

Secure Sketch: How to Correct More Errors Without Entropy Loss

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Abstract. Secure sketch produces public information of its input w without revealing it, yet, allows the exact recovery of w given another value w' that is close to w . Therefore, it can be used to reliably reproduce any error-prone secret sources (i.e., biometric) stored in secret storage. However, some sources have lower entropy compared to the error itself, formally called “more error than entropy”, a standard secure sketch cannot show its security promise perfectly to these kinds of sources. Besides, when same input is reused for multiple sketches generation, the complex error process of the input further results to security uncertainty, and offer no security guarantee. Fuller et al., (Asiacrypt 2016) defined the fuzzy min-entropy is necessary to show security for different kind of sources over different distributions. This paper focuses on secure sketch. We propose a new technique to generate re-usable secure sketch. We show security to low entropy sources and enable error correction up to Shannon bound. Our security defined information theoretically with Shannon entropy over a noise distribution adding to the input source. In particular, our new technique offers security guarantee for all family of input distributions with min-entropy at least single bit.

Keywords: Secure Sketch · Error Correction · Fuzzy Extractor · Information Theory

1 Introduction

Traditional cryptography systems rely on uniformly distributed and recoverable random strings for secret. For example, random passwords, tokens, and keys, all are commonly used secrets for deterministic cryptographic applications, i.e., encryption/decryption and password authentication. These secrets must present exactly on every query for a user to be authenticated and get accessed into the system. Besides, it must also consist of high enough entropy, thus making it very long and complicated, further resulted in the difficulty in memorizing it. On the other hand, there existed plentiful non-uniform strings to be utilized for secrets in practice. For instance, biometrics (i.e., human iris, fingerprint) which can be used for human recognition/identification purpose. Similarly, long passphrase (S. N. Porter, 1982 [1]), answering several questions for secure access (Niklas

Frykholm *et al.*, 2001 [2]) or personal entropy system (Ellison *et al.*, 2000 [3]), and list of favorite movies (Juels and Sudan, 2006 [4]), all are non-uniformly distributed random strings that can be utilized for secrets.

As a solution by utilizing non-uniform input for secrets, it raised several security and practicability concerns. Firstly, since it is *not truly random and uniform*, this increased the risk where an adversary may easily be guessed and compromised it, thus reveals the underlying secret. Secondly, most of the available non-uniform strings are *not exactly recoverable*. Therefore, they cannot be used for a typical deterministic cryptographic application. For instance, human biometric data, it is well understood that two biometric readings sourced from the same individual are rarely to be identical. Additionally, precise answer to multiple questions or entering a password through keyboard consistently, from time to time, would be a challenge for human memory although the provided answers are likely to be similar.

Nevertheless, these non-uniform measurements that always selected by human or naturally existing are believed to offer a higher entropy than human-memorable password. Especially, higher security level can be achieved by using longer/more complex human biological measurements, i.e., fingerprint, voice, retina scan, handwriting signature, and others. (N. Frykholm, 2000 [2]), (Jain *et al.*, 2016 [5]). Most importantly, it is memory-free and somewhat difficult to steal, or loss compared to using external key storage, e.g., smart card, token, keys.

The availability of non-uniform information prompted the generation of uniform random string from non-uniform materials. Started by Bennete *et al.*, (1988) [6], identified two major approaches to derive a uniform string from noisy non-uniform sources. The first approach is *information-reconciliation*, by tolerating the errors in the sources without leaking any information. The second approach refers to the *privacy amplification*, which converts high entropy input into a uniform random input. The information-reconciliation process can be classified into interactive (includes multi messages) and non-interactive (only includes single message) versions. For non-interactive line of work, it has been first defined by Dodis *et al.*, (2004) [7] called the fuzzy extractor. Likewise, the fuzzy extractor used two approaches to accomplish the task, which are the secure sketch - for error tolerance, and randomness extractor - for uniform string generation.

In this paper, we only focus on the secure sketch. Secure sketch is more demanding because it allows information-reconciliation, e.g., exact recovery of a noisy secret while offering security assurance to it. Moreover, a secure sketch can be easily extended to fuzzy extractor for uniform string generation by using a randomness extractor. There existing various secure sketch constructions in the literature. Some notable constructions involved the code-offset construction proposed by Juels and Wattenberg (1999) [8] that operates perfectly over hamming matrix space. This work generates a sketch through encoding a uniform string with error correction code, then leaving an offset via performing XOR operation with a noisy string. The uniform string can be reproduced by another

noisy string by means of error tolerance, provided the noise level is lower than a specified threshold. Besides, Juels and Sudan (2006) [4] have also proposed another construction for metric other than hamming called the fuzzy vault. An improved version of the fuzzy vault is proposed by Dodis *et al.*, (2004) [7], and also the Pin-sketch that relies on syndrome encoding/decoding with t -error correcting BCH code \mathcal{C} , which works well for non-fixed length input over a universe \mathcal{U} .

1.1 Existing Issues in Secure Sketch

We here review some existing issues in a secure sketch that have not considered by the previous constructions.

More error than entropy: The secure sketch must contain some information about the sources to tolerate the errors. More generally, given a point (some value) w , the sketch would allow the acceptance of its nearby point w' within distance t . Therefore, if an adversary can predict an accepting w' with noticeable probability, the sketch must reveal w to the adversary with noticeable probability as well. The tension between the security and error tolerance capability is very strong. Precisely, the security is measured in term of the residual (min-) entropy, which is the starting entropy of w minus the entropy loss. Often, a larger tolerance distance is needed to tolerate more errors. However, exercising larger tolerance distance will offer greater advantages to the adversary in predicting w' . In the end, the residual entropy becomes lower by the increment of t . This consequent to an upper bound of the tolerance distance translated to a lower bound on the entropy loss of the input sources. This event is much worsening for some non-uniform sources with low min-entropy, especially, when the sources consist of *more error than entropy* itself. Since the source entropy rate is lower than the error rate, simply deducting the entropy loss from the sources' min-entropy always output a negative value, hence, show no security. One typical example of a source with more error than entropy refers to the commonly known biometric feature - IrisCode (Daugman, 2006) [9]. The IrisCode is said to provide entropy of 249 bits. Whereas, the IrisCodes generated from the same user of each 2048 bits have showed far more than 249 bits of errors. Therefore, this more error than entropy problem is indeed restricting the usage of a secure sketch from all kind of available sources.

Distribution uncertainty: The predictability of nearby point w' within distance t is not merely entropically connected, but it is also closely tied to the distribution of the sources. A source can be described using a family of distributions $\mathcal{W} = \{W_1, \dots, W_\gamma\}$. Given a source under a random distribution $W \in \mathcal{W}$ where all points are far apart, the probability for an adversary to predict any nearby point $w' \in W$ within distance t will be small. The entropy loss of the sketch would be bounded that is proportional to t . In particular, given a source with min-entropy m , a larger distance between the points implies higher min-entropy, thus, the entropy loss due to error tolerance over distance t can be compensated by the high min-entropy. This entropy loss is crude if one has set $t > m$ for error tolerance over distance t (e.g., more error than entropy).

Fuller *et al.*, (2013) [10] have showed that under the event when the input distribution is precisely known and the security is defined computationally, the crude entropy loss can be avoided by the measurement of *fuzzy min-entropy*, which defined as the min-entropy with maximized chances for a variable of W within distance t of w' :

$$H_{t,\infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} -\log\left(\max_{w'} \Pr[W \in B_t(w')]\right)$$

where $B_t(w')$ denoted a hamming ball of radius t around w' . Conceivably, the fuzzy min-entropy is equivalent to the residual entropy, it can be bounded by the min-entropy $H_\infty(W) - \log(B_t(w')) \leq H_{t,\infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W)$ minus the loss signified by the hamming ball $B_t(w')$ of radius t , due to error tolerance.

However, it is imprudent to assume the source distribution is precisely known, especially for high entropy sources. The adversary may have higher computation power to model and exam the distribution compared to the designer. This leads to another problem called *distribution uncertainty*, where one cannot show information theoretical security guarantee without precise knowledge on the input worst case distribution W (i.e., distance between points is minimum).

Reusability¹ Reusability property is introduced by Boyen (2004) [13]. Given a user comes with a noisy input w (i.e., biometric), the user may enroll w for different applications. Each time the user enrolls using w , he/she must provide slightly different reading w_i due to the noise. Therefore, different sketches ss_i and keys R_i can be generated for different applications respectively. The security property of *individual* sketches and keys should hold with all existing sketches $ss_1, ss_2, \dots, ss_\gamma$. In fact, this property has been well studied for current constructions of secure sketch and fuzzy extractor, but many of them do not satisfied reusability [13] [14] [15] [16].

1.2 Our Contributions

We highlighted our main contributions as follow:

Average fuzzy min-entropy: To correct more errors, larger error tolerance distance is desired. Unfortunately, larger tolerance distance renders higher probability of success in predicting w' within more considerable distance around w . Thus, security diminution cannot be avoided. Our new result has considered the notion of *average fuzzy min-entropy*, which is basically the fuzzy min-entropy with different error tolerance distances.

To be more precise, consider another variable Φ . To allow error tolerance within a larger distance $t > t'$, one must maximize the total probability mass of Φ with larger ball $B_t(\phi')$ ² around the string ϕ' . Suppose Φ is correlated with some

¹ The reusability property is different to the unlinkability property [11] [12]. Unlinkability property prevents an adversary from differentiating whether two enrollments correspond to the same physical source, which is not focus in this work.

² Sometime, we omit ϕ' or w' to describe the ball B_t or $B_{t'}$, when they are not depend upon their center ϕ' and w' respectively

variable W , if the adversary finds out $W \notin B_{t'}(w')$, then the predictability of Φ becomes $\mathbb{E}_{w' \leftarrow W} \left[\max_{\phi'} \Pr[\Phi \in B_t(\phi') \mid W \notin B_{t'}(w')] \right]$. On average, the average fuzzy min-entropy is:

$$\tilde{H}_{t,\infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(\Phi \mid W \notin B_{t'}(w')) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} -\log \left(\mathbb{E}_{w' \leftarrow W} \left[\max_{\phi'} \Pr[\Phi \in B_t(\phi') \mid W \notin B_{t'}(w')] \right] \right)$$

Intuitively, average fuzzy min-entropy refers to the fuzzy min-entropy of some variable Φ defined by a larger hamming ball B_t , where only the points outside an existing smaller ball $B_{t'}$ are considered. Substantial fuzzy min-entropy implies more errors can be corrected over larger tolerance distance $t > t'$, hence, higher entropy loss. In this sense, average fuzzy min-entropy $\tilde{H}_{t,\infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(\Phi \mid W \notin B_{t'}(w'))$ reveals the entropy loss from the fuzzy min-entropy of W over smaller tolerance distance t' . Since the quantity of entropy loss must lower bound to the entropy of the source to show meaningful security, the average fuzzy min-entropy manifested the minimum entropy loss from a source over the worst case t' (minimum t'). In view of this, the average-fuzzy min-entropy is useful for better monitoring the loss of the min-entropy while providing optimal resilience. We obtain its definition by merely combined the average min-entropy and fuzzy min-entropy notions.

