New Lower Bounds on Predicate Entropy for Function Private Public-Key Predicate Encryption

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Abstract. We present function private public-key predicate encryption schemes from standard cryptographic assumptions, that achieve new lower bounds on the min-entropy of underlying predicate distributions. Existing function private predicate encryption constructions in the public-key setting can be divided into two broad categories. The first category of constructions are based on standard assumptions, but impose highly stringent requirements on the min-entropy of predicate distributions, thereby limiting their applicability in the context of real-world predicates. For example, the statistically function private constructions of Boneh, Raghunathan and Segev (CRYPTO'13 and ASIACRYPT'13) are inherently restricted to predicate distributions with min-entropy roughly proportional to the security parameter λ. The second category of constructions mandate more relaxed min-entropy requirements, but are either based on non-standard assumptions (such as indistinguishability obfuscation) or are secure in the generic group model. In this paper, we affirmatively bridge the gap between these categories by presenting new public-key constructions for identity-based encryption, hidden-vector encryption, and subspace-membership encryption (a generalization of inner-product encryption) that are both data and function private under variants of the well-known DBDH, DLIN and matrix DDH assumptions, while relaxing the min-entropy requirement on the predicate distributions to $\omega(\log \lambda)$. In summary, we establish that the minimum predicate entropy necessary for any meaningful notion of function privacy in the public-key setting, is in fact, sufficient, for a fairly rich class of predicates.

Keywords: Predicate Encryption, Public-Key, Function Privacy, Computational Indistinguishability, Min-Entropy, Identity-Based Encryption, Hidden-Vector Encryption, Inner-Product Encryption, Subspace-Membership Encryption

1 Introduction

Predicate encryption schemes [1–3] in the public-key setting allow a single public-key to be associated with multiple secret-keys, where each secret-key corresponds to a Boolean predicate $f : \Sigma \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}$ over a pre-defined set of attributes Σ. A plaintext message in a predicate encryption scheme is an attribute-payload message pair $(I, M) \in \Sigma \times \mathcal{M}$, with $\mathcal{M}$ being the payload message space. A secret-key sk_f

associated with a predicate f successfully decrypts a ciphertext C corresponding to a plaintext (I, M) and recovers the payload message M if and only if $f(I) = 1$. On the other hand, if $f(I) = 0$, attempting to decrypt C using sk_f returns $\perp$.

The simplest sub-class of public-key predicate encryption is identity-based encryption (IBE) [4–6]. IBE supports a set of equality predicates $f_{\mathsf{id}} : \Sigma \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}$ defined as $f_{\mathsf{id}}(x) = 1$ if and only if $x = \mathsf{id}$. The attribute space in this case is a set of identities $\mathcal{ID}$, and each identity $\mathsf{id} \in \mathcal{ID}$ is associated with its own secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}}$. A highly expressive sub-class of predicate encryption is inner-product encryption (IPE) [2, 3, 7]. IPE supports a set of predicates $f_{\mathbf{v}} : \Sigma \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}$ over a vector space of attributes $\Sigma = \mathbb{F}_q^n$ (q being a λ-bit prime), such that for $\mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$, we have $f_{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{x}) = 1$ if and only if $\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle = 0$, where $\langle \mathbf{v}, \mathbf{x} \rangle$ denotes the inner-product of the vectors $\mathbf{v}$ and $\mathbf{x}$. IPE is powerful enough to encompass IBE and many other predicate encryption systems [3]. Subspace-membership encryption (SME) [8] is a generalization of IPE where a predicate is defined with respect to a matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$ instead of a vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$, while an attribute is still a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$. A special sub-class of IPE is hidden-vector encryption (HVE) [1] that supports conjunctive equality predicates, defined over predicate vectors with one or more occurrences of a special *wildcard* symbol $\star$.

Searchable Encryption from Predicate Encryption. Predicate encryption provides a generic framework for searchable encryption supporting a wide range of query predicates including conjunctive, disjunctive, range and subset queries [9, 1–3]. For instance, a predicate encryption system can be used to realize a mail gateway that follows some special instructions to route encrypted mails based on their header information (e.g. if the mail is from the boss and needs to be treated as urgent). The mail gateway is given the secret-key corresponding to the predicate *is-urgent*, the mail header serves as the attribute, while the routing instructions can be used as the payload message. Another application could be a payment gateway that flags encrypted payments if they correspond to amounts beyond some pre-defined threshold X. The payment gateway is given the secret-key corresponding to the predicate *greater-than-X*, the payment amount itself serves as the attribute, while the flag signal is encoded as the payload message.

Data and Function Privacy of Predicate Encryption. Suppose a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary against a predicate encryption scheme receives a ciphertext C corresponding to an attribute I and a payload message M. In addition, suppose that the adversary also receives secret-keys $\mathsf{sk}_1, \cdots, \mathsf{sk}_n$ corresponding to predicates $f_1, \cdots, f_n$, subject to the restriction that $f_j(I) = 0$ for each $j \in [1, n]$. Informally, a predicate encryption scheme is *data private* if it guarantees that the adversary learns nothing beyond the absolute minimum about both the attribute I and the message M from the ensemble $\left(C, \{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j \in [1,n]}\right)$. Additionally, the predicate encryption scheme is *function private* if it also guarantees that the secret-keys $\mathsf{sk}_1, \cdots, \mathsf{sk}_n$ reveal no information beyond the absolute minimum about the underlying predicates $f_1, \cdots, f_n$. Quite evidently, the notions of data and function privacy for a predicate encryption scheme are independent in the sense that one does not necessarily imply the other.

1.1 Function Private Predicate Encryption in the Public-Key Setting

As pointed out by Boneh, Raghunathan and Segev in [10, 8], formalizing a realistic notion of function privacy in the context of public-key predicate encryption is, in general, not straightforward. Consider, for example, an adversary against an IBE scheme who is given a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}}$ corresponding to an identity id and has access to an encryption oracle. As long as the adversary has some apriori information that the identity id belongs to a set $\mathcal{S}$ such that $|\mathcal{S}|$ is at most polynomial in the security parameter λ, it can fully recover id from $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}}$: it can simply resort to encrypting a random message M under each identity in $\mathcal{S}$, and decrypting using $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}}$ to check for a correct recovery. Consequently, Boneh, Raghunathan and Segev [10, 8] consider a framework for function privacy under the minimal assumption that any predicate is sampled from a distribution with min-entropy at least super logarithmic in the security parameter λ. This rules out trivial attacks and results in a meaningful notion of function privacy in the public-key setting. However, their work leaves open the following important issues, which we address in this paper:

- The predicate encryption schemes proposed in [10, 8] are inherently restricted to satisfying a *statistical* notion of function privacy against computationally unbounded adversaries. For a vast majority of applications, a *computational* notion of function privacy against probabilistic polynomial-time adversaries suffices. It is currently an open problem to design public-key predicate encryption schemes whose function privacy can be based on standard computational assumptions.

- Ideally, the function privacy guarantees of any public-key predicate encryption scheme should hold under the minimal assumption that the predicates are sampled from a distribution with min-entropy $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$ (where λ is the security parameter), so as to rule out trivial attacks. However, the statistically function private constructions in [10, 8] assume predicate distributions with min-entropy $k \geq \lambda$. This rather stringent assumption stems from their use of the universal hash lemma for arguing the statistical indistinguishability of secret-keys against unbounded adversaries, and limits the applicability of their constructions in the context of real-world predicates.

- It is also an open problem to construct function private hidden-vector encryption schemes. Existing function private constructions for inner-product encryption and subspace-membership encryption do not naturally subsume hidden-vector encryption due to the presence of a special wildcard character in the predicate vectors for the latter. Function private HVE paves the way for realizing function private searchable encryption schemes supporting conjunctive, subset and range queries over encrypted data.

Agrawal et al. [11] have recently proposed a new universal composability-style definition of simulation-security for predicate encryption, capturing both data and function privacy. To the best of our knowledge, the only known public-key construction satisfying this *wishful* notion of security is an IPE scheme proposed by Agrawal et al. themselves in [11]. This construction does not impose stringent requirements on

the min-entropy of the underlying predicate distributions. However, the security of this construction cannot be based on any standard computational assumption to the best of our knowledge (the security proof presented in [11] is in the generic group model). Other existing approaches to achieving function privacy that also preclude strict min-entropy requirements, such as that proposed by Iovino et al. in [12], are based on non-standard assumptions such as indistinguishability obfuscation (IO). In particular, the approach of Iovino et al. assumes the existence of a quasi-strong indistinguishability obfuscation algorithm over the class of all NC^1) circuits. To the best of our knowledge, general-purpose IO is still unachievable from standard cryptographic assumptions based on existing mathematical objects (such as bilinear maps on elliptic curve groups), although the gap between such assumptions and the ones required for IO has been narrowed considerably in recent years [13]. Other predicate encryption schemes for all poly-depth bounded circuits [14, 15, 7] from standard assumptions such as LWE are trivially non-function private, since they inherently assume that the secret-key contains the predicate circuit in the clear.

1.2 Our Contributions

In this paper, we address the following open problem arising out of the above discussion:

Is it possible to design public-key predicate encryption schemes that are provably data and function private under standard computational assumptions, while imposing the bare-minimum min-entropy requirements on the underlying predicate distributions?

We answer these questions in the affirmative by presenting new public-key constructions for identity-based encryption, subspace-membership encryption (a generalization of inner-product encryption) and hidden vector encryption, that are both data and function private under variants of the well-known DBDH, DLIN and matrix DDH assumptions, while relaxing the min-entropy requirement on the predicate distributions to $\omega(\log \lambda)$. Our results may be summarized in the form of the following informal theorems:

Theorem (Informal). *Under the DBDH and DLIN assumptions over bilinear groups, there exists an adaptively data private and computationally function private identity-based encryption scheme for identities sampled from distributions with min-entropy* $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$.

Theorem (Informal). *Under the matrix DDH assumption over bilinear groups, there exists an adaptively data private and computationally function private subspace-membership encryption scheme for predicate matrices sampled from distributions with min-entropy* $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$.

Theorem (Informal). *Under the matrix DDH assumption over bilinear groups, there exists an adaptively data private and computationally function private hidden-vector encryption scheme for predicate vectors sampled from distributions with min-entropy* $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$.

Our constructions concretely establish that the minimum predicate entropy necessary for any meaningful notion of function privacy in the public-key setting, is in fact, sufficient, for a fairly rich class of predicates.

1.3 Overview of Techniques

We briefly summarize our techniques below. A common technique implicit in the function privacy arguments for all our constructions in this paper is the use of hash proof systems [16, 17].

Function-Private IBE from DBDH and DLIN (Section 4). Our function private IBE construction is inspired by the seminal IBE scheme of Boneh and Franklin [4]. It involves public parameters $\mathsf{pp} = (g, g^{s_1}, g^{s_2})$, where g generates a bilinear group $\mathbb{G}$ of prime order q, and the master secret key is $\mathsf{msk} = (s_1, s_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q$. The scheme uses two hash functions H_1 and H_2, that are modeled as random oracles in the security proofs. The secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}}$ corresponding to an identity id is randomized as $\left(H_1(\mathsf{id})^{s_1 \cdot z_1} \cdot H_2(\mathsf{id})^{s_2 \cdot z_2}, z_1, z_2\right)$ for $z_1, z_2 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, while a ciphertext C corresponding to (id, M) is generated as $\left(g^r, M \cdot e(g^{s_1}, H_1(\mathsf{id}))^r, e(g^{s_2}, H_2(\mathsf{id}))^r\right)$ for $r \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$. The decryption procedure is essentially similar to that in the Boneh-Franklin IBE scheme. Note that both the secret-key and the ciphertext comprise of a constant number of group elements. We establish the data privacy of this scheme from the DBDH assumption via a sequence of two hybrid experiments, each of which manipulate the random oracles in the same way as [4] to answer secret-key and challenge ciphertext queries. Additionally, we establish the function privacy of this scheme using arguments akin to those of Cramer and Shoup [16], where the reduction knows the master-secret-key at all times (allowing it to answer any number of secret key-queries), and embeds a random DLIN instance in the challenge secret-key provided to the function privacy adversary. The proof suitably manipulates the random oracles, and also exploits the min-entropy restrictions on the challenge identity-distributions to argue the negligibility of abortion-probability during the reduction.

Function-Private SME from Matrix-DDH (Section 5). Our function private subspace-membership encryption (SME) scheme is inspired by a matrix-DDH-based variant of the recently proposed adaptively data private IPE of Agrawal, Libert and Stehlé [7]. It involves public parameters of the form $\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, g^{\mathbf{A}}, g^{\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A}}\right)$, where g generates a bilinear group $\mathbb{G}$ of prime order q, $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$, $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l_1}$, and the master-secret-key is $\mathsf{msk} = \mathbf{S}$. The secret-key corresponding to a predicate matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$ is generated as $\left(g^{\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}}, g^{\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{S}}\right)$ for a randomly sampled $y \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, while

a ciphertext C corresponding to an attribute-message pair $(\mathbf{x}, M) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathcal{M}$ is generated as $\left(g^{\mathbf{A}\cdot\mathbf{r}}, g^{\alpha\cdot\mathbf{x}+\mathbf{m}+\mathbf{S}\cdot\mathbf{A}\cdot\mathbf{r}}\right)$ for $\mathbf{r} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_2}$, $\alpha \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\mathbf{m} = \left[M\ 0\ 0 \cdots 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. The decryption procedure requires the computation of a discrete log over the target group $\mathbb{G}_T$ of the bilinear map, which necessitates that $\mathcal{M}$ is a poly-sized subset of $\mathbb{Z}_q$. The analysis of both data and function privacy for this scheme relies on the implicit use of hash proof systems, exploiting the following fact: the restriction on the number of secret-key queries Q ensures that the master-secret-key $\mathbf{S}$ has sufficient entropy from an adversary's point of view, even given the public parameter pp and $\mathcal{B}$'s responses to Q-many secret-key queries. This ensures that at some stage of the data privacy experiment (respectively, the function privacy experiment), if the challenge ciphertext (respectively, the challenge secret-key) is generated using the master-secret-key instead of the public parameter, it will perfectly hide which challenge attribute-message pair (respectively, the challenge predicate distribution). As in any security proof based on hash-proof systems, both the data and function privacy reductions know the master-secret-key at all times, allowing them to answer secret-key queries at any time. The function privacy proof additionally exploits the fact that any predicate matrix sampled from distribution with super-logarithmic min-entropy has full rank n with overwhelmingly large probability.

Function-Private HVE from Matrix-DDH (Section 6). Our function-private hidden-vector encryption (HVE) scheme uses techniques similar to our function private SME construction, with slight differences to account for the presence of the wildcard character $\star$. The public parameters and master-secret-key of our HVE construction are:

$$\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, \{g^{\mathbf{A}_j}\}_{j\in[1,n+1]}, \{g^{\mathbf{S}\cdot\mathbf{A}_j}\}_{j\in[1,n+1]}\right)\ ,\ \mathsf{msk} = \mathbf{S}$$

Given a predicate vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \cdots, v_n) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \cup \{\star\} \setminus \{0\})^n$, the key-generation algorithm creates a matrix $\mathbf{W} = \left[\mathbf{W}_1 \mid \mathbf{W}_1 \cdot \mathbf{v}'\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times(n+1)}$, where $\mathbf{W}_1 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times n}$ is a random *invertible* matrix, and $\mathbf{v}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is a vector created from $\mathbf{v}$ by substituting the wildcard characters with 0. It then outputs the secret-key for this matrix using the key-generation algorithm of our SME scheme, along with a set $\mathcal{S}$ comprising of the location of the wildcard characters in $\mathbf{v}$ (this is treated as a trivial function privacy leakage). The ciphertext C corresponding to an attribute-message pair $(\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \cdots, x_n), M) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{0\})^n \times \mathcal{M}$ is generated via the following steps by the encryption algorithm:

- It decomposes the attribute vector $\mathbf{x}$ into n vectors of the form:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{x}_1 &= \left[x_1\ 0 \cdots 0\ 0\ 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}\\
\mathbf{x}_2 &= \left[0\ x_2 \cdots 0\ 0\ 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}\\
&\vdots\\
\mathbf{x}_n &= \left[0\ 0 \cdots 0\ x_n\ 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}
\end{aligned}$$

- It also sets $\mathbf{x}_{n+1} = \left[0\ 0 \cdots 0\ 0\ (-1)\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$

- The final ciphertext C comprises $(n+1)$ SME ciphertexts - the first n corresponding $\{(\mathbf{x}_j, 0)\}_{j\in[1,n]}$, and the last corresponding to the pair $(\mathbf{x}_{n+1}, M)$. The ciphertexts share the same random scalar $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, which is subsequently exploited during decryption.

The decryption algorithm cleverly manipulates the aforementioned SME ciphertexts to obtain a ciphertext C' corresponding to $\left(\sum_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}} \mathbf{x}_j, M\right)$, where $\mathcal{S}$ comprises of the location of the wildcard characters in the predicate vector $\mathbf{v}$. It easy to see that if $v_j = x_j$ for each $j \in [1, n]$ such that $v_j \neq \star$, we must have

$$\sum_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}} \mathbf{x}_j = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{v}' \\ (-1) \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$$

and hence $\mathbf{W} \cdot \left(\sum_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}} \mathbf{x}_j\right) = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Hence, a procedure similar to the decryption algorithm of our SME scheme can now be used to recover the payload message M. The data and function privacy arguments for the HVE scheme are again based on the use of hash-proof systems, akin to those for the SME scheme.

1.4 Notations Used

This section summarizes the notations used throughout the rest of the paper.

General Notations. We write $x \xleftarrow{R} \chi$ to represent that an element x is sampled uniformly at random from a set $\mathcal{X}$. The output a of a deterministic algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is denoted by $x \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$ and the output a' of a randomized algorithm $\mathcal{A}'$ is denoted by $x' \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}'$. We refer to $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ as the security parameter, and denote by $\mathsf{exp}(\lambda)$, $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ and $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ any generic (unspecified) exponential function, polynomial function and negligible function in λ respectively. Note that a function $f : \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{N}$ is said to be negligible in λ if for every positive polynomial p, $f(\lambda) < 1/p(\lambda)$ when λ is sufficiently large. For $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $a \leq b$, we denote by $[a, b]$ the set of integers lying between a and b (both inclusive). For a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$ (q being a λ-bit prime) and $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$, we denote by $\mathbb{F}_q^{m\times n}$ the space of all $m \times n$ matrices $\mathbf{W}$ with elements from $\mathbb{F}_q$. Further, we use the short-hand notation $\mathbb{F}_q^m$ to represent the vector space $\mathbb{F}_q^{m\times 1}$. Finally, given a matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m\times n}$, its transpose in $\mathbb{F}_q^{n\times m}$ is denoted as $\mathbf{W}^{\mathbf{T}}$.

