4-Round Luby-Rackoff Construction is a qPRP

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Abstract. The Luby-Rackoff construction, or the Feistel construction, is one of the most important approaches to construct secure block ciphers from secure pseudorandom functions. The 3-round and 4-round Luby-Rackoff constructions are proven to be secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPAs) and chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCAs), respectively, in the classical setting. However, Kuwakado and Morii showed that a quantum superposed chosen-plaintext attack (qCPA) can distinguish the 3-round Luby-Rackoff construction from a random permutation in polynomial time. In addition, a recent work by Ito et al. showed a quantum superposed chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA) that distinguishes the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction. Since Kuwakado and Morii showed the result, it has been a problem of much interest how many rounds are sufficient to achieve the provable security against quantum query attacks. This paper shows the answer to this fundamental question by showing that 4-rounds suffice against qCPAs. Concretely, we prove that the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction is secure up to $O(2^{n/12})$ quantum queries. We also give a query upper bound for the problem of distinguishing the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction from a random permutation by showing a distinguishing qCPA with $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries. Our result is the first one that shows security of a typical block-cipher construction against quantum query attacks, without any algebraic assumptions. To give security proofs, we introduce a proof technique which is a modification of Zhandry's compressed oracle technique.

Keywords: symmetric-key cryptography · post-quantum cryptography · provable security · quantum security · quantum chosen plaintext attacks · Luby-Rackoff constructions.

1 Introduction

Post-quantum public-key cryptography has been one of the most active research areas in cryptography research community since Shor developed the polynomial-time integer factoring quantum algorithm [30]. NIST is working on a standardization process for post-quantum public-key schemes such as public-key encryption, key-establishment, and digital signature schemes [27].

On the other hand, for symmetric key cryptography, it has been said that the security of symmetric-key schemes would not be much affected by quantum

computers. However, a series of recent results has shown that some of them are also broken in polynomial time by using Simon's algorithm [31] if quantum adversaries have access to quantum circuits that implement keyed primitives [18,20,9,7,21,29,14,13,12,17], though they are proven or assumed to be secure in the classical setting. Now it is also important to study post-quantum security of symmetric-key schemes.

While many quantum query attacks on symmetric-key schemes have been proposed, the development on post-quantum provable security of symmetric-key schemes is limited. There are two possible post-quantum security notions for symmetric-key schemes: *standard security* and *quantum security* [33]. The standard security is the one that assumes adversaries have quantum computers, but have access to keyed oracles in a classical manner. On the other hand, the quantum security is the one that assumes adversaries can make queries to keyed primitives in quantum superpositions. If a scheme is proven to have quantum security, then it will remain secure even in a far future where all computations and communications are done in quantum superpositions. Therefore, it is a problem of much interest whether a classically secure symmetric-key scheme also has quantum security.

The Luby-Rackoff construction. The Luby-Rackoff construction, or the Feistel construction, is one of the most important approaches to construct efficient and secure block ciphers, which are pseudorandom permutations (PRPs), from efficient and secure pseudorandom functions (PRFs). A significant number of block ciphers including popular ones such as DES [25] and Camellia [4] were designed based on this construction.

For families of functions $f_i := \{f_{i,k} : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ that are parameterized by k in a key space $\mathcal{K}$ ($1 \le i \le r$), the r-round Luby-Rackoff construction $\mathsf{LR}_r(f_1,\ldots,f_r)$ is defined as follows: First, keys $k_1,\ldots,k_r$ are chosen independently and uniformly at random from $\mathcal{K}$. For each input $x_0 = x_{0L}\|x_{0R}$, where $x_{0L}, x_{0R} \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, the state is updated as

$$x_{(i-1)L}\|x_{(i-1)R} \mapsto x_{iL}\|x_{iR} := x_{(i-1)R} \oplus f_{i,k_i}(x_{(i-1)L})\|x_{(i-1)L} \tag{1}$$

for $i = 1,\ldots,r$ in a sequential order (see Fig. 1). The output is the final state $x_r = x_{rL}\|x_{rR}$. Then the resulting function becomes a keyed permutation over $\{0,1\}^n$ with keys in $(\mathcal{K})^4$.

In the classical setting, if each f_i is a secure PRF, LR_r becomes a secure PRP against chosen-plaintext attacks (CPAs) for $r \ge 3$ and a secure PRP against chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCAs) for $r \ge 4$ [23], i.e., LR_r becomes a strong PRP. However, in the quantum setting, Kuwakado and Morii showed that LR_3 can be distinguished in polynomial time from a truly random permutation by a quantum superposed chosen-plaintext attack [20] (qCPA). [3] Moreover, the

[3] Strictly speaking, the attack by Kuwakado and Morii works only for the case that all round functions are keyed permutations. Kaplan et al. [18] showed that the attack works for more general cases.



Fig. 1. The i-th round state update.

recent work by Ito et al. showed that LR_4 can be distinguished in polynomial time by a quantum superposed chosen-ciphertext attack (qCCA) [17]. On the other hand, for any r, no post-quantum security proof of LR_r is known. A very natural question is then whether such a proof is feasible for some r, and if so, to determine the minimum number of r so that we can prove the post-quantum security of LR_r.

1.1 Our Contributions

As the first step to giving post-quantum security proofs for the Luby-Rackoff constructions, this paper shows that the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction LR_4 is secure against qCPAs. In particular, we give a security bound of LR_4 against qCPAs in the case that all round functions are truly random functions. We also give a query upper bound for the problem of distinguishing LR_4 from a random permutation by showing a distinguishing attack. Concretely, we show the following theorems.

Theorem 1 (Lower bound and upper bound, informal). *If all round functions are truly random functions, then the following claims hold.*

1. LR_4 *cannot be distinguished from a truly random permutation by qCPAs up to* $O(2^{n/12})$ *quantum queries.*
2. *There exists a quantum algorithm that distinguishes* LR_4 *from a truly random permutation with a constant probability by making* $O(2^{n/6})$ *quantum chosen-plaintext queries.*

Theorem 2 (Construction of PRP from PRF, informal). *Suppose that each* f_i *is a secure PRF against efficient quantum query attacks, for* $1 \leq i \leq 4$. *Then* $\mathsf{LR}_4(f_1, f_2, f_3, f_4)$ *is a secure PRP against efficient qCPAs.*

Technical details. To give a quantum security proof for LR_4 in the case that all round functions are truly random, we introduce a technique that we call *compressed oracle technique with errors*, which is a modification of the *compressed oracle technique* developed by Zhandry [37].

One of the challenging obstacles to give security proofs against quantum superposed query adversaries is that we cannot record *transcripts* of quantum

Attack setting	Classical CPA	Classical CCA	Quantum CPA	Quantum CCA
Security proof	Secure up to $O(2^{n/4})$ queries [23]	Secure up to $O(2^{n/4})$ queries [23]	Secure up to $O(2^{n/12})$ queries **[Ours]** (Section 4)	No proofs (Insecure)
Distinguishing attack	$O(2^{n/4})$ queries [28]	$O(2^{n/4})$ queries [28]	$O(2^{n/6})$ queries **[Ours]** (Section 5)	$O(n)$ queries [17]

Table 1. Comparison of security proofs and attacks for the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction LR_4 in the case that all round functions are truly random. In the quantum CPA/CCA settings, adversaries can make quantum superposed queries.

queries and answers. While it is trivial that we can store query-answer records in the classical setting, it is highly non-trivial to store them in the quantum setting, since measuring or copying (parts of) quantum states will lead to perturbing them, which may be detected by adversaries.

