Strongly Secure Authenticated Key Exchange from Supersingular Isogeny

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Abstract. Motivated by the main concern in supersingular isogeny-based authenticated key exchange (AKE) of exploring new techniques to design and prove AKE protocols in the security model that covers the widest possible adversarial goals, in this paper, we present two elegant AKEs based on a double-key PKE in the supersingular isogeny setting, one is 2-pass and the other is 3-pass. Our contributions are four fold and can be summarised as follows: *(i)* We first propose a strong OW-CPA secure PKE $2\mathsf{PKE}_{sidh}$ based on SI-DDH assumption. By applying modified Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, we obtain a [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] secure KEM $2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}$. *(ii)* From $2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}$ we propose a two-pass AKE SIAKE_2 based on SI-DDH assumption, which is proved to be CK^+ secure in the random oracle model and supports arbitrary registration. *(iii)* We provide a slightly modified version of $2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}$ that is secure against leakage under the 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption. *(iv)* From modified $2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}$ we propose a three-pass AKE SIAKE_3 based on 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption, which is proved to be CK^+ secure in the random oracle model and supports arbitrary registration. In lateral perspective, both SIAKE_2 and SIAKE_3 achieve the security against multiple possible adversaries, which as far as we know cover the most extensive adversarial goals, including arbitrary registrant, wPFS, KCI and MEX. While in the vertical perspective, when meeting the same security target, SIAKE_2 and SIAKE_3 present significant advantages in terms of bandwidth and efficiency compared with other existing schemes, which is illustrated by our implementation of two schemes.

Keywords: authenticated key exchange, key encapsulation mechanism, supersingular elliptic curve isogeny, post quantum

Version Notes

We have revised our paper, and some presentations in the current version are different from the previous versions.

− The 201808 Version: The original version.

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- The 201810 Version: Add the FTTY work [13].
- The 201905 Version:
  1. In the previous version, we utilize the modified chosen public key and chosen ciphertext security [30] as the secure notion for key encapsulation. In this version, we utilize the [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] in [33] as the secure notion for key encapsulation.
  2. We utilize the crypto-friendly notions proposed by [13] to give a clearer and more convenient presentation.

1 Introduction

Authenticated Key Exchange. Key exchange (KE) is a fundamental cryptographic primitive, which enables two parties to agree on a common shared key over a public but possibly insecure channel. Many studies have investigated how to achieve KE protocols that provide authentication in secure models [4,6,11,27] and how to implement authenticated key exchange (AKE) with high efficiency [2,11,12,20,27,28,29] based on classical assumptions. A plenty of security models have been proposed, including BR model [4], CK model [6] and eCK model [27]. CK^+ security model known as one of the 'strongest' and most 'desirable' security notions [22] for AKE is reformulated by Fujioka et al. [11]. The CK^+ model not only covers the security requirement in CK model, but also captures some advanced attacks such as the key compromise impersonation (KCI) attack, the maximal exposure (MEX) attack and the breaking of weak perfect forward secrecy (wPFS). Therefore, CK^+ model can be theoretically considered as a complete version of the AKE security model since it currently covers the widest possible variety of adversarial methods in some sense.

Supersingular Isogeny Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange (SIDH). Apart from lattice, code, hash and multivariate cryptography, supersingular elliptic curve isogeny is one of the most attractive candidates for post-quantum cryptography. The best-known protocol is Jao and De Feo's supersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman key exchange (SIDH) [8] based on the hard problem of computing isogenies between supersingular elliptic curves. There are several interesting topics concerning SIDH covered in the literature. For example, computational efficiency [7,9,23], key compression [5], adaptive attacks on SIDH [16], relationship of the underlying complexity problems [18,32], signature schemes [15,21,31,34] and its standardization [19,24].

Recently another very important problem of designing AKE schemes from the basic SIDH primitive has been studied in [13,14,26]. As pointed out by Galbraith [14], there are several challenges in adapting the security proof of existing well-designed AKE schemes (most of them are based on discrete logarithm assumption) to the SIDH case:

- Many AKE schemes based on discrete logarithm assumption, such as MQV [28] and HMQV [22], require a richer algebraic structure the supersingular isogeny does not have.

- The protocols involving long-term/static secret keys are vulnerable to the adaptive attack [16] aiming at the case where the static public key is used. More precisely, suppose that in a protocol Alice sets E_A as her static public key, and E_Y is an ephemeral public value sent by Bob. Galbraith et al. [16] showed that a malicious adversary Bob can send (E_Y, R', S') with specified points R' and S', and gradually learn Alice's static secret key.
- The gap assumption that holds in the discrete logarithm setting is crucial for security proof. But the gap assumption does not hold in the SIDH setting when polynomial queries are submitted to an *unlimited* decisional solver.

The State of Art of SIDH AKE. Recently, there are many exciting results both on the generic and non-generic constructions of AKE over supersingular curves [13,14,26]. Galbraith [14] and Longa [26] showed how to adapt the generic constructions of secure AKE from basic primitives like IND-CCA encryption/KEMs, MACs, PRFs etc, including the schemes proposed by Boyd, Cliff, Gonzlez Nieto and Paterson [2] (abbreviated as BCNP scheme), by Fujioka, Suzuki, Xagawa and Yoneyama [12] (abbreviated as FSXY scheme) and by Guilhem, Smart and Warinschi [17] (abbreviated as GSW scheme), to the SIDH setting by inserting an IND-CCA secure KEM based on SIDH. However, these transformations lead to either more isogeny computations or more rounds of communication. The detailed analyses are examined and summarized in the table 1 of [14]. Here we make a more concrete comparison among these resulting SIDH schemes in Table 1.

With respect to non-generic constructions, Galbraith proposed two SIDH-AKE protocols [14], one of which is based on the Jeong-Katz-Lee [20] scheme TS2 (we call it Gal 1) and another is an SIDH variant of NAXOS scheme (we call it Gal 2). Very recently Fujioka et al. [13] gave two Diffie-Hellman like isogeny-based AKEs, which we denote as FTTY 1 where the session key is extracted from the combination of two Diffie-Hellman values, and FTTY 2 where the session key is extracted from four Diffie-Hellman values, respectively. Unfortunately, all of these schemes only satisfy the security against adversaries with limited capabilities, such as wPFS security (details are given in section 1.3). Several recognized attacks are not taken into account, including arbitrary registrant for static public keys, KCI attacks, or MEX attacks. In an AKE system, the adversary-controlled parties may register arbitrary public keys and arbitrary registrant allows any party to register arbitrary valid keys (even the same key with some other party) without any validity checks. In fact, neither Gal 1-2 nor FTTY 1-2 scheme allows the arbitrary registrant for the static public key. Or else, with malicious static public keys, a target secret key can be learned bit by bit, which implies that Gal 1-2 and FTTY 1-2 are not resistant to the adaptive attack. Moreover, Gal 1 is not resistant to the KCI attack and Gal 2 is not resistant to the MEX attack. Detailed analyses on those attacks against Gal 1-2 and FTTY 1-2 are given in the related works.

Thus, *"to find new techniques to design and prove security of AKE protocols in SIDH setting, and give full analysis of AKE that includes the widest possible adversarial goals."*, a quote from Galbraith [14], is the main concern in

SIDH-based AKE area. In this paper, we are motivated to address such an open problem.

1.1 Our Contributions.

In this paper, we present two elegant AKEs based on a double-key PKE in the SIDH setting and show that both of them allow arbitrary registrant and are CK^+ secure in the random oracle model. Our results are summarized as follows.

– we propose a strong OW-CPA secure PKE $2PKE_{sidh}$ based on SI-DDH assumption. The strong OW-CPA security is exactly the [OW-CPA, ·] security formalized in [33] which states that the PKE is still OW-CPA secure even part of the public key is generated by the adversary. The construction is elegant and of independent interest. And by applying the modified Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [33], we get a [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] secure KEM $2KEM_{sidh}$ as the building block of AKE.
– With $2KEM_{sidh}$ as the basic tool, we propose a two-pass AKE $SIAKE_2$ based on SI-DDH assumption. $SIAKE_2$ is CK^+ secure in the random oracle model and supports arbitrary registration.
– In order to achieve a three-pass AKE, we propose a 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption which is a strong version of the SI-DDH assumption. Contrary to the original 1-Oracle DH problem in [1], the 1-Oracle SI-DH problem only allows one query to the oracle. We revisit $2PKE_{sidh}$ and a slightly modified version of $2KEM_{sidh}$, and show that under the 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption both of them are still secure against leakage.
– With modified $2KEM_{sidh}$ as the basic tool, we eventually propose a three-pass AKE $SIAKE_3$ based on 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption and prove it supporting arbitrary registration and CK^+ secure in the random oracle model.

From Table 1, we can observe that in lateral perspective, both $SIAKE_2$ and $SIAKE_3$ achieve the security against multiple possible adversaries, which as far as we know covers the most extensive adversarial goals, including arbitrary registrant, wPFS, KCI and MEX. While in the vertical perspective, when meeting the same security target, $SIAKE_2$ and $SIAKE_3$ present significant advantages in terms of bandwidth and efficiency compared with other existing schemes. In particular, $SIAKE_3$ has the smallest communication volume in total event though it needs 3 rounds interaction, while $SIAKE_2$ only needs two rounds.

1.2 Technique Overview

Our core ideas and techniques are illustrated in Figure 1. Let E_0 be the starting curve, and $(P_1, Q_1), (P_2, Q_2)$ be the base points. E_{A_1}, E_{B_2}, E_X and E_Y are four intermediate curves which are part of static or ephemeral public keys. E_{A_1Y}, E_{XB_2} and E_{XY} are three collaborated computing curves.

Let U_A, U_B be two parties in the AKEs. The SIDH works as follows: U_A chooses a secret, computes the isogeny $\phi_X : E_0 \to E_X$ with kernel G_X and publishes $X = (E_X, \phi_X(P_2), \phi_X(Q_2))$. U_B chooses a secret, computes the isogeny

Scheme	Key Reg.	Assum.	Model	wPFS	KCI	MEX	Rd	Init isog	Resp isog	Mess Size
Gal 1 [14]	Honest	SI-CDH	CK	✓	×	×	2	3	3	$108n$
Gal 2 [14]	Honest	SI-CDH	BR	✓	✓	×	2	4	4	$108n$
FTTY 1 [13]	Honest	SI-DDH	CK	✓	×	×	1	3	3	$72n$
FTTY 2 [13]	Honest	di-SI-DDH	CK^+	✓	✓	✓	1	5	5	$72n$
GSW [17]	Arbi.	SI-DDH	CK	✓	×	×	3	6	6	$186n$
BCNP-Lon [2,26]	Arbi.	SI-DDH	CK	✓	✓	×	2	6	6	$148n$
FSXY-Lon [12,26]	Arbi.	SI-DDH	CK^+	✓	✓	✓	2	7	6	$148n$
$SIAKE_2$	Arbi.	SI-DDH	CK^+	✓	✓	✓	2	6	5	$114n$
$SIAKE_3$	Arbi.	1-OSIDH	CK^+	✓	✓	✓	3	5	5	$80n$

Table 1. Comparison of existing AKE protocols on supersingular isogeny. **Key Reg.** represents registering the static public key. "Arbi" means arbitrary registrant is allowed while "Honest" means only honest registrant is allowed. **Assump.** is the abbreviation of assumptions. **Rd** denotes the number of protocol's communication round. **Init isog** and **Resp isog** represent the number of isogeny computation that the initiator and responder have to perform respectively. **Mess Size** denotes the total message size. "✓" indicates that the scheme can resist this kind of attack while "×" indicates it cannot.

$\phi_Y : E_0 \to E_Y$ with kernel G_Y and publishes $Y = (E_Y, \phi_Y(P_1), \phi_Y(Q_1))$. They both can compute $E_{XY} \cong E_X/\phi_X(G_Y) \cong E_Y/\phi_Y(G_X)$. The strategy to provide authentication with the static and ephemeral components is that every user registers a static public key such that U_A's static public key is $pk_{A_1} = (E_{A_1}, \phi_{A_1}(P_2), \phi_{A_1}(Q_2))$ while U_B's static public key is $pk_{B_2} = (E_{B_2}, \phi_{B_2}(P_1), \phi_{B_2}(Q_1))$.

As shown in Figure 1, there is a natural way to extract a session key from four Diffie-Hellman values $E_{A_1B_2}$, E_{A_1Y}, E_{XB_2} and E_{XY} (Actually, this is how FTTY2 scheme does). But it is risky to take $E_{A_1B_2}$ into account. Let us recall the adaptive attack from Galbraith, Petit, Shani and Ti [16]. A malicious user U_B who registers his static public key E_{B_2} with specified points R', S', can learn one bit of the static secret key of U_A if he can also query the resulting session key. As shown in Figure 1 with dashed lines, Galbraith [14] involves $E_{A_1B_2}$ and E_{XY} for the session key. Under the adaptive attack [16], adversary could gradually learn the static secret key by malicious registrations. Thus, $E_{A_1B_2}$ could not be included in the session key when arbitrary registrant is allowed.

