SÉTA: Supersingular Encryption
from Torsion Attacks

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Abstract. We present *SÉTA*,[5] a new family of public-key encryption
schemes with post-quantum security based on isogenies of supersingu-
lar elliptic curves. At the heart of this construction is a new family of
trapdoor one-way functions, where the inversion algorithm uses Petit's
2017 attack to compute an isogeny between two supersingular elliptic
curves given images of torsion points. We use this method as a decryp-
tion mechanism to first build a OW-CPA scheme; then we prove further
properties of the OW-CPA scheme to obtain IND-CCA security in the
quantum random oracle model using generic transformations, both for
a PKE scheme and a KEM. We compare our protocols with the NIST
proposal SIKE from both security and efficiency points of view, and we
discuss how further work, including on cryptanalysis, may affect this
comparison.

1 Introduction

Isogeny-based cryptography. In recent years, there has been an increasing interest
in cryptosystems whose security relies on supersingular isogeny problems. Since
these are believed to be hard to solve even with quantum computers, this makes
them appropriate candidates for post-quantum cryptography. This field has re-
ceived increasing attention due to the recent standardization process initiated
by NIST.[6]

More precisely, the central problem considered in isogeny-based cryptography
is, given two elliptic curves, to compute an isogeny between them. For the right
choice of parameters, the best quantum algorithms for solving this problem still
run in exponential time [5]. Variants of this problem have been used to build

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[5] To be pronounced [ʃeːtɒ] meaning "walk" in Hungarian.
[6] U.S. Department of Commerce, National Institute of Standards and Technology,
Post-Quantum Cryptography project, 2016. Available at `https://csrc.nist.gov/projects/post-quantum-cryptography`, last retrieved September 13th, 2019.

Fig. 1. Sketch of the SIDH key agreement protocol.

cryptographic primitives such as hash functions [9], encryption schemes [15,2], key encapsulation mechanism (KEM)s [2] and signatures [21,38].

Encryption schemes. In 2011, Jao and De Feo [23] introduced the first public-key encryption (PKE) scheme based on isogenies of supersingular elliptic curves, built from a key agreement protocol. Their work was inspired by a previous construction by Stolbunov [32] for ordinary elliptic curves, with a switch to supersingular curves to thwart sub-exponential quantum algorithms that exist in the ordinary case [10].

The key agreement protocol follows a "Diffie–Hellman-like" structure: Alice and Bob start from a public curve E_0 and choose random secret isogenies φ_A, φ_B to reach curves E_A, E_B. Then they send the curves to each other and finally use their respective secrets to arrive at a common curve E_{AB} as shown in Figure 1.

In the supersingular case the commutativity of this diagram is not immediately preserved as, say, Bob cannot evaluate his isogeny φ_B on Alice's curve E_A without some extra help. To solve this, Jao and De Feo proposed sending additional information in the protocol in the form of images of torsion points under the secret isogenies. With the help of these points, they ensured that each party could evaluate their secret isogeny on the other's curve.

However, the isogeny problem upon which the security of the scheme is based now differs from the original problem in several ways. First, it is a decisional problem, consisting on distinguishing E_{AB} from random, given E_0, E_A, E_B. This is analogous to the relation between the discrete logarithm and decisional Diffie–Hellman problems. Second, the adversary now has access to the images of some torsion points under the secret isogenies, which in principle could make the recovery of these isogenies easier. In addition, Jao and De Feo proposed to use special primes and rather small degree isogenies in their protocols to accelerate computations.

The introduction of this new hardness assumption fostered the proposal of new related assumptions that were used to prove the security of isogeny-based schemes. Many of these assumptions shared the need to reveal extra points. In

particular, this family of assumptions and parameter choices are used in the SIKE submission[7] to the NIST process [2].

A worrisome attack on SIKE variants. In 2017, Petit [26] studied the impact of the extra points in the hardness of these problems. He showed that for some choices of parameters, the problem could in fact be solved in polynomial time with classical algorithms. More precisely, Petit's algorithm solves the following problem: let E_0 be a special curve, for which the endomorphism ring is known, and let $\varphi : E_0 \to E$ be an isogeny of degree D. Let P, Q be a basis of the N-torsion of E_0. Then, given $E_0, E, \varphi(P), \varphi(Q)$, the problem is to compute φ. The algorithm's running time depends on the choices of D and N.

So far, Petit's techniques cannot be applied to the parameters proposed by Jao and De Feo, hence the proposed schemes [23,15,2] remain secure. Nevertheless and in anticipation of potential further cryptanalysis progress, it is desirable to design alternative cryptographic protocols that only rely on original isogeny problems. This has so far only been achieved for signature schemes [31,21,14] and hash functions [9]. A special case is CSIDH [8], a key agreement protocol that relies on the original isogeny problem, but is restricted to supersingular elliptic curves over $\mathbb{F}_p$, and can be solved in quantum subexponential time.

More generally, any relaxation of the assumptions used in building isogeny-based PKE schemes and KEMs is of interest from a theoretical point of view, and could become crucial if further cryptanalysis progress occurs.

Our contributions. We provide new PKE schemes and KEMs based on isogeny problems. Key recovery security for our schemes only relies on the original isogeny problem for supersingular curves, and the standard OW-CPA and IND-CCA security rely on different problems than those used in SIDH and SIKE. We argue that, depending on future cryptanalysis progress, our schemes can provide an interesting alternative to the SIKE family.

We now briefly sketch the core idea of our constructions. Petit's algorithm crucially uses the fact that the endomorphism ring of E_0 is known in SIDH/SIKE. We exploit this fact to turn the attack into a decryption mechanism.

1. Let E_0 be a special curve as above. Alice takes a random isogeny $\varphi_s : E_0 \to E_s$ and publishes E_s as her public key, keeping φ_s as her secret key. A canonical method to compute a basis P, Q of the N-torsion of any E_s is also fixed as part of the scheme.
2. When Bob wants to send a message m to Alice, he encodes it into an isogeny $\varphi_m : E_s \to E_m$, creating the following diagram.

$$E_0 \xrightarrow{\quad \varphi_s \quad} E_s \xrightarrow{\quad \varphi_m \quad} E_m$$

He sends $(j(E_m), \varphi_m(P), \varphi_m(Q))$ as the ciphertext.

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[7] In particular, SIKE is proven secure under the hardness of the "computational DH-like" isogeny problem, in the random oracle model.

3. To decrypt a message, Alice uses her secret isogeny φ_s and knowledge of the endomorphism ring of E_0 to compute endomorphisms of E_s. She can then recover the secret φ_m by running the attack on the ciphertext.

The endomorphism ring of E_s remains hidden to the adversary, so, even though the parameters are chosen to enable Petit's attack, it cannot be run unless $\text{End}(E_s)$ is recovered. The task of recovering the endomorphism ring of a randomly sampled supersingular curve is also a hard problem, for which only exponential-time algorithms exist. The problem is in fact heuristically equivalent to computing isogenies between two randomly sampled supersingular curves [27,17]. As a consequence, an alternative secret key cannot be derived when given only E_0 and E_s.

Since we rely on Petit's attack for decryption, we send torsion point images that are larger than the ones used in SIDH, which suggests an easier underlying problem. However, a key difference is that there is no Diffie–Hellman-like structure in our case: we rely directly on the discrete logarithm-like problem, so in this sense our problem is harder.

We also deal with the algorithmic aspects of the construction, in particular addressing a potential timing dependency that arises from an uncommon case in which Petit's algorithm takes longer to recover the isogeny. We identify when this happens and tune our parameters to avoid this case completely.

We first build an OW-CPA secure PKE scheme and then we use a generic OAEP-style transformation to achieve IND-CCA security in the quantum random oracle model (QROM). For KEMs, we present two alternative routes: one uses the transformations of [22], which work out of the box but have a non-tight security reduction; the other uses the work of [28], which has tighter reductions but requires the starting scheme to verify an additional property called sparse pseudorandomness. We focus on the proof that our scheme satisfies this property and include the technical details of the transformations in the Appendices.

Outline. We first recall the required background on isogenies and quaternion algebras in Section 2. We also state relevant computational problems and formal security definitions that we will use, and briefly recall the SIDH/SIKE constructions. This section can be safely skipped by readers who are familiar with these works. We then present a generalisation of the Charles-Goren-Lauter hash function and describe our construction as a trapdoor one-way function (OWF), together with its inversion mechanism and the relevant algorithmic considerations, in Section 3. In Sections 4 and 5, we present the PKE schemes and KEMs, respectively. These three sections contain the core technical details of this work. In Section 6, we discuss parameter selection. We finally compare our scheme with SIDH/SIKE in Section 7 and conclude the paper in Section 8.

2 Preliminaries

We denote the security parameter by λ. We write PPT for probabilistic polynomial time. The notation $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x; r)$ means that the algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, with input x and randomness r, outputs y. An algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ with oracle access to a function O is represented as $\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)}$. The notation $\Pr[\text{sampling} : \text{event}]$ means the probability of the event on the right happening after sampling elements as specified on the left. Given a set $\mathcal{S}$, we denote sampling a uniformly random element x of $\mathcal{S}$ by $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{S}$. We denote the cardinality of $\mathcal{S}$ by $\#\mathcal{S}$. A probability distribution X has min-entropy $H_\infty(X) = b$ if any event occurs with probability at most 2^{-b}. For $n \in \mathbb{N}$, we use the notation $[n] = \{0, \ldots, n-1\}$ when the context clearly indicates that this is a set. Given an integer $n = \prod_i \ell_i^{e_i}$, where the ℓ_i are its prime factors, we say that n is *B-powersmooth* if $\ell_i^{e_i} < B$ for all i. We denote by $\mathbb{Z}_n$ the set of residue classes modulo n. Throughout this paper, we let $p > 3$ denote a prime number.

2.1 Supersingular elliptic curves

We first recall definitions and results concerning supersingular elliptic curves.

Let q be a power of p and let E_1, E_2 be elliptic curves defined over a finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$. An isogeny $\varphi : E_1 \to E_2$ is a surjective morphism which sends the point of infinity of E_1 to the point of infinity of E_2. An isogeny is also a group homomorphism from $E_1(\overline{\mathbb{F}_q})$ to $E_2(\overline{\mathbb{F}_q})$ with a finite kernel. The degree of the isogeny is its degree as a finite map of curves. If the isogeny φ is separable, then $\#\ker\varphi = \deg\varphi$. If there exists an isogeny φ from E_1 to E_2, then there exists a unique isogeny $\hat{\varphi}$ from E_2 to E_1 with the property that $\varphi \circ \hat{\varphi} = [n]$ where n is the degree of the isogeny and $[n]$ denotes here the multiplication by n map on E_2. Such isogenies φ and $\hat{\varphi}$ are called dual of each other. We call two curves isogenous if there exists an isogeny between them. By the previous remark, this relation is symmetric.

Let E be an elliptic curve defined over $\mathbb{F}_q$. An isogeny from E to itself is called an endomorphism of E. Under addition and composition, endomorphisms of E form, together with the zero map, a ring denoted $\mathrm{End}(E)$. A theorem of Deuring states that such an endomorphism ring is either an order in an imaginary quadratic field (such curves are called ordinary) or a maximal order in a quaternion algebra (such curves are called supersingular).

