

Universal Proxy Re-Encryption

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Abstract

We put forward the notion of universal proxy re-encryption (UPRE). A UPRE scheme enables a proxy to convert a ciphertext under a (delegator) public key of *any existing public-key encryption (PKE) scheme* into another ciphertext under a (delegatee) public key of *any existing PKE scheme (possibly different from the delegator one)*. The proxy has a re-encryption key generated from the delegator's secret key and the delegatee public key. Thus UPRE generalizes proxy re-encryption by supporting arbitrary PKE schemes and allowing to convert ciphertexts into ones of *possibly different PKE schemes*. In this work, we

- provide syntax and definitions for both UPRE and a variant we call relaxed UPRE. The relaxed variant means that decryption algorithms for re-encrypted ciphertexts are slightly modified but still only use the original delegatee secret keys for decryption.
- construct a UPRE based on probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscation (PIO). It allows us to re-encrypt ciphertexts polynomially many times.
- construct relaxed UPRE from garbled circuits (GCs). We provide two variants of this construction, one which allows us to re-encrypt ciphertexts polynomially many times, and a second one which satisfies a stronger security requirement but only allows us to re-encrypt ciphertexts a constant number of times.

Keywords: universal proxy re-encryption, public-key encryption, secret sharing.

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

Constructing cryptographic systems from scratch is a challenging task. When migrating from a legacy cryptosystem to a new one with better security and functionality, it would be desirable to reuse existing public key infrastructures (PKI) to reduce the cost of migration. In this work, we explore a *universal* methodology to construct a new and easily deployable cryptographic system from existing cryptographic systems and PKI.

As a particular example of cryptographic systems, we consider proxy re-encryption (PRE) [BBS98]. PRE allows to convert a ciphertext under public key pk_f (we call delegator public key and f denotes “from”) into another ciphertext under public key pk_t (we call delegatee public key and t denotes “to”) by using a re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ without decrypting the original ciphertext by sk_f (we call delegator secret key). A third party, called proxy, owns the re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ and executes the re-encryption procedure. PRE thus enables delegation of re-encryption and several useful applications. It can be used to achieve encrypted email forwarding [BBS98, Jak99], key escrow [ID03], encrypted file storage [AFGH05], secure publish-subscribe operation [PRSV17], and secure payment systems for credit cards [GSL19].

However, all known PRE schemes only support conversions from ciphertexts under a public key generated by *their key generation algorithm* into other ones under another key generated by *the same key generation algorithm with the same parameter*. They *cannot* convert ciphertexts into ones under another key generated by *another key generation algorithm of another encryption scheme*. Moreover, almost all known PRE schemes were constructed from scratch by using specific cryptographic assumptions such as the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and the learning with errors (LWE) assumption. The formats of their keys and ciphertexts are fixed in advance at the setup and can never be changed. Only a few PRE schemes use public-key encryption (PKE) schemes generically [HKK⁺12]. However, in such schemes, we cannot use a PKE scheme as it is (some additional conversion is needed). Moreover, only delegatees (receivers of converted ciphertexts) can select any PKE scheme and delegators (senders of original ciphertexts) cannot. From a practical point of view, this is unsatisfactory as we need to build a new system using a PRE scheme from scratch if we want to use applications of PRE described above. When we use a PRE scheme, we cannot use existing and widely used public-key cryptosystems to achieve the applications of PRE. Ideally, we would like to achieve a re-encryption mechanism that works for any pair of PKE schemes without any modification and setup.

Universal Proxy Re-Encryption. To resolve the problems above, we put forward the concept of *universal proxy re-encryption (UPRE)*. UPRE enables us to convert ciphertexts under a public key of a scheme Σ_f (delegator scheme) into ciphertexts under another public key of *another scheme* Σ_t (delegatee scheme). *We can select arbitrary secure PKE schemes for Σ_f, Σ_t* . For example, we can use Goldwasser-Micali PKE [GM84] as Σ_f and ElGamal PKE [EIG85] as Σ_t . If a delegator and delegatee have key pairs (pk_f, sk_f) and (pk_t, sk_t) of schemes Σ_f and Σ_t , respectively, then a re-encryption key generation algorithm of UPRE can output a re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ from $(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, sk_f, pk_t)$. A proxy can generate a re-encrypted ciphertext rct from $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ and $Enc_f(pk_f, m)$ where Enc_f is the encryption algorithm of Σ_f . Of course, the re-encrypted ciphertext rct can be correctly decrypted to m by using sk_t .

Ideally, a re-encrypted ciphertext should be decrypted by the original decryption algorithm of the delegatee scheme (i.e., $Dec_t(sk_t, \cdot)$). However, we can also consider a relaxed variant where a re-encrypted ciphertext can be decrypted via a slightly modified decryption algorithm *with the original delegatee decryption key* sk_t . We call this variant *relaxed UPRE*. Here, we emphasize that the delegator uses only pk_f and Enc_f to encrypt a message and the delegatee uses only sk_t to decrypt a re-encrypted ciphertext (they do not need any additional keys) even if its decryption procedure is slightly modified. Our work is the first to explore such a universal methodology for proxy re-encryption.

UPRE enables us to build a re-encryption mechanism dynamically by using currently deployed cryptosystems. Users who have already used PKE schemes can convert ciphertexts into other ones by using a UPRE scheme. They do not need to setup a proxy re-encryption system from scratch. Therefore, UPRE offers more flexibility than standard PRE. In addition, UPRE has applications that PRE does not have, e.g. the following. UPRE enables us to delegate migration of encryption systems to a third party such as cloud-servers with many computational resources when an encryption scheme with some parameter settings becomes obsolete, or vulnerability is found in an encryption system. That is, we can outsource renewing encrypted storage to a third party.

UPRE can be seen as a generalized notion of PRE. Therefore, we can consider several analogies of the notions used in PRE. They are the notions of “direction” and “the number of hops”. For directions, there are unidirectional

and bidirectional, which means that a re-encryption key between pk_f and pk_t can be used for only one-way from f to t and both ways, respectively. For the number of hops, there are single-hop and multi-hop, which mean a re-encrypted ciphertext cannot be converted anymore and can be converted polynomially-many times, respectively. In particular, when only a constant number of conversions is possible, we call it constant-hop. We consider unidirectional single/constant/multi-hop but do not focus on bidirectional since the functionality of a bidirectional re-encryption key is simulated by two unidirectional re-encryption keys.

The main question addressed in this work is how to achieve UPRE. Regarding feasibility, it seems plausible that UPRE can be achieved from indistinguishability obfuscation (IO) [BGI⁺12, GGH⁺16] or multilinear maps [GGH13, CLT13, GGH15].¹ And in fact, we present a construction based on IO as an initial step, though we emphasize that formally proving security is not a trivial task even if we use IO. Consequently, the main focus of this work is concerned with the following question.

Is it possible to achieve a UPRE scheme without IO and multilinear maps?

We give a positive answer to this question.

1.2 Our Contributions

The main contributions of this study are the following.

1. We introduce the notion of UPRE and formally define its security.
2. We present a general construction of multi-hop UPRE for some class of PKE by using probabilistic IO (PIO).
3. We present a general construction of multi-hop relaxed UPRE for any PKE by using only garbled circuits (GC) and therefore need no additional assumptions.
4. By using our general constructions and known instantiations of tools above, we can obtain multi-hop (relaxed) UPRE schemes from IO, or generic standard assumptions.

The third contribution is notable since we introduce a new design idea and use only weak assumptions. We explain more details (tools, security levels, and so on) of these contributions below.

For UPRE, we can consider a natural analog of security against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA) for PRE (PRE-CPA), where adversaries execute CPA attacks with oracles that give re-encryption keys and re-encrypted ciphertexts. However, we do not focus on the definition of CPA-security for UPRE (UPRE-CPA) because Cohen introduced a better security notion called security against honest re-encryption attacks (HRA) for PRE [Coh19]². Thus, we define security against honest re-encryption attacks for UPRE (UPRE-HRA), which implies UPRE-CPA, instead of CPA-security. We also define security against corrupted-delegator re-encryption attacks (CRA) to consider the setting of migration of encryption system explained in Section 1.1. That is, even if a delegator is corrupted, once a ciphertext is re-encrypted for an honest delegatee, then the delegator cannot obtain information about a plaintext from the re-encrypted ciphertext.^{3,4} See Section 3 for details.

We present three general constructions of UPRE. One is UPRE for some class of PKE based on PIO. PIO was introduced by Canetti, Lin, Tessaro, and Vaikuntanathan [CLTV15]. Another is relaxed UPRE for any PKE based on GC. The other is constant-hop and CRA-secure relaxed UPRE for any PKE based on GC. We emphasize that our relaxed UPRE is based on *generic* standard assumptions without relying on heavy tools. We look closer at what kind of (relaxed) UPRE is achieved below.

Our UPRE scheme based on PIO is a unidirectional multi-hop UPRE scheme. The required properties for PKE schemes depend on the security level of PIO. If we assume additional properties on PKE, then we can achieve UPRE from sub-exponentially secure IO (sub-exp IO) and sub-exponentially secure OWF (sub-exp OWF). Most well-known CPA-secure PKE schemes such as ElGamal, Goldwasser-Micali PKE schemes satisfy the additional properties (See Section 4.1 for details). However, if we use any PKE, we need PIO with the strongest security for specific circuits (refer to [CLTV15]). If we use the exponential DDH assumption, we can achieve UPRE from any PKE and polynomially secure IO. The advantage of the scheme based on PIO is that it is a multi-hop UPRE scheme and conceptually simple. See Section 4 for more details.

¹A.k.a. “heavy hammers”.

²Derler, Krenn, Lörünser, Ramacher, Slamanig, and Striecks also proposed a similar security notion in the forward secret setting as (fs)-RIND-CPA [DKL⁺18].

³Note that the corrupted delegator does not have a ciphertext to be re-encrypted here.

⁴Davidson, Deo, Lee, and Martin [DDL19] independently introduced a stronger notion called strong post-compromised security in the *standard PRE setting*. Note that our work appeared before their publication. Our work appeared on September 7th in 2018 while their work [DDL19] did on April 5th in 2019. (See the submission dates on Cryptology ePrint Archive.)

Our relaxed UPRE scheme based on garbled circuits (GC) is a unidirectional multi-hop *relaxed* UPRE scheme for any PKE scheme. This is a significant contribution since GC is a light cryptographic tool. This relaxed UPRE scheme satisfies HRA-security. However, some meta information (all garbled circuits from the first delegator to the last delegatee) is directly preserved in all re-encrypted ciphertexts. Therefore, the number of hops cannot be hidden in the scheme based on GC. In particular, when a delegator is corrupted, we do not know how to prove that a re-encrypted ciphertext does not reveal information about the plaintext.

Our last UPRE scheme is a unidirectional constant-hop relaxed UPRE scheme for any PKE scheme based on GC. This scheme satisfies CRA-security unlike the multi-hop scheme above, but it can re-encrypt only constant times since its re-encryption procedure incurs polynomial blow-up.

In the GC-based schemes, we must use a slightly modified decryption algorithm (i.e., we achieve relaxed UPRE) though we can use the original delegatee decryption key as it is. While this is a small disadvantage of the GC-based constructions, we would like to emphasize that these are the first constructions of relaxed UPRE, achieved by the standard assumptions.

1.3 Technical Overview

In this section, we give a high-level overview of our UPRE schemes and techniques. To achieve the re-encryption mechanism, we use a circuit with a hard-wired secret key of a delegator PKE scheme to generate a re-encryption key. This is because UPRE supports *general PKE schemes* and we need to decrypt ciphertexts once to re-encrypt them. However, such a circuit should not be directly revealed to a proxy to guarantee security. Therefore, we must hide information about the secret-key in a re-encryption key. That is, to use CPA security of the delegator PKE scheme, we must erase information about the secret key embedded in a re-encryption key in security proofs. This is the most notable issue to prove the security of UPRE. When we succeed in erasing secret keys from re-encryption keys in our reductions, we can directly use the CPA-security of delegators to prove the security of a UPRE scheme.

Based on IO IO is a promising tool to hide information about delegator secret keys since IO is a kind of compiler that outputs a functionally equivalent program that does not reveal information about the original program. We define a re-encryption circuit C_{re} , in which a delegator secret key sk_f and a delegatee public key pk_t are hard-wired in and which takes a delegator ciphertext ct_f as an input. The re-encryption circuit decrypts ct_f by using sk_f , obtains a plaintext m , and generates a ciphertext of m under pk_t . We can hide information about sk_f by using PIO (note that C_{re} is a randomized circuit). That is, a re-encryption key from delegator f to delegatee t is $piO(C_{re})$ where piO is a PIO algorithm. A re-encrypted ciphertext is a fresh ciphertext under pk_t . Thus, we can achieve multi-hop UPRE. This construction is similar to the FHE scheme based on PIO presented by Canetti et al. [CLTV15]. However, we cannot directly use the result by Canetti et al. since the setting of unidirectional multi-hop UPRE is different from that of FHE.

The security proof proceeds as follows. To erase sk_f , we use a dummy re-encryption circuit that does not run the decryption algorithm of Σ_f with sk_f and just outputs a dummy ciphertext under pk_t (does not need plaintext m). We expect that adversaries cannot distinguish this change. This intuition is not false. However, to formally prove it, we cannot directly use the standard CPA-security of PKE since an obfuscated circuit of the re-encryption circuit generates ciphertexts under *hard-wired* pk_t . It means that we cannot use a target ciphertext of the CPA-security game and the common “punctured programming” approach unless the scheme has a kind of “puncturable” property for its secret key [CHN⁺18]. Therefore, we use trapdoor encryption introduced by Canetti et al. [CLTV15].

In trapdoor encryption, there are two modes for key generation. One is the standard key generation, and the other one is the trapdoor key generation, which does not output a secret key for decryption. The two modes are computationally indistinguishable. Ciphertexts under a trapdoor key are computationally/statistically/perfectly indistinguishable (See Section 4.1 for more details). Thus, we proceed as follows. First, we change the hard-wired public key pk_t into a trapdoor key tk_t . Second, we use the security of PIO. The indistinguishability under tk_t is used to satisfy the condition of PIO.

We can consider the relationships among keys as a directed acyclic graph (DAG). Each vertex is a user who has a key pair, and each edge means that a re-encryption key was generated between two vertices. To prove ciphertext indistinguishability under a target public-key, we repeat the two processes above from the farthest vertex connected to the target vertex to the target vertex. We gradually erase information about secret keys of vertices connected to the target vertex. At the final step, information about the target secret key is also deleted, and we can use security under the target public-key of the delegator’s PKE scheme.

Types of indistinguishability under trapdoor keys affect what kind of PIO can be used. The weakest

indistinguishability under a trapdoor key, which is equivalent to the standard IND-CPA security, requires stronger security of PIO. If we use perfect indistinguishability under a trapdoor key, which is achieved by re-randomizable PKE schemes such as ElGamal PKE scheme, then we can use weaker PIO for circuits that are implied by sub-exp IO for circuits and sub-exp OWF. Finally, we can use doubly-probabilistic IO introduced by Agrikola, Couteau, and Hofheinz [ACH20] instead of PIO to achieve UPRE for IND-CPA PKE. Agrikola et al. prove that we can achieve doubly-probabilistic IO by using polynomially secure IO and the exponential DDH assumption.

Based on GC The most challenging task in this work is achieving a relaxed UPRE scheme without obfuscation. Surprisingly, we can achieve a relaxed UPRE scheme for any CPA-secure PKE scheme by using GC in combination with a secret sharing scheme. The idea is that a proxy and a delegatee are different entities and can separately use shares of a decryption key. We generate *shares of a decryption key*, and use a garbled circuit where one of the shares is hardwired to hide information about the decryption key.

Our re-encryption mechanism proceeds in the following two steps. First, we generate shares (s_1, s_2) of a delegator secret key sk_f by a secret sharing scheme. We encrypt share s_1 by using pk_t and obtain $\tilde{ct}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk_t, s_1)$. A re-encryption key from f to t is $rk_{f \rightarrow t} := (s_2, \tilde{ct}_t)$. Roughly speaking, s_1 is hidden by the CPA-security of PKE, and s_2 does not reveal information about sk_f by the privacy property of secret sharing. We define a circuit C_{de}^{re} where s_2 and the delegator ciphertext ct_f are hard-wired. The circuit C_{de}^{re} takes as input s_1 , reconstructs sk_f from (s_1, s_2) , and computes $\text{Dec}_f(sk_f, ct_f)$. Now, we garble $C_{de}^{re}[s_2, ct_f]$ and obtain a garbled circuit \widetilde{C}_{de}^{re} and labels $\{\text{labels}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [|s_1|], b \in \{0,1\}}$. We set a re-encrypted ciphertext to $rct := (\tilde{ct}_t, \widetilde{C}_{de}^{re}, \{\text{labels}_{i,b}\})$ (we omit $\{i \in [|s_1|], b \in \{0,1\}\}$ if it is clear from the context). The delegatee t can evaluate the garbled circuit and obtain decrypted value since the delegatee can obtain s_1 from \tilde{ct}_t . However, this apparently does not work since sending $\{\text{labels}_{i,b}\}$ breaks the security of GC and sk_f is revealed.

Before we move to the second step, we introduce the notion of weak batch encryption, which is a non-succinct variant of batch encryption [BLSV18] and easily constructed from standard CPA-secure PKE. A batch key pair (\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) is generated from a choice string $s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$. We can encrypt a pair of vector messages $(\{m_{i,0}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}, \{m_{i,1}\}_{i \in [\lambda]})$ by using \hat{pk} . We can obtain $\{m_{i,s[i]}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ from a batch ciphertext and \hat{sk} . A batch public-key \hat{pk} does not reveal any information about s . Adversaries cannot obtain any information about $\{m_{i,1-s[i]}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ from a batch ciphertext even if \hat{sk} is given. By using 2λ pairs of a public-key and secret-key of PKE, we can achieve weak batch encryption (we select a key pair based on each bit of s). Note that we can recycle \hat{pk} for many vectors of messages. See Section 5.1 for details.