Although now only E_{A_1Y}, E_{XB_2}, and E_{XY} are involved in the session key, the adaptive attack still takes effect if the CK^+ adversary (in case E_2 in Table 6) sends E_Y with specified points R', S' to U_A. With the ephemeral secret key for E_X and the session key, the adversary could still extract one bit of the static secret key. The problem comes down to how to check the "validity" of $Y = (E_Y, R, S)$. Our solution is to employ the "re-encryption" technique used in Fujisaki-Okamoto (FO) transformation [10]. Precisely, $C = (Y, y_1, y_0)$ is the ciphertext under public key pk_{A_1} and X, where $Y = (E_0/\langle P_2 + [y]Q_2 \rangle, \phi_Y(P_1), \phi_Y(Q_1))$, $y_1 = h(j(E_{A_1Y})) \oplus m_1$, $y_0 = h(j(E_{XY})) \oplus m_0$ and $y = G(m_1, m_0)$ for a hash function G, and the encapsulated key is $K_B = H(m_1, m_0, C)$. As a byproduct, we obtain the chosen ciphertext (CCA) secure KEM by the FO transformation

Fig. 1. Illustration of the core idea of SIAKE_2 and SIAKE_3. The red dashed lines illustrate the core ideas of Gal 1 scheme [14]. In SIAKE_2, E_X and E_{X_0} are two independent curves. In SIAKE_3, $E_X = E_{X_0}$ and the dashed double arrow is included.

and the "validity" of $Y = (E_Y, R, S)$ can be checked by U_A using $y = G(m_1, m_0)$ so that the adaptive attack fails to work.

Now the CCA secure KEM with "re-encryption" avoids the adaptive attack, but it is still not sufficient for CK^+ security. The CK^+ adversary has the capability to adaptively *send* messages and adaptively query the *session state* and *session key* of non-test sessions. The capability of adaptively *sending* messages in the test session means that the adversary is allowed to choose one-part of the challenge public key X^* for (Y^*, y_1^*, y_0^*), while the capability of querying the *session state* and *session key* of non-test sessions implies that the adversary is also allowed to query the decapsulation oracle which decapsulates the ciphertext under several other public keys X'. This feature has been analyzed by [33] and formalized as $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ security. The modified Fujisaki-Okamoto [33] says what we need to do is just putting the public key in the hashing step when generating the encapsulated key. Precisely, K_B encapsulated in (Y, y_1, y_0) is $H(X, m_1, m_2, C)$.

We almost figure out a resolution to exclude the case of both X and Y having two functionalities. In the test session, on the one hand X is part of the public key (pk_{A_1}, X) under which the ciphertext (Y, y_1, y_0) is computed. On the other hand X is part of the ciphertext (X, x_1, x_0) in which K_A is encapsulated under public key (pk_{B_2}, Y). Precisely, in the test session $X = ((E_X, R_2, S_2), x_1, x_0)$ is sent by AKE adversary $\mathcal{A}$, and the simulator $\mathcal{S}$ gets challenge ciphertext

(Y^*, y_1^*, y_0^*) from the [OW-CCA, ·] challenger (which means the secret y in Y^* is unknown). But to simulate the CK^+ game, especially to maintain the consistency of hash lists, $\mathcal{S}$ should learn $h(j(E_X/\langle R_2 + [y]S_2\rangle))$ to extract K_A encapsulated in (X, x_1, x_0).

We propose two solutions for this problem. One method is to add an extra X_0 such that X_0 is part of the public key (pk_{A_1}, X_0) under which the ciphertext (Y, y_1, y_0) is computed, while X is part of the ciphertext (X, x_1) under public key E_{B_2} (we omit Y). The other solution is to strengthen the underlying assumption as 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption such that $h(j(E_X/\langle R_2 + [y]S_2\rangle))$ could be leaked.

In consequence, two solutions lead to two AKEs SIAKE_2 and SIAKE_3 respectively.

- SOLUTION 1: We add an extra X_0 to take the position of X as part of the public key (pk_{A_1}, X_0) under which the ciphertext (Y, y_1, y_0) is computed, remove x_2 and set (X, x_1) as the ciphertext under public key E_{B_2} rather than (E_{B_2}, Y). Then the value of $h(j(E_X/\langle R_2 + [y]S_2\rangle))$ is not needed during the security proof. The drawback of this solution is that K'_A can not be included in the session state of U_B. Solution 1 leads to SIAKE_2.
- SOLUTION 2: We enhance the underlying SI-DDH assumption to the 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption to allow the leakage of $h(j(E_X/\langle R_2 + [y]S_2\rangle))$. The 1-Oracle SIDH assumption can be considered as a hashed SI-DDH assumption where a one-time hashed SI-CDH oracle is allowed. Note that considering $\langle R_2 + [y]S_2\rangle = \langle [u]R_2 + [y][u]S_2\rangle$ for any integer $1 \le u \le \ell_2^{e_2}$ and coprime to ℓ_2, we employ a simple trick of tailoring the hash function as $h(Y, j(E_{XY}))$ in x_2 and $h(X, j(E_{XY}))$ in y_2. This solution results in SIAKE_3.

1.3 Related Works and Their Analysis.

Galbraith [14] proposed two SIDH variants of AKE, namely Gal 1 from Jeong-Katz-Lee protocol [20] and Gal 2 from NAXOS protocol [27]. Considering the adaptive attack on static secret keys, Gal 1 protocol only allows honest registrant of static public keys and it is also vulnerable to the KCI attack. So far, neither has there been any concrete MEX attack on Gal 1, nor any formal proofs to show Gal 1 is resistant to the MEX attack. Gal 2 protocol is provably secure in BR model, which only allows honest registrant of static public keys (if the adversary gets the ephemeral secret key, like x, the adaptive attack still works), and can not resist the MEX attack.

Very recently, Fujioka et al. [13] gave two Diffie-Hellman like isogeny-based AKEs, FTTY 1 and FTTY 2. FTTY 1 protocol, which is quite similar to Gal 1 scheme, is CK secure in the quantum random oracle model, but it only allows honest registrant and can not resist the KCI attack. FTTY 2 is secure in CK+ secure model, but it also only allows honest registrant.

Below we illustrate in detail the (in)capability of Gal 1-2 and FTTY 1-2 on resisting the adaptive attacks (if the arbitrary registrant is allowed), the KCI attack, and the MEX attack.

Adaptive attacks if *arbitrary* registrant is allowed. Suppose that in a protocol Alice sets $E_{A_1}, \phi_{A_1}(P_2), \phi_{A_1}(Q_2)$ as her static public key. The goal of a malicious adversary is to compute Alice's static secret key. As illustrated in Figure 1, the session key of Gal 1 is extracted from E_{XY} and $E_{A_1 B_2}$. By applying the adaptive attacks [16], a malicious adversary can register (E_{B_2}, R', S') with specified points R' and S', rather than $\phi_{B_2}(P_1)$ and $\phi_{B_2}(Q_1)$, as the static public key for Bob. By checking whether the session key computed by Alice (which can be obtained by adversary with SessionKeyReveal query) is equal to that computed by Bob, one bit of Alice's static secret key is determined. The adversary gradually learns Alice's static secret key by registering several valid static public keys according to adaptive attacks. Such attack can be applied to FTTY 1 directly and it also works for FTTY 2 if the adversary also has the ephemeral secret key x of Alice (which can be obtained by querying SessionStateReveal), which means that FTTY 2 does not allow arbitrary registrant. Gal 2 doesn't allow arbitrary registrant either, since if the adversary has the ephemeral secret key x of Alice (which can be obtained from SessionStateReveal query), by honestly registering static public key for Bob, then sending (E_Y, R', S') with specified points R' and S', and checking whether the session key computed by Alice is equal to that computed by Bob, the adversary is able to learn one bit of Alice's static secret key.

KCI Attacks. KCI attacks state that if a static secret key is revealed, an adversary can try to impersonate any other honest parties in order to fool the owners of the exposed secret keys. Neither Gal 1 nor FTTY 1 are resistant to the KCI attack since each session key is extracted from E_{XY} and $E_{A_1 B_2}$, and by generating $E_Y, \phi_Y(P_1), \phi_Y(Q_1)$ and sending it to Alice on behalf of Bob, with Alice's static secret key the adversary could compute the session key even if Bob's static secret key is unknown.

MEX Attacks. In MEX, an adversary aims to distinguish the session key from a random value under the disclosure of the ephemeral secret key of one party of the test session at least. Gal 2 is not resistant to the MEX attack since its session key is extracted from E_{XY}, E_{XB_2}, and $E_{A_1 Y}$, thus it is easy for an adversary to compute those curves with the ephemeral secret key corresponding to E_X and E_Y.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 SIDH and Crypto-friendly Description

We recall briefly the SIDH protocol using the same notation as [8,19]. Let p be a large prime with a form $p = \ell_1^{e_1} \ell_2^{e_2} \cdot f \pm 1$, where ℓ_1 and ℓ_2 are two small primes, and f is an integer cofactor. Then we can construct a supersingular elliptic curve E_0 defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ with order $|E_0(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})| = (\ell_1^{e_1} \ell_2^{e_2} \cdot f)^2$. Let $\mathbb{Z}_m$ be the ring of residue classes modulo m. The subgroup $E_0[m]$ of m-torsion points is isomorphic to $\mathbb{Z}_m \times \mathbb{Z}_m$ for $m \in \{\ell_1^{e_1}, \ell_2^{e_2}\}$. Let P_1, Q_1 be two points that generate

$E_0[\ell_1^{e_1}]$ and P_2, Q_2 be two points that generate $E_0[\ell_2^{e_2}]$. The public parameters are $(E_0; P_1, Q_1; P_2, Q_2; \ell_1, \ell_2, e_1, e_2)$.

$$
\begin{array}{ccc}
E_0 & \xrightarrow{\phi_A} & E_A = E_0/\langle R_A \rangle \\
\downarrow{\scriptstyle \phi_B} & & \downarrow{\scriptstyle \phi_{AB}} \\
E_B = E_0/\langle R_B \rangle & \xrightarrow{\phi_{BA}} & E_{AB} = E_0/\langle R_A, R_B \rangle
\end{array}
$$

Fig. 2. SIDH

The SIDH, as depicted in Figure 2, works as follows. Alice chooses her secret key k_a from $\mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}$ and computes the isogeny $\phi_A : E_0 \to E_A$ whose kernel is the subgroup $\langle R_A \rangle = \langle P_1 + [k_a]Q_1 \rangle$. She then sends to Bob her public key which is E_A together with the two points $\phi_A(P_2), \phi_A(Q_2)$. Similarly, Bob chooses his secret key k_b from $\mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}$ and computes the isogeny $\phi_B : E_0 \to E_B$ with kernel the subgroup $\langle R_B \rangle = \langle P_2 + [k_b]Q_2 \rangle$. He sends to Alice his public key which is E_B together with the two points $\phi_B(P_1), \phi_B(Q_1)$. To get the shared secret, Alice computes the isogeny $\phi_{BA} : E_B \to E_{BA}$ with kernel the subgroup generated by $\phi_B(P_1) + [k_a]\phi_B(Q_1)$. Similarly, Bob computes the isogeny $\phi_{AB} : E_A \to E_{AB}$ with kernel the subgroup generated by $\phi_A(P_2) + [k_b]\phi_A(Q_2)$. Since the composed isogeny $\phi_{AB} \circ \phi_A$ has the same kernel $\langle R_A, R_B \rangle$ as $\phi_{BA} \circ \phi_B$, Alice and Bob can share the same j-invariant $j(E_{AB}) = j(E_{BA})$.

It will be helpful to have a crypto-friendly description of SIDH for the presentation of our AKEs. We follow the treatment of Fujioka et al. [13]. In what follows we assume $\{t, s\} = \{1, 2\}$, and denote the public parameters by $\mathfrak{g} = (E_0; P_1, Q_1, P_2, Q_2)$ and $\mathfrak{e} = (\ell_1, \ell_2, e_1, e_2)$. Let the sets of supersingular curves with an auxiliary basis be

$\text{SSEC}_p = \{\text{supersingular elliptic curves } E \text{ over } \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \text{ with } E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) \simeq (\mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1} \ell_2^{e_2} f})^2\};$

$\text{SSEC}_A = \{(E; P'_t, Q'_t) | E \in \text{SSEC}_p, (P'_t, Q'_t) \text{ is basis of } E[\ell_t^{e_t}]\};$

$\text{SSEC}_B = \{(E; P'_s, Q'_s) | E \in \text{SSEC}_p, (P'_s, Q'_s) \text{ is basis of } E[\ell_s^{e_s}]\}.$

Let $\mathfrak{a} = k_a$ and $\mathfrak{b} = k_b$, then we define,

$\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}} = (E_A; \phi_A(P_t), \phi_A(Q_t)) \in \text{SSEC}_A, \text{ where } R_A = P_s + [k_a]Q_s, \phi_A : E_0 \to E_A = E_0/\langle R_A \rangle;$

$\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}} = (E_B; \phi_B(P_s), \phi_B(Q_s)) \in \text{SSEC}_B, \text{ where } R_B = P_t + [k_b]Q_t, \phi_B : E_0 \to E_B = E_0/\langle R_B \rangle;$

$(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}})^{\mathfrak{a}} = j(E_{BA}), \text{ where } R_{BA} = \phi_B(P_s) + [k_a]\phi_B(Q_s), \phi_{BA} : E_B \to E_{BA} = E_B/\langle R_{BA} \rangle;$

$(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}})^{\mathfrak{b}} = j(E_{AB}), \text{ where } R_{AB} = \phi_A(P_t) + [k_b]\phi_A(Q_t), \phi_{AB} : E_A \to E_{AB} = E_A/\langle R_{AB} \rangle.$

Using this notation, the SIDH looks almost exactly like the classical Diffie-Hellman. That is, the public parameters are $\mathfrak{g}$ and $\mathfrak{e}$, Alice chooses a secret key $\mathfrak{a}$ and sends $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}$ to Bob, while Bob chooses a secret key $\mathfrak{b}$ and sends $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}$ to Alice. The shared key is, as we expect, $j = (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}})^{\mathfrak{a}} = (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}})^{\mathfrak{b}}$.