Zhandry's compressed oracle technique enables us to overcome the obstacle in the case when oracles are truly random functions. The technique is so powerful that it can be used to show quantum indifferentiability of the Merkle-Damgård domain extender and quantum security for the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation [37], in addition to the (tight) lower bounds for the multicollision-finding problems [22]. His crucial observation is that we can record queries and answers without affecting quantum states by appropriately forgetting previous records. To check if a previous record is the one that should be forgot, we have to do a "test and forget" procedure after each query.

The compressed oracle technique is a powerful tool, while we see that the "test and forget" procedure is not intuitively and mathematically clear, which would be problematic when we apply it to complex schemes such as the Luby-Rackoff construction.

To overcome this issue, we scrutinized the compressed oracle technique, and observed that we can re-formalize the technique without "test and forget" procedures by introducing some errors. This modification enables us to describe properties and behaviors of oracles in an intuitively clear manner. We also explicitly describe error terms, which enables us to give mathematically rigorous proofs. We name the modified version *compressed oracle technique with errors*. We believe that our modified technique would be useful for other applications. See Section 3 for details on the technique.

By making heavy use of our compressed oracle technique with errors, we complete the security proof of LR_4 against quantum superposed query attacks, taking advantage of classical proof intuitions to some extent. First, we consider LR_3, the 3-round Luby-Rackoff construction, which is easy to be distinguished from a truly random permutation, and a slightly modified version of it, where the last-round state update of LR_3 is modified. Our observation is that it seems hard even for quantum (chosen-plaintext) query adversaries to notice the modi-

fication, and we are actually able to show that this is indeed the case. Intuitively, the proof is possible since it is infeasible even for quantum query adversaries to produce collisions on the input of the third round. Second, we prove that a family of random permutations (i.e., a function $P : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ such that $P(x,\cdot)$ is a truly random permutation over $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ for each x) is hard to distinguish from a truly random function. To show the first hardness result, we use our compressed technique with errors. On the other hand, for the second hardness result, we can show it by just combining some previous results. Once we prove these two hardness results, the rest of the proof can be done easily without any argument that is specific to the quantum setting. Our proof is much more complex than the classical one, though, we give rigorous and careful analyses. See Section 4 for details on the security proof of LR_4.

In contrast to the high complexity of the provable security result, our quantum distinguishing attack is a simple quantum polynomial speed-up of existing classical attacks. See Section 5 for details on the quantum distinguishing attack.

Remark 1. When the first version of this paper was uploaded to IACR ePrint Archive, the latest version of [37] was version 20180814:183812. The descriptions in this paper regarding [37] is written based on the version 20180814:183812. Recently the paper [37] was revised, and explanations and formalizations for the compressed oracle technique in the latest version have been changed from the version 20180814:183812.

1.2 Related Works

With respect to security proofs against quantum query adversaries for symmetric key schemes other than the ones we introduced above, there is a proof for standard modes of operations by Targhi et al. [3], one for the Carter-Wegman MACs by Boneh and Zhandry [6], one for NMAC by Song and Yun [32], and one for Davies-Meyer and Merkle-Damgård constructions by Hosoyamada and Yasuda [16]. Zhandry showed the PRP-PRF switching lemma in the quantum setting [35], and that quantum-secure PRPs can be constructed from quantum-secure PRFs by using a technique of format preserving encryption [36]. Czajkowski et al. showed that the sponge construction is *collapsing* (collapsing is a quantum extension of the classical notion of collision-resistance) when round functions are one-way random permutations or functions [10].[4] Alagic and Russell proved that polynomial time attacks against symmetric-key schemes that make use of Simon's algorithm can be prevented by replacing XOR operations with modular additions based on an algebraic hardness assumption [1], however, Bonnetain and Naya-Plasecia showed that the countermeasure is not practical [8]. Regarding standard security proofs (against quantum adversaries that make only classical queries) for symmetric-schemes, Mennink and Szepieniec proved security for XOR of PRPs [24]. Recently Czajkowski et al. [11] showed

[4] Note that the condition that the round function of the sponge construction is one-way is unusual in the context of classical symmetric-key provable security.

that the compressing technique can be extended to quantum oracles with non-uniform distributions such as a random permutation, and showed quantum indifferentiability of the sponge construction.

2 Preliminaries

This section describes notations and definitions. In this paper, any algorithm (or adversary) is supposed to be a quantum algorithm, and makes quantum superposed queries to oracles.

For any finite sets X and Y, let $\mathsf{Func}(X,Y)$ denote the set of all functions from X to Y. For any n-bit string x, we denote the left half $n/2$-bits of x by x_L and the right half $n/2$-bits by x_R, respectively. We identify the set $\{0,1\}^m$ with the set of the integers $\{0,1,\ldots,2^m-1\}$.

2.1 Quantum Computation

Throughout this paper, we assume that readers have basic knowledge about quantum computation and finite dimensional linear algebra (see textbooks such as [26,19] for an introduction). We use the computational model of quantum circuits. We measure complexity of quantum algorithms by the number of queries, and the number of basic gates in addition to oracle gates. In this paper, by *basic gates* we denote the gates in the standard basis of quantum circuits $\mathcal{Q}$ [19]. Let $\|\cdot\|$ and $\|\cdot\|_{\mathsf{tr}}$ denote the norm of vectors and the trace norm of operators, respectively. In addition, let $\mathsf{td}(\cdot,\cdot)$ denote the trace distance. For Hermitian operators ρ,σ on a Hilbert space $\mathcal{H}$, $\mathsf{td}(\rho,\sigma)=\frac{1}{2}\|\rho-\sigma\|_{\mathsf{tr}}$ holds. For a mixed state ρ of a joint quantum system $\mathcal{H}_A\otimes\mathcal{H}_B$, let $\mathsf{tr}_B(\rho)$ (resp., $\mathsf{tr}_A(\rho)$) denote the partial trace of ρ over $\mathcal{H}_B$ (resp., $\mathcal{H}_A$). Moreover, for a pure state $|\psi\rangle$ of the joint quantum system $\mathcal{H}_A\otimes\mathcal{H}_B$, we write $\mathsf{tr}_B(|\psi\rangle)$ (resp., $\mathsf{tr}_A(|\psi\rangle)$) instead of $\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{B}}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)$ (resp., $\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{A}}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)$), for simplicity. Similarly, for a pure state $|\psi\rangle$ and a mixed state ρ of a quantum system $\mathcal{H}$, we write $\mathsf{td}(|\psi\rangle,\rho)$ and $\mathsf{td}(\rho,|\psi\rangle)$ instead of $\mathsf{td}(|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|,\rho)$ and $\mathsf{td}(\rho,|\psi\rangle\langle\psi|)$, respectively. For an integer $n\geq 1$, by I_n and $H^{\otimes n}$ we denote the identity operator on n-qubit systems and the n-qubit Hadamard operator, respectively. If n is clear from the context, we just write I instead of I_n, for short. By abuse of notation, for an operator V, we sometimes use the same notation V to denote $V\otimes I$ or $I\otimes V$ for simplicity, when it will cause no confusion. In addition, for a vector $|\phi\rangle$ and a positive integer m, we sometimes use the same notation $|\phi\rangle$ to denote $|\phi\rangle\otimes|0^m\rangle$ or $|0^m\rangle\otimes|\phi\rangle$ for simplicity, when it will cause no confusion.