List-decoding toward Shannon bound: Our construction relies on *Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH)* to generate a resilient vector pair (trivially, a pair of longer strings with resilience property) for sketching and recover instead of using the original input string. The resilient vector resemble additional random noise adding to an encoded codeword by any linear error correction code. We showed that under this particular scenario, one able to list-decode the corrupted codewords, and correcting a total number of error rate up to Shannon bound

Security bound independent to the input length: Info. theoretic secure sketch is always desired. Because it does not introduce additional assumption of computational limits to the attacker, thus offers better security assurance. Most importantly, info. theoretic secure sketch eliminates the distribution uncertainty issue by showing security to all family of input distribution via min-entropy measurement. Notwithstanding its security robustness, the cost imposed by info. theoretic secure sketch to the source entropy requirement is too high, which is at least half of the input length itself [17]. It means that if the entropy is less than half of its input length, it achieves nothing where the underlying secret can be easily revealed due to exhaustive entropy loss caused by error tolerance. We constructed a pair of sketching and recover algorithm. Formal correctness and security proof have been given to show that it satisfied the properties of an info. theoretical secure sketch. In additional to this, the new construction is capable of achieving security bound that merely depends upon the Shannon entropy of some random noise distribution rather than its input length.

Reusable secure sketch: Apart from this, the new construction offers extra security property, which is the reusability. In the beginning, our design is meant to provide better security bound to the secure sketch, through the insertion of

additional random noise during the sketching phase. Eventually, we find out the noise included implicitly allows reusability. We defined our reusability in information theoretical sense, with a group of computational unbounded adversaries. Our results imply the flexibility of independent re-enrollment of a single source with multiple providers, yet offer security assurance to each of them, as long as the noise is kept within specified range, i.e., worst case error. Our reusability emphasizes the case when the providers are not communicating with each other hence it supports security to all of them individually.

1.3 Our Technique

Some notation need to know: This work focus on binary hamming metric where $\mathcal{M}_1 = \{0, 1\}^l$, and $\mathcal{M}_2 = \{0, 1\}^n$ denoted two different sizes of metric spaces with $n > l$. The distance between different binary string w and w' is the binary hamming distance (e.g., the number of disagree elements) denoted as $\|w \oplus w'\|$ where $\|\cdot\|$ is the hamming weight that counts the number of non-zero elements, and \oplus is the addition modulo two operation (XOR). Besides, the error rate of w and w' is denoted as $\|w \oplus w'\| / |w|$ which is simply the normalized hamming distance, given their size (length) $|w| = |w'|$. For error correction code notation, since we are more interested in tolerating the errors of a codeword c' instead of its min-distance d , we used t instead of d to explicitly represent an $[n, k, t]_2$ binary code \mathcal{C}_ξ with the tolerance rate denoted as $\xi = tn^{-1}$ over larger binary metric space $\{0, 1\}^n$. Besides, we here only focus on code \mathcal{C}_ξ with $d \geq 2t + 1$ and $\xi \in (0, 1/4)$. At the same point, we let $t_{(+)} = \lfloor (\xi + \epsilon)l \rfloor$ and $t_{(-)} = \lfloor (\xi - \epsilon)l \rfloor$ to describe two different error tolerance distances over the smaller binary metric space $\{0, 1\}^l$, with some error parameter $\epsilon > 0$.

Main idea: Suppose Alice wishes to conceal a noisy non-uniform string $w \in \{0, 1\}^l$ while allows exact recovery of w from another noisy string $w' \in \{0, 1\}^l$ that is close to w . Then, Alice has to generate a secure sketch which able to tolerate the error in w' . To do so, we invoke the use of error correction code for conventional secure sketch generation. Additional random errors (of different weights) are adding to the noisy input w and w' while sketching and recovery respectively. This can be done by simply perform an XOR operation in between w or w' with some random error vector $e \in \{0, 1\}^l$, i.e., $w_e = w \oplus e$. Given a $[n, k, t]_2$ code \mathcal{C}_ξ is chosen over $\{0, 1\}^n$, Alice encodes a longer string $v \in \{0, 1\}^k$ by padding w with additional random bits string $r \in \{0, 1\}^{k-l}$ drawn uniformly at random, i.e., $v = w||r$. The output of the encoding process is a codeword $c \in \mathcal{C}_\xi$. After this, she conceals c by generating a sketch $ss = c \oplus \delta$ which is then made public and leaving the offset δ in the clear. The offset δ is characterized by a pair of resilient vectors $\phi, \phi' \in \{0, 1\}^n$, which is generated from a pair of noisy strings $w'_e, w_e \in \{0, 1\}^l$ (with additional error vector e) through LSH. The resilient vectors offer resilience for the recovery of w from w' if $\|\delta\| \leq t$.

Likewise the code-offset construction [8], our idea is conceptual simpler but comes with some crucial differences in term of operations. Firstly, the code-offset construction concealing a random and uniform string (called as the witness of w);

our construction concealing a non-uniform input padded with additional random bits. Therefore the concealed object is not entirely random and uniform in our case. Secondly, despite the code-offset construction does not limit to particular types of error correction code (i.e., not necessary to be linear), the sketch size is always bounded by the size of the input w . Comparatively, in our case, Alice is free to choose any error correction code where the sizes of the concealed object and output sketch are not bounded but parametrized by the selected $[n, k, t]_2$ code \mathcal{C}_ξ . Thirdly, of course, our operation comes with additional random error added to the input w and w' during sketching and recovery.

For resilient vector generation, we only focus on a particular LSH family called hamming-hash [18]. The hamming hash is considered as one of the easiest ways to construct an LSH family by bit sampling technique. Since it will be a core element in our proposal, it is worth sketching in details on how it works.

Hamming hash strategy. Let $[l] = \{1, \dots, l\}$. For Alice with $w \in \{0, 1\}^l$ and Bob with $w' \in \{0, 1\}^l$. Alice and Bob agreed on this strategy as follow:

1. They are told to each other a common random integer $N \in [l]$.
2. They separately output '0' or '1' depend upon their private string w and w' , i.e., Alice output '1' if the N -th bit of w is '1', else output '0'.
3. They win if they got the same output, i.e., $w(N) = w'(N)$.

Based on above strategy, we are interested in the probability for Alice and Bob output the same value which can be described with a similarity function $S(w, w') = P$ with probability $P \in [0, 1]$.

Theorem 1. *Hamming hash strategy is a LSH with similarity function $S(w, w') = 1 - \|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1}$*

Theorem 1 concluded that Alice and Bob always win with probability described as $P = 1 - \|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1}$. Observe that, the similarity function for hamming hash correspond to the hamming distance between w and w' .

By repeat step 1 and step 2 of hamming hash strategy n times, with different random integers, Alice and Bob able to output a n bits string $\phi, \phi' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ respectively, which we have earlier named as *resilient vectors*.

Theorem 2. *Suppose two resilient vectors $\phi, \phi' \in \{0, 1\}^n$ are generated from $w, w' \in \{0, 1\}^l$ respectively by hamming hash strategy with a random integer string $N \in [l]^n$, the expected hamming distance is $\mathbb{E}[\|\phi \oplus \phi'\|] = n \|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1}$.*

Proof. Let $\|\delta\| = \|\phi \oplus \phi'\|$, base on Theorem 1, we know that, for each time in comparing the hamming hash output (for $i = 1, \dots, n$), the probability of disagree is described as:

$$\Pr[\phi(i) \neq \phi'(i)] = \|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} = 1 - P$$

Therefore, one has i.i.d variable (or Bernoulli variable) for each offset element, $\delta(i) = 1$ if $\phi(i) \neq \phi'(i)$ and $\delta(i) = 0$ if $\phi(i) = \phi'(i)$. Precisely, $\|\delta\| = \|\phi \oplus \phi'\| =$

$\sum_{i=1}^n \delta(i)$, thus, $\|\delta\| \sim \text{Bin}(n, 1 - P)$ follows binomial distribution of expected distance $\mathbb{E}[\|\delta\|] = n(1 - P)$ and s.d. $\sigma = \sqrt{nP(1 - P)}$. Hence, $\mathbb{E}[\|\delta\|] = n(1 - P) = n \|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1}$ and prove the theorem.

Theorem 2 concluded that, any changes in the input hamming distance $\|w \oplus w'\|$ can be described as an Bernoulli variable corresponds to the offset elements $\delta(i)$. Therefore, by introducing additional error $e \in \{0, 1\}^l$ of weight $\|e\| = l\epsilon$ to the inputs, where $\epsilon > 0$ (e.g., adding the error simply equivalent to $\|w \oplus w' \oplus e\|$), the probability of disagreeing for each element between the resilient vectors ϕ, ϕ' must shifted by ϵ , which can be described as $1 - P \pm \epsilon$.

To make the above argument more precise, we provide the following corollaries to characterize the effect on the offset $\|\delta\|$ with ϵ . To avoid notation clutter, we always refer to the resilient vectors generated from LSH hamming using the same random integer string $N \in [l]^n$. The corollaries are given as follow.

Corollary 1. *Let W and Φ be some random variable over $\{0, 1\}^l$ and $\{0, 1\}^n$ respectively, let $\xi = t/n$ be the tolerance rate of a $[n, k, t]_2$ code \mathcal{C}_ξ and $\epsilon > 0$ be the error parameter. Suppose a resilient vector $\phi' \in \Phi$ is generated from strings $w' \in W$. For two hamming ball $B_t(\phi')$ and $B_{t_{(-)}}(w')$ of radius $t_{(-)} = \lfloor (\xi - \epsilon)l \rfloor$ and $t > t_{(-)}$, given a variable $W \in B_{t_{(-)}}(w')$, then, one has the minimum probability to find any variable $\Phi \in B_t(\phi')$ described as $1 - \exp(-2n\epsilon^2)$.*

Proof. For $W \in B_{t_{(-)}}(w')$, it means that any string $w \in W$ must show an error rate of $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi - \epsilon$. Based on Theorem 2, w can be used to produce its corresponding resilient vector $\phi \in \Phi$ that shows an expected offset with ϕ' described as $\mathbb{E}[\|\phi \oplus \phi'\|] = \mathbb{E}[\|\delta\|]$ s.t. $\mathbb{E}[\|\delta\|] \leq t - n\epsilon$ (by multiplying both sides of the inequality with n). It follows, there will be a minimum value of t_{\min} s.t. $t_{\min} = \mathbb{E}[\|\delta\|] + n\epsilon$. Therefore, By using *Hoeffding's inequality*, one able to calculate the average probability:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}_{w' \leftarrow W} \left[\min_{\phi'} \Pr [\Phi \in B_t(\phi') \mid W \in B_{t_{(-)}}(w')] \right] \\ & \geq \min_{t=t_{\min}} \Pr [\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(-)}] = 1 - \exp(-2n\epsilon^2) \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

and complete the prove.