It is a well-known theorem of Tate that two curves defined over $\mathbb{F}_q$ are isogenous by an isogeny defined over $\mathbb{F}_q$ if and only if their number of $\mathbb{F}_q$-rational points is equal. Supersingular curves can always be defined (up to isomorphism) over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ and a curve is supersingular if and only if the number of points is congruent to 1 mod p. Supersingularity is thus preserved under isogenies.

Kernels of isogenies and Vélu's formulas.

An isogeny is a group homomorphism whose kernel is a finite subgroup of the starting curve. Moreover, let E be an elliptic curve defined over finite field $\mathbb{F}_q$ and let G be a finite subgroup of $E(\overline{\mathbb{F}_q})$. Then there exists a unique (up to

automorphisms of the target curve) separable isogeny whose kernel is exactly G. Due to this uniqueness property we will denote the image curve by E/G. Furthermore, given a subgroup G whose order is powersmooth, the curve E/G can be computed efficiently using Vélu's formulas [37].

Elliptic curve j-invariant. An elliptic curve E defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ can always be written in short Weierstrass form $E : y^2 = x^3 + Ax + B$, for $A, B \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$. We can therefore identify any curve with its two coefficients: $E \sim (A, B)$. Given such a curve, its j-invariant is defined as $j(E) = 1728\frac{4A^3}{4A^3+27B^2}$. As its name suggests, this quantity is invariant under any isomorphism over $\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}}$. In this work, we denote by $\mathcal{J}_p$ the set of j-invariants of supersingular curves defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$. We then identify the set of isomorphism classes of supersingular elliptic curves over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ with $\mathcal{J}_p$.

The Weil pairing. For $N \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\gcd(p, N) = 1$, let $E[N] := \{P \in E(\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}}) : [N]P = \infty\}$ denote the N-torsion of E, where ∞ denotes the point at infinity in $E(\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})$. The Weil pairing is a map $e : E[N] \times E[N] \to \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ that is both bilinear and non-degenerate:

$$e(P_1 + P_2, Q) = e(P_1, Q) \cdot e(P_2, Q)$$
$$e(P, Q_1 + Q_2) = e(P, Q_1) \cdot e(P, Q_2)$$
$$\forall P \in E[N] \setminus \{\infty\}, \exists Q \in E[N] : e(P, Q) \neq 1.$$

Canonical curves. We take the same approach as [21, Appendix A] to fix canonical choices of curves. Given $j \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, we define the curve E_j as $E_j \sim (0, 1)$ when $j = 0$, $E_j \sim (1, 0)$ when $j = 1728$ and $E_j \sim (\frac{3j}{1728-j}, \frac{2j}{1728-j})$ otherwise.

Isogeny graphs. Let $\ell \neq p$ be a prime number. Define the graph $G_\ell = G_\ell(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ to have vertex set $V = \mathcal{J}_p$. We have that $\#V = \lfloor \frac{p}{12} \rfloor + k$, where $k \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. Given two vertices $j_1, j_2 \in V$, with representative curves E_1, E_2 such that $j(E_i) = j_i$, there is an edge in G_ℓ between j_1 and j_2 if and only if there is an equivalence class of ℓ-isogenies between E_1 and E_2, where two isogenies $\varphi, \psi : E_1 \to E_2$ are equivalent if there exists an automorphism α of E_2 such that $\psi = \alpha\varphi$.

Edges of $G_\ell(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$ can also be defined by the modular polynomial $\Phi_\ell(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}[x, y]$ [29]. It is symmetric, meaning that $\Phi_\ell(x, y) = \Phi_\ell(y, x)$, and is of degree $\ell + 1$ in both x and y. It holds that $\Phi_\ell(j_1, j_2) = 0$ if and only if there is an ℓ-isogeny equivalence class between two curves with j-invariants j_1 and j_2, and thus an edge in G_ℓ. Therefore, given a vertex $j \in V$, its neighbours are exactly those j-invariants which are roots of the univariate polynomial $\Phi_\ell(x, j)$. As Φ_ℓ is of degree $\ell + 1$ in x and all the j-invariants are in $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, we see that G_ℓ is an $(\ell + 1)$-regular graph.

2.2 Quaternion algebras and endomorphism rings of supersingular elliptic curves

A quaternion algebra is a four-dimensional central simple algebra over a field K. When the characteristic of K is not 2, then A admits a basis $1, i, j, ij$ such that

$i^2 = a,\ j^2 = b, ij = -ji$ where $a, b \in K \setminus \{0\}$. The numbers a, b characterise the quaternion algebra up to isomorphism, thus we denote the aforementioned algebra by the pair (a, b). A quaternion algebra is either a division ring or it is isomorphic to $M_2(K)$, the algebra of 2×2 matrices over K.

Let A be a quaternion algebra over $\mathbb{Q}$. Then $A \otimes \mathbb{Q}_p$ is a quaternion algebra over $\mathbb{Q}_p$ (the field of p-adic numbers) and $A \otimes \mathbb{R}$ is a quaternion algebra over the real numbers. A is said to split at p (resp. at ∞) if $A \otimes \mathbb{Q}_p$ (resp. $A \otimes \mathbb{R}$) is a full matrix algebra. Otherwise it is said to ramify at p (resp. at ∞). A quaternion algebra over $\mathbb{Q}$ is split at every but finitely many places, and the list of these places defines the quaternion algebra up to isomorphism. An order in a quaternion algebra over $\mathbb{Q}$ is a four-dimensional $\mathbb{Z}$-lattice which is also a subring containing the identity (it is the non-commutative generalization of the ring of integers in number fields). A maximal order is an order that is maximal with respect to inclusion.

The endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ is a maximal order in the quaternion algebra $B_{p,\infty}$, which ramifies at p and at ∞. Moreover, for every maximal order in $B_{p,\infty}$ there exists a supersingular elliptic curve whose endomorphism ring is isomorphic to it.

It is easy to see that, when $p \equiv 3 \pmod 4$, this quaternion algebra is isomorphic to the quaternion algebra $(-p, -1)$. In that case, the integral linear combinations of $1, i, \frac{ij+j}{2}, \frac{1+i}{2}$ form a maximal order $\mathcal{O}_0$ which corresponds to an isomorphism class of supersingular curves, namely the class of curves with j-invariant 1728 (e.g. the curve $E : y^2 = x^3 + x$). It is easy to see that all elements $ai + bj + cij + d$ with $a, b, c, d \in \mathbb{Z}$ are contained in $\mathcal{O}_0$.

2.3 Computational problems for supersingular isogenies

Given an elliptic curve, a first problem is to compute its endomorphism ring.

Problem 1 (Endomorphism ring computation). Let p be a prime number. Let E be a supersingular elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, chosen uniformly at random. Determine the endomorphism ring of E.

Next, given two elliptic curves over $\mathbb{F}_q$, another problem is whether there exists an isogeny between them and, if it does, how to compute it. Existence can be decided in polynomial time by computing the number of points on the respective curves. When there exists a low-degree isogeny between them, this isogeny can be guessed and computed easily. The interesting problem is therefore to compute an isogeny between two curves when no such isogeny with low degree exists. Moreover, one typically restricts to the case of smooth degree isogenies, as the output isogeny can then be naturally represented as a composition of low degree rational maps.

Problem 2. Let d be a smooth number. Let E_1 and E_2 be elliptic curves over $\mathbb{F}_q$ connected by an isogeny of degree d. Compute an isogeny between E_1 and E_2.

Note that, heuristically at least, the restriction to smooth degree isogenies does not change the hardness of Problem 2, which is equivalent to Problem 1 [27,17]. Furthermore, fixing E_1 arbitrarily and letting E_2 vary does not change the complexity. In our protocols, security against key recovery attacks will rely on the hardness of these problems only, unlike in SIDH and SIKE. The OW-CPA security of our protocols also relies on the following related problem, in which images of torsion points by a degree d isogeny are revealed.

Problem 3 (Random-start computational supersingular isogeny (RCSSI) problem). Given p and integers d and N, let E_1 be a uniformly random supersingular elliptic curve over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ and $\varphi : E_1 \to E_2$ be a random isogeny of degree d sampled from a distribution X with min-entropy $H_\infty(X) = O(\lambda)$. Let P, Q be a basis of the torsion group $E_1[N]$. Given $E_1, P, Q, E_2, \varphi(P)$ and $\varphi(Q)$, compute φ.

We stress that Problem 3 is a variant of the CSSI problem, introduced in [15, Problem 5.2], which differs in two aspects. The first difference is that the starting curve E_1 is uniformly random instead of being a special fixed curve. When E_1 is a special curve for which the endomorphism ring is known, there are parameters d and N for which Problem 3 may be easy, as shown in [26]. However, selecting E_1 at random means that computing its endomorphism ring is exactly an instance of Problem 1. Since that problem is also believed to be hard on average, the attack of Petit [26] does not apply against Problem 3, even for unbalanced d and N.

The second difference is the specification of the entropy of the distribution from which the challenge isogeny is sampled. Note that in the statement of Problem 3 we have allowed arbitrary distributions with sufficient min-entropy for convenience, but in fact we will only require the problem to be hard for specific distributions. In Appendix A, we explain that this modification to the original CSSI problem is in fact not specific to our protocols, as a similar modification seems to be needed to formally prove the security of the NIST submission SIKE [2] derived from SIDH.

The above problems are the only computational problems needed to construct new PKE and KEM schemes based on our new trapdoor OWF. However, the reduction is not tight for the KEM, and a tighter reduction can be obtained by relying on an additional problem.

In [34, Definitions 2 and 3], the authors consider the problem of, given two curves E_1, E_2 such that there exists an isogeny φ between them, and a basis $\{P, Q\}$ of the N-torsion of E_1, computing $\varphi(P), \varphi(Q)$. We consider the decisional variant of this problem. However, we cannot expect indistinguishability between images of torsion points and random points of the N-torsion of E_2, as there is a pairing equation that the former will always satisfy. We therefore impose this on the latter.

Problem 4. Let E_1 be a random supersingular elliptic curve, and let P, Q be a basis of $E[N]$. Let $E_2 = E_1/\ker \varphi$ for some random d-isogeny φ from E_1,

sampled from a distribution X with min entropy $H_\infty(X) = O(\lambda)$, and assume that $gcd(N, d) = 1$. Consider the following distributions:

- $(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$, where $\overline{P} = \varphi(P), \overline{Q} = \varphi(Q)$.
- $(\overline{P}, \overline{Q})$, where $\overline{P}, \overline{Q} \xleftarrow{\$} E_2[N]$, conditioned on $e(\overline{P}, \overline{Q}) = e(P, Q)^{\deg \varphi}$.

The problem is, given $E_1, E_2, P, Q, \overline{P}, \overline{Q}$, to distinguish between these two distributions.

Remark 1. We note that sampling elements of the second distribution is efficient, as it essentially amounts to choosing a matrix in $GL_2(\mathbb{Z}_N)$ with the correct determinant. See Appendix B for a more detailed analysis.

