proposition 5.1. *Let λ, q, ϵ be functions such that $0 \leq \lambda(n), q(n)$ and $0 < \epsilon(n) \leq 1$. Let \mathcal{A} be a q -query oracle-aided quantum algorithm. Suppose that there is a function $\eta(n) \leq \lambda(n)$ such that, for each circuit C that \mathcal{A}_n queries to ColFinder, C makes at most $\eta(n)$ queries. If*

$$\Pr_{\substack{f_n, \Pi_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] \geq \epsilon(n) \quad (15)$$

holds for infinitely many n , then there exists a constant const such that

$$\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} \geq \text{const} \cdot \epsilon(n) \cdot 2^{n/7} \quad (16)$$

holds for infinitely many n .

Now we show that Theorem 5.1 follows from Proposition 5.1.

Proof of Theorem 5.1. Let $\Gamma_1 := \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^*)$ and $\Gamma_2 := \{\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f\}_{f \in \Gamma_1, \lambda \in \Lambda}$, where Λ is the set of all polynomials in n . (If $\lambda(n) \leq 0$ for some n , we assume that $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, n}^f$ does not take any inputs.) Below we show that the two conditions of Lemma 4.1 are satisfied.

For the first condition of Lemma 4.1, we define an oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{J}_0 as follows: When we feed \mathcal{J}_0 with an input x relative to a permutation f , \mathcal{J}_0 queries x to f and obtains the output $f(x)$. Then \mathcal{J}_0 returns $f(x)$ as its output. We show that this algorithm \mathcal{J}_0 satisfies the first condition of Lemma 4.1 (existence of CC-qOWP). It is obvious that $\mathcal{J}_0^f \in F_{\text{CC-qOWP}}$ for any permutation f , by definition of \mathcal{J}_0 . Let \mathcal{B} be an efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithm, and λ be a polynomial in n . Now we show the following claim.

Claim 5.1. *For any efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{B} and for any polynomial λ , there exists a permutation $f : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ such that*

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{f, \text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f}(y) : f(x) = y \right] < 2^{-n/8} \quad (17)$$

holds for all sufficiently large n .

Proof of Claim. It suffices to show the claim in the case that $\eta(n) = \lambda(n) = |\mathcal{B}_n|$, since the ability of adversaries to invert permutations increase as $\eta(n)$ becomes large, but the size of quantum circuits which \mathcal{B}_n can query to ColFinder does not exceed $|\mathcal{B}_n|$. Hence, below we consider the case that $\eta(n) = \lambda(n) = |\mathcal{B}_n|$. Note that \mathcal{B} can be regarded as a λ -query algorithm in this case, since \mathcal{B}_n cannot make more than $\lambda(n)$ queries.

Since \mathcal{B} is an efficient algorithm, it follows that

$$\Pr_{\substack{f_n, \Pi_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_n^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] < 2^{-n/8} \quad (18)$$

for all sufficiently large n , from Proposition 5.1. Thus, for all sufficiently large n , there exists a permutation f'_n on $\{0, 1\}^n$ such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{\Pi_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_n^{f'_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{f'}}(y) : f'_n(x) = y \right] < 2^{-n/8} \quad (19)$$

holds. Now, define a permutation $f' : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ by $f'|_{\{0, 1\}^n} = f'_n$. Then

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{f', \text{ColFinder}_\lambda^{f'}}(y) : f'(x) = y \right] < 2^{-n/8} \quad (20)$$

holds for all sufficiently large n . □

From the above claim, it follows that, for any efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{B} and any $\lambda \in \Lambda$, there exists a permutation f such that

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}^{f, \text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f}(y) : f(x) = y \right] < \text{negl}(n) \quad (21)$$

holds, which implies that $\mathcal{B}^{f, \text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f}$ does not CC-qOWP-break \mathcal{J}_0^f relative to $(f, \text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f)$. Hence the first condition (existence of CC-qOWP) of Lemma 4.1 is satisfied.

Next, we show that the second condition (non-existence of QC-qCRH) of Lemma 4.1 is satisfied. For any efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithm $\mathcal{I} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Eval})$ such that $\mathcal{I}^f \in F_{\text{CC-qCRH}}$ holds for any permutation f , let λ be a polynomial such that $\lambda(n) > |\mathcal{I}_n|$ for all n . We define a family of oracle-aided quantum algorithms $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}}$ as: Given an input σ which is generated by $\text{Gen}(1^n)$, $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}}$ queries the oracle-aided quantum circuit $\text{Eval}_n(\sigma, \cdot)$ to $\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f$, obtains an answer $(w^1, w^2, H_\sigma(w^1))$, and finally output (w^1, w^2) . When $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f}$ is given an input σ , the output will be (w^1, w^2) , where w^1 is uniformly distributed over the domain of $H_\sigma : \{0, 1\}^{m(n)} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell(n)}$ and w^2 is uniformly distributed over the set $H_\sigma^{-1}(H_\sigma(w^1))$. Since $m(n) > \ell(n)$ holds by definition of implementations of QC-qCRH, the probability that $w^1 \neq w^2$, which implies that (w^1, w^2) is a collision of H_σ , is at least $1/4$. Thus it follows that there exists $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}}$ and $\lambda \in \Lambda$ such that $\mathcal{A}_{\mathcal{I}}^{\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f}$ CC-qCRH-breaks \mathcal{I}^f for any permutation f . Hence the second condition of Lemma 4.1 is satisfied. \square

Remark 5.2. *In this paper we formally treat only efficient reductions such that the circuit sizes of reduction algorithms are polynomial in n . However, the statement of Proposition 5.1 also excludes sub-exponential reductions from CRH to OWP in the quantum setting.*

5.1 Proof of Proposition 5.1

This subsection proves Proposition 5.1. See Section 2.2 for an intuitive overview of our proof idea. We begin with describing some technical preparations.

5.1.1 Preparations.

Without loss of generality we can assume that $q(n), \eta(n), \lambda(n) \geq 1$ holds, since increasing these numbers does not decrease the ability of \mathcal{A} to invert f . We construct another algorithm $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ that iteratively runs \mathcal{A} to increase the success probability, and then apply the encoding technique to $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$.

Let c be a positive integer. Let \mathcal{B}_c be an oracle-aided quantum algorithm that runs as follows, relative to the oracles f and $\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f$.

1. Take an input y . Set $\text{guess} \leftarrow \perp$.
2. For $i = 1, \dots, c \lceil 1/\epsilon(n) \rceil$ do:
 3. Run $\mathcal{A}^{f, \text{ColFinder}_\lambda^f}$ on the input y . Let x denote the output.
 4. Query x to f . If $f(x) = y$, then set $\text{guess} \leftarrow x$.
5. End For
6. Return guess .

Let $Q(n) := c\lceil 1/\epsilon(n)\rceil(\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} + 1)$. Then \mathcal{B}_c can be regarded as a Q -query algorithm, and for each quantum circuit C that \mathcal{B}_c queries to $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda,n}^f$, C makes at most $Q(n)$ queries.

Remark 5.3. *The randomness Π_n of $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^f$ is chosen before \mathcal{B}_c starts, and unchanged while \mathcal{B}_c is running (see Remark 3.3).*

Lemma 5.1. *Let p_1, p_2 be any positive constant values such that $0 < p_1, p_2 < 1$. For a sufficiently large integer c , the following condition is satisfied for infinitely many n :*

Condition. *There exist $X \subset \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$ and Π_n such that $|X| \geq p_1 \cdot |\text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)|$ and*

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[\Pr \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{c,n}^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi_n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] \geq 2/3 \right] \geq p_2 \quad (22)$$

for all $f_n \in X$.

Proof. Let $p_0 := p_1 + (\frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3}p_2)(1 - p_1)$, and c be an integer that satisfies $e^{-c} \leq 1 - p_0$. In what follows, we show that this c satisfies the condition.

First, for each n such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{f_n, \Pi_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi_n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] \geq \epsilon(n) \quad (23)$$

holds, there exists Π_n such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{f_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi_n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] \geq \epsilon(n) \quad (24)$$

holds. Below we fix Π_n that satisfies inequality (24) for each n such that inequality (23) holds.

Now we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr_{\substack{f_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{c,n}^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi_n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] &\geq 1 - (1 - \epsilon(n))^{\frac{c}{\epsilon(n)}} \\ &= 1 - ((1 - \epsilon(n))^{-\frac{1}{\epsilon(n)}})^{-c} \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

holds. If $\epsilon(n) = 1$, the right hand side of inequality (25) becomes 1, which is larger than p_0 . If $\epsilon(n) < 1$, the right hand side of inequality (25) is lower bounded by $1 - e^{-c} \geq p_0$, here we used the fact that $(1 - x)^{-\frac{1}{x}} \geq e$ holds for $0 < x < 1$. Therefore we have that

$$\Pr_{\substack{f_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{c,n}^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi_n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] \geq p_0 \quad (26)$$

holds.

Here it follows that

$$\Pr \left[\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{c,n}^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi_n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] \geq \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3}p_2 \right] \geq p_1 \quad (27)$$

from inequality (26). In other words, there exists $X \subset \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$ such that $|X| \geq p_1 |\text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)|$ and

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{c,n}^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi_n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] \geq \frac{2}{3} + \frac{1}{3}p_2 \quad (28)$$

holds for all $f_n \in X$. Now, from inequality (28), it follows that

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[\Pr \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{c,n}^{f_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f}(y) : f_n(x) = y \right] \geq 2/3 \right] \geq p_2 \quad (29)$$

for all $f_n \in X$. \square

In what follows, we fix constants p_1, p_2 such that $0 < p_1, p_2 < 1$ arbitrarily. Then, from the above lemma, it follows that there exists a constant c that satisfies the condition in Lemma 5.1 for infinitely many n . Let us denote \mathcal{B}_c by $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$. We use the encoding technique to this Q -query algorithm $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$, here $Q(n) = c \lceil 1/\epsilon(n) \rceil (\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} + 1)$. Below we fix a sufficiently large n in addition to Π_n and X such that the condition in Lemma 5.1 is satisfied. For simplicity, we write Q, q, ϵ, η, f , and ColFinder^f instead of $Q(n), q(n), \epsilon(n), \eta(n), f_n$, and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^f$ respectively, for simplicity.

5.1.2 An Information Theoretic Property of Randomized Compressing Schemes.

Here we introduce an information theoretic property of a randomized compressing scheme $(E_r : X \rightarrow Y \cup \{\perp\}, D_r : Y \rightarrow X \cup \{\perp\})$, where r is chosen according to a distribution \mathcal{R} . Generally, if the encoding and decoding success with a constant probability p , then $|Y|$ cannot be much smaller than $|X|$:

Lemma 5.2 ([DTT10], Fact 10.1). *If there exists a constant $0 \leq p \leq 1$ such that $\Pr_{r \sim \mathcal{R}}[D_r(E_r(x)) = x] \geq p$ holds for all $x \in X$, then $|Y| \geq p \cdot |X|$ holds.*

Below we formally define an encoder E and a decoder D that compress elements (truth tables of permutations) in X . In the encoder E , random coin r is chosen according to a distribution \mathcal{R} . On the other hand, we consider that D is deterministic rather than randomized, and regard r as a part of inputs to D . Note that we do not care whether encoding and decoding can be efficiently done, since Lemma 5.2 describes a purely information theoretic property.

5.1.3 Encoder E .

Let δ be a sufficiently small constant ($\delta = (1/8)^4$ suffices). When we feed E with $f \in X$ as an input, E first chooses subsets $R, R' \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ by the following sampling: For each $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, x is added to R with probability $\delta^{3/2}/Q^2$, and independently added to R' with probability $\delta^{5/2}/Q^4$. (The pair (R, R') is the random coin of E .)

