Bidirectional Asynchronous Ratcheted Key Agreement without Key-Update Primitives

F. Betül Durak and Serge Vaudenay

Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) LASEC - Security and Cryptography Laboratory Lausanne, Switzerland

Abstract. Following up mass surveillance and privacy issues, modern secure communication protocols now seek more security such as forward secrecy and post-compromise security. They cannot rely on an assumption such as synchronization, predictable sender/receiver roles, or online availability. At EUROCRYPT 2017 and 2018, key agreement with forward secrecy and zero round-trip time (0-RTT) were studied. Ratcheting was introduced to address forward secrecy and post-compromise security in real-world messaging protocols. At CSF 2016 and CRYPTO 2017, ratcheting was studied either without 0-RTT or without bidirectional communication. At CRYPTO 2018, ratcheting with bidirectional communication was done using heavy key-update primitives, which involve hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE).

In this work, we define the bidirectional asynchronous ratcheted key agreement (BARK) with formal security notions. We provide a simple security model with a pragmatic approach and design the first secure BARK scheme not using key-update primitives. Our notion offers forward secrecy and post-compromise security. It is asynchronous, with random roles, and 0-RTT. It is based on a cryptosystem, a signature scheme, one-time symmetric encryption, and a collision-resistant hash function family without key-update primitives or random oracles. Compared to previous protocols, ours is much faster and exchanging n messages has complexity O(n) while others have $O(n^2)$. We further show that BARK (even unidirectional) implies public-key cryptography, meaning that it cannot solely rely on symmetric cryptography.

1 Introduction

In standard communication systems, protocols are designed to provide messaging services with end-to-end encryption that provides security for the users.

In bidirectional two-party secure communication, participants alternate their role as a *sender* and a *receiver*. Essentially, secure communication reduces to continuously exchanging keys, because each message requires a new key.

The modern instant messaging protocols are substantially *asynchronous*. In other words, for a two-party communication, the messages should be transmitted (or the key exchange should be done) even though the counterpart is not online. Moreover, to be able to send the payload data without requiring online exchanges is a major design goal called *zero round trip time* (θ -*RTT*). Finally, the moment when a participant wants to send a message is undefined, meaning that participants use *random roles* (sender or receiver) without any synchronization. Namely, they could send messages at the same time. Being asynchronous, with 0-RTT, and random roles make the formalism more difficult and tedious.

Even though many systems were designed for the privacy of their users, they rapidly faced security vulnerabilities caused by the *compromises* of the participants' states. In this work, compromising a participant means to obtain some of its internal information. We will call it *exposure*.

The desired security notion is that compromised information should not uncover more than possible by trivial attacks. For instance, the compromised state of participants should not allow decrypting past communication. This is called *forward secrecy*. Typically, forward secrecy is obtained by updating states with a one-way function $x \to H(x) \to H(H(x)) \to ...$ and deleting old

entries. It is used, for instance, in RFID protocols [13,14]. One mechanical technique to allow moving forward and preventing from moving backward is to use a *ratchet*. In secure communication, ratcheting also includes the use of randomness in every state update so that a compromised state is not enough to decrypt future communication as well. This is called *future secrecy* or *backward secrecy* or *post-compromise security* or even *self-healing*.

One thesis of the present work is that healing after an active attack involving a forgery is not a nice property. We show that it implies insecurity. After one participant is compromised and impersonated, if communication self-heals, it means that some adversary can make a trivial attack which is not detected. We also show other insecurity cases. Hence, we rather mandate communication to be cut after active attacks.

Our goal is to obtain ratcheting security. To define it, we must exclude attacks which trivially exploit leakages. In this work, we adopt a very easy-to-understand rule: messages which are acknowledged by the legitimate receiver are considered safe (unless trivial passive attacks). This way, as soon as a sender confirms that his message was well received, the sender has strong guarantees that his message is safe and will remain so.

Previous work. The security of key exchange was studied by many authors. The prominent models are the CK and eCK models [4, 12].

Techniques for ratcheting first appeared in real life protocols. It appeared in the Off-the-Record (OTR) communication system by Borisov et al. [3]. The Signal protocol designed by Open Whisper Systems [16] later gained a lot of interest from message communication companies. Today, the WhatsApp messaging application reached billions of users worldwide [19]. It uses the Signal protocol.

A broad survey about various techniques and terminologies was made at S&P 2015 by Unger et al. [17].

At CSF 2016, Cohn-Gordon et al. [6] studied bidirectional ratcheted communication and proposed a protocol. However, their protocol does not offer 0-RTT and requires synchronized roles.

At EuroS&P 2017, Cohn-Gordon et al. [5] formally studied Signal.

At CRYPTO 2017, Bellare et al. [2] gave a secure ratcheting key exchange protocol. Their protocol is unidirectional and does not allow receiver exposure. They further construct secure communication (i.e. authentication and encryption) from a key agreement and symmetric authenticated encryption.

At CRYPTO 2018, Poettering and Rösler [15] studied bidirectional asynchronous ratcheted key agreement and presented a protocol which is secure in the random oracle model. Their solution further relies on hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) but offers stronger security than what we aim at, leaving the room to better protocols.

At the same conference, Jaeger and Stepanovs [10] had similar results but focused on secure communication rather than key agreement. They give another protocol relying on HIBE. In both results, HIBE is used to construct encryption/signature schemes with key-update security. This is a rather new notion allowing forward secrecy but is expensive to achieve. In both cases, it was claimed that the depth of HIBE is really small. However, when participants are disconnected and continue sending several messages, the depth grows up quite fast. Consequently, HIBE needs unbounded depth.

0-RTT communication with forward secrecy was achieved using puncturable encryption by Günther et al. at EUROCRYPT 2017 [9]. Later on, at EUROCRYPT 2018, Derler et al. made it quite practical by using Bloom filters [7].

Two papers appeared after the first version of the current paper was released.

At EUROCRYPT 2019, Jost, Maurer, and Mularczyk [11] designed another ratcheting protocol which has *near-optimal security* and does not use HIBE. Nevertheless, it still has a huge complexity: When messages alternate well (i.e., no participant sends two messages without receiving one in between), processing n messages requires O(n) operations in total. However, when messages accumulate before alternating (for instance, because the participants are disconnected by the network), the complexity becomes $O(n^2)$. This is also the case for Poettering-Rösler [15] and Jaeger-Stepanovs [10].¹ One advantage of the Jost-Maurer-Mularczyk protocol [11] comes with the resilience with random coin leakage as discussed below.

At EUROCRYPT 2019, Alwen, Coretti, and Dodis [1] designed two other ratcheting protocols aiming at *instant decryption*, i.e. the ability to decrypt even though some previous messages have not been received yet. This is closer to real-life protocols but this comes with a potential threat: keys to decrypt un-delivered messages are stored until the messages are delivered. Hence, the adversary could choose to hold messages and decrypt them with future state exposure. This weakens forward secrecy, as it can only be obtained if adversaries never prevent message deliveries. Furthermore, unless the direction of communication changes (or more precisely, if the *epoch* increases), their protocols are not really ratcheting as no random coins are used to update the state. This weakens post-compromise security as well. In Table 1, we call this weaker security "pragmatic". The lighter of the two protocols is not competing in the same category because it mostly uses symmetric cryptography. It is more efficient but with lower security. Namely, corrupting the state of a participant A implies impersonating B to A, and also decrypting the messages that A sends. Other protocols do not have this weakness. Yet, they are slower. The second protocol by Alwen, Coretti, and Dodis [1] uses asymmetric cryptography.

Some authors address the corruption of random coins in different ways. Bellare et al. [2] and Jost et al. [11] allow leaking the random coins just *after* use. Jaeger and Stepanovs [10] allow leaking it just *before* usage only. Alwen et al. [1] allow adversarially *chosen* random coins. In most of the protocols, revealing (or choosing) the random coins imply revealing some part of the new state which allows decrypting incoming messages. It is comparable to state exposure. Jost et al. [11] offers better security as revealing the random coins reveals the new state (and allow to decrypt) only when the previous state was already known.

Table 1: Comparison of Protocols: complexity for exchanging n messages in alternating or accumulating mode, with timing (in seconds) for n = 900 of comparable implementations; and types of coin-leakage security (\Rightarrow state exposure means coins leakage implies a state exposure).

	Security	Complexity			Coins leakage resilience	
				accumu		
Poettering-Rösler [15]	*			5897.35	. ,	
Jaeger-Stepanovs [10]	optimal	58.07	O(n)	9087.28	$O(n^2)$	pre-send leakage, \Rightarrow state exposure
BARK [this paper]	sub-optimal	1.61	O(n)	0.99	O(n)	chosen coins, \Rightarrow state exposure
Jost-Maurer-Mularczyk [11]	near-optimal	2.08	O(n)	11.41	$O(n^2)$	post-send leakage
Alwen-Coretti-Dodis [1]	pragmatic	1.18	O(n)	0.92	O(n)	chosen coins, \Rightarrow state exposure

Our contributions. We give a definition for a bidirectional asynchronous key agreement (BARK) along with security properties. We start setting the stage with some definitions (such as *matching status*) then identify all cases leading to trivial attacks. We split them into *direct* and *indirect leakages*. Then, we define security with a KIND game (privacy). We also consider the resistance to forgery (impersonation) and the resistance to attacks which would heal after active attacks (RECOVER security). We use these two notions as a helper to prove KIND-security. We finally construct a secure protocol. Our design choices are detailed below and compared to other papers. More comprehensive and technical comparisons between BARK and Bellare et al. [2], Jaeger-Stepanovs [10], and Poettering-Rösler [15] are given in Appendix C.

1. **Simplicity**. Contrarily to previous work, we define KIND security in a very comprehensive way by moving all technicalities in a *cleanness* predicate which identifies and captures all trivial ways of attacking.

¹ This is only visible in the corrected version of the paper on eprint [10].

2. Strong security. In the same line as previous works, the adversary in our model can see the entire communication between participants and control the delivery. Of course, he can replace messages with anything. Scheduling communications is under the control of the adversary. This means that the time when a participant sends or receives messages is decided by the adversary. Moreover, the adversary is capable of corrupting participants by making exposures of their internal data. We separate two types of exposures: the exposure of the state (that is kept in internal machinery of a participant) and the exposure of the key (which is produced by the key agreement and given to an external protocol). This is because states are (normally) kept secure in our protocol while the generated key leaves to other applications which may leak for different reasons. In the beginning, we do not consider exposure of the random coins for simplicity. Later on, we show how to address random-coin-leakage resilience (with adversarially chosen random coins) in Section 6. Essentially, we just need to update our way to decide if an attack is trivial or not in the security definition. For that, we consider that each Send call made by the adversary with corrupted coins counts as two exposure calls, which reveal both the generated key and the state.