2.4 SIDH and SIKE protocols

Here we give a high level description of SIDH and SIKE. We start with the original SIDH protocol of Jao and De Feo [23]. In the setup one chooses two small primes ℓ_A, ℓ_B and a prime p of the form $p = \ell_A^{e_A} \ell_B^{e_B} f - 1$, where f is a small cofactor and e_A and e_B are large (in SIKE [2] they use $\ell_A^{e_A} = 2^{216}$, $\ell_B^{e_B} = 3^{137}$ and $f = 1$). Let E be the elliptic curve with j-invariant 1728.[8] Let P_A, Q_A be a basis of $E[\ell_A^{e_A}]$ and let P_B, Q_B be a basis of $E[\ell_B^{e_B}]$. The protocol is as follows:

1. Alice chooses a random cyclic subgroup of $E[\ell_A^{e_A}]$ generated by $A = [x_A]P_A + [y_A]Q_A$ and Bob chooses a random cyclic subgroup of $E[\ell_B^{e_B}]$ generated by $B = [x_B]P_B + [y_B]Q_B$.
2. Alice computes the isogeny $\varphi_A : E \to E/\langle A \rangle$ and Bob computes the isogeny $\varphi_B : E \to E/\langle B \rangle$.
3. Alice sends the curve $E/\langle A \rangle$ and the points $\varphi_A(P_B)$ and $\varphi_A(Q_B)$ to Bob and Bob similarly sends $(E/\langle B \rangle, \varphi_B(P_A), \varphi_B(Q_A))$ to Alice.
4. Alice and Bob both use the images of the torsion points to compute the shared secret which is the curve $E/\langle A, B \rangle$ (e.g. Alice can compute $\varphi_B(A) = [x_A]\varphi_B(P_A) + [y_A]\varphi_B(Q_A)$ and $E/\langle A, B \rangle = E_B/\langle \varphi_B(A) \rangle$).

This key exchange protocol also leads to a PKE scheme in the same way as the Diffie–Hellman key exchange leads to ElGamal encryption. Let Alice's private key be the isogeny $\varphi_A : E \to E/\langle A \rangle$ and her public key be the curve $E/\langle A \rangle$ together with the images of the torsion points $\varphi_A(P_B)$ and $\varphi_A(Q_B)$. Encryption and decryption work as follows:

1. To encrypt a bitstring m, Bob chooses a random subgroup generated by $B = [x_B]P_B + [y_B]Q_B$ and computes the corresponding isogeny $\varphi_B : E \to E/\langle B \rangle$. He computes the shared secret $E \to E/\langle A, B \rangle$ and hashes the j-invariant of $E/\langle A, B \rangle$ to a binary string s. The ciphertext corresponding to m is the tuple $(E/\langle B \rangle, \varphi_B(P_A), \varphi_B(Q_A), c := m \oplus s)$

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[8] There is a less efficient variant in which a random curve E' is obtained through a random walk from E, and E' is used as the starting curve.

2. In order to decrypt Bob's message, Alice computes $E/\langle A, B \rangle$ and from this information computes s. Then she retrieves the message by computing $c \oplus s$.

This PKE scheme is IND-CPA secure [23,15,2]. In the SIKE submission [2], it is transformed using the constructions in [22, Section 3] to produce an IND-CCA secure KEM in the random oracle model (ROM).

2.5 Security definitions

We now recall standard security definitions for PKE schemes and KEMs. We note that in the definitions in this section, the adversary has quantum access to the random oracles, but only classical access to any other oracles.

We will first recall some weak security notions that are used as a starting point in the generic transformations discussed in later sections. The first one is the notion of partial-domain one-wayness, which states that some part of the input of a function f is hard to recover given the corresponding output.

Definition 1 ([35], Def. 6). *Let* $f : \{0,1\}^{\lambda+k_1} \times \{0,1\}^{k_0} \to \{0,1\}^m$ *be a function. We say that* f *is* partial-domain one-way *if, for any quantum PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\Pr\left[s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{\lambda+k_1}, t \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^{k_0}, \tilde{s} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(f(s,t)) : \tilde{s} = s \right] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

We also consider OW-CPA security for PKE schemes, meaning that it should be hard to decrypt a ciphertext of a random message. Note that this is weaker than the usual IND-CPA security.

Definition 2 ([22], Def. 1). *Let* $(\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *be an encryption scheme with message space* $\mathcal{M}$. *We say that the encryption scheme is secure against quantum* one-way chosen-plaintext attack (OW-CPA) *if, for any quantum PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\Pr\left[\begin{array}{l} (pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KGen}(1^\lambda), m^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}, \\ c^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m^*), \tilde{m} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk, c^*) \end{array} : \tilde{m} = \mathsf{Dec}_{sk}(c^*) \right] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda).$$

We include below a definition for security against key recovery. This is usually not defined separately from OW-CPA security as the latter implies the former. We include it here to later highlight that our encryption schemes enjoy additional protection guarantees against key recovery attacks.

Definition 3 (Security against key recovery). *Let* $(\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *be an encryption scheme with key space* $\mathcal{K}$ *and message space* $\mathcal{M}$. *We say that the encryption scheme is secure against key recovery if, for any quantum PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\Pr\left[\begin{array}{l} (pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KGen}(1^\lambda) \\ sk' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pk) \end{array} : \forall m \in \mathcal{M}, \mathsf{Dec}_{sk'}\left(\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m)\right) = m \right] \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda).$$

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Starting from primitives satisfying the definitions above, generic transformations can produce PKE schemes and KEMs, respectively, with very strong levels of security. More precisely, we will obtain IND-CCA security in the quantum random oracle model in both cases.

Definition 4 ([35], Def. 5). *Let* $(\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *be an encryption scheme. We say that the encryption scheme is secure against quantum* indistinguishable chosen-ciphertext attack *(IND-CCA)* *if, for any quantum PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\left| \Pr \left[\begin{matrix} (pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KGen}(1^\lambda), m_0, m_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)}(pk), \\ b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}, c^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m_b), \tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)}(pk, c^*), \end{matrix} : \tilde{b} = b \right] - \frac{1}{2} \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $\mathsf{O}(c)$ *returns* $\mathsf{Dec}_{sk}(c)$ *for* $c \neq c^*$.

Definition 5 ([22], Definition 3). *Let* $(\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *be a KEM with symmetric key space* $\mathcal{K}$. *We say that the KEM is secure against quantum* IND-CCA *if, for any quantum PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$,

$$\left| \Pr \left[\begin{matrix} (pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KGen}(1^\lambda), b \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}, \\ (K_0^*, c^*) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(pk), K_1^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{K}, \tilde{b} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)}(K_b^*, c^*) \end{matrix} : \tilde{b} = b \right] - \frac{1}{2} \right| \leq \mathsf{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $\mathsf{O}(c)$ *returns* $\mathsf{Dec}_{sk}(c)$ *for* $c \neq c^*$.

3   Injective trapdoor OWFs from supersingular isogenies

We first present a generalisation of the CGL hash function [9] and then introduce a new family of trapdoor OWFs. We show that, for certain parameters, we can efficiently sample a statistically uniform function from the family and that any such function is injective and one-way. Finally, we show that sampling a function at random yields a trapdoor, i.e. a secret isogeny, which we can use to efficiently invert the function.

3.1   Charles-Goren-Lauter hash function

We now present the CGL hash function family as introduced in [9]. To select a hash function from the family, one selects a j-invariant $j \in \mathcal{J}_p$ which fixes a canonical curve $E/\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ with $j(E) = j$. There are $\ell + 1$ isogenies of degree ℓ connecting E to other vertices so a canonical one of these is ignored and the other ℓ are numbered arbitrarily. Then, given a message $m = b_1 b_2 \ldots b_n$, with $b_i \in [\ell]$, hashing starts by choosing a degree-ℓ isogeny from E according to symbol b_1 to arrive at a first curve E_1. Not allowing backtracking, there are then only ℓ isogenies out of E_1 and one is chosen according to b_2 to arrive at a second curve E_2. Continuing in the same way, m determines a unique walk of length n.

The output of the CGL hash function h_j is then the j-invariant of the final curve in the path, i.e. $h_j(m) \coloneqq j(E_n)$ where the walks starts at vertex j and

is defined as above. We see that starting at a different vertex j' results in a different hash function $h_{j'}$.

We modify this hash function family in three ways. First, we consider a generalisation where we do not ignore one of the $\ell+1$ isogenies from the starting curve E. That is, we take inputs $m = b_1 b_2 \ldots b_n$ where $b_1 \in [\ell+1]$ and $b_i \in [\ell]$ for $i \geq 1$; this introduces a one-to-one correspondence between inputs and cyclic isogenies of degree ℓ^n originating from E.

Secondly, we consider a generalisation where the walk takes place over multiple graphs G_{ℓ_i}. Given an integer $D_m = \prod_{i=1}^n \ell_i^{e_i}$ where the ℓ_i are its prime factors, we introduce the notation $\mu(D_m) := \prod_{i=1}^n (\ell_i + 1) \cdot \ell_i^{e_i - 1}$. We then take the message m to be an element of $[\mu(D_m)]$ represented as a tuple $(m_1, \ldots, m_n)$ and each m_i is hashed along the graph G_{ℓ_i}. To ensure continuity, the j-invariants are chained along the hash functions, that is, we write $j_i = h_{j_{i-1}}(m_i)$, where j_{i-1} is the hash of m_{i-1}. Thus, only j_0 parametrises the overall hash function, which we denote by j. As before, this generalization returns the final j-invariant $j_n = h_{j_{n-1}}(m_n)$ as the hash of m.

Thirdly, we also modify the CGL hash function to return the images of two given points under the D_m-isogeny φ_m from E_j to E_{j_n}. For the rest of this work, as we will only make use of this family of generalised functions, we therefore refer by $\mathcal{H}^{p,D_m}$ to the hash function family

$$\mathcal{H}^{p,D_m} = \left\{ h_j^{D_m} : m, P, Q \mapsto j(E_n), \varphi_m(P), \varphi_m(Q) \right\}.$$

3.2 A new one-way function family

Given p, D_m and N, we define a family of functions $\mathcal{F}^{p,D_m,N} : \mathcal{J}_p \times [\mu(D_m)] \to \mathcal{J}_p \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2 \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2$, which uses the generalised CGL hash function family $\mathcal{H}^{p,D_m}$. We define the function $f_j(m)$ to first compute the canonical curve E_j and compute a canonical basis (P_j, Q_j) of the N-torsion group $E_j[N]$ (which is efficient if N is powersmooth). Next, the function computes $(j_c, P_c, Q_c) = h_j^{D_m}(m, P_j, Q_j)$. Succinctly, we have

$$f_j : m \mapsto \left(h_j^{D_m}(m, P_j, Q_j) \right)$$

Statistically random sampling from the family. The starting curve E_0 with j-invariant $j(E_0) = 1728$ is fixed as part of the global parameters of the family $\mathcal{F}^{p,D_m,N}$. To select a random f_j from $\mathcal{F}$, a random isogeny of degree D_s, with cyclic kernel K_s, is chosen. This fixes $E_s \approx E_0/K_s$, and the corresponding j-invariant $j_s = j(E_s)$, thus fixing $f_{j_s} : [\mu(D_m))] \to \mathcal{J}_p \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2 \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2$.

