

Indistinguishability Obfuscation Without Multilinear Maps: $i\mathcal{O}$ from LWE, Bilinear Maps, and Weak Pseudorandomness

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Abstract

The existence of secure indistinguishability obfuscators ($i\mathcal{O}$) has far-reaching implications, significantly expanding the scope of problems amenable to cryptographic study. All known approaches to constructing $i\mathcal{O}$ rely on d -linear maps which allow the encoding of elements from a large domain, evaluating degree d polynomials on them, and testing if the output is zero. While secure *bilinear maps* are well established in cryptographic literature, the security of candidates for $d > 2$ is poorly understood.

We propose a new approach to constructing $i\mathcal{O}$ for general circuits. Unlike all previously known realizations of $i\mathcal{O}$, we avoid the use of d -linear maps of degree $d \geq 3$.

At the heart of our approach is the assumption that a new *weak* pseudorandom object exists, that we call a *perturbation resilient generator* (ΔRG). Informally, a ΔRG maps n integers to m integers, and has the property that for any sufficiently short vector $a \in \mathbb{Z}^m$, all efficient adversaries must fail to distinguish the distributions $\Delta\text{RG}(s)$ and $(\Delta\text{RG}(s)+a)$, with at least some probability that is inverse polynomial in the security parameter. We require that the ΔRG be computable by degree-2 polynomials over \mathbb{Z} . We use techniques building upon the Dense Model Theorem to deal with adversaries that have nontrivial but non-overwhelming distinguishing advantage.

As a result, we obtain $i\mathcal{O}$ for general circuits assuming:

- Subexponentially secure LWE
- Bilinear Maps
- $(1 - 1/\text{poly}(\lambda))$ -secure 3-block-local PRGs
- $1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$ -secure ΔRG s

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1 Introduction

Program obfuscation considers the problem of building an efficient randomized compiler that takes as input a computer program P and outputs an equivalent program $O(P)$ such that any secrets present within P are “as hard as possible” to extract from $O(P)$. This property can be formalized by the notion of indistinguishability obfuscation ($i\mathcal{O}$) [BGI⁺01, GR07]. Formally, $i\mathcal{O}$ requires that given any two equivalent programs P_1 and P_2 of the same size, it is not possible for a computationally bounded adversary to distinguish between the obfuscated versions of these programs. Recently, starting with the works of [GGH⁺13b, SW14], it has been shown that $i\mathcal{O}$ would have far-reaching applications, significantly expanding the scope of problems to which cryptography can be applied [SW14, K LW15, GGHR14, CHN⁺16, GPS16, HSW14, BPR15, GGG⁺14, HJK⁺16, BFM14].

The work of [GGH⁺13b] gave the first mathematical candidate $i\mathcal{O}$ construction, and since then several additional candidates have been proposed and studied [GGH13a, CLT13, GGH15, CLT15, Hal15, BR14, BGK⁺14, PST14, AGIS14], [BMSZ16, CHL⁺15, BWZ14, CGH⁺15, HJ15, BGH⁺15, Hal15, CLR15, MF15, MSZ16, DGG⁺16], as well as more recently [Lin16, LV16, AS17, LT17].

Constructing $i\mathcal{O}$. Securely building $i\mathcal{O}$ remains a central challenge in cryptography. In this work, we show how to utilize new techniques to securely build $i\mathcal{O}$. Most notably, we show new ways to leverage *bilinear maps* and tools building upon the *dense model theorem* [JP14, CCL18, RTTV08] in the context of constructing $i\mathcal{O}$. Using these new tools, we show how to securely construct $i\mathcal{O}$ *without using cryptographic multilinear maps* beyond bilinear maps. We now elaborate.

Graded Encodings. All known approaches for building $i\mathcal{O}$ crucially rely on the existence of a *graded encoding scheme* [GGH13a, CLT13, GGH15], which generalizes the notion of a cryptographic multilinear map [BS02]. In a degree- d graded encoding scheme, it is possible to compute encodings $[x]$ of values x , such that for any degree- d polynomial f with small coefficients, given only the encodings $[x]$, it is possible to efficiently test whether $f(x) \stackrel{?}{=} 0$. For $d = 2$, this corresponds to cryptographic *bilinear maps* [BF01], for which we know well-studied constructions based on the hardness present in elliptic curve groups that admit pairing operations.

However, the situation for $d > 2$ is much more problematic. While candidate constructions of such graded encoding schemes exist [GGH13a, CLT13, GGH15], their security is poorly understood due to several known explicit attacks on certain distributions of encoded values [CHL⁺15, BWZ14, CGH⁺15, HJ15, BGH⁺15, Hal15, CLR15, MF15, MSZ16].

Due to a recent line of work [Lin16, LV16, AS17, Lin17, LT17], based additionally on the subexponential hardness of 3-blockwise-local PRGs and the Learning with Errors assumption (LWE), it is known that achieving security for $d = 3$ is already enough to construct $i\mathcal{O}$. Unfortunately, however, the security of candidate graded encodings supporting $d = 3$ seems no better understood than the general $d > 2$ case.

The state of our understanding strongly motivates the following central question:

Can we build $i\mathcal{O}$ without cryptographic multilinear maps?

Our Goals and Assumptions. We seek to build $i\mathcal{O}$ from as few non-standard components as possible. Because LWE and cryptographic bilinear maps have a long history of security, we consider using LWE or (generically secure) cryptographic bilinear maps as standard. Beyond these

standard tools, however, we will seek to qualitatively and quantitatively minimize the risk of any new tools that we use. This is in contrast with existing candidate multilinear maps, where both constructions [GGH13a, CLT13, GGH15] and standing security models [MSZ16] are complex and therefore difficult to understand and analyze.

More specifically, we will show how to build $i\mathcal{O}$ from LWE, bilinear maps, and novel *weakly pseudorandom* objects that we call *perturbation-resilient generators* (ΔRG), that can be implemented with degree-2 polynomials over \mathbb{Z} . Informally speaking, a perturbation-resilient generator is a generator ΔRG such that the distributions $\Delta\text{RG}(s)$ and $(\Delta\text{RG}(s) + a)$ are *somewhat* hard to distinguish as long as the perturbation a is relatively small. We describe ΔRG s in more detail below in our technical overview, where we will also discuss why we conjecture that they exist (even in light of [BBKK17, LV17]).

A key innovation of our work is that we can work with perturbation-resilient generators where the security property only asks that efficient adversaries fail to distinguish between two distributions with at least some $1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$ probability – i.e. some fixed inverse polynomial in the security parameter. Thus, even if an efficient adversary correctly predicts whether a sample comes from the $\Delta\text{RG}(s)$ distribution or the $(\Delta\text{RG}(s) + a)$ distribution 99% of the time, our $i\mathcal{O}$ scheme will still be secure.

We stress that the new object (ΔRG) that we introduce is quite simple – indeed crucially it is implementable by degree-2 polynomials over \mathbb{Z} . This simplicity stands in notable contrast to candidate multilinear maps. More generally, our work motivates the further cryptanalytic study of simple pseudorandom objects

We will also only need to use similarly weakened¹ forms of 3-blockwise-local PRGs [LT17].

In particular, we obtain the following:

Theorem 1 (Informal). *There is a construction of indistinguishability obfuscation for all polynomial-sized circuits from,*

- $\frac{1}{\lambda}$ -secure perturbation-resilient generators (see Section 8.1), with security against sub-exponential size adversaries.
- $(1 - \frac{1}{2\lambda})$ -secure three-block-local pseudorandom generators [LT17] of stretch $n^{1+\varepsilon}$, for $\varepsilon > 0$ on seeds of length n , with security against sub-exponential size adversaries.
- Sub-exponentially secure learning with errors.
- Sub-exponentially secure assumptions on bilinear maps (that hold unconditionally in the generic bilinear map model).

2 Technical Overview

We begin with a very high-level overview of our techniques.

¹There will be a tradeoff between how much we can weaken the indistinguishability requirements of the ΔRG and the 3-block-local PRG.

The story so far. Prior work, culminating in the most recent works of [AS17, Lin17, LT17] showed us that the powerful primitive of indistinguishability obfuscation can be based on trilinear maps and (sub-exponential) 3-block-local pseudorandom generators. Importantly for us, these works also (implicitly) demonstrate that in order to achieve indistinguishability obfuscation, it suffices to construct (sub-exponentially secure) secret-key sublinear FE for cubic polynomials, satisfying semi-functional security. Unfortunately, these prior approaches necessarily relied on multilinear maps with degree at least 3 to build such a cubic FE scheme.

That is because intuitively such a cubic FE scheme guarantees a way to evaluate a cubic polynomial on encrypted inputs without revealing any information about the input except the evaluation of the polynomial. In other words, such a scheme provides a way to output the decryption of a degree-3 polynomial evaluated “homomorphically” on encoded inputs. However, we seek to accomplish this without the use of degree-3 maps.

Since we seek to operate homomorphically on encoded values, a natural starting idea is to use fully homomorphic encryption (for concreteness and simplicity, in this paper we rely on the GSW fully homomorphic encryption scheme [GSW13]) with polynomially bounded error in order to perform cubic evaluations on encrypted inputs. The main challenge, however, is to reveal the output of cubic evaluation without compromising security.

Initial approach. Our first observation is that computing the inner product $\langle \text{GSW.sk}, \text{GSW.CT} \rangle$ of a GSW secret key with a GSW ciphertext encrypting message M , outputs $(M \cdot \lfloor q/2 \rfloor + e)$ where the LWE modulus is q and e is a small error. With the assistance of a bilinear map, this inner product can be carried out via pairings, such that the output $(M \cdot \lfloor q/2 \rfloor + e)$ appears as an exponent in the target group. Next, one can hope to test whether the message M is zero by computing a discrete logarithm by brute-force checking all possible values, provided the output range is polynomial, which would happen if $M = 0$.

A reader familiar with GSW will observe that this approach already runs into major hurdles. The first problem is that brute-force computing the message M also reveals the error e to a potential adversary, which is problematic when we try to invoke the semantic security of GSW. In fact, recent work shows how knowledge of such error can be used to build devastating attacks [Agr17]. We will crucially deal with this issue, but before we tackle this, let us first consider how we can force the adversary to obtain only inner products $\langle \text{GSW.sk}, \text{GSW.CT} \rangle$ where the messages correspond to cubic computations that the adversary is allowed to obtain.

3-Restricted FE. To accomplish this, we first define a *restricted* version of functional encryption – which allows for the computation of cubic polynomials of three inputs, where one remains unencoded and is called the public component and the other two are encoded; these are the private components.

One of our key technical contributions is to achieve a new way of (indistinguishably) enforcing the output of such a 3-restricted FE scheme, despite the fact that one of the encodings is publicly known to the adversary. We use these techniques to achieve security for this 3-restricted variant of FE relying solely on asymmetric bilinear maps. While we only need the resulting 3-restricted FE to be sublinear, our construction in fact achieves compactness, where the size of encoding is only linear in the input length.

In Section 9, we provide details of our 3-restricted FE. Once we have such a restricted FE, making the leap to cubic FE would require us to also keep the public encoding hidden. Therefore,

it is not clear whether we have achieved anything meaningful yet.

One way that we can hope to protect or hide the input that goes into the public component of the 3-restricted FE, is to let this component itself be a GSW-based fully homomorphic encryption of the input. We can then rely on 3-restricted FE to homomorphically evaluate the cubic function itself and obtain a GSW encryption of the output of cubic evaluation. Note that releasing such a GSW encryption as such is useless, because it does not allow even an honest evaluator to recover the output of cubic evaluation.

At this point, let us go back to the initial approach described at the beginning of this section. Notice that instead of relying on 3-restricted FE to *only* homomorphically evaluate the cubic function itself, we can also perform a decryption via 3-restricted FE. The secret key for GSW decryption can be embedded as input into one of the private components of the 3-restricted FE. We show how this can be carefully done via degree three operations only, to obtain output the GSW plaintext with some added error, that is, we obtain $\text{out} = \mu \lfloor \frac{q}{2} \rfloor + e$. Our actual method of bootstrapping three-restricted FE to sublinear FE for cubic polynomials involves additional subtleties, and in particular, we define and construct what we call *tempered cubic encodings* that serve as a useful abstraction in this process. We now further discuss one of the main technical issues that arises in this process.

Because the error e is sampled from a (bounded) polynomial-sized domain, it is possible to iterate, in polynomial time, over all possible values of out corresponding to $\mu = 0$ and $\mu = 1$, and therefore recover μ . Unfortunately, this process also reveals the error e , which can be devastating as we noted before.

Preventing the revelation of error terms. To prevent this issue, we will reveal the value out but with some added noise, so as to hide the error e via noise flooding. Unfortunately, this idea still suffers from two major drawbacks:

- How should we generate such noise? A natural idea is to rely a pseudorandom generator that can be computed via quadratic operations only. However, this is exactly the reason why previous approaches from the literature could not rely on bilinear maps – in fact, the recent works of [LV17, BBKK17] showed that such PRGs are quite difficult to construct. To overcome this problem, we introduce and rely on a very weak variant of a pseudorandom object, that instead of guaranteeing pseudorandomness, only guarantees perturbation resilience. We will soon explain this object in more detail.
- For an honest evaluator to recover μ by iterating over all possible values of out , we crucially require the added noise be sampled from a polynomial-sized domain. But such noise appears to be insufficient for security, in particular, an adversary would have advantage at least $\frac{1}{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$ in distinguishing a message with added noise from a message without noise. Another key technical contribution of our work is to find a way to *amplify security*, via tools inspired by the dense model theorem. In the next two bullets, we describe these ideas in additional detail.

The challenge of constructing degree-2 pseudorandomness. As we’ve outlined above, we need a way to use degree 2 polynomials over \mathbb{Z} to create pseudorandomness to (at least partially) hide noise values. The most straightforward way to do this would be to build a pseudorandom generator (PRG) whose output is indistinguishable from some nice m -dimensional distribution, like

a discrete gaussian. However, the works of [BBKK17, LV17] showed that there are fundamental barriers to constructing such PRGs due to attacks arising from the Sum of Squares paradigm. Because we will propose a direction to overcome this barrier, we now review how these attacks work at a high level.

For simplicity, let's restrict our attention to polynomials where every monomial is of degree exactly 2. We can represent any such polynomial p as a symmetric n -by- n matrix P , where $P_{i,j} = P_{j,i}$ is equal to half the coefficient of the monomial $x_i x_j$ if $i \neq j$, and $P_{i,i}$ is equal to the coefficient of the monomial x_i^2 . Then we observe that $p(x) = x^\top P x$. Suppose, then, we have a candidate PRG consisting of m degree-2 polynomials that we represent by matrices M_1, \dots, M_m . Thus, to sample from this PRG, we sample a seed vector x from a bounded-norm distribution, and obtain the outputs $y_i = x^\top M_i x$. The goal of an attack would be to distinguish such outputs from a set of independent random values r_1, \dots, r_m , say from a discrete gaussian distribution centered around zero.

The works of [BBKK17, LV17] suggest the following attack approach: Suppose we receive values z_1, \dots, z_m . Then we construct the matrix

$$M = \sum_{i=1}^m z_i M_i$$

Observe now, that if $z_i = y_i$ corresponding to some seed vector x , then we have:

$$x^\top M x = \sum_{i=1}^m y_i x^\top M_i x = \sum_{i=1}^m y_i^2$$

Intuitively, because the above sum is a sum of squares, this will be a quite large positive value, showing that there exists x of bounded norm such that $x^\top M x$ can be quite large.

However, if the $z_i = r_i$, then the entries of the matrix M arise from a “random walk,” and thus intuitively, the matrix M should behave a lot like a random matrix. However a random matrix has bounded eigenvalues, and thus we expect that there should not exist any x of bounded norm such that $x^\top M x$ is large. Indeed, this intuition can be made formal and gives rise to actual attacks on many degree-2 PRGs [BBKK17, LV17].

There are several potential caveats to this attack, and indeed it is not known to be true that no degree-2 PRGs can exist. Just as a few examples of such caveats, if the seed vector x comes from a nonstandard distribution, or if the matrices M_i have special shapes or structures, then it is unclear if the intuitive attack analysis above can be carried out.

However, we propose a different, arguably more conservative, way out:

Perturbation-Resilient Generators (Δ RG). We observe that even though the most natural way to “drown out” the GSW error term above is by adding some nice noise distribution, all we actually need is something we will call a perturbation-resilient generator (Δ RG): Informally speaking, we want that for every polynomial bound $B(\lambda)$, there should exist a degree-2 Δ RG using polynomially bounded seeds and coefficients, such that for any perturbation vector $a \in [-B, B]^m$, it should be true that all efficient adversaries must fail to distinguish between the distributions $\Delta RG(x)$ and $(\Delta RG(x) + a)$ with probability at least $1/\text{poly}(\lambda)$, which is a fixed inverse polynomial in the security parameter. We stress again that we are not seeking a Δ RG with standard negligible security, but only some quite low level of security.

Why should such weakly secure Δ RGs exist, resisting the attacks based on the Sum of Squares paradigm above? In the attack above, now, $z_i = y_i$ or $z_i = y_i + a_i$. However, note that the polynomials represented by M_i that make up the Δ RG can be designed so that the expected value of $|y_i|$ is substantially larger than the bound B on the perturbation values a_i . For instance, we can design the Δ RG so that we expect $|y_i| = B^2\lambda^2$. Now, when $z_i = y_i$, then indeed we have an x such that $x^\top Mx = \sum_i y_i^2$. However, when $z_i = y_i + a_i$, we still have an x such that $x^\top Mx = \sum_i y_i(y_i + a_i)$. Because $|y_i|$ is expected to be so much larger than $|a_i|$, it will be true that $x^\top Mx$ will be nearly as large in the case when $z_i = y_i + a_i$ as in the case when $z_i = y_i$. Because of the large variance that each y_i will have, we expect the overlap between the two cases to be quite substantial. We cautiously conjecture that a high probability distinguishing attack based on the Sum of Squares paradigm does not exist. We have conducted experiments using the basic SDPs formulated in [BBKK17] and confirmed that indeed they do not directly yield a high probability distinguishing attack (for small values of n).

Further in-depth research is certainly needed to explore our new assumptions. Indeed, we see our work as strongly motivating the systematic exploration of the limits of various types of degree-2 pseudorandom objects over \mathbb{Z} using the Sum of Squares paradigm and beyond.

Security Amplification. At this point, it is possible to show (as we do in our technical sections) that relying on $\frac{1}{\lambda}$ -secure Δ RG in the approach outlined above, helps achieve a “weak” form of sublinear FE (sFE), that only bounds adversarial advantage by $\frac{1}{\lambda}$. Unfortunately, such an FE scheme it not known to yield $i\mathcal{O}$, and for our approach to succeed, we must find a way to amplify security of sublinear FE.

How should we amplify security? An initial idea is to implement a direct-product type theorem for functional encryption. However, a simple XOR trick does not suffice: since we are trying to amplify security of a complex primitive like FE while retaining correctness, we will additionally need to rely on a special kind of secure computation. More precisely, we will use (subexponentially secure) n -out-of- n threshold fully homomorphic encryption (TFHE [MW16, BGG⁺]), that is known to exist based on LWE [Reg05]. Recall that such a threshold (public key) fully homomorphic encryption scheme allows to encrypt a ciphertext in such a way that all secret key holders can *partially* decrypt the ciphertext, and then can recover the plaintext by combining these partial decryptions. However, any coalition of secret key holders of size at most $n - 1$ learns no information about the message.

A simplified overview of our scheme, that makes use of $t = \lambda^2$ weak sublinear FEs, is as follows:

- The setup algorithm outputs the master secret keys msk_i for all weak sublinear FEs.
- In order to generate the encryption of a plaintext M , generate a public key TFHE.pk and t fresh secret keys TFHE.sk_i for a threshold FHE, and encrypt M using the public key for threshold FHE to obtain ciphertext TFHE.ct . Additionally, for all i , encrypt $(\text{TFHE.ct}, \text{TFHE.sk}_i)$ using the master secret key msk_i for the i^{th} weak sublinear FE.
- To generate a function secret key for circuit C , generate t function secret keys for the sFEs, each of which computes the output of the i^{th} TFHE partial decryption of the result of homomorphic evaluation of the circuit C on TFHE.ct .
- Finally, to evaluate a functional secret key for circuit C on a ciphertext, combine the results of the TFHE threshold decryptions obtained via the t outputs of sFE evaluation of the t function secret keys.

The correctness of our scheme follows immediately from the correctness properties of the TFHE scheme. *Intuitively*, security seems to hold because of the following argument. Upon combining λ^2 independent, random instances of the weak sFE, with overwhelming probability, at least one must remain secure. As long as a single instance remains secure, the corresponding secret key for TFHE will remain hidden from the adversary. Now, TFHE guarantees semantic security against any adversary that fails to obtain even one secret key, and as a result, the resulting FE scheme should be secure. While this intuition sounds deceptively simple, many of these intuitive leaps assume information-theoretic security. Thus, this template evades a formal proof in the computational setting, and we must work harder to obtain our proof of security, as we now sketch.

From a cryptographic point of view, one of the early hurdles when trying to obtain such a proof is the following. A reduction must rely on an adversary that breaks security of the final FE scheme with *any* noticeable probability, in order to break $\frac{1}{\lambda}$ security of one of the λ^2 “weak” FEs. However, the reduction does not know which of the λ^2 repetitions is secure, and therefore does not directly know where to embed an external challenge. To deal with this, we rely on the concept of a *hardcore measure* [Imp95, MT10]. Roughly speaking, we obtain measures of probability mass roughly $\frac{1}{\lambda}$ over the randomness of the sFE schemes, such that no efficient adversary can break the security of the sFE scheme even with some inverse subexponential probability.

However, unfortunately these hardcore measures can depend on other parameters in our system, such as the TFHE public key. And unfortunately, this dependence is via extreme inefficiency; the hardcore measure is not efficiently sampleable. This means that, for example, the hardcore measure could in principle contain information about the TFHE master secret key. If this information is leaked to the adversary, this would destroy the security of our scheme.

We overcome this issue through the following idea, which can be made formal via the work on simulating auxiliary input [JP14, CCL18]. Because the hardcore measure has reasonable probability mass $\frac{1}{\lambda}$, it cannot *verifiably* contain useful information to the adversary. For example, even if the hardcore distribution revealed the first few bits of the TFHE master secret key, the adversary could not *know* for sure that these bits were in fact the correct bits. Indeed, we use the works of [JP14, CCL18] to make this idea precise, and show that the hardcore measures can be simulated in a way that fools all efficient adversaries, with a simulation that runs in subexponential time.

Finally, using complexity leveraging, we can set the security of the TFHE scheme to be such that its security holds against adversaries whose running time exceeds this simulation. Thus, for example, even if the original hardcore measure was revealing partial information about the TFHE master secret key, we show that we can give the adversary access to a simulated hardcore measure that provably does not reveal any useful information about the TFHE master secret key, and the adversary can’t tell the difference!

In this way, we accomplish security amplification for sFE, which allows us to achieve $i\mathcal{O}$ for general circuits when combined with previous work [AS17, LT17]. Along the way, our amplification technique also shows that we can weaken the security requirement on the relatively new notion of a 3-block-local PRG due to [LT17], in a way that still allows us to achieve $i\mathcal{O}$.

3 Preliminaries

We denote the security parameter by λ . For a distribution X we denote by $x \leftarrow X$ the process of sampling a value x from the distribution X . Similarly, for a set \mathcal{X} we denote by $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$ the process of sampling x from the uniform distribution over \mathcal{X} . For an integer $n \in \mathbb{N}$ we denote by $[n]$ the set

$\{1, \dots, n\}$. A function $\text{negl} : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is negligible if for every constant $c > 0$ there exists an integer N_c such that $\text{negl}(\lambda) < \lambda^{-c}$ for all $\lambda > N_c$.

By \approx_c we denote computational indistinguishability. We say that two ensembles $\mathcal{X} = \{\mathcal{X}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\mathcal{Y} = \{\mathcal{Y}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ are computationally indistinguishable if for every probabilistic polynomial time adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a negligible function negl such that $\left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_\lambda}[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, x) = 1] - \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda}[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, y) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for every sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$.

For a field element $a \in \mathbb{F}_p$ represented in $[-p/2, p/2]$, we say that $-B < a < B$ for some positive integer B if its representative in $[-p/2, p/2]$ lies in $[-B, B]$.

Definition 1 (Distinguishing Gap). *For any adversary \mathcal{A} and two distributions $\mathcal{X} = \{\mathcal{X}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and $\mathcal{Y} = \{\mathcal{Y}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, define \mathcal{A} 's distinguishing gap in distinguishing these distributions to be $|\Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}_\lambda}[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, x) = 1] - \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}_\lambda}[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, y) = 1]|$*

Now we define the notion of a measure,

Definition 2. *A measure is a function $\mathcal{M} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow [0, 1]$. The size of a measure is $|\mathcal{M}| = \sum_{x \in \{0, 1\}^k} \mathcal{M}(x)$. The density of a measure, $\mu(\mathcal{M}) = |\mathcal{M}|2^{-k}$*

Each measure \mathcal{M} induces a probability distribution $\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{M}$.

Definition 3. *Let $\mathcal{M} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow [0, 1]$ be a measure. The distribution defined by measure \mathcal{M} (denoted by $\mathcal{D}_\mathcal{M}$) is a distribution over $\{0, 1\}^k$, where for every $x \in \{0, 1\}^k$, $\Pr_{X \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\mathcal{M}}[X = x] = \mathcal{M}(x)/|\mathcal{M}|$.*

At this point we remark, we will consider scaled version \mathcal{M}_c of a measure \mathcal{M} for a constant $0 < c < 1$. We define $\mathcal{M}_c = c\mathcal{M}$. Note that \mathcal{M}_c induces the same distribution as \mathcal{M}

3.1 Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO)

The notion of indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), first conceived by Barak et al. [BGI⁺01], guarantees that the obfuscation of two circuits are computationally indistinguishable as long as they both are equivalent circuits, i.e., the output of both the circuits are the same on every input. Formally,

Definition 4 (Indistinguishability Obfuscator (iO) for Circuits). *A uniform PPT algorithm $i\mathcal{O}$ is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit family $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, where \mathcal{C}_λ consists of circuits C of the form $C : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ with $n = n(\lambda)$, if the following holds:*

- **Completeness:** *For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, every input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, we have that*

$$\Pr [C'(x) = C(x) : C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C)] = 1$$

- **Indistinguishability:** *For any PPT distinguisher D , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that the following holds: for all sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all pairs of circuits $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ such that $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$ for all inputs $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $|C_0| = |C_1|$, we have:*

$$\left| \Pr [D(\lambda, i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_0)) = 1] - \Pr [D(\lambda, i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C_1)) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

- **Polynomial Slowdown:** *For every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, every $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, we have that $|i\mathcal{O}(\lambda, C)| = \text{poly}(\lambda, C)$.*

3.2 Slotted Encodings

We define a relaxation of slotted encodings SE (originally constructed in [AS17]) with 4 slots to bilinear setting. A slotted encoding scheme consists of the following algorithms:

- **Secret Key Generation**, $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$: It outputs secret encoding key SEsp , a pairing function e along with a prime $\mathbf{p} > 2^\lambda$ and public parameters PP . We assume that e, PP and \mathbf{p} are implicitly given to all the algorithms below.
- **Encoding**, $\text{Encode}(\text{SEsp}, a_1, \dots, a_4, l \in \{1, 2\})$: In addition to secret key SEsp , it takes as input $a_1, \dots, a_4 \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ and a level $l \in \{1, 2\}$. It outputs an encoding $[a_1 \mid a_2 \mid a_3 \mid a_4]_l$.
- **Multiply**, $e([a_1 \mid a_2 \mid a_3 \mid a_4]_1, [b_1 \mid b_2 \mid b_3 \mid b_4]_2) = [\sum_i a_i b_i]_T$. The pairing operation takes as input an encoding of \mathbf{a} at level 1 and \mathbf{b} at level 2 and it outputs an encoding of $\sum_i a_i b_i$ at level T . We require the set $G_T = \{[a]_T \mid a \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}\}$ to form an additive group of order \mathbf{p} .
- **Addition at the top level T** , Given $[a]_T$ and $[b]_T$, the operation $+$ computes $[a + b]_T = [a]_T + [b]_T$.
- **Encoding at level T** , Given $a \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ and PP , $\text{Encode}_T(\cdot)$ is an efficiently computable isomorphism that maps $a \in G$ to $[a]_T \in G_T$.
- **Zero test at all three levels $Z\text{Test}(u, l)$** : The zero-test algorithm takes an element u at level $l \in \{1, 2, T\}$ and checks if $u = [0 \mid 0 \mid 0 \mid 0]_l$ if $l \in \{1, 2\}$. Otherwise it checks that $u = [0]_T$.