Quantum oracle query algorithms. Following previous works (see [5], for example), any quantum oracle query algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ that makes at most q queries to oracles is modeled as a sequence of unitary operators $(U_0,\ldots,U_q)$, where each U_i is a unitary operator on an ℓ-qubit quantum system, for some integer ℓ. Here, U_0 can be regarded as the initialization process, and for $1\leq i\leq q-1$, U_i is the process after the i-th query. U_q can be regarded as the finalization process. We

only consider quantum algorithms that take no inputs, and we assume that the initial state of $\mathcal{A}$ is $|0^\ell\rangle$.

Stateless oracles. For a function $f : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n$, the quantum oracle of f is defined as the unitary operator $O_f : |x,y\rangle \mapsto |x, y \oplus f(x)\rangle$. When we run $\mathcal{A}$ relative to the oracle O_f, the unitary operators $U_0, O_f, \ldots, U_{q-1}, O_f, U_q$ act in a sequential order on the initial state $|0^\ell\rangle$. (We consider that O_f acts on the first $(m+n)$-qubits of $\mathcal{A}$'s quantum register.) Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ measures the resulting quantum state $U_q O_f U_{q-1} \cdots O_f U_0 |0^\ell\rangle$, and returns the measurement result as the output. f may be chosen according to a distribution at the beginning of each game. Let us denote the event that $\mathcal{A}$ runs relative to the oracle O_f and returns an output α by $\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{O_f}()$ or by $\mathcal{A}^{O_f}() \to \alpha$.

Stateful oracles. In this paper, we also consider more general cases that quantum oracles are stateful, i.e., oracles have ℓ'-qubit quantum states for an integer $\ell' \geq 0$.[5] In these cases, an oracle $\mathcal{O}$ is modeled as a sequence of unitary operators $(\mathcal{O}_1, \ldots, \mathcal{O}_q)$ that acts on the first $(m+n)$-qubits of $\mathcal{A}$'s quantum register in addition to $\mathcal{O}$'s quantum register. When we run $\mathcal{A}$ relative to the oracle $\mathcal{O}$, the unitary operators $U_0 \otimes I_{\ell'}, \mathcal{O}_1, \ldots, (U_{q-1} \otimes I_{\ell'}), \mathcal{O}_q, (U_q \otimes I_{\ell'})$ act in a sequential order on the initial state $|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |\mathsf{init}_{\mathcal{O}}\rangle$, where $|\mathsf{init}_{\mathcal{O}}\rangle$ is the initial state of $\mathcal{O}$. Finally, $\mathcal{A}$ measures the resulting quantum state $(U_q \otimes I_{\ell'})\mathcal{O}_q(U_{q-1} \otimes I_{\ell'}) \cdots \mathcal{O}_1(U_0 \otimes I_{\ell'}) |0^\ell\rangle \otimes |\mathsf{init}_{\mathcal{O}}\rangle$, and returns the measurement result as the output. If $\mathcal{O}$ has no state and $\mathcal{O}_i = O_f$ holds for each i, the behavior of $\mathcal{A}$ relative to $\mathcal{O}$ precisely matches that of $\mathcal{A}$ relative to the stateless oracle O_f. Thus, our model of stateful oracles is an extension of the typical model of stateless oracles described above. $\mathcal{O}$ may be chosen according to a distribution at the beginning of each game. We denote the event that $\mathcal{A}$ runs relative to the oracle $\mathcal{O}$ and returns an output α by $\alpha \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}()$ or by $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}() \to \alpha$.

Quantum distinguishing advantages. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be a quantum algorithm that makes at most q queries, outputs 0 or 1 as the final output, and let $\mathcal{O}_1$ and $\mathcal{O}_2$ be some oracles. We consider the situation that $\mathcal{O}_1$ and $\mathcal{O}_2$ are chosen randomly according to some distributions. We define the *quantum distinguishing advantage* of $\mathcal{A}$ by

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathcal{O}_1,\mathcal{O}_2}(\mathcal{A}) := \left| \Pr_{\mathcal{O}_1}\left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_1}() \to 1\right] - \Pr_{\mathcal{O}_2}\left[\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_2}() \to 1\right] \right|. \tag{2}$$

When we are interested only in the number of queries and do not consider other complexities such as the number of gates (i.e., we focus on information theoretic adversaries), we use the notation

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathcal{O}_1,\mathcal{O}_2}(q) := \max_{\mathcal{A}} \left\{ \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathcal{O}_1,\mathcal{O}_2}(\mathcal{A}) \right\}, \tag{3}$$

[5] Here we do not mean that our model captures all reasonable stateful quantum oracles. We use our model of stateful quantum oracles just for intermediate arguments to prove our main results, and the claims of the main results are described in the typical model of stateless oracles.

where the maximum is taken over all quantum algorithms that make at most q quantum queries.

Quantum PRF advantages. By RF we denote the quantum oracle of random functions, i.e., the oracle such that a function $f \in \mathsf{Func}(\{0,1\}^m, \{0,1\}^n)$ is chosen uniformly at random, and an oracle access to O_f is given to adversaries.

Let $\mathcal{F} = \{F_k : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ be a family of functions. Let us use the same symbol $\mathcal{F}$ to denote the oracle such that k is chosen uniformly at random, and an oracle access to O_{F_k} is given to adversaries. In addition, let $\mathcal{A}$ be an oracle query algorithm that outputs 0 or 1. Then we define the quantum pseudorandom-function (qPRF) advantage by $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathcal{F}}(\mathcal{A}) := \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathcal{F},\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{A})$. Similarly, we define $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathcal{F}}(q)$ by $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathcal{F}}(q) := \max_{\mathcal{A}} \left\{ \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathcal{F}}(\mathcal{A}) \right\}$, where the maximum is taken over all quantum algorithms $\mathcal{A}$ that make at most q quantum queries.

Quantum PRP advantages. By RP we denote the quantum oracle of random permutations, i.e., the oracle such that a permutation $P \in \mathsf{Perm}(\{0,1\}^n)$ is chosen uniformly at random, and an oracle access to O_P is given to adversaries.

Let $\mathcal{P} = \{P_k : \{0,1\}^n \to \{0,1\}^n\}_{k\in\mathcal{K}}$ be a family of permutations. We use the same symbol $\mathcal{P}$ to denote the oracle such that k is chosen uniformly at random, and an oracle access to O_{P_k} is given to adversaries. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an oracle query algorithm that outputs 0 or 1, and we define the quantum pseudorandom-permutation (qPRP) advantage by $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRP}}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{A}) := \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathcal{P},\mathsf{RP}}(\mathcal{A})$. Similarly, we define $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRP}}_{\mathcal{P}}(q)$ by $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRP}}_{\mathcal{P}}(q) := \max_{\mathcal{A}} \left\{ \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRP}}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{A}) \right\}$, where the maximum is taken over all quantum algorithms $\mathcal{A}$ that make at most q quantum queries.