Corollary 2. *Let W and Φ be some random variable over $\{0, 1\}^l$ and $\{0, 1\}^n$ respectively, let $\xi = t/n$ be the tolerance rate of a $[n, k, t]_2$ code \mathcal{C}_ξ and $\epsilon > 0$ be the error parameter. Suppose a resilient vector $\phi' \in \Phi$ is generated from strings $w' \in W$. For two hamming ball $B_t(\phi')$ and $B_{t_{(+)}}(w')$ of radius $t_{(+)} = \lfloor (\xi + \epsilon)l \rfloor$ and $t > t_{(+)}$, given a variable $W \notin B_{t_{(+)}}(w')$, then, one has the maximum probability to find any variable $\Phi \in B_t(\phi')$ described as $\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)$.*

Proof. This proof is instantiated from the proof of Corollary 1. For $W \notin B_{t_{(+)}}(w')$, it means that any string $w \in W$ must show error rate of $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \geq \xi + \epsilon$. More precisely, $\|w \oplus w'\| \geq \lfloor (\xi + \epsilon)l \rfloor > t_{(+)}$. According to Theorem 2, w is

capable to produce its corresponding resilient vector $\phi \in \Phi$ that will show an expected offset with ϕ' described as $\mathbb{E}[\|\delta\|] \geq t + n\epsilon$. Thus, there will be a maximum value of t_{\max} s.t. $t_{\max} = \mathbb{E}[\|\delta\|] - n\epsilon$. Therefore, By using *Hoeffding's inequality*, one able to calculate the average probability, by symmetry:

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}_{w' \leftarrow W} \left[\max_{\phi'} \Pr [\Phi \in B_t(\phi') \mid W \notin B_{t_{(+)}}(w')] \right] \\ & \leq \max_{t=t_{\max}} \Pr [\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}] = \exp(-2n\epsilon^2) \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

and complete the prove.

The results obtained from Corollary 1 and Corollary 2 imply the following statement: Once the error is introduced into the input, the probability to find any resilient vector $\phi' \in \Phi$ close to its original reading ϕ within the ball $B_t(\phi')$ will be bounded due to the error effect. These bounds are conditioned on the input W , whether $W \in B_{t_{(-)}}(w')$ or $W \notin B_{t_{(+)}}(w')$, that can be proven in either way by minimizing/maximizing the value of $t = t_{\min}/t_{\max}$ respectively. Accordingly, we have the computed numerical bound for average fuzzy min-entropy described as

$$\tilde{H}_{t,\infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(\Phi \mid W \notin B_{t_{(+)}}(w')) \geq -\log(\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \quad (3)$$

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we briefly highlight and recall some classical notions used in our constructions.

Metric Spaces: A metric space defined \mathcal{M} as finite set along with a distance function $\text{dis} : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}^+ = [0, \infty)$, that takes any non-negative real values and obey symmetric e.g., $\text{dis}(A, B) = \text{dis}(B, A)$, and triangle inequality, e.g., $\text{dis}(A, C) \leq \text{dis}(A, B) + \text{dis}(B, C)$.

Min-Entropy: For security, one is always interested in the probability for an adversary to predict a random value, i.e., guessing a secret. For a random variable W , $\max_w \Pr[W = w]$ is the adversary's best strategy to guess the most likely value, also known as the predictability of W . The min-entropy thus defined as

$$H_{\infty}(W) = -\log(\max_w \Pr[W = w])$$

min-entropy also viewed as worst case entropy.

Average min-entropy: Given pair of random variable W , and W' (possible correlated), given an adversary find out the value w' of W' , the predictability of W is now become $\max_w \Pr[W = w \mid W' = w']$. The average min-entropy of W given W' is defined as

$$\tilde{H}_{\infty}(W \mid W') = -\log \left(\mathbb{E}_{w' \leftarrow W'} \left[\max_w \Pr[W = w \mid W' = w'] \right] \right)$$

Fuzzy min-entropy: Given an adversary try to find w' that is within distance t of w , the *fuzzy min-entropy* is the total maximized probability mass of W within the ball $B_t(w')$ of radius t around w defined as:

$$H_{t,\infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W) = -\log\left(\max_{w'} \Pr[W \in B_t(w')]\right)$$

high fuzzy min-entropy is a necessary for strong key derivation.

Secure sketch [7] An $(\mathcal{M}, m, \tilde{m}, t)$ -secure sketch is a pair of randomized procedures “sketch” (SS) and “Recover” (Rec), with the following properties:

SS: takes input $w \in \mathcal{M}$ returns a secure sketch (e.g., helper string) $ss \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

Rec: takes an element $w' \in \mathcal{M}$ and ss . If $\text{dis}(w, w') \leq t$, then $\text{Rec}(w', ss) = w$ with probability $1 - \beta$, where β is some negligible quantity. If $\text{dis}(w, w') > t$, then no guarantee is provided about the output of Rec.

The security property of secure sketch guarantees that for any distribution W over \mathcal{M} with min-entropy m , the values of W can be recovered by the adversary who observes ss with probability no greater than $2^{-\tilde{m}}$. That is the residual entropy $\tilde{H}_\infty(W|W') \geq \tilde{m}$.

Error correction code [19]: Let $q \geq 2$ be an integer, let $[q] = \{1, \dots, q\}$, we called an $(n, k, d)_q$ -ary code \mathcal{C} consist of following properties:

- \mathcal{C} is a subset of $[q]^n$, where n is an integer referring to the *blocklength* of \mathcal{C} .
- The *dimension* of code \mathcal{C} can be represented as $|\mathcal{C}| = [q]^k = V$
- The *rate* of code \mathcal{C} to be the normalized quantity $\frac{k}{n}$
- The *min-distance* between different codewords defined as $\min_{c, c^* \in \mathcal{C}} \text{dis}(c, c^*)$

It is convenient to view code \mathcal{C} as a function $\mathcal{C} : [q]^k \rightarrow [q]^n$. Under this view, the elements of V can be considered as a message $v \in V$ and the process to generate its associated codeword $\mathcal{C}(v) = c$ is called *encoding*. Viewed this way, encoding a message v of size k , always adding redundancy to produce codeword $c \in [q]^n$ of longer size n . Nevertheless, for any codeword c with at most $t = \lfloor \frac{d-1}{2} \rfloor$ symbols are being modified to form c' , it is possible to uniquely recover c from c' by using certain function f s.t. $f(c') = c$. The procedure to find the unique $c \in \mathcal{C}$ that satisfied $\text{dis}(c, c') \leq t$ by using f is called as *decoding*. A code \mathcal{C} is said to be efficient if there exists a polynomial time algorithm for encoding and decoding.

Linear error correction code [19]: Linear error correction code is a linear subspace of \mathbb{F}_q^n . A q -ary linear code of blocklength n , dimension k and minimum distance d is represented as $[n, k, d]_q$ code \mathcal{C} . For a linear code, a string with all zeros 0^n is always a codeword. It can be specified into one of two equivalent ways with a generator matrix $G \in \mathbb{F}_q^{n \times k}$ or parity check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}_q^{(n-k) \times n}$:

- a $[n, k, d]_q$ linear code \mathcal{C} can be specified as the set $\{Gv : v \in \mathbb{F}_q^k\}$ for an $n \times k$ metric which known as the *generator matrix* of \mathcal{C} .
- a $[n, k, d]_q$ linear code \mathcal{C} can also be specified as the subspace $\{x : x \in \mathbb{F}_q^n \text{ and } Hx = 0^n\}$ for an $(n - k) \times n$ metric which known as the *parity check matrix* of \mathcal{C} .

For any linear code, the linear combination of any codewords is also considered as a codeword over \mathbb{F}_q^n . Often, the encoding of any message $v \in \mathbb{F}_q^k$ can be done with $O(nk)$ operations (by multiplying it with the generator matrix, i.e., Gv). The distance between two linear codewords refers to the number of disagree elements between them, also known as the *hamming distance*.

Shannon Code [20] Let a binary code \mathcal{C} over $\{0, 1\}^n$. We call that \mathcal{C} is an $[t, \varepsilon]$ -Shannon code if there exists an encoding and decoding algorithm $\langle \text{Encode}, \text{decode} \rangle$ such that, **Encode** encode any k bits message to n bits codeword $c \in \mathcal{C}$, and a **decode** decode any codeword c' for all $t' \leq t$, and $c \in \mathcal{C}$, $\Pr[\text{dis}(c, c') \leq t' \wedge \text{decode}(c') \neq c] \leq \varepsilon$.

Locality Sensitive Hashing (LSH) [21] Given that $P_2 > P_1$, while $w, w' \in \mathcal{M}$, and $\mathcal{H} = h_i : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow U$, where U refers to the output metric space (after hashing), which comes along with a similarity function S , where i is the number of hash functions h_i . A locality sensitive hashing can be viewed as a probability distribution over a family \mathcal{H} of hash functions follows $P_{h \in \mathcal{H}}[h(w) = h(w')] = S(w, w')$. In particular, the similarity function S described the hashed collision probability in between w and w' .

$$\begin{aligned} P_{h \in \mathcal{H}}(h_i(w) = h_i(w')) &\leq P_1, & \text{if } S(w, w') < R_1 \\ P_{h \in \mathcal{H}}(h_i(w) = h_i(w')) &\geq P_2, & \text{if } S(w, w') > R_2 \end{aligned}$$

LSH transforms input w and w' to its output metric space U with property that ensuring similarity inputs render higher probability of collision over U , and vice versa.

3 New Construction-LSH Secure Sketch

We hereby provide the detail of our based design of on a pair of sketching and recover algorithm, that incorporated with LSH, by hamming hash strategy.

3.1 LSH-Hamming hash

We first formulate the hamming-hash algorithm $\Omega^{\text{ham-h}}$ which will be used in our LSH-sketching and recover algorithms described later. Generally, the hamming-hash algorithm $\Omega^{\text{ham-h}} : \mathcal{M}_1 \times [l]^n \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_2$ is an iterative process through repeating the hamming hash strategy (steps 1 and 2) up to $n > 1$ times. It serves to sample the input binary string of size l into a longer binary string a.k.a resilient vector of size $n > l$.