Remark 1. *The algorithms for addition and multiplication suggests what polynomials can be evaluated on the encodings. Given level 1 and level 2 encodings one can compute an encoding of a scaled inner product of the encoded element vectors at level T . At level 1 and level 2, we can only add encoded vectors component wise.*

Security: Since we prove security in the generic model, we require generic security from our slotted encodings at level 1 and 2 when SEsp is kept hidden from the adversary.

3.2.1 Generic Bilinear Group Model

We describe the generic bilinear group model [BBG05] tailored to the slotted asymmetric setting. This model is parameterized by slotted encodings SE, which encodes four dimensional vectors over a prime field $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ at level 1 and 2, and it encodes element from $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ at the target level T . The encodings are done over level 1, 2 and the target T . The multiplication operation computes encoding at level T . The adversary in this model has access to an oracle \mathcal{O} . Initially, the adversary is handed out *handles* (sampled uniformly at random) instead of being handed out actual encodings. A handle is an element in a ring \mathbb{Z} of order \mathbf{p} . The oracle \mathcal{O} maintains a list L consisting of tuples $(e, \mathbf{Y}[e], u)$, where e is the handle issued, $\mathbf{Y}[e]$ is the formal expression associated with e and e is associated with encoding at level $u \in \{1, 2, T\}$.

The adversary is allowed to submit the following types of queries to the oracle:

- *Addition/ Subtraction*: The adversary submits (e_1, u_1) and (e_2, u_2) along with the operation ‘+’(or ‘-’) to the oracle where $u_1, u_2 \in \{1, 2, T\}$. If $u_1 \neq u_2$ or If there is no tuple associated with either e_1 or e_2 , the oracle sends \perp back to the adversary. Otherwise, it replies according to the following cases:
 - $u_1 \in \{1, 2\}$: In this case it locates $(e_1, p_{1,e_1}, p_{2,e_1}, p_{3,e_1}, p_{4,e_1}, u_1)$ and $(e_2, p_{1,e_2}, p_{2,e_2}, p_{3,e_2}, p_{4,e_2}, u_2)$. It creates a new handle e' (sampled uniformly at random from \mathcal{R}) and appends $(e', p_{1,e_1} + p_{1,e_2}, p_{2,e_1} + p_{2,e_2}, p_{3,e_1} + p_{3,e_2}, p_{4,e_1} + p_{4,e_2}, u_1)$ to the list (in case of subtractions the polynomials are subtracted). It outputs e' to the adversary.
 - $u_1 = u_2 = T$: In this case the adversary locates the tuples (e_1, p_{e_1}, u_1) and (e_2, p_{e_2}, u_2) . It creates a new handle e' (sampled uniformly at random from \mathcal{R}) and appends $(e', p_{e_1} + p_{e_2}, u_1)$ (or $(e', p_{e_1} - p_{e_2}, u_1)$) to the list. The oracle sends e' to the adversary.
- *Multiplication*: The adversary submits (e_1, u_1) and (e_2, u_2) to the oracle. If there is no tuple associated with either e_1 or e_2 , the oracle sends \perp back to the adversary. If $u_1 = u_2, u_1 = T$ or $u_2 = T$, the oracle outputs \perp . Otherwise, it locates the tuples $(e_1, p_{1,e_1}, p_{2,e_1}, p_{3,e_1}, p_{4,e_1}, u_1)$ and $(e_2, p_{1,e_2}, p_{2,e_2}, p_{3,e_2}, p_{4,e_2}, u_2)$. It creates a new handle e' (sampled uniformly at random from \mathcal{R}) and appends $(e', \sum_{j \in [4]} p_{j,e_1} * p_{j,e_2}, T)$ to the list.
- *Zero Test*: The adversary submits element (e_1, u_1) to the oracle. If there is no tuple associated to e_1 it outputs \perp . Otherwise, if $u_1 = 1$ or $u_1 = 2$, it locates the tuples $(e_1, p_{1,e_1}, p_{2,e_1}, p_{3,e_1}, p_{4,e_1}, u_1)$. It outputs 1 if $p_{j,e_1} = 0$ for all $j \in [4]$ otherwise it outputs 0. If $u_1 = T$, it locates the tuples (e_1, p_{1,e_1}, u_1) . It outputs 1 if $p_{1,e_1} = 0$, otherwise it outputs 0.

Inspired from [Fre10], in [AS17] it was shown how to construct degree-2 slotted encoding scheme in the bilinear generic group model. We remark here that the procedure given in [AS17], was instantiated for higher degrees using graded encoding schemes. However, it can be instantiated for degree two using bilinear maps. Thus, we have the following theorem.

Theorem 2 (Imported from [AS17]). *There exists a construction of degree 2 slotted encoding scheme in the generic bilinear group model.*

3.3 Threshold Leveled Fully Homomorphic Encryption

The following definition of threshold homomorphic encryption is adapted from [MW16, BGG⁺]. A threshold homomorphic encryption scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\text{TFHE} = (\text{TFHE.Setup}, \text{TFHE.Enc}, \text{TFHE.Eval}, \text{TFHE.PartDec}, \text{TFHE.FinDec})$ satisfying the following specifications:

- **Setup**, $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n)$: It takes as input the security parameter λ , a circuit depth d , and the number of parties n . It outputs a public key fpk and secret key shares $\text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n$.
- **Encryption**, $\text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, \mu)$: It takes as input a public key fpk and a single bit plaintext $\mu \in \{0, 1\}$ and outputs a ciphertext CT .
- **Evaluation**, $\text{Eval}(C, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k)$: It takes as input a boolean circuit $C: \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ of depth $\leq d$ and ciphertexts $\text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k$ encrypted under the same public key. It outputs an evaluation ciphertext CT . We shall assume that the ciphertext also contains fpk .

- **Partial Decryption**, $p_i \leftarrow \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{CT})$: It takes as input a secret key share fsk_i and a ciphertext CT . It outputs a partial decryption p_i related to the party i .
- **Final Decryption**, $\text{FinDec}(B)$: It is a deterministic algorithm that takes as input a set $B = \{p_i\}_{i \in [n]}$. It outputs a plaintext $\hat{\mu} \in \{0, 1, \perp\}$.

Definition 5 (TFHE). A TFHE scheme is required to satisfy the following properties for all parameters $(\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_N) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n)$, any plaintexts $\mu_1, \dots, \mu_k \in \{0, 1\}$, and any boolean circuit $C: \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\} \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ of depth $\leq d$.

Correctness of Encryption. Let $\text{CT} = \text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, \mu_1)$ and $B = \{\text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{CT})\}_{i \in [n]}$. With all but negligible probability in λ over the coins of Setup , Enc , and PartDec , $\text{FinDec}(B) = \mu_1$.

Correctness of Evaluation. Let $\text{CT}_i = \text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, \mu_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq k$, $\hat{\text{CT}} = \text{Eval}(C, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k)$, and $B = \{\text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \hat{\text{CT}})\}_{i \in [n]}$. With all but negligible probability in λ over the coins of Setup , Enc , and PartDec , $\text{FinDec}(B) = C(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_k)$.

Compactness of Ciphertexts. There exists a polynomial, *poly*, such that $|\text{CT}| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, d)$ for any ciphertext CT generated from the algorithms of TFHE.

Compactness of Partial Decryption Keys. There exists a polynomial, *poly*, such that $|\text{fsk}_i| \leq \text{poly}(\lambda, d)$ for any index $i \in [n]$ generated from the setup algorithm of TFHE.

Semantic Security of Encryption. There exists a constant $c > 0$ such that any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} has only advantage bounded by $2^{-\lambda^c}$ as a function of λ over the coins of all the algorithms in the following game:

1. Run $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^d, 1^n) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_n)$. The adversary is given fpk .
2. The adversary outputs a set $S \subset [n]$ of size $n - 1$.
3. The adversary receives $\{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \in S}$ along with $\text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, b) \rightarrow \text{CT}$ for a random $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
4. The adversary outputs b' and wins if $b = b'$.

Simulation Security. Let $\text{CT}_i = \text{Enc}(\text{fpk}, \mu_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq k$, $\hat{\text{CT}} = \text{Eval}(C, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k)$, and $p_i = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \hat{\text{CT}})$ for all $i \in [n]$. There exists a PPT algorithm Sim such that for any subset S of the form $[n] \setminus i^*$, $\text{Sim}(\hat{\text{CT}}, \{\text{fsk}\}_S, C(\mu_1, \dots, \mu_k)) \rightarrow p'_{i^*}$ the following distributions are statistically close (in the security parameter):

$$(p_i, \text{fpk}, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k, \{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}) \approx (p'_{i^*}, \text{fpk}, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_k, \{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \in [n]}).$$

3.4 Useful Lemmas

We first import the following theorem from [MT10].

Theorem 3 (Imported Theorem [MT10]). Let $E: \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ and $F: \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ be two functions, and let $\epsilon, \gamma \in (0, 1)$ and $s > 0$ be given. If for all distinguishers \mathcal{A} with size s we have

$$\left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n} [\mathcal{A}(E(x)) = 1] - \Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m} [\mathcal{A}(F(y)) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon$$

Then there exist two measures \mathcal{M}_0 (on $\{0,1\}^n$) and \mathcal{M}_1 (on $\{0,1\}^n$) that depend on γ, s such that:

- $\mu(\mathcal{M}_b) \geq 1 - \epsilon$ for $b \in \{0,1\}$
- For all distinguishers \mathcal{A}' of size $s' = \frac{s\gamma^2}{128(m+n+1)}$

$$\left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_0}} [\mathcal{A}'(E(x)) = 1] - \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_1}} [\mathcal{A}'(F(y)) = 1] \right| \leq \gamma$$

Now we describe a lemma from [Hol06], that shows that if we sample a set Set from any measure \mathcal{M} by choosing each element i in the support with probability $\mathcal{M}(i)$, then no circuit of (some) bounded size can distinguish a sample x chosen randomly from the set Set from an element sampled from distribution given by \mathcal{M} . Formally,

Theorem 4 (Imported Theorem [Hol06]). *Let \mathcal{M} be any measure on $\{0,1\}^n$ of density $\mu(\mathcal{M}) \geq 1 - \rho(n)$ Let $\gamma(n) \in (0, 1/2)$ be any function. Then, for a random set Set chosen according to the measure \mathcal{M} the following two holds with probability at least $1 - 2(2^{-2^n \gamma^2 (1-\rho)^4} / 64)$:*

- $(1 - \frac{\gamma(1-\rho)}{4})(1 - \rho)2^n \leq |\text{Set}| \leq (1 + \frac{\gamma(1-\rho)}{4})(1 - \rho)2^n$
- For such a random set Set , for any distinguisher \mathcal{A} with size $|\mathcal{A}| \leq 2^n (\frac{\gamma^2(1-\rho)^4}{64n})$ satisfying

$$\left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow \text{Set}} [\mathcal{A}(x) = 1] - \Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}} [\mathcal{A}(x) = 1] \right| \leq \gamma$$

We also import a theorem from [CCL18] that will be used by our security proofs. This lemma would be useful to simulate the randomness used to encrypt in an inefficient hybrid.

Theorem 5 (Imported Theorem [CCL18]). *Let $n, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$, $\epsilon > 0$ and $\mathcal{C}_{\text{leak}}$ be a family of distinguisher circuits from $\{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ of size $s(n)$. Then, for every distribution (X, Z) over $\{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^\ell$, there exists a simulator $h : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\ell$ such that:*

- h has size bounded by $s' = O(s2^\ell \epsilon^{-2})$.
- (X, Z) and $(X, h(X))$ are indistinguishable by $\mathcal{C}_{\text{leak}}$. That is for every $C \in \mathcal{C}_{\text{leak}}$,

$$\left| \Pr_{(x,z) \leftarrow (X,Z)} [C(x, z) = 1] - \Pr_{x \leftarrow X, h} [C(x, h(x)) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon$$

4 Tempered Cubic Encoding

In this section, we describe the notion of a Tempered Cubic Encoding scheme (TCE for short). The encodings in this scheme are associated with a ring $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$, for an integer $\mathbf{p} \in \mathbb{Z}^{\geq 0}$ that is fixed by the setup algorithm. The plaintext elements are sampled from the set $R \in \cap[-\delta, \delta]$ for some constant δ . TCE consists of the following polynomial time algorithms:

- **Setup**, $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$: On input security parameter λ , the number of inputs n , this algorithm outputs public parameters params .
- **Setup-Encode**, $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params})$: On input params , this algorithm outputs secret encoding parameters sp .
- **Setup-Decode**, $\text{SetupDec}(\text{params})$: On input params , this algorithm outputs (public) decoding parameters (q_1, \dots, q_η) where $\eta = n^{1+\epsilon}$ described in the security definition.
- **Encode**, $\text{Encode}(\text{sp}, a, \text{ind}, S)$: On input the secret parameter sp , a plain-text element $a \in R$, a set $S = \{i\}$ with $i \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ and an index $\text{ind} \in [n]$, it outputs an encoding $[\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}$ with respect to the set S and an index ind . Without loss of generality, this algorithm is deterministic as all the randomness can be chosen during SetupEnc . This encoding satisfies two properties:
 - The encoding $[\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S} = ([\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}.\text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}.\text{priv}(2))$ consists of a public component $[\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}.\text{pub}$ and two private components $[\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}.\text{priv}(1)$ and $[\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}.\text{priv}(2)$.
 - $[\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}.\text{pub}$, $[\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}.\text{priv}(1)$ and $[\mathbf{a}]_{\text{ind}, S}.\text{priv}(2)$ are vectors over $\mathbb{Z}_\mathbf{N}$.
- **Decode**, $\text{Decode}(q, f, \{[\mathbf{a}_i]_{i,1}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{b}_i]_{i,2}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{c}_i]_{i,3}\}_{i \in [n]})$: The decode algorithm takes as input a decoding parameter q , a polynomial $f = \sum_{i,j,k} \gamma_{i,j,k} a_i b_j c_k$ with $|\gamma_{i,j,k}| \leq \delta$. It also takes encodings $\{[\mathbf{a}_i]_{i,1}\}_{i \in [n]}$, $\{[\mathbf{b}_i]_{i,2}\}_{i \in [n]}$ and $\{[\mathbf{c}_i]_{i,3}\}_{i \in [3]}$. It outputs $\text{leak} \in \mathbb{Z}_\mathbf{N}$.

Efficiency Properties: Consider the following experiment associated with any $n, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any index $\text{ind} \in [n]$, any level $\ell \in [3]$ and any plaintext $x \in [-\delta, \delta]$:

1. $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{params}$
2. $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \text{sp}$
3. $\text{Encode}(\text{sp}, x, \text{ind}, \ell) \rightarrow [\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind}, \ell}$

Then we require $||[\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind}, \ell}|| < \text{poly}(\lambda, \log n)$ for some fixed polynomial poly .

(X, Y, Z)-Multilinear polynomials. We define the notion of $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z})$ cubic multilinear polynomials below.

Definition 6 ((X, Y, Z)-Multilinear). *Let $\mathbf{X} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, $\mathbf{Y} = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ and $\mathbf{Z} = (z_1, \dots, z_n)$ be three sets of variables. A polynomial $p \in \mathbb{Z}_\mathbf{N}[x_1, \dots, x_n, y_1, \dots, y_n, z_1, \dots, z_n]$ is $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z})$ -multilinear if every term in the expansion of p is of the form $\tau_{ijk} \cdot x_i y_j z_k$, for some $i, j, k \in [n]$, $\tau_{ijk} \in \mathbb{Z}_\mathbf{N}$.*

Cubic Evaluation and Correctness: Consider the following experiment associated with any $n, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any index $\text{ind} \in [n]$, any index $\text{ind}_Q \in [\eta]$, any level $\ell \in [3]$, any polynomial $f = \sum_{i,j,k} \gamma_{i,j,k} a_i b_j c_k$ with $\gamma_{i,j,k} \in [-\delta, \delta]$ and any plaintexts $a_i, b_i, c_i \in [-\delta, \delta]$ for $i \in [n]$:

1. $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{params}$
2. $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \text{sp}$

3. $\text{SetupDec}(\text{params}) \rightarrow (q_1, \dots, q_\eta)$
4. $\text{Encode}(\text{sp}, a, i, 1) \rightarrow [\mathbf{a}]_{i,1}$ for $i \in [n]$
5. $\text{Encode}(\text{sp}, b, i, 2) \rightarrow [\mathbf{b}]_{i,2}$ for $i \in [n]$
6. $\text{Encode}(\text{sp}, c, i, 3) \rightarrow [\mathbf{c}]_{i,3}$ for $i \in [n]$
7. Let $q = q_{\text{ind}_Q}$
8. $\text{Decode}(q, f, \{[\mathbf{a}_i]_{i,1}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{b}_i]_{i,2}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{c}_i]_{i,3}\}_{i \in [n]}) \rightarrow \text{leak}$

Cubic Evaluation: We now describe cubic evaluation property. This property states that the $\text{Decode}(q, f, \{[\mathbf{a}_i]_{i,1}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{b}_i]_{i,2}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{c}_i]_{i,3}\}_{i \in [n]})$ algorithm evaluates an efficiently computable cubic polynomial $\phi_{q,f}$ which depends on params, f, q , and which is a $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z})$ -multilinear polynomial over \mathbb{Z}_N with:

- $\mathbf{X} = (\{[\mathbf{a}_i]_{i,1}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{b}_i]_{i,2}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{c}_i]_{i,3}.\text{pub}\}_{i \in [n]})$
- $\mathbf{Y} = (\{[\mathbf{a}_i]_{i,1}.\text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{b}_i]_{i,2}.\text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{c}_i]_{i,3}.\text{priv}(1)\}_{i \in [n]})$
- $\mathbf{Z} = (\{[\mathbf{a}_i]_{i,1}.\text{priv}(2), [\mathbf{b}_i]_{i,2}.\text{priv}(2), [\mathbf{c}_i]_{i,3}.\text{priv}(2)\}_{i \in [n]})$

Correctness: We require that with overwhelming probability over the randomness of the algorithms:

- If $f(a_1, \dots, a_n, b_1, \dots, b_n, c_1, \dots, c_n) = 0$, $|\text{leak}| < \text{TCEbound}(\lambda, n)$ for some polynomial TCEbound .
- Otherwise, $|\text{leak}| > \text{TCEbound}(\lambda, n)$.

4.1 Tempered Security

We present the definition of Tempered Security. Let \mathcal{F} be a family of homogenous $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{Z})$ -multilinear δ -bounded polynomials, for some sets of vectors \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y} and \mathbf{Z} (where each vector is of size n). We define \mathcal{S}_η to be a subset of η -sized product $\mathcal{F} \times \dots \times \mathcal{F}$ (also, written as \mathcal{F}^η).

We first describe the experiments associated with tempered security property. The experiment is associated with a deterministic polynomial time algorithm Sim . It is also parameterised by $\text{aux} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}, f_1, \dots, f_\eta)$. Each vector $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}$ is in \mathbb{Z}^n and $f_1, \dots, f_\eta \in \mathcal{S}_\eta$.

$\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 0)$:

1. Challenger performs $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{params}$
2. The challenger samples $(q_1, \dots, q_\eta) \leftarrow \text{SetupDec}(\text{params})$.
3. Challenger performs $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \text{sp}$.
4. Now compute encodings as follows.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,1} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, x_i, i, 1)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{y}_i]_{i,2} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, y_i, i, 2)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, z_i, i, 3)$ for every $i \in [n]$.

5. Compute $\text{leak}_j \leftarrow \text{Decode}(q_j, f_j, \{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\mathbf{y}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\mathbf{z}_i\}_{i \in [n]})$ for $j \in [\eta]$.
6. Output the following:
 - (a) Public components of the encodings, $\{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \cdot \text{pub}, \{\mathbf{y}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \cdot \text{pub}, \{\mathbf{z}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \cdot \text{pub}$.
 - (b) Decoding parameters q_j for $j \in [\eta]$.
 - (c) Output of decodings, $\{\text{leak}_j\}_{j \in [\eta]}$.

$\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1)$:

1. Challenger performs $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{params}$
2. The challenger samples $(q_1, \dots, q_\eta) \leftarrow \text{SetupDec}(\text{params})$.
3. Challenger performs $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \text{sp}$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,1} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, 0, i, 1)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{y}_i]_{i,2} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, 0, i, 2)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, 0, i, 3)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
4. Compute the following for all $j \in [\eta]$:

$$\widehat{\text{leak}}_j \leftarrow \text{Sim}(q_j, f_j, \{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\mathbf{y}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\mathbf{z}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, f_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}))$$

to obtain the simulated outputs.

5. Output the following:
 - (a) Public components of the encodings, $\{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \cdot \text{pub}, \{\mathbf{y}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \cdot \text{pub}, \{\mathbf{z}_i\}_{i \in [n]} \cdot \text{pub}$.
 - (b) Decoding parameters q_j for $j \in [\eta]$.
 - (c) Output of decodings, $\{\widehat{\text{leak}}_j\}_{j \in [\eta]}$.

Definition 7 (Tempered Security). *A tempered cubic encoding scheme $\text{TCE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{SetupEnc}, \text{SetupDec}, \text{Encode}, \text{Decode})$ associated with plaintext space $\mathbb{Z} = [-\delta, \delta]$ is said to satisfy **Tempered security** for polynomials (with coefficients over $[-\delta, \delta]$) if there exists an algorithm Sim so that following happens:*

$\exists c > 0$, such that for all large enough security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, and polynomial $n = n(\lambda)$ and any $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, $(f_1, \dots, f_\eta) \in \mathcal{S}_\eta$ and adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} ,

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 0)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1)) = 1]| \leq 1 - 2/\lambda + \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where $\text{aux} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}, f_1, \dots, f_\eta)$ and $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ is some negligible function.

Few remarks are in order:

Remark 2. For the rest of the paper, we abbreviate tempered security as \mathcal{S}_η -tempered security to explicitly mention the function class \mathcal{S}_η . One can imagine \mathcal{S}_η to be an arbitrary subset of $\mathcal{F} \times \dots \times \mathcal{F}$. However, to pursue our approach, we will set \mathcal{S}_η as the η -sized product of cubic polynomials in $n(\lambda)$ variables with the sum of absolute value of coefficients being bounded by some polynomial (in λ) independent of n . As described later, it turns out that this set contains the set of randomizing polynomials constructed by [LT17], and suffices to get iO .

Remark 3. (On distinguishing gap being $1 - 2/\lambda$) In the definition above and other definitions described in the paper, we require distinguishing gap of any adversary of some bounded size to be bounded by $1 - 2/\lambda + \text{negl}(\lambda)$, however it actually suffices if it is bounded by $1 - 1/\text{poly}(\lambda) + \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for any fixed polynomial poly . We do this for simplicity of description.

Remark 4. (On number of query polynomials) In the definition above, an implicit restriction on the number of polynomials (i.e., η polynomials). Indeed, in the instantiation, we only support $\eta = n^{1+\epsilon}$ for some $0 < \epsilon < 0.5$. This choice of parameters will suffice for our construction of iO . This ϵ will be set later.

5 Three-restricted FE

In this section we describe the notion of a three-restricted functional encryption scheme (denoted by 3FE).

Function class of interest: Consider a set of functions $\mathcal{F}_{3FE} = \mathcal{F}_{3FE, \lambda, \mathbf{p}, n} = \{f : \{\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n\}^3 \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}\}$ where $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ is a finite field of order $\mathbf{p}(\lambda)$. Here n is seen as a function of λ . Each $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\lambda, \mathbf{p}, n}$ takes as input three vectors $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$ over $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ and computes a polynomial of the form $\sum c_{i,j,k} \cdot x_i y_j z_k$, where $c_{i,j,k}$ are coefficients from $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$.

Syntax. Consider the set of functions $\mathcal{F}_{3FE, \lambda, \mathbf{p}, n}$ as described above. A three-restricted functional encryption scheme 3FE for the class of functions \mathcal{F}_{3FE} (described above) consists of the following PPT algorithms:

- **Setup**, $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$: On input security parameter λ (and the number of inputs $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$), it outputs the master secret key MSK.
- **Encryption**, $\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$: On input the encryption key MSK and input vectors $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, $\mathbf{y} = (y_1, \dots, y_n)$ and $\mathbf{z} = (z_1, \dots, z_n)$ (all in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$) it outputs ciphertext CT. Here \mathbf{x} is seen as a public attribute and \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{z} are thought of as private messages.
- **Key Generation**, $\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, f)$: On input the master secret key MSK and a function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{3FE}$, it outputs a functional key $sk[f]$.
- **Decryption**, $\text{Dec}(sk[f], 1^B, \text{CT})$: On input functional key $sk[f]$, a bound $B = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and a ciphertext CT, it outputs the result out .

We define correctness property below.

B-Correctness. Consider any function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{3FE}$ and any plaintext $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$. Consider the following process:

- $sk[f] \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, f)$.
- $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$
- If $f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \in [-B, B]$, set $\theta = f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$, otherwise set $\theta = \perp$.

The following should hold:

$$\Pr [\text{Dec}(sk[f], 1^B, \text{CT}) = \theta] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

for some negligible function negl .

Linear Efficiency: We require that for any message $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ the following happens:

- Let $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$.
- Compute $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$.

The size $|\text{CT}| \leq n \log_2 \mathbf{p} \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$. Here poly is some polynomial independent of n .

5.1 Semi-functional Security

We define the following auxiliary algorithms.

Semi-functional Key Generation, sfKG(MSK, f, θ): On input the master secret key MSK, function f and a value θ , it computes the semi-functional key $sk[f, \theta]$.

Semi-functional Encryption, sfEnc(MSK, $\mathbf{x}, 1^{|\mathbf{y}|}, 1^{|\mathbf{z}|}$): On input the master encryption key MSK, a public attribute \mathbf{x} and length of messages \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} , it computes a semi-functional ciphertext ct_{sf} .

We define two security properties associated with the above two auxiliary algorithms. We will model the security definitions along the same lines as semi-functional FE.

Definition 8 (Indistinguishability of Semi-functional Ciphertexts). *A three-restricted functional encryption scheme 3FE for a class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{3FE} = \{\mathcal{F}_{3FE, \lambda, \mathbf{p}, n}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ is said to satisfy **indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property** if there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} , the probability that \mathcal{A} succeeds in the following experiment is $2^{-\lambda^c}$.*

$\text{Expt}(1^\lambda, \mathbf{b})$:

1. \mathcal{A} specifies the following:

- Challenge message $M^* = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$. Here each vector is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$.
- It can also specify additional messages $\{M_k = (\mathbf{x}_k, \mathbf{y}_k, \mathbf{z}_k)\}_{k \in [q]}$ Here each vector is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$.
- It also specifies functions f_1, \dots, f_η and hardwired values $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_\eta$.

