

Certificateless Public Key Signature Schemes from Standard Algorithms

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Abstract. Certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC) is designed to have succinct public key management without using certificates at the same time avoid the key-escrow attribute in the identity-based cryptography. Security mechanisms employing implicit certificates achieve same goals. In this work, we first unify the security notions of these two types of mechanisms with a modified CL-PKC formulation. We further present a general key-pair generation algorithm for CL-PKC schemes and uses it to construct certificateless public key signature (CL-PKS) schemes from standard algorithms. The technique, which we apply, helps defeat known-attacks against existing constructions, and the resulting schemes could be quickly deployed based on the existing standard algorithm implementations. The proposed schemes are particularly useful to provide security services such as authentication, data integrity and non-repudiation in the Internet of Things because of their high efficiency of computation cost, bandwidth consumption and storage requirement.

1 Introduction

In a public key cryptography system, a security mechanism to unequivocally demonstrate the relationship between a key pair and the identity of its owner is indispensable. In the public key infrastructure (PKI) system, the authority issues a certificate to bind a user's identity with his public key. While the solution is well-established and universal, the PKI system can be very complicated and faces many challenges in practice, such as the efficiency and scalability of the system. The identity-based cryptography (IBC) offers an attractive alternative. In an IBC system, a user treats his identity as his public key or more accurately everyone can derive a user's public key from his identity string through a pre-defined function with a set of system parameters. Hence in such system, the public key authenticity problem becomes trivial, and certificates are no longer necessary. However, the key generation center (KGC) can generate a private key corresponding to any of identity in an IBC system. This key-escrow function sometimes causes concerns of users' privacy. Moreover, the compromise of the KGC resulting in leaking the master secret could be a disastrous event.

In 2003, Al-Riyami and Paterson introduced a new paradigm: the certificateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC). The CL-PKC is designed to have succinct

public key management without certificates at the same time remove the key-escrow property embedded in the IBC. In the CL-PKC, a user has a public key, and his private key is determined by two pieces of secrets: one secret associated with the user's identity is extracted from the KGC, and the other is generated by the user himself. Moreover, one secret is not computable from the other, so the KGC cannot compute the user's private key. Hence the CL-PKC is key-escrow free. The approach against the key replacement attack in the CL-PKC is not to directly prove the authenticity of a public key with a certificate. Instead, the CL-PKC guarantees that even if a malicious user successfully replaces a victim's public key with his own choice, he still cannot generate a valid signature or compute the agreed session key or decrypt a ciphertext generated with the false public key and the victim's identity. This effect will undoubtedly reduce the interest of launching the attack.

Interestingly, another line of work under the name "implicit certificate" [22, 14] had been developed before the birth of CL-PKC. An implicit certificate is comprised of a user's identity and a public key reconstruction data, which is used to reconstruct user's public key together with KGC's public key. The validity of user's public key cannot be explicitly verified like a certificate with a CA's signature. Instead, like CL-PKC, a sound implicit-certificate-based security mechanism guarantees that the key replacement attack cannot compromise the intended security.

In 1998 Arazi submitted a paper [4] to IEEE P1363, which specifies a discrete logarithm (DL) based algorithm to generate a "certificate" from the modified Schnorr signature. Essentially, this scheme is an implicit certificate scheme. Arazi further described how to construct security mechanisms upon the standardized signature, encryption, and key agreement scheme respectively with the generated "certificate" and private key. In 2000, Pintsov and Vanstone [39] proposed an implicit certificate scheme from the Schnorr signature, called the Optimal Mail Certificate (OMC) scheme. The scheme was then combined with the Pintsov-Vanstone signature forming a partial message recovery signature. As shown in [13], the OMC scheme cannot work directly with a standard signature such as ECDSA to form a secure signature scheme. In 2001, Brown, Gallant and Vanston [14] described a modification of the OMC algorithm, which is essentially same as Arazi's key generation algorithm. This scheme later becomes known as the elliptic curve Qu-Vanstone (ECQV) certificate scheme [15]. Again shown in [13], the composition of ECQV with ECDSA still suffers from the Kravitz's attack and is only proved to be secure against passive adversaries with restrictions. Whyte et al. proposed using the ECQV-based signature in the vehicle to vehicle (V2V) applications [45]. It worths mentioning that Groves developed an elliptic curve-based certificateless signature named as ECCSI [23] "by drawing on ideas set out by Arazi." ECCSI does not allow a user to generate his secret. Hence it is more like an identity-based signature (IBS) as it still maintains the key-escrow attribute. ECCSI has been adopted as a standard algorithm in 4G-LTE to secure mission-critical communications [18].

In the literature, there are many publications of CL-PKC either presenting concrete constructions or researching the formal models of related security notions. A short and incomplete list includes [1, 2, 7, 5, 16, 26–29, 34, 33, 35, 44, 46, 47]. In prac-

tice, many products have already implemented standard cryptographic schemes. If the CL-PKC constructions can reuse these existing infrastructures, it will certainly help facilitate the adoption of the CL-PKC-based security solutions. However, only some of the schemes such as [5, 26–28, 33, 35, 44, 46] do not require pairing, which is a cumbersome operation, and none of the CL-PKS algorithms is constructed upon standard algorithms such as ECDSA, SM2 [20].

This type of occurrences happens because most of the work strictly follows the Al-Riyami-Paterson’s formulation of CL-PKC, except a few such as [5] that made minor changes. The definition of key generation functions in Al-Riyami-Paterson’s CL-PKC formulation [1, 2] excludes the use of implicit certificate schemes such as OMC and ECQV. And the formulation makes it difficult to construct CL-PKC schemes built upon standard algorithms.

On the other hand, there lacks a systematic treatment of the security notions of an implicit certificate and the security mechanisms using it. In [14], Brown et al. presented an implicit certificate security model, which however does not address the impact of a malicious KGC. Moreover, a native composition of a sound implicit certificate scheme with a standard security mechanism such as a provably secure signature does not always result in a scheme to achieve the intended security properties. Hence, only a security definition of implicit certificate schemes is not enough, and it’s useful to formulate security notions for implicit-certificate-based security mechanisms and so to analyze the security of constructed schemes.

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we revisit the formulation of CL-PKC and define a unified model, which enables one to use implicit certificate schemes to generate public and private key to construct efficient CL-PKC schemes and allows one to systematically analyze the security of mechanisms using implicit certificates. Then, we present a concrete certificateless key generation algorithm (CL-KGA) and formally analyze its security in Section 3. We show how to apply a simple technique to combine the proposed CL-KGA with standard algorithms to securely form CL-PKS schemes in Section 4. The performance of the proposed schemes are compared with the related ones in the literature and an implementation on an ARM chip is reported in Section 5. Finally, we draw a conclusion.

2 CL-PKC Definition

In this section, we revisit the definition of CL-PKC algorithms including CL-PKS and CL-PKE. Because this type of cryptographic schemes share a common key generation process (we call it CL-KGA), we define this process first and then describe the schemes of signature and encryption.

Given a security parameter k , a CL-KGA uses the following five functions to generate public and private key pairs. The first three functions are probabilistic and the others are deterministic.

- $(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}) \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Setup}(1^k)$. The output is a master public/secret key pair.
- $(U_A, x_A) \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Set-User-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A)$. $\text{ID}_A \in \{0, 1\}^*$ refers to an identity string of entity A ; the output is a pair of public/secret values.
- $(W_A, d_A) \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A)$. The output is a pair of partial public/private keys.

- $s_A \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Set-Private-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A, x_A, W_A, d_A)$. The output is the private key of entity A .
- $P_A \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Set-Public-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A, W_A)$. The output is the *claimed* public key of entity A .

The above key generation process is substantially different from Al-Riyami-Paterson’s definition [1, 2], in which, two public key values U_A and W_A are not addressed. We replace their **CL.Set-Secret-Value** by **CL.Set-User-Key** to make U_A “visible”. We also modify their **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** by specifically adding U_A as input and outputting W_A . Finally, in our definition, these two values are explicitly inputted to **CL.Set-Private-Key** and **CL.Set-Public-Key**, and x_A is no longer part of the input to **CL.Set-Public-Key**.

Apparently, **CL.Set-User-Key** can compute any values, which need x_A and are necessary to generate P_A , and include them in U_A . Hence, any key generation schemes following the Al-Riyami-Paterson’s definition can be covered by our definition. On the other hand, some schemes such as the ones presented in this work achieve the same goals of CL-PKC but cannot fit in with the Al-Riyami-Paterson’s definition. Specifically, the schemes presented in this work require that **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** makes use of U_A . In [2], Al-Riyami and Paterson elaborated a method to construct Certificate-Based Encryption (CBE) [21] from CL-PKE. It requires to execute **CL.Set-Public-Key** immediately after **CL.Set-Private-Key** and uses P_A as part of ID_A to invoke **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key**. This method essentially sets $U_A = P_A$ and calls **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key**($M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_A || U_A, \emptyset$) with an empty variable \emptyset under our definition. We think this circumventive method, which forces inefficient constructions on many occasions, is unnatural. By removing x_A from **CL.Set-Public-Key**’s input, the KGC can compute P_A after executing **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key**. This modification is important to facilitate the security definitions below.

Once having generated the key pair, the user should be able to execute **CL.Verify-Key** to check the correctness of it.

- $\{\text{valid or invalid}\} \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Verify-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, s_A)$. The deterministic function outputs whether (ID_A, P_A, s_A) is valid with regard to M_{pt} .

In CL-PKC schemes, another value derived from the identity and the master public key together with P_A is used as the *real* public key. This derivation process is typically specified in the encryption function or signature verification function. Here we explicitly define this process as the **CL.Calculate-Public-Key** function. We think this generalization could present a more distinct view of CL-PKC constructions.

- $O_A \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Calculate-Public-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A)$. The deterministic function outputs the *real* public key O_A of entity A .

So both P_A and O_A are the public keys of entity ID_A . P_A is distributed in some way such as through an active directory or as part of a signature or messages exchanged in a key establishment protocol, and O_A is computed from $M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A$,

and P_A . O_A is the one used as the real public key of ID_A in the **CL.Encrypt** or **CL.Verify** or a session key computation function.

If **CL.Verify-Key**(M_{pt}, ID_A, P_A, s_A) returns **valid**, the key pair (O_A, s_A) , when used in cryptographic schemes such as encryption or signature, should satisfy the soundness requirement of those types of mechanisms.

Now we are ready to define the CL-PKS and CL-PKE. A CL-PKS scheme is specified by following two functions with the key generation scheme above.

- $\sigma \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Sign}(M_{pt}, ID_A, P_A, s_A, m)$. The probabilistic function signs on a message m and outputs a signature σ .
- $\{\mathbf{valid} \text{ or } \mathbf{invalid}\} \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Verify}(M_{pt}, ID_A, P_A, m, \sigma)$. The deterministic function outputs whether σ is a valid signature of m respect to (M_{pt}, ID_A, P_A) .

A CL-PKE scheme is specified by following two functions together with the key generation scheme above.

- $C \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Encrypt}(M_{pt}, ID_A, P_A, m)$. The probabilistic function encrypts a message m with (M_{pt}, ID_A, P_A) and outputs a ciphertext C .
- $\{m \text{ or } \perp\} \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Decrypt}(M_{pt}, ID_A, P_A, s_A, C)$. The deterministic function outputs a plaintext m or a failure symbol \perp .

As explained above, our CL-PKC formulation covers constructions following Al-Riyami-Paterson’s definition. As shown in the following sections, implicit-certificate-based mechanisms are also covered by this definition. For example, Appendix 7.1 shows that ECQV fits well in the above formulation as a CL-KGA. It has been demonstrated in [2] that Gentry’s CBE can be constructed with Al-Riyami-Paterson’s CL-PKE. Our generalized definition obviously works for CBE as well.