According to the choice of R' , “bad” inputs (oracle-aided quantum circuits) to ColFinder^f are defined for each $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ as follows. Note that now π_C^1 and π_C^2 have been fixed for each $C \in \text{valid}$, and thus the output $\text{ColFinder}^f(C) = (w_{Cf}^1, w_{Cf}^2, F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1))$ is uniquely determined. Since C is an oracle-aided quantum circuit, we can define query magnitude of C to f on input w_{Cf}^1 and w_{Cf}^2 at $z \in \{0, 1\}^n$ (see Definition 3.5). We say that a quantum circuit $C \in \text{valid}$ is *bad* relative to x if

$$\sum_{z \in R' \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{C,f}(w_{Cf}^1) > \frac{\delta}{Q} \quad (30)$$

or

$$\sum_{z \in R' \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{C,f}(w_{Cf}^2) > \frac{\delta}{Q} \quad (31)$$

hold, and otherwise we say that C is *good* relative to x . Let $\text{badC}(R', x)$ denote the set of bad circuits relative to x for each $R' \subset \{0, 1\}^n$.

Next, E constructs a set $G \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ depending on the input f . Let $I \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ be the set of elements x such that \hat{A} successfully inverts $f(x)$, i.e., $I := \{x \mid \Pr[x' \leftarrow \hat{A}^{f, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) : x' = x] \geq 2/3\}$. Then $|I| \geq p_2 \cdot 2^n$ holds by definition of X (Remember that X is chosen in such a way as to satisfy the condition in Lemma 5.1). Now, a set G is defined to be the set of elements $x \in I$ that satisfies the following conditions:

Condition for G .

- (A) $x \in R \cap R'$.
- (B) $\sum_{z \in R \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{\hat{A}, f}(f(x)) \leq \delta/Q$.
- (C) $\sum_{C \in \text{badC}(R', x)} \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) \leq \delta/Q$.

Finally, E encodes f into $(f|_{\{0, 1\}^n \setminus G}, f(G))$ if $|G| \geq \theta$, where $\theta = (1 - 60\sqrt{\delta})\delta^4 p_2 2^n / 2Q^6$. Otherwise E encodes f into \perp .

In addition, here we formally define the set Y (the range of E) as

$$Y := \{(f|_{\{0, 1\}^n \setminus G}, f(G)) \mid f \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n), G \subset \{0, 1\}^n, |G| \geq \theta\}. \quad (32)$$

In fact $E((R, R'), f) \in Y \cup \{\perp\}$ holds for any choice of (R, R') and any permutation $f \in X$.

5.1.4 Decoder D .

D takes (\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) as an input in addition to (R, R') , where $\tilde{G} \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ and \tilde{f} is a bijection from a subset of $\{0, 1\}^n$ onto $\{0, 1\}^n \setminus \tilde{G}$, and R, R' are subsets of $\{0, 1\}^n$. If $\{0, 1\}^n \setminus (\text{the domain of } \tilde{f}) \not\subset R \cap R'$ holds, then D outputs \perp . Otherwise, D decodes (\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) and reconstructs the truth table of a permutation $f \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$ as follows.

For each x in the domain of \tilde{f} , D infers the value $f(x)$ as $f(x) := \tilde{f}(x)$. For other elements $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ which is not contained in the domain of \tilde{f} , what D now knows is only that $f(x)$ is contained in \tilde{G} . To determine the remaining part of the truth table of f , D tries to recover the value $f^{-1}(y)$ for each $y \in \tilde{G}$ by using \hat{A} .

For each fixed $y \in \tilde{G}$, D could succeed to recover the value $f^{-1}(y)$ if D were able to determine the output distribution of \hat{A} on input y relative to oracles f and ColFinder^f . However, D cannot determine the distribution even though D has no limitation on its running time, since f itself is the permutation of which D wants to reconstruct the truth table, and the behavior of ColFinder^f depends on f . Thus D instead prepares oracles h_y and SimCF^{h_y} which approximates f and ColFinder^f , respectively, and computes the output distribution of $\hat{A}^{h_y, \text{SimCF}^{h_y}}$ on input y . SimCF^{h_y} uses a subroutine CalC_y that takes (C, w) as an input (C is a valid oracle-aided circuit that may make queries to f and computes F_C^f , and w is an element of the domain of F_C^f) and simulates an evaluation of $F_C^f(w)$. D finally infers that $f^{-1}(y)$ is the element which $\hat{A}^{h_y, \text{SimCF}^{h_y}}$ outputs with probability greater than $1/2$. (If there does not exist such an element, then D outputs \perp .) Below we describe h_y , CalC_y , and SimCF^{h_y} .

Oracle h_y . The oracle (function) $h_y : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is defined by

$$h_y(z) = \begin{cases} \tilde{f}(z) & \text{if } z \notin R \cap R', \\ y & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (33)$$

Subroutine CalC_y. Let $P_{\text{candidate}} := \{h' \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n) \mid \Delta(h', h_y) \subset R \cap R'\}$. CalC_y is defined as the following procedures.

1. Take an input (C, w) , where C is an oracle-aided circuit and w is an element of the domain of the function F_C .
2. Compute the output distribution of the quantum circuit $C^{h'}$ on input w for each $h' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, and find the corresponding output $u(C, w, h')$ which has the highest probability (i.e., $u(C, w, h')$ is the u that maximizes $\Pr[C^{h'}(w) = u]$). If there are two or more candidates of $u(C, w, h')$ for a fixed h' , set $u(C, w, h') := \perp$.
3. If $u(C, w, h') = u(C, w, h'') \neq \perp$ for all $h', h'' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, return the value $u(C, w, h')$. Otherwise return \perp .

Oracle SimCF^{h_y}. SimCF^{h_y} is defined as the following procedures:

1. Take an input C , where C is an oracle-aided quantum circuit.
2. Check if C is a valid input by checking whether there exists $y \in \{0,1\}^\ell$ such that $\Pr[C^{f'_n}(x) = y] > 2/3$ holds for any $f'_n \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n)$ and $x \in \{0,1\}^m$, and whether the size of C is less than or equal to $\lambda(n)$. If C is an invalid input, return \perp .
3. Compute $\tilde{w}_{Cf}^1 := \pi_C^1(0^m)$.
4. If $\text{CalC}_y(C, \tilde{w}_{Cf}^1) = \perp$, return \perp .
5. Otherwise, search the minimum $t \in \{0,1\}^m$ such that $\text{CalC}_y(C, \tilde{w}_{Cf}^1) = \text{CalC}_y(C, \pi_C^2(t))$ by checking whether $\text{CalC}_y(C, \tilde{w}_{Cf}^1) = \text{CalC}_y(C, \pi_C^2(i))$ holds for $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ in a sequential order.
6. If the minimum number t is found, set $\tilde{w}_{Cf}^2 := \pi_C^2(t)$. Otherwise return \perp .
7. Return $(\tilde{w}_{Cf}^1, \tilde{w}_{Cf}^2, \text{CalC}_y(C, \tilde{w}_{Cf}^1))$.

Note that D is an information theoretic decoder, and we do not care whether CalC_y and SimCF^{h_y} run efficiently.

5.1.5 Analyses.

The following lemma shows that h_y , CalC_y, and SimCF^{h_y} satisfy some suitable properties. Here we consider the situation that D takes an input (\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) such that $(\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) = E((R, R'), f)$ for some subsets $R, R' \subset \{0,1\}^n$ and a permutation $f \in \{0,1\}^n$, and tries to recover the value $f^{-1}(y)$ for some $y \in \tilde{G}$.

Lemma 5.3. *h_y , CalC_y, and SimCF_{h_y} satisfy the following properties.*

1. $\Delta(h_y, f) = R \cap R' \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\}$ holds.
2. $\text{CalC}_y(C, w) = F_C^f(w)$ or \perp holds for any $C \in \text{valid}$ and w .
3. $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1)$ and $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{Cf}^2) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^2)$ hold for each circuit $C \in \text{valid}$ which is good relative to $f^{-1}(y)$.

4. $\text{SimCF}^{h_y}(C) = \text{ColFinder}^f(C)$ holds for each circuit $C \in \text{valid}$ which is good relative to $f^{-1}(y)$. In particular, $\Delta(\text{ColFinder}^f, \text{SimCF}^{h_y}) \subset \text{badC}(R', f^{-1}(y))$ holds.

Proof. The first property is obviously satisfied by definition of h_y .

For the second property, since $f \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, if $\text{CalC}_y(C, w) \neq \perp$ then we have $\text{CalC}_y(C, w) = u(C, w, f)$ by definition of CalC_y , and $u(C, w, f) = F_C^f(w)$ always holds. Hence the second property holds.

For the third property, for each $h' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, from Lemma 3.2 we have

$$\Pr \left[C^{h'}(w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) \right] \geq \Pr \left[C^f(w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) \right] - \left\| C_F^f |w_{Cf}^1, 0, 0\rangle - C_F^{h'} |w_{Cf}^1, 0, 0\rangle \right\|. \quad (34)$$

From the swapping lemma (Lemma 3.3) it follows that

$$\left\| C_F^f |w_{Cf}^1, 0, 0\rangle - C_F^{h'} |w_{Cf}^1, 0, 0\rangle \right\| \leq 2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{z \in \Delta(f, h')} \mu_z^{C, f}(w_{Cf}^1)}. \quad (35)$$

Since $\Delta(f, h') \subset R \cap R' \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\} \subset R' \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\}$ holds for all $h' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, and C is a good circuit relative to $f^{-1}(y)$, the right hand side of the above inequality is upper bounded by $2\sqrt{\delta}$. Thus, for a sufficiently small δ we have

$$\Pr \left[C^{h'}(w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1) \right] \geq \frac{2}{3} - 2\sqrt{\delta} > \frac{1}{2}, \quad (36)$$

which implies that $u(C, w_{Cf}^1, h') = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1)$ holds for every $h' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$. Thus $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{Cf}^1) = F_C^f(w_{Cf}^1)$ holds if C is good relative to $f^{-1}(y)$. It can be shown that the corresponding property also holds for w_{Cf}^2 in the same way.

The fourth property follows from the definition of SimCF^{h_y} , the second property, and the third property. \square

The following lemma shows that the decoding always succeeds if the encoding succeeds.

Lemma 5.4. *If $E((R, R'), f) \neq \perp$, then $D((R, R'), E((R, R'), f)) = f$ holds.*

Proof of Lemma 5.4. Let $\tilde{f} := f|_{\{0,1\}^n \setminus G}$ and $\tilde{G} := f(G)$. We show that D can correctly recover $x = f^{-1}(y)$ for each $y \in \tilde{G}$.

We apply the swapping lemma (Lemma 3.3) to the oracle pairs $(f, \text{ColFinder}^f)$ and $(h_y, \text{SimCF}^{h_y})$. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \left\| \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{f, \text{ColFinder}^f} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle - \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{h_y, \text{SimCF}^{h_y}} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle \right\| \\ & \leq 2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{z \in \Delta(f, h_y)} \mu_z^{\hat{\mathcal{A}}, f}(f(x))} + 2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{C \in \Delta(\text{ColFinder}^f, \text{SimCF}^{h_y})} \mu_C^{\hat{\mathcal{A}}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x))}. \end{aligned} \quad (37)$$

Since $\Delta(f, h_y) = R \cap R' \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\} \subset R \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\} = R \setminus \{x\}$ and $\Delta(\text{ColFinder}^f, \text{SimCF}^{h_y}) \subset \text{badC}(R', f^{-1}(y)) = \text{badC}(R', x)$ from Lemma 5.3, the right hand side of inequality (37) is upper bounded by

$$2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{z \in R \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{\hat{\mathcal{A}}, f}(f(x))} + 2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{C \in \text{badC}(R', x)} \mu_C^{\hat{\mathcal{A}}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x))}. \quad (38)$$

Due to the conditions (B) and (C) (see p. 24), each term of the above expression is upper bounded by $2\sqrt{\delta}$. Thus, eventually we have

$$\left\| \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{f, \text{ColFinder}^f} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle - \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{h_y, \text{SimCF}^{h_y}} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle \right\| \leq 4\sqrt{\delta} \quad (39)$$

Finally, from Lemma 3.2, for sufficiently small δ it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[\hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{h_y, \text{SimCF}^{h_y}} (f(x)) = x \right] \\ & \geq \Pr \left[\hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{f, \text{ColFinder}^f} (f(x)) = x \right] \\ & \quad - \left\| \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{f, \text{ColFinder}^f} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle - \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{h_y, \text{ColFinder}^h} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle \right\| \\ & \geq 2/3 - 4\sqrt{\delta} > 1/2, \end{aligned} \quad (40)$$

which implies that D correctly recovers $x = f^{-1}(y)$. \square

Next, we show the following lemma, which shows that our E and D work well with a constant probability. Our analysis below is a generalization of an analysis by Nayebi et al [NABT15, Claim 8].