Now, we move to the second step. To send only $\{\text{labels}_{i,s_1[i]}\}_{i \in |s_1|}$ to the delegatee t , we use weak batch encryption. That is, we let s_1 be choice bits of a batch key pair and $\{\text{labels}_{i,b}\}$ be messages of batch encryption. To achieve a re-encryption mechanism with this idea, at the re-encryption key generation phase, we generate a batch key pair $(\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(s_1)$. Moreover, we encrypt the batch secret-key \hat{sk} under pk_t . That is, we set $rk_{f \rightarrow t} := (\hat{pk}, s_2, \text{Enc}(pk_t, \hat{sk}))$. At the re-encryption phase, we generate not only the garbled circuit \widetilde{C}_{de}^{re} of $C_{de}^{re}[s_2, ct_f]$ and $\{\text{labels}_{i,b}\}_{i,b}$ but also the batch ciphertext $\hat{ct} \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, (\{\text{labels}_{i,0}\}_i, \{\text{labels}_{i,1}\}_i))$. That is, a re-encrypted ciphertext is $rct := (\tilde{ct}_t, \hat{ct}, \widetilde{C}_{de}^{re})$, where $\tilde{ct}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk_t, \hat{sk})$.

The delegatee t can obtain the plaintext m as follows. It obtains $\hat{sk} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_t(sk_t, \tilde{ct}_t)$ by its secret key sk_t , recover selected messages $\{\text{labels}_{i,s_1[i]}\}_i \leftarrow \text{BatchDec}(\hat{sk}, \hat{ct})$, and $m' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\widetilde{C}_{de}^{re}, \{\text{labels}_{i,s_1[i]}\}_i)$. By the functionality of GC, it holds that $m' = C_{de}^{re}[s_2, ct_f](s_1) = m$. Thus, this construction works as relaxed UPRE for any PKE scheme if there exists GC.

Intuitively, the re-encryption key $rk_{f \rightarrow t}$ does not reveal information about sk_f since the CPA-security of PKE and the receiver privacy of weak batch encryption hides information about s_1 . Adversaries cannot obtain any information about sk_f from the other share s_2 by the privacy property of the secret sharing scheme. That is, we can erase information about sk_f and can use the CPA-security of pk_f . Here, the choice s_1 is fixed at the re-encryption key generation phase and recycled in many re-encryption phases. However, this is not an issue since the security of weak batch encryption holds for many batch ciphertexts under the same batch key pair.

We explain only the single-hop case. However, we can easily extend the idea above to a multi-hop construction. See Section 5 for the detail.

In the construction above, a delegator might obtain information about the plaintext since the re-encrypted ciphertext includes ct_f in the garbled circuit and the delegator has sk_f . We have no way to prove that the construction above satisfies CRA-security. This is a problem when we use a relaxed UPRE scheme for migration of encryption systems explained in Section 1.1. However, we can easily solve this problem by encrypting a garbled circuit under

the delegatee’s public key since we can hide ct_f by using the security of the delegatee’s PKE scheme. Yet, this extension incurs polynomial blow-up of ciphertext size. Thus, we can apply the re-encryption procedure only constant times.

Summary of Our Results. We give a summary of our concrete instantiations in Table 1.

Table 1: Summary of our UPRE schemes. In “Type” column, rUPRE means relaxed UPRE. In “#Hop” column, const/multi means constant/multi-hop, respectively. In “Security” column, HRA and CRA means security against honest-re-encryption/corrupted-delegator-re-encryption attacks, respectively. In “Supported PKE” column, 0-hiding trapdoor means trapdoor encryption that satisfies 0-hiding security (see Section 4.1).

Instantiation	Type	#Hop	Security	Supported PKE	Assumptions
Ours in Sec. 4 + [CLTV15]	UPRE	multi	HRA & CRA	0-hiding trapdoor	sub-exp IO and OWF
Ours in Sec. 4 + [CLTV15]	UPRE	multi	HRA & CRA	any IND-CPA	di-PIO and OWF
Ours in Sec. 4 + [ACH20]	UPRE	multi	HRA & CRA	any IND-CPA	IO and exponential DDH
Ours in Sec. 5	rUPRE	multi	HRA	any IND-CPA	PKE
Ours in Sec. 6	rUPRE	const	HRA & CRA	any IND-CPA	PKE

1.4 Related Work

Encryption switching protocol (ESP), which was introduced by Couteau, Peters, and Pointcheval [CPP16], is a related notion. It is an interactive two-party computation that enables us to transform a ciphertext of a PKE scheme into a ciphertext of another PKE scheme and vice versa. It has a similar functionality to that of UPRE. However, they are incomparable in the following sense. In an ESP, parties must interactively communicate each other though there does not exist a proxy (and no re-encryption key). UPRE does not need interactive communication. Moreover, the proposed ESPs are not universal, that is, the protocols work only for specific PKE schemes. Thus, the purpose of ESPs is different from that of UPRE and they are incomparable.

There is a universal methodology to construct a new cryptographic system from existing *signature* schemes. Hohenberger, Koppula, and Waters introduce the notion of universal signature aggregator (USA) [HKW15], which enables us to aggregate signatures under different secret keys of *different* signature schemes. Standard aggregate signatures enable us to compress multiple signatures under different secret keys of *the same* scheme into one compact signature that is verified by a set of multiple verification keys [BGLS03]. Thus, USA is a generalization of aggregate signatures. Koppula et al. [HKW15] constructed selectively (resp. adaptively) secure USA scheme from sub-exp IO, sub-exp OWF, and additive homomorphic encryption (resp. IO, OWF, homomorphic encryption, and universal samplers) in the standard (resp. random oracle) model.

Reconfigurable cryptography was introduced by Hesse, Hofheinz, and Rupp [HHR16]. It makes updating PKI easier by using long-term keys, short-term keys, and common reference strings. Reconfigurable encryption can update keys, but cannot update ciphertexts.

There is a long series of works on proxy re-encryption. After the introduction of proxy cryptography by Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [BBS98], improved constructions [ID03, AFGH05], CCA-secure constructions [CH07, LV08, HKK⁺12], key-private constructions [ABH09, ABPW13, NX15], obfuscation-based definition and constructions [HRsV11, CCV12, CCL⁺14] have been proposed. Note that this is not an exhaustive list.

Organization. The main body of this paper consists of the following parts. In Section 2, we provide preliminaries and basic definitions. In Section 3, we introduce the syntax and security definitions of UPRE. In Section 4, we present our UPRE scheme based on PIO and prove its security. In Section 5, we present our relaxed UPRE scheme based on GC, and prove its security. In Section 6, we present our CRA-secure relaxed UPRE scheme based on GC, and prove its security.

2 Preliminaries

We define some notations and introduce cryptographic primitives in this section.

2.1 Notations and Basic Concepts

In this paper, $x \leftarrow X$ denotes selecting an element from a finite set X uniformly at random, and $y \leftarrow A(x)$ denotes assigning to y the output of a probabilistic or deterministic algorithm A on an input x . When we explicitly show that A uses randomness r , we write $y \leftarrow A(x; r)$. For strings x and y , $x||y$ denotes the concatenation of x and y . Let $[\ell]$ denote the set of integers $\{1, \dots, \ell\}$, λ denote a security parameter, and $y := z$ denote that y is set, defined, or substituted by z . PPT stands for probabilistic polynomial time.

- A function $f : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is a negligible function if for any constant c , there exists $\lambda_0 \in \mathbb{N}$ such that for any $\lambda > \lambda_0$, $f(\lambda) < \lambda^{-c}$. We write $f(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$ to denote $f(\lambda)$ being a negligible function.
- If $\mathcal{X}^{(b)} = \{X_\lambda^{(b)}\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ are two ensembles of random variables indexed by $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, we say that $\mathcal{X}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ are computationally indistinguishable if for any PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\lambda)$, such that

$$\Delta := |\Pr[\mathcal{D}(X_\lambda^{(0)}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(X_\lambda^{(1)}) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We write $\mathcal{X}^{(0)} \stackrel{\epsilon}{\approx}_\delta \mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ and $\mathcal{X}^{(0)} \stackrel{\epsilon}{\approx} \mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ to denote that the advantage Δ is bounded by δ and δ is negligible, respectively and call the former δ -indistinguishability.

- The statistical distance between $\mathcal{X}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ over a countable set S is defined as $\Delta_S(\mathcal{X}^{(0)}, \mathcal{X}^{(1)}) := \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\alpha \in S} |\Pr[X_\lambda^{(0)} = \alpha] - \Pr[X_\lambda^{(1)} = \alpha]|$. We say that $\mathcal{X}^{(0)}$ and $\mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ are statistically indistinguishable (denoted by $\mathcal{X}^{(0)} \stackrel{s}{\approx} \mathcal{X}^{(1)}$) if $\Delta_S(\mathcal{X}^{(0)}, \mathcal{X}^{(1)}) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$. We also say that $\mathcal{X}^{(0)}$ is ϵ -close to $\mathcal{X}^{(1)}$ if $\Delta_S(\mathcal{X}^{(0)}, \mathcal{X}^{(1)}) = \epsilon$. If $\epsilon = 0$ (perfectly indistinguishable), we write $\mathcal{X}^{(0)} \stackrel{p}{\approx} \mathcal{X}^{(1)}$.

2.2 Basic Cryptographic Tools

Definition 2.1 (Public-key Encryption). Let \mathcal{M} be a message space. A PKE scheme for \mathcal{M} is a tuple of algorithms $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ where:

- $\text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ takes as input the security parameter and outputs a public key pk and secret key sk .
- $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$ takes as input pk and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and outputs a ciphertext ct .
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct})$ takes as input sk and ct , and outputs some $m' \in \mathcal{M}$, or \perp .

Correctness: For any $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $(\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$, we have that $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)) = m$.

CPA-security: We define the experiment $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{pke}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and challenger as follows.

1. The challenger runs $(\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$, and gives pk to \mathcal{A} .
2. The following process can be repeated polynomially many times.
 - \mathcal{A} sends two messages m_0^*, m_1^* as the challenge messages to the challenger.
 - The challenger generates ciphertext $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_b^*)$ and sends ct^* to \mathcal{A} .
3. At some point, \mathcal{A} outputs a guess b' for b . The experiment outputs b' .

We say PKE is CPA-secure if, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{pke}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{pke}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{pke}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Note that we can achieve the CPA-security above by using the standard CPA-security of PKE, where \mathcal{A} sends the challenge messages only once (with polynomial security loss) by using the standard hybrid argument.

Definition 2.2 (Pseudorandom functions). For sets \mathcal{D} and \mathcal{R} , let $\{F_K(\cdot) : \mathcal{D} \rightarrow \mathcal{R} \mid K \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda\}$ be a family of polynomially computable functions. We say that F is pseudorandom if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{F, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{prf}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{F_K(\cdot)}(1^\lambda) = 1 \mid K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\lambda] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{R(\cdot)}(1^\lambda) = 1 \mid R \leftarrow \mathcal{F}_U]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where \mathcal{F}_U is the set of all functions from \mathcal{D} to \mathcal{R} .

Theorem 2.3 ([GGM86]). *If one-way functions exist, then for all efficiently computable functions $n(\lambda)$ and $m(\lambda)$, there exists a pseudorandom function that maps $n(\lambda)$ bits to $m(\lambda)$ bits (i.e., $\mathcal{D} := \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)}$ and $\mathcal{R} := \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)}$).*

Definition 2.4 (Puncturable pseudorandom function). *For sets \mathcal{D} and \mathcal{R} , a puncturable pseudorandom function PPRF consists of a tuple of algorithms (F, Punc) that satisfies the following two conditions.*

Functionality preserving under puncturing: *For all polynomial size subset $\{x_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ of \mathcal{D} , and for all $x \in \mathcal{D} \setminus \{x_i\}_{i \in [k]}$, we have $\Pr[F_K(x) = F_{K^*}(x) : K \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda, K^* \leftarrow \text{Punc}(K, \{x_i\}_{i \in [k]})] = 1$.*

Pseudorandomness at punctured points: *For all polynomial size subset $\{x_i\}_{i \in [k]}$ of \mathcal{D} , and any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that*

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(K^*, \{F_K(x_i)\}_{i \in [k]}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(K^*, \mathcal{U}^k) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) ,$$

where $K \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$, $K^* \leftarrow \text{Punc}(K, \{x_i\}_{i \in [k]})$, and \mathcal{U} denotes the uniform distribution over \mathcal{R} .

Theorem 2.5 ([GGM86, BW13, BGI14, KPTZ13]). *If one-way functions exist, then for all efficiently computable functions $n(\lambda)$ and $m(\lambda)$, there exists a puncturable pseudorandom function that maps $n(\lambda)$ bits to $m(\lambda)$ bits (i.e., $\mathcal{D} := \{0,1\}^{n(\lambda)}$ and $\mathcal{R} := \{0,1\}^{m(\lambda)}$).*

Definition 2.6 (Garbling Scheme (Garbled Circuit)). *A garbling scheme GC is a two tuple $(\text{Grbl}, \text{Eval})$ of PPT algorithms.*

- The garbling algorithm Grbl, given a security parameter 1^λ and a circuit C with n -bit input, outputs a garbled circuit \tilde{C} , together with $2n$ labels $\{\text{labels}_{k,b}\}_{k \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}$.
- The evaluation algorithm Eval, given a garbled circuit \tilde{C} and n labels $\{\text{labels}_k\}_{k \in [n]}$, outputs y .

Correctness: *We require $\text{Eval}(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_{k,x_k}\}_{k \in [n]}) = C(x)$ for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, a circuit C with n -bit input, and $x \in \{0,1\}^n$, where $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_{k,b}\}_{k \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Grbl}(1^\lambda, C)$ and x_k is the k -th bit of x for every $k \in [n]$.*

Security: *Let Sim be a PPT algorithm. We define the following game $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{GC}}(1^\lambda, \beta)$ between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows.*

1. The challenger sends the security parameter 1^λ to \mathcal{A} .
2. \mathcal{A} sends a circuit C with n -bit input and an input $x \in \{0,1\}^n$ to the challenger.
 - If $\beta = 0$, then the challenger computes $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_{k,b}\}_{k \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}) \leftarrow \text{Grbl}(1^\lambda, C)$ and returns $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_{k,x_k}\}_{k \in [n]})$ to \mathcal{A} .
 - If $\beta = 1$, then it computes $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_k\}_{k \in [n]}) \leftarrow \text{Sim}(1^\lambda, 1^{|\mathcal{C}|}, C(x))$, and returns $(\tilde{C}, \{\text{labels}_k\}_{k \in [n]})$ to \mathcal{A} .
3. \mathcal{A} outputs $\beta' \in \{0,1\}$.

We say that a garbling scheme is selectively secure if there exists PPT Sim such that for any PPT \mathcal{A} , we have

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{GC}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{GC}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Definition 2.7 (Secret Sharing). *A t -out-of- n secret sharing scheme over message space \mathcal{M} is a pair of algorithms $(\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ where:*

- $\text{Share}(1^\lambda, m)$ takes as input the security parameter and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, and outputs an n -tuple of shares (s_1, \dots, s_n) .
- $\text{Reconstruct}(s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_t})$ takes as input t shares $(s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_t})$ where $i_k \in [n]$ and $k \in [t]$ outputs a message $m' \in \mathcal{M}$ or \perp .

Correctness: *For any $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $(i_1, \dots, i_t) \subseteq [n]$ of size t , we have that*

$$\Pr[\text{Reconstruct}(s_{i_1}, \dots, s_{i_t}) = m \mid (s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(m)] = 1.$$

Security: *For any $m, m' \in \mathcal{M}$, $S \subseteq [n]$ such that $|S| < t$, we have that*

$$\left\{ \{s_i\}_{i \in S} \mid (s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(m) \right\} \stackrel{\$}{\approx} \left\{ \{s'_i\}_{i \in S} \mid (s'_1, \dots, s'_n) \leftarrow \text{Share}(m') \right\}.$$

2.3 (Probabilistic) Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Definition 2.8 (Indistinguishability Obfuscator). A PPT algorithm $i\mathcal{O}$ is an IO for a circuit class $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ if it satisfies the following two conditions.

Functionality: For any security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, and input x , we have that

$$\Pr[C'(x) = C(x) \mid C' \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(C)] = 1 .$$

Indistinguishability: For any PPT distinguisher \mathcal{D} and for any pair of circuits $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ such that for any input x , $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$ and $|C_0| = |C_1|$, it holds that

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{D}(i\mathcal{O}(C_0)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D}(i\mathcal{O}(C_1)) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) .$$

We further say that $i\mathcal{O}$ is sub-exponentially secure if for any PPT \mathcal{D} the above advantage is smaller than $2^{-\lambda^\epsilon}$ for some $0 < \epsilon < 1$.

Next, we consider a family of sets of randomized polynomial-size circuits, $\mathcal{C} := \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$. A circuit sampler for \mathcal{C} is a distribution ensemble $\text{Samp} := \{\text{Samp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$, where the distribution of Samp_λ is (C_0, C_1, z) with $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ such that C_0 and C_1 take inputs of the same length, and $z \in \{0, 1\}^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$. A class \mathcal{S} of samplers for \mathcal{C} is a set of circuit samplers for \mathcal{C} .

Definition 2.9 (PIO for a Class of Samplers [CLTV15]). A PPT algorithm $pi\mathcal{O}$ is a probabilistic indistinguishability obfuscator for a class of samplers \mathcal{S} over the randomized circuit family $\mathcal{C} = \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ if it satisfies the following.

Alternative Correctness [DHRW16]: For any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, any $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, any $\hat{C} \leftarrow pi\mathcal{O}(C)$ and any individual input x , the distribution of $\hat{C}(x)$ and $C(x)$ are identical.

Security with respect to \mathcal{S} : We define the following experiments $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{pio}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and a distinguisher \mathcal{D} as follows.

1. The challenger samples $(C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}_\lambda$.
2. The challenger computes $\hat{C}_b \leftarrow pi\mathcal{O}(C_b)$ and sends $(1^\lambda, C_0, C_1, \hat{C}_b, z)$ to \mathcal{D} .
3. \mathcal{D} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

We say that $pi\mathcal{O}$ is secure PIO for \mathcal{S} if for any sampler $\text{Samp} = \{\text{Samp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \in \mathcal{S}$, and for any PPT \mathcal{D} , it holds that

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{pio}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{pio}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

As noted by Dodis et al. [DHRW16], the PIO construction by Canetti et al. [CLTV15] can be easily modified to satisfy the alternative correctness above, so we use it. Canetti et al. [CLTV15] introduced a few types of samplers. We review static-input X -indistinguishable and dynamic-input indistinguishable samplers.