Given input $w \in \{0, 1\}^l$, and $N \leftarrow_s [l]^n$, the LSH-hamming hash algorithm described as follow:

```

 $\Omega^{\text{ham-h}}(w, N)$ 


---


 $\phi \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
for  $i = 1, \dots, n$  do
  parse  $x = w(N(i))$  //  $x$  is the  $N(i)$ -th bits of  $w$ 
   $\phi = \phi \| x$ 
endfor
return  $\phi$ 

```

3.2 LSH-Hamming hash

We denote the LSH-sketching algorithm that employed the hamming-hash algorithm, Ω and a $[n, k, t]_2$ code \mathcal{C}_ξ with parity check matrix H^3 as $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}$.

For sketching, one is required to generate a resilient vector ϕ by using the LSH hamming hash algorithm. The size of the resilient vector must same as the sampled codeword c . Then, the sketch ss can be constructed by simply perform an XOR operation, i.e., $ss = c \oplus \phi$. Besides, to add additional noise to the input during sketching, we denote the random error vector $e \in \text{supp}(\chi)$ over some random distribution χ parametrized by $\epsilon > 0$. Specifically, we have $\|\chi\| = \lfloor l\epsilon \rfloor$, which means the error vector e is of weight $\|e\| = \|\chi\| = \lfloor l\epsilon \rfloor$. The sketching algorithm $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}$ used input w, N, H described as follow:

```

 $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w, N, H, \epsilon)$ 


---


 $r \leftarrow \mathfrak{s} \{0, 1\}^{k-l}$  // sample  $r$  uniformly at random
 $\chi \leftarrow \mathfrak{s} \{0, 1\}^l$  // sample  $\chi$  according to the noise parameter  $\epsilon$ 
 $e \leftarrow \mathfrak{s} \text{supp}(\chi)$  // sample  $e$  from  $\chi$  uniformly at random, where  $\|e\| = \|\chi\| = \lfloor l\epsilon \rfloor$ 
 $v = w \| r$ ;
 $c = Hv$ ;
 $w_e = w \oplus e$ ;
 $\phi \leftarrow \Omega^{\text{ham-h}}(w_e, N)$ 
 $ss = c \oplus \phi$ 
return  $(ss, N, H)$ 

```

All steps on $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w, N, H, \epsilon)$ can be done in $O(n^2)$. Notably, the size of v and ss are now depend upon the chosen code \mathcal{C}_ξ (parametrized by k and n respectively). Often, the XOR operation $c \oplus \phi$ works perfectly under the case when the size of the codeword and the resilient vector are equal, i.e., $|c| = |\phi| = n$.

Assuming in a scenario that is without any random bits padding, direct encoding w must add $n - l$ number of redundant symbols for $|c| = |\phi| = n$ to hold, which will lead to exhaustive entropy loss when the sketch is published. As a solution to this, we padded the input to form a longer string v before encoding

³ Sometimes, we replace H with G if generator matrix is desired for code \mathcal{C}_ξ

takes place, hence reduced the number of redundancy. Doing so can minimize the entropy loss from the sketch during encoding phase.

In fact, the idea of random bits padding for secure sketch has been earlier proposed by Woodage *et al.* [22] for password typo correction. Their works padded random bits on shorter sketches that protecting the same password. The effort required to recover the password from all sketches of the same size is increased, so, it reduced the entropy loss.

Noting that for any random bit padded input $v \in K$ over some random distribution K , our strategy should introduce a changes over the input metric space form \mathcal{M}_1 to \mathcal{M}_2 for $W \in \mathcal{M}_1$ and $V \in \mathcal{M}_2$ respectively. In fact any secure sketch construction technique that allows changing in between metric space can be viewed as *biometric embedding*, first identified by Dodis *et al.*, (2004) [7]. Generally, biometric embedding used a transformation function f_b to transform the input $w, w' \in \mathcal{M}_a$ over a metric space \mathcal{M}_a to another metric space \mathcal{M}_b , i.e., $f_b(w), f_b(w') \in \mathcal{M}_b$. The transformation function itself must come with some useful properties for secure sketch construction (see Section 4.3 in [7] for more details). Like wise, our construction can be considered as an realization of biometric embedding with resilient vector where the achievable security is bounded by the input min-entropy over the original metric space before transformation ([7], Lemma 4.7).

3.3 LSH-Recover

For recovery, suppose one wishes to recover w from another string $w' \in \{0, 1\}^l$. He/she needs to provide another resilient vector ϕ' . This resilient vector can be generated by using the same hamming hash algorithm Ω with inputs $w'_e = w' \oplus e$ after adding the error vector $e \in \text{supp}(\chi')$ followed another sampled error distribution χ' parametrized by the same parameter ϵ . Noting that, despite the noise's distribution χ' and χ are both parametrized by ϵ , but the later one consisted of doubled in amplitude, i.e., $\|\chi'\| = [2l\epsilon]$. The offset is manifested by the way of measuring the hamming distance on the resilient vectors pair, $\delta = \phi \oplus \phi'$. Often, we allow the recovery algorithm to run iteratively for all $e_i \in \text{supp}(\chi')$ to take consideration of all possible errors' pattern of e_i over χ' (for $i = 1, \dots, |\text{supp}(\chi')|$).

We denote the LSH-recover algorithm that employed the hamming-hash algorithm, Ω , and a $[n, k, t]_2$ code \mathcal{C}_ϵ with parity check matrix H and a decoding algorithm f as $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon, f}^{\text{LSH}}$. The recover algorithm $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ used input string ss, w', N, ϵ and H to recover w is described as follow:

```

Rec $_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}(ss, w', N, H, \epsilon)$ 
-----
 $\chi' \leftarrow_s \{0, 1\}^l$  // sample  $\chi'$  with noise parameter  $\epsilon$  i.e.,  $\|\chi'\| = \lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor$ 
 $\mathcal{L} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
for  $i = 1, \dots, |\text{supp}(\chi')|$ 
   $e_i \leftarrow_s \text{supp}(\chi')$  // sample  $e'_i$  uniformly at random, where  $\|e'_i\| = \|\chi'\|$ 
   $w'_{e_i} = w' \oplus e_i$ 
   $\phi'_i \leftarrow \Omega^{\text{ham-h}}(w'_{e_i}, N)$ 
   $c'_i = ss \oplus \phi'_i$  // also  $ss \oplus \phi'_i = c \oplus (\phi \oplus \phi'_i)$ 
  // try to decode the codeword:
   $c_i \leftarrow f(c'_i, H)$ 
   $v_i \leftarrow H^{-1}c_i$ 
   $w_i \leftarrow v_i$  // look for  $w_i$  from first  $l$  bits of  $v_i$ 
   $\mathcal{L} \cup w_i$ 
endfor
return  $\mathcal{L}$ 

```

If the final decoding process $f(c, H)$ is successful, the algorithm returns a list of outputs \mathcal{L} where $w \in \mathcal{L}$. Else, it will output all wrong results and $w \notin \mathcal{L}$.

By introducing additional error during the sketching phase, we are now able to describe the input error rate with ϵ by $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi \pm \epsilon$ or $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \geq \xi \pm \epsilon$. We want the recovery algorithm to output $w \in \mathcal{L}$ for any error rate $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi \pm \epsilon$ by some error correction code \mathcal{C}_ξ .

A brief description of the recovery mechanism is given as follow. Suppose Bob has intercepted with a sketch $ss = c \oplus \phi$. Firstly, he has to double the noise parameter from ϵ to 2ϵ and generate a resilient vector $\phi' \leftarrow \Omega^{\text{ham-h}}(w'_e, N)$. Doubling the noise parameter is mainly aimed to show correctness for any error rate $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon$. The hamming weight of the offset can be conveniently represented as $\|\delta\| = \|\phi \oplus \phi'\|$. By means of the similarity preservation property of LSH, the offset, δ is expected to be low as well if w and w' are close to each other. Expressly, if w and w' are close enough, one would have $\|\delta\| \leq t$, with distance t specified by the error correction code \mathcal{C}_ξ . Eventually, Bob can perform $ss \oplus \phi'_i$ to output the nearest codeword c' . The errors over c' can be tolerated by means of error correction with code \mathcal{C}_ξ with decoding function f .

When comes into decoding, it follows that $f(c', H) = f(c \oplus \delta, H) = f((c \oplus \phi) \oplus \phi', H) = f(c \oplus (\phi \oplus \phi'), H)$. If $\|\phi \oplus \phi'\| = \|\delta\| \leq t$, the decoding will success and its efficiency follows the decoding algorithm f itself. Thereafter, v can be recovered successfully and so w by looking at the first l symbols of v . Above process is repeated for $i = 1, \dots, |\text{supp}(\chi')|$ iterations to list all possible solutions for w over a list \mathcal{L} .

4 Resilience

We now consider the resilience of the proposed algorithm pair $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}})$. Generally, the resilience measures on how probable the offset $\|\delta\|$ can be tolerated in facilitating the recovery of w from the sketch. High resilience implies high probability to tolerate the offset, or more formally, high probability of correcting the errors.

Obviously, the resilience of $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}})$ is bounded by the resilience of the selected code \mathcal{C}_ξ . Choosing a ‘good’ code with a high value of ξ is non-trivial, this is because different code \mathcal{C}_ξ is subjected to different set of parameters (n, k, t) and there is no straightforward way to determine which the most efficient one is. The design of such code under different set of parameters (n, k, t) is another broad research topic. We direct the interested user refer to the works of MacWilliams, (1977) [23], and Peterson and Weldo, (1972) [24]. Nevertheless, with random bit padding to the input, the selection for different codes \mathcal{C}_ξ of different values $\xi \in (0, 1/4)$ are highly relieved, since once can easily find a code \mathcal{C}_ξ with $k \geq l$ for any input $w \in \{0, 1\}^l$. In particular, we hereby focus on a type of efficient $[n, k, t]_2$ code \mathcal{C}_ξ named BCH code [24] with efficient decoding algorithm f via algebraic method, i.e., syndrome decoding [25] for our resilience study.

In this section, we are more interested in the probability to recover the original input w . We will leave the discussion of the topic regarding resilience bound to the following Section 4.1.