Lemma 5.5. *If $Q^6 \leq \delta^4 p_2 2^n / 32$,*

$$\Pr_{(R, R')} [D((R, R'), E((R, R'), f)) = f] \geq 0.7 \quad (41)$$

holds for each $f \in X$.

Proof of Lemma 5.5. If $|G| \geq \theta$ holds, then it follows that $E((R, R'), f) \neq \perp$ by definition of E , which leads to $D((R, R'), E((R, R'), f)) = f$ by Lemma 5.4. Therefore, in what follows, we show that $|G| \geq \theta$ holds with a high probability. Let H be the set defined as $H := \{x \in I \mid x \text{ satisfies (A)}\}$, J_1 be the set defined as $J_1 := \{x \in I \mid x \text{ satisfies (A) but does not satisfy (B)}\}$, and J_2 be the set defined as $J_2 := \{x \in I \mid x \text{ satisfies (A) but does not satisfy (C)}\}$. Then $|G| \geq |H| - |J_1| - |J_2|$ holds.

First, we show that $|H|$ becomes large with a high probability: Since $\mathbf{E}_{R, R'}[|H|] = \delta^4 |I| / Q^6$,

$$\Pr_{R, R'} \left[|H| \geq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{\delta^4 |I|}{Q^6} \right] \geq 1 - \exp \left[-\frac{1}{8} \cdot \frac{\delta^4 |I|}{Q^6} \right] \quad (42)$$

follows from the multiplicative Chernoff bound. Since $|I| \geq p_2 2^n$ holds by definition of I , and $Q^6 \leq \delta^4 p_2 2^n / 32$ is assumed, we have

$$\exp \left[-\frac{1}{8} \cdot \frac{\delta^4 |I|}{Q^6} \right] \leq \exp[-4] \leq 0.1. \quad (43)$$

Therefore

$$\Pr_{R, R'} \left[|H| \geq \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{\delta^4 |I|}{Q^6} \right] \geq 0.9 \quad (44)$$

holds.

Second, we show that $|J_1|$ becomes large only with a small probability: For each $x \in I$, we have that

$$\mathbf{E}_R \left[\sum_{z \in R \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{\hat{\mathcal{A}}, f}(f(x)) \right] = \sum_{z \in \{0, 1\}^n \setminus \{x\}} \frac{\delta^{3/2}}{Q^2} \mu_z^{\hat{\mathcal{A}}, f}(f(x)) \leq \frac{\delta^{3/2}}{Q} \quad (45)$$

holds, where we used the property that $\sum_z \mu_z^{\hat{A},f}(f(x)) \leq Q$ holds since \hat{A} is a Q -query algorithm. Hence

$$\Pr_R \left[\sum_{z \in R \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{\hat{A},f}(f(x)) \geq \frac{\delta}{Q} \right] \leq \sqrt{\delta} \quad (46)$$

follows from Markov's inequality. Since the conditions (A) and (B) are independent (note that the condition (B) does not depend on whether $x \in R \cap R'$),

$$\Pr_{R,R'} [x \in J_1] = \Pr_{R,R'} [x \text{ satisfies (A)}] \cdot \Pr_{R,R'} [x \text{ does not satisfy (B)}] \leq (\delta^4/Q^6) \cdot \sqrt{\delta} = \frac{\delta^{9/2}}{Q^6} \quad (47)$$

holds for each $x \in I$. Now we can show the following claim.

Claim 5.2. *It holds that*

$$\mathbf{E}_{R,R'} [|J_1|] \leq \delta^{9/2} |I| / Q^6. \quad (48)$$

Proof of Claim. Note that the set J_1 is determined once R and R' are fixed. Let $J_1^{(R,R')}$ denote the set J_1 that corresponds to (R, R') . Let 2^I be the set of subsets of I . For each $x \in I$, define a function $\xi_x : 2^I \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ by $\xi_x(J) = 1$ if and only if $x \in J$. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{E}_{R,R'} [|J_1|] &= \mathbf{E}_{R,R'} \left[\sum_{x \in I} \xi_x \left(J_1^{(R,R')} \right) \right] \\ &= \sum_{R_0, R'_0} \left(\sum_{x \in I} \xi_x \left(J_1^{(R_0, R'_0)} \right) \right) \cdot \Pr_{R_0, R'_0} [(R, R') = (R_0, R'_0)] \\ &= \sum_{x \in I} \left(\sum_{R_0, R'_0} \xi_x \left(J_1^{(R_0, R'_0)} \right) \cdot \Pr_{R_0, R'_0} [(R, R') = (R_0, R'_0)] \right) \\ &= \sum_{x \in I} \Pr_{R, R_0} [x \in J_1] \leq |I| \cdot \frac{\delta^{9/2}}{Q^6}, \end{aligned} \quad (49)$$

where the last inequality follows from inequality (47). \square

From the above claim and Markov's inequality, it follows that

$$\Pr_{R,R'} \left[|J_1| \geq \frac{10\delta^{9/2}|I|}{Q^6} \right] \leq 0.1 \quad (50)$$

holds.

Third, we show that $|J_2|$ becomes large only with a small probability: Remember that, for each $x \in I$, a quantum circuit $C \in \text{valid}$ becomes bad relative to x if and only if inequalities (30) or (31) hold. Here, for any fixed $C \in \text{valid}$ and w we have

$$\mathbf{E}_{R'} \left[\sum_{z \in R' \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{C,f}(w) \right] = \sum_{z \in \{0,1\}^n \setminus \{x\}} \frac{\delta^{5/2}}{Q^4} \mu_z^{C,f}(w) \leq \frac{\delta^{5/2}}{Q^3}, \quad (51)$$

where we used the property that $\sum_z \mu_z^{C,f}(w) \leq Q$ holds since C makes at most Q queries. Thus, the probability that a fixed $C \in \text{valid}$ becomes bad relative to x is upper bounded as

$$\Pr_{R'} [C \in \text{badC}(R', x)] \leq \sum_{i=1,2} \Pr_{R'} \left[\sum_{z \in R' \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{C,f}(w_{Cf}^i) > \delta/Q \right] \leq \frac{2\delta^{3/2}}{Q^2} \quad (52)$$

by Markov's inequality. Since R' is chosen independently of \hat{A} , we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbf{E}_{R'} \left[\sum_{C \in \text{badC}(R', x)} \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) \right] \\ &= \sum_{R_0} \sum_{C \in \text{badC}(R_0, x)} \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) \cdot \Pr_{R'} [R' = R_0] \\ &= \sum_{R_0} \sum_C \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) \cdot \mathcal{X}_{\text{badC}(R_0, x)}(C) \cdot \Pr_{R'} [R' = R_0] \\ &= \sum_C \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) \cdot \left(\sum_{R_0} \mathcal{X}_{\text{badC}(R_0, x)}(C) \cdot \Pr_{R'} [R' = R_0] \right) \\ &= \sum_C \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) \cdot \Pr_{R'} [C \in \text{badC}(R', x)] \\ &\leq \sum_C \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) \cdot (2\delta^{3/2}/Q^2) \leq 2\delta^{3/2}/Q, \end{aligned} \quad (53)$$

where $\mathcal{X}_{\text{badC}(R_0, x)}$ is the boolean function such that $\mathcal{X}_{\text{badC}(R_0, x)}(C) = 1$ if and only if $C \in \text{badC}(R_0, x)$, and we used the property that $\sum_C \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) \leq Q$ holds since \hat{A} is a Q -query algorithm. Therefore

$$\Pr_{R'} \left[\sum_{C \in \text{badC}(R', x)} \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^f}(f(x)) > \delta/Q \right] \leq 2\sqrt{\delta} \quad (54)$$

follows from Markov's inequality. Since the conditions (A) and (C) are independent (note that the condition (C) does not depend on whether $x \in R \cap R'$),

$$\Pr_{R, R'} [x \in J_2] = \Pr_{R, R'} [x \text{ satisfies (A)}] \cdot \Pr_{R, R'} [x \text{ does not satisfy (C)}] \leq (\delta^4/Q^6) \cdot 2\sqrt{\delta} = \frac{2\delta^{9/2}}{Q^6} \quad (55)$$

holds for each $x \in I$. Now we can show the following claim in the same way as we showed that Claim 5.2 holds.

Claim 5.3. *It holds that*

$$\mathbf{E}_{R, R'} [|J_2|] \leq 2\delta^{9/2}|I|/Q^6 \quad (56)$$

From the above claim and Markov's inequality, it follows that

$$\Pr_{R, R'} \left[|J_2| \geq \frac{20\delta^{9/2}|I|}{Q^6} \right] \leq 0.1 \quad (57)$$

holds.

Finally, we show that $|G|$ becomes large with a high probability: From inequalities (44), (50), and (57) it follows that

$$\Pr_{R,R'} \left[|H| < \frac{1}{2} \cdot \frac{\delta^4 |I|}{Q^6} \vee |J_1| \geq \frac{10\delta^{9/2} |I|}{Q^6} \vee |J_2| \geq \frac{20\delta^{9/2} |I|}{Q^6} \right] \leq 0.3. \quad (58)$$

holds. Therefore, with a probability at least $1 - 0.3 = 0.7$ it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} |G| &\geq |H| - |J_1| - |J_2| \geq \frac{\delta^4 |I|}{2Q^6} - \frac{10\delta^{9/2} |I|}{Q^6} - \frac{20\delta^{9/2} |I|}{Q^6} \\ &= \frac{\delta^4 |I|}{2Q^6} (1 - 60\sqrt{\delta}) \geq \delta^4 (1 - 60\sqrt{\delta}) \frac{p_2 2^n}{2Q^6} = \theta. \end{aligned} \quad (59)$$

Thus we have that

$$\Pr_{R,R'} [|G| \geq \theta] \geq 0.7, \quad (60)$$

which completes the proof. \square

Finally, we show that Proposition 5.1 follows from the above lemmas.

Proof of Proposition 5.1. First, remember that the set Y is defined as

$$Y := \{(f|_{\{0,1\}^n \setminus G}, f(G)) \mid f \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n), G \subset \{0,1\}^n, |G| \geq \theta\}. \quad (61)$$

For each fixed positive integer $\theta \leq M \leq 2^n$, the cardinality of the set

$$Y_M := \{(f|_{\{0,1\}^n \setminus G}, f(G)) \mid f \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n), G \in \{0,1\}^n, |G| = M\} \quad (62)$$

is equal to $(2^n - M)! \cdot \binom{2^n}{M} = (2^n)!/M!$. Thus $|Y|$ is upper bounded as

$$|Y| = \sum_{M=\lceil \theta \rceil}^{2^n} \frac{(2^n)!}{M!} \leq 2^n \cdot \frac{(2^n)!}{(\lceil \theta \rceil)!} \quad (63)$$

for sufficiently large n . Here we show the following claim.