Definition 2.10 (Static-input X -Indistinguishable-Samplers). Let $X(\lambda)$ be a function bounded by 2^λ . The class $\mathcal{S}^{X\text{-ind}}$ of static-input X -IND-samplers for a circuit family \mathcal{C} contains all circuit samplers $\text{Samp} = \{\text{Samp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ for \mathcal{C} satisfying the following. For any $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, there exists a set $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{X}_\lambda \subseteq \{0, 1\}^*$ of size at most $X(\lambda)$ such that the following two conditions hold.

X differing inputs: For any input $x' \notin \mathcal{X}$, for any random coin r , it holds that

$$\Pr[C_0(x'; r) = C_1(x'; r) \mid (C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}_\lambda] > 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

X -indistinguishability: For any PPT \mathcal{A} , $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda) \cdot X^{-1}$ holds, where $\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(\lambda)$ is defined as below.

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]|,$$

where experiments $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{si-ind}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} are as follows.

1. The adversary \mathcal{A} sends x to the challenger.

2. The challenger samples $(C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}_\lambda$.
3. The challenger computes $y \leftarrow C_b(x)$ and sends (C_0, C_1, z, y) to \mathcal{A} .
4. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

Definition 2.11 (X-IND PIO for Randomized Circuits). Let $X(\lambda)$ be any function bounded by 2^λ . A PPT algorithm piO ($X\text{-piO}$) is an X -PIO for randomized circuits if it is a PIO for the class of X -IND samplers $\mathcal{S}^{X\text{-ind}}$ over \mathcal{C} that includes all randomized circuits of size at most λ .

Theorem 2.12 ([CLTV15, DHRW16]). If there exists sub-exponentially secure IO for circuits and sub-exponentially secure puncturable PRF, then there exists an X -IND PIO with alternative correctness for randomized circuits.

Definition 2.13 (Dynamic-input Indistinguishable Sampler). We define the experiments $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{di-ind}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows.

1. The challenger samples $(C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}_\lambda$ and sends it to \mathcal{A} .
2. The adversary \mathcal{A} outputs x and sends it to the challenger.
3. The challenger computes $y \leftarrow C_b(x)$ and sends (C_0, C_1, z, y) to \mathcal{A} .
4. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

The class $\mathcal{S}^{\text{di-ind}}$ of dynamic-input indistinguishable sampler for a circuit family \mathcal{C} contains all circuit samplers $\text{Samp} = \{\text{Samp}_\lambda\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}$ for \mathcal{C} satisfies the following. If for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{di-ind}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{di-ind}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{Samp}}^{\text{di-ind}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Definition 2.14 (Dynamic-input PIO for Randomized Circuits). A PPT algorithm piO (di-piO) is a dynamic-input PIO for randomized circuits if it is a PIO for the class of dynamic-input indistinguishable samplers $\mathcal{S}^{\text{di-ind}}$ over \mathcal{C} that includes all randomized circuits of size at most λ .

Canetti et al. [CLTV15] wrote that a construction of dynamic-input PIO for *specific* classes of samplers is possible as in the case of differing-input obfuscation [BGI⁺12] for specific circuits.

3 Definition of Universal Proxy Re-Encryption

In this section, we present the definitions of universal proxy re-encryption (UPRE). In particular, we present the definition of UPRE for PKE and its security notions. A UPRE scheme enables us to convert ciphertexts of a PKE scheme Σ_f into ciphertexts of a (possibly) different PKE scheme Σ_t . A UPRE scheme does not need a setup for a system. That is, it can use existing PKE schemes with different parameters. UPRE can be seen as a generalization proxy re-encryption [BBS98]. Therefore, we borrow many terms of proxy re-encryption [AFGH05, CH07].

Notations. We consider multiple PKE schemes and key pairs, so we assume that every known PKE scheme is named by a number in $[N]$ (say, 1 is for Goldwasser-Micali PKE, 2 is for ElGamal PKE etc). We also put a number in $[U]$ for a generated key pair. When we write $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^\lambda)$, we mean that i -th key pair is generated by PKE scheme $\Sigma_{\sigma_i} = (\text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Dec}_{\sigma_i})$ where $\sigma_i \in [N]$. In this paper, when we emphasize which user is a delegator or delegatee, we denote delegator and delegatee key pairs by $(\text{pk}_f, \text{sk}_f)$ and $(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t)$, respectively (f and t mean “from” and “to”, respectively). That is, a ciphertext under pk_f will be converted into a ciphertext pk_t . We assume that in the description of Σ_{σ_i} , ciphertext space \mathcal{C}_{σ_i} and message space \mathcal{M}_{σ_i} are also included. When we use Σ_{σ_i} as an input for algorithms of UPRE, we interpret it as a description of algorithms (rather than Turing machines or circuits). Note that the length of such descriptions is polynomial since algorithms of PKE should be PPT.

3.1 Unidirectional UPRE

Definition 3.1 (Universal Proxy Re-Encryption for PKE: Syntax). A universal re-encryption scheme UPRE consists of two PPT algorithms $(\text{ReKeyGen}, \text{ReEnc})$.

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(1^\lambda, \Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$ takes the security parameter, a pair of PKE scheme $(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$, a secret-key sk_f of Σ_{σ_f} , and a public-key pk_t of Σ_{σ_t} and outputs a re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ for ciphertexts under pk_f . The security parameter is often omitted.
- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$ takes a pair of PKE schemes $(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$, a re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$, and a ciphertext ct_f under pk_f of Σ_{σ_f} , and outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext ct_t under pk_t .

Definition 3.2 (Relaxed Universal Proxy Re-Encryption for PKE: Syntax). A relaxed universal re-encryption scheme UPRE consists of two PPT and one deterministic polynomial-time algorithms $(\text{ReKeyGen}, \text{ReEnc}, \text{mDec})$.

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(1^\lambda, \Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$ is the same as in Definition 3.1.
- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$ takes a pair of PKE schemes $(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$, a re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$, and a ciphertext ct_f under pk_f of Σ_{σ_f} , and outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext rct . We implicitly assume that rct includes index ℓ which indicates how many times ReEnc was applied so far. When we write $\text{rct}^{(\ell)}$, it means that $\text{rct}^{(\ell)}$ was obtained by applying ReEnc ℓ times.
- $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_t, \text{rct}^{(\ell)}, \ell)$ is a deterministic algorithm and takes a PKE scheme Σ_{σ_t} , a secret key sk_t , a re-encrypted ciphertext $\text{rct}^{(\ell)}$ under $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$, and index ℓ and outputs a message m . When $\ell = 1$, we omit the index.

The difference between UPRE and relaxed UPRE is that we can use the decryption algorithm of Σ_{σ_t} as it is in UPRE. In relaxed UPRE, we need use a modified decryption algorithm though what we need for decryption is the original secret key sk_t . Note that re-encrypted ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}_{\sigma_f \rightarrow \sigma_t}$ potentially depends on \mathcal{C}_{σ_f} and \mathcal{C}_{σ_t} and possibly $\text{rct} \notin \mathcal{C}_{\sigma_t}$ happens.

Hereafter, we focus only on the relaxed notion since we can easily replace $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_t, \text{rct}^{(\ell)}, \ell)$ with $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_t, \text{ct}_t)$.

On Message Space. For simplicity, we consider messages in $\mathcal{M}_{\sigma_1} \cap \dots \cap \mathcal{M}_{\sigma_N}$ where N is the number of considered PKE scheme in security games (described later). We can consider $\{0, 1\}^\ell$ as a message space where ℓ is a polynomial of a security parameter and UPRE for such a message space by considering bit-by-bit encryption for all PKE scheme. However, this is cumbersome. Thus, hereafter, we consider messages in the intersection of all message spaces though we do not explicitly mention.

Bidirectional UPRE. We can consider bidirectional UPRE, where a re-encryption key generated from key pairs $(\text{pk}_f, \text{sk}_f)$ and $(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t)$ can convert ciphertexts under pk_f (resp. pk_t) into ciphertexts that can be decrypted by sk_t (resp. sk_f). Although unidirectional UPRE can support the functionality of bidirectional UPRE by generating two re-encryption keys $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ and $\text{rk}_{t \rightarrow f}$, it is not clear whether security is preserved. We focus on unidirectional UPRE in this study.

Functionality and Security. We introduce the correctness and a security notion of UPRE that we call security against *honest re-encryption attacks (HRA)* for UPRE. Correctness is easy to understand.

This HRA for UPRE is based on security against HRA of PRE introduced by Cohen [Coh19]. Roughly speaking, in the setting of HRA, adversaries are allowed to obtain an honestly encrypted ciphertext *via an honest encryption oracle* and can convert it into a re-encrypted ciphertext under a key of a *corrupted* user via a re-encryption oracle. In PRE-CPA security, adversaries cannot obtain such a re-encrypted ciphertext because it is *not allowed* to obtain a re-encryption key query *from an honest user to a corrupted user* via the re-encryption key oracle to prevent trivial attacks⁵. Cohen observes that PRE-CPA security is not sufficient for many applications of PRE. Therefore, we define HRA-security for UPRE (in fact, we also define a selective variant).

First, we consider *single-hop* UPRE, where if a ciphertext is converted into another ciphertext, then we cannot convert the re-encrypted one anymore.

Definition 3.3 (UPRE for PKE: Single-Hop Correctness). A relaxed UPRE scheme UPRE for PKE is correct if for all pairs of PKE schemes $(\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$, $(\text{pk}_f, \text{sk}_f) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_f}(1^{\lambda_f})$, $(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_t}(1^{\lambda_t})$, $m \in \mathcal{M}_{\sigma_f} \cap \mathcal{M}_{\sigma_t}$, $\text{ct}_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_f}(\text{pk}_f, m)$, it holds that

$$\Pr[\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \text{sk}_t, \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma', \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma', \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t), \text{ct}_f)) = m] = 1,$$

⁵Of course, a re-encryption query from an honest user to a corrupted user is also prohibited in PRE-CPA security.

where $\Sigma' := (\Sigma_{\sigma_f}, \Sigma_{\sigma_t})$. In the case of UPRE, $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_t}, \cdot, \cdot) = \text{Dec}_{\sigma_t}(\cdot, \cdot)$.

Before we present the definition of the HRA security for UPRE, we give an informal explanation about it. Readers who are familiar with PRE-HRA security [Coh19] may be able to skip explanations below and jump into the formal definition. Readers who are familiar with PRE-CPA security [ABH09, Coh19] may be able to skip explanations below except ‘‘Honest encryption and re-encryption query’’ part.

Challenge query: We consider a natural extension of the CPA security of PKE. The adversary selects a target public-key pk_{i^*} indexed by i^* and tries to distinguish whether a target ciphertext ct_{i^*} is an encryption of m_0 or m_1 that it selects. This will be modeled by the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} .

Key query: The adversary can be given public keys pk_i or key pairs $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ by specifying a user and a PKE scheme at the setup phase since we consider multiple keys and schemes. When a secret key is given, it means its owner is corrupted.

Re-encryption key query: The most notable feature is that the adversary is given re-encryption keys by the re-encryption key oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$. If the adversary specifies existing indices of keys, say (i, j) , then it is given a corresponding re-encryption key from i to j . Here, we must restrict queries for some indices to prevent trivial attacks. If j is a corrupted user and i is the target user (queried to \mathcal{O}_{cha}), then the adversary trivially wins the security game by converting the target ciphertext and decrypting with the corrupted key sk_j . Therefore, such queries must be prohibited.

Honest encryption and re-encryption query: If the adversary specifies keys and a ciphertext to the re-encryption oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$, then it is given a re-encrypted ciphertext generated from queried values. One might think this oracle is redundant since it is simulatable by $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$. However, there is a subtle issue here since a re-encryption key query with a corrupted delegatee is prohibited as explained above. As Cohen observed [Coh19] in the setting of PRE, simply prohibiting such a query is not sufficient and considering re-encryption queries is meaningful.

Re-encrypted ciphertexts may leak information about a delegator key pair and help to attack a delegator ciphertext. As Cohen observed [Coh19], if a re-encryption key is $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_f)$ and it is included in a re-encrypted ciphertext, then the delegatee easily breaks security. This is unsatisfactory when we consider applications of PRE and UPRE. However, in the setting of PRE, such a construction is secure under the standard CPA-security model since it prohibits queries (i, j) (resp. (i, j, ct_i)) to the re-encryption key generation (resp. re-encryption) oracle [Coh19]. Thus, we introduce the notion of derivative and the honest encryption oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} in UPRE as Cohen did.

We say that a (re-encrypted) ciphertext is a derivative if it is the target ciphertext generated by the challenge oracle or a re-encrypted ciphertext from the target ciphertext. This is managed by a set Drv . The honest encryption oracle allows the adversary to obtain a re-encrypted ciphertext under a corrupted key from honest encryption. The re-encryption oracle does not accept queries whose delegatee is a corrupted user j and ciphertext is a derivative to prevent trivial attacks. Moreover, the re-encryption oracle does not accept ciphertexts that are not generated via the honest encryption oracle.

Definition 3.4 (Derivative). We say that a (re-encrypted) ciphertext is a derivative when the (re-encrypted) ciphertext is a target ciphertext itself or obtained from a target ciphertext given by \mathcal{O}_{cha} by applying re-encryption.

Definition 3.5 (UPRE for PKE: Single-Hop selective HRA Security). We define the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a challenger. The experiment consists of three phases.

Phase 1 (Setup): This is the setup phase. All security parameters are chosen by the challenger.

- The challenger initializes $\#\text{Keys} := 0, \text{HList} := \emptyset, \text{CList} := \emptyset, \#\text{CT} := 0, \text{KeyCTList} := \emptyset, \text{Drv} := \emptyset$. Note that we assume that all indices are recorded with keys and corresponding schemes though we do not explicitly write for simplicity.
- For an honest key query (i, σ_i, λ_i) from \mathcal{A} , if the challenger already received $(i, *, *)$ before, it outputs \perp . Otherwise, the challenger generates uncorrupted keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$, sends $(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \text{pk}_i)$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\text{HList} := \text{HList} \cup i$ and $\#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + 1$. If $\lambda_i < \lambda$, then the challenger ignores the query.⁶
- For a corrupted key query (i, σ_i, λ_i) from \mathcal{A} , if the challenger already received $(i, *, *)$ before, it outputs \perp . Otherwise, the challenger generates corrupted keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$, sends $(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\text{CList} := \text{CList} \cup i$ and $\#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + 1$.

⁶If we prefer longer security parameters, then we can change the condition to $\lambda_i < c\lambda$ for some constant $c > 1$.

Let \mathcal{M}_{\perp} be the intersection of all message spaces defined by $\text{pk}_{i_1}, \dots, \text{pk}_{i_{\#\text{Keys}}}$. At the end of Phase 1, we assume that the list $((1, \sigma_1), \dots, (\#\text{Keys}, \sigma_{\#\text{Keys}}))$ is broadcasted and all entities know it.

Phase 2 (Oracle query): This is the oracle query phase.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(i, m)$: For an honest encryption query (i, m) where $i \leq \#\text{Keys}$, the challenger generates $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}(\text{pk}_i, m)$, sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, records $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_{\sigma_i}, i, \#\text{CT})$ in KeyCTList , and gives $(\text{ct}_i, \#\text{CT})$ to \mathcal{A} .

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}(i, j)$: For a re-encryption key query (i, j) where $i, j \leq \#\text{Keys}$, the challenger outputs \perp if $i = j$ or $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j \in \text{CList}$. Otherwise, the challenger generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j)$ and gives $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ to \mathcal{A} .

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}(i, j, k)$: For a re-encryption query (i, j, k) where $i, j \leq \#\text{Keys}$ and $k \leq \#\text{CT}$, the challenger does the following.

1. If $j \in \text{CList} \wedge k \in \text{Drv}$, then returns \perp .
2. If there is no value $(*, *, i, k)$ in KeyCTList , returns \perp .
3. Otherwise, retrieves $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ for (i, j) (if it does not exist, generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j)$ and stores it), generates $\text{rct} \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}, \text{ct}_i)$ from ct_i in KeyCTList , sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, records $(\text{rct}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, j, \#\text{CT})$ in KeyCTList , and gives $(\text{rct}, \#\text{CT})$ to \mathcal{A} .

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{cha}}(i^*, m_0, m_1)$: This oracle is invoked only once. For a challenge query (i^*, m_0, m_1) where $i^* \in \text{HList}$ and $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}_{\perp}$ (defined at the end of Phase 1), the challenger generates $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_{i^*}}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_b)$, gives it to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, $\text{Drv} := \text{Drv} \cup \{\#\text{CT}\}$, $\text{KeyCTList} := \text{KeyCTList} \cup \{(\text{ct}^*, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i^*}}, i^*, \#\text{CT})\}$.

Phase 3 (Decision) : This is the decision phase. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess b' for b . The experiment outputs b' .

We say the UPRE is single-hop UPRE-HRA secure if, for any $\sigma_i \in [N]$, for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-hra}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-hra}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Discussion on Definition 3.5. (1) On security parameter: We can simply set $\forall i \lambda_i := \lambda$. Some λ_j may be longer than other λ_i (say, $\lambda_j = \text{poly}(\lambda_i)$). (2) On adaptive corruption: The adversary is not allowed to adaptively corrupt users during the experiment. This is because, in general, it is difficult to achieve security against adaptive corruption. In particular, in our setting, $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ cannot decide whether it should return \perp or a valid re-encryption key if j may be corrupted later. This static security is standard in the PRE setting [AFGH05, CH07, LV08, ABH09]. One exception is the work by Fuchsbauer, Kamath, Klein, and Pietrzak [FKKP19]. The honest and corrupted key generation queries could be moved to the oracle query phase, but it does not incur a significant difference. Thus, we select a simpler model as most works on re-encryption did [AFGH05, LV08, ABH09, Coh19].

3.2 Unidirectional Multi-Hop UPRE

In this section, we introduce multi-hop UPRE, which is an extension of single-hop UPRE, where a re-encrypted ciphertext rct generated by $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ could be re-encrypted many times. Let $L = L(\lambda)$ be the maximum number of hops that a UPRE scheme can support.