2.2 Standard SIDH Assumptions

We describe two standard assumptions about supersingular isogeny based on the crypto-friendly notation. Let $s \neq t$ and $s, t \in \{1, 2\}$.

Definition 1 (SI-CDH Assumption [8,13]). *The SI-CDH problem is that, given public parameters $\mathfrak{g}$ and $\mathfrak{e}$, and $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}$, $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}$ where $\mathfrak{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}$, $\mathfrak{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_t^{e_t}}$, compute the j-invariant $(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}})^{\mathfrak{b}} = (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}})^{\mathfrak{a}}$. For any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, we define the advantage of solving SI-CDH problem as*

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{sicdh} = Pr[j' = (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}})^{\mathfrak{b}} | j' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{e}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}})].$$

The SI-CDH assumption states: for any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage of solving SI-CDH problem is negligible.

Definition 2 (SI-DDH Assumption [8,13]). *Let $\mathfrak{g}$ and $\mathfrak{e}$ be that defined in SI-CDH assumption. Let D_0 and D_1 be two distributions defined as:*

$$D_1 := \{\mathfrak{e}, \mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}})^{\mathfrak{b}} | \mathfrak{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}, \mathfrak{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_t^{e_t}}\}$$

$$D_0 := \{\mathfrak{e}, \mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{s}})^{\mathfrak{t}} | \mathfrak{a}, \mathfrak{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}, \mathfrak{b}, \mathfrak{t} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_t^{e_t}}\}$$

The SI-DDH problem is that given a random sample from D_b depending on $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, guess b. The advantage of solving SI-DDH problem for any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{siddh} = Pr[b' = b | b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathfrak{d}_b \leftarrow D_b), b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}] - 1/2.$$

The SI-DDH assumption states: for any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage of solving SI-DDH problem is negligible.

2.3 CK$^+$ Secure Model

Fujioka et al. [11] reformulated the desirable security notion of AKE in [22] and called it CK$^+$ model, which includes resistance to KCI, wPFS and MEX, as well as provable security in the CK model. We just give a general description of CK$^+$ security model here. Please refer to [11] or Appendix A for more concrete details. Roughly speaking, during the non-test session, the adversary is allowed to make Send, SessionStateReveal, SessionKeyReveal and Corrupt queries. In the test session the adversary is only allowed to make Send query, and may get the leakage of non-trivial combination of static and epemeral secret keys. Furthermore, the arbitrary registration of static public key can be performed.

2.4 2-Key PKE and KEM

In this section we provide the definitions of 2-key PKE and 2-key KEM, as well as the modified Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation proposed by Xue et al. [33].

A 2-key PKE with a plaintext space $\mathcal{M}$ and a ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$ consists of a quadruple of PPT algorithms 2PKE=(KeyG1, KeyG0, Enc, Dec) described as follows:

- KeyG1(n, pp) : on input a security parameter n and public parameter pp, output a pair of public and secret keys (pk_1, sk_1).
- KeyG0(n, pp) : on input a security parameter n and public parameter pp, output a pair of public and secret keys (pk_0, sk_0).
- Enc$(pk_1, pk_0, m; r)$: on input public keys pk_0, pk_1 and a plaintext $m \in \mathcal{M}$, output a ciphertext $C \in \mathcal{C}$.
- Dec(sk_1, sk_0, C) : on input secret keys sk_0, sk_1 and a cipheretext $C \in \mathcal{C}$, output a plaintext m.

CORRECTNESS. For $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow$ KeyG1(n, pp), $(pk_0, sk_0) \leftarrow$ KeyG0(n, pp) and $C \leftarrow$ Enc$(pk_1, pk_0, m; r)$, then we have Dec$(sk_1, sk_0, C) = m$.

Game [**OW-CPA**, $\cdot$] on pk_1	Game [$\cdot$, **OW-CPA**] on pk_0
01 $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow$ KeyG1(n, pp);	07 $(pk_0, sk_0) \leftarrow$ KeyG0(n, pp);
02 $(state, pk_0^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(pk_1)$;	08 $(state, pk_1^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_1(pk_0)$;
03 $m \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$;	09 $m \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$;
04 $c^* \leftarrow$ Enc(pk_1, pk_0^*, m);	10 $c^* \leftarrow$ Enc(pk_1^*, pk_0, m);
05 $m' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(state, c^*)$;	11 $m' \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_2(state, c^*)$;
06 return $m' \stackrel{?}{=} m$	12 return $m' \stackrel{?}{=} m$

Fig. 3. The [OW-CPA, $\cdot$] and [$\cdot$, OW-CPA] games of 2PKE for adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$.

The security games of 2PKE are formalized in Figure 3. We define the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ winning in the game [OW-CPA, $\cdot$] as $\mathrm{Adv}_{2\mathsf{PKE}}^{[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1]$, and the advantage of $\mathcal{B}$ in the game [$\cdot$, OW-CPA] as $\mathrm{Adv}_{2\mathsf{PKE}}^{[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]}(\mathcal{B}) = \Pr[[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1]$, respectively.

The 2-key key encapsulation (2-key KEM) 2KEM is defined similarly.

- KeyGen1(n, pp) : on input a security parameter n and public parameter pp, output a pair of public-secret keys (pk_1, sk_1). In order to show the randomness that is used, we denote key generation algorithm as KeyGen1(n, r).
- KeyGen0(n, pp) : on input a security parameter n and public parameter pp, output a pair of public and secret keys (pk_0, sk_0).
- Encaps(pk_1, pk_0) : on input public keys pk_1, pk_0, output a ciphertext c and encapsulated key k in key space $\mathcal{K}$. Sometimes, we explicitly add the randomness r and denote it as Encaps$(pk_1, pk_0; r)$.
- Decaps(sk_1, sk_0, c) : on input secret keys sk_1, s_0 and a ciphertext c, output a key k.

CORRECTNESS. For $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow$ KeyGen1(n, pp), $(pk_0, sk_0) \leftarrow$ KeyGen0(n, pp) and $(c, k) \leftarrow$ Encaps(pk_1, pk_0), it holds that Decaps$(sk_1, sk_0, c) = k$.

The security games of 2KEM are formalized in Figure 4. On the i-th query of $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{leak}_0}$, the challenger generates $(pk_0^i, sk_0^i) \leftarrow$ KeyGen0(r_0^i), sets $L_0 = L_0 \cup \{(pk_0^i, sk_0^i)\}$ and returns (pk_0^i, sk_0^i) to adversary $\mathcal{A}$. On the i-th query of $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{leak}_1}$, the challenger generates $(pk_1^i, sk_1^i) \leftarrow$ KeyGen1(r_1^i), sets $L_1 = L_1 \cup \{(pk_1^i, sk_1^i)\}$

Game [**OW-CCA**, ·] on pk_1	Game [·, **OW-CPA**] on pk_0
01 $(pk_1, sk_1) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen1}(n, pp);$	07 $(pk_0, sk_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen0}(n, pp);$
02 $L_0 = \{(-,-,-)\};$	08 $(state, pk_1^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_1(pk_0);$
03 $(state, pk_0^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{cca}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{leak}_0}}(pk_1);$	09 $(c^*, k^*) \leftarrow \mathsf{Encaps}(pk_1^*, pk_0);$
04 $(c^*, k^*) \leftarrow \mathsf{Encaps}(pk_1, pk_0^*);$	10 $k' \leftarrow \mathcal{B}_2^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{leak}_1}}(state, c^*);$
05 $k' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{cca}}, \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{leak}_0}}(state, c^*);$	11 return $k' \overset{?}{=} k^*$
06 return $k' \overset{?}{=} k^*$	

Fig. 4. The [OW-CCA, ·], and [·, OW-CPA] games of 2KEM for adversaries $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{B}$. The oracles $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{leak}_0}$, $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{cca}}$, and $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{leak}_1}$ are defined in the following.

and returns (pk_1^i, sk_1^i) to adversary $\mathcal{B}$. $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{cca}}(pk_0', c')$ works as follows: If $pk_0' \in [L_0]_1$ and $(c', pk_0') \neq (c^*, pk_0^*)$, compute and return the corresponding $k' \leftarrow \mathsf{Decaps}(sk_1, sk_0', c')$, otherwise return $\bot$.

We define the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ winning in the game [OW-CCA, ·] as: $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathsf{2KEM}}^{[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA},\cdot]}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr[[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]^{\mathcal{A}} \Rightarrow 1]$, and the advantage of $\mathcal{B}$ winning in the game [·, OW-CPA] as: $\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathsf{2KEM}}^{[\cdot,\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]}(\mathcal{B}) = \Pr[[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]^{\mathcal{B}} \Rightarrow 1]$, respectively.

KeyGen1(n)	KeyGen0(n)	Encaps$(pk_1, pk_0);$	Decaps(sk_1, sk_0, c)
$(pk_1', sk_1') \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyG1}$	$(pk_0', sk_0') \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyG0}$	$m \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$	$m' = \mathsf{Dec}(sk_1', sk_0', c)$
$s_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$	$sk_0 = sk_0'$	$c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(pk_1, pk_0, m; G(m))$	$c' = \mathsf{Enc}(pk_1, pk_0, m'; G(m'))$
$sk_1 = (sk_1', s_1)$	$pk_0 = pk_0'$	$K = H(pk_0, m, c)$	if $c \neq c'$, let $m' = s_1$
$pk_1 = pk_1'$		return (K, c)	return $K = H(pk_0, m', c)$

Fig. 5. The modified Fujisaki-Okamoto from [OW-CPA, OW-CPA] secure 2-key PKE to [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] secure 2-key KEM 2KEM.

Lemma 1 (Theorem 7 in [33]). *For any* [*OW-CCA*, ·] *adversary* $\mathcal{C}$, *or* [·, *OW-CPA*] *adversary* $\mathcal{D}$ *against 2KEM with at most* q_H *queries to random oracle* H, *there are* [*OW-CPA*, ·] *adversary* $\mathcal{A}$, *or* [·, *OW-CPA*] *adversary* $\mathcal{B}$ *against 2PKE, that make at most* q_H *(resp.* q_G*) queries to random oracle* H *(resp.* G*) s.t.*

$$Adv_{\mathsf{2KEM}}^{[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA},\cdot]}(\mathcal{C}) \leq \frac{q_H}{2^n} + q_H \cdot Adv_{\mathsf{2PKE}}^{[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA},\cdot]}(\mathcal{A}), \quad Adv_{\mathsf{2KEM}}^{[\cdot,\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]}(\mathcal{D}) \leq Adv_{\mathsf{2PKE}}^{[\cdot,\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]}(\mathcal{B}).$$

3 [**OW-CCA**, **OW-CPA**] Secure KEM from SIDH

We now propose a [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] secure 2-key KEM from supersingular isogeny. It is the core building block for our AKEs. At first, we propose an elegant [OW-CPA, OW-CPA] 2-key PKE from supersingular isogeny, and then apply the modified Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation to get the strong secure 2-key KEM.

Choose $p = \ell_1^{e_1} \ell_2^{e_2} \cdot f \pm 1, E_0, \{P_1, Q_1\}, \{P_2, Q_2\}$ as above. Let $h : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a random hash function from hash function families $\mathcal{H}$. Let $\mathfrak{g} =$

$(E_0; P_1, Q_1, P_2, Q_2)$ and $\mathfrak{e} = (\ell_1, \ell_2, e_1, e_2)$ be public parameters. Let $s, t \in \{1, 2\}$, $s \neq t$. The [OW-CPA, OW-CPA] 2-key PKE $2\mathsf{PKE}_{sidh}$ is built as follows.