Bilinear Group Notations. Let $\mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ, and outputs a tuple of the form $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e)$, where $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ are groups of order q (q being a λ-bit prime), g is a generator for $\mathbb{G}$ and $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map. The group $\mathbb{G}$ is popularly referred to as a *bilinear group* [4]. Now, given a matrix $\mathbf{W} = \{w_{i,j}\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m\times n}$, we use the following notations:

- $g^{\mathbf{W}}$: Denotes the set of group elements $\{g^{w_{i,j}}\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]} \in \mathbb{G}^{m\times n}$
- $e(g, g)^{\mathbf{W}}$: Denotes the set of group elements $\{e(g, g)^{w_{i,j}}\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]} \in \mathbb{G}_T^{m\times n}$

The aforementioned notations lead to the following straightforward observations:

Observation 1.1 *Let* $\mathbf{W}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m\times n}$ *and* $\mathbf{W}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m\times n}$ *be two matrices for* $m, n = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$*. Then* $g^{\mathbf{W}_1+\mathbf{W}_2}$ *is well-defined, and efficiently computable given* $\left(g^{\mathbf{W}_1}, g^{\mathbf{W}_2}\right)$*.*

Observation 1.2 *Let* $\mathbf{W}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m\times n}$ *and* $\mathbf{W}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times l}$ *be two matrices for* $m, n, l = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$*. Then* $g^{\mathbf{W}_1\cdot\mathbf{W}_2}$ *is well-defined, and may be efficiently computed given either* $\left(g^{\mathbf{W}_1}, \mathbf{W}_2\right)$ *or* $\left(\mathbf{W}_1, g^{\mathbf{W}_2}\right)$*.*

Observation 1.3 *let* $\mathbf{W}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m\times n}$ *and* $\mathbf{W}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times l}$ *be two matrices for* $m, n, l = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$*. Then* $e(g,g)^{\mathbf{W}_1\cdot\mathbf{W}_2}$ *is well-defined, and may be efficiently computed given* $\left(g^{\mathbf{W}_1}, g^{\mathbf{W}_2}\right)$*.*

Min-Entropy of Random Variables. The min-entropy of a random variable Y is called $\mathbf{H}_\infty(Y)$ and is evaluated as $-\log\left(\max_y \Pr[Y = y]\right)$; a random variable Y is said to be a k-source if $\mathbf{H}_\infty(Y) \geq k$. We additionally define an (m, n, k)-*matrix-source* for $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ to be a matrix of mutually independent random variables $\mathbf{Y} = \left(\{Y_{i,j}\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]}\right)$, such that each individual $Y_{i,j}$ is uniformly distributed over some finite field $\mathbb{F}_{q_k}$, where q_k is a k-bit prime. It is easy to see that each such $Y_{i,j}$ represents a k-source.

2 Background and Preliminaries

In this section, we recall certain standard computational assumptions in bilinear groups, and also introduce certain *min-entropy* variants of these assumptions.

2.1 Standard Computational Assumptions in Bilinear Groups

The Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption (DBDH). Let $\mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ, and outputs a tuple of the form $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e)$, where $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ are groups of order q (q being a λ-bit prime), g is a generator for $\mathbb{G}$ and $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map. The decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption is that the distribution ensembles:

$$\{(g, g^{a_1}, g^{a_2}, g^{a_3}, e(g,g)^{a_1\cdot a_2\cdot a_3})\}_{a_1,a_2,a_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q} \text{ and } \{(g, g^{a_1}, g^{a_2}, g^{a_3}, Z)\}_{a_1,a_2,a_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q, Z \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}_T}$$

are computationally indistinguishable, where $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e) \leftarrow \mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$.

The Decisional Linear Assumption (DLIN). Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group of prime order q and let g_1, g_2, g_3 be arbitrary generators for $\mathbb{G}$. The decisional linear assumption [18] is that the distribution ensembles:

$$\left\{\left(g_1, g_2, g_3, g_1^{a_1}, g_2^{a_2}, g_3^{a_1+a_2}\right)\right\}_{a_1,a_2 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q} \text{ and } \{(g_1, g_2, g_3, g_1^{a_1}, g_2^{a_2}, g_3^{a_3})\}_{a_1,a_2,a_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q}$$

are computationally indistinguishable, where $g_1, g_2, g_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}$. A generalized version of this assumption, denoted as k-DLIN, is presented in Appendix B.

The Matrix Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption (MDDH). Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group of prime order q and let g be an arbitrary generator for $\mathbb{G}$. Also, let $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ with $m > n$, and let $\mathcal{D}_{m,n}$ denote a matrix distribution from which one can efficiently sample with overwhelmingly large probability a matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$, such that $\mathbf{W}$ has full rank n. The $\mathcal{D}_{m,n}$-matrix decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption [19] is that the distribution ensembles:

$$\left\{\left(g^{\mathbf{W}}, g^{\mathbf{W}\cdot\mathbf{y}}\right)\right\}_{\mathbf{W}\xleftarrow{R}\mathcal{D}_{m,n}\ ,\ \mathbf{y}\xleftarrow{R}\mathbb{Z}_q^n} \text{ and } \left\{\left(g^{\mathbf{W}}, g^{\mathbf{u}}\right)\right\}_{\mathbf{W}\xleftarrow{R}\mathcal{D}_{m,n}\ ,\ \mathbf{u}\xleftarrow{R}\mathbb{Z}_q^m}$$

are computationally indistinguishable, where $g \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $m, n = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$.

The $\mathcal{D}_{m,n}$-MDDH assumption holds even if the group $\mathbb{G}$ is bilinear, albeit subject to the additional restriction that $n \geq 2$ [19]. This restriction may, however, be relaxed if the corresponding bilinear map is asymmetric over two distinct source groups $\mathbb{G}_1$ and $\mathbb{G}_2$, and the MDDH assumption is assumed to hold in either one or both these groups (analogous to the external Diffie-Hellman (XDH) and symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumptions (SXDH) [20], respectively).

2.2 Min-Entropy-based Sub-Families of the MDDH Assumption

In this section, we introduce two min-entropy-based sub-families of the MDDH assumption. We first state the following claims:

Claim 2.1 *Let $\mathbf{V} = \left(\{V_{i,j}\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]}\right)$ be an (m,n,k)-matrix-source over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{m\times n}$ for $k = \omega(\log\lambda)$. Then, $\mathbf{V}$ represents a matrix distribution from which one can efficiently sample with overwhelmingly large probability a matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m\times n}$, such that $\mathbf{W}$ has full rank n.*

Claim 2.2 *Let $\mathbf{V}_1 = \left(\{V_{i,j,1}\}_{i\in[1,n],j\in[1,n]}\right)$ be an (n,n,k)-matrix-source over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times n}$, such that $k = \omega(\log\lambda)$, and let $\mathbf{V}_2 = \left(\{V_{i,2}\}_{i\in[1,n]}\right)$ be any non-zero distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Then $\tilde{\mathbf{V}} = \left[\mathbf{V}_1 \mid \mathbf{V}_1 \cdot \mathbf{V}_2\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n+1)\times n}$ represents a matrix distribution from which one can efficiently sample with overwhelmingly large probability a matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n+1)\times n}$, such that $\mathbf{W}$ has full rank n.*

The detailed proofs of these claims are presented in Appendix C. The aforementioned claims allows us to define the following min-entropy-based sub-families of the MDDH assumption.

Definition 2.1 (The (m,n,k)-Source-MDDH Assumption). *Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group of prime order q and let g be an arbitrary generator for $\mathbb{G}$. The* (m,n,k)-source-MDDH assumption*, for $m, n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $m > n$ and $k = \omega(\log\lambda)$, is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\text{MDDH}}_{m,n,k,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\text{MDDH},m,n,k,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\text{MDDH},m,n,k,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right]\right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

where for each $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and $b \in \{0,1\}$, the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b)}_{\text{MDDH},m,n,k\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ is defined as:

1. $(\mathbf{V}^*, \mathsf{state}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}\left(1^\lambda, m, n, k\right)$, *where* $\mathbf{V}^* = \left(\{V^*_{i,j}\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]}\right)$ *is an* (m,n,k)-*matrix-source.*
2. *Sample* $\mathbf{W} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{V}^*$.
3. *If* $b = 1$, *sample* $\mathbf{y} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, *and set* $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{W}\cdot\mathbf{y}$. *Else if* $b = 0$, *sample* $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$.
4. $b' \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}\left(\left(g^{\mathbf{W}}, g^{\mathbf{u}}\right), \mathsf{state}\right)$.
5. *Output* b'.

The (m,n,k)-Source-MDDH Assumption holds even if the group $\mathbb{G}$ is bilinear, subject to the additional restriction that $n \geq 2$.

Definition 2.2 (The (n,k)-Source-MDDH Assumption). *Let* $\mathbb{G}$ *be a group of prime order* q *and let* g *be an arbitrary generator for* $\mathbb{G}$. *The* (n,k)-source-MDDH assumption, *for* $n \in \mathbb{N}$ *and* $k = \omega(\log\lambda)$, *is that for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary* $\mathcal{A}$, *the following holds:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{MDDH}}_{n,k,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,k,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,k,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right]\right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

where for each $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ *and* $b \in \{0,1\}$, *the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,k\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ *is defined as:*

1. $(\mathbf{V}^*_1, \mathbf{V}^*_2, \mathsf{state}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}\left(1^\lambda, n, k\right)$, *where* $\mathbf{V}^*_1 = \left(\{V^*_{i,j,1}\}_{i\in[1,n],j\in[1,n]}\right)$ *is an* (n,n,k)-*matrix-source and* $\mathbf{V}^*_2 = \left(\{V^*_{i,2}\}_{i\in[1,n]}\right)$ *is a non-zero distribution over* $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$.
2. *Let* $\tilde{\mathbf{V}}^* = \left[\mathbf{V}^*_1 \mid \mathbf{V}^*_1 \cdot \mathbf{V}^*_2\right]^{\mathbf{T}}$. *Sample* $\mathbf{W} \xleftarrow{R} \tilde{\mathbf{V}}^*$.
3. *If* $b = 1$, *sample* $\mathbf{y} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, *and set* $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{W}\cdot\mathbf{y}$. *Else if* $b = 0$, *sample* $\mathbf{u} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$.
4. $b' \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}\left(\left(g^{\mathbf{W}}, g^{\mathbf{u}}\right), \mathsf{state}\right)$.
5. *Output* b'.

Once again, the (n,k)-Source-MDDH Assumption holds even if the group $\mathbb{G}$ is bilinear, subject to the additional restriction that $n \geq 2$.

3 Function Privacy of Public-Key Predicate Encryption

In this section, we formally define the indistinguishability-based framework for function privacy of predicate encryption in the public-key setting. We consider adversaries that have access to the public parameters of the scheme, as well as a secret-key generation oracle. The adversary is additionally allowed to query a left-or-right function-privacy oracle $\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}$. This oracle takes as input two adversarially-chosen distributions over the class of predicates $\mathcal{F}$, subject to certain min-entropy requirements, and outputs a secret-key for a predicate sampled from one of these distributions. At the end of the interaction, the adversary should be able to distinguish between the *left* and *right* modes of operation of $\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}$ with only negligible probability. The formal definitions for function privacy are presented separately for three specific sub-classes of predicate encryption considered in this paper - namely, identity-based encryption (IBE),

subspace-membership encryption (SME) and hidden-vector encryption (HVE). Note that the corresponding data privacy notions for each of these predicate encryption systems can be captured within a single indistinguishability-based framework (see Definition A.1 in Appendix A).

3.1 Identity-Based Encryption and its Function Privacy

An identity-based encryption scheme Π^{IBE} over an identity space $\mathcal{ID}$ and a message space $\mathcal{M}$ is a public-key predicate encryption scheme supporting the set of equality predicates $f_{\mathsf{id}} : \mathcal{ID} \longrightarrow \{0,1\}$ defined as $f_{\mathsf{id}}(\mathsf{id}') = 1$ if and only if $\mathsf{id}' = \mathsf{id}$. The secret-key associated with an identity $\mathsf{id} \in \mathcal{ID}$ is denoted as $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}}$. We now define the function privacy notions for an IBE scheme.

Definition 3.1 (Left-or-Right Function Privacy Oracle for IBE). *A left-or-right function privacy oracle* $\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\text{IBE}}$ *takes as input a quadruplet* $(\mathsf{mode}, msk, \mathbf{ID}_0, \mathbf{ID}_1)$*, where* $\mathsf{mode} \in \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$*,* msk *is the master-secret-key of the IBE scheme, and* $(\mathbf{ID}_0, \mathbf{ID}_1)$ *are circuits representing distributions over the identity space* $\mathcal{ID}$*. If* $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$*, the oracle samples* $\mathsf{id} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{ID}_0$*, while if* $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{right}$*, it samples* $\mathsf{id} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{ID}_1$*. It then responds with* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}} \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{KeyGen}(msk, \mathsf{id})$*.*

Definition 3.2 (Computationally Function Private IBE). *An IBE scheme* $\Pi_{\text{IBE}} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *is said to be* computationally function private *if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, the following holds:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\Pi_{\text{IBE}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi_{\text{IBE}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi_{\text{IBE}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

where for each $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ *and* $\mathsf{mode} \in \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$*, the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi_{\text{IBE}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ *is defined as follows:*

1. $(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{msk}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}\left(1^\lambda\right)$.
2. $b \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\text{IBE}}(\mathsf{mode},\mathsf{msk},\cdot,\cdot),\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk},\cdot)}\left(1^\lambda, \mathsf{pp}\right)$.
3. *Output* b.

subject to the restriction that each query issued to $\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\text{IBE}}(\mathsf{mode}, \mathsf{msk}, \cdot, \cdot)$ *is of the form* $(\mathbf{ID}^*_0, \mathbf{ID}^*_1)$*, where both* $\mathbf{ID}^*_0$ *and* $\mathbf{ID}^*_1$ *represent* k*-sources such that* $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$*.*

3.2 Subspace-Membership Encryption and its Function Privacy

A subspace-membership encryption scheme Π^{SME} over an attribute space $\Sigma = \mathbb{F}_q^n$ (q being a λ-bit prime) and a payload message space $\mathcal{M}$ is a public-key predicate encryption scheme supporting the set of matrix predicates $f_{\mathbf{W}} : \mathbb{F}_q^n \longrightarrow \{0,1\}$, such that for $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$ and $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$, we have $f_{\mathbf{W}}(\mathbf{x}) = 1$ if and only if $\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{F}_q^m$. The secret-key associated with a matrix $\mathbf{W}$ is denoted as $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}}$. We now define the function privacy notions for an SME scheme.

Definition 3.3 (Left-or-Right Function Privacy Oracle for SME). *A left-or-right function privacy oracle* $\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\mathrm{SME}}$ *takes as input a quadruplet* $(\mathsf{mode}, msk, \mathbf{V}_0, \mathbf{V}_1)$*, where* $\mathsf{mode} \in \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$*, msk is the master-secret-key of the SME scheme, and* $(\mathbf{V}_0, \mathbf{V}_1)$ *are circuits representing joint distributions over* $\mathbb{F}_q^{m \times n}$*. If* $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$*, the oracle samples* $\mathbf{W} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{V}_0$*, while if* $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{right}$*, it samples* $\mathbf{W} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{V}_1$*. It then responds with* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}} \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{KeyGen}(msk, \mathbf{W})$*.*

Definition 3.4 (Computationally Function Private SME). *An SME scheme* $\Pi_{\mathrm{SME}} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *is said to be* computationally function private *if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, the following holds:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\Pi_{\mathrm{SME}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi_{\mathrm{SME}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi_{\mathrm{SME}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

where for each $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ *and* $\mathsf{mode} \in \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$*, the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi_{\mathrm{SME}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ *is defined as follows:*

1. $(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{msk}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}\left(1^\lambda\right)$.
2. $b \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\mathrm{SME}}(\mathsf{mode},\mathsf{msk},\cdot,\cdot),\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk},\cdot)}\left(1^\lambda, \mathsf{pp}\right)$.
3. *Output* b.

subject to the restriction that each query issued to $\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\mathrm{SME}}(\mathsf{mode}, \mathsf{msk}, \cdot, \cdot)$ *is of the form* $(\mathbf{V}^*_0, \mathbf{V}^*_1)$*, where both* $\mathbf{V}^*_0 = \left(\{V^*_{i,j,0}\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]}\right)$ *and* $\mathbf{V}^*_1 = \left(\{V^*_{i,j,1}\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]}\right)$ *represent* (m, n, k)*-matrix-sources for* $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$*.*

Avoiding Arbitrary Correlations among the Elements of W. Note that Definition 3.4 essentially requires that a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}}$ reveals no unnecessary information about the predicate matrix $\mathbf{W}$ as long as the elements of $\mathbf{W}$ are sampled from mutually independent and sufficiently unpredictable distributions. This restriction is imposed to rule out arbitrary correlations among the elements of $\mathbf{W}$. Indeed, it is impossible to achieve any realistic notion of function privacy for subspace-membership encryption that allows such arbitrary correlations among the elements of a predicate matrix (see [8] for a more detailed explanation of this impossibility).

3.3 Hidden-Vector Encryption and its Function Privacy

A hidden-vector encryption scheme Π^{HVE} over an attribute space Σ, a special wildcard symbol $\star$, and a payload message space $\mathcal{M}$, is a public-key predicate encryption scheme supporting predicates of the form $f_{\mathbf{v}} : \Sigma \longrightarrow \{0, 1\}$, such that for each $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \cdots, v_n) \in (\Sigma \cup \{\star\})^n$, and each $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \cdots, x_n) \in \Sigma^n$, we have $f_{\mathbf{v}}(\mathbf{x}) = 1$ if and only if for each $j \in [1, n]$, either $v_j = x_j$ or $v_j = \star$. The secret-key associated with a predicate vector $\mathbf{v}$ is denoted as $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}}$. Although SME subsumes HVE, the presence of the wildcard character in the predicate vector implies that the function privacy definitions for SME do not naturally apply to HVE [3]. This necessitates separate definitions for the function privacy of an HVE scheme.