3. Slightly sub-optimal security. Using the result from exposure allows the adversary to be quite active, e.g. by impersonating the exposed participant. However, the adversary is not allowed to use exposures to mount a *trivial* attack. Identifying such trivial attacks is not easy. As a design goal, we adopt not to forbid more than what the intuitive notion of ratcheting captures. We do forbid a bit more than Poettering-Rösler [15] and Jaeger-Stepanovs [10] which are considered of having optimal security and than Jost-Maurer-Mularczyk [11] (which has near-optimal security), though, allowing lighter building blocks. Namely, we need no key-update primitives and have linear-time complexity in terms of the number of exchanged messages, even when the network is occasionally down. This translates to an important speedup factor, as shown on Table 1. We argue that this is a reasonable choice enabling ratchet security as we define it: unless trivial leakage, a message is private as long as it is acknowledged for reception in a subsequent message.

4. Sequence integrity. We believe that duplex communication is reliably enforced by a lower level protocol. This is assumed to solve non-malicious packets loss e.g. by resend requests and also to reconstruct the correct sequence order. What we only have to care for is when an adversary prevents the delivery of a message even though it has been requested several times. We made the choice to make the transmission of the next messages impossible under such an attack. Contrarily, Alwen et al. [1] advocate for immediate decryption, even though one message is missing. This lowers the security and we chose not to have it.

In the BARK protocol, the correctness implies that both participants generate the same keys. We define the stages *matching status, direct leakage, indirect leakage.* We aim to separate trivial attacks and trivial forgeries from non-trivial cases with our definitions. Direct and indirect leakages define the times when the adversary can deduce the key generated due to the exposure of a participant who can either be the same participant (direct) or their counterpart (indirect). Such leakages cause trivial victory of the adversary.

We construct a secure BARK protocol. We build our constructions on top of a cryptosystem and a signature scheme and achieve strong security, without key-update primitives or random oracles. We further show that a secure unidirectional BARK implies public-key cryptography.

Notations. We have two characters: Alice and Bob. Whenever we need an abbreviation, they are represented as A and B respectively. When P designates a participant, \overline{P} refers to P's counterpart. We use the roles send and rec for sender and receiver respectively. We define $\overline{send} = rec$ and $\overline{rec} = send$. When participants A and B have exclusive roles (like in unidirectional cases), we call them *sender* S and *receiver* R.

Structure of the paper. In Section 2, we define our BARK protocol along with correctness definition and security of key indistinguishability. Section 3 proves that a simple unidirectional scheme implies public-key cryptography. In Section 4 we define the security notions unforgeability and unrecoverability. In Section 5, we give our BARK construction. Appendix A recalls definitions for underlying primitives. Using plaintext-aware security, Appendix B shows that "optimally secure" protocols may still eliminate attacks which are of no harm, hence eliminate more than necessary. In Appendix C, we make some comments and comparison with the results of Bellare et al. [2], Poettering-Rösler [15], and Jaeger-Stepanovs [10].

2 Bidirectional Asynchronous Ratcheted Communication

2.1 BARK Definition and Correctness

Definition 1 (BARK). A bidirectional asynchronous ratcheted key agreement (BARK) consists of the following algorithms:

- $\operatorname{Init}(1^{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\operatorname{st}_{A}, \operatorname{st}_{B}, z)$: The initial state generation protocol lnit inputs a security parameter λ and outputs a tuple $(\operatorname{st}_{A}, \operatorname{st}_{B}, z)$ which are initial states for both Alice and Bob and some public information z.
- $\text{Send}(st_P) \xrightarrow{\$} (st'_P, upd, k): The algorithm inputs a current state st_P for P ∈ {A, B}. It outputs a tuple (st'_P, upd, k) with an updated state st'_P, a message upd, and a key k.$
- Receive(st_P, upd) \rightarrow (acc, st'_P, k): The algorithm inputs (st_P, upd) where P \in {A, B}. It outputs a triple consisting of a flag acc \in {true, false} to indicate an accept or reject of upd information, an updated state st'_P, and a key k i.e. (acc, st'_P, k).

In practice, it is convenient to consider **Init** algorithms which are *splittable*:

Definition 2 (Splittable Init). We say that the Init algorithm of a BARK is splittable if there exists some algorithms Gen_A , Gen_B , f_A , and f_B such that Init is defined by

$Init(1^{\lambda})$:	$4: st_{A} \leftarrow (sk_{A}, f_{A}(pk_{A}, pk_{B}, r))$
1: $\operatorname{Gen}_{A}(1^{\lambda}) \to (sk_{A}, pk_{A})$	$5: st_{B} \leftarrow (sk_{B}, f_{B}(pk_{A}, pk_{B}, r))$
$\mathcal{2}: \ Gen_{\mathrm{B}}(1^{\lambda}) \to (sk_{\mathrm{B}}, pk_{\mathrm{B}})$	$\textit{6: } z \leftarrow (pk_{A}, pk_{B})$
3: pick r	7: $return$ (st _A , st _B , z)

This way, private keys can be generated by their holders and there is no need to rely on an authority, except for authentication of pk_A and pk_B .

We consider bidirectional completely asynchronous communications. We can see, in Fig. 1, Alice and Bob running some sequences of Send and Receive operations without any prior agreement. Their time scale can be completely different. This means that Alice and Bob run algorithms in an asynchronous way. We define the scheduling by a sequence of users (Alice and Bob). Reading the sequence tells who executes a new step of the protocol. In our model, scheduling is controlled by the adversary. As already explained, we assume that the order of transmitted messages is preserved in each direction. If two messages arrive in different order or one was lost or replayed, it must be due to the attacks.

The protocol also uses random roles. Alice and Bob can both send and receive messages. They take their role (sender or receiver) in a sequence, but the sequence of roles of Alice is not necessarily synchronized. Sending/receiving is refined by the RATCH(P, role, [upd]) call in Fig. 2. In the correctness notion, sent messages by participants are buffered and delivered in the same order to the counterpart. Therefore, both participants can send messages at the same time.

Correctness. We say that a ratcheted communication protocol functions correctly if the receiver accepts the update information upd and generates the same key as its counterpart who generated upd. We formally define the correctness in Fig. 2. We define variables. $received_{key}^{P}$ (respectively $sent_{key}^{P}$) keeps a list of secret keys that are generated by P when running Receive (respectively, Send). Similarly, $received_{msg}^{P}$ (respectively $sent_{msg}^{P}$) keeps a list of upd information that are received (respectively sent) by P and accepted by Receive. We stress that the received sequences only keep values for which acc = true. (This will be important in the security game.)

For two communicating parties Alice and Bob, we run lnit to set up the states, and then run the correctness game in Fig. 2. The scheduling is defined by a sequence sched of tuples of form




Fig. 1: The message exchange between Alice and Bob.

either (P, send) (saying that P must run Send and send) or (P, rec) (saying that P must run Receive with whatever is received). In this game, communication between the participants uses a waiting queue for messages in each direction. Each participant has a queue of incoming messages and is pulling them in the order they have been pushed in.

Definition 3 (Correctness of BARK). We say that BARK is correct if for all sequence sched, the adversary playing the correctness game of Fig. 2 never wins. Namely, at all time, for each P, received $_{key}^{P}$ is prefix of sent $_{key}^{\overline{P} \ 2}$ and each RATCH(., rec, .) call accepts.

The correctness implies that the decryption keys for the receiver have been generated the same as encryption keys of the sender in the correct order. See Fig. 1 for the ordering of encryption/decryption keys, e.g. $sent_{key}^{Alice} = received_{key}^{Bob}$.

Security. We model our security notion with an active adversary who can have access to some of the states of Alice or Bob along with access to their secret keys enabling them to act both as a sender and as a receiver. We focus on three main security notions which are *key indistinguishability* (denoted as KIND) under the compromise of states or keys, *unforgeability* of upd information (FORGE) by the adversary which will be accepted, and *recovery from impersonation* (RECOVER) which will make the two participants restore secure communication without noticing a (trivial) impersonation resulting from a state exposure. A challenge in these notions is to eliminate the trivial attacks. FORGE and RECOVER security will be useful to prove KIND security.

2.2 KIND Security

The adversary can access four oracles called RATCH, EXP_{st} , EXP_{key} , and TEST .

RATCH. This is essentially the message exchange procedure. It is defined in Fig. 2. The adversary can call it with three inputs, a participant P, where $P \in \{A, B\}$; a role of P; and an upd


² By saying that $\mathsf{received}_{\mathsf{key}}^{\mathsf{P}}$ is prefix of $\mathsf{sent}_{\mathsf{key}}^{\overline{\mathsf{P}}}$, we mean that when n is the number of keys generated by P running Receive, then these keys are the first n keys generated by $\overline{\mathsf{P}}$ running Send.

$\begin{array}{l} \text{Oracle RATCH}(P,rec,upd) \\ 1: (acc,st_{P}',k_{P}) \leftarrow Receive(st_{P},upd) \\ 2: \text{ if acc then} \\ 3: upd_{P} \leftarrow upd \\ 4: st_{P} \leftarrow st_{P}' \\ 5: append \; kp \; to \; received_{key}^{P} \\ 6: append \; upd_{P} \; to \; received_{msg}^{P} \\ 7: \; end \; if \\ 8: \; return \; acc \\ \text{Oracle RATCH}(P, send) \\ 9: \; (st_{P}', upd_{P}, kp) \leftarrow Send(st_{P}) \\ 10: \; stp \leftarrow st_{P}' \\ 11: \; append \; kp \; to \; sent_{key}^{P} \\ 12: \; append \; upd_{P} \; to \; sent_{msg}^{P} \\ 13: \; return \; upd_{P} \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$
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Fig. 2: The correctness game.

information if the role is rec. The adversary gets upd (for role = send) or acc (for role = rec) in return.

- EXP_{st} . The adversary can expose the state of Alice or Bob. It inputs $\mathsf{P} \in \{\mathsf{A},\mathsf{B}\}$ to the EXP_{st} oracle and it receives the full state st_{P} of P .
- $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{key}}$. The adversary can expose the generated key by calling this oracle. Upon inputting P, it gets the last key k_P generated by P. If no key was generated, \perp is returned.
- **TEST.** This oracle can be called only once to receive a challenge key which is generated either uniformly at random (if the challenge bit is b = 0) or given as the last generated key of a participant P specified as input (if the challenge bit is b = 1). The oracle cannot be queried if no key was generated yet.



We specifically separate $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{key}}$ from $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}$ as the key k generated by BARK will be used by the external process which may leak. Thus, $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{key}}$ can be more frequent than $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}$, however it harms security less.

To define security, we avoid trivial attacks. Capturing the trivial cases in a broad sense requires a new set of definitions. All of them are intuitive. We introduce these definitions as follows.

We use a notion of *time* and the value of the sequences received and sent at a given time. The security game executes instructions on a time scale and variables are updated. For all global variables ν in the game such as received^P_{msg}, k_P, or st_P, we denote by $\nu(t)$ the value of ν at time t. For instance, received^A_{msg}(t) is the sequence of upd which were received and accepted by A when running Receive up to time t.