- $\mathsf{KeyG1}(n, \mathsf{pp})$: on input security parameter and public parameter, randomly choose a secret $\mathfrak{a}_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}$ and compute $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1}$. Then output

$$sk_1 := \mathfrak{a}_1, pk_1 := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1}.$$

- $\mathsf{KeyG0}(n, \mathsf{pp})$: on input security parameter and public parameter, randomly choose a secret $\mathfrak{a}_0 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}$ and compute $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_0}$. Then output

$$sk_0 := \mathfrak{a}_0, pk_0 := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_0}.$$

- $\mathsf{Enc}(pk_1, pk_0, m)$: on input public keys and a message $m = m_1 \| m_0 \in \{0, 1\}^{2n}$, randomly choose $\mathfrak{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_t^{e_t}}$ and compute $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}$, $h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1})^{\mathfrak{b}}) \oplus m_1$ and $h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_0})^{\mathfrak{b}}) \oplus m_0$. The ciphertext is

$$c := \left(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}, h\left((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1})^{\mathfrak{b}}\right) \oplus m_1, h\left((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_0})^{\mathfrak{b}}\right) \oplus m_0\right).$$

- $\mathsf{Dec}(sk_1, sk_0, c)$: on input secret keys $sk_1 = \mathfrak{a}_1$, $sk_0 = \mathfrak{a}_0$ and ciphertext $c = (\mathfrak{c}_1, c_2, c_3)$, compute $m_1 := c_2 \oplus h(\mathfrak{c}_1^{\mathfrak{a}_1})$ and $m_0 := c_3 \oplus h(\mathfrak{c}_1^{\mathfrak{a}_0})$. The plaintext is $m = m_1 \| m_0$.

The correctness of $2\mathsf{PKE}_{sidh}$ is straightforward due to the correctness of SIDH.

Lemma 2. *Under the SI-DDH assumption, $2\mathsf{PKE}_{sidh}$ is [OW-CPA, OW-CPA] secure. Precisely, for any PPT [OW-CPA, OW-CPA] adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathcal{C}$, there exists algorithms $\mathcal{B}$ and $\mathcal{D}$ such that*

$$Adv_{2\mathsf{PKE}_{sidh}}^{[\textit{OW-CPA}, \cdot]}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 2Adv_{\mathcal{B}}^{siddh} + 1/2^n + negl,$$

$$Adv_{2\mathsf{PKE}_{siddh}}^{[\cdot, \textit{OW-CPA}]}(\mathcal{C}) \leq 2Adv_{\mathcal{D}}^{siddh} + 1/2^n + negl.$$

Proof. We reduce the [OW-CPA, $\cdot$] security to the underlying SI-DDH assumption. It is analogous for the [$\cdot$, OW-CPA] security. We prove the [OW-CPA, $\cdot$] security via a sequence of games.

Game 0: This is the original [OW-CPA, $\cdot$] challenge game in Fig. 3. We denote the event that the adversary wins the games as Succ_0.

Game 1: In this game we modify [OW-CPA, $\cdot$] challenge game by requiring that the adversary wins the game if $m_1' = m_1$. We denote this event as Succ_1. (In Game i ($i \geq 1$), we denote this event as Succ_i.) Note that in Game 0, the adversary wins only if both $m_1' = m_1$ and $m_0' = m_0$. Thus, we have $\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_0] \leq \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_1]$.

Game 2: In this game, we modify the computation of challenge ciphertext. Specifically, $(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}})^{\mathfrak{a}_1}$ is replaced by a random j-invariant j^*. We construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ to solve the SI-DDH problem given an instance $(\mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathfrak{g}_2, j)$, if there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ to distinguish Game 1 and Game 2.

$$\begin{array}{l}
\underline{\mathcal{B}(\mathfrak{c}, \mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathfrak{g}_2, j)} \\
01 \quad pk_1 \leftarrow \mathfrak{g}_1 \\
02 \quad pk_0^*, \text{state} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk_1) \\
03 \quad m_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n \\
04 \quad \mathfrak{c}_1^* = \mathfrak{g}_2, \; c_2^* = h(j) \oplus m_1, \; c_3^* \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n \\
05 \quad c^* = (\mathfrak{c}_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*) \\
06 \quad m_1' || m_0' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{state}, C^*) \\
07 \quad \text{If } m_1' = m_1, \; b' = 1, \text{ else } b' \leftarrow \{0,1\}.
\end{array}$$

If $(\mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathfrak{g}_2, j)$ is an SI-DDH tuple, $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates Game 1, else $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates Game 2. In the SI-DDH challenge, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{siddh} &= \Pr[b = b'] - 1/2 \\
&= 1/2(\Pr[b' = 1 | b = 1] - \Pr[b' = 1 | b = 0]) \\
&= 1/2(\Pr[b' = 1 | \text{Game 1}] - \Pr[b' = 1 | \text{Game 2}]) \\
&= 1/2(\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_2]).
\end{aligned}$$

Game 3: In this game, we modify the computation of the challenge ciphertext. Specifically, $h(j^*)$ is replaced by a random string h^*. Now c_2^* is a completely random string. Thus, the advantage to compute m_1 is $\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_3] = 1/2^n$. Note that, since h is a hash function, $|\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_2] - \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_3]|$ is negligible.

To sum them up, we have that $\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_0] \leq 2\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{siddh} + 1/2^n + negl.$ $\qquad\square$

Remark 1: By setting pk_0 and sk_0 to be empty and the ciphertext to be $\mathfrak{c}_1, c_2$, the scheme is exactly the ElGamal scheme and is OW-CPA secure under the SI-DDH assumption.

Applying the modified Fujisaki-Okamoto in Fig. 5, we will get a [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] secure 2-key KEM $2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}$ in Fig. 6. Let $h : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$, $G : \{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^*$ and $H : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^{2n}$ be hash functions. Note that there is a subtle difference between the Fig. 6 and the modified Fujisaki-Okamoto in Fig. 5 that the "re-encryption" only needs to check the correctness of $\mathfrak{c}_1$.

KeyGen1	**KeyGen0**
$\mathfrak{a}_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}$, $s_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}$	$\mathfrak{a}_{\mathfrak{o}} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}$
$pk_1 := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1}$, $sk_1 := (\mathfrak{a}_1, s_1)$	$pk_0 := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_{\mathfrak{o}}}$, $sk_0 := \mathfrak{a}_{\mathfrak{o}}$
Encaps(pk_1, pk_0)	**Decaps**(sk_1, sk_0)
$m_1, m_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$, $\mathfrak{b} := G(m_1, m_0)$	$m_1' := c_2 \oplus h(\mathfrak{c}_1^{\mathfrak{a}_1})$
$\mathfrak{c}_1 = \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}$, $c_2 = h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1})^b) \oplus m_1$	$m_0' := c_3 \oplus h(\mathfrak{c}_1^{\mathfrak{a}_{\mathfrak{o}}})$
$c_3 = h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_{\mathfrak{o}}})^b) \oplus m_0$	$\mathfrak{b} := G(m_1', m_0')$
$c := (\mathfrak{c}_1, c_2, c_3)$	If $\mathfrak{c}_1 \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}$, $m_1 || m_0 = s_1$
$K := H(pk_0, m_1 || m_0, c)$	$K := H(pk_0, m_1 || m_0, c)$

Fig. 6. The [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] secure $2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}$.

Theorem 1. *Under the SI-DDH assumption,* $2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}$ *is* [*OW-CCA, OW-CPA*] *secure in the random oracle model. Precisely, for any PPT* [*OW-CCA, OW-CPA*] *adversary* $\mathcal{A}$ *and* $\mathcal{C}$ *with at most* q_H *queries to* H *oracle, there exists an algorithm* $\mathcal{B}$ *and* $\mathcal{D}$ *solving SI-DDH problem such that*

$$Adv^{[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA},\cdot]}_{2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \frac{q_H}{2^{2n}} + q_H \cdot \left(2Adv^{siddh}_{\mathcal{B}} + 1/2^n + negl\right),$$

$$Adv^{[\cdot,\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]}_{2\mathsf{KEM}_{siddh}}(\mathcal{C}) \leq 2Adv^{siddh}_{\mathcal{D}} + 1/2^n + negl.$$

Proof. According to Lemma 1, the [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] security of $2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}$ is guaranteed by the [OW-CPA, OW-CPA] security of $2\mathsf{PKE}_{sidh}$. By applying Lemma 2, the [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] security is finally reduced to the underlying SI-DDH assumption. ☐

Remark 2: By setting pk_0 and sk_0 to be empty, the message space to be $\{0,1\}^n$, the input of G to be $(m_1, -)$ and the ciphertext to be $\mathfrak{c}_1, c_2$, the scheme is exactly the FO transformed ElGamal scheme and is OW-CCA secure under the SI-DDH assumption.

4 Two-pass SIAKE

In this section, we propose a two-pass AKE based on SI-DDH assumption. The two-pass AKE SIAKE_2 is shown in Fig. 7.

Public Parameters: Let $\mathfrak{e} = (\ell_1, \ell_2, e_1, e_2)$ and $\mathfrak{g} = (E_0; P_1, Q_1, P_2, Q_2)$. Let $g : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^{2n}$, $h : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n$, $G : \{0,1\}^{2n} \to \{0,1\}^*$, $H : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^{2n}$, $\hat{H} : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ be hash functions.

Register: Any user registers two sets of public-secret keys. One set of keys is assigned by the user as an initiator, and another set is assigned as a responder. For user U_A, it first chooses $sk_{A_1} := (\mathfrak{a}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}, s_{A1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n})$ and computes $pk_{A_1} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1}$, then chooses $sk_{A_2} := (\mathfrak{a}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}, s_{A2} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n})$ and computes $pk_{A_2} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_2}$.

Phase 1: User U_A randomly chooses $r_A, \mathfrak{x}_0 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}$ as two ephemeral randomness. Let $\mathfrak{x} = G(g(r_A, \mathfrak{a}_1))$. Then U_A computes $X_0 := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}_0}$, $X := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}}$, $x_1 := h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}_2})^{\mathfrak{x}}) \oplus n_1$, and sends X_0, X, x_1 to U_B. U_A computes $K_A = H(n_1, X, x_1)$.

Phase 2: User U_B randomly chooses $r_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}$ as the ephemeral randomness and computes $m_1 || m_0 = g(r_B, s_b)$, $\mathfrak{y} = G(m_1, m_0)$, and $Y := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}}$. On receiving (X_0, X, x_1) from U_A, U_B computes $y_1 = h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1})^{\mathfrak{y}}) \oplus m_1$, $y_0 = h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}_0})^{\mathfrak{y}}) \oplus m_0$, $K_B = H(X, m_1, m_0, Y, y_1, y_0)$, and sends (Y, y_1, y_0) to U_A. U_B decrypts X, x_1 to extract n_1' and $\mathfrak{x}' = G(n_1')$. If $X \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}}$, set $n_1' := s_{B2}$. Let $K_A' = H(n_1', X, x_1)$. The session key is $SK = \hat{H}(sid, K_A', K_B)$ where sid is $\left(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, X_0, Y, y_1, y_0\right)$.

Phase 3: On receiving (Y, y_1, y_0) from U_B, U_A computes $m_1' = y_1 \oplus h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}})^{\mathfrak{a}_1})$, $m_0' = y_0 \oplus h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}})^{\mathfrak{x}})$ to extract $\mathfrak{y}' = G(m_1', m_0')$. If $Y \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}}$, set $m_1' || m_0' := s_{A1}$. Let

$K'_B = H(X_0, m'_1, m'_0, Y, y_1, y_0)$. The session key is $SK = \hat{H}(sid, K_A, K'_B)$ where sid is $\left(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, X_0, Y, y_1, y_0\right)$.

The session state owned by U_A consists of the ephemeral secret key $r_A, \mathfrak{x}_o$, the decapsulated key K'_B and the encapsulated key K_A. The session state owned by U_B consists of the ephemeral secrete key r_B and the encapsulated key K_B, but not the decapsulated key K'_A.

U_A	U_B
$sk_{A_1} := (\mathfrak{a}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}, s_{A1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n})$	$sk_{B_2} := (\mathfrak{b}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}, s_{B2} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n})$
$pk_{A_1} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1}$	$pk_{B_2} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}_2}$
$sk_{A_2} := (\mathfrak{a}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}, s_{A2} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n})$	$sk_{B_1} := (\mathfrak{b}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}, s_{B1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n})$
$pk_{A_2} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_2}$	$pk_{B_2} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}_2}$

U_A		U_B
$r_A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}, n_1 \leftarrow g(r_A, \mathfrak{a}_1)$		
$\mathfrak{x} \leftarrow G(n_1), \mathfrak{x}_o \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}.$		$r_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}, m_1 \| m_0 \leftarrow g(r_B, \mathfrak{b}_2)$
$X_0 := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}_o}$		$\mathfrak{y} \leftarrow G(m_1, m_0)$
$X := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}}, x_1 := h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}_2})^{\mathfrak{x}}) \oplus n_1$	$\xrightarrow{X, x_1, X_0}$	$Y := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}}, y_1 := h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1})^{\mathfrak{y}}) \oplus m_1$
$K_A := H(n_1, X, x_1)$		$y_0 := h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}_o})^{\mathfrak{y}}) \oplus m_0$
	$\xleftarrow{Y, y_1, y_0}$	$K_B := H(X_0, m_1, m_0, Y, y_1, y_0)$
$m'_1 := y_1 \oplus h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}})^{\mathfrak{a}_1})$		
$m'_0 := y_0 \oplus h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}})^{\mathfrak{x}}), \mathfrak{y}' \leftarrow g(m'_1, m'_0)$		$n'_1 := x_1 \oplus h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}})^{\mathfrak{b}_2}), \mathfrak{x}' \leftarrow G(n'_1)$
If $Y \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}'}, m'_1 \| m'_0 := s_{A1}$		If $X \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}'}, n'_1 := s_{B2}$
$K'_B := H(X_0, m'_1, m'_2, Y, y_1, y_0)$		$K'_A := H(n'_1, X, x_1)$
$SK := \hat{H}(sid, K_A, K'_B)$		$SK := \hat{H}(sid, K'_A, K_B)$

Fig. 7. A Compact 2-pass AKE SIAKE_2 Based on SI-DDH. Here sid is $\left(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, X_0, Y, y_1, y_0\right)$.

