

Fully Bideniable Interactive Encryption

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January 1, 2019

Abstract

While standard encryption guarantees secrecy of the encrypted plaintext only against an attacker that has no knowledge of the communicating parties' keys and randomness of encryption, *deniable encryption* [Canetti et al., Crypto'96] provides the additional guarantee that the plaintext remains secret even in face of authoritative entities that attempt to coerce (or bribe) communicating parties to expose their internal states, including the plaintexts, keys and randomness. To achieve this guarantee, deniable encryption is equipped with a faking algorithm which allows parties to generate fake keys and randomness that make the ciphertext appear consistent with any plaintext of the parties' choice.

To date, only partial results were known: either deniability against coercing only the sender, or against coercing only the receiver [Sahai-Waters, STOC '14] or schemes satisfying weaker notions of deniability [O'Neil et al., Crypto '11].

In this paper we present the first *fully bideniable* interactive encryption scheme, thus resolving the 20-years-old open problem. Our scheme also satisfies an additional, incomparable to standard deniability, property called *off-the-record deniability*, which we introduce in this paper. This property guarantees that, even if the sender claims that one plaintext was used and the receiver claims a different one, the adversary has no way of figuring out who is lying - the sender, the receiver, or both. This is useful when parties don't have means to agree on what fake plaintext to claim, or when one party defects against the other.

Our protocol has three messages, which is optimal [Bendlin et al., Asiacrypt'11], and works in a CRS model. We assume subexponential indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and one way functions.

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Contents

| | | |
|----------|--|------------|
| 1 | Introduction | 1 |
| 1.1 | Discussion | 3 |
| 1.2 | Related work | 6 |
| 1.3 | Full Deniability versus Flexible Deniability. | 7 |
| 1.4 | Our results: interactive deniable encryption | 8 |
| 1.5 | A very brief overview of the scheme | 9 |
| 2 | Informal overview of our scheme | 11 |
| 2.1 | Decryption behavior on related transcripts | 12 |
| 2.2 | Description of the scheme for the case when programs are given as oracles | 15 |
| 2.3 | Changes to the construction and the proof when obfuscated code of programs is given. | 25 |
| 3 | Preliminaries | 26 |
| 3.1 | Indistinguishability Obfuscation for Circuits | 26 |
| 3.2 | Equivalence of iO and diO for programs differing on one point | 26 |
| 3.3 | Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions and their variants | 27 |
| 3.4 | Asymmetrically constrained encryption (ACE) and its relaxed variant | 28 |
| 4 | Defining bideniable and off-the-record-deniable encryption | 33 |
| 5 | Level System | 35 |
| 5.1 | Definition | 36 |
| 5.2 | Construction | 38 |
| 5.3 | Overview of the proof | 39 |
| 5.4 | List of hybrids | 49 |
| 5.4.1 | Proof of lemma 2 (Switching from ℓ_0^* to ℓ_1^*). | 49 |
| 5.4.2 | Proof of lemma 3 (Changing the upper bound from $T + 1$ to T). | 71 |
| 5.4.3 | Proof of lemma 4 (Restoring behavior of Transform). | 89 |
| 5.5 | Detailed proof of security | 134 |
| 5.5.1 | Reductions in the proof of lemma 2 (Switching from ℓ_0^* to ℓ_1^*) | 134 |
| 5.5.2 | Reductions in the proof of lemma 3 (Changing the upper bound from $T + 1$ to T) | 137 |
| 5.5.3 | Reductions in the proof of lemma 4 (Restoring behavior of Transform) | 139 |
| 6 | Construction of interactive deniable encryption | 146 |
| 6.1 | Construction | 147 |
| 6.2 | Required primitives and their parameters. | 148 |
| 6.3 | Proof overview | 154 |
| 7 | Proof of security of our bideniable encryption | 156 |
| 7.1 | List of hybrids | 156 |
| 7.1.1 | Proof of lemma 54 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the sender) | 156 |
| 7.1.2 | Proof of lemma 55 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the receiver) | 160 |
| 7.1.3 | Proof of lemma 56 (Semantic security) | 172 |
| 7.1.4 | Proof of lemma 57 (Indistinguishability of levels) | 184 |
| 7.2 | Detailed proof of security | 200 |

| | | |
|----------|---|------------|
| 7.2.1 | Reductions in the proof of lemma 54 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the sender) | 200 |
| 7.2.2 | Reductions in the proof of lemma 55 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the receiver) | 204 |
| 7.2.3 | Reductions in the proof of lemma 56 (Semantic Security) | 213 |
| 7.2.4 | Reductions in the proof of lemma 57 (Indistinguishability of Levels) | 220 |
| 8 | Proof of off-the-record deniability of our bideniable encryption | 226 |
| A | On removing layers of obfuscation | 238 |
| B | Construction of relaxed ACE | 240 |
| C | Encrypting longer plaintexts | 246 |

1 Introduction

Standard encryption guarantees that parties can communicate in secrecy even when an adversary can see their communication transcript. However, this secrecy guarantee holds only as long as the private keys and randomness used for encryption remain secret. If an authoritative entity bribes or even coerces the parties to disclose their secret keys and randomness — for instance, under threats or subpoena — secrecy is no longer guaranteed. In fact, with common encryption schemes the ciphertext is often a “commitment” to the plaintext, in the sense that there is often only a single way to convincingly demonstrate secret keys and randomness that are consistent with the ciphertext.

To address this issue, Canetti *et al.* [CDNO96] introduced the notion of *deniable encryption*, in which a party may send a ciphertext c which is an encryption of message m , and later, for any plaintext $m' \neq m$, the party can reveal *fake* keys and randomness with respect to which c appears to be an encryption of m' .¹ When the communicating parties have common secret key, deniable encryption can be simple². For instance, the one-time pad (OTP) scheme is perfectly deniable: having sent $c = k \oplus m$, the parties can claim that they sent any plaintext m' by claiming that $k' = c \oplus m'$ is their true key. In fact, it turns out that the key size in any deniable encryption scheme has to be at least as large as the size of a plaintext (since there should exist a different key for any possible fake plaintext), and in this sense OTP is “the best possible” symmetric-key deniable encryption.

But what if no pre-shared secret key is available? Is it possible to communicate fully deniably even in this case?

In the non-interactive case, this notion corresponds to *deniable public-key encryption*. Such an encryption scheme, in addition to standard algorithms $\text{Gen}(r)$, $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m; s)$, and $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, c)$ (for key generation, encryption, and decryption, respectively), also has “faking algorithms” $\text{SFake}(s, m, m', (\text{pk}, c); \rho_S) \rightarrow s'$ and $\text{RFake}(r, m, m', (\text{pk}, c); \rho_R) \rightarrow r'$. They take as input the true random coins of the sender or receiver, real and fake messages m, m' , communication transcript (pk, c) , and random coins ρ_S or ρ_R , in case these algorithms are randomized. Their outputs s' and r' respectively are “fake sender randomness” and “fake receiver randomness” which explain (pk, c) as a transcript transmitting m' .

There are three natural notions of deniability, depending on whether the adversary gets access to (possibly fake) randomness of the sender, receiver, or both. They are called *sender-*, *receiver-*, and *sender-and-receiver-deniability*, respectively. Sender-and-receiver deniability is often called *bideniability*, which is the strongest notion among the three. It requires that for any plaintexts m, m' :

$$(\text{pk}, c = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m'; s), s, r) \approx_c (\text{pk}, c = \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m; s), s', r'), \quad (1)$$

where \approx_c denotes computational indistinguishability, s, r are uniformly chosen, $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(r)$, $s' = \text{SFake}(s, m, m', (\text{pk}, c); \rho_S)$, $r' = \text{RFake}(r, m, m', (\text{pk}, c); \rho_R)$. The probabilities are taken over the random choice of s, r, ρ_S, ρ_R . In other words, bideniable encryption guarantees that an adversary, who sees (possibly fake) encryption and generation randomness consistent with m' , cannot tell whether m' or m was really

¹Deniable encryption should not be confused with deniable authentication, which allows a party to deny that it participated in the communication.

²Note that such key has to be shared in a way which is out of the coercer’s view, e.g. physically. Key exchange protocols do not help, unless these protocols are already incoercible themselves, i.e. allow to lie about the resulting key upon coercion. But such protocols are equivalent to interactive deniable encryption, i.e. in this paper we essentially build the first incoercible key exchange.

sent.³ Sender deniability (respectively, receiver deniability) is a relaxation of the above definition where the internal randomness of the receiver (respectively, sender) is removed from both sides of (1).

While all variants are meaningful, it should be stressed that bideniability provides a qualitatively stronger guarantee than either sender deniability or receiver deniability alone: *it leaves the coercer no way of figuring out what the plaintext really was, even if all parties involved are coerced: the plaintext becomes “virtually erased” from the system.* And while sender-deniable encryption was built in [SW14], perhaps it shouldn't come as a surprise that non-interactive bideniable, and even receiver-deniable, encryption was shown to be impossible, i.e. the definition above is not satisfiable [BNNO11].

However, the [BNNO11] impossibility only holds for two-message protocols. But the notions of sender-, receiver-, and bideniable encryption can be easily extended to a multi-round setting. Indeed, [CDNO96] already demonstrate how to turn any sender-deniable encryption scheme to a receiver-deniable interactive encryption protocol at the expense of one more round. Still, the following question has remained wide open:

Can parties communicate bideniably without any pre-established secrets?

A positive answer to this question may seem somewhat unexpected. For instance, in key exchange protocols - another setting where secrecy is required without any pre-shared secrets - security crucially relies on the fact that parties keep their internal state, e.g. discrete log, *hidden from the eavesdropper*. Among other things, the missing variable prevents the eavesdropper from running algorithms of the scheme, thus making the eavesdropper inherently less powerful than parties and guaranteeing that the parties can learn the key while the eavesdropper cannot. In contrast, in bideniable encryption (or, incoercible key exchange) the adversary is as powerful as parties, since it knows all variables which honest parties would know, and therefore can compute any function which honest parties could compute. Thus, security of bideniable encryption (or, incoercible key exchange) hinges on a delicate distinction between knowing *the right* internal state and *the wrong* one.

Nevertheless, we show that interactive bideniable encryption, and therefore incoercible key exchange, exists. Concretely, we show a 3-message protocol which allows to transmit 1-bit plaintexts bideniably. Our protocol works in a CRS model and assumes subexponential iO and OWFs. In addition to standard deniability, it also provides a different guarantee which we call off-the-record deniability, as we explain next.

Off-the-record deniability. Besides standard deniability as defined by [CDNO96], we additionally consider a different form of deniability, incomparable to the standard one, which we call *off-the-record deniability*. Off-the-record deniability guarantees that the plaintext remains hidden even when both parties are coerced, and one party gives randomness consistent with one plaintext and the other party gives randomness consistent with another plaintext. Further, this should hold no matter whether both random coins given to the coercer are fake, or one of them is real. That is, with an off-the-record deniable scheme the coercer cannot tell which party - if any - is telling the truth.

Such a guarantee may be useful in a number of situations. One example is when the parties do not have the ability to agree on a fake message, or when they cannot even coordinate whether they should lie or tell the truth. Another example is when one party defects against the other party and discloses its own randomness for a sole purpose of demonstrating that the other party sent, or received, a sensitive plaintext.

³Note that this definition implies that $(pk, c = \text{Enc}(pk, m'; s)) \approx_c (pk, c = \text{Enc}(pk, m; s))$, and therefore any deniable encryption is also semantically secure.

| | Type of deniability | Secure against adversaries that may... |
|------|-----------------------------|---|
| I. | Sender-deniable | coerce S but not R |
| II. | Receiver-deniable | coerce R but not S |
| III. | Sender-or-receiver deniable | coerce either S or R but not both |
| IV. | bideniable | coerce both S and R , who claim the same plaintext |
| V. | Off-the-record deniable | coerce S and R , who claim two different plaintexts |

Table 1: *A taxonomy of deniability.* In each case, the adversary is acting with respect to a given communication transcript between sender S and receiver R . “Coercion” means the adversary may demand from a party an explanation consistent with a plaintext m of the adversary’s choice. Note that $(IV) \vee (V) \Rightarrow (I) \wedge (II) \wedge (III)$.

Note that off-the-record deniability is incomparable to standard deniability, which in fact does not give *any* guarantee in a situation where parties’ claimed plaintexts are inconsistent, or even when plaintexts are consistent but one party provides true randomness and the other provides fake randomness for the same true plaintext. In other words, if a scheme only satisfies standard definition of deniability, each party’s security fully relies on correct actions of the other party, which is undesirable. However, if the scheme is in addition off-the-record deniable, then parties can still have some protection independently of actions of the other party - but course only as much as it could possibly be guaranteed with an ideal secure channel, given that parties’ claimed plaintexts are inconsistent with each other.

1.1 Discussion

In this section we discuss a number of issues such as applicability of deniable encryption, possible variations in the definition, and some related notions.

When is deniable encryption useful? Note that, no matter how good deniable encryption is, the original randomness and plaintexts in most cases remain in the memory of machines of the parties. If the adversary has the ability to seize these machines without any prior notice, deniable encryption clearly cannot help. Further, even if parties expect their machines to be seized, replacing their true randomness and plaintext with fake ones requires secure erasures.

That is, deniable encryption is useful in a setting when the adversary doesn’t have direct access to parties’ machines, and instead encourages parties to disclose their state themselves. Examples include an attempt to learn the content of communication via bribes or threats, an obligation to disclose the keys as part of the legal process, or vote selling.

Deniability is guaranteed only assuming the correct execution of the protocol. We cannot stress enough that deniability protects parties only as long as parties correctly run the protocol: that is, choose their random coins truly at random and generate messages according to instructions of a protocol. This is generally not an issue when parties want protection against an external coercer who could demand their keys later, and therefore are themselves interested in following the protocol honestly.

However, in some scenarios parties themselves should be treated as malicious: for instance, a government agent who was offered bribes for revealing the content of sensitive communication, or a voter who is planning

to sell its vote, or any other person who intends to prove its plaintext in a situation where it better doesn't. Clearly, if a party is already malicious *during the protocol execution*, it can always set its randomness s to be, e.g., digits of π , and then use it as a proof that it knows the true plaintext. In some applications this issue can be solved using physical setup assumptions. For instance, [BT94] argues that a physical booth is required to achieve receipt-free voting; if such a booth is available, one could use it to generate randomness for voters and give it to them (rather than letting voters pick it themselves, potentially in a malicious way), thus making deniable encryption sufficient.

However, even when such a setup is not available, deniable encryption still guarantees some security - that parties cannot prove their plaintext as long as they followed the protocol, even if later their intentions become malicious. Indeed, any "proof of plaintext" computed using their true random coins could be also computed from fake coins and fake plaintext.

Possible variants of the definition. The definition of deniable encryption can be parametrized in a number of ways, e.g.:

- **Post-execution vs adaptive coercion.** In this paper we consider the setting where coercion happens after the protocol is executed. One can consider a broader definition of adaptive coercion which can happen at arbitrary moment during the protocol execution (and with the other party being aware or unaware of the coercion).
- **Time when the fake plaintext is chosen.** In this paper we avoid this issue by considering bit encryption only. If one considers encrypting longer messages, there are several possible levels of how adaptive the choice of fake plaintext is:

The weakest notion is to require that the fake plaintext m' should be chosen already at the time of encryption and supplied to the encryption algorithm: this is called *plan-ahead deniability* in [CDNO96]. Another definition (commonly used) requires encryption process to be independent of fake plaintext; however, note that both real and fake plaintexts have to be chosen *by the adversary* at the time of encryption in order for deniability game to be well-defined. Another option is to consider a simulation-based definition of deniable encryption (discussed later), and let the environment choose fake messages for parties as late as at the time of coercion. Finally, in a CRS model there is one more level of adaptivity, where both real and fake plaintexts are chosen before the CRS is fixed.

- **Ind-based vs sim-based definition.** One could define incoercible encryption as an encryption which implements ideal secure channels under coercion, similarly to how [CG96] (and its follow-up [CGP15]) define incoercible computation (there are also other definitions, e.g. [UM10, AOZZ15]). The idea behind the definition is that the simulator should be able to simulate random coins, given only the plaintext, but not the information whether this plaintext is real or fake - which implies that in the real world the adversary doesn't know this either. (Both real and fake plaintexts are chosen by the environment, and fake plaintexts of the sender and the receiver do not have to be consistent).

It is easy to show that in the semi-honest model (i.e. when parties follow the protocol) with post-execution coercion only, encryption is incoercible if and only if it is both bideniable and off-the-record deniable⁴. Intuitively, the simulator can always simulate the communication by generating an encryp-

⁴It is important that both properties hold with respect to *the same* faking algorithms, i.e. that parties do not have to choose whether they want standard deniability or off-the-record deniability.

tion of 0, and simulate random coins by running faking algorithm for a given plaintext.

- **Deterministic or randomized faking algorithms.** We note that faking algorithms could be deterministic (i.e. the only randomness they take as input is true randomness of the sender s , which we treat as non-random input since it is picked once and reused across different algorithms of the sender) or randomized (when they additionally take as input fresh random coins ρ which are not used anywhere else). For instance, the syntax of SFake could be both $\text{SFake}(s, m, m', \text{tr})$ and $\text{SFake}(s, m, m', \text{tr}; \rho_S)$, where tr is the transcript of communication. In our construction SFake is deterministic and RFake is randomized.
- **Private and public deniability.** We say that deniability of the sender (or receiver, or both) is *public* ([SW14]), if the corresponding faking algorithm doesn't take the true randomness and the true plaintext as input. For instance, our scheme has public deniability of the receiver, i.e. RFake has syntax $\text{RFake}(m', \text{tr}; \rho_R)$. This means that anyone, not just the receiver, can produce fake random coins of the receiver. Note that in this case RFake has to be randomized, otherwise the coercer could easily check if claimed r is fake by comparing it to $\text{RFake}(m', \text{tr})$.
- **“Coordinated” scheme.** One can also consider a “coordinated” scheme ([OPW11]) where faking algorithm takes as input true coins of *both the sender and the receiver* at the same time, thus requiring coordination between the sender and the receiver in order to compute fake randomness. Our scheme doesn't require such coordination, but we note that prior to this work even coordinated fully bideniable schemes were not known.

Related concepts.

- **Incoercible key exchange** is equivalent to deniable encryption: indeed, given the former, one can always encrypt messages deniably under one-time pad. Given deniable encryption, one can always pick a random key and send it to the receiver deniably.
- **Non-committing encryption (NCE, [CFG96])** may sound similar to deniable encryption; it requires that the simulator can generate dummy ciphertexts that can later be opened to any given plaintext. The differences are twofold. First, in deniable encryption a ciphertext that carries a plaintext can be faked, while in NCE ciphertexts either can be faked (if they are simulated) or carry a plaintext (if they are real). In other words, parties cannot fake; only the simulator can. Second, fake opening on behalf of the sender and the receiver in NCE is done by the same entity - the simulator - while in deniable encryption parties fake on their own.

Bideniable encryption is strictly stronger than NCE, since bideniable encryption implies NCE ([CDNO96]), and since there exist two-message NCE schemes ([CDMW09]) which provably cannot be bideniable due to the 3-message lower bound ([BNNO11]).

- **Deniable authentication.** Deniable encryption should not be confused with deniable authentication. In the latter, the goal is to allow the receiver of a message to authenticate the source and contents of the message, while providing the sender with a guarantee that the receiver is unable to convincingly *prove* to an external entity, *that did not directly witness the communication*, that the message has been indeed received from the sender (see e.g. [DKSW09]). In contrast, in the setting of deniable encryption the external entity is assumed to have directly witnessed the communicated ciphertext and concern is for

both parties to maintain secrecy of the plaintext, even when coerced (separately or jointly) to provide their internal secrets.

1.2 Related work

Prior work on deniable encryption. The notion of deniable encryption was first introduced in 1996 in the work of [CDNO96]. However, techniques of that time fell short of achieving deniability: indeed, [CDNO96] present a construction where the distinguishing advantage between real and fake opening was inversely proportional to the length of the ciphertext, thus requiring superpolynomially-long ciphertexts in order to achieve deniability. It was not until 2014 when Sahai and Waters presented the first (and, to date, the only) construction of sender-deniable encryption [SW14], and their construction was based on assumptions as strong as indistinguishability obfuscation. (In fact, to the best of our knowledge, their approach gives the only known way of “inverting” generic programs, i.e. coming up with consistent random coins for a different input-output pair, which is necessary for deniable encryption).

The construction of [SW14] can be transformed into 3-message *receiver*-deniable protocol using generic transformation of [CDNO96], by letting the receiver send random bit b to the sender deniably in rounds 1 and 2, and then letting the sender send $b \oplus m$ back in round 3. In fact, the sender, instead of sending $b \oplus m$ in the clear, can send it encrypted under deniable encryption, and the resulting 3-message scheme will be *sender-or-receiver*-deniable - that is, the adversary is allowed to obtain randomness of any party of its choice, but only one of the two⁵. However, all these constructions heavily rely on the fact that internal state of one of the parties remains hidden, and therefore fail to achieve deniability for both parties at the same time.

Several works focused on proving lower bounds for deniable encryption. [CDNO96] show that a certain class of schemes cannot achieve better distinguishing advantage than inverse polynomial. [Dac12] extends this result to a broader class of constructions, showing that the same holds for *any* black-box construction of sender-deniable encryption from simulatable encryption. [Nie02] show that any non-committing encryption, including bideniable encryption, can only reuse its public key a priori bounded number of times; and therefore it has to be an interactive protocol, even if it requires two messages. Using different techniques, [BNNO11] show that receiver-deniable scheme cannot even be a 2-message protocol: at least 3 messages are required. The same holds for bideniable encryption.

A number of works build deniable schemes under a weaker definition called *flexible*, or *multi-distributional*, deniability. However, there was a lot of debate regarding the meaningfulness of this notion. We give our view on this subject in section 1.3.

⁵In fact, this is an example of the scheme, asked by [OPW11], which is sender-or-receiver-deniable, but provably not bideniable. Indeed, for this scheme to be bideniable, both parties should *simultaneously* lie about either plaintext b of the first encryption, or plaintext $b \oplus m$ of the second encryption - otherwise true values of b and $b \oplus m$ reveal true m . This in turn implies that at least one of the two deniable schemes is receiver-deniable, which is impossible due to lower bound of [BNNO11] for 2 messages. Similarly, this scheme is not off-the-record deniable. Indeed, the adversary can xor the plaintext claimed to be received by the sender at round 2 (which is the true value of b) with the plaintext claimed to be received by the receiver at round 3 (which is the true value of $b \oplus m$) to learn the true plaintext.

1.3 Full Deniability versus Flexible Deniability.

In addition to full deniability, [CDNO96] also introduced a weaker notion of deniability, sometimes called *multi-distributional deniability* ([OPW11, BNN011, Dac12, AFL16, CIO16]), or *dual-scheme deniability* ([GKW17]). Under this definition, there are two schemes, S and S' , where S is “deniable with respect to S' ”. That is, parties who used deniable scheme S can convincingly claim that they sent a different plaintext, but under the non-deniable scheme S' . However, if parties truly used S' , they cannot lie about the plaintext.

On a positive side, this definition already guarantees *plausible deniability*, since the coercer cannot *prove* that S was used - even though it may have reasons to believe so. Thus, flexible deniability already protects parties in many scenarios where plausible deniability suffices, e.g. in court. But even in cases when plausible deniability is not enough, having a partial solution is much better than nothing - especially given a very slow progress on fully deniable schemes. Moreover, the efficiency gap between fully and flexibly deniable schemes seems tremendous: unlike fully deniable schemes (including this work and [SW14]), known flexibly deniable schemes can be implemented in practice.

But even from a theoretical prospective, a weaker definition of flexible deniability allows for fewer rounds, more efficiency, and weaker assumptions than fully deniable schemes, and requires no setup. For instance, [OPW11] build a 2-message flexibly bideniable encryption from LWE and from simulatable encryption. In fact we even have more advanced encryption schemes (like identity-based encryption [OPW11], functional encryption [CIO16], and attribute-based encryption ([AFL16])) with flexible deniability, and we have flexibly deniable encryption scheme with *succinct* keys [GKW17], where the size of a key is proportional to the number of possible fake messages (which can be smaller than the total number of possible plaintexts).

However, flexible notion of deniability has significant drawbacks. Indeed, having two different algorithms, which have two different security guarantees and which are up to the parties to choose, leaves room for suspicion, misuse, and can even cause harm to parties themselves. It also requires additional coordination between parties. But most importantly, *flexible deniability doesn't provide perhaps the most desirable benefit of deniability - preventing coercion in the first place by making it useless*. Below we explain these issues in more detail.

First, refusal to provide keys for deniable version could significantly increase the adversary's certainty that parties are lying - compared to the ideal channels case where the coercer has nothing besides parties' claims. Indeed, in the real world the opinion of the coercer will be shifted by its certainty that deniable version was used. However, this is not captured by security definition of flexible deniability, which doesn't take into account how exactly parties choose an algorithm, e.g. by assuming some distribution on the choices of S and S' , or considering rational behavior. For instance, one could argue that rational players would prefer S over S' because of better security guarantees, which is further aggravated by the fact that flexible deniability could actually *harm* those who use the non-deniable version. Indeed, as [CHK⁺08], who analyze plausible deniability of TrueCrypt hidden volume, put it, “deniability cuts both ways, and sometimes that's not a benefit”.

Second, note that fully deniable encryption doesn't allow parties to prove what their plaintext was even if they want to⁶. This is crucial in preventing bribery or vote selling. In contrast, in flexibly deniable encryption parties can choose whether they want it or not by choosing deniable or non-deniable algorithm. As a result, with fully deniable encryption one could set up receipt-free voting scheme using a physical booth which, for

⁶As discussed before, this property only holds if parties execute the protocol correctly.

instance, provides parties with randomness (so that they can still lie about their vote, but cannot use preset randomness to sell their vote). But if flexible scheme is used, then voters can lie about their vote but at the same time sell their true vote if they want (if deniable version is used), or can do neither (if non-deniable version is used).

Another important issue which arises in flexible setting is the need for coordination. That is, parties need a way to agree whether they run S or S' , and do so by the time of encryption⁷. It is not clear how to do such coordination without another deniable channel. As a result, well-being of each party is in the other party's hands: e.g. the sender's claim will look credible only as long as the receiver also used deniable algorithm at time of encryption, also decided to fake at time of coercion, and used the same fake plaintext. This is a problem not only when the receiver turns against the sender, but also when the receiver remains honest but doesn't know what actions to take out of lack of coordination.

Finally and most importantly, as already pointed out by [OPW11], deniable encryption not only allows to withstand coercion, but also makes in useless in the first place - just like it is useless in the ideal world, where there is no way of verifying parties' claims. However, flexible deniability doesn't give this guarantee: the coercer (who suspects that deniable version could be used) can gradually increase the pressure - be it a sum of money or "enhanced interrogation" - until the parties find it more preferable to prove what their plaintext was by disclosing keys of deniable version, S .

To summarize this discussion, we think that flexible deniability as a real-life application already suffices in many cases - e.g. when plausible deniability is sufficient, or when the coercer is not aware of the concept of deniable encryption and will be satisfied by seeing some working key. However, to obtain security guarantees of the ideal channel, one should use encryption which is (fully) deniable and off-the-record deniable.

Needless to say, we still believe that flexible deniability is a fascinating concept to explore. For instance, coming up with flexible scheme where S' is some standard encryption, e.g. RSA, would mitigate some issues mentioned above, thus making flexible deniability as good as full deniability for many practical purposes. Further, flexibly deniable encryption is an interesting primitive whose connections to non-committing encryption and full deniability are yet to be explored.

1.4 Our results: interactive deniable encryption

We show a 3-message deniable encryption scheme from subexponential iO and subexponential one-way functions in a non-programmable CRS model⁸. The CRS consists of obfuscated programs which everyone (including parties and adversaries) has access to. The CRS has to be generated by some trusted entity ahead of time, but this entity doesn't need to participate in the protocol. The programs are reusable an arbitrary polynomial number of times by arbitrarily many pairs of communicating parties. We stress again that the adversary has access to the same programs and thus has exactly the same power as honest parties do: in particular, parties do not receive any help (in generating fake randomness) from external incoercible authority, and can disclose their *full* internal state, including the faking key, to the adversary (unlike in flexible deniable

⁷However coordination is not required for correctness and semantic security, since these properties hold even if the sender and the receiver use different schemes [OPW11].

⁸The standard definition of deniable encryption ([CDNO96]) is game-based (there is no notion of simulation), and for both challenge bits $b = 0, 1$ the CRS has to be generated in the same way. Thus the CRS is inherently non-programmable.

encryption)⁹.

Our scheme, besides being bideniable, also provides off-the-record guarantees. More concretely, the adversary cannot distinguish between the following three cases: (1) seeing a transcript for plaintext 0, true randomness of the sender (consistent with 0), and fake randomness of the receiver consistent with 1; (2) seeing a transcript for plaintext 1, fake randomness of the sender consistent with 0, and true randomness of the receiver (consistent with 1); and (3) seeing a transcript for any plaintext (even different from 0 or 1 when longer plaintexts are allowed), fake randomness of the sender consistent with 0, and fake randomness of the receiver consistent with 1.

Theorem 1. *Assuming subexponentially-secure indistinguishability obfuscation and subexponentially-secure one-way functions, there exists a three-message bideniable and off-the-record-deniable interactive encryption for 1-bit plaintexts in the common reference string model. In addition, the receiver’s deniability is public, i.e. true random coins of the receiver are not required to compute fake randomness of the receiver.*

Our scheme instructs parties to run programs in the CRS in order to compute protocol messages, decrypt, or fake: that is, all the computation happening in the scheme is hidden even from the parties themselves, and choosing initial random coins is the only thing parties do themselves.

The challenges we are facing are two-fold. First, deniable encryption is not easy to build even when parties have only *oracle* access to the programs; in fact, throughout the introduction we mostly explain how to build deniable encryption in this setting. It turns out that even in this setting deniable encryption should have a special hidden logic which thwarts all potential adversarial recombinations of the transcript and claimed randomness of the parties. Second, in our actual construction parties (and an attacker) have access to the actual code of programs, protected by indistinguishability obfuscation; thus we need to argue that security still holds with weaker guarantees of indistinguishability obfuscation. To achieve this we use techniques commonly used in settings where the adversary can run programs on outputs of other programs iteratively, like in garbled TMs and RAM from iO ([KLW15, CHJV14]), or the construction of trapdoor permutations from iO ([BPR15, BPW16]).

Although we state and prove the theorem for 1-bit encryption, our construction can be used to encrypt and deny longer messages, albeit with additional multiplicative factor in security loss, equal to the cube of the size of the message space.

1.5 A very brief overview of the scheme

Our starting point is a special mechanism built by [SW14] which allows to make any randomized algorithm deniable - that is, it is possible to come up with fake random coins for this algorithm which are consistent with any input-output pair, even if such an input normally doesn’t result in such output. In particular, this means that we can take any protocol and equip parties with a way to “explain”, separately, each of the messages they send to the other party - that is, come up with fake randomness which makes, say, the first message sent from the sender to the receiver consistent with any plaintext of parties’ choice.

However, this mechanism works out of the box only when applied to independent algorithms, which is definitely not the case for next message functions of a protocol. Indeed, otherwise we could simply apply the

⁹In fact, in our scheme there is no separate faking key: the same randomness r is used by the receiver to generate its messages, decrypt, and fake. Upon coercion, the adversary gets access to (possibly fake) r .

mechanism of [SW14] to any public-key encryption and get a two-message bideniable encryption, which is impossible [BNNO11]. The problem here is that the joint behavior of key generation, encryption, and decryption algorithm by itself reveals too much - no matter how innocently-looking fake randomness we create for each algorithm. Namely, the adversary can play with the given transcript and randomness to generate certain “related” transcripts and randomness, and then try to run the decryption algorithm on different combinations of them. To get some intuition for why this is a problem, consider the following. Fake r can be viewed as a string which “remembers”, explicitly or implicitly, a single instruction to decrypt a certain transcript to a certain fake plaintext. The adversary can try to run RFake many times on (claimed to be real) r and related transcripts, hoping that each new application of RFake will add a new instruction into the “memory” of r . Since r is a bounded-length string which can “remember” only a fixed amount of information, sooner or later the very first instruction will be erased from the “memory” of r . In other words, if r is fake, then by running RFake many times it is possible to come up with some different \tilde{r} which doesn’t have the instruction r has and thus decrypts the transcript in question honestly. (In fact, this is the high-level idea of the impossibility argument of [BNNO11]; see more details in section 2.1).

Thus our plan is to first design a protocol that doesn’t allow the coercer to compute related transcripts, and then to put [SW14] mechanism on top of it to achieve input-output consistency. We first do it in “oracle-access model” - a model where everyone (both parties and adversaries) has black-box access to specially designed programs - and then adapt the construction to the setting where everyone gets access to the actual code of programs, obfuscated under indistinguishability obfuscation.

The first part of our plan - designing a protocol free from related transcripts - itself consists of two major steps:

Step 1: We design a “base” protocol as follows: we give parties (and the coercer) an access to specially designed programs for *all* algorithms of deniable encryption, i.e. for generating messages, decrypting, and faking; parties are not supposed to do anything by themselves - they only pick their random coins and run corresponding programs. We set the programs such that the first message μ_1 is a PRF of the sender randomness s and its plaintext m , the second message μ_2 is a PRF of the receiver randomness r and μ_1 , and the third message μ_3 is an encryption of m, μ_1, μ_2 . (All keys, e.g. for PRFs and encryption, are hidden inside these programs and not known to anyone, including parties.) Then the receiver can use its decryption program which decrypts the ciphertext and outputs m . In addition, we add certain consistency checks to the programs to make sure that decryption program returns the output only if it gets the correct r (i.e. consistent with μ_2), and the program for the third message only returns the output if it gets the correct s (i.e. consistent with μ_1).

In other words, in the first two messages parties essentially exchange “hashes” of their internal state so far. Intuitively, this guarantees (or, rather, *should* guarantee) that the adversary cannot compute related transcripts - for instance, cannot reuse μ_1, μ_2 from transcript (μ_1, μ_2, μ_3) and compute some new μ_3' such that (μ_1, μ_2, μ_3') is also a valid transcript with respect to the same r .

Step 2: We show that the intuition from the step 1 is only partially correct: namely, it turns out that, despite all precautions, there *always* exists a certain, very specific algorithm to compute related transcripts, in any 3-message bideniable encryption scheme. This algorithm, given any transcript (μ_1, μ_2, μ_3) , and run iteratively, allows to compute transcripts $(\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3^{(1)})$, $(\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3^{(2)})$, and so on, with the same first and second messages, but different third message. This allows to produce “a chain” of related transcripts tr_1, tr_2 , and so on. (However, the scheme from step 1 is still useful, since it protects from all other attempts to compute related transcripts, except for this algorithm).

To make sure that the adversary cannot use this chain of related transcripts to learn the true plaintext (like in 2-message case), we augment the base scheme with “levels”: that is, we set up the scheme in such a way that $\mu_3^{(i)}$, generated using that algorithm, “knows” its own index i , i.e. it is an encryption of (m, μ_1, μ_2, i) ; we call this index i a *level*. (This is possible to do since the algorithm to generate related transcripts is inherently sequential, and in particular index i of each transcript is well defined.) Further, we let the fake randomness r' (generated by running RFake on $(\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3^{(i)})$) also “know” index i of the transcript which was used to generate this r' . (We make sure that this number i is hidden from parties and the adversary, but programs still have a way to learn it). With this in place, we can set up decryption algorithm such that any fake r' associated with some index i can be used to decrypt correctly transcripts with $\mu_3^{(j)}$ where $j > i$, but cannot be used to decrypt transcripts with $\mu_3^{(j)}$ where $j < i$. We refer to this as “comparison-based decryption behavior”. As we will show later, such a setup allows to design a scheme and prove its security. In particular, it avoids the attack described before, where the adversary takes (fake) r and uses it to run RFake multiple times on related transcripts in an attempt to “erase” an instruction for the challenge transcript.

As mentioned above, we then put [SW14] mechanism on top of this protocol to allow to generate consistent fake randomness. Finally, we need to show security of the protocol while only relying on iO. This comes with its own set of challenges. First, security argument in “oracle-access” setting relies a lot on the fact that certain outputs of programs are hard to find, as long as corresponding inputs are hard to find. In contrast, to make the same reasoning in iO setting we need to show that such inputs *don't exist* (rather than being hard to find). Second, it turns out that as part of our construction we have to build a special primitive which somewhat resembles “deterministic order-revealing encryption”: concretely, no one should be able to tell between $\text{Enc}(0)$ and $\text{Enc}(1)$, even given programs which homomorphically increment ciphertexts (producing $\text{Enc}(2)$, $\text{Enc}(3)$ and so on up to some superpolynomial bound) and homomorphically compare them. (Intuitively, homomorphic comparison is required to implement comparison-based decryption behavior; we give more details in section 2).

This concludes the brief overview of our scheme. For a more detailed explanation of challenges and techniques we refer the reader to section 2. An impatient reader can directly look up the description of programs on fig. 2, fig. 3 in the introduction, or read the construction in the body of the paper (section 6, fig. 79, fig. 80).

Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we give an informal yet almost complete description of the scheme, starting with the base scheme and then augmenting it with levels. We also outline main steps of the proof, and explain the challenges coming from the use of indistinguishability obfuscation.

Next we proceed with a formal presentation. In sections 3 and 4 we formally define deniability and other required primitives. In section 5 we define and build the level system - an important building block in our scheme. The scheme itself is described in section 6. Next in section 7 we list the hybrids and reductions for the proof of bideniability, and then in section 8 explain what changes to the main proof are required to prove off-the-record deniability.

2 Informal overview of our scheme

In this section we give informal yet almost complete overview of the scheme. We start by explaining that the scheme should decrypt related transcripts according to a certain comparison-based logic in section 2.1.

Next in section 2.2 we design the scheme such that decryption algorithm has necessary information to follow this logic on sequentially-generated related transcripts (and at the same time we make sure that the scheme doesn't allow to generate related transcripts in any other way). Finally in section 2.3 we describe the changes to the scheme due to the use of indistinguishability obfuscation.

2.1 Decryption behavior on related transcripts

In order to understand how to set decryption behavior for our 3-message scheme, it is instructive to recall why receiver-deniable encryption cannot exist in two messages.

Impossibility result of the 2-message case ([BNNO11]), and related transcripts. [BNNO11] show that any 2-message receiver-deniable encryption scheme, even for a single-bit plaintext, can be used to deniably send any polynomial number of plaintexts, simply by reusing the first message (pk) and sending multiple second messages c_1, \dots, c_N (where N is an arbitrary polynomial); they show that all these ciphertexts can be faked simultaneously using a single fake decryption key. This in turn implies that any string can be compressed beyond information-theoretic bound. This compression is done as follows. The protocol to compress any random string b_1, \dots, b_N from N bits (where N is an arbitrary number larger than $|\text{sk}|$) to $|\text{sk}|$ bits is the following: first, ahead of time prepare N encryptions of 0 - let us call them c_1, \dots, c_N - under the same pk . (Note that these ciphertexts do not depend on the string to be compressed and thus can be thought of as public parameters of the compression protocol.) Then, to compress b_1, \dots, b_N , compute fake $\text{sk}^{(N)}$ by mapping each c_i to b_i , that is, compute $\text{sk}^{(1)} \leftarrow \text{RFake}(\text{sk}, c_1, b_1)$, $\text{sk}^{(2)} \leftarrow \text{RFake}(\text{sk}^{(1)}, c_2, b_2)$, \dots , $\text{sk}^{(N)} \leftarrow \text{RFake}(\text{sk}^{(N-1)}, c_N, b_N)$. The string $\text{sk}^{(N)}$ is a compressed description of b_1, \dots, b_N , since it is shorter than N and since the original string can be recovered by decrypting each b_i as $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}^{(N)}, c_i)$.¹⁰

An important property of the 2-message scheme which allows this proof to go through (concretely, to reduce single-bit deniability to multi-bit deniability) is that given some transcript $\text{tr}_1 = (\text{pk}, c_1)$, it is easy to compute another transcript which is consistent with the same receiver randomness r and contains a possibly different plaintext. Indeed, it is easy to compute another transcript $\text{tr}_2 = (\text{pk}, c_2)$ simply by reusing pk and encrypting any plaintext of one's choice under fresh encryption randomness. Further, note that transcripts generated this way are "symmetric" - meaning that not only it is easy to compute tr_2 from tr_1 , but it is also easy to compute (the right distribution of) tr_1 from tr_2 . Next, note that it is possible to generate polynomially many transcripts this way, which encrypt arbitrary plaintexts of one's choice. Finally and most importantly, from the point of view of sk all these transcripts could be transcripts in an honest execution of the protocol, and therefore sk has to "work" on each of them: that is, it has to decrypt them correctly, it has to produce valid fake key on them, and so on. We call such transcripts *related*.

Similarly, in the 3-message case, given some transcript $\text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m)$ for randomly chosen sender and receiver coins s^*, r^* , one can consider a set of *related transcripts*, i.e. transcripts on which r^* also has to "work". For instance, transcripts of the form $\text{tr}(s', r^*, m')$, where m' is arbitrary and s' is random, could be themselves the result of the honest execution of the protocol, and therefore such transcripts are related transcripts. Similarly, transcripts where s' is not random but is indistinguishable from random are also related.

¹⁰Since any bideniable encryption is also receiver-deniable, this impossibility of 2-message receiver-deniable encryption immediately implies impossibility of 2-message bideniable encryption as well.

We say that a scheme *allows to construct related transcripts*, if, given $\text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m)$ but not r^* , it is possible to compute related transcripts in polynomial time. This property is important because by indistinguishability of real and fake randomness, *fake* receiver randomness also has to work on related transcripts - at least on those which can be computed from a challenge transcript¹¹. Intuitively, this imposes too many requirements on the scheme, leading to impossibility in the 2-message case and requiring special decryption logic in the 3-message case. Let us first analyze what goes wrong in the 2-message case, in what is essentially a reformulation of the intuition behind the proof of [BNNO11]:

It is helpful to view fake r' (produced by running RFake on some transcript tr_1 , plaintext m'_1 and real r) as having “memory” where RFake records the mapping $\text{tr}_1 \rightarrow m'_1$ ¹². However, what happens if we run RFake on already-fake r' and some tr_2, m'_2 ? Since r' already remembers a mapping $\text{tr}_1 \rightarrow m'_1$, and RFake now asks it to remember another mapping $\text{tr}_2 \rightarrow m'_2$, it is not clear what should happen. Intuitively, there are 3 possible ways of how the scheme could handle this: remember both mappings, or only the last one, or abort:

- Option 1: RFake outputs \perp (or any other value which is not a “valid” fake randomness, i.e. which doesn’t remember the last mapping $\text{tr}_2 \rightarrow m'_2$ and therefore doesn’t decrypt tr_2 to m'_2). In other words, the scheme only allows to run RFake once. Such behavior immediately leads to an attack: assume the adversary is given tr_1 and fake receiver randomness r' as a challenge. It can compute tr_2 and run RFake on it. If r' randomness was real, then RFake would work and output randomness which decrypts tr_2 to m'_2 ; if this doesn’t happen when r' is already fake, then this can be used to distinguish between real and fake r' .

Note that for this argument it is crucial that given tr_1 , it is easy to compute tr_2 .

- Option 2: RFake “forgets” the previous mapping, i.e. outputs fake randomness which only memorizes the new mapping $\text{tr}_2 \rightarrow m'_2$ (but not the old mapping $\text{tr}_1 \rightarrow m'_1$)¹³. Such behavior leads to an attack: assume the adversary is given tr_1 and fake receiver randomness r' (which maps tr_1 to m'_1) as a challenge. It can compute tr_2 and run RFake on r' and tr_2 , and use the resulting randomness (which doesn’t remember the mapping $\text{tr}_1 \rightarrow m'_1$ anymore) to decrypt tr_1 honestly and learn the true plaintext of tr_1 .

Note that decrypting tr_1 should indeed result in the true plaintext (as opposed to aborting, for example). Indeed, if r' was real randomness of tr_1 , then the adversary could compute fake randomness with respect to tr_2 , which should still decrypt tr_1 correctly (otherwise, if randomness fake with respect to tr_2 decrypts tr_1 incorrectly, then it is possible to win deniability game when tr_2 is a challenge transcript - as long as tr_1 can be computed from tr_2). Therefore the same should hold if r' is already fake with respect to tr_1 .

Note that for this argument it is crucial that tr_1 can be computed from tr_2 , and tr_2 can be computed from tr_1 .

- Option 3: RFake “appends” the new mapping to all previous ones, i.e. outputs fake randomness which

¹¹Requirement that r^* shouldn’t be used when computing related transcripts comes from the fact that in deniability game the adversary doesn’t necessarily get real randomness r^* and has to generate related transcripts without it. Also, note that with r^* related transcripts would be always easy to find simply by computing $\text{tr}(s', r^*, m')$ for random s' and any m' ; for this reason, when we talk about finding related transcripts, we always implicitly assume that r^* shouldn’t be used.

¹²The proof of [BNNO11] essentially shows that in any 2-message scheme r' has to memorize this mapping, explicitly or implicitly.

¹³Note that we consider remembering only 1 mapping for simplicity. This argument can be easily extended to the case when randomness can remember some fixed polynomial number of mappings.

memorizes both mappings $\text{tr}_2 \rightarrow m'_2, \text{tr}_1 \rightarrow m'_1$. Then by repeating the process more than $|r|$ times we can force r to remember more than $|r|$ mappings, which is information-theoretically impossible.

Summarizing this discussion, the following properties make a scheme insecure:

1. Assume a scheme allows to construct multiple (more than $|r|$) related transcripts $\text{tr}_1, \text{tr}_2, \dots$, for possibly different plaintexts m_1, m_2, \dots ;
2. further, assume that the procedure to construct them is “symmetric” - that is, if tr_j can be constructed using tr_i , then (the correct distribution of) tr_i can also be constructed using tr_j ;

then this scheme - even if it is interactive - is subject to the same impossibility result as in [BNNO11].

Comparison-based decryption behavior. As we explain in more detail in section 2.2, any 3-message bideniable scheme allows to construct related transcripts; however, the algorithm to generate them is not “symmetric”. That is, this algorithm allows to generate $\text{tr}_1 \rightarrow \text{tr}_2 \rightarrow \text{tr}_3 \rightarrow \dots$ but only in a sequential way: it is easy to compute them “forward”, but in general it could be hard, given tr_j , to generate (the correct distribution of) tr_i where $i < j$ - i.e. hard to compute them “backward”.

To understand how the scheme should behave on related transcripts in the 3-message case, let’s reconsider options 1 - 3 mentioned above, keeping in mind that related transcripts are easy to compute forward but hard to compute backward, i.e. that tr_j is easy to build from tr_i if and only $i < j$.

Let r' be fake with respect to tr_i , and assume RFake is run on already-fake r' and a different transcript tr_j . Then:

- Option 1 (RFake gives invalid output, e.g. \perp) is still insecure for $j > i$, but possible for $j < i$.
- Option 2 (new fake randomness only remembers the last mapping and forgets the previous one) is now possible, but only as long as decrypting “backwards”, i.e. using r' to decrypt transcripts tr_j for $j < i$, outputs \perp ; otherwise this option has the same issue as in 2-round case. (In contrast, note that r' should decrypt “forward”, i.e. tr_j for $j > i$, correctly, since this is what r' would do if it was real).
- Option 3 (new fake randomness remembers all previous mappings and the new one) is still information-theoretically impossible.

These options tell us that the scheme should exhibit a different behavior depending on whether r' is used “forward” or “backward” (i.e. if it is used to decrypt/fake tr_j for $j > i$ or $j < i$). Perhaps the most natural logic consistent with options described above is to do everything correctly “forward”, but output \perp “backward”, that is:

1. When $j > i$, r' should decrypt tr_j correctly, and $\text{RFake}(r', \text{tr}_j, m'_j)$ should output new fake randomness which only remembers $\text{tr}_j \rightarrow m'_j$ (but not the previous mapping with tr_i);
2. When $j < i$, both Dec and RFake on inputs r', tr_j should output \perp ;

However, we elect to change this logic slightly in order to make deniability of the receiver *public*, meaning that $\text{RFake}(\text{tr}, m)$ doesn’t take receiver randomness as input. Indeed, note that the previous mapping is discarded by RFake anyway and thus RFake can work without knowledge of receiver randomness. Thus in our scheme we adopt the following comparison-based decryption behavior, slightly different from the one described above:

1. When $j > i$, Dec on inputs r' , tr_j should decrypt tr_j correctly;
2. When $j < i$, Dec on inputs r' , tr_j should output \perp ;
3. For all j $\text{RFake}(\text{tr}_j, m'_j)$ outputs fake randomness which remembers $\text{tr}_j \rightarrow m'_j$.

It remains to mention that by definition of related transcripts, the original, truly random r^* should decrypt each one of them correctly. This concludes the description of the logic which we incorporate into programs Dec and RFake.

In the next section we design a scheme which only allows to compute related transcripts sequentially, and where Dec has all necessary information in order to decide if it should decrypt honestly or output \perp , according to the rule above.