Definition 3.5 (Left-or-Right Function Privacy Oracle for HVE). *A left-or-right function privacy oracle* $\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\mathrm{HVE}}$ *takes as input a quintuplet* $(\mathsf{mode}, msk, \mathbf{V}_0, \mathbf{V}_1, \mathcal{S})$*, where* $\mathsf{mode} \in \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$*,* msk *is the master-secret-key of the HVE scheme,* $(\mathbf{V}_0, \mathbf{V}_1)$ *are circuits representing joint distributions over* Σ^n*, and* $\mathcal{S} \subseteq [1, n]$*. If* $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$*, the oracle samples* $\mathbf{v} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{V}_0$*, while if* $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{right}$*, it samples* $\mathbf{v} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{V}_1$*. For such a* $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \cdots, v_n)$*, the oracle constructs a second* $\mathbf{v}' = (v'_1, \cdots, v'_n)$ *such that* $v'_j = v_j$ *if* $j \in \mathcal{S}$*, and* $v'_j = \star$*, otherwise. It then responds with* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}'} \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{KeyGen}(msk, \mathbf{v}')$*.*

Definition 3.6 (Computationally Function Private HVE). *An HVE scheme* $\Pi_{\mathrm{HVE}} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *is said to be* computationally function private *if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, the following holds:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\Pi_{\mathrm{HVE}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \stackrel{\mathrm{def}}{=} \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi_{\mathrm{HVE}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi_{\mathrm{HVE}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

where for each $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ *and* $\mathsf{mode} \in \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$*, the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi_{\mathrm{HVE}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ *is defined as follows:*

1. $(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{msk}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}\left(1^\lambda\right)$.
2. $b \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\mathrm{HVE}}(\mathsf{mode},\mathsf{msk},\cdot,\cdot,\cdot),\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk},\cdot)}\left(1^\lambda, \mathsf{pp}\right)$.
3. *Output* b.

subject to the restriction that each query issued to $\mathsf{LoR}^{\mathsf{FP}}_{\mathrm{HVE}}(\mathsf{mode}, \mathsf{msk}, \cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ *is of the form* $(\mathbf{V}^*_0, \mathbf{V}^*_1, \mathcal{S}^*)$*, where both* $\mathbf{V}^*_0 = \left(\{V^*_{j,0}\}_{j\in[1,n]}\right)$ *and* $\mathbf{V}^*_1 = \left(\{V^*_{j,1}\}_{j\in[1,n]}\right)$ *represent* $(1, n, k)$*-matrix-sources for* $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$*, and* $\mathcal{S}^* \subseteq [1, n]$*.*

Note that our definitions for function private HVE essentially require that a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}}$ reveals no more information about $\mathbf{v}$ than the location of the wildcard characters, subject to the restriction that the remaining components of $\mathbf{v}$ are sampled from sufficiently unpredictable distributions. This *trivial leakage* induced by the presence of wildcard characters is not captured by our function privacy definitions for SME in general, and necessitates separate function privacy definitions for HVE.

3.4 Multi-Shot vs. Single-Shot Function Privacy Adversaries

Note that Definitions 3.2 and 3.4 consider function privacy adversaries that query the left-or-right function privacy oracle for any polynomial number of times. In fact, as adversaries are also given access to the key-generation oracle, this *multi-shot* definition is polynomially equivalent to its *single-shot* variant in which adversaries query the function privacy oracle at most once. This equivalence may be proved by a hybrid argument (originally proposed by Boneh, Raghunathan and Segev [10, 8]), where the hybrids are constructed such that only one query is forwarded to the function privacy oracle, and all other queries are answered using the key-generation oracle.

4 Computationally Function Private Identity-Based Encryption

In this section we present an IBE scheme based on the DBDH and DLIN assumptions in the random-oracle model. The scheme is inspired by the IBE of Boneh and Franklin [4]. The scheme is described below, and its proofs of data privacy and function privacy are presented subsequently.

4.1 The Scheme

Let $\mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ, and outputs the tuple $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e)$, where $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ are groups of of order q (q being a λ-bit prime), g is a generator for $\mathbb{G}$ and $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map. The scheme $\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}}$ is parameterized by the security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. For any such λ, we denote by $\mathcal{ID}_\lambda$ and $\mathcal{M}_\lambda$ the identity space and the message space, respectively. The scheme uses two hash functions $H_1 : \mathcal{ID}_\lambda \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}$ and $H_2 : \mathcal{ID}_\lambda \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}$ (modeled as random oracles).

- **Setup:** The setup algorithm samples $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ on input the security parameter 1^λ. It also samples $s_1, s_2 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and outputs the public parameter pp and the master-secret-key msk as:

$$\mathsf{pp} = (g, g^{s_1}, g^{s_2}) \ , \ \mathsf{msk} = (s_1, s_2)$$

- **KeyGen:** On input the public parameter pp, the master-secret-key msk and an identity $\mathsf{id} \in \mathcal{ID}_\lambda$, the key generation algorithm samples $z_1, z_2 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and outputs the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}} = (d_1, d_2, d_3)$ where:

$$d_1 = H_1(\mathsf{id})^{s_1 \cdot z_1} \cdot H_2(\mathsf{id})^{s_2 \cdot z_2} \ , \ d_2 = z_1 \ , \ d_3 = z_2$$

- **Enc:** On input the public parameter pp, an identity $\mathsf{id} \in \mathcal{ID}_\lambda$ and a message $M \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda$, the encryption algorithm samples $r \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and outputs the ciphertext $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$ where:

$$c_1 = g^r \ , \ c_2 = M \cdot e(g^{s_1}, H_1(\mathsf{id}))^r \ , \ c_3 = e(g^{s_2}, H_2(\mathsf{id}))^r$$

- **Dec:** On input a ciphertext $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$ and a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}} = (d_1, d_2, d_3)$, the decryption algorithm outputs:

$$M' = \left(\frac{c_2^{d_2} \cdot c_3^{d_3}}{e(d_1, c_1)} \right)^{1/d_2}$$

Correctness. Consider a ciphertext $C = (c_1, c_2, c_3)$ corresponding to a message M under an identity id, and a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}} = (d_1, d_2, d_3)$ corresponding to the same identity id. Then, we have:

$$\begin{aligned} M' &= \left(\frac{c_2^{d_2} \cdot c_3^{d_3}}{e\left(d_1, c_1\right)} \right)^{1/d_2} \\ &= \left(\frac{M^{z_1} \cdot e\left(g^{s_1}, H_1\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^{r \cdot z_1} \cdot e\left(g^{s_2}, H_2\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^{r \cdot z_2}}{e\left(H_1\left(\mathsf{id}\right)^{s_1 \cdot z_1} \cdot H_2\left(\mathsf{id}\right)^{s_2 \cdot z_2}, g^r\right)} \right)^{1/z_1} \\ &= M \cdot \left(\frac{e\left(g^{s_1}, H_1\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^{r \cdot z_1} \cdot e\left(g^{s_2}, H_2\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^{r \cdot z_2}}{e\left(g^r, H_1\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^{s_1 \cdot z_1} \cdot e\left(g^r, H_2\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^{s_2 \cdot z_2}} \right)^{1/z_1} \\ &= M \end{aligned}$$

Therefore as long as $z_1 \neq 0 \pmod{q}$ (an event which occurs with probability $1 - 1/q$ over the randomness of KeyGen), the message is recovered correctly.

4.2 Security of the Scheme

Adaptive Data Privacy. We state the following theorem for the adaptive data privacy of $\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}}$:

Theorem 4.1 *Our IBE scheme* $\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}}$ *is adaptively data private under the* DBDH *assumption in the random oracle model.*

Proof. The analysis of data privacy uses techniques very similar to those of Boneh and Franklin [4]. We define a sequence of three experiments, the first of which is identical to the standard data privacy experiment, the second experiment randomizes the second component of the challenge ciphertext provided to the adversary, while the final experiment randomizes both the second and third challenge ciphertext components. The indistinguishability of the first and second experiments is argued via a simulation where a simulator $\mathcal{B}$ embeds a DBDH instance in the second challenge ciphertext component, such that the component is well-formed with respect to the public parameters and a challenge identity-message pair if and only if the DBDH instance is valid. The indistinguishability of the second and third experiments follows from a similar simulation-based argument. The analysis models both the hash functions H_1 and H_2 as random oracles, and argues that the probability that either simulation aborts due to potential inconsistencies in either the secret-key-generation phase or the challenge ciphertext generation phase is negligible in the security parameter λ.

Computational Function Privacy. We state the following theorem for the computational function privacy of $\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}}$:

Theorem 4.2 *Our IBE scheme* $\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}}$ *is function private under the* DLIN *assumption for identities sampled uniformly from* k*-sources with* $k = \omega\left(\log \lambda\right)$.

Proof. The proof follows directly from the following claim:

Claim 4.1 *For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds:*

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]-\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right|\leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

To prove this claim, we assume the contrary. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that:

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]-\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right|=\epsilon$$

where $\epsilon > \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. We construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that solves an instance of the DLIN problem with advantage ϵ' negligibly close to ϵ. $\mathcal{B}$ receives as input a DLIN instance $(g_1, g_2, g_3, g_1^{a_1}, g_2^{a_2}, g_3^{a_3})$ over a bilinear group $\mathbb{G}$ with prime order q and generator g, and interacts with $\mathcal{A}$ as follows:

- ***Setup:*** $\mathcal{B}$ samples $x_1, x_2, x_3 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and provides $\mathcal{A}$ with the public parameter pp as:

  $$\mathsf{pp} = (g, g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_3^{x_3}, g_2^{x_2} \cdot g_3^{x_3})$$

  where g_1,g_2 and g_3 are part of its input DLIN instance. Let $\alpha_j = \log_g g_j$ for $j \in \{1,2,3\}$. Then observe that $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of public parameters *formally* fixes the master secret key to be:

  $$\mathsf{msk} = (s_1 = \alpha_1 \cdot x_1 + \alpha_3 \cdot x_3, s_2 = \alpha_2 \cdot x_2 + \alpha_3 \cdot x_3)$$

- H_1, H_2 ***Query Phase-1***: $\mathcal{A}$ is allowed to issue H_1 and H_2 queries. $\mathcal{B}$ maintains a list of three-tuples $\left(\mathsf{id}_j, y_j, y'_j\right) \in \mathcal{ID}_\lambda \times \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q$. Upon receiving a query for an identity id_i it first looks up the list for a matching $(\mathsf{id}_i, y_i, y'_i)$ entry. If not found, it samples $y_i, y'_i \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and adds the tuple $(\mathsf{id}_i, y_i, y'_i)$ to the list. Finally, it responds with $H_1(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y_i}$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y'_i}$.

- ***Secret-Key Query Phase-1:*** When $\mathcal{A}$ issues a secret-key query for some identity id_i, $\mathcal{B}$ looks up $H_1(\mathsf{id}_i)$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}_i)$, as described above. Let $y_{1,i}$ and $y_{2,i}$ be the corresponding tuple entries. $\mathcal{B}$ samples $z_{1,i}, z_{2,i} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and responds with:

  $$\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}_i} = \left((g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_3^{x_3})^{y_{1,i} \cdot z_{1,i}} \cdot (g_2^{x_2} \cdot g_3^{x_3})^{y_{2,i} \cdot z_{2,i}}, z_{1,i}, z_{2,i}\right)$$

  It is easy to see that this simulation of the key-generation oracle by $\mathcal{B}$ is computationally indistinguishable from the real oracle the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$. In particular, we have:

  $$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}_i} &= \left((g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_3^{x_3})^{y_{1,i} \cdot z_{1,i}} \cdot (g_2^{x_2} \cdot g_3^{x_3})^{y_{2,i} \cdot z_{2,i}}, z_{1,i}, z_{2,i}\right)\\ &= \left((g^{y_{1,i}})^{s_1 \cdot z_{1,i}} \cdot (g^{y_{2,i}})^{s_2 \cdot z_{2,i}}, z_{1,i}, z_{2,i}\right)\\ &= \left(H_1(\mathsf{id}_i)^{s_1 \cdot z_{1,i}} \cdot H_2(\mathsf{id}_i)^{s_2 \cdot z_{2,i}}, z_{1,i}, z_{2,i}\right)\end{aligned}$$

- ***Left-or-Right Query:*** Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ queries the left-or-right oracle with $(\mathbf{ID}_0^*, \mathbf{ID}_1^*)$ - a two-tuple of circuits representing k-sources over the identity space $\mathcal{ID}_\lambda$ such that $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$. $\mathcal{B}$ uniformly samples $\mathsf{mode} \xleftarrow{R} \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$. If $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$, it samples $\mathsf{id}^* \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{ID}_0^*$; otherwise, it samples $\mathsf{id}^* \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{ID}_1^*$. If either $H_1(\mathsf{id}^*)$ or $H_2(\mathsf{id}^*)$ have already been looked up, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs a random bit and aborts.* Otherwise, it samples $z_1^*, z_2^* \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and responds with:

$$\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*} = (g_1^{a_1 \cdot x_1} \cdot g_2^{a_2 \cdot x_2} \cdot g_3^{a_3 \cdot x_3}, z_1^*, z_2^*)$$

  where $(g_1^{a_1}, g_2^{a_2}, g_3^{a_3})$ is part of its input DLIN instance. It also formally sets $H_1(\mathsf{id}^*) = g^{a_1/z_1^*}$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}^*) = g^{a_2/z_2^*}$.

- H_1, H_2 ***Query Phase-2***: $\mathcal{A}$ continues to issue queries to the random oracles H_1 and H_2. $\mathcal{B}$ responds as in Phase-1, except if a query for id^* arrives. In this case, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs* 1 *and aborts.*

- ***Secret-Key Query Phase-2:*** $\mathcal{A}$ continues to issue secret-key queries, and $\mathcal{B}$ continues to respond as in Phase-1, except if a query for id^* arrives. In this case, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs* 1 *and aborts.*

- ***Output:*** Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1 if the challenge identity id^* was sampled from $\mathbf{ID}_b^*$, and 0 otherwise.

Note that we considered the single-shot variant of the function privacy adversary making a single left-or-right oracle query. Such an adversary is polynomially equivalent to its multi-shot variant (see Section 3.4). We now state and prove the following claims:

Claim 4.2 *When $a_3 = a_1 + a_2$, the joint distribution of* mode *and the challenge secret-key* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ *in the simulation of the left-or-right oracle by $\mathcal{B}$ is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP}, \Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Note that the sampling of id^* from either $\mathbf{ID}_1^*$ or $\mathbf{ID}_1^*$ by $\mathcal{B}$ is consistent with its random choice of mode. Additionally, when $a_3 = a_1 + a_2$, the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ takes the form:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*} &= \left(g_1^{a_1 \cdot x_1} \cdot g_2^{a_2 \cdot x_2} \cdot g_3^{(a_1+a_2) \cdot x_3}, z_1^*, z_2^*\right) \\
&= \left((g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_3^{x_3})^{a_1} \cdot (g_2^{x_2} \cdot g_3^{x_3})^{a_2}, z_1^*, z_2^*\right) \\
&= \left((g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_3^{x_3})^{(a_1/z_1^*) \cdot z_1^*} \cdot (g_2^{x_2} \cdot g_3^{x_3})^{(a_2/z_2^*) \cdot z_2^*}, z_1^*, z_2^*\right) \\
&= \left(H_1(\mathsf{id}^*)^{s_1 \cdot z_1^*} \cdot H_2(\mathsf{id}^*)^{s_2 \cdot z_2^*}, z_1^*, z_2^*\right)
\end{aligned}$$

which is identically distributed to the response of the left-or-right oracle in the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP}, \Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$. This completes the proof of Claim 4.2.

Claim 4.3 *When a_3 is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, the distribution of the challenge secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ is statistically independent of $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of* mode *with overwhelmingly large probability.*

Proof. Recall that $\alpha_j = \log_g g_j$ for $j \in \{1, 2, 3\}$. Consider the following system of equations, determined by the public parameters pp and the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$:

$$\log_g \left(g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_3^{x_3}\right) = \alpha_1 \cdot x_1 + \alpha_3 \cdot x_3$$
$$\log_g \left(g_2^{x_2} \cdot g_3^{x_3}\right) = \alpha_2 \cdot x_2 + \alpha_3 \cdot x_3$$
$$\log_g \left(g_1^{a_1 \cdot x_1} \cdot g_2^{a_2 \cdot x_2} \cdot g_3^{a_3 \cdot x_3}\right) = a_1 \cdot \alpha_1 \cdot x_1 + a_2 \cdot \alpha_2 \cdot x_2 + a_3 \cdot \alpha_3 \cdot x_3$$

Since a_3 is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, with all but negligible probability, we have that $a_3 \neq a_1 + a_2$, *which makes the aforementioned system of equations linearly independent*. Hence, the *conditional distribution* of $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ (where the conditioning is on $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of mode and everything else in $\mathcal{A}$'s view) is uniform. This completes the proof of Claim 4.3.

It now follows from Claims 4.2 and 4.3 that the advantage ϵ' of $\mathcal{B}$ in solving the DLIN instance may be quantified as $\epsilon' = \epsilon \cdot (1 - \Pr[\mathsf{abort}_1]) - \Pr[\mathsf{abort}_2]$, where ϵ is the advantage of the function privacy adversary $\mathcal{A}$, while abort_1 and abort_2 denote the events that aborting the simulation during the left-or-right query phase and the second hash/secret-key query phases, respectively, leads to a loss of advantage for $\mathcal{B}$. We bound the probability of this event as follows:

- **Abortion during Left-or-Right Query.** Suppose that the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ makes Q_1 and Q_2 queries to the random oracles and secret-key generation oracle, respectively, prior to the left-or-right query. Recall that both the circuits $\mathbf{ID}_0^*$ and $\mathbf{ID}_1^*$ generated by $\mathcal{A}$ represent k-sources over the identity space $\mathcal{ID}_\lambda$, such that $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$. Hence, the probability that a uniformly randomly sampled id^* from either distribution has already been queried by $\mathcal{A}$ may be upper bounded as $\frac{(Q_1+Q_2)}{2^{\omega(\log \lambda)}} \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.