Theorem 2. *Under the SI-DDH assumption, SIAKE_2 is CK^+ secure in the random oracle model. Precisely, if the number of users is N and there are at most l sessions between any two users, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against SIAKE_2 with q times of hash oracle queries, there exists $\mathcal{B}$ s.t.*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{CK^+}_{\mathsf{SIAKE}_2}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 1/2 + N^2 \cdot l \cdot q \cdot \left(4Adv_{\mathcal{B}}^{siddh} + \frac{q+1}{2^n} + negl\right).$$

Proof sketch: Obviously, U_A sends X_0 and a $\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}$ secure ciphertext X, x_1 under public key pk_{B_2} to U_B. U_B responds a $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]$ secure ciphertext Y, y_1, y_0 under public keys pk_{A_1} and X_0 to U_A. We first assume that the AKE adversary only has the capability to Send message and does not query $\mathsf{SessionKeyReveal}$ and $\mathsf{SessionStateReveal}$ on non-test sessions. Then under the

assumption of [OW-CPA, OW-CPA] security, $\mathsf{SIAKE_2}$ is secure. Take the event E_3 (one of the behaviors presented in Appendix A Table 6) as an example, where the adversary may send X_0 in the test session and he/she knows $\mathfrak{b_2}$ but not $\mathfrak{a_1}$ or r_B. Since the adversary does not know $\mathfrak{a_1}$ and $\mathfrak{y}$, the [OW-CPA, OW-CPA] security guarantees that K_B encapsulated in (Y, y_1, y_0) is secure (thus SK is random assuming $\hat{H}$ is a random oracle) even the adversary chooses part of the public key X_0. Note that to simulate the CK^+ game and reduce the advantage of the AKE adversary to the advantage of solving underlying [OW-CPA, $\cdot$] game, the simulator does not hold the static secret key $\mathfrak{a_1}$ of U_A. It is safe if the adversary does not make SessionKeyReveal and SessionStateReveal queries. However if the adversary makes SessionKeyReveal queries that involves U_A, the simulator fails to compute the encapsulated key and session key. Nevertheless, when the underlying KEM is [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] secure, the simulator could query the strong decapsulation oracle to get the encapsulated key and session key, so the reduction works. In other events, the proof proceeds similarly.

Proof. We give representative security proof in two cases E_5 and E_3 in Table 6 in Appendix A, where one is wPFS and the other is KCI attack. The other cases can be easily extended or modified from the proof of E_3, so they are omitted here. Table 2 presents the outline of reduction.

Assumption	2-Key PKE	2-Key KEM	Cases in Table 6
SI-DDH	$[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]$, $pk_0 = \mathfrak{x_o}$	$[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]$, $pk_0 = \mathfrak{x_o}$	E_5
SI-DDH	$[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$, $pk_1 = \mathfrak{a_1}$	$[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$, $pk_1 = \mathfrak{a_1}$	E_3, E_4, E_6, $E_{7\text{-}2}$, $E_{8\text{-}1}$
SI-DDH	OW-CPA	OW-CCA, $pk_1 = \mathfrak{b_2}$	E_1, E_2, $E_{7\text{-}1}$, $E_{8\text{-}2}$

Table 2. The outline of security reduction for $\mathsf{SIAKE_2}$.

wPFS E_5. The proof of this case proceeds via a sequence of games, i.e. Games 0 to 2. In this case, the test session sid^* (with owner as responder or initiator) has a matching session $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$. Both static secret keys of the initiator and the responder are leaked to $\mathcal{A}$. We denote the event that the AKE adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs b' such that $b = b'$ as Succ_i in Game i.

Game 0: This is the original CK^+ game in case E_5. In the test session, the adversary owns all the static secret keys, i.e. $\mathfrak{a_1}, \mathfrak{a_2}, \mathfrak{b_1}, \mathfrak{b_2}$ asssuming the test session is between U_A and U_B.

Game 1: In this game, we change the way to generate $m_1 || m_0$ in the test session by replacing $m_1 || m_0 \leftarrow g(r_B, \mathfrak{b_2})$ with $m_1 || m_0 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$. Since g is a random oracle, $\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_0] - \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_1] \le N^2 \cdot l \cdot \frac{q}{2^n}$.

Game 2: In this game, we change the session key in the test session by replacing $\hat{H}(sid, K_A', K_B)$ with a random bit-string in $\{0, 1\}^n$. Obviously, $\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_2] = 1/2$.

We construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ to solve the $[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]$ security of $\mathsf{2KEM}_{sidh}$, if there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ to distinguish Game 1 and Game 2.

On receiving the public key pk_0 from the $[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]$ challenger, to simulate the CK^+ game, $\mathcal{B}$ randomly chooses two parties U_A, U_B and the i-th session

as a guess of the test session with success probability $1/N^2l$. $\mathcal{B}$ computes and sets all the static secrets and public key pairs by himself for all N users U_P as both responder and initiator. Particularly, $\mathcal{B}$ sets the static secret and public key pair (pk_{B_2}, sk_{B_2}) for U_B as responder, and sets pk_{A_1} for U_A as initiator. $\mathcal{B}$ sends pk_{A_1} to $[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]$ challenger and receives the challenge ciphertext C^*. Then $\mathcal{B}$ simulates all the communications and SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal as those in Game 1 except the test session. In the test session, $\mathcal{B}$ sets $X_0 = pk_0$ and responds $(Y, y_1, y_0) = C^*$.

Finally, $\mathcal{B}$ checks the hash list queried by $\mathcal{A}$. If there exists some $(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, X_0, C^*, K_A, K_B)$ in the list such that K_A is the key encapsulated in (X, x_1) (since (X, x_1) is honestly generated by $\mathcal{B}$, it can compute K_A), $\mathcal{B}$ chooses a random one and outputs K_B, otherwise $\perp$. Denote flag as the event that $\mathcal{A}$ explicitly queries $(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, X_0, C^*, K_A, K_B)$ to the oracle $\hat{H}$ such that K_A is the key encapsulated in (X, x_1) and K_B is the key encapsulated in C^*. If flag does not happen, $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates both Game 1 and Game 2. Thus,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_2] \leq \Pr[\mathsf{flag}] \leq N^2 \cdot l \cdot \mathrm{Adv}_{2\mathsf{PKE}_{sidh}}^{[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]}(\mathcal{C}).$$

By Lemma 2, to sum up, $\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_0] \leq 1/2 + N^2 \cdot l \cdot \left(\frac{q}{2^n} + 2\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{siddh}} + 1/2^n + negl \right)$.

KCI E_3**.** In this case, the test session sid^* with its owner as responder does not have a matching session which means that X, x_1, X_0 is sent by adversary. Both static secret keys of U_B and the randomness r_B are leaked to $\mathcal{A}$. It is more complicated than E_5. At first, (X, x_1, X_0) in the test session is generated by $\mathcal{A}$ rather than $\mathcal{B}$. However, (X, x_1) is the ciphertext under public key pk_{B_2}, and the encapsulated key K_A can be extracted with sk_{B_2}. Furthermore, the challenge public key that the security relies on is the static public key, and this will affect the simulation of answering SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal queries. Fortunately, $2\mathsf{PKE}_{sidh}$ provides a strong decapsulation oracle to answer those queries.

The proof also proceeds via a sequence of games, i.e. Game 0 to 2. We denote the event that the AKE adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs b' such that $b = b'$ as Succ_i in Game i.

Game 0: This is the original CK^+ game in case E_3. In the test session, r_B is leaked to the adversary assuming the test session is between U_A and U_B.

Game 1: In this game, we change the way to generate $m_1 \| m_0$ in the test session by replacing $m_1 \| m_0 \leftarrow g(r_B, \mathfrak{b}_2)$ with $m_1 \| m_0 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$. Although r_B is leaked to $\mathcal{A}$, since g is a random oracle, $\mathcal{A}$ will not find this change without querying g with $r_B, \mathfrak{b}_2$. We denote Askg as the event $\mathcal{A}$ queries g with $r_B, \mathfrak{b}_2$. If event Askg happens, we can extract $\mathfrak{b}_2$ and utilize it to solve the underlying SI-DDH problem. Precisely, given $(\mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathfrak{g}_2, j)$, $\mathcal{B}$ randomly chooses U_B as a guess of the responder in the test session with success probability $\frac{1}{2N}$. $\mathcal{B}$ sets $pk_{B_2} := \mathfrak{g}_2$. When event Askg happens, $\mathcal{B}$ uses $\mathfrak{b}_2$ to output $j \overset{?}{=} \mathfrak{g}_1^{\mathfrak{b}_2}$.

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_0] - \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_1] \leq 2N \cdot \mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{siddh}}.$$

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Game 2: In this game, we change the session key in the test session by replacing $\hat{H}(sid, K'_A, K_B)$ with a random bit-string in $\{0,1\}^n$. Obviously, $\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_2] = 1/2$.

We construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ to solve the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ security of $2\mathsf{KEM}_{\mathsf{sidh}}$, if there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ to distinguish Game 1 and Game 2.

On receiving the public key pk_1 from the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ challenger, to simulate the CK^+ game, $\mathcal{B}$ randomly chooses two parties U_A, U_B and the i-th session as a guess of the test session with success probability $1/N^2 l$. $\mathcal{B}$ computes and sets all the static secrets and public key pairs on his own for all N users U_P as both responder and initiator except the static public key for U_A as initiator.

- Specially, $\mathcal{B}$ sets the static secret and public key pair (pk_{A_2}, sk_{A_2}) that invloves U_A as responder, and sets pk_1 (receiving from the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ challenger) for U_A as initiator.
- In the test session, on receiving (X, x_1, X_0) from $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{B}$ sends $pk_0^* = X_0$ to the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ challenger and receives the challenge ciphertext C^*. Then $\mathcal{B}$ returns C^* to $\mathcal{A}$ as response.
- $\mathcal{B}$ simulates all the communications and SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal queries as those in Game 1 except that involves U_A as initiator (since $\mathcal{B}$ does not know sk_{A_1}).
- For those SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal queries involves U_A as initiator (for example, U_A honestly sends out X', x'_1, X'_0 and receives (Y', y'_1, y'_0)), $\mathcal{B}$ queries the $\mathcal{O}$ oracle with $(X'_0; Y', y'_1, y'_0)$ provided by the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ challenger to extract the encapsulated key and maintains the consistency of the $\hat{H}$ list with SessionStateReveal and SessionKeyReveal queries.

Finally, $\mathcal{B}$ checks the hash list queried by $\mathcal{A}$. If there exists some $(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, X_0, C^*, K_A, K_B)$ in the list such that K_A is the key encapsulated in (X, x_1) (since (X, x_1) is honestly generated by $\mathcal{B}$, it can compute K_A), $\mathcal{B}$ chooses a random one and outputs K_B, otherwise $\bot$. Denote flag as the event that $\mathcal{A}$ explicitly queries $(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, X_0, C^*, K_A, K_B)$ to the oracle $\hat{H}$ such that K_A is the key encapsulated in (X, x_1) and K_B is the key encapsulated in C^*. If flag does not happen, $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates both Game 1 and Game 2. Thus,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_2] \leq \Pr[\mathsf{flag}] \leq N^2 \cdot l \cdot \mathrm{Adv}_{2\mathsf{KEM}_{sidh}}^{[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]}(\mathcal{C}).$$

By Theorem 1, to sum them up,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_0] \leq 1/2 + N^2 \cdot l \cdot q \cdot \left(4\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{siddh}} + 1/2^n + negl\right).$$

$\square$

5 Three-pass SIAKE

We first enhance the SI-DDH assumption to 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption, and analyze its reliability. Based on this assumption, we then propose the three-pass SIAKE_3.

5.1　1-Oracle SI-DH and Implied 2-key KEM

The 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption is inspired by the Oracle Diffie-Hellman assumption over classical group given by Abdalla, Bellare and Rogaway [1] for analyzing DHIES. Let $G :=< g >$ and $|G| = p$ be a prime. The Oracle Diffie-Hellman assumption states that, given (g, g^a, g^b, h), it is difficult to decide whether $h = H(g^{ab})$ or not (where H is a hash function), even the solver could make polynomial queries to an oracle $H_B(\cdot)$ which will return $H(v^b)$ with $v \in G$ satisfying $v \neq g^a$. Under the Oracle Diffie-Hellman assumption, the DHIES scheme is chosen ciphertext secure [1].