Definition 4 (Matching status). At a given time t, we say that a participant P is in a matching status if there exist times \overline{t} and t' such that 1. $t' \leq t$, 2. received $_{msg}^{P}(t) = \operatorname{sent}_{msg}^{\overline{P}}(\overline{t})$, and 3. received $_{msg}^{\overline{P}}(\overline{t}) = \operatorname{sent}_{msg}^{P}(t')$. If this is the case, we say that time t for P originates from time \overline{t} for \overline{P} .

The second condition clearly states that all the received (and accepted) upd information match the upd information sent by the counterpart of P, at some point in the past (at time \bar{t}), in the same order. The third condition similarly verifies that those messages from \bar{P} only depend on information coming from P. In Fig. 1, Bob is in a matching status with Alice because he receives the upd information in the exact order as they have sent by Alice (i.e. Bob generates k_2 after k_1 and k_4 after k_2 same as it has sent by Alice). In general, as long as no adversary switches the order of messages or creates fake messages successfully for either party, the participants are always in a matching status. The third condition is useful to prove that $k_{\rm P}(t) = k_{\rm \overline{P}}(t)$. This will be done in Lemma 8.

The key exchange literature often defines a notion of partnering which is simpler. What makes the notion more complicated here is the fact that we have asynchronous random roles.

An easy property of the notion of matching status is that if P is in a matching status at time t, then P is also in a matching status at any time $t_0 \leq t$. Similarly, if P is in a matching status at time t and t for P originates from \overline{t} for \overline{P} , then \overline{P} is in a matching status at time \overline{t} and also at any time before. Note that although t originates from \overline{t} , which itself originates from t', we may have $t' \neq t$.

Definition 5 (Forgery). Given a participant P in a game, we say that the forgeries in received^P_{mse} are upd messages upd_1, \ldots, upd_n if there exist finite sequences of upd messages (possibly empty) seq_0, \ldots, seq_n such that

- $\ \mathsf{received}^{\mathsf{P}}_{\mathsf{msg}} = (\mathsf{seq}_0, \mathsf{upd}_1, \mathsf{seq}_1, \mathsf{upd}_2, \mathsf{seq}_2, \dots, \mathsf{upd}_n, \mathsf{seq}_n);$
- $\text{ for all } i, (seq_0, seq_1, \dots, seq_{i-1}) \text{ is a prefix of sent}_{msg}^{\overline{P}}; \\ \text{ for all } i, (seq_0, seq_1, \dots, seq_{i-1}, upd_i) \text{ is not a prefix of sent}_{msg}^{\overline{P}};$

Here, the comma operation "," is the concatenation of sequences and single messages upd_i are taken as sequences of length 1. We call upd_1 as P's first forgery.

Lemma 6. If P is not in a matching status, either P or \overline{P} has received a forgery.

Proof. If P did not receive a forgery, then $\operatorname{received}_{msg}^{P}$ is a prefix of $\operatorname{sent}_{msg}^{\overline{P}}$. Therefore, there exists a time \overline{t} such that $\text{received}_{msg}^{P}(t) = \text{sent}_{msg}^{\overline{P}}(\overline{t})$. If P is not in matching status at time t, then received $_{msg}^{P}(\bar{t})$ cannot be a prefix of sent $_{msg}^{P}(t)$. This implies that \overline{P} received a forgery due to Definition 5.

A secure communication protocol needs such a "matching status" since it characterizes a normal execution of the protocol. More specifically, as we explained in previous section (and as it will become more clear later), "recovery from impersonation" cannot be allowed in BARK. A secure protocol should either enforce that both participants are always in matching status or make communication between them impossible.

In a matching status, any upd received by P must correspond to an upd sent by \overline{P} and the sequences must match. This implies the following notion.

Definition 7 (Corresponding RATCH calls). Let P be a participant. We consider only the RATCH(P, rec, .) calls by P returning true. We say that the ith one corresponds to the jth sending RATCH(\overline{P} , send) call by \overline{P} if i = j and P is in matching status at the time of this i^{th} accepting RATCH(P, rec, .) call.

Lemma 8. In a correct BARK protocol, two corresponding RATCH(P, rec, upd) and RATCH(\overline{P} , send) calls generate the same key $k_{\rm P} = k_{\overline{\rm P}}$.

Proof. If $\mathsf{RATCH}(\mathsf{P},\mathsf{rec},\mathsf{upd})$ and $\mathsf{RATCH}(\overline{\mathsf{P}},\mathsf{send})$ correspond to each other, then P is in matching status. We let t be the time of the RATCH(P, rec, upd) call and \overline{t} be the time of the RATCH(\overline{P} , send). We make the sequence of all RATCH calls from P until time t and all RATCH calls from \overline{P} until time \overline{t} . By putting them in chronological order, thanks to the conditions of the matching status, we define a sequence sched, and the experiment runs as the correctness game. Due to correctness, the last calls generate the same key k. Hence, $k_{\rm P}(t) = k_{\overline{p}}(\overline{t})$.

Definition 9 (Ratcheting period of P). A maximal time interval during which there is no RATCH(P, send) call is called a ratcheting period of P.

Consequently, a RATCH(P, send) call ends a ratcheting period for P and starts a new one. In Fig. 1, the time between T_1 and T_3 or the interval $T_5 - T_6$ are called ratcheting period of Alice and Bob respectively.

We now define the time when the adversary can trivially obtain a key generated by P due to an exposure. We distinguish the case when the exposure was done on P (direct leakage) and the case when the exposure was done on \overline{P} (indirect leakage).

Definition 10 (Direct leakage). Let t be a time and P be a participant. We say that $k_P(t)$ has a direct leakage if one of the following conditions is satisfied:

- There is an $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{key}}(\mathsf{P})$ at a time t_e such that the last RATCH call which is executed by P before time t and the last RATCH call which is executed by P before time t_e are the same.
- − P is in a matching status and there exists $t_0 \leq t_e \leq t_{RATCH} \leq t$ and \bar{t} such that time t originates from time \bar{t} ; time \bar{t} originates from time t_0 ; there is one EXP_{st}(P) at time t_e ; there is one RATCH(P, rec, .) at time t_{RATCH} ; and there is no RATCH(P, ., .) between time t_{RATCH} and time t.

In the first case, it is clear that $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{key}}(\mathsf{P})$ gives $k_\mathsf{P}(t_e) = k_\mathsf{P}(t)$. In the second case (in the figure³), the state which leaks from $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(\mathsf{P})$ at time t_e allows to simulate all deterministic Receive (skipping all Send) and to compute the key $k_\mathsf{P}(t_{\mathsf{RATCH}}) = k_\mathsf{P}(t)$. The reason why we can allow the adversary skipping all Send is that they make messages which are supposed to be delivered to $\overline{\mathsf{P}}$ after time \overline{t} , so they have no impact on $k_\mathsf{P}(t)$.

Consider Fig. 1. Suppose t is in between time T_3 and T_4 . According to our definition P = A and the last RATCH call is at time T_3 . It is a Send, thus the second case cannot apply. The next RATCH call is at time T_4 . In this case, t has a direct leakage for Alice if there is a key exposure of Alice between T_3 and T_4 .

Suppose now that $T_8 < t < T_9$. We have P = B, the last RATCH call is a Receive, it is at time $t_{RATCH} = T_8$, and t originates from time $\overline{t} = T_0$ which itself originates from the origin time $t_0 = T_{Init}$ for B. We say that t has a direct leakage if there is a key exposure between $T_8 - T_9$ or a state exposure of Bob before time T_8 . Indeed, with this last state exposure, the adversary can ignore all Send and simulate all Receive to derive k_0 .




Fig. 3: Direct (left) and indirect (right) leakage

Definition 11 (Indirect leakage). We consider a time t and a participant P. Let t_{RATCH} be the time of the last successful RATCH call and role be its input role. (We have $k_P(t_{RATCH}) = k_P(t)$.)

³ Origin of dotted arrows indicate when a time originates from.

We say that $k_{P}(t)$ has an indirect leakage if P is in matching status at time t and one of the following conditions is satisfied

- There exists a RATCH(\overline{P} , role, .) corresponding to that RATCH(P, role, .) and making a $k_{\overline{P}}$ which has a direct leakage for $\overline{\mathsf{P}}$.
- There exists $t' \leqslant t_{RATCH} \leqslant t$ and $\overline{t} \leqslant \overline{t}_e$ such that \overline{P} is in a matching status at time \overline{t}_e , t originates from \overline{t} , \overline{t}_e originates from t', there is one $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(\overline{\mathsf{P}})$ at time \overline{t}_e , and role = send.

In the first case, $k_P(t) = k_P(t_{RATCH})$ is also computed by \overline{P} and leaks from there. The second case (in the figure) is more complicated: it corresponds to an adversary who can get the internal state of \overline{P} by $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(\overline{P})$ then simulate all Receive with messages from P until the one sent at time t_{RATCH} , ignoring all Send by \overline{P} , to recover $k_P(t)$.

For example, let t be a time between T_1 and T_2 in Fig. 1. We take P = A. The last RATCH call is at time $t_{RATCH} = T_1$, it is a Send and corresponds to a Receive at time T_{10} , but t originates from the origin time $\bar{t} = T_{\text{lnit}}$. We say that t has an indirect leakage for A if there exists a direct leakage for P = B at a time between T_{10} and T_{11} (first condition) or there exists a $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(B)$ call at a time \bar{t}_e (after time $\bar{t} = T_{Init}$), originating from a time t' before time T_1 , so $\bar{t}_e < T_{10}$ (second condition). In the latter case, the adversary can simulate Receive with the updates sent at time T_0 and T_1 to derive the key k_1 .

Exposing the state of a participant gives certain advantages to the attacker and make trivial attacks possible. In our security game, we avoid those attack scenarios. In the following lemma, we show that direct and indirect leakage capture the times when the adversary can trivially win. The proof is straightforward.

Lemma 12 (Trivial attacks). Assume that BARK is correct. For any t and P, if $k_{\rm P}(t)$ has a direct or indirect leakage, the adversary has all information to compute $k_{\rm P}(t)$.

Proof. We use correctness, Lemma 8, and the explanations given after Def. 10 and Def. 11.

So far, we mostly focused on matching status cases but there could be situations with forgeries as well. We define trivial forgeries as follows.

Definition 13 (Trivial forgery). We consider a first forgery received in a RATCH(P, rec, upd) call by P. Let t be the time just before this call. Let \overline{t} be a time such that $\operatorname{received}_{\mathsf{msg}}^{\mathsf{P}}(t) = \operatorname{sent}_{\mathsf{msg}}^{\mathsf{P}}(\overline{t})$. If there is any $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(\overline{\mathsf{P}})$ call during the ratcheting period of $\overline{\mathsf{P}}$ which includes time $\overline{\mathsf{t}}$, we say that upd is a trivial forgery.

