

Updatable Encryption with Post-Compromise Security^{*}

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Abstract. An updatable encryption scheme allows to periodically rotate the encryption key and move already existing ciphertexts from the old to the new key. These ciphertext updates are done with the help of a so-called update token and can be performed by an untrusted party, as the update never decrypts the data. Updatable encryption is particularly useful in settings where encrypted data is outsourced, e.g., stored on a cloud server. The data owner can produce an update token, and the cloud server can update the ciphertexts.

We provide a comprehensive treatment of *ciphertext-independent* schemes, where a single token is used to update all ciphertexts. We show that the existing ciphertext-independent schemes and models by Boneh et al. (CRYPTO'13) and Everspaugh et al. (CRYPTO'17) do not guarantee the *post-compromise* security one would intuitively expect from key rotation. In fact, the simple scheme recently proposed by Everspaugh et al. allows to recover the current key upon corruption of a single old key. Surprisingly, none of the models so far reflects the timely aspect of key rotation which makes it hard to grasp *when* an adversary is allowed to corrupt keys. We propose strong security models that clearly capture post-compromise and forward security under adaptive attacks. We then analyze various existing schemes and show that none of them is secure in this strong model, but we formulate the additional constraints that suffice to prove their security in a relaxed version of our model. Finally, we propose a new updatable encryption scheme that achieves our strong notions while being (at least) as efficient as the existing solutions.

1 Introduction

In data storage, key rotation refers to the process of (periodically) exchanging the cryptographic key material that is used to protect the data. Key rotation is considered good practice as it hedges against the impact of cryptographic keys being compromised over time. For instance, the Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard (PCI DSS) [23], which specifies how credit card data must be stored in encrypted form mandates key rotation, meaning that encrypted data must regularly be moved from an old to a fresh key. Many cloud storage providers that implement data-at-rest encryption, such as Google and Amazon, employ

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a similar feature [15]. The trivial approach to update an existing ciphertext towards a new key is to decrypt the ciphertext and re-encrypt the underlying plaintext from scratch using the fresh key. Implementing this approach for secure cloud storage applications where the data owner outsources his data in encrypted form to a potentially untrusted host is not trivial, though: Either the owner has to download, re-encrypt and upload all ciphertexts, which makes outsourcing impractical, or the encryption keys have to be sent to the host, violating security.

Updatable Encryption. A better solution for updating ciphertexts has been proposed by Boneh et al. [10]: in what they call an *updatable encryption scheme*, the data owner can produce a short update token that allows the host to re-encrypt the data himself, while preserving the security of the encryption, i.e., the token allows to migrate ciphertexts from an old to a new key, but does not give the host an advantage in breaking the confidentiality of the protected data. Boneh et al. also proposed a construction (BLMR) based on key-homomorphic PRFs, which essentially is a symmetric proxy re-encryption scheme (PRE) where one sequentially re-encrypts data from one epoch to the next.

While being somewhat similar in spirit, PRE and updatable encryption do have different security requirements: PRE schemes often keep parts of the ciphertexts static throughout re-encryption, as there is no need to make a re-encrypted ciphertext independent from the original ciphertext it was derived from. In updatable encryption, however, the goal should be that an updated ciphertext is as secure as a fresh encryption; in particular, it should look like an independently computed ciphertext even given previous ones. Thus, any scheme that produces linkable ciphertexts, such as the original BLMR construction, cannot guarantee such a security notion capturing post-compromise security of updated ciphertexts.

Ciphertext-Independence vs. Ciphertext-Dependence. In the full version of their paper, Boneh et al. [9] provide security notions for updatable encryption, which aim to cover the desired indistinguishability of updated ciphertexts. To satisfy that notion, they have to remove the linkability from the BLMR scheme, which they achieve by moving to the setting of *ciphertext-dependent* updates. In ciphertext-dependent schemes, the owner no longer produces a single token that can update *all* ciphertexts, but produces a dedicated token for each ciphertext. Therefore, the owner has to download all outsourced ciphertexts, compute a specific token for every ciphertext, and send all tokens back to the host.

Clearly, ciphertext-dependent schemes are much less efficient and more cumbersome for the data owner than *ciphertext-independent* ones. They also increase the complexity of the update procedure for the host, who has to ensure that it applies the correct token for each ciphertext—any mistake renders the updated ciphertexts useless. Another, more subtle disadvantage of ciphertext-dependent schemes is that they require the old and new keys to be present together for a longer time, as the owner needs both keys to derive the individual tokens for all of his ciphertexts. Deleting the old key too early might risk losing the ability of decrypting ciphertexts that have not been upgraded yet, whereas keeping the

old key too long makes an attack at that time more lucrative—the adversary obtains two keys at the same time. In a ciphertext-independent scheme, the old key can and should be deleted immediately after the token has been derived.

In a recent work [15], Everspaugh et al. provide a systematic treatment for such ciphertext-dependent schemes and observe that computing the token often does not require access to the full ciphertext, but only to a short ciphertext header, which allows to moderately improve the efficiency of this approach. Everspaugh et al. also show that the security notions from [9] do not cover the desired property of post-compromise security of updated ciphertexts. They provide two new security notions and propose schemes that can provably satisfy them. As a side-result, they also propose a security definition for ciphertext-independent schemes and suggest a simple xor-based scheme (XOR-KEM) for this setting.

Ambiguity of Security Models. Interestingly, both previous works phrase the algorithms and security models for updatable encryption in the flavor of normal proxy re-encryption. That leads to a mismatch of how the scheme is used and modeled—in practice, an updatable encryption scheme is used in a clear sequential setting, updating ciphertexts as the key progresses. The security model offers more and unrealistic flexibility, though: it allows to rotate keys and ciphertexts across *arbitrary* epochs, jumping back in forth in time. This flexibility gives the adversary more power than he has in reality and, most importantly, makes the security that is captured by the model hard to grasp, as it is not clear *when* the adversary is allowed to corrupt keys.

Non-intuitive security definitions increase the risk that proofs are flawed or that schemes are unintentionally used outside the security model. And in fact, the way that Everspaugh et al. [15] define security for (ciphertext-independent) schemes is ambiguous, and only the weaker interpretation of their model allows their scheme XOR-KEM to be proven secure. However, this weaker interpretation does not guarantee any confidentiality *after* a secret key got compromised, as it allows key corruption only after the challenge epoch. Thus, an updatable scheme that is secure only in such a weak model does not provide the intuitive security one would expect from key rotation: namely that after migrating to the new key, the old one becomes useless and no longer of value to the adversary. To the contrary, all previous keys still require strong protection or secure deletion.

Importance of Post-Compromise Security. Realizing secure deletion in practice is virtually impossible, as keys may be copied or moved across the RAM, swap partitions, and SSD memory blocks, and thus we consider *post-compromise security* an essential property of updatable schemes. Avoiding the assumption of securely deleted keys and re-gaining security after a temporary corruption has recently inspired numerous works on how to achieve post-compromise security in other encryption settings [6, 13, 14, 16]. Note that an updatable encryption scheme that is not post-compromise secure can even reduce the security compared with a scheme where keys are never rotated: as one expects old keys to be useless after rotation, practitioners can be misled to reduce the safety measures

for “expired” keys, which in turn makes key compromises more likely. For the example of Everspaugh et al.’s simple XOR-KEM scheme [15], a compromised old key allows to fully recover the fresh key.

This leaves open the important question how to design a ciphertext-independent scheme that achieves post-compromise security, capturing the full spirit of updatable encryption and key rotation.

Our Contributions. In this work we provide a comprehensive treatment for *ciphertext-independent* updatable encryption schemes that have clear advantages in efficiency and ease-of-deployment over the ciphertext-dependent solutions. We model updatable encryption and its security in the natural sequential manner that is inherent in key rotation, avoiding the ambiguity of previous works, and clearly capturing all desired security properties. We also analyze the (in)security of a number of existing schemes and finally propose a construction that provably satisfies our strong security notions.

Strong Security Models. We define updatable encryption in its natural form where keys and ciphertexts sequentially evolve over time epochs. To capture security, we allow the adversary to *adaptively* corrupt secret keys, update tokens and ciphertexts in any combination of epochs as long as this does not allow him to trivially decrypt a challenge ciphertext. In our first notion, *indistinguishability of encryptions* (IND-ENC), such a challenge ciphertext will be a fresh encryption C_d of one of two messages m_0, m_1 under the current epoch key, and the task of the adversary is to guess the bit d . This is the standard CPA game adapted to the updatable encryption and adaptive corruption setting. Our second notion, *indistinguishability of updates* (IND-UPD), returns as a challenge the re-encryption C'_d of a ciphertext either C_0 or C_1 , and an adversary again has to guess the bit d .

We stress that this second property is essential for the security of updatable encryption schemes, as it captures confidentiality of *updated* encryptions, whereas IND-ENC only guarantees security for ciphertexts that originate from a fresh encryption. While IND-ENC is similar to the security of symmetric proxy re-encryption schemes, IND-UPD is a property that is special to the context of key rotation. And thus, contrary to a common belief, a symmetric PRE scheme cannot directly be used for secure updatable encryption [10, 15, 21]!

In the ciphertext-independent setting, capturing the information that the adversary can infer from a certain amount of corrupted tokens, keys and ciphertexts is a delicate matter, as, e.g., an update token allows the adversary to move *any* ciphertext from one epoch to the next. We observe that all existing constructions leak more information than necessary. Instead of hard-coding the behavior of the known schemes into the security model, we propose a set of leakage profiles, and define both the optimal and currently achievable leakage.

We then compare our model to the existing definition for encryption indistinguishability by Everspaugh et al. [15]. We argue that their definition can be interpreted in two ways: the weaker interpretation rules out post-compromise security, but allows the XOR-KEM construction to be secure, whereas the stronger

	SE-KEM	2ENC	BLMR	BLMR+	RISE
IND-ENC	(✓) no token near a challenge	(✓) either token near challenge, or secret key	✓	✓	✓
IND-UPD	✗	(✓) no token near a challenge	✗	(✓) at most one token	✓

Table 1. Overview of results in this work. (Corruption of secret keys in challenge epochs is forbidden by the IND-ENC and IND-UPD definitions. The symbol (✓) denotes that a schemes requires additional constraints on the tokens that can be corrupted to achieve the security notion.)

interpretation is closer to our IND-ENC model. However, in their stronger version, as well as in our IND-ENC notion, we show that XOR-KEM cannot be secure by describing a simple attack that allows to recover the challenge secret key after compromising one old key. We further show that IND-ENC is strictly stronger than the weak interpretation of [15], but incomparable to the stronger one, due to the way both models handle adversarial ciphertexts.

Provably Secure Constructions. We further analyze several schemes according to the new definitions (Sec. 5), the results are summarized in Table 1. First, we consider a simple construction (called 2ENC) that is purely based on symmetric primitives. Unfortunately, the scheme cannot satisfy our strong security notions. Yet, instead of simply labeling this real-world solution as insecure, we formulate the additional constraints on the adversarial behavior that suffice to prove its security in relaxed versions of our IND-ENC and IND-UPD models.

We then turn our attention to less efficient but more secure schemes, starting with the BLMR construction by Boneh et al. [10] that uses key-homomorphic PRFs. We show that the original BLMR scheme does satisfy our IND-ENC notion but not IND-UPD, and also propose a slight modification BLMR+ that improves the latter and achieves a weak form of update indistinguishability. While BLMR seems to be a purely symmetric solution on the first glance, any instantiation of the underlying key-homomorphic PRFs so far requires modular exponentiations or is built from lattices. The same holds for the recent ciphertext-dependent construction by Everspaugh et al. [15] that also relies on key-homomorphic PRFs and suggests a discrete-logarithm based instantiation.

Acknowledging that secure updatable encryption schemes seem to inherently require techniques from the public-key world, we then build a scheme that omits the intermediate abstraction of using key-homomorphic PRFs which allows us to take full advantage of the underlying group operations. Our construction (RISE, for Re-randomizable ciphertext-Independent Symmetric ElGamal) can be seen as the classic ElGamal-based proxy re-encryption scheme combined with a fresh re-randomization upon each re-encryption. We prove that this scheme fully achieves both of our strong security definitions.

	Ciphertext Independent	Encryption	Token Derivation	Update of n Ciphertexts
BLMR' [9]		2 exp.	$2n$ sym.	$2n$ exp.
ReCrypt [15]		2 exp.	$2n$ exp.	$2n$ exp.
BLMR [10]	✓	2 exp.	2 exp.	$2n$ exp.
BLMR+ (this work)	✓	2 exp.	2 exp.	$2n$ exp.
RISE (this work)	✓	2 exp.	1 exp.	$2n$ exp.

Table 2. Comparison of computational efficiency measured by the most expensive operations for short (one-block) ciphertexts (exponentiation, symmetric cryptography).² Note that the ciphertext-dependent BLMR' variant of [9] is unlikely to have a security proof [15], and BLMR and BLMR+ achieve significantly weaker security than RISE. (SE-KEM and 2ENC are omitted here as they are purely symmetric solutions.)

We compare the schemes in terms of efficiency in Table 2. The costs for encryption and updates of our most secure RISE scheme are—on the owner side—even lower than the costs in the less secure BLMR scheme and the recent ciphertext-dependent scheme ReCrypt by Everspaugh et al. [15]. The solution by Everspaugh et al. shifts significantly many expensive update operations to the data owner, who has to compute two exponentiation for each ciphertext (block) that shall be updated, whereas our scheme requires the owner to compute only a single exponentiation for the update of all ciphertexts.

In Appendix A, we additionally analyze a “hybrid-encryption” scheme SE-KEM that is widely used in practical data-at-rest protection, where the encrypted plaintext is stored together with the encryption key wrapped under an epoch key. The scheme provides rather weak guarantees when viewed as an updatable encryption scheme, but may still be useful in certain scenarios due to the efficient key update.

Other Related Work. Beyond the previous work on updatable encryption [9, 10, 15] that we already discussed above, the most closely related line of work is on (symmetric) proxy re-encryption (PRE) [2, 3, 7, 8, 12, 17, 19–21]. Notably, the recent work of Berners-Lee [7] builds on the work of Everspaugh et al. [15] and views the concept of ciphertext-dependent updates as a desirable security feature of PRE in general, as it reduces the freedom of a possibly untrusted proxy. The recent work of Myers and Shull [21] studies *hybrid* PRE schemes aiming at efficient solutions for key rotation and access revocation. As stressed before, however, while being similar in the sense that PRE allows a proxy to move ciphertexts from one key to another, the desired security guarantees have subtle differences and the security property of IND-UPD that is crucial for updatable encryption is neither covered nor needed by PRE.

While this means that a secure PRE does not automatically yield a secure updatable encryption scheme, it does not prevent PREs from being secure in the updatable encryption sense as well—but this has to be proven from scratch. In fact, our schemes are strongly inspired by proxy re-encryption: For the simple

double-encryption scheme discussed by Ivan and Dodis [18], we show that a weak form of security can be proven, and our most secure scheme RISE combines the ElGamal-based PRE with re-randomization of ciphertexts. We also observe similar challenges in designing schemes that limit the “power” of the token, which is related to the long-standing problem of constructing efficient PRE’s that are uni-directional, multi-hop and collusion-resistant.

In the context of tokenization, which is the process of consistently replacing sensitive elements, such as credit card numbers, with non-sensitive surrogate values, the feature of key rotation has recently been studied by Cachin et al. [11]. Their schemes are inherently deterministic, and thus their results are not applicable to the problem of probabilistic encryption, but we follow their formalization of modeling key rotation in a strictly sequential manner.

Finally, a recent paper of Ananth et al. [1] provides a broader perspective on updatable cryptography, but targets generic and rather complex schemes with techniques such as randomized encodings. The definitions in their work have linkability hardcoded, as randomness has to remain the same across updates, which is in contrast to our goal of achieving efficient unlinkable schemes for the specific case of updatable encryption.

2 Preliminaries

Symmetric Encryption. A symmetric encryption scheme SE consists of a key space \mathcal{K} and three polynomial-time algorithms SE.kgen, SE.enc, SE.dec satisfying the following conditions:

- SE.kgen: The probabilistic key generation algorithm takes as input a security parameter and produces an encryption key $k \in \mathcal{K}$. That is, $k \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$.
- SE.enc: The probabilistic encryption algorithm takes a key $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and returns a ciphertext C , written as $C \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k, m)$.
- SE.dec: The deterministic decryption algorithm SE.dec takes a key $k \in \mathcal{K}$ and a ciphertext C to return a message $(\mathcal{M} \cup \{\perp\}) \ni m \leftarrow \text{SE.dec}(k, C)$

For correctness we require that for any key $k \in \mathcal{K}$, any message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and any ciphertext $C \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k, m)$, we have $m \leftarrow \text{SE.dec}(k, C)$.

Chosen-Plaintext Security. The IND-CPA security of a symmetric encryption scheme SE is defined through the following game $\text{GAME}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{A})$ with adversary \mathcal{A} . Initially, choose $b \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$ and $k \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$. Run adversary \mathcal{A} with oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$, which computes $C \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k, m)$ and returns C . When \mathcal{A} outputs two messages m_0, m_1 with $|m_0| = |m_1|$ and a state *state*, compute $\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k, m_b)$ and run $\mathcal{A}(\tilde{C}, \text{state})$, again with access to oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} . When \mathcal{A} outputs a bit \tilde{b} , the game is won if $b = \tilde{b}$. The IND-CPA advantage of \mathcal{A} is defined as $|2 \Pr[\text{GAME}^{\text{IND-CPA}}(\mathcal{A}) \text{ won}] - 1|$, and SE is called IND-CPA-secure if for all efficient adversaries \mathcal{A} the advantage is negligible in λ .

² The computation of the key-homomorphic PRF requires 2 exponentiations—one for hashing into the group and one for computing the PRF.

Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption. Our final construction requires a group (\mathbb{G}, g, p) as input where \mathbb{G} denotes a cyclic group $\mathbb{G} = \langle g \rangle$ of order p in which the Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) problem is hard w.r.t. λ , i.e., p is a λ -bit prime. More precisely, a group (\mathbb{G}, g, p) satisfies the DDH assumption if for any efficient adversary \mathcal{A} the probability $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G}, p, g, g^a, g^b, g^{ab})] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbb{G}, p, g, g^a, g^b, g^c)]|$ is negligible in λ , where the probability is over the random choice of p, g , the random choices of $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, and \mathcal{A} 's coin tosses.

3 Formalizing Updatable Encryption

We now present our formalization of updatable encryption and its desired security features, and discuss how our security model captures these properties.