Security against efficient adversaries. An algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ is called *efficient* if it can be realized as a quantum circuit of which the number of basic gates and oracle gates is polynomial in n. A set of functions $\mathcal{F}$ (resp., a set of permutations $\mathcal{P}$) is a *quantumly secure PRF* (resp., a *quantumly secure PRP*) if the following properties are satisfied:

1. Uniform sampling $f \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{F}$ (resp., $P \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{P}$) and evaluation of each f (resp., each P) can be implemented on quantum circuits of which the number of basic gates is polynomial in n.
2. $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathcal{F}}(\mathcal{A})$ (resp., $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRP}}_{\mathcal{P}}(\mathcal{A})$) is *negligible* (i.e., for any positive integer c, it is upper bounded by n^{-c} for all sufficiently large n) for any efficient algorithm $\mathcal{A}$.

2.2 The Luby-Rackoff Constructions

The Luby-Rackoff construction [23] is a construction of n-bit permutations from $n/2$-bit functions by using the Feistel network.

Fix $r \geq 1$, and for $1 \leq i \leq r$, let $f_i := \{f_{i,k} : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}\}_{k \in \mathcal{K}}$ be a family of functions parameterized by key k in a key space $\mathcal{K}$. Then, the Luby-Rackoff construction for $f_1, \ldots, f_r$ is defined as a family of n-bit permutations $\mathsf{LR}_r(f_1, \ldots, f_r) := \{\mathsf{LR}_r(f_{1,k_1}, \ldots, f_{r,k_r})\}_{k_1,\ldots,k_r \in \mathcal{K}}$ with the key space $(\mathcal{K})^r$. For each fixed key $(k_1, \ldots, k_r)$, $\mathsf{LR}_r(f_{1,k_1}, \ldots, f_{r,k_r})$ is defined by the following procedure: First, given an input $x_0 \in \{0,1\}^n$, divide it into $n/2$-bit strings x_{0L} and x_{0R}. Second, iteratively update n-bit states as

$$(x_{(i-1)L}, x_{(i-1)R}) \mapsto (x_{iL}, x_{iR}) := (x_{(i-1)R} \oplus f_{i,k_i}(x_{(i-1)L}), x_{(i-1)L}) \tag{4}$$

for $1 \leq i \leq r$. Finally, return the final state $x_r := x_{rL} \| x_{rR}$ as the output (see Fig. 2).



Fig. 2. The 3-round Luby-Rackoff construction.

The resulting function $\mathsf{LR}_r(f_{1,k_1}, \ldots, f_{r,k_r}) : x_0 \mapsto x_r$ becomes an n-bit permutation owing to the property of the Feistel network. Each f_{i,k_i} is called the i-th round function. When we say that an adversary is given an oracle access to $\mathsf{LR}_r(f_1, \ldots, f_r)$, we consider the situation that keys $k_1, \ldots, k_r$ are first chosen independently and uniformly at random, and then the adversary runs relative to the stateless oracle $O_{\mathsf{LR}_r(f_{1,k_1},\ldots,f_{r,k_r})} : |x\rangle\,|y\rangle \mapsto |x\rangle\,|y \oplus \mathsf{LR}_r(f_{1,k_1}, \ldots, f_{r,k_r})(x)\rangle$. When each round function is chosen from $\mathsf{Func}(\{0,1\}^{n/2}, \{0,1\}^{n/2})$ uniformly at random (i.e., each f_i is the set of all functions $\mathsf{Func}(\{0,1\}^{n/2}, \{0,1\}^{n/2})$ for all i), we use the notation LR_r for short.

3 Compressed Oracle Technique with Errors

In many security proofs in the *classical* random oracle model (ROM), they implicitly rely on the fact that transcripts of queries and answers can be recorded. However, such proofs do not necessarily work in the *quantum random oracle model* (QROM) [5], since recording transcripts may significantly perturb quantum states, which might be detected by adversaries. To solve this issue, Zhandry introduced the "compressed oracle technique" [37] to enable us to record transcripts of queries and answers even in QROM.

Zhandry's technique was originally developed for QROM in which adversaries can make direct queries to random functions, but it can also be applied to the case that adversaries can make queries to random functions only indirectly. In particular, one may think that the technique is applicable to giving a security proof for the Luby-Rackoff constructions for the cases that all round functions are truly random.

However, there is an issue with the technique when we apply it to complex schemes such as the Luby-Rackoff construction. [6] In this section, we scrutinize the technique and study how we can modify and re-formalize it to avoid the issue. We name our modified version the *compressed oracle technique with errors*. In later sections, we apply our modified technique to showing the security of the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction.

In Section 3.1 we give an overview of the original technique by Zhandry, and describe which part of it can be improved. Then, in Section 3.2 we describe our modified technique.

3.1 An Overview of the Original Technique

First, Zhandry observed that the oracle O_f can be implemented with an encoding of f and an operator stO that is independent of f. In this subsection, we consider that each function $f : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n$ is encoded into the $(n2^m)$-qubit state $|f\rangle = |f(0)\|f(1)\|\cdots\|f(2^m-1)\rangle$. The operator stO is the unitary operator that acts on $(n+m+n2^m)$-qubit states defined as

$$\mathsf{stO} : |x\rangle\,|y\rangle \otimes |\alpha_0\rangle \cdots |\alpha_{2^m-1}\rangle \mapsto |x\rangle\,|y \oplus \alpha_x\rangle \otimes |\alpha_0\rangle \cdots |\alpha_{2^m-1}\rangle\,, \tag{5}$$

where $\alpha_x \in \{0,1\}^n$ for each $0 \le x \le 2^m - 1$. We can easily confirm that $\mathsf{stO}\,|x\rangle\,|y\rangle\,|f\rangle = |x\rangle\,|y \oplus f(x)\rangle\,|f\rangle$ holds. Here, we consider that $|x\rangle\,|y\rangle$ corresponds to the first $(m+n)$-qubits of adversaries' registers.

When f is chosen uniformly at random and $\mathcal{A}$ runs relative to stO and $|f\rangle$ (i.e., $\mathcal{A}$ runs relative to the quantum oracle of a random function), the whole quantum state before $\mathcal{A}$ makes the $(i+1)$-st quantum query becomes

$$|\phi_{f,i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\mathsf{stO}(U_{i-1} \otimes I)\mathsf{stO} \cdots \mathsf{stO}(U_0 \otimes I)\,|0^\ell\rangle\,|f\rangle \tag{6}$$

with probability $1/2^{n2^m}$. Here, we assume that $\mathcal{A}$ has ℓ-qubit quantum states.

Random choice of f can be implemented by first making the uniform superposition of functions $\sum_f \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n2^m}}}\,|f\rangle = H^{\otimes n2^m}\,|0^{n2^m}\rangle$ and then measure the state with the computational basis. So far we have considered that a random function f is chosen at the beginning of games, but the output distribution of $\mathcal{A}$ will not be changed even if we measure the $|f\rangle$ register at the same time as we measure $\mathcal{A}$'s register. Thus, below we consider that all quantum registers including those of functions are measured only once at the end of each game.

[6] Again, here we note that the descriptions in this paper regarding [37] is written based on the version 20180814:183812. See also Remark 1.