2.2 Description of the scheme for the case when programs are given as oracles

Notation. Before proceeding further, we fix some notation. We denote by s and r variables corresponding to randomness of the sender and the receiver, respectively, and μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 denote the three messages of the protocol. P1, P2, P3, Dec, SFake, RFake are the programs of the deniable encryption. More specifically:

P1(s, m) takes as input sender randomness s and plaintext m and outputs the first message μ_1 . P2(r, μ_1) takes as input receiver randomness r and first message μ_1 and outputs the second message μ_2 . P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2) takes as input sender randomness s , plaintext m , and protocol messages μ_1, μ_2 and outputs the last message μ_3 . Dec(r, μ_1, μ_2, μ_3) takes as input receiver randomness r and protocol messages μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 and outputs the plaintext m . SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$) takes as input sender randomness s , true plaintext m , new (fake) plaintext \hat{m} , and protocol messages μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 and outputs fake randomness s' which makes μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 look consistent with \hat{m} . RFake($\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$) takes as input new (fake) plaintext \hat{m} and protocol messages μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 and outputs fake randomness r' which makes μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 look consistent with \hat{m} (note that receiver-deniability is public, that is, anyone can create fake r' since the knowledge of true r is not required to run RFake).

The base scheme. We start with the base scheme where the goal is to make sure that related transcripts are hard to compute, unless a certain algorithm is used.

Programs of the scheme are presented on fig. 1. Programs P1, P2, P3 normally output messages μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 computed as $\mu_1 = \text{PRF}(s, m)$, $\mu_2 = \text{PRF}(r, \mu_1)$, $\mu_3 = \text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$ ¹⁴. Here Enc is a deterministic encryption scheme, and its key K is hardwired inside programs P3 and Dec. (All keys involved in the construction are only known to the programs, but not known to parties.) Program Dec(r, μ_1, μ_2, μ_3) can verify that $\text{PRF}(r, \mu_1) = \mu_2$ and then decrypt μ_3 and output m .

In addition, programs P1, P2, P3, Dec have a “hidden trigger” mechanism ([SW14]) which allows to create fake, but random-looking s and r with a certain value encrypted inside (which can be read by the programs). Such fake s and r are encryptions under keys K_S, K_R of an instruction for the program - e.g. s which is an encryption of (μ_1, m) tells program P1 to output μ_1 on input m . The encryption scheme used should have pseudorandom ciphertxts; since its keys K_S, K_R are hidden inside the programs, to an external observer

¹⁴Note that s, m (and r, μ_1) are both *inputs* to the PRF, not keys; we omit PRF keys in order to not overload the notation.

Programs of the base scheme.

Program P1(s, m)

1. **Trapdoor step:** if $\text{Dec}_{K_S}(s) = (m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3')$ and $m' = m$, then return μ_1' //if s is fake and encodes m , output encoded μ_1'
2. **Main step:** Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(s, m)$. //otherwise output $\text{PRF}(s, m)$

Program P2(r, μ_1)

1. **Trapdoor step:** if $\text{Dec}_{K_R}(r) = (m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3')$ and $\mu_1' = \mu_1$, then return μ_2' . //if r is fake and encodes μ_1 , output encoded μ_2'
2. **Normal step:** else return $\text{PRF}(r, \mu_1)$. //otherwise output $\text{PRF}(r, \mu_1)$

Program P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2)

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$, then abort;
2. **Trapdoor step:** if $\text{Dec}_{K_S}(s) = (m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3')$ and $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2') = (m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$, then return μ_3' . //if s is fake and encodes correct (m, μ_1, μ_2) , output encoded μ_3'
3. **Normal step:** else return $\text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$. //otherwise encrypt m

Program Dec(r, μ_1, μ_2, μ_3)

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P2}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$, then abort;
2. **Trapdoor step:** if $\text{Dec}_{K_R}(r) = (m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3')$ and $(\mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3') = (\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$, then return m' . //if r is fake and encodes correct (μ_1, μ_2, μ_3) , output encoded m'
3. **Normal step:** else decrypt $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_K(\mu_3)$. If $(\mu_1'', \mu_2'' = \mu_1, \mu_2)$ then output m'' , else abort. //otherwise decrypt honestly

Program SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho_S$)

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$, then abort;
2. **Normal step:** else return $\text{Enc}_{K_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \rho_S)$ // output fake s with fake plaintext and the transcript inside.

Program RFake($\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho_R$)

1. **Normal step:** return $\text{Enc}_{K_R}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \rho_R)$ // output fake r with fake plaintext and the transcript inside

Figure 1: Programs of the base scheme (note that this scheme is not secure yet and will be augmented later). Programs P1, P2, P3, Dec are deterministic (we treat s, r as part of the normal input, even though they are randomly chosen, since they are reused across different programs). Programs SFake, RFake are randomized.

such fake randomness looks like a uniformly chosen string. The sender and the receiver can compute such fake randomness by running SFake and RFake.

In addition, program P3, before producing the output, performs a validity check which aims to make sure that μ_3 which it will output corresponds to the same plaintext as μ_1 . It does so by verifying that input s is a correct preimage of μ_1 with respect to m under program P1 (possibly fake). Similarly the decryption program Dec only gives the output if randomness r is a consistent (possibly fake) preimage for the second message μ_2 under P2.

Communication in this protocol consists of $\mu_1 = \text{PRF}(s, m)$, $\mu_2 = \text{PRF}(r, \mu_1)$, and $\mu_3 = \text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$. If the sender and receiver want to claim they transmitted \hat{m} instead, they can use SFake, RFake to compute fake s' and r' , which are random-looking strings with $(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \rho)$ hardwired inside (ρ is just for randomizing, and is ignored by the programs). In particular, if the adversary tries to decrypt the transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 with fake $r' = \text{Enc}_{K_R}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \rho_R)$, it will get \hat{m} as a result (via trapdoor step of the

decryption program). Similarly, other programs, given fake s' or r' as input, use trapdoor step as well, making the transcript look consistent with \hat{m} .

Note that the current scheme at the very least guarantees consistent input-output behavior of programs on fake randomness s', r' .

How the base scheme protects from related transcripts. Recall that in previous subsection we wanted related transcripts to be hard to find: i.e. given $\text{tr}^* = (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*) = \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m)$, it should be hard to come up with another transcript $\text{tr} = (\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3) = \text{tr}(s, r^*, m')$ for the same r^* .

The base scheme partially prohibits computing related transcripts. Indeed, let's divide all related transcripts into two groups: transcripts with $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*$ (and therefore $\mu_2 = \mu_2^*$, since μ_2 only depends on μ_1 and r^*), and transcripts with $\mu_1 \neq \mu_1^*$ (and therefore, in general, $\mu_2 \neq \mu_2^*$). We describe how the above construction deals with each case:

Case $\mu_1 \neq \mu_1^*$: Finding such a transcript (in particular, μ_2) requires coming up with $\mu_2 = \text{P2}(r^*, \mu_1)$ without knowing r^* , which is hard due to the fact that P2 computes a PRF.

Case $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*$: Unlike the previous case, related transcripts with $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*$ also have $\mu_2 = \mu_2^*$, and thus one can always reuse $\mu_2 = \mu_2^*$ in such a transcript. However, to compute the transcript of this form, it still remains to compute μ_3 , such that μ_1^*, μ_2^*, μ_3 is a valid transcript with respect to r^* .

Recall that μ_3 is an encryption under a hidden key K and therefore can be only computed by running the corresponding program, P3. Further, recall that there is a validity check in P3 which guarantees that the program produces the output only if we give it a consistent s for μ_1 (by checking that $\text{P1}(s, m) = \mu_1$). Finally, note that $\text{P1}(s, m) = \mu_1$ can be satisfied in one of the two ways: either s is indeed a correct PRF preimage of μ_1 , or s is fake and contains μ_1 . Thus, if we wish to compute a different $\mu_3 \neq \mu_3^*$ (potentially for a different plaintext m') for the same μ_1^*, μ_2^* , we need to give P3 as input some string s' such that:

- either s' is a valid PRF preimage (that is, $\text{PRF}(s', m') = \mu_1^*$);
- or s' is fake randomness containing m', μ_1^* .

Intuitively, finding a valid PRF preimage is hard since the key of the PRF is hidden inside the program. Note however that finding fake s' with m', μ_1^* inside is very easy - in fact, SFake will readily output such s' ! However, note that finding such s' cannot be done *without* running SFake (again, since the key K_S is hidden inside the programs).

To summarize this part, we now have a scheme which doesn't allow to compute related transcripts *but only as long as SFake is not used to find them*. Needless to say, SFake is readily available to the adversary, and therefore the current scheme does allow to construct related transcripts (and is not secure yet). However, as we see next, executing SFake only allows to compute related transcripts in inherently sequential way, and therefore we can make the scheme secure by implement the comparison-based decryption logic which we discussed in the previous subsection.

Computing related transcripts using SFake. Assume the adversary is given the challenge transcript $\text{tr}^* = (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, randomness s^*, r^* which can be real or fake, and plaintext m^* (which this transcript is

claimed to encrypt). We now explain how to compute related transcripts tr_1, tr_2 , and so on, using tr^* and s^* ¹⁵. Each related transcript tr_i will be of the form $(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^{(i)})$.

The idea is to force P3 to output a different $\mu_3^{(1)}$ by giving it randomness s_1 which passes validity check with respect to μ_1^*, m_1 (where m_1 is an arbitrary plaintext, possibly different from the plaintext m^* of tr^*). This can be done by using SFake to generate fake s_1 which contains m_1, μ_1^* . However, if we just compute s_1 by running SFake on s^*, tr^* , and m_1 , it won't do us any good: while s_1 generated this way passes validity check, it will make P3 simply output hardwired μ_3^* and thus we won't get a new third message. The idea is to get fake s_1 which contains m_1, μ_1^* , but different $\tilde{\mu}_2 \neq \mu_2^*$, which can be done as follows:

1. Compute an auxiliary transcript $\tilde{\text{tr}} = (\mu_1^*, \tilde{\mu}_2, \tilde{\mu}_3)$ with the same first message μ_1^* , but different second message $\tilde{\mu}_2$ by choosing fresh randomness \tilde{r} of the receiver and setting $\tilde{\text{tr}} \leftarrow \text{tr}(s^*, \tilde{r}, m^*)$. Note that the first message of this transcript is $\text{P1}(s^*, m^*) = \mu_1^*$.
2. Compute $s_1 \leftarrow \text{SFake}(s^*, m^*, m_1, \mu_1^*, \tilde{\mu}_2, \tilde{\mu}_3)$. Note that s_1 is fake randomness which remembers m_1, μ_1^* but different $\tilde{\mu}_2 \neq \mu_2^*$.
3. Compute $\mu_3^{(1)} \leftarrow \text{P3}(s_1, m_1, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$. Set $\text{tr}_1 = (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^{(1)})$. Note that $\mu_1^* = \text{P1}(s_1, m_1)$ and therefore $\text{tr}_1 = \text{tr}(s_1, r^*, m_1)$; it follows from sender-deniability that s_1 is indistinguishable from random, and therefore tr_1 is a related transcript.

An important thing to note is that program P3 can detect when it is being used to produce related transcripts the way described above. Indeed, in this case the input to program P3, (s, m, μ_1, μ_2) , is such that s is fake and contains m, μ_1 , but some different $\tilde{\mu}_2 \neq \mu_2$; we will refer to this case as *mixed case*. Further, we claim that the procedure above (or its variations, e.g. repeating SFake several times) is the only way to compute related transcripts in our scheme - *which means that P3 can always detect when it is computing related transcript*. Intuitively, this is because the only way to compute valid third message is to run P3, which in turn requires some s which passes validity check, which in turn requires fake s with m_1 and μ_1^* inside (recall that it is hard to find a PRF preimage of μ_1^*), which in turn requires to run RFake on some (not necessarily valid) transcript with the same μ_1^* but different $\tilde{\mu}_2 \neq \mu_2^*$ - which can be detected by P3.

Note that this procedure can then be repeated (this time starting from s_1 instead of s^*) to generate s_2 and corresponding tr_2, s_3 and tr_3 and so on¹⁶.

For our scheme this means that the adversary can generate many third messages of the form $\text{Enc}_K(m_i, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$. Note that, just like with ciphertexts in the 2-message scheme, these third messages are “symmetric” and therefore our base scheme is insecure because of the same reasons as 2-message schemes. (In fact, the base scheme is badly broken because of a simpler reason: the adversary can test whether tr^* encrypts m_1 or not simply by checking whether $\mu_3^* = \mu_3^{(1)}$ or not. However, the latter issue could be easily fixed, while the former is substantial.)

Next we are going to change the scheme so that the procedure above indeed generates transcripts in “one-way” manner - such that they are hard to compute backwards - and allows program Dec to decrypt according to comparison-based rule discussed before.

¹⁵Recall that previously we required that related transcripts are hard to find given *only the transcript* tr^* , and now we additionally allow to use (real or fake) s^* in order to generate them. The reason is that in many cases everything we said above about impossibility of all three options can be extended to the case where related transcripts are generated using s^* and tr^* (as opposed to just tr^*).

¹⁶One can show, by a reduction to sender-deniability, that this procedure generates related transcripts in any 3-message scheme.

Augmenting the scheme with levels. First we briefly describe the idea. Recall that according to comparison-based logic program Dec should correctly decrypt forward, i.e. for $j > i$ it should correctly decrypt tr_j using r_i (which is fake with respect to tr_i), but if $i < j$ it should output bot. To let program Dec decide whether $i < j$ or not (and therefore whether it should decrypt correctly or output \perp), we modify the base scheme such that both the transcript and fake randomness know their index, which we call a *level*: that is, we change the third message μ_3 of the transcript tr_j to be an encryption of (m, μ_1, μ_2, j) , and we let fake $r' = \text{RFake}(\text{tr}_i, m'_i)$ remember not only the mapping $\text{tr}_i \rightarrow m'_i$, but also i (this can be achieved by making RFake decrypt the third message of tr_i and write its level into memory of r'). Then program Dec can decrypt both μ_3 and r' , compare their levels i and j and make a decision whether to decrypt honestly or output \perp .

It remains to describe how to make sure that μ_3 encrypts the correct level i (i.e. which indeed corresponds to the index of its transcript in the chain of related transcripts). In other words, why does program P3 know that now it is producing the message belonging to the transcript number i ? Indeed, this program needs to somehow learn i from its inputs s, m, μ_1, μ_2 . Recall that the algorithm to compute related transcript tr_j in fact does so by running this program on fake s which was faked j times. If we change the format of fake s to additionally encrypt a number representing how many times SFake was executed to produce this s , then the program for the third message can learn this number from s and copy it into μ_3 .

More concretely, we are going to do the following changes to the base scheme: first, we change the format of fake randomness. Recall that in the base scheme fake randomness was an encryption of $(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \rho)$ under the corresponding key (K_S or K_R). In the augmented scheme we set fake randomness to be an encryption of $(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell)$ for sender randomness and $(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell, \rho)$ for receiver randomness, where ℓ is a number between 0 and some superpolynomial upper bound T , which we call a level. Further, we let the third message also contain a level, i.e. be $\text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \ell)$; in the honest execution the level of the transcript is always set to 0.

Below we outline required modifications to the programs. The programs themselves can be found in fig. 2 (programs of the sender) and fig. 3 (programs of the receiver).

- Program SFake now additionally increments the level. That is, if it is given real s as input, it treats it as having level 0 and outputs fake randomness with $\ell = 1$. If it gets already fake randomness with some level ℓ , it outputs fake randomness with level $\ell + 1$ (unless the upper bound T is reached, in which case it aborts). Note that this modification makes SFake “one-way”, since it is hard, given fake s with level ℓ , to compute fake s with level smaller than ℓ .

Recall that SFake in the base scheme was randomized; in the final scheme we make it deterministic: since incremented level guarantees that fake s changes with each application of SFake, there is no need for randomization anymore.

- Program P3 now additionally encrypts a level, i.e. it outputs $\text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, 0)$ in the main step (where 0 is a level). Further, program P3 now has a “mixed input” step where it checks that s is fake and contains the same m, μ_1 as the input, but some other μ_2 (recall that this condition was a warning that P3 is being used to compute a related transcript). In this case it outputs $\text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, i)$, where i is a level in fake s . This guarantees that related transcript tr_i , computed using the procedure described above, will have its index i encrypted in its third message $\mu_3^{(i)}$.
- Program RFake now also copies the level from μ_3 into the fake randomness.
- Program Dec now also has “mixed input” step, which happens when fake r contains the same μ_1, μ_2 as

Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Program P1(s, m)

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{K_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ; //if s is fake and encodes m , output encoded μ_1'

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{PRF}_{k_S}(s, m)$. //otherwise output $\text{PRF}(s, m)$

Program P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2)

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{K_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ; //if s is fake and encodes correct (m, μ_1, μ_2) , output encoded μ_3'

3. **Mixed input step:** If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ but $\mu_2 \neq \mu_2'$ then return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \ell')$; //if s is fake and encodes correct (m, μ_1) but incorrect μ_2' , encrypt m with level copied from s

4. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, 0)$. //otherwise encrypt m with level 0

Program SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$)

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{K_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. If $\ell \geq T$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{Enc}_{K_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell + 1)$. //if input s is already fake then output new fake s with fake plaintext, the transcript, and incremented level

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\text{Enc}_{K_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, 1)$. //otherwise output fake s with fake plaintext, the transcript, and level 1

Figure 2: Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Programs P2, Dec, RFake.

Program P2(r, μ_1)

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{K_R}(r)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ; //if r is fake and encodes μ_1 , output encoded μ_2'

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}_{k_R}(r, \mu_1)$. //otherwise output $\text{PRF}(r, \mu_1)$

Program Dec(r, μ_1, μ_2, μ_3)

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P2}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{K_R}(r)$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ; //if r is fake and encodes correct (μ_1, μ_2, μ_3) , output encoded m'
- (c) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_K(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', \ell'')$;

3. **Mixed input step:** If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ but $\mu_3 \neq \mu_3'$ then

- (a) If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'')$ and $\ell' < \ell''$ then return m'' ; //if r is fake and encodes correct (μ_1, μ_2) but incorrect μ_3' , decrypt honestly or abort, depending on whether the level in r is smaller than in μ_3 or not
- (b) Else abort.

4. **Main step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_K(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', \ell'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'')$ then return m'' ; //otherwise decrypt honestly
- (c) Else abort.

Program RFake($\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho$)

- 1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_K(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', \ell'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{K_R}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell'', \text{prg}(\rho))$. // output fake r with fake plaintext, the transcript, and the level copied from μ_3

Figure 3: Programs P2, Dec, RFake.

in its input, but some different μ_3 . This condition indicates that Dec is being used to test the behavior of the scheme on related transcripts - i.e. that some fake r_i (fake with respect to transcript tr_i) is used to decrypt tr_j . In this case Dec follows the comparison-based decryption logic we described above: that is, it learns the level i of receiver randomness and the level j of the transcript, and decrypts honestly when $i < j$ or outputs \perp otherwise.

This concludes the description of our scheme in the model where parties only have oracle access to the programs. It remains to explain why the resulting scheme indeed doesn't allow to compute related transcripts backwards. Roughly, this is because computing the third message can only be done by running P3 on fake s , but computing fake s is possible only in one direction: that is, one can repeatedly apply SFake to generate fake s with higher and higher levels, but given some fake s with level i , it is hard to find any fake s with levels below i ¹⁷.

Summary. To summarize, we designed the scheme in such a way that related transcripts are hard to compute unless SFake-based procedure is used. Further, we added a counter called "level" into fake s and transcripts in such a way that related transcripts tr_1, tr_2, \dots carry their index $1, 2, \dots$ inside them. Finally, we let fake r remember the index of the transcript which was used to generate that r . If the adversary decides to play with related transcripts - e.g. take randomness r' (fake with respect to tr_i) and decrypt tr_j using r' - the decryption algorithm can compare i and j and make the decision whether to decrypt or abort.

Finally, recall that the comparison-based logic of the decryption program was designed in such a way that fake r , on one hand, doesn't remember too much to violate the information-theoretic bound, and on the other hand, doesn't decrypt too much to reveal the true plaintext of the challenge transcript. Such logic is possible in the 3-message case as long as related transcripts cannot be computed "backward" (e.g. tr_1 cannot be computed from tr_2). Our scheme forces this property by making sure that tr_i can only be computed using i -times-fake s , and that given i -times-fake s it is hard to compute the right distribution of $i - 1$ -times-fake s . The latter is due to the fact that SFake increments the counter of how many times s was faked, all the way to some unreachable in polynomial time bound T .

Finally, let us describe how the programs behave in the normal execution, on fake randomness, and when the adversary generates related transcripts:

- **Normal execution of the protocol:** executing programs on randomly chosen s^*, r^* and plaintext m_0^* makes programs execute the main step and output $\mu_1^* = \text{PRF}(s^*, m_0^*), \mu_2^* = \text{PRF}(r^*, \mu_1^*),$ and $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_K(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, 0)$; Dec, given the resulting transcript as input, outputs m_0^* via main step.
- **Fake randomness of parties:** executing programs on fake s' (which encodes $(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, 1)$), fake r' (which encodes $(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, 0)$), and m_1^* makes programs execute trapdoor step, which tells them to output a hardwired value and abort. Thus, P1 will output μ_1^* , P2 will output μ_2^* , P3 will output μ_3^* , and Dec will output m_1^* via trapdoor step, making the transcript for plaintext m_0^* look consistent with m_1^* .

¹⁷Formally speaking, the procedure to generate related transcripts actually allows to generate a tree of transcripts, not just a chain. This is because the procedure can be repeated several times (with different \tilde{r}), starting with the same level-0 transcript, to obtain several level-1 transcripts, and then each level-1 transcript can produce several level-2 transcripts, and so on. However, randomness and transcripts from different branches don't have to "work" together (e.g. Dec can output \perp), and the comparison-based decryption should hold only on each separate branch of the tree of any polynomial length.

- **Efficiently computable related transcripts:** it is only possible to compute related transcripts of the form $(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3)$, where $\mu_3 = \text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \ell)$, $\ell \geq 1$; moreover, the only way of doing so is to follow the procedure described above (which includes running SFake). Trying to compute μ_3 for such transcript will make program P3 execute “mixed input step”, making sure that such μ_3 indeed receives level $\ell \geq 1$; for this mechanics it is important that SFake increments the level inside s . Trying to decrypt such related transcript $(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3)$ will make program Dec execute “mixed input step”, making sure that the correct decryption behavior is observed (that fake r decrypts correctly transcripts with larger level, but refuses to decrypt transcripts with smaller level); for this mechanics it is important that RFake copies the level from the transcript to r .

Security proof when programs are given as oracles. Since the proof even in this simpler model is somewhat lengthy, we only outline main steps and give the intuition for why each step holds. The proof proceeds in 4 main steps. We start with a real execution corresponding to plaintext m_0^* , where the adversary receives real randomness s^*, r^* . The proof proceeds as follows:

- **Step 1.** Instead of giving the adversary real s^* , we give it $s' = \text{Enc}_{K_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell = 0)$ (note that this s' contains level 0, unlike fake randomness produced by SFake which contains level at least 1).

Intuitively, the reason why we can switch from s^* to s' indistinguishably is because all programs treat them in the same way. That is:

- either the programs output the same value, possibly using different parts of the program (e.g. P1 on input (s^*, m_0^*) outputs μ_1^* via main step and on input (s', m_0^*) it outputs μ_1^* via trapdoor step),
- or the programs execute the same code, possibly outputting different result (e.g. P1 on input (s^*, m_1^*) and (s', m_1^*) outputs a PRF of its input).

This observation, together with the fact that the ciphertext s' is pseudorandom, allows us to change s^* to s' , in a manner similar to the proof of deniable encryption of [SW14].

- **Step 2.** Instead of giving the adversary real r^* , we give it fake r' , i.e. $r' = \text{Enc}_{K_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell = 0, \rho_R)$. The proof is analogous to the previous case - with the difference that there exist an input on which r^* and r' behave differently.

Indeed, recall that r^* decrypts honestly *all* related transcripts, while r' decrypts honestly only “forward”, i.e. related transcripts with level $\ell \geq 1$. Thus, transcripts with level 0 are at risk of being treated differently. Indeed, consider a transcript $(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \overline{\mu_3^*})$, where $\overline{\mu_3^*} = \text{Enc}_K(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \ell = 0)$ is like μ_3^* except that it encrypts the wrong plaintext m_1^* . Such transcript is decrypted correctly to m_1^* by r^* , but decrypting it with r' returns \perp since comparison of levels fails.

This single transcript makes r^* and r' look different enough so that we cannot do the proof like in step 1. Therefore, we first move to a hybrid where this “differing” transcript doesn’t exist. This is done as follows. First, since s^* - the preimage of a PRF value μ_1^* - is not part of the distribution anymore, we can move μ_1^* outside of the PRF image. Then we can argue that P3 never outputs $\overline{\mu_3^*}$:

- The main step cannot output $\overline{\mu_3^*}$, since the main step is executed only if validity check is passed *via a correct PRF preimage*, which now doesn’t exist.

- The mixed step cannot output $\overline{\mu_3^*}$. To make the mixed step output a ciphertext with level 0 (like $\overline{\mu_3^*}$), one has to give P3 as input randomness with level 0. However, it is hard to find such randomness since SFake never outputs randomness with level 0.
- The trapdoor step can only output $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ if we give P3 fake randomness with $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ inside to begin with. Since there are no other means of computing $\overline{\mu_3^*}$, such randomness is also hard to find and therefore this step also doesn't output $\overline{\mu_3^*}$.

Once the differing transcript $(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \overline{\mu_3^*})$ is eliminated, we can switch r^* to r' similar to the previous step.

- **Step 3.** The next step is to switch μ_3^* from encrypting m_0^* to m_1^* . This is done by “detaching” μ_3^* from its key K in programs P3 and Dec. Concretely, note that:
 - P3 can only output μ_3^* via the trapdoor thread (which doesn't use the key K). The reason is very similar to the case-by-case analysis of P3 above: the main step requires the preimage of the PRF, which doesn't exist, and the mixed step requires sender randomness with level 0, which is hard to find.
 - Dec can only “decrypt” μ_3^* via the trapdoor thread (which, again, doesn't use K). To guarantee this, we first move μ_2^* outside of the image of the PRF (this is possible since r^* is not part of the distribution anymore). As a result, μ_3^* is never decrypted via the main step because the preimage for μ_2^* doesn't exist. Further, μ_3^* cannot be decrypted in the mixed step either, because, due to “forward decryption” rule, it requires receiver randomness with level smaller than level in μ_3^* - which doesn't exist since μ_3^* has the smallest possible level, 0.

In other words, neither P3 nor Dec need to use K to encrypt or decrypt μ_3^* . Therefore we can “detach” K and μ_3^* and change the plaintext to m_1^* .

Note that the transcript now contains m_1^* , and both randomness s', r' are consistent with m_0^* . However, the proof is not finished yet since parties cannot produce such s' themselves (since it contains level 0 instead of 1).

- **Step 4.** The last step is to change the level inside s' from 0 to 1, i.e. generate $s' = \text{Enc}_{K_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell = 1)$. To understand the challenge of this step, it is instructive to take a “level-centric” point of view: let's forget that the scheme is about transmitting the plaintext, and instead think about fake s as an encryption of level (0 or 1), think about μ_3^* as an encryption of level 0, and think about programs of deniable encryption as programs which allow homomorphic operations on encrypted levels. For example, program SFake outputs fake randomness which is an encryption of incremented level, thus providing homomorphic Increment operation. Program Dec compares levels inside μ_3 and r and based on that decides whether to decrypt or not, thus providing access to homomorphic isLess function which tells (in the clear) if one level is smaller than the other.

In other words, step 4 essentially requires to switch s' from encryption of 0 to encryption of 1, while giving the adversary an access to homomorphic functions Increment and isLess¹⁸. In the oracle model it can be easily shown that polynomially-bounded adversary cannot distinguish between Enc(0) and Enc(1), even given access to isLess and Increment oracles, as long as the largest allowed level is superpolynomial. Indeed, the adversary can only generate polynomially-many subsequent encryptions

¹⁸Recall that the adversary also has μ_3^* which is an encryption of level 0. For simplicity, we ignore this fact in this high-level overview.

$\text{Enc}(1), \text{Enc}(2), \dots$ or $\text{Enc}(2), \text{Enc}(3), \dots$ (depending on whether the challenge ciphertext was $\text{Enc}(0)$ or $\text{Enc}(1)$) and compare them, but the result of comparison will be exactly the same in both cases.

This concludes the proof in the model where programs are given as oracles.

2.3 Changes to the construction and the proof when obfuscated code of programs is given.

There are two major changes:

ACE. First, instead of using symmetric-key encryption scheme for generating fake randomness of the sender and the receiver (keys K_S, K_R), as well as the main encryption scheme which is used to compute μ_3 (key K), we are using special public key encryption scheme called asymmetric constrained encryption (ACE) from of [CHJV14] (with keys $\text{EK}_S, \text{DK}_S; \text{EK}_R, \text{DK}_R; \text{EK}, \text{DK}$, respectively).

To understand why ACE is required, note that in many places of the security proof we used the fact that the only way to obtain some value is to run a corresponding program on some inputs. If those inputs are themselves provably hard to find, in the oracle setting it is usually easy to argue that outputs are hard to find as well. Everything changes when parties have access to obfuscated programs, as opposed to just oracles. First, such reasoning becomes more difficult because the keys are now fixed inside programs and therefore are part of the distribution. Second, iO guarantees security only when two programs are *identical*, and therefore in most cases it is not enough to show that some inputs are hard to find: we need to show they don't exist.

ACE proved to be an indispensable tool in adapting our proof from the oracle-based setting to the iO-based setting. At a high level, ACE is a deterministic, public-key encryption scheme with special security requirements, which essentially allows to switch any ciphertext from “hard to find” to “doesn't exist”. More concretely, its security requirement says that, given punctured encryption key $\text{EK}\{m\}$ (which outputs \perp on attempt to encrypt m), nobody can distinguish between DK and $\text{DK}\{m\}$ (which outputs \perp on attempt to decrypt $\text{Enc}(m)$), and besides that, doesn't reveal $\text{Enc}(m)$ itself). As an example, recall that program SFake never encrypts level 0. Thus, we can puncture EK_S at all strings ending with level 0, relying on iO. Next we can puncture DK_S at all such strings, relying on security of ACE. Now we are in a hybrid where fake sender randomness with level 0 is non-existent, since punctured decryption key DK never decrypts to level 0. Next in a similar manner we can puncture EK and then DK to argue that $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ is non-existent, like we did in step 2 in the proof in the oracle setting.

The level system. The second change is that instead of using plain numbers $0, \dots, T$ as levels, we use what we call a *level system*. That is, we use *encrypted* numbers $\text{Enc}(0), \dots, \text{Enc}(T)$ as levels, and, since programs of deniable encryption should be able to increment and compare levels, we also provide obfuscated programs which homomorphically increment and compare them. Security requirement of the level system says that $\text{Enc}(0)$ is indistinguishable from $\text{Enc}(1)$ even given programs for homomorphic increment and compare functions.¹⁹

¹⁹In our actual construction, to account for the fact that the adversary also has an encryption of level 0 (μ_3^*), we use two different types of levels. Also, each level, in addition to encryption of a number, contains some auxiliary information which “ties” this level to a particular transcript of the protocol. We also provide programs to sample level 0 and transform between different types of levels. Actual security requirement is slightly more complicated than what we have stated in this introduction. However, those modifications are mostly technical: the main ideas are as described.

However, the proof of step 4 - that is, the proof of security of the level system - turns out to be quite involved when programs for homomorphic increment and comparison are given. Roughly, our proof proceeds as follows:

1. First we change $\text{Enc}(0)$ to $\text{Enc}(1)$ by changing the whole chain from $\text{Enc}(0), \text{Enc}(1), \dots, \text{Enc}(T)$ to $\text{Enc}(1), \text{Enc}(2), \dots, \text{Enc}(T + 1)$. This is done in T big steps and therefore incurs security loss proportional to T (recall that T has to be superpolynomial to make sure that the adversary cannot reach the end).
2. The inadvertent result of the previous step is that in program `Increment` the upper bound is changed from T to $T + 1$ (that is, if previously `Increment` returned \perp on inputs $\text{Enc}(T), \text{Enc}(T + 1)$ and so on, now it returns \perp on inputs $\text{Enc}(T + 1), \text{Enc}(T + 2)$ and so on). Recall that program `Increment` is part of the code of `SFake`, and recall that in the proof of security of deniable encryption we need to start and finish with exactly the same CRS, and therefore the same program `Increment`. Therefore we need to change the upper bound in `Increment` back to T . This is done by arguing that it is hard for the adversary to reach the end (i.e. find $\text{Enc}(T)$) - similar to how [BPR15] argue that the adversary cannot reach the end of the line - and then using the properties of ACE and `iO` to change the upper bound back to T .

3 Preliminaries

3.1 Indistinguishability Obfuscation for Circuits

Definition 1 (Indistinguishability Obfuscation (`iO`)). *A uniform PPT machine `iO` is called an indistinguishability obfuscator if the following conditions are satisfied:*

- For all security parameters $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, for all inputs x , we have that

$$\Pr[C'(x) = C(x) : C' \leftarrow \text{iO}(1^\lambda, C)] = 1$$

- There is a polynomial p such that for every circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, it holds that $|\text{iO}(c)| \leq p(|C|)$.
- For any (not necessarily uniform) PPT distinguisher D , there exists a negligible function α such that the following holds: For all security parameters $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all circuit families $C_0 = \{C_\lambda^0\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, $C_1 = \{C_\lambda^1\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ of size $|C_\lambda^0| = |C_\lambda^1|$, we have that if $C_\lambda^0(x) = C_\lambda^1(x)$ for all inputs x , then

$$\left| \Pr[D(\text{iO}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda^0)) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{iO}(1^\lambda, C_\lambda^1)) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We say that indistinguishability obfuscation is $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -secure if the distinguishing advantage of all distinguishers of size $t(\lambda)$ is at most $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.

3.2 Equivalence of `iO` and `diO` for programs differing on one point

In the proof of security of the level system we use the following lemma from [BPR15] (which is a special case of theorem 6.2 from [BCP14], with exact parameters):

Lemma 1. ([BPR15, BCP14]) Let iO be a (t, δ) -secure indistinguishability obfuscator for P/poly . There exists a PPT oracle-aided extractor E , such that for any $t^{O(1)}$ -size distinguisher D , and two equal-size circuits C_0, C_1 differing on exactly one input x^* , the following holds. Let C'_0, C'_1 be padded versions of C_0, C_1 of size $s \geq 3 \cdot |C_0|$. If $|\Pr[D(\text{iO}(C'_0)) = 1] - \Pr[D(\text{iO}(C'_1)) = 1]| = \eta \geq \delta(s)^{o(1)}$, then $\Pr[x^* \leftarrow E^{D(\cdot)}(1^{1/\eta}, C_0, C_1)] \geq 1 - 2^{-\Omega(s)}$.

3.3 Puncturable Pseudorandom Functions and their variants

Puncturable PRFs. In puncturable PRFs it is possible to create a key that is punctured at a set S of polynomial size. A key k punctured at S (denoted $k\{S\}$) allows evaluating the PRF at all points not in S . Furthermore, the function values at points in S remain pseudorandom even given $k\{S\}$.

Definition 2. A puncturable pseudorandom function family for input size $n(\lambda)$ and output size $m(\lambda)$ is a tuple of algorithms $\{\text{Sample}, \text{Puncture}, \text{Eval}\}$ such that the following properties hold:

- **Functionality preserved under puncturing:** For any PPT adversary A which outputs a set $S \subset \{0, 1\}^n$, for any $x \notin S$,

$$\Pr[F_k(x) = F_{k\{S\}}(x) : k \leftarrow \text{Sample}(1^\lambda), k\{S\} \leftarrow \text{Puncture}(k, S)] = 1.$$

- **Pseudorandomness at punctured points:** For any PPT adversaries A_1, A_2 , define a set S and state state as $(S, \text{state}) \leftarrow A_1(1^\lambda)$. Then

$$\Pr[A_2(\text{state}, S, k\{S\}, F_k(S))] - \Pr[A_2(\text{state}, S, k\{S\}, U_{|S| \cdot m(\lambda)})] < \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $F_k(S)$ denotes concatenated PRF values on inputs from S , i.e. $F_k(S) = \{F_k(x_i) : x_i \in S\}$.

The GGM PRF [GGM84] satisfies this definition.

Statistically injective puncturable PRFs. Such PRFs are injective with overwhelming probability over the choice of a key. Sahai and Waters [SW14] show that if F is a puncturable PRF with arbitrary input length n and output length $m \geq 2n + \lambda$, and h is 2-universal hash function, then $F'_{k,h} = F_k(x) \oplus h(x)$ is a statistically injective puncturable PRF with probability $1 - 2^{-\lambda}$ over the choice of a key.

Extracting puncturable PRFs. Such PRFs have a property of a strong extractor: even when a full key is known, the output of the PRF is statistically close to uniform, as long as there is enough min-entropy in the input. Sahai and Waters [SW14] show that if the input has min-entropy at least $m + 2\lambda + 2$ (where m is the output size), then such PRF can be constructed from any puncturable PRF F as $F'_{k,h} = h(F_k(x))$, where h is 2-universal hash function; it can be shown that the output of this PRF together with the key is $2^{-\lambda}$ -close to the uniform distribution.

Sparse computationally extracting puncturable PRFs. We need a slightly modified version of extracting PRFs: we relax the extracting requirement from statistical to computational, but require our PRF to have a sparse image. Such a PRF can be built from computationally extracting PRF by applying a prf on top of it [CPR17].

Definition 3. A PRF family with a key k mapping $\{0, 1\}^{n(\lambda)}$ to $\{0, 1\}^{l(\lambda)}$ is a sparse computationally extracting family for min-entropy $t(\lambda)$, if, in addition to the standard definition of a puncturable PRF, the following two conditions hold:

- **Sparseness:** $\Pr[r \in \text{Im}(F_k) : k \leftarrow \text{Sample}(1^\lambda), r \leftarrow U_l] < \nu(\lambda)$ for some negligible function ν ;
- **Computational extractor:** If distribution X has min-entropy at least $t(\lambda)$, then with overwhelming probability over the choice of key k for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A}

$$| \Pr[\mathcal{A}(k, F_k(x)) = 1 \mid x \leftarrow X] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(k, r) = 1 \mid r \leftarrow U_l] | < \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We say that such a PRF is $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -secure, if for any t -sized distinguishers the distinguishing advantage in the puncturable PRF game and in the computational extractor game is at most ε , and sparseness $\nu(\lambda) < \varepsilon(\lambda)$.

[CPR17] show that, assuming one-way functions, such PRFs exists if $t(\lambda)$, the entropy of the input, is at least $m/2 + 2\lambda + 2$, and m is superlogarithmic. We note that their construction uses a PRF with security parameter λ and a prg with security parameter $m/2$ and therefore the construction can be made exponentially secure, by requiring (possibly stronger) subexponential security of the underlying PRF and prg.

3.4 Asymmetrically constrained encryption (ACE) and its relaxed variant

ACE at a high level. Asymmetrically constrained encryption ([CHJV14], see also the journal version [BCG⁺18]), or ACE for short, is a public-key, *deterministic* encryption scheme with special security properties. Intuitively, it allows to puncture both the public key and the secret key, at possibly different sets, such that $\text{EK}\{m\}$ doesn't allow to compute the encryption of m , and $\text{DK}\{m\}$ doesn't allow to decrypt the encryption of m . The scheme has to satisfy the following security properties, which we only roughly outline in this paragraph (see the formal definition below for precise correctness and security requirements):

- **Indistinguishability of ciphertexts:** $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0)$ and $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1)$ are indistinguishable even given punctured $\text{EK}\{m_0, m_1\}$, $\text{DK}\{m_0, m_1\}$ (or given EK , DK punctured at bigger sets including m_0, m_1). Intuitively, the adversary can neither encrypt m_0, m_1 nor decrypt $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0)$ and $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1)$, and thus cannot distinguish between encryptions of m_0, m_1 .
- **Security of constrained decryption:** Given $\text{EK}\{U\}$, it is hard to distinguish between $\text{DK}\{S_0\}$ and $\text{DK}\{S_1\}$, where $S_0 \subseteq S_1 \subseteq U$. Intuitively, the adversary cannot distinguish between these two cases since it is hard to find a “differing ciphertext” $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m)$, $m \in S_1 \setminus S_0$, which $\text{DK}\{S_0\}$ and $\text{DK}\{S_1\}$ decrypt differently (to m and \perp). Such ciphertexts are hard to find since such $m \in U$, and EK is punctured at U .

Relaxed ACE at a high level. In addition to ACE, we require a slightly different version of it, which we call a *relaxed ACE*. In relaxed ACE indistinguishability of ciphertexts doesn't necessarily hold. Instead, we require a different property called *symmetry*, and we show how to modify the construction of [CHJV14] to build relaxed ACE with small security loss in constrained decryption game for certain sets. More concretely, we have the following differences:

- In [CHJV14], security of constrained decryption allows for security loss proportional to the size of $S_1 \setminus S_0$, since they change $\text{DK}\{S_0\}$ to $\text{DK}\{S_1\}$, one point at a time. This is too much in our case,

since our sets have size $2^{O(\lambda)}$. However, our sets have nice structure (e.g. all strings ending with the same suffix, or all such strings except one), and we can slightly modify the construction such that security loss is only polynomial on such sets. Essentially, our ciphertexts, instead of having a single signature of a plaintext like in [CHJV14], have signatures of each prefix of the plaintext, which allows to puncture DK at a lot of points at once (this technique is similar to [GPS16]).

- We require additional property which we call *symmetry*. To define it, we first need a syntactically different way of puncturing the decryption key. In [CHJV14] puncturing is plaintext-based (i.e. the punctured key $DK\{m\}$ has the description of the plaintext but not the ciphertext). We need, in addition to that, a ciphertext-based way to puncture (we denote it as $DK\{c\}$). Symmetry then says that distributions $(c^*, c', EK\{m\}, DK\{c^*, c'\})$ and $(c', c^*, EK\{m\}, DK\{c^*, c'\})$ are indistinguishable, where m is an arbitrary plaintext, c' is its ciphertext, and c^* is randomly chosen. We note that for ciphertext-based punctured key symmetry is the only required security property, although we still require all applicable correctness properties.

Definition of ACE. Now we present a formal definition:

Definition 4. [CHJV14], [BCG⁺18] An *asymmetrically constrained encryption (ACE) scheme* is a 5-tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup, GenEK, GenDK, Enc, Dec) satisfying syntax, correctness, security of constrained decryption, and selective indistinguishability of ciphertexts as described below.

Syntax. The algorithms (Setup, GenEK, GenDK, Enc, Dec) have the following syntax.

- **Setup:** $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1^s)$ is a randomized algorithm that takes as input the security parameter λ , the message length n , and a “circuit succinctness” parameter s , all in unary. Setup then outputs a secret key SK . We think of secret keys as consisting of two parts: an encryption key EK and a decryption key DK .

Let $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}^n$ denote the message space.

- **(Constrained) Key Generation:** Let $S \subset \mathcal{M}$ be any set whose membership is decidable by a circuit C_S . We say that S is *admissible* if $|C_S| \leq s$. Intuitively, the set size parameter s denotes the upper bound on the size of circuit description of sets to which encryption and decryption keys can be constrained.
 - $\text{GenEK}(SK, C_S)$ takes as input the secret key SK of the scheme and the description of circuit C_S for an admissible set S . It outputs an encryption key $EK\{S\}$. We write EK to denote $EK\{\emptyset\}$.
 - $\text{GenDK}(SK, C_S)$ also takes as input the secret key SK of the scheme and the description of circuit C_S for an admissible set S . It outputs a decryption key $DK\{S\}$. We write DK to denote $DK\{\emptyset\}$.

Unless mentioned otherwise, we will only consider admissible sets $S \subset \mathcal{M}$.

- **Encryption:** $\text{Enc}(EK', m)$ is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input an encryption key EK' (that may be constrained) and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and outputs a ciphertext c or the reject symbol \perp .

- **Decryption:** $\text{Dec}(DK', c)$ is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a decryption key DK' (that may be constrained) and a ciphertext c and outputs a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ or the reject symbol \perp .

Correctness. An ACE scheme is correct if the following properties hold:

1. *Correctness of Decryption:* For all n , all $m \in \mathcal{M}$, all sets $S, S' \subset \mathcal{M}$ s.t. $m \notin S \cup S'$,

$$\Pr \left[\text{Dec}(DK, \text{Enc}(EK, m)) = m \mid \begin{array}{l} SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \\ EK \leftarrow \text{GenEK}(SK, C_{S'}), \\ DK \leftarrow \text{GenDK}(SK, C_S) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

Informally, this says that $\text{Dec} \circ \text{Enc}$ is the identity on messages which are in neither of the punctured sets.

2. *Equivalence of Constrained Encryption:* Let $SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$. For any message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and any sets $S, S' \subset \mathcal{M}$ with m not in the symmetric difference $S \Delta S'$ (i.e., we are requiring that m is in both S and S' or m is in neither S nor S').

$$\Pr \left[\text{Enc}(EK, m) = \text{Enc}(EK', m) \mid \begin{array}{l} SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), \\ EK \leftarrow \text{GenEK}(SK, C_S), \\ EK' \leftarrow \text{GenEK}(SK, C_{S'}) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

3. *Unique Ciphertexts:* With high probability over $SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, it holds for any c and c' that if $\text{Dec}(DK, c) = \text{Dec}(DK, c') \neq \perp$, then $c = c'$.
4. *Safety of Constrained Decryption:* For all strings c , all $S \subset \mathcal{M}$,

$$\Pr [\text{Dec}(DK, c) \in S \mid SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda), DK \leftarrow \text{GenDK}(SK, C_S)] = 0$$

This says that a punctured key $DK\{S\}$ will never decrypt a string c to a message in S .

5. *Equivalence of Constrained Decryption:* If $\text{Dec}(DK\{S\}, c) = m \neq \perp$ and $m \notin S'$, then $\text{Dec}(DK\{S'\}, c) = m$.

Security of Constrained Decryption. Intuitively, this property says that for any two sets S_0, S_1 , no adversary can distinguish between the constrained key $DK\{S_0\}$ and $DK\{S_1\}$, even given additional auxiliary information in the form of a constrained encryption key EK' and ciphertexts c_1, \dots, c_t . To rule out trivial attacks, EK' is constrained at least on $S_0 \Delta S_1$. Similarly, each c_i is an encryption of a message $m \notin S_0 \Delta S_1$.

Formally, we describe security of constrained decryption as a multi-stage game between an adversary adv and a challenger.

- *Setup:* \mathcal{A} chooses sets S_0, S_1, U s.t. $S_0 \Delta S_1 \subseteq U \subseteq \mathcal{M}$ and sends their circuit descriptions (C_{S_0}, C_{S_1}, C_U) to the challenger. adv also sends arbitrary polynomially many messages m_1, \dots, m_t such that $m_i \notin S_0 \Delta S_1$.

The challenger chooses a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and computes the following:

1. $SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$,
2. $DK\{S_b\} \leftarrow \text{GenDK}(SK, C_{S_b})$,
3. $EK \leftarrow \text{GenEK}(SK, \emptyset)$,
4. $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(EK, m_i)$ for every $i \in [t]$, and
5. $EK\{U\} \leftarrow \text{GenEK}(SK, C_U)$.

Finally, it sends the tuple $(EK\{U\}, DK\{S_b\}, \{c_i\})$ to adv .

- *Guess*: \mathcal{A} outputs a bit $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.

The advantage of \mathcal{A} in this game (on security parameter λ) is defined as $\text{adv}_{\mathcal{A}} = |\Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}|$. We require that for all PPT \mathcal{A} , $\text{adv}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ is $\text{negl}(\lambda)|S_1 \setminus S_0|$.

Selective Indistinguishability of Ciphertexts. Intuitively, this property says that no adversary can distinguish encryptions of m_0 from encryptions of m_1 , even given certain auxiliary information. The auxiliary information corresponds to constrained encryption and decryption keys EK' , DK' , as well as some ciphertexts c_1, \dots, c_t . In order to rule out trivial attacks, EK' and DK' should both be punctured on at least $\{m_0, m_1\}$, and none of c_1, \dots, c_t should be an encryption of m_0 or m_1 . Let both \mathcal{F}_1 and \mathcal{F}_2 be sub-exponentially secure.

Formally, we require that for all sets $S, U \subset \mathcal{M}$, for all $m_0^*, m_1^* \in S \cap U$, and all $m_1, \dots, m_t \in \mathcal{M} \setminus \{m_0^*, m_1^*\}$, the distribution

$$EK\{S\}, DK\{U\}, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_1, \dots, c_t$$

is computationally indistinguishable from

$$EK\{S\}, DK\{U\}, c_1^*, c_0^*, c_1, \dots, c_t$$

in the probability space defined by sampling $SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $EK \leftarrow \text{GenEK}(SK, \emptyset)$, $EK\{S\} \leftarrow \text{GenEK}(SK, C_S)$, $DK\{U\} \leftarrow \text{GenDK}(SK, C_U)$, $c_b^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(EK, m_b^*)$, and $c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(EK, m_i)$.

As shown in [CHJV14], there exists subexponentially secure ACE assuming subexponentially secure injective PRGs and iO. We note that their construction and the proof can be based on injective OWFs instead of injective PRGs, similar to the proof of our relaxed ACE (section B).

Definition of relaxed ACE. As noted earlier, we also consider a relaxed ACE where indistinguishability of ciphertexts doesn't necessarily hold. Instead, we require a different property called *symmetry*, and we show how to modify the construction of [CHJV14] to build relaxed ACE with small security loss in constrained decryption game for certain sets.