However, the Oracle Diffie-Hellman assumption can not be directly extended in the supersingular isogeny setting. As we present several times before, the adaptive attack [16] would extract every bit of b with polynomial queries to $H_B(\cdot)$ with specified points, which thereby implies the Oracle Diffie-Hellman problem could be solved. Moreover, in the classical group, if $v \neq g^a$, then $v^b \neq (g^a)^b$. But in the supersingular isogeny setting even $v \neq g^a \in \mathrm{SSEC}_A$, it is possible that v^b is equal to $(g^a)^b$.

Fortunately, only one query to $H_B(\cdot)$ with $v \neq g^a$ is needed for our purpose. Thus the adaptive attack does not work. Furthermore, when $H_B(v) = H(v, v^b)$, even if $v \neq g^a$, the case $H(v, v^b) = H(g^a, (g^a)^b)$ occurs with negligible probability.

Definition 3 (1-Oracle SI-DH Assumption). *Let $H : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^n$ be a hash function. Let $\mathfrak{e}$ and $\mathfrak{g}$ be public parameters as defined in SI-DDH assumption. Let D_0 and D_1 be two distributions:*

$$D_1 :=\{\mathfrak{e}, \mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}, H(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}})^{\mathfrak{b}}) | \mathfrak{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}, \mathfrak{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_t^{e_t}}\}$$

$$D_0 :=\{\mathfrak{e}, \mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}, \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}, h | \mathfrak{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}, \mathfrak{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_t^{e_t}}, h \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n\}$$

The 1-Oracle SI-DH problem is, given a random sample from D_b depending on $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$, and a one-time oracle H_B, guessing b. The one-time oracle H_B can be queried only one time with $\mathfrak{y} \in SSEC_A$ and $\mathfrak{y} \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}$, and it will return $H(\mathfrak{y}, \mathfrak{y}^{\mathfrak{b}})$. The advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ to solve the 1-Oracle SI-DH problem is

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{1osidh} = Pr[b' = b | \mathcal{A}^{H_B(\cdot)}(\mathfrak{d}_b \leftarrow D_b) = b', b \leftarrow \{0,1\}] - 1/2.$$

The 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption states that for any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, $Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{1osidh}$ is negligible.

We emphasize that the adversary is allowed to query the hashed SIDH oracle H_B only once and $\mathfrak{y} \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}$. If there are polynomial queries, then the 1-Oracle SI-DH problem can be solved by the adaptive attack in [16]. Please also notice that the hash function involves $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}$ or $\mathfrak{y}$ as input besides the j-invariant. Otherwise the 1-Oracle SIDH problem is not hard. Let $\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}} = (E_A, \phi_A(P_t), \phi_A(Q_t))$. Since $\langle \phi_A(P_s) + [y]\phi_A(Q_s) \rangle = \langle [u]\phi_A(P_s) + [y][u]\phi_A(Q_s) \rangle$ for any integer $1 \leq u \leq \ell_s^{e_s}$ and coprime to ℓ_s, the attacker sets $E_Y = E_A$, $R = [u]\phi_A(P_s)$, $S = [u]\phi_A(Q_s)$ and $\mathfrak{y} = (Y, R, S)$. Then $(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}})^{\mathfrak{b}}$ and $\mathfrak{y}^{\mathfrak{b}}$ will produce the same j-invariant. However,

when taking $\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{a}$ or $\mathfrak{y}$ as input of H, any query with $\mathfrak{y} \neq \mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{a}$ to H_B will get an obsolutly different value.

1-Gap SI-DH problem is similar with the SI-CDH problem but the adversary is given access to a highly restricted SI-DDH oracle.

Definition 4 (1-Gap SI-DH Assmption). *Let $\mathfrak{c}$ and $\mathfrak{g}$ be public parameters. The 1-Gap SI-DH problem is that, given $\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{a}$, $\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}$ (where $\mathfrak{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_s^{e_s}}$, $\mathfrak{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_t^{e_t}}$), and an oracle $\mathcal{O}_{siddh}(\mathfrak{y}, \cdot)$, compute the j-invariant $(\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{a})^\mathfrak{b} = (\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b})^\mathfrak{a}$. Here, $\mathfrak{y} \in SSEC_A$ is chosen by the adversary $\mathcal{A}$. $\mathcal{O}_{siddh}(\mathfrak{y}, j)$ will return 1 if $j = \mathfrak{y}^\mathfrak{b}$, and 0 otherwise. For any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, we define the advantage of solving 1-Gap SI-DH problem as*

$$Adv_{\mathcal{A}}^{1gsidh} = Pr[j' = (\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{a})^\mathfrak{b} | \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{siddh}(\mathfrak{y},\cdot)}(\mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{c}, \mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{a}, \mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}) \rightarrow (\mathfrak{y}, j')].$$

The 1-Gap SI-DH assumption states: for any PPT algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, the advantage of solving 1-Gap SI-CDH problem is negligible.

We emphasize that if the adversary is allowed to query $\mathcal{O}_{siddh}(\cdot, \cdot)$ with unlimited numbers of $\mathfrak{y}$, 1-Gap SI-DH problem can be solved using the adaptive attack in [16]. However, here $\mathcal{O}_{siddh}(\cdot, \cdot)$ oracle only allows to be queried once with $\mathfrak{y}$ of adversary's choice.

The following theorem shows that the 1-Gap SI-DH assumption implies the 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption when the hash function H is modeled as a random oracle.

Theorem 3. *For any algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ against the 1-Oracle SI-DH problem there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ against the 1-Gap SIDH problem such that*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},H}^{1osidh}(n) \leq q \cdot \mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{1gsidh}(n).$$

Please refer to Appendix B for the proof.

We now modify the $\mathsf{2PKE}_{sidh}$ and denote the new scheme as $\mathsf{2PKE}_{1osidh}$. The key generation algorithms are the same. In the encryption algorithm, $h\left((\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b})^{\mathfrak{a}_1}\right)$ is replaced by $h\left(\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}, (\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b})^{\mathfrak{a}_1}\right)$ and $h\left((\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b})^{\mathfrak{a}_0}\right)$ is replaced by $h\left(\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}, (\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b})^{\mathfrak{a}_0}\right)$. Thus the ciphertext is

$$c := \left(\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}, h\left(\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}, (\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b})^{\mathfrak{a}_1}\right) \oplus m_1, h\left(\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}, (\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b})^{\mathfrak{a}_0}\right) \oplus m_0\right).$$

Lemma 3. *The following holds.*

- *Under the 1-Oracle SI-DDH assumption, the scheme $\mathsf{2PKE}_{1osidh}$ is $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ secure even $H(pk_0^*, pk_0^{*\mathfrak{b}})$ is given to the adversary besides the challenge ciphertext $c^* = (\mathfrak{c}_1^* = \mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}, c_1, c_2)$.*
- *If the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ game is changed as that pk_0^* is generated by the challenger and the corresponding sk_0^* is leaked to the adversary, then under the SI-DDH assumption, $\mathsf{2PKE}_{1osidh}$ satisfies this $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ security even $H(pk_0^*, pk_0^{*\mathfrak{b}})$ is given to the adversary besides the challenge ciphertext $c^* = (\mathfrak{c}_1^* = \mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}, c_1, c_2)$.*

– *Under the SI-DDH assumption, the scheme* $\mathsf{2PKE}_{1osidh}$ *is* $[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]$ *secure.*

Proof. The $[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]$ security is the same with that in Lemma 2. We reduce the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ security with leakage to the underlying 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption.

We proof the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ security via a sequence of Games 0 to 4.

Game 0: This is the original $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ challenge game in Fig. 3. We denote the event that the adversary wins the games as Succ_0.

Game 1: In this game, we modify the computation of challenge ciphertext. specifically, $h(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}})^{\mathfrak{a}_1}$ is replaced by a random bit $h \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$. We construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ to solve the 1-Oracle SI-DH problem given instance $(\mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathfrak{g}_2, h)$, and an one-time oacle $\mathcal{H}_B(\cdot)$, if there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ to distinguish Game 0 and Game 1.

$\underline{\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{H}_B(\cdot)}(\mathfrak{e}, \mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathfrak{g}_2 = \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}, h)}$

01 $pk_1 \leftarrow \mathfrak{g}_1$
02 $pk_0^*, \text{state} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk_1)$
03 $m_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n, m_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$
04 Query $\mathcal{H}_B$ with pk_0^* and get $pk_0^{*\mathfrak{b}}$
04 $\mathfrak{c}_1^* = \mathfrak{g}_2, c_2^* = h \oplus m_1, c_3^* = h(pk_0^*, pk_0^{*\mathfrak{b}}) \oplus m_0$
05 $c^* = (\mathfrak{c}_1^*, c_2^*, c_3^*)$
06 $m_1' || m_0' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{state}, C^*)$
07 If $m_1' = m_1$, $b' = 1$, else $b' \leftarrow \{0,1\}$.

If $(\mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathfrak{g}_2, h)$ is a 1-Oracle SI-DH tuple, $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates Game 0, else $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates Game 1. In the 1-Oracle SI-DH challenge, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{1osidh} &= \Pr[b = b'] - 1/2 \\
&= 1/2(\Pr[b' = 1 | b = 1] - \Pr[b' = 1 | b = 0]) \\
&= 1/2(\Pr[b' = 1 | \text{Game 1}] - \Pr[b' = 1 | \text{Game 2}]) \\
&= 1/2(\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_2]).
\end{aligned}$$

Note that in this game, the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ advantage is less than $1/2^n$. Sum them up and we have that, $\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_0] \leq 2\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{siddh} + 1/2^n$ □

Similarly, we make the same modification to the $\mathsf{2KEM}_{sidh}$ and denote the new scheme as $\mathsf{2KEM}_{1osidh}$.

Theorem 4. *The following holds in the random oracle model.*

– *Under the 1-Oracle SI-DDH assumption, the scheme* $\mathsf{2KEM}_{1osidh}$ *is* $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ *secure in the random oracle model, even* $h(pk_0^*, pk_0^{*\mathfrak{b}})$ *is given to the adversary besides the challenge ciphertext* $c^* = (\mathfrak{c}_1^* = \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}}, c_1, c_2)$.

– If the [OW-CCA, ·] game is changed as that pk_0^* is generated by challenger and the corresponding sk_0^* is leaked to the adversary, then under the SI-DDH assumption, $2PKE_{1osidh}$ satisfies this [OW-CPA, ·] security even $H(pk_0^*, pk_0^{*\mathfrak{b}})$ is given to the adversary besides the challenge ciphertext $c^* = (\mathfrak{c}_1^* = \mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{b}, c_1, c_2)$.

– Under the SI-DDH assumption, the scheme $2KEM_{1osidh}$ is [·, OW-CPA] secure.

5.2 A Three-pass AKE based on 1-Oracle SIDH Assumption

The three-pass AKE $SIAKE_3$ is shown in Fig. 8. The public parameters and register are the same with those for $SIAKE_2$.

Phase 1: User U_A chooses ephemeral randomness r_A. Let $n_1||n_0 = g(r_A, \mathfrak{a_1})$ and $\mathfrak{x} = G(n_1, n_0)$. Then U_A computes $X := \mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{x}$, $x_1 := h(g^{b_2}, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b_2}})^\mathfrak{x}) \oplus n_1$, and sends X, x_1 to U_B.

Phase 2: User U_B chooses ephemeral randomness $r_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}$ and computes $m_1||m_0 = g(r_B, \mathfrak{b_2})$, $\mathfrak{y} = G(m_1, m_0)$, and $Y := \mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{y}$. On receiving (X, x_1, X_0) from U_A, if $X = pk_{B_2}$, aborts, else U_B computes $y_1 = h(g^{a_1}, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a_1}})^\mathfrak{y}) \oplus m_1$, $y_0 = h(X, (\mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{x})^\mathfrak{y}) \oplus m_0$, $K_B = H(X, m_1, m_0, Y, y_1, y_0)$, and sends (Y, y_1, y_0) to U_A.

Phase 3: On receiving (Y, y_1, y_0) from U_B, if $Y = pk_{A_1}$, aborts, else U_A decrypts Y, y_1, y_0 to extract $m_1'||m_0'$ and $\mathfrak{y}' = G(m_1', m_0')$. If $Y \neq \mathfrak{g}^\mathfrak{y}$, then $m_1'||m_0' = s_{A1}$. U_A computes $K_B' = H(X, m_1', m_0', Y, y_1, y_0)$ and the session key as $SK = \hat{H}(sid, K_A, K_B')$, where sid is $(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, x_0, Y, y_1, y_0)$.

Phase 4: If $X = pk_{B_2}$, then aborts, else U_B decrypts X, x_1, x_0 to extract n_1', n_0' and $\mathfrak{r}' = G(n_1', n_0')$. If $X \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{r}'}$, then $n_1'||n_0' = s_{B2}$. Let $K_A' = H(Y, n_1', n_0', X, x_1, x_0)$. The session key is computed as $SK = \hat{H}(sid, K_A', K_B)$ where sid is $(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, Y, y_1, y_0, x_0)$.