2. The challenger checks if $\theta_k = f_k(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$ for every $k \in [\eta]$. If this check fails, the challenger aborts the experiment.
3. The challenger computes the following
 - Compute $sk[f_k, \theta_k] \leftarrow \text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, f_k, \theta_k)$, for every $k \in [\eta]$.
 - If $\mathbf{b} = 0$, compute $\text{CT}^* \leftarrow \text{sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x}, 1^{|\mathbf{y}|}, 1^{|\mathbf{z}|})$. Else, compute $\text{CT}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$.
 - $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_i)$, for every $i \in [q]$.
4. The challenger sends $(\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [q]}, \text{CT}^*, \{sk[f_k, \theta_k]\}_{k \in [\eta]})$ to \mathcal{A} .
5. The adversary outputs a bit b' .

We say that the adversary \mathcal{A} succeeds in $\text{Expt}(1^\lambda, \mathbf{b})$ with probability ε if it outputs $b' = \mathbf{b}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$.

We now define indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property.

Definition 9 (Indistinguishability of Semi-functional Keys). *A three-restricted FE 3FE for a class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE}, \lambda, \mathbf{p}, n}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ is said to satisfy **indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property** if there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for all sufficiently large λ , any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} , the probability that \mathcal{A} succeeds in the following experiment is $2^{-\lambda^c}$.*

$\text{Expt}(1^\lambda, \mathbf{b})$:

1. \mathcal{A} specifies the following:
 - It can specify messages $M_j = \{(\mathbf{x}_i, \mathbf{y}_i, \mathbf{z}_i)\}_{j \in [q]}$. Here each vector is in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$
 - It specifies functions $f_1, \dots, f_\eta \in \mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE}}$ and hardcoded values $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_\eta$.
2. Challenger computes the following :
 - If $\mathbf{b} = 0$, compute $sk[f_i]^* \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, f_i)$ for all $i \in [\eta]$. Otherwise, compute $sk[f_i]^* \leftarrow \text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, f_i, \theta_i)$ for all $i \in [\eta]$.
 - $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_j)$, for every $j \in [q]$.
3. Challenger then sends $(\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [q]}, \{sk[f_i]^*\}_{i \in [\eta]})$ to \mathcal{A} .
4. \mathcal{A} outputs b' .

The success probability of \mathcal{A} is defined to be ε if \mathcal{A} outputs $b' = \mathbf{b}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$.

If a three-restricted FE scheme satisfies both the above definitions, then it is said to satisfy semi-functional security.

Definition 10 (Semi-functional Security). *Consider a three-restricted FE scheme 3FE for a class of functions \mathcal{F} . We say that 3FE satisfies **semi-functional security** if it satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property (Definition 8) and indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property (Definition 9).*

6 (Stateful) Semi-Functional Functional Encryption for Cubic Polynomials

In this section, we define the notion of Semi-Functional Functional Encryption (referred to as FE_3) for cubic polynomials. This is defined along the same lines as the definition of projective arithmetic functional encryption (PAFE), introduced by [AS17]. The main difference between our notion and PAFE is that, we allow for evaluation of arithmetic circuits over values from a bounded domain whereas PAFE allowed for evaluation of arithmetic circuits over large fields. Because of this, the decryption in [AS17] was expressed in two steps (Projective Decrypt and Recover), whereas the syntax of our decryption algorithm is the same as in a standard functional encryption scheme.

Function class of interest for FE_3 : We consider functional encryption scheme for cubic homogeneous polynomials over variables over integers \mathbb{Z} . Formally, consider a set of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n} = \{f : [-\rho, \rho]^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}\}$ where ρ is some constant. Here n is interpreted as a function of λ . Each $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n}$ takes as input $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in [-\rho, \rho]^n$ and computes a polynomial of the form $\sum c_{i,j,k} x_i x_j x_k$ over \mathbb{Z} (where some variables can repeat) and each coefficient $c_{i,j,k} \in [-\rho, \rho]$ and sum of absolute values of the coefficients $\sum_{j,k} |c_{i,j,k}| < w(\lambda)$. Constructing functional encryption for homogenous polynomials suffice to construct functional encryption for all cubic polynomials. This is because we can always write any polynomial as a homogeneous polynomial in the same variables and an artificially introduced variable set to 1.

Syntax. Consider the set of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3} = \mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n}$ as described above. A semi-functional functional encryption scheme FE_3 for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3}$ (described above) consists of the following PPT algorithms:

- **Setup**, $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$: On input security parameter λ and the length of the message 1^n , it outputs the master secret key MSK.
- **Encryption**, $\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x})$: On input the encryption key MSK and a vector of integers $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in [-\rho, \rho]^n$, it outputs ciphertext CT.
- **Key Generation**, $\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, i, f)$: On input the master secret key MSK and an index $i \in [\eta]$ denoting the index of the function in $[\eta]$, function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3}$, it outputs a functional key sk_f . Here, η denotes the number of key queries possible. Note that this algorithm is allowed to be stateful.
- **Decryption**, $\text{Dec}(sk_f, \text{CT})$: On input functional key sk_f and a ciphertext CT, it outputs the result *out*.

We define correctness property below.

Correctness. Consider any function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3}$, any index $i \in [\eta]$ and any plaintext integer vector $\mathbf{x} \in [-\rho, \rho]^n$. Consider the following process:

- $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$
- $sk_f \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, i, f)$.

- $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x})$

Let $\theta = 1$ if $f(\mathbf{x}) \neq 0$, $\theta = 0$ otherwise. The following should hold:

$$\Pr [\text{Dec}(sk_f, \text{CT}) = \theta] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

for some negligible function negl .

Remark 5. We consider a form of semi-functional functional encryption where the decryption algorithm only allows the decryptor to learn if the functional value $f(\mathbf{x})$ is 0 or not.

Linear Efficiency: We require that for any message $\mathbf{x} \in [-\rho, \rho]^n$ the following holds:

- Let $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$.
- Compute $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x})$.

The size $|\text{CT}| \leq n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, \log n)$. Here poly is some fixed polynomial independent of n .

6.1 Semi-functional Security

We define the following auxiliary algorithms.

Semi-functional Key Generation, $\text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, i, f, \theta)$: On input the master secret key MSK , function f , an index i and a value θ , it computes the semi-functional key $sk_{f,\theta}$.

Semi-functional Encryption, $\text{sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, 1^n)$: On input the master encryption key MSK , and the length 1^n , it computes a semi-functional ciphertext ct_{sf} .

We define two security properties associated with the above auxiliary algorithms.

We now define indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property.

Throughout the definition we denote by \mathcal{S}_η a set of tuples of dimension η over $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3}$. Thus $\mathcal{S}_\eta \subseteq \mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3}^\eta$.

Definition 11 (\mathcal{S}_η -Bounded Indistinguishability of Semi-functional Keys). A Semi-Functional FE scheme for cubic polynomials FE_3 for a class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ is said to satisfy \mathcal{S}_η -bounded indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property if there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for any sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} , the probability that \mathcal{A} succeeds in the following experiment is $2^{-\lambda^c}$.

$\text{Expt}(1^\lambda, 1^n, \mathbf{b})$:

1. \mathcal{A} specifies the following:

- It can specify messages $M_j = \{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i \in [q]}$. Here each vector is in $[-\rho, \rho]^n$
- It specifies function queries as follows:
 - It specifies $(f_1, \dots, f_\eta) \in \mathcal{S}_\eta \subseteq \mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3}^\eta$.
 - It specifies values $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_\eta$.

2. The challenger computes the following:

- $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$
- $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_j)$, for every $j \in [q]$.
- If $\mathbf{b} = 0$, compute $sk_{f_i}^* \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, i, f_i)$. Otherwise, compute $sk_{f_i}^* \leftarrow \text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, i, f_i, \theta_i)$ for all $i \in [\eta]$.

3. Challenger sends $\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in q}$ and $\{sk_{f_i}^*\}_{i \in [\eta]}$ to \mathcal{A} :

4. \mathcal{A} outputs b' .

The success probability of \mathcal{A} is defined to be ε if \mathcal{A} outputs $b' = \mathbf{b}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$.

Definition 12 (\mathcal{S}_η -Bounded Indistinguishability of Semi-functional Ciphertexts). For a semi-functional FE scheme FE_3 for a class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3} = \{\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, the \mathcal{S}_η -**bounded indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property** is associated with two experiments. The experiments are parameterised with $\text{aux} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, \Gamma, M_i = \{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}, M^* = (\mathbf{x}), f_1, \dots, f_\eta)$. $\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, 1^n, \mathbf{b})$:

1. The challenger sets $\theta_i = f_i(\mathbf{x})$ for $i \in [\eta]$. The challenger computes the following:
2. Compute $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$.
3. Compute $sk_{f_k, \theta_k} \leftarrow \text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, k, f_k, \theta_k)$, for every $k \in [\eta]$.
4. $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_i)$, for every $i \in \Gamma$.
5. If $\mathbf{b} = 0$, compute $\text{CT}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M^*)$.
6. If $\mathbf{b} = 1$ compute $\text{CT}^* \leftarrow \text{sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, 1^n)$.
7. Output the following:
 - (a) CT_i for $i \in \Gamma$ and CT^* .
 - (b) sk_{f_k, θ_k} for $k \in [\eta]$
 - (c) M^* and $\{M_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}$
 - (d) f_1, \dots, f_η

A semi-functional FE scheme FE_3 associated with plaintext space $\mathbb{Z} = [-\delta, \delta]$ is said to satisfy η -**indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property** if the following happens: $\exists c > 0$ such that, $\forall \lambda > \lambda_0$, polynomial $n = n(\lambda)$, polynomial Γ , for any messages $\{M_i\}_{i \in \Gamma} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, $M^* \in \mathbb{Z}^n$, $(f_1, \dots, f_\eta) \in \mathcal{S}_\eta$ and any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} ,

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 0)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, 1^n, 1)) = 1]| \leq 1 - 2/\lambda + \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where $\text{aux} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, \Gamma, M_i = \{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}, M^* = (\mathbf{x}), f_1, \dots, f_\eta)$

If a FE_3 scheme satisfies both the above definitions, then it is said to satisfy semi-functional security.

Definition 13 (\mathcal{S}_η -Bounded Semi-functional Security). Consider a semi-functional FE scheme for cubic polynomials FE_3 for a class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3}$. We say that FE_3 satisfies \mathcal{S}_η -**bounded semi-functional security** if it satisfies \mathcal{S}_η -bounded indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property (Definition 12) and \mathcal{S}_η -bounded indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property (Definition 11).

7 Semi-Functional Functional Encryption for Circuits

In this section, we define the notion of Semi-Functional Functional Encryption (referred to as sFE) for circuits.

Syntax. A Semi-Functional secret-key functional encryption scheme for a message space $\chi = \{\chi_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ and a function space $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_\lambda$ is a tuple of PPT algorithms with the following properties:

- **Setup**, $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$: On input security parameter λ , it outputs the master secret key MSK .
- **Encryption**, $\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, x)$: On input the encryption key MSK and a message $x \in \chi_\lambda$, it outputs ciphertext CT .
- **Key Generation**, $\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)$: On input the master secret key MSK and a function $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, it outputs a functional key sk_C .
- **Decryption**, $\text{Dec}(sk_C, \text{CT})$: On input functional key sk_C and a ciphertext CT , it outputs the result out .

We define correctness property below.

Correctness. Consider any function $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ and any plaintext $x \in \chi_\lambda$. Consider the following process:

- $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $sk_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)$.
- $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, x)$

The following should hold:

$$\Pr [\text{Dec}(sk_C, \text{CT}) = C(x)] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

for some negligible function negl .

Sub-Linear Efficiency: We require that for any message $x \in [-\rho, \rho]^n$ the following holds:

- Let $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
- Compute $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, x)$.

The size $|\text{CT}| \leq \ell_C^{1-\epsilon_C} \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda, |x|)$. Here poly is some fixed polynomial, $\epsilon_C > 0$ is some constant, $|x|$ is the length of the message x and $\ell_C = \max\{\text{size}(C)\}_{C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda}$.

7.1 Semi-functional Security

We define the following auxiliary algorithms.

Semi-functional Key Generation, $\text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, C, \theta)$: On input the master secret key MSK , function $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ and a value θ , it computes the semi-functional key $sk_{C,\theta}$.

Semi-functional Encryption, $\text{sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, 1^\lambda)$: On input the master encryption key MSK , and the length 1^λ , it computes a semi-functional ciphertext ct_{sf} .

We define two security properties associated with the above auxiliary algorithms.

We now define indistinguishability of semi-functional key property.

Definition 14 (Indistinguishability of Semi-functional Key). *A Semi-Functional FE scheme for circuits sFE for a class of functions $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ is said to satisfy **indistinguishability of semi-functional key property** if for sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} , the probability that \mathcal{A} succeeds in the following experiment bounded by $2^{-\lambda^c}$.*

$\text{Expt}(1^\lambda, \mathbf{b})$:

1. \mathcal{A} specifies the following:

- It can specify messages $M_j = \{x_j\}_{j \in [q]}$ for any polynomial q . Here each $M_j \in \chi_\lambda$.
- It specifies function queries as follows:
 - It specifies $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$.
 - It specifies values θ in output space of C .

2. The challenger computes the following:

- $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$
- $\text{CT}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_j)$, for every $j \in [q]$.
- If $\mathbf{b} = 0$, compute $sk_C^* \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, C)$. Otherwise, compute $sk_C^* \leftarrow \text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, C, \theta_i)$.

3. Challenger sends $\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [q]}$ and $\{sk_C^*\}$ to \mathcal{A} :

4. \mathcal{A} outputs b' .

The success probability of \mathcal{A} is defined to be ε if \mathcal{A} outputs $b' = \mathbf{b}$ with probability $\frac{1}{2} + \varepsilon$.

Definition 15 (Indistinguishability of Semi-functional Ciphertexts). *For a semi-functional FE scheme sFE for a class of functions $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, the **indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property** is associated with two experiments. The experiments are parameterised with $\text{aux} = (1^\lambda, \Gamma, M_i = \{x_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}, M^* = x, C)$*

$\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, \mathbf{b})$:

1. The challenger sets $\theta = C(x)$. The challenger computes the following:

2. Compute $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.

3. Compute $sk_{C,\theta} \leftarrow \text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, C, \theta)$.
4. $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_i)$, for every $i \in [\Gamma]$.
5. If $\mathbf{b} = 0$, compute $\text{CT}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M^*)$.
6. If $\mathbf{b} = 1$ compute $\text{CT}^* \leftarrow \text{sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, 1^\lambda)$.
7. Output the following:
 - (a) CT_i for $i \in \Gamma$ and CT^* .
 - (b) $sk_{C,\theta}$.
 - (c) M^* and $\{M_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}$
 - (d) C

A semi-functional FE scheme sFE associated with plaintext space χ is said to satisfy **indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property** if the following happens: $\exists c > 0$ such that $\forall \lambda > \lambda_0$, any polynomial Γ , messages $\{M_i\}_{i \in \Gamma} \in \chi_\lambda$, $M^* \in \chi_\lambda$, $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ and any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} :

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1)] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Expt}_{\text{aux}}(1^\lambda, 1)) = 1]| \leq 1 - 2/\lambda + \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where $\text{aux} = (1^\lambda, \Gamma, M_i = \{x_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}, M^* = x, C)$

Definition 16 (Semi-functional Security). Consider a semi-functional FE scheme sFE for a class of circuits $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. We say that sFE satisfies **semi-functional security** if it satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property (Definition 15) and indistinguishability of semi-functional key property (Definition 14).

Remark 6. Note that if in the indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property if instead of requiring the advantage of adversary to be bounded by $1 - 1/2\lambda + \text{negl}(\lambda)$, we require it to be $2^{-\lambda^c}$ for some constant $c > 0$, then this notion implies (sublinear) secret-key FE in traditional sense and is already enough to imply iO .

Now, we rephrase the above definition of indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertext security by using theorem 7.

Theorem 6. Fix $1^\lambda, 1^n, \Gamma, \{M_i\}, M^*, C$ as above. Define two functions E_b for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, that takes as input $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_b}$. Here ℓ_b is the length of randomness required to compute the following. The functions do the following.

Consider the following process:

1. Compute $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
2. Compute $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
3. Set $\theta = C(M^*)$. Compute $sk_C \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(\text{MSK}, C, \theta)$.
4. If $b = 0$, compute $\text{CT}^* = \text{sFE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, M^*)$ and if $b = 1$, compute $\text{CT}^* = \text{sFE.sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, 1^\lambda)$.

5. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, E_b on input $r \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_b}$ outputs $\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}, \text{sk}_C, \text{CT}^*$.

If sFE satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property, then, there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that there exists two computable (not necessarily efficient) measures \mathcal{M}_0 and \mathcal{M}_1 (\mathcal{M}_b defined over $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_b}$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$) of density exactly $1/\lambda$ such that, for all circuits \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} ,

$$\left| \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_0}} [\mathcal{A}(E_0(u)) = 1] - \Pr_{v \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_1}} [\mathcal{A}(E(v)) = 1] \right| < 2^{-\lambda^c}$$

Here both measures may depend on $(\{M_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}, C, M^*)$

Proof. We invoke theorem 7 to prove this. We recall the theorem below:

Theorem 7 (Imported Theorem [MT10]). *Let $E : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ and $F : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ be two functions, and let $\epsilon, \gamma \in (0, 1)$ and $s > 0$ be given. If for all distinguishers \mathcal{A} with size s we have*

$$\left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n} [\mathcal{A}(E(x)) = 1] - \Pr_{y \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^m} [\mathcal{A}(F(y)) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon$$

Then there exist two measures \mathcal{M}_0 (on $\{0, 1\}^n$) and \mathcal{M}_1 (on $\{0, 1\}^m$) that depend on γ, s such that:

- $\mu(\mathcal{M}_b) \geq 1 - \epsilon$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$
- For all distinguishers \mathcal{A}' of size $s' = \frac{s\gamma^2}{128(m+n+1)}$

$$\left| \Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_0}} [\mathcal{A}'(E(x)) = 1] - \Pr_{y \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_1}} [\mathcal{A}'(F(y)) = 1] \right| \leq \gamma$$

Due to security of sFE, we know that for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size $s = 2^{\lambda^{c_1}}$,

$$\left| \Pr_{u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_0}} [\mathcal{A}(E_0(u)) = 1] - \Pr_{v \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_1}} [\mathcal{A}(E(v)) = 1] \right| < 1 - 2/\lambda + \text{negl} < 1 - 3/2\lambda$$

Thus, there exists two measures \mathcal{M}'_0 (on $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_0}$) and \mathcal{M}'_1 (on $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_1}$) with density at least $3/2\lambda$ such that for all adversaries \mathcal{A}' of size $s' = s\gamma^2/128(\ell_0 + \ell_1 + 1)$,

$$\left| \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}'_0}} [\mathcal{A}'(E_0(u)) = 1] - \Pr_{v \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}'_1}} [\mathcal{A}'(E(v)) = 1] \right| < \gamma$$

Since $s = 2^{\lambda^{c_1}}$ we can set c such that $s' > 2^{\lambda^c}$ and $\gamma = 2^{-\lambda^c}$ for some constant $c > 0$.

Now define $\mathcal{M}_b = (\frac{1}{\lambda\mu(\mathcal{M}'_b)})\mathcal{M}'_b$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Note that the constants $\frac{1}{\lambda\mu(\mathcal{M}'_b)} < 1$ as the density $\mu(\mathcal{M}'_b) \geq 3/2\lambda$. Thus, these measures can be scaled so that their density is exactly $1/\lambda$. Since, \mathcal{M}_b induce the same distribution as \mathcal{M}'_b for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, the claim holds. \square

8 Step 1: Instantiating TCE

We start by describing the key ingredients and assumptions used to build our candidate. Then, we present our candidate.

8.1 Perturbation-Resilient Generator (Δ RG)

First we define the notion of a ϵ -polynomial sampler.

Definition 17. (*ϵ -polynomial sampler*) A randomized polynomial time algorithm Q is an ϵ -polynomial sampler if it takes as input a security parameter 1^λ , 1^n , and B , and outputs $(q_1, \dots, q_{n^{1+\epsilon}})$.

- Here each q_i is a homogeneous multilinear quadratic polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}[x_1, \dots, x_n]$.
- The coefficients of each polynomial are bounded by some polynomial $B_1(\lambda, n, B)$

Δ RG Assumption: There exists a constant $\epsilon > 0$ such that there exists an ϵ -polynomial sampler Q (with coefficient bound B_1), such that for every polynomial $B(\lambda)$, and for every large enough polynomial $n = n(\lambda)$, there exists a polynomial $B_2(n, \lambda)$ such that for all large enough λ , the following is true: for every a_1, \dots, a_η , where $\eta = n^{1+\epsilon}$, with $|a_i| \leq B(\lambda)$, we have that for any distinguisher D of size 2^λ :

$$|\Pr[D(x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{D}_1) = 1] - \Pr[D(x \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{D}_2) = 1]| < 1 - 2/\lambda$$

Here \mathcal{D}_1 and \mathcal{D}_2 are defined below:

- Distribution \mathcal{D}_1 : Sample $e_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} [-B_2, B_2]$ for $i \in [n]$. For $j \in [\eta]$, sample polynomials $Q(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow (q_1, \dots, q_\eta)$. Output $\{q_j, a_j + q_j(e_1, \dots, e_n)\}_{j \in [n^{1+\epsilon}]}$
- Distribution \mathcal{D}_2 : Sample $e_i \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} [-B_2, B_2]$ for $i \in [n]$. For $j \in [\eta]$, sample polynomials $Q(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow (q_1, \dots, q_\eta)$. Output $\{q_j, q_j(e_1, \dots, e_n)\}_{j \in [n^{1+\epsilon}]}$

Candidate Sampler Q : We now describe our candidate ϵ sampler Q for which Δ RG assumption holds. Q takes as input $1^n, 1^\lambda, B$ and does the following:

1. Set $B_1 = 1$ and $B_2 = B^2 \lambda^2$.
2. Sample polynomials $q_i(e_1, \dots, e_n) = \sum_{j,k \in [n], j > k} \gamma_{j,k} e_j e_k$ for $i \in [n^{1+\epsilon}]$. Here $\gamma_{j,k} \leftarrow [-B_1, B_1]$

8.2 LWE Preliminaries

A full-rank m -dimensional integer lattice $\Lambda \subset \mathbb{Z}^m$ is a discrete additive subgroup whose linear span is \mathbb{R}^m . The basis of Λ is a linearly independent set of vectors whose linear combinations are exactly Λ . Every integer lattice is generated as the \mathbb{Z} -linear combination of linearly independent vectors $\mathbf{B} = \{\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_m\} \subset \mathbb{Z}^m$. For a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_\mathbf{p}^{d \times m}$, we define the “ \mathbf{p} -ary” integer lattices:

$$\Lambda_\mathbf{p}^\perp = \{\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}^m \mid \mathbf{A}\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{\mathbf{p}}\}, \quad \Lambda_\mathbf{p}^\mathbf{u} = \{\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}^m \mid \mathbf{A}\mathbf{e} = \mathbf{u} \pmod{\mathbf{p}}\}$$

It is obvious that $\Lambda_\mathbf{p}^\mathbf{u}$ is a coset of $\Lambda_\mathbf{p}^\perp$.

Let Λ be a discrete subset of \mathbb{Z}^m . For any vector $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^m$, and any positive parameter $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}$, let $\rho_{\sigma, \mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x}) = \exp(-\pi \|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{c}\|^2 / \sigma^2)$ be the Gaussian function on \mathbb{R}^m with center \mathbf{c} and parameter σ . Next, we let $\rho_{\sigma, \mathbf{c}}(\Lambda) = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \Lambda} \rho_{\sigma, \mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})$ be the discrete integral of $\rho_{\sigma, \mathbf{x}}$ over Λ , and let $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda, \sigma, \mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{y}) := \frac{\rho_{\sigma, \mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{y})}{\rho_{\sigma, \mathbf{c}}(\Lambda)}$. We abbreviate this as $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda, \sigma}$ when $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{0}$. We note that $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma}$ is $\sqrt{m}\sigma$ -bounded.

Let S^m denote the set of vectors in \mathbb{R}^m whose length is 1. The norm of a matrix $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times m}$ is defined to be $\sup_{\mathbf{x} \in S^m} \|\mathbf{R}\mathbf{x}\|$. The LWE problem was introduced by Regev [Reg05], who showed that solving it *on average* is as hard as (quantumly) solving several standard lattice problems *in the worst case*.

Definition 18 (LWE). *For an integer $\mathbf{p} = \mathbf{p}(\mathbf{d}) \geq 2$, and an error distribution $\chi = \chi(\mathbf{d})$ over $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$, the Learning With Errors problem $\text{LWE}_{d,m,\mathbf{p},\chi}$ is to distinguish between the following pairs of distributions (e.g. as given by a sampling oracle $\mathcal{O} \in \{\mathcal{O}_s, \mathcal{O}_\mathfrak{s}\}$):*

$$\{\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{s}^T \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{x}^T\} \text{ and } \{\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u}\}$$

where $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{d \times m}$, $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}^d$, $\mathbf{u} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}^m$, and $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \chi^m$.

Gadget matrix. The gadget matrix described below is proposed in [MP12, AP14].

Definition 19. *Let $m = d \cdot \lceil \log \mathbf{p} \rceil$, and define the gadget matrix $\mathbf{G} = \mathbf{g}_2 \otimes \mathbf{I}_d \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times m}$, where the vector $\mathbf{g}_2 = (1, 2, 4, \dots, 2^{\lceil \log \mathbf{p} \rceil}) \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}^{\lceil \log \mathbf{p} \rceil}$. We will also refer to this gadget matrix as “powers-of-two” matrix. We define the inverse function $\mathbf{G}^{-1} : \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times m} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{m \times m}$ which expands each entry $a \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$ of the input matrix into a column of size $\lceil \log \mathbf{p} \rceil$ consisting of the bits of binary representations. We have the property that for any matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times m}$, it holds that $\mathbf{G} \cdot \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{A}) = \mathbf{A}$.*

8.3 Our TCE construction:

Below we present our TCE construction. This construction is inspired from the homomorphic encryption construction of [GSW13].

Setting the parameters: Set the following parameters:

- $d = \lambda^{c_1}$ for some constant $c_1 > 0$
- Let $\mathbf{p} = O(2^{\lambda^{c_2}})$ be a prime and $m = d \lceil \log \mathbf{p} \rceil$ for some constant $c > 0$ such that $\text{LWE}_{d,m,\mathbf{p},\chi}$ holds for a distribution χ bounded by a polynomial $B_3(\lambda)$.
- Set B_1 and B_2 such that the ΔRG assumption holds for some constant $\epsilon > 0$, length parameter n , security parameter λ and the polynomial $B(\lambda)$ (described below).
- \mathcal{S}_η : We set \mathcal{S}_η to be $(\mathcal{F}_{n,B_4})^\eta$. Here, \mathcal{F}_{n,B_4} is the set of homogenous cubic polynomials with sum of absolute value of coefficients in $[-B_4, B_4]$ for some polynomial $B_4(\lambda)$. This choice turns out to be sufficient to construct iO. Looking ahead, these polynomials will come from the set of degree three randomizing polynomials [LT17], which satisfy this property.
- B : The bound B is set to be $m^3 B_3 B_4$. This is computed as the maximum norm on the encodings for any function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{n,B_4}$ before smudging with $q(\cdot)$ values.
- TCEbound : TCEbound is the maximum norm of the decoded value for any function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{n,B_4}$ which evaluates to 0. It can be upper bounded by $B + n^2 B_1 B_2^2$.

We describe a non-commutative product lemma that will be useful to describe our construction. In particular, the function F_{ncp} described in the below lemma will be used in the decode algorithm.