Claim 5.4. *If $Q^6 \leq \delta^4 p_2 2^n / 32$, there exists a constant const_1 such that $Q^6 \geq \text{const}_1 \cdot 2^n / n$ holds. We can choose const_1 independently of n .*

Proof of Claim. By definition of X , $|X| \geq p_1 (2^n)!$ holds. In addition, from inequality (63), we have $|Y| \leq 2^n \cdot \frac{(2^n)!}{(\lceil \theta \rceil)!}$. Moreover, since now we are assuming that $Q^6 \leq \delta^4 p_2 2^n / 32$ holds, it follows that $|Y| \geq 0.7 |X|$ from Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.5. Hence we have $2^n \cdot \frac{(2^n)!}{(\lceil \theta \rceil)!} \geq 0.7 \cdot p_1 (2^n)!$, which is equivalent to

$$\frac{2^n}{0.7 p_1} \geq \lceil \theta \rceil!. \quad (64)$$

Since p_1 is a constant and $n! \geq 2^n$ holds for $n \geq 4$, there exists a constant const_2 , which can be taken independently of n , such that $\lceil \text{const}_2 \cdot n \rceil! \geq 2^n / (0.7 p_1)$ holds. Now we have $\lceil \text{const}_2 \cdot n \rceil \geq \lceil \theta \rceil$, which implies that

$$\text{const}_2 \cdot n + 1 \geq \theta = \delta^4 (1 - 60\sqrt{\delta}) \frac{p_2 2^n}{2Q^6} \quad (65)$$

holds. Moreover, since δ and p_2 are also constants, there exists a constant const_1 that is independent of n and

$$Q^6 \geq \text{const}_1 \cdot 2^n / n \quad (66)$$

holds, which completes the proof of the claim. \square

Let $\text{const}_3 := \min\{\delta^4 p_2/32, \text{const}_1\}$. Then, from the above Claim, it follows that

$$Q^6 \geq \text{const}_3 \cdot 2^n/n \quad (67)$$

holds. Since $Q = c \left\lceil \frac{1}{\epsilon} \right\rceil (\max\{q, \eta\} + 1)$ by definition of Q , we have

$$c^6 \left\lceil \frac{1}{\epsilon} \right\rceil^6 (\max\{q, \eta\} + 1)^6 \geq \text{const}_3 \cdot 2^n/n. \quad (68)$$

Hence there exists a constant const such that

$$\max\{q, \eta\} \geq \text{const} \cdot \epsilon \cdot 2^{n/6}/n^{1/6} \geq \text{const} \cdot \epsilon \cdot 2^{n/7} \quad (69)$$

holds for sufficiently large n , which completes the proof. \square

6 Impossibility of Reduction from QC-qCRH to CC-qTDP

The goal of this section is to show the following theorem.

Theorem 6.1. *There exists no quantum fully-black-box reduction from QC-qCRH to CC-qTDP.*

To show this theorem, we define two (families of) oracles that separate QC-qCRH from CC-qTDP. That is, we define an oracle that implements trapdoor permutations, in addition to an oracle that finds collisions of functions, and then apply the two oracle technique (Lemma 4.1).

Remark 6.1. *The statement of Theorem 6.1 is the strongest result among possible quantum (fully-black-box) separations of CRH from TDP, since it also excludes reductions from CC-qCRH to CC-qTDP, reductions from QC-qCRH to QC-qTDP, and reductions from CC-qCRH to QC-qTDP.*

6.0.1 Oracles that separates QC-qCRH from CC-qTDP.

Suppose, for each n , we have a permutation $g_n : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ and a function $f_n : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ for each n , where $f_n(z, \cdot) : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is a permutation for each $z \in \{0, 1\}^n$. Define $f_n^{\text{inv}} : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ by $f_n^{\text{inv}}(z, \cdot) := (f_n(g_n(z), \cdot))^{-1}$ for each z . Let $g := \{g_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$, $f := \{f_n\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$, and $f^{\text{inv}} := \{f_n^{\text{inv}}\}_{n \in \mathbb{N}}$. Define efficient oracle-aided quantum algorithms (Gen, Eval, Inv) relative to (g, f, f^{inv}) as follows.

1. When we feed Gen^g with 1^n as an input, first $\text{td} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ is chosen uniformly at random, and then pk is set as $\text{pk} := g_n(\text{td})$. Finally Gen^g outputs (pk, td) .
2. Given an input $(\text{pk}, x) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$, Eval^f queries (pk, x) to f_n , and output $f_n(\text{pk}, x)$.
3. Given an input $(\text{td}, x) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$, $\text{Inv}^{f^{\text{inv}}}$ queries (td, x) to f_n^{inv} , and output $f_n^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}, x)$.

$(\text{Gen}, \text{Eval}, \text{Inv})$ implements CC-qTDP relative to (g, f, f^{inv}) .

For each fixed g, f and a function λ , define the randomized oracle $\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^{g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}$ in the same way as we defined ColFinder in Section 5. Note that now an input to $\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^{g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}$ is an oracle-aided quantum circuit C of which circuit size is at most $\lambda(n)$, and C may make queries to g, f , and f^{inv} . We say that C is a *valid* input if it computes a function $F_C^{g', f', f'^{\text{inv}}} : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ relative to the oracles g', f' , and f'^{inv} , for each permutation g' and function f' such that $f'_n(z, \cdot)$ is a permutation over $\{0, 1\}^n$ for each $z \in \{0, 1\}^n$ (here we assume that m and ℓ are independent of

g' and f'). We say that C is *invalid* if it is not valid. Let **valid** and **invalid** denote the set of valid and invalid circuits, respectively.

We can show that Theorem 6.1 follows from Proposition 6.1 below by applying the two oracle technique (Lemma 4.1) with $\Gamma_1 := \{(g, f, f^{\text{inv}})\}$ and $\Gamma_2 := \{\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}\}_{(g, f, f^{\text{inv}}) \in \Gamma_1, \lambda \in \Lambda}$, where Λ is the set of polynomials in n , in the same way as Theorem 5.1 follows from Proposition 5.1.

Proposition 6.1. *Let λ, q, ϵ be functions such that $0 \leq \lambda(n), q(n)$ and $0 < \epsilon(n) \leq 1$. Let \mathcal{A} be a q -query oracle-aided quantum algorithm. Suppose that there is a function $\eta(n) \leq \lambda(n)$ such that, for each circuit C that \mathcal{A}_n queries to ColFinder , C makes at most $\eta(n)$ queries. If*

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, f_n, \Pi_n \\ y, \text{td} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\text{td}), x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{g_n, f_n, f_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}}(\text{pk}, y) : \right. \\ \left. f_n(\text{pk}, x) = y \right] \geq \epsilon(n) \quad (70)$$

holds for infinitely many n , then there exists a constant const such that

$$\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} \geq \text{const} \cdot \epsilon(n)^3 \cdot 2^{n/42} \quad (71)$$

holds for infinitely many n .⁵

Remark 6.2. *In this paper we formally treat only efficient reductions such that the circuit sizes of reduction algorithms are polynomial in n . However, the statement of Proposition 6.1 also excludes sub-exponential reductions from CRH to TDP in the quantum setting.*

6.0.2 Intuitive Overview of Proof Idea.

Here we explain an intuition of our proof idea. We consider three separate cases. In the first and second cases, we can show that the claim Proposition 6.1 is reduced to Proposition 5.1. In the third case, we again use the arguments about randomized compressing schemes to show permutations are hard to invert.

The first case is the one that \mathcal{A} queries td to f^{inv} with a high probability (we denote this event by TDHIT_1). In this case, we can make an oracle-aided quantum query algorithm \mathcal{B}_1 that inverts the permutation g . Given $\text{pk} = g(\text{td})$ as an input and oracle access to $(g, \text{ColFinder}^g)$, \mathcal{B}_1 runs \mathcal{A} simulating oracles f and f^{inv} , and measures a query of \mathcal{A} to f^{inv} . Since \mathcal{A} queries td to f^{inv} with a high probability, \mathcal{B}_1 can obtain td with a high probability, which implies that \mathcal{B}_1 can invert pk in g . Thus the claim can be reduced to Proposition 5.1 in this case. From Proposition 5.1, it follows that \mathcal{B}_1 has to make many queries, which implies that \mathcal{A} also has to make many queries.

The second case is the one that \mathcal{A} queries a *trapdoor-hitting* circuit C to $\text{ColFinder}^{g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}$ with a high probability (we denote this event by TDHIT_2). Intuitively, a circuit $C \in \text{valid}$ is called *trapdoor-hitting* if it queries td to f^{inv} with a high probability on input $w_{C, g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}^1$ or $w_{C, g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}^2$, where $(w_{C, g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}^1, w_{C, g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}^2, u)$ is the output of $\text{ColFinder}^{g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}$ on input C . In this case, again we can make an oracle-aided quantum query algorithm \mathcal{B}_2 that inverts the permutation g . Given $\text{pk} = g(\text{td})$ as an input and oracle access to $(g, \text{ColFinder}^g)$, \mathcal{B}_2 runs \mathcal{A} simulating oracles f and f^{inv} , and measures

⁵Strictly speaking, when we feed an input $(\text{pk}, y) \in \{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n$, \mathcal{A} should run a quantum circuit denoted by \mathcal{A}_{2n} in our definition of quantum circuits (see Definition 3.1 and Definition 3.2). However, in this section we abuse the notation \mathcal{A}_n to denote \mathcal{A}_{2n} , for simplicity.

a query of \mathcal{A} to $\text{ColFinder}^{g,f,f^{\text{inv}}}$. Since \mathcal{A} queries a trapdoor-hitting circuit C to $\text{ColFinder}^{g,f,f^{\text{inv}}}$ with a high probability, \mathcal{B}_2 can obtain a trapdoor-hitting circuit C with a high probability. Once \mathcal{B}_2 obtains a trapdoor-hitting circuit C , \mathcal{B}_2 computes the value $(w_{C^{g,f,f^{\text{inv}}}}^1, w_{C^{g,f,f^{\text{inv}}}}^2, u)$ by simulating f , f^{inv} and making queries to its own oracle ColFinder^g . Then \mathcal{B}_2 runs C relative to the oracles g , f , and f^{inv} on inputs $w_{C^{g,f,f^{\text{inv}}}}^1$ and $w_{C^{g,f,f^{\text{inv}}}}^2$, simulating oracles f and f^{inv} , and measures a query of C to f^{inv} . Since the trapdoor-hitting circuit C queries td to f^{inv} with a high probability, \mathcal{B}_2 can obtain td with a high probability, which implies that \mathcal{B}_2 can invert pk in g . Thus the claim can be reduced to Proposition 5.1 in this case as well.

The third case is the one that both of TDHIT_1 and TDHIT_2 do not occur (that is, the case that $\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ occurs). In this case, intuitively, we can construct a randomized compressing scheme that compresses the truth table of $f(\text{pk}, \cdot)$ without the oracle $f^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}, \cdot)$ since the query magnitude to $f^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}, \cdot)$ is almost always small if $\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ occurs. In this section, we only describe the difference between the proof for the third case and the proof in Section 5. The complete proof of the third case can be found in Section A.

6.0.3 Formal Proof.

Below we give a formal proof. We begin with formally defining trapdoor-hitting circuits, and the events TDHIT_1 and TDHIT_2 . Let δ be a sufficiently small constant ($\delta = (1/8)^4$ suffices), and c be a sufficiently large positive constant integer (actually $c = 2$ suffices.) Let $Q(n) := c \left\lceil \frac{12}{\epsilon(n)} \right\rceil (\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} + 1)$. (We will use δ , c , and $Q(n)$ for the compressing technique in the third case, in the almost same way as we did in Section 5.)

Definition of trapdoor-hitting Circuits. For each fixed n , Π , (g, f, f^{inv}) , and td , we say that an oracle-aided quantum circuit $C \in \text{valid}$ is *trapdoor-hitting* if

$$\sum_{z \in \{0,1\}^n} \mu_{(\text{td},z)}^{C,f^{\text{inv}}} (w_{C^{g,f,f^{\text{inv}}}}^1) > \frac{\delta}{Q(n)} \text{ or } \sum_{z \in \{0,1\}^n} \mu_{(\text{td},z)}^{C,f^{\text{inv}}} (w_{C^{g,f,f^{\text{inv}}}}^2) > \frac{\delta}{Q(n)} \quad (72)$$

holds. If $C \in \text{valid}$ is not trapdoor-hitting, we say that it is a *non-trapdoor-hitting* circuit.

Definition of the events TDHIT_1 and TDHIT_2 . For each n , we define TDHIT_1 as the event that

$$\sum_z \mu_{(\text{td},z)}^{\mathcal{A},f^{\text{inv}}} (\text{pk}, y) > \frac{\delta}{Q(n)} \quad (73)$$

occurs. In addition, for each n , we define TDHIT_2 as the event that

$$\sum_{C:\text{trapdoor-hitting}} \mu_C^{\mathcal{A},\text{ColFinder}_\lambda^{g,f,f^{\text{inv}}}} (\text{pk}, y) > \frac{\delta}{Q(n)} \quad (74)$$

occurs. Below we give a proof of Proposition 6.1.