An updatable encryption scheme contains algorithms for a data *owner* and a *host*. The owner encrypts data using the `UE.enc` algorithm, and then outsources the ciphertexts to the host. To this end, the data owner initially runs an algorithm `UE.setup` to create an encryption key. The encryption key evolves with *epochs*, and the data is encrypted with respect to a specific epoch e , starting with $e = 0$. When moving from epoch e to epoch $e + 1$, the owner invokes an algorithm `UE.next` to generate the key material k_{e+1} for the new epoch and an update token Δ_{e+1} . The owner then sends Δ_{e+1} to the host, deletes k_e and Δ_e immediately, and uses k_{e+1} for encryption from now on. After receiving Δ_{e+1} , the host first deletes Δ_e and then uses an algorithm `UE.upd` to update all previously received ciphertexts from epoch e to $e + 1$, using Δ_{e+1} . Hence, during some epoch e , the update token from $e - 1$ to e is available at the host, but update tokens from earlier epochs have been deleted. (The host could already delete the token when all ciphertexts are updated, but as this is hard to model in the security game, we assume the token to be available throughout the full epoch.)

Definition 1 (Updatable Encryption). *An updatable encryption scheme UE for message space \mathcal{M} consists of a set of polynomial-time algorithms `UE.setup`, `UE.next`, `UE.enc`, `UE.dec`, and `UE.upd` satisfying the following conditions:*

UE.setup: The algorithm `UE.setup` is a probabilistic algorithm run by the owner.

On input a security parameter λ , it returns a secret key $k_0 \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.setup}(\lambda)$.

UE.next: This probabilistic algorithm is also run by the owner. On input a secret key k_e for epoch e , it outputs a new secret key k_{e+1} and an update token Δ_{e+1} for epoch $e + 1$. That is, $(k_{e+1}, \Delta_{e+1}) \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.next}(k_e)$.

UE.enc: This probabilistic algorithm is run by the owner, on input a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and key k_e of some epoch e returns a ciphertext $C_e \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.enc}(k_e, m)$.

UE.dec: This deterministic algorithm is run by the owner, on input a ciphertext C_e and key k_e of some epoch e returns $\{m'/\perp\} \leftarrow \text{UE.dec}(k_e, C_e)$.

UE.upd: This either probabilistic or deterministic algorithm is run by the host. On input a ciphertext C_e from epoch e and the update token Δ_{e+1} , it returns the updated ciphertext $C_{e+1} \leftarrow \text{UE.upd}(\Delta_{e+1}, C_e)$.

Correctness. The correctness condition of an updatable encryption scheme ensures that an update of a valid ciphertext C_e from epoch e to $e + 1$ leads again to a valid ciphertext C_{e+1} that can be decrypted under the new epoch key k_{e+1} . More precisely, we require that for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, for any $k_0 \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.setup}(\lambda)$, for any sequence of key/update token pairs $(k_1, \Delta_1), \dots, (k_e, \Delta_e)$ generated as $(k_j, \Delta_j) \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.next}(k_{j-1})$ for $j = 1, \dots, e$ through repeated applications of the key-evolution algorithm, and for any $C_i \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.enc}(k_i, m)$ with $i \in \{0, \dots, e\}$ it holds that $m = \text{UE.dec}(k_e, C_e)$ where C_e for $e > i$ is recursively obtained through $C_j \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.upd}(\Delta_j, C_{j-1})$ for $j = i + 1, \dots, e$.

3.1 Security Properties

The main goal of updatable encryption is twofold: First, it should enable efficient updates by a potentially corrupt host, i.e., the update procedure and compromise of the update tokens must not reduce the standard security of the encryption. Second, the core purpose of key rotation is to reduce the risk and impact of key exposures, i.e., confidentiality should be preserved or even re-gained in the presence of *temporary* key compromises, which can be split into forward and post-compromise security. Furthermore, we aim for security against adaptive and retroactive corruptions, modeling that any key or token from a current or previous epoch can become compromised.

Token Security: The feature of updating ciphertexts should not harm the standard IND-CPA security of the encryption scheme. That is, seeing updated ciphertexts or even the exposure of *all* tokens does not increase an adversary’s advantage in breaking the encryption scheme.

Forward Security: An adversary compromising a secret key in some epoch e^* does not gain any advantage in decrypting ciphertexts he obtained in epochs $e < e^*$ *before* that compromise.

Post-Compromise Security: An adversary compromising a secret key in some epoch e^* does not gain any advantage in decrypting ciphertexts he obtained in epochs $e > e^*$ *after* that compromise.

Adaptive Security: An adversary can adaptively corrupt keys and tokens of the current epoch and all previous ones.

Given that updatable encryption schemes can produce ciphertexts in two ways—either via a direct encryption or an update of a previous ciphertext—we require that the above properties must hold for both settings. This inspires our split into two indistinguishability-based security notions, one capturing security of direct encryptions (IND-ENC) and one ruling out attacks against updated ciphertexts (IND-UPD). Both security notions are defined through experiments run between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} . Depending on the notion, the adversary may issue queries to different oracles, defined in the next section. At a high level, \mathcal{A} is allowed to adaptively corrupt arbitrary choices of secret keys and update tokens, as long as they do not allow him to trivially decrypt the challenge ciphertext.

The Importance of Post-Compromise Security. We have formalized updatable encryption in the strict sequential setting it will be used in, and in particular modeled key derivation of a new key k_{e+1} as a sequential update $(k_{e+1}, \Delta_{e+1}) \stackrel{r}{\leftarrow} \text{UE.next}(k_e)$ of the old key k_e . Previous works [10, 15] instead model key rotation by generating fresh keys via a dedicated $k_{e+1} \stackrel{r}{\leftarrow} \text{UE.kgen}(\lambda)$ algorithm at each epoch and deriving the token as $\Delta_{e+1} \stackrel{r}{\leftarrow} \text{UE.next}(k_e, k_{e+1})$.

One impact of our sequential model is that post-compromise security becomes much more essential, as this property intuitively ensures that new keys are independent of the old ones (which is directly ensured in the previous formalization where keys were generated independently). Without requiring post-compromise security, $\text{UE.next}(k_e)$ could generate the new key by hashing the old one: $k_{e+1} \leftarrow H(k_e)$. If H is modeled as a random oracle, this has no impact for standard or forward security, but any scheme with such a key update loses all security in the post-compromise setting. An adversary compromising a single secret key k_e can derive all future keys himself.

What we do not Model. The focus of this work is to obtain security against arbitrary key compromises, i.e., an adversary can steal secret keys, update tokens, and outsourced ciphertexts at any epoch. We do not consider attacks where an adversary fully takes over the owner or host and starts manipulating ciphertexts, e.g., providing adversarially generated ciphertexts to the host, or tampering with the update procedure. Thus, we model passive CPA attacks but not active CCA ones, and assume that all ciphertexts and updates are honestly generated. We believe this still captures the main threat in the context of updatable encryption, namely smash-and-grab attacks aiming at compromising the key material.

In fact, this restriction to passive attacks allows us to be more generous when it comes to legitimate queries towards corrupted epochs, as we can distinguish challenge from non-challenge ciphertexts and only prohibit the ones that allow trivial wins. Interestingly, Everspaugh et al. [15] use a similar approach in their stronger CCA-like security notion for ciphertext-dependent schemes where they are able to recognize whether a ciphertext is derived from the challenge and prevent these from being updated towards a corrupt key. They are able to recognize challenge ciphertexts as all keys are generated honestly, i.e., they are known to the challenger, and updates are required to be *deterministic*. The latter allows the challenger to trivially keep track of the challenge ciphertext, but it also makes misuse of the schemes more likely: if a scheme is implemented with probabilistic updates—which intuitively seems to only increase security—then one steps outside of the model and loses all security guarantees. In our model, we allow updates to be probabilistic, and in fact, the security of our strongest construction crucially relies on the re-randomization of updated ciphertexts.

3.2 Definition of Oracles

During the interaction with the challenger in the security definitions, the adversary may access oracles for *encryption*, for moving the key to the *next epoch*, for *corrupting the token or secret key*, and for *updating ciphertexts* into the current

epoch. In the following description, the oracles may access the state of the challenger during the experiment. The challenger initializes a UE scheme with global state $(k_e, \Delta_e, \mathbf{S}, e)$ where $k_0 \leftarrow \text{UE.setup}(\lambda)$, $\Delta_0 \leftarrow \perp$, and $e \leftarrow 0$, and \mathbf{S} consists of initially empty sets $\mathcal{L}, \tilde{\mathcal{L}}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}$ and \mathcal{T} . Furthermore, let \tilde{e} denote the challenge epoch, and e_{end} denote the final epoch in the game.

The sets $\mathcal{L}, \tilde{\mathcal{L}}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}$ and \mathcal{T} are used to keep track of the generated and updated ciphertexts, and the epochs in which \mathcal{A} corrupted a secret key or token, or learned a challenge-ciphertext:

\mathcal{L}	List of non-challenge ciphertexts (C_e, e) produced by calls to the \mathcal{O}_{enc} or \mathcal{O}_{upd} oracle. \mathcal{O}_{upd} only updates ciphertexts contained in \mathcal{L} .
$\tilde{\mathcal{L}}$	List of updated versions of the challenge ciphertext. $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}$ gets initialized with the challenge ciphertext (\tilde{C}, \tilde{e}) . Any call to the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ oracle automatically updates the challenge ciphertext into the new epoch, which \mathcal{A} can fetch via a $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{\mathcal{C}}}$ call.
\mathcal{C}	List of all epochs e in which \mathcal{A} learned an updated version of the challenge ciphertext.
\mathcal{K}	List of all epochs e in which \mathcal{A} corrupted the secret key k_e .
\mathcal{T}	List of all epochs e in which \mathcal{A} corrupted the update token Δ_e .

Fig. 1. Summary of lists maintained by the challenger.

- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$: On input a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, compute $C \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.enc}(k_e, m)$ where k_e is the secret key of the current epoch e . Add C to the list of ciphertexts $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C, e)\}$ and return the ciphertext to the adversary.
- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$: When triggered, this oracle updates the secret key, produces a new update value as $(k_{e+1}, \Delta_{e+1}) \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.next}(k_e)$, and updates the global state to $(k_{e+1}, \Delta_{e+1}, \mathbf{S}, e + 1)$. If the challenge query was already made, this call will also update the challenge ciphertext into the new epoch, i.e., it runs $\tilde{C}_{e+1} \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.upd}(\Delta_{e+1}, \tilde{C}_e)$ for $(\tilde{C}_e, e) \in \tilde{\mathcal{L}}$ and sets $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \{(\tilde{C}_{e+1}, e + 1)\}$.
- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$: On input a ciphertext C_{e-1} , check that $(C_{e-1}, e - 1) \in \mathcal{L}$ (i.e., it is an honestly generated ciphertext of the previous epoch $e - 1$), compute $C_e \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.upd}(\Delta_e, C_{e-1})$, add (C_e, e) to the list \mathcal{L} and output C_e to \mathcal{A} .
- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\{\text{token}, \text{key}\}, e^*)$: This oracle models adaptive corruption of the host and owner keys, respectively. The adversary can request a key or update token from the current or any of the previous epochs.
- Upon input **token**, $e^* \leq e$, the oracle returns Δ_{e^*} , i.e., the update token is leaked. Calling the oracle in this mode sets $\mathcal{T} \leftarrow \mathcal{T} \cup \{e^*\}$.
 - Upon input **key**, $e^* \leq e$, the oracle returns k_{e^*} , i.e., the secret key is leaked. Calling the oracle in this mode sets $\mathcal{K} \leftarrow \mathcal{K} \cup \{e^*\}$.
- $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{\mathcal{C}}}$: Returns the current challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}_e from $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}$. Note that the challenge ciphertext gets updated to the new epoch by the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ oracle, whenever a new key gets generated. Calling this oracle sets $\mathcal{C} \leftarrow \mathcal{C} \cup \{e\}$.

Fine-grained corruption modeling. Note that in the case of key-corruption in an epoch e^* , the oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$ only reveals the secret key k_{e^*} , but not the

update token of the epoch. This assumes erasure of the token as an ephemeral value on the owner side. If the adversary also wants to learn the token, he can make a dedicated query for token-corruption in the same epoch. This allows to capture more fine-grained corruption settings.

Moreover, we have chosen to give the adversary a dedicated challenge-update oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{c}}$ that simply returns the updated challenge ciphertext of the current epoch, i.e., it does not require knowledge of the challenge ciphertext from the previous epoch. This gives the adversary more power compared with the definition in earlier models [10,15]: Therein, an adversary wanting to know an updated version of the challenge ciphertext for some epoch $e' > \tilde{e}$ (with \tilde{e} denoting the challenge epoch) had to make update queries in *all* epochs from \tilde{e} to e' , which in turn is only allowed if \mathcal{A} has not corrupted any secret key between \tilde{e} and e' . Consequently, \mathcal{A} could not receive an updated challenge ciphertext after a single key corruption, which we consider too restrictive. Therefore, we internally update the challenge ciphertext with every key rotation and allow the adversary to selectively receive an updated version at every epoch of his choice. Thus, in every epoch after \tilde{e} , the adversary \mathcal{A} can choose whether he wants to learn the secret key or an updated version of the challenge ciphertext.

3.3 “Leakage” Profiles

The main benefit of *ciphertext-independent* updatable encryption schemes is that a single token can be used to update all ciphertexts from one epoch to the next. However, the generality of the token also imposes a number of challenges when modeling the knowledge of the adversary after he has corrupted a number of keys, tokens and updated challenge ciphertexts. For instance, if the adversary knows a challenge ciphertext \tilde{C} from epoch \tilde{e} and an update token for epoch $\tilde{e} + 1$, he can derive an updated version of \tilde{C} himself, which is not captured in the set \mathcal{C} that only reflects the challenge ciphertexts that \mathcal{A} has directly received from the challenger. This inference of updated ciphertexts via an update token is clearly inherent in ciphertext-independent schemes.

Practical schemes often enable the adversary to derive even more information, e.g., a token might allow not only to update but also to “downgrade” a ciphertext into the previous epoch, i.e., the updates are bi-directional, or even allow to update and downgrade a secret key via a token. While these features are present in all current solutions, we do not see a reason why they *should* be inherent in updatable encryption in general. Thus, we model different inference options outside of the game by defining extended sets \mathcal{T}^* , \mathcal{C}^* and \mathcal{K}^* that capture the information an adversary can infer from the directly learned tokens, ciphertexts or keys. In the security games defined in the next section, we will require the intersection of the extended sets of known challenge ciphertexts \mathcal{C}^* and known secret keys \mathcal{K}^* to be empty, i.e., there must not exist a single epoch where the adversary knows both the secret key and the (updated) challenge. We give an example of such direct and inferable information in Figure 2.

Note that such inference is less an issue for *ciphertext-dependent* schemes where the owner has to derive a dedicated token for each ciphertext. This

epoch:	$e-3$	$e-2$	$e-1$	e	$e+1$	$e+2$	$e+3$
keys:	k_{e-3}	k_{e-2}	k_{e-1}	k_e	k_{e+1}	k_{e+2}	k_{e+3}
token:		Δ_{e-2}	Δ_{e-1}	Δ_e	Δ_{e+1}	Δ_{e+2}	Δ_{e+3}
challenge:	\tilde{C}_{e-3}	\tilde{C}_{e-2}	\tilde{C}_{e-1}	\tilde{C}_e	\tilde{C}_{e+1}	\tilde{C}_{e+2}	\tilde{C}_{e+3}

Fig. 2. Example of direct and indirect knowledge of an adversary. The boxed values denote \mathcal{A} 's directly received information as captured in \mathcal{K} , \mathcal{T} and \mathcal{C} , whereas the circled ones denote the inferable values for a scheme with token-inference and bi-directional updates of ciphertexts and keys.

naturally limits the power of the token to the ciphertext it was derived for, and prevents the adversary from using the token outside of its original purpose.

Capturing Key Updates. In many schemes (in fact all the ones we will consider), an update token does not only allow to update ciphertexts, but also the secret key itself. That is, if an adversary has learned a key k_e of epoch e and the update token Δ_{e+1} of the following epoch, then he can also derive the new key k_{e+1} . If that is the only possible derivation, we call this an *uni-directional key update*. If in addition also key downgrades are possible, i.e., a key k_e can be derived from k_{e+1} and Δ_{e+1} , we call this *bi-directional key updates*.

In the context of proxy re-encryption, a similar property is known as “collision-resistance”. So far only uni-directional and single-hop schemes satisfy this property, though [2,3,12,17,19,20], indicating that preventing keys to be updatable in a more flexible setting is a challenging property.

For defining uni- and bi-directional key updates we use the information contained in \mathcal{K} and \mathcal{T} to derive the inferable information. Recall that \mathcal{K} denotes the set of epochs in which the adversary has obtained the secret key. The sets $\mathcal{K}_{\text{uni}}^*$ and $\mathcal{K}_{\text{bi}}^*$ are then defined via the recursive predicate `corrupt-key` as follows:

Uni-directional key updates:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{K}_{\text{uni}}^* &\leftarrow \{e \in \{0, \dots, e_{\text{end}}\} \mid \text{corrupt-key}(e) = \text{true}\} \\ &\text{and } \text{true} \leftarrow \text{corrupt-key}(e) \text{ iff:} \\ &\quad (e \in \mathcal{K}) \vee (\text{corrupt-key}(e-1) \wedge e \in \mathcal{T}) \end{aligned}$$

Bi-directional key updates:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{K}_{\text{bi}}^* &\leftarrow \{e \in \{0, \dots, e_{\text{end}}\} \mid \text{corrupt-key}(e) = \text{true}\} \\ &\text{and } \text{true} \leftarrow \text{corrupt-key}(e) \text{ iff:} \\ &\quad (e \in \mathcal{K}) \vee (\text{corrupt-key}(e-1) \wedge e \in \mathcal{T}) \\ &\quad \vee (\text{corrupt-key}(e+1) \wedge e+1 \in \mathcal{T}) \end{aligned}$$

Capturing Token Inference from Subsequent Secret Keys. The second indirect knowledge we model is the derivation of an update token from two subsequent secret keys. This is possible in all existing schemes where a token Δ_{e+1} is

deterministically derived from the keys k_e and k_{e+1} . In fact, all previous definitions explicitly model the token computation as an algorithm that receives both keys as input, instead of using an algorithm that updates the key and produces an update token at the same time. While the former is clearly a necessary design choice for proxy re-encryption, it is less so for updatable encryption where keys are generated in a strictly sequential order. Yet, if such token inference is possible, we define an extended set \mathcal{T}^* that contains all update tokens that the adversary has either obtained directly or derived himself from corrupted keys.