Al-Riyami and Paterson defined the security notion of indistinguishability under adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-CCA) of CL-PKE [1]. A serial of work [29, 47] refined the security notion of existential unforgeability against adaptive chosen-message attack (EUF-CMA) of CL-PKS. The formal security model of certificateless authenticated key agreement (CL-AKA) can be found in such as [34]. All of these security notions are defined with two games. Game 1 is conducted between a challenger \mathcal{C} and a Type-I adversary \mathcal{A}_I who does not know the master secret key but can replace a user’s public key with its choice. This type of adversary simulates those who may impersonate a party by providing others with a false public key. Game 2 is conducted between a challenger \mathcal{C} and a Type-II adversary \mathcal{A}_{II} who knows the master secret key (so every entity’s partial private key). This type of adversary simulates a malicious KGC adversary who eavesdrops the communications between its subscribers or may even switch public keys among them. We refer to [1, 47, 34] for further details.

Here we introduce a formal security model of CL-KGA which has not been defined in the literature and can also serve as a model for implicit certificate mechanisms.³ In CL-PKC, a KGC and its users could be an opponent to each other, but they work together to generate a key pair for an identity ID if both

³ In [14], a security model of the implicit certificate mechanism is defined. The model is more like for a key agreement and does not consider the Type-II adversary.

behave honestly. Hence, they are in a different security world from the classic signature. On the other hand, we can still make use of the security definition of signature mechanism to address the security requirements of a CL-KGA.

Intuitively, a secure CL-PKE requires that an adversary knowing x_A but without d_A or knowing d_A without x_A for a valid key pair (ID_A, P_A, s_A) should not be able to decrypt a ciphertext encrypted with (ID_A, P_A) . Following the two-game definition, a Type-I adversary \mathcal{A}_I succeeds in Game 1, if it generates a valid key pair (ID_*, P_*, s_*) from any (ID_*, U_*) and **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** $(M_{pt}, M_{st}, ID_*, U_*)$ has not been queried. A Type-II adversary \mathcal{A}_{II} succeeds in Game 2 if it generates a valid key pair (ID_*, P_*, s_*) of which P_* is generated by the challenger through **CL.Set-Public-Key** and related functions and its related secret values x_* and s_* are not disclosed to the adversary. A secure CL-PKE requires that its CL-KGA is safe against these two types of adversaries. Game 1 is similar to the UEF-CMA notion of a signature scheme.

Similarly, a secure CL-PKS requires that an adversary knowing x_A but without d_A or knowing d_A without x_A should not be able to generate a valid signature with a key pair (ID_A, P_A, s_A) . For non-repudiation, a secure CL-PKS further requires that an adversary should not be able to generate a signature on a message with a pair of keys different from the one obtained through a query with **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key**. More formally, an adversary succeeds in Game 1 if it generates two valid key pairs (ID_*, P_*, s_*) and (ID_*, P'_*, s'_*) for any chosen (ID_*, U_*) and **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** $(M_{pt}, M_{st}, ID_*, U_*)$ has been queried *at most once*. A secure CL-PKS requires its CL-KGA is safe against this type of adversary. This requirement is similar to the strong UEF-CMA notion of a signature scheme. As in a CL-PKE, a CL-PKS requires that its CL-KGA is also secure against Type-II adversaries.

The two games are depicted in Table 1. In these games, an adversary can access an oracle \mathcal{O}_{CL} to issue queries adaptively before outputting a key pair (ID_*, P_*, s_*) for test. In both games, query **CL.Get-Public-Key**, **CL.Get-Private-Key**, and **CL.Get-User-Key** can be asked. And in Game 1, query **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** can also be asked.

- Query **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** $(M_{pt}, M_{st}, ID_A, U_A)$. The oracle follows the function definition to generate W_A and d_A and calls function **CL.Set-Public-Key** (M_{pt}, ID_A, U_A, W_A) to get P_A . It returns W_A and d_A after recording (ID_A, P_A) in a set \mathbb{Q} . The oracle can build the set \mathbb{Q} because **CL.Set-Public-Key** doesn't need x_A in our CL-KGA formulation.
- Query **CL.Get-Public-Key** $(ID_A, bNewKey)$. If $bNewKey$ is true, the oracle follows function **CL.Set-User-Key**, **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key**, **CL.Set-Private-Key**, and **CL.Set-Public-Key** sequentially to generate keys, and it returns P_A after recording all the internal keys as (ID_A, P_A, x_A, s_A) in a set \mathbb{L} and putting P_A in a set \mathbb{P} . Otherwise, the oracle returns P_A from the latest record indexed by ID_A in \mathbb{L} .
- Query **CL.Get-Private-Key** (ID_A, P_A) . The oracle returns s_A from the record indexed by (ID_A, P_A) in \mathbb{L} after putting (ID_A, P_A) in a set \mathbb{S}_1
- Query **CL.Get-User-Key** (ID_A, P_A) . The oracle returns x_A from the record indexed by (ID_A, P_A) in \mathbb{L} after putting (ID_A, P_A) in a set \mathbb{S}_2 .

Table 1. The CL-KGA Games

Game 1: Type-I Adversarial
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}) \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Setup}(1^k)$. 2. $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, s_*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_I^{\text{CL}}(M_{\text{pt}})$. 3. succeed if $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \notin \mathbb{S}_1 \cup \mathbb{Q}$ and $\mathbf{valid} \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Verify-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, s_*)$.
Game 2: Type-II Adversarial
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}) \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Setup}(1^k)$. 2. $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, s_*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{II}^{\text{CL}}(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}})$. 3. succeed if $P_* \in \mathbb{P}$, $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \notin \mathbb{S}_1 \cup \mathbb{S}_2$ and $\mathbf{valid} \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Verify-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, s_*)$.

In these two games, if no record is found when searching \mathbb{L} , the oracle returns an error. To exclude the cases that the adversary can win trivially, $\mathbf{CL.Get-Private-Key}(\text{ID}_*, P_*)$ is disallowed in both games, i.e. $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \notin \mathbb{S}_1$. In Game 1, (ID_*, P_*) is not allowed in the final test if $\mathbf{CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_*, U_*)$ has been queried for some U_* , and W_* from the query output satisfies $P_* = \mathbf{CL.Set-Public-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, U_*, W_*)$, i.e. $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \notin \mathbb{Q}$. In Game 2, $\mathbf{CL.Get-User-Key}(\text{ID}_*, P_*)$ is forbidden, i.e. $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \notin \mathbb{S}_2$, and P_* has to be a public key generated through a query $\mathbf{CL.Get-Public-Key}(\text{ID}_A, \text{true})$ for some ID_A , i.e. $P_* \in \mathbb{P}$.

Definition 1 A CL-KGA is secure if the success probability of both \mathcal{A}_I and \mathcal{A}_{II} in the CL-KGA games is negligible.

Table 2. The CL-PKS-UEF-CMA Games

Game 1: Type-I Adversarial
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}) \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Setup}(1^k)$. 2. $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, m_*, \sigma_*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_I^{\text{CL}}(M_{\text{pt}})$. 3. succeed if $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \notin \mathbb{S}_1 \cup \mathbb{Q}$, $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, m_*) \notin \mathbb{M}$ and $\mathbf{valid} \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Verify}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, m_*, \sigma_*)$.
Game 2: Type-II Adversarial
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}) \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Setup}(1^k)$. 2. $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, m_*, \sigma_*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{II}^{\text{CL}}(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}})$. 3. succeed if $P_* \in \mathbb{P}$, $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \notin \mathbb{S}_1 \cup \mathbb{S}_2$, $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, m_*) \notin \mathbb{M}$ and $\mathbf{valid} \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Verify}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, m_*, \sigma_*)$.

For CL-PKS, we use the security model shown in Table 2 to define the security notion of EUF-CMA. As in the CL-KGA games, the $\mathbf{CL.Get-Public-Key}(\text{ID}_A, \text{bNewKey})$, $\mathbf{CL.Get-Private-Key}(\text{ID}_A, P_A)$, $\mathbf{CL.Get-User-Key}(\text{ID}_A, P_A)$ can be issued in both games, and in Game 1, the query $\mathbf{CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key}(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A)$ can also be asked. To enable signature queries, the following extra query is allowed in both games.

- Query $\mathbf{CL.Get-Sign}(\text{ID}_A, P_A, m)$. The oracle uses the private key s_A from the record indexed by (ID_A, P_A) in \mathbb{L} to sign the message m and returns the

signature after recording (ID_A, P_A, m) in a set \mathbb{M} . If no private key is found corresponding to P_A belonging to ID_A , return an error.

In the security model of [29, 47], the adversary in Game 1 is allowed to issue another query **CL.Replace-Public-Key** (ID_A, P_A) , which replaces user ID_A 's public with his choice P_A . This query simulates the attack to forge a signature for a targeted identity but with a faked public key. In this work, we don't use this query. Instead, we allow the adversary to provide a public key of his choice in **CL.Verify** in the final stage of both games. This arrangement implicitly empowers the adversary to cheat a signature verifier with a faked public key. Adversaries defined by this approach corresponds to the normal (instead of strong) adversaries in [29].

As in the CL-KGA games, same restrictions are applied to allowed queries to avoid trivial cases that the adversary can win. Moreover, **CL.Get-Sign** (ID_*, P_*, m_*) is disallowed in both games, which implies $(ID_*, P_*, m_*) \notin \mathbb{M}$, because the proposed schemes in this work are not strong UEF-CMA secure.

Definition 2 *A CL-PKS is secure if the success probability of both \mathcal{A}_I and \mathcal{A}_{II} in the CL-PKS-UEF-CMA games is negligible.*

For CL-PKE, we use the standard two-stage games shown in Table 3 to define the IND-CCA security notion of as in [1]. Like the CL-KGA games, the **CL.Get-Public-Key** $(ID_A, bNewKey)$, **CL.Get-Private-Key** (ID_A, P_A) , **CL.GetUser-Key** (ID_A, P_A) can be issued in both games, and in Game 1, the query **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** $(M_{pt}, M_{st}, ID_A, U_A)$ can also be asked. To enable decryption queries, the following extra query is allowed in both games.

- Query **CL.Decrypt-Message** (ID_A, P_A, C) . The oracle uses the private key s_A from the record indexed by (ID_A, P_A) in \mathbb{L} to decrypt the ciphertext C and returns the output. If no private key is located, then use the latest private key belonging to user ID_A to decrypt C and return the output. The challenger in stage two records (ID_A, P_A, C) in a set \mathbb{D} , which implies that both \mathcal{A}_{I-2} and \mathcal{A}_{II-2} cannot ask this query with (ID_*, P_*, C_*) .

Like the security definition of CL-PKS, the adversary here is not allowed to issue the **CL.Replace-Public-Key** (ID_A, P_A) query, instead, at the end of stage one in both games, the challenger has to encrypt the message m_b with a public key P_* chosen by the adversary. The challenger does not need to answer query **CL.Decrypt-Message** (ID_A, P_A, C) correctly without knowing related private key as in practice. Adversaries defined by this approach corresponds to the normal (instead of conceptual strong) adversaries in [1].

Definition 3 *A CL-PKE is secure if the advantage: $2(Pr[succeed]-1/2)$ of both \mathcal{A}_I and \mathcal{A}_{II} in the CL-PKE-IND-CCA games is negligible.*

In [13], the authors interpreted the reason that “the composition of two ‘provably secure’ schemes, namely original OMC and ECDSA, results in an insecure scheme” as “This situation may be viewed as a specific limitation of the security definition for implicit certificates given in” [14], “or ... as a broader limitation of provable security, or ... as a need to formulate all security definitions according

Table 3. The CL-PKE-IND-CCA Games

Game 1: Type-I Adversarial
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}) \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Setup}(1^k)$. 2. $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, m_1, m_2, \rho) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{I-1}^{\text{CL}}(M_{\text{pt}})$. 3. $C_* \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Enc}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, m_b)$ with random $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. 4. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{I-2}^{\text{CL}}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, m_1, m_2, C_*, \rho)$. 5. succeed if $b = b'$, $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \notin \mathbb{S}_1 \cup \mathbb{Q}$, and $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, C_*) \notin \mathbb{D}$.
Game 2: Type-II Adversarial
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}) \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Setup}(1^k)$. 2. $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, m_1, m_2, \rho) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{II-1}^{\text{CL}}(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}})$. 3. $C_* \leftarrow \mathbf{CL.Enc}(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, m_b)$ with random $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$. 4. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_{II-2}^{\text{CL}}(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, m_1, m_2, C_*, \rho)$. 5. succeed if $b = b'$, $P_* \in \mathbb{P}$, $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \notin \mathbb{S}_1 \cup \mathbb{S}_2$, and $(\text{ID}_*, P_*, C_*) \notin \mathbb{D}$.

to the recently defined universal composability.” Because both OMC and ECQV appear to be natural candidates to generate implicit certificates, we interpret this failure of universal composition as the limitation of implicit certificates in general. That is we should not purposely define a stronger security notion of implicit certificates, which maintains universal composability but excludes those natural constructions such as OMC and ECQV. Instead, we need to define the security notion for signature schemes that employ implicit certificates. The CL-PKS definition above serves such purpose. Meanwhile, Al-Riyami-Paterson’s formulation in [1] does not allow to use implicit certificate schemes such as OMC and ECQV to generate private and public keys and makes it difficult to construct certificateless schemes upon widely used standard algorithms such as ECDSA, SM2, etc. This is exactly what a good implicit certificate scheme intends to achieve. The new CL-PKC definition in this work overcomes this hurdle. The formulation above unifies the two types of security mechanisms, namely the one using implicit certificates and CL-PKC, under one umbrella, and brings forth the benefits of both realms, i.e., efficiency of implicit-certificate-based schemes and rigorous security analysis of CL-PKC.