For the sake of simplicity, we combined the results of Eq. (1) and Eq. (2). Let $\beta = \exp(-2n\epsilon^2)$. Thus, $\mathbb{E}_{w' \leftarrow W} \left[\max_{\phi'} \Pr [\Phi \in B_t(\phi') \mid W \notin B_{t(+)}(w')] \right] \leq \beta$, and on the other hand, $\mathbb{E}_{w' \leftarrow W} \left[\min_{\phi'} \Pr [\Phi \in B_t(\phi') \mid W \in B_{t(-)}(w')] \right] \geq 1 - \beta$.

Further simplification is done by describing the term *overwhelming* if the value of $1 - \beta$ is close to one (e.g., negligible β). As we shall, negligible β means substantial average fuzzy min-entropy.

Our explication of resilience evinced by the *completeness* of $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}})$. It captured the scenario when the players are honest, which is defined under the following definition.

Definition 1. Let W, SS be some random variables over $\mathcal{M}_1 = \{0, 1\}^l$ and $\mathcal{M}_2 = \{0, 1\}^n$. Given $N \in [l]^n$, an $[n, k, t]_2$ linear code \mathcal{C}_ξ with parity check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}^{(n-k) \times n}$ where $\xi = t/n$ and $l \leq k < n$. For a sketch ss generated through $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w, N, H, \epsilon) = ss$, where $ss \in SS$. For all $w, w' \in W$, the probability for $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}(ss, w', N, H, \epsilon) = w$ is overwhelming if the error rate $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} \leq \xi - \epsilon$. We said $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}})$ is complete in (ξ, ϵ) -fuzziness if above statement holds.

We hereby provide a proposition with proof to characterize the resilience property of $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}})$.

Proposition 1. *If syndrome decoding algorithm f and an $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code with $\xi = tn^{-1} \in (0, 1/4)$ are used in $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$, then, $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ is complete in (ξ, ϵ) -fuzziness if n and ϵ are sufficiently large.*

Proof. To claim our completeness, we use the results from Corollary 1. For $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} \leq \xi - \epsilon$, one has the minimum probability for successful decoding expressed as:

$$\min_{t=t_{\min}} \Pr [\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(-)}] = 1 - \beta$$

It follows $1 - \beta$ is overwhelming with negligible quantity $\beta = \exp(-2n\epsilon^2)$ when n and ϵ are sufficiently large. Hence, the proposition is prove.

Proposition 1 concluded that given a $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code \mathcal{C}_ξ , under the scenario where $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} \leq \xi - \epsilon$, or formally, it also equivalent to the case when $\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(-)}$, the offset can be tolerated with overwhelming probability if one has the value of n and ϵ are sufficiently large for any decoding algorithm f .

Generally, with an $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code, the syndrome decoding algorithm f itself will always success without error (i.e., perfect correctness, $\beta = 0$) if $\|\delta\| \leq t$ [24]. However, adding random error eventually boils down this perfect correctness notion into probabilistic correctness notion. Precisely, the error added into the input w would affect the distance of the resilient vectors pair $\|\phi \oplus \phi'\|$ described by their collision probability. Therefore the distance over the resilient vector will be probabilistic as well.

4.1 Correcting More Error via List-Decoding in Polynomial Time

Recall the completeness statement only hold when $\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(-)}$. This result demonstrating a limited amount of the original inputs' error $\|w \oplus w'\|$ could be corrected by the code \mathcal{C}_ξ . To be precise, since $\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(-)}$ can also view as $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} + \epsilon \leq \xi$, therefore, the correctable error rate $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1}$ must be bounded by ξ with some value of ϵ .

Conversely, one can actually correct more error with any code \mathcal{C}_ξ when $\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}$. Since $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} \leq t_{(+)}$ can be viewed as $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} - \epsilon \leq \xi$. It follows that one can achieve the same bound when $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} \geq \xi$ with sufficiently large ϵ . Formally, $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} + \epsilon - 2\epsilon \leq \xi$, therefore, by introducing additional random error of rate -2ϵ during recovery phase, i.e., $\|e\| = \lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor$, the error can be corrected with overwhelming probability $1 - \beta$ by Proposition 1.

We hereby provide the soundness of $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ to characterize the correctness of $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ for larger range of error rate, e.g., $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon$. This soundness of $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ covered the scenario when any adversary is capable of sampling a query sample w' where $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon$ holds.

Often, for efficient decoding, we always hope the list size $|\mathcal{L}|$ to be as small as possible, or at least polynomial in the sketch size (n). The definition below captured the soundness of $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ in correcting the errors probability at least $1 - \beta$ and efficiently under the event when $\|w \oplus w'\|l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon$.

Definition 2. Let W , and SS be some random variables where over $\mathcal{M}_1 = \{0, 1\}^l$ and $\mathcal{M}_2 = \{0, 1\}^n$ respectively. Given $N \in [l]^n$, an $[n, k, t]_2$ linear code \mathcal{C}_ξ , and parity check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}^{(n-k) \times n}$, where $l \leq k < n$. For all $w, w' \in W$, given a sketch ss generated by $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w, N, H, \epsilon) = ss \in SS$. We said $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ is efficient if $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}(ss, w', N, H, \epsilon) = w$ can be done in time $\text{poly}(n)$

We provide a theorem with proof to show that $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ can be done in an efficient manner follows Definition 2. In the meantime, we denote $h_2(\epsilon) = -(\epsilon) \log(\epsilon) - (1 - \epsilon) \log(1 - \epsilon)$ is the binary entropy function of error rate ϵ .

Theorem 3. Suppose a syndrome decoding algorithm f and an $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code \mathcal{C}_ξ are used in $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$. For $\exp(-2n\epsilon^2) < 0.125$, $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ is efficient when $\lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil \leq \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$, $\epsilon \in [l^{-1}, 1/4]$, $\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor \leq \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}$.

Proof. Given $\|e_i\| = \lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor$, we have $|\text{supp}(\chi')| = \binom{l}{\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor}$ possible ways to describe all different combination of the error vector $e_i \in \text{supp}(\chi')$. It follows $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ maximally run in $\binom{l}{\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor}$ iterations. Noting that all these possible ways of description should include both scenarios when the final error rate is increasing (i.e., $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon + 2\epsilon$) or decreasing (i.e., $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon - 2\epsilon$). The second scenario can be viewed as $\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(-)}$ where this error can be corrected with probability at least $1 - \exp(-2n\epsilon^2)$ by Proposition 1. Therefore, the probability of successful decoding with additional error vector $\|e_i\| = \lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor$ when $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon$ can be expressed as:

$$\Pr[\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon] = \frac{\binom{\|w \oplus w'\|}{\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor}}{\binom{l}{\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor}} \leq \frac{\binom{\|w \oplus w'\|}{2l\epsilon}}{\binom{l}{2l\epsilon}}$$

To keep list size $|\mathcal{L}|$ small, we knew that, for some positive integer $m' > 3$ and $t < 2^{m'-1}$, there exists an BCH code (computation in Galois field $GF(2^{m'})$) with parameters $n = 2^{m'} - 1$, $n - k \leq m't$ and minimum distance $d \geq 2t - 1$. In view of this, the total number of codewords in \mathcal{C}_ξ is bounded by $2^{m'} = n + 1$. For $\exp(-2n\epsilon^2) < 0.125$, by Eq. 2, there are at least $1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2) = 2^{\log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2))} > 2^3$ number of codewords which are considered as ‘good’ codewords (i.e., $c'_i \in \mathcal{C}_\xi$) for successful decoding. It follows that this number can be further bounded as $2^{\log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2))} \leq 2^{\lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil}$, and yield $\lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil = m' > 3$. We need $\binom{l}{\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor} / \binom{\|w \oplus w'\|}{2l\epsilon} \leq 2^{m'}$ to ensure $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ maximally run in $2^{m'} = n + 1$ iterations. With $\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor \leq \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}$, by *Stirling's approximation*, $\binom{l}{\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor} \leq 2^{lh_2(\epsilon)} \leq 2^{kh_2(\epsilon)}$ holds when $\epsilon \in [l^{-1}, 1/4]$, hence $\frac{\binom{\|w \oplus w'\|}{2l\epsilon}}{\binom{l}{2l\epsilon}} \geq 2^{-kh_2(\epsilon)}$. Therefore, one has the solution:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon] &= 2^{-kh_2(\epsilon)} \\ &\geq 2^{-\lceil kh_2(\epsilon) \rceil} \geq 2^{-\lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil} = 2^{-m'} = \frac{1}{2^{O(\log(n))}} = \frac{1}{\text{poly}(n)} \end{aligned} \quad (4)$$

Therefore, after $\text{poly}(n)$ iterations, $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ would success and output $w \in \mathcal{L}$ with probability at least $1 - \exp(-2n\epsilon^2) > 0.875$ and complete the prove.

In summary, given $\exp(-2n\epsilon^2) < 0.125$, $\epsilon \in [l^{-1}, 1/4]$, $\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor \leq \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}$, one needs $\lceil kh_2(\epsilon) \rceil \leq \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$ to ensure efficient decoding with f in $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$. For maximum error correction capacity (maximum value for ξ and ϵ), it follows $h_2(1/4) = 0.8113$ where $\lceil (0.8113)k \rceil \leq \log(n+1)$ must follow. In addition to this, one is capable of correcting a total error of $\|w \oplus w'\| \leq \lfloor (\xi + \epsilon)l \rfloor = t_{(+)} < l/2 \leq k/2$ and approaching the Shannon Bound with input of length $l \leq k$ that is small enough. We reserved more details discussion regarding the error correction bound in the next subsection.

4.2 Error Correction up to Shannon Bound

In the previous section, we have demonstrated the resilience of algorithm pair $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$, in term of the probability in correcting the errors. Although, high probability in correcting the errors does not always mean high number of errors can be corrected. Therefore, this section will provide the discussion on how much errors can be corrected by using $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$. Formally, we called this as the resilience bound of $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$.

Generally, to study the resilience bound, the error model of the system must be conceived. It is mean to say that, without any knowledge on the error process of the input, it is difficult to precisely model and determine the resilience bound of a given error correcting construction. It is also heedless for one to believe that people have a complete understanding of the complex error pattern, or the distribution that is overtaking by the noisy non-uniform sources, i.e., biometric.

Principally, to study the resilience bound without the knowledge of the input error process, one can always use the *perfect correctness* model. Recall that, high resilience means the errors can be corrected with overwhelming probability $1 - \beta$. Ideally, it is natural to let $\beta = 0$, which will easily lead to the perfect correctness model, so, the errors can be corrected with probability one. This means there will be only one unique solution for every w' within distance t . Hence, the decoding process always return the original value w precisely (e.g., unique decoding). In this model, the fuzzy min-entropy notion may not necessary, since one can easily show infinite fuzzy min-entropy without any dissension for security. Therefore, this model is useful and suitable for who try to avoid certain assumption about the exact properties of the stochastic error process, or the computational power of an adversary to carry out decoding successfully. Formally, once the error pattern of the input sources is precisely modelled and known, one can easily determine the min-distance d between the codewords so that the decoding process must succeed without any error. On the other hand, computational hardness assumption must be applied to show meaningful security with fuzzy min-entropy in case of it is not infinite.