The session state of U_A consists of the ephemeral secret key r_A, the decapsulated key K_B' and the encapsulated key K_A. The session state of U_B consists of the ephemeral secrete key r_B, the encapsulated key K_B and the decapsulated key K_A'.

Theorem 5. *Under the 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption, $SIAKE_3$ supports arbitrary registrant and is CK^+ secure in the random oracle model. Precisely, if the number of users is N and there are at most l sessions between any two users, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against $SIAKE_3$ with q times of hash oracle queries, there exists $\mathcal{B}$ s.t.*

$$\mathbf{Adv}_{AKE_{siake3}}^{CK^+}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 1/2 + N^2 \cdot l \cdot q \cdot \left(4Adv_{\mathcal{B}}^{1osidh} + \frac{q+1}{2^n} + negl\right).$$

Proof sketch: Obviously, U_A sends [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] secure X, x_1, x_0 under public keys pk_{B_2} and Y, to U_B. U_B responds [OW-CCA, OW-CPA] secure ciphertexts Y, y_1, y_0 under public keys pk_{A_1} and X_0 to U_A. The proof of wPFS

	U_A	U_B

$$sk_{A_1} := (\mathfrak{a}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}, s_{A1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}) \qquad sk_{B_2} := (\mathfrak{b}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}, s_{B2} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n})$$
$$pk_{A_1} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1} \qquad pk_{B_2} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}_2}$$

$$sk_{A_2} := (\mathfrak{a}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}, s_{A2} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}) \qquad sk_{B_1} := (\mathfrak{b}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}, s_{B1} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n})$$
$$pk_{A_1} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1} \qquad pk_{B_2} := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}_2}$$

$$r_A \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_1^{e_1}}, \; n_1 || n_0 \leftarrow g(r_A, \mathfrak{a}_1) \qquad r_B \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_2^{e_2}}, \; m_1 || m_0 \leftarrow g(r_B, \mathfrak{b}_2)$$
$$\mathfrak{x} \leftarrow G(n_1, n_0) \qquad \mathfrak{y} \leftarrow G(m_1, m_0)$$
$$X := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}}, \; x_1 := h(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}_2}, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}_2})^{\mathfrak{x}}) \oplus n_1 \quad \xrightarrow{\; X, x_1 \;} \quad Y := \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}}, \; y_1 := h(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1}, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}_1})^{\mathfrak{y}}) \oplus m_1$$

$$\boxed{\text{If } X := pk_{A_1}, \perp}$$

$$\boxed{\text{If } Y := pk_{B_2}, \perp} \quad \xleftarrow{\; Y, y_1, y_0 \;} \quad y_0 := h(X, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}})^{\mathfrak{y}}) \oplus m_0$$

$$\boxed{x_0 := h(Y, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}})^{\mathfrak{x}}) \oplus n_0} \qquad K_B := H(X, m_1, m_0, Y, y_1, y_0)$$

$$K_A := H(Y, n_1, n_0, X, x_1, x_0) \quad \xrightarrow{\;\boxed{x_0}\;}$$

$$m_1' := y_1 \oplus h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}})^{\mathfrak{a}_1}) \qquad n_1' := x_1 \oplus h((\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}})^{\mathfrak{b}_2}$$
$$m_0' := y_0 \oplus h(X, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}})^{\mathfrak{x}}), \; \mathfrak{y}' := g(m_1', m_0') \qquad n_0' := x_0 \oplus h(X, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{x}})^{\mathfrak{y}}), \; \mathfrak{r}' :\leftarrow G(n_1', n_0')$$
$$\text{If } Y \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}'}, \; m_1' || m_0' := s_{A1} \qquad \text{If } X \neq \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{r}'}, \; n_1' || n_0' := s_{B2}$$
$$K_B' := H(X, m_1', m_2', Y, y_1, y_0) \qquad K_A' := H(Y, n_1', n_0', X, x_1, x_0)$$
$$SK := \hat{H}(sid, K_A, K_B') \qquad SK := \hat{H}(sid, K_A', K_B)$$

Fig. 8. A Compact 3-pass AKE SIAKE_3 based on SIDH. Here sid is $\big(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1},$ $pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, x_0, Y, y_1, y_0\big)$. The boxed arguments are the main differences with SIAKE_2. Besides, the input of h includes the first part of the public key.

security is exactly the same with that of SIAKE_2, but different for other security cases. The main observation is the same: since the underlying KEM is $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ secure, the simulator could query the strong decapsulation oracle to get the encapsulated key and session key and simulate the $\mathsf{SessionKeyReveal}$ and $\mathsf{SessionStateReveal}$. However, this is not sufficient. Take E_3 for example, given y^*, y_1^*, y_0^* as the challenge ciphertext, the simulator obviously does not know the randomness of Y^*, but in the test session Y^* is the public key of (X, x_1, x_0). Fortunately the underlying 1-Oracle SI-DH assumption provides this capability to encapsulate one ciphertext.

Proof. The proof for wPFS security is almost the same with that of SIAKE_2. The rest of cases can be easily extended or modified from the proof of E_3. We omit them and only show the proof for case E_3 here. For E_1, E_2, and E_4 when the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ makes Send query in the test session, the second part of the challenge public key is chosen by $\mathcal{A}$. For E_6, $E_{7\text{-}1}$, $E_{7\text{-}2}$, $E_{8\text{-}1}$, $E_{8\text{-}2}$, the messgaes in test session are honestly generated. Thus, the second part of the challenge public key is chosen by challenger $\mathcal{C}$.

Table 3 presents the outline of reduction.

Assumption	2-Key KEM	Cases in Table 6
SI-DDH	$[\cdot, \mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}]$, $pk_0 = \mathfrak{x}_\circ$	E_5
1-Oracle SI-DH	$[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ with leakage, $pk_1 = \mathfrak{a}_1$, $pk_0^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$	E_3, E_4
SI-DDH	$[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$, $pk_1 = \mathfrak{a}_1$, $pk_0^* \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$	E_6, $E_{7\text{-}2}$, $E_{8\text{-}1}$
1-Oracle SI-DH	$[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ with leakage, $pk_1 = \mathfrak{a}_1$, $pk_0^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}$	E_1, E_2
SI-DDH	$[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$, $pk_1 = \mathfrak{a}_1$, $pk_0^* \leftarrow \mathcal{C}$	$E_{7\text{-}1}$, $E_{8\text{-}2}$

Table 3. The outline of security reduction for SIAKE_3.

<u>KCI E_3</u>. In this case, X, x_1 and x_0 are sent by the adversary. Both the static secret keys of U_B and the randomness r_B are leaked to $\mathcal{A}$.

The proof proceeds via a sequence of Games 0 to 2. We denote the event that the AKE adversary $\mathcal{A}$ outputs b' such that $b = b'$ as Succ_i in Game i.

This is the original CK^+ game in case E_3. In the test session, r_B is leaked to the adversary assuming the test session is between U_A and U_B.

Game 1: In this game, we change the way to generate $m_1 || m_0$ in the test session from $m_1 || m_0 \leftarrow g(r_B, \mathfrak{b}_2)$ to $m_1 || m_0 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2n}$. Although r_B is leaked to $\mathcal{A}$, since g is a random oracle, if not querying g with $r_B, \mathfrak{b}_2$, $\mathcal{A}$ will not detect this change. We denote Askg as the event $\mathcal{A}$ queries g with $r_B, \mathfrak{b}_2$. If event Askg happens, we can extract $\mathfrak{b}_2$ and utilize it to solve the underlying SI-DDH problem (trivially solve the underlying 1-Oracl SI-DH problem). Precisely, given $(\mathfrak{g}, \mathfrak{g}_1, \mathfrak{g}_2, j)$, $\mathcal{B}$ randomly chooses U_B as a guess of the responder in the test session with success probability $\frac{1}{2N}$. $\mathcal{B}$ sets $pk_{B_2} = \mathfrak{g}_2$. When event Askg

happens, $\mathcal{B}$ just uses $\mathfrak{b}_2$ to compute and output $j \stackrel{?}{=} \mathfrak{g}_1^{\mathfrak{b}_2}$. Thus we have

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_0] - \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_1] \leq 2N \cdot \mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{siddh}} \leq 2N \cdot \mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{1osidh}}.$$

Game 2: In this game, we change the session key in the test session from $\hat{H}(sid, K_A', K_B)$ to a random bit-string in $\{0,1\}^n$. Obviously, $\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_2] = 1/2$.

We construct an algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ to solve the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ security of $2\mathsf{KEM}_{\mathsf{1osidh}}$ with leakage, if there exists an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ to distinguish Game 1 and Game 2.

On receiving the public key pk_1 from the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ challenger, to simulate the CK^+ game, $\mathcal{B}$ randomly chooses two parties U_A, U_B and the i-th session as a guess of the test session with success probability $1/N^2 l$. $\mathcal{B}$ computes and sets all the static secret and public key pairs by himself for all N users U_P as both responder and initiator except the static public key for U_A as initiator.

- Specially, $\mathcal{B}$ sets the static secret and public key pairs (pk_{A_2}, sk_{A_2}) for U_A as responder, and sets pk_1 (receiving from the $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}, \cdot]$ challenger) for U_A as initiator.
- In the test session, on receiving (X, x_1) from $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathcal{B}$ sets $pk_0^* = X$ and sends pk_0^* to $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ challenger and receives a challenge ciphertext $C^* = (Y^*, y_1, y_0)$. Then $\mathcal{B}$ returns C^* to $\mathcal{A}$ as response.
- $\mathcal{B}$ simulates all the communications and $\mathsf{SessionStateReveal}$ and $\mathsf{SessionKeyReveal}$ queries as those in Game 1 except that U_A acts as initiator (since $\mathcal{B}$ does not know sk_{A_1}).
- For those $\mathsf{SessionStateReveal}$ and $\mathsf{SessionKeyReveal}$ queries that involve U_A as initiator (for example, U_A honestly sends out X', x_1' and receives (Y', y_1', y_0')). $\mathcal{B}$ queries the $\mathcal{O}$ oracle with $(X_0'; Y', y_1', y_0')$ provided by $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ challenger to the extract encapsulated key and maintains the consistency of $\hat{H}$ list with $\mathsf{SessionStateReveal}$ and $\mathsf{SessionKeyReveal}$ queries.
- For the test session, on receiving x_0, $\mathcal{B}$ queries $[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]$ challenger with X to extract $h(X, X^{\mathfrak{y}})$ (where $Y^* = \mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{y}}$). Then $\mathcal{B}$ uses $h(X, X^{\mathfrak{y}})$ and $\mathfrak{b}_2$ to encapsulate X, x_1, x_0.

Finally, $\mathcal{B}$ checks the hash list queried by $\mathcal{A}$. If there exists some $(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, C^*, x_0, K_A, K_B)$ in the list such that K_A is the key encapsulated in (X, x_1, x_0) ($\mathcal{B}$ can compute K_A with $h(X, X^{\mathfrak{y}})$ and $\mathfrak{b}_2$), $\mathcal{B}$ chooses a random one and outputs K_B, otherwise $\perp$. Denote flag as the event that $\mathcal{A}$ explicitly queries $(U_A, U_B, pk_{A_1}, pk_{B_2}, X, x_1, C^*, x_0, K_A, K_B)$ to the oracle $\hat{H}$ such that K_A is the key encapsulated in (X, x_1, x_0) and K_B is the key encapsulated in C^*. If flag does not happen, $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates both Game 1 and Game 2. Thus,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_1] - \Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_2] \leq \Pr[\mathsf{flag}] \leq N^2 \cdot l \cdot \mathrm{Adv}_{2\mathsf{KEM}_{\mathsf{1osidh}}}^{[\mathsf{OW\text{-}CCA}, \cdot]}(\mathcal{C}).$$

By Theorem 4, to sum up,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Succ}_0] \leq 1/2 + N^2 \cdot l \cdot q \cdot \left(4\mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{1osidh}} + 1/2^n + negl\right).$$

$\square$

6 Implementation and Comparison

In this section, we implement $SIAKE_2$ and $SIAKE_3$, and compare their performance with [12], [2,26] and the lattice-based Kyber-AKE [3].

We adopt the curve SIKE751 in SIKE [19] that is proceeding the second round of NIST's post-quantum standardization. The performance is benchmarked on an Intel(R) Core i7-6567U CPU @3.30GHz processor supporting the Skylake micro-architecture.

It is easy to see in Table 4 that $SIAKE_2$'s bandwidth is reduced by 22.9% and $SIAKE_3$'s bandwidth is reduced by 49.3% compared to FSXY [12] and BCNP-Lon [2,26]. In Table 5, we present the performance of our protocols comparing with the FSXY scheme [12] and the BCNP-Lon scheme [2,26]. [26] shows how to use SIKE as basic building blocks to construct AKE schemes. They are median cycles over 1,000 measurements. It shows that our 2-pass scheme is 1.12 times faster than that of FSXY and 1.3 times faster than that of BCNP-Lon. Our 3-pass AKE is more efficient since it is 1.2 times faster than FSXY and 1.4 times faster than BCNP-Lon.