Definition 5. A relaxed asymmetrically constrained encryption (relaxed ACE) scheme for message space $\{0, 1\}^n$ and suffix parameter t is a 6-tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup, GenEK, GenDK, Enc, Dec, Puncture) satisfying the the following:

1. **Syntax:** Setup, GenEK, GenDK, Enc, Dec) have syntax as in the definition of ACE. Ciphertext-based puncturing algorithm $\text{Puncture}(SK, c_1, c_2)$ is an algorithm which takes as input the secret key SK , a ciphertext c_2 and a random string c_1 of the same length and outputs a ciphertext-based punctured key $DK\{c_1, c_2\}$. (We use this notation to distinguish ciphertext-based puncturing $DK\{c_1, c_2\}$ from plaintext-based puncturing $DK\{S\}$, where S is a set of *plaintexts*).
2. **Correctness:** We require all correctness properties as in ACE definition. In addition, we require **correctness of decryption** and **equivalence of constrained decryption** to hold even for ciphertext-based punctured decryption keys. Namely, if $DK\{c_1, c_2\} = \text{Puncture}(SK, c_1, c_2)$ where c_1 is random and c_2 is $\text{Enc}(EK, m)$, then we require that the mentioned properties hold for the constrained set $S = \{m\}$.
3. **Security:** We require **security of constrained decryption** (from the definition of ACE) to hold for the case when *there are no plaintext queries*, and only for the case when $S_1 \setminus S_0$ is either of the form S_{suf} (that is, a set of all strings ending with arbitrary, but the same for all strings, suffix *suf* of length t), or of the form $S_{\text{suf}} \setminus \{m^*\}$ (where again *suf* has the size t , and m^* also ends with *suf*). Further, we require that distinguishing advantage depends on $|S_1 \setminus S_0|$ at most logarithmically; in particular, it should be negligible even when $|S_1 \setminus S_0| = O(2^\lambda)$ (alternatively, we can require that the advantage is smaller than a concrete negligible function).

In addition, for ciphertext-based punctured key we require a property called **symmetry**, which is defined as follows:

1. \mathcal{A} chooses plaintext m and sends it to the challenger. Let $U = S_{\text{suffix}_t(m)}$ be the set of all strings ending with the same t bits as m . the challenger computes the following:
2. $SK \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$,
3. c_1 is chosen at random from $\{0, 1\}^{|c_1|}$;
4. $EK \leftarrow \text{GenEK}(SK, \emptyset)$,
5. $EK\{U\} \leftarrow \text{GenEK}(SK, U)$,
6. $c_2 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(EK, m)$
7. $DK\{c_1, c_2\} \leftarrow \text{Puncture}(SK, c_1, c_2)$,
8. Finally the challenger chooses random b and gives the adversary $(c_1, c_2, EK\{U\}, DK\{c_1, c_2\})$ if $b = 0$ and $(c_2, c_1, EK\{U\}, DK\{c_1, c_2\})$ if $b = 1$;
9. \mathcal{A} outputs a bit $b' \in \{0, 1\}$.

The advantage of \mathcal{A} in this game (on security parameter λ) is defined as $\text{adv}_{\mathcal{A}} = |\Pr[b' = b] - \frac{1}{2}|$. We require that for all PPT \mathcal{A} , $\text{adv}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ is negligible in λ (alternatively, we can require that it is smaller than a concrete negligible function).

In the appendix (section B) we show that there exists subexponentially secure relaxed ACE assuming subexponentially secure OWFs and iO.

Sparse relaxed ACE. We remark that our relaxed ACE from appendix B has sparse image, that is, the probability that a randomly chosen string of a proper length is a valid ACE ciphertext is at most $2^{-\lambda}$.

4 Defining bideniable and off-the-record-deniable encryption

In this section we present the definition of interactive deniable encryption, or, more formally, interactive bideniable message transmission.

Syntax. An interactive deniable encryption scheme π consists of seven algorithms $\pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake})$, where Setup is used to generate the public programs (i.e. the CRS), programs P1 , P3 and SFake are programs of the sender, and programs P2 , Dec and RFake are programs of the receiver. We let the transcript $\text{tr} = \pi(s, r, m)$ of an execution of the scheme on inputs m and random input s of the sender, and random input r of the receiver denote the sequence of three messages sent in this execution. That is, $\pi(s, r, m) = \text{tr} = (\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$, where $\mu_1 = \text{P1}(s, m)$, $\mu_2 = \text{P2}(r, \mu_1)$, and $\mu_3 = \text{P3}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$.

The faking algorithms have the following syntax: $\text{SFake}(s, m, m', \text{tr}; \rho)$ expects to take a transcript tr along with the true random coins s and true plaintext m , which were used to compute tr . It also needs the desired fake plaintext m' , and its own randomness ρ . RFake follows the same syntax except that it expects the receiver randomness r instead of sender randomness s .

Bideniable and off-the-record-deniable encryption in the CRS model. Below we define standard and off-the-record deniability for interactive deniable encryption in the CRS model. For simplicity, we concentrate on bit encryption. The definitions can be naturally extended to multi-bit plaintexts.

Note that formally algorithms of deniable encryption should take the CRS as input, but we omit this to keep the syntax close to the syntax in our construction (where the CRS contains the programs, and those programs do not take the CRS as input).

Definition 6. Bideniable bit encryption in the CRS model. $\pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake})$ is a 3-message bideniable interactive encryption scheme for message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0, 1\}$, if it satisfies the following correctness and bideniability properties:

- **Correctness:** *There exists negligible function $\nu(\lambda)$ such that for at least $(1 - \nu)$ -fraction of randomness r_{Setup} , drawn at random from $\{0, 1\}^{|r_{\text{Setup}}|}$, the following holds: let $\text{CRS} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(r_{\text{Setup}})$. Then for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$ $\Pr[m' \neq m : s \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{|s|}, r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{|r|}, \text{tr} \leftarrow \pi(s, r, m), m' \leftarrow \text{Dec}(r, \text{tr})] \leq \nu(\lambda)$, where the probability is taken over the choices of s and r .*
- **Bideniability:** *No PPT adversary Adv wins with more than negligible advantage in the following game, for any $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$:*
 1. *The challenger chooses random r_{Setup} and generates $\text{CRS} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(r_{\text{Setup}})$. It also chooses a bit b at random.*
 2. *If $b = 0$, then the challenger generates the following variables:*
 - (a) *It chooses random s^*, r^* and computes $\text{tr}^* = \pi(s^*, r^*, m_0)$.*
 - (b) *It gives the adversary $(\text{CRS}, m_0, m_1, s^*, r^*, \text{tr}^*)$.*
 3. *If $b = 1$, then the challenger generates the following variables:*
 - (a) *It chooses random s^*, r^* and computes $\text{tr}^* \leftarrow \pi(s^*, r^*, m_1)$;*

- (b) It sets $s' \leftarrow \text{SFake}(s^*, m_1, m_0, \text{tr}^*; \rho_S)$ and $r' \leftarrow \text{RFake}(r^*, m_1, m_0, \text{tr}^*; \rho_R)$, for randomly chosen ρ_S, ρ_R .
 - (c) It gives the adversary $(\text{CRS}, m_0, m_1, s', r', \text{tr}^*)$.
4. Adv outputs b' and wins if $b = b'$.

Next we define off-the-record deniability. We define it for an arbitrary message space, since having $|\mathcal{M}| > 2$ allows for an extra case when plaintexts claimed by the sender, by the receiver, and the real plaintext are three different strings (case $b = 2$ in the definition below).

Definition 7. Off-the-record deniable encryption in the CRS model. We say that a scheme is off-the-record-deniable, if it satisfies correctness as above and has the following property:

Off-the-record deniability: No PPT adversary Adv wins with more than negligible advantage in the following game, for any $m_0, m_1, m_2 \in \mathcal{M}$:

1. The challenger chooses random r_{Setup} and generates $\text{CRS} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(r_{\text{Setup}})$. It also chooses random $b \in \{0, 1, 2\}$.
 2. If $b = 0$, then the challenger generates the following variables:
 - (a) The challenger chooses random s^*, r^* and computes $\text{tr}^* \leftarrow \pi(s^*, r^*, m_0)$;
 - (b) It sets $r' \leftarrow \text{RFake}(r^*, m_0, m_1, \text{tr}^*; \rho_R)$ for randomly chosen ρ_R .
 - (c) It gives the adversary $(\text{CRS}, m_0, m_1, m_2, s^*, r', \text{tr}^*)$.
 3. If $b = 1$, then the challenger generates the following variables:
 - (a) The challenger chooses random s^*, r^* and computes $\text{tr}^* \leftarrow \pi(s^*, r^*, m_1)$;
 - (b) It sets $s' \leftarrow \text{SFake}(s^*, m_1, m_0, \text{tr}^*; \rho_S)$ for randomly chosen ρ_S .
 - (c) It gives the adversary $(\text{CRS}, m_0, m_1, m_2, s', r^*, \text{tr}^*)$.
 4. If $b = 2$, then the challenger generates the following variables:
 - (a) The challenger chooses random s^*, r^* and computes $\text{tr}^* \leftarrow \pi(s^*, r^*, m_2)$;
 - (b) It sets $s' \leftarrow \text{SFake}(s^*, m_2, m_0, \text{tr}^*; \rho_S)$ for randomly chosen ρ_S .
 - (c) It sets $r' \leftarrow \text{RFake}(r^*, m_2, m_1, \text{tr}^*; \rho_R)$ for randomly chosen ρ_R .
 - (d) It gives the adversary $(\text{CRS}, m_0, m_1, m_2, s', r', \text{tr}^*)$.
5. Adv outputs b' and wins if $b = b'$.

We say that an encryption scheme is bideniable (resp, off-the-record deniable) with (t, ε) -security, if for any size- t adversary distinguishing advantage in bideniability (resp., off-the-record deniability) game is at most ε .

Single-execution security implies multi-execution security. We observe that in the case of definitions 6 and 7 the CRS is global (i.e., non-programmable). Indeed, these definitions do not involve simulation and the same set of programs is used throughout. Furthermore, even though definitions 6 and 7 only talk about *one* execution of the protocol, it can be shown via a simple hybrid argument that security of a single execution

of the protocol implies security of any (unbounded) polynomially many executions with the same set of programs.²⁰

Definition 8. Public receiver-deniability. *We say that a bideniable scheme has public receiver-deniability, if the receiver faking algorithm RFake takes as input only the transcript tr and fake plaintext m' (but not true random coins of the receiver r^* and true plaintext m).*

5 Level System

Motivation and overview. The idea of a level system is to have an encryption scheme which allows to increment ciphertexts and compare them homomorphically. However, in order for this encryption to be useful in our construction of deniable protocol, we require the following properties of this "encryption scheme":²¹

- There should be two types of ciphertexts, which we call *single-tag levels* and *double-tag levels*;
- A single-tag level is an encryption of number i between 0 and upper bound T , together with some string $m_1 \in M_1$, which we call *a tag*. (In our construction of deniable encryption, we use the first message of the deniable protocol as a tag. This is done to “tie” the level to the instance of the protocol).
- A double-tag level is an encryption of number i between 0 and upper bound T , together with two tags $m_1 \in M_1, m_2 \in M_2$. (In our construction of deniable encryption, we use the first and the second messages of the deniable protocol as tags. This, again, is done to “tie” the level to the instance of the protocol).
- It should be possible to perform the following operations:
 1. Sample a single-tag level 0 for any tag m_1 ;
 2. Homomorphically increment the value inside any single-tag level (keeping its tag the same);
 3. Transform any single-tag level into a double-tag level, for any second tag m_2 (the value and the first tag remain the same);
 4. Compare two double-tag levels, as long as their both tags are the same;
 5. Given any level, retrieve its tag(s).

Notation. We use notation $[i, m_1]$ to denote a single-tag level with value i and tag m_1 . We also use ℓ_i to denote a single-tag level with value i , when the tag is clear from the context.

We use notation $[i, m_1, m_2]$ to denote a double-tag level with value i and tags m_1, m_2 . We also use L_i to denote a double-tag level with value i , when its tags are clear from the context.

²⁰Indeed, we can change all executions from real to fake one by one, where the reduction from a single-execution security will generate other executions on its own, using the fact that knowing the CRS (but not its generation randomness) is enough to run all programs.

²¹Note that even though we call it encryption, we don't require this primitive to have decryption.

Security property. Security requirement says that it should be hard to distinguish between $\ell_0^* = [0, m_1^*], L_0^* = [0, m_1^*, m_2^*]$ and $\ell_1^* = [1, m_1^*], L_0^* = [0, m_1^*, m_2^*]$, even given (limited) ability to perform homomorphic operations described above.

This will be used in the proof of security of deniable encryption scheme as follows. Recall that in that proof we need to start with the real transcript and real randomness s, r (having levels L_0^*, ℓ_0^*, L_0^* , respectively) and eventually switch to the (same) real transcript but fake randomness s', r' (with levels L_0^*, ℓ_1^*, L_0^*). We can use security of the level system in the proof of deniable encryption as follows: given challenge ℓ_b^*, L_0^* (where $\ell_b^* = [b, m_1^*], b \in \{0, 1\}, L_0^* = [0, m_1^*, m_2^*]$), we use ℓ_b^* inside fake s and we use L_0^* inside the transcript and fake r . Since security of levels only holds when programs are punctured, in the proof of deniable encryption we first move to a hybrid where we use only punctured level programs, and then use security of the level system.

5.1 Definition

We start with describing a syntax of the level system for tag space M and upper bound T :

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; T; \text{GenZero}, \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}, \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}}) \rightarrow \text{PP} = (\text{P}_{\text{GenZero}}, \text{P}_{\text{Increment}}, \text{P}_{\text{Transform}}, \text{P}_{\text{isLess}}, \text{P}_{\text{RetrieveTag}}, \text{P}_{\text{RetrieveTags}})$ is a randomized algorithm which takes as input security parameter, the largest allowed level T , description of programs, and randomness. It uses random coins to sample all necessary keys for each program²², and outputs those programs obfuscated under iO .
- $\text{GenZero}(m_1) \rightarrow \ell$ is a deterministic algorithm which takes message $m_1 \in M$ as input and outputs a string $\ell = [0, m_1]$, which is a single-tag level with tag m_1 and value 0. We also require that there exists a punctured version of this algorithm denoted $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*](m_1)$ which outputs 'fail' on input m_1^* .
- $\text{Increment}(\ell) \rightarrow \ell'$ is a deterministic algorithm which takes a single-tag level $\ell = [i, m_1]$ for some $0 \leq i \leq T - 1, m_1 \in M$, and outputs a single-tag level with the same tag and incremented value, i.e. $\ell' = [i + 1, m_1]$. If $i \geq T$, it instead outputs 'fail'.
- $\text{Transform}(\ell, m_2) \rightarrow L$ is a deterministic algorithm which takes a single-tag level $\ell = [i, m_1]$ for some $0 \leq i \leq T, m_1 \in M$, and some message $m_2 \in M$, and outputs $L = [i, m_1, m_2]$, which is a double-tag level with tags m_1, m_2 , and value i . We also require that there exists a punctured version of this algorithm denoted $\text{Transform}[(\ell^*, m_2^*)](\ell, m_2)$ which outputs 'fail' on input (ℓ^*, m_2^*) .
- $\text{isLess}(L', L'') \rightarrow \text{out} \in \{\text{true}, \text{false}\}$ is a deterministic algorithm which takes as input public parameters PP and two double-tag levels $L' = [i', m_1', m_2']$ and $L'' = [i'', m_1'', m_2'']$. If $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$, then it outputs 'fail'. Otherwise it outputs true if $i' < i''$ and false if $i' \geq i''$.
- $\text{RetrieveTag}(\ell) \rightarrow m$ is a deterministic algorithm which takes a single-tag level ℓ and outputs its tag.
- $\text{RetrieveTags}(L) \rightarrow m$ is a deterministic algorithm which takes a double-tag level L and outputs both tags.

We underline that all programs except Setup are deterministic.

²²We assume that Setup is implicitly given generation algorithms for all underlying primitives of the programs.

Definition 9. A tuple of parametrized, deterministic²³ algorithms $(\text{GenZero}, \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}, \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}, \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Transform}[l^*, m_2^*])$ is a level system for tag space M , if algorithms have syntax described above, and the correctness and security properties described below hold.

Notation: Let T be superpolynomial in λ , and $\text{PP} = (\text{P}_{\text{GenZero}}, \text{P}_{\text{Increment}}, \text{P}_{\text{Transform}}, \text{P}_{\text{isLess}}, \text{P}_{\text{RetrieveTag}}, \text{P}_{\text{RetrieveTags}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; T; \text{GenZero}, \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}, \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

Next, let $m_1^* \in M$, $m_2^* \in M$, and let ℓ^* be an arbitrary string (not necessarily a level). Let $\text{PP}' = (\text{P}'_{\text{GenZero}}, \text{P}'_{\text{Increment}}, \text{P}'_{\text{Transform}}, \text{P}'_{\text{isLess}}, \text{P}'_{\text{RetrieveTag}}, \text{P}'_{\text{RetrieveTags}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, T, \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}[(\ell^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ with the same randomness r_{Setup} as above.

For any fixed r_{Setup} consider the following notation:

- For every $m_1 \in M$ denote $[0, m_1] = \text{P}_{\text{GenZero}}(m_1)$;
- For every $m_1 \in M$, $1 \leq i \leq T$ denote $[i, m_1] = \text{P}_{\text{Increment}}([i-1, m_1])$;
- For every $m_2 \in M$ and every $[i, m_1]$, where $0 \leq i \leq T, m_1 \in M$, denote $[i, m_1, m_2] = \text{P}_{\text{Transform}}([i, m_1], m_2)$.

Correctness: The following properties should hold, except with negligible probability over the choice of r_{Setup} :

- **Uniqueness of levels:**

- For all $\ell \notin \{[i, m_1] : 0 \leq i \leq T, m_1 \in M\}$:
 - * $\text{P}_{\text{Increment}}(\ell) = \text{'fail'}$;
 - * $\text{P}_{\text{Transform}}(\ell, m_2) = \text{'fail'}$ for any $m_2 \in M$;
 - * $\text{P}_{\text{RetrieveTag}}(\ell) = \text{'fail'}$.
- For all $L \notin \{[i, m_1, m_2] : 0 \leq i \leq T, m_1 \in M, m_2 \in M\}$:
 - * $\text{P}_{\text{isLess}}(L, L') = \text{'fail'}$, $\text{P}_{\text{isLess}}(L', L) = \text{'fail'}$ for any string L' ;
 - * $\text{P}_{\text{RetrieveTags}}(L) = \text{'fail'}$.

- **Upper bound is respected:** For every $m_1 \in M$ $\text{P}_{\text{Increment}}([T, m_1]) = \text{'fail'}$.

- **Correctness of comparison:** For every $m_1, m_2 \in M$ and for every $0 \leq i, j \leq T$:

- $\text{P}_{\text{isLess}}([i, m_1, m_2], [j, m_1, m_2]) = \text{true}$ for $i < j$,
- $\text{P}_{\text{isLess}}([i, m_1, m_2], [j, m_1, m_2]) = \text{false}$ for $i \geq j$.

²³We prefer to use the notion of parametrized, deterministic algorithms to keep the definition simple. To formally define this notion, consider a randomized Turing machine with the restriction that the number of random bits written on its random tape is fixed and independent of input (only dependent on security parameter λ). Such a Turing machine can first use these random coins to generate all necessary parameters (e.g. keys) and then run the actual code of the algorithm using generated parameters. In particular, we assume that this TM has the code of all necessary generation algorithms.

- **Comparison is possible only on matching levels:** If $(m'_1, m'_2) \neq (m''_1, m''_2)$, then $P_{\text{isLess}}([i, m'_1, m'_2], [j, m''_1, m''_2]) = \text{'fail'}$.
- **Correctness of tags retrieval:** For every $m_1, m_2 \in M$ and for every $0 \leq i \leq T$:
 - $P_{\text{RetrieveTag}}([i, m_1]) = m_1$,
 - $P_{\text{RetrieveTags}}([i, m_1, m_2]) = (m_1, m_2)$.
- **Functionality is preserved under puncturing:**
 - $P_{\text{GenZero}}(m) = P'_{\text{GenZero}}(m)$ for all $m \in M$, $m \neq m_1^*$;
 - $P_{\text{Increment}}(\ell) = P'_{\text{Increment}}(\ell)$ for all strings ℓ ;
 - $P_{\text{Transform}}(\ell, m_2) = P'_{\text{Transform}}(\ell, m_2)$ for all strings ℓ and for all $m_2 \in M$, except (ℓ^*, m_2^*) ;
 - $P_{\text{isLess}}(L', L'') = P'_{\text{isLess}}(L', L'')$ for all strings L', L'' ;
 - $P_{\text{RetrieveTag}}(\ell) = P'_{\text{RetrieveTag}}(\ell)$ for all strings ℓ ;
 - $P_{\text{RetrieveTags}}(L) = P'_{\text{RetrieveTags}}(L)$ for all strings L .

Note that it follows from the correctness properties that $[i, m_1] = [i', m'_1]$ if and only if $(i, m_1) = (i', m'_1)$, and $[i, m_1, m_2] = [i', m'_1, m'_2]$ if and only if $(i, m_1, m_2) = (i', m'_1, m'_2)$.

Security: For any $m_1^* \in M, m_2^* \in M$, the following distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

$$(\ell_0^*, L_0^*, \text{PP}_0) \approx (\ell_1^*, L_0^*, \text{PP}_1),$$

where r_{Setup} is randomly chosen, $\text{PP} = (P_{\text{GenZero}}, P_{\text{Increment}}, P_{\text{Transform}}, P_{\text{isLess}}, P_{\text{RetrieveTag}}, P_{\text{RetrieveTags}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\text{GenZero}, \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}, \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$,

$$\ell_0^* \leftarrow P_{\text{GenZero}}(m_1^*), \ell_1^* \leftarrow P_{\text{Increment}}(\ell_0^*), L_0^* \leftarrow P_{\text{Transform}}(\ell_0^*, m_2^*),$$

$$\text{PP}_b \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}[(\ell_b^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}}).$$

5.2 Construction

We implement a level system in a natural way: we let levels to be ciphertexts (encrypting the value and the tag in a single-tag level, and the value and both tags in a double-tag level) under special encryption scheme called asymmetric constrained encryption, or ACE (4). For single-tag and double-tag levels we use two different instances of ACE, with keys EK_1, DK_1 for single-tag levels and EK_2, DK_2 for double-tag levels. We let programs of the level system (fig. 4) perform required ‘‘homomorphic’’ operations in a natural way, by decrypting the ciphertext and learning its value and tag, checking validity of the operation, and then outputting the result (reencrypted, when applicable).

Theorem 2. *Let:*

- λ be a security parameter;
- iO be $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))})$ -secure indistinguishability obfuscation;

- ACE be an asymmetric constrained encryption scheme with $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))})$ -secure indistinguishability of ciphertexts and $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))})$ security of decryption;
- g be a $(2^{O(\nu_{\text{OWF}}(\lambda'))}, 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{OWF}}(\lambda'))})$ -secure injective one-way function mapping $\lambda' = \log T(\lambda)$ -bit inputs to $\text{poly}(\lambda')$ -bit outputs;
- $\gamma(\lambda)$ be a function satisfying the following conditions:
 - $\gamma(\lambda) = O(\nu_{\text{iO}}(\lambda))$;
 - $2^{\gamma(\lambda)} \text{poly}(\lambda) \log T = O(2^{\nu_{\text{OWF}}(\log T)})$;

Then the scheme described on fig. 4 is a level system for upper bound $T(\lambda)$, tags of length $\tau(\lambda)$, which is $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\nu_{\text{levels}}(\lambda)})$ -secure, where $2^{-\nu_{\text{levels}}(\lambda)}$ is equal to the following:

$$2^{-\Omega(\gamma(\lambda))} + T^{-1}(\lambda) + T(\lambda) 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))} + 2^{\tau(\lambda)} (T(\lambda) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{iO}}(\lambda))} + T(\lambda) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}).$$

Note: Here $\gamma(\lambda)$ represents distinguishing advantage between two obfuscated programs differing on one input (which is a preimage of the OWF g). The two conditions on γ are set to satisfy the requirements of theorem 1, and say that the inverter's size is small enough, and that distinguishing advantage is big enough compared to the indistinguishability guarantee of iO .

By using subexponentially-secure primitives, we obtain the following corollary:

Corollary 1. *Let:*

- λ be a security parameter;
- iO be $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^\epsilon)})$ -secure indistinguishability obfuscation;
- ACE be an asymmetric constrained encryption scheme with $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^\epsilon)})$ -secure indistinguishability of ciphertexts and $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^\epsilon)})$ security of decryption;
- g be a $(2^{\Omega(\lambda^\epsilon)}, 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^\epsilon)})$ -secure injective one-way function mapping $\lambda' = \lambda^{\epsilon/2}$ -bit inputs to $\text{poly}(\lambda')$ -bit outputs;
- $\gamma(\lambda) = \lambda^{\epsilon^2/2}$;

Then the scheme described on fig. 4 is a level system for upper bound $T(\lambda) = 2^{\lambda^{\epsilon/2}}$, tags of length $\tau(\lambda) = \lambda^{\epsilon/2}$, which is $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^{\epsilon^2/2})})$ -secure.

5.3 Overview of the proof

Correctness. Correctness properties of our level scheme immediately follow from statistical correctness of iO and correctness and uniqueness properties of ACE.

For security, we first informally describe the structure of the proof, and then give the sequence of hybrids in section 5.4 and security reductions in section 5.5. Recall that security definition requires that $(\ell_0^*, L_0^*, \text{PP}_0) \approx (\ell_1^*, L_0^*, \text{PP}_1)$, where PP_b are punctured, obfuscated programs. Starting from the distribution $(\ell_0^*, L_0^*, \text{PP}_0)$, our proof proceeds in 3 main steps:

Program GenZero(m_1)
Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.
Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE.
1. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. $out \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_1}(l)$; if $out = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail' ; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail' ;
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform(l, m_2)
Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$
Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. $out \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_1}(l)$; if $out = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail' ; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail' ;
3. output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess(L', L'')
Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''
Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. $out' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_2}(L')$; if $out' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail' ; else parse out' as (i', m'_1, m'_2) .
2. $out'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_2}(L'')$; if $out'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail' ; else parse out'' as (i'', m''_1, m''_2) .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m'_1, m'_2) \neq (m''_1, m''_2)$ then output 'fail' ;
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTag(l)
Inputs: single-tag level l
Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. $out \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_1}(l)$; if $out = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail' ; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail' ;
3. Output m_1 .

Program RetrieveTags(L)
Inputs: double-tag level L
Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .
1. $out \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_2}(L)$; if $out = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail' ; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail' ;
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 4: Programs in our level system

1. **Switching from $\ell_0^* = [0, m_1^*]$ to $\ell_1^* = [1, m_1^*]$.** Programs GenZero and Increment define a chain $[0, m_1] \rightarrow [1, m_1] \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow [T, m_1] \rightarrow \perp$ for each tag m_1 . In a sequence of hybrids we switch from $[0, m_1^*]$ to $[1, m_1^*]$ by switching the whole chain from $[0, m_1^*] \rightarrow [1, m_1^*] \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow [T, m_1^*] \rightarrow \perp$ to $[1, m_1^*] \rightarrow [2, m_1^*] \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow [T + 1, m_1^*] \rightarrow \perp$.

As a result of this change, ℓ_0^* is switched to ℓ_1^* as desired (and in particular, the punctured point in Transform is switched from ℓ_0^* to ℓ_1^* as well). However, this change also affects the programs in the following two ways (resulting programs are in fig. 6) :

- **Wrong upper bound:** programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag now have an upper bound $T + 1$ (instead of T) for the case $m_1 = m_1^*$,
- **Incorrect reencryption:** program Transform, given $[i, m_1^*]$ for $0 \leq i \leq T + 1$, outputs $[i - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ instead of $[i, m_1^*, m_2]$.

2. **Restoring correct upper bound in Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag.** In a sequence of hybrids we change the wrong upper bound $T + 1$ to the correct upper bound T in relevant programs.

Resulting programs are in fig. 7. This part of the proof uses ideas from [BPR15] to argue that the adversary can never reach the upper bound and thus the upper bound can be decreased by 1 indistinguishably.

3. **Restoring correct reencryption in Transform.** In a sequence of hybrids we make program Transform output the correct value $[i, m_1^*, m_2]$, for all $0 \leq i \leq T$ and for all m_2 .

The proof of this step follows a by-now-standard puncturing technique (which allows to change the ciphertext in a PRF-based encryption from one plaintext to another), except that we also have to deal with program isLess which has decryption inside it.

At the end of this step, we obtain original punctured programs, thus proving security of our level system.

Security loss. Steps 1 and 2 require number of hybrids proportional to the upper bound T , and step 3 requires number of hybrids proportional to $2^{|m_2|}T$. In addition, in the proof of step 2 we also lose $1/T$, thus requiring T and $2^{|m_2|}$ to be superpolynomial.

Now we describe the proof in each step in more detail (recall that complete list of hybrids can be found in section 5.4):

Step 1: Switching ℓ^* from $[0, m_1^*]$ to $[1, m_1^*]$.

1. We first change the chain to $[0, m_1^*] \rightarrow [1, m_1^*] \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow [T - 1, m_1^*] \rightarrow [T + 1, m_1^*] \rightarrow \perp$, creating a gap between $T - 1$ and $T + 1$. This is done by first hardwiring the ciphertext $l_T^* = [T, m_1^*]$ into relevant programs, then puncturing keys corresponding to both $[T, m_1^*]$ and $[T + 1, m_1^*]$ (the latter can be punctured since they are never used due to upper bound T), and finally switching hardwired ciphertext to $l_{T+1}^* = [T + 1, m_1^*]$ and unpuncturing keys at $[T + 1, m_1^*]$ ²⁴.

²⁴Note that it is crucial for switching the ciphertext that keys are punctured at *both* points, and only one of the two ciphertexts is present in the distribution.

Note that the keys remain punctured at the point $[T, m_1^*]$, which essentially means that from the point of view of programs there doesn't exist a valid encryption of (T, m_1^*) .

Finally, note that switching the hardwired ciphertext from $[T, m_1^*]$ to $[T + 1, m_1^*]$ changes the upper bound from T to $T + 1$ in programs Transform and RetrieveTag.

2. Then in a sequence of hybrids we move the gap from T down to 0 as follows. Let j -th hybrid be a hybrid where the gap is at $j + 1$, i.e. Increment defines a chain $[0, m_1^*] \rightarrow [1, m_1^*] \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow [j, m_1^*] \rightarrow [j + 1, m_1^*] \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow [T, m_1^*] \rightarrow [T + 1, m_1^*]$, and keys are punctured at $[j + 1, m_1^*]$, meaning that there doesn't exist a valid encryption of $(j + 1, m_1^*)$. We move the gap to j by first hardwiring the ciphertext $l_j^* = [j, m_1^*]$ into relevant programs, then puncturing keys corresponding to $[j, m_1^*]$ (recall that keys are already punctured at $[j + 1, m_1^*]$), and finally switching hardwired ciphertext to $l_{j+1}^* = [j + 1, m_1^*]$ and unpuncturing keys at $[j + 1, m_1^*]$.

Note that the keys remain punctured at the point $[j, m_1^*]$, enabling the next step.

In addition, note that in the first step the upper bound in Increment is switched from T to $T + 1$. This is due to the fact that this step switches the hardwired ciphertext from $[T - 1, m_1^*]$ to $[T, m_1^*]$, and due to the fact that there is a hardwired instruction to output $[T + 1, m_1^*]$, given hardwired ciphertext as input (indeed, while in the original Increment input $[T, m_1^*]$ results in \perp , after the change input $[T, m_1^*]$ results in $[T + 1, m_1^*]$).

Finally, note that the last step switches challenge level $\ell_0^* = [0, m_1^*]$ to $\ell_1^* = [1, m_1^*]$.

3. As a result, we obtain Increment which defines a chain $1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow T \rightarrow T + 1 \rightarrow \perp$ for the tag m_1^* , and keys are punctured at $[0, m_1^*]$. We remove the puncturing using the fact that keys for $[0, m_1^*]$ are never used, since GenZero doesn't have to work on input m_1^* .

Resulting programs are in fig. 6).

Step 2: Restoring the correct upper bound of Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag on m_1^* .

Intuitively, nobody can tell whether these programs have an upper bound T or $T + 1$, since the only way to test this is to check if, starting with level $[1, m_1^*]$, Increment fails after $T - 1$ or T executions, which requires superpolynomial time to compute. To turn this intuition into a formal argument, we follow the proof of [BPR15]:

1. We cut the chain $1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow T \rightarrow T + 1 \rightarrow \perp$ (we omit the tag m_1^* for simplicity and compactness) at a random point as follows. We add a check "if $\text{prg}(i) = S$ then abort" to Increment, where S is randomly chosen. If the prg is expanding enough, then with overwhelming probability S is outside of the prg image, and adding this line doesn't change the functionality. However, next we change S to be $\text{prg}(s)$ for some random s , which cuts the line at point s : that is, Increment now defines the chain $1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow s \rightarrow \perp, s + 1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow T + 1 \rightarrow \perp$.
2. In a sequence of hybrids we cut the line in all points after s , obtaining the following chain: $1 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow s \rightarrow \perp, s + 1 \rightarrow \perp, s + 2 \rightarrow \perp, \dots, T \rightarrow \perp, T + 1 \rightarrow \perp$. Intuitively, once Increment outputs \perp given $[s, m_1^*]$, it becomes impossible for an adversary to obtain $[s + 1, m_1^*]$, and therefore behavior of Increment at $[s + 1, m_1^*]$ can be changed to \perp as well. The process can be continued. This intuition is captured by the security of constrained decryption of ACE.

As the result, we move to a hybrid where valid encryptions of $(s + 1, m_1^*), \dots, (T + 1, m_1^*)$ do not exist.

3. Then we can move the upper bound from $T + 1$ back to T for the case $m_1 = m_1^*$, since programs output \perp on input $[T + 1, m_1^*]$ anyway. Thus, changing $T + 1$ to T doesn't affect the functionality of the programs.
4. Then we can reverse all previous steps, restore the chain and eventually get original programs with correct upper bound T (except Transform, which now has the correct upper bound T , but still has incorrect behavior on inputs of the form $([i, m_1^*], m_2)$).

Resulting programs are in fig. 7).

Step 3: Restoring the correct reencryption behaviour in Transform. Note that Transform_B (fig. 7) defines the set of outputs $[0, m_1, m_2], \dots, [T, m_1, m_2]$ (corresponding to inputs $([0, m_1], m_2), \dots, ([T, m_1], m_2)$) for the case $m_1 \neq m_1^*$, and the set of outputs $[-1, m_1^*, m_2], \dots, [T - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ (corresponding to inputs $([0, m_1^*], m_2), \dots, ([T, m_1^*], m_2)$) for the case $m_1 = m_1^*$. We change the set of outputs from $[-1, m_1^*, m_2], \dots, [T - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ to $[0, m_1^*, m_2], \dots, [T, m_1^*, m_2]$ by running the following sequence of steps for each possible second tag m_2 :

1. We first change the set of outputs from $[-1, m_1^*, m_2], \dots, [T - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ to $[-1, m_1^*, m_2], \dots, [T - 2, m_1^*, m_2], [T, m_1^*, m_2]$, creating a gap between $T - 2$ and T . This is done by first hardwiring the ciphertext $L_{T-1}^* = [T - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ into relevant programs (Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags), then puncturing keys corresponding to both $[T - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ and $[T, m_1^*, m_2]$ (the latter can be punctured since they are never used due to the upper bound T), and finally switching hardwired ciphertext to $L_T^* = [T, m_1^*, m_2]$ and unpuncturing keys at $[T, m_1^*, m_2]$ ²⁵.

Note that the keys remain punctured at the point $[T - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$, which essentially means that from the point of view of programs there doesn't exist a valid encryption of $(T - 1, m_1^*, m_2)$.

2. Then in a sequence of hybrids we move the gap from $T - 1$ down to -1 as follows. Let j -th hybrid be a hybrid where the gap is at $j + 1$, i.e. Transform outputs $[-1, m_1^*, m_2], \dots, [j, m_1^*, m_2], [j + 2, m_1^*, m_2], \dots, [T, m_1^*, m_2]$, and keys are punctured at $[j + 1, m_1^*, m_2]$, meaning that there doesn't exist a valid encryption of $(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2)$. We move the gap to j by first hardwiring the ciphertext $L_j^* = [j, m_1^*, m_2]$ into relevant programs, then puncturing keys corresponding to $[j, m_1^*, m_2]$ (recall that keys are already punctured at $[j + 1, m_1^*, m_2]$), and finally switching hardwired ciphertext to $L_{j+1}^* = [j + 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ and unpuncturing keys at $[j + 1, m_1^*, m_2]$.

Note that the keys remain punctured at the point $[j, m_1^*, m_2]$, enabling the next step.

An important property of program isLess which enables switching $[j, m_1^*, m_2]$ to $[j + 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ at each step is that isLess treats both $[j, m_1^*, m_2]$ and $[j + 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ in the same way. That is, both $[j, m_1^*, m_2]$ and $[j + 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ are larger than $[0, m_1^*, m_2], \dots, [j - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$, and both are smaller than $[j + 2, m_1^*, m_2], \dots, [T, m_1^*, m_2]$. Finally, both are equal when compared to themselves. These inputs are the only valid inputs, since the other point (i.e. $[j + 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ or $[j, m_1^*, m_2]$, respectively) is punctured out.

²⁵Note that it is crucial for switching the ciphertext that keys are punctured at *both* points, and only one of the two ciphertexts is present in the distribution.

Finally, note that we don't perform two last steps, i.e. switching from 0 to 1 and from -1 to 0, for the case $m_2 = m_2^*$ (indeed, that would switch the challenge value from $L_0^* = [0, m_1^*, m_2^*]$ to $L_1^* = [1, m_1^*, m_2^*]$, but it has to remain $L_0^* = [0, m_1^*, m_2^*]$ in both experiments). In fact, we don't have to switch from 0 to 1 since Transform is punctured at $[l_1^*, m_2^*]$ and outputs 'fail' on this input anyway. Further, since $[0, m_1^*]$ is hard to obtain for the adversary, we argue that Transform may be indistinguishably changed from outputting $[-1, m_1^*, m_2^*]$ to $[0, m_1^*, m_2^*]$ on input $[0, m_1^*], m_2^*$.

Programs in Hyb_A

Program GenZero $[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment (l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess (L', L'')

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTag (l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program RetrieveTags (L)

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 5: Programs in Hyb_A . In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in Hyb_B

Program GenZero $_B[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_B(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_B[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_B(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTag $_B(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i > T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i > T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Program RetrieveTags $_B(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 6: Programs in Hyb_B . In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in Hyb_C .

Program GenZero $_C[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_C(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_C[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_C(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m'_1, m'_2) .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m''_1, m''_2) .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m'_1, m'_2) \neq (m''_1, m''_2)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTag $_C(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program RetrieveTags $_C(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 7: Programs in Hyb_C . In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in Hyb_D

Program GenZero $[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment (l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess (L', L'')

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTag (l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program RetrieveTags (L)

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 8: Programs in Hyb_D . In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

5.4 List of hybrids

For any messages m_1^*, m_2^* , consider the following distributions for randomly chosen r_{Setup} :

- $\text{Hyb}_A = (\text{PP}, \ell_0^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}[\ell_0^*, m_2^*], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ (fig. 5), $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, m_2^*)$.
- $\text{Hyb}_B = (\text{PP}, \ell_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_B[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_B, \text{Transform}_B[\ell_1^*, m_2^*], \text{isLess}_B, \text{RetrieveTag}_B, \text{RetrieveTags}_B; r_{\text{Setup}})$ (fig. 6), $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(m_1^*)$, $\ell_1^* = \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, m_2^*)$.
- $\text{Hyb}_C = (\text{PP}, \ell_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_C[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_C, \text{Transform}_B[\ell_1^*, m_2^*], \text{isLess}_C, \text{RetrieveTag}_C, \text{RetrieveTags}_C; r_{\text{Setup}})$ (fig. 7), $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(m_1^*)$, $\ell_1^* = \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, m_2^*)$.
- $\text{Hyb}_D = (\text{PP}, \ell_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}[\ell_1^*, m_2^*], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ (fig. 8), $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(m_1^*)$, $\ell_1^* = \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, m_2^*)$.

Note that Hyb_A is the distribution from security game for $b = 0$ and Hyb_D is the distribution from security game for $b = 1$. To prove security of the level system, we need to show that $\text{Hyb}_A \approx \text{Hyb}_D$, which we do in the following lemmas:

Lemma 2. (Switching from ℓ_0^* to ℓ_1^*) For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_A, \text{Hyb}_B}(\lambda) \leq T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}.$$

Lemma 3. (Changing the upper bound from $T + 1$ to T) For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_B, \text{Hyb}_C}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\gamma(\lambda))} + \frac{1}{T} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}.$$

Lemma 4. (Restoring behavior of Transform) For any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_C, \text{Hyb}_D}(\lambda) \leq 2^{\tau(\lambda)}(T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}).$$

5.4.1 Proof of lemma 2 (Switching from ℓ_0^* to ℓ_1^*).

As described earlier, we are going to shift levels $[i, m_1^*]$ to $[i + 1, m_1^*]$ one by one, starting from $i = T$. We start from Hyb_A .

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,1,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, \ell_0^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,1,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,1,1}, \text{Transform}_{A,1,1}[\ell_0^*, m_2^*], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,1,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $\ell_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 9.

That is, we puncture ACE key EK_1 at point $p_{T+1} = (T + 1, m_1^*)$ in programs Increment and GenZero , since these programs never run encryption on p_{T+1} . Indistinguishability holds by iO .

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,1,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, \ell_0^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,1,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,1,2}, \text{Transform}_{A,1,2}[\ell_0^*, m_2^*], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,1,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $\ell_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 10.

That is, we puncture ACE key DK_1 at the same point $p_{T+1} = (T + 1, m_1^*)$ in programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption key is already punctured at p_{T+1} .

Next we consider the following sequence of hybrids for $j = T, \dots, 1$. Programs for the case $j = T$ and $j = T - 1$ are written separately in order to track how the upper bound in programs is changed from T to $T + 1$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,1}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_0^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,2,j,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,2,j,1}, \text{Transform}_{A,2,j,1}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,2,j,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 10 (for the case $j = T$), fig. 13 (for $j = T - 1$), fig. 17 (for $j = T - 2, \dots, 1$).

That is, in this hybrid EK_1 and DK_1 are punctured at $p_{j+1} = (j + 1, m_1^*)$. In addition, program Increment, given $[j, m_1^*]$, outputs $[j + 2, m_1^*]$. Program Transform, given $([i, m_1^*], m_2)$ for $i > j$, outputs $[i - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,1} = \text{Hyb}_{A,1,2}$ for $j = T$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,2}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_0^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,2,j,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,2,j,2}, \text{Transform}_{A,2,j,2}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,2,j,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 11 (for the case $j = T$), fig. 14 (for $j = T - 1$), fig. 18 (for $j = T - 2, \dots, 1$).

That is, we additionally puncture ACE keys EK_1, DK_1 at the point $p_j = (j, m_1^*)$ and hardwire $l_j^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(j, m_1^*)$ to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt p_j in programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,3}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_0^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,2,j,3}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,2,j,3}, \text{Transform}_{A,2,j,3}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,2,j,3}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 12 (for the case $j = T$), fig. 15 (for $j = T - 1$), fig. 19 (for $j = T - 2, \dots, 1$).

That is, we replace $l_j^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(j, m_1^*)$ with $l_{j+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(j + 1, m_1^*)$ in programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds by security of ACE for punctured points p_j, p_{j+1} .

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,4}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_0^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,2,j,4}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,2,j,4}, \text{Transform}_{A,2,j,4}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,2,j,4}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 13 (for the case $j = T$), fig. 16 (for $j = T - 1$), fig. 20 (for $j = T - 2, \dots, 1$).

That is, we unpuncture ACE keys EK_1, DK_1 at the point $p_{j+1} = (j + 1, m_1^*)$ and remove hardwired $l_{j+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(j + 1, m_1^*)$ in programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,4} = \text{Hyb}_{A,2,j-1,1}$ for $2 \leq j \leq T$.

Next we change l_0^* to l_1^* as follows:

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_0^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,2,0,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,2,0,1}, \text{Transform}_{A,2,0,1}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,2,0,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 21.

That is, in this hybrid EK_1 and DK_1 are punctured at $p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$. In addition, program Increment , given $[0, m_1^*]$, outputs $[2, m_1^*]$. Program Transform , given $([i, m_1^*], m_2)$ for $i > 0$, outputs $[i - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,1} = \text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,4}$ for $j = 1$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_0^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,2,0,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,2,0,2}, \text{Transform}_{A,2,0,2}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,2,0,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 22.

That is, we additionally puncture ACE keys EK_1, DK_1 at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ and hardwire $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$ to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt p_0 in programs GenZero , Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag . Indistinguishability holds by iO .

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,2,0,3}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,2,0,3}, \text{Transform}_{A,2,0,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,2,0,3}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 23.

That is, we replace $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$ with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$ in programs Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag , and give l_1^* instead of l_0^* to the adversary. Indistinguishability holds by security of ACE for punctured points p_0, p_1 .

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,3,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,3,1}, \text{Transform}_{A,3,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,3,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 24.

That is, we unpuncture ACE keys EK_1, DK_1 at the point $p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$ and remove hardwired $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$ in programs GenZero , Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag . Indistinguishability holds by iO .

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,3,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,3,2}, \text{Transform}_{A,3,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,3,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 25.

That is, we unpuncture ACE decryption key DK_1 at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ in programs Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag . Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption key is punctured at p_0 .

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{A,3,3}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{A,3,3}, \text{Transform}_{A,3,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{A,3,3}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for ran-

domly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 26.

That is, we unpuncture ACE encryption key EK_1 at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ in programs GenZero , Increment . Indistinguishability holds by iO , since these programs never encrypt p_0 .

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,3}$ is the same as Hyb_B .

Thus, the the advantage of the PPT adversary in distinguishing between Hyb_A and Hyb_B is at most

$$(2T + 4) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{iO}}(\lambda))} + (T + 1) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 2 \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))} =$$

$$T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{iO}}(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}.$$

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,1,1}$

Program GenZero $_{A,1,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{T+1} = (T + 1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Return $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,1,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}$, DK_1 of ACE punctured at $p_{T+1} = (T + 1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,1,1}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,1,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return m_1 .

Figure 9: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,1,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,1,2}$ (same as $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T,1}$)

Program GenZero $_{A,2,T,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{T+1} = (T + 1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Return $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,T,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{T+1} = (T + 1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
3. Return $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,T,1}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{T+1} = (T + 1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,T,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{T+1} = (T + 1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
3. Return m_1 .

Figure 10: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,1,2}$ (same as $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T,1}$). In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T,2}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,T,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, $p_{T+1} = (T+1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,T,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, $p_{T+1} = (T+1, m_1^*)$, **single-tag level** $l_T^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $l = l_T^*$ then output 'fail';**
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(l)$; if out = 'fail' then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. **If $i = T - 1$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output l_T^* ;**
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,T,2}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, $p_{T+1} = (T+1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , **single-tag level** $l_T^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. **If $l = l_T^*$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(T, m_1^*, m_2)$;**
3. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(l)$; if out = 'fail' then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
4. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
5. output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,T,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, $p_{T+1} = (T+1, m_1^*)$, single-tag level $l_T^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $l = l_T^*$ then output m_1^* ;**
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(l)$; if out = 'fail' then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Figure 11: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T,3}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,T,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, $p_{T+1} = (T+1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,T,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, $p_{T+1} = (T+1, m_1^*)$, single-tag level $l_{T+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T+1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $l = l_{T+1}^*$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(l)$; if out = 'fail' then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i = T-1$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output l_{T+1}^* ;
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,T,3}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, $p_{T+1} = (T+1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , **single-tag level** $l_{T+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T+1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. If $l = l_{T+1}^*$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(T, m_1^*, m_2)$;
3. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(l)$; if out = 'fail' then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
4. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
5. output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,T,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, $p_{T+1} = (T+1, m_1^*)$, single-tag level $l_{T+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T+1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $l = l_{T+1}^*$ then output m_1^* ;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_T, p_{T+1}\}}(l)$; if out = 'fail' then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Figure 12: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T,4}$ (same as $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T-1,1}$).