However, inevitably, under the perfect correctness model, one always tied to a very strong bound in term of the resilience. Typically, one can only uniquely

decode the codeword by using an error correction code with min-distance $d \geq 2t + 1$. Saying so, the Plotkin bound (see [26]) has revealed the limited maximum number of codewords in a code of blocklength n and minimum distance d . More formally, there can be only at most $2n$ codewords with $d > n/2$, which means given the residual entropy larger or equal to $\log(n)$, there has no error correction code can correct $n/4$ errors with probability one and so for a secure sketch.

Despite of this, for sufficiently large n , the code \mathcal{C}_ξ would contain large distance in between the codewords itself (i.e., $d \geq 2t + 1$) with overwhelming probability ([27], Theorem 8). In such an event, one has a slightly relaxed notion of correctness called *probabilistic correctness model*. Notably, our construction naturally categorized under this relaxed model, where the decoding process will not succeed with probability one, rather $1 - \beta$, with some probability to fail. The failure in decoding is subjected to the condition of either $W \in B_{t(-)}(w')$ or $W \notin B_{t(+)}(w')$ for a given sketch ss . Therefore, a higher distance between the codewords implicitly reduces the failure in decoding. This relaxed notion of correctness is essential for $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ to free from the Plotkin bound and allows it to correct more errors by increment of n .

We now show that the probabilistic correctness model has allowed us to correct more errors, arbitrarily close to $n/2$. Credited by the LSH-hamming hash, the errors in a pair of resilient vectors can be described by using the Bernoulli process. More formally, our works following the random error model which was famously considered by Shannon [20]. Shannon provided the noisy channel coding theorem saying that, for any discrete memoryless channel, the error tolerance rate is characterized by the maximum mutual information between the input and outputs. Precisely, in a binary symmetric channel, like our case, there exists a code encoding k bits into n bits which able to tolerate the error of probability p for every single bit, if and only if:

$$k < \lfloor (1 - h_2(p))n \rfloor$$

Since $h_2(p)$ is maximally one when $p = 1/2$, conversely, this theorem indicates the existence of a secure sketch even for high error rate as long as p is smaller than $1/2$. Therefore, by Theorem 3, we obtain

Proposition 2. *With syndrome decoding algorithm f, for $\exp(-2n\epsilon) < 0.125$, there exists a $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code \mathcal{C}_ξ for $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ to correct the errors with probability at least $1 - \exp(-2n\epsilon)$ in time $\text{poly}(n)$ as long as the total error rate satisfy $\xi + \epsilon < 1/2$ (Shannon bound) and $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ is efficient.*

It is useful to have an example to show how $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ works according to our claim follows Proposition 2 with BCH codes.

Example 1. Suppose one wish to correct the errors with probability at least 0.9 using an $[1023, 56, 191]_2$ BCH code. Thus, $\exp(-2n\epsilon^2) \leq 0.1 < 0.125$. By efficiency argument, he/she needs $\lceil kh_2(\epsilon) \rceil \leq \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$, thus, $h_2(\epsilon) \leq 0.0593$, so $\epsilon \leq 0.0688$. In such a case, one has the correctable error rate is bounded at most $\xi + \epsilon = 0.2555$ (i.e., $t_{(+)} = \lfloor (0.2555)l \rfloor$). Let say an $[1023, 11, 255]_2$

BCH code is used where $\xi = 0.2493$. Suppose maximum $\epsilon = 1/4$ is chosen for maximum error correction capacity. In such a case, one can easily compute $\exp(-2n\epsilon^2) = 2.92 \times 10^{-56}$ where the error of rate of at most $\xi + \epsilon = 0.4993$ can be corrected with overwhelming probability at least $1 - 2.92 \times 10^{-56}$.

Finally, we give a corollary whom proof is instantiated by the proof of Theorem 3, to formalize $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ as an $[t_{(+)}, \beta]$ Shannon code.

Corollary 3. *For any $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code \mathcal{C}_ξ with efficient decoding algorithm f used in $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$, $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ is an efficient $[(t/n) + \epsilon, \beta]$ -Shannon code with $\beta = \exp(-2n\epsilon^2)$*

Apart from this, computationally efficient code achieve Shannon bound is also found by Forney in 1965, named as *concatenated code* [28]. We reserved the possibility of using concatenated code for $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ since the code can be linear as well.

5 Security

Recall the soundness of $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ captured the scenario where \mathcal{A} is capable of sampling any $w' \in \mathcal{M}_1$ satisfy $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \leq \xi + \epsilon$ where decoding can be done and success with probability at least $1 - \exp(-2n\epsilon^2)$. The security of our proposal depends on the hardness in searching a variable W satisfy $W \in B_{t_{(+)}}(w')$. Since error correction implies entropy loss, this loss must be indicated by the number of codewords in \mathcal{C}_ξ which is considered as ‘good’ (e.g., $c'_i \in \mathcal{C}_\xi$) for successful decoding. Therefore, any ‘good’ codewords would contribute to additional information for an attacker to differentiate whether $W \in B_{t_{(+)}}(w')$. In the absence of these additional information, W is hidden in information theoretically fashion in \mathcal{M}_1 with security proportional to the min-entropy $H_\infty(W)$.

We now formalize the security of algorithm pair $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$. We assume an original input w is randomly sampled from a metric space $\mathcal{M}_1 = \{0, 1\}^l$, over some random distribution $W \in \mathcal{M}_1$ (not mandatory uniform). Besides, we restrain another sample $w' \in W$ that show at least error rate of $\|w \oplus w'\| l^{-1} \geq \xi + \epsilon$ (i.e., $\|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}$) with the original sample w . We sake to characterize the security of $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ by using an adversary \mathcal{A} comes with unlimited computation power. The security is formalized by using an attack running together with \mathcal{A} . Formally, $\mathcal{A} : \mathcal{M}_1^2 \times \mathcal{M}_2 \times \mathbb{F}_2^{(n-k) \times n} \times [l]^n \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_1$ is just an algorithm that is computationally unbounded, aim to recover w from a sketch $ss \in \mathcal{M}_2$, with the parity check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}_2^{(n-k) \times n}$, an integer string $N \in [l]^n$ and $w' \in \mathcal{M}_1$ and error parameter $\epsilon > 0$. The attack is denoted as $\text{Attack}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \mathcal{A})$ with LSH-sketching algorithm $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}$, and inputs N , H , ϵ , and \mathcal{A} as follow:

Attack($\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \mathcal{A}$)

- 1: $w \leftarrow W$ // sample according to some distribution $W \in \mathcal{M}_1$
- 2: $w' \leftarrow W$
- 3: **if** $\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}$, **repeat step 2 until** $\|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}$
- 4: **if** $\mathcal{A}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w, N, H, \epsilon), w', N, H, \epsilon) = w$
- 5: Output **true**
- 6: **else**
- 7: Output **false**

We then have the following definition for our security.

Definition 3. For $\mu > 0$. Let W and SS be some random variable over a metric space $\mathcal{M}_1 = \{0, 1\}^l$ and $\mathcal{M}_2 = \{0, 1\}^n$ respectively. Given an $[n, k, t]_2$ linear code \mathcal{C}_ξ where $\xi = t/n$ with parity check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}^{(n-k) \times n}$ random string $N \in [l]^n$, where $l \leq k < n$. For all $w, w' \in W$, and $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w, N, H, \epsilon) = ss \in SS$, $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, \mathbf{f}}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ is $(\mu, \xi + \epsilon)$ -information theoretically secure if one has $\Pr[\text{Attack}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \mathcal{A}) = \text{true}] \leq \mu$ for any computationally unbounded adversary \mathcal{A} .

According to Definition 3, a theorem with proof to generally characterize the information theoretical security of algorithm pair $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, \mathbf{f}}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ is given as follow.

Theorem 4. Let a positive integer $m \geq 1$, for any $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code \mathcal{C}_ξ with syndrome decoding algorithm \mathbf{f} , used in $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, \mathbf{f}}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$, where $\xi = t/n \in (0, 1/4)$, $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, \mathbf{f}}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ is $(\mu, \xi + \epsilon)$ -information theoretically secure with $\mu = \left(\frac{2^{-m-1}}{1-2^{-m}}\right)$, when $\lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil > \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$, $\epsilon \in [l^{-1}, 1/4]$, and $\|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}$

Proof. : We first analyse the adversary \mathcal{A} effort required to recover w from a sketch when $\|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}$. We claim that this amount of effort is large and bounded by the number of codewords which is considered as ‘good’ for successful decoding. By Corollary 2, for all $\phi, \phi' \in \Phi$, and $w, w' \in W$ the probability to have a ‘good’ codeword given $\|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}$ is expressed as (recall we denoted $\beta = \exp(-2n\epsilon^2)$):

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w, N, H, \epsilon), w', N, H, \epsilon) = w] \\ & \leq \max_{t=t_{\max}} \Pr[\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}] = \beta = \exp(-2n\epsilon^2) \end{aligned}$$

Therefore, the number of codewords which are considered as ‘good’ is at least $(1/\beta)$. It follows this number is bounded as $\log(1/\beta) = 2^{\log(1/\beta)} \leq 2^{\lceil \log(1/\beta) \rceil}$.

therefore, the number of codewords which are ‘goods’ must be equal to $2^{\lceil \log(1/\beta) \rceil}$. Thus we obtain the solution:

$$\Pr \left[\mathcal{A}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w, N, H, \epsilon), w', N, H, \epsilon) = w \right] = 2^{-\lceil \log(1/\beta) \rceil} \quad (5)$$

We now revert to our main problem where (w', w) are not sampled randomly instead of selected by the algorithm itself according to some distribution W (e.g., non-uniform) over \mathcal{M}_1 . We will show that in this case, the probability to sample any $W \in B_{t_{(+)}}(w')$ is at most $\left(\frac{2^{-m-1}}{1-2^{-m}} \right)$

It should be described as follow:

$$\Pr \left[\text{Attack}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \mathcal{A}) = \text{true} \right] = \Pr \left[\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)} \mid \|\delta\| \leq t \right]$$

To continue, we denote two events $\{\text{Event}_a, \text{Event}_b\}$ where $a, b \in \{0, 1\}$ as follow:

$$\text{Event}_a = \begin{cases} \|\delta\| \leq t, & a = 0 \\ \|\delta\| > t, & a = 1 \end{cases}$$

$$\text{Event}_b = \begin{cases} \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}, & b = 0 \\ \|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}, & b = 1 \end{cases}$$

By using *Bayes' law*:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr \left[\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)} \mid \|\delta\| \leq t \right] &= \frac{\Pr \left[\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)} \right] \Pr \left[\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)} \right]}{\Pr \left[\|\delta\| \leq t \right]} \\ &= \frac{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right] \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right]}{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \right]} \\ &= \frac{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right] \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right]}{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right] \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right] + \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=1} \right] \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=1} \right]} \\ &= \frac{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right] \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right]}{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right] \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right] + \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=1} \right] (1 - \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right])} \\ &= \frac{1}{1 + \frac{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=1} \right] (1 - \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right])}{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right] \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right]}} \\ &< \frac{1}{\frac{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=1} \right] (1 - \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right])}{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right] \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right]}} = \frac{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right] \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right]}{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=1} \right] (1 - \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right])} \\ &= \left(\frac{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right]}{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=1} \right]} \right) \left(\frac{\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right]}{1 - \Pr \left[\text{Event}_{b=0} \right]} \right) \quad (6) \end{aligned}$$

By Eq. 5, we have $\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=1} \right] = 2^{-\lceil \log(1/\beta) \rceil}$.