More, precisely, for schemes with *token-inference*, the adversary can derive from any two subsequent keys k_e and k_{e+1} the update token Δ_{e+1} from epoch e to $e+1$. We capture this by defining \mathcal{T}^* via the sets \mathcal{T} of corrupted token epochs and \mathcal{K}^* denoting the extended set of corrupted key epochs as defined above.

$$\mathcal{T}^* \leftarrow \{e \in \{0, \dots, e_{\text{end}}\} \mid (e \in \mathcal{T}) \vee (e \in \mathcal{K}^* \wedge e - 1 \in \mathcal{K}^*)\}$$

On a first glance it might look like we could run into a definitional loop between inferred tokens and keys, as the extended set \mathcal{T}^* based on \mathcal{K}^* could now also impact the definition of \mathcal{K}^* (which we build from \mathcal{T}). This is not the case though: the additional epochs e that will be contained in \mathcal{T}^* are epochs where the adversary already knew k_e and k_{e-1} . Thus the additional tokens Δ_e where $e \in \mathcal{T}^* \setminus \mathcal{T}$ would have no impact on a (re-definition) of \mathcal{K}^* as all inferable keys from Δ_e are already in \mathcal{K}^* .

Capturing Challenge Ciphertext Updates. For capturing all the epochs in which the adversary knows a version of the challenge ciphertext, we define the set \mathcal{C}^* containing all *challenge-equal* epochs. Informally, a challenge-equal epoch is every epoch in which the adversary knows a current version of the challenge ciphertext. This can be either obtained via a direct call to the challenge-ciphertext oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{c}}$, or by the adversary computing it himself via a (sequence of) updates. We have to distinguish between two cases, depending on whether the updates are uni- or bi-directional. In schemes with *uni-directional* updates, an update token Δ_e can only move ciphertexts from epoch $e - 1$ into epoch e , but not vice versa. Note that uni-directional updates are by definition possible in all ciphertext-independent schemes. A scheme where a token Δ_e also allows to downgrade ciphertexts from epoch e to $e - 1$, is called *bi-directional*.

Clearly, for security, uni-directional schemes are desirable, as the bi-directional property does not provide additional useful features but only allows the adversary to trivially derive more information. However, bi-directional schemes are easier to build, as this is related to the problem of designing uni-directional and multi-hop proxy re-encryption schemes, for which a first (compact) lattice-based solution was proposed only recently [24].

In both cases, we define $\mathcal{C}_{\text{uni}}^*$ and $\mathcal{C}_{\text{bi}}^*$ by using the information contained in \mathcal{C} , \mathcal{T}^* and \tilde{e} to derive the inferable information. Recall that \tilde{e} denotes the challenge epoch, \mathcal{C} denotes the set of epochs in which the adversary has obtained an updated version of the ciphertext (via $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{c}}$), and \mathcal{T}^* is the augmented set of tokens known to the adversary. The sets $\mathcal{C}_{\text{uni}}^*$ and $\mathcal{C}_{\text{bi}}^*$ of all challenge-equal ciphertexts are then defined via the recursive predicate *challenge-equal* as follows:

Uni-directional ciphertext updates:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{C}_{\text{uni}}^* &\leftarrow \{e \in \{0, \dots, e_{\text{end}}\} \mid \text{challenge-equal}(e) = \text{true}\} \\ &\text{and true} \leftarrow \text{challenge-equal}(e) \text{ iff:} \\ &\quad (e = \tilde{e}) \vee (e \in \mathcal{C}) \vee (\text{challenge-equal}(e-1) \wedge e \in \mathcal{T}^*) \end{aligned}$$

Bi-directional ciphertext updates:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{C}_{\text{bi}}^* &\leftarrow \{e \in \{0, \dots, e_{\text{end}}\} \mid \text{challenge-equal}(e) = \text{true}\} \\ &\text{and true} \leftarrow \text{challenge-equal}(e) \text{ iff:} \\ &\quad (e = \tilde{e}) \vee (e \in \mathcal{C}) \\ &\quad \vee (\text{challenge-equal}(e-1) \wedge e \in \mathcal{T}^*) \\ &\quad \vee (\text{challenge-equal}(e+1) \wedge e+1 \in \mathcal{T}^*) \end{aligned}$$

Optimal Leakage. The optimal leakage, capturing only the inference minimally necessary to perform ciphertext-independent updates would be $\mathcal{T}^* = \mathcal{T}$, $\mathcal{K}^* = \mathcal{K}$ and $\mathcal{C}^* = \mathcal{C}_{\text{uni}}^*$. That is, there is no token inference, keys cannot be updated via a token and ciphertext updates are only uni-directional. All our schemes have leakage $(\mathcal{T}^*, \mathcal{C}_{\text{bi}}^*, \mathcal{K}_{\text{bi}}^*)$, and we leave it as an interesting open problem whether efficient schemes with less leakage exist. Interestingly, the extended set of corrupted tokens \mathcal{T}^* does not give the adversary more power in our IND-ENC and IND-UPD definitions, compared with definitions that are based only on \mathcal{T} .

3.4 Security Notions for Updatable Encryption

We are now ready to formally define the security notions for updatable encryption schemes in the remainder of this section. We propose two indistinguishability-based notions—the first capturing the security of fresh encryptions in the presence of key evolutions and adaptive corruptions, and the second defining the same security for updated ciphertexts.

Adaptive Encryption Indistinguishability (IND-ENC). Our IND-ENC notion ensures that ciphertexts obtained from the `UE.enc` algorithm do not reveal any information about the underlying plaintexts even when \mathcal{A} adaptively compromises a number of keys and tokens before and after the challenge epoch. Thus this definition captures forward and post-compromise security.

Definition 2 (IND-ENC). *An updatable encryption scheme UE is said to be IND-ENC-secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries \mathcal{A} it holds that $|\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{UE}}^{\text{IND-ENC}}(\lambda) = 1] - 1/2| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for some negligible function ϵ .*

Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{UE}}^{\text{IND-ENC}}(\lambda)$:

$k_0 \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.setup}(\lambda)$

$e \leftarrow 0$; $\tilde{e} \leftarrow \perp$; $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$ // these variables are updated by the oracles

$(m_0, m_1, \text{state}) \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}}(\lambda)$

proceed only if $|m_0| = |m_1|$

$\tilde{e} \leftarrow e$; $d \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$

$\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.enc}(k_{\tilde{e}}, m_d)$, $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \{(\tilde{C}, \tilde{e})\}$

$d' \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}}(\tilde{C}, \text{state})$

return 1 if $d' = d$ and the following condition holds:

\mathcal{A} has not learned k_{e^*} in any *challenge-equal* epoch e^* , i.e., let \mathcal{C}^* denote the set of all *challenge-equal epochs* and \mathcal{K}^* the set of epochs in which \mathcal{A} learned the secret key, then it must hold that $\mathcal{C}^* \cap \mathcal{K}^* = \emptyset$

This experiment follows the typical IND-CPA definition, but additionally grants the adversary access to the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ oracles defined in Section 3.2. To exclude trivial wins, we require that \mathcal{A} has not learned the secret key in any challenge-equal epoch. Recall that a “challenge-equal” epoch is every epoch in which the adversary knows a current version of the challenge ciphertext. This can be either obtained via a direct call to the challenge-ciphertext oracle or by the adversary computing it himself via a (sequence of) updates. The exact set of challenge-equal epochs (\mathcal{C}^*) and secret keys that are known to the adversary (\mathcal{K}^*) depends on the leakage profile, which has to be specified when proving IND-ENC security. For all schemes proven secure in this work, the leakage profile is the one defined in Section 3.3.

Insufficiency of IND-ENC for Full Post-Compromise Security. It is often claimed that symmetric proxy re-encryption (PRE) can be used for updatable encryption, indicating that security of symmetric PRE is sufficient for the security of key-evolving schemes [10, 15, 21]. In fact, the security definition for ciphertext-independent schemes given by Boneh et al. [10] and Everspaugh et al. [15] coincides with the security of symmetric PRE. Our IND-ENC definition can be seen as a strengthened version (as it allows adaptive corruptions) of such PRE security adapted to the sequential setting of an updatable encryption scheme. However, an updatable scheme only satisfying IND-ENC would not necessarily provide the security properties one expects. Note that in the IND-ENC definition above, the challenge is a *fresh* encryption of one of the two challenge messages m_0, m_1 , but not an updated ciphertext. Thus, IND-ENC security cannot guarantee anything about the security of *updates*. In fact, a scheme where the update algorithm UE.upd includes all the old ciphertexts C_0, \dots, C_e in the updated ciphertext C_{e+1} could be considered IND-ENC secure, but clearly lose all security if a single old key gets compromised.

We therefore also propose a second definition that requires indistinguishability of updates, and in combination with IND-ENC guarantees the security properties one expects from updatable encryption.

Adaptive Update Indistinguishability (IND-UPD). The IND-UPD notion ensures that an updated ciphertext obtained from the UE.upd algorithm does not reveal any information about the previous ciphertext, even when \mathcal{A} adaptively compromises a number of keys and tokens before and after the challenge epoch. Thus this definition again captures forward and post-compromise security in an adaptive manner. We will informally refer to this notion also as *unlinkability*.

Definition 3 (IND-UPD). An updatable encryption scheme UE is said to be IND-UPD-secure if for all probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries \mathcal{A} it holds that $|\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{UE}}^{\text{IND-UPD}}(\lambda) = 1] - 1/2| \leq \epsilon(\lambda)$ for some negligible function ϵ .

Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{UE}}^{\text{IND-UPD}}(\lambda)$:

$k_0 \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.setup}(\lambda)$
 $e \leftarrow 0$; $\tilde{e} \leftarrow \perp$; $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$ // these variables are updated by the oracles
 $(C_0, C_1, \text{state}) \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}}(\lambda)$
 proceed only if $(C_0, \tilde{e} - 1) \in \mathcal{L}$ and $(C_1, \tilde{e} - 1) \in \mathcal{L}$ and $|C_0| = |C_1|$
 $\tilde{e} \leftarrow e$; $d \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$
 $\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.upd}(\Delta_{\tilde{e}}, C_d)$, $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \{(\tilde{C}, \tilde{e})\}$
 $d' \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}}(\tilde{C}, \text{state})$
return 1 if $d' = d$ and all of the following conditions hold

- 1) \mathcal{A} has not learned $\Delta_{\tilde{e}}$, i.e., $\tilde{e} \notin \mathcal{T}^*$
- 2) \mathcal{A} has not learned k_{e^*} in any *challenge-equal* epoch e^* , i.e., let \mathcal{C}^* denote the set of all *challenge-equal epochs* and \mathcal{K}^* the set of epochs in which \mathcal{A} learned the secret key, then it must hold that $\mathcal{C}^* \cap \mathcal{K}^* = \emptyset$
- 3) if UE.upd is deterministic, then \mathcal{A} has neither queried $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_0)$ nor $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_1)$ in epoch \tilde{e}

This experiment is similar to IND-ENC, but instead of requiring a fresh encryption to be indistinguishable, we let the adversary provide two ciphertexts C_0 and C_1 and return the update \tilde{C} of one of them. The task of the adversary is to guess which ciphertext got updated. Note that the adversary is allowed to corrupt the secret key $k_{\tilde{e}-1}$, i.e., from right before the challenge epoch. Similar as in IND-ENC we exclude trivial wins where the adversary learned the secret key of a challenge-equal epoch. Moreover, if the update algorithm is deterministic, \mathcal{A} is also not allowed to update any of the two challenge ciphertexts into the challenge epoch himself.

4 Comparison with Existing Models

We now compare our security notion with the definition proposed by Everspaugh et al. [15], which in turn builds upon the work by Boneh et al. [9]. We also discuss the XOR-KEM scheme that was claimed to be a secure ciphertext-independent scheme [15]. Note that, for ciphertext-independent schemes, only the property of encryption indistinguishability (UP-IND-BI in [15]) was previously defined but

not the additional update indistinguishability, and thus our comparison focuses on IND-ENC.

The UP-IND-BI definition by Everspaugh et al. [15] is ambiguous, and we show that one can either interpret the model such that it excludes any key compromises before the challenge (i.e., it does not cover post-compromise security), or it is closer to our model and allows a restricted form of key corruptions before the challenge. We refer to the former as **weakUP-IND-BI** and to the latter as **strongUP-IND-BI** model. We stress that neither **weakUP-IND-BI** nor **strongUP-IND-BI** used in our comparison is the verbatim definition presented in [15]. Both are adaptations of the UP-IND-BI model to the sequential setting that we use in our work and in which updatable schemes are naturally used. This adaptation revealed an ambiguity in the UP-IND-BI model w.r.t. whether it allows key corruptions before the challenge.

One reason for the ambiguity is that the XOR-KEM scheme, which is claimed secure, is secure only in the **weakUP-IND-BI** model, but not in **strongUP-IND-BI**: we show that it loses all security if the adversary can corrupt an old key, which is allowed in the stronger model, as well as in our IND-ENC game.

Overall we show the following:

Theorem 1. $\text{IND-ENC} \implies \text{weakUP-IND-BI}$, $\text{IND-ENC} \not\iff \text{strongUP-IND-BI}$.

4.1 **weakUP-IND-BI vs. strongUP-IND-BI**

The key reason for the ambiguity of the security definition by Everspaugh et al. [15] is that the security game does not convey the notion of epochs and thus it is not clear *when* the adversary is allowed to corrupt secret keys. The definition considers static corruptions, and assumes a known threshold t that separates honest from corrupted keys. That is, all keys k_1, \dots, k_t are assumed to be uncorrupted, whereas the keys k_{t+1}, \dots, k_κ are considered corrupted and are given to the adversary. Jumping ahead, the security notion then allows challenge queries for all keys k_i where $i \leq t$ and disallows any update or token corruption queries towards a corrupt key k_j , i.e., where $j > t$.

One interpretation is that the threshold t strictly separates honest from corrupt epochs, i.e., the uncorrupted keys k_1, \dots, k_t belong to the first t epochs in which the adversary can request the challenge. We call this the **weakUP-IND-BI** model, as all corrupted keys k_{t+1}, \dots, k_κ must occur after the challenge epoch(s).

The second interpretation is that k_1, \dots, k_t merely refer to *some* t honest keys, but not necessarily to the first t epochs. That is, the corrupt keys could belong to arbitrary epochs, and key compromises before the challenge epoch(s) would be allowed. We call this the **strongUP-IND-BI** model.

Honest vs. Adversarial Ciphertexts. The **weakUP-IND-BI** and **strongUP-IND-BI** definitions do not distinguish between challenge and non-challenge ciphertexts in the responses to the update oracle, and allow \mathcal{O}_{upd} to be called with arbitrary ciphertexts. Thus, in contrast to our definition that only allows updates of honestly generated ciphertexts, the oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_e)$ omits the check

whether $(C_e, e) \in \mathcal{L}$ and simply returns the updated ciphertext for any input. Consequently, the adversary is not allowed to make *any* update query towards a corrupted epoch, as the query could be the challenge ciphertext. We show that for **strongUP-IND-BI** security, this difference of updating also adversarially crafted ciphertexts prevents our **IND-ENC** notion to be strictly stronger than **strongUP-IND-BI**. For **weakUP-IND-BI** this does not give the adversary any additional advantage though.

The weakUP-IND-BI Model. We follow the original definition by Everspaugh et al. [15] (in its weaker sense) and adopt it to our notation. As our scheme is strictly sequential, we cannot give the adversary all corrupted keys k_{t+1}, \dots, k_κ already at the beginning of the game, but rather let \mathcal{A} corrupt them via the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \cdot)$ oracle. Further, we consider a single challenge query in some epoch $\tilde{e} \leq t$, whereas [15] granted the adversary a dedicated left-or-right oracle for all keys before t .

Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{UE}}^{\text{weakUP-IND-BI}}(\lambda)$:

$k_0 \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.setup}(\lambda)$
 $e \leftarrow 0; \tilde{e} \leftarrow \perp$ // these variables are updated by the oracles
 $(m_0, m_1, \text{state}) \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}}(\lambda)$
 proceed only if $\tilde{e} \leq t$ and $|m_0| = |m_1|$
 $\tilde{e} \leftarrow e; d \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$
 $\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.enc}(k_{\tilde{e}}, m_d)$
 $d' \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}}(\tilde{C}, \text{state})$
return 1 if $d' = d$ and the following condition holds:

- 1) no query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e')$ was made where $e' < t + 1$
- 2) no query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, t + 1)$ was made in epoch $t + 1$
- 3) no query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(\cdot)$ was made in epoch $t + 1$

The winning condition requires that \mathcal{A} does not learn the update token towards the first corrupted epoch e_{t+1} , nor makes any update query in e_{t+1} , as both would enable the adversary to update the challenge ciphertext into a corrupted epoch.

This weaker interpretation does not guarantee any confidentiality *after* a secret key got compromised, as it allows key corruption only after the challenge epoch. Thus, an updatable scheme that is secure only in the **weakUP-IND-BI** model does not provide the intuitive security one would expect from key rotation: namely that after migrating to the new key, the old one becomes useless and no longer of value to the adversary. To the contrary, all previous keys still require strong protection or secure deletion.

The strongUP-IND-BI Model. In the stronger interpretation, \mathcal{A} can corrupt a set of arbitrary epochs, i.e., also before he makes the challenge query, but has

to commit to them upfront. Whereas Everspaugh et al. [15] hand the adversary all keys already at the beginning, we let \mathcal{A} retrieve them sequentially via the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \cdot)$ oracle in all epochs that he announced as corrupted in the beginning of the game.

Experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{UE}}^{\text{strongUP-IND-BI}}(\lambda)$:

$k_0 \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.setup}(\lambda)$
 $e \leftarrow 0$; $\tilde{e} \leftarrow \perp$ // these variables are updated by the oracles
 $(\mathcal{K}^*, \text{state}) \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{A}(\lambda)$
 $(m_0, m_1, \text{state}) \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}}(\text{state})$
 proceed only if $\tilde{e} \notin \mathcal{K}^*$ and $|m_0| = |m_1|$
 $\tilde{e} \leftarrow e$; $d \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$
 $\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE.enc}(k_{\tilde{e}}, m_d)$
 $d' \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}}(\tilde{C}, \text{state})$
return 1 if $d' = d$ and the following condition holds:

- 1) no query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e)$ was made where $e \notin \mathcal{K}^*$
- 2) no query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e')$ was made where $e' \in \mathcal{K}^*$ or $e' - 1 \in \mathcal{K}^*$
- 3) no query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(\cdot)$ was made in an epoch e'' where $e'' \in \mathcal{K}^*$

The second winning condition forbids the adversary to receive any token that is connected to an epoch where \mathcal{A} knows the secret key. This can be seen as the bi-directionality of key updates hard-coded in the experiment, which is captured in our IND-ENC definition via the definition of $\mathcal{K}_{\text{bi}}^*$. The third condition forbids any ciphertext updates towards a corrupted epoch.

4.2 Insecurity of XOR-KEM in the strongUP-IND-BI and IND-ENC Model

Everspaugh et al. [15] proposed a simple construction, termed XOR-KEM, as a secure ciphertext-independent updatable encryption scheme. We now show that this scheme is neither secure in the stronger interpretation of their model nor in our IND-ENC definition.