- **Abortion during Query Phase-2.** Note that when $\mathcal{B}$ aborts during a random oracle/secret-key generation oracle query in phase-2, it always outputs 1, thereby indicating that its input DLIN instance is valid. Hence, a loss of advantage for $\mathcal{B}$ occurs only when it has to abort even if the DLIN instance is invalid. Now, as per Claim 4.3, when the DLIN instance is invalid, the distribution of the challenge secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ is uniformly random and independent of mode. Given the min-entropy bounds on the circuits represented by $\mathbf{ID}_0^*$ and $\mathbf{ID}_1^*$, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ still correctly guesses id^* and issues oracle queries for the same is $\mathcal{O}\left(2^{-\omega(\log \lambda)}\right) \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.

In summary, we have $\Pr[\mathsf{abort}_\beta] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ for $\beta \in \{1, 2\}$, implying that $\mathcal{B}$'s advantage in solving the DLIN instance is negligibly close to the advantage of the function privacy adversary $\mathcal{A}$. This completes the proof of Claim 4.1.

We demonstrate in Appendix E that the $\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}}$ scheme can be readily extended to a sequence of IBE schemes that share the same data privacy guarantees, while

enjoying progressively stronger function privacy guarantees under weaker variants of the DLIN assumption, albeit at the cost of a constant growth in ciphertext size.

5 Computationally Function Private Subspace-Membership Encryption

In this section we present an adaptively data private and computationally function private SME scheme based on the matrix DDH assumption in the standard model. The scheme is described below, and its proofs of data privacy and function privacy are presented subsequently.

The Scheme. Let $\mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, and outputs the tuple $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e)$, where $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ are groups of of order q (q being a λ-bit prime), g is a generator for $\mathbb{G}$ and $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map. Our scheme $\Pi^{\text{SME}}_{\text{MDDH}}$ is parameterized by $m, n, l_1, l_2 = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ (for $l_1 > l_2$), in the sense that it supports predicate matrices of the form $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$, and attribute vectors of the form $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. The payload message space $\mathcal{M}_\lambda$ is assumed to be a polynomial-sized subset of $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

- **Setup:** The setup algorithm samples $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ on input the security parameter 1^λ. It also randomly samples $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$, such that $\mathbf{A}$ has full rank l_2, and $\mathbf{S} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l_1}$. It outputs the public parameter pp and the master-secret-key msk as:

$$\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, g^{\mathbf{A}}, g^{\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A}}\right) \ , \ \mathsf{msk} = \mathbf{S}$$

- **KeyGen:** On input the public parameter pp, the master-secret-key msk and a predicate matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$, the key-generation algorithm samples $\mathbf{y} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ and outputs the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}} = (d_1, d_2)$ where:

$$d_1 = g^{\mathbf{y}^\mathbf{T} \cdot \mathbf{W}} \ , \ d_2 = g^{\mathbf{y}^\mathbf{T} \cdot \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{S}}$$

- **Enc:** On input the public parameter pp, an attribute vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and a message $M \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, the encryption algorithm sets:

$$\mathbf{m} = \left[M \ 0 \ 0 \cdots 0\right]^\mathbf{T} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$$

  It then samples $\mathbf{r} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_2}$ and $\alpha \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and outputs the ciphertext $C = (c_1, c_2)$ where:

$$c_1 = g^{\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}} \ , \ c_2 = g^{\alpha \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{m} + \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}}$$

- **Dec:** On input a ciphertext $C = (c_1, c_2)$ and a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}} = (d_1, d_2)$, the decryption algorithm first computes:

$$T_1 = e\left(d_1, c_2\right) \ , T_2 = e\left(d_2, c_1\right)$$

Let $d_1 = \left[d_{1,1}\ d_{1,2} \cdots d_{1,n}\right] \in (\mathbb{G})^n$. The decryption algorithm checks if there exists an $M' \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda$ such that $T_2 \cdot e\left(d_{1,1}, g\right)^{M'} = T_1$. If such an M' is found, it outputs M'; else it outputs $\perp$. Note that the decryption algorithm is efficient since $|\mathcal{M}_\lambda| = \mathsf{poly}\left(\lambda\right)$.

Correctness. Consider a ciphertext $C = (c_1, c_2)$ corresponding to a message M under an attribute vector $\mathbf{x}$, and a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}} = (d_1, d_2)$ corresponding to a predicate matrix $\mathbf{W}$. Also, let $d_1 = \left[d_{1,1}\ d_{1,2} \cdots d_{1,n}\right] \in (\mathbb{G})^n$ and let $\mathbf{m} = \left[M\ 0\ 0 \cdots 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Then we have the following:

$$e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) = e\left(d_{1,1}, g^M\right) \cdot \prod_{j=2}^{n} e\left(d_{1,j}, g^0\right) = e\left(d_{1,1}, g\right)^M$$

Now, if $\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
T_1 &= e\left(d_1, c_2\right) \\
&= e\left(g^{\mathbf{y^T} \cdot \mathbf{W}}, g^{\alpha \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}}\right) \cdot e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) \\
&= e\left(g, g\right)^{\alpha \cdot \mathbf{y^T} \cdot \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{y^T} \cdot \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}} \cdot e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) \\
&= e\left(g, g\right)^{\mathbf{y^T} \cdot \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}} \cdot e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) \\
&= e(g^{\mathbf{y^T} \cdot \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{S}}, g^{\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}}) \cdot e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) \\
&= e(d_2, c_1) \cdot e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) \\
&= T_2 \cdot e\left(d_{1,1}, g\right)^M
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore, if $\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$, the decryption algorithm will output the payload message correctly. On the other hand, if $\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{x} \neq \mathbf{0}$, we have $\alpha \cdot \mathbf{y^T} \cdot \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{x} \neq 0$ with probability $1 - 1/q$ over the randomness of KeyGen, implying that the decryption algorithm returns $\perp$ with overwhelmingly large probability.

5.1 Security of the Scheme

Adaptive Data Privacy. We state the following theorem for the adaptive data privacy of $\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}}$:

Theorem 5.1 *Our SME scheme $\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}}$ is adaptively data private for parameters $m, n, l_1, l_2 = \mathsf{poly}\left(\lambda\right)$ under the (l_1, l_2, k)-*Source-MDDH *assumption for $k = \log_2 q$, subject to the restrictions that:*

- $l_1 > l_2 \geq 2$

- $Q \leq \lfloor (n \times (l_1 - l_2) - 1) / l_1 \rfloor$

where $Q = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ is the maximum number of secret-key-generation queries made by the adversary in the data privacy experiment.

Proof. The analysis of data privacy relies on hash proof systems, and uses arguments similar to those of Cramer and Shoup [16, 17]. The analysis exploits the following fact: the restriction on the number of secret-key queries Q ensures that the master-secret-key $\mathbf{S}$ has sufficient entropy from an adversary's point of view, even given the public parameter pp and $\mathcal{B}$'s responses to Q-many secret-key queries. This in turn ensures that at some stage, if the challenge ciphertext is generated using the master-secret-key instead of the public parameter, it will perfectly hide which attribute-message pair among $(\mathbf{x}_0^*, M_0^*)$ and $(\mathbf{x}_0^*, M_1^*)$ is encrypted. Finally, the scheme is adaptively secure because the reduction knows the master-secret-key at any time, which allows it to answer all secret-key queries without knowing the challenge attribute-message pairs beforehand. This feature is common to nearly all security proofs relying on hash proof systems [16, 17]. The detailed analysis is presented in Appendix F.

Computational Function Privacy. We state the following theorem for the computational function privacy of $\Pi_{\mathrm{MDDH}}^{\mathrm{SME}}$:

Theorem 5.2 *Our SME scheme $\Pi_{\mathrm{MDDH}}^{\mathrm{SME}}$ is function private for parameters $m, n, l_1, l_2 = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ under the $(n, 2, k)$-Source-MDDH assumption for $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$, subject to the restrictions that:*

- *Each predicate matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$ is sampled uniformly from an (m, n, k)-matrix source.*
- $n > m \geq 2$
- $Q \leq \lfloor (n \times (l_1 - l_2) - 1) / l_1 \rfloor$

where Q is the maximum number of secret-key-generation queries made by the adversary during the function privacy experiment.

Proof. The proof follows directly from the following claim:

Claim 5.1 *For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds:*

$$\left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

To prove this claim, we assume the contrary. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that:

$$\left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| = \epsilon$$

We construct a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ such that:

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{MDDH}}_{n,m,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,m,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,m,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| = \epsilon$$

for $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$. $\mathcal{B}$ poses as the challenger for $\mathcal{A}$ in the function privacy experiment, and delays outputting its own choice of matrix distribution in the min-entropy MDDH game until $\mathcal{A}$ queries the left-or-right function privacy oracle. More concretely, $\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:

- ***Setup:*** $\mathcal{B}$ randomly samples $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$ and $\mathbf{S} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l_1}$, where $l_1, l_2 \in \mathbb{N}$. It sets the public parameter pp and the master-secret-key msk as:

$$\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, g^{\mathbf{A}}, g^{\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A}}\right) \ , \ \mathsf{msk} = \mathbf{S}$$

  It provides pp to $\mathcal{A}$.

- ***Secret-Key Queries:*** Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ issues a key-generation query for a predicate matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$. $\mathcal{B}$ samples $\mathbf{y} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ and responds with the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}} = (d_1, d_2)$ where:

$$d_1 = g^{\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}} \ , \ d_2 = g^{\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{S}}$$

  Quite evidently, the distribution of $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}}$ is $\mathcal{B}$'s simulation is computationally indistinguishable from that in the response of the key-generation oracle in the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP}, \Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

- ***Left-or-Right Query:*** Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ queries the left-or-right oracle with $(\mathbf{V}_0^*, \mathbf{V}_1^*)$, where both $\mathbf{V}_0^* = \left(\{V_{i,j,0}^*\}_{i \in [1,m], j \in [1,n]}\right)$ and $\mathbf{V}_1^* = \left(\{V_{i,j,1}^*\}_{i \in [1,m], j \in [1,n]}\right)$ represent (m, n, k)-matrix-sources over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$ for $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$. $\mathcal{B}$ uniformly samples $\mathsf{mode} \xleftarrow{R} \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$. If $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$, it sets $b = 0$, else it sets $b = 1$.

  At this point, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the distribution $(\mathbf{V}_b^*)^{\mathbf{T}}$ and receives in response a tuple $\left(g^{(\mathbf{W}^*)^{\mathbf{T}}}, g^{\mathbf{u}^*}\right) \in \left((\mathbb{G})^{n \times m} \times (\mathbb{G})^n\right)$, for a matrix $\mathbf{W}^* \in \mathbf{V}_b^*$. Note that $\mathbf{u}^*$ is either of the form $(\mathbf{W}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{y}^*$ for some uniformly random $\mathbf{y}^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, or $\mathbf{u}^*$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$.

  $\mathcal{B}$ responds with the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}^*} = (d_1^*, d_2^*)$ where:

$$d_1^* = g^{(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}}} \ , \ d_2^* = g^{(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{S}}$$

- ***Output:*** $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a bit b'. If $b' = b$ (where $b = 0$ if $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$ and $b = 1$ if $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{right}$), $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1; else, it outputs 0.

Note that once again, we considered the single-shot variant of the function privacy adversary making a single left-or-right oracle query. Such an adversary is polynomially equivalent to its multi-shot variant (see Section 3.4). The following claims now follow:

Claim 5.2 *When* $\mathbf{u}^*$ *is of the form* $(\mathbf{W}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{y}^*$ *for some uniformly random* $\mathbf{y}^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$*, the joint distribution of* mode *and the challenge secret-key* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}^*}$ *in the simulation of the left-or-right oracle by* $\mathcal{B}$ *is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP}, \Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Claim 5.3 *When* $\mathbf{u}^*$ *is uniformly random in* $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$*, the distribution of the challenge secret-key* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}^*}$ *is statistically independent of* $\mathcal{B}$*'s choice of* mode *with overwhelmingly large probability.*

Proof. The first claim is obvious. To prove the second claim, it is sufficient to prove that the conditional distribution of $(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{S}$ (where the conditioning is on $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of mode and everything else in $\mathcal{A}$'s view) is uniformly random, given that $\mathbf{u}^*$ is a uniformly random vector in $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$.

Suppose that during the function privacy experiment, $\mathcal{A}$ makes Q secret-key-generation queries on predicate matrices $\mathbf{W}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{W}_Q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$, and $\mathcal{B}$ responds with $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}_j} = (d_{j,1}, d_{j,2})$ for $j \in [1, Q]$. Also, suppose that $Q = \lfloor (n \times (l_1 - l_2) - 1) / l_1 \rfloor$. Now consider the following system of $(n \times l_2 + Q \times l_1)$ equations, determined by the public parameters and the responses of $\mathcal{B}$ to the aforementioned key-generation queries:

$$\begin{aligned}
\log_g \left(g^{\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A}} \right) &= \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A} \\
\log_g \left(d_{1,2} \right) &= \mathbf{y}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}_1 \cdot \mathbf{S} \\
\log_g \left(d_{2,2} \right) &= \mathbf{y}_2^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}_2 \cdot \mathbf{S} \\
&\vdots \\
\log_g \left(d_{Q,2} \right) &= \mathbf{y}_Q^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}_Q \cdot \mathbf{S}
\end{aligned}$$

Quite evidently, the aforementioned system of equations has exponentially many solutions for $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l_1}$. Let $\mathbf{S}_0$ be one such solution, chosen deterministically. Also, let $\mathbf{Z}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$ and $\mathbf{Z}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ be deterministically chosen vectors such that:

- $\mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_1 = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$
- $\mathbf{y}_j^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}_j \cdot \mathbf{Z}_2 = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ for each $j \in [1, Q]$

Note that exponentially many such vectors exist since $l_1 > l_2$ and $n > Q$. Then, the distribution of $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l_1}$ in the view of a computationally unbounded adversary is as follows:

$$\{\mathbf{S}_0 + \mu \cdot \mathbf{Z}_2 \cdot \mathbf{Z}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \mid \mu \in \mathbb{Z}_q\}$$

Now, observe that the conditional distribution of $(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{S}$ (where the conditioning is on $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of b and everything else in $\mathcal{A}$'s view) is as follows:

$$\{(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{S}_0 + \mu \cdot (\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_2 \cdot \mathbf{Z}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \mid \mu \in \mathbb{Z}_q\}$$

Since $\mathbf{u}^*$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, we have (except with negligible probability) $(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_2 \neq \mathbf{0}$, implying the conditional distribution of $(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{S}$ is uniformly random. This completes the proof of Claim 5.3.

It now follows from Claims 5.2, and 5.3, that:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{MDDH}}_{n,2,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) &= \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,2,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1 \right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,2,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1 \right] \right| \\
&= \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1 \right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1 \right] \right| = \epsilon
\end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof of Claim 5.1.

Relaxing the Parameter Restriction for Function Privacy. Our SME scheme, parameterized by $m, n = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$, is computationally function private subject to the restriction that $n > m$. However, we demonstrate here any instance π of our SME scheme that is parameterized by m, n such that $n \leq m$ can be transformed into an equivalent instance π' that is parameterized by m, n', such that $n' > m$. In particular, the transformation works on the predicate matrices and the attribute vectors as follows:

- Given a predicate matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$ for the instance π, the instance π' uses a corresponding predicate matrix $\mathbf{W}' = \left[\mathbf{W} \mid \mathbf{R}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n'}$, where $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times (n'-n)}$ is sampled uniformly from an $(m, (n'-n), k)$-matrix-source for $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$.
- Given an attribute vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ for the instance π, the instance π' uses a corresponding attribute vector $\mathbf{x}' = \left[\mathbf{x}^{\mathbf{T}} \mid 0\ 0 \cdots 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n'}$.

The following observations establish the validity of this transformation:

- $\mathbf{W}'$ is an (m, n', k)-matrix-source if and only if $\mathbf{W}$ is an (m, n, k)-matrix-source.
- $\mathbf{W}' \cdot \mathbf{x}' = \mathbf{0}$ if and only if $\mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0}$, where $\mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$.

The other restriction for function privacy, namely $m \geq 2$, appears to have no such immediate relaxation so long as our SME construction is based on symmetric bilinear maps. However, an alternative approach is to base our construction on asymmetric bilinear maps over two distinct source groups $\mathbb{G}_1$ and $\mathbb{G}_2$, with the assumption that the MDDH family of assumptions holds individually in both these groups (this is essentially analogous to the *symmetric external Diffie-Hellman assumption*, or SXDH [20]). The public parameter pp and the ciphertext C are then generated using a generator g_1 for the group $\mathbb{G}_1$, while the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}}$ is generated using a generator g_2 for the group $\mathbb{G}_2$. The decryption algorithm proceeds analogously to recover the payload message M. The data privacy of the scheme can then be based on the $(l_1, l_2, \log_2 q)$-Source-MDDH assumption in $\mathbb{G}_1$, while its function privacy can be based on the (n, m, k)-Source-MDDH assumption in $\mathbb{G}_2$ for $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$. The asymmetric nature of the bilinear map now allows $m = 1$, *which in turn allows our* SME *scheme to naturally subsume a function private inner-product encryption* (IPE) *scheme.*

6 Computationally Function Private Hidden-Vector Encryption

In this section we present an adaptively data private and computationally function private HVE scheme based on the matrix DDH assumption in the standard model. The scheme uses techniques similar to the function private HVE scheme presented in Section 5, with subtle differences to account for the presence of the wildcard characters. The scheme is described below, and its proofs of data privacy and function privacy are presented subsequently.

The Scheme. Let $\mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, and outputs the tuple $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e)$, where $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ are groups of of order q (q being a λ-bit prime), g is a generator for $\mathbb{G}$ and $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map. Our scheme $\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}}$ is parameterized by $n = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$, in the sense that it supports predicate vectors of the form $\mathbf{v} \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \cup \{\star\} \setminus \{0\})^n$, and attribute vectors of the form $\mathbf{x} \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{0\})^n$. The reason for excluding 0 from the attribute space will be clear from the construction. The payload message space $\mathcal{M}_\lambda$ is a polynomial-sized subset of $\mathbb{Z}_q$.