Remark 6.3. Once g , f , td , y , and Π_n are fixed, whether or not the events TDHIT_1 and TDHIT_2 occur is determined, since the left hand side of inequalities (73) and (74) are completely determined.

Proof of Proposition 6.1. Let E denote the event that \mathcal{A} inverts the trapdoor permutation, i.e., $f_n(\text{pk}, x) = y$ holds. If $\Pr[E] \geq \epsilon(n)$ holds, then one of the three conditions holds: (1) TDHIT_1 occurs with a high probability, i.e., $\Pr[E \wedge \text{TDHIT}_1] \geq \epsilon(n)/3$ holds, (2) TDHIT_2 occurs with a high

probability, i.e., $\Pr[E \wedge \text{TDHIT}_2] \geq \epsilon(n)/3$ holds, or $(3)\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ occurs with a high probability, i.e., $\Pr[E \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)] \geq \epsilon(n)/3$ holds. Below we show that the claim of the proposition holds in each case.

6.0.4 Case 1: The Event TDHIT_1 Occurs.

Here we consider the case that TDHIT_1 occurs. That is, we consider the case that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, f_n, \Pi_n \\ y, \text{td} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\text{td}), x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{g_n, f_n, f_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}(\text{pk}, y) : \right. \\ \left. f_n(\text{pk}, x) = y \wedge \text{TDHIT}_1 \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3} \quad (75)$$

holds for infinitely many n . In this case, for each n such that (75) holds, there exist $y_0 \in \{0,1\}^n$ and \hat{f}_n such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, \Pi_n \\ \text{td} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\text{td}), x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{g_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(\text{pk}, y_0) : \right. \\ \left. f_n(\text{pk}, x) = y_0 \wedge \text{TDHIT}_1 \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3}. \quad (76)$$

Under the condition that TDHIT_1 occurs, we have that

$$\sum_z \mu_{(\text{td}, z), i_0}^{\mathcal{A}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(\text{pk}, y_0) > \frac{\delta}{q(n) \cdot Q(n)} \geq \frac{\delta}{Q(n)^2} \quad (77)$$

holds for some $1 \leq i_0 \leq q(n)$. Below we construct an oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{B}_1 relative to oracles $g \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n)$ and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda'}^g$ (defined in Section 5), where λ' is a function that $\lambda'(n)$ is sufficiently large for each n .

Before describing the algorithm \mathcal{B}_1 , here we explain that we can simulate the oracles \hat{f}^{inv} and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$, given the truth table of \hat{f} and oracle access to g and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda'}^g$, with knowing pk but without knowing td .

We begin with explaining how to simulate the oracle \hat{f}^{inv} . Remember that $\hat{f}^{\text{inv}}(z, x) = (\hat{f}(g(z), \cdot))^{-1}(x)$ holds. Thus we can evaluate \hat{f}^{inv} once by using the truth table of \hat{f} and making one query to g .

Next we explain how to simulate the oracle $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$. Given an oracle-aided circuit C which may make queries to g, \hat{f} , and \hat{f}^{inv} , first we replace \hat{f} oracle gates in C with the concrete quantum circuit that computes \hat{f} , by using the truth table of \hat{f} . (Note that here we do not care whether calculations can be done efficiently, and we focus only on the number of queries.) Second, we replace \hat{f}^{inv} oracle gates in C with an oracle-aided quantum circuit that computes \hat{f}^{inv} by using the truth table of \hat{f} and making one query to g , in the same way as we simulate the \hat{f}^{inv} oracle.

Let C_{fill} denote the resulting circuit. If C is an η -query circuit, then C_{fill} makes at most 2η -queries. By definition of C_{fill} , obviously $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda'}^g(C_{\text{fill}}) = \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(C)$ holds. Thus we can simulate the oracles of \hat{f}^{inv} and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$.

Next we give the description of \mathcal{B}_1 .

Algorithm \mathcal{B}_1 .

1. \mathcal{B}_1 takes $\mathbf{pk} \in \{0, 1\}^n$ as an input and is given oracle access to a permutation $g \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$. The truth table of \hat{f} is hardcoded in the description of \mathcal{B}_1 . Set $\text{guess} \leftarrow \perp$.
2. Repeat the following procedures $Q(n)^2$ times.
 - (a) Run the algorithm \mathcal{A} on input y_0 relative to the oracles $g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}$, and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$ before the i_0 -th query to \hat{f}^{inv} , and measure the i_0 -th query. \mathcal{B}_1 simulates the oracles $g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}$, and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$ as we described above. Let $(\tilde{\mathbf{td}}, \tilde{z}) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$ be the measurement result.
 - (b) Query $\tilde{\mathbf{td}}$ to g . If $\mathbf{pk} = g(\tilde{\mathbf{td}})$ holds, set $\text{guess} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathbf{td}}$.
3. Return guess .

Analysis of \mathcal{B}_1 . The number of queries to each of g and ColFinder^g made by \mathcal{B}_1 is at most $Q(n)^2(q(n) + 1) \leq 2Q(n)^3$. In addition, for each oracle aided circuit C that \mathcal{A} queries to $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$, the number of queries to each oracle made by C is at most $\eta(n)$, by assumption. Hence, for each oracle aided circuit C_{fill} that \mathcal{B}_1 queries to $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^g$, the number of queries to g made by C_{fill} is at most $2\eta(n)$.

From inequality (77), under the condition that TDHIT_1 occurs, it follows that the probability that \mathcal{B}_1 finds $\tilde{\mathbf{td}}$ such that $\mathbf{pk} = g(\tilde{\mathbf{td}})$ is at least $1 - (1 - \delta/Q(n)^2)^{Q(n)^2} \geq 1 - e^{-\delta}$. (Here we used the fact that $(1 - x)^{-\frac{1}{x}} \geq e$ for $0 < x < 1$.) That is, we have that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, \Pi_n \\ \mathbf{td} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} \left[\mathbf{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\mathbf{td}), \tilde{\mathbf{td}} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{1, n}^{g_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda', \Pi, n}^g}(\mathbf{pk}) : \tilde{\mathbf{td}} = \mathbf{td} \mid \text{TDHIT}_1 \right] \geq 1 - e^{-\delta} \quad (78)$$

holds for the $2Q(n)^3$ -query algorithm \mathcal{B}_1 . From inequality (76), it follows that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, \Pi_n, \\ \mathbf{td} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} [\text{TDHIT}_1] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3} \quad (79)$$

holds for infinitely many n . Therefore we have

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, \Pi_n \\ \mathbf{td} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} \left[\mathbf{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\mathbf{td}), \tilde{\mathbf{td}} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{1, n}^{g_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda', \Pi, n}^g}(\mathbf{pk}) : \tilde{\mathbf{td}} = \mathbf{td} \right] \geq (1 - e^{-\delta}) \cdot \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3} \quad (80)$$

for infinitely many n .

Now we can show that there exists a constant const_1 such that

$$\max \{2Q(n)^3, 2\eta(n)\} \geq \text{const}_1 \cdot \epsilon(n) \cdot 2^{n/7} \quad (81)$$

holds for infinitely many n in the almost same way as we showed Proposition 5.1.

Moreover, since $Q(n) = c \left\lceil \frac{12}{\epsilon(n)} \right\rceil (\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} + 1)$, we have that

$$2c^3 \left\lceil \frac{12}{\epsilon(n)} \right\rceil^3 (\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} + 1)^3 \geq \text{const}_1 \cdot \epsilon(n) \cdot 2^{n/7}, \quad (82)$$

which implies that there exists a constant const_2 such that

$$\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} \geq \text{const}_2 \cdot \epsilon(n)^2 \cdot 2^{n/21} \quad (83)$$

for infinitely many n . Therefore the claim holds in this case.

6.0.5 Case 2: The Event TDHIT₂ Occurs.

Here we consider the case that TDHIT₂ occurs. That is, we consider the case that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, f_n, \Pi_n \\ y, \text{td} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\text{td}), x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{g_n, f_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{g, f, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(\text{pk}, y) : \right. \\ \left. f_n(\text{pk}, x) = y \wedge \text{TDHIT}_2 \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3} \quad (84)$$

holds for infinitely many n . In this case, for each n such that inequality (84) holds, again there exist $y_0 \in \{0,1\}^n$ and \hat{f}_n such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, \Pi_n \\ \text{td} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\text{td}), x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{g_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(\text{pk}, y_0) : \right. \\ \left. f_n(\text{pk}, x) = y_0 \wedge \text{TDHIT}_2 \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3}, \quad (85)$$

and we can construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that inverts random permutation g_n . Under the condition that TDHIT₂ holds, we have that

$$\sum_{C: \text{trapdoor-hitting}} \mu_{C, i_0}^{\mathcal{A}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, f, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(\text{td}, y) > \frac{\delta}{Q(n) \cdot q(n)} \geq \frac{\delta}{Q(n)^2} \quad (86)$$

holds for some $1 \leq i_0 \leq q(n)$. In addition, for each trapdoor-hitting circuit C we have that

$$\sum_{z \in \{0,1\}^n} \mu_{(\text{td}, z), j_0}^{C, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{g, f, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) > \frac{\delta}{(Q(n))^2} \text{ or } \sum_{z \in \{0,1\}^n} \mu_{(\text{td}, z), j_0}^{C, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{g, f, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^2) > \frac{\delta}{(Q(n))^2} \quad (87)$$

for some $1 \leq j_0 \leq \eta(n)$, by definition of trapdoor-hitting circuits and since $\eta(n) \leq Q(n)$.

Below we construct an oracle-aided quantum algorithm \mathcal{B}_2 relative to oracles $g \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n)$ and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^g$, (defined in Section 5), where λ' is a function that $\lambda'(n)$ is sufficiently large for each n . In what follows, without loss of generality we assume that each circuit C that \mathcal{A} queries to ColFinder makes $\eta(n)$ queries.

Algorithm \mathcal{B}_2 .

1. \mathcal{B}_2 takes $\text{pk} \in \{0,1\}^n$ as an input and is given oracle access to a permutation $g \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n)$ and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^g$. The truth table of \hat{f} is hardcoded in the description of \mathcal{B}_2 . Set $\text{guess} \leftarrow \perp$.
2. Repeat the following procedures $Q(n)^2$ times.
 - (a) Run the algorithm \mathcal{A} on input y_0 relative to the oracles $g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}$, and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$ before the i_0 -th query to $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$, and measure the i_0 -th query. \mathcal{B}_2 simulates the oracles $g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}$, and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$ as we described in the proof of case 1. Let C be the measurement result.
 - (b) Query C_{fill} to $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^g$ to compute $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(C) = (w_{C_F^{(g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}})}}^1, w_{C_F^{(g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}})}}^2, y)$ (see p. 34 for the definition of C_{fill}).

(c) For $1 \leq i \leq \eta(n)$, do:

i. Repeat the following procedures $(Q(n))^2$ times.

- A. Run the circuit C on the input $w_{C_F^{(g,\hat{f},\hat{f}^{\text{inv}})}}^1$ relative to $g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}$ before the i -th query to \hat{f}^{inv} , and measure the i -th query. \mathcal{B}_2 simulates the oracles $(g, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}})$ as we described in the proof of case 1. Let $(\tilde{\text{td}}, z) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$ be the measurement result.
- B. Query $\tilde{\text{td}}$ to g . If $\text{pk} = g(\tilde{\text{td}})$ holds, set $\text{guess} \leftarrow \tilde{\text{td}}$.
- C. Do Steps A and B by using $w_{C_F^{(g,\hat{f},\hat{f}^{\text{inv}})}}^2$ instead of $w_{C_F^{(g,\hat{f},\hat{f}^{\text{inv}})}}^1$.