The XOR-KEM scheme relies on a standard symmetric encryption scheme SE which it uses in a simple hybrid construction. Therein, every message gets encrypted under a fresh key x and x gets xor'd under the epoch key k_e . For updating a ciphertext, only the part depending on k_e gets updated via the token $\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow (k_e \oplus k_{e+1})$.

XOR-KEM.setup(λ): return $k_0 \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$
 XOR-KEM.next(k_e): $k_{e+1} \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, $\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow (k_e \oplus k_{e+1})$, return (k_{e+1}, Δ_{e+1})
 XOR-KEM.enc(k_e, m): $x \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, return $C_e \leftarrow ((k_e \oplus x), \text{SE.enc}(x, m))$
 XOR-KEM.upd(Δ_{e+1}, C_e): parse $C_e = (C^1, C^2)$, return $C_{e+1} \leftarrow ((C^1 \oplus \Delta_{e+1}), C^2)$
 XOR-KEM.dec(k_e, C_e): parse $C_e = (C^1, C^2)$, return $\text{SE.dec}(k_e \oplus C^1, C^2)$

Attack against XOR-KEM. We now present a simple attack against the XOR-KEM scheme, for which we only require the adversary to learn one key in some epoch before the challenge epoch. Let this epoch be $e < \tilde{e}$, to which \mathcal{A} commits before the game starts. In epoch e , \mathcal{A} requests the secret key k_e via $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e)$, and also makes a standard encryption query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$ receiving a ciphertext $C_e = ((k_e \oplus x), \text{SE.enc}(x, m))$. The adversary then computes $x \leftarrow C_e^1 \oplus k_e$, where C_e^1 denotes the first part $(k_e \oplus x)$ of the ciphertext. Then, in all epochs from e to \tilde{e} , the adversary requests an updated version of C_e via $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(\cdot)$. Note that **strongUP-IND-BI** forbids updates only *towards* but not *from* a corrupt key, and thus these queries are legitimate. Finally, in the challenge epoch \tilde{e} , \mathcal{A} uses the updated (non-challenge) ciphertext $C_{\tilde{e}} = ((k_{\tilde{e}} \oplus x), \text{SE.enc}(x, m))$ and its previously computed x to derive the secret key $k_{\tilde{e}}$ of the challenge epoch. Clearly, he can now trivially win the **strongUP-IND-BI** game, and did not violate any of the winning restrictions. The same attack applies in our IND-ENC game.

In the **weakUP-IND-BI** game, however, this attack is not possible, as \mathcal{A} does not see a secret key before the challenge epoch, and is also not allowed to update any ciphertext into a corrupt epoch (i.e., he cannot perform the same attack by updating a non-challenge ciphertext into a corrupt epoch after \tilde{e}).

Weakening the strongUP-IND-BI Model. A tempting easy “fix” would be to forbid *any* updates from a corrupted epoch into an honest epoch in the **strongUP-IND-BI** model. This would allow the XOR-KEM scheme to be proven secure, and at the same time preserve \mathcal{A} ’s capability of corrupting keys before the challenge epoch.

However, this “fix” would significantly weaken the guaranteed security, as it essentially disallows the adversary to see any updated ciphertexts after an attack. For instance, the following attack would be excluded by the model: Assume the adversary at some epoch e corrupts the secret key k_e and *one* ciphertext C_e from a large set of outsourced ciphertexts. Then, the key gets rotated into k_{e+1} and all ciphertexts get re-encrypted to the new key. In that new epoch $e + 1$, the adversary learns neither k_{e+1} nor the update token, but steals *all* ciphertexts from the database. Intuitively, confidentiality of these updated ciphertexts should be guaranteed, as the adversary never compromised the key and all ciphertexts in the same epoch. This attack would not be covered by the model though, and the XOR-KEM scheme becomes entirely insecure if such an attack happens, as it allows the adversary to decrypt all re-encrypted ciphertexts even though he never corrupted k_{e+1} .

4.3 IND-ENC vs. strongUP-IND-BI (and weakUP-IND-BI)

XOR-KEM serves as a separating example between the **weakUP-IND-BI** and the two stronger **strongUP-IND-BI**, **IND-ENC** models, and both models are in fact strictly stronger than **weakUP-IND-BI**. Such a strict relation does not exist between **strongUP-IND-BI** and **IND-ENC** though: we show that both models are incomparable.

Separating Example I (strongUP-IND-BI $\not\Rightarrow$ IND-ENC). The first separating example exploits the fact that in strongUP-IND-BI, the adversary is not allowed to update any ciphertext into a corrupt epoch, whereas IND-ENC allows such updates for non-challenge ciphertexts. Assume that UE is a secure updatable encryption scheme in both models. We then derive a scheme UE' that remains secure in the strongUP-IND-BI model but loses all security in our IND-ENC game. In addition to UE we use a standard CPA secure encryption scheme SE = (SE.kgen, SE.enc, SE.dec), such that both share the same key space \mathcal{K} from which they sample uniformly random keys.

We now derive a scheme UE' where we let the token Δ_{e+1} contain an encryption C_{key} of the old key k_e under the new key k_{e+1} . That is, an adversary knowing k_{e+1} and seeing the token towards the corrupted epoch can immediately learn the old key as well. We further include this encrypted key C_{key} of the token in every updated ciphertext, as otherwise we would only get a separation for IND-ENC with *no* key-updates (which in turn seems to be hard to realize).

UE'.setup(λ): as UE.setup(λ)
 UE'.next(k_e): (k_{e+1}, Δ_{e+1}) \xleftarrow{r} UE.next(k_e), $C_{key} \xleftarrow{r}$ SE.enc(k_{e+1}, k_e),
 set $\Delta'_{e+1} \leftarrow (\Delta_{e+1}, C_{key})$, return (k_{e+1}, Δ'_{e+1})
 UE'.enc(k'_e, m): return $C_e \xleftarrow{r}$ (UE.enc(k_e, m), \perp)
 UE'.upd(Δ'_{e+1}, C'_e): parse $\Delta'_{e+1} = (\Delta_{e+1}, C_{key})$, and $C'_e = (C_e, \overline{C_e})$,
 $C_{e+1} \xleftarrow{r}$ UE.upd(Δ_{e+1}, C_e), return $C'_{e+1} \leftarrow (C_{e+1}, C_{key})$
 UE'.dec(k'_e, C'_e): parse $C'_e = (C_e, C_{key})$, return UE.dec(k_e, C_e)

In the strongUP-IND-BI game, this change cannot increase \mathcal{A} 's advantage as he is not allowed to see any token towards a corrupt epoch e^* , nor make any updates towards e^* . In all other epochs, C_{key} is an encryption under a key unknown to the adversary. However, in the IND-ENC game, \mathcal{A} can corrupt the secret key $k_{\tilde{e}+1}$ in the epoch after he makes the challenge query, and update an arbitrary non-challenge ciphertext from \tilde{e} to $\tilde{e} + 1$ using the \mathcal{O}_{upd} oracle. From there he extracts C_{key} , decrypts $k_{\tilde{e}}$ and can now trivially win the IND-ENC game as he knows the secret key of the challenge epoch. Note that the adversary does not have to make a $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \tilde{e})$ query which would be prohibited if the scheme allows uni- or bidirectional key updates.

Separating Example II (IND-ENC $\not\Rightarrow$ strongUP-IND-BI). Our model is not strictly stronger than strongUP-IND-BI, due to fact that we are more restrictive for ciphertexts that can be updated. Whereas we only allow honestly generated ciphertexts C_e to be updated (which is enforced by \mathcal{O}_{upd} checking whether $C_e \in \mathcal{L}$), strongUP-IND-BI is more generous and returns the update of *any* ciphertext (as they aim for *authenticated* encryption). This can be exploited to turn a secure scheme UE into UE'' that is secure in our IND-ENC model, but insecure according to strongUP-IND-BI. The idea is to modify the update algorithm, such that it returns the update token when it gets invoked with a special ciphertext, that would never occur for an honest encryption.

More precisely, the scheme UE' derived from UE works as follows:

$\text{UE}''.\text{setup}(\lambda), \text{UE}''.\text{next}(k_e)$: as $\text{UE}.\text{setup}(\lambda)$ and $\text{UE}.\text{next}(k_e)$
 $\text{UE}''.\text{enc}(k_e, m)$: $C_e \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE}.\text{enc}(k_e, m)$, return $C'_e \leftarrow (0||C_e)$
 $\text{UE}''.\text{upd}(\Delta_{e+1}, C'_e)$: parse $C'_e \leftarrow (b||C_e)$,
 if $b = 0$ then return $(0||C_{e+1})$ with $C_{e+1} \xleftarrow{r} \text{UE}.\text{upd}(\Delta_{e+1}, C_e)$,
 if $b = 1$ then return Δ_{e+1}
 $\text{UE}''.\text{dec}(k_e, C'_e)$: parse $C'_e = (b||C_e)$, return $\text{UE}.\text{dec}(k_e, C_e)$

In our IND-ENC definition UE'' is secure if UE is, as the \mathcal{O}_{upd} oracle can only be invoked with ciphertexts that were generated by the \mathcal{O}_{enc} oracle and thus always have the leading 0 bit for which UE'' and UE behave identical. An adversary in the **strongUP-IND-BI** model can easily win though: \mathcal{A} corrupts the secret key $k_{\tilde{e}-1}$, i.e., right before the challenge epoch \tilde{e} and in \tilde{e} then makes an update query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(1||C_e)$ for some arbitrary ciphertext C_e upon which \mathcal{A} learns $\Delta_{\tilde{e}}$. If the UE scheme allows to update $k_{\tilde{e}-1}$ with $\Delta_{\tilde{e}}$ to $k_{\tilde{e}}$, then \mathcal{A} knows the secret key of the challenge epoch and can simply decrypt the challenge ciphertext \tilde{C} . Note that \mathcal{A} did not violate the winning conditions of **strongUP-IND-BI** as it learned $\Delta_{\tilde{e}}$ without having to query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \tilde{e})$, which would be forbidden.

IND-ENC \implies **weakUP-IND-BI**. One might wonder whether the previous example can also be used to show that **weakUP-IND-BI** can be stronger than **IND-ENC**. This is not the case though. Recall that in **weakUP-IND-BI** there is a clear split t that separates honest and from corrupt epochs, and it must hold that $\tilde{e} \leq t$, i.e., adversary is not allowed to corrupt any key before the challenge epoch \tilde{e} . Considering the same adversary in our **IND-ENC** game allows \mathcal{A} to get *all* update tokens until epoch e_t . Knowing all tokens $\Delta_1, \dots, \Delta_t$, \mathcal{A} can simply run the update algorithm himself where he can clearly invoke it on ciphertexts of his choice. Thus, any adversary \mathcal{A} winning in the **weakUP-IND-BI** game can be turned into an adversary \mathcal{A}' that has the same advantage in our **IND-ENC** game.

4.4 IND-UPD vs. UP-REENC

Our **IND-UPD** definition is similar in spirit to the re-encryption indistinguishability notion **UP-REENC** by Everspaugh et al. [15], which captures post-compromise security of updates as well. However, the **UP-REENC** notion was only proposed for ciphertext-*dependent* schemes. Note that the difference between ciphertext-dependent and independent schemes has a significant impact on the achievable security: a single update token in the ciphertext-independent setting has much more functionality than in ciphertext-dependent schemes, which in turn gives the adversary more power when he compromises such tokens. Thus, no ciphertext-independent scheme can satisfy the **UP-REENC** definition. Our **IND-UPD** definition formalizes this extra power in ciphertext-independent schemes in a way that carefully excludes trivial wins but still captures strong post-compromise guarantees. The aspect that **IND-UPD** allows adaptive corruptions, whereas **UP-REENC** only considers static ones, makes both definitions incomparable.

Interestingly, in the ciphertext-dependent setting, this property has a somewhat “esoteric” flavor as it got motivated by an exfiltration attack where the adversary fully breaks into both the host and owner, compromising all ciphertexts and keys but is only able to extract a small amount of information at that time. The re-encryption indistinguishability should then guarantee that when the key gets rotated and the adversary compromises all the updated ciphertexts again (but not the new key), the previously extracted information becomes useless. This seems to be a somewhat contrived attack scenario, and might lead to the impression that such update indistinguishability is rather an optional feature. This is not the case for ciphertext-independent schemes: without the dedicated IND-UPD property an updatable encryption scheme does not guarantee *any* security of the updated ciphertexts when an old key gets compromised!

5 Constructions

We analyze several constructions of updatable encryption with respect to our security notions of indistinguishability of encryptions (IND-ENC) and updates (IND-UPD). First, we analyze the simple double-encryption construction that is purely based on symmetric primitives (Section 5.1). Unfortunately, the scheme cannot satisfy our strong security notions. We formulate the additional constraints on the adversarial behavior that suffices to prove its security in relaxed versions of our IND-ENC and IND-UPD models.

We then proceed to less efficient but more secure schemes, starting with the BLMR construction by Boneh et al. [10] based on key-homomorphic PRFs (Section 5.2). We show that the original BLMR scheme satisfies IND-ENC but not IND-UPD, and also propose a slight modification BLMR+ that improves the latter and achieves a weak form of update indistinguishability.

In Section 5.3, we introduce a new ElGamal-based scheme RISE and show that it fully achieves both of our strong security definitions. While proposing a “public-key solution” for a symmetric key primitive might appear counter-intuitive at first, we stress that the efficiency is roughly comparable to that of BLMR under known instantiations for the key-homomorphic PRF (same number of exponentiations). Also, taking advantage of the underlying group operations allows us to get full IND-UPD security.

All of our schemes allow to infer token from two subsequent keys and bi-directional updates of the ciphertexts and keys. Thus, all theorems are with respect to the leakage profile $(\mathcal{T}^*, \mathcal{K}_{\text{bi}}^*, \mathcal{C}_{\text{bi}}^*)$ as defined in Section 3.3.

In the Appendix A, we additionally describe and analyze a symmetric KEM construction SE-KEM, which is widely used in practice since it does not require an (expensive) re-encryption of the payload data upon key rotation. This scheme is, however, better suited for deployment within the cloud infrastructure, because it requires the encryption keys to be sent to the host performing the re-encryption. Furthermore, the fact that the data is not re-encrypted makes ciphertexts fully linkable. We therefore show only basic encryption security and under a weak adversary model.

5.1 Double Encryption (2ENC)

An approach that is based only on symmetric encryption is to first encrypt the plaintext under an “inner key,” and subsequently encrypt the resulting ciphertext under a second, “outer key.” In each epoch, the outer key is changed, and the ciphertext is updated by decrypting the outer encryption and re-encrypting under the new key. This scheme has been proposed by Ivan and Dodis [18] as symmetric uni-directional proxy re-encryption.³ It has also appeared in other contexts, such as so-called “over-encryption” for access revocation in cloud storage systems [4]. More formally, this scheme can be phrased as an updatable encryption scheme 2ENC as follows.

2ENC.setup(λ): $k_0^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, $k^i \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, return $k_0 \leftarrow (k_0^o, k^i)$
 2ENC.next(k_e): parse $k_e = (k_e^o, k^i)$, create $k_{e+1}^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$,
 $\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow (k_e^o, k_{e+1}^o)$, $k_{e+1} \leftarrow (k_{e+1}^o, k^i)$,
 return (k_{e+1}, Δ_{e+1})
 2ENC.enc(k_e, m): parse $k_e = (k_e^o, k^i) \leftarrow k_e$,
 return $C_e \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, \text{SE.enc}(k^i, m))$
 2ENC.upd(Δ_{e+1}, C_e): parse $\Delta_{e+1} = (k_e^o, k_{e+1}^o)$,
 return $C_{e+1} \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_{e+1}^o, \text{SE.dec}(k_e^o, C_e))$
 2ENC.dec(k_e, C_e): parse $k_e = (k_e^o, k^i)$, return $\text{SE.dec}(k_e^o, \text{SE.dec}(k^i, C_e))$

Clearly this scheme does not achieve our desired IND-ENC security: A ciphertext can be decrypted if an adversary sees the secret key of *some* epoch and one of the tokens relating to the epoch where he learned the ciphertext. However, we show that this is the only additional attack, i.e., if the adversary never sees such a combination of tokens and keys, then the scheme is secure, which is formalized by the following theorem.

Theorem 2 (2ENC is weakly IND-ENC secure). *Let SE be an IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme, then 2ENC is (weakly) IND-ENC-secure if the following additional condition holds: If \mathcal{A} makes any query to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \cdot)$, then, for any challenge-equal epoch $e \in \mathcal{C}^*$, \mathcal{A} must not call $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \cdot)$ for epochs e or $e + 1$.*

The proof of this theorem turns out to be surprisingly subtle and is provided in Appendix B.1. As intuitively expected, it consists of two reductions to the IND-CPA security of SE, but the reduction for the outer encryption part is complicated by the fact that \mathcal{A} may call either $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ or $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{\mathcal{C}}}$ adaptively and in multiple epochs. Instead of guessing all epochs, which would lead to a large loss in tightness, we devise a specific hybrid argument and formalize the intuition that only epochs with a query to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{\mathcal{C}}}$ can help \mathcal{A} in gaining advantage.

It is also easy to see that the double encryption scheme is not IND-UPD secure: The inner ciphertext remains static and an adversary seeing tokens that

³ It is uni-directional in a proxy re-encryption scheme; the proxy removes the outer layer. As an updatable scheme, which replaces the outer layer, it is bi-directional.

allow him to unwrap the outer encryption can trivially link ciphertexts across epochs. But we again show that this is the only attack, i.e., 2ENC achieves a weak form of IND-UPD security if the adversary is restricted to learn at most one update token Δ_e for an epoch e for which he also obtained the challenge ciphertext in epochs e or $e - 1$.

Theorem 3 (2ENC is weakly IND-UPD secure). *Let SE be an IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme, then 2ENC is (weakly) IND-UPD-secure if the following additional condition holds: For any challenge-equal epoch $e \in \mathcal{C}^*$, \mathcal{A} must not call $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \cdot)$ for epochs e or $e + 1$.*

The proof follows along the lines of that for Theorem 2, with the main difference that we have to distinguish between the cases where the single special query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e)$ occurs before or after the challenge epoch \tilde{e} . The proof is given in Appendix B.2 .

5.2 Schemes from Key-Homomorphic PRFs (BLMR and BLMR+)

Boneh et al. [10] proposed an updatable encryption scheme based on key-homomorphic pseudorandom functions, to which we will refer to as BLMR-scheme. We first recall the notion of key-homomorphic PRFs and then present the BLMR and our improved BLMR+ scheme.

Definition 4 (Key-homomorphic PRF [9]). *Consider an efficiently computable function $F : \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$ such that (\mathcal{K}, \oplus) and (\mathcal{Y}, \otimes) are both groups. We say that F is a key-homomorphic PRF if the following properties hold:*

1. F is a secure pseudorandom function.
2. For every $k_1, k_2 \in \mathcal{K}$, and every $x \in \mathcal{X}$: $F(k_1, x) \otimes F(k_2, x) = F((k_1 \oplus k_2), x)$

A simple example of a secure key-homomorphic PRF is the function $F(k, x) = H(x)^k$ where $\mathcal{Y} = \mathbb{G}$ is an additive group in which the DDH assumption holds, and H is a random oracle [22].