Then the whole quantum state before $\mathcal{A}$ makes the $(i+1)$-st quantum query becomes

$$|\phi_{i+1}\rangle = \sum_f |\phi_{f,i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\mathsf{stO}\cdots\mathsf{stO}(U_0 \otimes I)\left(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes \sum_f \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n2^m}}}|f\rangle\right). \tag{7}$$

Next, we change the basis of the y register and α_i registers in (5) from the standard computational basis $\{|u\rangle\}_{u\in\{0,1\}^n}$ to the one $\{H^{\otimes n}|u\rangle\}_{u\in\{0,1\}^n}$, which is called *Fourier basis*[7] by Zhandry [37]. In what follows, we use the symbol " $\widehat{\ }$ " to denote the encoding of classical bit strings into quantum states by using the Fourier basis instead of the computational basis, and we ambiguously denote $H^{\otimes n}|u\rangle$ by $|\widehat{u}\rangle$ for each $u \in \{0,1\}^n$. Then, it can be easily confirmed that

$$\mathsf{stO}|x\rangle|\widehat{y}\rangle \otimes |\widehat{\alpha_0}\rangle\cdots|\widehat{\alpha_{2^m-1}}\rangle = |x\rangle|\widehat{y}\rangle \otimes |\widehat{\alpha_0}\rangle\cdots|\widehat{\alpha_x \oplus y}\rangle\cdots|\widehat{\alpha_{2^m-1}}\rangle \tag{8}$$

holds. Intuitively, the direction of data writing changes when we change the basis: When we use the standard computational basis, data is written from the function registers to adversaries' registers as in (5). On the other hand, when we use the Fourier basis, data is written in the opposite direction as in (8). With the Fourier basis, $|\phi_{i+1}\rangle$ can be written as

$$|\phi_{i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\mathsf{stO}(U_{i-1} \otimes I)\mathsf{stO}\cdots\mathsf{stO}(U_0 \otimes I)\left(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |\widehat{0^{n2^m}}\rangle\right). \tag{9}$$

Here, note that $\sum_f |f\rangle = H^{\otimes n2^m}|0^{n2^m}\rangle = |\widehat{0^{n2^m}}\rangle$ holds. In particular, the register of the functions are initially set as $|\widehat{0^{n2^m}}\rangle$, and at most one data is written (in superpositions) when an adversary makes a query. Thus

$$|\phi_{i+1}\rangle = \sum_{xyz\widehat{D}} a'_{xyz\widehat{D}}|xyz\rangle \otimes |\widehat{D}\rangle \tag{10}$$

holds for some complex numbers $a'_{xyz\widehat{D}}$ such that $\sum_{xyz\widehat{D}}|a'_{xyz\widehat{D}}|^2 = 1$, where each x is an m-bit string that corresponds to $\mathcal{A}$'s query register, y is an n-bit string that corresponds to $\mathcal{A}$'s answer register, z corresponds to $\mathcal{A}$'s remaining register, and $\widehat{D} = \widehat{\alpha_0}\|\cdots\|\widehat{\alpha_{2^m-1}}$ is a concatenation of 2^m many n-bit strings.

Zhandry's key observation is that, since stO adds at most one data to the $\widehat{D}$-register in each query, $\widehat{\alpha}_x \neq 0^n$ holds for at most i many x, and thus $\widehat{D}$ can be "compressed" to a database with at most i many entries. (Note that $\widehat{D}$ may contain less than i entries. For example, if a state $|x\rangle|\widehat{y}\rangle$ is successively queried to stO twice, then the database will remain unchanged since $\mathsf{stO}\cdot\mathsf{stO} = I$.) We use the same notation $\widehat{D}$ for the compressed database, and call it *compressed Fourier database* since now we are using the Fourier basis for $\widehat{D}$. Each entry of $\widehat{D}$ has the form $(x, \widehat{\alpha}_x)$, where $x \in \{0,1\}^m$, $\widehat{\alpha}_x \in \{0,1\}^n$, and $\widehat{\alpha}_x \neq 0^n$.

[7] Note that the Hadamard operator $H^{\otimes n}$ corresponds to the Fourier transformation over the group $(\mathbb{Z}/2\mathbb{Z})^{\oplus n}$.

Intuitively, if the compressed Fourier database $\widehat{D}$ contains an entry $(x, \widehat{\alpha}_x)$, it means that $\mathcal{A}$ has queried x to a random function f and holds some information about the value $f(x)$. Hence $\widehat{D}$ can be seen as a record of transcripts for queries and answers. However, it is still not clear what kind of information $\mathcal{A}$ has about the value $f(x)$, since we are now using the Fourier basis. To make it clear, let the Hadamard operator $H^{\otimes n}$ act on each $\widehat{\alpha}_x$ in $\widehat{D}$ and obtain another (superposition of) database D. Then, intuitively, D satisfies the condition "$(x, \alpha_x) \in D$ corresponds to the condition that $\mathcal{A}$ has queried x to the oracle and gotten the value α_x in response". We call D a *compressed standard database*.

In summary, Zhandry observed that the quantum random oracle can be described as a stateful quantum oracle CstO. The whole quantum state of an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and the oracle just before the $(i+1)$-st query is

$$|\phi_{i+1}\rangle = \sum_{xyzD} a_{xyzD} \, |xyz\rangle \otimes |D\rangle \,, \tag{11}$$

where each D is a compressed standard database which contains at most i entries. Initially, the database D is empty. In [37], Zhandry describes that, when $\mathcal{A}$ makes a query $|x, y\rangle$ to the oracle, CstO does the following procedures. [8]

The three procedures of CstO.

1. Look for a tuple $(x, \alpha_x) \in D$. If one is found, respond with $|x, y \oplus \alpha_x\rangle$.
2. If no tuple is found, create new registers initialized to the state $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\alpha_x} |\alpha_x\rangle$. Add the registers (x, α_x) to D. Then respond with $|x, y \oplus \alpha_x\rangle$.
3. Finally, regardless of whether the tuple was found or added, there is now a tuple (x, α_x) in D, which may have to be removed. To do so, test whether the registers containing α_x contain 0^n in the Fourier basis. If so, remove the tuple from D. Otherwise, leave the tuple in D.

Intuitively, the first and second steps correspond to the classical *lazy sampling*, which do the following procedures: When an adversary makes a query x to the oracle, look for a tuple (x, α_x) in the database. If one is found, respond with α_x (this part corresponds to the first procedure of CstO). If no tuple is found, *choose α_x uniformly at random from* $\{0,1\}^n$ (this part corresponds to creating the superposition $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\alpha_x} |\alpha_x\rangle$ in the second procedure of CstO), respond with α_x, and add (x, α_x) to the database.

The third "test and forget" step is crucial and specific to the quantum setting. Intuitively, the third step forgets data which is no longer used by the adversary from the database. By appropriately forgetting information, we can record transcripts of queries and answers without perturbing quantum states.

[8] We remark that these three-step precedures are a verbatim quotation from the original paper [37] of version 20180814:183812, except that the symbol y' and 0 are used instead of α_x and 0^n, respectively, in the original one.

An issue. The above technique by Zhandry is so clever and insightful, but there is a point that can be improved. The third "test and forget" step is crucial to avoid perturbing quantum states, but hard to capture intuitively, and its mathematically explicit description as a unitary operation is not given in the original paper [37]. [9] This would be problematic if we apply the technique to showing security of complex schemes that are composed of multiple random functions. If we apply the technique to such schemes, quantum entanglements among multiple compressed databases will be extremely complex, where it will be very hard to appropriately operate the "test and forget" procedure to each database. Since unexpected properties often hold in the quantum setting, it is more important to give mathematically rigorous proofs than in the classical setting. Moreover, if we could apply the technique without caring about such procedures, we can give quantum proofs with classical intuitions to a greater extent.