3. Return guess .

Analysis of \mathcal{B}_2 . First we analyze the number of queries made by \mathcal{B}_2 . Steps (a) and (b) require at most $i_0 \leq q(n)$ and 1 queries to each oracle, respectively, and the maximum number of queries made by each circuit C_{fill} that \mathcal{B}_2 queries to $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda'}^g$, is at most $2\eta(n)$.

In Step A, C makes at most $\eta(n)$ queries to each oracle. Since \mathcal{B}_2 has to make one query to g in order to simulate one evaluation of \hat{f}^{inv} , \mathcal{B}_2 makes at most $2\eta(n)$ queries in Step A. In Step B, \mathcal{B}_2 makes 1 query. Thus, in Step (c), \mathcal{B}_2 makes at most $\eta(n) \cdot (Q(n))^2 \cdot 2 \cdot (2\eta(n) + 1) \leq 6Q(n)^4$ queries.

Therefore \mathcal{B}_2 makes at most $Q(n)^2 \cdot (6Q(n)^4 + (q(n) + 1)) \leq 2^3 Q(n)^6$ queries, and the maximum number of queries made by each circuit C_{fill} that \mathcal{B}_2 queries to $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda'}^g$, is at most $2\eta(n)$.

Second we analyze success probability of \mathcal{B}_2 . Since inequality (86) holds, under the condition that TDHIT_2 occurs, the probability that \mathcal{B}_2 obtains a trapdoor-hitting circuit C in Step 2-(a) at least once while \mathcal{B}_2 is running (below we call this event succ_1) is lower bounded by $1 - (1 - \delta/Q(n)^2)^{Q(n)^2} \geq 1 - e^{-\delta}$. Since inequality (87) holds for each trapdoor-hitting circuit, under the condition that succ_1 occurs, the probability that \mathcal{B}_2 obtains $\tilde{\text{td}}$ such that $\text{pk} = g(\tilde{\text{td}})$ in Step 2-(c)-i at least once while \mathcal{B}_2 is running under the condition that succ_1 occurs is lower bounded by $1 - (1 - \delta/(Q(n))^2)^{(Q(n))^2} \geq 1 - e^{-\delta}$. Hence it follows that \mathcal{B}_2 finds $\tilde{\text{td}}$ such that $\text{pk} = g(\tilde{\text{td}})$ with a probability at least $(1 - e^{-\delta})^2$, under the condition that TDHIT_2 occurs.

Now we have that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, \Pi_n \\ \text{td} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\text{td}), \tilde{\text{td}} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{2,n}^{g_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda', \Pi, n}^g}(\text{pk}) : \tilde{\text{td}} = \text{td} \mid \text{TDHIT}_2 \right] \geq (1 - e^{-\delta})^2 \quad (88)$$

holds for a $2^3 Q^6$ -query quantum algorithm \mathcal{B}_2 . Moreover, from inequality (85), it follows that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, \Pi_n \\ \text{td} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} [\text{TDHIT}_2] > \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3} \quad (89)$$

holds for infinitely many n . Therefore we have that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, \Pi_n \\ \text{td} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\text{td}), \tilde{\text{td}} \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{2,n}^{g_n, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda', \Pi, n}^g}(\text{pk}) : \tilde{\text{td}} = \text{td} \right] \geq (1 - e^{-\delta})^2 \cdot \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3} \quad (90)$$

holds for infinitely many n . Thus we can show that there exists a constant const_1 such that

$$\max \{ 2^3 Q(n)^6, 2\eta(n) \} \geq \text{const}_1 \cdot \epsilon(n) \cdot 2^{n/7} \quad (91)$$

holds for infinitely many n , in the almost same way as we showed Proposition 5.1.

Moreover, since $Q(n) = c \left\lceil \frac{12}{\epsilon(n)} \right\rceil (\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} + 1)$, we have that

$$2^3 c^6 \left\lceil \frac{12}{\epsilon(n)} \right\rceil^6 (\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} + 1)^6 \geq \text{const}_1 \cdot \epsilon(n) \cdot 2^{n/7}, \quad (92)$$

which implies that there exists a constant const_2 such that

$$\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} \geq \text{const}_2 \cdot \epsilon(n)^2 \cdot 2^{n/42} \quad (93)$$

for infinitely many n . Therefore the claim also holds in this case.

6.0.6 Case 3: The Event $\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ Occurs.

Here we consider the case that $\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ occurs. That is, we consider the case that

$$\Pr_{\substack{g_n, f_n, \Pi_n \\ y, \text{td} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk} \leftarrow g_n(\text{td}), x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{g_n, f_n, f_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{g, f, f^{\text{inv}}}}(\text{pk}, y) : \right. \\ \left. f_n(\text{pk}, x) = y \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2) \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3} \quad (94)$$

holds for infinitely many n . In this case, for each n such that inequality (94) holds, there exist an n -bit string $\text{td}_0 \in \{0, 1\}^n$, a permutation $\hat{g}_n \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$, and a family of permutations $\{\hat{f}_n(\text{pk}, \cdot)\}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}$ such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{\hat{f}_n(\text{pk}_0, \cdot), \Pi_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk}_0 \leftarrow \hat{g}_n(\text{td}_0), x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(\text{pk}_0, y) : \right. \\ \left. \hat{f}_n(\text{pk}_0, x) = y \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2) \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3}, \quad (95)$$

Here we can construct a randomized compressing scheme (E, D) that compresses the truth table of $\hat{f}_n(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$, and can show that

$$\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} \geq \text{const} \cdot \epsilon(n)^3 \cdot 2^{n/7} \quad (96)$$

for infinitely many n , which implies that the claim also holds in this case.

The compressing scheme is an analogue of that in Section 5. Below we describe only the difference between the randomized compressing scheme here and that in Section 5. See Appendix A for a complete proof.

Difference from the Proof in Section 5. The constructions of E and D are almost the same as that of Section 5, except that in this section D uses the dummy oracle that always returns \perp to simulate the oracle $\hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}_0, \cdot)$.

The main difference between from the proof in Section 5 is that we take X (the domain of encoder E) and G (subset of $\{0, 1\}^n$ on which E “forgets” values of permutation $f \in X$) in such a way that, for any $f = \hat{f}_n(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$ and $x \in G$, (i) \mathcal{A} inverts $f(x)$ in f with probability at least

$2/3$ and (ii) the event $\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ always occurs with respect to \hat{A} , y , and $f = \hat{f}(\mathbf{pk}_0, \cdot)$. We use $\epsilon(n)/6$ and $\epsilon(n)/12$, which may not be constants, instead of constants p_1 and p_2 so that the condition (ii) will hold. Hence we have to change Lemma 5.1.

Accordingly, the statement of Lemma 5.3 and Lemma 5.4 will be slightly changed: In Lemma 5.3, it is claimed that CalC_y satisfies some suitable properties for good circuits, but in this section CalC_y satisfies the corresponding properties for good *and non-trapdoor-hitting* circuits. For Lemma 5.4, the statement will not be changed in this section, but we will make full use of the condition (ii) above in the proof.

Moreover, since we use $\epsilon(n)/6$ and $\epsilon(n)/12$ instead of constants p_1 and p_2 , the factor $\epsilon(n)^3$, instead of $\epsilon(n)$, appears in the final bound (96). \square

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A A Complete Proof for the Case 3 of Proposition 6.1.

The goal of this section is to show the following proposition.

Proposition A.1. *Suppose that, for infinitely many n , there exist an n -bit string $\text{td}_0 \in \{0, 1\}^n$, a permutation $\hat{g}_n \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$, and a family of permutations $\{\hat{f}_n(\text{pk}, \cdot)\}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}$ such that*

$$\Pr_{\substack{\hat{f}_n(\text{pk}_0, \cdot), \Pi_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n}} \left[\text{pk}_0 \leftarrow \hat{g}_n(\text{td}_0), x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(\text{pk}_0, y) : \right. \\ \left. f_n(\text{pk}_0, x) = y \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2) \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3}, \quad (97)$$

holds. Then there exists a constant const such that

$$\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} \geq \text{const} \cdot \epsilon(n)^3 \cdot 2^{n/7} \quad (98)$$

holds for infinitely many n .

A.0.1 Preparations.

Here we describe some technical preparations before using the encoding technique. Without loss of generality we can assume that $q(n), \eta(n), \lambda(n) \geq 1$ holds, since increasing these numbers does not decrease the ability of \mathcal{A} to invert f . In a similar way as we did in Section 5, we construct another algorithm $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ that iteratively runs \mathcal{A} to increase the success probability, and then apply the encoding technique to $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$.

Remember that c is a sufficiently large positive integer in Section 6. Let \mathcal{B}_c be an oracle-aided quantum algorithm that runs as follows, relative to the oracles $\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$.

1. Take an input y . Set $\text{guess} \leftarrow \perp$.
2. For $i = 1, \dots, c \lceil 12/\epsilon(n) \rceil$ do:
 3. Run $\mathcal{A}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}$ on the input (pk_0, y) . Let x be the output.
 4. Query x to f . If $f(x) = y$, then set $\text{guess} \leftarrow x$.
5. End For
6. Return guess .

Remember that $Q(n)$ is defined as $c \lceil 12/\epsilon(n) \rceil (\max\{q(n), \eta(n)\} + 1)$ in Section 6. \mathcal{B}_c can be regarded as a Q -query algorithm, and for each quantum circuit C that \mathcal{B}_c queries to $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$, C makes at most $Q(n)$ queries.

The following lemma corresponds to Lemma 5.1 in Section 5. The main difference between Lemma A.1 and Lemma 5.1 is that Lemma A.1 uses $\epsilon(n)/6$ and $\epsilon(n)/12$, which may not be constants, instead of constants p_1 and p_2 , respectively. We use $\epsilon(n)/6$ and $\epsilon(n)/12$ since, for $y \in G$ (G is the set we will use in our encoder and decoder) and $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$, so that \mathcal{B}_c inverts y in $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$ and the event $\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ occurs with respect to \mathcal{B}_c, y , and f .

Lemma A.1. *For a sufficiently large positive integer c , the following condition is satisfied for infinitely many n :*

Condition. *There exist $X \subset \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$ and Π_n such that $|X| \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{6} \cdot |\text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)|$ and*

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n} \left[\Pr \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{c, n}^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi_n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(y) : \hat{f}_n(\text{pk}_0, x) = y \right] \geq 2/3 \right. \\ \left. \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2) \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{12} \quad (99)$$

for all $\hat{f}_n(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$, where the events TDHIT_1 and TDHIT_2 are defined with respect to the algorithm \mathcal{B}_c . (Note that whether or not the event $\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ occurs is determined once $y, \hat{f}_n(\text{pk}_0, \cdot), \hat{g}, \{\hat{f}_n(z, \cdot)\}_{z \neq \text{pk}_0}, \text{td}_0, \text{pk}_0$, and Π_n are all fixed.)

Proof. Let c be an integer that satisfies $e^{-c} \leq 1/3$. In what follows, we show that this c satisfies the condition.

First, for each n such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{\hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, \cdot), \Pi_n \\ y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(y) : \hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, x) = y \right. \\ \left. \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2) \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3} \quad (100)$$

holds, there exists Π_n such that

$$\Pr_{\substack{\hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, \cdot), \\ y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n}} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(y) : \hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, x) = y \right. \\ \left. \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2) \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{3} \quad (101)$$

holds. Below we fix Π_n that satisfies inequality (101) for each n such that inequality (100) holds.