We define the KIND security game in Fig. 4. Essentially, the adversary plays with all oracles. At some point, he does one $\mathsf{TEST}(\mathsf{P})$ call which returns either the same result as $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{kev}}(\mathsf{P})$ (case b = 1) or some random value (case b = 0). The goal of the adversary is to guess b. The TEST call can be done only once and it defines the participant $P_{test} = P$ and the time t_{test} at which this call is made. It also defines upd_{test} , the last upd which was used (either sent or received) to carry $k_{\mathsf{P}_{test}}(t_{test})$ from the sender to the receiver. It is not allowed to make this call at the beginning, when P did not generate a key yet. It is not allowed to make a trivial attack as defined by a cleanness predicate C_{clean} appearing on Step 5 in the KIND game in Fig. 4. Identifying the appropriate *cleanness predicate* C_{clean} is not easy. It must clearly forbid trivial attacks but also allow efficient protocols. In what follows we use the following predicates:

- $\begin{array}{l} \ C_{leak} \colon k_{P_{test}}(t_{test}) \ has \ no \ direct \ or \ indirect \ leakage. \\ \ C_{trivial \ forge}^{P} \colon P \ received \ no \ trivial \ forgery \ until \ P \ has \ seen \ upd_{test}. \end{array}$
- (This implies that upd_{test} is not a trivial forgery. It also implies that if P never sees upd_{test} , then P received no trivial forgery at all.)
- $-C_{forge}^{P}$: P received no forgery until P has seen upd_{test}.
- C_{ratchet}: upd_{test} was sent by a participant P, then received and accepted by \overline{P} , then some upd' was sent by \overline{P} , then upd' was received and accepted by P. (Here, P could be P_{test} or his counterpart. This accounts for the receipt of upd_{test} being acknowledged by \overline{P} through upd'.)

 $-C_{noEXP(R)}$: there is no $EXP_{st}(R)$ and no $EXP_{kev}(R)$ query. (R is the receiver.)

Lemma 12 says that the adopted cleanness predicate C_{clean} must imply C_{leak} in all considered games. Otherwise, no security is possible. It is however not sufficient as it only covers trivial attacks with no forgeries.

 $C_{ratchet}$ targets that any acknowledged sent message is secure. Another way to say is that a key generated by one Send starting a round trip must be safe. This is the notion of healing by ratcheting. Intuitively, the security notion from $C_{clean} = C_{leak} \wedge C_{ratchet}$ is fair enough.

Bellare et al. [2] consider unidirectional BARK with $C_{\text{clean}} = C_{\text{leak}} \wedge C_{\text{trivial forge}}^{P_{\text{test}}} \wedge C_{\text{noEXP}(R)}$. Other papers like Poettering-Rösler [15] and Jaeger-Stepanovs [10] implicitly use $C_{\text{clean}} = C_{\text{leak}} \wedge$ $C_{\text{trivial forge}}^{P_{\text{test}}}$ as cleanness predicate. They show that this is sufficient to build secure protocols but it is probably not the minimal cleanness predicate.

Jost-Maurer-Mularczyk [11] excludes cases where \overline{P}_{test} received a (trivial) forgery then had an $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(\overline{\mathsf{P}}_{\mathsf{test}})$ before receiving $\mathsf{upd}_{\mathsf{test}}$. Actually, they use a cleanness predicate which is somewhere

between $C_{\text{leak}} \wedge C_{\text{trivial forge}}^{P_{\text{test}}}$ and $C_{\text{leak}} \wedge C_{\text{trivial forge}}^{A} \wedge C_{\text{trivial forge}}^{B}$. In our construction, we use the predicate $C_{\text{clean}} = C_{\text{leak}} \wedge C_{\text{forge}}^{A} \wedge C_{\text{forge}}^{B}$. However, in Section 4.1, we define the FORGE security (unforgeability) which implies that $(C_{leak} \land C_{forge}^A \land C_{forge}^B)$ -KIND security and $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C^{A}_{\text{trivial forge}} \land C^{B}_{\text{trivial forge}})$ -KIND security are equivalent. (See Th. 19.) One drawback is that it forbids more than $(C_{\mathsf{leak}} \wedge C_{\mathsf{trivial forge}}^{\mathsf{P}_{\mathsf{test}}})$ -KIND security. The advantage is that we can achieve security without key-update primitives. We will prove in Th. 21 that this security is enough to achieve security with the predicate $C_{clean} = C_{leak} \wedge C_{ratchet}$, thanks to RECOVER-security which we define in Section 4.2. Thus, our cleanness notion is fair enough.

1: $\operatorname{Init}(1^{\lambda}) \stackrel{\$}{\to} (\operatorname{st}_{A}, \operatorname{st}_{B}, z)$ 2: set all sent [*] and received [*] variables to \emptyset 3: set t _{test} , k _A , k _B to \bot 4: b' $\leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{RATCH,EXP_{st},EXP_{key},TEST(z)$ 5: if $\neg C_{clean}$ then abort 6: return b' Oracle $EXP_{st}(P)$ 1: return st _P	$\begin{array}{l} \text{Oracle TEST}(P) \\ 1: \ \textbf{if } t_{test} \neq \bot \ \textbf{then abort} \qquad \triangleright \ \text{TEST was queried} \\ 2: \ \textbf{if } k_{P} = \bot \ \textbf{then abort} \\ 3: \ t_{test} \leftarrow time, \ P_{test} \leftarrow P, \ upd_{test} \leftarrow upd_{P} \\ 4: \ \textbf{if } b = 1 \ \textbf{then} \\ 5: \ \textbf{return } k_{P} \\ 6: \ \textbf{else} \\ 7: \ \textbf{return random } \{0,1\}^{ k_{P} } \\ 8: \ \textbf{end if} \\ \\ \text{Oracle EXP}_{key}(P) \\ 1: \ \textbf{return } k_{P} \end{array}$
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Fig. 4: C_{clean} -KIND game. (Oracle RATCH is defined in Fig. 2.)

Definition 14 (C_{clean} -KIND security). Let C_{clean} be a cleanness predicate. We consider the $KIND_{b,C_{clean}}^{\mathcal{A}}$ game of Fig. 4. We say that the ratcheted key agreement BARK is $(q, T, \epsilon)-C_{clean}$ -KIND-secure if for any adversary limited to q queries and time complexity T, the advantage

$$\mathsf{Adv}(\mathcal{A}) = \left| \Pr\left[\mathsf{KIND}_{0,\mathsf{C}_{\mathsf{clean}}}^{\mathcal{A}} \to 1\right] - \Pr\left[\mathsf{KIND}_{1,\mathsf{C}_{\mathsf{clean}}}^{\mathcal{A}} \to 1\right] \right|$$

of \mathcal{A} in KIND^{\mathcal{A}}_{b,C_{clean} security game is bounded by ε .}

uniARK Implies KEM 3

We now prove that a weakly secure uniARK (a unidirectional asynchronous ratcheted key exchange) implies public key cryptography. Namely, we can construct a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) out of it. We recall the KEM definition.

Definition 15 (KEM scheme). A KEM scheme consists of three algorithms: a key pair generation $\text{Gen}(1^{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\text{sk}, \text{pk})$, an encapsulation algorithm $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\text{k}, \text{ct})$, and a decapsulation algorithm $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct}) \rightarrow \text{k}$. It is correct if $\Pr[\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct}) = 1] = 1$ when the keys are generated with Gen and $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}) \rightarrow (\text{k}, \text{ct})$.

We consider a uniARK which is KIND-secure for the following cleanness predicate:

 C_{weak} : the adversary makes only three oracle calls which are, in order, $EXP_{st}(S)$, RATCH(S, send), and TEST(S).

(Note that R is never used.) This implies cleanness for all other considered predicates. Hence, it is more restrictive. Our result implies that it is unlikely to construct even such weakly secure uniARK from symmetric cryptography.

Theorem 16. Given a uniARK protocol, we can construct a KEM with the following properties. The correctness of uniARK implies the correctness of KEM. The C_{weak} -KIND-security of uniARK implies the IND-CPA security of KEM.

Proof. Assuming a uniARK protocol, we construct a KEM as follows:

 $\begin{array}{l} \mathsf{KEM}.\mathsf{Gen} \xrightarrow{\$} (\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{pk}) \texttt{:} \ \mathrm{run} \ \mathsf{uniARK}.\mathsf{Init} \xrightarrow{\$} (\mathsf{st}_S,\mathsf{st}_R,z) \ \mathrm{and} \ \mathrm{set} \ \mathsf{pk} = \mathsf{st}_S, \ \mathsf{sk} = \mathsf{st}_R.\\ \mathsf{KEM}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\mathsf{k},\mathsf{ct}) \texttt{:} \ \mathrm{run} \ \mathsf{uniARK}.\mathsf{Send}(\mathsf{pk}) \xrightarrow{\$} (.,\mathsf{upd},\mathsf{k}) \ \mathrm{and} \ \mathrm{set} \ \mathsf{ct} = \mathsf{upd}.\\ \mathsf{KEM}.\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{ct}) \to \mathsf{k} \texttt{:} \ \mathrm{run} \ \mathsf{uniARK}.\mathsf{Receive}(\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{upd}) \to (.,.,\mathsf{k}). \end{array}$

The IND-CPA security game with adversary \mathcal{A} works as in the left-hand side below. We transform \mathcal{A} into a KIND adversary \mathcal{B} in the right-hand side below.

Game IND-CPA:	Adversary $\mathcal{B}(z)$:
1: KEM.Gen $\xrightarrow{\$}$ (sk, pk)	1: call $EXP_{st}(S) \to pk$
2: KEM.Enc(pk) $\xrightarrow{\$}$ (k, ct) 3: if b = 0 then set k to random 4: $\mathcal{A}(pk, ct, k) \xrightarrow{\$} b'$ 5: return b'	2: call RATCH(S, send) \rightarrow ct 3: call TEST(S) \rightarrow k 4: run $\mathcal{A}(pk, ct, k) \rightarrow b'$ 5: return b'

We can check that C_{weak} is satisfied. The KIND game with \mathcal{B} simulates perfectly the IND-CPA game with \mathcal{A} . So, the KIND-security of uniARK implies the IND-CPA security of KEM.

4 FORGE and RECOVER Security

4.1 Unforgeability

Another security aspect of the key agreement BARK is to have that no upd information is forgeable by any bounded adversary except trivially by state exposure. This security notion is independent from KIND security but is certainly nice to have for explicit authentication in key agreement. Besides, it is easy to achieve. We will use it as a helper to prove KIND security: to reduce $C_{trivial\ forge}^{p}$ -cleanness to C_{forge}^{p} -cleanness.

A first forgery is a upd received by a participant P making him lose his matching status. Let the adversary interact with the oracles RATCH, EXP_{st} , EXP_{key} in any order. For BARK to have unforgeability, we eliminate the trivial forgeries (as defined in Def. 13). The FORGE game is defined in Fig. 5.

Definition 17 (FORGE security). Consider FORGE^A game in Fig. 5 associated to the adversary A. Let the advantage of A in succeeding the attack in FORGE^A game be the probability of succeeding the game. We say that BARK is (q, T, ε) -FORGE-secure if, for any adversary limited to q queries and time complexity T, the advantage is bounded by ε .