3 Certificateless Key Generation

Here following the definition in Section 2, we present a certificateless key generation algorithm to generate private and public key pairs, which will be used in the CL-PKS schemes later. The algorithm can also be used to construct CL-PKE and CL-AKA schemes. The scheme is built upon the standard elliptic curve Schnorr signature (specifically EC-FSDSA [30]). In the description, we use symbol \in_R to denote the operation to randomly choose from a set, and x_G and y_G to signify the x-axis and y-axis of a point G respectively.

– **CL.Setup**(1^k)

1. Select an elliptic curve $\mathbf{E} : Y^3 = X^2 + aX + b$ defined over a prime field \mathbb{F}_p . The curve has a cyclic point group \mathbb{G} of prime order q .

2. Pick a generator $G \in \mathbb{G}$.
 3. $s \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
 4. $P_{KGC} = [s]G$.
 5. Pick two cryptographic hash functions: $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$;
 $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ for some integer $n > 0$.
 6. Output $M_{\text{pt}} = (a, b, p, q, G, P_{KGC}, H_1, H_2)$ and $M_{\text{st}} = s$.
- **CL.Set-User-Key**($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A$)
 1. $x_A \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
 2. $U_A = [x_A]G$.
 3. Output (U_A, x_A) .
 - **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key**($M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A$)
 1. $Z = H_1(a \| b \| x_G \| y_G \| x_{P_{KGC}} \| y_{P_{KGC}} \| \text{ID}_A)$.
 2. $w \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
 3. $X = [w]G$.
 4. $W = U_A + X$.
 5. $\lambda = H_2(x_W \| y_W \| Z)$.
 6. $t = (w + \lambda \cdot s) \bmod q$.
 7. Output $(W_A = W, d_A = t)$.
 - **CL.Set-Private-Key**($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A, x_A, W_A, d_A$)
 1. Output $s_A = (x_A + d_A) \bmod q$.
 - **CL.Set-Public-Key**($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A, W_A$)
 1. Output $P_A = W_A$.
 - **CL.Calculate-Public-Key**($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A$)
 1. $Z = H_1(a \| b \| x_G \| y_G \| x_{P_{KGC}} \| y_{P_{KGC}} \| \text{ID}_A)$.
 2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A} \| y_{P_A} \| Z)$.
 3. $O_A = P_A + [\lambda]P_{KGC}$.
 - **CL.Verify-Key**($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, s_A$)
 1. $Z = H_1(a \| b \| x_G \| y_G \| x_{P_{KGC}} \| y_{P_{KGC}} \| \text{ID}_A)$.
 2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A} \| y_{P_A} \| Z)$.
 3. $P'_A = [s_A]G - [\lambda]P_{KGC}$.
 4. Output **valid** if $P_A = P'_A$, and **invalid** otherwise.

It is easy to check that $O_A = [s_A]G$ and everyone can compute it from public values. However, the **CL.Verify-Key** function makes use of s_A , so only the owner of the key pair can validate its correctness. It cannot be done by one just knowing O_A . The equations $P'_A = O_A - [\lambda]P_{KGC}$ and $P_A = P'_A$ do not mean a Schnorr signature. The hash-function H_1 in the description is unnecessary, but useful for a neat implementation. The security of the scheme can be summarised by following two theorems.

Definition 4 Let (\mathbb{G}, G, q) be a group of prime order q and G is a generator. The discrete logarithm problem is given a random $P \in \mathbb{G}$ to find α such that $P = [\alpha]G$.

Theorem 1 If there exists a Type-I adversary \mathcal{A}_I that has a non-negligible probability of success in Game 1 against the CL-KGA, then the discrete logarithm in the group \mathbb{G} can be solved in polynomial time in the random oracle model.

The reduction behaves very much like the reduction of Schnorr signature in [40]. The challenger simulates the KGC (the signer) to answer **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key**($M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A$) as follows: it randomly chooses $w, \lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and returns $(W = [w]G + U_A - [\lambda]P_{KGC}, t = w)$ if W is a valid point, otherwise resamples w . This response should be indistinguishable from the result generated with private key s : it randomly chooses $w, \lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and returns $(W = [w]G + U_A, t = (w + \lambda \cdot s) \bmod q)$. To answer query **CL.Get-Public-Key**(ID_i, true), randomly select $x_i, d_i, \lambda_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, return $P_i = [x_i]G + [d_i]G - [\lambda_i]P_{KGC}$. To answer query **CL.Get-Private-Key**(ID_i, P_i), return $x_i + d_i$. To answer **CL.GetUser-Key**(ID_i, P_i), return x_i . We skip the details of the full reduction.

Theorem 2 *If there exists a Type-II adversary \mathcal{A}_{II} that has a non-negligible probability of success in Game 2 against the CL-KGA, then the discrete logarithm in the group \mathbb{G} can be solved in polynomial time in the random oracle model.*

A reduction is given in Appendix 7.4.

3.1 On Some Choices of the Design

One may notice that **CL.Verify-Key** after step 2 is precisely a standard Schnorr verification function which verifies the signature (P_A, s_A) on the message Z .

Message Z here is a hash result of the concatenation of octet representation of M_{pt} and ID_A . We choose this design based on several considerations. The use of H_1 is unnecessary in theory, but useful for a neat implementation. Z can be only the concatenation of octet representation of M_{pt} and ID_A . This change would not affect much the security analysis of the CL-KGA. While from the practical point of view, the interface of a signature algorithm such as [43] typically only accept a message digest instead of a full message. This type of interface not only forces a modular approach for the signing and verification process but also reduces memory consumption in a (hardware) implementation. Without restricting the length of ID_A , which may include other information such as the time-period of the generated key, et al., it appears reasonable to introduce an extra hash operation.

The inclusion of M_{pt} in the input to H_1 appears to help only a little on the security of the CL-KGA. On the key-related attack, Morita et al. showed that one has to recompute $P_{KGC} = [s]G$ in every signing action before including P_{KGC} in H_1 to defend certain attack [37]. On the aspect of security deduction in the multi-user setting [8], there won't be many KGCs, and a user usually will only register with a handful of them. On the other hand, Z computed in current mode may serve as a fixed-size globally unique identifier of a user with a KGC. Therefore λ , which is generated in the Schnorr signing process, may act as a fixed-size globally unique identifier of a (KGC, user, public-key) trio. Instead of using an independent procedure to compute these values to identify keys, integrating these values into the cryptographic schemes helps avoid possible management operational mistakes.

The downside of the design is that an extra hash operation is executed in the **CL.Calculate-Public-Key** function whenever O_A is required and additional storage is used to store those input values. Fortunately, for the **CL.Sign** function, saving only λ is enough if we ignore some advanced key-related attacks and λ is

also necessary for the security of the presented CL-PKS scheme as we will see in Section 4. The **CL.Encrypt** and **CL.Verify** function can compute Z on the fly without the extra cost of persistent storage.

Overall the benefit brought by the current way of generating Z weighs against the little extra cost of a hash operation and minor implementation hassle. On the unique representation of the domain parameter M_{pt} , instead of only using P_{KGC} , a conservative approach of including those essential values is chosen to prevent possible loopholes including advanced attacks exploiting different curve parameters such as the invalid-curve attack [3]. If all KGCs use a fixed curve and G , the value of a, b and G may be excluded from H_1 .

3.2 Secure Key Provision

In the CL-KGA process, the user queries the KGC his partial keys with his public key value U_A . Once (W_A, d_A) is generated, there should be a security protection mechanism to safely distribute these values to the user. One solution is to establish a secure channel between users and the KGC, which requires extra trust chain or pre-deployed secrets. Due to the high sensitivity of d_A and in pursuit of a more succinct key management system using CL-PKC, it would be desirable to have a better solution. Observing that U_A is provided by the user who should know the corresponding private value, the KGC can encrypt d_A with U_A through a standard public key encryption algorithm such as ECIES. This approach also implicitly verifies that the user knows d_A , which is although not as critical as a process required for the same security purpose when a CA issues certificates.

4 CL-PKS

4.1 Heuristic Approach to Construct CL-PKS

Using CL-KGA, a user with identity ID_A generates a pair of keys (P_A, s_A) , and everyone can call function **CL.Calculate-Public-Key** $(M_{\text{pt}}, ID_A, P_A)$ to compute the real public key O_A . A standard signature scheme is defined by three functions (\mathcal{G}, Σ, V) such that the key generation function \mathcal{G} generates a key pair (O_A, s_A) , the signing function Σ takes (O_A, s_A, m) as input and produces a signature σ , and the verification function V takes (O_A, m, σ) as input and tests whether σ is a valid signature of m with respect to O_A . An obvious way to construct a CL-PKS is to call a CL-KGA to generate keys and call Σ in **CL.Sign** and call **CL.Calculate-Public-Key** first to compute O_A and then call V to test a signature in **CL.Verify**. However, such crude construction with a CL-KGA that is secure by Definition 1 and a signature scheme that is EUF-CMA secure [40] does not always end up with a secure CL-PKS satisfying Definition 2.

In Section 3 we have proved that the CL-KGA, which bears high similarity with the OMC implicit certificate scheme, is secure by Definition 1. ECDSA [30] is one of the most widely used signature algorithms. The simple combination of these two schemes following the method suggested does not produce a secure CL-PKS. In [13] Brown et al. detailed a security analysis which shows that the OMC with

ECDSA is completely broken and the ECQV with ECDSA is not safe against an artificial forgery attack.

Here we propose a simple technique to enhance the security of such schemes. The intermediate value λ in the CL-KGA, which is generated in the Schnorr signing process, is called the *assignment* in [30]. If the signing function of the digital signature algorithm (DSA) is signing on $(\lambda||m)$ instead of m , the two algorithms, the CL-KGA and DSA, are linked together to safeguard the security of resulting CL-PKS. Intuitively, with including λ as the prefix of the message to be signed, the signer is forced to commit to a public key P_A and hence the corresponding *real* public key O_A before generating a signature. This mechanism takes away the freedom of a forger to generate a signature before finding a public key P_A satisfying the verification equation. The security of a standard DSA such as ECDSA guarantees that without knowing the private key, it is unlikely to generate valid signature respect to a given public key O_A . Meanwhile, the security of the CL-KGA assures that without the help of the KGC, the adversary cannot compute the private key s_A corresponding to a given public key O_A .

This simple technique works like applying with the so-called “key prefixing” technique [8] by signing on a message together with the signer’s public key and its identity indirectly. We apply this technique to construct two CL-PKS schemes. We will show later that the technique indeed plays an essential role to defeat all the known attacks against the resulting CL-PKS.

4.2 Two CL-PKS Schemes

First, we present a scheme (CL-PKS1) using the CL-KGA and the standard ECDSA. The scheme uses another hash function $H_3 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$.