- **Setup:** The setup algorithm samples $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ on input the security parameter 1^λ. It also randomly samples $\mathbf{A}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{A}_n, \mathbf{A}_{n+1} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$ and $\mathbf{S} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n+1)\times l_1}$, where $l_1, l_2 \in \mathbb{N}$. It then outputs the public parameter pp and the master-secret-key msk as:

$$\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, \{g^{\mathbf{A}_j}\}_{j\in[1,n+1]}, \{g^{\mathbf{S}\cdot\mathbf{A}_j}\}_{j\in[1,n+1]}\right) \ , \ \mathsf{msk} = \mathbf{S}$$

- **KeyGen:** On input the public parameter pp, the master-secret-key msk and a predicate vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \cdots, v_n) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \cup \{\star\} \setminus \{0\})^n$, the key-generation algorithm first sets:

$$\mathcal{S} = \{j \in [1, n] : v_j \neq \star\}$$
$$\left\{ v'_j = \begin{cases} v_j & \text{if } j \in \mathcal{S} \\ 0 & \text{if } j \notin \mathcal{S} \end{cases} \right\}_{j\in[1,n]}$$

It then samples a random *invertible* matrix $\mathbf{W}_1 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times n}$ and sets the following:

$$\mathbf{v}' = \begin{bmatrix} v'_1 \\ v'_2 \\ \vdots \\ v'_n \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \ , \ \mathbf{W} = \left[\mathbf{W}_1 \mid \mathbf{W}_1 \cdot \mathbf{v}'\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times(n+1)}$$

Finally, the key-generation algorithm samples $\mathbf{y} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and outputs the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}} = (d_1, d_2, \mathcal{S})$ where:

$$d_1 = g^{\mathbf{y}^\mathbf{T}\cdot\mathbf{W}} \ , \ d_2 = g^{\mathbf{y}^\mathbf{T}\cdot\mathbf{W}\cdot\mathbf{S}}$$

- **Enc:** On input the public parameter pp, an attribute vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \cdots, x_n) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{0\})^n$ and a message $M \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, the encryption algorithm sets:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{m} &= \left[M\ 0 \cdots 0\ 0\ 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1} \\
\mathbf{x}_1 &= \left[x_1\ 0 \cdots 0\ 0\ 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1} \\
\mathbf{x}_2 &= \left[0\ x_2 \cdots 0\ 0\ 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1} \\
&\vdots \\
\mathbf{x}_n &= \left[0\ 0 \cdots 0\ x_n\ 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1} \\
\mathbf{x}_{n+1} &= \left[0\ 0 \cdots 0\ 0\ (-1)\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}
\end{aligned}$$

  Next, the encryption algorithm samples $\mathbf{r}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{r}_n, \mathbf{r}_{n+1} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_2}$ and $\alpha \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and outputs the ciphertext $C = \left(\{c_{j,1}, c_{j,2}\}_{j \in [1,n+1]}\right)$ where for each $j \in [1, n]$, we have:

$$c_{j,1} = g^{\mathbf{A}_j \cdot \mathbf{r}_j}\ ,\ c_{j,2} = g^{\alpha \cdot \mathbf{x}_j + \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A}_j \cdot \mathbf{r}_j}$$

  and:

$$c_{n+1,1} = g^{\mathbf{A}_{n+1} \cdot \mathbf{r}_{n+1}}\ ,\ c_{n+1,2} = g^{\alpha \cdot \mathbf{x}_{n+1} + \mathbf{m} + \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A}_{n+1} \cdot \mathbf{r}_{n+1}}$$

- **Dec:** On input a ciphertext $C = \left(\{c_{j,1}, c_{j,2}\}_{j \in [1,n+1]}\right)$ and a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}} = (d_1, d_2, \mathcal{S})$, the decryption algorithm computes the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
T_1 &= \left(\prod_{j \in \mathcal{S}} e\left(d_1, c_{j,2}\right)\right) \cdot e\left(d_1, c_{n+1,2}\right) \\
T_2 &= \left(\prod_{j \in \mathcal{S}} e\left(d_2, c_{j,1}\right)\right) \cdot e\left(d_2, c_{n+1,1}\right)
\end{aligned}$$

  Let $d_1 = \left[d_{1,1}\ d_{1,2} \cdots d_{1,n+1}\right] \in (\mathbb{G})^{n+1}$. The decryption algorithm checks if there exists an $M' \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda$ such that $T_2 \cdot e\left(d_{1,1}, g\right)^{M'} = T_1$. If such an M' is found, it outputs M'; else it outputs $\perp$. Note that the decryption algorithm is efficient since $|\mathcal{M}_\lambda| = \mathsf{poly}\left(\lambda\right)$.

Correctness. Consider a predicate vector $\mathbf{v} = (v_1, \cdots, v_n) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \cup \{\star\} \setminus \{0\})^n$ and an attribute vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \cdots, x_n) \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{0\})^n$, such that $v_j = x_j$ for each $j \in [1, n]$ such that $v_j \neq \star$. Also, let $\mathcal{S} = \{j \in [1, n] : v_j \neq \star\}$. It is easy to see the following relation:

$$\sum_{j \in \mathcal{S} \cup \{n+1\}} \mathbf{x}_j = \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{v}' \\ (-1) \end{bmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$$

where $\mathbf{v}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $\mathbf{x}_j \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ for $j \in [1, n+1]$ are as defined above. This now automatically yields the following:

$$\mathbf{W} \cdot \left(\sum_{j \in \mathcal{S} \cup \{n+1\}} \mathbf{x}_j\right) = \left[\mathbf{W}_1 \mid \mathbf{W}_1 \cdot \mathbf{v}'\right] \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \mathbf{v}' \\ (-1) \end{bmatrix} = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$$

Now consider a ciphertext $C = \left(\{c_{j,1}, c_{j,2}\}_{j\in[1,n+1]}\right)$ corresponding to $(\mathbf{x}, M)$ and a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}} = (d_1, d_2)$. Also, let $d_1 = \left[d_{1,1}\ d_{1,2} \cdots d_{1,n+1}\right] \in (\mathbb{G})^{n+1}$ and let $\mathbf{m} = \left[M\ 0\ 0 \cdots 0\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$. Then we have the following:

$$e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) = e\left(d_{1,1}, g^M\right) \cdot \prod_{j=2}^{n+1} e\left(d_{1,j}, g^0\right) = e\left(d_{1,1}, g\right)^M$$

The following now establishes the correctness of our HVE scheme:

$$\begin{aligned}
T_1 &= \prod_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}} e\left(d_1, c_{j,2}\right) \\
&= \prod_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}} e\left(g^{\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{W}}, g^{\alpha\cdot\mathbf{x}_j + \mathbf{S}\cdot\mathbf{A}_j\cdot\mathbf{r}_j}\right) \cdot e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) \\
&= \left(\prod_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}} e\left(g, g\right)^{\alpha\cdot\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{W}\cdot(\mathbf{x}_j)}\right) \cdot \left(\prod_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}} e\left(g^{\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{W}\cdot\mathbf{S}}, g^{\mathbf{A}_j\cdot\mathbf{r}_j}\right)\right) \cdot e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) \\
&= \left(\prod_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}} e\left(g, g\right)^{\alpha\cdot\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{W}\cdot(\mathbf{x}_j)}\right) \cdot \left(\prod_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}} e\left(d_2, c_{j,1}\right)\right) \cdot e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) \\
&= \left(e(g,g)^{\alpha\cdot\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{W}\cdot\left(\sum_{j\in\mathcal{S}\cup\{n+1\}}\mathbf{x}_j\right)}\right) \cdot T_2 \cdot e\left(d_1, g^{\mathbf{m}}\right) \\
&= T_2 \cdot e\left(d_{1,1}, g\right)^M
\end{aligned}$$

6.1 Security of the Scheme

Adaptive Data Privacy. We state the following theorem for the adaptive data privacy of $\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}}$:

Theorem 6.1 *Our HVE scheme $\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}}$ is adaptively data private for parameters $n, l_1, l_2 = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ under the (l_1, l_2, k)-*source-matrix decisional Diffie Hellman *assumption for $k = \log_2 q$ subject to the restrictions that:*

- $l_1 > l_2 \geq 2$
- $Q \leq \lfloor((n+1)\cdot(l_1 - l_2) - 1)/l_1\rfloor$

where $Q = \mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ is the maximum number of secret-key-generation queries made by the adversary in the data privacy experiment.

We define a series of experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\},k\in[0,n+1]}\}$ as follows:

- The experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,0)}_{\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$ are identical to the data privacy experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$.

- For each $k \in [1, n+1]$, the experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$ are identical to their predecessor experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k-1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$ except that, in the challenge ciphertext $C^* = \left(\{c^*_{j,1}, c^*_{j,2}\}_{j\in[1,n+1]}\right)$, the components $c^*_{k,1}$ and $c^*_{k,2}$ are additionally statistically independent of b.

Quite obviously, the following holds for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$:

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0,n+1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1,n+1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| = 0$$

We state the following claim:

Claim 6.1 *For a given $k \in [1, n+1]$ and $b \in \{0,1\}$, and for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds:*

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k-1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

The proof of this claim is very similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1 and is detailed in Appendix G. This claim naturally leads to the following relation:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{DP}}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) &= \left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| \\
&\leq \sum_{k=1}^{n+1}\sum_{b\in\{0,1\}}\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k-1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| \\
&\leq \mathsf{negl}\left(\lambda\right)
\end{aligned}$$

which completes the proof of Theorem 6.1.

Computational Function Privacy. We state the following theorem for the computational function privacy of $\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}}$:

Theorem 6.2 *Our HVE scheme $\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}}$ is function private for parameters $n, l_1, l_2 = \mathsf{poly}\left(\lambda\right)$ under the $(n, \log_2 q)$-Source-MDDH assumption, subject to the restrictions that:*

- *The non-wildcard entries of each predicate vector $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ are sampled uniformly from independent k-sources, for $k = \omega\left(\log\lambda\right)$.*
- *$n \geq 2$*
- *$Q \leq \lfloor((n+1) \times (l_1 - l_2) - 1)/l_1\rfloor$*

where Q is the maximum number of secret-key-generation queries made by the adversary during the function privacy experiment.

Proof. The analysis of function privacy uses arguments based on hash proof systems, akin to those in the proof of function privacy for our SME construction in Section 6. The full analysis is presented in Appendix H. We detail here how a simulator $\mathcal{B}$

answers the left-or-right function privacy oracle. Note that $\mathcal{B}$ knows the master-secret-key $\mathbf{S}$ at all points, which allows it to answer all secret-key queries. Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ queries the left-or-right oracle with $(\mathbf{V}_0^*, \mathbf{V}_1^*)$, where both $\mathbf{V}_0^* = \left(\{V_{i,j,0}^*\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]}\right)$ and $\mathbf{V}_1^* = \left(\{V_{i,j,1}^*\}_{i\in[1,m],j\in[1,n]}\right)$ represent (m,n,k)-matrix-sources over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{m\times n}$ for $k = \omega(\log\lambda)$. $\mathcal{B}$ uniformly samples $\mathsf{mode} \xleftarrow{R} \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$. If $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$, it sets $b = 0$, else it sets $b = 1$. At this point, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the distribution $(\mathbf{V}_b^*)^{\mathbf{T}}$ and receives in response a tuple $\left(g^{(\mathbf{W}^*)^{\mathbf{T}}}, g^{\mathbf{u}^*}\right) \in \left((\mathbb{G})^{n\times m} \times (\mathbb{G})^n\right)$, for a matrix $\mathbf{W}^* \in \mathbf{V}_b^*$. Note that $\mathbf{u}^*$ is either of the form $(\mathbf{W}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{y}^*$ for some uniformly random $\mathbf{y}^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, or $\mathbf{u}^*$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$. $\mathcal{B}$ responds with the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}^*} = (d_1^*, d_2^*)$ where:

$$d_1^* = g^{(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}}} \ , \ d_2^* = g^{(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{S}}$$

The analysis now exploits the following fact: the restriction on the number of secret-key queries Q ensures that the master-secret-key $\mathbf{S}$ has sufficient entropy from an adversary's point of view, even given the public parameter pp and $\mathcal{B}$'s responses to Q-many secret-key queries. This in turn ensures that $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}^*}$ perfectly hides the bit b chosen by the simulator $\mathcal{B}$.

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A Definitions for Public-Key Predicate Encryption

A public-key predicate encryption scheme for a class of predicates $\mathcal{F}$ over an attribute space Σ and a payload-message space $\mathcal{M}$ is a quadruple of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms $\Pi = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$. The Setup algorithm takes as input the security parameter λ, and generates the public parameter pp and the master-secret-key msk for the system. The key-generation algorithm, KeyGen takes as input the public parameter pp, the master-secret-key msk and a predicate $f \in \mathcal{F}$, and generates a secret-key sk_f corresponding to f. The Enc algorithm takes as input the public parameter pp, an attribute $I \in \Sigma$ and a payload-message $M \in \mathcal{M}$, and outputs the ciphertext $C = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp}, I, M)$. The Dec algorithm takes as input the public parameter pp, a ciphertext C and a secret-key sk_f, and outputs either a payload-message $M \in \mathcal{M}$ or the symbol $\perp$.

Correctness. A predicate encryption scheme Π is said to be functionally correct if for any security parameter λ, for any predicate $f \in \mathcal{F}$, for any attribute $I \in \Sigma$ and any payload-message $M \in \mathcal{M}$, the following hold:

1. If $f(I) = 1$, we have $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp}, I, M), \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{msk}, f)) = M$.
2. If $f(I) = 0$, we have $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp}, I, M), \mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{msk}, f)) = \perp$ with probability at least $1 - \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.

where the probability is taken over the internal randomness of the $\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}$, Enc, and Dec algorithms.

A.1 Data Privacy of Public-Key Predicate Encryption

We recall the standard notion of *attribute hiding* data privacy for a predicate encryption scheme against an adaptive probabilistic polynomial-time adversary.

Definition A.1 (Adaptively Data Private Predicate Encryption). *A predicate encryption scheme* $\Pi = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{KeyGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *is said to be* adaptively data private *if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, the following holds:*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{DP}}_{\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

where for each $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ *and* $b \in \{0,1\}$*, the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi,\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ *is defined as:*

1. $(\mathsf{pp}, \mathsf{msk}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Setup}\left(1^\lambda\right)$.
2. $((I_0^*, M_0^*), (I_1^*, M_1^*), \mathsf{state}) \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk},\cdot)}\left(1^\lambda, \mathsf{pp}\right)$*, where* $I_0^*, I_1^* \in \Sigma$ *and* $M_0^*, M_1^* \in \mathcal{M}$.
3. $C^* \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp}, I_b^*, M_b^*)$.
4. $b' \xleftarrow{R} \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk},\cdot)}(C^*, \mathsf{state})$.
5. *Output* b'.

subject to the following restrictions:

1. *For each predicate f_i with which $\mathcal{A}$ queries $\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \cdot)$, we have $f_i(I_0^*) = f_i(I_1^*)$.*
2. *If $\mathcal{A}$ queries $\mathsf{KeyGen}(\mathsf{msk}, \cdot)$ with a predicate f_i such that $f_i(I_0^*) = f_i(I_1^*) = 1$, we have $M_0^* = M_1^*$.*

The above notion of adaptive data privacy is referred to as DP throughout the rest of the paper. There also exists a *selective* variant of the above security notion, referred to as sDP throughout the rest of the paper, that requires the adversary to commit to the challenge pair of attributes (I_0^*, I_1^*) before seeing the public parameters of the scheme.

B The Generalized Decisional k-Linear Assumption (k-DLIN)

Let $\mathbb{G}$ be a group of prime order q and let $g_1, \cdots, g_k, g_{k+1}$ be arbitrary generators for $\mathbb{G}$, for $k \geq 2$. The generalized decisional k-linear assumption is that the distribution ensembles:

$$\left\{ \left(g_1, \cdots, g_k, g_{k+1}, g_1^{a_1}, \cdots, g_k^{a_k}, g_{k+1}^{\sum_{j=1}^{k} a_j} \right) \right\}_{a_1, \cdots, a_k \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q} \text{ and}$$
$$\left\{ \left(g_1, \cdots, g_k, g_{k+1}, g_1^{a_1}, \cdots, g_k^{a_k}, g_{k+1}^{a_{k+1}} \right) \right\}_{a_1, \cdots, a_k, a_{k+1} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q}$$

are computationally indistinguishable, where $g_1, \cdots, g_k, g_{k+1} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{G}$.

Note that the k-DLIN assumption implies the $(k+1)$-DLIN assumption for all $k \geq 1$, but the reverse is not necessarily true. In other words, the k-DLIN assumption family is a family of progressively weaker assumptions.

C Proofs of Claims 2.1 and 2.2

Let $\mathbf{V} = \left(\{V_{i,j}\}_{i \in [1,m], j \in [1,n]} \right)$ be an (m, n, k)-matrix-source over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$ for $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$. Sample uniformly at random $\mathbf{W} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{V}$ and choose any n rows of $\mathbf{W}$. By definition of a matrix-source, the elements of the resulting $n \times n$ sub-matrix of $\mathbf{W}$ have been sampled from mutually independent distributions, where each distribution is uniformly random over a sub-field $\mathbb{Z}_{q_k}$, where $q_k \leq q$ is a k-bit prime. Consequently, the probability that this sub-matrix has a zero determinant is given by $\left(1 - \prod_{j=1}^{n} \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{j \cdot k}}\right)\right)$. It is easy to see that this quantity is upper bounded by $\frac{1}{2^k} = \frac{1}{2^{\omega(\log \lambda)}} \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. In other words, the matrix $\mathbf{W}$ has full rank n with overwhelmingly large probability. This completes the proof of Claim 2.1.