Theorem 1 ([21], Theorem 1). *For degree $D_s = \prod_i \ell_i^{e_i}$, the distribution of the j-invariant j_s sampled as the last j-invariant of a random walk of length D_s is within statistical distance $\prod_i \left(\frac{2\sqrt{\ell_i}}{\ell_i + 1} \right)^{e_i}$ of uniform.*

Following [21, Lemma 1], taking $D_s = \prod_i \ell_i^{e_i}$ with ℓ_i ranging through all primes less than $2(1+\epsilon)\log p$ and $e_i = \max\{e \in \mathbb{N} : \ell_i^e < 2(1+\epsilon)\log p\}$ leads

to a statistical distance of less than $1/p^{1+\epsilon}$, for arbitrary ϵ. This also ensures that D_s is B-powersmooth, for $B \approx 2(1 + \epsilon) \log p$, which allows for efficient computation of degree-D_s isogenies.

Injectivity. We observe that, for the right choice of parameters, the functions are injective.

Lemma 1. *Let $N^2 > 4D_m$, then any function $f_j \in \mathcal{F}^{p,D_m,N}$ is injective.*

Proof. Suppose that a function f_j is not injective, i.e. that there are two distinct isogenies φ and φ' of degree D_m from E_j to E_c, corresponding to two distinct messages, with the same action on $E_j[N]$, implied by the colliding images of P_j and Q_j. Then, following [25, Section 4], their difference is also an isogeny between the same curves whose kernel contains the entire N-torsion. This, together with [30, Lemma V.1.2], implies that $4D_m \geq \deg(\varphi - \varphi') \geq N^2$. Taking $N^2 > 4D_m$ ensures that in fact $\varphi = \varphi'$ and therefore that f_j is injective. □

One-wayness. We now prove that the functions from this family are one-way under the hardness of an isogeny problem.

Lemma 2. *Let D_s be such that the distribution of j_s is statistically close to uniform. A function $f_j \in \mathcal{F}^{p,D_m,N}$ sampled at random as explained above, is quantum one-way under the hardness of Problem 3 with isogeny degree $d = D_m$ and torsion degree N.*

Proof. Suppose that there is a PPT quantum adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that can break the one-wayness of f_j; that is, given j and $(j_c, P_c, Q_c) = f_j(m^*)$ for $m^* \xleftarrow{\$} [\mu(D_m)]$, $\mathcal{A}$ can recover m^* with non-negligible probability. We build a reduction $\mathcal{B}$ which receives a challenge $(E_1, P_1, Q_1, E_2, P_2, Q_2)$ for Problem 3, with X being the uniform distribution over isogenies of degree D_m, and returns an isogeny $\varphi : E_1 \to E_2$ such that $\varphi(P_1) = P_2$ and $\varphi(Q_1) = Q_2$.

We first observe that since E_1 is uniformly distributed, then so is its j-invariant and its distribution is statistically close to that expected by $\mathcal{A}$ for j, so $\mathcal{A}$ is not able to distinguish such distributions. We also observe that the distribution of isogenies resulting from hashing a uniform $m^* \xleftarrow{\$} [\mu(D_m)]$ is exactly the distribution X of D_m-isogenies. The reduction therefore passes $j(E_1)$ and $(j(E_2), P_2, Q_2)$ to $\mathcal{A}$, who will return a corresponding input m with high probability. By reproducing the hashing of m, the reduction $\mathcal{B}$ can then recompute an isogeny $\tilde{\varphi}$ which is equivalent to φ. Note here that if m is a correct pre-image of (j_c, P_c, Q_c) under the function f_j, then we are certain that it is the only one as, by Lemma 1, f_j is injective. With its knowledge of E_1, P_1 and Q_1, $\mathcal{B}$ can then compute φ and return it. □

3.3 Computing inverses

In this section, we show how to use the algorithm of [26] to invert a given function $f_j \in \mathcal{F}^{p,D_m,N}$. We are given (j_c, P_c, Q_c) as the output of $f_j(m)$ for some unknown

m, and also the random isogeny $\phi_s : E_0 \to E_j$ of degree D_s used to select E_j at random. This gives us the composed isogeny $\phi = \phi_m \circ \phi_s : E_0 \to E_m$ of degree $D = D_m \cdot D_s$, where ϕ_m is the walk determined by m, used in the computation of $f_j(m)$.

Computing ϕ_m given a suitable endomorphism of E_0. In this section we assume that we know $\theta \in \mathrm{End}(E_0)$ and $d \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $\mathrm{Tr}(\theta) = 0$ and $\deg(\phi \circ \theta \circ \hat{\phi} + [d]) = N$. Furthermore we assume that D is odd, that $\gcd(D, N) = 1$ and that $-4 \deg(\theta)$ is not a square modulo every prime divisor of D. We will explain how to find such θ as part of the global parameters for our schemes in Section 3.4; here we describe how to invert the function given such a θ.

Let $\psi = \phi \circ \theta \circ \hat{\phi} + [d] \in \mathrm{End}(E_m)$. We can compute ψ by the following method described in [26]. The endomorphism ψ has degree N and we know its action on $E_m[N]$, thus we can compute its kernel (since it is contained in $E_m[N]$). Since we are able to compute ψ, we can compute $\ker(\phi \circ \theta \circ \hat{\phi}) \cap E_m[D]$ efficiently. Now let $G = \ker(\phi \circ \theta \circ \hat{\phi}) \cap E_m[D]$. Lemma 3 below shows that in fact $G = \ker(\hat{\phi})$; from this we can recover first $\ker(\phi)$ and then $\ker(\phi_m)$, separating out ϕ_s. This then allows us to recover $m \in [\mu(D_m)]$ which corresponds to $\ker(\phi_m)$. Algorithm 1 summarises these steps in pseudocode.

Algorithm 1 Computing inverses

Require: $\mathsf{c}, \phi_s, \theta \in \mathrm{End}(E_0), d \in \mathbb{Z}$.
Ensure: $m \in [\mu(D_m)]$ such that $f_{j_s}(m) = \mathsf{c}$.
1: Parse c as $(j_c, P_c, Q_c) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2 \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2$.
2: Compute the canonical curve $E_m = E_j$.
3: Let $\phi = \phi_m \circ \phi_s : E_0 \to E_m$.
4: Let $\psi = \phi \circ \theta \circ \hat{\phi} + [d] \in \mathrm{End}(E_m)$. ▷ Choices of θ and d ensure $\deg \psi = N$.
5: Compute $K_1 = \ker \psi \subset E_m[N]$ using d, θ, ϕ_s and $P_c, Q_c \in E_m[N]$.
6: Compute $K_2 = \ker(\phi \circ \theta \circ \hat{\phi}) \cap E_m[D] = \ker(\psi - [d]) \cap E_m[D] = \ker(\hat{\phi})$.
7: Compute $\ker(\phi_m)$ using $\ker(\hat{\phi})$.
8: **return** $m \in [\mu(D_m)]$ that corresponds to $\ker(\phi_m)$.

Lemma 3. *Let θ be such that $-\deg(\theta)$ is a quadratic nonresidue modulo every prime dividing D. Then G is cyclic and furthermore $G = \ker(\hat{\phi})$.*

Proof. It is clear that $\ker(\hat{\phi}) \subset G$ since it is contained in $\ker(\phi \circ \theta \circ \hat{\phi})$ and in $E_m[D]$ as well. We now show that G is cyclic. Let M be the largest divisor of D such that $E_m[M] \subset G$. Then ϕ can be decomposed as $\phi_{D/M} \circ \phi_M$. Then by [26, Lemma 5] the kernel of ϕ_M is fixed by θ. In the proof of [26, Lemma 6] it is shown that a subgroup of $E_0[M]$ can only be fixed by an endomorphism θ if $\mathrm{Tr}(\theta)^2 - 4 \deg(\theta)$ is a square modulo M. Choosing θ as above therefore ensures that $M = 1$ which implies that G is cyclic. The order of G is a divisor

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of D since G is cyclic and every element of G has order dividing D. However, G contains $\ker(\hat{\phi})$ which is a group of order D. This implies that $G = \ker(\hat{\phi})$. $\quad\square$

Avoiding a timing dependency. The condition that $-\deg(\theta)$ is a quadratic nonresidue modulo every prime dividing D may seem strange at first since in [26] the case when G is not cyclic is also considered. Without this condition, M will not always be equal to 1 and in that case the most time-consuming part of the algorithm is guessing a θ-invariant subgroup of $E_0[M]$—this is exponential in the number of prime factors of M and it can be expensive since D is powersmooth. In [26] it is shown that the expected running time of the attack remains polynomial time. This is however not sufficient for our purposes, as inversion could take a very long time on some inputs, and the variable inversion time creates a dependency between the input and the inversion time. By evoking this extra condition on θ and increasing the parameters slightly, we avoid a timing dependency entirely.

Detection of invalid inputs. When provided with a valid ciphertext c, Algorithm 1 will always return the corresponding plaintext. To detect invalid inputs we proceed as follows. If any of the steps fails we return $\perp$ to indicate that the ciphertext is invalid. If the algorithm returns an output $\tilde{m}$ then we recompute the image $\tilde{\mathsf{c}}$ from it; if that matches the original c, then we return $\tilde{m}$ as a valid message; otherwise we return $\perp$.

3.4 Computation of the endomorphism

We now provide an algorithm for finding $\theta \in \mathrm{End}(E_0)$ which does not depend on ϕ_s or ϕ_m, only on their degrees, and can therefore be run as part of global parameter generation. This is essentially just a small modification of [26, Algorithm 2] but it is technical and may be skipped at a first reading.

The ring $\mathrm{End}(E_0)$ has an integral basis $\{1, i, \frac{ij+j}{2}, \frac{1+i}{2}\}$, with $i^2 = -p$ and $j^2 = -1$. As seen in Section 2.2 the endomorphism ring contains the $\mathbb{Z}$-linear combinations of i, j, ij. We will be looking for θ in the form $ai + bj + cij$ with $a, b, c \in \mathbb{Z}$. This means that we are looking for a solution of the following Diophantine equation:

$$D^2(pa^2 + pb^2 + c^2) + d^2 = N \tag{1}$$

Furthermore, we need that $-4\deg(\theta)$ is a quadratic nonresidue modulo every prime divisor of D.

We make certain parameter restrictions which are partly necessary and partly for convenience. First we choose D to be odd since $-4\deg(\theta)$ is obviously a square modulo 2. We choose N to be a square modulo D^2, so the equation will be solvable modulo D^2 and we choose $N > D^5$. Let $D = \prod_{i=1}^{k} \ell_i^{e_i}$ be the prime decomposition of D, and let us denote by $T := \prod_{i=1}^{k} \ell_i$ the product of all distinct prime factors of D. We will also add the restriction that $D > T^3$. Let

$A := pa^2 + pb^2 + c^2$. Algorithm 2 below computes a solution to Equation 1 such that $-A$ is a quadratic nonresidue modulo every prime number dividing D.