Table 4. CL-PKS1

CL.Sign ($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, s_A, m$)	CL.Verify ($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, m, \sigma$)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $Z = H_1(a b x_G y_G x_{P_{KGC}} y_{P_{KGC}} \text{ID}_A)$. 2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A} y_{P_A} Z)$. 3. $h = H_3(\lambda m)$. 4. $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. 5. $Q = [r]G$. 6. $u = x_Q \pmod q$. 7. $v = r^{-1} \cdot (u \cdot s_A + h) \pmod q$. 8. Output $\sigma = (u, v)$. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $Z = H_1(a b x_G y_G x_{P_{KGC}} y_{P_{KGC}} \text{ID}_A)$. 2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A} y_{P_A} Z)$. 3. $O_A = P_A + [\lambda]P_{KGC}$. 4. $h = H_3(\lambda m)$. 5. $v_1 = v^{-1} \cdot h \pmod q$. 6. $v_2 = v^{-1} \cdot u \pmod q$. 7. $Q' = [v_1]G + [v_2]O_A$. 8. $u' = x_{Q'} \pmod q$. 9. Output valid if $u = u'$, and invalid otherwise.

The presented **CL.Sign** function from step 3 exactly follows ECDSA to sign with private key s_A on message $(\lambda||m)$. The first two steps can be treated as a message preparation process, which re-generates the *assignment* computed in the Schnorr signing process invoked by **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key**. These two steps can further be saved if λ is pre-computed and stored. **CL.Verify** function

invokes two functions sequentially. It first activates **CL.Calculate-Public-Key** to calculate the signer’s supposed real public key O_A and then calls the verification function of ECDSA to verify signature σ on message $(\lambda||m)$ with regard to O_A . We note that signing on $(\lambda||m)$ instead of m does not require any modification to the implementation of ECDSA either in software or hardware.

In [13], it’s been shown that both the OMC and ECQV are insecure with ECDSA in direct composition. Our revisiting the analysis of [13] in Appendix 7.5 shows that after applying with the key prefixing technique of signing on $(\lambda||m)$, both CL-PKS1 and ECQV with ECDSA are secure against the known attacks. The analysis also shows that CL-PKS1 has the security equivalent to (in fact better than) the ECQV with the vanilla ECDSA scheme.

Because ECDSA lacks a security reduction based on a standard complexity assumption, several modifications to ECDSA such as [32, 36] were proposed to address this issue. All modifications includes u as an input to H_3 . However the way to generate u is different in each proposal. We use a variant of ECDSA by setting $u = x_Q$. For most of the elliptic curves defined over prime fields used in practice, this modification will not change the size of the representation of u . On the other hand, this variant can be proved secure in the random oracle with the *Improved Forking Lemma* [10] as in [36]. We use this modified ECDSA to construct CL-PKS2.

Table 5. CL-PKS2

CL.Sign ($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, s_A, m$)	CL.Verify ($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, m, \sigma$)
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $Z = H_1(a b x_G y_G x_{P_{KGC}} y_{P_{KGC}} \text{ID}_A)$. 2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A} y_{P_A} Z)$. 3. $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. 4. $Q = [r]G$. 5. $u = x_Q$. 6. $h = H_3(u \lambda m)$. 7. $v = r^{-1} \cdot (u \cdot s_A + h) \pmod q$. 8. Output $\sigma = (u, v)$. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. $Z = H_1(a b x_G y_G x_{P_{KGC}} y_{P_{KGC}} \text{ID}_A)$. 2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A} y_{P_A} Z)$. 3. $O_A = P_A + [\lambda]P_{KGC}$. 4. $h = H_3(u \lambda m)$. 5. $v_1 = v^{-1} \cdot h \pmod q$. 6. $v_2 = v^{-1} \cdot u \pmod q$. 7. $Q' = [v_1]G + [v_2]O_A$. 8. $u' = x_{Q'}$. 9. Output valid if $u = u'$, and invalid otherwise.

We note that without including λ , even with u as an input to H_3 , such variant still suffers from the attacks shown in Appendix 7.5. This again demonstrates the effectiveness of the proposed technique. Another scheme with a standard reduction is Schnorr DSA: EC-FSDSA [30], a certificateless variant of EC-FSDSA is shown in Appendix 7.3.

4.3 Security Analysis

Now, we analyze the security of the schemes. Apart from the analysis against the existing attacks in Appendix 7.5, we present two formal security results of CL-PKS1 for building confidence in the scheme. The analysis of CL-PKS1 with a few

changes is also applicable to ECQV with ECDSA if the proposed technique of signing on $(\lambda||m)$ is used. We fully analyze CL-PKS2's security.

Because the CL-PKS1 scheme is the composition of the CL-KGA and ECDSA, the security of the scheme won't be better than either of the component. For ECDSA, the known security result is either based on the collision resistance of the used hash function in the generic group model [11] or based on so-called the semi-logarithm problem in the random oracle model [12, 19]. As we have already adopted the random oracle model to analyze the security of the CL-KGA, here we continue to analyze the security of the CL-PKS schemes in the same model.

To address the technique shortcoming of the proof, we put a restriction on the **CL-Get-Sign**(ID_A, P_A, m) query. If $ID_* = ID_A$ and $P_* = P_A$, then each message m can be queried *at most once*. This "one-per-message unforgeability" security notion [19] is weaker than the UEF-CMA. However, it is so far the provable one for ECDSA in the random oracle. We label these two types of adversaries as Type-I⁻ and Type-II⁻ adversary. We note that for CL-PKS2, this restriction is unnecessary because of including u in H_3 .

Definition 1. Let (\mathbb{G}, G, q) be a group of prime order q and G is a generator. The semi-logarithm problem is given a random $P \in \mathbb{G}$ to find (u, v) such that $u = \mathcal{F}([v^{-1}](G + [u]P))$, where $\mathcal{F}(X)$ returns x -axle of point X .

For Type-I adversaries, there are two possible attacking cases. Case 1: \mathcal{A}_{Ia} generates a signature which is valid with a targeted ID_* and ID_* 's public key. Case 2: \mathcal{A}_{Ib} generates a signature which is valid with a targeted ID_* but a public key different from ID_* 's. Note that in this case, ID_* may have no public key yet. The security analysis results of these two CL-PKS schemes are as follows.

Lemma 1. *If there exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{Ia}^- that has a non-negligible probability of success in Game 1 against CL-PKS1 in the random oracle model, then the semi-logarithm problem in the group \mathbb{G} can be solved in polynomial time.*

Theorem 3 *If there exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{II}^- that has a non-negligible probability of success in Game 1 against CL-PKS1 in the random oracle model, then the semi-logarithm problem in the group \mathbb{G} can be solved in polynomial time.*

The reductions for Lemma 1 and Theorem 3 are given in Appendix 7.6.

Lemma 2. *If there exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{Ia} that has a non-negligible probability of success in Game 1 against CL-PKS2 in the random oracle model, then the discrete logarithm problem in the group \mathbb{G} can be solved in polynomial time.*

Lemma 3. *If there exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{Ib} that has a non-negligible probability of success in Game 1 against CL-PKS2 in the random oracle model, then the discrete logarithm problem in the group \mathbb{G} can be solved in polynomial time.*

Theorem 4 *If there exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_I that has a non-negligible probability of success in Game 1 against CL-PKS2 in the random oracle model, then the discrete logarithm problem in the group \mathbb{G} can be solved in polynomial time.*

Theorem 5 *If there exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{II} that has a non-negligible probability of success in Game 2 against CL-PKS2 in the random oracle model, then the discrete logarithm problem in the group \mathbb{G} can be solved in polynomial time.*

The reductions for Lemma 2 and 3 and Theorem 5 are given in Appendix 7.7. Theorem 4 follows from Lemma 2 and 3.

Overall, CL-PKS2 is a secure scheme with regard to Definition 2 in the random oracle model based on the DL assumption. With two results from Lemma 1 and Theorem 3, CL-PKS1 still lacks a formal security analysis against the \mathcal{A}_{Ib} adversary, though an informal argument in Appendix 7.5 has demonstrated its security strength against potential attacks.

5 Performance Evaluation and Application

We first compare the proposed CL-PKS schemes with the related schemes including existing CL-PKS schemes and standard signature schemes using implicit certificates. Many CL-PKS schemes with or without pairing are proposed in the literature. Pairing (denoted by P , which is a bilinear map: $\mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_3$ such that \mathbb{G}_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 are two cyclic groups and \mathbb{G}_3 is a related extension field) is a much heavier computation operation than the point scalar (denoted by S) or exponentiation (denoted by E) in the field \mathbb{G}_3 . We don't list all the existing CL-PKS schemes. Instead, only some commonly referred pairing-based schemes and some most efficient pairing-free schemes are compared. We use $|\mathbb{G}|$ and $|q|$ to denote the bit length of the size of a group \mathbb{G} and an integer q respectively.

Table 6. Performance Comparison

Scheme	Key size		Computation		Signature size	Security status	Upon standard alg.
	Private	Public	Signing	Verification			
AP[1]	$ \mathbb{G}_1 $	$2 \mathbb{G}_1 $	$1P + 3S$	$4P + 1E$	$ \mathbb{G}_1 + q $	broken	No
CPHL[17]	$ \mathbb{G}_1 $	$ \mathbb{G}_1 $	$2S$	$2P + 2S$	$2 \mathbb{G}_1 $	proof	No
HMSWW[29]	$ q + \mathbb{G}_1 $	$ \mathbb{G}_1 $	$1S$	$3P$	$ \mathbb{G}_1 $	proof	No
ZWXF[47]	$ q + \mathbb{G}_1 $	$ \mathbb{G}_1 $	$3S$	$4P$	$2 \mathbb{G}_1 $	proof	No
ZZZ[48]	$ q + \mathbb{G}_1 $	$ \mathbb{G}_2 $	$1S + 2E$	$1P + 3E$	$ \mathbb{G}_1 + 2 q $	proof	No
HRL[26]	$ q $	$ q + \mathbb{G} $	$1S$	$5S$	$2 \mathbb{G} $	no proof	No
HCZ[28]	$ q $	$2 \mathbb{G} $	$1S$	$3S$	$ \mathbb{G} + q $	broken	No
LXWHH[35]	$2 q $	$2 \mathbb{G} $	$1S$	$3S$	$2 q $	proof	No
YSCC[46]	$ q $	$ \mathbb{G} $	$1S$	$3S$	$ \mathbb{G} + q $	proof	No
OMC+							
ECDSA[13]	$ q $	$ \mathbb{G} $	$1S$	$3S$	$2 q $	broken	Yes
ECQV+							
ECDSA[13]	$ q $	$ \mathbb{G} $	$1S$	$3S$	$2 q $	known attack	Yes
CL-PKS1	$ q $	$ \mathbb{G} $	$1S$	$3S$	$2 q $	partial proof	Yes
CL-PKS2	$ q $	$ \mathbb{G} $	$1S$	$3S$	$ p + q $	proof	No

According to Table 6, it is known that our two schemes are the most efficient ones. Moreover, CL-PKS1 doesn't suffer from Kravitz's attack that affects ECQV+ECDSA, and it can be realized by reusing the existing implementation

of ECDSA. This is a particularly important advantage in practice because many security elements (SE) have ECDSA embedded and the private key is protected within SE. Deploying CL-PKS1 doesn't need to modify existing chips and won't cause extra security concerns because the signing process can use the private key stored in SE in the same way as ECDSA.

We have implemented CL-PKS1 on the 32-bit Cortex-M4 MCU STM32F4 with both the hardware acceleration and the native software. STMicroelectronics provides a crypto library [43], which has interfaces to access to the implementation of ECDSA and point scalar operation over the NIST p256 elliptic curve. The signing process of CL-PKS1 can directly call ECDSA signature generation function in the library by signing on $(\lambda||m)$. The verification process first calls the scalar operation to compute O_A and then calls the verification function of ECDSA in the library. We have also implemented CL-PKS1 from the scratch to evaluate the performance of a native implementation of the scheme. In the implementation, the Montgomery modular is applied to compute multiplication in \mathbb{F}_p . The addition and multiplication operations are implemented with assembly language. The code is compiled with -O3 option and speed is measured with STM32F4 working at 168MHz. Our software implementation is faster than the one from the hardware

Table 7. Implementation of CL-PKS1 on STM32F4

Implementation	Code size	Stack size	Signing time	Verification time
Hardware acc.	15K	0.5K	0.078s	0.076s(scalar)+0.104s(ECDSA ver.)
Pure software	11K	0.7K	0.058s	0.15s

acceleration library provided by STMicroelectronics. This is probably because our implementation has not considered side-channel protection. The speed of the implementation appears quick enough for most applications.