Program GenZero $_{A,2,T-1,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_T\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,T-1,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_T\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_T\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. If $i = T - 1$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_T\}}(i + 2, m_1)$;
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_T\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,T-1,1}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_T\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $i = T + 1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(T, m_1^*, m_2)$;
4. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
5. output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,T-1,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_T\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
3. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 13: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T,4}$ (same as $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T-1,1}$). In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T-1,2}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,T-1,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,T-1,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, **single-tag level** $l_{T-1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T-1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T ,

1. **If $l = l_{T-1}^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(T+1, m_1^*)$;**
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(l)$; if out = 'fail' then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. **If $i = T-2$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output l_{T-1}^* ;**
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,T-1,2}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , **single-tag level** $l_{T-1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T-1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. **If $l = l_{T-1}^*$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(T-1, m_1^*, m_2)$;**
3. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(l)$; if out = 'fail' then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $i = T+1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(T, m_1^*, m_2)$;
5. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
6. output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,T-1,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, single-tag level $l_{T-1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T-1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $l = l_{T-1}^*$ then output m_1^* ;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(l)$; if out = 'fail' then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
4. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 14: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T-1,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T-1,3}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,T-1,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,T-1,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, **single-tag level** $l_T^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. **If** $l = l_T^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(T+1, m_1^*)$;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i = T-2$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then **output** l_T^* ;
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,T-1,3}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , **single-tag level** $l_T^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. **If** $l = l_T^*$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(T-1, m_1^*, m_2)$;
3. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $i = T+1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(T, m_1^*, m_2)$;
5. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
6. output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,T-1,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, $p_T = (T, m_1^*)$, single-tag level $l_T^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. **If** $l = l_T^*$ then output m_1^* ;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}, p_T\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
4. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 15: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T-1,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T-1,4}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,T-1,4}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,T-1,4}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. **If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';**
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i = T-2$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}}(i+2, m_1)$;
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,T-1,4}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $i = T+1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(T, m_1^*, m_2)$;
4. **If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $i = T$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(T-1, m_1^*, m_2)$;**
5. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
6. output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,T-1,4}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{T-1} = (T-1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{T-1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
3. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 16: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,T-1,4}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,1}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,j,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{j+1} = (j + 1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,j,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j+1} = (j + 1, m_1^*)$, index j , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i = j$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}}(i + 2, m_1^*)$;
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,j,1}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{j+1} = (j + 1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , index j , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) If $i > j + 1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
 - (c) If $i = j + 1$ then output 'fail';
 - (d) If $i < j + 1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,j,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_{j+1} = (j + 1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_{j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
3. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 17: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,2}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,j,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_j = (j, m_1^*), p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,j,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_j = (j, m_1^*), p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$, **single-tag level** $l_j^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j, m_1^*)$, index j , upper bound T ,

1. **If $l = l_j^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(j+2, m_1^*)$;**
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
5. **If $i = j-1$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output l_j^* ;**
6. output $l_{j+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,j,2}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_j = (j, m_1^*), p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , **single-tag level** $l_j^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j, m_1^*)$, index j , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. **If $l = l_j^*$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2)$;**
3. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) If $i > j+1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
 - (c) If $i = j+1$ then output 'fail';
 - (d) **If $i = j$ then output 'fail';**
 - (e) **If $i < j$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.**
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,j,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_j = (j, m_1^*), p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$, single-tag level $l_j^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $l = l_j^*$ then output m_1^* ;**
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .
4. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 18: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,3}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,j,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_j = (j, m_1^*), p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,j,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_j = (j, m_1^*), p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$, **single-tag level** $l_{j+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j+1, m_1^*)$, index j , upper bound T .

1. If $l = l_{j+1}^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(j+2, m_1^*)$;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
5. If $i = j-1$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then **output** l_{j+1}^* ;
6. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,j,3}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_j = (j, m_1^*), p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , **single-tag level** $l_{j+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j+1, m_1^*)$, index j , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. If $l = l_{j+1}^*$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2)$;
3. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) If $i > j+1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
 - (c) If $i = j+1$ then output 'fail';
 - (d) **If $i = j$ then output 'fail';**
 - (e) **If $i < j$ then output** $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,j,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_j = (j, m_1^*), p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$, **single-tag level** $l_{j+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j+1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $l = l_{j+1}^*$ then output m_1^* ;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .
4. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 19: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,4}$.

Program GenZero $_{A,2,j,4}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_j\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_j = (j, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_j\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,j,4}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_j\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_j\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_j = (j, m_1^*)$, index j , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_j\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i = j - 1$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_j\}}(i + 2, m_1^*)$;
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_j\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,j,4}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_j\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_j = (j, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , index j , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_j\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) If $i > j$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
 - (c) If $i = j$ then output 'fail';
 - (d) If $i < j$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,j,4}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_j\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_j = (j, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_j\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
3. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 20: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,4}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,1}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,0,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_1\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,0,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_1\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_1\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i = 0$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_1\}}(i + 2, m_1^*)$;
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_1\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,0,1}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_1\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) If $i > 1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
 - (c) If $i = 1$ then output 'fail';
 - (d) If $i < 1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,0,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_1\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
3. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 21: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,2}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,0,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_0 = (0, m_1^*), p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,0,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_0 = (0, m_1^*), p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T ,

1. If $l = l_0^*$ then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(2, m_1^*)$;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,0,2}[(l_0^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_0 = (0, m_1^*), p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_0^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. If $l = l_0^*$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2)$;
3. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) If $i > 1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
 - (c) If $i = 1$ then output 'fail';
 - (d) If $i = 0$ then output 'fail';
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,0,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_0 = (0, m_1^*), p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, single-tag level $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $l = l_0^*$ then output m_1^* ;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .
4. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 22: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,3}$

Program GenZero $_{A,2,0,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_0 = (0, m_1^*), p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,2,0,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_0 = (0, m_1^*), p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, **single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$** , upper bound T ,

1. **If $l = l_1^*$** then output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(2, m_1^*)$;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1$ or $i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T$ or $i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,2,0,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_0 = (0, m_1^*), p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. **If $l = l_1^*$** then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2)$;
3. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) If $i > 1$ then output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
 - (c) If $i = 1$ then output 'fail';
 - (d) If $i = 0$ then output 'fail';
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,2,0,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$ of ACE punctured at points $p_0 = (0, m_1^*), p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $l = l_1^*$** then output m_1^* ;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .
4. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 23: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,1}$.

Program GenZero $_{A,3,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,3,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,3,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,3,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
3. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 24: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,2}$

Program GenZero $_{A,3,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,3,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,3,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,3,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
3. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 25: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,3}$

Program GenZero $_{A,3,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{A,3,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{A,3,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{A,3,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1^* .
3. If $m \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
 - (b) Output m_1 .

Figure 26: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{A,3,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

5.4.2 Proof of lemma 3 (Changing the upper bound from $T + 1$ to T).

As described earlier, we will fix upper bounds in programs by cutting the sequence of encryptions $[1, m_1^*] \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow [T + 1, m_1^*]$ at a random place and then cutting the sequence in all subsequent positions, then changing the upper bound, and finally restoring the line. We cut the line at a random place in the following sequence of hybrids, starting from Hyb_B :

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,1,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,1,1}, \text{Transform}_{B,1,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,1,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 28.

That is, in program Increment we add an instruction to abort if $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $g(i) = I^*$, where g is an injective OWF and I^* is a random image of g . Indistinguishability holds by security of iO and OWF: since OWF is injective, the two programs differ only at a single point; as shown in [BCP14], any adversary which can distinguish between the two programs, can be also used to find the differing point, which can be used to break one-wayness of g (see lemma 1).

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,1,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,1,2}, \text{Transform}_{B,1,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,1,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 29.

That is, in programs Increment and GenZero we puncture ACE encryption key EK_1 at the point $(i^* + 1, m_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO , since Increment never needs to encrypt this point, because it aborts earlier on input $[i^*, m_1^*]$. GenZero never needs to encrypt (i^*, m_1^*) as well, since it only encrypts value 0, and $i^* = 0$ only with negligible probability.

Next we run the following sequence of hybrids for $j = i^*, \dots, T$ in order to cut the chain at all points after i^* :

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,2,j,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,2,j,1}, \text{Transform}_{B,2,j,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,2,j,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 30.

That is, in programs GenZero , Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag ACE encryption key EK_1 is punctured at the set $\{(i^* + 1, m_1^*), \dots, (j + 1, m_1^*)\}$, and its decryption key DK_1 is punctured at the set $\{(i^* + 1, m_1^*), \dots, (j, m_1^*)\}$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,1} = \text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$ for $j = i^*$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,2,j,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,2,j,2}, \text{Transform}_{B,2,j,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,2,j,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 31.

That is, in programs Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag we additionally puncture ACE decryption key DK_1 at the point $(j + 1, m_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since EK_1 is already punctured at the set which includes $(j + 1, m_1^*)$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,2,j,3}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,2,j,3}, \text{Transform}_{B,2,j,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,2,j,3}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 32.

That is, we additionally puncture ACE encryption key EK_1 at the point $(j + 2, m_1^*)$ in programs GenZero and Increment . Indistinguishability holds by iO , since DK_1 is punctured at the set which includes $(j + 1, m_1^*)$, and thus program Increment never tries to encrypt $(j + 2, m_1^*)$, aborting earlier; GenZero never needs to encrypt $(j + 2, m_1^*)$ either since $j + 2 \neq 0$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,3} = \text{Hyb}_{B,2,j+1,1}$ for $j = i^*, \dots, T$.

Next we change the upper bound as follows:

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,3,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,3,1}, \text{Transform}_{B,3,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,3,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 33.

That is, in programs GenZero , Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag EK_1, DK_1 are punctured at the set $\{[i^* + 1, m_1^*], \dots, [T + 1, m_1^*]\}$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1} = \text{Hyb}_{B,2,T,2}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,3,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,3,2}, \text{Transform}_{B,3,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,3,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 34.

That is, in program Increment and Transform we change the upper bound from $T + 1$ to T . Indistinguishability holds by iO , since DK_1 is punctured at the set which includes $(T, m_1^*), (T + 1, m_1^*)$, and thus Increment anyways outputs 'fail' on input $[T, m_1^*]$, and Transform anyway outputs 'fail' on input $[T + 1, m_1^*]$.

Next we run the following sequence of hybrids for $j = T, \dots, i^*$ in order to restore the chain:

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,4,j,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,4,j,1}, \text{Transform}_{B,4,j,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,4,j,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 35.

That is, in programs GenZero , Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag ACE key EK_1, DK_1 are punctured at the set $\{(i^* + 1, m_1^*), \dots, (j + 1, m_1^*)\}$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,1} = \text{Hyb}_{B,3,2}$ for $j = T$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,4,j,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,4,j,2}, \text{Transform}_{B,4,j,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,4,j,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 36.

That is, we unpuncture DK_1 in Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag at the point $(j + 1, m_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since EK_1 is punctured at the set which includes $(j + 1, m_1^*)$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,3}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,4,j,3}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,4,j,3}, \text{Transform}_{B,4,j,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,4,j,3}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 37.

That is, we unpuncture EK_1 in GenZero and Increment at the point $(j + 1, m_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since GenZero never encrypts $(j + 1, m_1^*)$ where $j + 1 \neq 0$, and since Increment never encrypts $(j + 1, m_1^*)$, since it aborts on input $[j, m_1^*]$ due to punctured DK_1 .

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,3} = \text{Hyb}_{B,4,j-1,1}$ for $j = T, \dots, i^* + 1$.

Finally we remove the last remaining cut in the chain as follows:

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,1}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,5,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,5,1}, \text{Transform}_{B,5,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,5,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 38.

That is, in programs Increment and GenZero ACE encryption key EK_1 is punctured at the point $(i^* + 1, m_1^*)$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,1} = \text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,2}$ for $j = i^*$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,2}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,5,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,5,2}, \text{Transform}_{B,5,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,5,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 39.

That is, in program Increment we add an instruction to abort if $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $g(i) = I^*$, where $I^* = g(i^*)$ for randomly chosen i^* . In addition, we remove the puncturing from EK_1 in all programs. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since Increment outputs 'fail' on $[i^*, m_1^*]$ in both cases, and since GenZero never needs to encrypt $(i^* + 1, m_1^*)$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,3}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{B,5,3}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{B,5,3}, \text{Transform}_{B,5,4}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{B,5,3}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 40.

That is, in program Increment we remove an instruction to abort if $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $g(i) = I^*$. Indistinguishability holds by security of iO and OWF: since OWF is injective, the two programs differ only at a single point; as shown in [BCP14], any adversary which can distinguish between the two programs, can be also used to find the differing point, which can be used to break one-wayness of g (see lemma 1).

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,3} = \text{Hyb}_C$.

Note that this reduction works only as long as $i^* \neq 0$, which happens with probability $\frac{1}{T}$. Thus, the the

advantage of the PPT adversary in distinguishing between Hyb_B and Hyb_C is at most

$$\frac{1}{T} + 2 \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\gamma(\lambda))} + (2(T - i^* + 1) + 3) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))} + 2(T - i^* + 1) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))} \leq$$

$$\frac{1}{T} + 2^{-\Omega(\gamma(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}.$$

Programs in Hyb_B

Program GenZero $_B$ $[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_B$ (l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_B$ $[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_B$ (L', L'')

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTag $_B$ (l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i > T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i > T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Program RetrieveTags $_B$ (L)

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 27: Programs in Hyb_B . In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{B,1,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{B,1,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* , **OWF $g, I^* = g(i^*)$ for random i^*** , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. **If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $g(i) = I^*$ then output 'fail';**
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
5. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{B,1,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{B,1,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i > T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i > T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Figure 28: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{B,1,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_{i^*+1}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the point $p_{i^*+1} = (i^* + 1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{i^*+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{B,1,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_{i^*+1}\}, \text{DK}_1$ of ACE, punctured at $p_{i^*+1} = (i^* + 1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{i^*+1}\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{B,1,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T + 1$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{B,1,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i > T + 1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i > T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Figure 29: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,1}$.

Program GenZero $_{B,2,j,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{B,2,j,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* , set $S_{i^*,j}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{B,2,j,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{B,2,j,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the set $S_{i^*+1,j}$, tag m_1^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i > T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i > T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Figure 30: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,2}$.

Program GenZero $_{B,2,j,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{B,2,j,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* , set $S_{i^*,j}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{B,2,j,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{B,2,j,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the set $S_{i^*+1,j+1}$, tag m_1^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i > T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i > T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Figure 31: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,3}$.

Program GenZero $_{B,2,j,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+2}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+2}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{B,2,j,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+2}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* , set $S_{i^*,j}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+2}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{B,2,j,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{B,2,j,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the set $S_{i^*+1,j+1}$, tag m_1^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i > T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i > T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Figure 32: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1}$.

Program GenZero $_{B,3,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{B,3,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* , set $S_{i^*,T}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i \geq T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{B,3,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}$ of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T+1$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
4. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$:
 - (a) If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
 - (b) return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{B,3,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the set $S_{i^*+1,T+1}$, tag m_1^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $(i > T+1 \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ and $(i > T \text{ or } i < 0)$ then output 'fail';
4. Output m_1 .

Figure 33: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in Hyb_{B,3,2}.

Program GenZero_{B,3,2}[m_1^*](m_1)

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $EK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment_{B,3,2}(l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}, DK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* , set $S_{i^*,T}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. **If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';**
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform_{B,3,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $DK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}$ of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. **If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';**
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag_{B,3,2}(l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $DK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the set $S_{i^*+1,T+1}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_1\{S_{i^*+1,T+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. **If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';**
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 34: Programs in Hyb_{B,3,2}. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags, together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in Hyb_{B,4,j,1}.

Program GenZero_{B,4,j,1}[m_1^*](m_1)

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment_{B,4,j,1}(l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* , set $S_{i^*,j}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform_{B,4,j,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag_{B,4,j,1}(l)

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the set $S_{i^*+1,j+1}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 35: Programs in Hyb_{B,4,j,1}. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags, together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,2}$.

Program GenZero $_{B,4,j,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{B,4,j,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* , set $S_{i^*,j}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{B,4,j,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{B,4,j,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the set $S_{i^*+1,j}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 36: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`, together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,3}$.

Program GenZero $_{B,4,j,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{B,4,j,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: punctured encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, tag m_1^* , set $S_{i^*,j}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(i+1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{B,4,j,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{B,4,j,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the set $S_{i^*+1,j}$, upper bound T . Here $S_{a,b} = \{(a, m_1^*), (a+1, m_1^*), \dots, (b, m_1^*)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and $\{\emptyset\}$ otherwise.

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 37: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,1}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{B,5,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_{i^*+1}\}$ of ACE, punctured at the point $p_{i^*+1} = (i^* + 1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{i^*+1}\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{B,5,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_{i^*+1}\}$, DK_1 of ACE, punctured at the point $p_{i^*+1} = (i^* + 1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_{i^*+1}\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{B,5,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{B,5,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 38: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,2}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{B,5,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{B,5,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* , OWF $g, I^* = g(i^*)$ for random i^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $g(i) = I^*$ then output 'fail';
4. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{B,5,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{B,5,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 39: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,3}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{B,5,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{B,5,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{B,5,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 \neq m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{B,5,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 40: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,5,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

5.4.3 Proof of lemma 4 (Restoring behavior of Transform).

Starting from Hyb_C , we first change outputs of Transform from $[i - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ to $[i, m_1^*, m_2]$ for different $m_2 \neq m_2^*$ one by one, by considering the following sequence of hybrids for $q = 0, \dots, \nu_2$, $q \neq m_2^*$, where $\nu_2 = 2^{\lfloor m_2 \rfloor}$:

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q}, l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*), L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 42.

That is, program Transform on input $([i, m_1^*], m_2)$ outputs $[i - 1, m_1^*, m_2]$ for $m_2 \geq q$ or $m_2 = m_2^*$ and $[i, m_1^*, m_2]$ otherwise.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_C = \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q}$ for $q = 0$.

In the following sequence of hybrids we change the output at $m_2 = q$ from $[i - 1, m_1^*, q]$ to $[i, m_1^*, q]$:

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,1,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,1,1}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,1,1}, l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*), L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 43.

That is, in program Transform we puncture ACE encryption key EK_2 at the point $p_{T,q} = (T, m_1^*, q)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO , since Transform never encrypts this plaintext.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,1,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,1,2}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,1,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*), L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 44.

That is, in programs isLess and RetrieveTags we puncture ACE decryption key DK_2 at the point $p_{T,q} = (T, m_1^*, q)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained ACE key, since EK_2 is already punctured at the same point.

We consider the following hybrids for $j = T - 1, \dots, 0$, switching the output from $[j, m_1^*, q]$ to $[j + 1, m_1^*, q]$:

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,2,j,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,2,j,1}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,2,j,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*), L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 45.

That is, in this hybrid EK_2, DK_2 are punctured at the point $p_{j+1,q} = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,2} = \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,1}$ for $j = T - 1$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,2,j,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,2,j,2}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,2,j,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*), L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 46.

That is, we additionally puncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$ and hardwire $L_{j,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, q)$ to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt $p_{j,q}$ in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

Note that in program isLess we instruct the program to use the value $p_{j+1,q} = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$ on input $L_{j,q}^*$ (instead of correct value $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$). However, this doesn't change the overall functionality of the program: using $p_{j+1,q}$ instead of $p_{j,q}$ could change the result of comparison only if the other input was an encryption of $p_{j+1,q}$ (since comparison will result in true when $p_{j,q}$ is used and false when $p_{j+1,q}$ is used). However, DK_2 is punctured at a set which includes $p_{j+1,q}$, and thus no ciphertext is decrypted to $p_{j+1,q}$. Thus programs $\text{isLess}_{12,q,2,j,1}$ and $\text{isLess}_{12,q,2,j,0}$ have the same functionality.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,3}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,2,j,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,2,j,3}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,2,j,3}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 47.

That is, we replace $L_{j,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, q)$ with $L_{j+1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j+1, m_1^*, q)$ in programs Transform, isLess and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by security of ACE for punctured points $p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,4}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,2,j,4}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,2,j,4}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,2,j,4}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 48.

That is, we unpuncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{j+1,q} = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$ and remove hardwired $L_{j+1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j+1, m_1^*, q)$ in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,4} = \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j-1,1}$ for $j = T-1, \dots, 1$.

Next we separately consider the case $j = -1$, switching the output from $[-1, m_1^*, q]$ to $[0, m_1^*, q]$:

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 49.

That is, in this hybrid EK_2, DK_2 are punctured at the point $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,1} = \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,4}$ for $j = 0$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 50.

That is, we additionally puncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$ and hardwire $L_{-1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(-1, m_1^*, q)$ to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt $p_{-1,q}$ in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

Note that in programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags` we instruct the program to output fail, given $L_{-1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(-1, m_1^*, q)$ as input, since both programs treat levels with $i < 0$ as invalid.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 51.

That is, we replace $L_{-1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(-1, m_1^*, q)$ with $L_{0,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, q)$ in programs `Transform`, `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`. Indistinguishability holds by security of ACE for punctured points $p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}$.

Next we clean up punctured keys:

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,3,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,3,1}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,3,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 52.

That is, we unpuncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ and remove hardwired $L_{0,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, q)$ in programs `Transform`, `isLess`, and `RetrieveTags`. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,3,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,3,2}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,3,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 53.

That is, we unpuncture ACE key DK_2 at the point $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$ in programs `Transform`, `isLess`, and `RetrieveTags`. Indistinguishability holds by security of a constrained ACE key, since EK_2 is punctured at $p_{-1,q}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,3,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,3,3}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,3,3}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 54.

That is, we unpuncture ACE key EK_2 at the point $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$ in program `Transform`. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since `Transform` never encrypts this value.

Note that programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags` now output 'fail' on input $[0, m_1^*, q]$. We fix this in the following hybrids:

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,1}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,1}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,1}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,1}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 55.

That is, in this hybrid we puncture ACE encryption key EK_1 at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ in programs `GenZero` and `Increment`. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since these programs never encrypt p_0 .

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,2}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,2}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,2}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,2}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,2}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 56.

That is, in this hybrid we puncture ACE decryption key DK_1 at the same point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ in programs Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag . Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption key EK_1 is already punctured at p_0 .

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,3}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,3}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,3}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,3}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,3}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,3}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 57.

That is, in this hybrid we puncture ACE encryption key EK_2 at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ in program Transform . Indistinguishability holds by security of iO , since, due to punctured $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$, this program always outputs 'fail' on input $([0, m_1^*], q)$ and thus never needs to encrypt $p_{0,q}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,4}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,4}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,4}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,4}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,4}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,4}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,4}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 58.

That is, in this hybrid we puncture ACE decryption key DK_2 at the same point $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ in programs isLess and RetrieveTags . Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption key EK_2 is already punctured at $p_{0,q}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,5}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,5}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,5}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,5}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,5}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,5}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,5}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 59.

That is, we remove instructions to output 'fail' in programs isLess and RetrieveTags on input $[0, m_1^*, q]$. Indistinguishability holds by iO , since these instructions are never executed due to the fact that DK_2 is punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ and thus the programs output 'fail' during decryption.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,6}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,6}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,6}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,6}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,6}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,6}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,6}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 60.

That is, in this hybrid we unpuncture ACE decryption key DK_2 at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ in programs isLess and RetrieveTags . Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption key EK_2 is punctured at $p_{0,q}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,7}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,7}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,7}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,7}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,7}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,7}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,7}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 61.

That is, in this hybrid we unpuncture ACE encryption key EK_2 at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ in program Transform . Indistinguishability holds by security of iO , since, due to punctured $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$, this program always outputs 'fail' on input $([0, m_1^*], q)$ and thus never needs to encrypt $p_{0,q}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,8}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,8}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,8}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,8}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,8}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,8}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,8}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 62.

That is, in this hybrid we unpuncture ACE decryption key DK_1 at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ in programs Increment , Transform , and RetrieveTag . Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since corresponding encryption key EK_1 is punctured at p_0 .

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,9}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,9}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,9}, \text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,9}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,9}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,9}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,9}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 63.

That is, in this hybrid we unpuncture ACE encryption key EK_1 at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ in programs GenZero and Increment . Indistinguishability holds by iO , since these programs never encrypt p_0 .

This concludes fixing behavior of Transform for the case $m_2 \neq m_2^*$. Next we fix the case $m_2 = m_2^*$ in a similar manner, except that we need different hybrids for the case $j = -1, 0$ (to prevent switching L_0^* to L_1^*):

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,1,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,2,1,1}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,1,1}, l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*), L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*))$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 64.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,9} = \text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,1}$ for $q = 2^{\lfloor m_2 \rfloor}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,1,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,2,1,2}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,1,2}, l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*), L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*))$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 65.

That is, in program Transform we puncture ACE encryption key EK_2 at the point $p_{T,m_2^*} = (T, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO , since Transform never encrypts this plaintext.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,1,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,2,1,3}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,1,3}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the

programs can be found on fig. 66.

That is, in programs `isLess` and `RetrieveTags` we puncture ACE decryption key DK_2 at the point $p_{T,m_2^*} = (T, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained ACE key, since EK_2 is already punctured at the same point.

We consider the following hybrids for $j = T - 1, \dots, 1$, switching the output from $[j, m_1^*, m_2^*]$ to $[j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*]$:

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,1}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,2,j,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,2,2,j,1}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,2,j,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 67.

That is, in this hybrid EK_2, DK_2 are punctured at the point $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,3} = \text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,1}$ for $j = T - 1$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,2}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,2,j,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,2,2,j,2}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,2,j,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 68.

That is, we additionally puncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and hardwire $L_{j,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt p_{j,m_2^*} in programs `Transform`, `isLess`, and `RetrieveTags`. Indistinguishability holds by iO .

Note that in program `isLess` we instruct the program to use the value $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ on input $L_{j,m_2^*}^*$ (instead of correct value $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$). However, this doesn't change the overall functionality of the program: using p_{j+1,m_2^*} instead of p_{j,m_2^*} could change the result of comparison only if the other input was an encryption of p_{j+1,m_2^*} (since comparison will result in true when p_{j,m_2^*} is used and false when p_{j+1,m_2^*} is used). However, DK_2 is punctured at a set which includes p_{j+1,m_2^*} , and thus no ciphertext is decrypted to p_{j+1,m_2^*} . Thus programs `isLess`_{C,2,2,j,1} and `isLess`_{C,2,2,j,2} have the same functionality.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,3}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,2,j,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,2,2,j,3}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,2,j,3}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 69.

That is, we replace $L_{j,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ with $L_{j+1,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ in programs `Transform`, `isLess` and `RetrieveTags`. Indistinguishability holds by security of ACE for punctured points $p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,4}$. We give the adversary $(PP, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,2,j,4}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,2,2,j,4}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,2,j,4}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 70.

That is, we unpuncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and remove hardwired $L_{j+1,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ in programs `Transform`, `isLess`, and `RetrieveTags`.

Indistinguishability holds by iO.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,4} = \text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j-1,1}$ for $j = T - 1, \dots, 2$.

Finally we consider the case $j = -1$, switching the output from $[-1, m_1^*, m_2^*]$ to $[0, m_1^*, m_2^*]$ and cleaning up any left puncturing:

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,3,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,2,3,1}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,3,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 71.

In this hybrid EK_2, DK_2 are punctured at the point $p_{1,m_2^*} = (1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,1} = \text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,4}$ for $j = 1$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,3,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}_{C,2,3,2}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,3,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 72.

That is, we unpuncture ACE key DK_2 at the point $p_{1,m_2^*} = (1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. in programs isLess and RetrieveTags . Indistinguishability holds by security of a constrained ACE key, since EK_2 is punctured at p_{1,m_2^*} .

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,2,3,3}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,2,3,3}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,3,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,2,3,3}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 73.

That is, we change the following: first, we puncture ACE key EK_1 at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ in programs GenZero and Increment : this is without changing the functionality of those programs, since then never need to encrypt p_0 . Second, we unpuncture ACE key EK_2 at point $p_{1,m_2^*} = (1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ in program Transform , since this program never needs to encrypt p_{1,m_2^*} due to the first instruction (which tells the program to output 'fail' if it gets $([1, m_1^*], m_2^*)$ as input). Indistinguishability holds by iO.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,2,3,4}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,2,3,4}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,3,4}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,2,3,4}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 74.

That is, in programs Increment and RetrieveTag we puncture ACE decryption key DK_1 at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained ACE key, since EK_1 is already punctured at the same point.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,2,3,5}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,2,3,5}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,3,5}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,2,3,5}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 75.

That is, we let program Transform output $[0, m_1^*, m_2^*]$ (instead of $[-1, m_1^*, m_2^*]$) on input $([0, m_1^*], m_2^*)$. This doesn't change the functionality of the program, since DK_1 is punctured the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$.

thus no valid encryption of $(0, m_1^*)$ exists, and Transform aborts on input $[0, m_1^*], m_2^*$. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,6}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,2,3,6}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,2,3,6}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,3,6}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,2,3,6}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 76.

That is, in programs Increment and RetrieveTag we unpuncture ACE decryption key DK_1 at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained ACE key, since EK_1 is already punctured at the same point.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,7}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, l_1^*, L_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{GenZero}_{C,2,3,7}[m_1^*], \text{Increment}_{C,2,3,7}, \text{Transform}_{C,2,3,7}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}_{C,2,3,7}, \text{RetrieveTags}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} , $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Description of the programs can be found on fig. 77.

That is, we unpuncture ACE key EK_1 at the point $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ in programs GenZero and Increment. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since neither program encrypts this value.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,7} = \text{Hyb}_D$.

Thus, the the advantage of the PPT adversary in distinguishing between Hyb_C and Hyb_D is at most

$$\begin{aligned} & (2^{\tau(\lambda)} - 1)((2T + 9) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))} + (T + 1) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 6 \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}) + \\ & (2(T - 1) + 4) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))} + (T - 1) \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 4 \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}) = \\ & 2^{\tau(\lambda)}(T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}). \end{aligned}$$

Programs in Hyb_C .

Program $\text{GenZero}_C[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_C(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_C[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{isLess}_C(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_C(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program $\text{RetrieveTags}_C(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 41: Programs in Hyb_C . In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$;

Program isLess $_{C,1,q}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 42: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,1}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,1,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{T,q} = (T, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$;

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,1,1}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,1,1}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 43: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,2}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,1,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{T,q} = (T, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$;

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,1,2}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{T,q} = (T, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,1,2}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{T,q} = (T, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 44: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.




Figure 45: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,2}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,2,j,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{j+1,q} = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$, **double-tag level** $L_{j,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 > q$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. **If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i = j+1$ return $L_{j,q}^*$;**
7. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i < j+1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
8. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,2,j,2}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{j+1,q} = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$, **double-tag level** $L_{j,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $L' = L_{j,q}^*$ then set $(i', m_1', m_2') = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$,**
else $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. **If $L'' = L_{j,q}^*$ then set $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$,**
else $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,2,j,2}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{j+1,q} = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$, **double-tag level** $L_{j,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $L = L_{j,q}^*$ then return (m_1^*, q) ;**
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 46: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,3}$

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,2,j,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{j+1,q} = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$, double-tag level $L_{j+1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j+1, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 > q$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i = j+1$ return $L_{j+1,q}^*$;
7. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i < j+1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
8. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,2,j,3}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{j+1,q} = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$, double-tag level $L_{j+1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j+1, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. If $L' = L_{j+1,q}^*$ then set $(i', m_1', m_2') = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$,
else $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. If $L'' = L_{j+1,q}^*$ then set $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$,
else $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,2,j,3}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{j+1,q} = (j+1, m_1^*, q)$, double-tag level $L_{j+1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j+1, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. If $L = L_{j+1,q}^*$ then return (m_1^*, q) ;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 47: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,4}$

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,2,j,4}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 > q$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i \leq j$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
7. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,2,j,4}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,2,j,4}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 48: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,4}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 > q$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i \leq 0$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
7. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 49: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, **double-tag level** $L_{-1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(-1, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 > q$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. **If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i = 0$ return $L_{-1,q}^*$;**
7. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i < 0$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
8. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, **double-tag level** $L_{-1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(-1, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $L' = L_{-1,q}^*$ then output 'fail';**
else $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. **If $L'' = L_{-1,q}^*$ then output 'fail';**
else $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, **double-tag level** $L_{-1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(-1, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $L = L_{-1,q}^*$ then output 'fail';**
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 50: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, double-tag level $L_{0,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 > q$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i = 0$ return $L_{0,q}^*$;
7. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = q$, and $i < 0$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
8. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, double-tag level $L_{0,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. If $L' = L_{0,q}^*$ then output 'fail';
else $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. If $L'' = L_{0,q}^*$ then output 'fail';
else $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, double-tag level $L_{0,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. If $L = L_{0,q}^*$ then output 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 51: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,1}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,3,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. **If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;**
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,3,1}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. **If $(i', m_1', m_2') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';**
5. **If $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';**
6. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,3,1}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. **If $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';**
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 52: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,2}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,3,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,3,2}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $(i', m_1', m_2') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
5. If $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
6. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,3,2}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. If $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 53: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,3}$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,3,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,3,3}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $(i', m_1', m_2') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
5. If $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
6. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,3,3}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. If $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 54: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,1}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,1}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,1}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m'_1, m'_2) .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m''_1, m''_2) .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m'_1, m'_2) \neq (m''_1, m''_2)$ then output 'fail';
4. If $(i', m'_1, m'_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
5. If $(i'', m''_1, m''_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
6. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,1}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program $\text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,1}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. If $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 55: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,2}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,2}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,2}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,2}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $(i', m_1', m_2') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
5. If $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
6. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program $\text{RetrieveTags}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. If $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 56: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,3}$.

Program GenZero $_{C,1,q,4,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{C,1,q,4,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,4,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,4,3}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $(i', m_1', m_2') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
5. If $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
6. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTag $_{C,1,q,4,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,4,3}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. If $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 57: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,4}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,4}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,4}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,4}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,4}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $(i', m_1', m_2') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
5. If $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail';
6. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,4}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program $\text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,4}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, message q , tag m_1^* , upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. If $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$ then output 'fail'; 114
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 58: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,4}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,5}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,5}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,5}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,5}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,5}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,5}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program $\text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,5}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 59: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,5}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,6}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,6}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,6}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,6}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{0,q}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,6}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,6}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program $\text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,6}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 60: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,6}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,7}$.

Program GenZero $_{C,1,q,4,7}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{C,1,q,4,7}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,4,7}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,4,7}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTag $_{C,1,q,4,7}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,4,7}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 61: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,7}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,8}$.

Program $\text{GenZero}_{C,1,q,4,8}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Increment}_{C,1,q,4,8}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$, DK_1 of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{C,1,q,4,8}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{isLess}_{C,1,q,4,8}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{C,1,q,4,8}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program $\text{RetrieveTags}_{C,1,q,4,8}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 62: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,8}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,9}$.

Program GenZero $_{C,1,q,4,9}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{C,1,q,4,9}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program Transform $_{C,1,q,4,9}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, message q , tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 \geq q + 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,1,q,4,9}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTag $_{C,1,q,4,9}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,1,q,4,9}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 63: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,9}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,1}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,1,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. **If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;**
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$;

Program isLess $_{C,2,1,1}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,2,1,1}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 64: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

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Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,2}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,1,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{T,m_2^*} = (T, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$;

Program isLess $_{C,2,1,2}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,2,1,2}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 65: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,3}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,1,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{T,m_2^*} = (T, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ and $m_2 = m_2^*$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$;

Program isLess $_{C,2,1,3}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{T,m_2^*} = (T, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,2,1,3}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{T,m_2^*} = (T, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 66: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,1}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,2,j,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{j+1}, m_2^*\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j+1}, m_2^* = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , index j , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*, m_2 = m_2^*$ and $i \leq j+1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j+1}, m_2^*\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j+1}, m_2^*\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,2,2,j,1}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j+1}, m_2^*\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j+1}, m_2^* = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j+1}, m_2^*\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j+1}, m_2^*\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,2,2,j,1}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j+1}, m_2^*\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j+1}, m_2^* = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j+1}, m_2^*\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1, m_2 .

Figure 67: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in Hyb_{C,2,2,j,2}.

Program Transform_{C,2,2,j,2} $[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $EK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, **double-tag level** $L_{j,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , index j , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*, m_2 = m_2^*$ and $i < j+1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. **If $m_1 = m_1^*, m_2 = m_2^*$ and $i = j+1$ return $L_{j,m_2^*}^*$;**
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess_{C,2,2,j,2} (L', L'')

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, **double-tag level** $L_{j,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $L' = L_{j,m_2^*}^*$ then set $(i', m_1', m_2') = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$,**
else $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. **If $L'' = L_{j,m_2^*}^*$ then set $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$,**
else $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags_{C,2,2,j,2} (L)

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, **double-tag level** $L_{j,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. **If $L = L_{j,m_2^*}^*$ then return (m_1^*, m_2^*) ;**
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 68: Programs in Hyb_{C,2,2,j,2}. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in Hyb_{C,2,2,j,3}.

Program Transform_{C,2,2,j,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $EK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, double-tag level $L_{j+1,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , index j , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*, m_2 = m_2^*$ and $i < j+1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. If $m_1 = m_1^*, m_2 = m_2^*$ and $i = j+1$ return $L_{j+1,m_2^*}^*$;
6. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess_{C,2,2,j,3}(L', L'')

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, double-tag level $L_{j+1,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $L' = L_{j+1,m_2^*}^*$ then set $(i', m_1', m_2') = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, else $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. If $L'' = L_{j+1,m_2^*}^*$ then set $(i'', m_1'', m_2'') = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, else $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags_{C,2,2,j,3}(L)

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, double-tag level $L_{j+1,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j+1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. If $L = L_{j+1,m_2^*}^*$ then return (m_1^*, m_2^*) ;
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}, p_{j+1,m_2^*}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
4. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 69: Programs in Hyb_{C,2,2,j,3}. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,4}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,2,j,4}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , index j , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*, m_2 = m_2^*$ and $i \leq j$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,2,2,j,4}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,2,2,j,4}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{j,m_2^*}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 70: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,4}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,1}$.

Program $\text{Transform}_{C,2,3,1}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{1,m_2^*} = (1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*, m_2 = m_2^*$ and $i \leq 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program $\text{isLess}_{C,2,3,1}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{1,m_2^*} = (1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program $\text{RetrieveTags}_{C,2,3,1}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{1,m_2^*} = (1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 71: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,1}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,2}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,3,2}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_{1,m_2^*} = (1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*, m_2 = m_2^*$ and $i \leq 1$ return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program isLess $_{C,2,3,2}(L', L'')$

Inputs: double-tag levels L', L''

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L')$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out' as (i', m_1', m_2') .
2. $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L'')$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out'' as (i'', m_1'', m_2'') .
3. If $i' > T$ or $i'' > T$ or $i' < 0$ or $i'' < 0$ or $(m_1', m_2') \neq (m_1'', m_2'')$ then output 'fail';
4. If $i' < i''$ then output true, else output false.

Program RetrieveTags $_{C,2,3,2}(L)$

Inputs: double-tag level L

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_2 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_2}(L)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1, m_2) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Return (m_1, m_2) .

Figure 72: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,2}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs $\text{GenZero}[m_1^*]$, Increment and RetrieveTag , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,3}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,3,3}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = m_2^*$, and $i \leq 0$, return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program GenZero $_{C,2,3,3}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{C,2,3,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{C,2,3,3}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 73: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,3}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,4}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,3,4}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* , tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. If $m_1 = m_1^*$, $m_2 = m_2^*$, and $i \leq 0$, return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$;
5. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program GenZero $_{C,2,3,4}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{C,2,3,4}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{C,2,3,4}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 74: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,4}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,5}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,3,5}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program GenZero $_{C,2,3,5}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{C,2,3,5}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}, \text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{C,2,3,5}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 75: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,5}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,6}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,3,6}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program GenZero $_{C,2,3,6}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{C,2,3,6}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$, DK_1 of ACE punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{C,2,3,6}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 76: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,6}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,7}$.

Program Transform $_{C,2,3,7}[(l_1^*, m_2^*)](l, m_2)$

Inputs: single-tag level l , tag $m_2 \in M$

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, encryption key EK_2 of ACE, single-tag level $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, tag m_2^* , upper bound T .

1. If $(l, m_2) = (l_1^*, m_2^*)$ then return 'fail';
2. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then return 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
3. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then return 'fail';
4. Return $L \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$.

Program GenZero $_{C,2,3,7}[m_1^*](m_1)$

Inputs: tag $m_1 \in M$.

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_1 of ACE, tag m_1^* .

1. If $m_1 = m_1^*$ then output 'fail';
2. Output $l \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1)$.

Program Increment $_{C,2,3,7}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: encryption and decryption keys EK_1, DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i \geq T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. output $l_{+1} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i + 1, m_1)$.

Program RetrieveTag $_{C,2,3,7}(l)$

Inputs: single-tag level l

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_1 of ACE, upper bound T .

1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_1}(l)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then output 'fail'; else parse out as (i, m_1) .
2. If $i > T$ or $i < 0$ then output 'fail';
3. Output m_1 .

Figure 77: Programs in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,7}$. In addition, in this hybrid the adversary gets unmodified obfuscated programs isLess and RetrieveTags , together with $l_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

5.5 Detailed proof of security

5.5.1 Reductions in the proof of lemma 2 (Switching from ℓ_0^* to ℓ_1^*)

We show that for any PPT adversary,

$$\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A, \text{Hyb}_B}}(\lambda) \leq T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{io}}(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}.$$

Lemma 5. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A, \text{Hyb}_{A,1,1}}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{io}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In programs $\text{GenZero}_{A,1,1}$ and $\text{Increment}_{A,1,1}$ encryption key EK_1 is punctured at $p_{T+1} = (T + 1, m_1^*)$. This is without changing the functionality, since GenZero only encrypts plaintexts of the form $(0, m_1)$, and Increment outputs 'fail' when $i = T$ and thus never encrypts $(T + 1, m_1^*)$. \square

Lemma 6. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A,1,1, \text{Hyb}_{A,1,2}}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_{T+1}\} = \{(T + 1, m_1^*)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_1 and challenge sets $\{p_{T+1}\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_1 . Indeed, given $\text{EK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}$ and *key* which is either DK_1 or $\text{DK}_1\{p_{T+1}\}$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. \square

Lemma 7. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,1, \text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,2}}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{io}}(\lambda))}$ for $1 \leq j \leq T$.

Proof. In programs GenZero , Increment , Transform , RetrieveTag we puncture EK_1 , DK_1 at $p_j = (j, m_1^*)$ and hardwire $\ell_j^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j, m_1^*)$ when required, in order to preserve functionality.

In program $\text{GenZero}_{A,2,j,2}$ we can puncture EK_1 at p_j without changing the functionality, since $\text{GenZero}_{A,2,j,2}$ only encrypts plaintexts of the form $(0, m_1)$ (note that $j \geq 1$).

In program $\text{Increment}_{A,2,j,2}$ we puncture DK_1 at p_j and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j + 2, m_1^*)$ on input ℓ_j^* (note that this is what $\text{Increment}_{A,2,j,1}$ outputs on input ℓ_j^*)²⁶. Further, we puncture EK_1 at p_j and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output ℓ_j^* on input $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j - 1, m_1^*)$ (note that this is what $\text{Increment}_{A,2,j,1}$ does).

In program $\text{Transform}_{A,2,j,2}$ we puncture DK_1 at p_j and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2)$ on input (ℓ_j^*, m_2) for any m_2 (note that this is what $\text{Transform}_{A,2,j,1}$ does). Because of this instruction, we can also instruct $\text{Transform}_{A,2,j,2}$ to output 'fail' when $(i, m_1) = (j, m_1^*)$, since this line will never be reached.

In program $\text{RetrieveTag}_{A,2,j,2}$ we puncture DK_1 at p_j and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output m_1^* on input ℓ_j^* (note that this is what $\text{RetrieveTag}_{A,2,j,1}$ does). \square

Lemma 8. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,2, \text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,3}}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))}$ for $1 \leq j \leq T$.

²⁶Except for the case $j = T$, when we instead instruct the program to output 'fail'.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE ciphertexts for the challenge plaintexts $p_j = (j, m_1^*)$ and $p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$. Indeed, given $\text{EK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{p_j, p_{j+1}\}$, and either $\ell_j^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j, m_1^*)$ or $\ell_{j+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j+1, m_1^*)$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. Note that indeed only one of the two ciphertexts is used in both hybrids (in particular, since $j \geq 1$, the key is never punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ and therefore we can always compute ℓ_0^* for the distribution). \square

Lemma 9. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,3}, \text{Hyb}_{A,2,j,4}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_0(\lambda))}$ for $1 \leq j \leq T$.

Proof. In programs `GenZero`, `Increment`, `Transform`, `RetrieveTag` we unpuncture EK_1 , DK_1 at $p_{j+1} = (j+1, m_1^*)$ and remove hardwired $\ell_{j+1}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j+1, m_1^*)$:

In program `GenZero` _{$A,2,j,4$} we can unpuncture EK_1 at p_{j+1} without changing the functionality, since `GenZero` _{$A,2,j,3$} only encrypts plaintexts of the form $(0, m_1)$ (note that $j \geq 1$).

In program `Increment` _{$A,2,j,4$} we unpuncture DK_1 at p_{j+1} , remove the instruction to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j+2, m_1^*)$ on input ℓ_{j+1}^* and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j+2, m_1^*)$ when $(i, m_1) = (j+1, m_1^*)$ (we don't put any separate instruction since this is normal behavior of `Increment`);²⁷ Further, we unpuncture EK_1 at p_{j+1} , remove the instruction to output ℓ_{j+1}^* on input $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j-1, m_1^*)$ and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j+1, m_1^*)$ when $(i, m_1) = (j-1, m_1^*)$.

In program `Transform` _{$A,2,j,4$} we unpuncture DK_1 at p_j , remove the instruction to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2)$ on input (ℓ_{j+1}^*, m_2) for any m_2 and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$ when $(i, m_1) = (j+1, m_1^*)$.

In program `RetrieveTag` _{$A,2,j,4$} we unpuncture DK_1 at p_{j+1} and remove the instruction to output m_1^* on input ℓ_{j+1}^* . No additional change is required since this is what `RetrieveTag` would normally output²⁸. \square

Lemma 10. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,1}, \text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_0(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In programs `GenZero`, `Increment`, `Transform`, `RetrieveTag` we puncture EK_1 , DK_1 at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ and hardwire $\ell_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$ when required, in order to preserve functionality:

In program `GenZero` _{$A,2,0,2$} we can puncture EK_1 at p_0 without changing the functionality, since `GenZero` _{$A,2,0,2$} outputs 'fail' when $m_1 = m_1^*$.

In program `Increment` _{$A,2,0,2$} we puncture DK_1 at p_0 and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(2, m_1^*)$ on input ℓ_0^* (note that this is what `Increment` _{$A,2,0,1$} outputs on input ℓ_0^*). Further, we puncture EK_1 at p_0 : this is without changing the functionality, since this program never needs to encrypt plaintexts with value 0.

In program `Transform` _{$A,2,0,2$} we puncture DK_1 at p_0 and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2)$ on input (ℓ_0^*, m_2) for any m_2 (note that this is what

²⁷Except for the case $j = T$, when we instead remove the instruction to output 'fail'. Note that `Increment` outputs 'fail' when $i = T+1$ so no additional modification is required. The other exception is the case $j = T-1$, where `Increment` _{$A,2,j,3$} contains the instruction to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(T+1, m_1^*)$ on input ℓ_T^* , and thus in `Increment` _{$A,2,j,4$} we change the upper bound from T to $T+1$ for the case $m_1 = m_1^*$ in order to preserve the functionality.

²⁸Except for the case $j = T$, which instruct the program to output m_1^* on input ℓ_{T+1}^* . In this case we additionally change the upper bound to $T+1$, instead of T , for the case $m_1 = m_1^*$ in program `RetrieveTag` _{$A,2,j,4$}

Transform_{A,2,0,1} does). Because of this instruction, we can also instruct Transform_{A,2,0,2} to output 'fail' when $(i, m_1) = (0, m_1^*)$, since this line will never be reached.

In program RetrieveTag_{A,2,0,2} we puncture DK₁ at p_0 and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output m_1^* on input ℓ_0^* (note that this is what RetrieveTag_{A,2,0,1} does).

□

Lemma 11. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,2}, \text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE ciphertexts for the challenge plaintexts $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$ and $p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$. Indeed, given $\text{EK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$, $\text{DK}_1\{p_0, p_1\}$, and either $\ell_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(0, m_1^*)$ or $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. Note that indeed only one of the two ciphertexts is used in both hybrids (in particular, a single-tag level we give to the adversary is either ℓ_0^* or ℓ_1^*). □

Lemma 12. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A,2,0,3}, \text{Hyb}_{A,3,1}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In programs GenZero, Increment, Transform, RetrieveTag we unpuncture EK₁, DK₁ at $p_1 = (1, m_1^*)$ and remove hardwired $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(j + 1, m_1^*)$:

In program GenZero_{A,3,2} we can unpuncture EK₁ at p_1 without changing the functionality, since GenZero_{A,2,0,3} only encrypts plaintexts of the form $(0, m_1)$.

In program Increment_{A,3,1} we unpuncture DK₁ at p_1 and remove the additional instruction to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(2, m_1^*)$ on input ℓ_1^* (this is without changing the functionality, since this is what the program normally does). Further, we unpuncture EK₁ at p_1 without changing the functionality: indeed, the program could possibly encrypt p_1 only given an encryption of p_0 as input. However, DK₁ is punctured at p_0 and thus the program would instead output 'fail' on such input.

In program Transform_{A,3,1} we instruct the program to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$, given an encryption of (i, m_1^*) and m_2 as input, in the whole range of i from 0 to T . In contrast, program Transform_{A,2,0,3} does this only for $2 \leq i \leq T$. However, this is without changing the functionality: first, Transform_{A,2,0,3} outputs $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2)$, given ℓ_1^* and m_2 as input, thus we didn't change the case $i = 1$. Second, DK₁ is punctured at p_0 , and thus we can arbitrary change behaviour for the case $i = 0$ since the program never reaches that line when $i = 0$, outputting 'fail' during decryption.

With this modification, we can remove the instruction to output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2)$ on input (ℓ_1^*, m_2) and then unpuncture DK₁ at point p_1 .

In program RetrieveTag_{A,3,1} we unpuncture DK₁ at p_1 and remove the instruction to output m_1^* on input ℓ_1^* . No additional change is required since this is what RetrieveTag would normally output. □

Lemma 13. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A,3,1}, \text{Hyb}_{A,3,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_0\} = \{(0, m_1^*)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK₁ and challenge sets $\{p_0\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK₁. Indeed, given $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ and key which is either DK₁ or DK₁ $\{p_0\}$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. □

Lemma 14. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{A,3,2}, \text{Hyb}_{A,3,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In programs GenZero and Increment we unpuncture EK_1 at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. This doesn't change the functionality, since GenZero outputs 'fail' when $m_1 = m_1^*$, and Increment never encrypts a plaintext with value 0. \square

5.5.2 Reductions in the proof of lemma 3 (Changing the upper bound from $T + 1$ to T)

We show that

$$\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,\text{Hyb}_C}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\gamma(\lambda))} + \frac{1}{T} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}.$$

($1/T$ term comes from the fact that the reduction works only when $i^* \neq 0$, where i^* is chosen randomly between 0 and T).