Now we have that

$$\Pr_{\hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, \cdot)} \left[\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(y) : \hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, x) = y \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2) \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{6} \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{6} \quad (102)$$

from inequality (101). In other words, there exists $X \subset \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n)$ such that $|X|$ is lower bounded by $\frac{\epsilon(n)}{6} |\text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n)|$ and

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(y) : \hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, x) = y \right. \\ \left. \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2) \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{6} \quad (103)$$

holds for all $\hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$. Hence, for each $\hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$, from inequality (103) it follows that

$$\Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} \left[\Pr \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(y) : \hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, x) = y \right. \right. \\ \left. \left. \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{12} \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2) \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{12} \right] \quad (104)$$

For each pair $(f(\mathbf{pk}_0, \cdot), y) \in X \times \{0,1\}^n$ such that

$$\Pr \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_n^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(y) : \hat{f}_n(\mathbf{pk}_0, x) = y \right] \geq \frac{\epsilon(n)}{12} \\ \wedge \neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2), \quad (105)$$

we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[x \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_{c,n}^{\hat{g}_n, \hat{f}_n, \hat{f}_n^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(y) : \hat{f}_n(\text{pk}_0, x) = y \right] &\geq 1 - \left(1 - \frac{\epsilon(n)}{12} \right)^{\frac{12c}{\epsilon(n)}} \\ &= 1 - \left(\left(1 - \frac{\epsilon(n)}{12} \right)^{-\frac{1}{\frac{\epsilon(n)}{12}}} \right)^{-c}. \end{aligned} \quad (106)$$

The right hand side of inequality (106) is equal to 1 if $\epsilon(n) = 1$, and lower bounded by $1 - e^{-c} \geq \frac{2}{3}$ if $\epsilon(n) < 1$ (here we used the fact that $(1-x)^{-\frac{1}{x}} \geq e$ holds for $0 < x < 1$). Therefore the claim holds. \square

Then, from the above lemma, it follows that there exists a constant c that satisfies the condition in Lemma A.1 for infinitely many n . Let us denote \mathcal{B}_c by $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$. We use the encoding technique to this Q -query algorithm $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$, here $Q(n) = c \lceil 12/\epsilon(n) \rceil (\max\{q(n), \lambda(n)\} + 1)$. Below we fix a sufficiently large n in addition to Π_n and X such that the condition in Lemma A.1 is satisfied. For simplicity, we write Q , ϵ , \hat{g} , \hat{f} , \hat{f}^{inv} , and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$ instead of $Q(n)$, $\epsilon(n)$, \hat{g}_n , \hat{f}_n , \hat{f}_n^{inv} , and $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$, respectively, for simplicity. Moreover, sometimes we write f instead of $\hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$.

Below we describe an encoder E and a decoder D that compress elements (truth tables of permutations) in X . The encoder in this section has to deal with more oracles than the encoder in Section 5 does, but there is no essential difference between them. The decoder in this section has to simulate the oracle $\hat{f}^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}_0, \cdot) = (\hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot))^{-1}$ since $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ may make queries to it. However, $\hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$ itself is the permutation that our decoder want to invert. Thus we use a dummy oracle that returns \perp for any input instead of $f^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}_0, \cdot)$. Since the sets X and G will be constructed in such a way that the event $\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ occurs with respect to $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$, $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$, and $y \in G$, $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ will not be able to distinguish the dummy oracle and $f^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}_0, \cdot)$.

A.0.2 Encoder E .

When we feed E with $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$ as an input, E first chooses subsets $R, R' \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ by the following sampling: For each $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, x is added to R with probability $\delta^{3/2}/Q^2$, and independently added to R' with probability $\delta^{5/2}/Q^4$. (The pair (R, R') is the random coin of E .)

According to the choice of R' , “bad” inputs (oracle-aided quantum circuits) to $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$ are defined for each $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ as follows. Note that now π_C^1 and π_C^2 have been fixed for each $C \in \text{valid}$, and the output $\text{ColFinder}_{\lambda, \Pi, n}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(C) = (w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1, w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^2, F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1))$ is uniquely determined. Since C is an oracle-aided quantum circuit, we can define query magnitude of C to $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$ on input $w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1$ and $w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^2$ at $z \in \{0, 1\}^n$ (see Definition 3.5). We say a quantum circuit $C \in \text{valid}$ is *bad* relative to x if

$$\sum_{z \in R' \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{C, \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) > \frac{\delta}{Q} \quad (107)$$

or

$$\sum_{z \in R' \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{C, \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^2) > \frac{\delta}{Q} \quad (108)$$

hold, and otherwise we say C is *good* relative to x . Let $\text{badC}(R', x)$ denote the set of bad circuits relative to x for each $R' \subset \{0, 1\}^n$.

Next, E construct a set $G \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ depending on the input $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$. Let $I \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ be the set of elements x such that $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ successfully inverts $f(x) = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, x)$, i.e., $I := \{x \mid \Pr[x' \leftarrow \hat{\mathcal{A}}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(\hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, x)) : x' = x] \geq 2/3\}$. Then $|I| \geq \frac{\epsilon}{12} \cdot 2^n$ holds by definition of X (Remember that X is chosen in such a way as to satisfy the condition in Lemma A.1). Now, a set G is defined to be the set of elements $x \in I$ that satisfies the following conditions:

Condition for G .

(A) $x \in R \cap R'$.

(B) $\sum_{z \in R \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{\hat{\mathcal{A}}, \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)}(\hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, x)) \leq \delta/Q$.

(C) $\sum_{C \in \text{badC}(R', x)} \mu_C^{\hat{\mathcal{A}}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(\hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, x)) \leq \delta/Q$.

Finally, E encodes $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$ into $(f|_{\{0, 1\}^n \setminus G}, f(G))$ if $|G| \geq \theta$, where $\theta = (1 - 60\sqrt{\delta})\delta^4 \cdot (\frac{\epsilon}{12}) \cdot 2^n / 2Q^6$. Otherwise E encodes $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$ into \perp .

In addition, here we formally define the set Y (the range of E) as

$$Y := \{(f|_{\{0, 1\}^n \setminus G}, f(G)) \mid f \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n), G \subset \{0, 1\}^n, |G| \geq \theta\}. \quad (109)$$

In fact $E((R, R'), f) \in Y \cup \{\perp\}$ holds for any choice of (R, R') and any permutation $f \in X$.

A.0.3 Decoder D .

D takes (\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) as input in addition to (R, R') , where $\tilde{G} \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ and \tilde{f} is a bijection from a subset of $\{0, 1\}^n$ onto $\{0, 1\}^n \setminus \tilde{G}$, and R, R' are subsets of $\{0, 1\}^n$. If $\{0, 1\}^n \setminus (\text{the domain of } \tilde{f}) \not\subset R \cap R'$ holds, then D outputs \perp . Otherwise, D decodes (\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) and reconstruct the truth table of a permutation $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$ as follows.

For each x in the domain of \tilde{f} , D infers the value $f(x) = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, x)$ as $f(x) := \tilde{f}(x)$. For other elements $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ which is not contained in the domain of \tilde{f} , what D now knows is only that $f(x)$ is contained in \tilde{G} . To determine the remaining part of the truth table of $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$, D tries to recover the value $f^{-1}(y)$, which is equal to $(\hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot))^{-1}(y) = \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}_0, y)$, for each $y \in \tilde{G}$ by using $\hat{\mathcal{A}}$ and without the oracle $\hat{f}^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}_0, \cdot)$.

In a similar way as we did in Section 5, D prepares oracles h_y and SimCF^{h_y} which approximates $f(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)$ and $\text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$, respectively, and computes the output distribution of $\hat{\mathcal{A}}^{\hat{g}, (h_y, \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (\perp, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}}), \text{SimCF}^{h_y}}$ on input y . Here, $(h_y, \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0})$ is the oracle that returns $h_y(x)$ on input (pk_0, x) , and returns $\hat{f}(z, x)$ on input (z, x) such that $z \neq \text{pk}_0$. $(\perp, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}})$ is the oracle that returns \perp on input (td_0, x) and returns $\hat{f}^{\text{inv}}(z, x)$ on input (z, x) such that $z \neq \text{td}_0$.

SimCF^{h_y} uses a subroutine CalC_y that takes (C, w) as an input (C is a valid oracle-aided circuit that may make queries to $\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}$ and computes a function $F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$, and w is an element of the domain of $F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}$) and simulates the evaluation of $F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w)$. D finally infers that $f^{-1}(y)$, which is equal to $(f(\text{pk}_0, \cdot))^{-1}(y) = \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}_0, y)$, is the element which $\hat{\mathcal{A}}^{\hat{g}, (h_y, \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (\perp, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}}), \text{SimCF}^{h_y}}$ outputs with probability greater than $1/2$. (If there does not exist such an element, then D outputs \perp .) Below we describe h_y , CalC_y , and SimCF^{h_y} .

Oracle h_y . The oracle (function) $h_y : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is defined by

$$h_y(z) = \begin{cases} \tilde{f}(z) & \text{if } z \notin R \cap R', \\ y & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \quad (110)$$

Subroutine CalC_y . Let $P_{\text{candidate}} := \{h' \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n) \mid \Delta(h', h_y) \subset R \cap R'\}$. CalC_y is defined as the following procedures. For $h' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, let $(h'^{-1}, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}})$ denote the oracle that returns $h'^{-1}(x)$ on input (td_0, x) and returns $\hat{f}^{\text{inv}}(z, x)$ on input (z, x) such that $z \neq \text{td}_0$.

1. Take an input (C, w) , where C is a valid oracle-aided circuit and w is an element of the domain of the function F_C ,
2. Compute the output distribution of the quantum circuit $C^{\hat{g}, (h', \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (h'^{-1}, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}})}$ on input w for each $h' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, and find the corresponding output $u(C, w, h')$ which has the highest probability (i.e., $u(C, w, h')$ is the u that maximizes $\Pr \left[C^{\hat{g}, (h', \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (h'^{-1}, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}})}(w) = u \right]$). If there are two or more candidates of $u(C, w, h')$ for h' , set $u(C, w, h') := \perp$.
3. If $u(C, w, h') = u(C, w, h'') \neq \perp$ for all $h', h'' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, return the value $u(C, w, h')$. Otherwise return \perp .

Oracle SimCF^{h_y} . SimCF^{h_y} is defined as the following procedures:

1. Take an input C , where C is an oracle-aided quantum circuit.
2. Check if C is a valid input by checking whether there exists $y \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$ such that $\Pr[C^{g'_n, f'_n, f_n{}^{\text{inv}}} |x, 0, 0\rangle = y] > 2/3$ holds for any $g'_n \in \text{Perm}(\{0, 1\}^n)$, $f'_n : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $f'(z, \cdot)$ is a permutation for all $z \in \{0, 1\}^n$, and $x \in \{0, 1\}^m$, and whether the size of C is less than or equal to $\lambda(n)$. If C is an invalid input, return \perp .
3. Compute $\tilde{w}_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1 := \pi_C^1(0^m)$.
4. If $\text{CalC}_y(C, \tilde{w}_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) = \perp$, return \perp .
5. Otherwise, search the minimum $t \in \{0, 1\}^m$ such that $\text{CalC}_y(C, \tilde{w}_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) = \text{CalC}_y(C, \pi_C^2(t))$ by checking whether $\text{CalC}_y(C, \tilde{w}_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) = \text{CalC}_y(C, \pi_C^2(i))$ holds for $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$ in a sequential order.
6. If the minimum number t is found, set $\tilde{w}_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^2 := \pi_C^2(t)$. Otherwise return \perp .
7. Return $(\tilde{w}_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1, \tilde{w}_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^2, \text{CalC}_y(C, \tilde{w}_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1))$.

Note that D is an information theoretic decoder, and we do not care whether CalC_y and SimCF^{h_y} run efficiently.

A.0.4 Analyses.

The following lemma, which corresponds to Lemma A.2 in Section 5, shows that h_y , CalC_y , and SimCF^{h_y} satisfy some suitable properties. Here we consider the situation that D takes an input (\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) such that $(\tilde{f}, \tilde{G}) = E((R, R'), f)$ for some subsets $R, R' \subset \{0, 1\}^n$ and a permutation $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in \{0, 1\}^n$, and tries to recover the value $f^{-1}(y)$ for some $y \in \tilde{G}$.

In Lemma 5.3, some suitable properties are satisfied for good circuits. On the other hand, in Lemma A.2, to satisfy the corresponding suitable properties, a circuit have to be good *and* non-trapdoor-hitting (see (72)). This is the main difference between Lemma 5.3 and Lemma A.2.