Lemma 1 (Non-commutative Product Lemma). *Suppose we have a vector $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times d}$, matrices $\mathbf{U} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{d \times m}$, $\mathbf{V} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times m}$. There is a function $F_{ncp} : \mathbb{Z}_q^{nm^2 \times 1} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^{d \times m} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^{1 \times m}$ that given $\mathbf{a} \otimes \mathbf{V}$ and \mathbf{U} , computes \mathbf{aUV} . That is, $F_{ncp}(\mathbf{a} \otimes \mathbf{V}, \mathbf{U})$ outputs \mathbf{aUV} . Moreover, $F_{ncp}(\mathbf{a} \otimes \mathbf{V}, \mathbf{U}) = (\mathbf{q}_1(\mathbf{a} \otimes \mathbf{V}, \mathbf{U}), \dots, \mathbf{q}_m(\mathbf{a} \otimes \mathbf{V}, \mathbf{U}))$, where \mathbf{q}_i is a quadratic polynomial with every term being a product of an element in $\mathbf{a} \otimes \mathbf{V}$ and an element in \mathbf{U} .*

Proof. Let $\mathbf{a} = [a_1 \cdots a_d]$. The $(i, j)^{th}$ element in \mathbf{U} is denoted by $u_{i,j}$, for every $i \in [d], j \in [m]$. The $(i, j)^{th}$ element in \mathbf{V} is denoted by $v_{i,j}$.

Observe that the i^{th} element, for every $i \in [m]$, in \mathbf{aU} is denoted by $\sum_{j=1}^m a_j u_{ij}$. The i^{th} element in \mathbf{aUV} , for $i \in [m]$, is denoted by $\sum_{k=1}^m (\sum_{j=1}^d a_j u_{kj}) \cdot v_{ik}$. The expression $\sum_{k=1}^m (\sum_{j=1}^d a_j u_{kj}) \cdot v_{ik}$ can be rewritten as, $\sum_{k=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^d (a_j v_{ik}) \cdot u_{kj}$. Recall that $\mathbf{a} \otimes \mathbf{V}$ is a vector consisting of $a_j v_{ik}$, for every $i \in [d], j \in [m], k \in [m]$. Thus, $\sum_{k=1}^m \sum_{j=1}^d (a_j v_{ik}) \cdot u_{kj}$ is a quadratic polynomial, denoted by \mathbf{q}_i , with every term being a product of an element in \mathbf{aV} and an element in \mathbf{U} . Thus, $\mathbf{q}_i(\mathbf{aV}, \mathbf{U})$ computes the i^{th} element in \mathbf{aUV} , for $i \in [m]$. This completes the proof. \square

Construction. We describe the scheme TCE below.

- **Setup**, $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$: On input security parameter $\lambda, 1^n$, it sets $\text{params} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, B_1, B_2, \mathbf{p})$. Function class \mathcal{S}_η and parameters B, B_1, B_2 are instantiated later.
- **SetupEncode**, $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params})$: On input $\text{params} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, \text{adv}, B_1, B_2, \mathbf{p})$, run the following steps:

1. Sample $\mathbf{t} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times 1}$ and $\mathbf{C} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times m}$.
2. Set $\mathbf{b} = \mathbf{C}^T \mathbf{t} + \mathbf{e}^T$, where $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \chi^m$ with $\|\mathbf{e}\|_\infty \leq B_3$.
3. Set $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{C}^T \parallel \mathbf{b}]^T$ in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{(d+1) \times m}$.
4. Also set $\mathbf{s} = (\mathbf{t}^T, -1)$ in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{1 \times (d+1)}$.
5. Sample $e_i \leftarrow [-B_2, B_2]$ for $i \in [n]$.
6. Output $\text{sp} = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{A}, e_1, \dots, e_n)$

- **Encode**, $\text{Encode}(\text{sp}, x, \text{ind}, \ell)$: On input $\text{sp} = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{A}, e_1, \dots, e_n)$, plaintext $x \in [-\rho, \rho]$, index ind and level $\ell \in [3]$, proceed according to the three cases:

Sample uniformly $\mathbf{R}_{\text{ind}, \ell} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^{m \times m}$. Let $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{(d+1) \times m}$ denote the gadget matrix and let its inverse function be $\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\cdot)$, as given in Definition 19. Set $\phi \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$ such that $\phi \mathbf{s} \mathbf{G} \mathbf{e}_m = \lfloor \frac{\mathbf{p}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \rfloor$, where \mathbf{e}_m is an indicator vector of dimension m with the m^{th} position containing 1 and the rest of the elements are zero. Compute $([\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind}, \ell} \cdot \text{pub}, [\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind}, \ell} \cdot \text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind}, \ell} \cdot \text{priv}(2))$ according to Figure 1.

We also assume that all these public and private parts of the encodings are padded appropriately with string consisting of zeroes such that their lengths are same. This length is equal to $\ell_{enc} = (d+1) \times m \times m \log \mathbf{p}$, which is computed from the length of $[\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind}, \ell} \cdot \text{priv}(2)$.

Output $([\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind}, \ell} \cdot \text{pub}, [\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind}, \ell} \cdot \text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind}, \ell} \cdot \text{priv}(2))$.

	$[\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind},\ell}.\text{pub}$	$[\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind},\ell}.\text{priv}(1)$	$[\mathbf{x}]_{\text{ind},\ell}.\text{priv}(2)$
$\ell = 1$	$(\mathbf{AR}_{\text{ind},\ell} + x\phi\mathbf{G}, 1)$	$(x\phi, e_{\text{ind}})$	$(1, e_{\text{ind}})$
$\ell = 2$	$\mathbf{AR}_{\text{ind},\ell} + x\phi^{-1}\mathbf{G}$	$\mathbf{G}^{-1}(-\mathbf{AR}_{\text{ind},\ell})$	$x\phi^{-1}\mathbf{s}$
$\ell = 3$	$\mathbf{AR}_{\text{ind},\ell} + x\phi\mathbf{G}$	1	$\mathbf{s} \otimes \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_{\text{ind},\ell})$

Figure 1:

- **Setup-Decode**, $\text{SetupDec}(\text{params})$: On input $\text{params} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, \text{adv}, B_1, B_2, \mathbf{p})$, generate $Q(1^\lambda, 1^n, \cdot) \rightarrow (q_1, \dots, q_\eta)$, where Q is as defined in the ΔRG assumption.
- **Decode**, $\text{Decode}(q, f, \{U_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{V_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \{W_k\}_{k \in [n]})$: Let $f \in \mathcal{S}_\eta = \Sigma_{i,j,k} \gamma_{i,j,k} x_i y_j z_k$. Suppose $U_i.\text{priv}(1) = (Q_{i,\text{priv}(1)}, e_i)$ and $U_i.\text{priv}(2) = (Q_{i,\text{priv}(2)}, e_i)$. Consider the following operation:

- **Computing a monomial**: for every monomial of the form $x_i y_j z_k$, compute the following polynomial,

$$Z_{ijk} = Q_{i,\text{priv}(1)} \times V_j.\text{priv}(2) \times W_k.\text{pub} + F_{ncp}(W_k.\text{priv}(2), U_i.\text{pub} \times V_j.\text{priv}(1) - V_j.\text{pub} \times Q_{i,\text{priv}(1)}),$$

where F_{ncp} is the function guaranteed by Lemma 1.

$$\text{Output } \left| \left(\sum_{i,j,k} \gamma_{i,j,k} Z_{ijk} \right) \mathbf{e}_m + q(e_i, \dots, e_n) \right|.$$

We now prove the following properties.

Correctness: First, we prove correctness of homomorphic evaluation with respect to a monomial. Then, we show how to extend this to homomorphic evaluation of arbitrary polynomials.

Consider plaintexts $x_i, x_j, x_k \in [-\rho, \rho]$, indices $i, j, k \in [n]$. Generate $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ to obtain $\text{params} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, B_1, B_2, \mathbf{p})$. Generate $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params})$ to obtain $\text{sp} = (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{A}, e_1, \dots, e_n)$. Compute the following three encodings:

- $U_i \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, x_i, i, 1)$
- $V_j \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, x_j, j, 2)$
- $W_k \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, x_k, k, 3)$

Let $U_i.\text{Priv}(1) = (Q_{i,\text{priv}(1)}, e_i)$ and $U_i.\text{Priv}(2) = (Q_{i,\text{priv}(2)}, e_i)$. Perform the following operations.

- **Computing** $\text{Int}_1 = Q_{i,\text{priv}(1)} \times V_j.\text{priv}(2) \times W_k.\text{pub}$:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Int}_1 &= x_i \phi \cdot x_j \phi^{-1} \mathbf{s} \cdot (\mathbf{AR}_k + x_k \phi \mathbf{G}) \\ &= x_i x_j \mathbf{s} \mathbf{AR}_k + x_i x_j x_k \phi \mathbf{s} \mathbf{G} \end{aligned}$$

- **Computing** $\text{Int}_2 = (U_i.\text{pub} \times V_j.\text{priv}(1) - V_j.\text{pub} \times Q_{i,\text{priv}(1)})$:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Int}_2 &= ((\mathbf{AR}_i + x_i \phi \mathbf{G}) \times \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j) - (\mathbf{AR}_j + x_j \phi^{-1} \mathbf{G}) \times x_i \phi) \\ &= \mathbf{AR}_i \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{R}_j) + x_i \phi \mathbf{AR}_j - x_i \phi \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j) - x_i x_j \mathbf{G} \\ &= \mathbf{AR}_i \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j) - x_i x_j \mathbf{G} \end{aligned}$$

- **Computing** $Int_3 = F_{ncp}(W_k.\text{priv}(2), Int_2)$: Recall that $W_k = \mathbf{s} \otimes \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_k)$. From Lemma 1, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
Int_3 &= F_{ncp}(W_k.\text{priv}(2), Int_2) \\
&= \mathbf{s} \times (\mathbf{AR}_i \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j) - x_i x_j \mathbf{G}) \times \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_k) \\
&= \mathbf{sAR}_i \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j) \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_k) - x_i x_j \mathbf{sAR}_k
\end{aligned}$$

- **Computing** $Int = Int_1 + Int_3$:

$$Int_{ijk} = \mathbf{sAR}_i \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j) \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_k) + x_i x_j x_k \phi \mathbf{sG}$$

We calculate $|Int_{ijk} \times \mathbf{e}_m|$ below.

$$\begin{aligned}
|Int_{ijk} \times \mathbf{e}_m| &= |(\mathbf{sAR}_i \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j) \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_k) + x_i x_j x_k \phi \mathbf{sG}) \mathbf{e}_m| \\
&\leq |(\mathbf{sAR}_i \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j) \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_k)) \mathbf{e}_m| + |x_i x_j x_k \phi \mathbf{sG} \mathbf{e}_m| \\
&= |(\mathbf{sAR}_i \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j) \mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_k)) \mathbf{e}_m| + x_i x_j x_k \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{P}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor \\
&\leq m^3 \|\mathbf{sA}\|_\infty \cdot \|\mathbf{R}_i\|_\infty \cdot \|\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_j)\|_\infty \cdot \|\mathbf{G}^{-1}(\mathbf{AR}_k)\|_\infty + x_i x_j x_k \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{P}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor \\
&\leq m^3 B_3 + x_i x_j x_k \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{P}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor
\end{aligned}$$

We now prove the correctness of evaluation of a polynomial $f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} \gamma_{i,j,k} x_i x_j x_k$. We have,

$$\text{Decode}(q, f, \{U_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{V_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \{W_k\}_{k \in [n]}) = \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} \gamma_{i,j,k} Int_{ijk} \times \mathbf{e}_m + q(e_1, \dots, e_n)$$

There are two cases:

- **Case** $f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = 0$:

$$\begin{aligned}
|\text{Decode}(q, f, \{U_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{V_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \{W_k\}_{k \in [n]})| &\leq \left| \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} \gamma_{i,j,k} Int_{ijk} \times \mathbf{e}_m \right| + |q(e_1, \dots, e_n)| \\
&\leq \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} \gamma_{i,j,k} m^3 B_3 + \left(\sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} \gamma_{i,j,k} x_i x_j x_k \right) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{P}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor \\
&\quad + q(e_1, \dots, e_n) \\
&= \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} \gamma_{i,j,k} m^3 B_3 + q(e_1, \dots, e_n) \\
&\leq n^3 m^3 B_3 + n^2 B_2
\end{aligned}$$

- **Case** $f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = 1$:

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Decode}(q, f, \{U_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{V_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \{W_k\}_{k \in [n]}) &\leq \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} \gamma_{i,j,k} m^3 B_3 + \left(\sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} \gamma_{i,j,k} x_i x_j x_k \right) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{P}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor \\
&\quad + q(e_1, \dots, e_n) \\
&\leq n^3 m^3 B_3 + \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{P}}{2} \right\rfloor + n^2 B_2
\end{aligned}$$

Also,

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Decode}(q, f, \{U_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{V_j\}_{j \in [n]}, \{W_k\}_{k \in [n]}) &\geq \left(\sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} \gamma_{i,j,k} x_i x_j x_k \right) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{P}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor \\
&\geq \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{P}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor
\end{aligned}$$

Cubic Evaluation Property. The cubic evaluation property can be observed from the description of Decode.

Security. We prove security below.

Theorem 8. *The above scheme satisfies tempered security assuming the ΔRG assumption and learning with errors.*

Proof. We first describe the simulator associated with the above scheme.

$\text{Sim}(q_j, f_j, \{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\mathbf{y}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\mathbf{z}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, f_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}))$: On input polynomial q_j , function f_j associated with index $j \in [\eta]$, encodings $\{\mathbf{x}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\mathbf{y}_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\mathbf{z}_i\}_{i \in [n]}$ and output $f_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$,

- Sample $e_i \leftarrow [-B_2, B_2]$ for $i \in [n]$.
- Compute $(e'_1, \dots, e'_\eta) \leftarrow (q_1(e_1, \dots, e_n), \dots, q_\eta(e_1, \dots, e_n))$.
- (Smudge), Set $\widehat{\text{leak}}_j \leftarrow e'_j + f_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{P}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor$.
- Output $(\widehat{\text{leak}}_1, \dots, \widehat{\text{leak}}_\eta)$.

We describe the hybrids below. Let $\text{aux} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}, f_1, \dots, f_\eta)$. Each vector $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}$ is in \mathbb{Z}^n .

Hybrid₁: This corresponds to the real experiment. In particular, the output of this hybrid is:

1. Challenger performs $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{params}$
2. The challenger samples $(q_1, \dots, q_\eta) \leftarrow \text{SetupDec}(\text{params})$.
3. Challenger performs $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \text{sp}$.
4. Now compute encodings as follows.

- Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,1} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, x_i, i, 1)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{y}_i]_{i,2} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, y_i, i, 2)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, z_i, i, 3)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
5. Compute $\text{leak}_j \leftarrow \text{Decode}(q_j, f_j, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,1}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{y}_i]_{i,2}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3}\}_{i \in [n]})$ for $j \in [\eta]$.
 6. Output the following:
 - (a) Public components of the encodings, $\{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,1}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{y}_i]_{i,2}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3}.\text{pub}\}_{i \in [n]}$.
 - (b) Decoding parameters $\{q_j\}$ for $j \in [\eta]$.
 - (c) Output of decodings, $\{\text{leak}_j\}_{j \in [\eta]}$.

Hybrid₂: In this hybrid, the leakage output by decode is instead generated by the simulator.

1. Challenger performs $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{params}$
2. The challenger samples $(q_1, \dots, q_\eta) \leftarrow \text{SetupDec}(\text{params})$.
3. Challenger performs $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \text{sp}$.
4. Now compute encodings as follows.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,1} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, x_i, i, 1)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{y}_i]_{i,2} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, y_i, i, 2)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, z_i, i, 3)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
5. Compute $\{\widehat{\text{leak}}_j\}_{j \in [\eta]} \leftarrow \text{Sim}(q_j, f_j, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,1}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{y}_i]_{i,2}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3}\}_{i \in [n]}, f_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}))$.
6. Output the following:
 - (a) Public components of the encodings, $\{[\mathbf{x}_{b,i}]_{i,1}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{y}_{b,i}]_{i,2}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{z}_{b,i}]_{i,3}.\text{pub}\}_{i \in [n]}$.
 - (b) Decoding parameters q_j for $j \in [\eta]$.
 - (c) Output of decodings, $\{\widehat{\text{leak}}_j\}_{j \in [\eta]}$.

Claim 1. *Suppose that the ΔRG assumption is true then for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size at most 2^λ , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_1) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_2)]| \leq 1 - 2/\lambda + \text{negl}(\lambda)$*

Proof. The only difference between **Hybrid₁** and **Hybrid₂** is in how the η number of leakages are generated. In **Hybrid₁**, the j^{th} leakage is of the form $q_j(\cdot) + a_j$. Note that $a_j = e_{j, f_{he}} + f_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{p}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor$, where $e_{j, f_{he}}$ is some value in the range $[-B, B]$. In **Hybrid₂**, the j^{th} leakage is of the form $\widehat{\text{leak}}_j = q_j(\cdot) + f_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \cdot \left\lfloor \frac{\mathbf{p}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \right\rfloor$.

Suppose the output distributions of **Hybrid₁** and **Hybrid₂** are computationally distinguishable with probability greater than $1 - 2/\lambda + \text{negl}(\lambda)$, we can design an attacker that breaks the ΔRG assumption as follows. This attacker first generates $(e_{1, f_{he}}, \dots, e_{\eta, f_{he}})$: this is performed by first generating the TCE encodings and then computing $(e_{1, f_{he}}, \dots, e_{\eta, f_{he}})$ as a function of these encodings. The attacker submits this tuple to the challenger of the ΔRG assumption. The challenger

returns the polynomials (q_1, \dots, q_η) and $(\text{leak}_1, \dots, \text{leak}_\eta)$. The attacker then submits the TCE encodings along with (q_1, \dots, q_η) and $(\text{leak}_1 + f_1(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \cdot \lfloor \frac{\mathbf{p}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \rfloor, \dots, \text{leak}_\eta + f_\eta(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) \cdot \lfloor \frac{\mathbf{p}}{2n^3 B_4 \rho^3} \rfloor)$ to the distinguisher (who distinguishes **Hybrid**₁ and **Hybrid**₂). The output of the attacker is the same as the output of the distinguisher. Thus, if the distinguisher distinguishes with probability ε then the attacker breaks the ΔRG assumption with probability ε . \square

Hybrid₃: In this hybrid, generate the encodings as encodings of zeroes. In particular, execute the following operations.

1. Challenger performs $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{params}$
2. The challenger samples $(q_1, \dots, q_\eta) \leftarrow \text{SetupDec}(\text{params})$.
3. Challenger performs $\text{SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \text{sp}$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,1} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, 0, i, 1)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{y}_i]_{i,2} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, 0, i, 2)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
 - Compute the encodings, $[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}, 0, i, 3)$ for every $i \in [n]$.
4. Compute $\{\widehat{\text{leak}}_j\}_{j \in [\eta]} \leftarrow \text{Sim}(q_j, f_j, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,1}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{y}_i]_{i,2}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3}\}_{i \in [n]}, f_j(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}))$ to obtain the simulated outputs.
5. Output the following:
 - (a) Public components of the encodings, $\{[\mathbf{x}_{\mathbf{b},i}]_{i,1} \cdot \text{pub}, [\mathbf{y}_{\mathbf{b},i}]_{i,2} \cdot \text{pub}, [\mathbf{z}_{\mathbf{b},i}]_{i,3} \cdot \text{pub}\}_{i \in [n]}$.
 - (b) Decoding parameters q_j for $j \in [\eta]$.
 - (c) Output of decodings, $\{\widehat{\text{leak}}_j\}_{j \in [\eta]}$.

Claim 2. *Suppose the learning with errors assumption is true, then for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^λ , it holds that $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_2) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_3) = 1]| \leq 2^{-\lambda}$.*

Proof. We show the indistinguishability of **Hybrid**₂ and **Hybrid**₃ by considering the following sub-hybrids.

Hybrid_{2,1}: The only change between hybrids **Hybrid**₂ and **Hybrid**_{2,1} are in the generation of \mathbf{b} . In this hybrid, generate $\mathbf{b} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^m$.

The indistinguishability of hybrids **Hybrid**₂ and **Hybrid**_{2,1} follow from the learning with errors assumption.

Hybrid_{2,2}: The only change between **Hybrid**_{2,1} and **Hybrid**_{2,2} is in the generation of the public parts of the encodings. Specifically, for every $i \in [n], \ell \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, generate the public part of the encoding of $x_{i,\ell}$ as $[\mathbf{x}_{i,\ell}]_{i,\ell} \cdot \text{pub} = \mathbf{U}_{i,\ell} + x_{i,\ell} \mathbf{G}$. The statistical indistinguishability of **Hybrid**_{2,1} and **Hybrid**_{2,2} follows from the extended leftover hash lemma.

Hybrid_{2,3}: The only change between **Hybrid**_{2,2} and **Hybrid**_{2,3} is in the generation of the public parts of the encodings. Specifically, for every $i \in [n], \ell \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, generate the public part of the

encoding of $x_{i,\ell}$ as $[\mathbf{x}_{i,\ell}]_{i,\ell}.\text{pub} = \mathbf{U}_{i,\ell} + 0 \cdot \mathbf{G}$. The output distributions of **Hybrid**_{2,2} and **Hybrid**_{2,3} are identical.

Hybrid_{2,4}: The only change between **Hybrid**_{2,2} and **Hybrid**_{2,3} is in the generation of the public parts of the encodings. Specifically, for every $i \in [n], \ell \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, generate the public part of the encoding of $x_{i,\ell}$ as $[\mathbf{x}_{i,\ell}]_{i,\ell}.\text{pub} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_{i,\ell} + 0 \cdot \mathbf{G}$, with $\mathbf{A} = [\mathbf{C}^{\mathbf{T}} \parallel \mathbf{b}^{\mathbf{T}}]$, where (i) $\mathbf{C} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times m}$ and, (ii) $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{d \times 1}$.

The statistical indistinguishability of the output distributions of **Hybrid**_{2,3} and **Hybrid**_{2,4} follows from the extended leftover hash lemma.

Finally, learning with errors assumption implies that the output distributions of **Hybrid**_{2,4} and **Hybrid**₃ are computationally indistinguishable. This concludes the proof. □

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9 Step 2: Construction of Three-Restricted FE from Bilinear Maps

We construct a three-restricted FE scheme 3FE for the class of functions $\mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE}} = \{\mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE},\lambda,\mathbf{p},n}\}_{\lambda \in [\mathbb{N}]}$ (recalled below). We later show that 3FE satisfies semi-functional security property. The tool to construct this primitive is a 4-slotted encodings scheme, introduced by [AS17], of degree 2. We use additive notation to indicate the group operation. Each slot will correspond to a group of order \mathbf{p} . We recall this definition in Section 3.2. The abstraction of this scheme is similar to bilinear maps of composite order.

- Recall function class of interest. $\mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE}}$ consists of all functions $\mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE},\lambda,\mathbf{p},n} = \{f : \{\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n\}^3 \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}\}$ where $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ is a finite field of order $\mathbf{p}(\lambda)$. Here n is seen as a function of λ . Each $f \in \mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE},\lambda,\mathbf{p},n}$ takes as input three vectors $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$ over $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ and computes a polynomial of the form $\sum c_{i,j,k} x_i y_j z_k$ over $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$, where the coefficients are specified by the function f .

We describe the construction below. We assume that n is known to the algorithms implicitly.

Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n$): On input security parameter λ ,

- Sample $\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ for all $i \in [n]$. Denote $\boldsymbol{\alpha} = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n)$, $\boldsymbol{\beta} = (\beta_1, \dots, \beta_n)$ and $\boldsymbol{\gamma} = (\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n)$.
- Sample S uniformly at random from $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$.
- Sample \mathbf{R} uniformly at random from $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$.
- This algorithm also does setup for a slotted encoding scheme. For simplicity of notation, we assume that the encoding key and public parameters of this scheme are implicitly known to the encoding algorithm and public parameters are known to the evaluation algorithms. We also assume that the slotted encoding encodes elements in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$.

Set the master secret key to be $\text{MSK} = (\boldsymbol{\alpha}, \boldsymbol{\beta}, \boldsymbol{\gamma}, S, \mathbf{R})$.

KeyGen(MSK, f): On input the master secret key MSK and function f ,

- Compute $\mathbf{k}_{i,j} = [0 \mid \beta_i \cdot \gamma_j \cdot S \mid 0 \mid 0]_2$, for every $i, j \in [n]$.
- Sample r uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$. Compute $\Theta_{key} = [0 \mid V \cdot \mathbf{R} \mid 0 \mid r]_2$. We compute V as follows: let f be represented as a degree three polynomial g such that g is multilinear over the variables \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{z} . Let $g(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} c_{ijk} x_i y_j z_k$ with $c_{ijk} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$. We set the value V as $V = \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} c_{ijk} \alpha_i \beta_j \gamma_k$.

Output the resulting functional key $sk[f] = (\{\mathbf{k}_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [n]}, \Theta_{key})$.

Enc(MSK, $\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}$): The input message $M = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$ consists of a public attribute \mathbf{x} and private vectors \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} . Denote by x_i to be the i^{th} component in the vector of \mathbf{x} (and likewise for \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{z}). Perform the following operations:

- Sample $\Delta \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$ uniformly at random.
- Compute $\text{CT}_{2,i} = [y_i \mid \beta_i \cdot \Delta \mid 0 \mid 0]_1$, for every $i \in [n]$.
- Compute $\text{CT}_{3,i} = [z_i \mid \gamma_i \cdot \Delta \mid 0 \mid 0]_2$, for every $i \in [n]$.
- Compute $\text{CT}_i^x = [0 \mid (\alpha_i + x_i) \cdot \Delta^2 S^{-1} \mid 0 \mid 0]_1$, for every $i \in [n]$.
- Compute $\Theta_{ct} = [0 \mid \Delta^2 \cdot \mathbf{R}^{-1} \mid 0 \mid 0]_1$.

Output the ciphertext $\text{CT} = (\mathbf{x}, \{\text{CT}_{2,i}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\text{CT}_{3,i}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\text{CT}_i^x\}_{i \in [n]}, \Theta_{ct})$.

Dec($sk[f], 1^B, \text{CT}$): On input the functional key $sk[f]$ and a ciphertext CT, perform the following: Parse the ciphertext as $\text{CT} = (\mathbf{x}, \{\text{CT}_{2,i}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\text{CT}_{3,i}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\text{CT}_i^x\}_{i \in [n]}, \Theta_{ct})$ and the functional key as $sk[f] = (\{\mathbf{k}_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [n]}, \Theta_{key})$.

- For all $i, j, k \in [n]$, first compute $e(\text{CT}_{2,i}, \text{CT}_{3,j})$ to obtain $\widehat{\text{CT}}_{i,j}$ and then compute $\widehat{\text{CT}}_{i,j,k} = x_k \cdot \widehat{\text{CT}}_{i,j}$.
- For all $i, j, k \in [n]$, compute $e(\text{CT}_k^x, \mathbf{k}_{i,j})$ to obtain $\widehat{\text{CT}}_{i,j,k}^x$.
- For all $i, j, k \in [n]$, compute $\text{ans}_{i,j,k} = \widehat{\text{CT}}_{i,j,k} - \widehat{\text{CT}}_{i,j,k}^x$.
- Let f be represented as a polynomial $g = \sum_{i,j,k} c_{i,j,k} x_i y_j z_k$ where each $c_{i,j,k} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$. Compute $\sum_{i,j,k} c_{i,j,k} \text{ans}_{i,j,k} = \text{ans}^*$.
- Compute $e(\Theta_{key}, \Theta_{ct})$ to get Θ^* .
- Compute $out = \text{ans}^* + \Theta^*$. Check if $out = [j]_T$ for some $j \in [-B, B]$. If so, output the value j , otherwise output \perp .