Again, let $\mathbf{V}_1 = \left(\{V_{i,j,1}\}_{i \in [1,n], j \in [1,n]} \right)$ be an (n, n, k)-matrix-source over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times n}$, such that $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$, and let $\mathbf{V}_2 = \left(\{V_{i,2}\}_{i \in [1,n]} \right)$ be any non-zero distribution over over

$\mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Let $\tilde{\mathbf{V}} = \left[\mathbf{V}_1 \mid \mathbf{V}_1 \cdot \mathbf{V}_2\right]^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n+1)\times n}$. Sample uniformly at random $\mathbf{W} \xleftarrow{R} \tilde{\mathbf{V}}$ and choose the first n rows of $\mathbf{W}$. By definition of a matrix-source, the elements of the resulting $n \times n$ sub-matrix of $\mathbf{W}$ have been sampled from mutually independent distributions, where each distribution is uniformly random over a sub-field $\mathbb{Z}_{q_k}$, where $q_k \leq q$ is a k-bit prime. Consequently, the probability that this sub-matrix has a zero determinant is given by $\left(1 - \prod_{j=1}^{n}\left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{j \cdot k}}\right)\right)$. It is easy to see that this quantity is upper bounded by $\frac{1}{2^k} = \frac{1}{2^{\omega(\log \lambda)}} \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. In other words, the matrix $\mathbf{W}$ has full rank n with overwhelmingly large probability. This completes the proof of Claim 2.2.

D Proof of Theorem 4.1

We define a series of experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\},k\in\{0,1,2\}}$ as follows:

- The experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,0)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$ are identical to the data privacy experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$.
- For each $k \in \{1,2\}$, the experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$ are identical to their predecessor experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k-1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$ except that, in the challenge ciphertext $C^* = (c_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*)$, the component c_{k+1}^* is additionally statistically independent of b.

Quite obviously, the following holds for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$:

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0,2)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1,2)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right]\right| = 0$$

Now, for $b \in \{0,1\}$, let $\mathcal{A}$ be any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that:

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,0)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right]\right| = \epsilon$$

where $\epsilon > \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. We construct a polynomial-time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that solves an instance of the DBDH problem with advantage $\epsilon' \geq \epsilon/\left(e\left(Q+1\right)\right)$, where Q is the maximum number of oracle queries made by $\mathcal{A}$ during the data privacy experiment. $\mathcal{B}$ receives as input a DBDH instance $(g, g^{a_1}, g^{a_2}, g^{a_3}, Z)$ over a bilinear group $\mathbb{G}$ with prime order q and generator g, and interacts with $\mathcal{A}$ as follows:

- ***Setup:*** $\mathcal{B}$ randomly samples $a_4 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and provides $\mathcal{A}$ with the public parameter pp as:

  $$\mathsf{pp} = (g, g^{a_1}, g^{a_4})$$

  where g and g^{a_1} are part of its input DBDH instance. Then observe that $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of public parameters *formally* fixes the master secret key to be:

  $$\mathsf{msk} = (s_1 = a_1, s_2 = a_4)$$

- H_1, H_2 ***Query Phase-1***: $\mathcal{A}$ is allowed to issue H_1 and H_2 queries. $\mathcal{B}$ maintains a list of four-tuples $\left(\mathsf{id}_j, y_j, y'_j, \delta_j\right) \in \mathcal{ID}_\lambda \times \mathbb{Z}_q \times \mathbb{Z}_q \times \{0,1\}$. Upon receiving a query for an identity id_i it first looks up the list for a matching $(\mathsf{id}_i, y_i, y'_i, \delta_i)$ entry. If not found, it uniformly samples $y_i, y'_i \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and samples δ_i from a distribution over $\{0,1\}$ such that $\Pr[\delta_i = 1] = \gamma$. It then adds the tuple $(\mathsf{id}_i, y_i, y'_i, \delta_i)$ to the list and proceeds as follows:
  - If $\delta_i = 0$, $\mathcal{B}$ responds with $H_1(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{a_2 \cdot y_i}$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y'_i}$, where g^{a_2} is part of its input DBDH instance.
  - If $\delta_i = 1$, $\mathcal{B}$ responds with $H_1(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y_i}$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y'_i}$.

  Note that only the output of the random oracle H_1 depends on δ.

- ***Secret-Key Queries:*** When $\mathcal{A}$ issues a secret-key query for some identity id_i, $\mathcal{B}$ looks up $H_1(\mathsf{id}_i)$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}_i)$, as described above. Let y_i, y'_i and δ_i be the corresponding tuple entries. $\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:
  - If $\delta_i = 0$, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs a random bit and aborts.*
  - If $\delta_i = 1$, $\mathcal{B}$ samples $z_{1,i}, z_{2,i} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and responds with:

$$\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}_i} = \left(g^{a_1 \cdot y_1 \cdot z_{1,i}} \cdot g^{a_4 \cdot y'_1 \cdot z_{2,i}}, z_{1,i}, z_{2,i}\right)$$

  Observe that if $\delta_i = 1$, we have $H_1(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y_i}$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y'_i}$; consequently, the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}_i}$ is well-formed with respect to the public parameter pp.

- ***Challenge:*** $\mathcal{A}$ outputs the challenge pair $((\mathsf{id}_0^*, M_0^*), (\mathsf{id}_1^*, M_1^*))$. $\mathcal{B}$ samples a random bit $b \xleftarrow{R} \{0,1\}$ and looks up $H_1(\mathsf{id}_b^*)$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}_b^*)$, as described above. Let y_1^*, y_2^* and δ^* be the corresponding tuple entries. $\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:
  - If $\delta^* = 1$, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs a random bit and aborts.*
  - If $\delta^* = 0$, we must have we have $H_1(\mathsf{id}_b^*) = g^{a_2 \cdot y_1^*}$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}_b^*) = g^{y_2^*}$. In this case, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the challenge ciphertext as:

$$C^* = \left(g^{a_3}, M_b \cdot Z^{y_1^*}, e\left(g^{a_3}, g^{a_4}\right)^{y_2^*}\right)$$

- ***Output:*** Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a guess b' for b. If $b' = b$, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1, else it outputs 0.

We now state and prove the following claims:

Claim D.1 *When $Z = e(g,g)^{a_1 \cdot a_2 \cdot a_3}$, the joint distribution of b and the challenge ciphertext C^* in the simulation by $\mathcal{B}$ is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,0)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Let $Z = e(g,g)^{a_1 \cdot a_2 \cdot a_3}$. As already discussed above, if $\mathcal{B}$ does not abort, we must have $H_1(\mathsf{id}_b^*) = g^{a_2 \cdot y_1^*}$ and $H_2(\mathsf{id}_b^*) = g^{y_2^*}$. Then the challenge ciphertext C^* takes the form:

$$\begin{aligned} C^* &= \left(g^{a_3}, M_b \cdot e(g,g)^{a_1 \cdot a_2 \cdot a_3 \cdot y_1^*}, e\left(g^{a_3}, g^{a_4}\right)^{y_2^*}\right) \\ &= \left(g^{a_3}, M_b \cdot e\left(g^{s_1}, H_1(\mathsf{id}_b^*)\right)^{a_3}, e\left(g^{s_2}, H_2(\mathsf{id}_b^*)\right)^{a_3}\right) \end{aligned}$$

for $s_1 = a_1$ and $s_2 = a_4$. Quite evidently, C^* is identically distributed to the challenge ciphertext in the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,0)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$. This completes the proof of Claim D.1.

Claim D.2 *When Z is uniformly random in $\mathbb{G}_T$, the joint distribution of b and the challenge ciphertext C^* in the simulation by $\mathcal{B}$ is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. The claim follows trivially from the fact that if Z is uniformly random in $\mathbb{G}_T$, the message M_b is perfectly one-time padded in the second component of the challenge ciphertext C^*, while the remaining components of C^* are well-formed with respect to b.

It now follows from Claims D.1 and D.2 that the advantage ϵ' of $\mathcal{B}$ in solving the DBDH instance may be quantified as $\epsilon' = \epsilon \cdot (1 - \Pr[\mathsf{abort}])$, where ϵ is the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$, and abort denotes the event of $\mathcal{B}$ aborting the simulation. We bound the probability of this event as follows:

- Suppose that the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ makes a maximum of Q_1, and Q_2 queries to the random oracle and the secret-key generation oracle, respectively. The probability that $\mathcal{A}$ does not abort is lower-bounded by $\gamma^{Q_2} \cdot (1 - \gamma)$.
- Now, $\mathcal{B}$ can set $\gamma = 1 - 1/(Q_2 + 1)$. Then, we have:

$$\Pr[\mathsf{abort}] \leq 1 - (1 - 1/(Q_2+1))^{Q_2} / (Q_2 + 1) \leq 1 - 1/\mathsf{e} \cdot (Q_2 + 1)$$

In other words, we have $\epsilon' \geq \epsilon/\mathsf{e} \cdot (Q_2 + 1)$. Hence, we must have $\epsilon \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. Following a similar proof technique, one can also show that for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, the following also holds:

$$\left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,2)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \leq \mathrm{negl}(\lambda)$$

The proof uses a simulation similar to the one described above, except that the algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ embeds its input DBDH instance in the third component of the challenge ciphertext C^*, while the second component is anyways set to a uniformly random element in $\mathbb{G}_T$. It is now easy to see the following:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{DP}}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) &= \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \\
&\leq \sum_{k \in \{1,2\}} \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k-1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \\
&\leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)
\end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof of Theorem 4.1.

E A DBDH+k-DLIN-based IBE Scheme

In this section, we demonstrate that our $\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+DLIN}}$ scheme () is that it can be readily extended to a sequence of IBE schemes that share the same data privacy guarantees, while enjoying progressively stronger function privacy guarantees. For $k > 1$, the $(k-1)^{\text{th}}$ IBE scheme in this sequence, denoted as $\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}}$, is adaptively data private under the DBDH assumption, and computationally function private under the k-DLIN assumption, in the random oracle model. We present the construction for $\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}}$ below. The detailed proofs for data and function privacy are presented subsequently.

The Scheme. Let $\mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that takes as input a security parameter λ, and outputs the tuple $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e)$, where $\mathbb{G}$ and $\mathbb{G}_T$ are groups of of order q (q being a λ-bit prime), g is a generator for $\mathbb{G}$ and $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ is an efficiently computable non-degenerate bilinear map. The scheme $\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}}$ is parameterized by the security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$. For any such λ, we denote by $\mathcal{ID}_\lambda$ and $\mathcal{M}_\lambda$ the identity space and the message space, respectively. The scheme uses k hash functions $\{H_j : \mathcal{ID}_\lambda \longrightarrow \mathbb{G}\}_{j\in[1,k]}$ (modeled as random oracles).

- **Setup:** The setup algorithm samples $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ on input the security parameter 1^λ. It also samples $s_1, \cdots, s_k \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and outputs the public parameter pp and the master-secret-key msk as:

$$\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, \{g^{s_j}\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right) \ , \ \mathsf{msk} = \left(\{s_j\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right)$$

- **KeyGen:** On input the public parameter pp, the master-secret-key msk and an identity $\mathsf{id} \in \mathcal{ID}_\lambda$, the key generation algorithm samples $z_1, \cdots, z_k \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and outputs the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}} = \left(\{d_j\}_{j\in[1,k+1]}\right)$ where:

$$d_1 = \prod_{j=1}^{k} H_j\left(\mathsf{id}\right)^{s_j \cdot z_j} \ , \ d_{j+1} = z_j \text{ for } j \in [1,k]$$

- **Enc:** On input the public parameter pp, an identity $\mathsf{id} \in \mathcal{ID}_\lambda$ and a message $M \in \mathcal{M}_\lambda$, the encryption algorithm samples $r \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and outputs the ciphertext $C = \left(\{c_j\}_{j\in[1,k+1]}\right)$ where:

$$c_1 = g^r \ , \ c_2 = M \cdot e\left(g^{s_1}, H_1\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^r \ , \ c_{j+1} = e\left(g^{s_j}, H_j\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^r \text{ for } j \in [2,k]$$

- **Dec:** On input a ciphertext $C = \left(\{c_j\}_{j\in[1,k+1]}\right)$ and a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}} = \left(\{d_j\}_{j\in[1,k+1]}\right)$, the decryption algorithm outputs:

$$M' = \left(\frac{\prod_{j=1}^{k} c_{j+1}^{d_{j+1}}}{e\left(d_1, c_1\right)}\right)^{1/d_2}$$

Correctness. Consider a ciphertext $C = \left(\{c_j\}_{j\in[1,k+1]}\right)$ corresponding to a message M under an identity id, and a secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}} = \left(\{d_j\}_{j\in[1,k+1]}\right)$ corresponding to the same identity id. Then, we have:

$$\begin{aligned}
M' &= \left(\frac{\prod_{j=1}^{k} c_{j+1}^{d_{j+1}}}{e\left(d_1, c_1\right)}\right)^{1/d_2} \\
&= \left(\frac{M^{z_1} \cdot \prod_{j=1}^{k} e\left(g^{s_j}, H_j\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^{r\cdot z_j}}{e\left(\prod_{j=1}^{k} H_j\left(\mathsf{id}\right)^{s_j\cdot z_j}, g^r\right)}\right)^{1/z_1} \\
&= M \cdot \left(\frac{\prod_{j=1}^{k} e\left(g^{s_j}, H_j\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^{r\cdot z_j}}{\prod_{j=1}^{k} e\left(g^{s_j}, H_j\left(\mathsf{id}\right)\right)^{r\cdot z_j}}\right)^{1/z_1} \\
&= M
\end{aligned}$$

Therefore as long as $z_1 \neq 0 \pmod{q}$ (an event which occurs with probability $1 - 1/q$ over the randomness of KeyGen), the message is recovered correctly.

Adaptive Data Privacy. We state the following theorem for the adaptive data privacy of $\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}}$:

Theorem E.1 *The IBE scheme* $\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}}$ *is adaptively data private under the* DBDH *assumption.*

Proof. We define a series of experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k')}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\},k'\in[1,k+1]}$ as follows:

- The experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,0)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$ are identical to the experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$.
- For each $k' \in [1, k+1]$, the experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k')}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$ are identical to their predecessor experiments $\{\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k'-1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)\}_{b\in\{0,1\}}$ except that, in the challenge ciphertext $C^* = \left(\{c^*_j\}_{j\in[1,k+2]}\right)$, the component $c^*_{k'+1}$ is additionally statistically independent of b.

Quite obviously, the following holds for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$:

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0,k+1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1,k+1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right]\right| = 0$$

Now, for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, let $\mathcal{A}$ be any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that:

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,0)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right]\right| = \epsilon$$

where $\epsilon > \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. We construct a polynomial-time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that solves an instance of the DBDH problem with advantage $\epsilon' \geq \epsilon/(e(Q+1))$, where Q is the maximum number of oracle queries made by $\mathcal{A}$ during the data privacy experiment. $\mathcal{B}$ receives as input a DBDH instance $(g, g^{a_1}, g^{a_2}, g^{a_3}, Z)$ over a bilinear group $\mathbb{G}$ with prime order q and generator g, and interacts with $\mathcal{A}$ as follows:

- ***Setup:*** $\mathcal{B}$ randomly samples $a_4, \cdots, a_{k+2} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and provides $\mathcal{A}$ with the public parameter pp as:
$$\mathsf{pp} = (g, g^{a_1}, g^{a_4}, \cdots, g^{a_{k+2}})$$
where g and g^{a_1} are part of its input DBDH instance. Then observe that $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of public parameters *formally* fixes the master secret key to be:
$$\mathsf{msk} = (s_1 = a_1, s_2 = a_4, \cdots, s_k = a_{k+2})$$

- $H_1, \cdots, H_k$ ***Query Phase-1***: $\mathcal{A}$ is allowed to issue queries to the random oracles for $H_1, H_2 \cdots, H_k$. $\mathcal{B}$ maintains a list of $(k+2)$-tuples $\left(\mathsf{id}_i, \{y_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}, \delta_i\right) \in \mathcal{ID}_\lambda \times (\mathbb{Z}_q)^k \times \{0,1\}$. Upon receiving a query for an identity id_i it first looks up the list for a matching $\left(\mathsf{id}_i, \{y_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}, \delta_i\right)$ entry. If not found, it uniformly samples $y_{1,i}, \cdots, y_{k,i} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and samples δ_i from a distribution over $\{0,1\}$ such that $\Pr[\delta_i = 1] = \gamma$. It then adds the tuple $\left(\mathsf{id}_i, \{y_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}, \delta_i\right)$ to the list and proceeds as follows:
  - If $\delta_i = 0$, $\mathcal{B}$ responds with $H_1(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{a_2 \cdot y_{1,i}}$ and $H_j(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y_{j,i}}$ for $j \in [2,k]$, where g^{a_2} is part of its input DBDH instance.
  - If $\delta_i = 1$, $\mathcal{B}$ responds with $H_j(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y_{j,i}}$ for $j \in [1,k]$.

- ***Secret-Key Queries:*** When $\mathcal{A}$ issues a secret-key query for some identity id_i, $\mathcal{B}$ looks up $H_j(\mathsf{id}_i)$ for $j \in [1,k]$, as described above. Let $\{y_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}$ and δ_i be the corresponding tuple entries. $\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:
  - If $\delta_i = 0$, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs a random bit and aborts.*
  - If $\delta_i = 1$, $\mathcal{B}$ samples $z_{1,i}, \cdots, z_{k,i} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and responds with:
$$\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}_i} = \left(\left(g^{a_1 \cdot y_{1,i} \cdot z_{1,i}} \cdot \prod_{j=2}^{k} g^{a_{j+2} \cdot y_{j,i} \cdot z_{j,i}}\right), \{z_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right)$$
  Observe that if $\delta_i = 1$, we have $H_j(\mathsf{id}_i) = g^{y_{j,i}}$ for $j \in [1,k]$; consequently, the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}_i}$ is well-formed with respect to the public parameter pp.

- ***Challenge:*** $\mathcal{A}$ outputs the challenge pair $((\mathsf{id}_0^*, M_0^*), (\mathsf{id}_1^*, M_1^*))$. $\mathcal{B}$ samples a random bit $b \xleftarrow{R} \{0,1\}$ and looks up $H_j(\mathsf{id}_b^*)$ for $j \in [1,k]$, as described above. Let $\{y_j^*\}_{j\in[1,k]}$ and δ^* be the corresponding tuple entries. $\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:
  - If $\delta^* = 1$, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs a random bit and aborts.*
  - If $\delta^* = 0$, we must have $H_1(\mathsf{id}_b^*) = g^{a_2 \cdot y_1^*}$ and $H_j(\mathsf{id}_b^*) = g^{y_j^*}$ for $j \in [2,k]$. In this case, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the challenge ciphertext as:
$$C^* = \left(g^{a_3}, M_b \cdot Z^{y_1^*}, e(g^{a_3}, g^{a_4})^{y_2^*}, \cdots, e(g^{a_3}, g^{a_{k+2}})^{y_k^*}\right)$$

- ***Output:*** Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a guess b' for b. If $b' = b$, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1, else it outputs 0.