	Game $RECOVER^{\mathcal{A}}_{BARK}$
1: $Init(1^{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{\$} (st_{\mathcal{A}}, st_{\mathcal{B}}, z)$	1: win $\leftarrow 0$
2: $(P, upd) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{RATCH, EXP_{st}, EXP_{key}}(z)$	2: $\operatorname{Init}(1^{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\operatorname{st}_{A}, \operatorname{st}_{B}, z)$
3: if one (or both) participants is NOT in a matching	
status then abort	4: $P \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{RATCH,EXP_{st},EXP_{key}}(z)$
4: $RATCH(P,rec,upd) \to acc$	5: if we can parse received $_{msg}^{P} = (seq_1, upd, seq_2)$ and
5: if $acc = false then abort$	$sent_{msg}^{\overline{p}} = (seq_3, upd, seq_4) \text{ with } seq_1 \neq seq_3 \text{ (where upd)}$
6: if P is in a matching status then abort	is a single message and all seq_i are finite sequences of
7: if upd is a trivial forgery for P then abort	single messages) then win $\leftarrow 1$
8: the adversary wins	6: return win

Fig. 5: FORGE and RECOVER games. (Oracle RATCH, EXP_{st}, EXP_{key} are defined in Fig. 2 and Fig. 4.)

We can now justify why forgeries in the KIND game must be trivial for a BARK with unforgeability.

Lemma 18. Assume that BARK is FORGE-secure. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary playing KIND^{\mathcal{A}}_{b,C_{clean} game. For any P and t, if there exists no trivial forgery, the probability that P is not in matching status at a time t is negligible.}

Proof. It follows from Lemma 6 and the definition of the $\mathsf{FORGE}^{\mathcal{A}}$ game.

Theorem 19. If a BARK is FORGE-secure, then $(C_{\mathsf{leak}} \wedge C^{P_{\mathsf{test}}}_{\mathsf{forge}})$ -KIND-security implies $(C_{\mathsf{leak}} \wedge C^{P_{\mathsf{test}}}_{\mathsf{trivial forge}})$ -KIND-security and $(C_{\mathsf{leak}} \wedge C^{A}_{\mathsf{forge}} \wedge C^{B}_{\mathsf{forge}})$ -KIND-security implies $(C_{\mathsf{leak}} \wedge C^{A}_{\mathsf{trivial forge}} \wedge C^{B}_{\mathsf{trivial forge}})$ -KIND-security.

Proof. This is obvious, as FORGE-security implies no non-trivial forgery.

4.2 Recovery from Impersonation

A priori, it seems nice to be able to restore a secure state when a state exposure of a participant takes place. We show here that it is not a good idea.

Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary playing two games as shown in Fig. 6. On the left strategy, \mathcal{A} exposes A with an EXP_{st} query (Step 2). Then, the adversary \mathcal{A} impersonates A by running the Send algorithm on its own (Step 3). Next, the adversary \mathcal{A} "sends" a message to B which is accepted due to correctness because it is generated with A's state. In Step 5, \mathcal{A} lets the legitimate sender to generate upd' by calling RATCH oracle. In this step, *if* security self-restores, B accepts upd' which is sent by A. Hence, acc' = 1 in the final step. It is clear that the strategy shown on the left side in Fig. 6 is equivalent to the strategy shown on the right side of the same figure (which only switches Alice and the adversary who run the same algorithm). Hence, both lead to acc' = 1 with the same probability p.

The crucial point is that the forgery in the right-hand strategy becomes non-trivial, which implies that the protocol is not FORGE-secure. In addition to this, if such phenomenon occurs, we can make a KIND adversary passing the $C_{leak} \wedge C_{trivial\ forge}^{P_{test}}$ and $C_{leak} \wedge C_{trivial\ forge}^{P_{test}} \wedge C_{noEXP(R)}^{P_{test}}$ conditions. Thus, we lose KIND-security.

In general, we believe it is not reasonable to allow recoveries from impersonation as it could serve as a discrete and temporary active attack and facilitate mass surveillance. For this purpose, we define the RECOVER security notion with another game in Fig. 5. Essentially, in the game, we require the receiver P to accept some messages upd' sent by the sender after the adversary makes successful forgeries upd. We will further use it as a second helper to prove KIND security with $C_{ratchet}$ -cleanness.




Fig. 6: Two recoveries succeeding with the same probability.

Definition 20 (RECOVER security). Consider RECOVER^A_{BARK} game in Fig. 5 associated to the adversary A. Let the advantage of A in succeeding playing the game be Pr(win = 1). We say that the ratcheted communication protocol is (q, T, ε) RECOVER-secure, if for any adversary limited to q queries and time complexity T, the advantage is bounded by ε .

We will see that RECOVER-security is quite easy to achieve using a collision-resistant hash function.

Theorem 21. If a BARK is RECOVER-secure and $(C_{\text{leak}} \wedge C^A_{\text{forge}} \wedge C^B_{\text{forge}})$ -KIND secure, then it is $(C_{\text{leak}} \wedge C_{\text{ratchet}})$ -KIND secure.

Proof. Let us consider a $(C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{ratchet}})$ -KIND game in which C_{ratchet} holds. Let P be the participant who sent upd_{test} . Since upd_{test} is a genuine message from P which is received by \overline{P} , the RECOVER security implies that \overline{P} did not receive a forgery until it received upd_{test} (except in negligible cases). So, $C_{\text{forge}}^{\overline{P}}$ holds. Similarly, since P received a genuine upd' after seeing upd_{test} , P did not receive a forgery until then (except in negligible cases). So, C_{forge}^{P} holds, except in negligible cases.

5 Our BARK Protocol

We construct a BARK from a signcryption SC and a hash function H as in Fig. 7. The signcryption we use is a naive combination of a public-key cryptosystem and a digital signature scheme, as defined in Appendix A. The collision-resistant hash function is defined in Appendix A as well.

The Init protocol is splittable.

For each participant, the state is a tuple $st = (hk, List_S, List_R, Hsent, Hreceived)$ where hk is the hashing key, Hsent is the iterated hash of all sent messages, and Hreceived is the iterated hash of all received messages. We also have two lists $List_S$ and $List_R$ of states. They are lists of states to be used for unidirectional communication: sending and receiving. Both lists are growing but start with erased entries. Thus, they can be compressed. (Typically, each list has only its last entry which is not erased.)

The idea is that the i^{th} entry of List_S for a participant P is associated to the i^{th} entry of List_R for its counterpart $\overline{\mathsf{P}}$. Every time a participant P sends a message, it creates a new pair of states for sending and receiving and sends the sending state to his counterpart $\overline{\mathsf{P}}$, to be used in the case $\overline{\mathsf{P}}$ wants to respond. If the same participant P keeps sending without receiving anything, he accumulates some receiving states this way. Whenever a participant $\overline{\mathsf{P}}$ who received many messages starts sending, he also accumulated many sending states. His message is sent using *all* those states in the **onion.Send** procedure. After sending, all but the last send state are erased,

and the message shall indicate the erasures to the counterpart P, who shall erase corresponding receiving states accordingly. Our onion encryption needs to ensure O(n) complexity (we cannot compose SC encryptions as ciphertext overheads would produce a $O(n^2)$ complexity). For that, we use a one-time symmetric encryption SymEnc using a key k which is splitted into shares k_1, \ldots, k_n . Each share is SC-encrypted in one state. Only the last state is updated (as others are meant to be erased).

The protocol is quite efficient when participant alternate their roles well, because the lists are often flushed to contain only one unerased state. It also becomes more secure due to ratcheting: any exposure has very limited impact. If there are unidirectional sequences, the protocol becomes less and less efficient due to the growth of the lists. In practice, one might want to reuse a key k and a "symmetric ratchet" for sessions of unidirectional sequences. This would lower security but would be perfectly in line with the current practice of "double ratchets".

We note that our protocol does *not* offer $(C_{leak} \wedge C_{forge}^{P_{test}})$ -KIND security due to the following attack:

1: $EXP_{st}(A) \to st_{A}$	
2: $EXP_{st}(B) \to st_B$	\triangleright this reveals $sk_{B}^{rec,1}$ to be used later on
$3: RATCH(B, send) \to upd_B$	
4: $RATCH(A, rec, upd_B) \to true$	
5: $RATCH(A, send) \to upd$	
6: $TEST(A) \to k$	
$7: Send(st_A) \to upd_A$	\triangleright this creates a trivial forgery
8: $RATCH(B, rec, upd_A) \to true$	\triangleright this makes B out-of-sync and updates $sk_{B}^{rec,1}$
9: $EXP_{st}(B) \to st'_B$	\triangleright this reveals $sk_{B}^{rec,2}$ and $sk_{B}^{rec,1}$ (updated)
10: use $sk_{B}^{rec,1}$ (original) and $sk_{B}^{rec,2}$ to decrypt upd	
11: compare the result with k	

Note that the trivial forgery is here to make the following $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(\mathsf{B})$ a non-trivial leakage for $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{B}}^{\mathsf{rec},2}$ ($\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{B}}^{\mathsf{rec},1}$ is already known).

The attack is ruled out in the $(C_{\text{leak}} \wedge C^A_{\text{forge}} \wedge C^B_{\text{forge}})$ -KIND security which does not allow forgeries until upd is received.

We state the security of our protocol below.

Theorem 22 (Unrecoverability). If H is a (T, ε) -collision-resistant hash function, then BARK in Fig. 7 is (T, ε) -RECOVER-secure.

Proof. Each upd sent must include the hash of the previous upd sent. We call them chained for this reason. If (seq_1, upd, seq_2) and (seq_3, upd, seq_4) are two validly chained list of messages with $seq_1 \neq seq_2$, we can easily see that upd = (h, onion) must include a collision on h. This cannot happen, thanks to collision resistance.

Theorem 23 (Unforgeability). For any q, T, ε , assuming that SC is (T', ε) -EF-OTCPA-secure and H is a (T, ε) -collision-resistant hash function, then BARK in Fig. 7 is $(q, T, q\varepsilon)$ -FORGEsecure. We let $T' = T + T_{Init} + qT_{Send,Receive}$ where T_{Init} denotes a complexity upper bound of Init and $T_{Send,Receive}$ denotes a complexity upper bound of both Send and Receive.

Proof. We consider an adversary \mathcal{A} making a forgery $\mathsf{upd} = (\mathsf{h}, \mathsf{ct})$ which is accepted by P . We let $\mathsf{n} + 1$ be the number of components in ct . We denote by Γ the FORGE game that \mathcal{A} plays against BARK. We assume without loss of generality that both participants are always in a matching status during Γ (otherwise, we make Γ abort as it will be the case in the FORGE game, eventually).