Scheme	$A \to B$	$B \to A$	$A \to B$	total(byte)
Kyber-AKE[3]	2272	2368		4640
FSXY [12]	1160	1160	-	2320
BCNP-Lon [2,26]	1160	1160	-	2320
$SIAKE_2$	1160	628	-	1788
$SIAKE_3$	596	628	32	1176

Table 4. Comparison of message sizes. We adopt the parameters chosen in [19], taking into account the efficiency. "-" stands for no messages to be transmitted. Only $SIAKE_3$ is a 3-pass one and then has a message from A to B again. The message sizes are counted in byte.

Scheme	A(**initial**)	B	A(**end**)	B(**end**)	total
FSXY [12]	6,238	14,779	10,124		31,141
BCNP-Lon [2,26]	11,146	20,092	9,563		40,801
$SIAKE_2$	6,828	13,917	6,641		27,386
$SIAKE_3$	5,966	4,429	4,922	9,575	24,892

Table 5. Comparison of cycle counts. Benchmarks are performed on a Intel(R) Core i7-6567U CPU @3.30GHz processor. Cycle counts are rounded to 10^6 cycles by taking the average of 1,000 trials.

7　Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed two AKEs based on supersingular isogeny assumption, one is two-pass and one is three-pass. Both of them achieve CK^+ security and support arbitrary registration.

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Appendix A, CK$^+$ Secure Model

We recall the CK$^+$ model introduced by [22] and later refined by [11], which is a CK model [6] integrated with the weak PFS, resistance to KCI and MEX properties. We focus on 3-pass and 2-pass protocols in this paper. For simplicity, we only show the model specified to 2-pass protocols. As for 3-pass protocol, we can extend it by adding an extra message in the matching session identifier and Send definitions.

In an AKE protocol, U_i denotes a party indexed by i, who is modeled as a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) interactive Turing machine. We assume that each party U_i owns a static pair of secret-public key (sk_i, pk_i), where the static public key is related to U_i's identity by a certification authority (CA). No other actions by the CA are required or assumed. In particular, we make no assumption on whether the CA requires a proof-of possession of the private key from a registrant of a public key, and we do not assume any specific checks on the value of a public key.

Session. Each party can be activated to run an instance called a *session*. A party can be activated to initiate the session by an incoming message of the form $(\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B)$ or respond to an incoming message of the form $(\Pi, \mathcal{R}, U_B, U_A, X_A)$, where Π is a protocol identifier, $\mathcal{I}$ and $\mathcal{R}$ are role identifiers corresponding to *initiator* and *responder*. Activated with $(\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B)$, U_A is called the session *initiator*. Activated with $(\Pi, \mathcal{R}, U_B, U_A, X_A)$, U_B is called the session *responder*.

According to the specification of AKE, the party creates randomness which is generally called *ephemeral secret key*, computes and maintains a *session state*, generates outgoing messages, and completes the session by outputting a session key and erasing the session state. Note that Canetti-Krawczyk [6] defines session state as session-specific secret information, but leaves it up to a protocol to specify which information is included in a session state. LaMacchia et al. [27] explicitly set all random coins used by a party in a session as session-specific secret information and call it *ephemeral secret key*. Here we require that the session state at least contains the ephemeral secret key.

A session may also be aborted without generating a session key. The initiator U_A creates a session state and outputs X_A, then may receive an incoming message of the forms $(\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B, X_A, X_B)$ from the responder U_B, and may compute the session key SK. On the contrary, the responder U_B outputs X_B, and may compute the session key SK. We say that a session is *completed* if its owner computes the session key.

A session is associated with its owner, a peer, and a session identifier. If U_A is the initiator, the session identifier is $\mathsf{sid} = (\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B, X_A)$ or $\mathsf{sid} = (\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B, X_A, X_B)$, which denotes U_A as an owner and U_B as a peer. If U_B is the responder, the session is identified by $\mathsf{sid} = (\Pi, \mathcal{R}, U_B, U_A, X_A, X_B)$, which denotes U_B as an owner and U_A as a peer. The *matching session* of $(\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B, X_A, X_B)$ is $(\Pi, \mathcal{R}, U_B, U_A, X_A, X_B)$ and vice versa.

Adversary. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is modeled in the following to capture real attacks in open networks, including the control of communication and the access to some of the secret information.

- Send(message): $\mathcal{A}$ sends messages in one of the forms: $(\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B)$, $(\Pi, \mathcal{R},$ $U_B, U_A, X_A)$, or $(\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B, X_A, X_B)$, and obtains the response.
- SessionKeyReveal(sid): if the session sid is completed, $\mathcal{A}$ obtains the session key SK for sid.
- SessionStateReveal(sid): The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ obtains the session state of the owner of sid if the session is not completed. The session state includes all ephemeral secret keys and intermediate computation results except for immediately erased information, but does not include the static secret key.
- Corrupt(U_i): By this query, $\mathcal{A}$ learns all information of U_A (including the static secret, session states and session keys stored at U_A). In addition, from the moment that U_A is corrupted, all its actions may be controlled by $\mathcal{A}$.

Freshness. Let $\mathsf{sid}^* = (\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B, X_A, X_B)$ or $(\Pi, \mathcal{I}, U_A, U_B, X_A, X_B)$ be a completed session between honest users U_A and U_B. If the matching session of sid^* exists, denote it by $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$. We say session sid^* is fresh if $\mathcal{A}$ does not query: 1) SessionStateReveal(sid^*), SessionKeyReveal(sid^*), and SessionStateReveal($\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$), SessionKeyReveal($\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$) if $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ exists; 2) SessionStateReveal(sid^*) and SessionKeyReveal(sid^*) if $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ does not exist.

Security Experiment. The adversary $\mathcal{A}$ could make a sequence of the queries described above. This query can be issued at any stage to a completed, fresh and unexpired session sid. A bit b is picked randomly. If $b = 1$, the oracle generates a random value in the key space; if $b = 0$, it reveals the session key. The adversary can continue to issue queries except that it cannot expose the test session. The adversary wins the game if the session is fresh and the guess of the adversary is correct, i.e., $b' = b$. The advantage of the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is defined as $\mathsf{Adv}_{\Pi}^{\mathrm{CK}^+}(\mathcal{A}) = \Pr\left[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}\right] - \frac{1}{2}$.

Definition 5. *We say that a AKE protocol Π is secure in the CK^+ model if the following conditions hold:*
__Correctness__: If two honest parties complete matching sessions, then they both compute the same session key except with negligible probability.
__Soundness__: For any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, $\mathsf{Adv}_{\Pi}^{\mathrm{CK}^+}(\mathcal{A})$ is negligible for the test session sid^*,

1. *the static secret key of the owner of sid^* is given to $\mathcal{A}$, if $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ does not exist.*
2. *the ephemeral secret key of the owner of sid^* is given to $\mathcal{A}$, if $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ does not exist.*
3. *the static secret key of the owner of sid^* and the ephemeral secret key of $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ are given to $\mathcal{A}$, if $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ exists.*
4. *the ephemeral secret key of sid^* and the ephemeral secret key of $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ are given to $\mathcal{A}$, if $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ exists.*
5. *the static secret key of the owner of sid^* and the static secret key of the peer of sid^* are given to $\mathcal{A}$, if $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ exists.*
6. *the ephemeral secret key of sid^* and the static secret key of the peer of sid^* are given to $\mathcal{A}$, if $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ exists.*

As indicated in Table 6, the CK$^+$ model captures all non-trivial patterns of exposure of static and ephemeral secret keys listed in Definition 5, and these ten cases cover wPFS, resistance to KCI, and MEX as follows: E_1, E_4, $E_{7\text{-}1}$, $E_{7\text{-}2}$, $E_{8\text{-}1}$ and $E_{8\text{-}2}$ capture KCI, since the adversary obtains either only the static secret key of one party or both the static secret key of one party and the ephemeral secret key of the other party of the test session. E_5 captures wPFS. E_2, E_3 and E_6 capture MEX, since the adversary obtains the ephemeral secret key of one party of the test session at least.

Event	Case	sid^*	$\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$	sk_A	ek_A	ek_B	sk_B	Security
E_1	1	A	No	$\checkmark$	$\times$	-	$\times$	KCI
E_2	2	A	No	$\times$	$\checkmark$	-	$\times$	MEX
E_3	2	B	No	$\times$	-	$\checkmark$	$\times$	MEX
E_4	1	B	No	$\times$	-	$\times$	$\checkmark$	KCI
E_5	4	A or B	Yes	$\checkmark$	$\times$	$\times$	$\checkmark$	wPFS
E_6	5	A or B	Yes	$\times$	$\checkmark$	$\checkmark$	$\times$	MEX
$E_{7\text{-}1}$	3	A	Yes	$\checkmark$	$\times$	$\checkmark$	$\times$	KCI
$E_{7\text{-}2}$	3	B	Yes	$\times$	$\checkmark$	$\times$	$\checkmark$	KCI
$E_{8\text{-}1}$	6	A	Yes	$\times$	$\checkmark$	$\times$	$\checkmark$	KCI
$E_{8\text{-}2}$	6	B	Yes	$\checkmark$	$\times$	$\checkmark$	$\times$	KCI

Table 6. The behavior of AKE adversary in CK$^+$ model. $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ is the matching session of sid^*, if it exists. "Yes" means that there exists $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ and "No" means not. sk_A (sk_B) means the static secret key of A (B). ek_A (ek_B) is the ephemeral secret key of A (B) in sid^* or $\overline{\mathsf{sid}}^*$ if there exists. "$\checkmark$" means the secret key may be revealed to adversary, "$\times$" means the secret key is not revealed. "-" means the secret key does not exist.

Appendix B, Proof of Theorem 3

Let $\mathcal{A}$ be any algorithm solving the 1-Oracle SI-DH problem. We construct an algorithms $\mathcal{B}$ to solve the 1-Gap SI-DH problem using $\mathcal{A}$ as a sub-routine in Figure 9. The challenge is how to maintain the hash list so as to keep the consistency with the one-time Oracle H_B. Actually, the limited oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{siddh}}(\cdot, \cdot)$ would help $\mathcal{B}$ to fix it.

Note that in Figure 9, if $H_B(\mathfrak{y})$ is asked at first and returns a random h, then when $(\mathfrak{y}, j')$ is queried to H such that $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{siddh}}(\mathfrak{y}, j') = 1$, it will return h. If $H(\mathfrak{y}, j')$ is asked at first and returns a random h, then when $\mathfrak{y}$ is asked to H_B such that $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{siddh}}(\mathfrak{y}, j') = 1$, it will return that h.

Let Ask be the event that $(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}}, (\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}})^{\mathfrak{b}})$ is queried to H and $\overline{\mathsf{Ask}}$ be the complement of Ask. If Ask does not happen, there is no way to tell whether h_b is equal

Algorithm $\mathcal{B}^{\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{siddh}}(\cdot,\cdot)}(\mathfrak{e},\mathfrak{g},\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}},\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}})$	
01 $h_0, h_1 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$	One time $H_B(\mathfrak{y})$
02 $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$	01 Choose $\mathfrak{y}$ as the base of $\mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{siddh}}$
03 Run $\mathcal{A}^{H_B(\cdot),H}(\mathfrak{g},\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}},\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{b}},h_b)$	02 if $\exists (\mathfrak{y},j',h') \in L_H \wedge \mathcal{O}_{\mathsf{siddh}}(\mathfrak{y},j')=1$
04 a. For one-time query H_B	03 return h'
05 do as one-time H_B	04 else $h'' \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$, $L_H = L_H \cup \{\mathfrak{y},j',h''\}$
06 b. For the H-query	05 return h''
07 do as $H(\mathfrak{x},j')$	$H(\mathfrak{x},j')$
08 c. Let b' be the output of $\mathcal{A}$	01 if $\exists (\mathfrak{x},j',h') \in L_H$ return h'
09 return $(\cdot,j,\cdot) \leftarrow L_H$	02 otherwise $h \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n$, $L_H = L_H \cup \{(\mathfrak{x},j',h)\}$
10 return j	03 return h

Fig. 9. Algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ for attacking the 1-Gap SI-DH problem.

to $H(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}},(\mathfrak{g}^{\mathfrak{a}})^{\mathfrak{b}})$ or not. Thus we have that

$$
\begin{aligned}
\mathbf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A},H}^{\mathsf{1osidh}} &= \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{H_B(\cdot)}(\mathfrak{b} \leftarrow D_b) = b] - 1/2 \\
&= \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{H_B(\cdot)}(\mathfrak{b} \leftarrow D_b) = b \wedge \mathsf{Ask}] + \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{H_B(\cdot)}(\mathfrak{b} \leftarrow D_b) = b \wedge \overline{\mathsf{Ask}}] - 1/2 \\
&= \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{H_B(\cdot)}(\mathfrak{b} \leftarrow D_b) = b \wedge \mathsf{Ask}] \\
&\leq \Pr[\mathsf{Ask}] \\
&\leq q_H \mathrm{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{1gsidh}.
\end{aligned}
$$