Systems employing CL-PKS will enjoy the benefit of lightweight key management. For example, inter-domain authentication in the Internet of Things (IoT) such as V2V communication [45] requires PKC-based security solutions. Considering the constrained resource, diversity of devices and the scale of the IoT, an efficient CL-PKS scheme like CL-PKS1 offers clear advantages over the certificate-based, identity-based, and raw public key with out-of-band validation (RPK-OOBV) solutions. The certificate size and the complicated validation process could quickly drain available resources of a constrained device (see [42] for a detailed evaluation of the impact of a certificate on IoT devices). The RPK-OOBV has small public key data but requires other validation mechanisms such as DNSSEC. On the other hand, the proposed CL-PKS has small key size as RPK-OOK and removes the necessity of public key validation. With only slightly larger communication overhead by including the public key as part of a signature as suggested in [6], CL-PKS can work just like an IBS but is free of the key-escrow concern.

6 Conclusion

In this work, we redefine the formulation of CL-PKC to unify it with security mechanisms using implicit certificates. We then construct a CL-KGA from the Schnorr signature and prove its security in the random oracle model. Furthermore,

we demonstrate that using the *assignment* computed in the **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** process as the *key prefixing* in the message signing process helps improve the security of a CL-PKS that is constructed by combining a secure CL-KGA with a standard signature algorithm. Several of such CL-PKS schemes are described. CL-PKS1 can be implemented based on existing security elements that support ECDSA, and security analysis shows that it has stronger security than the composition of ECQV with ECDSA. CL-PKS2 has a full security reduction based on the discrete logarithm assumption in the random oracle model. The results presented in the work may also shed light on the way of using of ECQV with ECDSA. With little cost, the security of the ECQV-based signature scheme can benefit from the proposed technique. However, whether using the assignment as the key prefixing allows universal composability of a secure CL-KGA with a secure DSA remains an open problem, though it looks promising.

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7 Appendix

7.1 The ECQV Implicit Certificate Scheme as a CL-KGA

For reference, we reprint the ECQV implicit certificate scheme following the description in [15] under the formulation of CL-KGA. ECQV uses the same **CL.Setup** and **CL.Set-User-Key** as the one in Section 3.

CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key($M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A$)

1. $w \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
2. $X = [w]G$.
3. $W = U_A + X$.
4. $\text{Cert}_A = \text{Encode}(W, \text{ID}_A, *)$.
5. $\lambda = H_2(\text{Cert}_A)$.
6. $t = (s + \lambda \cdot w) \bmod q$.
7. Output $(W_A = W, d_A = t)$.

CL.Set-Private-Key($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A, x_A, W_A, d_A$)

1. $\text{Cert}_A = \text{Encode}(W_A, \text{ID}_A, *)$.
2. $\lambda = H_2(\text{Cert}_A)$.
3. Output $s_A = (\lambda x_A + d_A) \bmod q$.

CL.Set-Public-Key($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, U_A, W_A$)

1. Output $P_A = W_A$.

CL.Calculate-Public-Key($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A$)

1. $\text{Cert}_A = \text{Encode}(P_A, \text{ID}_A, *)$.
2. $\lambda = H_2(\text{Cert}_A)$.
3. $O_A = [\lambda]P_A + P_{KGC}$.

CL.Verify-Key($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, s_A$)

1. $\text{Cert}_A = \text{Encode}(P_A, \text{ID}_A, *)$.
2. $\lambda = H_2(\text{Cert}_A)$.
3. $P'_A = [1/\lambda]([s_A]G - P_{KGC})$.
4. Output **valid** if $P_A = P'_A$, and **invalid** otherwise.

7.2 CL-PKS from SM2-DSA

Here we present a CL-PKS scheme based upon the SM2 digital signature algorithm [20]. The key generation process makes use of the CL-KGA in Section 3.

CL.Sign($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, s_A, m$)

1. $Z = H_1(a\|b\|x_G\|y_G\|x_{P_{KGC}}\|y_{P_{KGC}}\|\text{ID}_A)$.
2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A}\|y_{P_A}\|Z)$.
3. $h = H_3(\lambda\|m)$.
4. $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
5. $Q = [r]G$.
6. $u = (h + x_Q) \pmod q$.
7. $v = (1 + s_A)^{-1} \cdot (r - u \cdot s_A) \pmod q$.
8. Output $\sigma = (u, v)$.

CL.Verify($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, m, \sigma$)

1. $Z = H_1(a\|b\|x_G\|y_G\|x_{P_{KGC}}\|y_{P_{KGC}}\|\text{ID}_A)$.
2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A}\|y_{P_A}\|Z)$.
3. $O_A = P_A + [\lambda]P_{KGC}$.
4. $h = H_3(\lambda\|m)$.
5. $t = (u + v) \pmod q$.
6. $Q' = [v]G + [t]O_A$.
7. $u' = (h + x_{Q'}) \pmod q$.
8. Output **valid** if $u = u'$, and **invalid** otherwise.

In **CL.Sign**, step 4-8 is exactly the signing process on a message digest h in SM2 and in **CL.Verify** step 5-8 is the verification process in SM2 on a signature with respect to a message digest h and public key O_A .

7.3 CL-PKS from Schnorr-DSA

Here we construct a CL-PKS scheme from the Elliptic Curve Full Schnorr Digital Signature Algorithm (EC-FSDSA) [30]. The key generation process again follows the CL-KGA in Section 3.

CL.Sign($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, s_A, m$)

1. $Z = H_1(a\|b\|x_G\|y_G\|x_{P_{KGC}}\|y_{P_{KGC}}\|\text{ID}_A)$.
2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A}\|y_{P_A}\|Z)$.
3. $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
4. $Q = [r]G$.
5. $h = H_3(x_Q\|y_Q\|\lambda\|m)$.
6. $v = (r + h \cdot s_A) \bmod q$.
7. Output $\sigma = (Q, v)$.

CL.Verify($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_A, P_A, m, \sigma$)

1. $Z = H_1(a\|b\|x_G\|y_G\|x_{P_{KGC}}\|y_{P_{KGC}}\|\text{ID}_A)$.
2. $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A}\|y_{P_A}\|Z)$.
3. $O_A = P_A + [\lambda]P_{KGC}$.
4. $h = H_3(x_Q\|y_Q\|\lambda\|m)$.
5. $Q' = [v]G - [h]O_A$.
6. Output **valid** if $Q = Q'$, and **invalid** otherwise.

In **CL.Sign**, step 3-7 is exactly the signing process on a message ($\lambda\|m$) in EC-FSDSA and in **CL.Verify** step 4-6 is the verification process on a signature with respect to a message ($\lambda\|m$) and public key O_A in EC-FSDSA.

7.4 Proof of Theorem 2

Proof. Suppose that \mathcal{A}_{II} succeeds in Game 2 with a non-negligible probability $\epsilon(k)$ in time $t(k)$. Given a DL problem $(\mathbb{G}, G, [\alpha]G)$, we use \mathcal{A}_{II} to construct an algorithm \mathcal{C} to compute α . Suppose that in Game 2, **CL.Get-Public-Key** is queried \mathcal{N}_{pub} times with $b\text{NewKey}$ as true. The challenger \mathcal{C} randomly selects an index $0 < \mathcal{I} \leq \mathcal{N}_{\text{pub}}$. \mathcal{C} maintains a tuple \mathcal{T} in the form of $\langle \text{ID}_i, P_i, U_i, x_i, d_i, s_i, w_i \rangle$, which is indexed by (ID_i, P_i) . \mathcal{T}_c has a counter \mathcal{T}_c , which increases by one each time when a new entry is put in \mathcal{T} . \mathcal{C} answers the queries as follows:

- **CL.Setup**(1^k). \mathcal{C} follows the algorithm to compute M_{pt} and M_{st} , and passes the values to \mathcal{A}_{II} .
- **CL.Get-Public-Key**($\text{ID}_i, b\text{NewKey}$). If $b\text{NewKey}$ is false and at least one entry in \mathcal{T} includes ID_i , then \mathcal{C} returns P_i in the latest entry of ID_i in \mathcal{T} , otherwise responds differently in the following two cases:
 1. If $\mathcal{T}_c = \mathcal{I}$, then \mathcal{C} runs **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** ($M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_i, [\alpha]G$) to get (W_i, d_i) and the internal random value w_i^* , and puts $\langle \text{ID}_i, W_i, [\alpha]G, \perp, d_i, \perp, w_i^* \rangle$ in \mathcal{T} ; \mathcal{C} returns W_i .
 2. Else, \mathcal{C} randomly selects $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and runs **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** ($M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, \text{ID}_i, [x_i]G$) to get (W_i, d_i) and the internal random value w_i , and puts $\langle \text{ID}_i, W_i, [x_i]G, x_i, d_i, x_i + d_i, w_i \rangle$ in \mathcal{T} ; \mathcal{C} returns P_i .

- **CL.Get-Private-Key**(ID_i, P_i). If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, if s_i of the found entry is \perp , then terminate the game (**Event 1**), or return s_i .
- **CL.Get-User-Key**(ID_i, P_i). If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, if x_i of the found entry is \perp , then terminate the game (**Event 2**), or return x_i .
- **CL.Verify-Key**($M_{\text{pt}}, ID_*, P_*, s_*$). \mathcal{C} searches \mathcal{T} , and if the \mathcal{I} -th entry does not include P_* , then terminates the game (**Event 3**). Otherwise, \mathcal{C} outputs $s_* - s\lambda_* - w_i^*$ as the solution to the DL problem, where λ_* is computed according to the specification by querying H_1 and H_2 .
- Query to random oracle H_1 or H_2 : \mathcal{C} just simulates these random oracles as standard ones.

If the \mathcal{I} -th entry includes P_* (**Event 3**), then the game won't terminate early (**Event 1** \wedge **Event 2**) and \mathcal{A}_{II} won't notice any difference between the simulation and the attacking environment. \mathcal{C} solves the DL problem with the probability of $\frac{\epsilon(k)}{N_{\text{pub}}}$ and time $O(t(k))$. \square

7.5 On the Power of Using the Assignment as the Key Prefixing

Using the notation of this paper, we revisit the analysis of [13] applying to CL-PKS1 and ECQV with ECDSA.