Algorithm 2 Computing θ

Require: D, N, p as above. Let T be the product of primes dividing D.
Ensure: solution to equation 1 such that $-A$ is a quadratic nonresidue modulo every prime dividing D.
1: Find u such that $u^2 \equiv N \pmod{D^2}$.
2: **for** every prime ℓ_i dividing D **do**
3:      Let s_{ℓ_i} be a quadratic nonresidue modulo ℓ_i.
4:      $r_i \leftarrow (s_{\ell_i} - \frac{-N+u^2}{D^2})(2u)^{-1} \pmod{\ell_i}$.
5: Compute a residue r modulo T with the property that $r \equiv r_i \pmod{\ell_i}$.
6: $\ell \leftarrow 0$.
7: $d \leftarrow D^2(T\ell + r) + u$.
8: $A \leftarrow \frac{N-d^2}{D^2}$.
9: **if** A is not a square modulo p **then**
10:      $\ell \leftarrow \ell + 1$.
11:      **go to** Step 7.
12: **else**
13:      Find c such that $c^2 \equiv A \pmod{p}$.
14:      **if** $\frac{A-c^2}{p}$ is a prime congruent to 1 modulo 4 **then**
15:         Solve the equation $a^2 + b^2 = \frac{A-c^2}{p}$.
16:      **else**
17:         $\ell \leftarrow \ell + 1$.
18:         **go to** Step 7.
19: **return** (a, b, c, d)

The following lemmas address the correctness and efficiency of Algorithm 2.

Lemma 4. *Let A be the output of Algorithm 2. Then $-A$ is a quadratic nonresidue modulo all ℓ_i.*

Proof. Let r_i, s_{ℓ_i} and u be as in Algorithm 2. Let r be an integer such that $r \equiv r_i \pmod{\ell_i}$. Then we show that for every i, the integer $\frac{-N+(D^2r+u)^2}{D^2}$ is not a quadratic residue modulo ℓ_i which implies that $-A$ is not a quadratic residue modulo every ℓ_i since $T\ell + r \equiv r_i \pmod{\ell_i}$ for every integer ℓ.

We have that

$$\frac{-N + (D^2r + u)^2}{D^2} = \frac{-N + u^2}{D^2} + D^2r^2 + 2ur.$$

By our choice of r we have that

$$\frac{-N + u^2}{D^2} + D^2r^2 + 2ur \equiv \frac{-N + u^2}{D^2} + 2ur_i \equiv s_{\ell_i} \pmod{\ell_i},$$

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which is a quadratic nonresidue by the choice of s_{ℓ_i}. $\qquad\square$

Lemma 5. *Under plausible heuristic assumptions Algorithm 2 finds a solution to Equation 1 with the required properties in polynomial time.*

Proof. Lemma 4 implies that $-(pa^2 + pb^2 + c^2)$ is a quadratic nonresidue modulo every ℓ_i. Observe that if $\ell < \frac{T}{2}$ we have that $N - (D^2(T\ell + r) + u)^2 > 0$ because of the conditions $N > D^5$ and $D > T^3$. This implies that whenever $\ell < \frac{T}{2}$ we have that $\frac{A-c^2}{p}$ in Step 13 is a positive number. Moreover, we can estimate the size of $\frac{A-c^2}{p}$ since $A = \frac{N - (D^2(T\ell + r) + u^2)^2}{D^2} \approx D^3$, which implies that $\frac{A-c^2}{p} \approx D^2$. By the Prime number theorem and the Chebotarev density theorem we have that the number of primes smaller than D^2 and congruent to 1 modulo 4 is $O\left(\frac{D^2}{\log(D^2)}\right)$. Thus, after $O(\log p)$ iterations (which is much smaller than $\frac{T}{2}$) we will get that $\frac{A-c^2}{p}$ is a sum of two squares.

Finally, representing a prime number (congruent to 1 modulo 4) as a sum of two squares can be accomplished in polynomial time using Cornacchia's algorithm. All the other steps clearly run in polynomial time. $\qquad\square$

Remark 2. The proof implies that instead of having the two conditions $N > D^5$ and $D > T^3$ we could have had the condition $N > D^4 T^3$.

4 Public-key encryption schemes

We now build a PKE scheme using the family of trapdoor OWFs of Section 3 and show that it is OW-CPA secure; then we modify it to achieve IND-CCA security.

4.1 OW-CPA encryption scheme

We define the $\mathsf{SÉTA}_{\mathsf{OW\text{-}CPA}}$ PKE scheme as the tuple $(\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ of PPT algorithms described below.

Parameters. Let λ denote the security parameter. Let E_0 be a fixed supersingular elliptic curve defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ with j-invariant $j(E_0) = 1728$. Let D_s, D_m and N be integers chosen according to the requirements of Section 3. Let $\theta \in \mathrm{End}(E_0)$ be computed as in Section 3.4. We let $\mathsf{params} = (\lambda, p, j_0, D_s, D_m, N, \theta)$.

Key generation. The $\mathsf{KGen}(\mathsf{params})$ algorithm proceeds as follows:

1. Sample a random cyclic subgroup $K_s \subset E_0(\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})$ of size D_s.
2. Compute the isogeny $\phi_s : E_0 \to E_s := E_0/\langle K_s \rangle$.
3. Compute the j-invariant $j_s = j(E_s)$ and its canonical curve E_{j_s}.
4. Set $\mathsf{pk} := j_s$ and $\mathsf{sk} := K_s$.
5. Return $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk})$.

Encryption. The $\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{params}, \mathsf{pk}, m)$ algorithm proceeds as follows. For a given $m \in \{0,1\}^{n_m}$, where $n_m = \lfloor \log_2 \mu(D_m) \rfloor$, first cast m as an integer in the set $[\mu(D_m)]$ and then:

1. Parse $\mathsf{pk} = j_s \in \mathcal{J}_p$.
2. Compute $(j_c, P_c, Q_c) \leftarrow f_{j_s}(m)$, where $f_{j_s} \in \mathcal{F}^{p, D_m, N}$.
3. Embed (j_c, P_c, Q_c) as a binary string $\mathsf{c} \in \{0,1\}^{n_c}$ where n_c is sufficiently large to represent one j-invariant in $\mathcal{J}_p$ and two points in $E_{j_c}[N]$ (see end of Section 4.2).
4. Return c.

Decryption. The $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{params}, \mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{c})$ algorithm proceeds as follows:

1. Given $\mathsf{params}, \mathsf{sk}$ and $\mathsf{c} \in \{0,1\}^{n_c}$, parse c as $(j_c, P_c, Q_c) \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2} \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2 \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2$; if that fails, return $\perp$.
2. Follow Algorithm 1 to recover $\tilde{m} \in [\mu(D_m)]$; if this fails, set $\tilde{m} = \perp$.
3. If $\tilde{m} \neq \perp$; verify that $f_{j_s}(\tilde{m}) \overset{?}{=} \mathsf{c}$. If not, set $\tilde{m} = \perp$.
4. If $\perp$ was recovered, return $\perp$.
5. Otherwise, from $\tilde{m} \in [\mu(D_m)]$, recover $m \in \{0,1\}^{n_m}$ and return it.

Theorem 2. *Let D_s be such that the distribution of j_s is statistically close to uniform. If Problem 3 with $p, d = D_m, N$ and X such that $H_\infty(X) = \lambda$ is hard for quantum PPT adversaries, then the PKE scheme above is quantum OW-CPA secure.*

Proof. In the notation of Definition 2, we have $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^{n_m}$. We see that a randomly sampled $m \overset{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{M}$ directly embedded as an integer $m \in [\mu(D_m)]$ yields a distribution Y with min-entropy $H_\infty(Y) = \lambda$ on isogenies of degree D_m starting from E_s. Similarly to the proof of Lemma 2, the challenge of opening a given ciphertext c reduces to recovering the secret isogeny of Problem 3 with $X = Y$. $\qquad\square$

Efficiency. A ciphertext is composed of a j-invariant $j_c \in \mathbb{F}_{p^2}$, which can be represented with $2 \log p$ bits, and two torsion points $P_c, Q_c \in E_{j_c}[N]$, each of which can be represented with $2 \log N$ bits by identifying each N-torsion point with a pair of elements in $\mathbb{Z}_N$. Therefore, the bit size of a ciphertext is

$$2 \log p + 4 \log N + k.$$

Further compression is possible, representing both torsion points with $3 \log N$ bits, using the techniques in [12, Section 6.1].

4.2 IND-CCA encryption scheme

We now show how to construct $\mathsf{SÉTA}_{\mathsf{IND\text{-}CCA}}$, an IND-CCA secure encryption scheme based on our OWF of Section 3. We do so with the post-quantum OAEP transformation of [35, Section 5] (stated in Appendix C1), for which we prove that our function f is quantum partial-domain one-way. We then recall the transformation's security theorem and comment on the efficiency of the resulting IND-CCA scheme.

Lemma 6. *The function f defined in Section 3.2 is a quantum partial-domain one-way function, under the hardness of Problem 3.*

Proof. We note that in our case, partial domain inversion is the same as domain inversion where only the first part of the path is required. More precisely, factor D_m as $D'_m \cdot D''_m$ such that $\gcd(D'_m, D''_m) = 1$, $2^{\lambda+k_1} \leq \mu(D'_m)$ and $2^{k_0} \leq \mu(D''_m)$ (where $\lambda + k_0 + k_1$ is the bit-length of input strings) and then embed each of s and t in the respective factors. If D'_m is appropriately set, then recovering s from $c = f(s, t)$ is hard under the same assumption as Theorem 2 with D_m replaced by D'_m. $\qquad\square$

Theorem 3 ([35], Theorem 2). *If f is a quantum partial-domain one-way function, then the OAEP-transformed scheme is IND-CCA secure in the QROM.*

Efficiency. The IND-CCA version adds an output of a hash function H', which has the same size as the input of the one-way function f. Thus the total bit size of the ciphertext is

$$2 \log p + 4 \log N + k.$$

5 Key encapsulation mechanism

We select two generic transformations to apply to our encryption scheme to obtain an IND-CCA secure KEM in the QROM. The first works for any OW-CPA encryption scheme, but has the drawback a large tightness factor in the security reduction. The second has a tighter reduction, but requires the OW-CPA scheme to be *sparse pseudorandom*. We first provide a proof that our scheme statisfies this property and then recall the two transformations to achieve IND-CCA security in the QROM. We refer to [22,4] for transformations in the classical ROM.

5.1 Sparse pseudorandomness

In [28], the authors provide the SXY transformation from a weakly secure PKE scheme to a CCA-secure KEM. The security reduction is tight, but unlike other proposals, it requires an additional property from the original PKE scheme: *sparse pseudorandomness*. Informally, this means that the ciphertexts of a random message are computationally indistinguishable from uniformly random elements of the ciphertext space (pseudorandomness), and that at the same time the probability of a random element of the ciphertext space being a valid ciphertext is negligible (sparseness).