Lemma 15. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\gamma(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Assume there is a poly-time distinguisher D which distinguishes between these two hybrids with probability $\eta \geq 2^{-o(\gamma(\lambda))}$ (for infinitely many λ_i). Then, since:

- programs Increment_B and $\text{Increment}_{B,1,1}$ differ only at one point (due to the fact that g is injective);
- $\eta \geq 2^{-o(\gamma(\lambda))} \geq 2^{-o(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$ (from the condition $\gamma(\lambda) \leq O(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))$) in the theorem statement),

it follows from lemma 1 that there exists an inverter which runs in time at most $O(1/\eta) \log T = 2^{o(\gamma(\lambda))} \log T$, which by the condition in the theorem statement is at most $O(2^{\nu_{\text{OWF}}(\log T)})$. This inverter inverts the one way function with probability at least $(1 - 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)})\eta$, which contradicts the fact that g is $2^{O(\nu_{\text{OWF}}(\lambda \log T))}, 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{OWF}}(\lambda \log T))}$ -secure OWF. \square

Lemma 16. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1,\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. First, note that both programs $\text{GenZero}_{B,1,1}$ and $\text{GenZero}_{B,1,2}$ are functionally equivalent: since $i^* + 1 \neq 0$, and GenZero only needs to encrypt value 0, we can safely puncture EK_1 at $(i^* + 1, m_1^*)$.

Second, programs $\text{Increment}_{B,1,1}$ and $\text{Increment}_{B,1,2}$ are functionally equivalent as well: the only difference in the code is that the first outputs 'fail' when $(m_1, i) = (m_1^*, i^*)$ (on input $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i^*, m_1^*)$), and the second instead outputs 'fail' when it tries to encrypt a punctured point $(i^* + 1, m_1^*)$, which happens on the same input $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i^*, m_1^*)$. \square

Lemma 17. If $i^* \neq 0$, $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,1,\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,2}}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$ for $i^* \leq j \leq T$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $S_{i^*+1,j+1}$ to puncture encryption key EK_1 and challenge sets $S_{i^*+1,j}, S_{i^*+1,j+1}$ to puncture decryption key DK_1 (here $S_{a,b} = \{(m_1^*, a), (m_1^*, a+1), \dots, (m_1^*, b)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and \emptyset otherwise). Indeed, given $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ and key which is either $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j}\}$ or $\text{DK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution, as long as $i^* \neq 0$. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{S_{i^*+1,j+1}\}$ which is not punctured at $(1, m_1^*)$ since $i^* \neq 0$) and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. \square

Lemma 18. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,2,\text{Hyb}_{B,2,j,3}}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$ for $i^* \leq j \leq T$.

Proof. In programs GenZero, Increment we additionally puncture EK_1 at $p_{j+2} = (j + 2, m_1^*)$.

In program GenZero we can puncture EK_1 at p_{j+2} without changing the functionality, since GenZero only encrypts plaintexts of the form $(0, m_1)$, but $j + 2 \neq 0$.

In program Increment we can puncture EK_1 at p_{j+2} without changing the functionality, since DK_1 is punctured at the point p_{j+1} , thus Increment never needs to encrypt p_{j+2} since on input $[j + 1, m_1^*]$ it instead outputs 'fail' during decryption. \square

Lemma 19. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1}, \text{Hyb}_{B,3,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In programs Increment, Transform, and RetrieveTag we change the upper bound from $T + 1$ back to T .

In particular, in program Increment $_{B,3,2}$ we now additionally output 'fail' when $i = T$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$. This is without changing the functionality, since this line is never reached: both programs Increment $_{B,3,1}$ and Increment $_{B,3,2}$ anyway output 'fail' on input $[T, m_1^*]$, since DK_1 is punctured at (T, m_1^*) .

In program Transform we now additionally output 'fail' when $i = T + 1$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$. This is without changing the functionality, since this line is never reached: both programs Transform $_{B,3,1}$ and Transform $_{B,3,2}$ anyway output 'fail' on input $[T + 1, m_1^*]$ and any m_2 , since DK_1 is punctured at $(T + 1, m_1^*)$.

In program RetrieveTag we now additionally output 'fail' when $i = T + 1$ and $m_1 = m_1^*$. This is without changing the functionality, since this line is never reached: both programs RetrieveTag $_{B,3,1}$ and RetrieveTag $_{B,3,2}$ anyway output 'fail' on input $[T + 1, m_1^*]$, since DK_1 is punctured at $(T + 1, m_1^*)$. \square

Lemma 20. If $i^* \neq 0$, $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,1}, \text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$ for $i^* \leq j \leq T$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $S_{i^*+1, j+1}$ to puncture encryption key EK_1 and challenge sets $S_{i^*+1, j}, S_{i^*+1, j+1}$ to puncture decryption key DK_1 (here $S_{a,b} = \{(m_1^*, a), (m_1^*, a + 1), \dots, (m_1^*, b)\}$ if $b \geq a$ and \emptyset otherwise). Indeed, given $EK_1\{S_{i^*+1, j+1}\}$ and key which is either $DK_1\{S_{i^*+1, j}\}$ or $DK_1\{S_{i^*+1, j+1}\}$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution, as long as $i^* \neq 0$. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $EK_1\{S_{i^*+1, j+1}\}$ which is not punctured at $(1, m_1^*)$ since $i^* \neq 0$) and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. \square

Lemma 21. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,2}, \text{Hyb}_{B,4,j,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$ for $i^* \leq j \leq T$.

Proof. In programs GenZero, Increment we unpuncture EK_1 at $p_{j+1} = (j + 1, m_1^*)$.

In program GenZero we can unpuncture EK_1 at p_{j+1} without changing the functionality, since GenZero only encrypts plaintexts of the form $(0, m_1)$, but $j + 1 \neq 0$.

In program Increment we can unpuncture EK_1 at p_{j+1} without changing the functionality, since DK_1 is punctured at the point p_j , thus Increment never needs to encrypt p_{j+1} since on input $[j, m_1^*]$ it instead outputs 'fail' during decryption. \square

Lemma 22. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,5,1}, \text{Hyb}_{B,5,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. First, note that both programs $\text{GenZero}_{B,5,1}$ and $\text{GenZero}_{B,5,2}$ are functionally equivalent: since $i^* + 1 \neq 0$, and GenZero only needs to encrypt value 0, we can safely unpuncture EK_1 at $(i^* + 1, m_1^*)$.

Second, programs $\text{Increment}_{B,5,1}$ and $\text{Increment}_{B,5,2}$ are functionally equivalent as well: the only difference in the code is that the first outputs 'fail' when it tries to encrypt a punctured point $(i^* + 1, m_1^*)$ (which happens on input $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i^*, m_1^*)$), and the second outputs 'fail' when $(m_1, i) = (m_1^*, i^*)$, which happens on the same input $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(i^*, m_1^*)$. \square

Lemma 23. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{B,5,2}, \text{Hyb}_{B,5,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\gamma(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Assume there is a poly-time distinguisher D which distinguishes between these two hybrids with probability $\eta \geq 2^{-o(\gamma(\lambda))}$ (for infinitely many λ_i). Then, since:

- programs Increment_B and $\text{Increment}_{B,1,1}$ differ only at one point (due to the fact that g is injective);
- $\eta \geq 2^{-o(\gamma(\lambda))} \geq 2^{-o(\nu_{iO}(\lambda))}$ (from the condition $\gamma(\lambda) \leq O(\nu_{iO}(\lambda))$) in the theorem statement),

it follows from lemma 1 that there exists an inverter which runs in time at most $O(1/\eta) \log T = 2^{o(\gamma(\lambda))} \log T$, which by the condition in the theorem statement is at most $O(2^{\nu_{\text{OWF}}(\log T)})$. This inverter inverts the one way function with probability at least $(1 - 2^{-\Omega(\lambda)})\eta$, which contradicts the fact that g is $2^{O(\nu_{\text{OWF}}(\lambda \log T))}, 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{OWF}}(\lambda \log T))}$ -secure OWF. \square

5.5.3 Reductions in the proof of lemma 4 (Restoring behavior of Transform)

We show that

$$\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_C, \text{Hyb}_D}(\lambda) \leq 2^{\tau(\lambda)} (T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{iO}(\lambda))} + T \cdot 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))} + 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}).$$

Lemma 24. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,1}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{iO}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In program Transform we puncture encryption key EK_2 at $p_{T,q} = (T, m_1^*, q)$. This is without changing the functionality, since Transform never encrypts this point: indeed, it encrypts $(i - 1, m_1, m_2)$ when $m_2 = q$, but will abort instead if $i = T + 1$. \square

Lemma 25. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,1}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,1,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$ for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_{T,q}\} = \{(T, m_1^*, q)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_2 and challenge sets $\{p_{T,q}\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_2 . Indeed, given $\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}$ and key which is either $\text{DK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}$ or DK_2 , it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $L_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$ and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{T,q}\}$ which is not punctured at $(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$). \square

Lemma 26. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,1}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{iO}(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*, 0 \leq j \leq T - 1$.

Proof. We puncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$ and hardwire $L_{j,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j, m_1^*, q)$ to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt $p_{j,q}$ in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.

More specifically, in program Transform we puncture EK_2 at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$ and, in order to preserve the functionality, add an instruction to output $L_{j,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, q)$ when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$.

In program isLess we puncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$ and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program not to decrypt $L_{j,q}^*$, but to use $(j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ as the result of decryption instead. Note that this is different from what $L_{j,q}^*$ would normally decrypt to, which is (j, m_1^*, q) . However, we argue that this doesn't change the functionality of the program. Indeed:

- The set of inputs on which isLess outputs 'fail' isn't changed; in particular, since $0 \leq j \leq T - 1$, both (j, m_1^*, q) and $(j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ are within 0 to T limits and thus are both valid.
- The result of the comparison on inputs $[i', m_1, m_2]$ and $[i'', m_1, m_2]$, where $(m_1, m_2) \neq (m_1^*, q)$, remains the same;
- The result of the comparison on inputs $[i', m_1^*, q]$ and $[i'', m_1^*, q]$, where $i', i'' \neq j$ and $i', i'' \neq j + 1$, remains the same;
- The output of the program on inputs $([i', m_1^*, q], [i'', m_1^*, q])$, where $i' = j + 1$ or $i'' = j + 1$, is 'fail' for both the original and modified programs, since DK_2 is punctured at $p_{j+1,q} = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ and thus decryption returns 'fail';
- The result of the comparison on inputs $([i', m_1^*, q], [j, m_1^*, q] = L_{j,q}^*)$, remains the same, since for both programs the output is:
 - true for $0 \leq i' < j$;
 - false for $i' = j$ (indeed, in the original program in this case $i' = i'' = j$, and in the modified program $i' = i'' = j + 1$, since $[i', m_1^*, q] = L_{j,q}^*$ when $i' = j$ and the program uses $j + 1$ as the decryption result);
 - 'fail' for $i' = j + 1$, since DK_2 is punctured at $p_{j+1,q} = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ and thus decryption returns 'fail';
 - false for $j + 2 \leq i' \leq T$.
- Similarly, the result of the comparison on inputs $([j, m_1^*, q] = L_{j,q}^*, [i', m_1^*, q])$ remains the same for the original program and modified program (with the difference that the result is false for $0 \leq i' < j$ and true for $j + 2 \leq i' \leq T$).

In program RetrieveTags we puncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$ and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output (m_1^*, q) on input $L_{j,q}^*$. \square

Lemma 27. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,2}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*, 0 \leq j \leq T - 1$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE ciphertexts for the challenge plaintexts $p_{j,q} = (j, m_1^*, q)$ and $p_{j+1,q} = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$. Indeed, given $EK_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}$, $DK_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}$, and either $L_{j,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, q)$ or $L_{j+1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, q)$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all program (note that indeed at most one of two ciphertexts $L_{j,q}^*, L_{j+1,q}^*$ is used in programs of $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,3}$), and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$ and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $EK_2\{p_{j,q}, p_{j+1,q}\}$ which is not punctured at $(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ since $q \neq m_2^*$). \square

Lemma 28. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,3}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,j,4}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_0(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$, $0 \leq j \leq T - 1$.

Proof. We unpuncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{j+1,q} = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ and remove hardwired $L_{j+1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.

More specifically, in program Transform we unpuncture EK_2 at $p_{j+1,q} = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ and remove an instruction to output $L_{j+1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$. This is without changing the functionality, since now the program will run an encryption $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$, instead of directly outputting hardwired $L_{j+1,q}^*$.

In program isLess we unpuncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{j+1,q} = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ and remove an instruction to use $(j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ as a result of decrypting $L_{j+1,q}^*$, thus making the program decrypt $L_{j+1,q}^*$ instead. This is without changing the functionality, since $(j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ is what $L_{j+1,q}^*$ decrypts to.

In program RetrieveTags we unpuncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{j+1,q} = (j + 1, m_1^*, q)$ and remove an instruction to output (m_1^*, q) on input $L_{j+1,q}^*$. This is without changing the functionality, since (m_1^*, q) is what the program outputs when decrypting $L_{j+1,q}^*$. \square

Lemma 29. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,1}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_0(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. We puncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$ and hardwire $L_{-1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(-1, m_1^*, q)$ to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt $p_{-1,q}$ in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.

More specifically, in program Transform we puncture EK_2 at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$ and, in order to preserve the functionality, add an instruction to output $L_{-1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(-1, m_1^*, q)$ when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$.

In program isLess we puncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$ and instruct the program to output 'fail', given $L_{-1,q}^*$. This is without changing the functionality, since $[-1, m_1^*, q]$ is treated by the program as an invalid input, since the value i should be between 0 and T .

In program RetrieveTags we puncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$ and instruct the program to output 'fail', given $L_{-1,q}^*$. This is without changing the functionality, since $[-1, m_1^*, q]$ is treated by the program as an invalid input, since the value i should be between 0 and T . \square

Lemma 30. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE ciphertexts for the challenge plaintexts $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$ and $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$. Indeed, given $\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}$, $\text{DK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}$, and either $L_{-1,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(-1, m_1^*, q)$ or $L_{0,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, q)$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all program (note that indeed at most one of two ciphertexts $L_{-1,q}^*, L_{0,q}^*$ is used in programs of $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}$), and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$ and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{-1,q}, p_{0,q}\}$ which is not punctured at $(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ since $q \neq m_2^*$). \square

Lemma 31. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,2,-1,3}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,1}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_0(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. We unpuncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ and remove hardwired $L_{0,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, q)$ in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.

More specifically, in program Transform we unpuncture EK_2 at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ and remove an instruction to output $L_{0,q}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, q)$ when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$. This is without changing the functionality, since now the program will run an encryption $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, q)$ when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$, instead of directly outputting hardwired $L_{0,q}^*$.

In program isLess we unpuncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ and remove an instruction to output 'fail' given $L_{0,q}^*$; to preserve the functionality, we instruct the program to output 'fail' when (i', m_1', m_2') or (i'', m_1'', m_2'') is equal to $(0, m_1^*, q)$.

In program RetrieveTags we unpuncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$ and remove an instruction to output 'fail' given $L_{0,q}^*$; to preserve the functionality, we instruct the program to output 'fail' when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, q)$. \square

Lemma 32. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,1}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$ for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_{-1,q}\} = \{(-1, m_1^*, q)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_2 and challenge sets $\{p_{-1,q}\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_2 . Indeed, given $EK_2\{p_{-1,q}\}$ and *key* which is either $DK_2\{p_{-1,q}\}$ or DK_2 , it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$ and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $EK_2\{p_{-1,q}\}$ which is not punctured at $(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ since $q \neq m_2^*$). \square

Lemma 33. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,2}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. We unpuncture ACE key EK_2 at the point $p_{-1,q} = (-1, m_1^*, q)$ in program Transform. This is without changing the functionality, since this program never needs to encrypt $p_{-1,q}$: indeed, when $(m_1, m_2) = (m_1^*, q)$, the program only encrypts (i, m_1, m_2) , where $0 \leq i \leq T$. \square

Lemma 34. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,3,3}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,1}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. In programs GenZero and Increment we puncture encryption key EK_1 at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. This is without changing the functionality, since neither program needs to encrypt this point. \square

Lemma 35. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,1}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_0\} = \{(0, m_1^*)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_1 and challenge sets $\{p_0\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_1 . Indeed, given $EK_1\{p_0\}$ and *key* which is either DK_1 or $DK_1\{p_0\}$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $EK_1\{p_0\}$ which is not punctured at $(1, m_1^*)$) and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. \square

Lemma 36. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,2}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. In program Transform we puncture encryption key EK_2 at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$. This is without changing the functionality: indeed, in order to encrypt $p_{0,q}$, the program should get $([0, m_1^*], q)$ as input, but on this input Transform instead outputs 'fail', since decryption key DK_1 is punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. \square

Lemma 37. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,3}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,4}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$ for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_{0,q}\} = \{(0, m_1^*, q)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_2 and challenge sets $\{p_{0,q}\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_2 . Indeed, given $EK_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ and *key* which is either $DK_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ or DK_2 , it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$ and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $EK_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ which is not punctured at $(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ since $q \neq m_2^*$). \square

Lemma 38. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,4}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,5}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. In programs isLess and RetrieveTags we remove an instruction to output 'fail', given $[0, m_1^*, q]$. This is without changing the functionality, since in both programs DK_2 is punctured at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$, thus making the programs output 'fail' during decryption; thus the instructions which we are removing are never reached anyway, and we can safely remove them. \square

Lemma 39. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,5}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,6}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$ for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_{0,q}\} = \{(0, m_1^*, q)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_2 and challenge sets $\{p_{0,q}\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_2 . Indeed, given $EK_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ and *key* which is either $DK_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ or DK_2 , it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$ and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $EK_2\{p_{0,q}\}$ which is not punctured at $(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ since $q \neq m_2^*$). \square

Lemma 40. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,6}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,7}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. In program Transform we unpuncture encryption key EK_2 at $p_{0,q} = (0, m_1^*, q)$. This is without changing the functionality: indeed, in order to encrypt $p_{0,q}$, the program should get $([0, m_1^*], q)$ as input, but on this input Transform instead outputs 'fail', since decryption key DK_1 is punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. \square

Lemma 41. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,7}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,8}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_0\} = \{(0, m_1^*)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_1 and challenge sets $\{p_0\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_1 . Indeed, given $EK_1\{p_0\}$ and *key* which is either DK_1 or $DK_1\{p_0\}$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $EK_1\{p_0\}$ which is not punctured at $(1, m_1^*)$) and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. \square

Lemma 42. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,8}, \text{Hyb}_{C,1,q,4,9}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$, for $q \neq m_2^*$.

Proof. In programs GenZero and Increment we unpuncture encryption key EK_1 at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. This is without changing the functionality, since neither program needs to encrypt this point. \square

Lemma 43. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,1}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In program Transform we puncture encryption key EK_2 at $p_{T,m_2^*} = (T, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. This is without changing the functionality, since Transform never encrypts this point: indeed, when $(m_1, m_2) = (m_1^*, m_2^*)$ the largest value it encrypts is $(T - 1, m_1, m_2)$. \square

Lemma 44. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,2}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,1,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_{T,m_2^*}\} = \{(T, m_1^*, m_2^*)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_2 and challenge sets $\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_2 . Indeed, given $EK_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}$ and *key* which is either $DK_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}$ or DK_2 , it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_1}(1, m_1^*)$ and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $EK_2\{p_{T,m_2^*}\}$ which is not punctured at $(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$). \square

Lemma 45. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,1}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_o(\lambda))}$, for $1 \leq j \leq T - 1$.

Proof. We puncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and hardwire $L_{j,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ to eliminate the need to encrypt or decrypt p_{j,m_2^*} in programs Transform, isLess, and RetrieveTags, without changing their functionality.

More specifically, in program Transform we puncture EK_2 at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and, in order to preserve the functionality, add an instruction to output $L_{j,m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

In program isLess we puncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{j,m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program not to decrypt $L_{j,m_2^*}^*$, but to use $(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ as the result of decryption instead. Note that this is different from what $L_{j,m_2^*}^*$ would normally decrypt to, which is (j, m_1^*, m_2^*) . However, we argue that this doesn't change the functionality of the program. Indeed:

- The set of inputs on which isLess outputs 'fail' isn't changed; in particular, since $0 \leq j \leq T - 1$, both (j, m_1^*, m_2^*) and $(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ are within 0 to T limits and thus are both valid.
- The result of the comparison on inputs $[i', m_1, m_2]$ and $[i'', m_1, m_2]$, where $(m_1, m_2) \neq (m_1^*, m_2^*)$, remains the same, for all i', i'' ;
- The result of the comparison on inputs $[i', m_1^*, m_2^*]$ and $[i'', m_1^*, m_2^*]$, where $i', i'' \neq j$ and $i', i'' \neq j + 1$, remains the same;
- The output of the program on inputs $([i', m_1^*, m_2^*], [i'', m_1^*, m_2^*])$, where $i' = j + 1$ or $i'' = j + 1$, is 'fail' for both the original and modified programs, since DK_2 is punctured at $p_{j+1,m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and thus decryption returns 'fail';
- The result of the comparison on inputs $([i', m_1^*, m_2^*], [j, m_1^*, m_2^*] = L_{j,m_2^*}^*)$, remains the same, since for both programs the output is:
 - true for $0 \leq i' < j$;
 - false for $i' = j$ (indeed, in the original program in this case $i' = i'' = j$, and in the modified program $i' = i'' = j + 1$, since $[i', m_1^*, m_2^*] = L_{j,m_2^*}^*$ when $i' = j$ and the program uses $j + 1$ as the decryption result);

- 'fail' for $i' = j + 1$, since DK_2 is punctured at $p_{j+1, m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and thus decryption returns 'fail';
- false for $j + 2 \leq i' \leq T$.
- Similarly, the result of the comparison on inputs $([j, m_1^*, m_2^*] = L_{j, m_2^*}^*, [i', m_1^*, m_2^*])$ remains the same for the original program and modified program (with the difference that the result is false for $0 \leq i' < j$ and true for $j + 2 \leq i' \leq T$).

In program `RetrieveTags` we puncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{j, m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and, in order to preserve the functionality, instruct the program to output (m_1^*, m_2^*) on input $L_{j, m_2^*}^*$. \square

Lemma 46. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,2}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.Indist}}(\lambda))}$, for $1 \leq j \leq T - 1$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from indistinguishability of ACE ciphertexts for the challenge plaintexts $p_{j, m_2^*} = (j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and $p_{j+1, m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. Indeed, given $\text{EK}_2\{p_{j, m_2^*}, p_{j+1, m_2^*}\}$, $\text{DK}_2\{p_{j, m_2^*}, p_{j+1, m_2^*}\}$, and either $L_{j, m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ or $L_{j+1, m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs (note that creating the programs in each of the hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,2}$, $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,3}$ requires to know exactly *one* of the two ciphertexts $L_{j, m_2^*}^*, L_{j+1, m_2^*}^*$), and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$ and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{j, m_2^*}, p_{j+1, m_2^*}\}$ which is not punctured at $(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ since $j \geq 1$). \square

Lemma 47. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,3}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,2,j,4}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{io}}(\lambda))}$, for $1 \leq j \leq T - 1$.

Proof. We unpuncture ACE keys EK_2, DK_2 at the point $p_{j+1, m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and remove hardwired $L_{j+1, m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ in programs `Transform`, `isLess`, and `RetrieveTags`, without changing their functionality.

More specifically, in program `Transform` we unpuncture EK_2 at $p_{j+1, m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and remove an instruction to output $L_{j+1, m_2^*}^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. This is without changing the functionality, since now the program will run an encryption $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ when $(i, m_1, m_2) = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$, instead of directly outputting hardwired $L_{j+1, m_2^*}^*$.

In program `isLess` we unpuncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{j+1, m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and remove an instruction to use $(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ as a result of decrypting $L_{j+1, m_2^*}^*$, thus making the program decrypt $L_{j+1, m_2^*}^*$ instead. This is without changing the functionality, since $(j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ is what $L_{j+1, m_2^*}^*$ decrypts to.

In program `RetrieveTags` we unpuncture decryption key DK_2 at $p_{j+1, m_2^*} = (j + 1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ and remove an instruction to output (m_1^*, m_2^*) on input $L_{j+1, m_2^*}^*$. This is without changing the functionality, since (m_1^*, m_2^*) is what the program outputs when decrypting $L_{j+1, m_2^*}^*$. \square

Lemma 48. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,1}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,2}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_{1, m_2^*}\} = \{(1, m_1^*, m_2^*)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_2 and challenge sets $\{p_{1, m_2^*}\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_2 . Indeed, given $\text{EK}_2\{p_{1, m_2^*}\}$ and *key* which is either $\text{DK}_2\{p_{1, m_2^*}\}$ or DK_2 , it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs,

and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$ and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $\text{EK}_2\{p_{1,m_2^*}\}$ which is not punctured at $(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$). \square

Lemma 49. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,2}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,3}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In program Transform we do the following changes. First, we change the condition for when to encrypt $i-1$ from $i \leq 1$ to $i \leq 0$. This is without changing the functionality, since the case $(i, m_1, m_2) = (1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$ corresponds to the input $([1, m_1^*], m_2^*)$, in which case the program outputs 'fail' at the very beginning, thus the line with the condition is not reached on this input anyway. For the same reason we can unpuncture EK_2 at $p_{1,m_2^*} = (1, m_1^*, m_2^*)$.

Next, in programs GenZero and Increment we puncture encryption key EK_1 at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. This is without changing the functionality, since neither program needs to encrypt this point. \square

Lemma 50. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,3}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,4}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_0\} = \{(0, m_1^*)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_1 and challenge sets $\{p_0\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_1 . Indeed, given $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ and *key* which is either DK_1 or $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ which is not punctured at $(1, m_1^*)$) and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. \square

Lemma 51. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,4}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,5}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In program Transform we make the program output $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i, m_1, m_2)$ instead of $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(i-1, m_1, m_2)$ for the case $(i, m_1, m_2) = (0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$; this is without changing the functionality, since encryption is never reached in the case. Indeed, on input $([0, m_1^*], m_2^*)$ Transform outputs 'fail' during decryption, since DK_1 is punctured at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. \square

Lemma 52. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,5}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,6}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{ACE.ConstrDec}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. Indistinguishability immediately follows from security of constrained decryption of ACE for the challenge set $\{p_0\} = \{(0, m_1^*)\}$ to puncture encryption key EK_1 and challenge sets $\{p_0\}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key DK_1 . Indeed, given $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ and *key* which is either DK_1 or $\text{DK}_1\{p_0\}$, it is easy to reconstruct the rest of the distribution. That is, we can sample remaining keys, obfuscate all programs, and compute $\ell_1^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_1}(1, m_1^*)$ (using the challenge encryption key $\text{EK}_1\{p_0\}$ which is not punctured at $(1, m_1^*)$) and $L_0^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_2}(0, m_1^*, m_2^*)$. \square

Lemma 53. $\text{adv}_{\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,6}, \text{Hyb}_{C,2,3,7}}(\lambda) \leq 2^{-\Omega(\nu_{\text{IO}}(\lambda))}$.

Proof. In programs GenZero and Increment we unpuncture encryption key EK_1 at $p_0 = (0, m_1^*)$. This is without changing the functionality, since neither program needs to encrypt this point. \square

6 Construction of interactive deniable encryption

In this section we describe a construction of interactive deniable encryption for a single-bit message space.

Notation. We denote by s and r the variables corresponding to randomness of the sender and the receiver, respectively, and let μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 denote the three messages of the protocol. P1, P2, P3, Dec, SFake, RFake are programs of the deniable encryption.

P1(s, m) takes as input sender randomness s and plaintext m and outputs the first message μ_1 . P2(r, μ_1) takes as input receiver randomness r and first message μ_1 and outputs the second message μ_2 . P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2) takes as input sender randomness s , plaintext m , and protocol messages μ_1, μ_2 and outputs the last message μ_3 . Dec(r, μ_1, μ_2, μ_3) takes as input receiver randomness r and protocol messages μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 and outputs the plaintext m . SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$) takes as input sender randomness s , true plaintext m , new (fake) plaintext \hat{m} , and protocol messages μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 and outputs fake randomness s' which makes μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 look consistent with \hat{m} . RFake($\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$) takes as input new (fake) plaintext \hat{m} and protocol messages μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 and outputs fake randomness r' which makes μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 look consistent with \hat{m} .

To avoid cumbersome notation, we use the same name for both unobfuscated and obfuscated programs. In particular, the parties and the adversary only see obfuscated programs and never the actual code of the programs. For example, on fig. 78 the instruction to the sender to run P1 means taking the obfuscation of the program P1 from the CRS and running it.

Everywhere throughout the paper we will be assuming that any program outputs \perp , if any of its underlying primitives outputs \perp , except for the cases where it is explicitly written otherwise.

6.1 Construction

The protocol is described in fig. 78. It simply instructs parties to run the programs from the CRS, which consists of 6 obfuscated programs P1, P2, P3, Dec, SFake, RFake (described in fig. 79, fig. 80). Note that deniability of the receiver is *public*, since the knowledge of randomness of the receiver is not required in order to run RFake.

In the introduction we described the reasons behind the logic of the programs we are using. Here we give an overview of the overall structure of protocol messages and fake randomness. For simplicity, for this discussion we will use integers (instead of our level system used in the programs of deniable encryption) to count how many times s was faked (see the introduction for the discussion of what role levels play in our construction).

The structure of protocol messages. The first two messages in the protocol are simply “hashes” (implemented as a PRF) of internal state of parties so far: that is, μ_1 is PRF(s, m) and μ_2 is PRF(r, μ_1). The third message μ_3 is an encryption of m, μ_1, μ_2 , and level 0. After running the protocol, the receiver can run Dec which decrypts μ_3 and outputs m .

The structure of fake randomness. Fake randomness s' of the sender is an encryption (under a special sender-fake key which is known to programs but not known to parties) of $m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$, and level 1. This encryption has pseudorandom ciphertexts, and for an external observer s' looks like a truly random value. Programs can decrypt s' using hardwired key and interpret $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$ as an instruction to output μ_1' on input m' (for program P1) and an instruction to output μ_3' on input m', μ_1', μ_2' (for program P3).

The CRS: Programs P1, P2, P3, Dec, SFake, RFake (fig. 79, fig. 80)), obfuscated under iO.

Our Interactive bideniable encryption:

Inputs: plaintext $m \in \{0, 1\}$ of the sender.

1. **Message 1:** The sender chooses random s^* , computes $\mu_1^* \leftarrow P1(s^*, m)$ and sends μ_1^* .
2. **Message 2:** The receiver chooses random r^* , computes $\mu_2^* \leftarrow P2(r^*, \mu_1^*)$ and sends μ_2^* .
3. **Message 3:** The sender computes $\mu_3^* \leftarrow P3(s^*, m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ and sends μ_3^* .
4. The receiver runs $m' \leftarrow Dec(r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$.

Sender Coercion:

Inputs: real plaintext $m \in \{0, 1\}$, fake plaintext $\hat{m} \in \{0, 1\}$, real random coins s^* of the sender, and the protocol transcript $\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$.

1. Upon coercion, the sender computes fake randomness $s' \leftarrow SFake(s^*, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$.

Receiver Coercion:

Inputs: fake plaintext $\hat{m} \in \{0, 1\}$ and the protocol transcript $\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$.

1. Upon coercion, the receiver chooses random ρ^* and computes fake randomness $r' \leftarrow RFake(\hat{m}, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$.

Figure 78: Our interactive bideniable encryption scheme.

Thus, such s' makes the transcript look consistent with m' , regardless of the actual plaintext which was used to generate the transcript.

Similarly, fake randomness r' of the receiver is an encryption (under a special receiver-fake key which is known to programs but not known to parties) of $m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$, and level 0 (together with $\text{prg}(\rho)$ which is for randomizing this ciphertext). This encryption has pseudorandom ciphertexts, and for an external observer r' looks like a truly random value. Programs can decrypt r' using hardwired key and interpret $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L')$ as an instruction to output μ_2' on input μ_1' (for program P2) and an instruction to output m' on input μ_1', μ_2', μ_3' (for program Dec). Thus, such r' makes the transcript looks consistent with m' (and in particular decrypts it to m'), regardless of the actual plaintext which was used to generate the transcript.

Both programs P3, Dec also have special instructions for the “mixed input” case, i.e. for the case when P3 gets as input fake s' encrypting $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$, but input μ_2 of the program P3 is different from μ_2' in s' (in case of Dec, when μ_3' in fake r' is different from input μ_3 to Dec). The correct treatment of the mixed case is crucial for security of the scheme. See the explanation in the introduction for the logic of the programs on mixed inputs.

6.2 Required primitives and their parameters.

We require the primitives listed below. Note that these primitives can be constructed from iO, injective PRFs (which in turn can be constructed from standard OWFs, [SW14]) and injective OWFs (which in turn can be constructed from iO and standard OWFs, [BPW16]); thus it is enough to require iO and OWFs. By starting with subexponentially-secure iO and OWFs, we can get subexponential security of these primitives.

Definitions can be found in section 3.

Notation. We denote security parameter by λ . We parametrize sizes in our construction by $\tau(\lambda)$, which is the length of the first message in the protocol (also equal to the size of a tag for the level system, since we use μ_1, μ_2 as tags), and $T(\lambda)$, which is an upper bound of the level system.

Injective PRFs with sparse image. As shown in [SW14], for any length l there exists a family of PRFs $\{F_k\}_\lambda$ mapping l -sized inputs to $2l + \lambda$ -sized outputs, such that with probability at least $1 - 2^{-\lambda}$ (over the choice of the key), the PRF is injective. Note that PRF with these parameters has exponentially sparse image, i.e. a randomly chosen element is in its image with probability $2^{-l-\lambda}$.

These PRFs are used in the construction of ACE and relaxed ACE.

Sparse extracting PRF. As shown in [SW14], for any length l , as long as the input has entropy at least $l \geq \tau/2 + 2\lambda + 2$, there exists a family of extracting PRFs $\{F_k\}_\lambda$ mapping at least l -sized inputs to $\tau/2$ -sized outputs, which are strong extractors with statistical distance at most $2^{-\lambda}$. It can be shown in a simple reduction that applying a length-doubling prg to the output of such a PRF results in a (computationally) extracting PRF, such that a random string is in its image with probability $2^{\tau/2}$.

These PRFs are used to compute the first two messages in the protocol.

ACE. As shown in [CHJV14], for any plaintext length l , there exists an ACE with ciphertexts of size $3l + \lambda$ (as long as injective PRFs used are from l bits to $2l + \lambda$ bits).

ACE is used as the main encryption scheme (used to compute the third message of the protocol).

Relaxed ACE. As we show in the appendix B by modifying the construction of [CHJV14], for any plaintext length l and suffix parameter t , there exists a relaxed ACE with ciphertexts of size $(l - t + 1)(2l - t + \lambda) + \lambda$ (as long as each injective PRF $F_i, i = t, \dots, l$, is from i bits to $2i + \lambda$ bits). Further, ciphertexts of this ACE are sparse, with ratio of ciphertexts at most $2^{-\lambda}$. Relaxed ACE is used as an encryption scheme to generate fake sender and receiver randomness.

Length-doubling PRG. We use a prg from λ to 2λ bits. It is used in program RFake to randomize fake randomness of the receiver. (In addition, as part of the construction of a sparse extracting PRF, we also use a prg from $\tau(\lambda)/2$ to $\tau(\lambda)$ bits).

Level system. In section 5 we build the level system for any superpolynomial upper bound T and any sublinear tag size.

Length of variables as a function of the first message size τ and level upper bound T . Below we express sizes in our construction (which in turn specify parameters of all primitives) as a function of the first message size $\tau(\lambda)$ and the upper bound of the level system $T(\lambda)$. We require that both $\tau(\lambda)$ and $\log T(\lambda)$ are sublinear in λ . We assume that the plaintext of the deniable encryption scheme is one bit long. Somewhat abusing notation, in this discussion we will be denoting the size of the ACE ciphertext of l -size input as $ACE(l)$; size of levels as $|\ell|, |L|$; size of the output of a prg as $|\text{prg}|$.

- $|\mu_1| = \tau$;
- $|\mu_2| = \tau$;
- $|\ell| = |ACE(|\mu_1| + \log T)| = 3(\tau + \log T) + \lambda = O(\lambda)$;
- $|L| = |ACE(|\mu_1| + |\mu_2| + \log T)| = 3(2\tau + \log T) + \lambda = O(\lambda)$;

- $|\mu_3| = |\text{ACE}(1 + |\mu_1| + |\mu_2| + |L|)| = 3(1 + 2\tau + 3(2\tau + \log T) + \lambda) + \lambda = 3 + 24\tau + 9 \log T + 4\lambda = O(\lambda)$;
- $|s| = \text{relaxedACE}(1 + |\mu_1| + |\mu_2| + |\mu_3| + |\ell|)$ (for suffix parameter $t = |\ell|$), thus the size is equal to $(1 + 2\tau + (3 + 15\tau + 9 \log T + 4\lambda) + 1)(2(1 + 2\tau + (3 + 15\tau + 9 \log T + 4\lambda) + 3(\tau + \log T) + \lambda) - (3(\tau + \log T) + \lambda) + \lambda) + \lambda = (5 + 17\tau + 9 \log T + 4\lambda)(8 + 37\tau + 21 \log T + 20\lambda) + \lambda = O(\lambda^2)$;
- $|r| = \text{relaxedACE}(1 + |\mu_1| + |\mu_2| + |\mu_3| + |L| + |\text{prg}|)$ (for suffix parameter $t = |\text{prg}|$), thus the size is equal to $((1 + 2\tau + 3 + 24\tau + 9 \log T + 4\lambda + 3(2\tau + \log T) + \lambda + 2\lambda) - 2\lambda + 1)(2(1 + 2\tau + 3 + 24\tau + 9 \log T + 4\lambda + 3(2\tau + \log T) + \lambda + 2\lambda) - 2\lambda + \lambda) + \lambda = (5 + 32\tau + 12 \log T + 5\lambda)(8 + 64\tau + 24 \log T + 13\lambda) + \lambda = O(\lambda^2)$.

Further, since in our construction of deniable encryption we use the first message μ_1 as a tag for the level system, we need a level system for upper bound T and tag size τ .

The size of the programs, and removing layers of iO. Note that the source code on fig. 79, fig. 80 includes the description of *obfuscated* programs of the level system. In turn, the source code of programs of the level system contains ACE keys which are again obfuscations of some other programs. Thus, the CRS contains programs which have 3 layers of obfuscation.

However, we have only done this for convenience: namely, for being able to show security of all primitives (e.g. ACE and the level system) separately and then to use it as part of a bigger proof (e.g. of deniable encryption or the level system). Indeed, it is possible to prove security of our deniable encryption where programs of deniable encryption are obfuscated *only once*. That is, programs of deniable encryption can use *unobfuscated* code of the programs of the level system and ACE. However, to show security of such a construction, one would have to “unroll” all proofs, i.e. substitute the proof of, say, ACE instead of each reduction to security of ACE in the main proof. Needless to say, writing, or even more importantly, *verifying* such a proof does not sound feasible to the authors of this paper, who think of themselves as polynomially-bounded Turing machines.

Nevertheless, in appendix A we briefly explain why such a proof *could* be written. Intuitively, this holds because of the following: let’s say in the proof of ACE we punctured the PRF and reduced it to security of the obfuscation (of ACE source code). Then we can do the same reduction in the “unrolled” proof, since that punctured PRF key, which is now a part of a source code of deniable encryption program, is still protected by obfuscation on top of that program.

We state our theorem with the size σ of a source code of the programs of deniable encryption scheme as a parameter. As long as our construction uses only one layer of iO, $\sigma = O(\lambda^3)$ (λ^3 comes from the fact that all programs of deniable encryption use keys of a relaxed ACE, which have the size $O(\lambda^3)$ due to the fact each key consists of $O(\lambda)$ PRF keys, these keys are punctured in the security proof, and each punctured PRF key has size $O(\lambda^2)$).

Theorem 3. *Assume the existence of the following primitives with parameters spicified above:*

- SG, RG are extracting puncturable PRFs with sparse image. Further, these PRFs should have a property that, given a punctured key, we can further puncture them at one more point;
- prg is a pseudorandom generator with a sparse image;

- *Programs* (GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags) are the programs of a level system;
- *sender-fake ACE* (with keys EK_S, DK_S) is a relaxed ACE with suffix parameter equal to the size of a single-tag level of the level system; in addition, its ciphertexts should be sparse.
- *receiver-fake ACE* (with keys EK_R, DK_R) is a relaxed ACE with suffix parameter equal to the image length of a prg; in addition, its ciphertexts should be sparse.
- *main ACE* (with keys EK, DK);
- *iO* is a secure indistinguishability obfuscation for circuits of size $\sigma = c \cdot \lambda^3$ for some constant c ;

Then the protocol presented on fig. 78 with programs presented on fig. 79, fig. 80 is a bideniable and off-the-record deniable interactive encryption in the CRS model for 1-bit plaintexts. More specifically, assuming that each primitive except the level system is $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -secure, and assuming the level system for an upper bound T and tag size τ is $O(t(\lambda), \varepsilon_1(\lambda, T, \tau))$ -secure, the resulting deniable encryption is $(t(\lambda), O(\varepsilon(\lambda)) + O(2^{-\tau}) + \varepsilon_1(\lambda, T, \tau))$ -secure.

Corollary 2. Let $T = 2^{\lambda^{\varepsilon/2}}$, $\tau = \lambda^{\varepsilon/2}$, and assume that all primitives in the theorem 3 are $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^{\varepsilon^2/2})})$ -secure. Then the resulting deniable encryption is $(\text{poly}(\lambda), 2^{-\Omega(\lambda^{\varepsilon^2/2})})$ -secure.

Encrypting longer plaintexts. Note that the syntax of the scheme allows to encrypt longer plaintexts. However, for simplicity we define and prove deniability and off-the-record-deniability for 1-bit plaintexts only. In appendix C we list the changes required to adapt the proof to support longer plaintexts. However, this incurs additional security loss proportional to the $|\mathcal{M}|^3$, the *cube* of the size of the plaintext space.

Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Program P1(s, m)

Inputs: sender randomness s , plaintext m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2)

Inputs: sender randomness s , plaintext m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$)

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake plaintext \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryption keys EK_S, DK_S of sender-fake ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 79: Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Programs P2, Dec, RFake.

Program P2(r, μ_1)

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, key k_R of an extracting PRF RG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_R}(r)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow \text{RG}_{k_R}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program Dec(r, μ_1, μ_2, μ_3)

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of the main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P2}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_R}(r)$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;
- (c) $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK}(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (d) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then
 - i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L')$ and $\text{isLess}(L', L'') = \text{true}$ then return m'' ;
 - ii. Else abort.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK}(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L'')$ then return m'' ;
- (c) Else abort.

Program RFake($\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho$)

Inputs: fake plaintext \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_R of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of the main ACE.

- 1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK}(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_R}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', \text{prg}(\rho))$.

Figure 80: Programs P2, Dec, RFake.

6.3 Proof overview

Correctness. Correctness follows from correctness of all underlying primitives and from the fact that sender-fake and receiver-fake ACE are both sparse. More concretely, assume s^* and r^* are randomly chosen coins of the sender and the receiver. Due to sparseness of ACE, s^* (resp, r^*) is outside of the image of sender-fake (resp., receiver-fake) ACE. Therefore program P1 on input s^*, m executes the main step and outputs $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m)$, program P2 on input r^*, μ_1^* executes the main step and outputs $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, and program P3 on input s^*, m, μ_1^*, μ_2^* executes the main step and outputs $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_K(m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*), \mu_2^*))$. In particular, the validity check passes since indeed $\text{P1}(s^*, m) = \mu_1^*$.

Next, program Dec on input $r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$ executes the main step by decrypting μ_3^* and returning its plaintext m . In particular, validity check passes, since $\text{P2}(r^*, \mu_1^*) = \mu_2^*$. Further, note that μ_1, μ_2 which are the input to Dec, μ_1'', μ_2'' which are decrypted from μ_3^* , and the output of $\text{RetrieveTags}(L'')$ are all equal to μ_1^*, μ_2^* (recall that $L'' = \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*), \mu_2^*)$). Thus all checks in the main step of Dec pass and the program outputs m .

Notation. m_0^*, m_1^* denote messages chosen by the adversary. s^*, r^* denote true (chosen at random) random coins of the sender and receiver, respectively. $\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$ denote the challenge transcript of the protocol, which is either $\text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_0^*)$ or $\text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_1^*)$ depending on the hybrid. s', r' denote fake random coins of the sender and receiver, respectively. We write $\text{tr}(s, r, m)$ to denote the communication in the protocol with input m and randomness s and r .

By ℓ_0^* we denote a single-tag level 0 with tag μ_1^* . By ℓ_1^* we denote a single-tag level 1 with tag μ_1^* . By L_0^* we denote double-tag level 0 with tags μ_1^*, μ_2^* .

In addition, we will be using notation $[\text{val}, \mu_1]$ and $[\text{val}, \mu_1, \mu_2]$ to denote single-tag and double-tag levels with value val and tag μ_1 (or, tags μ_1, μ_2).

Main steps. We start with a distribution corresponding to transmitted plaintext $m_0^* \in \{0, 1\}$ and real randomness s^* and r^* presented to the adversary. More formally, we consider the following distribution:

$\text{Hyb}_A = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s^*, r^*, \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_0^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, and $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

To prove security of our deniable encryption scheme, we proceed in the following steps:

1. **Indistinguishability of explanations of the sender:** we switch real (randomly chosen) s^* to fake s' , which encodes plaintext m_0^* , transcript $\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$, and level $\ell^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$, moving to the following distribution:

$\text{Hyb}_B = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_0^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{ACE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

The proof of this step is similar in spirit to the proof of a sender-deniable encryption of Sahai and Waters [SW14], and relies on the fact that all relevant programs, given s^* or s' as input, behave in the same way for any choice of remaining inputs.

2. **Indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver:** we switch real (randomly chosen) r^* to fake r' , which encodes plaintext m_0^* , transcript $\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$, and level $L^* = [0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$, moving to the following distribution:

$$\text{Hyb}_C = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_0^*)), \text{ where } s^*, r^* \text{ are randomly chosen, } s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*), r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*)) \text{ for randomly chosen } \rho^*, \text{ and } \text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}}) \text{ for randomly chosen } r_{\text{Setup}}.$$

Unlike the previous step, here there exist inputs such that program Dec, when run on these inputs and r^* or r' , produces different outputs. However, such inputs are hard to find. Thus, in security proof of this step we first use properties of ACE to “eliminate” bad inputs (i.e. to make the programs reject them), then run Sahai-Waters-like proof similar to the previous step, and finally use ACE to bring bad inputs back and restore the programs.

3. **Semantic security:** we switch the transcript from encrypting m_0^* to encrypting m_1^* , moving to the following distribution:

$$\text{Hyb}_D = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_1^*)), \text{ where } s^*, r^* \text{ are randomly chosen, } s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*), r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*)) \text{ for randomly chosen } \rho^*, \text{ and } \text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}}) \text{ for randomly chosen } r_{\text{Setup}}.$$

Proving security of this step involves the following. First, similar to the previous step, we “eliminate” a ciphertext $\overline{\mu_3^*} = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, making all programs reject it (note that this ciphertext is “complementary” to the challenge ciphertext $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, meaning it encrypts the opposite bit). This allows us to modify program Dec such that decryption key DK is not used to decrypt $\mu_3^*, \overline{\mu_3^*}$. Then we use security of ACE to switch μ_3^* from encrypting m_0^* to m_1^* , and then revert all previous changes.

4. **Indistinguishability of levels:** we switch the level encoded in s' from $\ell_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$ to $\ell_1^* = [1, \mu_1^*]$ (while keeping $L_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$ the same), moving to the following distribution:

$$\text{Hyb}_E = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_1^*)), \text{ where } s^*, r^* \text{ are randomly chosen, } s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*), r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*)) \text{ for randomly chosen } \rho^*, \text{ and } \text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}}) \text{ for randomly chosen } r_{\text{Setup}}.$$

To prove security of this step, we first use security of ACE to eliminate some bad inputs. After this, we can modify programs of deniable encryption scheme in such a way that they only use *punctured* version of the programs of the level system. Then we invoke security of the level system and finally revert previous changes.

Finally, we argue that, except with negligible probability, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ is the same as $s' = \text{SFake}(s^*, m_1^*, m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$ (indeed, this is what SFake outputs except for a negligibly small fraction of inputs). In addition, since $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*)) = \text{RFake}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$, we thus obtain the following distribution:

$$\text{Hyb}_F = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_1^*)), \text{ where } s^*, r^* \text{ are randomly chosen, } s' = \text{SFake}(s^*, m_1^*, m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*), r' = \text{RFake}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*) \text{ for randomly chosen } \rho^*, \text{ and } \text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}}) \text{ for randomly chosen } r_{\text{Setup}}.$$

Note that this distribution corresponds to the execution of the protocol with plaintext m_1^* and fake randomness s', r' which makes this transcript look consistent with plaintext m_0^* , and thus we proved security of our

deniable encryption.

In section 7.1 for each one of the four steps we present a list of hybrids with a brief explanation of why indistinguishability between each hybrid holds. Formal security reductions can be found in section 7.2.

Off-the-record deniability. Proof of off-the-record deniability of our scheme follows the same major four steps, but in a different order and with slightly different distributions. In section 8 we explain how to modify the proof of deniability from section 7 to turn it into a proof of off-the-record deniability.

7 Proof of security of our bideniable encryption

7.1 List of hybrids

In this section we present a list of hybrids with brief explanation of why indistinguishability holds. Formal security reductions can be found in section 7.2.