Based on such a key-homomorphic PRF F , the BLMR construction is described as the following scheme:

BLMR.setup(λ): compute $k_0 \xleftarrow{r} F.\text{kgen}(\lambda)$, return k_0
 BLMR.next(k_e): $k_{e+1} \xleftarrow{r} F.\text{kgen}(\lambda)$, return $(k_{e+1}, (k_e \oplus k_{e+1}))$
 BLMR.enc(k_e, m): $N \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{X}$, return $((F(k_e, N) \otimes m), N)$
 BLMR.dec(k_e, C_e): parse $C_e = (C_1, N)$, return $m \leftarrow C_1 \otimes F(k_e, N)$.
 BLMR.upd(Δ_{e+1}, C_e): parse $C_e = (C_1, N)$, return $((C_1 \otimes F(\Delta_{e+1}, N)), N)$

Indeed, the subsequent theorem shows that BLMR is IND-ENC-secure.

Theorem 4 (BLMR is IND-ENC-secure). *Let F be a key-homomorphic PRF where $F.\text{kgen}(\lambda)$ returns uniformly random elements from \mathcal{K} , then BLMR is IND-ENC-secure.*

The proof uses an alternative characterization of PRF (as in the original proof in [10]) together with the techniques already used in the proofs of the 2ENC scheme. The proof is given in Appendix C.1. The BLMR scheme does not achieve the notion IND-UPD of update-indistinguishability though, as the second part of the ciphertext remains static throughout the updates. This might have inspired the change to the ciphertext-dependent setting in the full version of Boneh et al.'s paper [9]. Ciphertext-dependent updates, however, have the disadvantage that the key owner must produce one update token for each ciphertext to be updated. We show that a mild form of IND-UPD security can be achieved in the ciphertext-independent setting via a simple modification to the BLMR scheme.

The BLMR+ scheme. The BLMR+ scheme follows the basic structure of BLMR, but additionally encrypts the nonce. In more detail, in every epoch the owner also generates a second key $k'_e \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$ of a symmetric encryption scheme and encrypts the nonce-part N of each ciphertext under that key. In BLMR+, we simply include the old and new symmetric key into the update token and let the host re-encrypt the nonce.

The choice to simply reveal both keys might seem odd, but (in certain attack scenarios) it does not reveal more information to a corrupt host than what every updatable encryption scheme leaks anyway. Looking at two consecutive epochs, a corrupt host knows which updated and old ciphertext belong together – as he generated them – and thus letting him re-encrypt a static nonce does not reveal any additional information. The main advantage of BLMR+ over BLMR is that an adversary seeing only (updated) ciphertexts of different epochs cannot tell anymore which of them belong together. Clearly, this unlinkability is limited, though, as an adversary can still link ciphertexts whenever he also learned a related token which allows him to decrypt the static nonce.

In more detail, this modification results in the following scheme BLMR+:

BLMR+.setup(λ): $k_0^1 \xleftarrow{r} \text{F.kgen}(\lambda)$, $k_0^2 \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, return $k_0 \leftarrow (k_0^1, k_0^2)$

BLMR+.next(k_e): parse $k_e = (k_e^1, k_e^2)$,
create $k_{e+1}^1 \xleftarrow{r} \text{F.kgen}(\lambda)$, $k_{e+1}^2 \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$,
 $k_{e+1} \leftarrow (k_{e+1}^1, k_{e+1}^2)$, $\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow (k_e^1 \oplus k_{e+1}^1, (k_e^2, k_{e+1}^2))$,
return (k_{e+1}, Δ_{e+1})

BLMR+.enc(k_e, m): parse $k_e = (k_e^1, k_e^2)$, draw $N \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{X}$,
 $C^1 \leftarrow \text{F}(k_e^1, N) \otimes m$, $C^2 \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^2, N)$, return $C_e \leftarrow (C^1, C^2)$

BLMR+.dec(k_e, C_e): parse $k_e = (k_e^1, k_e^2)$ and $C_e = (C^1, C^2)$,
 $N \leftarrow \text{SE.dec}(k_e^2, C^2)$, return $m \leftarrow C^1 \otimes \text{F}(k_e^1, N)$

BLMR+.upd(Δ_{e+1}, C_e): parse $\Delta_{e+1} = (\Delta'_{e+1}, (k_e^2, k_{e+1}^2))$ and $C_e = (C_e^1, C_e^2)$,
 $N \leftarrow \text{SE.dec}(k_e^2, C_e^2)$, $C_{e+1}^1 \leftarrow C_e^1 \otimes \text{F}(\Delta'_{e+1}, N)$, $C_{e+1}^2 \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_{e+1}^2, N)$,
return $C_{e+1} \leftarrow (C_{e+1}^1, C_{e+1}^2)$

We first state the following corollary as an easy extension of Theorem 4 on BLMR. The encryption of the nonce can be easily simulated in the reduction.

Corollary 1. *The BLMR+ scheme is IND-ENC secure.*

We then prove that the modified BLMR+ scheme described above indeed achieves a weak form of IND-UPD security. The intuition behind the level of security specified in the following theorem is that knowing either a token or the key of the ciphertexts later used in the challenge in a round *before* the challenge allows the adversary to decrypt the nonce. Also, obtaining the challenge ciphertext and a related token *after* the challenge query allows the adversary to decrypt the nonce. To obtain unlinkability, we cannot allow the adversary to access the nonce both before and after the challenge query in epoch \tilde{e} . The theorem formalizes that we have security unless the adversary gains this access.

Theorem 5 (BLMR+ is weakly IND-UPD secure.). *Let F be a key-homomorphic PRF, and assume that all elements of \mathcal{X} are encoded as strings of the same length. Let SE be a IND-CPA-secure symmetric encryption scheme. Then, the scheme BLMR+ is (weakly) IND-UPD-secure if the following additional condition holds: Let e_{first} denote the epoch in which the first ciphertext that is later used as challenge C_0 or C_1 was encrypted. If there exist some $e^* \in \{e_{\text{first}}, \dots, \tilde{e} - 1\}$ where $e^* \in \mathcal{K}^* \cup \mathcal{T}^*$, i.e., \mathcal{A} knows the secret key k_{e^*} or token Δ_{e^*} , then for any challenge-equal epoch $e \in \mathcal{C}^*$, \mathcal{A} must not call $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \cdot)$ for epochs e or $e + 1$.*

The proof of this theorem is essentially a combination of the techniques used in the proofs of Theorems 3 and 4. It is provided in Appendix C.2 .

5.3 Updatable Encryption based on ElGamal (RISE)

We finally present a scheme that achieves both strong notions of indistinguishability of encryptions (IND-ENC) and updates (IND-UPD). This scheme uses the classical proxy re-encryption idea based on ElGamal that was originally proposed by Blaze et al. [8], but uses it in the secret-key setting. This alone would not be secure though, as parts of the ciphertext would remain static. What we additionally exploit is that ElGamal ciphertexts can be *re-randomized* by knowing only the public key. Thus, we add the “public-key” element of the epoch to the token and perform a re-randomization whenever a ciphertext gets updated. This makes it the first of the considered schemes where the update algorithm is probabilistic. Interestingly, probabilistic updates are not allowed in the work by Everspaugh et al. [15] which require updates to be deterministic such that the challenger in the security game can keep track of the challenge ciphertexts. Further, in the security proof we also rely on the *key anonymity* property [5] of ElGamal, which guarantees that ciphertexts do not leak information about the public key under which they are encrypted.

The use of public-key techniques for secret-key updatable encryption may appear unnecessary. We emphasize, however, that previous constructions are based on key-homomorphic PRFs, all instantiations of which are based on such techniques as well. By contrast, the direct use of the group structure without the intermediate abstraction allows us to implement the re-randomization and thereby achieve full IND-UPD security.

In fact, in terms of exponentiations, an encryption in our RISE scheme is as efficient as in BLMR and in Everspaugh et al.'s ReCrypt scheme [15], whereas the computations of update tokens and ciphertext updates are even more efficient than in [15] due to the ciphertext-independent setting of our work.

Let (\mathbb{G}, g, q) be system parameters available as CRS such that the DDH problem is hard w.r.t. λ , i.e., q is a λ -bit prime. The scheme RISE is described as follows.

RISE.setup(λ): $x \xleftarrow{r} \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, set $k_0 \leftarrow (x, g^x)$, return k_0
RISE.next(k_e): parse $k_e = (x, y)$, draw $x' \xleftarrow{r} \mathbb{Z}_q^*$,
 $k_{e+1} \leftarrow (x', g^{x'})$, $\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow (x'/x, g^{x'})$ return (k_{e+1}, Δ_{e+1})
RISE.enc(k_e, m): parse $k_e = (x, y)$, $r \xleftarrow{r} \mathbb{Z}_q$, return $C_e \leftarrow (y^r, g^r m)$
RISE.dec(k_e, C_e): parse $k_e = (x, y)$ and $C_e = (C_1, C_2)$, return $m' \leftarrow C_2 \cdot C_1^{-1/x}$
RISE.upd(Δ_{e+1}, C_e): parse $\Delta_{e+1} = (\Delta, y')$ and $C_e = (C_1, C_2)$,
 $r' \xleftarrow{r} \mathbb{Z}_q$, $C'_1 \leftarrow C_1^\Delta \cdot y'^{r'}$, $C'_2 \leftarrow C_2 \cdot g^{r'}$, return $C_{e+1} \leftarrow (C'_1, C'_2)$

The keys x for the encryption scheme are chosen from \mathbb{Z}_q^* instead of \mathbb{Z}_q as usual. The reason is that the update is multiplicative, and this restriction makes sure that each key is uniformly random in \mathbb{Z}_q^* . As this changes the distribution only negligibly, the standard Diffie-Hellman argument still applies. (However, the adaptation simplifies the security proof.)

The detailed proofs of the following theorems are provided in Appendix D.1 and D.2 .

Theorem 6 (RISE is IND-ENC secure). *The updatable encryption scheme RISE is IND-ENC secure under the DDH assumption.*

On a high-level, the proof exploits two properties of ElGamal encryption. First, a re-randomized ciphertext has the same distribution as a fresh encryption of the same plaintext. Second, as ElGamal encryption is key-anonymous [5], i.e., encryptions under two different public keys are indistinguishable, the adversary cannot distinguish between encryptions under the actual round key and encryptions under an independent, random key. These observations are used in game hops to make the challenge ciphertext independent from the information that the adversary learns by querying the other oracles. The remainder is a reduction to the DDH assumption, which underlies the security of ElGamal.

We also show that the scheme RISE is unlinkable. This property is mainly achieved by the re-randomization of the updates, but also leverages the key anonymity of ElGamal ciphertexts.

Theorem 7 (RISE is IND-UPD secure). *The updatable encryption scheme RISE is IND-UPD secure under the DDH assumption.*

The proof follows roughly along the same lines as that of Theorem 6. It is complicated a bit by the fact that, in contrast to IND-ENC, non-updated versions of the challenge-ciphertexts exist in the game even prior to the actual challenge

epoch, which means that in the reduction we have to guess certain parameters, such as the epochs directly preceding the challenge epoch in which the adversary obtains update tokens, to keep the simulation consistent. Nevertheless, we show that, with a proper construction of the hybrid argument, the loss remains polynomial.

One might wonder whether one could more generally build a secure updatable encryption scheme from any secure symmetric proxy re-encryption with key-anonymity that additionally allows public re-randomization of ciphertexts. For that analysis one would need a security notion for such a primitive schemes that also allows *adaptive* corruptions as in our models. However, so far, even for plain (symmetric) proxy re-encryption adaptive corruptions have only been considered for schemes that are uni-directional and single-hop, i.e., where the re-encryption capabilities would not be sufficient for updatable encryption.

6 Conclusion and Open Problems

We have provided a comprehensive model for ciphertext-independent updatable encryption schemes, complementing the recent work of Everspaugh et al. [15] that focuses on ciphertext-dependent schemes. Ciphertext-independent schemes are clearly superior in terms of efficiency and ease-of-use when key rotation is required for large volumes of ciphertexts, whereas ciphertext-dependent solutions give a more fine-grained control over the updatable information.

We formalized updatable encryption and its desired properties in the strict sequential manner it will be used, avoiding the ambiguity of previous security models. Our two notions IND-ENC and IND-UPD guarantee that fresh encryptions and updated ciphertext are secure even if an adversary can adaptively corrupt several keys and tokens before and after learning the ciphertexts.

Somewhat surprisingly, and contradictory to the claim in [15], we have shown that the XOR-KEM scheme is not a secure ciphertext-independent schemes in such a strong sense. For the (existing) schemes 2ENC, BLMR, BLMR+, and SE-KEM, we formalized the security of the schemes by specifying precisely the conditions on the adversary under which a weak form of IND-ENC and IND-UPD security is achieved. We also specified a scheme that builds on ElGamal encryption. By additionally exploiting the algebraic structure of the underlying groups, instead of using the key-homomorphic PRF abstraction as in previous works, we were able to build a scheme that fully achieves our strong security notions while being at least as efficient as existing schemes that are either weaker or require ciphertext-dependent tokens.

All schemes we analyze allow to infer tokens from keys, and enable bi-directional updates of ciphertexts and keys, whereas an ideal updatable encryption scheme should only allow uni-directional updates of ciphertexts. Building such an ideal scheme is related to the open challenge of building proxy re-encryption schemes that are uni-directional, multi-hop and collusion-resistant. Yet, while most proxy re-encryption work is in the public-key setting, updatable

encryption has secret keys, so the construction of schemes with similar properties may be easier and is an interesting and challenging open problem.

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A Symmetric Key-Encapsulation (SE-KEM)

We additionally analyze a scheme that can be considered as a symmetric key-encapsulation mechanism (KEM) together with a standard symmetric encryption scheme. The KEM has one key k_e per epoch e , and for each ciphertext it wraps an “inner” key x under which the actual message is encrypted. During an update, where the token is given by two keys (k_e, k_{e+1}) of subsequent epochs, all inner keys are simply un-wrapped using k_e and re-wrapped under the new key k_{e+1} .

This scheme is used in practical data-at-rest protection at cloud storage providers. The keys are, however, managed within the cloud storage systems. Not all nodes are equal; there are nodes that have access to the keys, and nodes that store the encrypted data.⁴ In this scenario, it is acceptable to have the proxy nodes perform the updates. We stress that the scheme is not applicable for outsourcing encrypted data, as it fully reveals the secret keys in the update procedure!

We describe the algorithms in a slightly different way to consider SE-KEM as a ciphertext-independent updatable encryption scheme. The algorithms are described in more detail as the scheme SE-KEM as follows.

SE-KEM.setup(λ): return $k_0 \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$
SE-KEM.next(k_e): $k_{e+1} \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, $\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow (k_e, k_{e+1})$, return (k_{e+1}, Δ_{e+1})
SE-KEM.enc(k_e, m): $x \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, return $C_e \leftarrow (\text{SE.enc}(k_e, x), \text{SE.enc}(x, m))$
SE-KEM.upd(Δ_{e+1}, C_e): parse $C_e = (C^1, C^2)$, and $\Delta_{e+1} = (k_e, k_{e+1})$,
return $C_{e+1} \leftarrow (\text{SE.enc}(k_{e+1}, \text{SE.dec}(k_e, C^1)), C^2)$
SE-KEM.dec(k_e, C_e): parse $C_e = (C^1, C^2)$, return $\text{SE.dec}(\text{SE.dec}(k, C^1), C^2)$

While this scheme is very similar to the hybrid AE as described by Everspaugh et al. [15], our description differs in that the token is independent of the ciphertext, and consists of the keys (k_e, k_{e+1}) used for encryption in epochs e and $e + 1$. In cloud storage systems where the keys for data-at-rest encryption are managed within the cloud, this is a faithful description of the real behavior.

The security that can be offered by such a solution is necessarily limited. First, if the adversary obtains a challenge in epoch e and also sees one of the tokens in epochs e or $e + 1$, the IND-ENC security is immediately broken. Furthermore, as the ciphertext update does not re-encrypt the second component, the ciphertexts are linkable through the epochs, i.e., SE-KEM cannot achieve any form of IND-UPD security. Still, we show that under the described (strict) constraints, the scheme guarantees a mild form of IND-ENC security.

Theorem 8 (SE-KEM is weakly IND-ENC secure). *Let SE be an IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme, then SE-KEM is (weakly) IND-ENC-secure if the following additional condition holds: For any challenge-equal epoch $e \in \mathcal{C}^*$, \mathcal{A} must not call $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \cdot)$ for epochs e or $e + 1$.*

The proof is very similar to the one of Theorem 2 and is provided in the following.

Proof. Given an adversary \mathcal{A} against the IND-ENC security of SE-KEM, we describe two adversaries $\mathcal{B}_{\text{in}} = \mathcal{B}_{\text{in}}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}} = \mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}(\mathcal{A})$ against the IND-CPA security of SE. To that end, we first describe an additional game in which the challenge ciphertext is generated by choosing two keys $x, x' \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, and computing the ciphertexts as $C_b \xleftarrow{r} (\text{SE.enc}(k_e, x), \text{SE.enc}(x', m_b))$. We then first

⁴ In OpenStack Swift, for instance, the “proxy server” nodes have access to the keys, whereas the role of the “object server” nodes is to store the ciphertext.

show that this game is difficult to win, and then that the adversary advantages in that game and in the original one differ only by a negligible amount.

Adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} attacks the inner encryption and emulates the modified game described above to \mathcal{A} as follows. Initially, it sets $e \leftarrow 0$, $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$, generates the outer key $k_0^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, and runs \mathcal{A} on empty input. It then emulates the oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as follows. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$, adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} chooses $k^i \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, and computes $C^i \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k^i, m)$ and $C^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, k^i)$, sets $C \leftarrow (C^i, C^o)$ and $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C, e)\}$, and returns C to \mathcal{A} . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} generates a new $k_{e+1}^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$ and sets $e \leftarrow e + 1$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$, adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} checks that $(C_{e-1}, e-1) \in \mathcal{L}$, parses $(C_{e-1}^o, C^i) \leftarrow C_{e-1}$, computes $C_e^o \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, \text{SE.dec}(k_{e-1}^o, C_{e-1}^o))$, sets $C_e \leftarrow (C_e^o, C^i)$ and $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C_e, e)\}$, and returns C_e to \mathcal{A} . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$, if $e^* \leq e$, then return (k_{e-1}^o, k_e^o) . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$, with $e^* \leq e$, return k_e^o .