To guarantee that **CL.Verify**($M_{\text{pt}}, ID_A, P_A, m, \sigma$) outputs **valid** in CL-PKS1, equation (1) should be satisfied.

$$[v]Q - [u]P_A = [h]G + [\lambda][u]P_{KGC}. \quad (1)$$

We express equation (1) using row and column vectors:

$$[-u \ v] \begin{bmatrix} P_A \\ Q \end{bmatrix} = [\lambda u \ h] \begin{bmatrix} P_{KGC} \\ G \end{bmatrix}. \quad (2)$$

The relation of P_A and Q to P_{KGC} and G can be expressed as

$$\begin{bmatrix} P_A \\ Q \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} d & e \\ f & g \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} P_{KGC} \\ G \end{bmatrix}. \quad (3)$$

After replacing $[P_A, Q]$ and eliminating $[P_{KGC}, G]$ and transposing the resulting matrix, we have

$$\begin{bmatrix} d & f \\ e & g \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} -u \\ v \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} \lambda u \\ h \end{bmatrix}. \quad (4)$$

By multiplying the inverse matrix (we first assume that the matrix is invertible), we get

$$\begin{bmatrix} -u \\ v \end{bmatrix} = \frac{1}{dg - ef} \begin{bmatrix} gu\lambda - fh \\ -eu\lambda + dh \end{bmatrix}. \quad (5)$$

As in [13], we consider λ as a non-linear function of d and e : $\lambda = L(d, e)$, since $\lambda = H_2(x_{P_A} \| y_{P_A} \| Z)$ and $P_A = [d]P_{KGC} + [e]G$. Similarly, we have u as

a non-linear function of f and g : $u = U(f, g)$, since $u = \tilde{x}_Q = x_Q \pmod q$ and $Q = [f]P_{KGC} + [g]G$. Different from [13], we have an extra non-linear function $h = H(L(d, e))$, since $h = H_3(\lambda \| m)$. This produces five equations:

$$-u = \frac{gu\lambda - fh}{dg - ef}, \quad (6)$$

$$v = \frac{-eu\lambda + dh}{dg - ef}, \quad (7)$$

$$\lambda = L(d, e), \quad (8)$$

$$u = U(f, g), \quad (9)$$

$$h = H(L(d, e)). \quad (10)$$

Substituting λ, u and h in equation (6) and (7) with equation (8), (9) and (10) respectively, we get

$$-U(f, g) = \frac{g}{dg - ef}U(f, g)L(d, e) - \frac{f}{dg - ef}H(L(d, e)), \quad (11)$$

$$v = -\frac{e}{dg - ef}U(f, g)L(d, e) + \frac{d}{dg - ef}H(L(d, e)). \quad (12)$$

If we choose $g = 0$ as the attacks in [13], the adversary needs to resolve the following equations:

$$-U(f, 0) = \frac{1}{e}H(L(d, e)), \quad (13)$$

$$v = -\frac{H(L(d, e))(L(d, e) + d)}{ef}. \quad (14)$$

We slight abuse the notation by using a point instead of axes of a point in hash functions. The above equations can be converted to

$$P_A = [d]P_{KGC} + [e]G, \quad (15)$$

$$\tilde{x}_{[f]P_{KGC}} = -\frac{1}{e}H_3(H_2(P_A \| Z) \| m), \quad (16)$$

$$v = \frac{\tilde{x}_{[f]P_{KGC}} \cdot (H_2(P_A \| Z) + d)}{f}. \quad (17)$$

By using the attacks in [13] on OMC with ECDSA to forge a valid signature, the attacker simply chooses an identity ID_A , a message m and any $0 < d, f < q$ and computes $u = \tilde{x}_{[f]P_{KGC}}$ and $e = -\frac{H_3(m)}{\tilde{x}_{[f]P_{KGC}}}$ first, and further computes v according to equation (7). However, in CL-PKS1, e appears on both sides of equation (18) and the relation is non-linear because of involving hash functions.

$$e = -\frac{H_3(H_2([d]P_{KGC} + [e]G \| Z) \| m)}{\tilde{x}_{[f]P_{KGC}}}. \quad (18)$$

Recall that $Z = H_1(a \| b \| x_G \| y_G \| x_{P_{KGC}} \| y_{P_{KGC}} \| ID_A)$. Hence, given any $0 < f < q$, if the hash functions are collision resistant, it would be difficult to find d and e or

some ID_A or m satisfying equation (18). Conversely, given any *proper* d and e or some ID_A or m , the hash functions simulated as random oracles would generate a random $j = -\frac{1}{e}H_3(H_2(P_A\|Z)\|m)$ corresponding to the x-axle modulo q of a point in a set J whose cardinality is small for practically used curves [36]. The problem becomes given $(G, [s]G, J)$ finding f such that $[f][s]G \in J$ for a random s and a random small set J . This problem appears hard based on the DL assumption.

It's not difficult to verify that the above analysis also works on the combination of ECQV with ECDSA. In ECQV plus ECDSA, if $(\lambda\|m)$ is signed, equation (11) becomes

$$-U(f, g)L(d, e) = \frac{g}{dg - ef}U(f, g) - \frac{f}{dg - ef}H(L(d, e)). \quad (19)$$

When $g = 0$, the equation of e becomes

$$e = -\frac{H_3(H_2([d]P_{KGC} + [e]G)\|Z)\|m)}{H_2([d]P_{KGC} + [e]G)\|Z) \cdot \tilde{x}_{[f]P_{KGC}}}. \quad (20)$$

The Kravitz's attack [13] requires finding (Z, P_A, m) satisfying $H_3(H_2(P_A\|Z)\|m) = H_2(P_A\|Z)$. This task becomes difficult if the used hash functions are collision resistant.

We see that CL-PKS1 can defend known attacks against a direct composition of these two algorithms. In fact, with including λ in H_3 , we can establish following result.

Lemma 4. *In the random oracle model, if there exists an efficient algorithm to solve equation (11), then there exists an efficient algorithm to solve equation (19).*

Proof. Suppose that an algorithm \mathcal{A} finds a solution to equation (11) with probability $\epsilon(k)$ and $t(k)$. Suppose \mathcal{A} makes \mathcal{N}_{H_3} queries to H_3 . Let $0 < \zeta \leq \mathcal{N}_{H_3}$ be a random integer. We construct an algorithm \mathcal{B} by rerunning \mathcal{A} . However, this time for the ζ -th query to $H_3(\lambda_\zeta\|m_\zeta)$, the oracle returns $h_\zeta\lambda_\zeta$, where h_ζ is the output of the same query in the last run, and all other random oracle queries return same values as last time. With $1/\mathcal{N}_{H_3}$ probability, \mathcal{B} will find a solution to the following equation

$$-U(f, g)L^{-1}(d, e) = \frac{g}{dg - ef}U(f, g) - \frac{f}{dg - ef}H(L(d, e)). \quad (21)$$

Suppose \mathcal{B} makes \mathcal{N}_{H_2} queries to H_2 . Let $0 < \gamma \leq \mathcal{N}_{H_2}$ be a random integer. We construct an algorithm \mathcal{D} by rerunning \mathcal{B} . This time the oracle returns $1/\lambda_\gamma$ for the γ -th query to $H_2(P_\gamma\|Z_\gamma)$ and returns $H_3(\frac{1}{\lambda_\gamma}\|m_j) = h_j$, where in the last run $\lambda_\gamma = H_2(P_\gamma\|Z_\gamma)$ and $h_j = H_3(\lambda_\gamma\|m_j)$ for each j . Overall, if such algorithm \mathcal{A} exists, then there exists an algorithm to solve equation (19) with probability $O(\frac{\epsilon(k)}{\mathcal{N}_{H_2} \cdot \mathcal{N}_{H_3}})$ and time $O(t(k))$. \square

In [13], Brown et al. proved in Theorem 1 that in the *combined* random oracle (for the hash function) and generic group model (for the elliptic curve group) [41], there does not exist an efficiently algorithm, which can find a solution (other than the Kravitz's) to equation (22)

$$-U(f, g)L(d, e) = \frac{g}{dg - ef}U(f, g) - \frac{f}{dg - ef}H', \quad (22)$$

where H' is a hash function only depends on m . Obviously any solution to equation (19) can be converted to a solution to equation (22) by using $\lambda\|m$ as the message input to H' . Following from Lemma 4, we conclude that there is no efficient algorithm to solve equation (11) in the same model. This result implies that CL-PKS1 has the security equivalent to (in fact better than) the vanilla ECQV with ECDSA scheme against the attackers who forge a signature by solving equation (11) and (22) respectively. Note that in the generic group model, the DL problem is hard [41].

Now, let's consider that the matrix in equation (4) is not invertible ($dg = ef$), and in this case the attacker against CL-PKS1 has to find $(Z, P_A, m, \tilde{x}_Q, v)$ satisfying the following simultaneous equations

$$\begin{aligned} P_A &= [d][s]G + [e]G, \\ Q &= [f][s]G + [g]G, \\ dg &= ef, \\ v &= \frac{H_2(P_A\|Z)s\tilde{x}_Q + ds\tilde{x}_Q + e\tilde{x}_Q + H_3(H_2(P_A\|Z)\|m)}{fs + g}. \end{aligned} \quad (23)$$

Note that a valid signature requires $H_3(H_2(P_A\|Z)\|m) \neq 0$, $u = \tilde{x}_Q \neq 0$ and $v \neq 0$. Let's investigate the possible four cases depending on the value of f and e .

1. Case 1: $f = 0, d = 0$, then $g \neq 0$ and $e \neq 0$, and

$$v = \frac{H_2(P_A\|Z)s\tilde{x}_Q + e\tilde{x}_Q + H_3(H_2(P_A\|Z)\|m)}{g}.$$

Now, $P_A = [e]G$. Hence, if P_A is fixed, so is e , and there is only a negligible probability that $H_2(P_A\|Z) = -e/s$.

2. Case 2: $f = 0, e = 0$, then $g \neq 0$ and $d \neq 0$, and

$$v = \frac{H_2(P_A\|Z)s\tilde{x}_Q + ds\tilde{x}_Q + H_3(H_2(P_A\|Z)\|m)}{g}.$$

Now, $P_A = [d][s]G$. Hence, if P_A is fixed, so is d , and there is only a negligible probability that $H_2(P_A\|Z) = -d$.

3. Case 3: $e = 0, g = 0$, then $f \neq 0, d \neq 0$, and

$$v = \frac{H_2(P_A\|Z)\tilde{x}_Q + d\tilde{x}_Q}{f} + \frac{H_3(H_2(P_A\|Z)\|m)}{fs}.$$

A valid signature requires $H_3(H_2(P_A\|Z)\|m) \neq 0$.

4. Case 4: $ef = dg \neq 0$. H_2 as a random oracle forces the attacker to fix P_A before computing v . Let $c = ds + e \neq 0$ as some constant. From $dg = ef$, we have $fs + g = gc/e$, so the attacker after querying H_2 and H_3 computes

$$v = e \frac{H_2(P_A\|Z)s\tilde{x}_Q + c\tilde{x}_Q + H_3(H_2(P_A\|Z)\|m)}{gc}.$$

Again, there is only a negligible probability that $H_2(P_A\|Z) = -c/s$.

In all four cases, there appears to be no simple trick to compute v without knowing s .

Overall, we can see that the key prefixing method by signing on $(\lambda\|m)$ indeed plays an essential role to defeat attacks against CL-PKS1.

7.6 Reductions for CL-PKS1

Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that \mathcal{A}_{Ia}^- succeeds in Game 1 with a non-negligible probability $\epsilon(k)$ in time $t(k)$. Given a semi-logarithm problem $(\mathbb{G}, G, [\alpha]G)$, we use \mathcal{A}_{Ia}^- to construct an algorithm \mathcal{C} to find a solution. Suppose that in Game 1, H_1 and H_2 are queried \mathcal{N}_{H_1} and \mathcal{N}_{H_2} times respectively and \mathcal{N}_{Key} keys are generated in the game through **CL.Get-Public-Key**, and the targeted ID_* has generated \mathcal{N}_{Key} keys and \mathcal{N}_{TH_3} queries on H_3 with the targeted ID_* and P_* are called and \mathcal{N}_E **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** queries are asked. The challenger \mathcal{C} randomly selects three indices $0 < \mathcal{I} \leq \mathcal{N}_{H_1}, 0 < \mathcal{J} \leq \mathcal{N}_{Key}, 0 < \mathcal{K} \leq \mathcal{N}_{TH_3}$. \mathcal{C} maintains a tuple \mathcal{T} in the form of $\langle ID_i, P_i, \lambda_i, U_i, x_i, d_i, s_i \rangle$, which is indexed by (ID_i, P_i) . For the presentation purpose, we use PI to denote the system parameter string $a\|b\|x_G\|y_G\|x_{PKGC}\|y_{PKGC}$. \mathcal{C} answers the queries as follows:

- **CL.Setup**(1^k). \mathcal{C} sets $P_{KGC} = [\alpha]G$, and passes M_{pt} to \mathcal{A}_{Ia}^- . \mathcal{C} randomly chooses three values $Z_*, h_* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $\lambda_* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
- $H_1(PI\|ID_A)$. \mathcal{C} maintains a list \mathcal{H}_1 in the form of $\langle I_i, Z_i \rangle$. If the input is on the list, then the hash value is returned. If this is the \mathcal{I} -th distinctive query, then \mathcal{C} puts $(PI\|ID_A, Z_*)$ on the list, and returns Z_* . Otherwise, it randomly samples $Z_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ (if $Z_i = Z_*$, terminate the game (**Event 1**)), and returns Z_i after putting the pair into \mathcal{H}_1 .
- $H_2(P_A\|Z)$. Similarly, \mathcal{C} has a list \mathcal{H}_2 in the form of $\langle I_i, \lambda_i \rangle$. If the input is on the list, then the hash value is returned. Otherwise, it randomly samples $\lambda_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. If $\lambda_i \neq \lambda_*$, return λ_i after putting the pair into \mathcal{H}_2 , else terminate the game (**Event 1**).
- $H_3(\lambda\|m)$. \mathcal{C} maintains a list \mathcal{H}_3 in the form of $\langle I_i, h_i, u_i, v_i \rangle$. If the input is on the list, then the hash value h_i is returned. Otherwise, \mathcal{C} behaves differently in the following cases:
 1. If $\lambda \neq \lambda_*$, then randomly choose $h_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$, return h_i after putting $(\lambda\|m, h_i, \perp, \perp)$ into \mathcal{H}_3 .
 2. Else, if this is the \mathcal{K} -th query, then after putting $(\lambda\|m, h_*, \perp, \perp)$ in the list, return h_* . Otherwise, randomly sample $(a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{*2}$ and compute $u_i = \mathcal{F}([a_i]G + [b_i][h_*][\alpha]G)$, $v_i = u_i/b_i$, and $h_i = a_i u_i/b_i$. \mathcal{C} returns h_i after putting $(\lambda\|m, h_i, u_i, v_i)$ into \mathcal{H}_3 .
- **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key**($M_{pt}, M_{st}, ID_i, U_i$). \mathcal{C} randomly selects $d_i, \lambda_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and computes $P_i = [d_i]G + U_i - [\lambda_i][\alpha]G$. \mathcal{C} puts $(P_i\|Z_i, \lambda_i)$ in \mathcal{H}_2 with $Z_i = H_1(PI\|ID_i)$ and returns (P_i, d_i) after putting (ID_i, P_i) in a set \mathbb{Q} . If \mathcal{H}_2 has an entry indexed by $(P_i\|Z_i)$ that has different value from λ_i , terminate the game (**Event 1**).
- **CL.Get-Public-Key**($ID_i, bNewKey$). If $bNewKey$ is false and at least one entry in \mathcal{T} includes ID_i , then \mathcal{C} returns P_i in the latest entry of ID_i in \mathcal{T} . Otherwise, let $Z_i = H_1(PI\|ID_i)$, and \mathcal{C} responds differently in the following cases:
 1. If $Z_i = Z_*$, and this is the \mathcal{J} -th public key generation on ID_i , then compute $P_i = [h_* - \lambda_*][\alpha]G$, put $(P_i\|Z_i, \lambda_*)$ in \mathcal{H}_2 and randomly select $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ and put $(ID_i, P_i, \lambda_*, [x_i]G, x_i, \perp, \perp)$ in \mathcal{T} ; \mathcal{C} returns P_i . If \mathcal{H}_2 has an entry indexed by $(P_i\|Z_i)$ that has different value from λ_* , terminate the game (**Event 1**).

2. Else, randomly select $x_i, d_i, \lambda_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ (if $\lambda_i = \lambda_*$, terminate the game (**Event 1**)), compute $P_i = [x_i]G + [d_i]G - [\lambda_i][\alpha]G$, put $(P_i \| Z_i, \lambda_i)$ in \mathcal{H}_2 and $(\text{ID}_i, P_i, \lambda_i, [x_i]G, x_i, d_i, x_i + d_i)$ in \mathcal{T} ; \mathcal{C} returns P_i .
- **CL.Get-Private-Key** (ID_i, P_i) . If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, if s_i of the found entry is \perp , then terminate the game (**Event 2**), or return s_i .
- **CL.Get-User-Key** (ID_i, P_i) . If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, return x_i from the found entry.
- **CL.Get-Sign** (ID_i, P_i, m_i) . If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, use λ_i from the found entry to query $H_3(\lambda_i \| m_i)$ and respond as follows:
 1. If s_i from the found entry is not \perp , then use s_i as the private key and P_i as the public key to sign the message and return signature.
 2. Else (i.e. $\lambda_i = \lambda_*$), use $\lambda_i \| m_i$ to search the list \mathcal{H}_3 .
 - If u_i is \perp on the found entry, then terminate the game (**Event 3**).
 - Else, return (u_i, v_i) as the signature.
- **CL.Verify** $(M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, m_*, \sigma_*)$. If $Z_* \neq H_1(PI \| \text{ID}_*)$ or $\lambda_* \neq H_2(P_* \| Z_*)$ or $h_* \neq H_3(\lambda_* \| m_*)$ or $(\text{ID}_*, P_*) \in \mathbb{Q}$, then terminate the game (**Event 4**). Otherwise, parse σ_* as (u_*, v_*) and output $(u_*, v_*/h_*)$.

First, we claim that if the game is not terminated prematurely, then the simulation is indistinguishable from the environment and the final output is the solution of the semi-logarithm problem. The output of H_1, H_2 and H_3 are all sampled randomly. **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** returns the correct response as $Z_i = H_1(PI \| \text{ID}_i), \lambda_i = H_2(P_i \| Z_i), O_i = P_i + [\lambda_i]P_{KGC} = [d_i]G + U_i$. The key pair (ID_i, P_i, s_i) for an identity ID_i is also generated randomly. For any (ID_i, P_i, s_i) with $\text{ID}_i \neq \text{ID}_*$ or $P_i \neq P_*$, we have $Z_i = H_1(PI \| \text{ID}_i), \lambda_i = H_2(P_i \| Z_i), O_i = P_i + [\lambda_i]P_{KGC} = [x_i + d_i]G$ and $s_i = x_i + d_i$ with x_i, d_i, s_i from the entry indexed with (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} . Hence, the key pair is valid and the signature generated by **CL.Get-Sign** (ID_i, P_i, m_i) is also valid. On the case that $\text{ID}_i = \text{ID}_*$ and $P_i = P_*$, (u_i, v_i) is returned as the signature. According to the reduction, $Z_* = H_1(PI \| \text{ID}_*), \lambda_* = H_2(P_* \| Z_*)$ and $P_* = [h_* - \lambda_*][\alpha]G$. Hence, $O_* = P_* + [\lambda_*][\alpha]G = [\alpha h_*]G$. According to **CL.Verify**, we have $v_i^1 = v_i^{-1}h_i = a_i, v_i^2 = v_i^{-1}u_i = b_i, Q_i' = [v_i^1]G + [v_i^2]O_* = [a_i]G + [b_i\alpha h_*]G$. Hence, $x_{Q_i'} = u_i$, which means the signature is valid. Furthermore, if (u_*, v_*) is a valid signature, $u_* = \mathcal{F}([v_*^{-1}h_*]G + [v_*^{-1}u_*][h_*\alpha]G) = \mathcal{F}([(v_*/h_*)^{-1}](G + [u_*][\alpha]G))$ and the semi-logarithm problem is solved successfully. **CL.Get-Private-Key** and **CL.Get-User-Key** return valid values which satisfy the requirements of the corresponding function definitions.

Second, we analyze the possibility of finding a solution. Let **Event 1** be that the hash collision happens on either H_1 or H_2 . Let **Event 5** be that the adversary $\mathcal{A}_{I_a}^-$ indeed chooses the \mathcal{I} -th identity as the target, the \mathcal{J} -th public key of the target and the \mathcal{K} -th query of $H_2(\lambda_* \| m_*)$ to generate σ_* . If **Event 5** happens, then **Event 2, 3** and **4** won't happen. Overall, \mathcal{C} solves the semi-logarithm problem with the probability at least $\frac{\epsilon(k)}{\mathcal{N}_{H_1} \cdot \mathcal{N}_{TKey} \cdot \mathcal{N}_{TH_3}} - \frac{\mathcal{N}_{H_2} + \mathcal{N}_{Key} + \mathcal{N}_E}{q} - \frac{\mathcal{N}_{H_1}}{2^n}$ and time $O(t(k))$. \square

Proof of Theorem 3. Suppose that $\mathcal{A}_{I_a}^-$ succeeds in Game 2 with a non-negligible probability $\epsilon(k)$ in time $t(k)$. Given a semi-logarithm problem $(\mathbb{G}, G, [\alpha]G)$, we

use \mathcal{A}_{II}^- to construct an algorithm \mathcal{C} to find a solution. Suppose that in Game 2, H_1 and H_2 are queried \mathcal{N}_{H_1} and \mathcal{N}_{H_2} times respectively, and \mathcal{N}_{Key} keys are generated through **CL.Get-Public-Key** and \mathcal{N}_{TH_3} queries with the targeted ID_* and P_* are called. The challenger \mathcal{C} randomly selects three indices $0 < \mathcal{I} \leq \mathcal{N}_{H_1}, 0 < \mathcal{J} \leq \mathcal{N}_{Key}, 0 < \mathcal{K} \leq \mathcal{N}_{TH_3}$. \mathcal{C} maintains a tuple \mathcal{T} in the form of $\langle ID_i, P_i, \lambda_i, U_i, x_i, d_i, s_i \rangle$, which is indexed by (ID_i, P_i) . \mathcal{C} answers the queries as follows:

- **CL.Setup**(1^k). \mathcal{C} follows the algorithm to compute M_{pt} and M_{st} , and passes the values to \mathcal{A}_{II} . In particular, \mathcal{C} chooses a random $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ as M_{st} and sets $P_{KGC} = [s]G$. \mathcal{C} randomly chooses four values $Z_*, h_* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $\lambda_*, \lambda_{\mathcal{J}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.
- $H_1(P_I || ID_A)$. \mathcal{C} maintains a list \mathcal{H}_1 in the form of $\langle I_i, Z_i \rangle$. If the input is on the list, then the hash value is returned. If this is the \mathcal{I} -th distinctive query, then \mathcal{C} puts $(P_I || ID_A, Z_*)$ on the list, and returns Z_* . Otherwise, it randomly samples $Z_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$ (if $Z_i = Z_*$, terminate the game (**Event 1**)), and returns Z_i after putting the pair into \mathcal{H}_1 .
- $H_2(P_A || Z)$. Similarly, \mathcal{C} has a list \mathcal{H}_2 in the form of $\langle I_i, \lambda_i \rangle$. If the input is on the list, then the hash value is returned. Otherwise, it randomly samples $\lambda_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$. If $\lambda_i \neq \lambda_*$ and $\lambda_i \neq \lambda_{\mathcal{J}}$, return λ_i after putting the pair into \mathcal{H}_2 , else terminate the game (**Event 1**).
- $H_3(\lambda || m)$. \mathcal{C} maintains a list \mathcal{H}_3 in the form of $\langle I_i, h_i, u_i, v_i \rangle$. If the input is on the list, then the hash value h_i is returned. Otherwise, \mathcal{C} behaves differently in the following cases:
 1. If $\lambda \neq \lambda_{\mathcal{J}}$ and $\lambda \neq \lambda_*$, randomly choose $h_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$, return h_i after putting $(\lambda || m, h_i, \perp, \perp)$ into \mathcal{H}_3 .
 2. Else (i.e. $\lambda = \lambda_*$ or $\lambda = \lambda_{\mathcal{J}}$), if the \mathcal{J} -th public key has not been generated, terminate the game (**Event 1**). \mathcal{C} responds differently in the following cases.
 - In the \mathcal{J} -th public key generation $Z_i \neq Z_*$,
 - * $\lambda = \lambda_*$. If this is the \mathcal{K} -th query, set $h_i = h_*$, else randomly select $h_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, after putting $(\lambda || m, h_i, \perp, \perp)$ in the list, return h_i
 - * $\lambda = \lambda_{\mathcal{J}}$. Randomly sample $(a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2$ and compute $u_i = \mathcal{F}([a_i]G + [b_i][h_*][\alpha]G + [b_i][\lambda_{\mathcal{J}} - \lambda_*][s]G)$, $v_i = u_i/b_i$, and $h_i = a_i u_i/b_i$. \mathcal{C} returns h_i after putting $(\lambda || m, h_i, u_i, v_i)$ into \mathcal{H}_3 .
 - Otherwise, if this is the \mathcal{K} -th query with λ_* , then after putting $(\lambda || m, h_*, \perp, \perp)$ in the list, return h_* . Otherwise, randomly sample $(a_i, b_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2$ and compute $u_i = \mathcal{F}([a_i]G + [b_i][h_*][\alpha]G)$, $v_i = u_i/b_i$, and $h_i = a_i u_i/b_i$. \mathcal{C} returns h_i after putting $(\lambda || m, h_i, u_i, v_i)$ into \mathcal{H}_3 .
- **CL.Get-Public-Key**($ID_i, bNewKey$). If $bNewKey$ is false and at least one entry in \mathcal{T} includes ID_i , then \mathcal{C} returns P_i in the latest entry of ID_i in \mathcal{T} . Otherwise, let $Z_i = H_1(P_I || ID_i)$, and \mathcal{C} responds differently in the following cases:
 1. If this is the \mathcal{J} -th public key generation in the game, then compute $P_i = [h_*\alpha]G - [s\lambda_*]G$. Put $(P_i || Z_*, \lambda_*)$ in \mathcal{H}_2 . If $Z_i = Z_*$, set $\lambda_i = \lambda_*$, else put $(P_i || Z_i, \lambda_{\mathcal{J}})$ in \mathcal{H}_2 and set $\lambda_i = \lambda_{\mathcal{J}}$. If the list has an entry indexed by $(P_i || Z_i)$ that has different value from λ_i , terminate the game (**Event 1**). Put $(ID_i, P_i, \lambda_i, \perp, \perp, \perp, \perp)$ in \mathcal{T} . \mathcal{C} returns P_i .