We note that we repeat some hybrids in order to get 4 clean steps (e.g. hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,3} - \text{Hyb}_{B,3,5}$ at the very end of the proof of lemma 55 are immediately undone at the very beginning of the proof of lemma 56).

Lemma 54. [Indistinguishability of explanations of the sender] Assuming $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ security of relaxed ACE, iO and sparse extracting PRFs, the distributions in $\text{Hyb}_A, \text{Hyb}_B$ are $(t(\lambda), O(\varepsilon(\lambda)))$ -close.

Lemma 55. [Indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver] Assuming $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ security of ACE, relaxed ACE, iO, prg and sparse extracting PRFs, the distributions in $\text{Hyb}_B, \text{Hyb}_C$ are $(t(\lambda), O(\varepsilon(\lambda)) + 2^{-\tau(\lambda)})$ -close.

Lemma 56. [Semantic security] Assuming $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ security of ACE, relaxed ACE, iO, and sparse extracting PRFs, the distributions in $\text{Hyb}_C, \text{Hyb}_D$ are $(t(\lambda), O(\varepsilon(\lambda)) + O(2^{-\tau(\lambda)}))$ -close.

Lemma 57. [Indistinguishability of levels] Assuming $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ security of relaxed ACE, iO, and sparse extracting PRFs, and assuming $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon_1(\lambda, T, \tau))$ -secure level system, the distributions in $\text{Hyb}_D, \text{Hyb}_E$ are $(t(\lambda), O(\varepsilon(\lambda)) + \varepsilon_1(\lambda, T, \tau))$ -close.

7.1.1 Proof of lemma 54 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the sender)

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s^*, r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{P2}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Programs are presented on fig. 81.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{A,1} = \text{Hyb}_A$, conditioned on the fact that s^* is outside of the image of ACE.

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s^*, r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{A,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{A,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{A,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{P2}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Programs are presented on fig. 82.

That is, we modify programs of the sender by puncturing encryption key of sender-fake ACE $\text{EK}_S\{S_{\ell_0^*}\}$ at the set $S_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, decryption key of sender-fake ACE $\text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\}$ at s^* and s' (where

$s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and the key k_S of extracting PRF SG of the sender at the points (s^*, m_0^*) and (s', m_0^*) . In addition, we hardwire certain outputs inside programs of the sender to make sure that functionality of the programs doesn't change. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s^*, r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{A,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{A,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{A,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{P2}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Programs are presented on fig. 82.

That is, we choose μ_1^* at random instead of computing it as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF SG at the punctured point (s^*, m_0^*) .

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{A,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{A,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{A,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{P2}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs are presented on fig. 82.

That is, we switch the roles of s^* and s' everywhere in the distribution: namely, we give s' (instead of s^*) to the adversary as randomness of the sender, and we change s^* to s' and s' to s^* everywhere in the programs. Note that this doesn't change the code of the programs since programs use s^* and s' in the same way. Indistinguishability holds by the symmetry of sender-fake ACE, which says that $(s^*, s', \text{EK}_S\{S_{\ell_0^*}\}, \text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\})$ is indistinguishable from $(s', s^*, \text{EK}_S\{S_{\ell_0^*}\}, \text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\})$, where $p = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, s^* is randomly chosen, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(p)$. Note that $\text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\}$ is first punctured at one of the points s^*, s' which is lexicographically smaller, and then at the other.

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{A,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{A,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{A,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{P2}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs are presented on fig. 82.

That is, we generate μ_1^* as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$ instead of choosing it at random. Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF SG at the punctured point (s^*, m_0^*) .

- $\text{Hyb}_{A,6}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{P2}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs are presented on fig. 81.

That is, we revert all changes we made to programs and thus use original programs of our deniable encryption scheme in this hybrid. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since we remove puncturing without changing the functionality of the programs.

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{A,6} = \text{Hyb}_B$, conditioned on the fact that s^* is outside of the image of ACE.

Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Program P1(s, m)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$)

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryption keys EK_S, DK_S of sender-fake ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 81: Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Programs $P1_{A,1}$, $P3_{A,1}$, $S\text{Fake}_{A,1}$.

Program $P1_{A,1}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $\text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\}$ of sender-fake ACE, punctured key $k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*), (s', m_0^*)\}$ of an extracting PRF SG, **variables** s^*, s', m_0^*, μ_1^* .

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) **If** $(s, m) = (s^*, m_0^*)$ **or** $(s, m) = (s', m_0^*)$ **then return** μ_1^* ;
- (b) **If** $s = s^*$ **or** $s = s'$ **then goto main step**;
- (c) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (d) **If** $m = m'$ **then return** μ_1' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) **Return** $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*), (s', m_0^*)\}}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{A,1}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{A,1}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $\text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\}$ of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE, **variables** $s^*, s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*$.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1_{A,1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) **If** $(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2) = (s^*, m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ **or** $(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2) = (s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ **then return** μ_3^* ;
- (b) **If** $(s, m, \mu_1) = (s^*, m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$ **or** $(s, m, \mu_1) = (s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$ **then return** $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2))$;
- (c) **If** $s = s^*$ **or** $s = s'$ **then goto main step**;
- (d) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (e) **If** $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ **then return** μ_3' ;
- (f) **If** $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ **then:**
 - i. **If** $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ **then abort**;
 - ii. **Set** $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. **Return** $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. **Main step:**

- (a) **Set** $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) **Return** $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $S\text{Fake}_{A,1}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{A,1}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_S\{S_{\ell_0^*}\}$ (where $S_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$) and punctured decryption key $\text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\}$, **variables** $s^*, s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \ell_0^*$.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1_{A,1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) **If** $(s, m, \mu_1) = (s^*, m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$ **or** $(s, m, \mu_1) = (s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$ **then return** $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{p\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*))$;
- (b) **If** $s = s^*$ **or** $s = s'$ **then goto main step**;
- (c) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (d) **If** $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ **then**
 - i. **Set** $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ **then abort**;
 - ii. **Return** $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{S_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) **Set** $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) **Return** $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{S_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 82: Programs $P1_{A,1}$, $P3_{A,1}$, $S\text{Fake}_{A,1}$, used in the proof of lemma 54 (indistinguishability of explanations of the sender).

7.1.2 Proof of lemma 55 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the receiver)

First in a sequence of hybrids we “eliminate” complementary ciphertext $\overline{\mu_3^*} = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, i.e. make programs Dec and SFake reject it:

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 83 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

Note that this distribution is exactly the distribution from Hyb_B , conditioned on the fact that s^*, r^* are outside of images of their ACE.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 84 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program SFake we puncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this modification doesn't change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level ℓ_0^* .

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 85 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs P1, P3, SFake we puncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the same set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK_S is already punctured at the same set.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 85 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we choose μ_1^* at random instead of computing it as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF SG (note that s^* was not used anywhere else in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$,

$s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 86 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program P3 we puncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at the point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since P3 never needs to encrypt this point. Roughly, this is because of the following: since μ_1^* is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, P3 never encrypts \bar{p} in the main step. In order to encrypt it in trapdoor step, P3 needs to take as input some fake s encoding level ℓ_0^* . However, due to the fact that DK_S is punctured at the set $P_{\ell_0^*}$ which contains all but one strings with ℓ_0^* , the only valid fake s with ℓ_0^* is s' . However, running P3 on s' cannot result in encrypting \bar{p} in the trapdoor step since \bar{p} contains the wrong plaintext $1 \oplus m_0^*$ (instead of m_0^*).

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,1}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,1}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 86 (programs of the sender) and fig. 88 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs Dec, RFake we puncture decryption key DK of the main ACE at the same point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is already punctured at this point.

Now $\overline{\mu_3^*} = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ is rejected by Dec and RFake. In the following hybrids, similarly to previous lemma, we switch the roles of r^* and r' , using the fact that programs treat them similarly, once $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ is eliminated²⁹.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,2}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 86 (programs of the sender) and fig. 89 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we modify programs of the receiver (P2, Dec, RFake) by puncturing encryption key of receiver-fake ACE $\text{EK}_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}$ at $S_{\hat{\rho}^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, *, \hat{\rho}^*)\}$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$. Next, we puncture decryption key of receiver-fake ACE $\text{DK}_R\{r^*, r'\}$ at r^* and r' (where $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(p)$, $p = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$), and the key k_R of extracting PRF RG of the receiver at the points (r^*, μ_1^*) and (r', μ_1^*) . In addition, we hardwire certain outputs inside programs of the receiver to make sure that functionality of the programs doesn't change. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,2}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 86 (programs of the sender) and fig. 89 (programs of the receiver).

²⁹The problem with $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ is that unmodified Dec on input $(r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \overline{\mu_3^*})$ outputs $1 \oplus m_0^*$ (via main step), and on input $(r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \overline{\mu_3^*})$ it outputs 'fail' (via trapdoor step, since levels in r' and $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ are both 0 and "isLess = true" check fails). Because of this difference, in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$ we wouldn't be able to modify program Dec such that the code treats r^* and r' in the same way. However, after $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$ $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ is not a valid ciphertext anymore and thus in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$ we can instruct Dec to output 'fail' on both r^* and r' .

That is, we choose μ_2^* at random instead of computing it as $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_S}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF SG at the punctured point (r^*, μ_1^*) .

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,2}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$. Programs can be found in fig. 86 (programs of the sender) and fig. 89 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we switch the roles of r^* and r' everywhere in the distribution: namely, we give r' (instead of r^*) to the adversary as randomness of the receiver, and we change r^* to r' and r' to r^* everywhere in the programs. Note that this doesn't change the code of the programs since programs use r^* and r' in the same way. Indistinguishability holds by the symmetry of receiver-fake ACE, which says that $(r^*, r', \text{EK}_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}, \text{DK}_R\{r^*, r'\})$ is indistinguishable from $(r', r^*, \text{EK}_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}, \text{DK}_R\{r', r^*\})$, where $S_{\hat{\rho}^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, *, \hat{\rho}^*)\}$, $p = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$, r^* is randomly chosen, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(p)$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,2}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$. Programs can be found in fig. 86 (programs of the sender) and fig. 89 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we compute μ_2^* as $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$ instead of choosing it at random. Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF RG at the punctured point (r^*, μ_1^*) .

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,1}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,1}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$. Programs can be found in fig. 86 (programs of the sender) and fig. 88 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we revert all changes we made to programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$ and thus use original programs P2, Dec, RFake, except that DK remains punctured at the point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since we remove puncturing without changing the functionality of the programs.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,6}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,1}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,1}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^* , r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 86 (programs of the sender) and fig. 88 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we replace randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$ with $\text{prg}(\rho^*)$ for randomly chosen ρ^* , when generating r' . Indistinguishability holds by security of a prg.

Finally, in the following hybrids we revert all changes we made in hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$ - $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$, thus restoring all programs (and making $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ a valid ciphertext):

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 86 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs Dec, RFake we unpuncture decryption key DK of the main ACE at the point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is punctured at this point.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 85 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program P3 we unpuncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at the point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, because of the same reason as in $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^* , r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 85 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we choose μ_1^* as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$ instead of computing it at random. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF SG (note that s^* is not used anywhere else in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^* , r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 84 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs P1, P3, SFake we unpuncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the same set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK_S is already punctured at the same set.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^* , r^* are cho-

sen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 83 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this modification doesn't change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level ℓ_0^* .

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,5}$ is the same as Hyb_C , conditioned on the fact that s^*, r^* are outside of image of ACE.

Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Program P1(s, m)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$)

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryption keys EK_S, DK_S of sender-fake ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 83: Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Programs $P1_{B,1}$, $P3_{B,1}$, $S\text{Fake}_{B,1}$.

Program $P1_{B,1}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{B,1}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{B,1}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{B,1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $S\text{Fake}_{B,1}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{B,1}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption key $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ and decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{B,1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 84: Programs $P1_{B,1}$, $P3_{B,1}$, $S\text{Fake}_{B,1}$, used in the proof of lemma 55 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).

Programs $P1_{B,2}, P3_{B,2}, SFake_{B,2}$.

Program $P1_{B,2}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{B,2}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{B,2}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{B,2}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform(GenZero(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{B,2}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{B,2}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{B,2}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 85: Programs $P1_{B,2}, P3_{B,2}, SFake_{B,2}$, used in the proof of lemma 55 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).

Programs $P1_{B,3}, P3_{B,3}, SFake_{B,3}$.

Program $P1_{B,3}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{B,3}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{B,3}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, punctured encryption key $\text{EK}\{\bar{p}\}$ of main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{B,3}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}\{\bar{p}\}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}\{\bar{p}\}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{B,3}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{B,3}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, \text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{B,3}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 86: Programs $P1_{B,3}, P3_{B,3}, SFake_{B,3}$, used in the proof of lemma 55 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).

Programs P2, Dec, RFake.

Program P2(r, μ_1)

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, key k_R of an extracting PRF RG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_R}(r)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow \text{RG}_{k_R}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program Dec(r, μ_1, μ_2, μ_3)

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of the main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P2}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_R}(r)$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;
- (c) $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK}(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (d) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then
 - i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L')$ and $\text{isLess}(L', L'') = \text{true}$ then return m'' ;
 - ii. Else abort.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK}(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L'')$ then return m'' ;
- (c) Else abort.

Program RFake($\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho$)

Inputs: fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_R of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of the main ACE.

- 1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK}(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_R}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', \text{prg}(\rho))$.

Figure 87: Programs P2, Dec, RFake.

Programs $P2_{B,1}, Dec_{B,1}, RFake_{B,1}$.

Program $P2_{B,1}(r, \mu_1)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, key k_R of an extracting PRF RG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow RG_{k_R}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program $Dec_{B,1}(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{\bar{p}\}$ of the main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

1. **Validity check:** if $P2(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out' = 'fail'$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;
- (c) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out'' = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (d) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then
 - i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L'')$ and $\text{isLess}(L', L'') = \text{true}$ then return m'' ;
 - ii. Else abort.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L'')$ then return m'' ;
- (c) Else abort.

Program $RFake_{B,1}(\hat{n}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho)$

Inputs: fake message \hat{n} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{\bar{p}\}$ of the main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

- 1. $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK_R}(\hat{n}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', \text{prg}(\rho))$.

Figure 88: Programs $P2_{B,1}, Dec_{B,1}, RFake_{B,1}$, used in the proof of lemma 55 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).

Programs $P2_{B,2}$, $Dec_{B,2}$, $RFake_{B,2}$.

Program $P2_{B,2}(r, \mu_1)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_R\{r^*, r'\}$ of receiver-fake ACE, punctured key $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*), (r', \mu_1^*)\}$ of an extracting PRF RG, **variables** $r^*, r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*$.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) **If $(r, \mu_1) = (r^*, \mu_1^*)$ or $(r, \mu_1) = (r', \mu_1^*)$ then return μ_2^* ;**
- (b) **If $r = r^*$ or $r = r'$ then goto main step;**
- (c) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R\{r^*, r'\}}(r)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (d) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow RG_{k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*), (r', \mu_1^*)\}}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program $Dec_{B,2}(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P2_{B,2}$, $isLess$, $RetrieveTags$; punctured decryption key $DK_R\{r^*, r'\}$ of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{\bar{p}\}$ of the main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, **variables** $r^*, r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, m_0^*$.

1. Validity check: if $P2_{B,2}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) **If $(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3) = (r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$ or $(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3) = (r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$ then return m_0^* ;**
- (b) **If $(r, \mu_1, \mu_2) = (r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ or $(r, \mu_1, \mu_2) = (r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ then then goto main step;**
- (c) **If $r = r^*$ or $r = r'$ then goto main step;**
- (d) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R\{r^*, r'\}}(r)$; if $out' = 'fail'$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (e) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;
- (f) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out'' = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (g) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then
 - i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L'')$ and $isLess(L', L'') = true$ then return m'' ;
 - ii. Else abort.

3. Main step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L'')$ then return m'' ;
- (c) Else abort.

Program $RFake_{B,2}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho)$

Inputs: fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $EK_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}$ of receiver-fake ACE, where $S_{\hat{\rho}^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, *, \hat{\rho}^*)\}$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$, punctured decryption key $DK\{\bar{p}\}$ of the main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

- 1. $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK_R\{p\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', prg(\rho))$.

Figure 89: Programs $P2_{B,2}$, $Dec_{B,2}$, $RFake_{B,2}$, used in the proof of lemma 55 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).

7.1.3 Proof of lemma 56 (Semantic security)

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 90 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

Note that this distribution is exactly the distribution from Hyb_C , conditioned on the fact that s^*, r^* are outside of image of ACE.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 91 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program SFake we puncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this modification doesn't change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level ℓ_0^* .

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs P1, P3, SFake we puncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the same set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK_S is already punctured at the same set.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we choose μ_1^* at random instead of computing it as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF SG (note that s^* was not used anywhere else in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; μ_1^*

is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we choose μ_2^* at random instead of computing it as $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the receiver PRF RG (note that r^* was not used anywhere else in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,3}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,3}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 93 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program P3 we puncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at the points $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since P3 never needs to encrypt these points. Roughly, this is because of the following: since μ_1^* is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, P3 never encrypts p_0, p_1 in the main step. In order to encrypt it in trapdoor step, P3 needs to take as input some fake s encoding level ℓ_0^* . However, due to the fact that DK_S is punctured at the set $P_{\ell_0^*}$ which contains all but one strings with ℓ_0^* , the only valid fake s with ℓ_0^* is s' . However, running P3 on s' cannot result in encrypting p_0 or p_1 in the trapdoor step: in order to hit the trapdoor step with s' , the input to P3 should be $(s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$; however, in this case the program immediately outputs μ_3^* without running an encryption algorithm.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,3}, \text{P2}_{C,1}, \text{P3}_{C,3}, \text{Dec}_{C,1}, \text{SFake}_{C,3}, \text{RFake}_{C,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 93 (programs of the sender) and fig. 95 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs Dec, RFake we puncture decryption key DK of the main ACE at the point $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is already punctured at this point (and encryption of p_1 is not used anywhere in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,3}, \text{P2}_{C,2}, \text{P3}_{C,3}, \text{Dec}_{C,2}, \text{SFake}_{C,3}, \text{RFake}_{C,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 93 (programs of the sender) and fig. 96 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we modify programs Dec and RFake by additionally puncturing decryption key of main ACE DK at the point $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. In addition, we hardwire certain outputs inside program RFake to make sure that its functionality doesn't change. (Note that in program Dec we only puncture keys, without hardwiring anything. However, this doesn't change the functionality of Dec. This is

because Dec would output \perp when trying to decrypt an encryption of p_0 anyway: roughly, this is because the main step cannot be reached because μ_2^* doesn't have a preimage, and trapdoor step would output \perp because there doesn't exist fake randomness with level smaller than 0.) Indistinguishability holds by iO.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,3}, \text{P2}_{C,2}, \text{P3}_{C,3}, \text{Dec}_{C,2}, \text{SFake}_{C,3}, \text{RFake}_{C,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 93 (programs of the sender) and fig. 96 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we generate μ_3^* as an encryption of $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ instead of $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of the main ACE, since encryption and decryption keys EK, DK are punctured at both p_0, p_1 .

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,3}, \text{P2}_{C,3}, \text{P3}_{C,3}, \text{Dec}_{C,3}, \text{SFake}_{C,3}, \text{RFake}_{C,3}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 93 (programs of the sender) and fig. 97 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we modify programs Dec and RFake by unpuncturing decryption key of main ACE DK at the point $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ (note that DK remains punctured at $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$). We also remove additional instructions introduced in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3}$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since we don't change functionality of the programs.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,6}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,3}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,3}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 93 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs Dec, RFake we unpuncture decryption key DK of the main ACE at the point $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is punctured at this point (and encryption of p_0 is not used anywhere in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,7}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program P3 we unpuncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at the points $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this doesn't

change functionality of P3 for the same reason as in $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we compute μ_2^* as $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$ instead of choosing it at random. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the receiver PRF RG (note that r^* is not used anywhere else in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^* is chosen at random, r^* is chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 92 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we compute μ_1^* as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$ instead of choosing it at random. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF SG (note that s^* is not used anywhere else in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{C,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{C,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{C,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^* is chosen at random, r^* is chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 91 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs P1, P3, SFake we unpuncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK_S is punctured at the same set.

- $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^* is chosen at random, r^* is chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 90 (programs of the sender) and fig. 94 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this modification doesn't change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level ℓ_0^* .

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,4} = \text{Hyb}_D$, conditioned on the fact that s^*, r^* are outside of image of ACE.

Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Program P1(s, m)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$)

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryption keys EK_S, DK_S of sender-fake ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 90: Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Programs $P1_{C,1}$, $P3_{C,1}$, $S\text{Fake}_{C,1}$.

Program $P1_{C,1}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{C,1}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{C,1}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{C,1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $S\text{Fake}_{C,1}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{C,1}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption key $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ and decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{C,1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 91: Programs $P1_{C,1}$, $P3_{C,1}$, $S\text{Fake}_{C,1}$, used in the proof of lemma 56 (semantic security).

Programs $P1_{C,2}, P3_{C,2}, SFake_{C,2}$.

Program $P1_{C,2}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{C,2}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{C,2}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{C,2}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform(GenZero(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{C,2}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{C,2}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{C,2}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 92: Programs $P1_{C,2}, P3_{C,2}, SFake_{C,2}$, used in the proof of lemma 56 (semantic security).

Programs $P1_{C,3}, P3_{C,3}, SFake_{C,3}$.

Program $P1_{C,3}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{C,3}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{C,3}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, punctured encryption key $\text{EK}\{p_0, p_1\}$ of main ACE, where $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{C,3}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}\{p_0, p_1\}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}\{p_0, p_1\}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{C,3}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{C,3}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, \text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{C,3}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 93: Programs $P1_{C,3}, P3_{C,3}, SFake_{C,3}$, used in the proof of lemma 56 (semantic security).

Programs P2, Dec, RFake.

Program P2(r, μ_1)

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, key k_R of an extracting PRF RG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_R}(r)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow \text{RG}_{k_R}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program Dec(r, μ_1, μ_2, μ_3)

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of the main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P2}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out}' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_R}(r)$; if $\text{out}' = \text{'fail'}$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;
- (c) $\text{out}'' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK}(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out}'' = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (d) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then
 - i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L'')$ and $\text{isLess}(L', L'') = \text{true}$ then return m'' ;
 - ii. Else abort.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK}(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L'')$ then return m'' ;
- (c) Else abort.

Program RFake($\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho$)

Inputs: fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_R of receiver-fake ACE, decryption key DK of the main ACE.

- 1. $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK}(\mu_3)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_R}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', \text{prg}(\rho))$.

Figure 94: Programs P2, Dec, RFake.

Programs $P2_{C,1}$, $Dec_{C,1}$, $RFake_{C,1}$.

Program $P2_{C,1}(r, \mu_1)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, key k_R of an extracting PRF RG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow RG_{k_R}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program $Dec_{C,1}(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P2_{C,1}$, $isLess$, $RetrieveTags$; decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{p_1\}$ of the main ACE, where $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P2_{C,1}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out' \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out' = 'fail'$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;
- (c) $out'' \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{p_1\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out'' = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (d) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then
 - i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L')$ and $isLess(L', L'') = true$ then return m'' ;
 - ii. Else abort.

3. Main step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{p_1\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L'')$ then return m'' ;
- (c) Else abort.

Program $RFake_{C,1}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho)$

Inputs: fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{p_1\}$ of the main ACE, where $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

- 1. $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{p_1\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK_R}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', prg(\rho))$.

Figure 95: Programs $P2_{C,1}$, $Dec_{C,1}$, $RFake_{C,1}$, used in the proof of lemma 56 (semantic security).

Programs $P2_{C,2}$, $Dec_{C,2}$, $RFake_{C,2}$.

Program $P2_{C,2}(r, \mu_1)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, key k_R of an extracting PRF RG.

1. Trapdoor step:

(a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;

(b) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. Main step:

(a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow RG_{k_R}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program $Dec_{C,2}(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P2_{C,2}$, $isLess$, $RetrieveTags$; decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{p_0, p_1\}$ of the main ACE, where $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P2_{C,2}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

(a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out' = 'fail'$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;

(b) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;

(c) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{p_0, p_1\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out'' = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;

(d) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then

- i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L')$ and $isLess(L', L'') = true$ then return m'' ;
- ii. Else abort.

3. Main step:

(a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{p_0, p_1\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;

(b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L'')$ then return m'' ;

(c) Else abort.

Program $RFake_{C,2}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho)$

Inputs: fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{p_0, p_1\}$ of the main ACE, where $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, variables μ_3^*, L_0^* .

1. If $\mu_3 = \mu_3^*$ then set $L'' = L_0^*$;

else $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{p_0, p_1\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;

2. Return $r' \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK_R}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', prg(\rho))$.

Figure 96: Programs $P2_{C,2}$, $Dec_{C,2}$, $RFake_{C,2}$, used in the proof of lemma 56 (semantic security).

Programs $P2_{C,3}$, $Dec_{C,3}$, $RFake_{C,3}$.

Program $P2_{C,3}(r, \mu_1)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, key k_R of an extracting PRF RG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow RG_{k_R}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program $Dec_{C,3}(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P2_{C,3}$, $isLess$, $RetrieveTags$; decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{p_0\}$ of the main ACE, where $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P2_{C,3}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out' \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out' = 'fail'$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;
- (c) $out'' \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{p_0\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out'' = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (d) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then
 - i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L')$ and $isLess(L', L'') = true$ then return m'' ;
 - ii. Else abort.

3. Main step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{p_0\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L'')$ then return m'' ;
- (c) Else abort.

Program $RFake_{C,3}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho)$

Inputs: fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{p_0\}$ of the main ACE, where $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

- 1. $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{p_0\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK_R}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', prg(\rho))$.

Figure 97: Programs $P2_{C,3}$, $Dec_{C,3}$, $RFake_{C,3}$, used in the proof of lemma 56 (semantic security).

7.1.4 Proof of lemma 57 (Indistinguishability of levels)

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 98.

Note that this distribution is exactly the distribution from Hyb_C , conditioned on the fact that s^*, r^* are outside of image of ACE.

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{D,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{D,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 99.

That is, in program SFake we puncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this modification doesn't change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level ℓ_0^* .

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{D,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{D,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 100.

That is, in programs P1, P3, SFake we puncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the same set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK_S is already punctured at the same set.

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{D,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{D,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 100.

That is, we choose μ_1^* at random instead of computing it as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF SG (note that s^* was not used anywhere else in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{D,3}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{D,3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,3}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 101.

That is, in programs P3 and SFake we use punctured programs $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$, $\text{Transform}[\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*]$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this doesn't change functionality of P3 and SFake. Roughly, this is because of the following:

Since μ_1^* is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, programs P3 and SFake never call $\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$ in the main step, and program P3 never calls $\text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$ in the main step.

In order to call $\text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$ in trapdoor step, P3 needs to take as input some fake s encoding level ℓ_0^* . However, due to the fact that DK_S is punctured at the set $P_{\ell_0^*}$ which contains all but one strings with ℓ_0^* , the only valid fake s with ℓ_0^* is s' . However, running P3 on s' cannot result in calling $\text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$ in the trapdoor step: in order to hit the trapdoor step with s' and run Transform with $\mu_2 = \mu_2^*$, the input to P3 should be $(s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$; however, in this case the program immediately outputs μ_3' without running Transform .

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{D,4}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{D,4}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,4}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 102.

That is, we switch the single-tag level used in generation of s' from $\ell_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$ to $\ell_1^* = [1, \mu_1^*]$. Indistinguishability holds by security of level system: recall that it guarantees that ℓ_0^* is indistinguishable from ℓ_1^* , even given $L_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$ and punctured programs of the level system.

Note that now keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender-fake ACE become punctured at the set $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ instead of $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and program Transform becomes punctured at the point (ℓ_1^*, μ_2^*) instead of (ℓ_0^*, μ_2^*) .

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{D,5}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{D,5}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,5}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 103.

That is, in programs P3 and SFake we use original programs GenZero , Transform instead of punctured programs $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$, $\text{Transform}[\ell_1^*, \mu_2^*]$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this doesn't change functionality of P3 and SFake. Roughly, this is because of similar reasoning as in Hyb_D , except for ℓ_1^* instead of ℓ_0^* :

Since μ_1^* is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, programs P3 and SFake never call $\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$ in the main step, and program P3 never calls $\text{Transform}(\ell_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ in the main step.

In order to call $\text{Transform}(\ell_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ in trapdoor step, P3 needs to take as input some fake s encoding level ℓ_1^* . However, due to the fact that DK_S is punctured at the set $P_{\ell_1^*}$ which contains all but one strings with ℓ_1^* , the only valid fake s with ℓ_1^* is s' . However, running P3 on s' cannot result in calling $\text{Transform}(\ell_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ in the trapdoor step: in order to hit the trapdoor step with s' and run Transform with $\mu_2 = \mu_2^*$, the input to P3 should be $(s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$; however, in this case the program immediately outputs μ_3' without running Transform .

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} =$

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{D,6}, P2, P3_{D,6}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,6}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 104.

That is, in program SFake we additionally puncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$ (recall that it is already punctured at the set $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$). Indistinguishability holds by security of iO , since this modification doesn't change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level ℓ_0^* .

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{D,7}, P2, P3_{D,7}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,7}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 105.

That is, in programs $P1, P3, \text{SFake}$ we additionally puncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$ (recall that it is already punctured at the set $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$). Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is already punctured at $P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{D,8}, P2, P3_{D,8}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,8}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 106.

That is, in programs $P1, P3, \text{SFake}$ we unpuncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ (but this key still remains punctured at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$). Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is already punctured at $P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{D,9}, P2, P3_{D,9}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,9}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 107.

That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ (but this key still remains punctured at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$). Indistinguishability holds by security of iO , since this doesn't change the functionality of SFake . Indeed, the program never needs to encrypt any plaintext containing ℓ_1^* because of the following. Since μ_1^* is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG , program SFake never calls $\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$ in the main step and thus never needs to encrypt $\ell_1^* = \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*))$. In order to encrypt a plaintext containing ℓ_1^* in the trapdoor step, SFake needs to get as input fake s which contains ℓ_0^* . However, since DK_S is punctured at $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, there do not exist valid fake s with ℓ_0^* , thus the program never needs to encrypt plaintexts with ℓ_1^* .

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} =$

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{D,10}, P2, P3_{D,10}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{D,10}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 108.

That is, in programs P1, P3, SFake we unpuncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is already punctured at $P_{\ell_0^*}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,6}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1, P2, P3, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 109.

That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$. Indistinguishability holds by security of iO, since this doesn't change the functionality of SFake since SFake never needs to encrypt plaintexts with ℓ_0^* .

- $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,7}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1, P2, P3, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^* is chosen at random, r^* is chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs of the sender can be found in fig. 109.

That is, we compute μ_1^* as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$ instead of choosing it at random. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF SG (note that s^* is not used anywhere else in the distribution).

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,7} = \text{Hyb}_E$.

Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Program P1(s, m)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$)

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryption keys EK_S, DK_S of sender-fake ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 98: Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Programs $P1_{D,1}, P3_{D,1}, SFake_{D,1}$.

Program $P1_{D,1}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,1}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,1}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform(GenZero(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{D,1}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,1}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption key $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ and decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 99: Programs $P1_{D,1}, P3_{D,1}, SFake_{D,1}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs $P1_{D,2}$, $P3_{D,2}$, $SFake_{D,2}$.

Program $P1_{D,2}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,2}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,2}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,2}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform(GenZero(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{D,2}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,2}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,2}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 100: Programs $P1_{D,2}, P3_{D,2}, SFake_{D,2}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs $P1_{D,3}, P3_{D,3}, SFake_{D,3}$.

Program $P1_{D,3}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,3}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,3}$, punctured $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$, punctured $\text{Transform}[(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)]$, RetrieveTag ; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,3}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}[(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)](\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}[(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)](\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*](\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{D,3}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,3}$, punctured $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$, Increment ; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,3}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*](\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 101: Programs $P1_{D,3}, P3_{D,3}, SFake_{D,3}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs $P1_{D,4}, P3_{D,4}, SFake_{D,4}$

Program $P1_{D,4}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,4}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,4}$, punctured $GenZero[\mu_1^*]$, punctured $Transform[(\ell_1^*, \mu_2^*)]$, $RetrieveTag$; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,4}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform[(\ell_1^*, \mu_2^*)](\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform[(\ell_1^*, \mu_2^*)](GenZero[\mu_1^*](\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{D,4}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,4}$, punctured $GenZero[\mu_1^*]$, $Increment$; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,4}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero[\mu_1^*](\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 102: Programs $P1_{D,4}, P3_{D,4}, SFake_{D,4}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs $P1_{D,5}$, $P3_{D,5}$, $SFake_{D,5}$.

Program $P1_{D,5}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,5}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,5}$, **GenZero**, **Transform**, **RetrieveTag**; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,5}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{D,5}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,5}$, **GenZero**, **Increment**; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,5}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 103: Programs $P1_{D,5}$, $P3_{D,5}$, $SFake_{D,5}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs $P1_{D,6}, P3_{D,6}, SFake_{D,6}$.

Program $P1_{D,6}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,6}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,6}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,6}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform(GenZero(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{D,6}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,6}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,6}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 104: Programs $P1_{D,6}, P3_{D,6}, SFake_{D,6}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs $P1_{D,7}$, $P3_{D,7}$, $SFake_{D,7}$.

Program $P1_{D,7}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,7}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,7}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,7}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform(GenZero(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{D,7}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,7}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,7}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 105: Programs $P1_{D,7}$, $P3_{D,7}$, $SFake_{D,7}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs $P1_{D,8}, P3_{D,8}, SFake_{D,8}$.

Program $P1_{D,8}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,8}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,8}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1_{D,8}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform(GenZero(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{D,8}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,8}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*), P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1_{D,8}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_1^*} \cup P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 106: Programs $P1_{D,8}, P3_{D,8}, SFake_{D,8}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs $P1_{D,9}, P3_{D,9}, SFake_{D,9}$.

Program $P1_{D,9}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,9}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,9}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,9}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform(GenZero(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{D,9}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,9}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,9}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 107: Programs $P1_{D,9}, P3_{D,9}, SFake_{D,9}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs $P1_{D,10}$, $P3_{D,10}$, $S\text{Fake}_{D,10}$.

Program $P1_{D,10}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{D,10}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,10}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,10}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $S\text{Fake}_{D,10}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{D,10}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption key $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ and decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$.

1. Validity check: if $P1_{D,10}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. Main step:

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 108: Programs $P1_{D,10}$, $P3_{D,10}$, $S\text{Fake}_{D,10}$, used in the proof of lemma 57 (security of levels).

Programs P1, P3, SFake.

Program P1(s, m)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow \text{SG}_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program P3(s, m, μ_1, μ_2)

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; decryption key DK_S of sender-fake ACE, encryption key EK of main ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq \text{RetrieveTag}(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program SFake($s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3$)

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P1, GenZero, Increment; encryption and decryption keys EK_S, DK_S of sender-fake ACE.

1. **Validity check:** if $\text{P1}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $\text{out} \leftarrow \text{ACE.Dec}_{DK_S}(s)$; if $\text{out} = \text{'fail'}$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = \text{'fail'}$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 109: Programs P1, P3, SFake.

7.2 Detailed proof of security

In this section we present formal security reductions for each hybrid described in section 7.1.

We denote by σ' the maximum size of programs of deniable encryption in the construction and the proof. Since our construction uses multiple layers of obfuscation, σ' is some polynomial of λ . As we note in appendix A, we could instead use only one layer of obfuscation, and the resulting code would have size $\sigma = O(\lambda^3)$.

7.2.1 Reductions in the proof of lemma 54 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the sender)

Let $t(\lambda)$ be any function in $\Omega(\text{poly}(\lambda))$, and let $\varepsilon(\lambda)$ be a negligible function in $w(2^{-\lambda})$. Assuming the sender-fake relaxed ACE, sparse extracting puncturable PRF, and iO for program size σ' is $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -secure, we show that no time- $t(\lambda)$ adversary can distinguish between Hyb_A and Hyb_B with more than $O(\varepsilon(\lambda))$ advantage.

Note that conditioning on s^* begin not in the image of ACE incurs only $2^{-\lambda}$ loss and therefore we omit it.

Lemma 58. *Statistical distance between distributions $\text{Hyb}_A, \text{Hyb}_{A,1}$ is at most $2^{-\lambda}$.*

Proof. Since randomly chosen s^* is a valid ciphertext of sender ACE with probability at most $2^{-\lambda}$, with all but this probability both P1 and P3 will fail to decrypt s^* under DK_S and therefore will run main step, outputting $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$ and $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, respectively. \square

Lemma 59. *Assume s^* is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists an adversary which can distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{A,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{A,2}$ in time $t(\lambda)$ with advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$, then there exists an adversary which can break iO for programs of size σ' in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\frac{1}{3} \cdot \varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. Below we analyze all three pairs of programs assuming that s^* is outside the image of sender ACE, and thus $\text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_S}(s^*) = \text{'fail'}$. We show that programs have the same functionality. We use the fact that all underlying primitives satisfy correctness.

Program P1. We present case analysis to show that the behavior of programs P1 and $\text{P1}_{A,1}$ on each input is the same:

- Case $s = s^*$:
 - Case $m = m_0^*$: P1 outputs μ_1^* via main step since s^* is outside of image of ACE. $\text{P1}_{A,1}$ outputs μ_1^* due to hardwired instruction.
 - Case $m \neq m_0^*$: P1 executes main step and outputs $\text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m)$ since s^* is outside of image of ACE. $\text{P1}_{A,1}$ executes main step and outputs $\text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m)$ due to hardwired instruction.
- Case $s = s'$:
 - Case $m = m_0^*$: P1 outputs μ_1^* via trapdoor step. $\text{P1}_{A,1}$ outputs μ_1^* due to hardwired instruction.

- Case $m \neq m_0^*$: P1 skips the trapdoor step since s' contains the wrong $m_0^* \neq m$, and outputs $SG_{k_S}(s', m)$. $P1_{A,1}$ executes main step and output $SG_{k_S}(s', m)$ due to hardwired instruction.
- Case $s \neq s', s^*$: P1 and $P1_{A,1}$ execute the same code, since punctured keys preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured (note that when $s \neq s', s^*$ keys are indeed never used at punctured points).

Program P3. Next we compare programs P3 and $P3_{A,1}$. Note that validity check passes on the same set of inputs in programs P3 and $P3_{A,1}$, since programs P1 and $P1_{A,1}$ are functionally equivalent. We present the analysis assuming inputs passed the validity check.

- Case $s = s^*$:
 - Case $(m, \mu_1) = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$:
 - * Case $\mu_2 = \mu_2^*$: P3 outputs μ_3^* via main step since s^* is outside of image of ACE. $P3_{A,1}$ outputs μ_3^* due to hardwired instruction.
 - * Case $\mu_2 \neq \mu_2^*$: P3 outputs $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*), \mu_2))$ via main step since s^* is outside of image of ACE. $P3_{A,1}$ outputs $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2))$ due to hardwired instruction. Note that $\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*) = \ell_0^*$ and thus both outputs are the same.
 - Case $(m, \mu_1) \neq (m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$: P3 executes main step and outputs $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2))$ since s^* is outside of image of ACE. $P3_{A,1}$ executes main step due to hardwired instruction and outputs $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2))$.
- Case $s = s'$:
 - Case $(m, \mu_1) = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$:
 - * Case $\mu_2 = \mu_2^*$: P3 outputs μ_1^* via trapdoor step. $P3_{A,1}$ outputs μ_1^* due to hardwired instruction.
 - * Case $\mu_2 \neq \mu_2^*$: P3 gets level ℓ_0^* from s' and outputs $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2))$ via trapdoor step. $P3_{A,1}$ outputs $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2))$ due to hardwired instruction.
 - Case $(m, \mu_1) \neq (m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$: P3 skips the trapdoor step since s' contains the wrong $(m_0^*, \mu_1^*) \neq (m, \mu_1)$, and outputs $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2))$ via main step. $P3_{A,1}$ executes main step due to hardwired instruction and outputs $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2))$.
- Case $s \neq s', s^*$: P3 and $P3_{A,1}$ execute the same code, since punctured keys preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured. Note that in this case these keys are never used at punctured points.

Program SFake. Next we compare programs SFake and $\text{SFake}_{A,1}$. Note that validity check passes on the same set of inputs in programs SFake and $\text{SFake}_{A,1}$, since programs P1 and $P1_{A,1}$ are functionally equivalent. We present the analysis assuming inputs passed the validity check.

- Case $s = s^*$:
 - Case $(m, \mu_1) = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$ (for arbitrary (\hat{m}, μ_2, μ_3)): SFake outputs $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \mu_3, \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)))$ via main step since s^* is outside of image of ACE. $\text{SFake}_{A,1}$ outputs $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \mu_3, \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*))$ due to hardwired instruction. Note that $\text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*) = \ell_0^*$ and thus both outputs are the same.
 - Case $(m, \mu_1) \neq (m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$ (for arbitrary (\hat{m}, μ_2, μ_3)): SFake executes main step since s^* is outside of image of ACE and outputs $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1)))$. $\text{SFake}_{A,1}$ skips the trapdoor step due to hardwired instruction and outputs the same value via main step.
- Case $s = s'$:
 - Case $(m, \mu_1) = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$ (for arbitrary (\hat{m}, μ_2, μ_3)): SFake gets ℓ_0^* from s' , increments it and outputs $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \mu_3, \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*))$. $\text{SFake}_{A,1}$ outputs the same value due to hardwired instruction.
 - Case $(m, \mu_1) \neq (m_0^*, \mu_1^*)$ (for arbitrary (\hat{m}, μ_2, μ_3)): SFake skips the trapdoor step since s' contains the wrong $(m_0^*, \mu_1^*) \neq (m, \mu_1)$, and outputs $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \text{Increment}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1)))$ via main step. $\text{SFake}_{A,1}$ skips the trapdoor step due to hardwired instruction and outputs $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, \text{Transform}(\text{GenZero}(\mu_1), \mu_2))$ via main step.
- Case $s \neq s', s^*$: SFake and $\text{SFake}_{A,1}$ execute the same code, since punctured keys preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured. Note that keys are never used at punctured points (in particular, the program never needs to encrypt a plaintext containing ℓ_0^* , and thus the key can be punctured at $S_{\ell_0^*} = \{*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*\}$).

□

Lemma 60. *Assume s^* is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists an adversary which can distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{A,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{A,3}$ in time $t(\lambda)$ with advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of a puncturable PRF SG_{k_S} in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{A,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{A,3}$ to security of a puncturable PRF SG_{k_S} at the punctured point (s^*, m_0^*) .

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. Next it chooses random s^* and sends the point (s^*, m_0^*) to the challenger of puncturable PRF game. The reduction gets back from the challenger the punctured key $k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*)\}$ and the value μ_1^* , which is either $\text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$ or randomly chosen.

Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all keys used in programs (except $k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*)\}$), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random r^* and sets $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ and $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

Next it computes punctured keys $DK_S\{s^*, s'\}$, $k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*), (s', m_0^*)\}$ (by additionally puncturing challenge $k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*)\}$ at (s', m_0^*)), and $EK_S\{S_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $S_{\ell_0^*} = \{*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*\}$.

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 82) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 80). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s^*, r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge μ_1^* was $SG_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{A,2}$. If μ_1^* was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{A,3}$.

Note that this reduction is using the fact that an adversary who holds the punctured key can additionally puncture it at another point. We note that the construction of an extracting PRF [SW14] is based on GGM PRF and satisfies this property. \square

Lemma 61. *Assume s^* is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists an adversary which can distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{A,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{A,4}$ in time $t(\lambda)$ with advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$, then there exists an adversary which can break symmetry of a sender-fake relaxed ACE scheme in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{A,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{A,4}$ to symmetry of sender ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. Next it samples all keys used in programs (except EK_S, DK_S), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random r^* and sets μ_1^* to be randomly chosen, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{EK}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

Next the reduction sends $p = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$ as the challenge point to the challenger of the symmetry of ACE. The challenger chooses random s^* , samples keys EK_S, DK_S of ACE and computes $s' = \text{Enc}_{EK_S}(p)$, and punctures EK_S at $S_{\ell_0^*} = \{*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*\}$ and DK_S at s^*, s' (DK_S is first punctured at one of the strings s^*, s' which is lexicographically smaller, and then at the other). The reduction gets back from the challenger $(s_1, s_2, EK_S\{S_{\ell_0^*}\}, DK_S\{s^*, s'\})$, where $s_1 = s^*, s_2 = s'$ or $s_1 = s', s_2 = s^*$.

Next the reduction computes punctured key $k_S\{(s_1, m_0^*), (s_2, m_0^*)\}$. Then it uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 82) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 80). In particular, in every place where s^*, s' appear, e.g. in code of programs, or as a punctured point, the reduction first uses one of the strings s_1, s_2 which is lexicographically smaller, and then the other (note that s^*, s' always appear together in the distribution, except for the value given to the adversary as randomness of the sender).

Next the reduction gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s_1, r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge s_1, s_2 are s^*, s' , then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{A,3}$. If s_1, s_2 are s', s^* , then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{A,4}$. \square

Lemma 62. *Assume s^* is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists an adversary which can distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{A,4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{A,5}$ in time $t(\lambda)$ with advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of a puncturable PRF SG_{k_S} in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{A,2}$, $\text{Hyb}_{A,3}$, except that the reduction gives s' instead of s^* as randomness of the sender to the adversary.

We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{A,4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{A,5}$ to security of a puncturable PRF SG_{k_S} at the punctured point (s^*, m_0^*) .

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. Next it chooses random s^* and sends the point (s^*, m_0^*) to the challenger of puncturable PRF game. The reduction gets back from the challenger the punctured key $k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*)\}$ and the value μ_1^* , which is either $\text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$ or randomly chosen.

Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all keys used in programs (except $k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*)\}$), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random r^* and sets $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ and $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

Next it computes punctured keys $\text{DK}_S\{s^*, s'\}$, $k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*), (s', m_0^*)\}$ (by additionally puncturing challenge $k_S\{(s^*, m_0^*)\}$ at (s', m_0^*)), and $\text{EK}_S\{S_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $S_{\ell_0^*} = \{*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*\}$

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 82) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 80). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge μ_1^* was $\text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{A,5}$. If μ_1^* was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{A,4}$.

Note that this reduction is using the fact that an adversary who holds the punctured key can additionally puncture it at another point. We note that the construction of an extracting PRF [SW14] is based on GGM PRF and satisfies this property. \square

Lemma 63. *Assume s^* is outside of the image of sender ACE. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{A,5}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{A,6}$, then there exists an adversary which can break iO for programs of size σ' in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\frac{1}{3} \cdot \varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 59, except that we give s' , and not s^* , as randomness of the sender to the adversary. \square

Finally, we note that the distributions in $\text{Hyb}_{A,6}$ and Hyb_B are $2^{-\lambda}$ -close (the reasoning is similar to distributions $\text{Hyb}_A, \text{Hyb}_{A,1}$).

7.2.2 Reductions in the proof of lemma 55 (Indistinguishability of explanation of the receiver)

Let $t(\lambda)$ be any function in $\Omega(\text{poly}(\lambda))$, and let $\varepsilon(\lambda)$ be a negligible function in $w(2^{-\lambda})$. Assuming the prg, the sender-fake relaxed ACE, receiver-fake relaxed ACE, main ACE, sparse extracting puncturable PRF, and iO for program size σ' are $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -secure, we show that no time- $t(\lambda)$ adversary can distinguish between Hyb_B and Hyb_C with more than $O(\varepsilon(\lambda)) + 2^{-\tau(\lambda)}$ advantage.

(Note that security loss $2^{-\tau(\lambda)}$ comes from conditioning on the fact that μ_1^* is outside of the image of the PRF SG. Conditioning on $s^*, r^*, \hat{\rho}^*$ incurs only $2^{-\lambda}$ loss and therefore we omit it.).

Lemma 64. *Statistical distance between distributions $\text{Hyb}_B, \text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$ is at most $2 \cdot 2^{-\lambda}$.*

Proof. Since randomly chosen s^* is a valid ciphertext of sender ACE with probability $\text{senderACE.sparsity}(\lambda)$, with all but this probability both P1 and P3 will fail to decrypt s^* under DK_S and therefore will run main step, outputting $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$ and $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, respectively.

Similarly, randomly chosen r^* is a valid ciphertext of receiver ACE with probability $\text{receiverACE.sparsity}(\lambda)$, and thus with all but this probability P2 will fail to decrypt r^* under DK_R and therefore will run main step, outputting $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. \square

Lemma 65. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$, then there exists an adversary which can break iO for programs of size σ' in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only difference between programs SFake and SFake $_{B,1}$ is that SFake $_{B,1}$ uses a punctured key $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. This is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with level ℓ_0^* , since $\ell_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$ and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1. \square

Lemma 66. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$ to security of constrained decryption of sender ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It samples all keys used in programs (except EK_S, DK_S), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random s^*, r^* and sets $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

Next the reduction sends the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$ to puncture encryption key and sets $P_{\ell_0^*}, \emptyset$ to puncture decryption key to the challenger of constrained decryption game. The challenger samples keys EK_S, DK_S and it sends back to the reduction $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ and key which is either $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ or $\text{DK}_S\{\emptyset\}$.

Next the reduction computes $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$ (note that this point is not punctured).

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 84, fig. 85) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 80). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge key was $\text{DK}_S\{\emptyset\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the

distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$. If key was $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$. \square

Lemma 67. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,4}$, then there exists an adversary which can break the strong computational extractor property of the PRF SG in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,4}$ to strong computationally extracting PRF SG_{k_S} .