When \mathcal{A} outputs m_0, m_1 in epoch \tilde{e} , adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} outputs the same messages m_0, m_1 and obtains challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}^i . It chooses $x \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, computes $\tilde{C}^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_{\tilde{e}}^o, x)$, and sets $\tilde{C} \leftarrow (\tilde{C}^o, \tilde{C}^i)$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \{(\tilde{C}, \tilde{e})\}$, and provides \tilde{C} to \mathcal{A} . Furthermore, \mathcal{B}_{in} continues to provide oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as before. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ is modified (as in IND-ENC) to additionally set $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{(\tilde{C}, e)\}$ with $(\tilde{C}_{e-1}^o, \tilde{C}^i) \leftarrow \tilde{C}_{e-1}$; $\tilde{C}_e^o \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, \text{SE.dec}(k_{e-1}^o, \tilde{C}_{e-1}^o))$; $\tilde{C}_e \leftarrow (\tilde{C}_e^o, \tilde{C}^i)$. Furthermore, \mathcal{B}_{in} provides \mathcal{A} with an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{c}}$ that returns the current challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}_e .

Observe that all computations performed by \mathcal{B}_{in} are exactly the same as in the game described above, and therefore the advantage of \mathcal{A} is retained. We next show that the advantages of \mathcal{A} in that game and in IND-ENC differ only by a negligible amount.

Adversary \mathcal{B}_{out} attacks the outer encryption and emulates either the above-described game or the IND-ENC game to \mathcal{A} . Initially, it sets $e \leftarrow 0$, $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$, guesses the challenge epoch e' uniformly random from $\{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$, where \hat{e} is an upper bound on the number of epochs for \mathcal{A} , and then uses $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ which is described as follows. Initially, it chooses $d \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$. Adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ then generates the initial outer key $k_0^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$ and runs \mathcal{A} on empty input. It then emulates the oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as follows. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$, adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ chooses $x \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$ and computes $C^i \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(x, m)$. If $e \neq e'$, then adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ computes $C^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, x)$, else it queries x to its own oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} to obtain C^o . Then, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ sets $C \leftarrow (C^o, C^i)$ and $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C, e)\}$ and returns C to \mathcal{A} . Oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ are dealt with exactly as in the case of \mathcal{B}_{in} above.⁵ Oracle \mathcal{O}_{upd} behaves (apart from the format of \mathcal{L}) as in \mathcal{B}_{in} for $e \neq e'$, but for $e = e'$ adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ uses its \mathcal{O}_{enc} oracle to compute the updated ciphertexts.

⁵ Queries $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$ for $e^* = e'$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$ for $e^* = e'$ or $e^* = e' + 1$ cannot be answered, in that case $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ aborts and outputs a random bit. We argue below that in these cases \mathcal{B}_{out} may fail. All other cases can be dealt with because $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ chose all keys k^i and k_e^o for $e \neq e'$ internally, and the oracles return $(k_{e^*}^o, k^i)$ and $(k_{e^*-1}^o, k_{e^*}^o)$, respectively.

Let now e' denote the epoch in which \mathcal{A} outputs m_0, m_1 ; adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ computes $\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k^i, m_d)$, and selects $x' \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$. If $e' < \tilde{e}$, then $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ computes $\tilde{C}^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_{e'}^o, x')$; if $e' = \tilde{e}$ then $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ outputs x, x' to obtain challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}^o ; and if $e' > \tilde{e}$, then computes $\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_{e'}^o, x)$. In any case, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ outputs $\tilde{C} = (\tilde{C}^o, \tilde{C}^i)$ as the challenge ciphertext. Then, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ sets $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \{(\tilde{C}, \tilde{e})\}$, and provides \tilde{C} to \mathcal{A} . Furthermore, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ continues to provide oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as before. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ is modified (as in IND-ENC) to additionally set $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{(\tilde{C}, e)\}$ where \tilde{C}_e is computed analogously to the challenge ciphertext \tilde{C} depending on whether $e < \tilde{e}$, $e = \tilde{e}$, or $e > \tilde{e}$. Furthermore, as \mathcal{B}_{in} , $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ provides \mathcal{A} with an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ that returns the current challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}_e .

Note that with $\tilde{e} = 0$ and challenge bit 0 in the embedded IND-CPA game, the view of \mathcal{A} is exactly the same as in the IND-ENC game with challenge bit 0, and that with $\tilde{e} = \hat{e}$ and challenge bit 1 in the embedded IND-CPA game, the view of \mathcal{A} is exactly the same as in the IND-ENC game with challenge bit 1. The hybrid argument then states that there is one $e' \in \{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$ in which \mathcal{B}_{out} wins with advantage at least ε/\hat{e} ; denote by $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ the adversary that always embeds the IND-CPA challenge in epoch e' .

We now have to deal with the fact that the reduction may fail. Assume, hypothetically, that $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ could obtain the key used in the IND-CPA game, in which case the emulation would always be perfect. Whenever \mathcal{A} does not obtain the challenge ciphertext in epoch e' , however, the entire view is independent of the challenge bit. Therefore, in such rounds $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ can safely randomize its output without decreasing the advantage. The condition on the challenge and token queries ensures that $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ will never actually need to get the key in the modified game.

On the other hand, if \mathcal{A} does not make any query of the type $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e')$, $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e' + 1)$, or $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e')$ for any e' being challenge-equal, which means in particular that \mathcal{B}_{out} as described above does not fail.

As \mathcal{B}_{out} perfectly emulates the two games, based on the challenge bit, a noticeable advantage of \mathcal{A} translates into a noticeable advantage of \mathcal{B}_{out} in distinguishing the two cases. This concludes the proof. \square

B Security of 2ENC

This section contains the detailed proofs of the weak IND-ENC and weak IND-UPD security of the 2ENC scheme presented in Section 5.1.

B.1 Proof of Theorem 2 (weak IND-ENC Security of 2ENC)

The updatable encryption scheme 2ENC as defined in Section 5.1 is IND-ENC-secure if SE is an IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme and for adversaries with the following restriction: If \mathcal{A} makes a query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e')$ where e' or $e' - 1$ are challenge-equal, then \mathcal{A} must not make *any* query to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \cdot)$.

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary against the IND-ENC security of 2ENC, then we construct from it adversaries $\mathcal{B}_{\text{in}} = \mathcal{B}_{\text{in}}(\mathcal{A})$ and $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}} = \mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}(\mathcal{A})$ such that at least one of \mathcal{B}_{in} and \mathcal{B}_{out} breaks the CPA security of SE. We can then combine \mathcal{B}_{in} and \mathcal{B}_{out} into a single adversary \mathcal{B} that chooses one of those strategies at random to break the CPA security of SE. Intuitively, \mathcal{B}_{out} can be seen as dealing with the cases where \mathcal{B} makes a query of the type $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \cdot)$, whereas \mathcal{B}_{in} can be seen as dealing with the cases where \mathcal{B} does not make such a query.

Adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} attacks the inner encryption and emulates the IND-ENC game to \mathcal{A} as follows. Initially, it sets $e \leftarrow 0$, $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$, generates the outer key $k_0^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, and runs \mathcal{A} on empty input. It then emulates the oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as follows. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$, adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} queries m to its own \mathcal{O}_{enc} oracle and obtains as a result a ciphertext C^i . Using the key k_e^o , \mathcal{B}_{in} computes $C^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, C^i)$, sets $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C^o, e)\}$, and returns C^o to \mathcal{A} . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} generates a new $k_{e+1}^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$ and sets $e \leftarrow e + 1$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$, adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} checks that $(C_{e-1}, e-1) \in \mathcal{L}$, computes $C_e \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, \text{SE.dec}(k_{e-1}^o, C_{e-1}))$, $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C, e)\}$, and returns C_e to \mathcal{A} . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$, if $e^* \leq e$, then return (k_{e-1}^o, k_e^o) . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$, if $e^* \leq e$, then fail (i.e., output a uniformly random bit in the game).

When \mathcal{A} outputs m_0, m_1 in epoch \tilde{e} , adversary \mathcal{B}_{in} outputs the same messages m_0, m_1 and obtains challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}' . It computes $\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_{\tilde{e}}^o, \tilde{C}')$, sets $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \{(\tilde{C}, \tilde{e})\}$, and provides \tilde{C} to \mathcal{A} . Furthermore, \mathcal{B}_{in} continues to provide oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as before. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ is modified (as in IND-ENC) to additionally set $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{(\tilde{C}, e)\}$ with $\tilde{C}_e \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, \text{SE.dec}(k_{e-1}^o, \tilde{C}_{e-1}))$. Furthermore, \mathcal{B}_{in} provides \mathcal{A} with an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ that returns the current challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}_e .

Observe that if \mathcal{A} does not make any query of the type $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$, then all computations performed by \mathcal{B}_{in} are exactly the same as in the IND-ENC game, and therefore the advantage of \mathcal{A} is retained.

Adversary \mathcal{B}_{out} attacks the outer encryption and emulates the IND-ENC game to \mathcal{A} . Initially, it sets $e \leftarrow 0$, $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$, and guesses the challenge epoch e' uniformly random from $\{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$, where \hat{e} is an upper bound on the number of epochs for \mathcal{A} . Adversary \mathcal{B}_{out} then runs the strategy $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$, which generates the initial outer key $k_0^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$ and inner key $k^i \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, and runs \mathcal{A} on empty input. It then emulates the oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as follows. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$, adversary \mathcal{B}_{out} computes $C^i \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k^i, m)$. If $e \neq e'$, then adversary \mathcal{B}_{out} computes $C^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, C^i)$, else it queries C^i to its own oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} to obtain C^o . Then, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ sets $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C^o, C^i, e)\}$ and returns C^o to \mathcal{A} . Oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ are dealt with exactly as in the case of \mathcal{B}_{in} above.⁶ Oracle \mathcal{O}_{upd} behaves (apart from the format of \mathcal{L}) as in \mathcal{B}_{in} for $e \neq e'$, but for $e = e'$ adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ uses its \mathcal{O}_{enc} oracle to compute the updated ciphertexts.

⁶ Queries $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$ for $e^* = e'$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$ for $e^* = e'$ or $e^* = e' + 1$ cannot be answered, and $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ aborts the emulation and outputs a random bit. Indeed, we argue below that in these cases $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ may fail. All other cases can be dealt with because $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ chose all keys k^i and k_e^o for $e \neq e'$ internally, and the oracles return $(k_{e^*}^o, k^i)$ and $(k_{e^*-1}^o, k_{e^*}^o)$, respectively.

Let now e' denote the epoch in which \mathcal{A} outputs m_0, m_1 ; adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ computes $\tilde{C}_b \stackrel{\leftarrow}{\leftarrow} \text{SE.enc}(k^i, m_b)$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$. If $e' < \tilde{e}$, then $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ computes $\tilde{C} \stackrel{\leftarrow}{\leftarrow} \text{SE.enc}(k_{e'}^o, \tilde{C}_0)$; if $e' = \tilde{e}$ then $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ outputs \tilde{C}_0, \tilde{C}_1 to obtain challenge ciphertext \tilde{C} ; and if $e' > \tilde{e}$, then computes $\tilde{C} \stackrel{\leftarrow}{\leftarrow} \text{SE.enc}(k_{e'}^o, \tilde{C}_0)$. Then, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ sets $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \{(\tilde{C}, \tilde{e})\}$, and provides \tilde{C} to \mathcal{A} . Furthermore, \mathcal{B}_{out} continues to provide oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as before. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ is modified (as in IND-ENC) to additionally set $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{(\tilde{C}, e)\}$ where \tilde{C}_e is computed analogously to the challenge ciphertext \tilde{C} depending on whether $e < \tilde{e}$, $e = \tilde{e}$, or $e > \tilde{e}$. Furthermore, as \mathcal{B}_{in} , $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ provides \mathcal{A} with an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ that returns the current challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}_e .

Assume, for now and hypothetically, that $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ emulates the embedded IND-CPA game and can open the respective key $k_{e'}^o$ for the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \cdot)$ or $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \cdot)$ queries, if necessary. (We will later explain why this assumption is not a problem.) Note that with $e' = 0$ and challenge bit 0 in the embedded IND-CPA game, the view of \mathcal{A} is exactly the same as in IND-ENC with challenge bit 0, and that with $e' = \hat{e}$ and challenge bit 1 in the embedded IND-CPA game, the view of \mathcal{A} is exactly the same as in IND-ENC with challenge bit 1. The hybrid argument then states that there is one $e' \in \{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$ in which \mathcal{B}_{out} wins with advantage at least ε/\hat{e} ; denote by $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ the adversary that always embeds the IND-CPA challenge in epoch e' .

What remains to be shown is how we deal with the fact that the reduction may fail; for this, we first further consider the case where $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ can obtain the key from the IND-CPA game. Indeed, whenever \mathcal{A} does not obtain the challenge ciphertext in epoch e' , then the entire view is independent of the challenge bit. Therefore, in cases where \mathcal{A} does not obtain the challenge in round e' , which means \mathcal{A} may make queries of the types $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \cdot)$ or $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \cdot)$, we can safely randomize the output of $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ without decreasing its advantage—this is why $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ may abort here, without decreasing its advantage!

On the other hand, if \mathcal{A} obtains the challenge ciphertext in round e' , either because it is the challenge oracle or through the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ oracle, then the condition stated in the lemma ensures that \mathcal{A} does not make any query of the types $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e')$, $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e' + 1)$, or $\mathcal{O}(\text{key}, e')$, which means in particular that $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ as described above does not fail. Therefore, the advantage of $\mathcal{B}_{\text{out}}^{e'}$ is at least $1/\hat{e}$ times the advantage of \mathcal{A} .

As the emulation of \mathcal{B}_{in} is perfect, and by the above arguments for \mathcal{B}_{out} , the sum of the advantage of \mathcal{B}_{in} and \hat{e} times the advantage of \mathcal{B}_{out} is at least as large as the advantage of \mathcal{A} . Together, this concludes the proof. \square

B.2 Proof of Theorem 3 (weak IND-UPD Security of 2ENC)

Our updatable encryption scheme 2ENC defined in Section 5.1 is IND-UPD-secure if SE is an IND-CPA-secure encryption scheme, and adversary \mathcal{A} makes at most one query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e)$ for $e, e - 1 \in \mathcal{C}^*$.

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary that achieves advantage at least $\varepsilon > 0$ against the unlinkability of 2ENC, then we construct from it an adversary $\mathcal{B} = \mathcal{B}(\mathcal{A})$ that

breaks the IND-CPA security of SE. Adversary \mathcal{B} uses one of two strategies \mathcal{B}^1 and \mathcal{B}^2 at random, where \mathcal{B}^1 works for the case in which \mathcal{A} makes the query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e)$ for $e, e-1 \in \mathcal{C}^*$ for $e < \tilde{e}$ and \mathcal{B}^2 makes for $e > \tilde{e}$.

Adversary \mathcal{B}^1 initially generates keys $k^i \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$ and $k_0^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, sets $e \leftarrow 0$, $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$, and guesses the challenge epoch e' uniformly random from $\{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$, where \hat{e} is an upper bound on the number of epochs for \mathcal{A} . Adversary \mathcal{B}^1 then runs \mathcal{A} on empty input and emulates oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as follows. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$, compute $C^i \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k^i, m)$. If $e = e'$, then \mathcal{B}^1 queries C^i to its own oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} to obtain a ciphertext C^o , otherwise \mathcal{B}^1 computes $C^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, C^i)$. Subsequently, set $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C^o, C^i, e)\}$, and return C^o to \mathcal{A} . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, generate key $k_{e+1}^o \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$ and set $e \leftarrow e+1$. Upon input $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$, adversary \mathcal{B}^1 checks that $(C_{e-1}, C^i, e-1) \in \mathcal{L}$, computes $C_e \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, C^i)$ if $e \neq e'$ or obtains C_e by querying C^i to its own \mathcal{O}_{enc} oracle, sets $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C_e, C^i, e)\}$, and returns C_e to \mathcal{A} . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$ with $1 \leq e^* \leq e$, return $(k_{e^*-1}^o k_{e^*}^o)$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$ with $e^* \leq e$, output (k_e^o, k^i) . These two operations may fail since we only know $e^* \neq \tilde{e}, \tilde{e}+1$ but not $e^* \neq e', e'+1$, as would be required for \mathcal{B}^1 to not have to open in epoch e' . We ignore this issue for now and explain how this is dealt with below.

If \mathcal{A} outputs C_0, C_1 , of which we know that they have been obtained either through \mathcal{O}_{enc} or \mathcal{O}_{upd} , then it also holds that that $(C_0, C_0^i, e-1), (C_1, C_1^i, e-1) \in \mathcal{L}$. If $e < e'$, then compute $\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, C_0^i)$; if $e = e'$, then obtain \tilde{C} by providing C_0, C_1 as challenge messages in the IND-CPA game for SE (here we require that $|C_0| = |C_1|$); if $e > e'$, then compute $\tilde{C} \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^o, C_1^i)$. Subsequently, provide \mathcal{A} with \tilde{C} and access to the oracles as before as well as $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$. Oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} and \mathcal{O}_{upd} are as before. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ must now also transfer the challenge ciphertext into the next epoch. This is done analogously to the computation of the challenge above, namely for $e < e'$ by encrypting C_0 under k_e^o , for $e = e'$ using the CPA game for SE, and for $e > e'$ by encrypting C_1 under k_e^o . Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ returns the current challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}_e computed during $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$.

The proof now proceeds by concluding the hybrid argument. First, if $e' = \hat{e}$ and the IND-CPA game for SE has its challenge bit set to 0, then the view of \mathcal{A} is exactly as in the IND-UPD game with challenge bit 0. This can be seen since the encryption and update of the challenge ciphertext are consistently done with respect to C_0 . By contrast, if $e' = 0$ and the IND-CPA game for SE has its challenge bit set to 1, then the view of \mathcal{A} is the same as in the IND-UPD game with challenge bit 1. All operations are consistently done with C_1 . Furthermore, for any $e' \in \{0, \dots, \hat{e}-1\}$, the view of \mathcal{A} when $e = e'$ and the IND-CPA challenge bit is 0 is the same as the view when $e = e'+1$ and the challenge bit is 1. This is so because in all rounds prior to and including e' , the challenge ciphertext contains C_0 , whereas in all rounds starting with $e'+1$ it contains C_1 . The hybrid argument then states that there is one $e' \in \{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$ in which \mathcal{B}^1 wins with advantage at least ε/\hat{e} ; denote by \mathcal{B}_e^1 the adversary that always embeds the IND-CPA challenge in epoch e' .

What remains to be shown is how we deal with the fact that the reduction may fail. Assume, hypothetically, that $\mathcal{B}_{e'}^1$ could obtain the key used in the IND-CPA game, in which case the emulation would always work. Whenever \mathcal{A} does not obtain the challenge ciphertext in epoch e' , however, the entire view is independent of the challenge bit. Therefore, in such rounds $\mathcal{B}_{e'}^1$ can safely randomize its output without decreasing the advantage. The condition on the challenge and token queries ensures that $\mathcal{B}_{e'}^1$ will never actually need to get the key in the modified game.