We now state and prove the following claims:

Claim E.1 *When $Z = e(g,g)^{a_1 \cdot a_2 \cdot a_3}$, the joint distribution of b and the challenge ciphertext C^* in the simulation by $\mathcal{B}$ is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,0)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Let $Z = e(g,g)^{a_1 \cdot a_2 \cdot a_3}$. As already discussed above, if $\mathcal{B}$ does not abort, we must have $H_1(\mathsf{id}_b^*) = g^{a_2 \cdot y_1^*}$ and $H_j(\mathsf{id}_b^*) = g^{y_j^*}$ for $j \in [2,k]$. Then the challenge ciphertext C^* takes the form:

$$\begin{aligned} C^* &= \left(g^{a_3}, M_b \cdot e(g,g)^{a_1 \cdot a_2 \cdot a_3 \cdot y_1^*}, e\left(g^{a_3}, g^{a_4}\right)^{y_2^*}, \cdots, e\left(g^{a_3}, g^{a_{k+2}}\right)^{y_k^*}\right) \\ &= \left(g^{a_3}, M_b \cdot e\left(g^{s_1}, H_1\left(\mathsf{id}_b^*\right)\right)^{a_3}, \left\{e\left(g^{s_j}, H_j\left(\mathsf{id}_b^*\right)\right)^{a_3}\right\}_{j \in [2,k]}\right) \end{aligned}$$

for $s_1 = a_1$ and $s_j = a_{j+2}$ for $j \in [2,k]$. Quite evidently, C^* is identically distributed to the challenge ciphertext in the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$. This completes the proof of Claim E.1.

Claim E.2 *When Z is uniformly random in $\mathbb{G}_T$, the joint distribution of b and the challenge ciphertext C^* in the simulation by $\mathcal{B}$ is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. The claim follows trivially from the fact that if Z is uniformly random in $\mathbb{G}_T$, the message M_b is perfectly one-time padded in the second component of the challenge ciphertext C^*, while all other components of C^* are well-formed with respect to b.

It now follows from Claims E.1 and E.2 that the advantage ϵ' of $\mathcal{B}$ in solving the DBDH instance may be quantified as $\epsilon' = \epsilon \cdot (1 - \Pr[\mathsf{abort}])$, where ϵ is the advantage of the adversary $\mathcal{A}$, and abort denotes the event of $\mathcal{B}$ aborting the simulation. We bound the probability of this event as follows:

- Suppose that the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ makes a maximum of Q_1 and Q_2 queries to the random oracle and the secret-key generation oracle, respectively. The probability that $\mathcal{A}$ does not abort is lower-bounded by $\gamma^{Q_2} \cdot (1-\gamma)$.
- Now, $\mathcal{B}$ can set $\gamma = 1 - 1/(Q_2+1)$. Then, we have:

$$\Pr[\mathsf{abort}] \leq 1 - (1 - 1/(Q_2+1))^{Q_2} / (Q_2+1) \leq 1 - 1/\mathsf{e} \cdot (Q_2+1)$$

In other words, we have $\epsilon' \geq \epsilon/\mathsf{e} \cdot (Q_2+1)$. Hence, we must have $\epsilon \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. Following a similar proof technique, one can also show that for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$, for any $k' \in [2, k+1]$, and for $b \in \{0,1\}$, the following holds:

$$\left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k'-1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k')}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \leq \mathrm{negl}(\lambda)$$

The proof uses a sequence of simulations similar to the one described above, except that in the k'^{th} simulation, the algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ embeds its input DBDH instance in the $(k'+1)^{\text{th}}$ component of the challenge ciphertext C^*, while the preceding component are anyways set to a uniformly random element in $\mathbb{G}_T$, and the succeeding components are well-formed with respect to b. It is now easy to see the following:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{DP}}_{\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) &= \left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| \\ &\leq \sum_{k'\in[1,k+1]}\sum_{b\in\{0,1\}}\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k'-1)}_{\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k')}_{\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| \\ &\leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)\end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof of Theorem E.1.

Computational Function Privacy. We state the following theorem for the computational function privacy of $\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}}$:

Theorem E.2 *Our IBE scheme $\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}}$ is function private under the k-DLIN assumption for identities sampled uniformly from k'-sources with $k' = \omega(\log\lambda)$.*

Proof. The proof follows directly from the following claim:

Claim E.3 *For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds:*

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

To prove this claim, we assume the contrary. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that:

$$\left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\text{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| = \epsilon$$

where $\epsilon > \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. We construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that solves an instance of the k-DLIN problem with advantage ϵ' negligibly close to ϵ. $\mathcal{B}$ receives as input a k-DLIN instance $\left(\{g_j\}_{j\in[1,k+1]}, \{g_j^{a_j}\}_{j\in[1,k+1]}\right)$ over a bilinear group $\mathbb{G}$ with prime order q and generator g, and interacts with $\mathcal{A}$ as follows:

- ***Setup:*** $\mathcal{B}$ samples $x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_{k+1} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and provides $\mathcal{A}$ with the public parameter pp as:
$$\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, \{g_j^{x_j}\cdot g_{k+1}^{x_{k+1}}\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right)$$
where $g_1, \cdots, g_k, g_{k+1}$ are part of its input k-DLIN instance. Let $\alpha_j = \log_g g_j$ for $j \in [1, k+1]$. Then observe that $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of public parameters *formally* fixes the master secret key to be:
$$\mathsf{msk} = \left(\{s_j = \alpha_j \cdot x_j + \alpha_{k+1}\cdot x_{k+1}\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right)$$

- $H_1, \cdots, H_k$ ***Query Phase-1***: $\mathcal{A}$ is allowed to issue queries to the random oracles for $H_1, H_2 \cdots, H_k$. $\mathcal{B}$ maintains a list of $(k+1)$-tuples $\left(\mathsf{id}_i, \{y_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right) \in \mathcal{ID}_\lambda \times (\mathbb{Z}_q)^k$. Upon receiving a query for an identity id_i it first looks up the list for a matching $\left(\mathsf{id}_i, \{y_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right)$ entry. If not found, it uniformly samples $y_{1,i}, \cdots, y_{k,i} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and adds the tuple $\left(\mathsf{id}_i, \{y_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right)$ to the list. It finally responds with $H_j\left(\mathsf{id}_i\right) = g^{y_{j,i}}$ for $j \in [1,k]$.

- ***Secret-Key Query Phase-1:*** When $\mathcal{A}$ issues a secret-key query for some identity id_i, $\mathcal{B}$ looks up $H_j\left(\mathsf{id}_i\right)$ for $j \in [1,k]$, as described above. Let $\{y_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}$ be the corresponding tuple entries. $\mathcal{B}$ samples $z_{1,i}, \cdots, z_{k,i} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and responds with:

$$\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}_i} = \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k} \left(g_j^{x_j} \cdot g_{k+1}^{x_{k+1}}\right)^{y_{j,i}\cdot z_{j,i}}, \{z_{j,i}\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right)$$

  Once again, it is again easy to see that this simulation of the key-generation oracle by $\mathcal{B}$ is computationally indistinguishable from the real oracle the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\text{DBDH+k-DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

- ***Left-or-Right Query:*** Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ queries the left-or-right oracle with $(\mathbf{ID}_0^*, \mathbf{ID}_1^*)$ - a two-tuple of circuits representing k'-sources over the identity space $\mathcal{ID}_\lambda$ such that $k' = \omega\left(\log \lambda\right)$. $\mathcal{B}$ uniformly samples $\mathsf{mode} \xleftarrow{R} \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$. If $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$, it samples $\mathsf{id}^* \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{ID}_0^*$; otherwise, it samples $\mathsf{id}^* \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{ID}_1^*$. If any of $H_j\left(\mathsf{id}^*\right)$ for $j \in [1,k]$ has already been looked up, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs a random bit and aborts.* Otherwise, it samples $z_1^*, z_2^*, \cdots, z_k^* \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and responds with:

$$\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*} = \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k+1} g_j^{a_j \cdot x_j}, \{z_j^*\}_{j\in[1,k]}\right)$$

  where $\left(g_1^{a_1}, \cdots, g_{k+1}^{a_{k+1}}\right)$ is part of its input k-DLIN instance. It also formally sets $H_j\left(\mathsf{id}^*\right) = g^{a_j/z_j^*}$ for $j \in [1,k]$.

- $H_1, \cdots, H_k$ ***Query Phase-2***: $\mathcal{A}$ continues to issue queries to the random oracles for $H_1, H_2 \cdots, H_k$. $\mathcal{B}$ responds as in Phase-1, except if a query for id^* arrives. In this case, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs* 1 *and aborts.*

- ***Secret-Key Query Phase-2:*** $\mathcal{A}$ continues to issue secret-key queries, and $\mathcal{B}$ continues to respond as in Phase-1, except if a query for id^* arrives. In this case, $\mathcal{B}$ *outputs* 1 *and aborts.*

- ***Output:*** Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a bit $b \in \{0,1\}$. $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1 if the challenge identity id^* was sampled from $\mathbf{ID}_b^*$, and 0 otherwise.

Note that once again, we considered the single-shot variant of the function privacy adversary making a single left-or-right oracle query. Such an adversary is polynomially

equivalent to its multi-shot variant (see Section 3.4). We now state and prove the following claims:

Claim E.4 *When $a_{k+1} = \sum_{j=1}^{k} a_j$, the joint distribution of* mode *and the challenge secret-key* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ *in the simulation of the left-or-right oracle by* $\mathcal{B}$ *is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+k\text{-}DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. Note that the sampling of id^* from either $\mathbf{ID}_1^*$ or $\mathbf{ID}_1^*$ by $\mathcal{B}$ is consistent with its random choice of mode. Additionally, when $a_{k+1} = \sum_{j=1}^{k} a_j$, the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ takes the form:

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*} &= \left(\left(\prod_{j=1}^{k} g_j^{a_j \cdot x_j} \right) \cdot g_{k+1}^{\left(\sum_{j=1}^{k} a_j\right) \cdot x_{k+1}}, \{z_j^*\}_{j \in [1,k]} \right) \\
&= \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k} \left(g_j^{x_j} \cdot g_{k+1}^{x_{k+1}} \right)^{a_j}, \{z_j^*\}_{j \in [1,k]} \right) \\
&= \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k} \left(g_j^{x_j} \cdot g_{k+1}^{x_{k+1}} \right)^{(a_j / z_j^*) \cdot z_j^*}, \{z_j^*\}_{j \in [1,k]} \right) \\
&= \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k} H_j \left(\mathsf{id}^* \right)^{s_j \cdot z_j^*}, \{z_j^*\}_{j \in [1,k]} \right)
\end{aligned}$$

which is identically distributed to the response of the left-or-right oracle in the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{IBE}}_{\mathrm{DBDH+k\text{-}DLIN}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$. This completes the proof of Claim E.4.

Claim E.5 *When a_{k+2} is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, the distribution of the challenge secret-key* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ *is statistically independent of $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of* mode.

Proof. Recall that $\alpha_j = \log_g g_j$ for $j \in [1, k+1]$. Consider the following system of equations, determined by the public parameters pp and the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\log_g \left(g_1^{x_1} \cdot g_{k+1}^{x_{k+1}} \right) &= \alpha_1 \cdot x_1 + \alpha_{k+1} \cdot x_{k+1} \\
\log_g \left(g_2^{x_2} \cdot g_{k+1}^{x_{k+1}} \right) &= \alpha_2 \cdot x_2 + \alpha_{k+1} \cdot x_{k+1} \\
&\vdots \\
\log_g \left(g_k^{x_k} \cdot g_{k+1}^{x_{k+1}} \right) &= \alpha_k \cdot x_k + \alpha_{k+1} \cdot x_{k+1} \\
\log_g \left(\prod_{j=1}^{k+1} g_j^{a_j \cdot x_j} \right) &= \sum_{j=1}^{k+1} a_j \cdot \alpha_j \cdot x_j
\end{aligned}$$

Since a_{k+2} is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q$, with all but negligible probability, we have that $a_{k+2} \neq \sum_{j=1}^{k+1} a_j$, *which makes the aforementioned system of equations linearly independent*. Hence, the *conditional distribution* of $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ (where the conditioning is

on $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of mode and everything else in $\mathcal{A}$'s view) is uniform. This completes the proof of Claim E.5.
It now follows from Claims E.4 and E.5, that the advantage ϵ' of $\mathcal{B}$ in solving the k-DLIN instance may be quantified as $\epsilon' = \epsilon \cdot (1 - \Pr[\mathsf{abort}_1]) - \Pr[\mathsf{abort}_2]$, where ϵ is the advantage of the function privacy adversary $\mathcal{A}$, while abort_1 and abort_2 denote the events that aborting the simulation during the left-or-right query phase and the second hash/secret-key query phase, respectively, leads to a loss of advantage for $\mathcal{B}$. We bound the probability of this event as follows:

- **Abortion during Left-or-Right Query.** Suppose that the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ makes a maximum of Q_1 and Q_2 queries to the random oracles and the secret-key generation oracle, respectively, prior to the left-or-right query. Recall that both the circuits $\mathbf{ID}_0^*$ and $\mathbf{ID}_1^*$ generated by $\mathcal{A}$ represent k-sources over the identity space $\mathcal{ID}_\lambda$, such that $k = \omega(\log \lambda)$. Hence, the probability that a uniformly randomly sampled id^* from either distribution has already been queried by $\mathcal{A}$ may be upper bounded as $\frac{Q_1+Q_2}{2^{\omega(\log \lambda)}} \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.

- **Abortion during Query Phase-2.** Note that when $\mathcal{B}$ aborts during a random oracle/secret-key generation oracle query in phase-2, it always outputs 1, thereby indicating that its input k-DLIN instance is valid. Hence, a loss of advantage for $\mathcal{B}$ occurs only when it has to abort even if the k-DLIN instance is invalid. Now, as per Claim E.5, when the k-DLIN instance is invalid, the distribution of the challenge secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{id}^*}$ is uniformly random and independent of mode. Given the min-entropy bounds on the circuits represented by $\mathbf{ID}_0^*$ and $\mathbf{ID}_1^*$, the probability that $\mathcal{A}$ still correctly guesses id^* and issues hash queries for the same is $\mathcal{O}\left(2^{-\omega(\log \lambda)}\right) \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.

In summary, we have $\Pr[\mathsf{abort}_\beta] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ for $\beta \in \{1, 2\}$, implying that $\mathcal{B}$'s advantage in solving the k-DLIN instance is negligibly close to the advantage of the function privacy adversary $\mathcal{A}$. This completes the proof of Claim E.3.

F Proof of Theorem 5.1

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that:

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{DP}}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| = \epsilon$$

where $\epsilon > \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. We construct a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ such that:

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{MDDH}}_{l_1,l_2,\log_2 q,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},l_1,l_2,\log_2 q,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},l_1,l_2,\log_2 q,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| = \epsilon$$

$\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:

- ***Init:*** $\mathcal{B}$ outputs a circuit $\mathbf{V}^*$ representing the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$ (indeed, the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$ is a (l_1, l_2, k)-matrix-source for $k =$

$\log_2 q$). In response, $\mathcal{B}$ receives a tuple $\left(g^{\mathbf{A}}, g^{\mathbf{u}}\right) \in \left((\mathbb{G})^{l_1 \times l_2} \times (\mathbb{G})^{l_1}\right)$, where $\mathbf{u}$ is either of the form $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}$ for some uniformly random $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_2}$, or $\mathbf{u}$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$.

- ***Setup:*** $\mathcal{B}$ samples $\mathbf{S} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l_1}$ and sets the public parameter pp and the master-secret-key msk as:

$$\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, g^{\mathbf{A}}, g^{\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A}}\right) \ , \ \mathsf{msk} = \mathbf{S}$$

  It provides pp to $\mathcal{A}$.

- ***Secret-Key Queries:*** Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ issues a key-generation query for a predicate matrix $\mathbf{W} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$. $\mathcal{B}$ samples $\mathbf{y} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ and responds with the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}} = (d_1, d_2)$ where:

$$d_1 = g^{\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}} \ , \ d_2 = g^{\mathbf{y}^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W} \cdot \mathbf{S}}$$

  Quite evidently, the distribution of $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{W}}$ is $\mathcal{B}$'s simulation is computationally indistinguishable from that in the response of the key-generation oracle in the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

- ***Challenge:*** $\mathcal{A}$ outputs the challenge pair $\left((\mathbf{x}_0^*, M_0^*), (\mathbf{x}_1^*, M_1^*)\right)$. $\mathcal{B}$ samples $b \xleftarrow{R} \{0,1\}$ and $\alpha^* \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and outputs the challenge ciphertext $C^* = (c_1^*, c_2^*)$ where:

$$c_1^* = g^{\mathbf{u}} \ , \ c_2^* = g^{\alpha^* \cdot \mathbf{x}_b^* + \mathbf{m}_b^* + \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{u}}$$

  where $\mathbf{m}_b^* = \left[M_b^* \ 0 \ 0 \cdots 0\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.

- ***Output:*** Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a guess b' for b. If $b' = b$, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1, else it outputs 0.

We now state and prove the following claims:

Claim F.1 *When* $\mathbf{u}$ *is of the form* $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}$ *for some uniformly random* $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_2}$*, the joint distribution of* b *and the challenge ciphertext* C^* *in the simulation by* $\mathcal{B}$ *is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b)}_{\mathsf{DP},\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. This is obvious from substituting $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}$ in the challenge ciphertext components c_1^* and c_2^*.

Claim F.2 *When* $\mathbf{u}$ *is uniformly random in* $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$*, the distribution of the challenge ciphertext* C^* *is statistically independent of* $\mathcal{B}$*'s choice of* b*.*

Proof. Observe that the challenge ciphertext component c_2^* is essentially $g^{\alpha^* \cdot \mathbf{x}_b^* + \mathbf{m}_b^* + \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{u}}$. Hence, c_2^* is statistically independent of b if and only if the conditional distribution of $\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{u}$ (where the conditioning is on $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of b and everything else in $\mathcal{A}$'s view) is uniformly random, given that $\mathbf{u}$ is a uniformly random vector in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$.