Definition 6 (Definition 3.2 from [28]). *A deterministic public-key encryption scheme* $\mathsf{PKE} = (\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$, *with plaintext space* $\mathcal{M}$ *and ciphertext space* $\mathcal{C}$, *is* sparse pseudorandom *if the following two properties are satisfied.*

– *Sparseness:*

$$\mathsf{Sparse}_{\mathsf{PKE}}(\lambda) := \max_{(pk,sk)\in\mathsf{KGen}(1^\lambda)} \frac{\#\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(\mathcal{M})}{\#\mathcal{C}} \le \mathsf{negl}(\lambda).$$

– *Pseudorandomness: for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$,*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PR}}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) := \left| \Pr\left[\begin{array}{c} (pk,sk)\leftarrow\mathsf{KGen}(1^\lambda); \\ m^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}; \\ c^* = \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m^*) \end{array} : 1\leftarrow\mathcal{A}(pk,c^*) \right] - \Pr\left[\begin{array}{c} (pk,sk)\leftarrow\mathsf{KGen}(1^\lambda); \\ c^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{C} \end{array} : 1\leftarrow\mathcal{A}(pk,c^*) \right] \right| \le \mathsf{negl}(\lambda).$$

We prove that our encryption scheme is sparse pseudorandom, under the hardness of problem 4. Recall that our encryption function is defined as

$$\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m) = (j(E_m), \varphi_m(P), \varphi_m(Q)),$$

where $pk = E_s$ is a supersingular elliptic curve, $\{P,Q\}$ is a basis of the N-torsion of E_s, and $\varphi_m : E_s \to E_m$ is the isogeny corresponding to the CGL hash function with input m. The message space is $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^n$. To guarantee that the two conditions above are satisfied, we must carefully choose the ciphertext space $\mathcal{C} \subset \mathcal{V} \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2 \times (\overline{\mathbb{F}_{p^2}})^2$, where $\mathcal{V} = \mathcal{J}_p$ is the set of vertices of the supersingular isogeny graph. In particular, to have pseudorandomness we must ensure that there is no way to distinguish random elements of $\mathcal{C}$ from valid ciphertexts. We impose the following conditions on $\mathcal{C}$:

– An element $(j(\overline{E}), \overline{P}, \overline{Q}) \in \mathcal{C}$ must satisfy that $\overline{E}$ is isogenous to E and $\overline{P}, \overline{Q} \in \overline{E}[N]$.
– The elements $\overline{P}, \overline{Q}$ must be of order N and linearly independent.
– Note that $e(\varphi_m(P), \varphi_m(Q)) = e(P,Q)^{D_m}$, where e is the Weil pairing. Therefore $(j(\overline{E}), \overline{P}, \overline{Q}) \in \mathcal{C}$ must satisfy that $e(\overline{P}, \overline{Q}) = e(P,Q)^{D_m}$.

Note that the third condition implies the second when N and D_m are coprime, which is the case for our constructions.

We now prove that our scheme is sparse pseudorandom.

Lemma 7. *Let $\epsilon > 0$. Assume that $p^{1-\varepsilon}N^3 > \mu(D_m)$ and D_m is large enough to ensure that the output of a random walk of degree D_m is close to uniform. Then the encryption scheme defined above is sparse in $\mathcal{C}$.*

Proof. Our aim is to prove that $\#\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(\mathcal{M})/\#\mathcal{C}$ is negligible. Since the encryption function is injective, we have that $\#\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(\mathcal{M}) = \#\mathcal{M} = 2^{\lfloor \log \mu(D_m) \rfloor}$. On the other hand, $\#\mathcal{C}$ can be factored in the number of valid j-invariants times the number of valid pairs of points for each curve.

We observe that, if D_m is large enough, the mixing property of expander graphs ensures that the probability of ending a random walk of degree D_m at any j-invariant on the graph is bounded away from 0. Therefore the number of valid j-invariants is the size of the graph, which is $\lfloor p/12 \rfloor + k$ where $k \in \{0, 1, 2\}$.

For the number of valid pairs, we fix a supersingular j-invariant $j(\overline{E}) \in \mathcal{V}$. We observe that $\overline{E}[N] = \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/N\mathbb{Z}$, and we are interested in finding how many choices of $(\overline{P}, \overline{Q}) \in \overline{E}[N] \times \overline{E}[N]$ correspond to a valid ciphertext, that is, that they verify the pairing condition. There are roughly N^3 such pairs, as we have N^4 pairs in the torsion and we impose one equation on them.

Therefore

$$\frac{\#\mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(\mathcal{M})}{\#\mathcal{C}} \approx \frac{\mu(D_m)}{\frac{p}{12}N^3} < \frac{12}{p^{\varepsilon}},$$

which is negligible in the security parameter. $\qquad\qquad\square$

Proving pseudorandomness information-theoretically does not seem possible, given the result above, so we rely on a hardness assumption.

Lemma 8. *The encryption scheme defined above is pseudorandom under the hardness of Problem 4.*

Proof. The pseudorandomness game is exactly distinguishing between the two distributions in Problem 4, given a single sample. $\qquad\qquad\square$

5.2 Generic transformations

We now recall the generic transformations and state corollaries of their application to our OW-CPA scheme. We also comment briefly on the relative efficiency of the transformed scheme.

The $\mathsf{QFO}_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation. We describe the $\mathsf{QFO}_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation from [22] in Appendix C2, which takes a OW-CPA secure PKE scheme and produces an IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanism. This is based on a previous transformation by Targhi-Unruh [35], which in turn is essentially a QROM secure version of the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [18]. We state the security theorem of the transformation and comment on its application to our scheme.

Theorem 4 (Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 from [22]). *Let* $(\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *be a PKE scheme with perfect correctness that is OW-CPA secure. Then the $\mathsf{QFO}_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation above produces a KEM that is IND-CCA secure in the quantum random oracle model. More precisely, for any quantum PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ there exists an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{KEM},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \leq 8q^{3/2}\left(\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{OW-CPA}}(\lambda)\right)^{1/4},$$

where q is the number of queries made to any of the random oracles.

We note that the theorem in [22] is more general and covers the case in which the PKE scheme has a decryption error, but we do not need this. Observe that there is a large tightness factor that is lost. Below, we present another transformation with a tighter reduction.

Corollary 1. *The scheme described in Section 4.1, combined with the $\mathsf{QFO}_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation, is a quantum IND-CCA secure KEM under the hardness of Problem 3.*

Proof. Direct application of Theorems 2 and 4. □

Efficiency. The overhead of the transformation over the OW-CPA scheme is the addition of the two hashes $H(m), H'(m)$ (our PKE scheme is deterministic, so we do not need the hash $G(m)$).

The SXY transformation. In Appendix C3 we describe the SXY transformation introduced in [28], which takes a deterministic PKE scheme that is sparse pseudorandom and produces an IND-CCA secure key encapsulation mechanism. We state the security theorem of the transformation and comment on its application to our scheme.

Theorem 5 (Theorem 4.2 and Lemma 3.1 from [28]). *Let* $(\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *be a deterministic PKE scheme with perfect correctness that is sparse pseudorandom. Assume that the ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$ is efficiently sampleable. Then the SXY transformation above produces a KEM that is IND-CCA secure in the quantum random oracle model. More precisely, for any quantum PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ there exists an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ such that*

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{KEM},\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{IND-CCA}}(\lambda) \leq \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathsf{PKE},\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{PR}}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Sparse}_{\mathsf{PKE}}(\lambda) + 2^{\frac{-\ell+1}{2}} q_{H'},$$

where $q_{H'}$ is the number of queries made to H'.

Corollary 2. *The scheme described in Section 4.1, combined with the SXY transformation, is a quantum IND-CCA secure KEM under the hardness of Problem 4.*

Proof. Direct application of Theorem 5, and Lemmas 7 and 8. □

Efficiency. The overhead of the transformation over the OW-CPA scheme is the addition of one hash function call.

6 Parameter selection

In this section, we first summarise the conditions on our parameters for OW-CPA security and for effective decryption. We then suggest concrete parameters.

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Requirement	Condition
Efficiency of computations	$\log p = O(\lambda)$
Representation of N-torsion points	N powersmooth
Efficiency of key generation	D_s powersmooth
Efficiency of encryption	D_m powersmooth
Existence of θ	$D \equiv 1 \bmod 2$
Injectivity of functions	$N^2 > 4D_m$
Solvability of Diophantine equation	$D > p$ and $N > D^4$
Inversion is constant time	$N > D^5$, $D > T^3$ and $N \bmod D$ is square

Table 1. List of parameter conditions for efficiency.

6.1 Parameter requirements

Recall that λ is the security parameter, p is the characteristic of the field, D_s, D_m are the degrees of the secret key and message isogenies, respectively, N is the order of torsion points whose image is revealed, and T is the product of all distinct prime factors of $D = D_s D_m$.

Algorithmic requirements.

We choose $\log p = O(\lambda)$ for efficient arithmetic. We require that N is powersmooth, with a powersmooth bound as small as possible, to efficiently represent N-torsion points. Key generation and encryption depend on performing a random walk in the isogeny graph. This can be done efficiently for isogenies of powersmooth degree. The conditions for efficient decryption and avoiding a timing dependency are discussed in Section 3. In Table 1, we list the conditions required for the efficiency of our algorithms.

Security requirements. We first review the hardness of the computational problems involved, presented in Section 2.3.

If the degree d were not specified in Problem 2, it could be solved in classical $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{p})$ time [19,16]. By specifying d, one can instead apply a claw-finding algorithm by computing all isogenies of degree $\sqrt{d}$ starting from E_1 and then looking for a collision with isogenies of degree $\sqrt{d}$ starting from E_2. Adapting the algorithms from [19,16] results in $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{d})$ classical running time.

Using Tani's quantum claw-finding algorithm [33] one could instead obtain a quantum algorithm with running time $\tilde{O}(\sqrt[3]{d})$, where time is quantified as the number of isogeny evaluation queries. However, based on the recent proposition of Adj et al. [1] that the van Oorschot–Wiener algorithm [36] is a better classical solution, Jaques and Schanck [24] argued that, in fact, running the query-optimal version of Tani's algorithm to achieve $\tilde{O}(\sqrt[3]{d})$ time would require enough hardware that could be repurposed to run van Oorschot–Wiener algorithm in time $\tilde{O}(\sqrt[4]{d})$. Adopting a reasonable constraint on such hardware, they therefore estimate that both the best classical and quantum algorithms require $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{d})$ time to solve Problem 2.

Problem 1 does not involve finding isogenies of a given degree and therefore the claw-finding technique used against Problem 2 cannot be used. Instead, this

Requirements	Condition
Problem 1 is hard	$\log p \geq 4\lambda$
Problem 3 is hard for OW-CPA	$\log D_m \geq 2\lambda$
Problem 3 is hard for IND-CCA	$\log D'_m \geq 2\lambda$
Sampleable $\mathcal{C}$	N powersmooth
Statistical uniformity of j_s, j_m	See Remark 3
OAEP transform is secure	$\log \mu(D'_m) = \log \mu(D''_m) \geq 2\lambda$
Ciphertexts do not leak information	$\gcd(D, N) = 1$
Ciphertexts are sparse	$p \cdot N^3 > \mu(D_m)$

Table 2. List of parameter conditions necessary for security.

problem can be solved in classical $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{p})$ time [19] and in quantum $\tilde{O}(\sqrt[4]{p})$ time [5]. We note that when $d > p$, it may actually be more efficient to solve Problem 2 by first solving a related instance of Problem 1, independent of d and then computing the isogeny using the endomorphism ring instead of the claw-finding strategy. This may be the case in our setting, but since we are already considering explicitly the hardness of Problem 1, we ensure that the choice of p is appropriate for security.