Correctness of Decryption: Note that given a key for any function $f \in \mathcal{F}_{3FE}$ and a ciphertext encrypting $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$ the following happens: (please refer to the decryption algorithm)

1. First step ensures that $\widehat{CT}_{i,j} = [y_i z_j + \beta_i \gamma_j \Delta^2]_T$ and $\widehat{CT}_{i,j,k} = [x_k y_i z_j + x_k \beta_i \gamma_j \Delta^2]_T$ for all $i, j, k \in [n]$.
2. Second step ensures that $\widehat{CT}_{i,j,k}^x = [(\alpha_i + x_i) \beta_j \gamma_k \Delta^2]_T$ for $i, j, k \in [n]$.
3. Third step ensures that $\text{ans}_{i,j,k} = [x_i y_j z_k - \alpha_i \beta_j \gamma_k \Delta^2]_T$ for $i, j, k \in [n]$.
4. Fourth step ensures that $\text{ans}^* = [f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) - \Theta^* \Delta^2]_T$
5. Final step ensures that $\text{out} = [f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})]_T$.

Efficiency: We now bound the size of the cipher-text. Each cipher-text consists of $3n + 1$ slotted encodings and a vector \mathbf{x} . Each encoding is of size $\log_2 \text{poly}(\lambda)$. This proves the result.

9.1 Security

Theorem 9. *Assuming the existence of a degree two slotted encoding scheme with four slots in the bilinear generic group model, the construction 3FE is a semi-functionally secure three-restricted functional encryption scheme in the generic bilinear map model.*

We first describe the semi-functional algorithms.

sfKG(MSK, f , θ): On input master secret key MSK, function f and a value θ ,

- Compute $\mathbf{k}_{i,j} = [0 \mid \beta_i \cdot \gamma_j \cdot S \mid 0 \mid 0]_2$, for every $i, j \in [n]$
- Sample r uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$.
- Compute $\Theta_{key} = [0 \mid V \cdot \mathbf{R} \mid \theta \mid r]_2$. We compute V as follows: let f be represented as a degree three polynomial g such that g is multilinear over the variables \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{z} . Let $g(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z}) = \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} c_{ijk} x_i y_j z_k$ with $c_{ijk} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$. We set the value V as $V = \sum_{i,j,k \in [n]} c_{ijk} \alpha_i \beta_j \gamma_k$.

Output the resulting semi-functional key $sk[f, \theta] = (\{\mathbf{k}_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [n]}, \Theta_{key})$.

sfEnc(MSK, \mathbf{x} , $1^{|\mathbf{y}|}$, $1^{|\mathbf{z}|}$): On input $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^n$ and length $1^{|\mathbf{y}|}$, $1^{|\mathbf{z}|}$ (which are equal to n), where \mathbf{x} is the public attribute and \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z} is the private message. Denote by x_i to be the i^{th} component in the vector of \mathbf{x} .

- Sample Δ uniformly at random.
- Compute $CT_{2,i} = [0 \mid \beta_i \cdot \Delta \mid 0 \mid 0]_1$, for every $i \in [n]$.
- Compute $CT_{3,i} = [0 \mid \gamma_i \cdot \Delta \mid 0 \mid 0]_2$, for every $i \in [n]$.
- Compute $CT_i^x = [0 \mid (\alpha_i + x_i) \cdot \Delta^2 S^{-1} \mid 0 \mid 0]_1$, for every $i \in [n]$.
- Compute $\Theta_{ct} = [0 \mid \Delta^2 \cdot \mathbf{R}^{-1} \mid 1 \mid 0]_1$.

Output the semi-functional ciphertext $\text{ct}_{\text{sf}} = (\mathbf{x}, \{\text{CT}_{2,i}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\text{CT}_{3,i}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{\text{CT}_i^x\}_{i \in [n]}, \Theta_{\text{ct}})$.

First, we recall the generic (slotted) bilinear group model below. We use this model to argue security.

Generic Bilinear Group Model We describe the generic bilinear group model [BBG05] tailored to the slotted asymmetric setting. This model is parameterized by slotted encodings SE , which encodes four dimensional vectors over a prime field $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ at level 1 and 2, and it encodes element from $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ at the target level T . The encodings are done over level 1, 2 and the target T . The multiplication operation computes encoding at level T . The adversary in this model has access to an oracle \mathcal{O} . Initially, the adversary is handed out *handles* (sampled uniformly at random) instead of being handed out actual encodings. A handle is an element in a ring \mathbb{Z} of order \mathbf{p} . The oracle \mathcal{O} maintains a list L consisting of tuples $(e, \mathbf{Y}[e], u)$, where e is the handle issued, $\mathbf{Y}[e]$ is the formal expression associated with e and e is associated with encoding at level $u \in \{1, 2, T\}$.

The adversary is allowed to submit the following types of queries to the oracle:

- *Addition/ Subtraction*: The adversary submits (e_1, u_1) and (e_2, u_2) along with the operation '+' (or '-') to the oracle where $u_1, u_2 \in \{1, 2, T\}$. If $u_1 \neq u_2$ or If there is no tuple associated with either e_1 or e_2 , the oracle sends \perp back to the adversary. Otherwise, it replies according to the following cases:
 - $u_1 \in \{1, 2\}$: In this case it locates $(e_1, p_{1,e_1}, p_{2,e_1}, p_{3,e_1}, p_{4,e_1}, u_1)$ and $(e_2, p_{1,e_2}, p_{2,e_2}, p_{3,e_2}, p_{4,e_2}, u_2)$. It creates a new handle e' (sampled uniformly at random from \mathcal{R}) and appends $(e', p_{1,e_1} + p_{1,e_2}, p_{2,e_1} + p_{2,e_2}, p_{3,e_1} + p_{3,e_2}, p_{4,e_1} + p_{4,e_2}, u_1)$ to the list (in case of subtractions the polynomials are subtracted). It outputs e' to the adversary.
 - $u_1 = u_2 = T$: In this case the adversary locates the tuples (e_1, p_{e_1}, u_1) and (e_2, p_{e_2}, u_2) . It creates a new handle e' (sampled uniformly at random from \mathcal{R}) and appends $(e', p_{e_1} + p_{e_2}, u_1)$ (or $(e', p_{e_1} - p_{e_2}, u_1)$) to the list. The oracle sends e' to the adversary.
- *Multiplication*: The adversary submits (e_1, u_1) and (e_2, u_2) to the oracle. If there is no tuple associated with either e_1 or e_2 , the oracle sends \perp back to the adversary. If $u_1 = u_2, u_1 = T$ or $u_2 = T$, the oracle outputs \perp . Otherwise, it locates the tuples $(e_1, p_{1,e_1}, p_{2,e_1}, p_{3,e_1}, p_{4,e_1}, u_1)$ and $(e_2, p_{1,e_2}, p_{2,e_2}, p_{3,e_2}, p_{4,e_2}, u_2)$. It creates a new handle e' (sampled uniformly at random from \mathcal{R}) and appends $(e', \sum_{j \in [4]} p_{j,e_1} * p_{j,e_2}, T)$ to the list.
- *Zero Test*: The adversary submits element (e_1, u_1) to the oracle. If there is no tuple associated to e_1 it outputs \perp . Otherwise, if $u_1 = 1$ or $u_1 = 2$, it locates the tuples $(e_1, p_{1,e_1}, p_{2,e_1}, p_{3,e_1}, p_{4,e_1}, u_1)$. It outputs 1 if $p_{j,e_1} = 0$ for all $j \in [4]$ otherwise it outputs 0. If $u_1 = T$, it locates the tuples (e_1, p_{1,e_1}, u_1) . It outputs 1 if $p_{1,e_1} = 0$, otherwise it outputs 0.

Now we describe a lemma that will be crucial for the rest of the proof.

Lemma 2 (Schwartz-Zippel-DeMillo-Lipton). *Consider a polynomial $h \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}[y_1, \dots, y_n]$ for a prime \mathbf{p} . Suppose the degree of h is at most deg then,*

$$\Pr_{y_1, \dots, y_n \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}} [h(y_1, \dots, y_n) = 0] \leq \frac{\text{deg}}{\mathbf{p}}$$

We also give a generalisation of the lemma for rational polynomials which has also been re-proven in [AS17].

Lemma 3 (Schwartz-Zippel-DeMillo-Lipton for Rational Polynomials). *Consider two rational polynomials $h_1 = \frac{p_1}{q_1}$ and $h_2 = \frac{p_2}{q_2}$, where $p_1, q_1, p_2, q_2 \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}[y_1, \dots, y_n]$. Suppose the maximum degree of p_1, q_1, p_2, q_2 is at most deg . If $\mathbf{p} = 2^\lambda$ and $\text{deg} = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ then,*

$$\Pr_{y_1, \dots, y_n \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}} [h_1(y_1, \dots, y_n) = h_2(y_1, \dots, y_n) : h_1 \neq h_2] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Now we consider three scenarios.

- **Case 1:** The adversary is given normal function keys and normal ciphertexts.
- **Case 2:** The adversary is given semi functional keys and normal ciphertexts.
- **Case 3:** The adversary is given semi-functional keys and one semi-functional ciphertext along with remaining normal ciphertexts.

To argue indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property we need to argue that **Case 1** is indistinguishable to **Case 2**. To argue indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertext property, we need to argue **Case 2** is indistinguishable to **Case 3**. We will argue this in the following manner:

- We assume that the adversary is given some set of encodings (depending on which case he is in). Then the adversary submits a polynomial P for zero-test. The argument is similar for multiple queries.
- Adversary wins if P evaluates to 0 in one case and non-zero in another.
- By a case analysis on P , we will show the if the adversary wins with non-negligible probability, then P must contradict the shwartz zippel lemma.

In another words, we will show that if P evaluates to 0 with non-negligible probability in one case, then it should also evaluate to 0 with almost the same probability in other cases. Let us analyse these cases separately.

Case 1: In this case the adversary is given ciphertexts and keys which contain encodings at level 1 and 2. The adversary can query for any function key for functions f_l for $l \in [\eta]$. He also gets challenge ciphertext CT_1 along with other ciphertexts for CT_m for $m \in [2, q]$. Each key for f_l consists of the following encodings (variables denoted by $\alpha, \beta, \gamma, R, S, \Delta, r$ are chosen at random from $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$):

- $\mathbf{k}_{j,k} = [0 \mid \beta_j \cdot \gamma_k \cdot S \mid 0 \mid 0]_2$, for every $j, k \in [n]$
- $\Theta_{key} = [0 \mid V_l \cdot \mathbf{R} \mid 0 \mid r_l]_2$ for $l \in [\eta]$.

Each ciphertext consists of the following encodings:

- $\text{CT}_{2,j}^m = [y_{m,j} \mid \beta_j \cdot \Delta_m \mid 0 \mid 0]_1$, for every $j \in [n], m \in [q]$.
- $\text{CT}_{3,k}^m = [z_{m,k} \mid \gamma_k \cdot \Delta_m \mid 0 \mid 0]_2$, for every $k \in [n], m \in [q]$.

- $\text{CT}_i^{m,x} = [0 \mid (\alpha_i + x_{m,i}) \cdot \Delta_m^2 S^{-1} \mid 0 \mid 0]_1$, for every $i \in [n], m \in [q]$.
- $\Theta_{ct}^m = [0 \mid \Delta_m^2 \cdot \mathbf{R}^{-1} \mid 1 \mid 0]_1$ for every $m \in [q]$.

Adversary can make a zero-test query to the oracle \mathcal{O} of some polynomial $P \neq 0$ of degree 1. Note that such a polynomial will output 0 with probability at most $2/\mathbf{p}$. This follows from lemma 3 and the structure of the encodings. This is seen analysis of the polynomials that will be formed after addition of encodings at level 1 or 2. Analysis of this case is straightforward and hence we omit the details.

The adversary can construct encodings over the target group. Each encoding formed, is a linear combination of monomials/terms that are formed by evaluating multiplication of encodings of level 1 and level 2. We now list these monomials (note that an encoding of the form $[a \mid b \mid c \mid d]_T$ gives rise to a monomial of the form $a + b + c + d$):

1. $V_l \mathbf{R} \beta_j \Delta_m$ for $l \in [\eta], j \in [n], m \in [q]$.
2. $\beta_{j_1} \beta_{j_2} \gamma_k S \Delta_m$ for $j_1, j_2, k \in [n]$ and $m \in [q]$.
3. $y_{m_1, j} z_{m_2, k} + \beta_j \gamma_k \Delta_{m_1} \Delta_{m_2}$. for $i, j, k \in [n]$ and $m_1, m_2 \in [q]$
4. $(\alpha_i + x_{m,i}) \Delta_m^2 \beta_j \gamma_k$ for $i, j, k \in [n]$ and $m \in [q]$
5. $(\alpha_i + x_{m,i}) \Delta_m^2 S^{-1} V_l \mathbf{R}$ for $m \in [q], l \in [\eta]$ and $i \in [n]$.
6. $(\alpha_i + x_{m_1, i}) \Delta_{m_1}^2 \gamma_k S^{-1} \Delta_{m_2}$ for $m_1, m_2 \in [q]$ and $i \in [n]$.
7. $V_l \Delta_m^2$ for $l \in [\eta]$ and $m \in [q]$
8. $\beta_j \gamma_k S \mathbf{R}^{-1} \Delta_m^2$ for $m \in [q]$ and $j, k \in [n]$
9. $\gamma_k \Delta_{m_1} \mathbf{R}^{-1} \Delta_{m_2}^2$ for $k \in [n]$ and $m_1, m_2 \in [q]$.
10. 1. This is generated from the encoding of 1 at the level T .

Consider a zero test polynomial query P of this kind to the oracle \mathcal{O} .

Structure of P : Let us now consider a polynomial P which is a linear combination of monomials with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$. Any monomial of type $i \in [10]$ can have a coefficient of the form $c_{i, \dots}$ where the \dots is replaced with quantifiers of the variables in the monomials. For example, the coefficient of first monomial is represented as $c_{1, l, j, m}$ for $l \in [\eta], j \in [n]$ and $m \in [q]$. This polynomial P can be represented as: $k_0 + \sum_m k_{1, m} \Delta_m + \sum_{m_1, m_2} k_{2, m_1, m_2} \Delta_{m_1} \Delta_{m_2} + \sum_{m_1, m_2} k_{3, m_1, m_2} \Delta_{m_1}^2 \Delta_{m_2}$ where each term k_i is a function of variables independent of Δ . Now by using lemma 2, the probability that P vanishes at $(\Delta_1, \dots, \Delta_q)$ is bounded by $3/\mathbf{p}$. So it must be the case with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ that $k_0 = k_{1, m} = k_{2, m_1, m_2} = k_{3, m_1, m_2} = 0$ for all $m, m_1, m_2 \in [q]$. Now we analyse these cases separately.

CASE $k_{3, m_1, m_2} = 0$:

- This coefficient is formed due to linear combination of monomial of kind 6 and 9.
- The degree three term k_{3, m_1, m_2} is a linear combination of $(\alpha_i + x_{m_1, i}) \gamma_j S^{-1}$ for $i, j \in [n]$ and $\gamma_i \mathbf{R}^{-1}$ for $i \in [n]$.

- Viewing them first as polynomial over S^{-1} and \mathbf{R}^{-1} and then over $\alpha_i + x_i$ and γ_i for $i \in [n]$, we can argue by lemma 3 that with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ that each coefficient in this coefficient should be 0.

CASE $k_{1,m} = 0$:

- The degree one term $k_{1,m}$ is a linear combination of $\beta_{j_1}\beta_{j_2}\gamma_k S$ for $i, j, k \in [n]$ and $V_l \mathbf{R} \beta_j$ for $l \in [\eta], j, k, j_1, j_2 \in [n]$. This is formed due to the monomials 1 and 2. Here each $V_l = f_l(\alpha, \beta, \gamma)$.
- Viewing them first as polynomial over S and \mathbf{R} and then over β_i and γ_i for $i \in [n]$, we can argue by shwartz-zippel lemma that with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ that each coefficient in this combination should satisfy some linear equation dependent on the coefficients of the polynomial f_l for $l \in [\eta]$.

CASE $k_{2,m_1,m_2} = 0$:

- First we look at the case when $m_1 \neq m_2$. Such combinations are formed by combinations of monomials 3. Due to lemma 3, it can be said that with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$, each coefficient in the combination must be 0.
- Now we look at the case when $m_1 = m_2 = m$. Such combinations are formed due to monomials of type 3,4, 5, 7 and 8.
- The degree two term $k_{2,m,m}$ is a linear combination of $(\alpha_i + x_i)\beta_j\gamma_k$ for $i, j, k \in [n]$, $\beta_i\gamma_j\mathbf{R}^{-1}S$ for $i, j \in [n]$, $V_i\mathbf{R}(\alpha_j + x_j)S^{-1}$ for $i \in [\eta], j \in [n]$, V_i for $i \in [\eta]$, $\beta_i\gamma_j$ for $i, j \in [9]$ generated from monomials 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8.
- Here monomials 3, 4 and 7 gives us one condition while 5 and 8 give another.
- Now viewing theses combination as polynomial over S and \mathbf{R} and then using shwartz-zippel lemma it turns out that the coefficients corresponding to $\beta_j\gamma_k\mathbf{R}^{-1}S$ is identically 0.
- The coefficients $V_l\mathbf{R}(\alpha_i + x_{m,i})S^{-1}$ are a function of the coefficients f_l for $l \in [\eta]$ with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.
- The coefficients of monomials 3, 4 and 7, lead to an interesting condition. $\sum_{i,j,k,l} c_{4,m,i,j,k}(\alpha_i + x_{m,i})\beta_j\gamma_k + c_{7,m,l}V_l + c_{3,m,m,j,k}\beta_j\gamma_k = 0$, implying with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$, $c_{4,m,i,j,k} + \sum_l c_{7,m,l}f_{l,i,j,k} = 0$ and $\sum_i c_{4,m,i,j,k}x_i = -c_{3,m,m,j,k}$. This is the condition that ensures that the decryptor can only compute linear combinations of f_l for $l \in [\eta]$ for the messages which are encrypted. Here $f_{l,i,j,k}$ is the i, j, k coefficient of f_l .

CASE $k_0 = \sum_{m_1,m_2} k_{0,m_1,m_2} + k = 0$:

- The degree zero term k_{0,m_1,m_2} is computed by taking linear combinations of the monomial 3. Which has been considered in the previous case. When $m_1 \neq m_2$, the corresponding coefficients $c_{3,m_1,m_2,j,k}$ are 0 with as discussed in the previous case. So $k_{0,m_1,m_2} = 0$ for $m_1 \neq m_2$.

- When $m_1 = m_2 = m$, $k_{0,m,m} = \sum_{j,k} c_{3,m,m,j,k} y_{m,j} z_{m,k}$. But from previous case, $\sum_i c_{4,m,i,j,k} x_{m,i} = -c_{3,m,j,k}$. Thus, $k_{0,m,m} = \sum_{i,j,k} -c_{4,i,j,k} x_{m,i} y_{m,j} z_{m,k}$. Hence, $k_0 = \sum_m k_{0,m,m} = \sum_{l,m} c_{7,m,l} f_l(\mathbf{x}_m, \mathbf{y}_m, \mathbf{z}_m) + k = 0$ only if the corresponding linear combination of function values on input $f_l(\mathbf{x}_m, \mathbf{y}_m, \mathbf{z}_m)$ for $l \in [\eta]$ and $m \in [q]$ add up to $-k$.

Hence, by a union bound with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$, all these conditions must be satisfied.

Case 2: The analysis of case 2 is the same as the previous one as the monomials generated are the same. This ensures indistinguishability of **case 1** and **case 2**.

Case 3: This case has monomials similar to case 1 except when the monomials are formed by the semi-functional cipher-text CT_1 and semi-functional keys with hardwired values $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_\eta$. We describe all monomials explicitly.

1. $V_l \beta_j \Delta_m$ for $l \in [\eta], j \in [n], m \in [q]$.
2. $\beta_{j_1} \beta_{j_2} \gamma_k S \Delta_m$ for $j_1, j_2, k \in [n]$ and $m \in [q]$.
3. $y_{m_1,j} z_{m_2,k} + \beta_j \gamma_k \Delta_{m_1} \Delta_{m_2}$. for $i, j, k \in [n]$ and $m_1 \in [2, q]$ and $m_2 \in [q]$.
4. $\beta_j \gamma_k \Delta_1 \Delta_m$. for $i, j, k \in [n]$ and $m \in [q]$.
5. $(\alpha_i + x_{m,i}) \Delta_m^2 \beta_j \gamma_k$ for $i, j, k \in [n]$ and $m \in [q]$
6. $(\alpha_i + x_{m,i}) \Delta_m^2 S^{-1} V_l \mathbf{R}$ for $m \in [q], l \in [\eta]$ and $i \in [n]$.
7. $(\alpha_i + x_{m_1,i}) \Delta_{m_1}^2 \gamma_k \Delta_{m_2}$ for $m_1, m_2 \in [q]$ and $i \in [n]$.
8. $V_l \Delta_m^2$ for $l \in [\eta]$ and $m \in [2, q]$
9. $V_l \Delta_1^2 + \theta_l$ for $l \in [\eta]$.
10. $\beta_j \gamma_k S \mathbf{R}^{-1} \Delta_m^2$ for $m \in [q]$ and $j, k \in [n]$
11. $\gamma_k \Delta_{m_1} \mathbf{R}^{-1} \Delta_{m_2}^2$ for $k \in [n]$ and $m_1, m_2 \in [q]$.
12. 1. This is generated from the encoding of 1 at the level T .

Let us now consider a polynomial P which is a linear combination of monomials with coefficients in $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$. Any monomial of type $i \in [9]$ can have a coefficient of the form $c_{i,\dots}$ where the \dots is replaced with quantifiers of the variables in the monomials. For example, the coefficient of first monomial is represented as $c_{1,l,j,m}$ for $l \in [\eta], j \in [n]$ and $m \in [q]$. This polynomial P can be represented as: $k_0 + \sum_m k_{1,m} \Delta_m + \sum_{m_1, m_2} k_{2,m_1, m_2} \Delta_{m_1} \Delta_{m_2} + \sum_{m_1, m_2} k_{3,m_1, m_2} \Delta_{m_1}^2 \Delta_{m_2}$ where each term k_i is a function of variables independent of Δ . Now by using lemma 3, the probability that P vanishes at $(\Delta_1, \dots, \Delta_q)$ is bounded by $3/\mathbf{p}$. So it must be the case with probability at least $1 - 3/\mathbf{p}$ that $k_0 = k_{1,m} = k_{2,m_1, m_2} = k_{3,m_1, m_2} = 0$ for all $m, m_1, m_2 \in [q]$. Most of the cases are same as before but for completeness we argue them here.

CASE $k_{3,m_1, m_2} = 0$

- The analysis of this case is exactly the same in the case of functional keys and ciphertexts as the corresponding monomials for this case are same.

CASE $k_{1,m} = 0$

- The analysis of this case is also exactly the same in the case of functional keys and ciphertexts as the corresponding monomials for this case are same.

CASE $k_{2,m_1,m_2} = 0$

- The analysis of k_{2,m_1,m_2} for the following cases remains the same.
 1. $m_1 \neq m_2$. In that case the coefficients corresponding to monomials are identically 0.
 2. $m_1 = m_2 \neq 1$. In this case the monomials generated are the same, hence the analysis is the same.

CASE $k_{2,1,1} = 0$

- This term is generated by using linear combination of monomials of type 4, 5, 6, 9 and 10. Monomials 6 and 10 are functions of \mathbf{R} and S . They give some condition on the combination with respect to the functions f_l for $l \in [\eta]$.
- The combination of monomials 4, 5 and 9 gives us the following condition. $\sum_{i,j,k,l} c_{5,1,i,j,k} (\alpha_i + x_{1,i}) \beta_j \gamma_k + c_{9,1,l} V_l + c_{4,m,j,k} \beta_j \gamma_k = 0$, implying with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$, $c_{5,m,i,j,k} + \sum_l c_{9,l} f_{l,i,j,k} = 0$ and $\sum_i c_{5,1,i,j,k} x_i = -c_{4,1,j,k}$.

CASE $k_0 = \sum_{m_1,m_2} k_{0,m_1,m_2} + k = 0$

- This case is different. The only thing that changes is $k_{0,1,1}$ as $k_{0,i,j} = 0$ for $i \neq j$ and $k_{0,i,i}$ for $i \in [2, q]$ is the same as in the case of functional ciphertexts and keys. This is because they are generated from same monomials.
- $k_{0,1,1} = \sum_l c_{9,1,l} \theta_l$. Note that $\theta_l = f_l(\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{y}_1, \mathbf{z}_1)$. Hence, $k_0 = \sum_{m \geq 2} k_{0,m,m} + k_{0,1,1} + k = 0$ only if it is the corresponding linear combination of function values $f_l(\mathbf{x}_m, \mathbf{y}_m, \mathbf{z}_m)$ for $l \in [\eta]$ and $m \in [q]$ add up to $-k$. Here k is the contribution of the last monomial.

Thus if on input P , \mathcal{O} outputs 0 in case 1 and case 2, then with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$, it outputs 0 in case 3, for some negligible negl . Likewise, on input P , if \mathcal{O} outputs 0 in case 3, then with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$, it outputs 0 in case 1 and case 2, for some negligible $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ due to the structure of P . This completes the proof.

10 Step 3: Construction of Semi-Functional FE for Cubic Polynomials

In this section we construct and then prove correctness, efficiency and security for semi-functional functional encryption for cubic functions (referred as FE₃). For this construction we assume the existence of a three-restricted 3FE for a specific function class (defined below) and a tempered cubic encoding scheme, TCE.

Function class of interest for FE₃: We construct a semi-functional functional encryption scheme for cubic homogenous polynomials over variables over integers \mathbb{Z} . Formally, consider a set of functions $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n} = \{f : [-\rho, \rho]^n \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}\}$. Here n is seen as a function of λ and ρ is a constant. Each $f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n}$ takes as input $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in [-\rho, \rho]^n$ and computes a polynomial of the form $\sum c_{i,j,k} x_i x_j x_k$ over \mathbb{Z} (where some variables can repeat) and each coefficient $c_{i,j,k} \in [-\rho, \rho]$ and $\sum_{j,k} |c_{i,j,k}| < w(\lambda)$ for some fixed polynomial $w(\lambda)$ independent of n . In order to implement semi-functional functional encryption for this class of functions we use a 3FE scheme over some large prime \mathbf{p} and a TCE scheme with a plain-text space is $\mathbb{Z} \cap [-\Delta, \Delta]$ for some large enough Δ . Note that if \mathbf{p} is large the result of computation is the same as the computation done over \mathbb{Z} .

Setting parameters of TCE: We require the following notational properties of TCE which can be instantiated as in Section 8.3.

1. We require the plain-text space \mathbb{Z} to be $\mathbb{Z} \cap [-\Delta, \Delta]$ for some polynomial Δ . Δ should be larger than $w(\lambda)\rho^3$. This is so as to allow the computations of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3}$ to be done over \mathbb{Z} (instead of \mathbb{Z}) as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3}$ contain polynomials that act on inputs in $[-\rho, \rho]$. This idea will be more clear when we describe the construction.
2. (Representation) The encoding of any element $a \in R$ at any level $l \in \{1, 2, 3\}$ should consist of three parts as described now: $[\mathbf{a}]_l = ([\mathbf{a}]_l.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{a}]_l.\text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{a}]_l.\text{priv}(2))$. Each part is thought of as a vector of dimension $\mathbf{d} = \mathbf{d}(\lambda)$ over $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ for some prime $\mathbf{p} = \mathbf{p}(\lambda)$.
3. **Security:** We require that TCE scheme satisfy (\mathcal{S}_η) -Tempered Security. We will prove that if TCE satisfies \mathcal{S}_η -tempered security, the semi-functional FE scheme for cubic polynomials will satisfy \mathcal{S}_η -Bounded semi-functional security. Thus, to construct a semi-functional FE scheme for cubic polynomials for class of functions \mathcal{S}_η , we need TCE to satisfy \mathcal{S}_η -tempered security. Denote by $\mathcal{S}_\eta = (\mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n})^\eta$. Here, η is the maximum number of key queries handled by the scheme.
4. **Cubic Evaluation:** We require that $\text{TCE.Decode}(q, g, \cdot)$ for any cubic homogeneous polynomial amounts to evaluating another cubic homogeneous polynomial $\phi_{q,g}$ on $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ over encodings (with partial degree 1 in public as well as private components). This follows from the cubic evaluation property of Tempered Cubic Encoding.