By the result from Theorem 3 (Eq. 4), we have (for $\epsilon \in [t^{-1}, 1/4]$, $\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor \leq \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}$):

$$\Pr \left[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0} \right] = \Pr \left[\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)} \right] = 2^{-kh_2(\epsilon)} \geq 2^{-\lceil kh_2(\epsilon) \rceil}$$

For a positive integer $\tilde{H}_{t_{(+)}, \infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W) \geq 1$, it follows $\max_{w'} \Pr[W \in B_{t_{(+)}}(w')] = 2^{-\tilde{H}_{t_{(+)}, \infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W)}$ by fuzzy min-entropy definition, which is the maximized probability to look for any distribution $W \in B_{t_{(+)}}(w')$. Therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Event}_{b=0}] &= \Pr[\|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}] \\ &\leq \max_{w'} \Pr[W \in B_{t_{(+)}}(w')] = 2^{-\tilde{H}_{t_{(+)}, \infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W)} \end{aligned}$$

Recall that $\tilde{H}_{t_{(+)}, \infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W) \geq H_{\infty}(W) = m$, where we hereby taking consideration on the worst case distribution with min-entropy $H_{\infty}(W) = m$. Hence, with positive integer $m \geq 1$, one has the solution for Eq. (6) expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} &\left(\frac{\Pr[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=0}]}{\Pr[\text{Event}_{a=0} \mid \text{Event}_{b=1}]} \right) \left(\frac{\Pr[\text{Event}_{b=0}]}{1 - \Pr[\text{Event}_{b=0}]} \right) = \left(\frac{2^{-lh_2(\epsilon)}}{2^{-\lceil \log(1/\beta) \rceil}} \right) \left(\frac{2^{-m}}{1 - 2^{-m}} \right) \\ &\leq \left(\frac{2^{-\lceil kh_2(\epsilon) \rceil}}{2^{-\lceil \log(1/\beta) \rceil}} \right) \left(\frac{2^{-m}}{1 - 2^{-m}} \right) \end{aligned}$$

For $\lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil > \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$, $\lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil - \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil \geq 1$ must hold by minimum. The maximum achievable probability is thus:

$$\Pr[\text{Attack}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_{\xi}}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \mathcal{A}) = \text{true}] \leq \left(\frac{2^{-m-1}}{1 - 2^{-m}} \right) \quad (7)$$

hence complete the prove.

Eventually, we give the below proposition to formalize $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_{\xi}}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_{\xi}, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ as an information theoretically secure sketch.

Proposition 3. $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_{\xi}}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_{\xi}, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ is an efficient (\mathcal{M}_2, m, m, t) -secure sketch

Proof. We start from the proof of **correctness**. Obviously, the correctness simply follows the proof of Theorem 3, where we claimed when $\lfloor 2l\epsilon \rfloor \leq \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}$ and $\lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil \leq \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$, the errors can be corrected with probability at least $1 - \exp(-2n\epsilon^2) > 0.875$ efficiently.

For **security** proof, by Theorem 4 (Eq. 7). For $\epsilon \in [l^{-1}, 1/4]$ and $\|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}$, the residual entropy required for a computationally unbounded attacker to differentiate whether $W \in B_{t_{(+)}}(w')$ from a sketch $ss \in SS$ under some distribution SS over \mathcal{M}_2 , a parity check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}_2^{(n-k) \times n}$, an integer string $N \in [l]^n$ and $w' \in W'$ over \mathcal{M}_1 can be expressed as:

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{H}_{\infty}(W|SS, H, N, W', \epsilon) &= -\log \left(\Pr[\text{Attack}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_{\xi}}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \mathcal{A}) = \text{true}] \right) \\ &\geq m + 1 + \log(1 - 2^{-m}) \end{aligned} \quad (8)$$

For $m \geq 1$, the term $0 \geq \log(1 - 2^{-m}) \geq -1$ maximally contribute to entropy loss of one bit, hence, the average minimum entropy is described as:

$$\tilde{H}_{\infty}(W|SS, H, N, W', \epsilon) \geq m$$

and complete the prove.

Since $\lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil > \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$ is a necessary condition to show security of $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ (information theoretically). For any input error parameter $\epsilon > 0$, Proposition 3 therefore suggested the following statement:

“high Shannon entropy is a necessary and sufficient condition for a secure sketch’s security equal to the inputs min-entropy $m \geq 1$ and correcting a total number of error close to Shannon bound”

5.1 Security Bound on Secure Sketch

In this section, we consider the security bound on the secure sketch. Formally, this security bound also refer to the best possible security can offer by a secure sketch construction. Particularly, we are interested in the best possible security by using the new sketching and recover algorithm pair $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$.

If a secure sketch allows recovery of the input from some errors with high probability, it must consist enough information to describe the error pattern. According to Dodis *et al.* [7], in a random error model, under the relaxed correctness notion, describing the outcome of n independent coin flips with probability of error, p requires $nh_2(p)$ bits of entropy. Therefore, the sketch must loss $nh_2(p)$ bits of entropy. They used the Shannon entropy to describe the security bound in this model and assumed the input noise W is random and uniformly distributed. Since $nh_2(p)$ bits of entropy is loss from the sketch, the upper bound residual entropy is thus reduced to $n(1 - h_2(p) - o(1))$. larger value of $p \in (0, 1/2)$ results to lower residual entropy.

In our model, the entropy loss can be described by $\lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil + 1$ (see Eq. 8). Observably, $\lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil + 1$ will show higher value (i.e., $\lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil + 1 > nh_2(p)$) with larger ϵ or n . This result suggested a better achievable lower bound to describe the error pattern in the resilient vectors of size n by using $\lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil + 1$ rather than $nh_2(p)$. Additionally, it is well-understood that W is not uniform in our case, therefore, the lower bound residual entropy described by $n(1 - h_2(p) - o(1))$ is not directly applicable in this case.

In fact, we have shown that, the upper bound residual entropy in our construction is $m + \lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil - \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil - 1$. Apparently, this residual entropy is always bounded by $m + \lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil$. Given $\lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil \leq \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$, entropy loss cannot be avoided, therefore, high min-entropy became a necessary condition to show security for any sources under a family of distributions $\{W_1, \dots\} \in \mathcal{W}$ over \mathcal{M}_1 . In viewed of this, meaningful security (e.g., at least one bit) can only be showed over any distribution $W \in \mathcal{W}$ with entropy (i.e., fuzzy min-entropy) larger than the total entropy loss. On the other hand, if $\lceil lh_2(\epsilon) \rceil > \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$, our results (see Theorem 4 and Proposition 3) replied that one can always show meaningful security for any random distributions $W \in \mathcal{M}_1$, including the worst case distribution with min-entropy $H_\infty(W) = m \geq 1$. In other words, we could have $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ to accept any sources with any distribution of min-entropy at least one bit, yet shown not entropy loss with the published sketch.

Table 1 tabulated the security bound for various β -correct probabilistic secure sketch in correcting the error in probability $1 - \beta$. To differentiate our proposal from other existing scheme, we stress here that $\beta = \exp(-2n\epsilon^2)$ must hold in our proposal.

Security Bound for β -Correct Secure Sketch		
Computational	Best possible security	$H_{t,\infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W) - \log(1 - \beta)$
Computational	FRS sketch(universal hash functions) [29]	$H_{t,\infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W) - \log(1/\beta) - \log \log(\text{supp}(W)) - 1$
Computational	Layer hiding hash (strong universal hash function)[22]	$H_{t,\infty}^{\text{fuzz}}(W) - \log(1/\beta) - 1$
Info. theoretic	LSH sketch	$H_\infty(W) \geq m$, for $m \geq 1$

Table 1: Summary of security bound of β -correct secure sketch in term of fuzzy-min entropy.

6 Reusability

We focus on the reusability of $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon, f}^{\text{LSH}})$ in this section. First stated by Boyen, 2004 [13], any information theoretical secure sketch or fuzzy extractor must leak certain amount of fresh information about the input for each time it reuses/re-enrolls. The reusability property allows the reuse/re-enrollment of the noisy data with multiple providers. Trivially, if $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon, f}^{\text{LSH}})$ can show reusability property, it also suggested a reusable fuzzy extractor for uniform random strings generation.

In the context of showing reusability, $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\epsilon}^{\text{LSH}}$ may run in multiple times for enrollment of correlating samples $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_\gamma$. Each enrollment should return a sketch ss_i which possesses individual security that holds even under the existence of other sketches for $i \in \{1, \dots, \gamma\}$. Boyens works on assuming a single adversary should be able to perform some perturbation on the original input w^* to yield a list of correlating samples $w_1, w_2, \dots, w_\gamma$, further gains advantages in recovering w_i from its corresponding sketch ss_i . The works of Boyen on reusability has focused on a particular class of perturbation which is the transitive and isometric permutation applied to w^* . This constraint applied to the perturbation is unlikely in a real and practical scenario. However, his work has encouraged the needs of showing reusability for a secure sketch to offer stronger security guarantee.