We first assume that P successfully received a message upd' from \overline{P} before upd. (See Fig. 8.) The receiving RATCH(P, rec, upd') \rightarrow true call at some time t corresponds to a RATCH(\overline{P} , send) \rightarrow upd' call at some time \overline{t} . Since the forgery upd is non-trivial, this call starts a ratcheting session for \overline{P} with no state exposure. This ratcheting session may never end, or end with some RATCH(\overline{P} , send) \rightarrow upd" call.

The RATCH(\overline{P} , send) call at time \overline{t} also defines some value u and some states $st_{\overline{P}}^{send,u}$ and $st_{\overline{P}}^{rec,u}$. During this call, $st_{\overline{D}}^{send,u}$ is updated with some st'_{S} generated by onion.Send. Inside st'_{S} , there is a




Fig. 7: Our BARK Protocol.

sk's generated by SC.Gen_S. We transform Γ into an EF-OTCPA game Γ' where the initialization SC.Gen_S is this one. The initialization SC.Gen_R is the one following SC.Gen_R. We construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' to play in Γ' and who will simulate \mathcal{A} and some part of Γ . The EF-OTCPA game gives all generated keys except sk's to the adversary \mathcal{A}' , so he can simulate Γ , except when sk's is needed. We recall that in Γ , there is no exposure which needs to give sk's to \mathcal{A} . This sk's is actually not used in Γ , but for one SC.Enc instruction to compute upd'' = (ad'', ct'') (if upd'' exists), with ct'' of n'' + 1 components. More precisely, it computes ct''_1 = SC.Enc(sk's, pk'_R, ad''_1, k''_1), the first element of ct'' with some associated data ad''_1 resulting from hashing ad'', ct''_{n''+1}, ..., ct''_2. The only SC.Enc which needs sk's can be simulated in the EF-OTCPA game, as the adversary is allowed to make one chosen message query. Finally, the adversary \mathcal{A}' in Γ' computes ad₁, the iterated hash of ad, ct_{n+1},..., ct₂ in upd, and returns (ad₁, ct₁) as a final output. We reduce Γ' to a game




Fig. 8: Forgery

 Γ'' where either the adversary made no chosen message query, or $ad_1 \neq ad_1''$, or $ad_1 = ad_1''$ are computed from exactly the same input list $(ad'', ct_{n''+1}', \ldots, ct_2'') = (ad, ct_{n+1}, \ldots, ct_2)$. Due to collision-resistance, Γ' and Γ'' succeeds with negligibly close probability of success. In Γ'' , having a forgery against SC is then equivalent to having a forgery in Γ . Since SC is EF-OTCPA-secure, this happens with negligible probability.

In the second case, we assume that P never received anything from \overline{P} . We proceed as before with u = 1. The proof is the same.

Theorem 24 (KIND Security). For any q, T, ε , assuming that SC is (T', ε) -IND-CCA-secure and SymEnc is (T', ε) -IND-OTCCA-secure, then BARK in Fig. 7 is $(q, T, 2q\varepsilon)$ - $(C_{leak} \land C^A_{forge} \land C^B_{forge})$ -KIND-secure. Here, $T' = T + T_{lnit} + qT_{Send,Receive}$ where T_{lnit} denotes a complexity upper bound of Init and $T_{Send,Receive}$ denotes a complexity upper bound of both Send and Receive.

Due to Th. 19, Th. 23, and Th. 24, we deduce $(C_{\mathsf{leak}} \land C^A_{\mathsf{trivial forge}} \land C^B_{\mathsf{trivial forge}})$ -KIND-security. The advantage of treating $(C_{\mathsf{leak}} \land C^A_{\mathsf{forge}} \land C^B_{\mathsf{forge}})$ -KIND-security specifically is that we clearly separate the required security assumptions for SC.

Due to Th. 21, Th. 22, and Th. 24, we deduce $(C_{leak} \land C_{ratchet})$ -KIND-security.

Proof. We take a KIND game which we denote by Γ . The idea is that we will identify which keys generated by SC.Gen_R are safe and apply the IND-OTCCA reduction to whatever they encrypt. This way, we hope that the key k which is tested by TEST will be replaced by a random one and never used in a distinguishable way. The difficulties are

- to identify which keys are safe;
- to get rid of a safe sk_R (except for decryption) to apply the IND-OTCCA game;
- to see the connection between C_{clean} and the notion of safe key.

We number each use of SC.Gen_R with an index j. All indices are set in chronological order. For each j, we define a list $i_{j,1}, \ldots, i_{j,\ell_j}$ of length ℓ_j . The jth run of SC.Gen_R is either done on Step 2 in onion.Init (called either by ARCAD.Init or ARCAD.Send) or on Step 2 in onion.Send (called by ARCAD.Send). If it is done in onion.Init, we set $\ell_j = 0$. Actually, the receive decryption key sk_R which is generated by SC.Gen_R stays local on the participant which generated it in BARK.Send (or BARK.Init), so is not encrypted. Otherwise, sk_R is generated during a onion.Send called by BARK.Send and it is encrypted in an onion to be sent to the other participant. Actually, it is encrypted with SymEnc with a key splitted into several shares which are encrypted in Step 12. We let $i_{j,1}, \ldots, i_{j,\ell_j}$ be the indices of the SC.Gen_R runs which generated the keys which are needed to decrypt those shares. (If some keys were not generated by a SC.Gen_R run of the game, they are not listed.) We note that those indices are all lower than j, due to the chronological order. In a game, for each j we define a flag NoEXP_j. The jth decryption key sk_R generated by the jth run of SC.Gen_R appears in some st^{rec} in st_P for P = A or P = B. If there is no oracle call $EXP_{st}(P)$ at a time when st_P includes sk_R , we set NoEXP_j to true. Otherwise, we set it to false. Hence, NoEXP_j indicates if the jth key sk_R is revealed by some EXP_{st} . One problem is that NoEXP_j can only be determined for sure after the key is updated or erased by a successful BARK.Receive.

For each j, if $\ell_j = 0$, we define SafeKey_j = NoEXP_j. Otherwise, we define recursively safe keys as those which are not exposed and which are encrypted by at least one safe key:

$$\mathsf{SafeKey}_j = \left(\mathsf{SafeKey}_{\mathfrak{i}_{j,1}} \lor \dots \lor \mathsf{SafeKey}_{\mathfrak{i}_{j,\ell_{\mathfrak{i}}}}\right) \land \mathsf{NoEXP}_j$$

This is well defined because the indices $i_{j,1}, \ldots, i_{j,\ell_i}$ are all lower than j.




Fig. 9: Safe keys in round trips

To understand which keys are safe, let us consider some RATCH calls:

- $\ \mathsf{RATCH}(\mathsf{P},\mathsf{send}) \to \mathsf{upd}_1 \ \mathrm{at} \ \mathrm{time} \ t_1 \ (\mathrm{some} \ \mathsf{sk}_R \ \mathrm{is} \ \mathrm{generated} \ \mathrm{by} \ \mathsf{onion.Init}),$
- $\mathsf{RATCH}(\overline{\mathsf{P}}, \mathsf{rec}, \mathsf{upd}_1) \to \mathsf{true} \ \mathrm{at} \ \mathrm{time} \ \overline{\mathsf{t}}_1,$
- $\ \mathsf{RATCH}(\overline{\mathsf{P}},\mathsf{send}) \to \mathsf{upd}_2 \ \mathrm{at} \ \mathrm{time} \ \bar{t}_2 > \bar{t}_1,$
- $\mathsf{RATCH}(\mathsf{P}, \mathsf{rec}, \mathsf{upd}_2) \rightarrow \mathsf{true} \ \mathrm{at} \ \mathrm{time} \ t_2 > t_1.$

(See Fig. 9.)

This is a round-trip $P \to \overline{P} \to P$. We assume that there is no $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(P)$ between t_1 and t_2 . Hence, the new receive key sk_R generated by P in onion.Init at time t_1 stays in P. It is used to decrypt upd_2 at time t_2 and then destroyed (actually, sk_R is updated into another key generated by \overline{P}). As there is no $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(P)$ to reveal sk_R between time t_1 and t_2 , this key sk_R is safe. As long as no $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(P)$ reveals it, the key generated by \overline{P} in onion.Send at time \overline{t}_2 to update sk_R at time t_2 (and the same for the keys generated in subsequent $\mathsf{RATCH}(\overline{P},\mathsf{send})$ as long as there is no $\mathsf{RATCH}(\overline{P},\mathsf{rec},.)$) is also safe as it is safely encrypted for the decryption key sk_R .


We define hybrid games Γ_j starting from $\Gamma_0 = \Gamma$. In those games, there is a flag bad which is set to false at the beginning. Some st^R states in st_A or st_B will include some decryption keys sk_R which will be replaced in hybrid games by random values and clearly marked as such. If any EXP_{st} call reveals a state which includes such marked key, the flag bad is set to true and the game aborts.

Given Γ_{j-1} , we look at the jth run of SC.Gen_R. We let pk_R be the encryption key and sk_R be the decryption key. We compute the flag NoEXP_j and SafeKey_j in Γ_{j-1} . If SafeKey_j = false, we set $\Gamma_j = \Gamma_{j-1}$. Otherwise, once generated, we replace sk_R by a well-marked random value, but we use the right sk_R when it is needed in a SC.Dec execution. If the key sk_R is not onion-encrypted, the two games give exactly the same result as NoEXP_j = true and sk_R is only used for decryption. If the key sk_R is onion-encrypted, since SafeKey_j = true, there must be one index $j_{i_{j,m}}$ such that SafeKey_{j_i} = true. We can use the IND-OTCCA game with the key of index $j_{i_{j,m}}$ to show that

the encryption of the real sk_R or some random value are indistinguishable, up to an advantage of ε . The probability that bad becomes true in Γ_{j-1} and Γ_j cannot differ by more than ε as well.

Eventually, we obtain a game Γ_q in which bad is true with negligible probability and giving an outcome which is indistinguishable from Γ . In Γ_q , all keys sk_R which are safe are marked and replaced by a random value, so only used for decryption. Hence, we can apply the IND-OTCCA game for any of the safe keys.

Now, we can analyze what happens if the key k tested with $\mathsf{TEST}(\mathsf{P}_{\mathsf{test}})$ at time $\mathsf{t}_{\mathsf{test}}$ is replaced by a random one, when the cleanness property of the KIND game is satisfied.



 $P_{\mathsf{test}} \in \{P, \overline{P}\}$

Fig. 10: Tested upd

First of all, we note that the key $k_{test} = k_{P_{test}}(t_{test})$ is made on P_{test} either by BARK.Send together with upd_{test} (so generated by this algorithm), or by BARK.Receive hence transmitted before through upd_{test} . (See Fig. 10.) Due to the $C_{forge}^A \land C_{forge}^B$ cleanness condition, upd_{test} is not a forgery. So, k_{test} is always originally made by a BARK.Send which generated upd_{test} . In what follows we denote by P the participant who runs this BARK.Send and by t the time when this execution terminates. Let \overline{t} be the time when \overline{P} ends the reception of upd_{test} (let $\overline{t} = \infty$ if it never receives it). Hence, k_{test} is generated by P and somehow sent to \overline{P} . Note that P_{test} may be P (so $k_{test} = k_P(t)$) or \overline{P} (so $k_{test} = k_{\overline{P}}(\overline{t})$). We stress that thanks to the $C_{forge}^A \land C_{forge}^B$ assumption and Lemma 6, P is in a matching status at time t and \overline{P} is in a matching status at time t.