Definition 3.6 (UPRE for PKE: L-hop Correctness). A multi-hop UPRE scheme mUPRE for PKE is L -hop correct if for all PKE schemes $(\Sigma_{\sigma_0}, \Sigma_{\sigma_1}, \dots, \Sigma_{\sigma_L})$ that satisfy correctness and $\sigma_{i-1} \neq \sigma_i$ for all $i \in [L]$, $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$ (for all $i = 0, \dots, L$), $m \in \mathcal{M}_{\sigma_0} \cap \dots \cap \mathcal{M}_{\sigma_L}$, $\text{ct}_0 \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_0}(\text{pk}_0, m)$, it holds that

$$\Pr[\text{mDec}(\Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_j, \text{rct}^{(j)}, j) = m] = 1$$

where $\text{rct}^{(j)} \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma'_j, \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma'_j, \text{sk}_{j-1}, \text{pk}_j), \text{rct}^{(j-1)})$, $\text{rct}^{(0)} = \text{ct}_0$, $\Sigma'_j := (\Sigma_{\sigma_{j-1}}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j})$ and $j \in [1, L]$.

The reason why mDec is indexed by j is that the decryption procedure for j -times re-encrypted ciphertexts might be different. See Section 5 as a concrete example.

The security notion of multi-hop UPRE is similar to that of single-hop one, but slightly more complex since we consider many intermediate keys from a delegator to a delegatee. In particular, we use a directed acyclic graph (DAG) to reflect the relationships among keys. A user is modeled as a vertex in a graph and if there exists a

re-encryption key from vertex (user) i to vertex (user) j , then a directed edge (i, j) is assigned between the vertices (note that edge (i, j) is not equal to (j, i) since we consider DAGs). That is, a DAG $G = (V, E)$ denotes that V is a set of users and E is a set of index pairs whose re-encryption key was issued. We do not consider cyclic graphs in this study since it incurs an issue of circular security in our constructions⁷.

We introduce the notion of *admissible edges* to exclude trivial attacks by using oracles. Roughly speaking, an admissible edge means that ciphertexts under a target public key will not be converted into ciphertexts under *corrupted* public keys in CList. We denote by $i \rightsquigarrow j$ there exists a path from vertex i to vertex j in G .

Definition 3.7 (Admissible edge). *We say that (i, j) is an admissible edge with respect to $G = (V, E)$ if, in $E \cup (i, j)$, there does not exist a path from any vertex $i^* \in \text{HList}$ (honest user set fixed at the setup phase) to $j^* \in \text{CList}$ such that the path includes edge (i, j) as an intermediate edge (this includes the case $j = j^*$). That is, no $i^* \in \text{HList}$, $j^* \in \text{CList}$ such that a path $i^* \rightsquigarrow j^*$ exists in $G' = (V, E \cup (i, j))$.*

We also introduce the notion of the *selective-graph model* as a weaker attack model. In the selective-graph model, the adversary must commit a graph $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ at the beginning of an experiment. To formally define this model, we define a *deviating pair with respect to G^* and G* .

Definition 3.8 (deviating pair). *We say that (i, j) is a deviating pair with respect to $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ and $G = (V, E)$ in the selective-graph model if $i \in V^* \wedge j \in V$ or $j \in V^* \wedge i \in V$.*

In the selective-graph model, the adversary must select $i^* \in V^*$ as the target vertex that will be queried to \mathcal{O}_{cha} . Moreover, the adversary is not given re-encryption keys and re-encrypted ciphertexts from $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$, respectively, if queried (i, j) is a deviating pair. That is, the structure of DAG that is connected to the target vertex must be determined at the beginning of the game. We focus on security in the selective-graph model in this study since it is what our schemes achieve. For admissible edges in the selective-graph model, we consider $i^* \in V_{\text{h}}^*$ (defined below) instead of $i^* \in \text{HList}$ (i.e., replacing HList with V_{h}^* in Definition 3.7).

Definition 3.9 (UPRE for PKE: Multi-Hop selective-graph HRA Security). *We define the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a challenger. The experiment consists of three phases.*

Phase 1 (Setup): *This is the setup phase. All security parameters are chosen by the challenger.*

- *The challenger initializes $\#\text{Keys} := 0, \text{HList} := \emptyset, \text{CList} := \emptyset, \#\text{CT} := 0, \text{KeyCTList} := \emptyset, \text{Drv} := \emptyset, V := \emptyset, E := \emptyset$.*
- *At the beginning of this phase, \mathcal{A} must commit a graph $G^* = (V^* = (V_{\text{h}}^*, V_{\text{c}}^*), E^*)$. We assume that $V^* = \{1, \dots, |V^*|\}$ by using appropriate renaming. If there is an edge $(i, j) \in E^*$ such that $i \in V_{\text{h}}^* \wedge j \in V_{\text{c}}^*$, then the game aborts. The challenger generates keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$ for all $i \in V^*$ and sends $\{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in V_{\text{h}}^*}, \{(\text{pk}_j, \text{sk}_j)\}_{j \in V_{\text{c}}^*}$ to \mathcal{A} . We assume that \mathcal{A} selects (σ_i, λ_i) for all $i \in V^*$ as the key generation queries below (if $\lambda_i < \lambda$ for $i \in V_{\text{h}}^*$, then the game aborts). The challenger also generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j)$ for all $(i, j) \in E^*$ and sends them to \mathcal{A} . The challenger sets $\text{HList} := \text{HList} \cup V_{\text{h}}^*, \text{CList} := \text{CList} \cup V_{\text{c}}^*$, and $\#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + |V^*|$.*
- *For the i -th honest key generation query (σ_i, λ_i) from \mathcal{A} , if $\lambda_i < \lambda$, the challenger outputs \perp . Otherwise, the challenger generates uncorrupted keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}(1^{\lambda_i})$, sends $(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \text{pk}_i)$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\text{HList} := \text{HList} \cup i, \#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + 1$, and $V := V \cup \{i\}$.*
- *For the j -th corrupted key generation query (j, σ_j, λ_j) from \mathcal{A} , the challenger generates corrupted keys $(\text{pk}_j, \text{sk}_j) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_j}(1^{\lambda_j})$, sends $(\Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{pk}_j, \text{sk}_j)$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\text{CList} := \text{CList} \cup j, \#\text{Keys} := \#\text{Keys} + 1$, and $V := V \cup \{j\}$.*
- *The challenger maintains graph $G := (V, E)$ during the experiment. Note that we assume that all keys and schemes are recorded with vertices and edges though we do not explicitly write for simplicity.*

Phase 2 (Oracle query): *This is the oracle query phase.*

⁷The circular security issue arises in constructions that use general PKE schemes. If there exists a cycle, we have no way to use the CPA-security of a PKE scheme in the cycle since the information of each secret key in the cycle is in a re-encryption key in the cycle. This does not happen in concrete constructions based on some hard problems such as the DDH.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{enc}}(i, m)$: For an honest encryption query (i, m) where $i \leq \#\text{Keys}$, the challenger generates $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}(\text{pk}_i, m)$, sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, record $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_{\sigma_i}, i, \#\text{CT})$ in KeyCTList , and gives $(\text{ct}_i, \#\text{CT})$ to \mathcal{A} .

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}(i, j)$: For a re-encryption key query (i, j) where $i, j \leq \#\text{Keys}$, the challenger does the following.

1. If $i \in V^*$ or $j \in V^*$ or $i = j$, then output \perp .
2. Otherwise, the challenger generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j)$ and updates $E := E \cup (i, j)$ and gives $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}$ to \mathcal{A} .

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}(i, j, k)$: For a re-encryption query (i, j, k) where $i, j \leq \#\text{Keys}$ and $k \leq \#\text{CT}$, the challenger does the following.

1. If (A) (i, j) is a deviating pair with respect to G^* and G , or (B) (i, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ and $k \in \text{Drv}$, then returns \perp .
2. If there is no $(*, *, i, k)$ in KeyCTList , then outputs \perp .
3. Otherwise, generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j)$ and $\text{rct}_j \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_i}, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, \text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j}, \text{rct}_i)$ from rct_i in KeyCTList , sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, records $(\text{rct}_j, \Sigma_{\sigma_j}, j, \#\text{CT})$ in KeyCTList , and gives $(\#\text{CT}, \text{rct}_j)$ to \mathcal{A} . If $k \in \text{Drv}$, then also sets $\text{Drv} := \text{Drv} \cup \{\#\text{CT}\}$.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{cha}}(i^*, m_0, m_1)$: This oracle is invoked only once. For a challenge query (i^*, m_0, m_1) where $i^* \in V_h^*$ and $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}_U$ (same as defined in Definition 3.5), the challenger generates $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_{i^*}}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_b)$ and gives it to \mathcal{A} . The challenger also sets $\#\text{CT} := \#\text{CT} + 1$, $\text{Drv} := \text{Drv} \cup \{\#\text{CT}\}$, $\text{KeyCTList} := \text{KeyCTList} \cup \{(\text{ct}^*, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i^*}}, i^*, \#\text{CT})\}$.

Phase 3 (Decision) : This is the decision phase. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess b' for b . The experiment outputs b' .

We say the UPRE is multi-hop selective-graph UPRE-HRA secure if, for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

UPRE-CPA Security. We can easily consider the CPA-security of UPRE. We can obtain the security experiment of the CPA-security if we employ the following items in the experiment of the HRA security.

1. The honest encryption oracle \mathcal{O}_{enc} is not used.
2. Neither the set Drv nor number $\#\text{CT}$ is used.
3. The condition that $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ outputs \perp for a query (i, j) such that $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j \in \text{CList}$ (or (i, j) is not an admissible edge) is used instead of the first and second conditions of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ in the experiment of the HRA security.

3.3 Security against Corrupted-Delegator Re-Encryption Attacks

Re-encrypted ciphertexts of relaxed UPRE schemes might include values that leak information about a plaintext to a delegator (that is, an entity that has a secret key for the original ciphertext). This is an important issue to use UPRE in migration of encryption systems explained in Section 1.1. We will see a concrete example in Section 5. To capture attacks on re-encrypted ciphertext by corrupted delegator, we define a new security notion for UPRE (and PRE), security against corrupted-delegator re-encryption attacks (CRA). We write the definition of the UPRE case. The PRE case is similarly defined as PRE-CRA security. We can also similarly define a single-hop variant.

Definition 3.10 (Selective-graph UPRE-CRA security). The experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-cra}}(1^\lambda, b)$ of this security notion is the same as that of multi-hop selective-graph UPRE-HRA security except that the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} is modified as follows.

$\mathcal{O}_{\text{cha}}(i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1)$: This oracle is invoked only once. For a challenge query (i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1) where $i_c \in V_c^* \wedge i^* \in V_h^*$ and $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}_U$ (same as defined in Definition 3.5), the challenger does the following.

1. Generates $\text{ct}_{i_c} \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\sigma_{i_c}}(\text{pk}_{i_c}, m_b)$.
2. Generates $\text{rk}_{i_c \rightarrow i^*} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{\sigma_{i_c}}, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i^*}}, \text{sk}_{i_c}, \text{pk}_{i^*})$.
3. Generates $\text{rct}^* \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{\sigma_{i_c}}, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i^*}}, \text{rk}_{i_c \rightarrow i^*}, \text{ct}_{i_c})$ and gives $(\text{rct}^*, \text{rk}_{i_c \rightarrow i^*})$ to \mathcal{A} .

The challenger also sets $\#CT := \#CT + 1$, $Drv := Drv \cup \{\#CT\}$, $KeyCTList := KeyCTList \cup \{(ct^*, \Sigma_{\sigma_i^*}, i^*, \#CT)\}$.

We say the UPRE is multi-hop selective-graph UPRE-CRA secure if, for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-cra}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-cra}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-cra}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

This definition means that adversaries that have secret key sk_{i_c} cannot break the security of the re-encrypted ciphertext rct^* generated from the ciphertext ct_{i_c} under pk_{i_c} if they are not given the original ciphertext ct_{i_c} (even if re-encryption key $rk_{i_c \rightarrow i^*}$ is given). The fact that ct_{i_c} is not given to \mathcal{A} guarantees that \mathcal{A} cannot trivially break the security.

3.4 On Re-Encryption Simulatability

Cohen introduced the notion of re-encryption simulatability for PRE to prove PRE-HRA security in a modular way [Coh19]. He proved that if a PRE scheme is PRE-CPA secure and satisfies re-encryption simulatability⁸, then the scheme is PRE-HRA secure. See Definition A.1 in Appendix A for the definition.

The re-encryption simulatability is sufficient to prove PRE-HRA security (if a PRE is PRE-CPA secure scheme) and useful. Thus, one might think it is better to use re-encryption simulatability for UPRE. However, it is a slightly stronger security notion. Our relaxed UPRE schemes in Sections 5 and 6 are *UPRE-HRA secure*, yet *does not* satisfy re-encryption simulatability. Thus, we do not use re-encryption simulatability to prove UPRE-HRA security in this study⁹. See Appendix A.1 for the reason why our schemes in Sections 5 and 6 does not satisfies re-encryption simulatability.

3.5 UPRE for More Advanced Encryption

We give the basic definitions of UPRE for PKE in Sections 3.1 and 3.2. We can consider more definitions for advanced encryption since UPRE is a general concept.

CCA-security. First, we can consider CCA-security of UPRE for PKE. The definition of CCA-security of UPRE for PKE could be defined in a similar way to that of PRE [CH07, LV08, HKK⁺12] though it will be more complex. We leave giving a formal definition of CCA-security and concrete constructions as an open problem since they are not in the scope of this paper. The focus of this study is that we initiate the study of UPRE, present the basic definition, and construct concrete schemes from well-known cryptographic assumptions.

Beyond PKE. We can also consider not only UPRE for PKE but also UPRE for identity-based encryption (IBE), attribute-based encryption (ABE), and functional encryption (FE). Moreover, we can even consider UPRE from a primitive to another primitive such as from IBE to FE. It is easier to consider UPRE between the same primitive since additional inputs to encryption algorithms such as an attribute in a delegator ciphertext can be recycled in a re-encrypted ciphertext. Defining UPRE between different primitives is much challenging since we have issues about how to set such additional inputs at re-encryption phase and define security between different primitives. We leave these as open problems since they are not in the scope of this paper.

4 Multi-Hop Construction based on Indistinguishability Obfuscation

In this section, we present a UPRE scheme for PKE based on PIO as the first step. To prove the security of our UPRE scheme by using sub-exponentially secure IO, we need to assume that PKE schemes are (0-hiding) trapdoor encryption (explained in Section 4.1). Several well-known CPA-secure PKE schemes could be transformed into (0-hiding) trapdoor encryption [ElG85, Pai99, GM84, DJ01]. If we use a stronger obfuscation, called dynamic-input

⁸Note that Cohen *does not* use key-privacy of PRE [ABH09] to prove PRE-HRA security.

⁹For our UPRE scheme in Section 4, we might be able to use re-encryption simulatability to prove UPRE-HRA security since Our UPRE scheme in Section 4 satisfies re-encryption simulatability for UPRE defined in Appendix A. Moreover, we define a weaker variant of re-encryption simulatability for UPRE (and PRE) that still implies HRA security in Appendix A.2. However, such a definition is not simple, and proofs are not simplified. Proving such a weak re-encryption simulatability takes almost the same efforts to prove HRA security directly. Thus, we do not use re-encryption simulatability in the main body.

PIO for randomized circuits [CLTV15], then we can use any standard CPA-secure PKE scheme. There is a possibility to construct dynamic-input PIO for specific dynamic-input indistinguishable samplers [CLTV15].

We can describe our UPRE scheme based on PIO in a unified way by the language of trapdoor encryption as Canetti et al. did [CLTV15].

4.1 Trapdoor Encryption

Before we proceed to present our UPRE scheme and prove the security, we present the notion of trapdoor encryption.

Definition 4.1 (Trapdoor Encryption [CLTV15]). We say that $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{TrapGen})$ with message space \mathcal{M} is a trapdoor encryption scheme if $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ with message space \mathcal{M} is a CPA-secure PKE scheme and the trapdoor key generation algorithm TrapGen satisfies the following.

Trapdoor Public Key Indistinguishability: It holds that

$$\left\{ \text{pk} \mid (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \right\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \left\{ \text{tpk} \mid \text{tpk} \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^\lambda) \right\}_{\lambda \in \mathbb{N}}.$$

Computational/Statistical/ δ -Hiding: We define ensembles of random variables, $\text{view}_{\text{tpke}}(b)$, which are all view from an adversary \mathcal{A} during experiments between \mathcal{A} and challenger defined as follows.

1. The challenger runs $\text{tpk} \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^\lambda)$ and gives tpk to \mathcal{A} .
2. \mathcal{A} sends two messages $m_0, m_1 \in \mathcal{M}$ as the challenge messages to the challenger.
3. The challenger generates ciphertext $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{tpk}, m_b)$ and sends ct^* to \mathcal{A} .
4. We set $\text{view}_{\text{tpke}}(b) := (\text{tpk}, m_0, m_1, \text{ct}^*)$.

We say Σ is computational/statistical/ δ -hiding if, for any PPT/unbounded/PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{view}_{\text{tpke}}(0) \stackrel{x}{\approx} \text{view}_{\text{tpke}}(1),$$

where $\stackrel{x}{\approx}$ is $\stackrel{c}{\approx}$ / $\stackrel{s}{\approx}$ / $\stackrel{\delta}{\approx}$, respectively.

In particular, 0-hiding is important for our constructions. It is easy to see that a standard CPA-secure PKE is trapdoor encryption with computational-hiding [CLTV15].

Theorem 4.2 ([CLTV15]). Any IND-CPA secure PKE schemes are computational-hiding trapdoor encryption.

Remark 4.3. The reason why we need trapdoor encryption is that we must hard-wire an encryption key in a re-encryption circuit to be obfuscated. In the security proof of the construction in Section 4, we need to change the behavior of the re-encryption circuit, so we cannot directly use the standard IND-CPA security. When we change the circuit behavior, we need to rely on the security of PIO defined in Definition 2.9. For the high-level overview, see Section 1.3.

Computational and δ -hiding properties are used to guarantee indistinguishability of samplers defined Definitions 2.10 and 2.13.

Definition 4.4 (δ -Rerandomizable Encryption [CLTV15]). We say that $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{reRand})$ is a δ -rerandomizable encryption scheme if $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is a CPA-secure PKE scheme and the additional algorithm reRand satisfies the following.

δ -Rerandomizability: We define the following experiments $\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{rerand}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and an adversary \mathcal{A} as follows.