Apart from Boyen works, Fuller *et al.*, (2016) [29] provided a modified definition of reusability that covered a more realistic scenario. In their works, they split the adversary into a group of adversaries $\{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\}$. This group of adversaries implicitly defined different distributions over the published sketch $\{ss_1, \dots, ss_\gamma\}$. Each sketch is subjected to a particular adversary in the group to show security individually. The act of showing security for a group of adversaries manifested the reusability for independent re-enrollment of the original input with multiple

providers that may not trust each other. They utilized set of functions f_1, \dots, f_γ to sample w', \dots, w_γ s.t. $w_i = f_i(w^*, ss_1, \dots, ss_i)$. These set of functions come with the main property, is to offer fresh min-entropy to the new sample w_i over a particular distribution W_i . The security is defined computationally with fuzzy min-entropy and holds for a large class of family of distributions $\{W_1, \dots, W_\gamma\}$ over \mathcal{M} .

Our intuition of showing reusability for a group of adversary follows the works proposed by Fuller *et al.*, [29]. The goal is to show security to the original sample w^* for different independent re-enrollments come with certain degree of perturbations. It considered a stronger notion of reusability compare to the previous case studied by Boyen and Fuller *et al.*. It means to show security for any perturbation applied to the input as long as the perturbation is kept within some limited strength, i.e., the maximum number of altered bits is bounded. This notion is more applicable to real case scenario since it does not introduce any assumption on the type of perturbation applied to the input but only provides a bound on it. To do so, we have introduced additional random noise $\{e'_1, \dots, e'_\gamma\}$, s.t. $\|e'_i\| = \lfloor l\epsilon'_i \rfloor \leq \lfloor l\epsilon \rfloor$, i.e., $\epsilon' \leq \epsilon$ acting as perturbation to the input w^* to sample a list of correlating reading $\{w_1, \dots, w_\gamma\}$. The usage of random noise is better fit to real case scenario, since any perturbation occurs during re-enrollment must cause certain amount of bits flip to the original sample w^* .

Recall we have initially introduced an error e of weight $\|e\| = \lfloor l\epsilon \rfloor$ during sketching. Given $\|e'_i\| = \lfloor l\epsilon'_i \rfloor \leq \lfloor l\epsilon \rfloor$ and $\|w^* \oplus w'\| l^{-1} = \xi + \epsilon$, the total error introduced by sketching and perturbation (ϵ, ϵ') will result to $\|w^* \oplus w'\| l^{-1} = \xi + \epsilon \pm \epsilon'_i$. For $\epsilon'_i \leq \epsilon$, and let $\epsilon^* = 2\epsilon$, it follows that the error rate is maximum in $\|w^* \oplus w'\| l^{-1} = \xi + \epsilon^*$ and minimum in $\|w^* \oplus w'\| l^{-1} = \xi - \epsilon^*$. In light of this, the probability of getting a similar pair of resilient vectors with offset $\|\delta\| \leq t$ can be obtained by Corollary 1 and 2 with ϵ^* , and let $t_{(+)}^* = \lfloor (\xi + \epsilon^*) \rfloor$, $t_{(-)}^* = \lfloor (\xi - \epsilon^*) \rfloor$:

$$\min_{t=t_{\min}} \Pr \left[\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(-)}^* \right] = 1 - \exp(-2n(\epsilon^*)^2) = 1 - \exp(-8n\epsilon^2) \quad (9)$$

$$\max_{t=t_{\max}} \Pr \left[\|\delta\| \leq t \mid \|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}^* \right] = \exp(-2n(\epsilon^*)^2) = \exp(-8n\epsilon^2) \quad (10)$$

Eq. 9 and Eq. 10 showed that the reusability of $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ can be formalized follow the proof of completeness and the soundness of $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ by different value of ϵ^* . To do so, we assume an original input w^* is randomly sampled from a metric space $\mathcal{M}_1 = \{0, 1\}^l$, then applied perturbation on w^* to generate a list of correlated samples $\{w_1, \dots, w_\gamma\}$ over some random distribution $\{W_1, \dots, W_\gamma\} \in \mathcal{M}_1$ (parametrized by $\epsilon'_i \leq \epsilon$) respectively. We restrain another sample $w' \in \mathcal{M}_1$ that show at least error rate of $\|w_i \oplus w'\| l^{-1} > t_{(+)}^*$ ($i = 1, \dots, \gamma$). We aim to characterize the reusability of $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ by using a group of adversaries $\{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\}$ comes with unlimited computation

power. Formally, each adversary $\mathcal{A}_i : \mathcal{M}_1 \times \mathcal{M}_2 \times \mathbb{F}_2^{(n-k) \times n} \times [l]^n \rightarrow \mathcal{M}_1$ is simply an algorithm that is computationally unbounded to output w_i from a public sketch $ss_i \in \mathcal{M}_2$, with input $w' \in \mathcal{M}_1$, a parity check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}_2^{(n-k) \times n}$ and an integer string $N \in [l]^n$. Our formalization used an attack running with $\{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\}$. The attack is depicted on $\text{Attack}_2(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\})$ with input LSH-sketching algorithm $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon$ and \mathcal{A}_i , which is considered as successes if at least one adversary $\mathcal{A}_i \in \{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\}$ has successfully recover w_i from the sketch ss_i

$\text{Attack}_2(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\})$

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1:  $w^* \leftarrow W$  // sample according to some distribution  $W \in \mathcal{M}_1$ 
2: for  $i = 1 : \gamma$ 
3:  $e'_i \leftarrow \$_\{0, 1\}^l$  // the weight  $\|e'_i\| = \lfloor l\epsilon'_i \rfloor \leq \lfloor l\epsilon \rfloor$ 
4:  $w_i = w^* \oplus e'_i$ 
5:  $w' \leftarrow W$ 
6:   if  $\|w_i \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}^*$ , repeat step 5 until  $\|w_i \oplus w'\| l^{-1} > t_{(+)}^*$ 
7:   if  $\mathcal{A}_i(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w_i, N, H, \epsilon), w', N, H, \epsilon) = w_i$ 
8:     Output true
9:   else
10:    Output false
11: endfor

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The reusability of $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ can be generally characterized by the definition below.

Definition 4. Let $\mu^* > 0$. Let W and SS be some random variable over a metric space $\mathcal{M}_1 = \{0, 1\}^l$ and $\mathcal{M}_2 = \{0, 1\}^n$ respectively. Given an $[n, k, t]_2$ linear code \mathcal{C}_ξ , where $\xi = t/n$, with parity check matrix $H \in \mathbb{F}_2^{(n-k) \times n}$, $N \in [l]^n$, where $l \leq k < n$. For all $w' \in W$, $w_i \in W_i$ and $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w_i, N, H, \epsilon) = ss_i \in SS_i$ ($i = 1, \dots, \gamma$), we said $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ is $(\xi + 2\epsilon, \mu', \gamma)$ -reusable if one has the probability $\Pr \left[\text{Attack}_2(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\}) = \text{true} \right] \leq \mu^*$

Theorem 5. Let a positive integer $m \geq 1$, for any $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code \mathcal{C}_ξ with syndrome decoding algorithm f , used in $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$, where $\xi = t/n \in (0, 1/4)$, $\langle \text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}} \rangle$ is $(\xi + 2\epsilon, \mu^*, \infty)$ -reusable with $\mu^* = \left(\frac{2^{-m-1}}{1-2^{-m}} \right)$, when $\lceil lh_2(2\epsilon) \rceil > \lceil \log(1/\exp(-8n\epsilon^2)) \rceil$, $\epsilon \in [l^{-1}, 1/8]$, and $\|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}^*$

Proof. The security must hold for individual adversary $\mathcal{A}_i \in \{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\}$, where each single adversary must processes maximum or minimum perturbation acting on w^* , which are $+2\epsilon$ and -2ϵ respectively. In such a scenario, Attack_2 will output a **true** result if at least one of the adversary \mathcal{A}_i has successfully recover w_i from the sketch ss_i . Therefore, the reusability reduced to clamming security

over single adversary (e.g., follows $\text{Attack}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon^*, \mathcal{A})$) with doubled error rate of $\epsilon^* = 2\epsilon$, holds for all $\mathcal{A}_i \in \{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\}$.

Follow the proof of Theorem 3 and Theorem 5, the following claims can be straightforwardly obtained by substituting ϵ to $\epsilon^* = 2\epsilon$ under single adversary setting:

Claim 1. *Suppose a syndrome decoding algorithm f and an $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code \mathcal{C}_ξ are used in $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$. For $\exp(-2n(\epsilon^*)^2) < 0.125$, $\text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}}$ is efficient when $\lceil \text{lh}_2(\epsilon^*) \rceil \leq \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n(\epsilon^*)^2)) \rceil$, $\epsilon^* \in [l^{-1}, 1/4]$, $\lfloor 2l\epsilon^* \rfloor \leq \|w \oplus w'\| \leq t_{(+)}^*$.*

Claim 2. *Let a positive integer $m \geq 1$, for any $[n, k, t]_2$ BCH code \mathcal{C}_ξ with $\xi = t/n \in (0, 1/4)$ used in $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}})$, then one has $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}})$ is $(\mu, \xi + \epsilon^*)$ -information theoretically secure with $\mu = \left(\frac{2^{-m-1}}{1-2^{-m}}\right)$, when $\lceil \text{lh}_2(\epsilon^*) \rceil > \lceil \log(1/\exp(-2n(\epsilon^*)^2)) \rceil$, $\epsilon^* \in [l^{-1}, 1/4]$, and $\|w \oplus w'\| > t_{(+)}^*$.*

Where the probability of successful in outputting true result over multiple adversaries setting (Attack_2) must be at least equal or larger than the probability of success under single adversary setting, therefore:

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[\text{Attack}(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon^*, \mathcal{A}) = \text{true} \right] \\ & \leq \Pr \left[\text{Attack}_2(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, N, H, \epsilon, \{\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_\gamma\}) = \text{true} \right] \leq \left(\frac{2^{-m-1}}{1-2^{-m}} \right) \end{aligned}$$

with $\mu^* = \mu = \left(\frac{2^{-m-1}}{1-2^{-m}}\right)$ and complete the prove.

Theorem 5 concluded that for any sketch $\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}(w, N, H, \epsilon) = ss \in SS$ generated with additional error parameter $\epsilon \in [l^{-1}, 1/4]$, the input $w \in W$ can be reused for γ times for any perturbation parametrized by $\epsilon'_i \leq \epsilon$ holds. Viewed this way, adding error to the input while sketching implicitly allows reusability.

Proposition 4. *If $(\text{SS}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi}^{\text{LSH}}, \text{Rec}_{\Omega, \mathcal{C}_\xi, f}^{\text{LSH}})$ is $(\xi + \epsilon^*, \mu^*, \infty)$ -reusable, it is also an efficient (\mathcal{M}_2, m, m, t) secure sketch.*

We omitted the proof of Proposition 4 since it is same with the proof in Proposition 3 by substituting ϵ into ϵ^* .

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