Function class for 3FE: To allow compatability with TCE we will use 3FE for the following class of functions. $\mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE}, \lambda, 3nd, \mathbf{p}} = \{f : \{\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{3nd}\}^3 \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}\}$ where $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ is a finite field of order $\mathbf{p}(\lambda)$ takes as input $(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$ where each vector over $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ is of length $3nd$ and computes a polynomial of the form $\sum c_{i,j,k} x_i y_j z_k$ over $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$.

10.1 Construction

Now we formally present our construction.

FE₃.Setup($1^\lambda, 1^n$): On input the security parameter 1^λ the setup algorithm does the following:

1. Compute $\text{TCE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow \text{params}$.
2. Sample $(q_1, \dots, q_\eta) \leftarrow \text{TCE.SetupDec}(\text{params})$.

3. Let $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$ denote the prime field associated with TCE encodings. Let $[-\rho, \rho]^n$ for some $n = n(\lambda)$ denote the plaintext space of which the scheme needs to be constructed. Let $\mathbf{d} = \mathbf{d}(\lambda)$ be the dimension of each part of encoding of TCE.
4. Now let 3FE denote the scheme for the function class $\mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE}} = \mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE}, \lambda, 3nd, \mathbf{p}}$. Run $3\text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow sk$.
5. Then sample $\mathbf{sp} \leftarrow \text{TCE.SetupEnc}(\text{params})$. Encode vector \mathbf{z} with $z_i = 0$ for $i \in [n]$ at all the three levels. That is, compute $[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\mathbf{sp}, z_i, i, j)$ for every $i \in [n]$ and $j \in [3]$. Denote $[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j} = ([\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2))$. Here, both public and private components belong to $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{\mathbf{d}}$. These encodings are used only in the semi-functional algorithms.
6. Output $\text{MSK} = (\text{params}, sk, \mathbf{sp}, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, \{q_j\}_{j \in [n]})$.

$\text{FE}_3.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in [-\rho, \rho]^n)$: On input the encryption key and the plaintext message in $[-\rho, \rho]^n$ the encryption algorithm does the following:

1. Run $\text{TCE.SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \mathbf{sp}_1$.
2. Encode each x_i for $i \in [n]$ at all the three levels. That is compute $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\mathbf{sp}_1, x_i, i, j)$ for every $i \in [n]$ and $j \in [3]$. Denote $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j} = ([\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2))$. Here $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}.\text{pub}$, $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1)$ and $[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2)$ belong to $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{\mathbf{d}}$.
3. Construct three vectors \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} and \mathbf{C} in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{3nd}$ as follows.
 - Set \mathbf{A} as the vector of level **pub** parts of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{A} = (\{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}.\text{pub}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - Set \mathbf{B} as the vector of level **priv(1)** part of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{B} = (\{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1)\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - Set \mathbf{C} as the vector of level **priv(3)** part of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{C} = (\{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2)\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
4. Encrypt these encodings using 3FE scheme and output the resulting ciphertext. Formally, output $\text{CT} \leftarrow 3\text{FE.Enc}(sk, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C})$

$\text{FE}_3.\text{KeyGen}(\text{MSK}, i, f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n})$: The key generation on input the master secret key MSK , an index i and a cubic integer polynomial f with coefficients over n variables from $[-\rho, \rho]$ does the following:

1. Parse $\text{MSK} = (\text{params}, sk, \mathbf{sp}, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, \{q_j\}_{j \in [n]})$.
2. See f as a polynomial with short coefficients over \mathbb{Z} . Let $\phi_{q_i, f}$ denote the resulting polynomial in $\mathcal{F}_{3\text{FE}}$ that computes $\text{TCE.Decode}(q_i, f, \cdot) \in \mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}$,
3. Compute a key for the function $sk_f \leftarrow 3\text{FE.KeyGen}(sk, \phi_{q_i, f})$. Output (q_i, sk_f) .

$\text{FE}_3.\text{Dec}((q, sk_f), \text{CT})$: The decryption algorithm on input a 3FE functional key sk_f and TCE decoding parameter q and a ciphertext CT does the following.

1. Compute $\text{temp} \leftarrow 3\text{FE.Dec}(sk_f, 1^{B_{\text{FE}_3}}, \text{CT})$ for some large enough polynomial B_{FE_3} to ensure correctness (described shortly).
2. temp is either a value in $[-B_{\text{FE}_3}, B_{\text{FE}_3}]$ or \perp . If it is \perp , output 1 otherwise output 0.

Now we argue the properties associated with the scheme.

Correctness: We argue correctness now. Consider the following:

- Ciphertext, $\text{CT} \leftarrow 3\text{FE.Enc}(sk, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j} \cdot \text{pub}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j} \cdot \text{priv}(1)}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j} \cdot \text{priv}(2)}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
- Function key for f , $sk_f \leftarrow 3\text{FE.KeyGen}(sk, \phi_{q,f})$. Here q is the decoding parameter.

Due to the correctness of the scheme 3FE and cubic evaluation property of TCE, the decryption function, $3\text{FE.Dec}(sk_f, 1^{B_{\text{FE}_3}}, \text{CT})$ does the following:

It checks $|\text{Decode}(q, f, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})| < B_{\text{FE}_3}$. If this is the case it outputs $\text{Decode}(q, f, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$, otherwise it outputs \perp . Now there are two cases:

- If $f(x_1, \dots, x_n) = 0$ then $|\text{Decode}(q, f, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})| < B_{\text{FE}_3}$ due to correctness of TCE. In this case we always output 0. Thus $B_{\text{FE}_3} = \text{TCEbound}(\lambda, n)$
- If $f(x_1, \dots, x_n) \neq 0$ then $|\text{Decode}(q, f, \{[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})| > \text{TCEbound}(\lambda, n)$ with overwhelming probability due to correctness of TCE. In this case, we output 1 with overwhelming probability as 3FE decryption outputs a \perp with overwhelming probability.

Efficiency: We now bound the size of the ciphertext encrypting $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n) \in [-\rho, \rho]^n$. Encryption of \mathbf{x} consists of 3FE encryption of three encoding parts of x_i for $i \in [n]$. The size of each encoding $|[\mathbf{x}_i]_{i,j}| = 3 \log_2 p \cdot d < \text{poly}(\lambda, \log n)$ for some polynomial poly , due to the efficiency of the TCE scheme. Due to the linear efficiency of 3FE the size of $|\text{CT}| \leq n \cdot \text{poly}'(\lambda, \log n)$ for some polynomial poly' . Note that $n < 2^\lambda$, hence, the claim follows.

10.2 Security Proof

Now we argue security.

Theorem 10. *If 3FE is a secure three-restricted functional encryption scheme and TCE satisfies \mathcal{S}_η -tempered security, then the scheme described in Section 10.1 is a \mathcal{S}_η -bounded semi-functionally secure semi-functional functional encryption scheme for homogenous degree three polynomials according to definition 16.*

Proof. First we present the semi-functional algorithms and then prove \mathcal{S}_η -bounded indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts and \mathcal{S}_η -bounded indistinguishability of semi-functional keys separately.

$\text{FE}_3.\text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, k, f \in \mathcal{F}_{\text{FE}_3, \lambda, n}, \theta)$: The key generation on input the master secret key $\text{MSK} = (\text{params}, sk, \text{sp}, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, \{q_j\}_{j \in [n]})$, a cubic integer polynomial f over n variables from $[-\rho, \rho]$, an index $k \in [n]$ along with a value $\theta \in \mathbb{F}_p$ does the following:

1. Compute $\text{leak}_{\text{sim}} \leftarrow \text{TCE.Sim}(q_k, f, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,1}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,2}\}_{i \in [n]}, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,3}\}_{i \in [n]}, \theta)$.

2. Compute a 3FE semi-functional key for the function $\phi_{q_k, f}, sk_{f, \theta} \leftarrow \text{3FE.sfKG}(sk, \phi_{q_k, f}, \text{leak}_{sim})$. Output $sk_{f, \theta}$.

We now describe the semi-functional encryption algorithm:

$\text{FE}_3.\text{sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, 1^n)$: On input the encryption key $\text{MSK} = (\text{params}, sk, \text{sp}, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{\{j\}}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, \{q_j\}_{j \in [\eta]})$ and the length of the plaintext message n , the encryption algorithm does the following:

1. Parse $\mathbf{A} = \left(\{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i, j \cdot \text{pub}}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]} \right)$ in $\mathbb{F}_{\mathbf{p}}^{3nd}$.
2. Encrypt \mathbf{A} using the semi-functional encryption algorithm of 3FE scheme and output the resulting ciphertext. Formally, output $\text{ct}_{\text{sf}} \leftarrow \text{3FE.sfEnc}(sk, \mathbf{A}, 1^{3nd}, 1^{3nd})$.

We now prove the indistinguishability of semi-functional key property.

\mathcal{S}_η -bounded Indistinguishability of semi-functional key property: We do this by presenting two hybrids, where the first hybrid correspond to the security where when the function keys are honestly generated whereas the last hybrid corresponds to the security game when the functional keys are semi-functional.

Hybrid₀ : This corresponds to the security game with challenge bit $\mathbf{b} = 0$:

1. Adversary outputs message queries $\mathbf{X}^k = (x_1^k, \dots, x_n^k)$ for $k \in [q]$.
2. Challenger runs **Setup** to get 3FE encryption key sk , the encodings $\{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i, j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}$ and the TCE public parameters params and encoding parameter sp . It also samples decoding parameters $\{q_i\}_{i \in [\eta]}$.
3. The challenger computes $\text{CT}_k \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{X}^k)$ for $k \in [q]$.
4. Now the adversary requests functions $(f_1, \dots, f_\eta) \in \mathcal{S}_\eta$. It specifies values θ_i for $i \in [\eta]$.
The polynomials (q_i, f_i) uniquely defines a cubic polynomial ϕ_{q_i, f_i} for each $i \in [\eta]$.
5. The challenger computes $\text{leak}_i \leftarrow \text{TCE.Sim}(q_i, f_i, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i, j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, f_i, \theta_i)$
6. Challenger outputs $(q_i, sk_{f_i} \leftarrow \text{3FE.KeyGen}(sk, \phi_{q_i, f_i}))$ as the function key for $i \in [\eta]$.
7. Adversary outputs b' .

Hybrid₁ : This corresponds to the real security game with challenge bit $\mathbf{b} = 1$. The change is marked with the boldfaced word [**Change**]:

1. Adversary outputs message queries $\mathbf{X}^k = (x_1^k, \dots, x_n^k)$ for $k \in [q]$.
2. Challenger runs **Setup** to get 3FE encryption key sk , the encodings $\{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i, j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}$ and the TCE public parameters params and encoding parameter sp . It also samples decoding parameters $\{q_i\}_{i \in [\eta]}$.

3. The challenger computes $\text{CT}_k \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{X}^k)$ for $k \in [q]$.
4. Now the adversary requests functions $(f_1, \dots, f_\eta) \in \mathcal{S}_\eta$. It specifies values θ_i for $i \in [\eta]$.
The polynomials (q_i, f_i) uniquely defines a cubic polynomial ϕ_{q_i, f_i} for each $i \in [\eta]$.
5. The challenger computes $\text{leak}_i \leftarrow \text{TCE.Sim}(q_i, f_i, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, f_i, \theta_i)$
6. **[Change]** Challenger outputs $(q_i, sk_{f_i, \theta_i} \leftarrow \text{3FE.sfKG}(sk, \phi_{f_i}, \text{leak}_i))$ as the function key for $i \in [\eta]$.
7. Adversary outputs b' .

Lemma 4. *If 3FE scheme satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional key property then there exists some constant $c > 0$ such that for any adversary of size 2^{λ^c} , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_1) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^c}$.*

Proof. (Sketch) The only way in which the above two hybrids differ is the way the keys for functions f_i for each $i \in [\eta]$ are generated. In **Hybrid**₀ they are generated using **3FE.KeyGen**, while in **Hybrid**₁ they are generated using **3FE.sfKG** algorithm. Note that in both the hybrids **3FE.sfEnc** is not used. The reduction can be sketched as follows. The reduction generates the TCE parameters and encodings itself. Then, it gets from the adversary the messages \mathbf{X}^k , functions (f_1, \dots, f_η) and values $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_\eta)$. It generates values leak_i (using TCE parameters) and passes it along with messages and functions to the challenger of 3FE scheme. Challenger can then encrypt the cipher-text honestly. It flips a coin and either sends functional keys or the semi-functional keys. These are then used to simulate rest of the game. In the end the adversary outputs bit b' which the reduction outputs as it is. The indistinguishability now follows from the indistinguishability of semi-functional keys. \square

\mathcal{S}_η -bounded Indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertext property Fix messages $M_i = \{(\mathbf{x}_i)\}_{i \in \Gamma}$ for some polynomial Γ and a challenge $M^* = (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{z})$. Also fix $f_1, \dots, f_\eta \in \mathcal{S}_\eta$. This defines $\text{aux} = (1^\lambda, 1^n, \Gamma, M_i = \{(\mathbf{x}_i)\}_{i \in \Gamma}, M^* = (\mathbf{x}^*), f_1, \dots, f_\eta)$. Set $\theta_i = f_i(M^*)$ for all $i \in [\eta]$.

We now prove security by describing hybrids and arguing indistinguishability between them.

Hybrid₀ : This corresponds to the security game with challenge bit $\mathbf{b} = 0$:

1. Challenger runs **Setup** to get 3FE encryption key sk , the encodings $\{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}$ and the TCE public parameters params and encoding parameter sp and decoding parameters $\{q_i\}_{i \in [n]}$.
2. The challenger computes $\text{CT}_k \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
3. The challenger also encrypts M^* .
 - (a) Run $\text{TCE.SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \text{sp}_1$.
 - (b) Encode each x_i^* for $i \in [n]$ at all the three levels. That is compute $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}_1, x_i^*, i, j)$ for every $i \in [n]$ and $j \in [3]$. Denote $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j} = ([\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2))$. Here $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{pub}$, $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1)$ and $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2)$ belong to \mathbb{F}_p^d .
 - (c) Construct three vectors \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} and \mathbf{C} in \mathbb{F}_p^{3nd} as follows.
 - Set \mathbf{A} as the vector of level pub parts of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{A} = (\{[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{pub}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.

- Set \mathbf{B} as the vector of level $\text{priv}(1)$ part of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{B} = (\{[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1)\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - Set \mathbf{C} as the vector of level $\text{priv}(3)$ part of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{C} = (\{[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2)\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
- (d) Encrypt these encodings using 3FE scheme and output the resulting ciphertext. Formally, output $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{3FE.Enc}(sk, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C})$
4. The polynomials (q_i, f_i) uniquely defines a cubic polynomial ϕ_{q_i, f_i} for each $i \in [\eta]$.
 5. The challenger computes $\text{leak}_i \leftarrow \text{TCE.Sim}(q_i, f_i, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, f_i, \theta_i)$
 6. Challenger outputs $(q_i, sk_{f_i} \leftarrow \text{3FE.sfKG}(sk, \phi_{q_i, f_i}, \text{leak}_i))$ as the function key for $i \in [\eta]$.
 7. Adversary outputs b' .

Hybrid₁ : This corresponds is the same as the previous hybrid, except that function keys are generated using a semi-functional key with different hardwired values. The change is marked with boldfaced word [**Change**].

1. Challenger runs Setup to get 3FE encryption key sk , the encodings $\{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}$ and the TCE public parameters params and encoding parameter sp and decoding parameters $\{q_i\}_{i \in [\eta]}$.
2. The challenger computes $\text{CT}_k \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
3. The challenger also encrypts M^* .
 - (a) Run $\text{TCE.SetupEnc}(\text{params}) \rightarrow \text{sp}_1$.
 - (b) Encode each x_i^* for $i \in [n]$ at all the three levels. That is compute $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\text{sp}_1, x_i^*, i, j)$ for every $i \in [n]$ and $j \in [3]$. Denote $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j} = ([\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2))$. Here $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{pub}$, $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1)$ and $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2)$ belong to \mathbb{F}_p^d .
 - (c) Construct three vectors \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} and \mathbf{C} in \mathbb{F}_p^{3nd} as follows.
 - Set \mathbf{A} as the vector of level pub parts of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{A} = (\{[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{pub}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - Set \mathbf{B} as the vector of level $\text{priv}(1)$ part of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{B} = (\{[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1)\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - Set \mathbf{C} as the vector of level $\text{priv}(3)$ part of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{C} = (\{[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2)\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - (d) Encrypt these encodings using 3FE scheme and output the resulting ciphertext. Formally, output $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{3FE.Enc}(sk, \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C})$
4. The polynomials (q_i, f_i) uniquely defines a cubic polynomial ϕ_{q_i, f_i} for each $i \in [\eta]$.
5. [**Change**] The challenger computes $\text{leak}_i \leftarrow \text{TCE.Dec}(q_i, f_i, \{[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$
6. Challenger outputs $(q_i, sk_{f_i} \leftarrow \text{3FE.sfKG}(sk, \phi_{q_i, f_i}, \text{leak}_i))$ as the function key for $i \in [\eta]$.
7. Adversary outputs b' .

Lemma 5. *If 3FE satisfies semi-functional security, then there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Hybrid}_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Hybrid}_1) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^c}$.*

Proof. (Sketch) The only difference between the two hybrids is the hardwirings while computing semi-functional functional keys. In both hybrids, ciphertexts are generated by using $3FE.Enc$ algorithm. The indistinguishability follows from the indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property of the 3FE scheme. \square

Hybrid₂ : This corresponds is the same as the previous hybrid, except that challenge ciphertext is generated using semi-functional encryption algorithm of 3FE scheme.

1. Challenger runs **Setup** to get 3FE encryption key sk , the encodings $\{[z_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}$ and the TCE public parameters $params$ and encoding parameter sp and decoding parameters $\{q_i\}_{i \in [\eta]}$.
2. The challenger computes $CT_k \leftarrow Enc(MSK, M_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
3. The challenger also encrypts M^* .
 - (a) Run $TCE.SetupEnc(params) \rightarrow sp_1$.
 - (b) Encode each x_i^* for $i \in [n]$ at all the three levels. That is compute $[x_i^*]_{i,j} \leftarrow Encode(sp_1, x_i^*, i, j)$ for every $i \in [n]$ and $j \in [3]$. Denote $[x_i^*]_{i,j} = ([x_i^*]_{i,j}.pub, [x_i^*]_{i,j}.priv(1), [x_i^*]_{i,j}.priv(2))$. Here $[x_i^*]_{i,j}.pub$, $[x_i^*]_{i,j}.priv(1)$ and $[x_i^*]_{i,j}.priv(2)$ belong to \mathbb{F}_p^d .
 - (c) Construct three vectors \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} and \mathbf{C} in \mathbb{F}_p^{3nd} as follows.
 - Set \mathbf{A} as the vector of level **pub** parts of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{A} = (\{[x_i^*]_{i,j}.pub\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - Set \mathbf{B} as the vector of level **priv(1)** part of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{B} = (\{[x_i^*]_{i,j}.priv(1)\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - Set \mathbf{C} as the vector of level **priv(3)** part of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{C} = (\{[x_i^*]_{i,j}.priv(2)\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - (d) [**Change**] Encrypt these encodings using 3FE scheme and output the resulting ciphertext. Formally, output $CT \leftarrow 3FE.sfEnc(sk, \mathbf{A}, 1^{3nd}, 1^{3nd})$.
4. The polynomials (q_i, f_i) uniquely defines a cubic polynomial ϕ_{q_i, f_i} for each $i \in [\eta]$.
5. The challenger computes $leak_i \leftarrow \phi_{q_i, f_i}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C}) = TCE.Dec(q_i, f_i, \{[x_i^*]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
6. Challenger outputs $(q_i, sk_{f_i} \leftarrow 3FE.sfKG(sk, \phi_{q_i, f_i}, leak_i))$ as the function key for $i \in [\eta]$.
7. Adversary outputs b' .

Lemma 6. *If 3FE is semi-functionally secure, then there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_1) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_2) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^c}$.*

Proof. (Sketch.) The only difference between the two hybrids is the way CT^* is generated. In **Hybrid₁** it is generated using $3FE.Enc$ algorithm, encrypting $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{C})$. In **Hybrid₂**, it is generated as $3FE.sfEnc(sk, \mathbf{A}, 1^{3nd}, 1^{3nd})$. Note that function keys are generated according to the requirement of the indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts security game. The indistinguishability follows from the indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertext property of the 3FE scheme. \square

Hybrid₃ : This corresponds to challenge bit $\mathbf{b} = 1$. Namely, this hybrid is the same as the previous one except that both \mathbf{A} and $leak_i$ are generated as in TCE security game with challenge bit 1.

1. Challenger runs **Setup** to get 3FE encryption key sk , the encodings $\{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}$ and the TCE public parameters \mathbf{params} and encoding parameter \mathbf{sp} and decoding parameters $\{q_i\}_{i \in [n]}$.
2. The challenger computes $\text{CT}_k \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
3. The challenger also encrypts M^* .
 - (a) Run $\text{TCE.SetupEnc}(\mathbf{params}) \rightarrow \mathbf{sp}_1$.
 - (b) Encode each x_i^* for $i \in [n]$ at all the three levels. That is compute $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j} \leftarrow \text{Encode}(\mathbf{sp}_1, x_i^*, i, j)$ for every $i \in [n]$ and $j \in [3]$. Denote $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j} = ([\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{pub}, [\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1), [\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2))$. Here $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{pub}$, $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(1)$ and $[\mathbf{x}_i^*]_{i,j}.\text{priv}(2)$ belong to \mathbb{F}_p^d .
 - (c) Construct three vectors \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} and \mathbf{C} in \mathbb{F}_p^{3nd} as follows.
 - **[Change]** Set \mathbf{A} as the vector of level **pub** parts of encodings. That is, $\mathbf{A} = (\{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}.\text{pub}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]})$.
 - (d) Encrypt these encodings using 3FE scheme and output the resulting ciphertext. Formally, output $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{3FE.sfEnc}(sk, \mathbf{A}, 1^{3nd}, 1^{3nd})$.
4. The polynomials (q_i, f_i) uniquely defines a cubic polynomial ϕ_{q_i, f_i} for each $i \in [n]$.
5. **[Change]** The challenger computes $\text{leak}_i \leftarrow \text{TCE.Sim}(q_i, f_i, \{[\mathbf{z}_i]_{i,j}\}_{i \in [n], j \in [3]}, f_i, \theta_i)$.
6. Challenger outputs $(q_i, sk_{f_i} \leftarrow \text{3FE.sfKG}(sk, \phi_{q_i, f_i}, \text{leak}_i))$ as the function key for $i \in [n]$.
7. Adversary outputs b' .

Lemma 7. *If TCE satisfies \mathcal{S}_η -tempered security, then there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that for any adversary \mathcal{A} , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_2) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_3) = 1]| < 1 - 2/\lambda + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. (Sketch.) Note that both the hybrids depend only on public part of encoding \mathbf{A} and leakages θ_i . In \mathbf{Hybrid}_2 , they correspond to actual encoding of M^* , in \mathbf{Hybrid}_3 , they are simulated. The indistinguishability follows from \mathcal{S}_η tempered security of TCE scheme. \square

Thus we get the result from the above three lemmas. \square

11 Step 4: (Sublinear) Semi-Functional Secret Key FE from Semi-Functional FE for Cubic Polynomials

11.1 Randomizing Polynomials

A randomizing polynomials scheme defined over a field \mathbb{Z}_p consists of probabilistic polynomial time algorithms ($\text{CktEncd}, \text{InpEncd}, \text{Decd}$) and is associated with a class of circuits,

$$\mathcal{F}_{n,s} = \{C : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m : C \text{ is of size } s\}$$

- $\text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C)$: On input security parameter λ , a circuit C , it outputs polynomials (p_1, \dots, p_N) over \mathbb{Z}_p . This is a deterministic algorithm.

- $\text{InpEncd}(x; R)$: On input x , randomness R , it outputs the input encoding \mathbf{x} .
- $\text{Decd}(p_1(\mathbf{x}), \dots, p_N(\mathbf{x}))$: On input $p_1(\mathbf{x}), \dots, p_N(\mathbf{x})$, it outputs the decoded value y .

Definition 20. A tuple of algorithms $\text{RP} = (\text{CktEncd}, \text{InpEncd}, \text{Decd})$ is a randomizing polynomials scheme with ε -sublinear randomness complexity for a class of circuits $\mathcal{F}_{n,s}$ over $\mathbb{Z}_{\mathbf{p}}$ if the following properties are satisfied:

- **Correctness:** For every $C \in \mathcal{F}_{n,s}$, input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, for sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, we have $\Pr[\text{Decd}(p_1(\mathbf{x}), \dots, p_N(\mathbf{x})) = C(x)] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$, for some negligible function negl , where:
 - $(p_1, \dots, p_N) \leftarrow \text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C)$
 - $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{InpEncd}(x; R)$, where R is sampled from uniform distribution.
- **adv-Security:** There exists a simulator Sim such that the following holds: for every $C \in \mathcal{F}_{n,s}$, $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, sufficiently large $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, consider $\text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C) \rightarrow (p_1, \dots, p_N)$ and $\text{InpEncd}(x) \rightarrow \mathbf{x}$. Then, for all adversaries \mathcal{A} of size at least 2^λ ,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(p_1(\mathbf{x}), \dots, p_N(\mathbf{x})) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Sim}(1^\lambda, C, C(x))) = 1] < \text{adv}(\lambda) + \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

- **ε -Sublinear Input Encoding:** We require that the size of the circuit computing $\text{InpEncd}(x; R)$ is $(n + s^{\frac{1}{1+\varepsilon}}) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

Moreover, we say that RP is a degree- d randomizing polynomials scheme if every polynomial p_i is homogenous and has degree exactly d .

Definition 21. Let λ be the security parameter. By $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ we denote the set of circuits $C : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^*$ with size bounded by some polynomial $s(n, \lambda)$ and depth λ . In particular, this class contains NC^1 circuits of size $s(n, \lambda)$.

We construct a sublinear semi-functional secret key FE for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ for $s = n^{1+\varepsilon}$ for some $\varepsilon > 0$ starting from semi-functional FE for $\mathcal{F}_{\lambda,3}$, where \mathcal{F}_λ consists of all polynomial-sized (in λ) circuits and $\mathcal{F}_{\lambda,3}$ consists of all cubic polynomials over \mathbb{Z} . As an intermediate tool, we consider the notion degree three randomizing polynomials with ε -sublinear randomness complexity $\text{RP} = (\text{CktEncd}, \text{InpEncd}, \text{Decd})$ for some $\varepsilon > 0$. Let Sim_{RP} be the simulator associated with the randomizing polynomials scheme. Such RP was constructed in [LT17]:

Theorem 11 (Imported Theorem [LT17]). Assuming there exists pseudorandom generators with

- block locality three and stretch $n^{1+\varepsilon'}$ for some $\varepsilon' > 0$.
- distinguishing gap bounded by adv for adversaries of size 2^λ

there exist a adv -secure degree three randomizing polynomials scheme with $\frac{1}{1+\varepsilon}$ -sublinear efficiency.

We now describe the ingredients of the construction:

Ingredients.