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It sends the point m_0^* to the challenger of strong extractor game. The challenger samples the key k_S for SG and either chooses μ_1^* at random or computes it as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$ for randomly chosen s^* . The reduction gets back from the challenger the key k_S and the value μ_1^* .

Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all keys used in programs (except k_S), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random r^* and sets $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ and $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

Next it computes punctured keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 85) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 80). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge μ_1^* was $\text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_0^*)$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$. If μ_1^* was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,4}$. \square

Lemma 68. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}$, then there exists an adversary which can break iO for programs of size σ' in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only difference between programs $\text{P3}_{B,2}$ and $\text{P3}_{B,3}$ is that $\text{P3}_{B,3}$ uses a punctured key $\text{EK}\{\bar{p}\}$, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. We argue that the program never needs to encrypt any plaintext of the form $(*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, and therefore puncturing this point doesn't change the functionality:

Note that, since μ_1^* is random, it is outside of the image of a PRF SG with overwhelming probability, and thus validity check can pass only if P3 is run on some (s, m, μ_1^*, μ_2^*) , where s encodes m, μ_1^* (and other values). However, note that $\text{P3}_{B,2}$ on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus the key in the main step can be safely punctured. Further, in order for the program to run encryption algorithm in the trapdoor step on any plaintext of the form $(*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, fake s should encode level ℓ_0^* . However, note that DK_S is punctured at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and thus

$P3_{B,2}$ rejects all fake s with ℓ_0^* inside except s which encodes $(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, that is, s' . Finally, note that running $P3_{B,2}$ on $(s', m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ will pass validity check only if $m = m_0^*$ (again, since μ_1^* is outside of the image of PRF SG). Thus $(s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ is the only potentially problematic input. However, running $P3_{B,2}$ on $(s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ will not trigger encryption algorithm, since the program directly outputs the value μ_3^* encoded in s' . Thus $P3_{B,2}$ never encrypts any plaintext of the form $(*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ in the trapdoor step. \square

Lemma 69. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of the main ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. We give a reduction from indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$ to security of constrained decryption of main ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It samples all keys used in programs (except EK, DK), namely keys EK_S, DK_S of sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random r^* and sets μ_1^* at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$.

Next the reduction sends the set consisting of a single point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ to puncture encryption key and sets \bar{p}, \emptyset to puncture decryption key to the challenger of constrained decryption game. The challenger samples keys EK, DK and it sends back to the reduction $\text{EK}\{\bar{p}\}$ and key which is either $\text{DK}\{\bar{p}\}$ or $\text{DK}\{\emptyset\}$.

Next the reduction computes $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}\{\bar{p}\}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ (note that this point isn't punctured, thus the reduction can indeed encrypt it).

It punctured keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, \text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and sets $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake (fig. 86) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 87, fig. 88). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge key was $\text{DK}\{\emptyset\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}$. If key was $\text{DK}_S\{\bar{p}\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$. \square

Lemma 70. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and $\hat{\rho}^*$ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\frac{1}{3} \cdot \varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. In this analysis we assume that r^* is outside the image of receiver ACE, and thus $\text{ACE.Dec}_{\text{DK}_R}(r^*) = \text{'fail'}$.

Programs P2 and P2_{B,2}. We present case analysis to show that the behavior of programs P2 and P2_{B,2} on each input is the same:

- Case $r = r^*$:
 - Case $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*$: P2 outputs μ_2^* via main step since r^* is outside of image of ACE. P2_{B,2} outputs μ_2^* due to hardwired instruction.
 - Case $\mu_1 \neq \mu_1^*$: P2 executes main step and outputs $\text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1)$ since r^* is outside of image of ACE. P2_{B,2} executes main step and outputs $\text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1)$ due to hardwired instruction.
- Case $r = r'$:
 - Case $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*$: P2 outputs μ_2^* via trapdoor step. P2_{B,2} outputs μ_2^* due to hardwired instruction.
 - Case $\mu_1 \neq \mu_1^*$: P2 skips the trapdoor step since r' contains the wrong $\mu_1^* \neq \mu_1$, and outputs $\text{RG}_{k_R}(r', \mu_1)$. P2_{B,2} executes main step due to hardwired instruction and outputs $\text{RG}_{k_R}(r', \mu_1)$.
- Case $r \neq r', r^*$: P2 and P2_{B,2} execute the same code, since punctured keys preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured. Note that keys are never used at punctured points.

Programs Dec and Dec_{B,2}. Next we compare programs Dec and Dec_{B,2}. Note that validity check passes on the same set of inputs in programs Dec and Dec_{B,2}, since programs P2 and P2_{B,1} are functionally equivalent. We present the analysis assuming inputs passed the validity check.

- Case $r = r^*$:
 - Case $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$:
 - * Case $\mu_3 = \mu_3^*$: Dec outputs m_0^* via main step since r^* is outside of image of ACE. Dec_{B,1} outputs m_0^* due to hardwired instruction.
 - * Case $\mu_3 \neq \mu_3^*$: since r^* is outside of image of ACE, Dec executes the main step. Dec_{B,2} skips the trapdoor step due to hardwired instruction and performs exactly the same actions in the main step.
 - Case $(\mu_1, \mu_2) \neq (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$: Dec executes main step since r^* is outside of image of ACE. Dec_{B,2} skips the trapdoor step due to hardwired instruction and performs exactly the same actions in the main step.
- Case $r = r'$:
 - Case $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$:
 - * Case $\mu_3 = \mu_3^*$: Dec outputs m_0^* via trapdoor step. Dec_{B,2} outputs m_0^* due to hardwired instruction.
 - * Case $\mu_3 \neq \mu_3^*$: Dec executes trapdoor step. That is, it tries to decrypt μ_3 and either outputs its plaintext or 'fail'. In order for Dec to outputs a plaintext (and not 'fail'), μ_1, μ_2 should be the same in the input, in μ_3 , in r' , and in L'' , and moreover, $\text{isLess}(L', L'')$ should be true. Since r' has level $L' = L_0^*$, isLess is true for all L'' of the form $[i, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$, where $i > 0$. In other words, μ_3 should be an encryption of $(m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L'')$, where $L'' = [i, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$, $i > 0$, and m is arbitrary. We call it condition 1.

$\text{Dec}_{B,2}$ is instructed to skip the trapdoor step and execute the main step. That is, it decrypts μ_3 and either outputs its plaintext or 'fail'. In order for $\text{Dec}_{B,1}$ to output a plaintext (and not 'fail'), μ_1, μ_2 should be the same in the input, in μ_3 , and in L'' (however, unlike Dec, there is no “isLess(L', L'') = true” condition). In other words, μ_3 should be an encryption of $(m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L'')$, where $L'' = [i, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$, $i \geq 0$, and m is arbitrary. We call it condition 2.

Thus, the only difference in these conditions for Dec and $\text{Dec}_{B,2}$ is that, given an encryption of $(m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, [0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*])$ for any m (that is, μ_3^* or $\overline{\mu_3^*}$), condition 1 instructs to output 'fail' and condition 2 instructs to output m . However, we claim that both programs Dec and $\text{Dec}_{B,2}$ still behave the same on inputs μ_3^* or $\overline{\mu_3^*}$. Indeed, recall that if the input was $(r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, both programs would output m_0^* as analysed in the previous case. If the input was $(r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \overline{\mu_3^*})$, both programs would output 'fail', since decryption key DK of the main ACE is punctured at the point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, [0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*])$.

Thus, in this case both programs have the same functionality.

- Case $(\mu_1, \mu_2) \neq (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$: Dec skips the trapdoor step since r' contains the wrong $(\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*) \neq (\mu_1, \mu_2)$, and executes the main step. $\text{Dec}_{B,2}$ skips the trapdoor step due to hardwired instruction and executes the main step.
- Case $r \neq r', r^*$: Dec and $\text{Dec}_{B,2}$ execute the same code, since punctured keys preserve functionality on all inputs which are not punctured. Note that $\text{Dec}_{B,2}$ never uses key DK_R at the punctured points, thus puncturing it doesn't change the functionality of the program. Note that the key $\text{DK}_{\bar{p}}$ can be used by Dec and $\text{Dec}_{B,2}$ to decrypt an encryption of \bar{p} , however it is punctured at both programs and thus functionality of both programs is the same in this case.

Programs RFake and RFake $_{B,2}$. Next we compare programs RFake and RFake $_{B,2}$. Note that the only difference is that RFake $_{B,2}$ uses a punctured key $\text{EK}_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}$, where $S_{\hat{\rho}^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, *, \hat{\rho}^*)\}$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$. By assumption of the lemma, $\hat{\rho}^*$ is outside of the image of this prg, and thus RFake $_{B,2}$ never needs to encrypt any of points ending with $\hat{\rho}^*$. Therefore puncturing the key doesn't change the functionality of the program. \square

Lemma 71. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and $\hat{\rho}^*$ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,2}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of of a puncturable PRF RG_{k_R} in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{A,2}, \text{Hyb}_{A,3}$, except that the reduction is for PRF of the receiver, not the PRF of the sender.

We give a reduction to security of a puncturable PRF RG_{k_R} at the punctured point (r^*, μ_1^*) .

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. Next it chooses random r^*, μ_1^* and sends the point (r^*, μ_1^*) to the challenger of puncturable PRF game. The reduction gets back from the challenger the punctured key $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*)\}$ and the value μ_2^* , which is either $\text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$ or randomly chosen.

Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all keys used in programs (except $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*)\}$), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{EK}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{Enc}_{EK_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$.

Next it computes punctured keys $DK_R\{r^*, r'\}$, $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*), (r', \mu_1^*)\}$ (by additionally puncturing challenge $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*)\}$ at (r', μ_1^*)), and $EK_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}$, $S_{\hat{\rho}^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, *, \hat{\rho}^*)\}$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$. It also punctures keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and $EK\{\bar{p}\}$, $DK\{\bar{p}\}$ at $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 86) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 89). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge μ_2^* was $\text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$. If μ_2^* was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,2}$.

Note that this reduction is using the fact that an adversary who holds the punctured key can additionally puncture it at another point. We note that the construction of an extracting puncturable PRF of [SW14] is based on GGM PRF and satisfies this property. \square

Lemma 72. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and $\hat{\rho}^*$ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,3}$, then there exists an adversary which can break the symmetry of a receiver-fake relaxed ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{A,3}, \text{Hyb}_{A,4}$, except that the reduction is to the ACE of the receiver, not ACE of the sender.

We give a reduction to symmetry of receiver ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. Next it samples all keys used in programs (except EK_R, DK_R), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random μ_1^*, μ_2^* . It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{EK}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

Next the reduction chooses $\hat{\rho}^*$ at random and sends $p = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$ as the challenge point to the challenger of the symmetry of ACE. The challenger chooses random r^* , samples keys EK_R, DK_R of ACE and computes $r' = \text{Enc}_{EK_R}(p)$, and punctures EK_R at $S_{\hat{\rho}^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, *, \hat{\rho}^*)\}$ and DK_R at r^*, r' (DK_R is first punctured at one of the strings r^*, r' which is lexicographically smaller, and then at the other). The reduction gets back from the challenger $(r_1, r_2, EK_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}, DK_R\{r^*, r'\})$, where $r_1 = r^*, r_2 = r'$ or $r_1 = r', r_2 = r^*$.

Next it computes punctured keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and $\text{EK}\{\bar{p}\}$, $\text{DK}\{\bar{p}\}$ where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

Next the reduction computes punctured key $k_R\{(r_1, \mu_1^*), (r_2, \mu_1^*)\}$. Then it uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 86) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 89). In particular, in every place where r^* , r' appear, e.g. in code of programs, or as a punctured point, the reduction first uses one of the strings r_1, r_2 which is lexicographically smaller, and then the other (note that r^* , r' always appear together in the distribution, except for the value given to the adversary as randomness of the receiver).

Next the reduction gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r_1, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge r_1, r_2 are r^*, r' , then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,2}$. If r_1, r_2 are r', r^* , then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,3}$. \square

Lemma 73. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and $\hat{\rho}^*$ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,4}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of a puncturable PRF RG_{k_R} in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$, $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,2}$, except that r' and not r^* is given to the adversary as randomness of the receiver.

We give a reduction to security of a puncturable PRF RG_{k_R} at the punctured point (r^*, μ_1^*) .

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. Next it chooses random r^*, μ_1^* and sends the point (r^*, μ_1^*) to the challenger of puncturable PRF game. The reduction gets back from the challenger the punctured key $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*)\}$ and the value μ_2^* , which is either $\text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$ or randomly chosen.

Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all keys used in programs (except $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*)\}$), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$.

Next it computes punctured keys $\text{DK}_R\{r^*, r'\}$, $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*), (r', \mu_1^*)\}$ (by additionally puncturing challenge $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*)\}$ at (r', μ_1^*)), and $\text{EK}_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}$, $S_{\hat{\rho}^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, *, \hat{\rho}^*)\}$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$. It also punctures keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and $\text{EK}\{\bar{p}\}$, $\text{DK}\{\bar{p}\}$ at $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 86) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 89). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge μ_2^* was $\text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,4}$. If μ_2^* was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,3}$.

Note that this reduction is using the fact that an adversary who holds the punctured key can additionally puncture it at another point. We note that the construction of an extracting puncturable PRF of [SW14] is based on GGM PRF and satisfies this property. \square

Lemma 74. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and $\hat{\rho}^*$ is outside of the image of the prg. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,5}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\frac{1}{3} \cdot \varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 70. \square

Lemma 75. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,5}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,6}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of a prg in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. We give a reduction to security of a prg.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary.

It samples all keys used in programs, namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of $\text{GenZero}, \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}, \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}$.

Next it chooses random r^*, μ_1^* and computes $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

It receives $\hat{\rho}^*$ from a challenger of a prg game which is either randomly chosen or $\text{prg}(\rho^*)$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Then the reduction sets $r' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$.

Next it punctures keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, \text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and $\text{EK}\{\bar{p}\}, \text{DK}\{\bar{p}\}$ at $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 86) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 88). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge $\hat{\rho}^*$ was an image of a prg, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,6}$. If $\hat{\rho}^*$ was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,5}$. \square

Lemma 76. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,6}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of the main ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}, \text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$, except that r' and not r^* is given to the adversary as randomness of the receiver. \square

Lemma 77. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,2}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 68. \square

Lemma 78. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,3}$, then there exists an adversary which can break the strong computational extractor property of a PRF SG_{k_S} in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$, $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,4}$, except that r' and not r^* is given to the adversary as randomness of the receiver. \square

Lemma 79. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,4}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of a sender-fake relaxed ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$, $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$, except that r' and not r^* is given to the adversary as randomness of the receiver. \square

Lemma 80. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,5}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 65. \square

Finally, we note that the distributions in $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,5}$ and Hyb_C are $2^{-\lambda}$ -close (the reasoning is similar to distributions Hyb_B , $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$).

7.2.3 Reductions in the proof of lemma 56 (Semantic Security)

Let $t(\lambda)$ be any function in $\Omega(\text{poly}(\lambda))$, and let $\varepsilon(\lambda)$ be a negligible function in $w(2^{-\lambda})$. Assuming the sender-fake relaxed ACE, receiver-fake relaxed ACE, main ACE, sparse extracting puncturable PRF, and iO for program size σ' are $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -secure, we show that no time- $t(\lambda)$ adversary can distinguish between Hyb_C and Hyb_D with more than $O(\varepsilon(\lambda)) + O(2^{-\tau(\lambda)})$ advantage.

(Note that security loss $O(2^{-\tau(\lambda)})$ comes from conditioning on the fact that μ_1^*, μ_2^* are outside of the image of the corresponding PRFs. Conditioning on s^*, r^* incurs only $2^{-\lambda}$ loss and therefore we omit it.)

Lemma 81. *Statistical distance between distributions Hyb_C , $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,1}$ is at most $2 \cdot 2^{-\lambda}$.*

Proof. Same as indistinguishability between hybrids Hyb_B , $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$. \square

Lemma 82. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,2}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only difference between programs SFake and SFake_{C,1} is that SFake_{C,1} uses a punctured key $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. This is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with level ℓ_0^* , since $\ell_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$ and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1. \square

Lemma 83. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,3}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of a sender-fake relaxed ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. Same as indistinguishability between hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,3}, \text{Hyb}_{B,3,4}$. \square

Lemma 84. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,4}$, then there exists an adversary which can break the strong computational extractor property of a PRF SG_{k_S} in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. Same as indistinguishability between hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,2}, \text{Hyb}_{B,3,3}$. \square

Lemma 85. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG . Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,5}$, then there exists an adversary which can break the strong computational extractor property of a PRF RG_{k_R} in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}, \text{Hyb}_{B,1,4}$, except that the reduction is to the strong extracting PRF of the receiver, not the sender.

We give a reduction to strong computationally extracting PRF RG_{k_R} .

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It chooses μ_1^* at random and sends the point μ_1^* to the challenger of strong extractor game. The challenger samples the key k_R for RG and either chooses μ_2^* at random or computes it as $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$ for randomly chosen r^* . The reduction gets back from the challenger the key k_R and the value μ_2^* .

Next the reduction reconstructs the rest of the distribution as follows. It samples all keys used in programs (except k_R), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{EK}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{Enc}_{EK_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* .

Next it computes punctured keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 92) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 94). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge μ_2^* was $\text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the

distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,4}$. If μ_2^* was randomly chosen, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,5}$. □

Lemma 86. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and μ_2^* is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,5}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only difference between programs $\text{P3}_{B,2}$ and $\text{P3}_{B,3}$ is that $\text{P3}_{B,3}$ uses a punctured key $\text{EK}\{p_0, p_1\}$, where $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. We argue that the program never needs to encrypt p_0, p_1 , and therefore puncturing these points doesn't change the functionality:

Since we assumed that μ_1^* is outside of the image of a PRF SG, validity check can pass only if P3 is run on some (s, m, μ_1^*, μ_2^*) , where s encodes m, μ_1^* (and other values). However, note that $\text{P3}_{C,2}$ on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus the key in the main step can be safely punctured. Further, in order for the program to run encryption algorithm in the trapdoor step on input p_0 or p_1 , fake s should encode level ℓ_0^* . However, note that DK_S is punctured at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and thus $\text{P3}_{C,2}$ rejects all fake s with ℓ_0^* inside except s which encodes $(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, that is, s' . Finally, note that running $\text{P3}_{C,2}$ on $(s', m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ will pass validity check only if $m = m_0^*$ (again, since μ_1^* is outside of the image of PRF SG). Thus $(s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ is the only potentially problematic input (in particular, the key is never used to encrypt p_1). However, running $\text{P3}_{C,2}$ on $(s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ will not trigger encryption algorithm, since the program directly outputs the value μ_3^* encoded in s' . Thus $\text{P3}_{C,2}$ never encrypts p_0 or p_1 in the trapdoor step. □

Lemma 87. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and μ_2^* is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of main ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,3}, \text{Hyb}_{B,3,4}$, except that EK is additionally punctured at another point, and μ_2^* is randomly chosen.

We give a reduction to security of constrained decryption of main ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It samples all keys used in programs (except EK, DK), namely keys EK_S, DK_S of sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of $\text{GenZero}, \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}, \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}$.

It chooses random μ_1^*, μ_2^* . It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*), L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$.

Next the reduction sends the set consisting of two points $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*), p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ to puncture encryption key, sets p_1, \emptyset to puncture decryption key, and plaintext p_0 to the challenger of constrained decryption game (note that plaintext p_0 doesn't belong to the set $\{p_1\}$ for puncturing DK and thus this is a valid query to the challenger of constrained decryption game). The challenger samples

keys EK, DK and it sends back to the reduction $\text{EK}\{p_0, p_1\}$, *key* which is either $\text{DK}\{p_1\}$ or $\text{DK}\{\emptyset\}$, and $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_0)$.

Next the reduction punctures keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and sets $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* .

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake (fig. 93) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 94, fig. 95). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge *key* was $\text{DK}\{\emptyset\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1}$. If *key* was $\text{DK}_S\{p_1\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2}$. \square

Lemma 88. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and μ_2^* is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized circuits in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. We start with analyzing program Dec: The only difference between programs $\text{Dec}_{C,1}$ and $\text{Dec}_{C,2}$ is that $\text{Dec}_{C,1}$ uses key $\text{DK}\{p_1\}$ and $\text{Dec}_{C,2}$ uses $\text{DK}\{p_0, p_1\}$, i.e. the key is additionally punctured at p_0 (here $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$). We will argue that if $\text{Dec}_{C,1}$ on input $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_0)$ reaches the line where it needs to decrypt μ_3^* , then it always outputs 'fail'. Therefore puncturing this point (and thus forcing $\text{Dec}_{C,2}$ to output 'fail' when attempt to decrypt μ_3^*) doesn't change the functionality:

First, note that if input $\mu_3 = \mu_3^*$, but $(\mu_1, \mu_2) \neq (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ and the program reached decryption of μ_3^* , then the program outputs 'fail': indeed, μ_3^* encrypts μ_1^*, μ_2^* and thus the check $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ will not pass.

Second, by assumption μ_2^* is outside of the image of a PRF RG, and thus validity check can pass only if $\text{Dec}_{C,1}$ is run on some $(r, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where r encodes μ_1^*, μ_2^* (and other values). However, note that $\text{Dec}_{C,1}$ on such input can only execute the trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus the key in the main step can be safely punctured. Further, in order for the program to output m after decryption in the trapdoor step, the condition "isLess(L', L'')" should hold. However, when input $\mu_3 = \mu_3^*$, L'' is equal to $[0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$, which is the smallest possible level and therefore there doesn't exist L' such that $\text{isLess}(L', L'') = \text{true}$. Thus, if $\text{Dec}_{C,1}$ reached decryption in the trapdoor step on input μ_3^* , it will anyway output 'fail' due to failed "isLess" check and therefore we can puncture DK at p_0 such that an attempt to decrypt μ_3^* would cause Dec to output 'fail' immediately.

Next we analyze program RFake. The difference between $\text{RFake}_{C,1}$ and $\text{RFake}_{C,2}$ is that the key DK, which is already punctured at p_1 , is additionally punctured at p_0 . In order to preserve the functionality of RFake on input μ_3^* , we additionally instruct RFake to use level $L_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$ on input μ_3^* (without actually decrypting μ_3^*). Note that this is what $\text{RFake}_{C,1}$ would do on input μ_3^* ; thus this doesn't change the functionality. \square

Lemma 89. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and μ_2^* is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,4}$,*

then there exists an adversary which can break indistinguishability of ciphertexts of main ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon(\lambda)$.

Proof. We give a reduction to indistinguishability of ciphertexts of main ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It samples all keys used in programs (except EK, DK), namely keys EK_S, DK_S of sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random μ_1^*, μ_2^* . It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$.

Next the reduction sends the set consisting of two points $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ to puncture encryption key, the same set $\{p_0, p_1\}$ to puncture decryption key, and plaintexts p_0, p_1 to the challenger of indistinguishability of ciphertexts game (note that plaintexts belong to both punctured sets and thus this is a valid query to the challenger of indistinguishability of ciphertexts game). The challenger samples keys EK, DK and it sends back to the reduction $\text{EK}\{p_0, p_1\}$, $\text{DK}\{p_0, p_1\}$, and μ_3^* which is either $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_0)$ or $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_1)$.

Next the reduction punctures keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and sets $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* .

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake (fig. 93) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 96). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge μ_3^* was $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_0)$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,3}$. If μ_3^* was $\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_1)$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,4}$. \square

Lemma 90. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and μ_2^* is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,5}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized circuits in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is very similar to the proof of lemma 88, except that in this hybrid $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_1)$ instead of p_0 , and we unpuncture DK at p_1 instead of p_0 .

We start with analyzing program Dec: The only difference between programs $\text{Dec}_{C,3}$ and $\text{Dec}_{C,2}$ is that $\text{Dec}_{C,3}$ uses key $\text{DK}\{p_0\}$ and $\text{Dec}_{C,2}$ uses $\text{DK}\{p_0, p_1\}$, i.e. the key is additionally punctured at p_1 (here $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$). We will argue that if $\text{Dec}_{C,3}$ on input $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_1)$ reaches the line where it needs to decrypt μ_3^* , then it always outputs 'fail'. Therefore puncturing this point (and thus forcing $\text{Dec}_{C,2}$ to output 'fail' when attempt to decrypt μ_3^*) doesn't change the functionality:

First, note that if input $\mu_3 = \mu_3^*$, but $(\mu_1, \mu_2) \neq (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ and the program reached decryption of μ_3^* , then the program outputs 'fail': indeed, μ_3^* encrypts μ_1^*, μ_2^* and thus the check $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ will not pass.

Second, since μ_2^* is random, it is outside of the image of a PRF RG with overwhelming probability, and thus validity check can pass only if $\text{Dec}_{C,3}$ is run on some $(r, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where r encodes μ_1^*, μ_2^* (and other

values). However, note that $\text{Dec}_{C,3}$ on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus the key in the main step can be safely punctured. Further, in order for the program to output m after decryption in the trapdoor step, the condition “isLess(L', L'')” should hold. However, when input $\mu_3 = \mu_3^*$, L'' is equal to $[0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$, which is the smallest possible level and therefore there doesn't exist L' such that $\text{isLess}(L', L'') = \text{true}$. Thus, if $\text{Dec}_{C,3}$ reached decryption in the trapdoor step on input μ_3^* , it will anyway output 'fail' due to failed “isLess” check and therefore we can puncture DK at p_1 such that an attempt to decrypt μ_3^* would cause Dec to output 'fail' immediately.

Next we analyze program RFake. The difference between $\text{RFake}_{C,3}$ and $\text{RFake}_{C,2}$ is that the key DK, which is already punctured at p_0 , is additionally punctured at p_1 . In order to preserve the functionality of RFake on input μ_3^* , we additionally instruct RFake to use level $L_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$ on input μ_3^* (without actually decrypting μ_3^*). Note that this is what $\text{RFake}_{C,3}$ would do on input μ_3^* ; thus this doesn't change the functionality. \square

Lemma 91. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and μ_2^* is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,5}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,6}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of main ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,1}$, $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,2}$, except that we unpuncture DK at p_0 instead of p_1 , and our third message is $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_1)$ instead of $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_0)$.

We give a reduction to security of constrained decryption of main ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It samples all keys used in programs (except EK, DK), namely keys EK_S, DK_S of sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random μ_1^*, μ_2^* . It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$.

Next the reduction sends the set consisting of two points $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ to puncture encryption key, sets p_0, \emptyset to puncture decryption key, and plaintext p_1 to the challenger of constrained decryption game (note that plaintext p_1 doesn't belong to the set $\{p_0\}$ for puncturing DK and thus this is a valid query to the challenger of constrained decryption game). The challenger samples keys EK, DK and it sends back to the reduction $\text{EK}\{p_0, p_1\}$, key which is either $\text{DK}\{p_0\}$ or $\text{DK}\{\emptyset\}$, and $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(p_1)$.

Next the reduction punctures keys $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, and sets $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* .

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake (fig. 93) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 97, fig. 94). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge key was $\text{DK}\{\emptyset\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,6}$. If key was $\text{DK}_S\{p_0\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,5}$. \square

Lemma 92. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG, and μ_2^* is outside the image of the PRF RG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,6}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,7}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of lemma 86. \square

Lemma 93. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,2,7}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,1}$, then there exists an adversary which can break the strong computational extractor property of a PRF RG_{k_R} in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,4}$, $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,5}$, except that $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ instead of $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. \square

Lemma 94. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,2}$, then there exists an adversary which can break the strong computational extractor property of a PRF SG_{k_S} in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,3}$, $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,4}$ (with the difference that $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ instead of $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, and the reduction is made for the point (s^*, m_1^*) instead of (s^*, m_0^*)). \square

Lemma 95. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,3}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of a sender-fake relaxed ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,2}$, $\text{Hyb}_{C,1,3}$ (with the difference that $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ instead of $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, and $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*)$ instead of $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$). \square

Lemma 96. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,4}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only difference between programs SFake and $\text{SFake}_{C,1}$ is that $\text{SFake}_{C,1}$ uses a punctured key $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. This is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with level ℓ_0^* , since $\ell_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$ and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1. \square

Finally, we note that the distributions in $\text{Hyb}_{C,3,4}$ and Hyb_D are $O(2^{-\lambda})$ -close (the reasoning is similar to distributions $\text{Hyb}_B, \text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$).

7.2.4 Reductions in the proof of lemma 57 (Indistinguishability of Levels)

Let $t(\lambda)$ be any function in $\Omega(\text{poly}(\lambda))$, and let $\varepsilon(\lambda)$ be a negligible function in $w(2^{-\lambda})$. Assuming the sender-fake relaxed ACE, sparse extracting puncturable PRF, and iO for program size σ' are $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -secure, and assuming the level system is $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon_1(\lambda, T, \tau))$ -secure, we show that no time- $t(\lambda)$ adversary can distinguish between Hyb_D and Hyb_E with more than $O(\varepsilon(\lambda)) + \varepsilon_1(\lambda, T, \tau)$ advantage.

(Note that security loss $O(2^{-\tau(\lambda)})$ comes from conditioning on the fact that μ_1^* is outside of the image of the corresponding PRF. Conditioning on s^*, r^* incurs only $2^{-\lambda}$ loss and therefore we omit it.)

Lemma 97. *Statistical distance between distributions $\text{Hyb}_D, \text{Hyb}_{D,1,1}$ is at most $2 \cdot 2^{-\lambda}$.*

Proof. Same as indistinguishability between hybrids $\text{Hyb}_B, \text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$. \square

Lemma 98. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,2}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only difference between programs SFake and SFake_{D,1} is that SFake_{D,1} uses a punctured key $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. This is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with level ℓ_0^* , since $\ell_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$ and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1. \square

Lemma 99. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,3}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}, \text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$ (with the difference that r' instead of r^* is given to the adversary, and $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ instead of $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*)$ instead of $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$). \square

Lemma 100. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,4}$, then there exists an adversary which can break computational strong extractor property of the PRF SG in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}, \text{Hyb}_{B,1,4}$ (with the difference that r' (instead of r^*) is given to the adversary, $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ instead of $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, and the reduction is made for the point (s^*, m_1^*) instead of (s^*, m_0^*)). \square

Lemma 101. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,1}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The difference between programs in the two hybrids is that in $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,1}$ programs use only punctured versions of programs of the level system. We argue that this doesn't change the functionality of the programs of deniable encryption, since these programs never need to call programs of the level system on punctured inputs.

We start with analyzing program $P3_{D,2}$. By assumption, μ_1^* is outside of the image of a PRF SG, and thus when $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*$ validity check can pass only if P3 is run on some (s, m, μ_1^*, μ_2) , where s encodes m, μ_1^* (and other values). However, note that $P3_{D,2}$ on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus in the main step we can use $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$ which is punctured at μ_1^* . Moreover, since $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$ never outputs ℓ_0^* , we can also use $\text{Transform}[(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)]$ which is punctured at the input (ℓ_0^*, μ_2^*) .

It remains to argue that we can puncture $\text{Transform}[(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)]$ at the input (ℓ_0^*, μ_2^*) in the trapdoor step as well. Note that in order to run Transform on this input in the trapdoor step, P3 should take as input fake s which encodes ℓ_0^* (among other things). However, since DK_S is punctured at $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, the only such fake s is $\text{ACE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, that is, s' . Further, in order for “ $(m, \mu_1) = (m', \mu_1')$ ” check to pass, inputs to P3 should be $m = m_0^*$ and $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*$. Finally, in order to call Transform on (ℓ_0^*, μ_2^*) , the input μ_2 to P3 should be μ_2^* . In other words, the only input on which P3 could potentially run Transform at the punctured point is $(s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$; however, in this case P3 simply outputs μ_3^* , which is encoded in s' , without running Transform at all. Thus we can puncture Transform safely.

Next we analyze program $\text{SFake}_{D,2}$. By assumption, μ_1^* is outside of the image of a PRF SG, and thus validity check can pass only if SFake is run on some $(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \mu_3)$, where s encodes m, μ_1^* (and other values). However, note that $\text{SFake}_{D,2}$ on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus in the main step we can use $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$ which is punctured at μ_1^* . \square

Lemma 102. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,1}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,2}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of the level system with an upper bound T and tag size τ in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. We give a reduction to security of the level system.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It samples all keys used in programs, namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_S, DK_S of the sender ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver.

It chooses random r^* and μ_1^* and computes $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It sends μ_1^*, μ_2^* as the first and the second tag to the challenger of the level system. The challenger chooses bit b at random and runs setup of the level system to obtain programs $\text{GenZero}, \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}, \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}$. Then it computes $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $\ell_1^* = \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*)$, and $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It also obfuscates punctured programs $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*], \text{Increment}, \text{Transform}[(\ell_b^*, \mu_2^*)], \text{isLess}, \text{RetrieveTag}, \text{RetrieveTags}$. It sends these obfuscated punctured programs to the reduction, together with ℓ_b^* and L_0^* .

The reduction computes $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_b^*)$, and $r' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* .

Next the reduction punctures keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_b^*}\}$, $DK_S\{P_{\ell_b^*}\}$ at the set $P_{\ell_b^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_b^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_b^*)$.

Then the reduction uses variables and code obtained from the challenger to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 101, fig. 102) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 80). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge bit b is 0, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,1}$. If b is 1, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,2}$. \square

Lemma 103. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,3}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\frac{1}{2}\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. This proof is very similar to the proof of lemma 101, except that Transform is punctured at (ℓ_1^*, μ_2^*) instead of (ℓ_0^*, μ_2^*) .

The difference between programs in $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,2}$, $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,3}$ is that in $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,2}$ programs use only punctured versions of programs of the level system. We argue that this doesn't change the functionality of the programs of deniable encryption, since these programs never need to call programs of the level system on punctured inputs.

We start with analyzing program $P3_{D,4}$. By assumption μ_1^* is outside of the image of a PRF SG, and thus when $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*$ validity check can pass only if P3 is run on some (s, m, μ_1^*, μ_2) , where s encodes m, μ_1^* (and other values). However, note that $P3_{D,4}$ on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus in the main step we can use $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$ which is punctured at μ_1^* . Moreover, since $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$ never outputs ℓ_1^* , we can also use $\text{Transform}[(\ell_1^*, \mu_2^*)]$ which is punctured at the input (ℓ_1^*, μ_2^*) .

It remains to argue that we can puncture $\text{Transform}[(\ell_1^*, \mu_2^*)]$ at the input (ℓ_1^*, μ_2^*) in the trapdoor step as well. Note that in order to run Transform on this input in the trapdoor step, $P3_{D,5}$ should take as input fake s which encodes ℓ_1^* (among other things). However, since DK_S is punctured at $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, the only such fake s is $\text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, that is, s' . Further, in order for “ $(m, \mu_1) = (m', \mu_1')$ ” check to pass, inputs to P3 should be $m = m_0^*$ and $\mu_1 = \mu_1^*$. Finally, in order to call Transform on (ℓ_1^*, μ_2^*) , the input μ_2 to P3 should be μ_2^* . In other words, the only input on which P3 could potentially run Transform at the punctured point is $(s', m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$; however, in this case P3 simply outputs μ_3^* , which is encoded in s' , without running Transform at all. Thus we can puncture Transform safely.

Next we analyze program $\text{SFake}_{D,4}$. Since μ_1^* is outside of the image of a PRF SG, and thus validity check can pass only if SFake is run on some $(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \mu_3)$, where s encodes m, μ_1^* (and other values). However, note that $\text{SFake}_{D,4}$ on such input can only execute trapdoor step (and not the main step); thus in the main step we can use $\text{GenZero}[\mu_1^*]$ which is punctured at μ_1^* . \square

Lemma 104. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,2,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,1}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only difference between programs SFake_{D,5} and SFake_{D,6} is that in SFake_{D,6} the key EK_S is also punctured at $P_{\ell_0^*}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$ (in addition to being punctured at $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$). This is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with level ℓ_0^* , since $\ell_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$ and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1. \square

Lemma 105. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish Hyb_{D,3,1} and Hyb_{D,3,2}, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids Hyb_{D,1,2}, Hyb_{D,1,3}, except that ℓ_1^* instead of ℓ_0^* is used in the distribution, and keys EK, DK are additionally punctured at the set $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$.

We give a reduction to security of constrained decryption of sender ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It samples all keys used in programs (except EK_S, DK_S), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random r^* and μ_1^* and computes $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $\ell_1^* = \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

Next the reduction sends the set $P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}$ as a set to puncture encryption key (where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$), and sends sets $P_{\ell_1^*}$ and $P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}$ as sets to puncture decryption key to the challenger of constrained decryption game. The challenger samples keys EK_S, DK_S and it sends back to the reduction $\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ and *key* which is either $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ or $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}\}$.

Next the reduction computes $s' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ (note that this point is not punctured) and $r' = \text{Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* .

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 104, fig. 105) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 80). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge *key* is $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from Hyb_{D,3,2}. If *key* is $\text{DK}_S\{P_{\ell_1^*}\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from Hyb_{D,3,1}. \square

Lemma 106. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish Hyb_{D,3,2} and Hyb_{D,3,3}, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids Hyb_{D,3,1}, Hyb_{D,3,2}, except that we unpuncture DK at the set $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ instead of $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$. We give a reduction to security of constrained decryption of sender ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It samples all keys used in programs (except EK_S, DK_S), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random r^* and μ_1^* and computes $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $\ell_1^* = \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{EK}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

Next the reduction sends the set $P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}$ as a set to puncture encryption key (where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$), and sends sets $P_{\ell_0^*}$ and $P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}$ as sets to puncture decryption key to the challenger of constrained decryption game. The challenger samples keys EK_S, DK_S and it sends back to the reduction $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}\}$ and key which is either $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ or $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}\}$.

Next the reduction computes $s' = \text{Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}\}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ (note that this point is not punctured) and $r' = \text{Enc}_{EK_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* .

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 105, fig. 106) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 80). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge key is $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*} \cup P_{\ell_1^*}\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,2}$. If key is $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,3}$. \square

Lemma 107. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,3}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,4}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only difference between programs $\text{SFake}_{D,8}$ and $\text{SFake}_{D,9}$ is that in $\text{SFake}_{D,8}$ the key EK_S is also punctured at $P_{\ell_1^*}$, where $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ (in addition to being punctured at $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$). We argue that this is without changing functionality:

First, note that the trapdoor step never needs to encrypt the plaintext with ℓ_1^* : for that SFake would need to get as input some fake s which encodes ℓ_0^* , but such fake s doesn't exist since DK_S is punctured on the whole set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$.

Second, in order to encrypt ℓ_1^* in the main step, $\text{SFake}_{D,9}$ should get μ_1^* as input. However, in order to pass validity check with μ_1^* (which is outside of the image of PRF SG), $\text{SFake}_{D,9}$ should get as input some $(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1^*, \mu_2, \mu_3)$, where s is fake and encodes (m, μ_1^*) (among other things). But on such input $\text{SFake}_{D,9}$ never executes the main step - it executes the trapdoor step. Thus we can additionally puncture EK at $P_{\ell_1^*}$ in the main step. \square

Lemma 108. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,4}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,5}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of constrained decryption of sender-fake relaxed ACE in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,2}, \text{Hyb}_{D,3,3}$, except that EK_S, DK_S are punctured at different sets. We give a reduction to security of constrained decryption of sender

ACE.

The reduction first takes plaintexts m_0^*, m_1^* from the adversary. It samples all keys used in programs (except EK_S, DK_S), namely keys EK, DK of the main ACE, keys EK_R, DK_R of the receiver ACE, key k_S of the sparse extracting PRF SG of the sender, key k_R of the sparse extracting PRF RG of the receiver. It also runs setup of the level system to create the code of GenZero, Increment, Transform, isLess, RetrieveTag, RetrieveTags.

It chooses random r^* and μ_1^* and computes $\mu_2^* = RG_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. It computes levels $\ell_0^* = \text{GenZero}(\mu_1^*)$, $\ell_1^* = \text{Increment}(\ell_0^*)$, $L_0^* = \text{Transform}(\ell_0^*, \mu_2^*)$. It sets $\mu_3^* = \text{Enc}_{EK}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

Next the reduction sends the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$ as a set to puncture encryption key, and sends sets $P_{\ell_0^*}$ and \emptyset as sets to puncture decryption key to the challenger of constrained decryption game. The challenger samples keys EK_S, DK_S and it sends back to the reduction $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ and key which is either $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ or $DK_S\{\emptyset\}$.

Next the reduction computes $s' = \text{Enc}_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ (note that this point is not punctured) and $r' = \text{Enc}_{EK_R}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* .

Then the reduction uses variables and code created above to construct and obfuscate programs P1, P3, SFake, (fig. 105, fig. 106) and P2, Dec, RFake (fig. 80). It gives obfuscated programs to the adversary, together with $s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$. If challenge key is $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,4}$. If key is $DK_S\{\emptyset\}$, then the resulting distribution is exactly the distribution from $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,5}$. \square

Lemma 109. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Further, assume that μ_1^* is outside the image of the PRF SG. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,5}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,6}$, then there exists an adversary which can break security of iO for σ' -sized programs in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only difference between programs $\text{SFake}_{D,9}$ and $\text{SFake}_{D,10}$ is that in $\text{SFake}_{D,9}$ the key EK_S is punctured at $P_{\ell_0^*}$, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$. This is without changing functionality, since SFake never needs to encrypt a plaintext with level ℓ_0^* , since $\ell_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$ and SFake encrypts levels with value at least 1. \square

Lemma 110. *Assume s^*, r^* are outside of the image of the sender-fake ACE and the receiver-fake ACE, respectively. Then, if there exists an adversary which can $(t(\lambda), \varepsilon(\lambda))$ -distinguish $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,6}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,7}$, then there exists an adversary which can break computational strong extractor property of the PRF SG in time $t(\lambda) + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ with distinguishing advantage $\varepsilon(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of indistinguishability of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{D,1,3}, \text{Hyb}_{D,1,4}$, except that fake s' is computed using level ℓ_1^* instead of ℓ_0^* . \square

Finally, we note that the distributions in $\text{Hyb}_{D,3,7}$ and Hyb_E are $O(2^{-\lambda})$ -close (the reasoning is similar to distributions $\text{Hyb}_B, \text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$).

8 Proof of off-the-record deniability of our bideniable encryption

In this section we show that our scheme also satisfies off-the-record property, which says that the adversary who gets contradicting claims from parties (that is, the sender claims that the plaintext was m_0^* and shows consistent randomness, but the receiver claims that the plaintext was m_1^* and also shows consistent randomness) cannot tell which party is lying (if not both) and which plaintext was actually sent. In other words, neither party can prove which plaintext was used in the protocol. We underline however that this property only holds as long as parties act honestly during the protocol: indeed, a malicious party can always choose its randomness as a result of a prg and provide the seed of this prg as a proof that its randomness is genuine.

Recall the definition of off-the-record deniability states that the following three distributions are computationally indistinguishable:

- **the sender claims m_0^* was sent, the receiver claims m_1^* was sent, the plaintext was m_0^*** : $(PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*, s^*, r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_0^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $r' = \text{RFake}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$ for randomly chosen ρ^* , and $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1, P2, P3, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .
- **the sender claims m_0^* was sent, the receiver claims m_1^* was sent, the plaintext was m_1^*** : $(PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*, s', r^*, \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_1^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{SFake}(s^*, m_1^*, m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, and $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1, P2, P3, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .
- **the sender claims m_0^* was sent, the receiver claims m_1^* was sent, the plaintext was m_2^*** : $(PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_2^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{SFake}(s^*, m_2^*, m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, $r' = \text{RFake}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$ for randomly chosen ρ^* , and $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1, P2, P3, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

Note that the first distribution is the same as the following distribution, since $\text{RFake}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$ outputs $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$:

$\text{Hyb}_A = (PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, s^*, r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_0^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* , and $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1, P2, P3, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

Further, note that the second distribution is statistically close to the following distribution, since $\text{SFake}(s^*, m_1^*, m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$ with overwhelming probability over the choice of s^* outputs $\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$:

$\text{Hyb}_E = (PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_1^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, and $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1, P2, P3, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

Finally, note that the third distribution is statistically close to the following distribution:

$\text{Hyb}_{D'} = (PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_2^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* , and $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1, P2, P3, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

Thus to prove off-the-record deniability it suffices to show indistinguishability between hybrids $\text{Hyb}_A, \text{Hyb}_E$,

and $\text{Hyb}_{D'}$. The proof of this statement consists of the same main components as the proof of deniability, albeit in a different order and with slight changes. Below we describe the structure of the proof and comment on the differences with the proof of deniability. Concretely, we show that $\text{Hyb}_A \approx \text{Hyb}_B \approx \text{Hyb}_C \approx \text{Hyb}_D \approx \text{Hyb}_E$ and that $\text{Hyb}_C \approx \text{Hyb}_{D'}$, where hybrids are as follows:

1. **Indistinguishability of explanations of the sender:** starting from Hyb_A , we switch real s^* to fake s' , which encodes plaintext m_0^* , transcript $\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$, and level $\ell^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$, moving to the following distribution:

$\text{Hyb}_B = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_0^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* , and $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

The proof of this step is identical to the proof of lemma 54, except that everywhere (in all hybrids and reductions) we additionally generate $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* and give r' (instead of r^*) to the adversary.

2. **Indistinguishability of levels:** we switch the level encoded in s' from $\ell_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*]$ to $\ell_1^* = [1, \mu_1^*]$ (while keeping $L_0^* = [0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$ the same), moving to the following distribution:

$\text{Hyb}_C = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_0^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* and $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

The proof of this step is identical to the proof of lemma 57, except that in all hybrids and reductions we generate $r' = \text{RFake}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$ instead of $r' = \text{RFake}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ instead of $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, and $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_0^*)$ instead of $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*)$ (except when μ_1^* is randomly chosen).

3. **Semantic security:** we switch the transcript from encrypting m_0^* to encrypting m_1^* , moving to the following distribution:

$\text{Hyb}_D = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_1^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* , and $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

The proof of this step is identical to the proof of lemma 56, except that in all hybrids and reductions we generate $r' = \text{RFake}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$ instead of $r' = \text{RFake}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$, for randomly chosen ρ^* , and $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ instead of $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$.

4. **Indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver:** we switch fake r' , which encodes plaintext m_1^* , transcript $\mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*$, and level $L^* = [0, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*]$, to real (randomly chosen) r^* , thus moving to the following distribution:

$\text{Hyb}_E = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*, s', r^*, \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_1^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, and $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

The proof of this step is very close to the proof of lemma 55, except for a couple of changes. First, we switch the role of m_0^*, m_1^* everywhere (in hybrids and reductions), and we generate s' using level

ℓ_1^* instead of ℓ_0^* . However, we still generate $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ (as opposed to $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$), and we use the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$ (instead of $P_{\ell_1^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_1^*)\} \setminus (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$).

For the ease of verification, in the paragraph below we present the list of hybrids proving indistinguishability of Hyb_D and Hyb_E .

Semantic security for plaintext m_2^* : besides showing indistinguishability between Hyb_C and Hyb_D , we also show indistinguishability between Hyb_C and $\text{Hyb}_{D'}$, i.e. we switch the transcript from encrypting m_0^* to encrypting m_2^* , moving from Hyb_C to the following distribution:

$\text{Hyb}_{D'} = (\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, m_2^*, s', r', \text{tr}(s^*, r^*, m_2^*))$, where s^*, r^* are randomly chosen, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* , and $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} .

The proof of this step is identical to the proof of lemma 56, except that in all hybrids and reductions we generate $r' = \text{RFake}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$ instead of $r' = \text{RFake}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*; \rho^*)$, for randomly chosen ρ^* , and $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$ instead of $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_0^*)$. Also, everywhere in hybrids and reductions we use $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_2 = (m_2^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ instead of $p_0 = (m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $p_1 = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

List of hybrids for the proof of indistinguishability of Hyb_D and Hyb_E Now we present the list of hybrids for the proof of indistinguishability of receiver explanation of off-the-record deniability. We do not present the reductions since they are very similar to the corresponding reductions (section 7.2.2), used for hybrids in section 7.1.2 in the proof of lemma 55. For a more convenient reference to security reductions, we do not change enumeration of hybrids from section 7.1.2, and we keep hybrids in the same order as there (starting from randomly chosen r^* , and moving to fake r').

We also present programs (those which require changes compared to their version in the proof of lemma 55).

List of hybrids. First in a sequence of hybrids we “eliminate” complementary ciphertext $\overline{\mu_3^*} = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, i.e. make programs Dec and SFake reject it:

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 83 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

Note that this distribution is exactly the distribution from Hyb_D , conditioned on the fact that s^*, r^* are outside of images of their ACE.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,1}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 84 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program SFake we puncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this modification doesn't change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level ℓ_0^* .

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,3}$. We give the adversary $(PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{B,2}, P2, P3_{B,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 85 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs P1, P3, SFake we puncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the same set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained key of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK_S is already punctured at the same set.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,4}$. We give the adversary $(PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{B,2}, P2, P3_{B,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 85 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we choose μ_1^* at random instead of computing it as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF SG (note that s^* was not used anywhere else in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}$. We give the adversary $(PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{B,3}, P2, P3_{B,3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 110 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program P3 we puncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at the point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since P3 never needs to encrypt this point. Roughly, this is because of the following: since μ_1^* is random and outside of the image of a PRF SG, P3 never encrypts \bar{p} in the main step. In order to encrypt it in trapdoor step, P3 needs to take as input some fake s encoding level ℓ_0^* , which doesn't exist due to the fact that DK_S is punctured at the set $P_{\ell_0^*}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$. We give the adversary $(PP, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $PP = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{B,3}, P2_{B,1}, P3_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,1}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 110 (programs of the sender) and fig. 111 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs Dec, RFake we puncture decryption key DK of the main ACE at the same point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained key of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is already punctured at this point.