Suppose that during the data privacy experiment, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ makes Q secret-key-generation queries on predicate matrices $\mathbf{W}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{W}_Q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$, and $\mathcal{B}$ responds with $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}_j} = (d_{j,1}, d_{j,2})$ for $j \in [1, Q]$. Also, suppose that $Q = \lfloor (n \times (l_1 - l_2) - 1) / l_1 \rfloor$. Now consider the following system of $(n \times l_2 + Q \times l_1)$ equations, determined by the public parameters and the responses of $\mathcal{B}$ to the aforementioned key-generation queries:

$$\begin{aligned}
\log_g \left(g^{\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A}} \right) &= \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A} \\
\log_g \left(d_{1,2} \right) &= \mathbf{y}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}_1 \cdot \mathbf{S} \\
\log_g \left(d_{2,2} \right) &= \mathbf{y}_2^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}_2 \cdot \mathbf{S} \\
&\vdots \\
\log_g \left(d_{Q,2} \right) &= \mathbf{y}_Q^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}_Q \cdot \mathbf{S}
\end{aligned}$$

Quite evidently, the aforementioned system of equations has exponentially many solutions for $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l_1}$. Let $\mathbf{S}_0$ be one such solution, chosen deterministically. Also, let $\mathbf{Z}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$ and $\mathbf{Z}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ be deterministically chosen vectors such that:

- $\mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{Z}_1 = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$
- $\mathbf{y}_j^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{W}_j \cdot \mathbf{Z}_2 = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ for each $j \in [1, Q]$

Note that exponentially many such vectors exist since $l_1 > l_2$ and $n > Q$. Then, the distribution of $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times l_1}$ in the view of a computationally unbounded adversary is as follows:

$$\{ \mathbf{S}_0 + \mu \cdot \mathbf{Z}_2 \cdot \mathbf{Z}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \mid \mu \in \mathbb{Z}_q \}$$

Now, observe that the conditional distribution of $\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{u}$ (where the conditioning is on $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of b and everything else in $\mathcal{A}$'s view) is as follows:

$$\{ \mathbf{S}_0 \cdot \mathbf{u} + \mu \cdot \mathbf{Z}_2 \cdot \mathbf{Z}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{u} \mid \mu \in \mathbb{Z}_q \}$$

Since $\mathbf{u}$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$, we may assume that $\mathbf{u}$ is not of the form $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}$, since this occurs with only negligible probability. This essentially implies that, except with negligible probability, $\mathbf{Z}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{u} \neq \mathbf{0}$, and the conditional distribution of $\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{u}$ is uniformly random. This completes the proof of Claim F.2.

It now follows from Claims F.1 and F.2 that :

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{MDDH}}_{l_1, l_2, \log_2 q, \mathcal{B}}(\lambda) &= \left| \Pr \left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{MDDH}, l_1, l_2, \log_2 q, \mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathrm{MDDH}, l_1, l_2, \log_2 q, \mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1 \right] \right| \\
&= \left| \Pr \left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathsf{DP}, \Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathsf{DP}, \Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1 \right] \right| \\
&= \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathsf{DP}}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{SME}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}}, \mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \epsilon
\end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof of Theorem 5.1.

G Proof of Claim 6.1

For a given $k \in [1, n+1]$ and $b \in \{0,1\}$ let $\mathcal{A}$ be any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that:

$$\left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k-1)}_{\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| = \epsilon$$

where $\epsilon > \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. We construct a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ such that:

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\text{MDDH}}_{l_1,l_2,\log_2 q,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\text{MDDH},l_1,l_2,\log_2 q,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\text{MDDH},l_1,l_2,\log_2 q,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| = \epsilon$$

$\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:

- ***Init:*** $\mathcal{B}$ outputs a circuit $\mathbf{V}^*$ representing the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$ (indeed, the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$ is a (l_1, l_2, k)-matrix-source for $k = \log_2 q$). In response, $\mathcal{B}$ receives a tuple $\left(g^{\mathbf{A}}, g^{\mathbf{u}}\right) \in \left((\mathbb{G})^{l_1 \times l_2} \times (\mathbb{G})^{l_1}\right)$, where $\mathbf{u}$ is either of the form $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}$ for some uniformly random $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_2}$, or $\mathbf{u}$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$.

- ***Setup:*** $\mathcal{B}$ randomly samples $\mathbf{A}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{A}_{k-1}, \mathbf{A}_{k+1}, \mathbf{A}_n, \mathbf{A}_{n+1} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$ and $\mathbf{S} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n+1) \times l_1}$. It *formally* sets $\mathbf{A}_k = \mathbf{A}$. It sets the public parameter pp and the master-secret-key msk as:

  $$\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, \{g^{\mathbf{A}_j}\}_{j \in [1,n+1]}, \{g^{\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{A}_j}\}_{j \in [1,n+1]}\right) \ , \ \mathsf{msk} = \mathbf{S}$$

  It provides pp to $\mathcal{A}$.

- ***Secret-Key Queries:*** Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ issues a key-generation query for a predicate vector $\mathbf{v} \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \cup \{\star\})^m$. $\mathcal{B}$ responds with $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}} = \Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}}.\mathsf{KeyGen}\left(\mathsf{msk}, \mathbf{v}\right)$.

- ***Challenge:*** $\mathcal{A}$ outputs the challenge pair $\left((\mathbf{x}^*_0, M^*_0), (\mathbf{x}^*_1, M^*_1)\right)$, where for each $b \in [0,1]$, we have $\mathbf{x}^*_b = \left(x^*_{b,1}, \cdots, x^*_{b,n}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}_n^q$. $\mathcal{B}$ samples $b \xleftarrow{R} \{0,1\}$ and $\alpha^* \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and proceeds as follows:
  - For each $j \in [1, k-1]$, it randomly samples $c^*_{j,1}, c^*_{j,2} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$.
  - For each $j \in [k+1, n+1]$, it computes $c^*_{j,1}$ and $c^*_{j,2}$ as per $\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}}.\mathsf{Encrypt}\left(\mathsf{pp}, \mathbf{x}^*_b, M^*_b\right)$.
  - If $k < n+1$, it sets:

    $$c^*_{k,1} = g^{\mathbf{u}} \ , \ c^*_{k,2} = g^{\alpha^* \cdot \mathbf{x}^*_{b,k} + \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{u}}$$

    where $\mathbf{x}^*_{b,k} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & x^*_{b,k} & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix}^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$. On the other hand, if $k = n+1$, it sets

    $$c^*_{n+1,1} = g^{\mathbf{u}} \ , \ c^*_{n+1,2} = g^{\alpha^* \cdot \mathbf{x}^*_{b,n+1} + \mathbf{m}^*_b + \mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{u}}$$

    where $\mathbf{x}^*_{b,n+1} = \begin{bmatrix} 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 & -1 \end{bmatrix}^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ and $\mathbf{m}^*_b = \begin{bmatrix} M^*_b & 0 & 0 & \cdots & 0 \end{bmatrix}^{\mathbf{T}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$.

- $\mathcal{B}$ finally responds with the ciphertext $C^* = \left(\{c^*_{j,1}, c^*_{j,2}\}_{j\in[1,n+1]}\right)$.

- ***Output:*** Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a guess b' for b. If $b' = b$, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1, else it outputs 0.

We now state and prove the following claims:

Claim G.1 *When* $\mathbf{u}$ *is of the form* $\mathbf{A}\cdot\mathbf{r}$ *for some uniformly random* $\mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_2}$*, the joint distribution of* b *and the challenge ciphertext* C^* *in the simulation by* $\mathcal{B}$ *is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k-1)}_{\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. This is obvious from substituting $\mathbf{u} = \mathbf{A}\cdot\mathbf{r}$ in the challenge ciphertext components $c^*_{k,1}$ and $c^*_{k,2}$.

Claim G.2 *When* $\mathbf{u}$ *is uniformly random in* $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$*, the joint distribution of* b *and the challenge ciphertext* C^* *in the simulation by* $\mathcal{B}$ *is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment* $\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.

Proof. It is easy to see that $c^*_{2,k}$ is statistically independent of b if and only if the conditional distribution of $\mathbf{S}\cdot\mathbf{u}$ (where the conditioning is on $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of b and everything else in $\mathcal{A}$'s view) is uniformly random, given that $\mathbf{u}$ is a uniformly random vector in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$.

Suppose that during the data privacy experiment, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ makes Q secret-key-generation queries on predicate vectors $\mathbf{v}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{v}_Q \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and $\mathcal{B}$ responds with $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}_j} = (d_{j,1}, d_{j,2})$ for $j \in [1, Q]$. Also, suppose that $Q = \lfloor((n+1)\times(l_1 - l_2) - 1)/l_1\rfloor$. Now consider the following system of $((n+1)\times l_2 + Q\times l_1)$ equations, determined by the public parameters and the responses of $\mathcal{B}$ to the aforementioned key-generation queries:

$$\begin{aligned}
\log_g\left(g^{\mathbf{S}\cdot\mathbf{A}}\right) &= \mathbf{S}\cdot\mathbf{A}\\
\log_g\left(d_{1,2}\right) &= \mathbf{y}_1^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{W}_1\cdot\mathbf{S}\\
\log_g\left(d_{2,2}\right) &= \mathbf{y}_2^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{W}_2\cdot\mathbf{S}\\
&\vdots\\
\log_g\left(d_{Q,2}\right) &= \mathbf{y}_Q^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{W}_Q\cdot\mathbf{S}
\end{aligned}$$

Quite evidently, the aforementioned system of equations has exponentially many solutions for $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n+1)\times l_1}$. Let $\mathbf{S}_0$ be one such solution, chosen deterministically. Also, let $\mathbf{Z}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$ and $\mathbf{Z}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ be deterministically chosen vectors such that:

- $\mathbf{A}^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{Z}_1 = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$
- $\mathbf{y}_j^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{W}_j\cdot\mathbf{Z}_2 = \mathbf{0} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ for each $j \in [1, Q]$

Note that exponentially many such vectors exist since $l_1 > l_2$ and $n+1 > Q$. Then, the distribution of $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n+1)\times l_1}$ in the view of a computationally unbounded adversary is as follows:

$$\{\mathbf{S}_0 + \mu\cdot\mathbf{Z}_2\cdot\mathbf{Z}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \mid \mu \in \mathbb{Z}_q\}$$

Now, observe that the conditional distribution of $\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{u}$ (where the conditioning is on $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of b and everything else in $\mathcal{A}$'s view) is as follows:

$$\{\mathbf{S}_0 \cdot \mathbf{u} + \mu \cdot \mathbf{Z}_2 \cdot \mathbf{Z}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{u} \mid \mu \in \mathbb{Z}_q\}$$

Since $\mathbf{u}$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1}$, we may assume that $\mathbf{u}$ is not of the form $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{r}$, since this occurs with only negligible probability. This essentially implies that, except with negligible probability, $\mathbf{Z}_1^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{u} \neq \mathbf{0}$, and the conditional distribution of $\mathbf{S} \cdot \mathbf{u}$ is uniformly random. This completes the proof of Claim G.2.

It now follows from Claims G.1 and G.2 that :

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{MDDH}}_{l_1,l_2,\log_2 q,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) &= \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},l_1,l_2,\log_2 q,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},l_1,l_2,\log_2 q,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \\
&= \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k-1)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(b,k)}_{\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \\
&= \epsilon
\end{aligned}$$

Hence, we must have $\epsilon \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$. This completes the proof of Claim 6.1.

H Proof of Theorem 6.2

The proof follows directly from the following claim:

Claim H.1 *For any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary $\mathcal{A}$, the following holds:*

$$\left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

Proof. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a probabilistic polynomial-time adversary such that:

$$\left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| = \epsilon$$

We construct a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ such that:

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{MDDH}}_{n,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) = 1\right] \right| = \epsilon$$

for $k = \log_2 q$. $\mathcal{B}$ poses as the challenger for $\mathcal{A}$ in the function privacy experiment, and delays outputting its own choice of matrix distribution in the min-entropy MDDH game until $\mathcal{A}$ queries the left-or-right function privacy oracle. More concretely, $\mathcal{B}$ proceeds as follows:

- ***Setup:*** $\mathcal{B}$ randomly samples $(\mathbb{G}, \mathbb{G}_T, q, g, e) \xleftarrow{R} \mathsf{GroupGen}(1^\lambda)$ on input the security parameter 1^λ. It also randomly samples $\mathbf{A}_1, \cdots, \mathbf{A}_n, \mathbf{A}_{n+1} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{l_1 \times l_2}$ and

$\mathbf{S} \xleftarrow{R} \mathbb{Z}_q^{(n+1)\times l_1}$, where $l_1, l_2 \in \mathbb{N}$. It then sets the public parameter pp and the master-secret-key msk as:

$$\mathsf{pp} = \left(g, \{g^{\mathbf{A}_j}\}_{j\in[1,n+1]}, \{g^{\mathbf{S}\cdot\mathbf{A}_j}\}_{j\in[1,n+1]}\right) \ , \ \mathsf{msk} = \mathbf{S}$$

It provides pp to $\mathcal{A}$.

- ***Secret-Key Queries:*** Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ issues a key-generation query for a predicate vector $\mathbf{v} \in (\mathbb{Z}_q \cup \{\star\})^m$. $\mathcal{B}$ responds with $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}} = \Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}}.\mathsf{KeyGen}\,(\mathsf{msk}, \mathbf{v})$.

- ***Left-or-Right Query:*** Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ queries the left-or-right oracle with $(\mathbf{V}_0^*, \mathbf{V}_1^*, \mathcal{S}^*)$, where $\mathbf{V}_0^* = \left(\{V_{j,0}^*\}_{j\in[1,n]}\right)$ and $\mathbf{V}_1^* = \left(\{V_{j,1}^*\}_{j\in[1,n]}\right)$ represent $(1, n, k)$-matrix-sources for $k = \omega(\log\lambda)$, and $\mathcal{S}^* \subseteq [1, n]$. $\mathcal{B}$ uniformly samples $\mathsf{mode} \xleftarrow{R} \{\mathsf{left}, \mathsf{right}\}$. If $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$, it sets $b = 0$, else it sets $b = 1$. It then creates a new distribution $\mathbf{V}_b^{'} = \left(V_1^{'}, \cdots, V_n^{'}\right) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, described as follows:

$$\left\{ V_j^{'} = \begin{cases} V_{j,b}^* & \text{if } j \in \mathcal{S} \\ 0 & \text{if } j \notin \mathcal{S} \end{cases} \right\}_{j\in[1,n]}$$

Note that $\mathbf{V}_b^{'}$ is a non-zero distribution so long as $\mathcal{S} \neq \phi$. At this point, $\mathcal{B}$ outputs the distribution $\tilde{\mathbf{V}}^* = \left[\mathbf{U}_{n\times n} \mid \mathbf{U}_{n\times n} \cdot \mathbf{V}_b^{'}\right]^{\mathbf{T}}$ (where $\mathbf{U}_{n\times n}$ is a circuit representing the uniform distribution, and hence an $(n, n, \log_2 q)$-matrix-source, over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times n}$) and receives in response a tuple $\left(g^{(\mathbf{W}^*)^{\mathbf{T}}}, g^{\mathbf{u}^*}\right) \in \left((\mathbb{G})^{(n+1)\times n} \times (\mathbb{G})^{n+1}\right)$. Note that $\mathbf{u}^*$ is either of the form $(\mathbf{W}^*)^{\mathbf{T}} \cdot \mathbf{y}^*$ for some uniformly random $\mathbf{y}^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, or $\mathbf{u}^*$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$.

$\mathcal{B}$ responds with the secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}^*} = (d_1^*, d_2^*)$ where:

$$d_1^* = g^{(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}}} \ , \ d_2^* = g^{(\mathbf{u}^*)^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{S}}$$

- ***Output:*** $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a bit b'. If $b' = b$ (where $b = 0$ if $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{left}$ and $b = 1$ if $\mathsf{mode} = \mathsf{right}$), $\mathcal{B}$ outputs 1; else, it outputs 0.

Note that once again, we considered the single-shot variant of the function privacy adversary making a single left-or-right oracle query. Such an adversary is polynomially equivalent to its multi-shot variant (see Section 3.4). The following claims now follow:

Claim H.2 *When $\mathbf{u}^*$ is of the form $(\mathbf{W}^*)^{\mathbf{T}}\cdot\mathbf{y}^*$ for some uniformly random $\mathbf{y}^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, the joint distribution of mode and the challenge secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}^*}$ in the simulation of the left-or-right oracle by $\mathcal{B}$ is computationally indistinguishable from that in the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{mode}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\text{HVE}}_{\text{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$.*

Claim H.3 *When $\mathbf{u}^*$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, the distribution of the challenge secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}^*}$ is statistically independent of $\mathcal{B}$'s choice of mode with overwhelmingly large probability.*

Proof. The proof of Claim H.2 follows from the fact that a matrix $\mathbf{W}_1 \xleftarrow{R} \mathbf{U}_{n\times n}$ is invertible with overwhelmingly high probability, while the proof of Claim H.3 is intuitively identical to the proof of Claim 5.3 in the proof of function privacy for our SME scheme. Note that the restriction on the number of secret-key queries Q ensures that the master-secret-key $\mathbf{S}$ has sufficient entropy from an adversary's point of view, even given the public parameter pp and $\mathcal{B}$'s responses to Q-many secret-key queries. This in turn ensures that when $\mathbf{u}^*$ is uniformly random in $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, the challenge secret-key $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathbf{v}^*}$ perfectly hides the distribution $\mathbf{V}_b^*$ from which the predicate vector $\mathbf{v}^*$ was sampled.

It now follows from Claims H.2, and H.3, that:

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{MDDH}}_{n,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) &= \left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(0)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{(1)}_{\mathrm{MDDH},n,k,\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| \\ &= \left|\Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{left}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{right}}_{\mathsf{FP},\Pi^{\mathrm{HVE}}_{\mathrm{MDDH}},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)=1\right]\right| = \epsilon\end{aligned}$$

This completes the proof of Claim H.1.