For the ciphertext space to be sampleable, we also require N to be powersmooth, as discussed in Remark 1 and Appendix B.

Remark 3. To achieve statistical uniformity of the j-invariants obtained through random walks, we must ensure that the walks are long enough, as discussed in Section 3.2. This amounts to choosing D_s, D_m as the product $\prod \ell_i^{e_i}$, where $\ell_i^{e_i}$ are all the highest prime powers smaller than $2 \log p$, for all primes ℓ_i. However, recall that we also need N to be powersmooth, and at the same time $\gcd(D, N) = 1$, so we must distribute small primes between D and N. The simplest way is to alternate assigning a prime to D and one to N, in each case going up to the necessary bound imposed by the rest of the conditions. Alternative distributions of the primes could be considered to optimise computations.

Regarding the post-quantum OAEP transformation of Section 4.2, we first recall that we factor D_m as $D'_m \cdot D''_m$ such that $\gcd(D'_m, D''_m) = 1$, $2^{\lambda+k_1} \leq \mu(D'_m)$ and $2^{k_0} \leq \mu(D''_m)$. Thus we require the conditions $\lfloor \log \mu(D'_m) \rfloor \geq \lambda + k_1$ and $\lfloor \log \mu(D''_m) \rfloor \geq k_0$. We now determine k_0 and k_1. Since we need the output length of the hashes to be at least 2λ to avoid collision-finding attacks[9], we require $k_0 \geq 2\lambda$. Since we also want $k - k_0 = \lambda + k_1 \geq 2\lambda$, we set $k_1 \geq \lambda$. Thus, the conditions on D'_m and D''_m become $\lfloor \log \mu(D'_m) \rfloor \geq 2\lambda$ and $\lfloor \log \mu(D''_m) \rfloor \geq 2\lambda$. Table 2 summarises the conditions required for security.

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[9] This seems to be an ongoing research. While the conservative choice would be to account for Grover's algorithm and take $t = 3\lambda$, there has been some arguments against quantum collision-finding algorithms in practice [3], so most works have suggested $t = 2\lambda$.

6.2 Concrete parameters

The parameters that we need to specify is D_m, D_s, p, N and the endomorphism θ. To avoid specializing the problems in any way we choose a random large prime (450 bits) as opposed to a prime of a special form. First we give an example for the integer parameters. The numbers D_m, D_s and N are given by their prime decomposition to highlight their powersmoothness.

1. $D_m = (17^8) \cdot (23^5) \cdot (31^5) \cdot (37^5) \cdot (53^3) \cdot (71^3) \cdot (73^4) \cdot (89^3) \cdot (97^3) \cdot (107^3)$
2. $D_s = (101^2) \cdot (113^2) \cdot (811^3) \cdot (1229^2) \cdot (1291^2) \cdot (2153^2) \cdot 2999 \cdot 3313 \cdot 3323 \cdot 3517 \cdot 4007 \cdot 4889 \cdot 5209 \cdot 5557 \cdot 5623$
3. $N = (21^8) \cdot (29^8) \cdot (41^8) \cdot (43^8) \cdot (59^8) \cdot (61^8) \cdot (67^8) \cdot (83^8) \cdot (103^8) \cdot (139^4) \cdot (149^4) \cdot (233^4) \cdot (283^4) \cdot (311^4) \cdot (443^4) \cdot (491^4) \cdot (599^4) \cdot (619^4) \cdot (631^4) \cdot (761^2) \cdot (1321^2) \cdot (1327^2) \cdot (1373^2) \cdot (1433^2) \cdot (1571^4) \cdot (1579^4) \cdot (1733^4) \cdot (1741^4) \cdot (1753^2) \cdot (1787^2) \cdot (1931^4) \cdot (2083^2) \cdot (2843^2) \cdot (2857^2) \cdot (2579^4) \cdot (2591^4) \cdot (2621^4) \cdot (2971^4) \cdot (3001^4) \cdot (3011^2) \cdot (3217^4) \cdot (3221^4) \cdot (3541^4) \cdot (3617^2) \cdot (3967^2) \cdot (4021^2) \cdot (4691^2) \cdot (5413^2) \cdot (6791^2) \cdot (7057^2) \cdot (7307^2) \cdot (7487^2) \cdot (7523^2) \cdot (7883^2) \cdot (6151^2) \cdot (6173^2) \cdot (6197^2) \cdot (7127^2) \cdot (8713^2) \cdot (8867^2) \cdot (9431^2) \cdot (9209^2) \cdot (8951^2) \cdot (9397^2) \cdot (9463^2) \cdot (9547^2) \cdot (9643^2) \cdot (9931^2) \cdot (10957^2) \cdot (11443^2) \cdot (11447^2)$
4. $p = 2301767813601034621333257775206570689211430600737756856359599712828218867264882060938936126891411134546286806604551293695256541173852591$

Now we turn our attention to θ. We implemented Algorithm 2 in MAGMA [6] to compute a suitable solution of Equation 1. We describe θ as a linear combination $ai + bj + cij$ as described in Section 3.3. To make verification easier we also disclose the value d in the solution of Equation 1:

1. $a = 470004680435850931981986242824341328308960027837590290743837742108219689853892959537881812925429737708845658524362794192902919241823\allowbreak48665487$
2. $b = 309851939654780546101263624372908335484351112050670232738514424867479296423041788093608027971211156252481512541561048308480374159740\allowbreak30967808$
3. $c = 306766875925565390967253066190832643413648987136999135766231864529154683167383967785308818283209878529191600383108515062638700270268819$
4. $d = 716619493873178978459392240151662187868598932021503514730262843268444911257520669288979589497036094977019772975131377270923771558593024783878753050234241777558122190631021305595744469656083026107381185177047617078746203145803384316463965668566108399311752016825531224628633496234647956882453339473372623136494929818982771232391604517\allowbreak0463515$

Running Algorithm 2 took less than 2 minutes on a standard laptop, which makes the generation of θ efficient, as this only has to be computed once at the parameter generation phase.

6.3 Possible improvements

The parameters above are only a proof of concept that key generation is efficient (since the running time estimate relied on some heuristics). There are various

options which will improve the efficiency of the scheme. Recently in [7] the authors propose an extension of Petit's attack where instead of Equation 1, one has to find integer solutions to the equation

$$D^2(pa^2 + pb^2 + c^2) + d^2 = N^2 e,$$

with the extra condition that e must be small. This not only allows for better parameters as potentially a larger part of the D-torsion of E_0 can be defined over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2}$ but also reduces the imbalance of N and D which would allow for a smaller N. Furthermore, a special choice of N could also increase efficiency and so could new techniques from [11]. We leave the task of finding practical parameters and an efficient implementation for further work.

7 Comparison with SIDH/SIKE

Prior to this work, the main method to obtain a PKE scheme from supersingular isogenies was to adapt the original key agreement protocol of [23] in an ElGamal fashion, as described in [15, Section 3.3]; we will refer to this as the SIDH encryption scheme. The SIKE KEM is derived from it through generic transformations. In the SIDH encryption scheme, key generation resembles a partial key agreement where one party generates their secret isogeny and publishes the target curve, together with the images of a torsion basis, as its long-term static key. In this section, we compare SÉTA with SIDH encryption and SIKE.

7.1 Security

The security of SÉTA relies on the hardness of isogeny problems different from those of SIDH encryption or SIKE; future cryptanalysis progress could affect SIKE without affecting our schemes.

Encryption schemes. The IND-CPA security of the original encryption schemes of [23,15] and their version in the SIKE specifications document [2] rely on the supersingular isogeny DDH and CDH problems, respectively; that is, given E_0, E_A, E_B as in Figure 1 and the corresponding images of torsion points, respectively distinguish E_{AB} from random or compute E_{AB}. Our work approaches the original "discrete logarithm"-like assumption (given two curves, compute an isogeny between them) as we reduce OW-CPA security to the hardness of this problem with additional images of torsion points. While OW-CPA is a weaker notion than IND-CPA, the generic OAEP transformation in the ROM provides us with IND-CCA security. SIKE also uses the ROM, even for IND-CPA security. In both cases, the reductions to the respective hard problems are tight.

Importantly in SIDH-based schemes, the starting curve E_0 is fixed for efficiency reasons and the schemes do not benefit from the additional hardness of Problem 3 that comes from a random starting curve. Furthermore, the curves E_0 and E_A are somewhat close in the underlying isogeny graph because of the chosen degrees. In contrast, the security of our schemes of Sections 4.1 and 4.2 benefit from the full hardness of Problem 3 and the use of longer isogenies.

However, since our schemes use images of larger torsion groups, the hardness of our problem does not formally imply that of the isogeny DDH and CDH problems that SIDH relies on. Nevertheless, our scheme could prove to be more valuable, depending on the direction in which cryptanalysis progresses. We consider different scenarios:

- Petit's attacks are improved to work with SIDH parameters. This will force SIDH to move to the less efficient setting of starting with a random curve.
- The requirement to know non-scalar endomorphisms of the starting curve is removed from Petit's attack. This would render both SIDH and SÉTA insecure but it would be a significant new attack.
- A new attack exploits the Diffie–Hellman structure of SIDH (Petit's attack does not). If knowledge of non-scalar endomorphisms was required, SIDH would need to use random starting curves. If not, SIDH would not remain secure, whereas SÉTA would secure. To the best of our knowledge, no attack of this kind is known at the moment.

Considering key recovery (Definition 3) we see that, for [15], it is directly related to the hardness of CSSI [15, Problem 5.2] as recovering the secret isogeny enables any attacker to complete the key agreement and decrypt the message. Not only does this problem include the torsion point images, which means that it can be weak against Petit's attacks [26], but the static nature of the key also opens the scheme to active attacks [20].

In contrast, our scheme of Section 4.1 does not suffer from this; the torsion point images that we reveal depend only on the plaintext. Indeed, the key recovery problem for our scheme consists of recovering an equivalent isogeny between the curves E_0 and E_s *without additional torsion information* (Problem 2), or, equivalently directly computing the endomorphism ring of E_s (Problem 1)—either of these options would allow to directly evaluate the endomorphism $\phi_s \circ \theta \circ \hat{\phi}_s \in \mathrm{End}(E_s)$ in the inversion algorithm of Section 3.3. This guarantees stronger key-recovery security to our schemes in contrast to SIDH and its variants. We formalise this in the following result.

Theorem 6. *If there exists a quantum PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ against the key recovery security of the scheme of Section 4.1 then there exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against Problem 2 for the curves E_0 and E_s.*

Proof. Given E_1 and E_2 as in the statement above, $\mathcal{B}$ computes $j_s = j(E_2)$ and submits j_s to $\mathcal{A}$ as the public key. When $\mathcal{A}$ returns an alternative secret key sk', $\mathcal{B}$ checks that it is valid and returns it as a solution to Problem 2. □

Table 3 summarises the security comparison between our schemes and the SIDH encryption variants.

Key encapsulation mechanisms. Most of the differences between our KEM and SIKE are inherited from those between our encryption scheme and the encryption scheme derived from SIDH. In particular the security of our KEM relies on different problems, as discussed above.