1. The challenger chooses a bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, generates $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, and sends pk to \mathcal{A} .
2. \mathcal{A} sends $m \in \mathcal{M}$ where \mathcal{M} is the message space of Σ to the challenger.
3. The challenger generates $\text{ct}_0 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$ and $\text{ct}_1 \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$.
4. If $b = 0$, the challenger computes $\hat{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \text{reRand}(\text{pk}, \text{ct}_0)$. Otherwise, the challenger computes $\hat{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \text{reRand}(\text{pk}, \text{ct}_1)$.
5. The challenger returns $(\text{ct}_0, \text{ct}_1, \hat{\text{ct}})$ to \mathcal{A} .

6. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .

We say that reRand is δ -rerandomizable if for any PPT \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$|\Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{rerand}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{rerand}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \delta(\lambda).$$

Re-randomizable encryption can be transformed into trapdoor encryption [CLTV15]. This transformation only changes the format of public-keys. *It does not change the format of ciphertexts at all.* Therefore, decryption procedure in the transformed scheme is completely the same as the original one. This is important for construction of UPRE based on PIO since we would like to use a PKE scheme as it is. We review the theorem and construction by Canetti et al. [CLTV15].

Theorem 4.5 ([CLTV15]). *If there exists δ -rerandomizable encryption, then $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{TrapGen})$ described below is δ -hiding trapdoor encryption scheme whose message space is $\{0, 1\}$.*

Let $\Sigma' = (\text{Gen}', \text{Enc}', \text{Dec}', \text{reRand})$ be a δ -rerandomizable encryption scheme.

$\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$: generates $(pk', sk') \leftarrow \text{Gen}'(1^\lambda)$ and $ct_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}'(pk', b)$ for $b = 0, 1$ and outputs $(pk, sk) := ((pk', ct_0, ct_1), sk')$.

$\text{Enc}(pk, b)$: parses $pk = (pk', ct_0, ct_1)$ and outputs $ct \leftarrow \text{reRand}(pk', ct_b)$.

$\text{Dec}(sk, ct)$: outputs $b' \leftarrow \text{Dec}'(sk', ct)$.

$\text{TrapGen}(1^\lambda)$: generates $(pk', sk') \leftarrow \text{Gen}'(1^\lambda)$ and $ct_b \leftarrow \text{Enc}'(pk', 0)$ for $b = 0, 1$ and outputs $\text{tpk} := (pk', ct_0, ct_1)$.

Theorem 4.6 ([CLTV15]). *Goldwasser-Micali [GM84], ElGamal [ElG85], Paillier [Pai99], and Damgård-Jurik PKE [DJ01] schemes can be transformed into 0-hiding trapdoor encryption schemes by the transformation described in Theorem 4.5 in Section 4.1.*

4.2 Our Multi-Hop Scheme from PIO

Now, we present our UPRE scheme based on PIO. In fact, the scheme is a modification of fully homomorphic encryption scheme from PIO and trapdoor encryption by Canetti et al. [CLTV15]. The scheme is simple and easy to understand. Hereafter, we overload the notation $\Sigma_{\sigma_i} = (\text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Dec}_{\sigma_i})$ by $\Sigma_i = (\text{Gen}_i, \text{Enc}_i, \text{Dec}_i)$ for ease of notation. Our scheme UPRE_{pio} is as follows.

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, sk_f, pk_t)$:
 - Define a probabilistic circuit $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$ described in Figure 1.
 - Output $rk_{f \rightarrow t} := \text{piO}(C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}})$.
- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, rk_{f \rightarrow t}, ct_f)$:
 - Parse $rk_{f \rightarrow t} = \text{piO}(C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}})$.
 - Output $\text{rct} := \text{piO}(C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}})(ct_f)$.

Re-Encryption Function $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, sk_f, pk_t](ct_f)$

Hardwired: $\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, sk_f, pk_t$.

Input: A ciphertext $ct_f \in \mathcal{C}_f$.

Padding: This circuit is padded to size $\text{pad}_\tau := \text{pad}_\tau(\lambda, \lambda_f, \lambda_t)$, which is determined in analysis (we may omit λ_f and λ_t).

1. Compute $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}_f(sk_f, ct_f)$.
2. Generate and return $ct_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, m)$.

Figure 1: The description of $C_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$




Figure 2: The description of dC_{re}^{pio}

Correctness. From the definition of C_{re}^{pio} , for $ct_f \leftarrow Enc_f(pk_f, m)$, it holds that $C_{re}^{pio}(ct_f) = Enc_t(pk_t, m) = ct_t$. From the alternative correctness of piO (See Definition 2.9) and the correctness of Σ_f , it holds that

$$rct = piO(C_{re}^{pio})(ct_f) \stackrel{P}{\approx} ct_t.$$

Therefore, it holds that

$$Dec(\Sigma_j, sk_j, ReEnc(\Sigma'_j, ReKeyGen(\Sigma'_j, sk_{j-1}, pk_j), rct_{j-1})) = Dec(\Sigma_{j-1}, sk_{j-1}, rct_{j-1}),$$

where $\Sigma'_j = (\Sigma_{j-1}, \Sigma_j)$ and the correctness holds. Note that a re-encrypted ciphertext under delegatee public-key pk_j is exactly in \mathcal{C}_j .

Padding Parameter. To use PIO, we need pad the size of circuits to be obfuscated. We set $pad_T(\lambda, \lambda_f, \lambda_t) := \max\{|C_{re}^{pio}|, |dC_{re}^{pio}|\}$, which is polynomial of $(\lambda, \lambda_f, \lambda_t)$ since an input of $C_{re}^{pio}, dC_{re}^{pio}$ is ciphertext under pk_f generated by $Gen_f(1^{\lambda_f})$ and all hard wired values are keys of Σ_f, Σ_t . We can think λ_f and λ_t are polynomials in λ , so we may omit λ_f and λ_t hereafter.

4.3 Security Proof

Theorem 4.7 (UPRE-HRA security). *If there exists PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ defined below and both Σ_f and Σ_t are trapdoor encryption schemes, then $UPRE_{pio}$ is selective-graph UPRE-HRA secure. More specifically, if either of the following two conditions holds, then $UPRE_{pio}$ is multi-hop selective-graph UPRE-HRA secure.*

- (a) piO is a PIO for the class of dynamic-input sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ and both Σ_f and Σ_t are IND-CPA secure PKE schemes.
- (b) piO is a PIO for the class of X-IND sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ and both Σ_f and Σ_t are 0-hiding trapdoor encryption schemes.

Before we proceed to prove Theorem 4.7, we define the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ defined by trapdoor encryption schemes Σ_i, Σ_j as follows.

Sampler $Samp^{SK}$: The distribution $Samp^{SK}$ samples a trapdoor public key $tpk_j \leftarrow TrapGen_j(1^{\lambda_j})$ and outputs circuits $C_0 := C_{re}^{pio}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, sk_i, tpk_j]$ and $C_1 := dC_{re}^{pio}[\Sigma_j, tpk_j]$, and $z := tpk_j$, where $SK = \{sk_{\lambda_i}\}$ is a sequence of strings of length $\rho_i(\lambda_i)$ and $sk := sk_{\lambda_i}$.

Class $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$: Let $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t}$ be the class of samplers with distribution $Samp^{SK}$ for all sequence of strings SK of length $\rho_j(\lambda_j)$.

Now, we proceed to prove Theorem 4.7.

Proof. We define a sequence of hybrid experiments $Hyb_A^x(b)$. We emphasize differences among hybrid experiments by using red underlines. Hereafter, $Hyb_A^x(b) \approx Hyb_A^y(b)$ denotes $|\Pr[Hyb_A^x(b) = 1] - \Pr[Hyb_A^y(b) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$: The first experiment is the original security experiment for b , $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. That is, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. Note that, in the successive experiments, we can easily simulate all keys in G since vertices in V are not connected to the target vertex in G^* and simulators can generate keys for them by itself.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$ except that we guess the target vertex i^* that will be queried to challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} and abort if the guess is incorrect. The guess is correct with probability $1/|V_h^*|$, so $\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{|V_h^*|} \cdot \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = 1]$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}$ except that

1. we record not only $(\text{rct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT)$ but also m in KeyCTList for encryption query (i, m) and
2. for re-encryption query (i', j, k) such that (i', j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ and $k \notin \text{Drv}$, the re-encrypted ciphertext is differently generated as follows. First, we retrieve $(\text{rct}_{i'}, \Sigma_{\sigma_{i'}}, i', k, m)$ from KeyCTList (if there is not such an entry, just outputs \perp). Then, we compute $\text{rct}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\text{pk}_j, m)$ instead of $\text{rk}_{i' \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\Sigma_{i'}, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_{i'}, \text{pk}_j)$ and $\text{rct} \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_{i'}, \Sigma_j, \text{rk}_{i' \rightarrow j}, \text{rct}_{i'})$.

That is, we do not need $\text{sk}_{i'}$ to generate rct_j . By the alternative correctness of piO in Definition 2.9, this perfectly simulates $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$ since an output of $\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$ for input $\text{rct}_{i'} = \text{Enc}_{i'}(\text{pk}_{i'}, m)$ is just a fresh ciphertext of m under pk_j .

Process for removing sk_{i^*} of the target vertex: Now, we focus on vertices in V^* connected via admissible edges. To use the security of Σ_{i^*} , we need remove information about sk_{i^*} from all re-encryption keys in $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ possibly connected to i^* . Let Q be the total number of admissible edges connected to target vertex i^* . We call the following procedure a depth-search from vertex i : We seek a vertex that is connected i and does not have an outgoing edge in a forward direction. If there is a vertex i' (possibly $i' = i$) that has two or more than two edges during the search, then we select a vertex i'_1 that is numbered by the smallest number and set a flag such that the vertex is already searched to i'_1 . We scan $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ by the depth-search as follows.

First, we do a depth-search from i^* and find a vertex j such that j does not have an outgoing edge.

Repeat the following process.

1. (Backward scan process) Go back to a vertex i' that has two or more than two edges. If there is no such a vertex, then we end. If an edge was scanned by this backward scan, then we set a ‘‘scanned’’ flag to the edge.
2. Do the depth-search from i' .

During the backward scan process above, we repeat the hybrid transitions $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}$ below whenever we move on a edge where $v = 1, \dots, Q$. We let Dlist be the list of vertices whose public key is replaced with a dummy key tpk . We initialize $\text{Dlist} := \emptyset$ and maintain Dlist during the repeated processes below.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,(v-1)}(b)$ except that for honest key generation query (j, Σ_j) , the challenger generates $\text{tpk}_j \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}_j(1^{\lambda_j})$ and for all $(i, j) \in E^*$ such that $i \in V_h^*$, the challenger uses tpk_j to generate $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j])$ instead of pk_j and $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_j])$. At this point, honest vertex j does not have any non-scanned edge in a forward direction. We renew $\text{Dlist} := \text{Dlist} \cup \{j\}$. In Lemma 4.8, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,(v-1)}(b) \stackrel{\epsilon}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$ holds due to the trapdoor public key indistinguishability property in Definition 4.1. Apparently, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,0}(b) = \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$ except that for all $(i, j) \in E^*$ such that $i \in V_h^*$, the challenger generates uses $\text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$ instead of $\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}$. That is, $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \text{tpk}_j])$ instead of $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j])$. In Lemma 4.9, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b) \stackrel{\epsilon}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$ holds due to the security of PIO with respect to $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$. The sampler Samp^{SK} generates the following distributions.

$$(\text{C}_0 = \text{hybC}_{\text{re}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j], \text{C}_1 = \text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j], z = \text{tpk}_j) \leftarrow \text{Samp}^{\text{SK}}.$$

In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(b)$, sk_{i^*} is neither written in any re-encryption key nor used to generate a re-encrypted ciphertext. Thus, we can use the security of Σ_{i^*} . In Lemma 4.10, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(1)$ holds due to the computational/statistical/ δ -hiding security of Σ_{i^*} . Therefore, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(1)$ by Lemmata 4.8 to 4.10 since Q and $|V_h^*|$ are polynomials. ■

Lemma 4.8. *If Σ_j is a trapdoor encryption scheme, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v-1}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$.*

Proof. We construct \mathcal{B} for the trapdoor public key indistinguishability property of Σ_j . First, \mathcal{B} is given a target key ek_j ($\text{ek}_j = \text{pk}_j$ or $\text{ek}_j = \text{tpk}_j$). To use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} generates key pairs $(\text{pk}_{i'}, \text{sk}_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus (\text{Dlist} \cup \{j\})$ and $i' \in \text{CList}$. Note that $\text{Dlist} \subseteq V_h^*$ by definition. For all $i' \in \text{Dlist}$, \mathcal{B} generates $\text{tpk}_{i'} \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}_{i'}(1^{\lambda_{i'}})$. For honest key generation query (j, Σ_j) , \mathcal{B} sets ek_j as the public-key of vertex j . For all $(i, j) \in E^*$ such that $i \in V_h^*$, \mathcal{B} generates $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{ek}_j])$. If $\text{ek}_j = \text{pk}_j$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v-1}(b)$. If $\text{ek}_j = \text{tpk}_j$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, \mathcal{B} can break the trapdoor key indistinguishability property of Σ_j . ■

Lemma 4.9. *If piO is a PIO for the sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$.*

Proof. We construct a distinguisher \mathcal{D} of PIO. To use \mathcal{A} of UPRE, \mathcal{D} generates key pairs $(\text{pk}_{i'}, \text{sk}_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus \text{Dlist}$ and $i' \in \text{CList}$. For all $i' \in \text{Dlist}$, \mathcal{D} generates $\text{tpk}_{i'} \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}_{i'}(1^{\lambda_{i'}})$. At this point, we do not need $\text{sk}_{i'}$ for $i' \in \text{Dlist}$. Therefore, \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles. However, to use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ in a slightly different way. The simulation for $(i, j) \in E^*$ such that (i, j) is an admissible edge is different. When \mathcal{B} simulates a re-encryption key for such $(i, j) \in E^*$ at the beginning of the game, \mathcal{B} uses the challenger of PIO. The challenger samples $(C_0, C_1, z) \leftarrow \text{Samp}^{\text{sk}_i}$ where $C_0 = \text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j]$, $C_1 = \text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j]$, and $z = \text{tpk}_j$ and generates \widehat{C} (obfuscated circuit of C_0 or C_1). When \mathcal{B} is given \widehat{C} from the challenger of PIO, \mathcal{B} sends $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j} := \widehat{C}$ to \mathcal{A} . This completes the simulation. If \mathcal{B} is given $\widehat{C} = \text{piO}(\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j])$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v}(b)$. If \mathcal{B} is given $\widehat{C} = \text{piO}(\text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j])$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,v}(b)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, \mathcal{B} can break the security of PIO for sampler $\text{Samp}^{\text{sk}_i}$. ■

Lemma 4.10. *If Σ_{i^*} is a trapdoor encryption scheme, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(1)$.*

Proof. We construct \mathcal{B} for (computational/statistical/ δ -) hiding of Σ_{i^*} . First, \mathcal{B} is given a target key pk_{i^*} . To use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{B} generates all keys except for vertex i^* . When (i^*, Σ_{i^*}) is queried as an uncorrupted key generation query, \mathcal{B} sets pk_{i^*} as the public-key for user i^* . At this point, \mathcal{B} does not need sk_{i^*} since it is neither written in any re-encryption key nor used in $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$. For the challenge query (i^*, m_0, m_1) to \mathcal{O}_{cha} , \mathcal{B} passes (m_0, m_1) to its challenger of Σ_{i^*} . When \mathcal{B} receives $\text{ct}_{i^*}^*$, then passes it to \mathcal{A} as the target ciphertext. If $\text{ct}_{i^*}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_0)$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(0)$. If $\text{ct}_{i^*}^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_1)$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,Q}(1)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, \mathcal{B} can break the hiding property of Σ_{i^*} . ■

CRA security of UPRE_{pio} . The distribution of re-encrypted ciphertexts of UPRE_{pio} is perfectly the same as that of delegates. Thus, the CRA-security of UPRE_{pio} immediately follows from the UPRE-HRA security of UPRE_{pio} since a secret key of a delegator never helps breaking the security of a delegatee's scheme and a re-encryption key does not include the information about the delegatee's secret key.

4.4 Instantiation of UPRE scheme based on PIO

Instantiation by 0-hiding trapdoor encryption and IO. To instantiate by sub-exponentially secure IO and OWF, we should prove that $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ is a static-input X -indistinguishable sampler for $\mathcal{X} := \mathcal{C}_i$ if Σ_i and Σ_j are δ -hiding trapdoor encryption schemes.

We let $\gamma(\lambda) := \log |\mathcal{C}_i| := \log X(\text{pad}_{\top}(\lambda))$ and set $\delta := \text{negl}(\lambda) \cdot 2^{-\gamma(\lambda)}$. It is easy to see that X differing inputs holds since $\mathcal{X} = \mathcal{C}_i$ is the whole domain of circuits $C_0 = \text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j]$ and $C_1 = \text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j]$. It is also easy to see that X -indistinguishability holds since outputs of $\text{C}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j, \text{sk}_i, \text{tpk}_j](\text{ct}_i)$ and $\text{dC}_{\text{re}}^{\text{pio}}[\Sigma_j, \text{tpk}_j](\text{ct}_i)$ are $\text{Enc}_j(\text{tpk}_j, m)$ and $\text{Enc}_j(\text{tpk}_j, 0^{\ell_j})$, respectively and these are $\text{negl}(\lambda) \cdot 2^{-\gamma(\lambda)}$ -indistinguishable due to the

δ -hiding property. This means the outputs of C_0 and C_1 are $\text{negl}(\lambda) \cdot X^{-1}$ -indistinguishable since $X(\text{pad}_T(\lambda)) = 2^{\gamma(\lambda)}$. This parameter setting of δ is achievable by 0-hiding trapdoor encryption, which is instantiated by well-known IND-CPA PKE schemes such as ElGamal PKE (see Section 4.1). Note that as observed in Theorem 4.5, the message space of this instantiation is $\{0, 1\}$.

Corollary 4.11. *If there exists sub-exponentially secure IO and sub-exponentially secure OWF, then UPRE_{pio} is a multi-hop selectively UPRE-HRA secure UPRE scheme for 0-hiding trapdoor encryption schemes.*

Instantiation by IND-CPA PKE and dynamic-input PIO. If we can use a dynamic-input PIO (see Definitions 2.9 and 2.13 for the definition), then we can set $\delta = \text{negl}(\lambda)$ in the analysis above and it is achievable by standard IND-CPA PKE schemes (that is, trapdoor encryption with computational hiding). A dynamic-input PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ might exist (no impossibility result on PIO for a specific class) though it is not proved [CLTV15]. The PIO construction by Canetti et al. [CLTV15] is a candidate of dynamic-input PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$.