Now $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{EK}(1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$ is rejected by Dec and RFake. In the following hybrids, similarly to previous lemma, we switch the roles of r^* and r' , using the fact that programs treat them similarly,

once $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ is eliminated³⁰.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,2}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 110 (programs of the sender) and fig. 112 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we modify programs of the receiver (P2, Dec, RFake) by puncturing encryption key of receiver-fake $\text{ACE EK}_R\{p\}$ at the point $p = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{p}^*)$, decryption key of receiver-fake $\text{ACE DK}_R\{r^*, r'\}$ at r^* and r' (where $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(p)$), and the key k_R of extracting PRF RG of the receiver at the points (r^*, μ_1^*) and (r', μ_1^*) . In addition, we hardwire certain outputs inside programs of the receiver to make sure that functionality of the programs doesn't change. Indistinguishability holds by iO.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,2}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$. Programs can be found in fig. 110 (programs of the sender) and fig. 112 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we choose μ_2^* at random instead of computing it as $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_S}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF SG at the punctured point (r^*, μ_1^*) .

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,2}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, μ_2^* is chosen at random, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{p}^*)$ for randomly chosen \hat{p}^* . Programs can be found in fig. 110 (programs of the sender) and fig. 112 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we switch the roles of r^* and r' everywhere in the distribution: namely, we give r' (instead of r^*) to the adversary as randomness of the receiver, and we change r^* to r' and r' to r^* everywhere in the programs. Note that this doesn't change the code of the programs since programs use r^* and r' in the same way. Indistinguishability holds by the symmetry of receiver-fake ACE, which says that $(r^*, r', \text{EK}_R\{p\}, \text{DK}_R\{r^*, r'\})$ is indistinguishable from $(r', r^*, \text{EK}_R\{p\}, \text{DK}_R\{r', r^*\})$, where $p = (m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{p}^*)$, r^* is randomly chosen, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(p)$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,2}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,2}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{p}^*)$ for randomly chosen \hat{p}^* . Programs can be found in fig. 110 (programs of the sender) and fig. 112 (programs of the receiver).

³⁰The problem with $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ is that unmodified Dec on input $(r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \overline{\mu_3^*})$ outputs $1 \oplus m_1^*$ (via main step), and on input $(r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \overline{\mu_3^*})$ it outputs 'fail' (via trapdoor step, since levels in r' and $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ are both 0 and "isLess = true" check fails). Because of this difference, in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$ we wouldn't be able to modify program Dec such that the code treats r^* and r' in the same way. However, after $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$ $\overline{\mu_3^*}$ is not a valid ciphertext anymore and thus in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$ we can instruct Dec to output 'fail' on both r^* and r' .

That is, we compute μ_2^* as $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}_{k_R}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$ instead of choosing it at random. Indistinguishability holds by pseudorandomness of the PRF RG at the punctured point (r^*, μ_1^*) .

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,1}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,1}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \hat{\rho}^*)$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$. Programs can be found in fig. 110 (programs of the sender) and fig. 111 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we revert all changes we made to programs in $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,1}$ and thus use original programs P2, Dec, RFake, except that DK remains punctured at the point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since we remove puncturing without changing the functionality of the programs.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,2,6}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}_{B,1}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}_{B,1}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}_{B,1}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^* , r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 110 (programs of the sender) and fig. 111 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we replace randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$ with $\text{prg}(\rho^*)$ for randomly chosen ρ^* , when generating r' . Indistinguishability holds by security of a prg.

Finally, in the following hybrids we revert all changes we made in hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,1} - \text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$, thus restoring all programs (and making $\bar{\mu}_3^*$ a valid ciphertext):

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,3}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,3}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,3}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 110 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs Dec, RFake we unpuncture decryption key DK of the main ACE at the point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained key of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is punctured at this point.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,2}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; \text{P1}_{B,2}, \text{P2}, \text{P3}_{B,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; r^* is chosen at random, μ_1^* is chosen at random, $\mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*)$, $\mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, $s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*)$, $r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 85 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program P3 we unpuncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at the point $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, because of the same reason as in $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}$.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,3}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} =$

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{B,2}, P2, P3_{B,2}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,2}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*), \mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*), \mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*), s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*), r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 85 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, we choose μ_1^* as $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}_{k_S}(s^*, m_1^*)$ instead of computing it at random. Indistinguishability holds by the strong extracting property of the sender PRF SG (note that s^* is not used anywhere else in the distribution).

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,4}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1_{B,1}, P2, P3_{B,1}, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}_{B,1}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*), \mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*), \mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*), s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*), r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 84 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in programs P1, P3, SFake we unpuncture decryption key DK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the same set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained key of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK_S is already punctured at the same set.

- $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,5}$. We give the adversary $(\text{PP}, m_0^*, m_1^*, s', r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$, where $\text{PP} = \text{Setup}(1^\lambda; P1, P2, P3, \text{Dec}, \text{SFake}, \text{RFake}; r_{\text{Setup}})$ for randomly chosen r_{Setup} ; s^*, r^* are chosen at random, $\mu_1^* = \text{SG}(s^*, m_1^*), \mu_2^* = \text{RG}(r^*, \mu_1^*), \mu_3^* = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*), s' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_S}(m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, \ell_1^*), r' = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}_R}(m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, L_0^*, \text{prg}(\rho^*))$ for randomly chosen ρ^* . Programs can be found in fig. 83 (programs of the sender) and fig. 87 (programs of the receiver).

That is, in program SFake we unpuncture encryption key EK_S of the sender-fake ACE at the set $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$. Indistinguishability holds by iO, since this modification doesn't change the functionality of SFake due to the fact that SFake never encrypts plaintexts with level ℓ_0^* .

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,5}$ is the same as Hyb_C , conditioned on the fact that s^*, r^* are outside of image of ACE.

Programs $P1_{B,3}, P3_{B,3}, SFake_{B,3}$.

Program $P1_{B,3}(s, m)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m .

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, key k_S of an extracting PRF SG.

1. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m = m'$ then return μ_1' ;

2. **Main step:**

- (a) Return $\mu_1 \leftarrow SG_{k_S}(s, m)$.

Program $P3_{B,3}(s, m, \mu_1, \mu_2)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , message m , the first and the second messages μ_1, μ_2 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{B,3}$, GenZero, Transform, RetrieveTag; punctured decryption key $DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$, punctured encryption key $EK\{\bar{p}\}$ of main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1_{B,3}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1, \mu_2 = m', \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then return μ_3' ;
- (c) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then:
 - i. If $\mu_1 \neq RetrieveTag(\ell')$ then abort;
 - ii. Set $L \leftarrow Transform(\ell', \mu_2)$;
 - iii. Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK\{\bar{p}\}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L)$;

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $L_0 \leftarrow Transform(GenZero(\mu_1), \mu_2)$;
- (b) Return $\mu_3 \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK\{\bar{p}\}}(m, \mu_1, \mu_2, L_0)$.

Program $SFake_{B,3}(s, m, \hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: sender randomness s , real message m , fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P1_{B,3}$, GenZero, Increment; punctured encryption and decryption keys $EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}, DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}$ of sender-fake ACE, where $P_{\ell_0^*} = \{(*, *, *, *, \ell_0^*)\}$.

1. **Validity check:** if $P1_{B,3}(s, m) \neq \mu_1$ then abort;

2. **Trapdoor step:**

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(s)$; if $out = 'fail'$ goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', \ell')$;
- (b) If $m, \mu_1 = m', \mu_1'$ then
 - i. Set $\ell_{+1} \leftarrow Increment(\ell')$; if $\ell_{+1} = 'fail'$ then abort;
 - ii. Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_{+1})$.

3. **Main step:**

- (a) Set $\ell_1 \leftarrow Increment(GenZero(\mu_1))$;
- (b) Return $ACE.Enc_{EK_S\{P_{\ell_0^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, \ell_1)$.

Figure 110: Programs $P1_{B,3}, P3_{B,3}, SFake_{B,3}$, used in the proof indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver for off-the-record deniability.

Programs $P2_{B,1}, Dec_{B,1}, RFake_{B,1}$.

Program $P2_{B,1}(r, \mu_1)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, key k_R of an extracting PRF RG.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow RG_{k_R}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program $Dec_{B,1}(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms P2, isLess, RetrieveTags; decryption key DK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{\bar{p}\}$ of the main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

1. Validity check: if $P2(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R}(r)$; if $out' = 'fail'$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (b) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;
- (c) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out'' = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (d) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then
 - i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L'')$ and $\text{isLess}(L', L'') = \text{true}$ then return m'' ;
 - ii. Else abort.

3. Main step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = \text{RetrieveTags}(L'')$ then return m'' ;
- (c) Else abort.

Program $RFake_{B,1}(\hat{n}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho)$

Inputs: fake message \hat{n} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: encryption key EK_R of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{\bar{p}\}$ of the main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

- 1. $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK_R}(\hat{n}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', \text{prg}(\rho))$.

Figure 111: Programs $P2_{B,1}, Dec_{B,1}, RFake_{B,1}$, used in the proof of lemma 55 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).

Programs $P_{2B,2}$, $Dec_{B,2}$, $RFake_{B,2}$.

Program $P_{2B,2}(r, \mu_1)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , the first message μ_1 in the protocol.

Hardwired values: punctured decryption key $DK_R\{r^*, r'\}$ of receiver-fake ACE, punctured key $k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*), (r', \mu_1^*)\}$ of an extracting PRF RG, variables $r^*, r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*$.

1. Trapdoor step:

- (a) **If $(r, \mu_1) = (r^*, \mu_1^*)$ or $(r, \mu_1) = (r', \mu_1^*)$ then return μ_2^* ;**
- (b) **If $r = r^*$ or $r = r'$ then goto main step;**
- (c) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R\{r^*, r'\}}(r)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then goto main step, else parse out as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (d) If $\mu_1 = \mu_1'$ then return μ_2' ;

2. Main step:

- (a) Return $\mu_2 \leftarrow RG_{k_R\{(r^*, \mu_1^*), (r', \mu_1^*)\}}(r, \mu_1)$.

Program $Dec_{B,2}(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3)$

Inputs: receiver randomness r , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 .

Hardwired values: obfuscated code of algorithms $P_{2B,2}$, $isLess$, $RetrieveTags$; punctured decryption key $DK_R\{r^*, r'\}$ of receiver-fake ACE, punctured decryption key $DK\{\bar{p}\}$ of the main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, variables $r^*, r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*, m_1^*$.

1. Validity check: if $P_{2B,2}(r, \mu_1) \neq \mu_2$ then abort;

2. Trapdoor step:

- (a) **If $(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3) = (r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$ or $(r, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3) = (r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, \mu_3^*)$ then return m_1^* ;**
- (b) **If $(r, \mu_1, \mu_2) = (r^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ or $(r, \mu_1, \mu_2) = (r', \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*)$ then then goto main step;**
- (c) **If $r = r^*$ or $r = r'$ then goto main step;**
- (d) $out' \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK_R\{r^*, r'\}}(r)$; if $out' = 'fail'$ then goto main step; else parse out' as $(m', \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3', L', \hat{\rho})$;
- (e) if $\mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3 = \mu_1', \mu_2', \mu_3'$ then return m' ;
- (f) $out'' \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out'' = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out'' as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (g) If $\mu_1, \mu_2 = \mu_1', \mu_2'$ then
 - i. If $(\mu_1', \mu_2') = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L'')$ and $isLess(L', L'') = true$ then return m'' ;
 - ii. Else abort.

3. Main step:

- (a) $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- (b) If $(\mu_1, \mu_2) = (\mu_1'', \mu_2'') = RetrieveTags(L'')$ then return m'' ;
- (c) Else abort.

Program $RFake_{B,2}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3; \rho)$

Inputs: fake message \hat{m} , protocol transcript μ_1, μ_2, μ_3 , random coins ρ .

Hardwired values: punctured encryption key $EK_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}$ of receiver-fake ACE, where $S_{\hat{\rho}^*} = \{*, *, *, *, *, \hat{\rho}^*\}$ for randomly chosen $\hat{\rho}^*$, punctured decryption key $DK\{\bar{p}\}$ of the main ACE, where $\bar{p} = (1 \oplus m_1^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$.

- 1. $out \leftarrow ACE.Dec_{DK\{\bar{p}\}}(\mu_3)$; if $out = 'fail'$ then abort, else parse out as $(m'', \mu_1'', \mu_2'', L'')$;
- 2. Return $r' \leftarrow ACE.Enc_{EK_R\{S_{\hat{\rho}^*}\}}(\hat{m}, \mu_1, \mu_2, \mu_3, L'', prg(\rho))$.

Figure 112: Programs $P_{2B,2}$, $Dec_{B,2}$, $RFake_{B,2}$, used in the proof of lemma 55 (indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver).

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A On removing layers of obfuscation

When our construction described in section 6 is instantiated with ACE from [CHJV14], relaxed ACE described in section B, and the level system described in section 5 (which in turn uses ACE of [CHJV14]), the resulting CRS ends up containing three layers of obfuscation. Since even a single obfuscation incurs a significant blowup in the program size, ideally we would like to have only one layer of obfuscation.

In this section we explain why the whole proof of bideniability and off-the-record deniability can still go through, if we use non-obfuscated version and “unroll” all the proofs. More concretely, we do the following:

- Instead of using ACE keys and the programs of the level system, which are all obfuscated programs, we use their *non-obfuscated versions*. Still, we use one layer of obfuscation on top of programs of deniable encryption. We pad the size of the non-obfuscated programs of deniable encryption to size σ such that σ is larger than the size of any (non-obfuscated) program (including programs variants in the hybrids) of deniable encryption, ACE, relaxed ACE, or the level system.
- In the proof we replace each hybrid reducing to security of any of ACE, relaxed ACE, or the level system with a sequence of hybrids proving the corresponding property of the primitive.

Now we briefly comment on why each security reduction can still be proven. Let program C_1 of a primitive Δ_1 , and program C_2 of a primitive Δ_2 be such that C_1 uses an obfuscated version of C_2 , i.e. $iO(C_2)$, as a black box (e.g. Δ_1 can be deniable encryption and Δ_2 can be relaxed ACE, ACE or the level system, or Δ_1

can be the level system and Δ_2 can be ACE). We denote this by $C_1[\text{iO}(C_2)]$. Further, let $C_1[C_2]$ be program C_1 which uses program C_2 , instead of $\text{iO}(C_2)$. Note that this is syntactically well-defined since C_1 uses $\text{iO}(C_2)$ as a black box and since $\text{iO}(C_2)$ and C_2 have the same syntax.

Further, let all reductions in the security proof of Δ_1 use $\text{iO}(C_2)$ as a black box. We claim that the “unrThen all reductions in security proofs of deniable encryption, ACE, relaxed ACE, and the level system can be classified as follows:

Reductions in the proof of security of Δ_1 :

- Reductions which rely on security of Δ_2 : we replace each reduction with a sequence of reductions from the proof of Δ_2 , and as we argue later, they all still can be proven.
- Reductions which do not rely on security of Δ_2 , but which use the fact that $\text{iO}(C_2)$ has a certain functionality (e.g. an iO -based reduction, which uses the fact that the functionality of C_1 in the two consecutive hybrids doesn't change, and analyzes functionality of $\text{iO}(C_2)$ as part of the argument). We claim that if such a reduction is possible with $C_1[\text{iO}(C_2)]$, then it is also possible with $C_1[C_2]$. This is because iO preserves the functionality with all-but-negligible probability over the randomness of iO .
- All other reductions: these reductions merely use the fact that in the reduction it is possible to reconstruct $\text{iO}(C_2)$ in polynomial time. Note that this is true for C_2 as well, thus such reductions still go through.

Reductions in the proof of security of Δ_2

- Reductions to security of obfuscation for a program C_2 , relying on the fact that C_2 has the same functionality in the two consecutive hybrids: we claim that we can instead reduce to security of obfuscation for a program $\text{iO}(C_1[C_2])$. Indeed, since C_1 uses $\text{iO}(C_2)$ as a black box, and since iO preserves functionality except for negligible probability over the choice of randomness of iO , $C_1[C_2]$ also has the same functionality in those two hybrids. Thus, as long as we pad the program $C_1[C_2]$ sufficiently, the reduction to security of iO still holds.
- Reductions which rely on the fact that in some cases iO allows to extract a differing input of programs C'_2, C''_2 , given $\text{iO}(C'_2), \text{iO}(C''_2)$. We argue that security of these hybrids can still be reduced to security of iO and one-way functions, even though the resulting programs $C_1[C'_2]$ and $C_1[C''_2]$ can be different on exponentially many inputs. Recall that those security reductions work by constructing a circuit M_2 such that M_2 is the same as C'_2 or C''_2 , and use it to do binary search over a differing value, which could be an input, or part of an input, or some intermediate variable in the program. But this means that the reduction in the “unrolled” proof can do the same binary search, over the same differing value, by using program $M_1 = C_1[M_2]$, which can be constructed using $\text{iO}(C_1[C'_2]), \text{iO}(C_1[C''_2])$: indeed, since M_2 is the same as either C'_2 or C''_2 , $C_1[M_2]$ is the same as either $C_1[C'_2]$ or $C_1[C''_2]$.
- All other reductions: in such reductions we need to make sure that the reduction can reconstruct the whole distribution, which now includes an obfuscated program $\text{iO}(C_1[C_2])$, together with any values the adversary is supposed to get as part of the game for primitive Δ_1 . We note that this can be done: since it was possible to do in the reduction (of the proof for Δ_1) to security of Δ_2 , it should be possible as well for every hybrid in security proof of Δ_2 , since otherwise the reduction of the proof of Δ_1 can be used as a distinguisher for Δ_2 . Indeed, since the reduction uses $\text{iO}(C_2)$ as a black box, we can replace $\text{iO}(C_2)$ with C_2 and the reduction still succeeds.

B Construction of relaxed ACE

In this section we describe how to modify the construction of ACE from [CHJV14] to obtain relaxed ACE (def. 5). Recall that the differences between ACE and relaxed ACE are that relaxed ACE doesn't necessarily satisfy indistinguishability of ciphertexts; that its distinguishing advantage in security of constrained decryption game is negligible for certain sets (as opposed to being proportional to size of those sets); and that it additionally satisfies symmetry.

Brief motivation and explanation of the construction. The first attempt to remove dependency on the size of the sets is perhaps to use the technique from [GPS16] - that is, instead of having a single PRF-based signature on the plaintext m , have $|m|$ signatures of each prefix of m . This allows to change the key on many inputs (with the same prefix) in a single step. However, with this approach we are not able to prove symmetry: it requires to switch $c^* = \text{Enc}(m^*)$ to random and thus to puncture all keys for each PRF; however, such puncturing cannot be done without changing the functionality of the encryption program, since e.g. puncturing the PRF which is applied on the first bit already prohibits encrypting of half of all inputs.

To deal with this, we notice that in the proof of deniable encryption we use security of relaxed ACE on sets of special structure, which is either all strings ending with the same suffix of a fixed size, or all such strings except one. Thus we require relaxed ACE to be parametrized with *prefix parameter* t , which denotes the size of this prefix.³¹ An encryption of m will be an ACE ciphertext where instead of a single PRF signature of m , we will have $n - t + 1$ PRF signatures of $\text{suffix}_t(m), \dots, \text{suffix}_n(m)$. We say that a set S is *consistent* with some suffix suf of size t , if S consists of all strings ending with suf ; we say that a plaintext m is consistent with suf , if m ends with suf . Using $n - t + 1$ signatures allows us to prove the following:

- symmetry for random c^* and $c' = \text{Enc}(m^*)$, as long as encryption key is punctured at the set S , and both S and m^* are consistent with the same suffix suf of size t ;
- security of constrained decryption with distinguishing advantage independent of set sizes, as long as $S_1 \setminus S_0$ is either S_{suf} (e.g. a set consistent with some suf of size t), or $S_{\text{suf}} \setminus \{m\}$, where both S and m are consistent with the same suf of size t .

Security of constrained decryption follows a by-now standard proof, which punctures the key at the whole set S_{suf_i} at once (for each $i = t + 1, \dots, n$), by adding an injective prg on top of a signature check and then switching the prg image to random (in the actual proof we instead use an injective OWF to minimize assumptions). For the case $S_1 \setminus S_0 = S_{\text{suf}}$ it is enough to do one step, and for the case $S_1 \setminus S_0 = S_{\text{suf}} \setminus \{m\}$ we need $n - t$ steps.³²

Symmetry argument is essentially a Sahai-Waters [SW14] symmetry argument in the proof of deniable encryption, with a difference that they didn't use ACE as an abstraction, and we instead decided to formulate it on ACE level to shorten the main proof of deniable encryption. The proof follows essentially the same steps, except that, since we have more signatures, we also need to argue that in the proof the decryption key can be punctured at a certain set of points (this is done using an argument similar to the proof of security of constrained decryption, since encryption key is already punctured on those points). Indeed, the proof of

³¹In the construction of deniable encryption, $t = |\ell_0|$ for the sender ACE and $t = |\text{prg}(\rho)|$ for the receiver ACE.

³²We write S_0, S_1 (sets to puncture keys at in the security game) and S_{suf} (a set denoting all strings ending with suf), somewhat abusing the notation, since the subscript means an index in the former case and a prefix in the latter. However, all our suffixes are of length at least t , so there should be no confusion.

Programs of relaxed ACE.

Program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Enc}}(m)$

Inputs: message m .

Hardwired values: keys K_t, \dots, K_n, K of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_U describing set U . Parameters t, n .

1. If $C_U(m)$ then return \perp ;
2. For each $i = t, \dots, n$ set $\alpha_i \leftarrow F_i(K_i; \text{suffix}_i(m))$;
3. Set $\beta \leftarrow F(K; \alpha_n) \oplus m$;
4. Return $(\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$.

Program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}(c)$

Inputs: ciphertext c .

Hardwired values: keys K_t, \dots, K_n, K of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_S . Parameters t, n .

1. Parse $c = (\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$;
2. Set $m \leftarrow F(K; \alpha_n) \oplus \beta$
3. If $C_S(m)$ then return \perp ;
4. For each $i = t, \dots, n$ do: if $\alpha_i \neq F_i(K_i; \text{suffix}_i(m))$ then return \perp ;
5. Return m .

Program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Puncture}}(c)$

Inputs: ciphertext c .

Hardwired values: keys K_t, \dots, K_n, K of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F . In addition, strings $c^{(0)}$ and $c^{(1)}$, hardwired in lexicographic order. Parameters t, n .

1. If $c = c^{(0)}$ or $c = c^{(1)}$ then return \perp ; ($c^{(0)}$ and $c^{(1)}$ are written in lexicographic order)
2. Parse $c = (\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$;
3. Set $m \leftarrow F(K; \alpha_n) \oplus \beta$
4. For each $i = t, \dots, n$ do: if $\alpha_i \neq F_i(K_i; \text{suffix}_i(m))$ then return \perp ;
5. Return m .

Figure 113: Programs of constrained keys of relaxed ACE. By $\text{suffix}_i(m)$ we denote m_{n-i+1}, \dots, m_n .

[SW14] uses the fact that the (only) signature uniquely defines the plaintext. This is not true in our case anymore, since some signatures only define the corresponding prefix of the plaintext. This introduces “bad” plaintexts which we need to get rid of. To do this, we rely on the fact that $S \setminus \{m^*\}$ can be represented as a union of S_{suf_i} , where all suf_i are different from suffixes of m^* .

Construction of relaxed ACE. The construction of relaxed ACE is the same as the construction of ACE from [CHJV14], except that we use different programs. Namely, let F_t, \dots, F_n be injective PRFs with sparse images, mapping t, \dots, n bits, respectively, to $n_{\text{out}} = O(\lambda)$ bits. Let F be a PRF mapping n_{out} bits to $O(\lambda)$ bits. Then a (possibly punctured) encryption key is obfuscated $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Enc}}(m)$, a (possibly punctured) decryption key is obfuscated $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}(m)$, and a ciphertext-based punctured key is obfuscated $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Puncture}}(c)[c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}]$, where one of $c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}$ is a valid ciphertext and the other is randomly chosen. Programs can be found on fig. 113.

Theorem 4. *Assuming iO and injective one way functions, the construction of [CHJV14] instantiated with programs on fig. 113 is a relaxed ACE for plaintext length n and suffix parameter t . Concretely, assuming iO is (t_1, ε_1) -secure and one way function is (t_2, ε_2) -secure, and let (t_3, ε_3) be such that $\varepsilon_3 \geq \varepsilon_1^{o(1)}$, and $t_3 \cdot \frac{1}{\varepsilon_1}(n - t) = O(t_2)$.*

Then the resulting ACE is $(\min(t_1, t_3), O((n - t) \cdot (\varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2 + \varepsilon)))$ -secure.

Proof. Correctness. All necessary correctness properties follow from correctness of iO, injectivity of PRFs and can be immediately verified.

Security of constrained decryption with negligible advantage. We prove security for a harder case of $S_1 \setminus S_0 = S_{\text{suf}_t} \setminus \{m^*\}$ (the case when $S_1 \setminus S_0 = S_{\text{suf}_t}$ can be shown by doing a single step of this proof for the PRF F_t). Note that $S_1 \setminus S_0 = S_{\text{suf}_t} \setminus \{m^*\}$ can be represented as $S_{\text{suf}_n} \cup \dots \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+1}}$, where $\text{suf}_n = \overline{m_1^*, m_2^*, \dots, m_n^*}$, $\text{suf}_{n-1} = \overline{m_2^*, m_3^*, \dots, m_n^*}$, $\text{suf}_{t+1} = \overline{m_{n-t+1}^*, m_{n-t+2}^*, \dots, m_n^*}$.

We start with a distribution corresponding to the key DK which is punctured at S_0 (which we denote by Hyb_0) and eventually reach a distribution where the key DK is punctured at S_1 (which we denote by $\text{Hyb}_{n,5}$). We show indistinguishability via a sequence of hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{j,k}$ for $j = t + 1, \dots, n, k = 0, \dots, 5$. Programs can be found on fig. 114:

- Hyb_0 corresponds to the game where DK is punctured at S_0 , i.e. the adversary gets $(EK\{U\}, DK\{S_0\})$.
- $\text{Hyb}_{j,0}$: the adversary gets $(EK\{U\}, DK^{j,0})$, where DK_i is an obfuscation of a program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,0}$ (fig. 114). Note that when $j = t + 1$, $\text{Hyb}_{j,0} = \text{Hyb}_0$.
- $\text{Hyb}_{j,1}$: the adversary gets $(EK^{j,1}, DK^{j,1})$, where $DK^{j,1}$ is an obfuscation of a program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,1}$, where $z^* = F_j(K_j; \text{suf}_j)$, and $EK^{j,1}$ is an obfuscation of $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Enc}}^{j,1}$. Indistinguishability from the previous hybrid follows from iO, since both pairs of programs have the same functionality. Indeed, in $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,0}$ and $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,1}$ we replaced the condition $\alpha_j = F_j(K_j; \text{suffix}_j(m))$ with two different checks for the case $\text{suffix}_j(m) \neq \text{suf}_j$ and $\text{suffix}_j(m) = \text{suf}_j$. For the former, we didn't change the check (but punctured the key K_j at suf_j), and for the latter, we replaced the check $\alpha_j = F_j(K_j; \text{suf}_j)$ with the check $g(\alpha_j) = z^*$, where $z^* = g(F_j(K_j; \text{suf}_j))$. Since g is injective, this doesn't change the functionality.
In $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Enc}}^{j,1}$ we punctured the key K_j at suf_j . This is without changing the functionality, since the program outputs \perp on input $m \in S_{\text{suf}_j} \subset U$.
- $\text{Hyb}_{j,2}$: the adversary gets $(EK^{j,1}, DK^{j,1})$, where $DK^{j,1}$ is an obfuscation of a program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,1}$, where $z^* = g(y^*)$ for random y^* , and $EK^{j,1}$ is an obfuscation of $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Enc}}^{j,1}$. Indistinguishability holds by security of a punctured PRF F_j at suf_j .
- $\text{Hyb}_{j,3}$: the adversary gets $(EK^{j,1}, DK^{j,3})$, where $DK^{j,3}$ is an obfuscation of a program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,3}$, where $z^* = g(y^*)$ for random y^* , and $EK^{j,1}$ is an obfuscation of $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Enc}}^{j,1}$. In other words, we instruct the program to output \perp instead of m when $g(\alpha_j) = z^*$.

Similar to lemma 1 from [BCP14], we argue that if any adversary can distinguish between hybrids $\text{Hyb}_{j,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{j,3}$ and iO is secure, then we can invert the one-way function g . Note that in our case programs differ on exponentially many inputs; however, differing inputs are a subset of $\{\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_j = y^*, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta\}$, where $y^* = g^{-1}(z^*)$ and other values can be arbitrary. In other words, differing inputs share the block y^* , and we can do binary search over y^* similar to how the proof of lemma 1 does a binary search over a single differing input.

More concretely, the extractor works as follows. It creates a program M which on input $\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_j, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta$ first checks if $\alpha_j < y'$ (where y' is a binary search guess for y^* , i.e. in the first iteration $y' = 2^{|\alpha_j|}/2$). If so, then M executes $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,1}$, otherwise it executes $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,3}$. Note that if $y^* < y'$, then M is functionally equivalent to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,1}$, and if $y^* \geq y'$, then M is functionally equivalent to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,3}$. (Indeed, if $y^* < y'$, then for all input $\alpha_j \geq y'$ the line with the check $g(\alpha_j) = z^*$ in both $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,1}, \mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,3}$ will never be executed, since g is injective and its only preimage $y^* < y'$. Since this is the only difference in the programs, these programs are functionally equivalent for the case $\alpha_j \geq y'$, and therefore for all inputs M is functionally equivalent to $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,1}$. The case $y^* \geq y'$ can be analyzed similarly). If by assumption there is an adversary which distinguishes between $\text{Hyb}_{j,2}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{j,3}$ with probability at least η and iO is ν -secure, where $\nu = \eta^{o(1)}$, then the adversary can run the adversary $O(1/\eta)$ times, estimate its distinguishing probability, learn the first bit of y^* , and continue binary search similar to the proof of lemma 1.

- $\text{Hyb}_{j,4}$: the adversary gets $(EK^{j,1}, DK^{j,3})$, where $DK^{j,3}$ is an obfuscation of a program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,3}$, where $z^* = g(F_j(K_j; \text{suf}_j))$, and $EK^{j,1}$ is an obfuscation of $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Enc}}^{j,1}$. In other words, we switch y^* back to $F_j(K_j; \text{suf}_j)$ from random. Indistinguishability holds by security of a punctured PRF F_j at suf_j .
- $\text{Hyb}_{j,5}$: the adversary gets $(EK\{U\}, DK^{j+1,0})$, where $DK^{j+1,0}$ is an obfuscation of a program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j+1,0}$. In other words, we unpuncture the key K_j at suf_j , and, since the program now always returns \perp when $\text{suffix}_j(m) = \text{suf}_j$, we remove the line with z^* -check and instead make the program output \perp when $m \in S_{\text{suf}_j}$. indistinguishability holds by iO , since this doesn't change the functionality (the reasoning why the key can be unpunctured is the same as in $\text{Hyb}_{j,1}$).

Note that $\text{Hyb}_{j,5} = \text{Hyb}_{j+1,0}$.

Note that in $\text{Hyb}_{n,5}$ program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{n+1,0}$ outputs \perp when $s \in S_0$ or $m \in S_{\text{suf}_n} \cup \dots \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+1}} = S_1 \setminus S_0$. In other words, it outputs \perp when $m \in S_1$, and thus this program is equivalent to $DK\{S_1\}$, which concludes security proof.

Finally, note that security loss depends only logarithmically on the size of $S_1 \setminus S_0$, as required by security of constrained decryption of relaxed ACE.

Programs of relaxed ACE.

Program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Enc}}^{j,1}(m)$

Inputs: message m .

Hardwired values: keys K_t, \dots, K_n, K (where $K_j\{\text{suf}_j\}$ is punctured at suf_j) of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_U describing set U . Parameters t, n .

1. If $C_U(m)$ then return \perp ;
2. For each $i = t, \dots, n, i \neq j$, set $\alpha_i \leftarrow F_i(K_i; \text{suffix}_i(m))$; set $\alpha_j \leftarrow F_j(K_j\{\text{suf}_j\}; \text{suffix}_i(m))$;
3. Set $\beta \leftarrow F(K; \alpha_n) \oplus m$;
4. Return $(\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$.

Program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,0}(c)$

Inputs: ciphertext c .

Hardwired values: keys K_t, \dots, K_n, K of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_{S_0} . Parameters t, n . Set of suffixes $\text{suf}_n, \dots, \text{suf}_{t+1}$ describing $S_1 \setminus S_0$.

1. Parse $c = (\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$;
2. Set $m \leftarrow F(K; \alpha_n) \oplus \beta$
3. If $C_{S_0}(m)$ then return \perp ;
4. If $m \in S_{\text{suf}_{j-1}} \cup S_{\text{suf}_{j-2}} \cup \dots \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+2}} \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+1}}$ then return \perp ;
5. For each $i = t, \dots, n$ do: if $\alpha_i \neq F_i(K_i; \text{suffix}_i(m))$ then return \perp ;
6. Return m .

Program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,1}(c)$

Inputs: ciphertext c .

Hardwired values: keys K_t, \dots, K_n, K (where $K_j\{\text{suf}_j\}$ is punctured at suf_j) of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_{S_0} . Parameters t, n . Set of suffixes $\text{suf}_n, \dots, \text{suf}_{t+1}$ describing $S_1 \setminus S_0$, injective owf g , value z^* .

1. Parse $c = (\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$;
2. Set $m \leftarrow F(K; \alpha_n) \oplus \beta$
3. If $C_{S_0}(m)$ then return \perp ;
4. If $m \in S_{\text{suf}_{j-1}} \cup \dots \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+1}}$ then return \perp ;
5. For each $i = t, \dots, n, i \neq j$ do: if $\alpha_i \neq F_i(K_i\{\text{suf}_j\}; \text{suffix}_i(m))$ then return \perp ;
6. If $\text{suffix}_j(m) = \text{suf}_j$ then: if $g(\alpha_j) = z^*$ then return m , else return \perp ;
7. If $\text{suffix}_j(m) \neq \text{suf}_j$ then: if $\alpha_j = F_j(K_j\{\text{suf}_j\}; \text{suffix}_j(m))$ then return m , else return \perp .

Program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Dec}}^{j,3}(c)$

Inputs: ciphertext c .

Hardwired values: keys K_t, \dots, K_n, K (where $K_j\{\text{suf}_j\}$ is punctured at suf_j) of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_{S_0} . Parameters t, n . Set of suffixes $\text{suf}_n, \dots, \text{suf}_{t+1}$ describing $S_1 \setminus S_0$, injective owf g , value z^* .

1. Parse $c = (\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$;
2. Set $m \leftarrow F(K; \alpha_n) \oplus \beta$
3. If $C_{S_0}(m)$ then return \perp ;
4. If $m \in S_{\text{suf}_{j-1}} \cup \dots \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+1}}$ then return \perp ;
5. For each $i = t, \dots, n, i \neq j$ do: if $\alpha_i \neq F_i(K_i\{\text{suf}_j\}; \text{suffix}_i(m))$ then return \perp ;
6. If $\text{suffix}_j(m) = \text{suf}_j$ then: if $g(\alpha_j) = z^*$ then return \perp , else return \perp ;
7. If $\text{suffix}_j(m) \neq \text{suf}_j$ then: if $\alpha_j = F_j(K_j\{\text{suf}_j\}; \text{suffix}_j(m))$ then return m , else return \perp .
8. Return \perp .

Figure 114: Programs used in the proof of security of constrained decryption of relaxed ACE.

Symmetry. Recall that from the definition of symmetry $U = S_{\text{suf}_t}$ is a set of plaintexts ending with the same suffix of size t , and the challenge plaintext m^* ends with suf_t as well. Let $\text{suf}_n^*, \dots, \text{suf}_t^*$ denote n, \dots, t -long suffixes of m^* (note that $\text{suf}_t = \text{suf}_t^*$). Further, as in the proof of security of constrained decryption, let $\text{suf}_n, \dots, \text{suf}_{t+1}$ be such that $U \setminus \{m^*\} = S_{\text{suf}_n} \cup \dots \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+1}}$. (Note that for each $i = t+1, \dots, n$ suf_i and suf_i^* only differ in the first bit).

We show symmetry of ACE in a sequence of hybrids, for $b = 0, 1$. Programs can be found on fig. 115.

- Hyb_0^b : The distribution in this hybrid is $(c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}, EK\{U\}, DK\{c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}\})$, where c_b is randomly chosen and c_{1-b} is $\text{Enc}(EK, m^*)$.
- Hyb_1^b : The distribution in this hybrid is $(c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}, EK', DK')$, where EK', DK' are instead obfuscations of programs $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Enc}}$ and $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Puncture}}$, respectively. Denote $c = (\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$, and $c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}$ accordingly (in particular, $\alpha_n^{(1-b)} = F_n(K_n; m^*)$). (fig. 115).

We argue that indistinguishability between Hyb_0^b and Hyb_1^b for any b holds by iO. Indeed, since for all $i = t, \dots, n$ $S_{\text{suf}_i^*} \subset U$ and $S_{\text{suf}_i} \subset U$, $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Enc}}$ outputs \perp on any input $m \in S_{\text{suf}_i^*}$ or $m \in S_{\text{suf}_i}$, for all $i = t, \dots, n$, anyway and thus each F_i is never computed on $\text{suf}_i^*, \text{suf}_i, i = t, \dots, n$. Thus we can puncture each F_i at $\text{suf}_i^*, \text{suf}_i, i = t, \dots, n$ (note that $\text{suf}_t = \text{suf}_t^*$ and thus F_t is only punctured once). Further, since F_n is injective, and is never run on $\text{suf}_n^* = m^*$, F is never computed on $\alpha_n^{(1-b)} = F_n(K_n; m^*)$, thus we can puncture K at $\alpha_n^{(1-b)}$. Finally, since $\alpha_n^{(b)}$ is randomly chosen and F_n has sparse image, with overwhelming probability $\alpha_n^{(b)}$ is outside of the image of F_n and we can puncture key K at $\alpha_n^{(b)}$ as well.

In $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Puncture}}$ we can puncture K at $\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}$ since before that there is an instruction to output \perp if α_n is equal to one of these values. We argue that this instruction doesn't change the functionality: indeed, $\alpha_n^{(b)}$ is outside of the image of F_n with high probability and therefore the program would reject anyway. Next, if $\alpha = \alpha_n^{(1-b)}$, since F_n is injective, the only way to satisfy the F_n -check is to have $\beta = F(K; \alpha_n^{(1-b)}) \oplus m^* = \beta^{(1-b)}$. But then, to satisfy other PRF checks, $\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}$ should be equal to $\alpha_t^{(1-b)}, \dots, \alpha_{n-1}^{(1-b)}$, in which case $c = c^{(1-b)}$ and the program outputs \perp in the very beginning.

- Hyb_2^b : The distribution in this hybrid is $(c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}, EK', DK'')$, where EK', DK'' are obfuscations of programs $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Enc}}$ and $\mathcal{G}''_{\text{Puncture}}$, respectively. In other words, we instruct the program $\mathcal{G}''_{\text{Puncture}}$ to output \perp if $m \in S_{\text{suf}_n} \cup S_{\text{suf}_{n-1}} \cup \dots \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+2}} \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+1}}$. Indistinguishability of this hybrid can be shown similarly to the proof of the security of constrained decryption. That is, for each $\text{suf}_i, i = t+1, \dots, n$, we can make this program reject all $m \in S_{\text{suf}_i}$ by puncturing the PRF F_i , changing $F_i(K_i; \text{suf}_i)$ to random, replacing the PRF check with OWF check, and arguing that the program can abort (instead of outputting m) if OWF check passes, since otherwise OWF can be inverted. (Importantly, note that indeed the value $F_i(K_i; \text{suf}_i)$, for $i = t+1, \dots, n$, isn't used anywhere else in the distribution: in particular, it is not required to compute $c^{(0)}$ or $c^{(1)}$, and moreover program $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Enc}}$ only uses a punctured key $K_i\{\text{suf}_i\}$).

Indistinguishability holds by security of punctured PRFs F_{t+1}, \dots, F_n , one-wayness of injective OWF, and security of iO.

- Hyb_3^b : The distribution in this hybrid is $(c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}, EK', DK''')$, where EK', DK''' are obfuscations of programs $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Enc}}$ and $\mathcal{G}'''_{\text{Puncture}}$, respectively. In other words, we instruct program $\mathcal{G}'''_{\text{Puncture}}$ to output \perp when $m \in S_{\text{suf}_t}$. We argue this doesn't change the functionality. Indeed, the condition " $m \in$

$S_{\text{suf}_n} \cup S_{\text{suf}_{n-1}} \cup \dots \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+1}}$ ” covers all $m \in S_{\text{suf}_t}$ except m^* . Therefore requiring to output \perp when $m \in S_{\text{suf}_t}$ is equivalent to additionally ask to output \perp when $m = m^*$. However, when $m = m^*$, $c = c^{(1-b)}$ and therefore the program outputs \perp in the very beginning.

Further, in program $\mathcal{G}_{\text{Puncture}}'''$ we puncture all keys $K_i, i = t, \dots, n$, at suf_i^* . This can be done since the program never needs to compute any of these values since when $m \in S_{\text{suf}_t}$, the program outputs \perp .

- Hyb_4^b : The distribution in this hybrid is $(c^{(0)}, c^{(1)}, EK', DK''')$, where EK', DK''' are obfuscations of programs $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Enc}}$ and $\mathcal{G}'''_{\text{Puncture}}$, respectively, and $c^{(1-b)}$ is chosen at random instead of as a result of PRFs. Security holds by security of PRFs F, F_t, \dots, F_n punctured at $\alpha_n^{(b)}, \text{suf}_t^*, \dots, \text{suf}_n^*$, respectively.

Finally, note that the distributions in Hyb_4^0 and Hyb_4^1 are the same. Thus concludes the proof of the symmetry of ACE. \square

C Encrypting longer plaintexts

Our main security proof holds for the case when 1-bit plaintexts are used. Here we outline the changes in the proof when the scheme is used to encrypt long plaintexts from some plaintext space \mathcal{M} .

The only change is that in the proof of indistinguishability of explanations of the receiver (lemma 55), instead of eliminating a single complementary ciphertext $\overline{\mu_3^*} = \text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(1 \oplus m_0^*, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*)$, we need to eliminate all complementary ciphertexts $\{\text{ACE.Enc}_{\text{EK}}(m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*) : m \in \mathcal{M}, m \neq m_0^*\}$. This change is required both in the proof of deniability and off-the-record deniability.

Concretely, changes are the following:

- In hybrid $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,5}$ (similarly, in $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,2}$) in program P3 we puncture encryption key EK of the main ACE at all points $\{(m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*) : m \in \mathcal{M}, m \neq m_0^*\}$. Indistinguishability holds by the same reasoning as in the original proof. The description of the program P3 on fig. 86 should be changed accordingly.
- In hybrid $\text{Hyb}_{B,1,6}$ (similarly, in $\text{Hyb}_{B,3,1}$) we puncture decryption key DK of the main ACE at the same set of points $\overline{p} = \{(m, \mu_1^*, \mu_2^*, L_0^*) : m \in \mathcal{M}, m \neq m_0^*\}$. Indistinguishability holds by security of constrained decryption of ACE, since the corresponding encryption key EK is already punctured at these points. The description of the programs Dec, RFake on fig. 88 should be changed accordingly. *Note however that this incurs security loss proportional to $|\mathcal{M}|$, since security loss in constrained decryption game depends on the size of the punctured set.*

Thus the proof can be adapted to the case of longer plaintexts, with additional multiplicative factor of $|\mathcal{M}|$ in security loss. However, the resulting scheme is only statically secure, i.e. both real and fake plaintexts have to be fixed before the CRS is generated. To achieve adaptive security, one can guess both plaintexts in the proof and lose another factor of $|\mathcal{M}|^2$.

Thus the scheme can be used for encrypting and denying longer messages, albeit with additional multiplicative factor of $|\mathcal{M}|^3$ in security loss.

Programs of relaxed ACE.

Program $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Enc}}(m)$

Inputs: message m .

Hardwired values: punctured keys $K_t\{\text{suf}_t^*, \text{suf}_t\}, K_{t+1}\{\text{suf}_{t+1}^*, \text{suf}_{t+1}\}, \dots, K_n\{\text{suf}_n^*, \text{suf}_n\}, K\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}$ of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_U describing set U . Parameters t, n .

1. If $C_U(m)$ then return \perp ;
2. For each $i = t, \dots, n$ set $\alpha_i \leftarrow F_i(K_i\{\text{suf}_i^*, \text{suf}_i\}; \text{suffix}_i(m))$;
3. Set $\beta \leftarrow F(K\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}; \alpha_n) \oplus m$;
4. Return $(\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$.

Program $\mathcal{G}'_{\text{Puncture}}(c)$

Inputs: ciphertext c .

Hardwired values: keys $K_t, \dots, K_n, K\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}$ of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_U describing set U . In addition, strings $c^{(0)}$ and $c^{(1)}$, hardwired in lexicographic order. Parameters t, n .

1. If $c = c^{(0)}$ or $c = c^{(1)}$ then return \perp ; ($c^{(0)}$ and $c^{(1)}$ are written in lexicographic order)
2. Parse $c = (\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$; $c^{(0)} = (\alpha_t^{(0)}, \dots, \alpha_n^{(0)}, \beta^{(0)})$; $c^{(1)} = (\alpha_t^{(1)}, \dots, \alpha_n^{(1)}, \beta^{(1)})$;
3. If $\alpha_n = \alpha_n^{(0)}$ or $\alpha_n = \alpha_n^{(1)}$ then return \perp ; ($\alpha_n^{(0)}$ and $\alpha_n^{(1)}$ are written in lexicographic order)
4. Set $m \leftarrow F(K\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}; \alpha_n) \oplus \beta$;
5. For each $i = t, \dots, n$ do: if $\alpha_i \neq F_i(K_i; \text{suffix}_i(m))$ then return \perp ;
6. Return m .

Program $\mathcal{G}''_{\text{Puncture}}(c)$

Inputs: ciphertext c .

Hardwired values: keys $K_t, \dots, K_n, K\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}$ of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_U describing set U . In addition, strings $c^{(0)}$ and $c^{(1)}$, hardwired in lexicographic order. Parameters t, n .

1. If $c = c^{(0)}$ or $c = c^{(1)}$ then return \perp ; ($c^{(0)}$ and $c^{(1)}$ are written in lexicographic order)
2. Parse $c = (\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$; $c^{(0)} = (\alpha_t^{(0)}, \dots, \alpha_n^{(0)}, \beta^{(0)})$; $c^{(1)} = (\alpha_t^{(1)}, \dots, \alpha_n^{(1)}, \beta^{(1)})$;
3. If $\alpha_n = \alpha_n^{(0)}$ or $\alpha_n = \alpha_n^{(1)}$ then return \perp ; ($\alpha_n^{(0)}$ and $\alpha_n^{(1)}$ are written in lexicographic order)
4. Set $m \leftarrow F(K\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}; \alpha_n) \oplus \beta$;
5. If $m \in S_{\text{suf}_n} \cup S_{\text{suf}_{n-1}} \cup \dots \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+2}} \cup S_{\text{suf}_{t+1}}$ then return \perp ;
6. For each $i = t, \dots, n$ do: if $\alpha_i \neq F_i(K_i; \text{suffix}_i(m))$ then return \perp ;
7. Return m .

Program $\mathcal{G}'''_{\text{Puncture}}(c)$

Inputs: ciphertext c .

Hardwired values: punctured keys $K_t\{\text{suf}_t^*\}, \dots, K_n\{\text{suf}_n^*\}, K\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}$ of PRFs F_t, \dots, F_n, F ; circuit C_U describing set U . In addition, strings $c^{(0)}$ and $c^{(1)}$, hardwired in lexicographic order. Parameters t, n .

1. If $c = c^{(0)}$ or $c = c^{(1)}$ then return \perp ; ($c^{(0)}$ and $c^{(1)}$ are written in lexicographic order)
2. Parse $c = (\alpha_t, \dots, \alpha_n, \beta)$; $c^{(0)} = (\alpha_t^{(0)}, \dots, \alpha_n^{(0)}, \beta^{(0)})$; $c^{(1)} = (\alpha_t^{(1)}, \dots, \alpha_n^{(1)}, \beta^{(1)})$;
3. If $\alpha_n = \alpha_n^{(0)}$ or $\alpha_n = \alpha_n^{(1)}$ then return \perp ; ($\alpha_n^{(0)}$ and $\alpha_n^{(1)}$ are written in lexicographic order)
4. Set $m \leftarrow F(K\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}; \alpha_n) \oplus \beta$;
5. If $m \in S_{\text{suf}_t}$ then return \perp ;
6. For each $i = t, \dots, n$ do: if $\alpha_i \neq F_i(K_i\{\text{suf}_i^*\}; \text{suffix}_i(m))$ then return \perp ;
7. Return m .

Figure 115: Programs of constrained keys. Note that everywhere where $c^{(0)}$, $c^{(1)}$ or $\alpha_n^{(0)}$, $\alpha_n^{(1)}$ appear, they are written in lexicographic order (in particular, in the GGM-based punctured PRF, key $K\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}$ doesn't depend on the order of puncturing and only depends on lexicographically sorted set $\{\alpha_n^{(0)}, \alpha_n^{(1)}\}$). For convenience we denote the punctured K_t by $K_t\{\text{suf}_t^*, \text{suf}_t\}$ (similar to other keys), even though $\text{suf}_t^* = \text{suf}_t$ and the key is only punctured at one point.