With the above in mind, in the next subsection, we modify Zhandry's technique so that we can intuitively capture properties of oracles without "test and forget" procedures, while keeping mathematically clear descriptions. Instead of getting rid of the "test and forget" procedure, we introduce some *errors* when we describe properties of the oracles.

3.2 Our Modified Technique

From now on, we represent each function $f : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n$ as $(n+1)2^m$-bit strings $(0\|f(0))\|(0\|f(1))\|\cdots\|(0\|f(2^m-1))$.

Remember that the whole quantum state before $\mathcal{A}$ makes the $(i+1)$-st query is described as

$$|\phi_{i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\mathsf{stO}(U_{i-1}\otimes I)\mathsf{stO}\cdots\mathsf{stO}(U_0\otimes I)\left(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes \sum_f \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^{n2^m}}}|f\rangle\right). \quad (12)$$

At each query, unlike the original technique that adds/deletes at most one entry to/from each database, we first "decode" superpositions of databases to superpositions of functions when an adversary makes a query, secondly respond to the adversary, and finally "encode" again superpositions of functions to superpositions of databases. Below we describe our encoding.

Encoding functions to databases: Intuitive descriptions. Modifying the idea of Zhandry, we apply the following operations to the $|f\rangle$-register of $|\phi_{i+1}\rangle$.

1. Let the Hadamard operator $H^{\otimes n}$ act on the $f(x)$ register for all x. Now the state becomes
$$\sum_{xyz\widetilde{D}} a'_{xyz\widetilde{D}}\,|xyz\rangle \otimes |\widetilde{D}\rangle \quad (13)$$

[9] Again, here we consider the original paper of version 20180814:183812.

for some complex numbers $a'_{xyz\widetilde{D}}$, where each $\widetilde{D} = (0\|\widehat{\alpha}_0)\|\cdots\|(0\|\widehat{\alpha}_{2^m-1})$ is a concatenation of 2^m many $(n+1)$-bit strings, and $\widehat{\alpha}_x \neq 0^n$ at most i-many x.

2. For each x, if $\widehat{\alpha}_x \neq 0^n$, flip the bit just before $\widehat{\alpha}_x$. Now each $\widetilde{D}$ changes to the bit strings $(b_0\|\widehat{\alpha}_0)\|\cdots\|(b_{2^m-1}\|\widehat{\alpha}_{2^m-1})$, where $b_x \in \{0,1\}$, and $b_x = 1$ if and only if $\widehat{\alpha}_x \neq 0^n$.
3. For each $x \in \{0,1\}^n$, let the n-bit Hadamard transformation $H^{\otimes n}$ act on $|\widehat{\alpha}_x\rangle$ if and only if $b_x = 1$. Then the quantum state becomes

$$|\psi_{i+1}\rangle := \sum_{xyzD} a_{xyzD} |xyz\rangle \otimes |D\rangle \tag{14}$$

for some complex numbers a_{xyzD}, where each D is a concatenation of 2^m many $(n+1)$-bit strings $(b_0\|\alpha_0)\|\cdots\|(b_{2^m-1}\|\alpha_{2^m-1})$ such that $b_x \neq 0$ holds for at most i many x, and intuitively $b_x \neq 0$ means that $\mathcal{A}$ has queried x to a random function f and has information that $f(x) = \alpha_x$.

Encoding functions to databases: Formal descriptions. The above three operations can be formally realized as actions of unitary operators on $|f\rangle$-registers. The first one is realized as $\mathsf{IH} := (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n})^{\otimes 2^m}$. The second one is realized as $U_{\text{toggle}} := (I_1 \otimes |0^n\rangle\langle 0^n| + X \otimes (I_n - |0^n\rangle\langle 0^n|))^{\otimes 2^m}$, where X is the 1-qubit operator such that $X|0\rangle = |1\rangle$ and $X|1\rangle = |0\rangle$. The third one is realized by the operator $\mathsf{CH} := (CH^{\otimes n})^{\otimes 2^m}$, where $CH := |0\rangle\langle 0| \otimes I_n + |1\rangle\langle 1| \otimes H^{\otimes n}$.

We call the action of unitary operator $U_{\text{enc}} := \mathsf{CH}\cdot U_{\text{toggle}}\cdot\mathsf{IH}$ and its conjugate U^*_{enc} *encoding* and *decoding*, respectively. [10] By using our encoding and decoding, the compressed standard oracle with errors is defined as follows.

Definition 1 (Compressed standard oracle with errors). *The* compressed standard oracle with errors *is the stateful quantum oracle such that queries are processed with the unitary operator* CstOE *defined by* $\mathsf{CstOE} := (I \otimes U_{\text{enc}}) \cdot \mathsf{stO} \cdot (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}})$.

Note that $|\psi_{i+1}\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\mathsf{CstOE}(U_{i-1} \otimes I)\mathsf{CstOE}\cdots\mathsf{CstOE}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^{(n+1)2^m}\rangle)$ and $|\phi_{i+1}\rangle = (I \otimes U^*_{\text{enc}})|\psi_{i+1}\rangle$ hold for each i.

Next, we introduce some notations related to our compressed standard oracle with errors, which are required to describe properties of CstOE.

Notations related to CstOE. We call a bit string $D = (b_0\|\alpha_0)\|\cdots\|(b_{2^m-1}\|\alpha_{2^m-1})$, where $b_x \in \{0,1\}$ and $\alpha_x \in \{0,1\}^n$ for each $x \in \{0,1\}^m$, is a *valid database* if $\alpha_x \neq 0^n$ holds only if $b_x \neq 0$. We call D an *invalid database* if it is not a valid database. Note that, in a valid database, b_x can be 0 or 1 if $\alpha_x = 0^n$. We identify a valid database D with the partially defined function from

[10] Actually the idea of toggle is noted by Zhandry in the original paper [37], but there is no formalization about it. Moreover, it was described with "test and forget" procedures and without any errors.

$\{0,1\}^m$ to $\{0,1\}^n$ of which value on $x \in \{0,1\}^m$ is defined to be y if and only if $b_x \neq 0$ and $\alpha_x = y$. We use the same notation D for this function. Moreover, we identify D with the set $\{(x, D(x))\}_{x \in \mathrm{dom}(D)} \subset \{0,1\}^m \times \{0,1\}^n$. We say that *an entry of x is in D* if $(x, y) \in D$ for some y. Unless otherwise noted, we always assume that D is valid.

We say that a valid database D is compatible with a function $f : \{0,1\}^m \to \{0,1\}^n$ if $D(x) = f(x)$ holds for each x in the domain of D. For each valid database D, let $\mathsf{comp}(D)$ denote the set of functions that are compatible with D.

If $\| \left|\psi\right\rangle - \left|\psi'\right\rangle \|$ is in $O(\epsilon)$ for two vectors $\left|\psi\right\rangle, \left|\psi'\right\rangle$, and some parameter ϵ (which will be a function of n in later applications), then we say that $\left|\psi\right\rangle$ *is equal to* $\left|\psi'\right\rangle$ *with an error in* $O(\epsilon)$, or just write $\left|\psi\right\rangle = \left|\psi'\right\rangle$ *with an error in* $O(\epsilon)$.