Conjecture 4.12. A dynamic-input PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ exists.

Corollary 4.13. *If there exists dynamic-input PIO for the class of sampler $\mathcal{S}^{\Sigma_i, \Sigma_j}$ where Σ_i, Σ_j are IND-CPA PKE schemes, then UPRE_{pio} is a multi-hop selectively UPRE-HRA secure UPRE scheme for any IND-CPA PKE scheme.*

Instantiation by IND-CPA PKE, doubly-probabilistic IO, and exponential DDH Agrikola, Couteau, and Hofheinz [ACH20] introduced the notion of doubly-probabilistic IO (DPIO), which is an extended notion of PIO. They prove that in most applications of PIO (fully homomorphic encryption, spooky encryption, function secret sharing etc.) we can replace PIO with DPIO. They also prove that we can achieve DPIO by using polynomially secure IO and exponential DDH assumption. It is easy to see that we can replace the PIO in UPRE_{pio} with DPIO.¹⁰ Therefore, we can obtain the following theorem.

Theorem 4.14. *If there exists polynomially secure IO and exponential DDH assumption is true, then UPRE_{pio} is a multi-hop selectively UPRE-HRA secure UPRE scheme for IND-CPA encryption schemes.*

We can prove this theorem by combining the proof techniques of Theorem 4.7 and that of fully homomorphic encryption based on DPIO by Agrikola et al. [ACH20]. We omit the detail in this manuscript.

5 Multi-Hop Construction based on Garbled Circuits

In this section, we provide a UPRE scheme using garbled circuits. The main idea of the construction provided here is that the re-encryptor delegates decryption to the target node via garbled circuits. To achieve UPRE, we use weak batch encryption schemes, which are constructed from standard IND-CPA secure PKE schemes.

5.1 Weak Batch Encryption

Definition 5.1 (Weak Batch Encryption). *Let \mathcal{M} be a message space. A weak batch encryption scheme is a tuple of algorithms $(\text{BatchGen}, \text{BatchEnc}, \text{BatchDec})$ where*

- $\text{BatchGen}(1^\lambda, s)$ takes as input the security parameter and selection bits $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and outputs a pair $(\hat{\text{pk}}, \hat{\text{sk}})$ of public and secret keys.
- $\text{BatchEnc}(\hat{\text{pk}}, \{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}_{i \in [\lambda]})$ takes as input a public key $\hat{\text{pk}}$ and λ -pairs of messages $\{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ where $m_{i,b} \in \mathcal{M}$, and outputs a ciphertext $\hat{\text{ct}}$.
- $\text{BatchDec}(\hat{\text{sk}}, \hat{\text{ct}})$ takes as input a secret key $\hat{\text{sk}}$ and a ciphertext message $\hat{\text{ct}}$, and outputs $\{m'_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$, or \perp .

¹⁰This is because the design idea of UPRE_{pio} is based on fully homomorphic encryption scheme based on PIO and Agrikola et al. achieve fully homomorphic encryption from DPIO.

Correctness: For any $\lambda, s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda, m_{i,b} \in \mathcal{M}$, we have that

$$\Pr \left[\forall i m'_i = m_{i,s[i]} \mid \begin{array}{l} (\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(1^\lambda, s), \\ \hat{ct} \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}_{i \in [\lambda]}), \\ \{m'_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]} \leftarrow \text{BatchDec}(\hat{sk}, \hat{ct}) \end{array} \right] > 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $s[i]$ denotes i -th bit of s .

Receiver Privacy: We require that public keys \hat{pk} are independent of the selection bits $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ used to generate \hat{pk} . That is, for all s_1, s_2 it holds that

$$\hat{pk}_1 \equiv \hat{pk}_2$$

where $(\hat{pk}_1, \hat{sk}_1) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(1^\lambda, s_1)$ and $(\hat{pk}_2, \hat{sk}_2) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(1^\lambda, s_2)$ and \equiv means the statistical distance is equal to 0.

Sender Privacy against Semi-Honest Receiver: We define the experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{wbe-cpa}}(1^\lambda, \beta)$ between an adversary \mathcal{A} and challenger as follows.

1. \mathcal{A} chooses $s \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and sends it to the challenger.
2. The challenger computes $(\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(1^\lambda, s)$ and sends \hat{pk} to \mathcal{A} .
3. \mathcal{A} sends $\{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ to the challenger and:
 - If $\beta = 0$, the challenger computes $\hat{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\})$.
 - Else if $\beta = 1$, the challenger computes $\hat{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \{(m_{i,s[i]}, m_{i,s[i]})\})$.
4. The challenger sends (\hat{sk}, \hat{ct}^*) to \mathcal{A} .
5. \mathcal{A} outputs a guess β' for β . The experiment outputs β' .

We say $(\text{BatchGen}, \text{BatchEnc}, \text{BatchDec})$ is WBE-CPA secure against semi-honest receiver if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that

$$\text{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{wbe-cpa}}(\lambda) := |\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{wbe-cpa}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{wbe-cpa}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We can consider a multi-challenge variant. That is, \mathcal{A} can send $\{(m_{i,0}^{(j)}, m_{i,1}^{(j)})\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ and obtain many target ciphertexts after (\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) is given for $j = 1, \dots, \text{poly}(\lambda)$.

IND-CPA Security: The experiment $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(1^\lambda, \beta)$ is the same as $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{wbe-cpa}}(1^\lambda, \beta)$ above except that

1. \mathcal{A} is not given \hat{sk} .
2. If $\beta = 1$, then $\hat{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \{(\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0})\})$ where $\mathbf{0}$ is a fixed special message (considered as all zero) that does not depend on β .

If $\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cpa}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]$ is negligible, then the weak batch encryption is IND-CPA secure.

The difference between weak batch encryption and batch encryption proposed by Brakerski, Lombardi, Segev, and Vaikuntanathan [BLSV18] is that there is no efficiency requirement on the size of the batch public-key \hat{pk} . Thus, it is easy to achieve weak batch encryption.

Theorem 5.2 (Weak Batch Encryption from IND-CPA PKE). *If there exists IND-CPA secure PKE, then there exists weak batch encryption.*

Proof. Let $\Sigma = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be an IND-CPA secure PKE scheme.

BatchGen $(1^\lambda, s)$: It generates $(pk_{i,b}, sk_{i,b}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$ for all $i \in [\lambda]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and outputs $\hat{pk} := \{pk_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0,1\}}$ and $\hat{sk} := \{sk_{i,s[i]}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.

$\text{BatchEnc}(\hat{\text{pk}}, \{(m_{i,0}, m_{i,1})\}_{i \in [\lambda]})$: It generates $\text{ct}_{i,b} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_{i,b}, m_{i,b})$ for all $i \in [\lambda]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$. It outputs $\hat{\text{ct}} := \{\text{ct}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0,1\}}$.

$\text{BatchDec}(\hat{\text{sk}}, \hat{\text{ct}})$: It parses $\hat{\text{sk}} = (\text{sk}_1, \dots, \text{sk}_\lambda)$ and $\hat{\text{ct}} = \{\text{ct}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [\lambda], b \in \{0,1\}}$. It computes $m'_i \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_i, \text{ct}_{i,b})$ for $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and sets $m_i := m'_{i,b}$ if $m'_{i,b} \neq \perp$. It outputs $\{m_i\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$.

The receiver privacy trivially holds since $\hat{\text{pk}}$ does not include any information about s . The sender privacy follows from the IND-CPA security of Σ and the standard hybrid argument because $\{sk_{i,1-s[i]}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$ are never used. Moreover, it is easy to see that the scheme satisfies the multi-challenge version by the standard hybrid argument. The IND-CPA security trivially holds. ■

5.2 Our Multi-Hop Scheme from GC

Our scheme UPRE_{gc} is based on a garbling scheme ($\text{Garble}, \text{Eval}$), a weak batch-encryption scheme ($\text{BatchGen}, \text{BatchEnc}, \text{BatchDec}$) and a 2-player secret-sharing scheme ($\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct}$). As in Section 4, we overload the notation $\Sigma_{\sigma_i} = (\text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Dec}_{\sigma_i})$ by $\Sigma_i = (\text{Gen}_i, \text{Enc}_i, \text{Dec}_i)$ for ease of notation. Moreover, we sometimes write labels instead of $\{\text{labels}_{k,b}\}_{k \in [n], b \in \{0,1\}}$ if it is clear from the context for ease of notation. We also denote by labels_s labels selected by s , that is, $\{\text{labels}_{i,s_i}\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$. Moreover, $\widetilde{\text{labels}}$ basically denotes selected labels output by BatchDec .

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(1^\lambda, \Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, \text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$:
 - Compute $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(\text{sk}_f)$
 - $(\hat{\text{pk}}, \hat{\text{sk}}) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(1^\lambda, s_1)$
 - Compute $\tilde{\text{ct}}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(\text{pk}_t, \hat{\text{sk}})$
 - Output $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} := (\hat{\text{pk}}, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, \text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$:
 - Parse $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} = (\hat{\text{pk}}, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
 - If ct_f is in the ciphertext space of Σ_f (1st level), set $C \leftarrow P[s_2, \text{ct}_f]$; Else if (level $i > 1$), parse $\text{ct}_f = (\hat{\text{ct}}', \tilde{\text{ct}}_f, \tilde{C}_{i-1}, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$ and set $C \leftarrow Q[s_2, \hat{\text{ct}}', \tilde{\text{ct}}_f]$
 - Compute $(\tilde{C}_i, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C)$.
 - Compute $\hat{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{\text{pk}}, \text{labels})$
 - Output $(\hat{\text{ct}}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{C}_i, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$
- $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_t, \text{sk}_t, \text{rct}, i)$: Parse $\text{rct} = (\hat{\text{ct}}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{C}_i, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$.
 - Compute $\hat{\text{sk}}' \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_t, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$.
 - Compute $\widetilde{\text{labels}}_i \leftarrow \text{BatchDec}(\hat{\text{sk}}', \hat{\text{ct}})$
 - For $j = i, \dots, 2$ do: Compute $\widetilde{\text{labels}}_{j-1} \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_j, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_j)$.
 - Compute and output $m' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_1)$.

Correctness. We now turn to the correctness of $(\text{ReKeyGen}, \text{ReEnc}, \text{mDec})$. We will show correctness via induction.

We will first show correctness for level 1 ciphertexts. Let thus $\text{rct} = (\hat{\text{ct}}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{C}_1)$ be a level 1 ciphertext, where $(\tilde{C}_1, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(P[s_2, \text{ct}_f])$, $\hat{\text{ct}} = \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{\text{pk}}, \text{labels})$ and $\tilde{\text{ct}}_t = \text{Enc}_t(\text{pk}_t, \hat{\text{sk}})$. Consider the computation of $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_t, \text{sk}_t, \text{rct})$. By the correctness of Σ_t it holds that $\hat{\text{sk}}' = \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_t, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t) = \hat{\text{sk}}$. Next, by the correctness of the batch public key encryption ($\text{BatchGen}, \text{BatchEnc}, \text{BatchDec}$) it holds that $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{BatchDec}(\hat{\text{sk}}, \hat{\text{ct}}) = \text{labels}_{s_1}$. Thus, by the correctness of the garbling scheme ($\text{Garble}, \text{Eval}$) it holds that $\text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) = \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_1, \text{labels}_{s_1}) = P[s_2, \text{ct}_f](s_1)$. By the definition of P , $P[s_2, \text{ct}_f](s_1)$ computes $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow$




Figure 3: The description of the first level re-encryption circuit P




Figure 4: The description of the higher level re-encryption circuit Q

$\text{Reconstruct}(s_1, s_2)$ and outputs $m' \leftarrow \text{Dec}_f(sk'_f, ct_f)$. Thus, by the correctness of (Share, Reconstruct) it holds that $sk'_f = sk_f$ and finally by the correctness of Σ_f we get that $m' = m$.

Now assume that decryption is correct for level $(i - 1)$ ciphertexts and consider a ciphertext $\text{rct} = (\hat{ct}, \tilde{ct}_t, \tilde{C}_i, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$ at level $i > 1$. As before, it holds that $(\tilde{C}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(Q_{[s_2, \hat{ct}', \tilde{ct}_f]})$, $\hat{ct} = \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \widetilde{\text{labels}})$ and $\tilde{ct}_t = \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, \hat{sk})$. Again consider the computation of $m\text{Dec}(\Sigma_t, sk_t, \text{rct})$. By the correctness of Σ_t it holds that $\hat{sk}' = \text{Dec}(sk_t, \tilde{ct}_t) = \hat{sk}$. Next, by the correctness of the batch public key encryption scheme (BatchGen, BatchEnc, BatchDec) it holds that $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{BatchDec}(\hat{sk}, \hat{ct}) = \widetilde{\text{labels}}_{s_1}$. Thus, by the correctness of the garbling scheme (Garble, Eval) it holds that $\text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_i) = \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_{s_1}) = Q_{[s_2, \hat{ct}', \tilde{ct}_f]}(s_1)$.

Notice now that we can substitute $Q_{[s_2, \hat{ct}', \tilde{ct}_f]}(s_1)$ by

- Compute $sk'_f \leftarrow \text{Reconstruct}(s_1, s_2)$.
- Compute $\hat{sk} \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk_f, \tilde{ct}_f)$.
- Compute $\widetilde{\text{labels}} \leftarrow \text{BatchDec}(\hat{sk}, \hat{ct}')$.

By the correctness of (Share, Reconstruct) it holds that $sk'_f = \text{Reconstruct}(s_1, s_2) = sk_f$. By inspection we see that the remaining steps of the computation are identical to the decryption of a level $(i - 1)$ ciphertext. The induction hypothesis provides that decryption is correct for level $(i - 1)$ ciphertexts and we are done.

5.3 Security Proof

Theorem 5.3 (UPRE-HRA security). *Assume that $gc = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$ is a selectively secure garbling scheme, (Share, Reconstruct) is a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme and (BatchGen, BatchEnc, BatchDec) is a weak batch encryption scheme in the sense of Definition 5.1, and both Σ_f and Σ_t are IND-CPA secure PKE, then UPRE_{gc} is selective-graph UPRE-HRA secure.*

Proof. We define a sequence of hybrid experiments $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b)$. We emphasize differences among hybrid experiments by using red underlines. Hereafter, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b) \approx \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^y(b)$ denotes $|\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^x(b) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^y(b) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$. We say that a ciphertext ct is a level i re-encryption, if ct is of the form $ct = (\hat{ct}, \tilde{ct}_t, \tilde{C}_i, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$, i.e. ct is the result of i re-encryptions.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$: The first experiment is the original security experiment for b , $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. That is, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. Note that in the successive experiments, we can easily simulate

all keys in $G = (V, E)$ since vertices in V are not connected to the target vertex in G^* and simulators can generate keys for them by itself.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$ except that we guess the target vertex i^* that will be queried to challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} and abort if the guess is incorrect. The guess is correct with probability $1/|V_h^*|$, so $\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b) = 1] = \frac{1}{|V_h^*|} \cdot \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = 1]$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$: In this hybrid we record not only $(\text{rct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT)$ but also m in KeyCTList for encryption query (i, m) .

Moreover, for each re-encryption query, store the value $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{labels}_{s_1}$.

The modification between $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$ is merely syntactic, thus it holds that $\Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{0'}(b) = 1] = \Pr[\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b) = 1]$.

We will now replace re-encrypted ciphertexts by simulated re-encrypted ciphertexts. For re-encryption query (\hat{i}, j, k) such that (\hat{i}, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ and $k \notin \text{Drv}$, the re-encrypted ciphertext is differently generated by a modified re-encryption procedure. We can assume \hat{i} is honest since we do not need guarantee anything if \hat{i} is not honest. The goal of the processes below is erasing secret keys of honest vertices queried by re-encryption queries. Note that $\hat{i} = i^*$ is possible due to the restriction $k \notin \text{Drv}$ though (\hat{i}, j) is not admissible. We repeat the processes below for $u = 1, \dots, Q_{\text{reenc}}$ where Q_{reenc} is the total number of tuples (\hat{i}, j, k) such that (\hat{i}, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ and $k \notin \text{Drv}$. Without loss of generality, we can assume that each \hat{i} is different for each such re-encryption query.¹¹ The changes in experiments below are for re-encryption query for u -th tuple (\hat{i}, j, k) such that (\hat{i}, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ and $k \notin \text{Drv}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$: This is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,(u-1),3}$ except that: Retrieve s_1 of \hat{i} ,

- Parse $\text{rk}_{\hat{i} \rightarrow j} = (\hat{\text{pk}}, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j)$.
- If ct_f is in the ciphertext space of Σ_f , set $C \leftarrow P[s_2, \text{ct}_f]$; Else if, parse $\text{ct}_f = (\hat{\text{ct}}', \tilde{\text{ct}}_f, \tilde{C}_{i-1}, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$ and set $C \leftarrow Q[s_2, \hat{\text{ct}}', \tilde{\text{ct}}_f]$.
- Compute $(\tilde{C}_i, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C)$.
- Compute $\text{labels}^* \leftarrow \left\{ (\text{labels}_{i, s_1[i]}, \text{labels}_{i, s_1[i]}) \right\}_{i \in [\lambda]}$
- Compute $\hat{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{\text{pk}}, \text{labels}^*)$.
- Output $(\hat{\text{ct}}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j, \tilde{C}_i, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$.

That is, we compute $\hat{\text{ct}}$ via $\text{BatchEnc}(\hat{\text{pk}}, \text{labels}^*)$ instead of $\text{BatchEnc}(\hat{\text{pk}}, \text{labels})$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$: This is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}$ except that: Retrieve s_1 of \hat{i} ,

- Parse $\text{rk}_{\hat{i} \rightarrow j} = (\hat{\text{pk}}, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j)$.
- If ct_f is in the ciphertext space of Σ_f , set $C \leftarrow P[s_2, \text{ct}_f]$; Else if, parse $\text{ct}_f = (\hat{\text{ct}}', \tilde{\text{ct}}_f, \tilde{C}_{i-1}, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$ and set $C \leftarrow Q[s_2, \hat{\text{ct}}', \tilde{\text{ct}}_f]$.
- Compute $(\tilde{C}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) \leftarrow \text{GCSim}(C(s_1))$.
- Compute $\text{labels}^* \leftarrow (\widetilde{\text{labels}}, \widetilde{\text{labels}})$.
- Compute $\hat{\text{ct}} \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{\text{pk}}, \text{labels}^*)$.
- Output $(\hat{\text{ct}}, \tilde{\text{ct}}_j, \tilde{C}_i, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,3}(b)$: This is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$ except that: Retrieve m and labels $\widetilde{\text{labels}}'$ (corresponding to $\hat{\text{ct}}'$),

¹¹If there exists (\hat{i}, j_1, k_1) and (\hat{i}, j_2, k_2) such that (\hat{i}, j_1) and (\hat{i}, j_2) are not admissible and $k_1, k_2 \notin \text{Drv}$, then we can use the same simulation process described in hybrid experiments for those queries.