Adversary \mathcal{B}^2 behaves similarly to \mathcal{B}^1 , with two major differences. First, \mathcal{B}^2 has to guess the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$ query during which one of the challenge ciphertexts is first encrypted. Then, it encrypts either this nonce or a random one; this reduces to the Real-or-Random variant of IND-CPA and requires an additional hybrid argument. In epochs $e > e'$ it will then encrypt under the respective epoch key. This completes the proof. \square

C Security of BLMR and BLMR+

This section contains the detailed proofs of the IND-ENC security of the BLMR scheme and the weak IND-UPD security of BLMR+ presented in Section 5.2.

C.1 Proof of Theorem 4 (IND-ENC Security of BLMR)

BLMR is a IND-ENC-secure updatable encryption scheme if F be a key-homomorphic PRF such that $F.\text{kgen}(\lambda)$ returns uniformly random elements from \mathbb{G} .

We use a non-standard formalization of PRF security, because it better matches what we need in the proof.⁷ In more detail, we say that a function F is called a pseudo-random function (PRF) if no efficient adversary \mathcal{A} can distinguish between two settings with non-negligible advantage. The challenger first chooses a key $k \xleftarrow{r} F.\text{kgen}(\lambda)$ and then gives \mathcal{A} access to an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{eval}}(x)$ to evaluate $F(k, x)$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{challenge}}(x)$ to *either* evaluate $F(k, x)$ *or* a uniformly random function $f : \mathcal{X} \rightarrow \mathcal{Y}$. Of course, the oracles may only be called on different inputs.

Proof. We again prove the statement by reduction. In more detail, for each adversary \mathcal{A} that breaks the IND-ENC security of BLMR, there is an adversary \mathcal{B} that breaks the PRF security of F .

Adversary \mathcal{B} is described as follows. Given a parameter $e' \in \{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$, where \hat{e} is an upper bound on the number of epochs, $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ initially samples $k_0 \xleftarrow{r} F.\text{kgen}(\lambda)$, $b \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$, as well as $\underline{e} \in \{0, \dots, e'\}$ and $\bar{e} \xleftarrow{r} \{e' + 1, \dots, \hat{e}\}$, sets $e \leftarrow 0$, $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$, and runs \mathcal{A} on empty input. It then emulates the oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as follows.

Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, if $e < \underline{e} - 1$ or $e \geq \bar{e}$, then adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ generates a new $k_{e+1}^o \xleftarrow{r} F.\text{kgen}(\lambda)$, and computes $\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow k_e \oplus k_{e+1}$. If $\underline{e} \leq e + 1 \leq \bar{e}$, then sample $\Delta_{e+1} \xleftarrow{r} F.\text{kgen}(\lambda)$ and set $\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow \Delta_e \oplus \Delta_{e+1}$ (where $\Delta_{\underline{e}-1}$ is zero).

⁷ This variant is equivalent to standard PRF security, see [9, Theorem 7.2].

Furthermore, if $e > \tilde{e}$ then update $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}$, i.e., first parse $(\tilde{C}_e^i, N) \leftarrow \tilde{C}_e$ and then: If $e + 1 < \underline{e}$, then compute $\tilde{C}_{e+1}^i \leftarrow F(k_{e+1}, N) \otimes m_d$; if $\underline{e} \leq e < \bar{e}$, then compute $\tilde{C}_{e+1}^i \leftarrow \mathcal{O}_{\text{challenge}}(N) \otimes F(\Delta_{e+1}, N) \otimes m_d$; if $e \geq \bar{e}$ then choose $\tilde{C}_{e+1}^i \xleftarrow{r} \mathbb{G}$. Additionally, set $\tilde{C}_{e+1} \leftarrow (\tilde{C}_{e+1}^i, N)$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{(\tilde{C}_{e+1}, e + 1)\}$. Finally, set $e \leftarrow e + 1$.

Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$, if $e \notin \{\underline{e}, \dots, \bar{e}\}$, then adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ chooses⁸ $N \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{X}$ and computes $\tilde{C} \leftarrow F(k_e, N) \otimes m$, sets $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C, m, e)\}$, and returns C to \mathcal{A} . If $e \in \{\underline{e}, \dots, \bar{e}\}$, then $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ computes $C \leftarrow (\mathcal{O}_{\text{eval}}(N) \otimes F(\Delta_e, N) \otimes m, N)$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$, adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ first verifies that $(C_{e-1}, e-1) \in \mathcal{L}$. If $e \neq \underline{e}, \bar{e} + 1$, then parse $(C_{e-1}^i, N) \leftarrow C_{e-1}$, compute $C_e^i \leftarrow C_{e-1}^i \otimes F(\Delta_e, N)$, set $C_e \leftarrow (C_e^i, N)$ and $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C_e, m, e)\}$, and return C_e to \mathcal{A} . For $e = \underline{e}, \bar{e}$, use the plaintext message stored in \mathcal{L} with C_{e-1} to provide a fresh encryption analogous to the computations in \mathcal{O}_{enc} .

Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$, if $e^* \leq e$, with $e^* \neq \underline{e}, \bar{e} + 1$, then return Δ_{e^*} . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$, with $e^* \leq e$ and $e^* \notin \{\underline{e}, \dots, \bar{e}\}$, return k_{e^*} .

When \mathcal{A} outputs m_0, m_1 in epoch \tilde{e} , then create an encryption analogously to the procedure described in $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$. Chooses $N \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{X}$; if this nonce N collides with previous nonces used in \mathcal{O}_{enc} , adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ fails. For $\tilde{e} < \underline{e}$, compute a real encryption of m_d . For $\underline{e} \leq \tilde{e} \leq \bar{e}$, compute the encryption using $\mathcal{O}_{\text{eval}}(N) \otimes F(\Delta_{\tilde{e}}, N)$, and for $\tilde{e} > \bar{e}$, use a uniformly random mask. Sets $\tilde{C} \leftarrow (\tilde{C}^o, \tilde{C}^i)$ and $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \{(\tilde{C}, \tilde{e})\}$, and provide \tilde{C} to \mathcal{A} . Adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ continues to provide \mathcal{A} with oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as before. Furthermore, $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ provides \mathcal{A} with an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ that returns the current challenge ciphertext \tilde{C}_e . Finally, when \mathcal{A} provides output bit d , then $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ outputs $b \oplus d$.

We implicitly defined a sequence of games $H_0, \dots, H_{\tilde{e}}$, where in game H_e the PRF challenge is embedded in epoch e . One could view the IND-ENC game as $H_{\tilde{e}} + 1$, where \mathcal{A} has advantage some ε , whereas in game H_{-1} all challenge ciphertexts are randomized, and therefore \mathcal{A} has no advantage. For each e , game H_e with ideal PRF is the same as H_{e+1} with real PRF, and therefore the hybrid argument states that there is at least one epoch e such that the advantage between H_e and H_{e+1} is at least ε/\hat{e} .

We can build adversary \mathcal{B}_e as described above to win the PRF game. Note that the failure probability of \mathcal{B}_e due to collision of nonces is upper bounded by $q/|\mathcal{X}|$, where q is the number of encryption queries per epoch. This term is negligible if \mathcal{X} has exponential size. Also, by guessing the rounds for the challenge and the first key-corruption, \mathcal{B}_e loses a factor \hat{e}^2 compared to \mathcal{A} . Still, if the advantage of \mathcal{A} is noticeable, then $b \oplus d$ is biased noticeably away from uniform, and therefore the advantage of \mathcal{B}_e is also noticeable. \square

C.2 Proof of Theorem 5 (weak IND-UPD Security of BLMR+)

Let F be a key-homomorphic PRF, and assume that all elements of \mathcal{X} are encoded as strings of the same length. Let SE be a IND-CPA-secure symmetric encryption scheme. Then, the scheme BLMR+ is (weakly) IND-UPD-secure (only) against

⁸ Adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ fails if $e > \tilde{e}$ and N collides with the nonce used in the challenge.

adversaries for which the following condition holds: Let e_{first} denote the epoch in which the first ciphertext that is later used as challenge C_0 or C_1 was encrypted. If there exist some $e^* \in \{e_{\text{first}}, \dots, \tilde{e} - 1\}$ where $e^* \in \mathcal{K}^* \cup \mathcal{T}^*$, i.e., \mathcal{A} knows the secret key k_{e^*} or token Δ_{e^*} , then for any challenge-equal epoch $e \in \mathcal{C}^*$, \mathcal{A} must not call $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \cdot)$ for epochs e or $e + 1$.

The reason for considering only key-corruptions *before* the challenge epoch \tilde{e} in the above restricting is the determinism of the update algorithm in BLMR+. For deterministic updates, the IND-UPD game does not allow the adversary to update C_0 or C_1 into the challenge epoch \tilde{e} via the \mathcal{O}_{upd} oracle. As the adversary is also not allowed to learn $\Delta_{\tilde{e}}$ either, both ciphertexts exist in a non-challenge form only up to epoch $\tilde{e} - 1$. Similarly, all challenge-equal epochs must be *after* the challenge epoch \tilde{e} due to the restrictions of the IND-UPD game.

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be the adversary breaking the unlinkability of BLMR+, then we build either an adversary \mathcal{B}_{enc} breaking the IND-CPA security of SE, or an adversary \mathcal{B}_{prf} breaking the PRF security of F. We first consider a hybrid game in which the first element of the challenge ciphertext is a uniformly random element from \mathcal{X} . We then show that (a) this game is difficult to win, based on the IND-CPA security of SE, and that (b) the hybrid game is indistinguishable from the unlinkability game, based on the PRF security of F.

Adversary \mathcal{B}_{enc} has to behave in one out of two ways. The first behavior applies if \mathcal{A} makes its $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \cdot)$ or $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \cdot)$ query in an epoch $e < \tilde{e}$ with the challenge epoch \tilde{e} . The second behavior applies if \mathcal{A} makes its $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e)$ query in an epoch $e > \tilde{e}$. We first describe the first strategy, denoted as $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^1$.

Adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^1$ is described in terms of adversaries $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1,e'}$, where $e' \in \{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$ and \hat{e} is an upper bound on the number of epochs invoked by \mathcal{A} . Adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1,e'}$ first sets $e \leftarrow 0$ and $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$, and then generates keys $k_0^1 \xleftarrow{r} \text{F.kgen}(\lambda)$ and $k_0^2 \xleftarrow{r} \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, sets $k_0 \leftarrow (k_0^1, k_0^2)$, and starts \mathcal{A} on empty input, providing access to oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$, described as follows. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$, if $e \neq e'$, then adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1,e'}$ computes $C \xleftarrow{r} \text{BLMR+}.enc(k_e, m)$ and sets $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C, e, N)\}$ for the nonce N used in the encryption. If $e = e'$, then adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1,e'}$ parses $(k_e^1, k_e^2) \leftarrow k_e$, chooses a random $N \xleftarrow{r} \mathcal{X}$, computes $C^1 \leftarrow \text{F}(k_e^1, N) \otimes m$ and queries its own enc oracle on N to obtain C^2 , and returns $C \leftarrow (C^1, C^2)$. It also sets $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C, e, N)\}$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1,e'}$ generates a new key $(k_{e+1}, \Delta_{e+1}) \xleftarrow{r} \text{BLMR+}.next(k_e)$ and sets $e \leftarrow e + 1$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$, first check that $(C_{e-1}, e - 1, N) \in \mathcal{L}$. Then, if $e \neq e'$, then compute $C_e \xleftarrow{r} \text{BLMR+}.upd(\Delta_e, C_{e-1})$, set $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C_e, e, N)\}$ and return C_e . If $e = e'$, then parse $(\Delta_e^1, (k_{e-1}^2, k_e^2)) \leftarrow \Delta_e$ and $(C_{e-1}^1, C_{e-1}^2) \leftarrow C_{e-1}$, compute $N \leftarrow \text{SE}.dec(k_{e-1}^2, C_{e-1}^2)$ and $C_e^1 \leftarrow C_{e-1}^1 \otimes \text{F}(\Delta_e^1, N)$, obtain C_e^2 by invoking the own enc oracle on N , output $C_e \leftarrow (C_e^1, C_e^2)$, and set $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C_e, e, N)\}$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$ with $e^* \leq e$ and $e^* < \tilde{e}$, return Δ_{e^*} . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$ with $e^* \leq e$ and $e^* < \tilde{e}$, return k_{e^*} . These query can always be answered, since $e^* \neq \tilde{e}$ for both queries and epochs $e < e^*$.

When \mathcal{A} outputs the two challenge ciphertexts C_0, C_1 in epoch \tilde{e} , adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1,e'}$ parses them as $(C_0^1, C_0^2) \leftarrow C_0$ and $(C_1^1, C_1^2) \leftarrow C_1$, sets \tilde{C}^1 to a uniformly

random value, and computes $N_0 \leftarrow \text{SE.dec}(k_{\tilde{e}}^2, C_0^2)$ and $N_1 \leftarrow \text{SE.dec}(k_{\tilde{e}}^2, C_1^2)$. If $\tilde{e} < e'$, then set $\tilde{C}_2 \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_{\tilde{e}}, N_0)$. If $\tilde{e} = e'$, then obtain \tilde{C}_2 by providing N_0, N_1 as challenge plaintexts in the IND-CPA game. If $\tilde{e} > e'$, then set $\tilde{C}_2 \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_{\tilde{e}}, N_1)$. Adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1, e'}$ then returns the challenge ciphertext $\tilde{C} \leftarrow (\tilde{C}^1, \tilde{C}^2)$ where \tilde{C}^1 is a uniformly random element from \mathcal{Y} , and also sets $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} = \{(\tilde{C}, \tilde{e})\}$.

After generating the challenge, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1, e'}$ again runs \mathcal{A} with access to oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$, and additionally to an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{c}}$. Oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} behaves as described above. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ now additionally updates the challenge ciphertext, meaning that for $(\tilde{C}_e, e) \in \tilde{\mathcal{L}}$, it updates the PRF value and re-encrypts the nonce depending on the epoch as in the challenge ciphertext, and sets $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{(\tilde{C}_{e+1}, e+1)\}$. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$ behaves as above for $e = \tilde{e}$. For $e > \tilde{e} + 1$, behave as above for $e \neq \tilde{e}$, and for $e = \tilde{e} + 1$ the only difference is that the nonce is taken from \mathcal{L} instead of by decryption from C_{e-1} . Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \cdot)$ again behaves as above, whereas querying $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \cdot)$ is no longer permitted, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{c}}$ simply returns \tilde{C}_e .

Since the view of \mathcal{A} with $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1, \tilde{e}}$ and challenge bit 0 is the same as in the hybrid game with challenge bit 0, the view with $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1, 0}$ and challenge bit 1 is the same as in the hybrid game with challenge bit 1, and every two subsequent $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1, e}$ and $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1, e+1}$ are linked in a similar way, the hybrid argument to obtain that at least one $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^{1, e}$ will be successful in its CPA security game against SE.

Adversary $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^2$ deals with the case where the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e)$ query is for an epoch $e > \tilde{e}$. The reduction operates similarly to the one above, with two major differences. First, $\mathcal{B}_{\text{enc}}^2$ has to guess the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$ query during which one of the challenge ciphertexts is first encrypted. Then, it encrypts either this nonce or a random one; this reduces to the Real-or-Random variant of IND-CPA and requires an additional hybrid argument. In epochs $e > e'$ it will then encrypt the actual nonce under the respective epoch key.

We now have to show that the original game is not substantially easier to win than the hybrid game. For this, we again use the upper bound \hat{e} on the number of epochs and describe an adversary \mathcal{B}_{prf} in the PRF security game for F. Similarly to \mathcal{B}_{enc} above, \mathcal{B}_{prf} guesses the target epoch $e' \in \{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$ uniformly at random and fails if the guess is incorrect. \mathcal{B}_{prf} also guesses the first epoch $\bar{e} > e'$ in which \mathcal{A} makes a $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \bar{e})$ -query.⁹ Adversary \mathcal{B}_{enc} further initializes $e \leftarrow 0$, $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$ and generates keys $k_0^1 \leftarrow \text{F.kgen}(\lambda)$ and $k_0^2 \leftarrow \text{SE.kgen}(\lambda)$, sets $k_0 \leftarrow (k_0^1, k_0^2)$, and chooses a random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. Adversary \mathcal{B}_{prf} then runs \mathcal{A} and emulates the oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ as described below.

Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$, if $e \neq \bar{e}$, then adversary \mathcal{B}_{prf} computes $C \leftarrow \text{BLMR+.enc}(k_e, m)$ and sets $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C, e, N)\}$ for the nonce N used in the encryption. If $e = \bar{e}$, then adversary \mathcal{B}_{prf} parses $(k_e^1, k_e^2) \leftarrow k_e$, chooses a random $N \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$, queries N to its PRF oracle to obtain output Y , computes $C^1 \leftarrow Y \otimes m$ and $C^2 \leftarrow \text{SE.enc}(k_e^2, N)$, and returns $C \leftarrow (C^1, C^2)$. It also sets $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C, e, N)\}$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, adversary \mathcal{B}_{prf} generates a new key $(k_{e+1}, \Delta_{e+1}) \leftarrow \text{BLMR+.next}(k_e)$

⁹ That means that \mathcal{B}_{prf} also if \mathcal{A} uses a different challenge epoch or if \mathcal{A} queries $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e)$ with $e' \leq e < \bar{e}$ or either of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \bar{e})$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, \bar{e} + 1)$.

and sets $e \leftarrow e+1$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$, first check that $(C_{e-1}, e-1, N) \in \mathcal{L}$. Then, if $e \neq e'$, then compute $C_e \stackrel{r}{\leftarrow} \text{BLMR+upd}(\Delta_e, C_{e-1})$, set $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C_e, e, N)\}$ and return C_e . If $e = e'$, then parse $(\Delta_e^1, (k_{e-1}^2, k_e^2)) \leftarrow \Delta_e$ and $(C_{e-1}^1, C_{e-1}^2) \leftarrow C_{e-1}$, compute $N \leftarrow \text{SE.dec}(k_{e-1}^2, C_e^2)$ and $C_e^1 \leftarrow C_{e-1}^1 \otimes Y$, where Y is obtained by querying the PRF oracle on N , compute $C_e^2 \stackrel{r}{\leftarrow} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^2, N)$, output $C_e \leftarrow (C_e^1, C_e^2)$, and set $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \mathcal{L} \cup \{(C_e, e, N)\}$. Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$ with $e^* \leq e$, return Δ_{e^*} . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$ with $e^* \leq e$, return k_e . This query can always be answered, since $e^* \neq \tilde{e}$ for both queries and additionally $e^* \neq \tilde{e} + 1$ for corrupting token.