The following proposition describes the core properties of CstOE.

Proposition 1 (Core Properties). *Let D be a valid database. Then, the following properties hold.*

1. *Suppose that $|D| \leq i$ holds. Then*

$$U^*_{\mathrm{enc}} \left|D\right\rangle = \sum_{f \in \mathsf{comp}(D)} \sqrt{\frac{1}{|\mathsf{comp}(D)|}} \left|f\right\rangle \tag{15}$$

   holds with an error in $O(\sqrt{i^2/2^n})$.
2. *Suppose that there is no entry of x in D. Then, for any y,*

$$\mathsf{CstOE} \left|x\right\rangle \left|y\right\rangle \otimes \left|D \cup (x, \alpha)\right\rangle = \left|x\right\rangle \left|y \oplus \alpha\right\rangle \otimes \left|D \cup (x, \alpha)\right\rangle$$

   with an error in $O(1/\sqrt{2^n})$. More precisely,

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathsf{CstOE} \left|x, y\right\rangle \otimes \left|D \cup (x, \alpha)\right\rangle \\
&\quad = \left|x, y \oplus \alpha\right\rangle \otimes \left|D \cup (x, \alpha)\right\rangle \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \left|x, y \oplus \alpha\right\rangle \left(\left|D\right\rangle - \left(\sum_{\gamma \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \left|D \cup (x, \gamma)\right\rangle \right) \right) \\
&\qquad - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \left|x, y \oplus \gamma\right\rangle \otimes \left(\left|D \cup (x, \gamma)\right\rangle - \left|D^{\mathsf{invalid}}_{\gamma}\right\rangle \right) \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{2^n} \left|x\right\rangle \left|\widehat{0^n}\right\rangle \otimes \left(2 \sum_{\delta \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \left|D \cup (x, \delta)\right\rangle - \left|D\right\rangle \right)
\end{aligned} \tag{16}$$

   holds, where $\left|D^{\mathsf{invalid}}_{\gamma}\right\rangle$ is a superposition of invalid databases for each γ, and $\left|\widehat{0^n}\right\rangle = H^{\otimes n} \left|0^n\right\rangle$.
3. *Suppose that there is no entry of x in D. Then, for any y,*

$$\mathsf{CstOE} \left|x\right\rangle \left|y\right\rangle \otimes \left|D\right\rangle = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \left|x\right\rangle \left|y \oplus \alpha\right\rangle \otimes \left|D \cup (x, \alpha)\right\rangle$$

with an error in $O(1/\sqrt{2^n})$*. To be more precise,*

$$\mathsf{CstOE}\,|x\rangle\,|y\rangle \otimes |D\rangle = \sum_{\alpha\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\,|x, y\oplus\alpha\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x,\alpha)\rangle + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\,|x\rangle\,|\widehat{0^n}\rangle \otimes \left(|D\rangle - \sum_{\gamma\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\,|D\cup(x,\gamma)\rangle\right) \tag{17}$$

holds, where $|\widehat{0^n}\rangle = H^{\otimes n}\,|0^n\rangle$*.*

Proposition 1 can be shown by straightforward calculations. For completeness, a proof of Proposition 1 is given in Section A in the appendix.

An intuitive interpretation of Proposition 1. The first property is a subsidiary one, which would be useful in later applications. When we ignore error terms, the second and third properties correspond to the first and second procedures of CstO, respectively: When an adversary makes a query x to the oracle, CstOE looks for a tuple (x,α) in the database. If one is found, respond with α (the second property in the above proposition). If no tuple is found, create the superposition $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\alpha_x}|\alpha_x\rangle$, respond with α_x, and add (x,α_x) to the database (the third property in the above proposition).

Note that we do not need any "test and forget" procedure to describe the second and third properties in Proposition 1. Thus we can intuitively capture time evolutions of databases with only the (classical) lazy-sampling-like arguments. When we apply the original technique, we have to strictly care the three procedures of CstO since, while they give the properties of CstO, they also describe the definition of CstO. On the other hand, the definition of CstOE is clearly given as a unitary operator (Definition 1), and it is not mandatory to use the properties in Proposition 1.

To get rid of the "test and forget" procedure, we have to introduce some errors. The error increases as the number of adversaries' queries q increases, but it remains negligible as long as $q \ll 2^{n/2}$. Thus the error will not be problematic when we focus on the situation $q \ll 2^{n/2}$, which is the case for showing the security bound of the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction.

In later applications, similarly to classical proofs, we introduce *good* and *bad* transcripts. The explicit formulas of the second and third properties will be used to show that, intuitively, adversaries cannot distinguish two oracles if transcripts are "good". Moreover, the first property and the descriptions with errors of the second and third properties will be used to show that the probability that transcripts become "bad" is negligible.

4 Security Proofs

The goal of this section is to show the following theorem, which gives the quantum query lower bound for the problem of distinguishing the 4-round Luby-

Rackoff construction LR_4 from random permutations RP, in the case that all round functions are truly random functions.

Theorem 3. *Let q be a positive integer. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that makes at most q quantum queries. Then,*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRP}}_{\mathsf{LR}_4}(\mathcal{A}) \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{q^6}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \tag{18}$$

holds.

Since we can efficiently simulate truly random functions against efficient quantum algorithms [34], the following corollary follows from Theorem 3.

Corollary 1. *Let f_i be a quantumly secure PRF for each $1 \leq i \leq 4$. Then, the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction $\mathsf{LR}_4(f_1, f_2, f_3, f_4)$ is a quantumly secure PRP.*

To the end of this section, we assume that all round functions in the Luby-Rackoff constructions are truly random functions, and we focus on the number of queries when we consider computational resources of adversaries. To have a good intuition on our proof in the quantum setting, it would be better to intuitively capture how LR_3 is proven to be secure against classical CPAs, how the quantum attack on LR_3 works, and what problem will be hard even for quantum adversaries. Thus, before giving a formal proof for the above theorem, in what follows we give some observations about these things, and then explain where to start.

An overview of a classical security proof for LR_3. Here we give an overview of a *classical* proof for the security of LR_3 against chosen plaintext attacks in the classical setting. For simplicity, we consider a proof for PRF security of LR_3.

Let bad_2 be the event that an adversary makes two distinct plaintext queries $(x_{0L}, x_{0R}) \neq (x'_{0L}, x'_{0R})$ to the real oracle LR_3 such that the corresponding inputs x_{1L} and x'_{1L} to the second round function f_2 are equal, i.e., inputs to f_2 collide. In addition, let bad_3 be the event that inputs to f_3 collide, and define $\mathsf{bad} := \mathsf{bad}_2 \vee \mathsf{bad}_3$.

If bad_2 (resp., bad_3) does not occur, then the right-half (resp., left-half) $n/2$ bits of LR_3's outputs cannot be distinguished from truly random $n/2$-bit strings. Thus, unless the event bad occurs, adversaries cannot distinguish LR_3 from random functions.

If the number of queries of an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is at most q, we can show that the probability that the event bad occurs when $\mathcal{A}$ runs relative to the oracle LR_3 is in $O(q^2/2^{n/2})$. Thus we can deduce that LR_3 is indistinguishable from a random function up to $O(2^{n/4})$ queries.