- Parse $rk_{i \rightarrow j} = (\hat{pk}, s_2, \tilde{ct}_j)$.
- If ct_f is in the ciphertext space of Σ_f , set compute $(\tilde{C}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) \leftarrow \text{GCSim}(m)$; Else if, parse $ct_f = (\hat{ct}', \tilde{ct}_f, \tilde{C}_{i-1}, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$ and compute $(\tilde{C}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) \leftarrow \text{GCSim}(\widetilde{\text{labels}}')$.
- Compute $\text{labels}^* \leftarrow (\widetilde{\text{labels}}, \widetilde{\text{labels}})$.
- Compute $\hat{ct} \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \text{labels}^*)$.
- Output $(\hat{ct}, \tilde{ct}_j, \tilde{C}_i, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$.

For syntactic convention, we let $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,0,3}(b) := \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$. Moreover, notice that at hybrid $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1, Q_{\text{reenc}}, 3}(b)$ all re-encryption queries are simulated with garbled circuits and their labels that do not depends on secret keys (or more specifically, without values that depend on secret keys). That is, we do not explicitly use sk_{i^*} to compute re-encrypted ciphertexts as above. However, in \hat{pk} and s_2 , information about sk_{i^*} still remains. We will handles these issues in the following process.

Process for removing sk_{i^*} of the target vertex. Now, we focus on vertices in V^* connected via admissible edges. To use the security of Σ_{i^*} , we need remove information about sk_{i^*} from all re-encryption keys in $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ possibly connected to i^* . Let Q be the total number of admissible edges connected to target vertex i^* . We call the following procedure a depth-search from vertex i : We seek a vertex that is connected to i and does not have an outgoing edge in a forward direction. If there is a vertex i' (possibly $i' = i$) that has two or more than two edges during the search, then we select a vertex i'_1 that is not searched yet and is numbered by the smallest number, and set a flag such that the vertex is already searched to i'_1 . We scan $G^* = (V^*, E^*)$ by the depth-search as follows.

First, we do a depth-search from i^* and find a vertex j such that j does not have an outgoing edge.

Repeat the following process.

1. (Backward scan process) Go back to the vertex i' that has two or more than two edges. If there is no such a vertex, then we end. If an edge was scanned by this backward scan, then we set a “scanned” flag to the edge.
2. Do the depth-search from i' .

During the backward scan process above, we repeat the hybrid transitions $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,1}$, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,2}$, and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,3}$ below whenever we move on a edge where $v = 1, \dots, Q$. We let Dlist be the list of vertices whose re-encryption key consists of a simulated and dummy values. That is, if $j \in \text{Dlist}$, then $rk_{i \rightarrow j} = (\hat{pk}, s_2, \text{Enc}(\hat{pk}_j, 0^n))$ where $(\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(0^n)$ and $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(0^n)$ for any i . We initialize $\text{Dlist} := \emptyset$ and maintain Dlist during the repeated processes below.

In the following hybrids we modify the key-generation for honest vertices. That is, all changes in the experiments are in the computation of $rk_{i \rightarrow j}$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,1}(b)$: At this point, we are at vertex i and edge (i, j) was just scanned.

- Compute $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(sk_i)$
- Compute $(\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(s_1)$.
- Compute $\tilde{ct}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\hat{pk}_j, 0^n)$
- Output $rk_{i \rightarrow j} := (\hat{pk}, s_2, \tilde{ct}_j)$.

That is, we compute $\tilde{ct}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\hat{pk}_j, 0^n)$ instead of $\tilde{ct}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\hat{pk}_j, (s_1, \hat{sk}))$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,2}(b)$:

- Compute $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(sk_i)$
- Compute $(\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(0^n)$.
- Compute $\tilde{ct}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\hat{pk}_j, 0^n)$

- Output $rk_{i \rightarrow j} := (\hat{pk}, s_2, \tilde{ct}_j)$.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,3}(b)$:

- Compute $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(0^n)$
- Compute $(\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(0^n)$.
- Compute $\tilde{ct}_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}_j(\hat{pk}_j, 0^n)$
- Output $rk_{i \rightarrow j} := (\hat{pk}, s_2, \tilde{ct}_j)$ and renew $\text{Dlist} := \text{Dlist} \cup \{j\}$.

For syntactic convention, we let $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,0,3}(b) := \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1, Q_{\text{reenc}}, 3}(b)$.

Now, we prove indistinguishability of hybrid games. First notice that by correctness of (Share, Reconstruct) and (BatchGen, BatchEnc, BatchDec) the modification between $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,3}(b)$ is merely syntactic and the following lemma holds.

Lemma 5.4. *It holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b) = \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,3}(b)$.*

Proof. This immediately holds since m and $\widetilde{\text{labels}}$ are outputs of $C(s_1)$ when $C = P$ and $C = Q$, respectively. ■

Indistinguishability of $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,(u-1),3}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$ is shown in Lemma 5.5, whereas indistinguishability of $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$ is shown in Lemma 5.6.

Lemma 5.5. *If (BatchGen, BatchEnc, BatchDec) is WBE-CPA secure, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b) \approx \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,(u-1),3}(b)$.*

Proof of Lemma 5.5. We will construct a reduction \mathcal{B} which breaks the sender privacy of (BatchGen, BatchEnc, BatchDec). The reduction \mathcal{B} answers re-encryption queries as follows. From the first to $(u-1)$ -th re-encryption queries are handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$. From the $(u+1)$ -th to Q_{reenc} -th re-encryption queries are handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,(u-1),3}(b)$. \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles since \mathcal{B} can generate secret keys by itself. For the u -th query (\hat{i}, j, k) such that (\hat{i}, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to G^* and $k \notin \text{Drv}$, \mathcal{B} embeds its own challenge. That is, \mathcal{B} sends s_1 and labels to the experiment and obtains $(\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}, \hat{ct})$. It then uses these values in its own simulation. Clearly, if $\hat{ct} = \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \text{labels})$, then this query is handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,(u-1),3}(b)$. On the other hand, if $\hat{ct} = \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \text{labels}^*)$, then the query is handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$. ■

Lemma 5.6. *If $gc = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$ is a selectively secure garbling scheme, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b) \approx \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$.*

Proof of Lemma 5.6. We will construct a reduction \mathcal{B} which breaks the security of (Garble, Eval). As in the proof of Lemma 5.5, from the first to $(u-1)$ -th re-encryption queries are handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$ and from the $(u+1)$ -th to Q_{reenc} -th re-encryption queries are handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$. \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles since \mathcal{B} can generate secret keys by itself. \mathcal{B} will embed its challenge in the u -th re-encryption query (\hat{i}, j, k) such that (\hat{i}, j) is not an admissible edge with respect to G^* and $k \notin \text{Drv}$. That is, \mathcal{B} sends (C, s_1) to the experiment and obtains $(\tilde{C}, \widetilde{\text{labels}})$. It then uses these values in its own simulation. Clearly, if $(\tilde{C}, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) = \text{Grbl}(C)$ and $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{labels}_{s_1}$, then this query is handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,1}(b)$. On the other hand, if $(\tilde{C}, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) = \text{GCSim}(C(s_1))$, then the query is handled as in $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{1,u,2}(b)$. ■

Lemma 5.7. *If Σ_j is CPA-secure, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,(v-1),3} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,1}$.*

Proof. First, at this point, honest vertex j does not have any not-scanned edge. That is, we never use sk_j for simulation at this point. We can construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that is given pk_j . \mathcal{B} sends $(\hat{sk}, 0^n)$ as a challenge message pair and receive a target ciphertext \tilde{ct}_j^* . \mathcal{B} uses \tilde{ct}_j^* as a part of $rk_{i \rightarrow j}$. Thus, the lemma immediately follows from the CPA-security of Σ_j . ■

Lemma 5.8. *It holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,2}(b) \equiv \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,1}(b)$*

Proof. This follows from the fact that the distribution of \hat{pk} is independent of s_1 . ■

Lemma 5.9. *If (Share, Reconstruct) is 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,2}(b) \stackrel{s}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,v,3}(b)$.*

Proof. This immediately follows from the security of (Share, Reconstruct) since s_1 is not used anywhere at this point. ■

In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(b)$, sk_{i^*} is neither written in any re-encryption key nor used to generate a re-encrypted ciphertext. Thus, we can use the security of Σ_{i^*} . As in Lemma 4.10, we can prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(1)$ holds due to the CPA-security of Σ_{i^*} . Therefore, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(1)$ since Q_{reenc} , Q and $|V_h^*|$ are polynomials. ■

6 Constant-Hop Construction Secure against CRA

In this section, we present constant-hop and CRA-secure UPRE schemes for PKE based on GC. The design is almost the same as that of the scheme in Section 5 except that we encrypt the garbled circuit \tilde{C} by using the delegatee's public key to hide information about the delegator's ciphertext.

6.1 Our Constant-Hop Scheme from GC

Our scheme UPRE_{cra} is based on a garbling scheme (Garble, Eval), a weak batch encryption scheme (BatchGen, BatchEnc, BatchDec) and a 2-player secret-sharing scheme (Share, Reconstruct). As in Section 4, we overload the notation $\Sigma_{\sigma_i} = (\text{Gen}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Enc}_{\sigma_i}, \text{Dec}_{\sigma_i})$ by $\Sigma_i = (\text{Gen}_i, \text{Enc}_i, \text{Dec}_i)$ for ease of notation.

- $\text{ReKeyGen}(1^\lambda, \Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, sk_f, pk_t)$:
 - Compute $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(sk_f)$
 - $(\hat{pk}, \hat{sk}) \leftarrow \text{BatchGen}(1^\lambda, s_1)$
 - Compute $\tilde{ct}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, \hat{sk})$
 - Output $rk_{f \rightarrow t} := (\hat{pk}, s_2, \tilde{ct}_t)$.
- $\text{ReEnc}(\Sigma_f, \Sigma_t, rk_{f \rightarrow t}, ct_f)$:
 - Parse $rk_{f \rightarrow t} = (\hat{pk}, s_2, \tilde{ct}_t)$.
 - Parse $ct_f = (\hat{ct}', \tilde{ct}_f, \tilde{ct}'_f)$.
 - If this is the first re-encryption (1st level), set $C \leftarrow P[s_2, ct_f]$; Else if (level $i > 1$), set $C \leftarrow Q[s_2, \hat{ct}', \tilde{ct}_f, \tilde{ct}'_f]$
 - Compute $(\tilde{C}, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C)$.
 - Compute $\hat{ct} \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \text{labels})$.
 - Compute $\tilde{ct}'_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, \tilde{C})$.
 - Output $(\hat{ct}, \tilde{ct}_t, \tilde{ct}'_t)$.
- $\text{mDec}(\Sigma_t, sk_t, rct, i)$: Parse $rct = (\hat{ct}, \tilde{ct}_t, \tilde{ct}'_t)$.
 - Compute $\hat{sk}' \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk_t, \tilde{ct}_t)$.
 - Compute $\widetilde{\text{labels}}_i \leftarrow \text{BatchDec}(\hat{sk}', \hat{ct})$.
 - Compute $\tilde{C}_i := \tilde{C} \leftarrow \text{Dec}_t(sk_t, \tilde{ct}'_t)$.
 - For $j = i, \dots, 2$ do: Compute $(\tilde{C}_{j-1}, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_{j-1}) \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_j, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_j)$.
 - Compute and output $m' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_1)$.




Figure 5: The description of the first level re-encryption circuit P




Figure 6: The description of the higher level re-encryption circuit Q

Efficiency. Encrypted garbled circuit $\tilde{c}t'_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk_{k_f}, \tilde{C})$ is hard-wired in $Q_{[s_2, \hat{c}t', \tilde{c}t_f, \tilde{c}t'_f]}$ and Q is garbled. That is, garbled circuits are nested. This incurs polynomial blow-up. Thus, we can apply the re-encryption algorithm only constant time.

Correctness. The correctness follows by a similar argument to that of UPRE_{gc} in Section 5.2.

We will first show correctness for level 1 ciphertexts. Let thus $rct = (\hat{c}t, \tilde{c}t_t, \tilde{c}t'_t)$ be a level 1 ciphertext, where $\tilde{c}t'_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, \tilde{C}_1)$ and $(\tilde{C}_1, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(P_{[s_2, ct_f]})$, $\hat{c}t = \text{BatchEnc}(pk, \text{labels})$ and $\tilde{c}t_t = \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, \hat{s}k)$. Consider the computation of $m\text{Dec}(\Sigma_t, sk_t, rct)$. By the correctness of Σ_t it holds that $\hat{s}k' = \text{Dec}(sk_t, \tilde{c}t_t) = \hat{s}k$ and $\tilde{C}_1 = \text{Dec}(sk_t, \tilde{c}t'_t)$. Next, by the correctness of the batch public key encryption ($\text{BatchGen}, \text{BatchEnc}, \text{BatchDec}$) it holds that $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{BatchDec}(\hat{s}k, \hat{c}t) = \text{labels}_{s_1}$. Thus, by the correctness of the garbling scheme ($\text{Garble}, \text{Eval}$) it holds that $\text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_1, \widetilde{\text{labels}}) = \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_1, \text{labels}_{s_1}) = P_{[s_2, ct_f]}(s_1)$. By the definition of P, $P_{[s_2, ct_f]}(s_1)$ computes $sk_f \leftarrow \text{Reconstruct}(s_1, s_2)$ and outputs $m' \leftarrow \text{Dec}_f(sk'_f, ct_f)$. Thus, by the correctness of ($\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct}$) it holds that $sk'_f = sk_f$ and finally by the correctness of Σ_f we get that $m' = m$.

Now we consider a ciphertext $rct = (\hat{c}t, \tilde{c}t_t, \tilde{c}t'_t)$ at level $i > 1$. As before, it holds that $\tilde{c}t'_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk_t, \tilde{C}_i)$, $(\tilde{C}_i, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(Q_{[s_2, \hat{c}t', \tilde{c}t_f, \tilde{c}t'_f]})$, $\hat{c}t = \text{BatchEnc}(pk, \text{labels})$ and $\tilde{c}t_t = \text{Enc}_t(pk_t, \hat{s}k)$. Again consider the computation of $m\text{Dec}(\Sigma_t, sk_t, rct)$. By the correctness of Σ_t it holds that $\hat{s}k' = \text{Dec}(sk_t, \tilde{c}t_t) = \hat{s}k$ and $\tilde{C}_i = \text{Dec}(sk_t, \tilde{c}t'_t)$. Next, by the correctness of the batch public key encryption scheme ($\text{BatchGen}, \text{BatchEnc}, \text{BatchDec}$) it holds that $\widetilde{\text{labels}} = \text{BatchDec}(\hat{s}k, \hat{c}t) = \text{labels}_{s_1}$. Thus, by the correctness of the garbling scheme ($\text{Garble}, \text{Eval}$) it holds that $\text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_i, \widetilde{\text{labels}}_i) = \text{Eval}(\tilde{C}_i, \text{labels}_{s_1}) = Q_{[s_2, \hat{c}t', \tilde{c}t_f, \tilde{c}t'_f]}(s_1)$.

Notice now that we can substitute $Q_{[s_2, \hat{c}t', \tilde{c}t_f, \tilde{c}t'_f]}(s_1)$ by

- Compute $sk'_f \leftarrow \text{Reconstruct}(s_1, s_2)$.
- Compute $\hat{s}k \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk_f, \tilde{c}t_f)$.
- Compute $\tilde{C}_{i-1} \leftarrow \text{Dec}(sk_f, \tilde{c}t'_f)$ and $\widetilde{\text{labels}} \leftarrow \text{BatchDec}(\hat{s}k, \hat{c}t')$.

By the correctness of ($\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct}$) it holds that $sk'_f = \text{Reconstruct}(s_1, s_2) = sk_f$. By inspection we see that the remaining steps of the computation are evaluating garbled circuits again and again until $i = 2$. By combining with the level 1 case, the correctness follows.