When \mathcal{A} outputs the two challenge ciphertexts C_0, C_1 with $(C_0, \tilde{e}-1, N_0), (C_1, \tilde{e}-1, N_1) \in \mathcal{L}$ in epoch $\tilde{e} = e'$ (with corresponding plaintexts m_0 and m_1 , respectively), adversary \mathcal{B}_{prf} parses one as $(C_b^1, C_b^2) \leftarrow C_b$, sets $\tilde{C}^1 = Y \otimes m_b$ where Y is the result of the PRF challenge on N_b , and computes $\tilde{C}_2 \stackrel{r}{\leftarrow} \text{SE.enc}(k_e^2, N_b)$. Adversary \mathcal{B}_{enc} then returns the challenge ciphertext $\tilde{C} \leftarrow (\tilde{C}^1, \tilde{C}^2)$, and also sets $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} = \{(\tilde{C}, \tilde{e})\}$.

After generating the challenge, \mathcal{B}_{prf} again runs \mathcal{A} with access to oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$, and additionally to an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$. Oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} behaves as described above. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ now additionally updates the challenge ciphertext. For $\tilde{e} \leq e < \bar{e}$ and $e > \bar{e}$ and $(\tilde{C}_e, e) \in \tilde{\mathcal{L}}$, it computes $\tilde{C}_{e+1} \stackrel{r}{\leftarrow} \text{BLMR+upd}(\Delta_{e+1}, \tilde{C}_e)$ and sets $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{(\tilde{C}_{e+1}, e+1)\}$. For $e = \bar{e}$, however, it re-computes $C^1 \leftarrow \text{F}(k_e^1, N_b) \otimes m_b$ to obtain the first component of the updated challenge ciphertext. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$ behaves as above for $\tilde{e} \leq e < \bar{e}$ and $e > \bar{e}$, and computes the update analogously to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ for $e = \bar{e}$. Oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ again behaves as above, and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ simply returns \tilde{C}_e . The update mechanism in $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ and \mathcal{O}_{upd} ensures that the epochs $\tilde{e} < e < \bar{e}$, for which \mathcal{A} may be querying $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e)$, are consistent with epoch \tilde{e} . It also ensures that epoch \bar{e} , for which $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, \bar{e})$ may be queried, is consistent with the key $k_{\bar{e}}$.

In the above game, if \mathcal{B}_{prf} guesses e' and \bar{e} correctly, then the view of \mathcal{A} is exactly the same as in the unlinkability game if the PRF challenge is real, and exactly the same as in the hybrid game if the PRF challenge is random. Therefore, the difference in \mathcal{A} 's advantage between winning the two games is bounded by $\hat{\epsilon}^2$ times the advantage of \mathcal{B}_{prf} in the PRF game. This concludes the proof. \square

D Security of RISE

This section contains the detailed proofs of the IND-ENC and IND-UPD security of the RISE scheme presented in Section 5.3.

D.1 Proof of Theorem 6 (IND-ENC Security of RISE)

The updatable encryption scheme RISE is IND-ENC secure under the DDH assumption.

Proof. We prove the above theorem via a short sequence of three game hops, where in the final game we develop a reduction \mathcal{B} to the DDH assumption.

GAME₀. Initially, \mathcal{B} simulates all oracles towards \mathcal{A} by running the correct algorithms of the updatable encryption scheme and maintaining the lists \mathcal{L} and $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}$ as in the IND-ENC game.

GAME₁. In the first game hop, \mathcal{B} changes its behavior when answering \mathcal{O}_{upd} and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{\mathcal{C}}}$ queries: instead of updating the provided ciphertexts, it re-encrypts the underlying messages from scratch. To do so, \mathcal{B} extends the list \mathcal{L} to store tuples (C_e, m, e) that now also include the message m whenever an encryption query is made. Then, when it receives a query $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e'})$, \mathcal{B} looks up the corresponding message m in \mathcal{L} and returns $\text{RISE.enc}(k_{e'}, m)$. Likewise, for queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{\mathcal{C}}}$ that would normally return an updated version of the challenge ciphertext, \mathcal{B} simply encrypts m_d under the current epoch key.

As ciphertexts in RISE are freshly randomized with every update, the adversary cannot distinguish an updated from a freshly generated ciphertext, and thus he cannot notice this changed behavior.

Thus, from now on, for all consecutive epochs e and $e + 1$ for which the adversary \mathcal{A} does not know the connecting update token Δ_{e+1} , the ciphertexts are fresh encryptions under fully independent keys. That is, even if \mathcal{A} knows the secret key from epoch e , this cannot help him in extracting information from ciphertexts learned in $e + 1$ and vice versa.

GAME₂. In the second game, we make all *challenge* ciphertexts, either obtained as direct challenge or via queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{\mathcal{C}}}$, independent of the actual epoch key (via a series of hybrids). That is, for the direct challenge ciphertext \tilde{C} as well as for queries to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{\mathcal{C}}}$ we respond with an encryption $\tilde{C}_e \leftarrow (\bar{y}^r, g^r m)$ for a random $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and random $\bar{y} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{G}$.

Thus, \mathcal{B} does not know the secret key \bar{x} to this ciphertext and also creates “inconsistent” ciphertexts in challenge-equal epochs. Recall that according to the IND-ENC definition, \mathcal{A} is not allowed to learn the secret key of any challenge-equal epoch, i.e., an epoch where he either directly received the challenge ciphertext or could derive a valid version of the challenge ciphertext using the corrupted tokens. \mathcal{A} is allowed to receive update tokens related to such a challenge-equal epoch though, and we have to show that our simulation remains unnoticeable to \mathcal{A} . To this end, we look at the different settings of values that could depend on \bar{x} :

\mathcal{A} obtains neither $\Delta_{\tilde{e}}$ nor $\Delta_{\tilde{e}+1}$: This is the simplest case, as \mathcal{A} has not obtained any token that would allow him to up- or downgrade the challenge ciphertext \tilde{C} . Thus, the impact of our modification is limited to the challenge epoch only. Recall that we changed \mathcal{O}_{upd} and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{\mathcal{C}}}$ in the previous game to respond with freshly generated ciphertexts, instead of updating them. Thus all ciphertexts before and after the challenge epoch \tilde{e} are proper encryptions under the correct keys again.

The only difference to GAME_1 is that in the challenge epoch, the challenge ciphertext is now an encryption under a different key than the one that is used in \mathcal{O}_{enc} . This is not noticeable to \mathcal{A} though, as ElGamal ciphertexts are *key-anonymous* (under the DDH assumption), i.e., ciphertexts for which the adversary does not know the secret key x , do not leak any information about the public key y under which they are encrypted [5]. Clearly, this property can only hold if the adversary does not know the corresponding secret key or can convert the ciphertext into a corrupted epoch, but this is exactly what the have in this case.

\mathcal{A} obtains $\Delta_{\tilde{e}}$ and/or $\Delta_{\tilde{e}+1}$: Here we have the same “inconsistent” ciphertexts in the challenge epoch as in the previous case, and the same indistinguishability argument based on the key-anonymity of ElGamal applies. But in addition, the inconsistency gets propagated as long as \mathcal{A} learns update tokens that allow him to up- or downgrade the challenge ciphertext that got produced with a dummy key. We will show that for all challenge ciphertexts that \mathcal{A} can *downgrade*, this inconsistency is not noticeable. The case for updates of ciphertexts is analogous.

When the adversary obtains the token $\Delta_{\tilde{e}}$ of the challenge epoch, than by the bidirectional property of the update scheme, \mathcal{A} can downgrade the challenge ciphertext into epoch $\tilde{e} - 1$. We haven’t changed the behavior of the $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$ oracle, i.e., \mathcal{B} still returns the correct tokens from the normal keys that he uses for queries to the \mathcal{O}_{enc} and \mathcal{O}_{upd} oracle. Clearly, this token does not match the challenge ciphertext though, i.e., the downgraded challenge ciphertext that \mathcal{A} can derive will be an encryption under a “wrong” key, i.e., not the actual key $k_{\tilde{e}-1}$ that \mathcal{B} has used in the previous epoch. However, the adversary \mathcal{A} cannot recognize that derivation due to the key-anonymity of ElGamal and the fact that \mathcal{A} is not allowed to learn the secret key $k_{\tilde{e}-1}$, as $\tilde{e} - 1$ became a challenge-equal epoch.

This argument now applies for any further downgrade the adversary can make by requesting update tokens that have a consecutive path to the challenge epoch: whenever he learns such a token, the epoch into which he can rotate the challenge ciphertext to becomes challenge-equal which in turn means that \mathcal{A} cannot corrupt the secret key of that epoch.

Let $\tilde{e}_{\text{first}} < \tilde{e}$ denote the *earliest* challenge-equal epoch that \mathcal{A} reached by downgrading the “original” \tilde{C} . Then \mathcal{A} cannot have learned the token $\Delta_{\tilde{e}_{\text{first}}}$ as this token would allow to downgrade ciphertexts to epoch $\tilde{e}_{\text{first}} - 1$, which contradicts the fact that \tilde{e}_{first} is the earliest derived challenge-equal epoch. By the definition of IND-ENC, the latest epoch prior to \tilde{e} in which \mathcal{A} would be allowed to request the secret key is then $\tilde{e}_{\text{first}} - 1$. Clearly, without knowing the token between $\tilde{e}_{\text{first}} - 1$ and \tilde{e} , and due the independent generation of ciphertexts in these two epochs (see GAME_1), and the key-anonymity of ElGamal, \mathcal{A} cannot notice the modifications in this case of the game.

GAME_3 . In the third game, we now change all challenge ciphertexts such that the second component is a uniformly random group element, chosen independently of the message. We then show that any adversary \mathcal{A} that has a non-negligibly

different advantage in games GAME_2 and GAME_3 can be used to solve a DDH challenge in the standard way. Recall that in the DDH game, the adversary \mathcal{B} receives a DDH tuple (g, g^a, g^b, g^c) and has to tell whether $c = ab$. We can embed such a tuple in the challenge epoch \tilde{e} when creating the ciphertext \tilde{C} for \mathcal{A} .

In more detail, adversary \mathcal{B} emulates the game to \mathcal{A} and, for answering the challenge query for messages m_0, m_1 , \mathcal{B} chooses a random bit d and returns $\tilde{C} \leftarrow (g^c, g^b m_d)$ instead of $\tilde{C} \leftarrow (g^{xr}, g^r m_d)$. For any subsequent query to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$, \mathcal{B} behaves similarly but uses a randomized DDH tuple (using DDH random self-reduction, such as in [25]).

Thus, if $c = ab$, then all ciphertexts \tilde{C}_e are correct encryptions of m_d under a “public key” g^a and random tuples if $c \neq ab$. Recall that we use a different key for all challenge ciphertexts since the last game, i.e., non-challenge ciphertexts are still computed correctly.

When \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $d' = d$, \mathcal{B} outputs DDH and **not**-DDH otherwise. The view of \mathcal{A} in this game with proper DDH tuples is the same as in game GAME_2 , and in the case with random tuples it is the same as in game GAME_3 . The advantage of \mathcal{A} therefore directly translates into the advantage of \mathcal{B} in the DDH game. Finally, as in GAME_3 the view of \mathcal{A} is independent of the challenge bit, the advantage is 0. This concludes the proof. \square

D.2 Proof of Theorem 7 (IND-UPD Security of RISE)

The updatable encryption scheme RISE is IND-UPD secure under the DDH assumption.

Proof. We prove the above theorem via a short sequence of three game hops, where in the final game we develop a reduction \mathcal{B} to the DDH assumption.

GAME_0 . Initially, \mathcal{B} simulates all oracles towards \mathcal{A} by running the correct algorithms of the updatable encryption scheme and maintaining the lists \mathcal{L} and $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}$ as in the IND-ENC game.

GAME_1 . In the first game hop, \mathcal{B} changes its behavior when answering \mathcal{O}_{upd} and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ queries. It re-encrypts the underlying messages from scratch, instead of updating the provided ciphertexts. As this step is exactly analogous to the corresponding one in the proof of Theorem 6, we omit it here.

GAME_2 . This game replaces the challenge ciphertexts by randomized ones. That is, the challenge ciphertext as well as all messages returned by $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{C}}$ are pairs of two uniformly random group elements. It is easy to see that GAME_2 cannot be won by the adversary, but it remains to be shown that the adversary advantage between games GAME_1 and GAME_2 is bounded. Let \hat{e} be an upper bound on the number of epochs invoked by \mathcal{A} , then we devise a sequence $H_0, \dots, H_{\hat{e}}$ of hybrid games. Each hybrid game H_e is then described as follows. In rounds $0, \dots, e-1$, the challenge ciphertext is computed as in GAME_1 , namely as an encryption of m_d . In rounds e, \dots, \hat{e} , the challenge ciphertext is computed as in GAME_2 ,

namely by choosing the second component uniformly and independently of m_d . Note that one could define $H_{-1} = \text{GAME}_2$ and $H_{\hat{e}+1} = \text{GAME}_1$.

Suppose now that the difference in adversary advantage in GAME_1 and GAME_2 differs by some non-negligible amount ε , then there is at least one $e' \in \{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$ such that the difference in adversary advantage between the two subsequent games $H_{e'-1}$ and $H_{e'}$ is at least $\varepsilon' = \varepsilon/\hat{e}$.

Consider now the adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$, for $e' \in \{0, \dots, \hat{e}\}$, which behaves as follows. It sets $e \leftarrow 0$ and $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$, and chooses a random bit $d \xleftarrow{r} \{0, 1\}$ as well as two epochs $\underline{e} \xleftarrow{r} \{0, \dots, e'\}$ and $\bar{e} \xleftarrow{r} \{e' + 1, \dots, \hat{e} + 1\}$. The intuition behind this is that $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ guesses the range $[\underline{e}, \dots, \bar{e}]$ as a “streak of challenge-equal epochs,” or more generally, that \mathcal{A} does not request the owner key in any of those periods. Adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ generates an initial secret key $(x_0, y_0) = k_0 \xleftarrow{r} \text{RISE.kgen}(\lambda)$ and runs \mathcal{A} on empty input, providing access to oracles \mathcal{O}_{enc} , $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, \mathcal{O}_{upd} , and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}$, which we describe below. In epoch e' , $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ embeds the challenge, and in epochs $\underline{e}, \dots, \bar{e}$, $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ implicitly uses keys $k_e = (a\delta_e, g^{a\delta_e})$. Of course, $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ cannot know a , but we show how to deal with this below.

Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$, if $e+1 < \underline{e}$, then sample a new key $(k_{e+1}, \Delta_{e+1}) \xleftarrow{r} \text{RISE.next}(k_e)$. For $\underline{e} \leq e+1 \leq \bar{e}$, then $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ chooses $\delta_{e+1} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^\times$ (with the sole exception of $\delta_e = 1$) and implicitly uses the key $(a\delta_{e+1}, g^{a\delta_{e+1}})$ in the upcoming epoch $e+1$, which means that only the second component $y_{e+1} = g^{a\delta_{e+1}}$ of k_{e+1} is known to $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$. For $\underline{e} \leq e < \bar{e}$, adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ also sets the token to $\Delta_{e+1} \leftarrow (\delta_{e+1}/\delta_e, y_{e+1})$. For $e \geq \bar{e}$, then keys are again sampled freshly as in the beginning. Generally, if $e > \bar{e}$, then $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ also has to update the challenge ciphertext from $(\tilde{C}_{e-1}, e-1) \in \tilde{\mathcal{L}}$. For $e < e'-1$, this is simply done by encrypting via $\tilde{C}_{e+1} \xleftarrow{r} \text{RISE.enc}(k_{e+1}, m_d)$, note that encryption only requires the second component of k_e which is always known to $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$. For $e = e'-1$, the challenge is embedded into the ciphertext by defining it as $\tilde{C} \leftarrow (g^b, g^c m_d)$. For $e \geq e'$, the challenge ciphertext \tilde{C} is the encryption of a uniformly random message. Adversary $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ then sets $\tilde{\mathcal{L}} \leftarrow \tilde{\mathcal{L}} \cup \{(\tilde{C}_{e+1}, e+1)\}$. Furthermore, in all cases set $e \leftarrow e+1$.

Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(m)$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}}(C_{e-1})$, if $e < \underline{e}$ or $e > \bar{e}$, then \mathcal{B} computes the ciphertext as usual via RISE.enc . If $\underline{e} \leq e \leq \bar{e}$, then \mathcal{B} encrypts with the partial key k_e ; observe that RISE.enc with key $k = (x, y)$ only depends on the value y . Upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$, for $e^* \leq e$ and $e^* \neq \underline{e}, \bar{e} + 1$, return Δ_{e^*} , and upon $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$, for $e^* \leq e$ and $e^* \notin [\underline{e}, \dots, \bar{e}]$, return k_{e^*} .

The challenge ciphertext in period \tilde{e} is then computed exactly as described in the oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{next}}$ above. Adversary \mathcal{B} then runs \mathcal{A} on input \tilde{C} , giving access to the above oracles but additionally to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{upd}\tilde{c}}$, which returns \tilde{C}_e from $\tilde{\mathcal{L}}$.

Recall that the difference in advantage that \mathcal{A} obtains differs by at least ε' between $H_{e'-1}$ and $H_{e'}$; this can be viewed as \mathcal{A} distinguishing between $H_{e'-1}$ and $H_{e'}$ with advantage at least ε' . Note that if \mathcal{A} does not obtain the challenge ciphertext in epoch e' , then the games $H_{e'-1}$ and $H_{e'}$ are exactly equivalent, which means that the advantage of \mathcal{A} does not change if we change \mathcal{A} to output a random bit in those cases. This justifies the assumption that \mathcal{A} obtains the challenge ciphertext in epoch e' , which we need in the subsequent steps.

Recall that $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ chooses \underline{e}, \bar{e} with $e' \in [\underline{e}, \bar{e}]$, and that $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ fails (i.e., outputs a random bit) if \mathcal{A} queries $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{key}, e^*)$ for $\underline{e} \leq e^* \leq \bar{e}$, or $\mathcal{O}_{\text{corrupt}}(\text{token}, e^*)$ for $e^* = \underline{e}, \bar{e} + 1$. Informally, this means that \mathcal{A} builds a “streak of challenge-equal epochs” from \underline{e} to \bar{e} . As by the above argument we know that \mathcal{A} obtains the challenge ciphertext in epoch e' , guessing \underline{e} and \bar{e} correctly further decreases the advantage of $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ by a factor $\leq \hat{e}^2$.

Note that the choice of \underline{e}, \bar{e} does not change the view of \mathcal{A} until $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ fails, and that until then the view is exactly the same in game $\text{H}_{e'}$ as it is when in the reduction with $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ the DDH triplet is real, and the view is exactly the same in $\text{H}_{e'-1}$ as it is when the DDH triplet is random. Altogether, this means that the DDH advantage of $\mathcal{B}_{e'}$ is $1/\hat{e}^3$ times the unlinkability advantage of \mathcal{A} . \square