2. Else, randomly select $x_i, d_i, \lambda_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ (if $\lambda_i = \lambda_*$ or $\lambda_i = \lambda_{\mathcal{J}}$, terminate the game (**Event 1**)), compute $P_i = [x_i]G + [d_i]G - [\lambda_i][s]G$, put $(P_i \| Z_i, \lambda_i)$ in \mathcal{H}_2 and $(\text{ID}_i, P_i, Z_i, \lambda_i, [x_i]G, x_i, d_i, x_i + d_i)$ in \mathcal{T} . \mathcal{C} returns P_i .
- **CL.Get-Private-Key**(ID_i, P_i). If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, if s_i of the found entry is \perp , then terminate the game (**Event 2**), or return s_i .
- **CL.Get-User-Key**(ID_i, P_i). If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, if x_i of the found entry is \perp , then terminate the game (**Event 3**), or return x_i .
- **CL.Get-Sign**(ID_i, P_i, m_i). If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, use λ_i from the found entry to query $H_3(\lambda_i \| m_i)$ and respond as follows:
 1. If s_i from the found entry is not \perp , then use s_i as the private key and P_i as the public key to sign the message and return signature.
 2. Else, use $\lambda_i \| m_i$ to search the list \mathcal{H}_3 .
 - If u_i is \perp on the found entry, then terminate the game (**Event 4**).
 - Else, return (u_i, v_i) as the signature.
- **CL.Verify**($M_{\text{pt}}, \text{ID}_*, P_*, m_*, \sigma_*$). If $Z_* \neq H_1(P_i \| \text{ID}_*)$ or $\lambda_* \neq H_2(P_* \| Z_*)$ or $h_* \neq H_3(\lambda_* \| m_*)$, then terminate the game (**Event 5**). Otherwise, parse σ_* as (u_*, v_*) and output $(u_*, v_*/h_*)$.

It is easy to verify that if the game is not terminated prematurely, then the simulation is indistinguishable from the environment. In particular, if the targeted $\text{ID}_* \neq \text{ID}_{\mathcal{J}}$ in the **CL.Get-Public-Key** query, \mathcal{C} still answers the **CL.Get-Sign**($\text{ID}_{\mathcal{J}}, P_{\mathcal{J}}, m_i$) properly. Precisely, $O_{\mathcal{J}} = P_{\mathcal{J}} + [\lambda_{\mathcal{J}}][s]G = [h_*\alpha]G + [\lambda_{\mathcal{J}} - \lambda_*][s]G$. According to **CL.Verify**, we have $v_i^1 = v_i^{-1}h_i = a_i$, $v_i^2 = v_i^{-1}u_i = b_i$, $Q'_i = [v_i^1]G + [v_i^2]O_{\mathcal{J}} = [a_i]G + [b_i][h_*][\alpha]G + [b_i][\lambda_{\mathcal{J}} - \lambda_*][s]G$. Hence, $x_{Q'_i} = u_i$, which means the signature is valid. The final output is the solution of the semi-logarithm problem. Let **Event 1** be that the hash collision happens on either H_1 or H_2 . If the attacker chooses the \mathcal{I} -th identity and the \mathcal{J} -th public key and the \mathcal{K} -th message queried with λ_* , then **Event 2, 3, 4** and **5** won't happen. Hence, \mathcal{C} solves the semi-logarithm problem with probability at least $\frac{\epsilon(k)}{\mathcal{N}_{H_1} \cdot \mathcal{N}_{Key} \cdot \mathcal{N}_{TH_3}} - 2 \frac{\mathcal{N}_{H_2} + \mathcal{N}_{Key}}{q} - \frac{\mathcal{N}_{H_1}}{2^n}$ and time $O(t(k))$. \square

7.7 Reductions for CL-PKS2

Proof of Lemma 2. The reduction in Lemma 1 can be modified easily for CL-PKS2 but still based on the strong semi-logarithm assumption. Applying the *Multiple-Forking Lemma* [9], the security of CL-PKS2 against \mathcal{A}_{Ia} can be further reduced to the DL problem. We skip the details. \square

Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that in the game, H_2 and H_3 are queried \mathcal{N}_{H_2} and \mathcal{N}_{H_3} times respectively, and \mathcal{A}_{Ib} wins the game with probability $\epsilon(k)$ in time $t(k)$. Given a DL problem $(\mathbb{G}, G, [\alpha]G)$, we use \mathcal{A}_{Ib} to construct \mathcal{C} . \mathcal{C} maintains a tuple \mathcal{T} in the form of $\langle \text{ID}_i, P_i, \lambda_i, U_i, x_i, d_i, s_i \rangle$, which is indexed by (ID_i, P_i) . \mathcal{C} answers the queries as follows:

- **CL.Setup**(1^k). \mathcal{C} sets $P_{KGC} = [\alpha]G$, and passes M_{pt} to \mathcal{A}_{Ib} . \mathcal{C} randomly chooses three values $Z_*, h_* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $\lambda_* \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$.

- $H_1(PI\|ID_A)$. \mathcal{C} maintains a list \mathcal{H}_1 in the form of $\langle I_i, Z_i \rangle$. If the input is on the list, then the hash value is returned. Otherwise, it randomly samples $Z_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$, and returns Z_i after putting the pair into \mathcal{H}_1 .
- $H_2(P_A\|Z)$. Similarly, \mathcal{C} has a list \mathcal{H}_2 in the form of $\langle I_i, \lambda_i \rangle$. If the input is on the list, then the hash value is returned. Otherwise, it randomly samples $\lambda_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and returns λ_i after putting the pair into \mathcal{H}_2 .
- $H_3(u\|\lambda\|m)$. \mathcal{C} maintains a list \mathcal{H}_3 in the form of $\langle I_i, h_i \rangle$. If the input is on the list, then the hash value h_i is returned. Otherwise, randomly sample $h_i \in \{0, 1\}^n$, return h_i after putting $(u\|\lambda\|m, h_i)$ into \mathcal{H}_3 .
- **CL.Extract-Partial-Private-Key** $(M_{\text{pt}}, M_{\text{st}}, ID_i, U_i)$. \mathcal{C} randomly selects $d_i, \lambda_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, and computes $P_i = [d_i]G + U_i - [\lambda_i][\alpha]G$. \mathcal{C} puts $(P_i\|Z_i, \lambda_i)$ in \mathcal{H}_2 with $Z_i = H_1(PI\|ID_i)$ and returns (P_i, d_i) .
- **CL.Get-Public-Key** $(ID_i, bNewKey)$. If $bNewKey$ is false and at least one entry in \mathcal{T} includes ID_i , then \mathcal{C} returns P_i in the latest entry of ID_i in \mathcal{T} . Otherwise, randomly select $x_i, d_i, \lambda_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, compute $P_i = [x_i]G + [d_i]G - [\lambda_i][\alpha]G$, put $(P_i\|Z_i, \lambda_i)$ in \mathcal{H}_2 with $Z_i = H_1(PI\|ID_i)$ and $(ID_i, P_i, \lambda_i, [x_i]G, x_i, d_i, x_i + d_i)$ in \mathcal{T} .
- **CL.Get-Private-Key** (ID_i, P_i) . If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, return s_i from the found entry.
- **CL.Get-User-Key** (ID_i, P_i) . If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, return x_i from the found entry.
- **CL.Get-Sign** (ID_i, P_i, m_i) . If there is no entry indexed by (ID_i, P_i) in \mathcal{T} , return error. Otherwise, use the found s_i as the private key and P_i as the public key to sign the message and return its signature.

\mathcal{C} perfectly simulates the attacking environment. Before applying the *Multiple-Forking Lemma* [9] to argue the security, we make several assumptions, so to make the analysis simpler. First, as explained in Section 3, the use of H_1 is unnecessary, in the following analysis we assume H_1 to be a normal collision-resistance hash function and \mathcal{C} requires the attacker to output Z instead of ID . Second, in the attacking process \mathcal{A} may query $H_3(u\|\lambda\|m)$ before querying $\lambda = H_2(P\|Z)$. However, as H_2 is simulated as a random oracle, there is only a negligible probability that this event has happened and at the same time σ is valid. We henceforth ignore this event in the analysis. \mathcal{C} runs the multiple-forking algorithm $\mathbf{MF}_{\mathcal{A}t_b, 3}(M_{\text{pt}})$ and gets four forgeries $(Z, m, P, (u_i, v_i))$, $i = 0, \dots, 3$ for some Z , some message m and some P . Moreover each u_i corresponds to a point $Q_i = \pm[r_i]G$, and $u_0 = u_1$ and $u_2 = u_3$. If the forged signatures are valid, by assuming $Q_0 = [r_0]G$ and $Q_2 = [r_2]G$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
Q_0 &= [v_0^{-1}h_0]G + [v_0^{-1}u_0](P + [\lambda_0][\alpha]G), \\
Q_0 &= [v_1^{-1}h_1]G + [v_1^{-1}u_0](P + [\lambda_0][\alpha]G), \\
Q_2 &= [v_2^{-1}h_2]G + [v_2^{-1}u_2](P + [\lambda_2][\alpha]G), \\
Q_2 &= [v_3^{-1}h_3]G + [v_3^{-1}u_2](P + [\lambda_2][\alpha]G).
\end{aligned}$$

Let $a_i = h_i/v_i$ for $i = 0, \dots, 3$, $b_0 = -u_0/v_0$, $b_1 = -u_0/v_1$, $b_2 = -u_2/v_2$ and $b_3 = -u_2/v_3$. \mathcal{C} computes α' as follows:

$$\alpha' = \frac{(a_0 - a_1)(b_2 - b_3) - (a_2 - a_3)(b_0 - b_1)}{(\lambda_0 - \lambda_2)(b_0 - b_1)(b_2 - b_3)}.$$

If $Q_0 = -[r_0]G$ or $Q_2 = -[r_2]G$, \mathcal{C} can compute α' in a similar way and test its correctness by checking if $[\alpha']G = [\alpha]G$ and find the solution to the DL problem. By the *Multiple-Forking Lemma*, \mathcal{C} solves the DL problem with probability $O(\frac{\epsilon^4(k)}{(\mathcal{N}_{H_2} + \mathcal{N}_{H_3})^6})$ and time $O(t(k))$.⁴ \square

Proof of Theorem 5. The reduction in Theorem 3 can be simply modified for CL-PKS2 but still based on the strong semi-logarithm assumption. Applying the *Multiple-Forking Lemma* [9], the security of CL-PKS2 against \mathcal{A}_{II} can be reduced to the DL problem. We skip the details. \square

Similar techniques used in the reductions for CL-PKS2 can be applied to analyze CL-PKS from Schnorr DSA presented in Appendix 7.3.

⁴ With the help of λ in H_3 , a tighter reduction could be established but with much more complicated analysis.