Lemma A.2. *h_y , CalC_y , and SimCF_{h_y} satisfy the following properties.*

1. $\Delta(h_y, f) = R \cap R' \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\}$ holds.
2. $\text{CalC}_y(C, w) = F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w)$ or \perp holds for any $C \in \text{valid}$ and w .
3. For each circuit $C \in \text{valid}$ which is good relative to $f^{-1}(y)$ and non-trapdoor-hitting, $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) = F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1)$ and $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^2) = F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^2)$ hold.
4. $\text{SimCF}^{h_y}(C) = \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(C)$ holds for each circuit $C \in \text{valid}$ which is good relative to $f^{-1}(y)$ and non-trapdoor-hitting. In particular, $\Delta(\text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}, \text{SimCF}^{h_y}) \subset \text{badC}(R', f^{-1}(y)) \cup \text{hitC}$ holds, where hitC is the set of trapdoor-hitting circuits.

Proof. The first property is obviously satisfied by definition of h_y .

For the second property, since $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, if $\text{CalC}_y(C, w) \neq \perp$ then we have $\text{CalC}_y(C, w) = u(C, w, f)$ by definition of CalC_y , and $u(C, w, f) = F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w)$ always holds. Hence the second property holds.

For the third property, for each $h' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, from Lemma 3.2 we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[C^{\hat{g}, (h', \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (h'^{-1}, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}})}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) = F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) \right] \\ & \geq \Pr \left[C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) = F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) \right] \\ & \quad - \left\| C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}} |w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1, 0, 0\rangle - C^{\hat{g}, (h', \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (h'^{-1}, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}})} |w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1, 0, 0\rangle \right\|. \end{aligned} \quad (111)$$

From the swapping lemma (Lemma 3.3) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} & \left\| C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}} |w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1, 0, 0\rangle - C^{\hat{g}, (h', \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (h'^{-1}, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}})} |w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1, 0, 0\rangle \right\| \\ & \leq 2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{z \in \Delta(f(\text{pk}_0, \cdot), h')} \mu_z^{C, \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1)} \\ & \quad + 2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{z \in \{0, 1\}^n} \mu_z^{C, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}_0, \cdot)}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1)}. \end{aligned} \quad (112)$$

Since $\Delta(f(\text{pk}_0, \cdot), h') = \Delta(f, h') \subset R \cap R' \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\} \subset R' \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\}$ holds for all $h' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$, and C is good relative to $f^{-1}(y)$ and non-trapdoor-hitting, the right hand side of the above inequality is upper bounded by $2\sqrt{\delta} + 2\sqrt{\delta} = 4\sqrt{\delta}$. Thus, for a sufficiently small δ we have

$$\Pr \left[C^{\hat{g}, (h', \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (h'^{-1}, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}})}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) = F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) \right] \geq \frac{2}{3} - 4\sqrt{\delta} > \frac{1}{2}, \quad (113)$$

which implies that $u(C, w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1, h') = F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1)$ holds for every $h' \in P_{\text{candidate}}$. Thus $\text{CalC}_y(C, w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1) = F_C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}(w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^1)$ holds if C is good relative to $f^{-1}(y)$ and non-trapdoor-hitting. It can be shown that the corresponding property also holds for $w_{C^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}^2$ in the same way.

The fourth property follows from the definition of SimCF^{h_y} , the second property, and the third property. \square

The following lemma shows that the decoding always succeeds if the encoding succeeds. In the proof below, we make full use of the condition that the sets X and G are constructed in such a way that the event $\neg(\text{TDHIT}_1 \vee \text{TDHIT}_2)$ occurs with respect to \hat{A} , $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$, and $y \in G$.

Lemma A.3. *If $E((R, R'), f) \neq \perp$, then $D((R, R'), E((R, R'), f)) = f$ holds for each $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$.*

Proof of Lemma 5.4. Let $\tilde{f} := f|_{\{0,1\}^n \setminus G}$ and $\tilde{G} := f(G)$. We show that D can correctly recover $x = f^{-1}(y)$ for each $y \in \tilde{G}$.

We apply the swapping lemma (Lemma 3.3) to the oracle tuples $(\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}})$ and $(\hat{g}, (h_y, \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (\perp, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}}), \text{SimCF}^{h_y})$. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned} & \left\| \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle - \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{\hat{g}, (h_y, \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (\perp, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}}), \text{SimCF}^{h_y}} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle \right\| \\ & \leq 2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{z \in \Delta(\hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot), h_y)} \mu_z^{\hat{A}, \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)}(f(x))} + 2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{z \in \{0,1\}^n} \mu_z^{\hat{A}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}(\text{td}_0, \cdot)}(f(x))} \\ & + 2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{C \in \Delta(\text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}, \text{SimCF}^{h_y})} \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(f(x))}. \end{aligned} \quad (114)$$

Since $\Delta(\hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot), h_y) = \Delta(f, h_y) = R \cap R' \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\} \subset R \setminus \{f^{-1}(y)\} = R \setminus \{x\}$ hold, the first term of the right hand side of inequality (114) is upper bounded by

$$2 \sqrt{Q \sum_{z \in R \setminus \{x\}} \mu_z^{\hat{A}, \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot)}(f(x))}, \quad (115)$$

which is upper bounded by $2\sqrt{\delta}$ due to the condition (B) (see p. 47)

In addition, since TDHIT_1 does not occur for $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$ and $y \in \tilde{G}$ by definition of X and \tilde{G} , the second term of the right hand side of inequality (114) is also upper bounded by $2\sqrt{\delta}$.

Moreover, since $\Delta(\text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}, \text{SimCF}^{h_y}) \subset \text{badC}(R', f^{-1}(y)) \cup \text{hitC} = \text{badC}(R', x) \cup \text{hitC}$ holds from Lemma A.2, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} & \sum_{C \in \Delta(\text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}, \text{SimCF}^{h_y})} \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(f(x)) \\ & \leq \sum_{C \in \text{badC}(R', x)} \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(f(x)) + \sum_{C \in \text{hitC}} \mu_C^{\hat{A}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}}(f(x)) \\ & \leq \frac{\delta}{Q} + \frac{\delta}{Q}, \end{aligned} \quad (116)$$

here we used the condition (C) (see p. 47) and that TDHIT₂ does not occur for $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$ and $x \in G$ by definition of X and G for the last inequality. Hence the third term of the right hand side of eq. (114) is upper bounded by $8\sqrt{\delta}$.

Thus, eventually we have

$$\left\| \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle - \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{\hat{g}, (h_y, \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (\perp, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}}), \text{SimCF}^{h_y}} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle \right\| \leq 8\sqrt{\delta}. \quad (117)$$

Finally, from Lemma 3.2, for sufficiently small δ it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[\hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{\hat{g}, (h_y, \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (\perp, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}}), \text{SimCF}^{h_y}} (f(x)) = x \right] \\ & \geq \Pr \left[\hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}} (f(x)) = x \right] \\ & \quad - \left\| \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}, \text{ColFinder}^{\hat{g}, \hat{f}, \hat{f}^{\text{inv}}}} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle \right. \\ & \quad \left. - \hat{\mathcal{A}}_n^{\hat{g}, (h_y, \hat{f}_{\text{pk} \neq \text{pk}_0}), (\perp, \hat{f}_{\text{td} \neq \text{td}_0}^{\text{inv}}), \text{SimCF}^{h_y}} |f(x), 0, 0\rangle \right\| \\ & \geq 2/3 - 8\sqrt{\delta} > 1/2, \end{aligned} \quad (118)$$

which implies that D correctly recovers $x = f^{-1}(y)$. \square

The following lemma shows that our E and D works well with a constant probability.

Lemma A.4. *If $Q^6 \leq \delta^4 \cdot \frac{\epsilon}{12} \cdot 2^n / 32$,*

$$\Pr_{(R, R')} [D((R, R'), E((R, R'), f)) = f] \geq 0.7 \quad (119)$$

holds for each $f = \hat{f}(\text{pk}_0, \cdot) \in X$.

Since it can be proven in the almost same way as Lemma 5.5 is proven (by replacing $\frac{\epsilon(n)}{6}$ and $\frac{\epsilon(n)}{12}$ with p_1 and p_2 , respectively), here we omit the proof of Lemma A.4.

Finally, we show that Proposition A.1 follows from the above lemmas.

Proof of Proposition A.1. First, remember that the set Y is defined as

$$Y := \{(f|_{\{0,1\}^n \setminus G}, f(G)) \mid f \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n), G \subset \{0,1\}^n, |G| \geq \theta\}. \quad (120)$$

For each fixed positive integer $\theta \leq M \leq 2^n$, the cardinality of the set

$$Y_M := \{(f|_{\{0,1\}^n \setminus G}, f(G)) \mid f \in \text{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n), G \in \{0,1\}^n, |G| = M\} \quad (121)$$

is equal to $(2^n - M)! \cdot \binom{2^n}{M} = (2^n)! / M!$. Thus $|Y|$ is upper bounded as

$$|Y| = \sum_{M=\lceil \theta \rceil}^{2^n} \frac{(2^n)!}{M!} \leq 2^n \cdot \frac{(2^n)!}{(\lceil \theta \rceil)!} \quad (122)$$

for sufficiently large n . Here we show the following claim.

Claim A.1. *If $Q^6 \leq \delta^4 \cdot \frac{\epsilon}{12} \cdot 2^n/32$, there exists a constant const_1 such that $Q^6 \geq \text{const}_1 \cdot \epsilon^2 \cdot 2^n/n$ holds. We can choose const_1 independently of n .*

Proof of Claim. By definition of X , $|X| \geq \frac{\epsilon}{6} \cdot (2^n)!$ holds. In addition, from inequality (122), we have $|Y| \leq 2^n \cdot \frac{(2^n)!}{(\lceil \theta \rceil)!}$. Moreover, since now we are assuming that $Q^6 \leq \delta^4 \cdot \frac{\epsilon}{12} \cdot 2^n/32$ holds, it follows that $|Y| \geq 0.7|X|$ from Lemma 5.2 and Lemma A.4. Hence we have $2^n \cdot \frac{(2^n)!}{(\lceil \theta \rceil)!} \geq 0.7 \cdot \frac{\epsilon}{6} \cdot (2^n)!$, which is equivalent to

$$\frac{6 \cdot 2^n}{0.7 \cdot \epsilon} \geq \lceil \theta \rceil!. \quad (123)$$

Since $n! \geq 2^n$ holds for $n \geq 4$, we have that

$$\left\lceil \frac{6 \cdot n}{0.7 \cdot \epsilon} \right\rceil! \geq \frac{6 \cdot 2^n}{0.7 \cdot \epsilon} \quad (124)$$

for sufficiently large n . Hence we have $\lceil \frac{6 \cdot n}{0.7 \cdot \epsilon} \rceil \geq \lceil \theta \rceil$, which implies that

$$\frac{6n}{0.7 \cdot \epsilon} + 1 \geq \theta = \delta^4 \left(1 - 60\sqrt{\delta}\right) \cdot \frac{\epsilon}{12} \cdot \frac{2^n}{2Q^6} \quad (125)$$

holds. Moreover, since δ is a constant, there exists a constant const_1 that is independent of n and

$$Q^6 \geq \text{const}_1 \cdot \epsilon^2 \cdot 2^n/n \quad (126)$$

holds, which completes the proof of the claim. \square

From the above claim, it follows that there exists a constant const_2 such that

$$Q^6 \geq \min \left\{ \delta^4 \cdot \frac{\epsilon}{12} \cdot 2^n/32, \text{const}_1 \cdot \epsilon^2 \cdot 2^n/n \right\} \geq \text{const}_2 \cdot \epsilon^2 2^n/n \quad (127)$$

holds.

Since $Q = c \left\lceil \frac{12}{\epsilon} \right\rceil (\max\{q, \eta\} + 1)$ by definition of Q and $\frac{1}{\epsilon} \geq 1$, we have

$$c^6 \left\lceil \frac{12}{\epsilon} \right\rceil^6 (\max\{q, s\} + 1)^6 \geq \text{const}_2 \cdot \epsilon^2 \cdot 2^n/n. \quad (128)$$

Hence there exists a constant const such that

$$\max\{q, \eta\} \geq \text{const} \cdot \epsilon^3 \cdot 2^{n/7} \quad (129)$$

holds for sufficiently large n , which completes the proof. \square