- A degree 3 randomizing polynomials scheme RP for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ with $\epsilon = \frac{1}{1+\epsilon'}$ sublinear complexity. Here $\epsilon' > 0$ is some constant. For any circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$, let N denote the number such that $\text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C) = (p_1, \dots, p_N)$. N is upper bounded by $\text{spoly}(\lambda)$ for some polynomial poly . Also, each polynomial p_i is such that the sum of the absolute values of the coefficients are bounded by a fixed polynomial $w(\lambda)$. Let RP satisfy adv_{RP} -security.
- A Semi-functional FE scheme for cubic polynomials to be $\text{sFE}_3 = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ associated with semi-functional algorithms $(\text{sFE}_3.\text{sfEnc}, \text{sFE}_3.\text{sfKG})$. We require sFE_3 to satisfy \mathcal{S}_η -Bounded semi-functional security. \mathcal{S}_η is the set \mathcal{F}^N , where the set \mathcal{F} denotes the set of all homogeneous cubic polynomials with sum of absolute values of coefficients weight bounded by $w(\lambda)$. Note that the polynomials generated by RP are in class \mathcal{F} . In Section 10, we construct such a notion with distinguishing gap bounded by $1 - 2/\lambda$, but for a general exposition we assume that it is bounded by some advantage $\text{adv}_{\text{sFE}_3}$.

We denote the scheme we construct to be sFE .

Setup $(1^\lambda, 1^n)$: On input security parameter λ , input length n , it executes the setup of the underlying semi-functional FE scheme to obtain $\text{sFE}_3.\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{sFE}.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^{n'})$. It outputs secret key $\text{MSK} = \text{sFE}_3.\text{MSK}$. Here n' is the output length of $|\text{InpEncd}(\cdot, \cdot)|$. Note that $n' = n\text{poly}(\lambda)$ for some fixed polynomial poly .

KeyGen (MSK, C) : It takes as input master secret key MSK and circuit C .

- Compute the polynomials associated with the randomizing polynomials scheme; $(p_1, \dots, p_N) \leftarrow \text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C)$.
- Compute the sFE_3 keys associated with the polynomials (p_1, \dots, p_N) ; for every $i \in [N]$, compute $\text{sFE}_3.\text{KeyGen}(\text{sFE}_3.\text{MSK}; p_i)$ to obtain $\text{sFE}_3.sk_{p_i}$.

Output the functional key $sk_C = (\text{sFE}_3.sk_{p_1}, \dots, \text{sFE}_3.sk_{p_N})$. Note that $N = |C|\text{poly}(\lambda)$ for some polynomial poly .

Enc (MSK, x) : It takes as input the master secret key MSK and input x , of length n . It samples a binary string R uniformly at random of length ℓ_R . Here, ℓ_R is the length of randomness used in algorithm InpEncd to encode a circuit of size $|C|$ and input length n . It then computes $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{RP}.\text{InpEncd}(x, R)$. It then computes $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{sFE}_3.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x})$. It outputs the ciphertext $\text{sFE}.\text{CT} = \text{sFE}_3.\text{CT}$.

Dec (sk_C, CT) : It takes as input functional key sk_C and ciphertext CT . It executes the following steps:

- Parse sk_C as $(sk_{p_1}, \dots, sk_{p_N})$. Compute $\text{sFE}_3.\text{Dec}(sk_{p_i}, \text{CT})$ to obtain \tilde{y}_i , for every $i \in [N]$.
- Compute $\text{RP}.\text{Decode}(\tilde{y}_1, \dots, \tilde{y}_N)$ to obtain the output z .

Output z .

Correctness. Consider a circuit $C \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ and input x . Let the functional key, $sk_C = (sk_{p_1}, \dots, sk_{p_N})$ and ciphertext, $CT = \text{sFE}_3.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x})$, where $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{RP.InpEncd}(x, R)$, be as generated in the above scheme. From the correctness of sFE_3 , we have that $\text{sFE}_3.\text{Dec}(sk_{p_i}, CT)$ yields $p_i(\mathbf{x})$ for every $i \in [N]$. Moreover, from the correctness of randomizing polynomials, we have that the output of RP.Decode on input $(p_1(\mathbf{x}), \dots, p_N(\mathbf{x}))$ is $C(x)$.

Encryption Complexity. From the multiplicative overhead property in encryption complexity of sFE_3 , we have:

$$\begin{aligned} |\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, x)| &= |\mathbf{x}| \cdot \text{poly}_1(\lambda) \\ &= n' \cdot \text{poly}_1(\lambda) \\ &= n \text{poly}_2(\lambda) \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda) \\ &\leq |C|^\varepsilon \cdot \text{poly}(|x|, \lambda) \quad (\because \varepsilon\text{-sublinear randomness complexity of RP}) \end{aligned}$$

Thus, the encryption complexity is ε -sublinear in $|C|$, as intended.

11.2 Security

We show that sFE satisfies semi-functional security. Before we show that, we need to demonstrate the semi-functional algorithms.

$\text{sFE.sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, 1^{|x|})$: On input master secret key MSK , length of input $1^{|x|}$, we compute $\text{sFE}_3.\text{FkCT} \leftarrow \text{sFE}_3.\text{sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, 1^{|x|})$. Output the semi-functional ciphertext, $\text{FkCT} = \text{sFE}_3.\text{FkCT}$.

$\text{sFE.sfKG}(\text{MSK}, C, \Theta)$: On input master secret key MSK , circuit C , value θ , compute $\text{Sim}(1^\lambda, C, \Theta)$ to obtain $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N)$. It then computes $\text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_i \leftarrow \text{sFE}_3.\text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, p_i, \theta_i)$ for every $i \in [N]$, where $(p_1, \dots, p_N) \leftarrow \text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C)$. Output $sk_C = (\text{sFE}_3.\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sFE}_3.\text{sk}_N)$.

Theorem 12. *Assuming the \mathcal{S}_η -bounded indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property of sFE_3 , the scheme sFE satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property.*

Proof. (Sketch.) There are just two hybrids in the proof. First hybrid corresponds to the case when key and the ciphertexts are functionally generated. Second hybrid corresponds to the case when ciphertexts are functionally encrypted while the key is semi-functionally generated. Since sFE_3 scheme satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional keys property, the claim follows. \square

Theorem 13. *Assuming $\text{adv}_{\text{RP}} + \text{adv}_{\text{sFE}_3} < 1 - 2/\lambda$, the \mathcal{S}_η -bounded semi-functional security of sFE_3 and adv_{RP} -security of RP , the scheme sFE satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertext property.*

Proof. (Sketch.) We now list hybrids. First hybrid corresponds to the case when the ciphertext is functionally encrypted and the keys are semi-functional, whereas, in the last hybrid the ciphertext is semi-functionally encrypted and the keys are semi-functionally encrypted.

Hybrid₀ :

1. Adversary \mathcal{A} on input 1^λ , outputs challenge message x^* , message queries $\{x_i\}_{i \in [\Gamma]}$ and circuit C .

2. The challenger samples $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
3. Encrypt message queries honestly $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, x_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
4. To encrypt the challenge message do the following:
 - Sample a binary string R uniformly at random of length ℓ_R . Here, ℓ_R is the length of randomness used in algorithm InpEncd to encode a circuit of size $|C|$ and input length n .
 - Compute $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{RP.InpEncd}(x^*, R)$.
 - Compute $\text{CT}^* \leftarrow \text{sFE}_3.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x})$
 - Set $\theta = C(x^*)$
5. To generate the function key, do the following.
 - On input master secret key MSK , circuit C , value θ , compute $\text{Sim}(1^\lambda, C, \Theta)$ to obtain $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N)$. It then computes $\text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_i \leftarrow \text{sFE}_3.\text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, p_i, \theta_i)$ for every $i \in [N]$, where $(p_1, \dots, p_N) \leftarrow \text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C)$. Output $\text{sk}_C = (\text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_1, \dots, \text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_N)$.
6. . Give the following to the adversary:
 - Challenge ciphertext CT^* .
 - Ciphertext queries $\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}$
 - Function key sk_C .
7. \mathcal{A} guesses bit b' .

Hybrid₁ : This hybrid is the same as the previous one except that hardwirings in the semi-functional keys are done differently. We describe the hybrid now. The change is described with boldfaced word [**Change**].

1. Adversary \mathcal{A} on input 1^λ , outputs challenge message x^* , message queries $\{x_i\}_{i \in [\Gamma]}$ and circuit C .
2. The challenger samples $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
3. Encrypt message queries honestly $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, x_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
4. To encrypt the challenge message do the following:
 - Sample a binary string R uniformly at random of length ℓ_R . Here, ℓ_R is the length of randomness used in algorithm InpEncd to encode a circuit of size $|C|$ and input length n .
 - Compute $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{RP.InpEncd}(x^*, R)$.
 - Compute $\text{CT}^* \leftarrow \text{sFE}_3.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, \mathbf{x})$
 - Set $\theta = C(x^*)$
5. [**Change**] To generate the function key, do the following.

- On input master secret key MSK , circuit C , do the following.
 - Let $(p_1, \dots, p_N) \leftarrow \text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C)$.
 - Set $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N) = (p_1(\mathbf{x}), \dots, p_N(\mathbf{x}))$
 - compute $\text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_i \leftarrow \text{sFE}_3.\text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, p_i, \theta_i)$ for every $i \in [N]$. Set $sk_C = (\text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_1, \dots, \text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_N)$
6. . Give the following to the adversary:
- Challenge ciphertext CT^* .
 - Ciphertext queries $\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}$
 - Function key sk_C .
7. \mathcal{A} guesses bit b' .

Lemma 8. *If sFE_3 satisfies \mathcal{S}_η indistinguishability of semi-functional key property then there exists a constant c_0 for any adversary D of size $2^{\lambda^{c_0}}$, $|\Pr[D(\mathbf{Hybrid}_0) = 1] - \Pr[D(\mathbf{Hybrid}_1) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_0}}$.*

Proof. (Sketch). The only difference between the two hybrids is the way hardwirings θ_i for the keys fk.sk_i for $i \in [N]$ are generated. In \mathbf{Hybrid}_0 , they are generated using RP.Sim , while in \mathbf{Hybrid}_1 , they are generated as $p_i(\mathbf{x})$. Note that in both hybrids CT^* is functionally generated. The claim then follows from the security of sFE_3 scheme. □

Hybrid₂ : This hybrid is the same as the previous one except that ciphertext is generated using $\text{sFE}_3.\text{sfEnc}$ algorithm. We describe the hybrid now.

1. Adversary \mathcal{A} on input 1^λ , outputs challenge message x^* , message queries $\{x_i\}_{i \in [\Gamma]}$ and circuit C .
2. The challenger samples $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
3. Encrypt message queries honestly $\text{CT} \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, x_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
4. To encrypt the challenge message do the following:
 - Sample a binary string R uniformly at random of length ℓ_R . Here, ℓ_R is the length of randomness used in algorithm InpEncd to encode a circuit of size $|C|$ and input length n .
 - Compute $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{RP.InpEncd}(x^*, R)$.
 - **[Change]** Compute $\text{CT}^* \leftarrow \text{sFE}_3.\text{Enc}(\text{MSK}, 1^\lambda)$
 - Set $\theta = C(x^*)$
5. To generate the function key, do the following.
 - On input master secret key MSK , circuit C , do the following.
 - Let $(p_1, \dots, p_N) \leftarrow \text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C)$.
 - Set $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N) = (p_1(\mathbf{x}), \dots, p_N(\mathbf{x}))$
 - compute $\text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_i \leftarrow \text{sFE}_3.\text{sfKG}(\text{MSK}, p_i, \theta_i)$ for every $i \in [N]$. Set $sk_C = (\text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_1, \dots, \text{sFE}_3.\text{fk.sk}_N)$

6. . Give the following to the adversary:

- Challenge ciphertext CT^* .
- Ciphertext queries $\{CT_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}$
- Function key sk_C .

7. \mathcal{A} guesses bit b' .

Lemma 9. *If sFE_3 satisfies \mathcal{S}_η -bounded indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts then there exists a constant c_1 for any adversary D of size $2^{\lambda^{c_1}}$, $|\Pr[D(\mathbf{Hybrid}_1) = 1] - \Pr[D(\mathbf{Hybrid}_2) = 1]| < \text{adv}_{sFE_3} + \text{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. (Sketch). The only difference between the two hybrids is the way CT^* is generated. In **Hybrid**₁, they are generated using $sFE_3.\text{Enc}$ algorithm, while in **Hybrid**₂, they are generated using $sFE_3.\text{sfEnc}$ algorithm. Note that the keys are semi-functionally generated with $\theta_i = p_i(\mathbf{x})$, as required by indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property game of sFE_3 . The claim then follows from the security of sFE_3 scheme. □

Hybrid₃ : This hybrid is the same as the previous one except that the function key is generated using $sFE_3.\text{sfKG}$ algorithm. We describe the hybrid now.

1. Adversary \mathcal{A} on input 1^λ , outputs challenge message x^* , message queries $\{x_i\}_{i \in [\Gamma]}$ and circuit C .
2. The challenger samples $MSK \leftarrow sFE.\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
3. Encrypt message queries honestly $CT \leftarrow sFE.\text{Enc}(MSK, x_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
4. To encrypt the challenge message do the following:
 - Sample a binary string R uniformly at random of length ℓ_R . Here, ℓ_R is the length of randomness used in algorithm InpEncd to encode a circuit of size $|C|$ and input length n .
 - Compute $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{RP.InpEncd}(x^*, R)$.
 - Compute $CT^* \leftarrow sFE_3.\text{Enc}(MSK, 1^\lambda)$
 - Set $\theta = C(x^*)$
5. [**Change**] To generate the function key, do the following.
 - On input master secret key MSK , circuit C , value θ , compute $\text{Sim}(1^\lambda, C, \Theta)$ to obtain $(\theta_1, \dots, \theta_N)$. It then computes $sFE_3.\text{fk.sk}_i \leftarrow sFE_3.\text{sfKG}(MSK, p_i, \theta_i)$ for every $i \in [N]$, where $(p_1, \dots, p_N) \leftarrow \text{CktEncd}(1^\lambda, C)$. Output $sk_C = (sFE_3.\text{fk.sk}_1, \dots, sFE_3.\text{fk.sk}_N)$.
6. . Give the following to the adversary:
 - Challenge ciphertext CT^* .
 - Ciphertext queries $\{CT_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}$

- Function key sk_C .

7. \mathcal{A} guesses bit b' .

Lemma 10. *If RP is adv_{RP} -secure then for any adversary D of size 2^λ , $|\Pr[D(\mathbf{Hybrid}_2) = 1] - \Pr[D(\mathbf{Hybrid}_3) = 1]| < \text{adv}_{\text{RP}}$.*

Proof. (Sketch). The only difference between the two hybrids is the way hardwirings θ_i are generated. In \mathbf{Hybrid}_2 , they are generated as $p_i(\mathbf{x})$ where $\mathbf{x} \leftarrow \text{RP.InpEncd}(x^*, R)$. In \mathbf{Hybrid}_3 they are simulated using simulator of the RP scheme. Note that in both the hybrids CT^* is semi-functionally encrypted and x^* is absent. The claim then follows from the security of RP scheme. \square

From the lemmas above, as long as the sum of advantages $\text{adv}_{\text{RP}} + \text{adv}_{\text{sFE}_3} + \text{negl} < 1 - 2/\lambda + \text{negl}(\lambda)$, the claim goes through. \square

Remark 7. *From the above proof, we observe that as long as $\text{adv}_{\text{RP}} + \text{adv}_{\text{sFE}_3} < 1 - 2/\lambda$, the proof goes through. Thus we can allow a trade off in the required level of security between a three block local PRGs and ΔRG assumption. This is because $\text{adv}_{\text{RP}} = \text{adv}_{\text{PRG}}$ and $\text{adv}_{\text{RP}} = \text{adv}_{\Delta\text{RG}}$ upto negligible factors. Here adv_{PRG} and $\text{adv}_{\Delta\text{RG}}$ is the allowed distinguishing gap for a three block local PRG and ΔRG respectively.*

12 Step 5: Amplification

In this section, we construct sub-exponentially secure sublinear secret key FE (denoted by FE) for circuits from three ingredients described below. More formally, let $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ be the class of circuits for which FE has to be constructed. Now we write the ingredients and describe the properties needed.

- Sub-exponentially secure pseudorandom function PRF in NC^1
- A compact sub-exponentially secure threshold fully homomorphic encryption scheme TFHE for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. The definition can be found in Section 3.3. We note that for any circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$, the circuit $\text{PartDec}(\cdot, \text{Eval}(C, \cdot); \text{PRF}(\cdot, \cdot))$ is in $\mathcal{C}_{n',s'}$ for $n' = n \cdot p_1(\lambda)$ and $s' = s \cdot p_2(\lambda)$. Here, p_1 and p_2 are some fixed polynomials and λ is the security parameter.
- Sub-exponentially hard one-way functions. In particular, a sub-exponentially secure statistically binding commitment scheme.
- Semi-functionally secure sublinear Semi-Functional FE scheme sFE for circuit class $\mathcal{C}_{n',s'}$. This is defined in Section 7

We describe the the construction below.

- Setup(1^λ) : Set $t = \lambda^2$. On input the security parameter, it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$. Output $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$
- Enc(MSK, m) :
 1. Parse $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.

2. Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 3. Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m)$.
 4. Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 5. Compute $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, \text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
 6. Compute $Z = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 7. Output $\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [t]}$.
- KeyGen(MSK, C) :
 1. Parse $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
 2. Let F be the following circuit described in Figure 2. Compute $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.KeyGen}(sk_i, F)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 3. Output $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$.
 - Dec(sk_C, CT) :
 1. Parse $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ and $\text{CT} = (\text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_t)$.
 2. Parse $\text{CT} = Z, \text{CT}_1, \dots, \text{CT}_t$.
 3. Compute $p_i \leftarrow \text{sFE.Dec}(sk_{C,i}, \text{CT}_i)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 4. Output $\text{TFHE.FinDec}(p_1, \dots, p_t)$




Figure 2: Description of the Circuit F .

Thus, we have the following :

Theorem 14. *Assuming*

- *Subexponentially secure LWE,*
- *Semi-functionally sublinear secure semi-functional FE for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ (security definition described in Section 7)*

there exists subexponentially secure sublinear secret key FE for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ for any polynomial $n(\lambda), s(\lambda)$ for $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$.

Now we argue some properties about the scheme:

Correctness: Correctness of this scheme follows from the correctness of underlying sFE scheme and TFHE scheme.

Sublinearity We now bound the size the size of ciphertext. Let $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ be the class of the circuits for which the scheme is constructed. For any message $\{0,1\}^n$, observe that:

$|\text{CT}| = |Z| + \sum_{i \in [t]} |\text{CT}_i|$ where Z is the commitment and $\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in [t]}$ are ciphertext components generating using sFE.Enc algorithm.

Thus, $|\text{CT}| \leq |Z| + t|\text{CT}_1|$. Now observe the following:

- $|Z| = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ as it is a commitment of PRF keys (K_1, \dots, K_t) and partial decryption keys $\text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t$ all of polynomial size in λ .
- Each CT_i is an encryption of $(\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$ where fct is a TFHE encryption of m . It is expected to be decrypted for a circuit F (Figure 2), which is in class $\mathcal{C}_{n',s'}$ where $n' = np_1(\lambda)$ and $s' = sp_2(\lambda)$ for some polynomials p_1 and p_2 . Thus, by sublinearity of sFE, we have $|\text{ct}_i| \leq (s')^\epsilon \text{poly}(\lambda, n')$ for some polynomial poly and constant $\epsilon < 1$. Thus, $|\text{ct}_i| \leq (s)^\epsilon \text{poly}'(\lambda, n)$ for some fixed polynomial poly' .

Hence, $|\text{ct}| \leq (s)^\epsilon \text{poly}''(\lambda, n)$ from the above two claims.

12.1 Security Proof

Theorem 15. *Assuming*

- *Subexponentially secure LWE,*
- *Semi-functionally sublinear secure semi-functional FE for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ (security definition described in Section 7)*

there exists subexponentially secure sublinear secret key FE for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ for any polynomial $n(\lambda), s(\lambda)$ for $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$.

Proof. We now present hybrids and argue indistinguishability between them. First hybrid encrypts m_b^* where as the last one is independent of b .

Hybrid₀ : In this hybrid, we have the following:

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
4. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as above.
5. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j similarly (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
6. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
7. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.KeyGen}(sk_i, F)$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
8. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j)$ for $i \in [t]$.
9. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*)$ for $i \in [t]$.
10. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
11. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Hybrid₁ : This hybrid is the same as the previous one except that the function key are generated using semi-functional key generation algorithm. More precisely, In this hybrid, we have the following. We describe the change from the previous hybrid using bold faced word **change**.

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
4. [**Change**] Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in [t]$.
5. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as above.
6. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j similarly (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
7. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
8. [**Change**] Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i)$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
9. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j)$ for $i \in [t]$.
10. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*)$ for $i \in [t]$.
11. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
12. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 11. *If sFE scheme satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional key property then for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size $2^{\lambda^{c_0}}$, $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_1) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_0}}$ for some constant $c_0 > 0$.*

Proof. (Sketch) In both the above hybrids, the ciphertexts are generated using honest encryption algorithm. The only way the hybrids differ is the way functional keys are generated. In **Hybrid₀** they are functional while in **Hybrid₁** they are semi-functional We can invoke a series of t hybrids, where one by one in each system the key is generated semi-functionally instead of functionally. The claim thus follows from indistinguishability of the semi-functional keys property of sFE scheme. \square

Before, we describe the hybrid, we recall the following theorem about the scheme sFE proved in Section 7:

Theorem 16. Fix $1^\lambda, 1^n, \Gamma, \{M_i\}, M^*, C$ as above. Define two functions E_b for $b \in \{0, 1\}$, that takes as input $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_b}$. Here ℓ_b is the length of randomness required to compute the following. The functions do the following.

Consider the following process:

1. Compute $\text{MSK} \leftarrow \text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$.
2. Compute $\text{CT}_i \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, M_i)$ for $i \in [\Gamma]$.
3. Set $\theta = C(M^*)$. Compute $sk_C \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(\text{MSK}, C, \theta)$.
4. If $b = 0$, compute $\text{CT}^* = \text{sFE.Enc}(\text{MSK}, M^*)$ and if $b = 1$, compute $\text{CT}^* = \text{sFE.sfEnc}(\text{MSK}, 1^\lambda)$.
5. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$, E_b on input $r \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_b}$ outputs $\{\text{CT}_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}, sk_C, \text{CT}^*$.

If sFE satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property, then, there exists a constant $c > 0$ such that there exists two computable (not necessarily efficient) measures \mathcal{M}_0 and \mathcal{M}_1 (\mathcal{M}_b defined over $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_b}$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$) of density exactly $1/\lambda$ such that, for all circuits \mathcal{A} of size 2^{λ^c} ,

$$\left| \Pr_{u \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_0}} [\mathcal{A}(E_0(u)) = 1] - \Pr_{v \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_1}} [\mathcal{A}(E(v)) = 1] \right| < 2^{-\lambda^c}$$

Here both measures may depend on $(\{M_i\}_{i \in \Gamma}, C, M^*)$

Hybrid₂ : This hybrid is inefficient. Let $\mathcal{M}_{0,i}$ denote the (scaled) measure of density $1/\lambda$ corresponding to encryption algorithm as described by the theorem above and let $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ denote corresponding measure for semi-functional encryption algorithm. For any measure \mathcal{M} , let $\overline{\mathcal{M}}$ denote the measure $1 - \mathcal{M}$. Now we describe the hybrid in more detail.

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. [**Change**] Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
5. Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in [t]$.
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^* for $j \in [t]$ as above.

7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j similarly (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. **[Change]** For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. If $y_i = 1$ sample $R_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_{0,i}}$, otherwise, sample $R_i \leftarrow \overline{\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_{0,i}}}$. We note here $\mathcal{M}_{0,i}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ may depend on $(C, x_i^*, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma]})$
9. **[Change]** Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
10. **[Change]** Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
11. **[Change]** For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
12. **[Change]** Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
13. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
14. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 12. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Hybrid}_1) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Hybrid}_2) = 1]| = 0$. *xw*

Proof. (Sketch) These hybrids are identical. Note that measure generated by $\mathcal{M}_{0,i}$ for every $i \in [t]$, have density exactly $1/\lambda$. With probability $1/\lambda$, uniform randomness to generate encryption can be thought of as if it was sampled from $\mathcal{M}_{0,i}$ and with $1 - 1/\lambda$ from its complement. \square

Hybrid₃ : This hybrid is the same as the previous the hybrid except that challenger aborts if $y = 0^t$.

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. [**Change**] Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
5. Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in [t]$.
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as above.
7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j similarly (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. If $y_i = 1$ sample $R_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_{0,i}}$, otherwise, sample $R_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}}$. We note here $\mathcal{M}_{0,i}$ and $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$ may depend on $(C, x_i^*, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma]})$.
9. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
10. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
11. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
12. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
13. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
14. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 13. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Hybrid}_2) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Hybrid}_3) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_2}}$ for some constant c_2 .

Proof. (Sketch) The probability that the string $y = 0^t$ is exactly $(1 - 1/\lambda)^t$. Substituting $t = \lambda^2$, the claim follows. \square

Hybrid₄ : In this hybrid we use the security of sFE and switch to encrypting challenge ciphertexts semi-functionally whenever $y_i = 1$. This hybrid is now described as follows:

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
5. Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in [t]$.
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as above.
7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j similarly (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. [**Change**] For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. If $y_i = 1$ sample $R_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}_{1,i}}$, otherwise, sample $R_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}}$. We note here $\mathcal{M}_{0,i}$ and $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ may depend on $(C, x_i^*, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma]})$.
9. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
10. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
11. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
12. [**Change**] Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.
13. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
14. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 14. *If sFE satisfies indistinguishability of semi-functional ciphertexts property, then for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size $2^{\lambda^{c_3}}$, $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Hybrid}_3) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{Hybrid}_4) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_3}}$ for some constant $c_3 > 0$.*

Proof. (Sketch) This proof goes by fixing the “best possible” string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ which is sampled according to the distribution specified in the hybrids. The claim is that if $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_3) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_4) = 1]| > \epsilon$, then there must exist (a non zero) y such that $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{3,y}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,y}) = 1]| > \epsilon$. Where $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{3,y}$ or $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,y}$ represents the corresponding hybrid where string y is fixed.

This is because $\sum_{y \in \{0,1\}^t} \Pr[y] |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{3,y}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,y}) = 1]| > |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_3) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_4) = 1]| > \epsilon$. Since for every string y , $0 < \Pr[y] < 1$ (refer previous hybrid for the calculation), $\sum_y \Pr[y] = 1$, and $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{3,0^t}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,0^t}) = 1]| = 0$ (as the experiment is aborted) the claim follows by pigeon hole principle.

Fix any such y . We can construct w indistinguishable hybrids, where w is the weight of the string y . For each such index i , with $y_i = 1$, we define an intermediate $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{3,y,i}$, where the encryptions for index $j \neq i$ are generated as in the previous hybrid but encryption of $j = i$ is generated differently as follows. Instead of being computed using $\mathbf{sFE.Enc}$ algorithm using randomness from $\mathcal{M}_{0,i}$, it is encrypted using $\mathbf{sFE.sfEnc}$ algorithm using the randomness generated from $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$. Note that for last such index i , such that $y_i = 1$, $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{3,y,i}$ is the same as $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,y}$.

Once this fixing is done, each intermediate hybrid is indistinguishable due to the security of \mathbf{sFE} . Note that to reduce to the security of \mathbf{sFE} , reduction has to non-uniformly fix the randomness generated for other indices $j \neq i$. Informally, we use this to advice to generate encryptions for indices $j \neq i$ in $[t]$. For index i , we get ciphertexts and the keys from the challenger. They are either functionally encrypted using the randomness sampled from $\mathcal{M}_{0,i}$ or they are semi-functionally encrypted using the randomness sampled from $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$. Since the encryptions for indices $j \neq i$ are generated using non-uniformly fixed randomness and encryption for index i comes from the challenger, the rest of the hybrid can be generated in polynomial time. Now the reduction can use the adversary’s response to break the security of \mathbf{sFE} . □

We now restate theorem 4. We will use this theorem in this hybrid.