6.2 Security Proof

Theorem 6.1 (UPRE-CRA security). *Assume that $gc = (\text{Garble}, \text{Eval})$ is a selectively secure garbling scheme, $(\text{Share}, \text{Reconstruct})$ is a 2-out-of-2 secret sharing scheme and $(\text{BatchGen}, \text{BatchEnc}, \text{BatchDec})$ is a weak batch encryption scheme in the sense of Definition 5.1, and both Σ_f and Σ_t are IND-CPA secure PKE, then UPRE_{cra} is selective-graph UPRE-CRA secure.*

Proof. The proof is basically the same as that of Theorem 5.3 in Section 5 except that we need three more hybrids in addition to the hybrids in Theorem 5.3. Note that we can also guess i_c with probability $1/|V_c^*|$. Thus, we write only the new hybrids. In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(b)$, sk_{i^*} is never used.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,1}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(b)$ except that for all (i_{-1}, i^*) such that $i_{-1} \in V_c^*$ ($(i_{-1}, i^*) \in E^*$), ciphertext \tilde{ct}_{i^*} in the re-encryption key $rk_{i_{-1} \rightarrow i^*}$ is generated by $\text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, \underline{0}^{\ell_{i^*}})$ instead of $\text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, \hat{sk})$. We can prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,1}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(b)$ hold due to the CPA-security of Σ_{i^*} in a similar way to Lemma 5.7.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,2}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,1}(b)$ except that for the challenge query (i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1) to \mathcal{O}_{cha} , \hat{ct}_{i^*} in the target ciphertext rct_{i^*} is generated by $\text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, \underline{0}^{\ell_j})$ instead of $\text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, \tilde{C})$ where $(\tilde{C}, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\text{P}[s_2, ct_c])$. Note that we can easily simulate $rk_{i_{-1} \rightarrow i^*}$ for $i_{-1} \in V_c^*$ since $sk_{i_{-1}}$ is revealed. We prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,2}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,1}(b)$ hold due to the CPA-security of Σ_{i^*} in Lemma 6.3.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,3}(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,2}(b)$ except that for the challenge query (i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1) to \mathcal{O}_{cha} , \hat{ct} in the target ciphertext rct_{i^*} is generated by $\text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, (\underline{0}, \underline{0}))$ instead of $\text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \text{labels})$. Note that we do not use \hat{sk} for the re-encryption key from i_c to i^* anywhere in this game since $i^* \in V_h^*$. We prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,3}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,2}(b)$ hold due to the standard CPA-security of the weak batch encryption in Lemma 6.4. In $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,3}(b)$, $\text{rct}_{i^*} = (\text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, (\underline{0}, \underline{0})), \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_j}), \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_j}))$. Thus, it is easy to see that the advantage of \mathcal{A} is just $\frac{1}{2}$ since there is no information about b in these hybrids. Thus, $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,2}(0) = \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,3}(1) = \frac{1}{2}$ and the theorem follows. ■

Lemma 6.2. *If Σ_{i^*} is IND-CPA secure PKE, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,1}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(b)$.*

Proof. We can prove in a similar way to the proof of Lemma 5.7, so we omit this. ■

Lemma 6.3. *If Σ_{i^*} is IND-CPA secure PKE, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,2}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,1}(b)$.*

Proof. We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} of Σ_{i^*} , which is given pk_{i^*} as a target public key. To use \mathcal{A} of UPRE, \mathcal{B} generates key pairs $(pk_{i'}, sk_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus \{i^*\}$. \mathcal{B} sets pk_{i^*} as a public-key of user i^* . In experiments $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{2,Q,3}(b)$, sk_{i^*} is not used anywhere by the definition of the experiments. When (i^*, j) is queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $(i^*, j) \in E^*$, \mathcal{B} can generate a re-encryption key without sk_{i^*} . When (i^*, j, k) is queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ such that $j \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$ and $(ct_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT, m) \in \text{KeyCTList}$, \mathcal{B} can generate a re-encrypted ciphertext without sk_{i^*} as we see in the proof of Theorem 5.3. When (i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1) is queried to the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} , then \mathcal{B} passes $(\tilde{C}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}})$ where $(\tilde{C}, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(\text{P}[s_2, ct_c])$ and $ct_c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_c(pk_c, m_b)$ to the challenger of IND-CPA game of Σ_{i^*} and receives a target ciphertext \hat{ct}_{i^*} . \mathcal{B} returns $(\text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \text{labels}), \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}}), \hat{ct}_{i^*})$ to \mathcal{A} . If \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, then \mathcal{B} can break the security of Σ_{i^*} since the case $\hat{ct}_{i^*} = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, \tilde{C})$ and the case $\hat{ct}_{i^*} = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}})$ perfectly simulate $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,1}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,2}(b)$, respectively. ■

Lemma 6.4. *If $(\text{BatchGen}, \text{BatchEnc}, \text{BatchDec})$ satisfies the IND-CPA security, then it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,2}(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,3}(b)$.*

Proof. At this point, \hat{sk} is never used since it was erased at $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,1}(b)$ and $i^* \in V_h^*$. In addition, sk_{i_c} is known (since $i_c \in V_c^*$). We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} of IND-CPA security of the weak batch encryption.

\mathcal{B} generates keys for all users. Here, $i_c \in V_c^*$ is corrupted, so \mathcal{B} has sk_{i_c} . When (i^*, j) is queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ such that $(i^*, j) \in E^*$, \mathcal{B} can generate a re-encryption key without sk_{i^*} as we see in the proof of Theorem 5.3. When

(i^*, j, k) is queried to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ such that $j \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$ and $(ct_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#CT, m) \in \text{KeyCTList}$, \mathcal{B} can generate a re-encrypted ciphertext without sk_{i^*} as we see in the proof of Theorem 5.3.

For the re-encryption key from i_c to i^* , \mathcal{B} can use sk_{i_c} to generate $(s_1, s_2) \leftarrow \text{Share}(sk_c)$. \mathcal{B} sends s_1 to the challenger of the IND-CPA game, receives a public key \hat{pk} of the weak batch encryption scheme, and sets $rk_{i_c \rightarrow i^*} := (\hat{pk}, s_2, \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}}))$. When (i_c, i^*, m_0, m_1) is queried to the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} , then \mathcal{B} passes labels where $(\tilde{C}, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(P[s_2, ct_c])$ and receives \hat{ct} from the challenger of IND-CPA game of the weak batch encryption. \mathcal{B} returns $(\hat{ct}, \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}}), \text{Enc}_{i^*}(pk_{i^*}, 0^{\ell_{i^*}}))$ to \mathcal{A} . If \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, then \mathcal{B} can break the IND-CPA security of the weak batch encryption since the case $\hat{ct} = \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, \text{labels})$ and the case $\hat{ct} = \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{pk}, (\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{0}))$ perfectly simulate $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,2}(b)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^{3,3}(b)$, respectively. ■

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A Re-Encryption Simulatability

We review the notion of re-encryption simulatability of PRE by Cohen. For the syntax and standard CPA-security of PRE, see previous works [Coh19, ABH09]. Roughly speaking, re-encryption simulatability means that a re-encrypted ciphertext generated from $rk_{i \rightarrow j}$ and ct_i under pk_i can be simulated without $rk_{i \rightarrow j}$ if pk_i, pk_j, ct_i , and m are given where ct_i is an encryption of m under pk_i . Moreover, the simulated re-encrypted ciphertext is *statistically* indistinguishable from the honestly generated re-encrypted ciphertext even if $sk_i, sk_j, rk_{i \rightarrow j}$ are given as auxiliary information. The definition below is found in the paper by Choen [Coh19, Definition 7].

Definition A.1 (Re-Encryption Simulatability [Coh19]). A proxy re-encryption scheme is re-encryption simulatable if there exists a PPT algorithm ReEncSim such that for all $m \in \mathcal{M}$

$$(\text{ReEncSim}(z), z) \stackrel{s}{\approx} (\text{ReEnc}(rk_{i \rightarrow j}, ct_i), z),$$

where $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$, $(pk_i, sk_i) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp)$, $(pk_j, sk_j) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp)$, $rk_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(sk_j, pk_i)$, $ct_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(pk_i, m)$, $z := (pp, pk_i, pk_j, sk_j, ct_i, m)$.

Theorem A.2 ([Coh19]). *If a PRE scheme is PRE-CPA secure and re-encryption simulatable, then it is PRE-HRA secure.*

We can consider re-encryption simulatability for UPRE as Definition A.3.

Definition A.3 (Re-encryption simulatability for UPRE). *A UPRE scheme is re-encryption simulatable if there exists a PPT algorithm ReEncSim such that for all $m \in \mathcal{M}$*

$$(\text{ReEncSim}(z), z) \stackrel{s}{\approx} (\text{ReEnc}(\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f), z),$$

where $(\text{pk}_f, \text{sk}_f) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_f}(1^{\lambda_f})$, $(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\sigma_t}(1^{\lambda_t})$, $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$, $\text{ct}_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_f, m)$, $z := (\text{pk}_f, \text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t, \text{ct}_f, m)$.

Remark A.4. Cohen updated his paper [Coh17] and revised the re-encryption simulatability [Coh19]. In the latest definition, ReEncSim takes sk_j as an input too, and $(\text{sk}_i, \text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j})$ are not given as auxiliary input as above.

A.1 Our Relaxed UPRE schemes are not Re-Encryption Simulatable

A re-encrypted ciphertext of UPRE_{gc} is $\text{rct} = (\hat{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t, \tilde{C}_1, \dots, \tilde{C}_1)$ where $\hat{\text{ct}}_t \leftarrow \text{BatchEnc}(\hat{\text{pk}}, \text{labels})$, $\tilde{\text{ct}}_t \leftarrow \text{Enc}_t(\text{pk}_t, \hat{\text{sk}})$, $(\tilde{C}_i, \text{labels}) \leftarrow \text{Garble}(C_i)$, and $C_1 := \text{P}[s_2, \text{ct}_f]$ and $C_i \leftarrow \text{Q}[s_2, \hat{\text{ct}}', \tilde{\text{ct}}_f]$ for $i > 1$. We can simulate ct_f since we have m . However, we do not know how to simulate \tilde{C}_i in a *statistically* indistinguishable way because a simulator ReEncSim does not have sk_f in the re-encryption simulatability setting. Due to a similar reason, UPRE_{cra} does not satisfy Definition A.3.

However, as we see in the proof of Theorem 5.3 (in particular, Lemmata 5.5 and 5.6), we can simulate \tilde{C}_i in a *computationally* indistinguishable way by using the security of GC and weak batch encryption. The point is that sk_f (delegator's key) is not revealed to adversaries though sk_t (delegatee's key) is revealed when we consider honest re-encryption attacks. Moreover, in that case (delegatee's key is corrupted), the re-encryption key $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} = (\hat{\text{pk}}, s_2, \tilde{\text{ct}}_t)$ is not given to adversaries. That is, we do not need s_2 when delegator/delegatee are honest/corrupted, respectively. Therefore, we can simulate the honest encryption oracle in an indistinguishable way in the proof of Theorem 5.3 without re-encryption simulatability. We can observe a similar fact in the proof of Theorem 6.1.

Based on the observation above, it seems that giving sk_f and $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ to adversaries makes the re-encryption simulatability stronger. Moreover, there is a possibility to weaken re-encryption simulatability, yet the weaker simulatability still implies the HRA security. We introduce such a weaker simulatability in the next section.

A.2 Weak Re-Encryption Simulatability

We can consider a weak re-encryption simulatability for UPRE (and PRE).

Definition A.5 (Weak Re-encryption simulatability for UPRE). *Let ReEncSim be a PPT simulator. We define the following experiments $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{w-re-sim}}(1^\lambda, b)$ between a challenger and a distinguisher \mathcal{D} as follows.*

1. *The challenger generates $(\text{pk}_f, \text{sk}_f) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_f(1^{\lambda_f})$, $(\text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_t(1^{\lambda_t})$, and sends $(1^{\lambda_f}, \text{pk}_f, 1^{\lambda_t}, \text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t)$ to \mathcal{D} .*
2. *The challenger and \mathcal{D} do the setup phase as in Definition 3.9 and set $\text{HList} := \text{HList} \cup \{f\}$ and $\text{CList} := \text{CList} \cup \{t\}$.*
3. *\mathcal{D} has the re-encryption key oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ as in Definition 3.9.*
4. *\mathcal{D} chooses a message $m \in \mathcal{M}_f$, generates a ciphertext $\text{ct}_f \leftarrow \text{Enc}_f(\text{pk}_f, m)$ and sends (m, ct_f) to the challenger.*
5. *If $b = 0$, the challenger computes $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\text{sk}_f, \text{pk}_t)$ and $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{ReEnc}(\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}, \text{ct}_f)$ and returns ct^* to \mathcal{D} . Otherwise, the challenger returns $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{ReEncSim}(\text{pk}_f, \text{pk}_t, \text{sk}_t, \text{ct}_f, m)$.*
6. *\mathcal{D} outputs $b' \in \{0, 1\}$. The experiment outputs b' .*

We say that UPRE is weakly re-encryption simulatable if there exists a simulator ReEncSim , for any PPT \mathcal{D} , it holds that

$$|\Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{w-re-sim}}(1^\lambda, 0) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{D}}^{\text{w-re-sim}}(1^\lambda, 1) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

The difference between the re-encryption simulatability and a weak one is that the indistinguishability is only computational. Moreover, the distinguisher is given oracle access to the re-encryption key oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$. Note that $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ does not give $\text{rk}_{f \rightarrow t}$ since $f \in \text{HList} \wedge t \in \text{CList}$. This weak variant is sufficient to prove UPRE-HRA security. That is, we can prove that if a UPRE scheme is UPRE-CPA secure and weakly re-encryption simulatable, then it is UPRE-HRA secure.

Theorem A.6. *If a UPRE scheme UPRE is multi-hop selective-graph UPRE-CPA secure and satisfies weak re-encryption simulatability, then UPRE is multi-hop selective-graph UPRE-HRA secure.*

Proof. We define hybrid games.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$: The first experiment is the original security experiment for b , $\text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. That is, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) = \text{Exp}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\text{upre-msg-hra}}(1^\lambda, b)$. Note that in the successive experiments, we can easily simulate all keys in $G = (V, E)$ since vertices in V are not connected to the target vertex in G^* and simulators can generate keys for them by itself.

$\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$: This experiment is the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$ except that

1. we record not only $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#\text{CT})$ but also m in KeyCTList for honest encryption query (i, m) and
2. for re-encryption query (i, j', k) such that $j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$, the re-encrypted ciphertext is differently generated as follows. First, we retrieve $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#\text{CT} = k, m)$ from KeyCTList (if there is no such an entry, just outputs \perp). Then, we compute the following value instead of computing $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}$.

$$(a) \text{ rct} \leftarrow \text{ReEncSim}(\text{pk}_i, \text{pk}_{j'}, \text{sk}_{j'}, \text{ct}_i, m).$$

Finally, we set rct as a re-encrypted ciphertext for user j' and send it to \mathcal{A} .

Note that for (i, j') such that $i \in V_h^* \wedge j' \in V_c^*$, we do not need sk_i and $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}$ since we just output \perp for such $(i, j') \in E^*$. The change above is for ciphertexts that \mathcal{A} can decrypt. Here, \mathcal{A} can obtain $\text{sk}_{j'}$ since user j' is corrupted. However, it is not an issue since a distinguisher is given $\text{sk}_{j'}$ as auxiliary input in the weak re-encryption simulatability game. In Lemma A.7, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b) \stackrel{s}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$ holds due to the weak re-encryption simulatability.

In Lemma A.8, we prove that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(1)$ holds due to the UPRE-CPA security of Σ_{i^*} . Therefore, it holds that $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(1)$ by Lemmata A.7 and A.8 ■

Lemma A.7. *If UPRE is weakly re-encryption simulatable, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$.*

Proof. In fact, we use q' intermediate hybrids to prove this where q' is the number of uncorrupted key pk_i such that re-encryption query (i, j', k) is sent and $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$. For each hybrid, we use the weak re-encryption simulatability. Below, we write only the case for one pk_i for simplicity.

We construct a distinguisher \mathcal{D} of the weak re-encryption simulatability. To use \mathcal{A} of UPRE, \mathcal{D} generates key pairs $(\text{pk}_{i'}, \text{sk}_{i'})$ for all $i' \in \text{HList} \setminus \{i\}$ and $i' \in \text{CList} \setminus \{j'\}$. For $\text{pk}_i, \text{pk}_{j'}, \text{sk}_{j'}$, we use keys $(1^{\lambda_i}, \text{pk}_i, 1^{\lambda_{j'}} \text{pk}_{j'}, \text{sk}_{j'})$ from the challenger, which is given to \mathcal{D} . The only issue is that we do not have sk_i and $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}$. First, we do not need $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}$ since $i \in \text{HList} \wedge j' \in \text{CList}$. Second, for re-encryption keys (i, \hat{j}) such that $\hat{j} \in \text{HList}$, \mathcal{D} passes the query (i, \hat{j}) to the re-encryption key oracle $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}$ in the weak re-encryption simulatability game, receives $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow \hat{j}}$, and returns it to \mathcal{A} . This is possible since $i, \hat{j} \in \text{HList}$. Therefore, \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles.

However, to use \mathcal{A} , \mathcal{D} simulates $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ in a slightly different way. As we define $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$, the simulation for query (i, j', k) to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ such that $j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$ and $(\text{ct}_i, \Sigma_i, i, \#\text{CT}, m) \in \text{KeyCTList}$ is different. When \mathcal{D} receives a re-encryption query for such (i, j', k) , \mathcal{D} generates $\text{ct}_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_i(\text{pk}_i, m)$ and sends it to the challenger of the weak re-encryption simulatability game. If \mathcal{D} is given ct^* , then \mathcal{D} returns ct^* as a re-encrypted ciphertext for (i, j', k) . Note that \mathcal{B} does not need sk_i for this query. This completes the simulation. If $\text{ct}^* = \text{ReEnc}(\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'}, \text{ct}_i)$ where $\text{rk}_{i \rightarrow j'} \leftarrow \text{ReKeyGen}(\text{sk}_i, \text{pk}_{j'})$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^0(b)$. If $\text{ct}^* \leftarrow \text{ReEncSim}(\text{pk}_i, \text{pk}_{j'}, \text{sk}_{j'}, \text{ct}_i, m)$, then the view is totally the same as $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(b)$. Therefore, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiment, \mathcal{D} can break the weak re-encryption simulatability. ■

Lemma A.8. *If UPRE is UPRE-CPA secure, then it holds $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(0) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(1)$.*

Proof. We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} of UPRE-CPA, which is given oracle access to $\mathcal{O}_{\text{rekey}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}, \mathcal{O}_{\text{cha}}$ and can send honest/corrupted key queries. To use a distinguisher \mathcal{A} of these two hybrids, \mathcal{B} must simulate oracles of the HRA security. Basically, \mathcal{B} can easily simulate them by using its oracles except \mathcal{O}_{enc} and $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ (note that re-encryption key oracles in the CPA/HRA-security are the same). Moreover, it is easy to simulate \mathcal{O}_{enc} since all encryption keys are public. The only issue is the simulation of $\mathcal{O}_{\text{reenc}}$ in the case that re-encryption queries (i, j', k) such that $j' \in \text{CList} \wedge k \notin \text{Drv}$ are sent. This is already solved since we use ReEncSim in these hybrids. Thus, \mathcal{B} can simulate all oracles by using its oracles and ReEncSim.

When (i^*, m_0, m_1) is queried to the challenge oracle \mathcal{O}_{cha} , then \mathcal{B} passes (i^*, m_0, m_1) to the challenger of the CPA game and receives a target ciphertext $\text{ct}_{i^*}^*$. \mathcal{B} returns $\text{ct}_{i^*}^*$ to \mathcal{A} . If \mathcal{A} can distinguish two experiments, then \mathcal{B} can break the CPA security since $\text{ct}_{i^*}^* = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_0)$ and $\text{ct}_{i^*}^* = \text{Enc}_{i^*}(\text{pk}_{i^*}, m_1)$ perfectly simulate $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(0)$ and $\text{Hyb}_{\mathcal{A}}^1(1)$, respectively. ■