Clearly, k_{test} is not revealed by any EXP_{key} due to the assumption that there is *no direct or indirect leakage*. Hence, EXP_{key} never uses k_{test} . So, k_{test} is only used during onion encryption in upd_{test} and by TEST.

Now, we can look at which flow of onion encryption followed the k_{test} generation to reach the receiver \overline{P} , with the *cleanness assumption*. The onion encryption is done with some keys defined in $st_p^{send,i}, st_p^{send,i+1}, \ldots, st_p^{send,u}$. We show below that k_{test} is transmitted with at least one safe encryption (in the sense of the SafeKey_j flag). Hence, we can use the IND-OTCCA game for this safe encryption. The encrypted share becomes indistinguishable from random. Thus, the ephemeral key used in SymEnc is safe and we can use the IND-OTCCA property for SymEnc. We deduce that k_{test} is only used by TEST, and indistinguishable from random. We obtain KIND security. Therefore, what remains to be proven is that k is encrypted by at least one safe encryption.

We start with the $\overline{t} < \infty$ case: \overline{P} receives upd_{test} at some point (like in Fig. 10). We recall that \overline{P} must be in a matching status, due to the above discussion. Hence, both P and \overline{P} have k_{test} and P_{test} is one or the other. Due to the C_{leak} hypothesis, \overline{P} has no direct leakage at time \overline{t} . (This is straightforward if $P_{test} = \overline{P}$, and this comes from the *first condition of indirect leakage* if $P_{test} = P$.) Since \overline{P} receives upd_{test} , the condition of no direct leakage implies that either there is no prior EXP_{st} or there is a round-trip communication $\overline{P} \to P \to \overline{P}$ in between the last EXP_{st} and time \overline{t} ,




Fig. 11: Tested upd seen by both participants with a round trip

hence, a message sent by \overline{P} after the last $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}$ and received by P before time t. (See Fig. 11.) Due to our previous analysis on this round trip, it means that $\mathsf{upd}_{\mathsf{test}}$ was encrypted with a safe encryption.




Fig. 12: Tested upd not seen by one participant

If now $\overline{t} = \infty$ (\overline{P} never receives upd; so $P_{test} = P$) and there are some $\mathsf{EXP}_{st}(\overline{P})$ queries, due to the no forgery assumption, \overline{P} stays in a matching status originating from a time prior to t. (See Fig. 12.) The second condition of no indirect leakage on P at time t implies that if \overline{t}_e denotes the time of the latest $\mathsf{EXP}_{st}(\overline{P})$ and t' denotes the time when it originates from, then there is a $\mathsf{RATCH}(\overline{P}, \mathsf{send}) \to \mathsf{upd}$ at a time \overline{t}_0 after time \overline{t}_e and a corresponding $\mathsf{RATCH}(P, \mathsf{rec}, \mathsf{upd})$ at a time t₀ between time t' and time t. The onion.Send at time \overline{t}_0 generates a safe key which is used to encrypt the next sent upd from P, and upd_{test} as well.

We now consider the case $\overline{t} = \infty$ with no $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(\overline{\mathsf{P}})$ query. With a similar analysis as before, the last reception key generated for $\overline{\mathsf{P}}$ is safe. So, $\mathsf{upd}_{\mathsf{test}}$ is safely encrypted.

6 Addressing Random Coin Corruption

Finally, we show that our scheme also addresses coin-leakage resilience. More specifically, it remains secure when the adversary can choose some coins. We just have to count them as exposures when checking the C_{clean} predicate in our model.

Assuming that an adversary can control the random coins which are selected during a Send operation, the benefit of ratcheting is lost. In our security game, we could add a new option to

the oracle RATCH which does the same as RATCH with role send but with an extra input which is the sequence of random coins to be used by Send. By treating those RATCH calls as if they were followed by EXP_{st} and EXP_{key} at the same time, we make sure that our security notion would not change and normal RATCH with role send would be healing.

Oracle RATCH(P, send, r)

- $1: \; (\mathsf{st}_P, \mathsf{upd}_P, k_P) \gets \mathsf{Send}(\mathsf{st}_P; r)$
- 2: $EXP_{key}(P)$
- 3: $EXP_{st}(P)$
- 4: return upd_P

Otherwise, we would need to add conditions in the $\mathsf{C}_{\mathsf{leak}}$ predicate by taking into account the Send queries with coin leakage. We can see that the proof of our BARK protocol still works in this setting. We only need to add a clause on the definition of $\mathsf{SafeKey}_j$ that the considered $\mathsf{SC.Gen}_R$ did not leak with coins in the Send query which run $\mathsf{SC.Gen}_R$.

It is quite normal to assume $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{key}}$ is done as the generated key depends on freshly flipped coins. As for $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}$, this is less clear. Actually, Jost et al. [11] have a subtle protocol making sure that corrupted coins do not imply leaking the state. So far, no other protocol offers such property.

7 Conclusion

We studied the BARK protocol and its security. For security, we marked three important security objectives: the BARK protocol should be KIND-secure; the BARK protocol should resist to unforgeability (FORGE-security), and the BARK protocol should not self-heal after impersonation (RECOVER-security). By relaxing the cleanness notion in KIND-security, we designed a protocol based on an IND-CCA-secure cryptosystem and a one-time signature scheme. We used neither random oracle nor key-update primitives.

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A Used Definitions

Function families and collision-resistant hash functions. A function family H defines an algorithm $H.Gen(1^{\lambda})$ which generates a key hk (we may denote its length as H.kl) and a deterministic algorithm H.Eval(hk, m) which takes a key hk and a message m to produce a digest of fixed length (we may denote it by H.ln). We will need a collision-resistant hash function H. It should be intractable, given a honestly generated hashing key hk, to find two different messages m and m' such that H.Eval(hk, m) = H.Eval(hk, m').

Definition 25 (Collision-resistant hash function). We say that a function family H is (T, ε) collision resistant if for any adversary A limited to time complexity T, the probability to win is
bounded by ε .

- 1: H.Gen $(1^{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{\$} hk$
- 2: $\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{hk}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\mathfrak{m}_1, \mathfrak{m}_2)$
- 3: if H.Eval(hk, \mathfrak{m}_1) = H.Eval(hk, \mathfrak{m}_2) and $\mathfrak{m}_1 \neq \mathfrak{m}_2$ then win

Signcryption. Our construction is based on signcryption. Actually, we do not use a strong signcryption scheme as defined by Dodis et al. [8] but rather a naive combination of signature and encryption. We only want that it encrypts and authenticates at the same time. We take the following definition for our naive signcryption scheme.

Definition 26 (Signcryption scheme). A signcryption scheme SC consists of four algorithms: two key generation algorithms $\text{Gen}_S(1^{\lambda}) \stackrel{\$}{\rightarrow} (\mathsf{sk}_S, \mathsf{pk}_S)$; and $\text{Gen}_R(1^{\lambda}) \stackrel{\$}{\rightarrow} (\mathsf{sk}_R, \mathsf{pk}_R)$; an encryption algorithm $\text{Enc}(\mathsf{sk}_S, \mathsf{pk}_R, \mathsf{ad}, \mathsf{pt}) \stackrel{\$}{\rightarrow} \mathsf{ct}$; a decryption algorithm $\text{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_R, \mathsf{pk}_S, \mathsf{ad}, \mathsf{ct}) \rightarrow \mathsf{pt}$ returning a plaintext or \bot . The correctness property is that for all pt and ad ,

 $\Pr[\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{R}},\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{S}},\mathsf{ad},\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{S}},\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{R}},\mathsf{ad},\mathsf{pt}))=\mathsf{pt}]=1$

when the keys are generated with Gen.

This notion comes with two security notions.

Definition 27 (EF-OTCPA). A signcryption scheme (T, ε) -resists to existential forgeries under one-time chosen plaintext attacks (EF-OTCPA) if for any adversary A limited to time complexity T playing the following game, the probability to win is bounded by ε .

- $1: \operatorname{Gen}_{S}(1^{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\operatorname{sk}_{S}, \operatorname{pk}_{S})$ $2: \operatorname{Gen}_{R}(1^{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\operatorname{sk}_{R}, \operatorname{pk}_{R})$
- $\Im: \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{R}},\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{S}},\mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{R}}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\mathsf{st},\mathsf{ad},\mathsf{pt})$
- 4: $Enc(sk_S, pk_R, ad, pt) \xrightarrow{\$} ct$

5: $\mathcal{A}(\mathsf{st}, \mathsf{ct}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\mathsf{ad}', \mathsf{ct}')$ 6: $if(\mathsf{ad}, \mathsf{ct}) = (\mathsf{ad}', \mathsf{ct}')$ then abort 7: $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{R}}, \mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{S}}, \mathsf{ad}', \mathsf{ct}') \to \mathsf{pt}'$ 8: $if \mathsf{pt}' = \bot$ then abort 9: the adversary wins

Definition 28 (IND-CCA). A signcryption scheme is (q, T, ε) -IND-CCA-secure if for any adversary \mathcal{A} limited to q queries and time complexity T, playing the following game, the advantage $\Pr[\mathsf{IND-CCA}_{0}^{\mathcal{A}} \xrightarrow{\$} 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{IND-CCA}_{1}^{\mathcal{A}} \xrightarrow{\$} 1]$ is bounded by ε .

 $Game \text{ IND-CCA}_{h}^{\mathcal{A}}$

1: challenge = \bot

- $\mathcal{Z}: \operatorname{Gen}_{S}(1^{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\mathsf{sk}_{S}, \mathsf{pk}_{S})$
- $\Im: \operatorname{Gen}_R(1^{\lambda}) \xrightarrow{\$} (\mathsf{sk}_R, \mathsf{pk}_R)$
- $\not{:} \ \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{Ch},\mathsf{Dec}}(\mathsf{sk}_S,\mathsf{pk}_S,\mathsf{pk}_R) \xrightarrow{\$} \mathfrak{b}'$

Oracle Dec(ad, ct)

- 6: if(ad, ct) = challenge then abort
- $\not 7: \ \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_R,\mathsf{pk}_S,\mathsf{ad},\mathsf{ct}) \to \mathsf{pt}$

8: return pt

Oracle Ch(ad, pt)

- 1: *if* challenge $\neq \perp$ *then abort*
- 2: if b = 0 then replace pt by a random message
 of same length
- $3: \operatorname{Enc}(\operatorname{sk}_{S}, \operatorname{pk}_{R}, \operatorname{ad}, \operatorname{pt}) \xrightarrow{\$} \operatorname{ct}$
- 4: challenge \leftarrow (ad, ct)
- 5: *return* ct

Clearly, we can work with the naive signcryption scheme defined by

 $\mathsf{SC}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{sk}_S,\mathsf{pk}_R,\mathsf{ad},\mathsf{pt}) = \mathsf{PKC}.\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_R,(\mathsf{pt},\mathsf{DSS}.\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}_S,(\mathsf{ad},\mathsf{pt}))))$

using an IND-CCA-secure public-key cryptosystem PKC and a EF-OTCMA-secure digital signature scheme DSS.