Theorem 17 (Imported Theorem [Hol06]). *Let \mathcal{M} be any measure on $\{0, 1\}^n$ of density $\mu(\mathcal{M}) \geq 1 - \rho(n)$. Let $\gamma(n) \in (0, 1/2)$ be any function. Then, for a random set Set chosen according to the measure \mathcal{M} the following two holds with probability at least $1 - 2(2^{-2^n \gamma^2 (1-\rho)^4 / 64})$:*

- $(1 - \frac{\gamma(1-\rho)}{4})(1 - \rho)2^n \leq |\text{Set}| \leq (1 + \frac{\gamma(1-\rho)}{4})(1 - \rho)2^n$
- For such a random set Set , for any distinguisher \mathcal{A} with size $|\mathcal{A}| \leq 2^n (\frac{\gamma^2(1-\rho)^4}{64n})$ satisfying

$$| \Pr_{x \leftarrow \text{Set}} [\mathcal{A}(x) = 1] - \Pr_{x \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}} [\mathcal{A}(x) = 1] | \leq \gamma$$

Hybrid₅ : This hybrid is the same as the previous hybrid except that for every $i \in [t]$, instead of sampling from a measure \mathcal{M}_i (either $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ or $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$), we sample a set Set_i from the corresponding measure, and then sample uniformly from Set_i . These sets are constructed according to theorem 4. Lets analyse it case by case. For the analysis, set the bound on distinguishing advantage γ to be $2^{-\lambda}$.

- If $y_i = 0$, measure $\mathcal{M}_i = \overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$ has density exactly $1 - 1/\lambda$. From Theorem 4 with probability at least $1 - 2(2^{-2^{\ell_b - 2\lambda} / 64 \lambda^4})$, density of Set_i is atleast $1/2\lambda$ and the distinguishing advantage is bounded by $2^{-\lambda}$ for adversaries of size $2^{\ell_b - 2\lambda} / (\ell_b \text{poly}(\lambda))$.
- If $y_i = 1$, measure $\mathcal{M}_i = \mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ has density exactly $1/\lambda$. From Theorem 4 we observe following. With probability at least, $1 - 2(2^{-2^{\ell_b - 2\lambda} (1-1/\lambda)^4 / 64})$, density of Set_i is atleast $1/2\lambda$ and the distinguishing advantage is bounded by $2^{-\lambda}$ for adversaries of size $2^{\ell_b - 2\lambda} / (\ell_b \text{poly}(\lambda))$.

Now we describe the hybrid in detail.

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
5. Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in [t]$.
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as above.

7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j similarly (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. [**Change**] For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i}) \leftarrow \text{Set}_i$ as follows. If $y_i = 1$ set Set_i is constructed using theorem 4 from measure $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$. Otherwise, set Set_i is constructed using theorem 4 from measure $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$. We note here Set_i may depend on $(C, x_i^*, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma]})$.
9. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
10. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
11. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
12. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.
13. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
14. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 15. *Due to theorem 4, there exists a constant $c_4 > 0$ such that with probability at least (over construction of Set_i) $1 - 2^{-\lambda^{c_4}}$, for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size $2^{\lambda^{c_4}}$, $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_4) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_5) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_4}}$ for some constant $c_4 > 0$.*

Proof. (Sketch) This proof goes by fixing the “best possible” string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ which is sampled according to the distribution specified in the hybrids. This can be proven by a series of t intermediate hybrids. We can define t intermediate hybrids, $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,i}$ for $i \in [t]$. Here $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,i}$ is similar to its previous hybrid except that for system i , randomness is sampled from Set_i instead of \mathcal{M}_i . Note that $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,t}$ is the same as \mathbf{Hybrid}_5 . Note that if there exists an adversary \mathcal{A} (of size loosely bounded by $2^{\lambda^{c_4}}$, refer description of the hybrid above for details) that distinguish $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,i}$ from $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{4,i+1}$ with advantage $2^{-\lambda}$, we can build a reduction that refutes theorem 4. In doing so, reduction fixes non-uniformly the randomness for other systems $j \in [t]$ with $j \neq i$. In particular, reduction generates keys and ciphertext for all indices $j \neq i$, as in the previous hybrid using the non-uniformly fixed randomness. For index i , the keys and ciphertext are generated using the randomness given by the challenger. It is either generated using measure \mathcal{M}_i or from the set Set_i . Due to theorem 4, the security holds. □

Hybrid₆ : This hybrid is the same as the previous hybrid except that for every $i \in [t]$, the following happens. For every $i \in [t]$, construct a new set SetR_i as a set of λ^2 random samples from $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_i}$ (here, let $\{0, 1\}^{\ell_i}$ denote the domain of measure \mathcal{M}_i). For every $i \in [t]$, instead of computing the challenge encryption using randomness sampled from Set_i , compute it from randomness sampled uniformly from $\text{Set}_i \cap \text{SetR}_i$. Abort if the intersection is empty. In this hybrid, let Mach_i denote the (unbounded probabilistic) machine that takes as input SetR_i along with $(C, x_i^*, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma]})$ to compute an index $j_i \in [\lambda^2]$ of the randomness sampled from SetR_i .

We describe now the randomized algorithm Mach_i .

1. On input $(\text{SetR}_i, C, x_i^*, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma]})$, sample the set Set_i as in the previous hybrid.
2. If $y_i = 0$, it is sampled from $\mathcal{M}_i = \overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$, otherwise from $\mathcal{M}_i = \mathcal{M}_{1,i}$.
3. Randomly sample from $\text{Set}_i \cap \text{SetR}_i$ and output the index of the element in j_i . Output \perp if the intersection is empty.
1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
5. Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in [t]$.
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as above.
7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j similarly (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. For $i \in [t]$, sample SetR_i as a set of λ^2 uniformly chosen inputs from support of \mathcal{M}_i (which is equal to $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ if $y_i = 1$ and $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$ otherwise).
9. [**Change**] For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. Run $\text{Mach}_i(\text{SetR}_i, C, x_i^*, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}) \rightarrow j_i$. Set R_i as the randomness with index j_i in the set SetR_i .
10. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.

11. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{1C}, 1, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
12. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
13. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.
14. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
15. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 16. *For any adversary \mathcal{A} , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_5) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_6) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_5}}$ for some constant $c_5 > 0$. This indistinguishability is statistical.*

Proof. (Sketch) These two hybrids are statistically close via construction of Mach_i . This can be proven by a series of t intermediate statistically close hybrids. Define $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{5,i}$ for $i \in [t]$, where randomness to encrypt challenge ciphertext is sampled as in previous hybrid for all indices $j \neq i$. For index i , it is generated using intersection of $\text{Set}_i \cap \text{SetR}_i$. Note that $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{5,t}$ is the same as \mathbf{Hybrid}_6 . Let us calculate the statistical distance between the two hybrids. The statistical distance is bounded by the sum of probability that Set_i has a density less than $1/\lambda$ and the sum of the probability that intersection of SetR_i and Set_i is empty. This is because once SetR_i is chosen and has a large enough size, sampling SetR_i randomly and sampling from the intersection ensures that the probability of choosing any element from Set_i is identical by symmetry.

The probability that Set_i has a density smaller than $1/\lambda$ is bounded by $2^{-\lambda^c}$ for some constant c (due to theorem 4). Let us bound the probability that intersection of Set_i and SetR_i is empty. This probability is bounded by $(1 - |\text{Set}_i|2^{-\ell_i})^{\lambda^2}$. This is less than, $(1 - 2/\lambda)^{\lambda^2} \leq e^{-\lambda/2}$ with probability at least $1 - 2^{-\lambda^c}$ over the construction of Set_i (described by \mathbf{Hybrid}_5 according to theorem 4). \square

Hybrid₇ : Let Y_β denote the set of indices i where $y_i = \beta$ for $\beta \in \{0, 1\}$. This hybrid is the same as the previous hybrid except that the representation changes. Let Mach' be an (unbounded) machine that computes the result of $\text{Mach}_1, \dots, \text{Mach}_t$. Precisely, Mach' takes as input y , SetR_i for $i \in [t]$, circuit C , $\{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}$, Z^* , $\{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}$ and hardwired partial decryption values $\{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}$. Note that Mach' does not take as input x_i^* for $i \in Y_1$ and in order to compute the result, it may have to break commitment Z^* to construct x_i^* for $i \in Y_1$.

Denote by X the distribution $(y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \text{fct}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in \Gamma})$. Thus, $\text{Mach}'(X) \rightarrow (j_1, \dots, j_t)$ where j_i is an index in $[\lambda^2]$. Here is the pseudocode of Mach' .

1. On input $X = (y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \text{fct}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in \Gamma})$, take following steps.
2. Break Z^* to compute $(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
3. For $i \in Y_1$, compute $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
4. Output $\left(\text{Mach}_i(C, x^*, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in \Gamma}) \right)_{i \in \lambda^2}$

We describe the hybrid in detail now:

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
5. Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in [t]$.
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as above.
7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j similarly (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. For $i \in [t]$, sample SetR_i as a set of λ^2 uniformly chosen inputs from support of \mathcal{M}_i (which is equal to $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ if $y_i = 1$ and $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$ otherwise).
9. **[Change]** Define $X = (y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \text{fct}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in \Gamma})$
10. **[Change]** For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. Run $\text{Mach}'(X) \rightarrow (j_1, \dots, j_t)$. Set R_i as the randomness with index j_i in the set SetR_i .

11. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
12. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
13. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
14. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.
15. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
16. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 17. *Hybrid₇ is identical to Hybrid₆.*

Proof. The only change in the two hybrids is the representation if Com satisfies perfect binding. \square

We first restate theorem 5. We will use the following theorem in this hybrid.

Theorem 18. *Let $n, \ell \in \mathbb{N}$, $\epsilon > 0$ and \mathcal{C}_{leak} be a family of distinguisher circuits from $\{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ of size $s(n)$. Then, for every distribution (X, Z) over $\{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^\ell$, there exists a simulator $h : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ such that:*

- h has size bounded by $s' = O(s2^\ell \epsilon^{-2})$.
- (X, Z) and $(X, h(X))$ are indistinguishable by \mathcal{C}_{leak} . That is for every $C \in \mathcal{C}_{leak}$,

$$\left| \Pr_{(x,z) \leftarrow (X,Z)} [C(x, z) = 1] - \Pr_{x \leftarrow X, h} [C(x, h(x)) = 1] \right| \leq \epsilon$$

Hybrid_g : This hybrid is the same as the previous one except that we now simulate Mach' using theorem 5. Note that output length of Mach' is $2t \log \lambda$. Set the size of distinguisher to be $2^{\lambda+1}$ and advantage bound to be $2^{-\lambda}$. Thus, by the theorem there exists a simulator h of size $O(2^{\lambda^3+t \log \lambda})$. This size is bounded by 2^{λ^4} . In this hybrid use h to generate randomness for encryption. Observe that the hybrid can be implemented by circuits of size 2^{λ^4} .

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
5. Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in [t]$.
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^* for $j \in [t]$ as above.
7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j similarly (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. For $i \in [t]$, sample SetR_i as a set of λ^2 uniformly chosen inputs from support of \mathcal{M}_i (which is equal to $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ if $y_i = 1$ and $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$ otherwise).
9. Define $X = (y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \text{fct}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in \Gamma})$
10. **[Change]** For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. Run $h(X) \rightarrow (j_1, \dots, j_t)$. Let R_i be the randomness with index j_i in the set SetR_i .

11. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
12. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
13. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
14. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.
15. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
16. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 18. *Due to theorem 5 the following holds, for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size 2^λ , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_7) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_8) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda}$.*

Proof. Here, we give our reduction. We are given (X, aux) where $X = (y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma]})$, as defined in stage 1 – 8 of **Hybrid**₇ and **Hybrid**₈. aux is either equal to $h(X)$ or $\text{Mach}'(X)$. Assume that we have an adversary \mathcal{A} (of size 2^λ) that distinguishes the hybrids with probability greater than $2^{-\lambda}$. Then the reduction proceeds as follows:

1. Parse $X = (y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma]})$
2. For $i \in Y_0$, set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*)$.
3. Parse $\text{aux} = (j_1, \dots, j_t)$. Set R_i as the randomness with index j_i in the set SetR_i . Parse $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$.
4. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: compute $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
5. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
6. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
7. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.
8. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
9. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$
10. Output adversary's guess as its own output.

Note that the reduction emulates the either **Hybrid**₇ (if aux is generated using Mach') or **Hybrid**₈ (if aux is generated as $h(X)$). Hence, the advantage of \mathcal{A} is exactly the same as the advantage of reduction to win in the game of theorem 5. Note that if \mathcal{A} has size 2^λ , the size of reduction is $2^\lambda + \text{poly}(\lambda)$ for some fixed polynomial poly . Claim now follows from the way the parameters are set in theorem 5. □

Hybrid₉ : This hybrid is the same as the previous one except that Z^* is now a commitment of 0.

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample t PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in [t]$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$.
5. Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in [t]$.
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as above.
7. [**Change**] Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(0^\ell)$ where ℓ is set as the length of $(K_1, \dots, K_t, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j as in the previous hybrid (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. For $i \in [t]$, sample SetR_i as a set of λ^2 uniformly chosen inputs from support of \mathcal{M}_i (which is equal to $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ if $y_i = 1$ and $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$ otherwise).
9. Define $X = (y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in \Gamma})$
10. For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. Run $h(X) \rightarrow (j_1, \dots, j_t)$. Set R_i as the randomness with index j_i in the set SetR_i .
11. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
12. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
13. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
14. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.
15. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
16. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 19. *If Com is secure against adversaries of size 2^{λ^4} , then there exists constant $c_8 > 0$ such that for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size $2^{\lambda^{c_8}}$, $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_8) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_9) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_8}}$.*

Proof. Note that both hybrids \mathbf{Hybrid}_8 and \mathbf{Hybrid}_9 can be computed in time roughly the size of h , and can be bounded by 2^{λ^4} . The reduction to the commitment scheme works by using the challenge commitment Z^* (either a commitment of 0 or respective PRF keys and TFHE partial decryption keys) to generate a hybrid. In \mathbf{Hybrid}_8 , Z^* is a commitment of PRF keys and partial decryption keys. In \mathbf{Hybrid}_9 , it is a commitment of 0. If there is an adversary \mathcal{A} , that distinguishes the hybrids with probability greater than $2^{-\lambda^{c_8}}$, the reduction uses the challenge commitment to generate either \mathbf{Hybrid}_8 or \mathbf{Hybrid}_9 (depending on Z^*) and runs \mathcal{A} on it. Then it just outputs response of \mathcal{A} as its guess. The advantage of \mathcal{A} then becomes the advantage of the reduction. Note that reduction runs in time bounded by 2^{λ^4} (bound on running time of generating the hybrid and running time of \mathcal{A}). Since, Com is secure against circuits of this size, the claim follows. \square

Hybrid₁₀ : This hybrid is the same as the previous one except that for $i \in Y_1$, θ_i is computed honestly using the PartDec algorithm using true randomness, instead of using PRF key K_i .

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - **[Change]** Sample PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in Y_0$.
 - **[Change]** Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$ for $i \in Y_0$.
5. **[Change]** Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in Y_0$, otherwise set $\theta_i = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}))$ using fresh and independent randomness.
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as in previous hybrids.
7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(0^\ell)$ where ℓ is the length in the previous hybrid. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j as in the previous hybrid (using respective independently sampled PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. For $i \in [t]$, sample SetR_i as a set of λ^2 uniformly chosen inputs from support of \mathcal{M}_i (which is equal to $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ if $y_i = 1$ and $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$ otherwise).
9. Define $X = (y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in \Gamma})$
10. For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. Run $h(X) \rightarrow (j_1, \dots, j_t)$. Set R_i as the randomness with index j_i in the set SetR_i .
11. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
12. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
13. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
14. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.
15. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$

16. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 20. *If PRF is secure against adversaries of size 2^{λ^4} , then there exists constant $c_9 > 0$ such that for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size $2^{\lambda^{c_9}}$, $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_9) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{10}) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_9}}$.*

Proof. Note that both hybrids **Hybrid**₉ and **Hybrid**₁₀ can be computed in time roughly the size of h , and can be bounded by 2^{λ^4} . The only difference between the hybrids is the way commitment θ_i is generated for $i \in Y_1$. This is proven by fixing a best possible y . In **Hybrid**₉ it is generated using randomness derived from PRF keys. In **Hybrid**₁₀, they are generated using true randomness. Note that for $i \in Y_1$, the PRF keys are absent. The security then holds due to the security of PRF against adversaries of size 2^{λ^4} . \square

Hybrid₁₁ : This hybrid is the same as the previous one except that for first index $i_0 \in Y_1$, θ_{i_0} is simulated using the simulator of the TFHE partial decryption keys $\{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \neq i_0}$. That is, set $\theta_{i_0} = \text{TFHE.Sim}(\{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \neq i_0}, \text{fct}, C, C(m_0))$.

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, m_b^*)$.
 - Sample PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in Y_0$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$ for $i \in Y_0$.
5. [**Change**] Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Let i_0 be the first index in Y_1 . Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in Y_0$, otherwise set $\theta_i = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}))$ for $i \in Y_1 \setminus i_0$. Set $\theta_{i_0} = \text{TFHE.Sim}(\{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \neq i_0}, \text{fct}, C, C(m_0))$
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^i for $j \in [t]$ as in previous hybrids.
7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(0^\ell)$ where ℓ is the length in the previous hybrid. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j as in the previous hybrid (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. For $i \in [t]$, sample SetR_i as a set of λ^2 uniformly chosen inputs from support of \mathcal{M}_i (which is equal to $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ if $y_i = 1$ and $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$ otherwise).
9. Define $X = (y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in \Gamma})$
10. For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. Run $h(X) \rightarrow (j_1, \dots, j_t)$. Set R_i as the randomness with index j_i in the set SetR_i .
11. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
12. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
13. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
14. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.

15. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$
16. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 21. *If TFHE is statistically simulation secure, then there exists constant $c_{10} > 0$ such that for any adversary \mathcal{A} , $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{10}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{11}) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_{10}}}$.*

Proof. The only difference between the hybrids is the way commitment θ_{i_0} is generated for first $i_0 \in Y_1$. This is proven by fixing a best possible y . In \mathbf{Hybrid}_{10} it is generated using TFHE.PartDec . In \mathbf{Hybrid}_{11} , it is generated using TFHE.Sim . Note that these two distributions are statistically close. The security then holds due to the security of TFHE. \square

Hybrid₁₂ : This hybrid is the same as the previous one except that now we generate fct as an encryption of 0

1. Adversary gets as input the security parameter 1^λ and outputs a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_{n,s}$. He also gives out some messages $m_0, \dots, m_\Gamma, m_0^*, m_1^* \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that $C(m_0^*) = C(m_1^*)$.
2. Sample a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
3. Sample a string $y \in \{0, 1\}^t$ such that for every $i \in [t]$, set $y_i = 1$ with probability $1/\lambda$ and $y_i = 0$ with probability $(1 - 1/\lambda)$. Here, each bit y_i is chosen independently. Abort if $y = 0^t$.
4. To encrypt challenge ciphertext, compute $x^* = (x_1^*, \dots, x_t^*)$ as follows.
 - Run $\text{TFHE.Setup}(1^\lambda, 1^t) \rightarrow (\text{fpk}, \text{fsk}_1, \dots, \text{fsk}_t)$.
 - [**Change**] Compute $\text{fct} \leftarrow \text{TFHE.Enc}(\text{fpk}, 0^{|\text{m}_0|})$.
 - Sample PRF keys $K_i \leftarrow \text{PRF.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ for $i \in Y_0$.
 - Set $x_i^* = (\text{fct}, \text{fsk}_i, K_i)$ for $i \in Y_0$.
5. Let F be the circuit described in the key generation algorithm. Let i_0 be the first index in Y_1 . Set $\theta_i = F(x_i^*) = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}); \text{PRF}(K_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct})))$ for $i \in Y_0$, otherwise set $\theta_i = \text{PartDec}(\text{fsk}_i, \text{Eval}(C, \text{fct}))$ for $i \in Y_1 \setminus i_0$. Set $\theta_{i_0} = \text{TFHE.Sim}(\{\text{fsk}_i\}_{i \neq i_0}, \text{fct}, C, C(m_0))$
6. To compute encryption of m_i for $i \in \Gamma$, also construct x_j^* for $j \in [t]$ as in previous hybrids.
7. Compute $Z^* = \text{Com}(0^\ell)$ where ℓ is the length in the previous hybrid. For other ciphertext queries $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute Z^j as in the previous hybrid (using respective PRF and partial decryption keys).
8. For $i \in [t]$, sample SetR_i as a set of λ^2 uniformly chosen inputs from support of \mathcal{M}_i (which is equal to $\mathcal{M}_{1,i}$ if $y_i = 1$ and $\overline{\mathcal{M}}_{0,i}$ otherwise).
9. Define $X = (y, \{\text{SetR}_i\}_{i \in [t]}, C, \{x_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \{x_i^*\}_{i \in Y_0}, Z^*, \{\theta_i\}_{i \in Y_1}, \text{fct}, \{Z^j\}_{j \in \Gamma})$
10. For every $i \in [t]$, to compute the following steps, we generate randomness $R_i = (r_{1,i}, r_{2,i}, \{r_{3,j,i}\}_{j \in [\Gamma]}, r_{4,i})$ as follows. Run $h(X) \rightarrow (j_1, \dots, j_t)$. Set R_i as the randomness with index j_i in the set SetR_i .
11. Then run the setup of the FE as follows: it computes $\text{sFE.Setup}(1^\lambda; r_{1,i}) \rightarrow sk_i$ for $i \in [t]$ and sets $\text{MSK} = (sk_1, \dots, sk_t)$.
12. Generate $sk_C = (sk_{C,1}, \dots, sk_{C,t})$ where $sk_{C,i} \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfKG}(sk_i, F, \theta_i; r_{2,i})$ for the circuit F described in the key generation algorithm.
13. For $j \in [\Gamma]$, compute $\text{CT}^j = (Z^j, \text{CT}_1^j, \dots, \text{CT}_t^j)$. Here, $\text{CT}_i^j \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^j; r_{3,j,i})$ for $i \in [t]$.
14. Compute $\text{CT}^* = (Z^*, \text{CT}_1^*, \dots, \text{CT}_t^*)$. Here, for every $i \in [t]$, if $y_i = 0$, $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.Enc}(sk_i, x_i^*; r_{4,i})$ otherwise $\text{CT}_i^* \leftarrow \text{sFE.sfEnc}(sk_i, 1^\lambda, 1^\lambda; r_{4,i})$.
15. Give the following to adversary $(sk_C, \{\text{CT}_i^j\}_{j \in [\Gamma], i \in [t]}, \text{CT}^*)$

16. Adversary guesses $b' \in \{0, 1\}$

Lemma 22. *If TFHE is semantic secure against adversaries size 2^{λ^4} , then there exists constant $c_{11} > 0$ such that for any adversary \mathcal{A} of size $2^{\lambda^{c_{11}}}$, $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{11}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{Hybrid}_{12}) = 1]| < 2^{-\lambda^{c_{11}}}$.*

Proof. To prove this, we non-uniformly fix y . Note that both hybrids $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{11,y}$ and $\mathbf{Hybrid}_{12,y}$ can be computed in time roughly the size of h , and can be bounded by 2^{λ^4} . The only difference between the hybrids is the way encryption fct is generated. In \mathbf{Hybrid}_{11} it is generated as an encryption of m_b^* , while in \mathbf{Hybrid}_{12} it is generated as an encryption of 0. In both hybrids, for first $i_0 \in Y_1$, partial decryption key fsk_{i_0} is missing. The security then holds due to semantic security of TFHE. \square

Lemma 23. *\mathbf{Hybrid}_{12} is information theoretically independent of b .*

Proof. This claim follows by construction. \square

From these lemmas we prove the theorem. \square

13 Construction of iO

From Section 12, we have the following result:

Theorem 19. *Assuming*

- *Subexponentially secure LWE.*
- *Subexponentially secure three restricted FE scheme².*
- *PRGs with*
 - *Stretch of $k^{1+\epsilon}$ (length of input being k bits) for some constant $\epsilon > 0$.*
 - *Block locality three.*
 - *Security with negl distinguishing gap against adversaries of subexponential size³.*
- *ΔRG assumption (refer Section 8.1).*

there exists subexponentially secure sublinear secret key FE for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$ for any polynomial $n(\lambda), s(\lambda)$ for $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$.

Once, we have subexponentially secure secret key FE for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$, then we invoke the following theorem from [AS17, LT17]. This theorem is based on the work of [BNPW16], which showed that sublinear secret key FE implies sublinear public key FE (assuming LWE), and the work of [AJ15, BV15] which showed that any subexponentially secure sublinear public key FE implies iO.

²See Section 9 for a construction of a three-restricted FE scheme from bilinear maps. The security of this construction is justified in the generic group model.

³As pointed before in Section 11, we allow a trade-off between the required level of security of ΔRG and a three-block local PRG.

Theorem 20 ([LT17, AS17]). *Assuming*

- *Subexponentially secure LWE.*
- *Subexponentially secure sublinear secret key FE for $\mathcal{C}_{n,s}$.*

there an indistinguishability obfuscation scheme for P/poly .

Thus, we have the following result.

Theorem 21. *Assuming*

- *Subexponentially secure LWE.*
- *Subexponentially secure three restricted FE scheme ⁴.*
- *PRGs with*
 - *Stretch of $k^{1+\epsilon}$ (length of input being k bits) for some constant $\epsilon > 0$.*
 - *Block locality three.*
 - *Security with negl distinguishing gap against adversaries of sub-exponential size⁵.*
- *ΔRG assumption (refer Section 8.1).*

there exists a secure iO scheme for P/poly .

Now we provide a more general theorem that allows a trade-off between the required level of security of ΔRG and a three-block local PRG. This follows from the results in Section 11.

Theorem 22. *For two distinguishing gaps $\text{adv}_1, \text{adv}_2$, if $\text{adv}_1 + \text{adv}_2 \leq 1 - 2/\lambda$ then assuming,*

- *Subexponentially secure LWE.*
- *Subexponentially secure three restricted FE scheme ⁶.*
- *PRGs with*
 - *Stretch of $k^{1+\epsilon}$ (length of input being k bits) for some constant $\epsilon > 0$.*
 - *Block locality three.*
 - *Security with distinguishing gap bounded by adv_1 against adversaries of sub-exponential size.*
- *ΔRG assumption with distinguishing gap bounded by adv_2 against adversaries of size 2^λ (refer Section 8.1).*

there exists a secure iO scheme for P/poly .

As a corollary, we get:

⁴This can be implemented in the generic bilinear group model as described in Section 9

⁵As pointed before in Section 11, we allow a trade-off between the required level of security of ΔRG and a three-block local PRG.

⁶This can be implemented in the generic bilinear group model as described in Section 9

Corollary 1. *Assuming,*

- *Subexponentially secure LWE.*
- *Subexponentially secure three restricted FE scheme ⁷.*
- *PRGs with*
 - *Stretch of $k^{1+\epsilon}$ (length of input being k bits) for some constant $\epsilon > 0$.*
 - *Block locality three.*
 - *Security with distinguishing gap bounded by $1/\lambda$ against adversaries of subexponential size.*
- *Δ RG assumption with distinguishing gap bounded by $1 - 3/\lambda$ against adversaries of size 2^λ (refer Section 8.1).*

there exists a secure iO scheme for $P/poly$.

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⁷This can be implemented in the generic bilinear group model as described in Section 9

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