Scheme	Security	Assumption	Tightness	Model
SIDH encryption	IND-CPA	SSDDH	ε	Standard
SIDH enc. (SIKE spec.)	IND-CPA	SSCDH	$2q\varepsilon$	ROM
SÉTA$_{\text{OW-CPA}}$	OW-CPA	RCSSI*	ε	Standard
SÉTA$_{\text{IND-CCA}}$	IND-CCA	RCSSI*	$(2q)^{15/8}\varepsilon^{1/8}$	ROM
SIKE	IND-CCA	SSCDH	$\frac{q}{2^r}+6q\varepsilon$	ROM
SÉTA $+$ QFO$_m^{\not\perp}$	IND-CCA	RCSSI*	$8q^{3/2}\varepsilon^{1/4}$	QROM
SÉTA $+$ SXY	IND-CCA	RCSSI*	$\frac{q}{2^r}+\varepsilon+\varepsilon'$	QROM

Table 3. Encryption schemes and KEMs security comparison. Our instance of RCSSI gives the image of a larger torsion, so it does not formally imply the instances of SSDDH and SSCDH. The tightness column contains (simplified) upper bounds on the advantage of any adversary against the security of the scheme; ε denotes the advantage for the underlying problem, ε' denotes the sparseness of the encryption scheme, q denotes the number of queries to hash functions, $r = \Theta(\lambda)$.

Generic transformations are used both by SIKE and SÉTA to achieve IND-CCA security. SIKE makes use of those in [22], which work out of the box, and we do the same in Section 5.2. However, we study security in the QROM, whereas SIKE focuses on ROM security. Most QROM transformations are highly non-tight, so we also consider another transformation from [28] which provides tightness at the expense of a stronger starting property. To the best of our knowledge, this approach has not yet been applied to SIKE.This security comparison is also summarised in Table 3.

7.2 Efficiency tradeoffs

For all of SIDH, SIKE and SÉTA, there are possible security-efficiency tradeoffs; we often aim for security whereas SIKE has aimed for efficiency. We discuss briefly several design options applicable to both SIDH and SÉTA, and their impact on efficiency and security.

Using special primes can improve efficiency as torsion points are defined over a smaller torsion, but the impact on security is not known. SIKE uses special primes but could use generic primes at a significant practical cost. On the other hand, SÉTA could use special primes to improve efficiency.

Shorter random walks also result in better efficiency and allow to use a smaller torsion, but it has a direct security impact. In SIKE the two curves are relatively close, as only square root of all curves can be reached through the random walk. One could use larger walks, as in SÉTA, at the cost of using larger isogenies or extensions. (B-SIDH [11] offers significant improvements in that direction.)

Petit's attack only works when the endomorphism ring of the curve is known. SIKE uses such a curve, although it could start from a random curve at some efficiency cost, whereas SÉTA uses a random curve by design. We leave the analysis of the efficiency and implementation of these tradeoffs for further work.

8 Conclusion

This work introduces a new trapdoor mechanism for isogeny-based cryptography, which relies on Petit's techniques to compute secret isogenies using extra torsion point information in a constructive way. Public-key encryption schemes and key encapsulation mechanisms are then derived from this and other transformations and are proven secure in the quantum random oracle model. Compared to protocols that are directly derived from SIDH [15,2], these protocols rely on computational problems that, in our view, are more likely to withstand future cryptanalysis. In particular, key recovery security reduces to the original isogeny problem for supersingular elliptic curves, where a random prime and curves are used and no torsion point information is revealed.

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Appendix

A Isogeny sampling in SIKE and the CSSI problem

In their paper introducing SIDH [15], Jao and De Feo specify that the kernel generator is selected as $[m]P + [n]Q$, with $m, n \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_{\ell^e}$ not both divisible by ℓ (taking $d = \ell^e$ in this case). This ensures that every one of the $(\ell + 1)\ell^{e-1}$ degree-d isogenies can be selected as the challenge. The CSSI problem defined in that paper therefore naturally assumes that the isogenies are sampled uniformly at random.

However for increased efficiency, it is proposed in [13, Section 4] to sample the generator points as $P + [\ell \cdot m]Q$ for $m \in [\ell^{e-1}]$. This has the consequence of only sampling from 1/3, resp. 1/4, of the possible isogenies, for $\ell = 2$ and $\ell = 3$ respectively. A similar method is included in the SIKE specification [2, Section 1.3.5] which furthermore samples m only in the set $[2^{\lfloor \log 3^{e_3} \rfloor}]$, therefore not reaching the full range of possible values. It is not expected that such imperfect sampling makes the CSSI problem easier, especially since such sampling methods still yield distributions of isogenies with min-entropy of the order of $O(\lambda)$. Nonetheless, we have included this difference into Problem 3 to make this sampling discrepancy more explicit.

B Sampling in Problem 4

We prove that sampling elements of the second distribution is efficient. Indeed, let R, S be a basis of $E_2[N]$. We can identify torsion points $xR + yS$ with elements $(x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}_N \times \mathbb{Z}_N$. Then we are looking for pairs $(a, b), (c, d)$ that verify the pairing equation. We can sample them in the following way. We write $N = \prod_{i=1}^{k} \ell_i^{e_i}$, where the ℓ_i are the prime factors of N. We denote the order of x by $|x|$.

1. Choose $a, b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_N$ such that $|(a,b)| = N$.
2. If $\exists a^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_i^{e_i}}$, choose $c_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_i^{e_i}}$, else if $\exists b^{-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_i^{e_i}}$, choose $d_i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_{\ell_i^{e_i}}$.
3. Solve $ad_i - bc_i = t \bmod \ell_i^{e_i}$ for all $i = 1, \ldots, k$.
4. Recover $a, b, c, d \bmod N$ via Chinese remainder theorem.

We now show why this algorithm works and produces uniformly random pairs verifying the condition above. We first note that in Step 2, we will always have that either a or b has multiplicative inverse. We note that $|(a,b)| = N$ in $\mathbb{Z}_N$ implies $|(a,b)| = \ell_i^{e_i}$ in $\mathbb{Z}_{\ell_i^{e_i}}$, and since

$$|(a,b)| = \mathrm{lcm}(|a|, |b|),$$

this in turn implies that either a or b is of maximal order in $\mathbb{Z}_{\ell_i^{e_i}}$.

We have that

$$e(aR + bS, cR + dS) = e(R, S)^{ad - bc},$$

using that the pairing is bilinear and alternating. Then we want to impose condition (3),
$$e(R, S)^{ad-bc} = e(P, Q)^{\deg \varphi},$$
which is equivalent to
$$x(ad - bc) = \deg \varphi,$$
where x is the discrete logarithm of $e(R, S)$ with respect to $e(P, Q)$ (this can be efficiently computed as long as N is smooth). Therefore, the pairs satisfying condition (3) above are the solutions of the equation
$$ad - bc = t,$$
where $t = x^{-1} \deg \varphi$ (note that x is invertible because $\{R, S\}$ is a basis of $E_2[N]$). Finally, the equation modulo prime powers can be solved as
$$d_i = a^{-1}(t + bc_i) \mod \ell_i^{e_i}, \qquad \text{or} \qquad c_i = b^{-1}(ad_i - t) \mod \ell_i^{e_i},$$
depending on whether a or b is invertible.

C Generic transformations to active security

We present here versions of several generic transformations adapted to the specifics of our schemes.

C1 Post-quantum OAEP transformation

Let
$$f : \{0, 1\}^{\lambda+k_1} \times \{0, 1\}^{k_0} \to \{0, 1\}^{n_c}$$
be an invertible injective function. The function f is the public key of the scheme, its inverse f^{-1} is the secret key. The scheme makes use of three hash functions
$$G : \{0, 1\}^{k_0} \to \{0, 1\}^{k-k_0},$$
$$H : \{0, 1\}^{k-k_0} \to \{0, 1\}^{k_0},$$
$$H' : \{0, 1\}^k \to \{0, 1\}^k,$$
modelled as random oracles, where $k = \lambda + k_0 + k_1$. Given those, the encryption scheme is defined as follows:

– Enc: given a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, choose $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_0}$ and set
$$s = m||0^{k_1} \oplus G(r), \qquad\qquad t = r \oplus H(s),$$
$$c = f(s, t), \qquad\qquad d = H'(s||t),$$
and output the ciphertext (c, d).

– Dec: given a ciphertext (c, d), use the secret key to compute $(s, t) = f^{-1}(c)$. If $d \neq H'(s||t)$ output $\perp$. Otherwise, compute $r = t \oplus H(s)$ and $\overline{m} = s \oplus G(r)$. If the last k_1 bits of $\overline{m}$ are 0, output the first n bits of $\overline{m}$, otherwise output $\perp$.

C2   QFO$_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation

Following the recommendation in [4, Section 16], we choose the variant with implicit rejection, that is, when the ciphertext is invalid, the decapsulation algorithm outputs a wrong key instead of $\perp$.

Let $(\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be a public-key encryption scheme, with message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and randomness space $\mathcal{R}$. Also, let

$$G : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \mathcal{R}, \qquad H : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^\lambda, \qquad H' : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^\lambda$$

be three hash functions, modelled as random oracles. The $\mathsf{QFO}_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation outputs KEM presented in Figure C1.

$\overline{\mathsf{KGen}}(1^\lambda)$:	$\overline{\mathsf{Enc}}(pk)$:	$\overline{\mathsf{Dec}}(dk, c, d)$:
$(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KGen}(1^\lambda)$	$m \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$	$m = \mathsf{Dec}_{sk}(c)$
$s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$	$c = \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m; G(m))$	**if** $c \neq \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m; G(m))$ **or** $H'(m) \neq d$
return (pk, dk)	$d = H'(m)$	$\quad$ **return** $K = H(s, c, d)$
$dk = (pk, sk, s)$	$K = H(m)$	**else return** $K = H(m)$.
	return (K, c, d)	

Fig. C1. The $\mathsf{QFO}_m^{\not\perp}$ transformation

C3   SXY transformation

Let $(\mathsf{KGen}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be a sparse pseudorandom deterministic public-key encryption scheme with message space $\mathcal{M} = \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$. Also, let

$$H : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^\lambda, \qquad H' : \{0,1\}^\ell \times \mathcal{C} \to \{0,1\}^\lambda$$

be two hash functions, modelled as random oracles. The SXY transformation outputs the following KEM:

$\overline{\mathsf{KGen}}(1^\lambda)$:	$\overline{\mathsf{Enc}}(pk)$:	$\overline{\mathsf{Dec}}(dk, c)$:
$(pk, sk) \leftarrow \mathsf{KGen}(1^\lambda)$	$m \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{M}$	$m = \mathsf{Dec}_{sk}(c)$
$s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^\ell$	$c = \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m)$	**if** $m = \perp$ **return** $K = H'(s, c)$
$dk = (pk, sk, s)$	$K = H(m)$	**if** $c \neq \mathsf{Enc}_{pk}(m)$ **return** $K = H'(s, c)$
return (pk, dk)	**return** (K, c)	**else return** $K = H(m)$.

Fig. C2. The SXY transformation