One-time symmetric encryption. We use SymEnc and SymDec satisfying

 $\mathsf{SymDec}(k,\mathsf{SymEnc}(k,\mathsf{pt})) = \mathsf{pt}$

for any key k and any bitstring $\mathsf{pt}.$ It must satisfy one-time security.

Definition 29 (One-time IND-OTCCA). A symmetric encryption scheme is (T, ε) -IND-OTCCAsecure if for any adversary \mathcal{A} limited to time complexity T, playing the following game, the advantage $\Pr[\mathsf{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{OTCCA}_0^{\mathcal{A}} \xrightarrow{\$} 1] - \Pr[\mathsf{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{OTCCA}_1^{\mathcal{A}} \xrightarrow{\$} 1]$ is bounded by ε . Game $\mathsf{IND}\text{-}\mathsf{OTCCA}_2^{\mathcal{A}} \xrightarrow{$}$

$Game IND-OTCCA_b^{sc}$	Oracle Ch(pt)
1: challenge = \perp	1: if challenge $ eq \perp$ then $abort$
2: pick k	2: $if b = 0$ then replace pt by a random message
$3: \mathcal{A}^{Ch,Dec}() \xrightarrow{\$} \mathfrak{b}'$	of same length
4: <i>return</i> b'	$\Im: SymEnc(k,pt) \to ct$
, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	$4:$ challenge \leftarrow ct
$Oracle \ Dec(ct)$	5: return ct
5: if ct = challenge $then$ $abort$	
6: <i>return</i> SymDec(k, ct)	

B $C_{forge}^{P_{test}}$ Forbids More Than Necessary

Let us consider SC.Enc(sk_S, pk_R, pt) = PKC.Enc(pk_R, pt) (which does not use sk_S/pk_S), where PKC is an IND-CCA-secure cryptosystem without the plaintext aware (PA) security. Hence, there exists an algorithm $C(pk_R; r) = ct$ such that $(pk_R, r, PKC.Dec(sk_R, ct))$ and $(pk_R, r, random)$ are indistinguishable.⁴ We can show that the uniARK obtained from the uniARCAD of Fig. 7 has $(C_{leak} \wedge C_{forge}^{P_{test}})$ -KIND security. We can consider the following adversary:

1: $\mathsf{EXP}_{\mathsf{st}}(S) \to \mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{R}}$

2: pick r; $C(\mathsf{pk}_R; r) \to \mathsf{ct}$

- 3: $RATCH(R, rec, ct) \rightarrow true$
- 4: $\mathsf{TEST}(\mathsf{R}) \to \mathsf{K}^*$

Due to the non-PA security, we do have privacy for the tested key. However, this adversary is ruled out by $C_{forge}^{P_{test}}$. Hence, this cleanness predicate does forbid more than necessary: we have KIND security for more attacks than allowed.

C Comparison with Other Protocols

C.1 Comparison with Bellare et al. [2]

Bellare et al. [2] consider uniARK (unidirectional BARK). They consider the KIND security defined by the game in Fig. 13 (with slightly adapted notations). This game has a single exposure oracle revealing the state st, the key k, and also the last used coins, but for the sender only. It also allows multiple TEST queries.

In the KIND game, the restricted flag is set when there is a trivial forgery. (It could be unset by receiving a genuine upd but we can ignore it for schemes with RECOVER security.) We can easily see that the cleanness notion required by the TEST queries corresponds to $C_{\text{leak}} \land C_{\text{rest}}^{P_{\text{test}}} \land C_{\text{noEXP}(R)}$.

$ \begin{array}{l} \text{Game KIND}_b^{\text{b}} \\ 1: i_s \leftarrow 0; i_r \leftarrow 0 \\ 2: \operatorname{Init}(1^{\lambda}) \stackrel{\$}{\rightarrow} (\operatorname{sts}, \operatorname{st}_R, z) \\ 3: \operatorname{pick} k \\ 4: k_s \leftarrow k ; k_R \leftarrow k \\ 5: b' \stackrel{\xi}{\leftarrow} \stackrel{\lambda}{\rightarrow} \mathcal{A}^{\text{RATSEND,RATREC, EXP, CHSEND, CHREC}(z) \\ 6: return b' \\ \text{Oracle EXP} \\ 1: if op[i_s] = "ch" then return \bot \\ 2: op[i_s] = "exp" \\ 3: return (r, \operatorname{sts}, k_S) \end{array} $	1: pick r; $(st'_{S}, upd_{S}, k_{S}) \leftarrow Send(st_{S}, r)$ 2: auth[i_{s}] \leftarrow upd; $i_{s} \leftarrow i_{s} + 1$ 3: return upd Oracle RATREC(upd)	$ \begin{array}{l} \text{Oracle CHSEND} \\ 1: \mbox{ if } op[i_s] = \mbox{$\stackrel{h}{\sim}$} exp" \mbox{ then return } \bot \\ 2: op[i_s] \leftarrow \mbox{$\stackrel{h}{\sim}$} ch" \\ 3: \mbox{ if } rkey[i_s] = \mbox{$\stackrel{L}{\rightarrow}$} \mbox{ then } rkey[i_s] \stackrel{\&}{\leftarrow} [0,1]^{kl} \\ 4: \mbox{ if } b = 1 \mbox{ then return } k_s \mbox{ else return } rkey[i_s] \\ \text{Oracle CHREC} \\ 1: \mbox{ if restricted then return } k_R \\ 2: \mbox{ if } op[i_r] = \mbox{$\stackrel{h}{\sim}$} exp" \mbox{ then return } \bot \\ 3: op[i_r] = \mbox{$\stackrel{h}{\sim}$} ch" \\ 4: \mbox{ if } rkey[i_r] = \mbox{$\stackrel{h}{\rightarrow}$} \mbox{ then } rkey[i_r] \stackrel{\&}{\leftarrow} [0,1]^{kl} \\ 5: \mbox{ if } b = 1 \mbox{ then return } k_R \mbox{ else return } rkey[i_r] \end{array} $
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Fig. 13: The security game in Bellare et al. [2].

C.2 Comparison with Poettering-Rösler [15]

Poettering and Rösler [15] have a different way to define correctness. Unfortunately, their definition is not complete as it takes schemes doing nothing as correct [18]. Indeed, the trivial scheme letting all states equal to \perp and doing nothing is correct (and obviously secure).

The Poettering-Rösler construction allows to generate keys while treating "associated data" ad at the same time. However, their security notion does not seem to imply authentication of ad

⁴ As an example, we can start from an IND-CCA-secure PKC_0 and add a ciphertext in the public key to define PKC. $PKC_0.Gen: PKC_0.Gen \rightarrow (sk, pk_0)$; pick x; $PKC_0.Enc(pk, x) \rightarrow y$; $pk \leftarrow (pk_0, y)$. Set Enc and Dec the same in PKC_0 and PKC. Then C(pk; r) = y. PKC is also IND-CCA-secure and C has the required property.

although their proposed protocol does. Like ours, this construction method starts from unidirectional, but their unidirectional scheme is not FORGE-secure as the state of the receiver allows to forge messages. Another important difference is that their scheme erases the state of the receiver as soon as the reception of an upd fails, instead of just rejecting it and waiting for a correct one. This makes their scheme vulnerable to denial-of-services attack.

The scheme construction uses no encryption. It also accumulates many keys in states, but instead of using an onion encryption, it does many parallel KEM and combines all generated keys as input to a random oracle. They feed the random oracle with the local history of communication as well (instead of using a collision-resistant hash function). It uses a KEM with a special additional property which could be realized with a hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE). Instead, we use a signcryption scheme. Finally, it uses the output of the random oracle to generate a new sk/pk pair. One of the participants erases sk and keeps pk while the other keeps sk. In our construction, one participant generates the pair, sends sk to the other, and erases it.




Fig. 14: The KIND game of Poettering-Rösler [15].

We recall the KIND game of Poettering-Rösler [15] in Fig. 14 (with slightly adapted notations). The adversary can make several TEST queries. Furthermore, $\mathsf{TEST}(\mathsf{P})$ queries are not necessarily on the last active k_P but can be on any previously generated k_P value. For this reason, TEST takes as input the index (a triplet (role, e, s)) of the tested key. This does not change the security notion.

The KIND game keeps a flag is_P stating if P is "in-sync". It means that P did not receive any forgery. This is a bit weaker than our matching status. However, assuming that a protocol is such that participants who received a forgery are no longer able to send valid messages to their counterparts, in-sync is equivalent to the matching status. As we can see, a key k_P produced during a reception is erased if P is in-sync, because it is available on the \overline{P} side from where it could be tested. This is one way to rule out some trivial attacks. The other way is to mark a TEST as forbidden in a TR list. We can see in the KIND game (Step 2–8 in RATREC) that if P receives a trivial forgery (this is deduced by $r_P \in XP_{\overline{P}}$), then no further TEST(P) is allowed. This means that $C_{trivial\ forge}^{P_{test}}$ is included in the cleanness predicate of this KIND game.

We can easily check that C_{leak} is included in the cleanness predicate. Hence, this KIND game looks equivalent to ours with cleanness predicate $C_{\mathsf{leak}} \wedge C_{\mathsf{trivial forge}}^{\mathsf{P}_{\mathsf{test}}}$.

This security notion does not seem to imply FORGE security.

C.3 Comparison with Jaeger-Stepanovs [10]

We recall the AEAC game of Jaeger-Stepanovs [10] in Fig. 15 (with slightly adapted notations). The RATSEND oracle implements the left-or-right challenge at the same time. Hence, the adversary can make several challenges. Additionally, the RATREC oracle implements a decrypt-or-silent oracle which leaks b in the case of a non-trivial forgery. (The oracle always decrypts after a trivial forgery and never decrypts if no forgery.) Hence, FORGE security is implied by AEAC security. A novelty here is that the adversary can get the *next* random coins to be used: z_P for sending or η_P for receiving. (Bellare et al. [2] allowed to expose the *last* coins.) This is managed by all instructions in gray in Fig. 15. Extracting these coins must be followed by the appropriate oracle query (enforced by the nextop state).

We cannot challenge P after P received a trivial forgery (due to the restricted_P flag). Hence, we have some kind of $C_{\text{trivial forge}}^{P_{\text{test}}}$ condition for cleanness. Since C_{leak} is necessary, we can say that this model includes the $C_{\text{leak}} \wedge C_{\text{trivial forge}}^{P_{\text{test}}}$ predicate.




Fig. 15: The AEAC game of Jaeger-Stepanovs [10].