Quantum chosen plaintext attack on LR_3. Next, we give an overview of the quantum chosen plaintext attack on LR_3 by Kuwakado and Morii [20]. Note that we consider the setting that adversaries can make quantum superposition queries. The attack distinguishes LR_3 from a random permutation with only $O(n)$ queries.

Fix $\alpha_0 \neq \alpha_1 \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and for $i = 0, 1$, define $g_i : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ by $g_i(x) = (\mathsf{LR}_3(\alpha_i, x))_R \oplus \alpha_i$, where $(\mathsf{LR}_3(\alpha_i, x))_R$ denote the right half $n/2$-bits of $\mathsf{LR}_3(\alpha_i, x)$. In addition, define $G : \{0,1\} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ by $G(b, x) = g_b(x)$. Then, it can be easily confirmed that $g_0(x) = g_1(x \oplus s)$ holds for any $x \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, where $s = f_1(\alpha_0) \oplus f_1(\alpha_1)$. Thus $G(b, x) = G((b, x) \oplus (1, s))$ holds for any b and x, i.e., the function G has the period $(1, s)$.

If we can make quantum superposed queries to G, then we can find the period $(1, s)$ by using Simon's period finding algorithm [31], making $O(n)$ queries to G. In fact G can be implemented on an oracle-querying quantum circuit $\mathcal{C}^{\mathsf{LR}_3}$ by making $O(1)$ queries to LR_3. [11]

Roughly speaking, Simon's algorithm outputs the periods with a high probability by making $O(n)$ queries if applied to periodic functions, and outputs the result that "this function is not periodic" if applied to functions without periods.

If we are given the oracle of a random permutation RP, the circuit $\mathcal{C}^{\mathsf{RP}}$ will implement an almost random function, which does not have any period with a high probability. Thus, if we run Simon's algorithm on $\mathcal{C}^{\mathsf{RP}}$, with a high probability, it does not output any period. Therefore, we can distinguish LR_3 from RP by checking if Simon's period finding algorithm outputs a period.

Observation: Why the classical proof does not work? Here we give an observation about the reason why quantum adversaries can distinguish LR_3 from random permutations even though LR_3 is proven to be indistinguishable from a random permutation in the classical setting.

We observe that quantum adversaries can make the event bad_2 occur: Once we find the period $1\|s = 1\|f_1(\alpha_0) \oplus f_2(\alpha_1)$ given the real oracle LR_3, we can force collisions on the input of f_2. Concretely, take $x \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ arbitrarily and set $(x_{0L}, x_{0R}) := (\alpha_0, x)$, $(x'_{0L}, x'_{0R}) := (\alpha_1, x \oplus s)$. Then the corresponding inputs to f_2 become $f_1(\alpha_0) \oplus x$ for both plaintexts. Thus the classical proof idea does not work in the quantum setting.

Quantum security proof for LR_4: The idea. As we explained above, the essence of the quantum attack on LR_3 is finding collisions for inputs to the second round function f_2. On the other hand, it seems difficult to make collisions for inputs to the third round function f_3 even for quantum (chosen-plaintext) query adversaries.

[11] Here we have to implement truncation of outputs of $\mathcal{O}$ without destroying quantum states, which is pointed out to be non-trivial in the quantum setting [18]. However, it has been shown that this "truncation" issue can be overcome by using a technique observed in [15].

Having these observations, our idea is that it would be hard even for quantum adversaries to notice that the third state update $(x_{2L}, x_{2R}) \mapsto (x_{2R} \oplus f_3(x_{2L}), x_{2L})$ of LR_3 is modified as $(x_{2L}, x_{2R}) \mapsto (F(x_{2L}, x_{2R}), x_{2L})$, where $F : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ is a random function. We denote this modified function by LR'_3 (see Fig. 3), and begin with showing that it is hard to distinguish LR'_3 from LR_3.



Fig. 3. LR'_3

We will show it by combining the classical proof idea and our compressed oracle technique with errors. Roughly speaking, we define "bad" databases to be the ones that contain "collisions at inputs to the third round function". Then we show that the probability that we measure bad databases is very small, and that adversaries cannot distinguish LR'_3 from LR_3 when databases are not bad.

Next, let $\mathsf{FamP}(\{0,1\}^{n/2})$ be the set of functions $F : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ such that $F(x, \cdot)$ is a permutation for each x. If P is chosen uniformly at random from $\mathsf{FamP}(\{0,1\}^{n/2})$, we say that P is a *family of random permutations*, or shortly FRP. Then, we intuitively see that it is hard to distinguish FRP from a random function RF from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$.

Once we show the above two properties, i.e.,

1. LR'_3 is hard to distinguish from LR_3, and
2. FRP is hard to distinguish from RF,

we can prove Theorem 3 with simple and easy arguments. In other words, showing those two properties are technically the most difficult parts in our proof for Theorem 3.

To show the first property, we use our compressed oracle technique with errors. On the other hand, for the second property, we can show it by just combining some previous results.

Organization of the rest of Section 4. Section 4.1 shows that LR'_3 is hard to distinguish from LR_3. Section 4.2 shows that FRP is hard to distinguish from RF. Section 4.3 proves Theorem 3 by combining the results in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.

4.1 Hardness of Distinguishing LR'_3 from LR_3

Here we show the following proposition.

Proposition 2. *Let q be a positive integer. Let $\mathcal{A}$ be an adversary that makes at most q quantum queries. Then,*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_3,\mathsf{LR}'_3}(\mathcal{A}) \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{q^3}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \tag{19}$$

holds.

First, let us discuss the behavior of the quantum oracles of LR_3 and LR'_3.

Quantum oracle of LR_3. Let O_{f_i} denote the quantum oracle of each round function f_i. In addition, let us define the unitary operator $O_{\mathrm{UP}.i}$ that computes the state update of the i-th round by

$$\begin{aligned} O_{\mathrm{UP}.i} : &|x_{(i-1)L}, x_{(i-1)R}\rangle\,|y_L, y_R\rangle \\ &\mapsto |x_{(i-1)L}, x_{(i-1)R}\rangle\,|(y_L, y_R) \oplus (f_i(x_{(i-1)L}) \oplus x_{(i-1)R}, x_{(i-1)L})\rangle\,. \end{aligned}$$

$O_{\mathrm{UP}.i}$ can be implemented by making one query to f_i (see Fig. 4).



Fig. 4. Implementation of $O_{\mathrm{UP}.i}$. f_i will be implemented by using the compressed standard oracle with errors.

Now O_{LR_3} can be implemented as follows by using $\{O_{\mathrm{UP}.i}\}_{1\leq i\leq 3}$:

1. Take $|x\rangle\,|y\rangle = |x_{0L}, x_{0R}\rangle\,|y_L, y_R\rangle$ as an input.
2. Compute the state (x_{1L}, x_{1R}) by querying $|x_{0L}, x_{0R}\rangle\,|0^n\rangle$ to $O_{\mathrm{Up}.1}$, and obtain
$$|x_{0L}, x_{0R}\rangle\,|y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle\,. \tag{20}$$
3. Compute the state (x_{2L}, x_{2R}) by querying $|x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle\,|0^n\rangle$ to $O_{\mathrm{Up}.2}$, and obtain
$$|x_{0L}, x_{0R}\rangle\,|y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \otimes |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle\,. \tag{21}$$
4. Query $|x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle\,|y_L, y_R\rangle$ to $O_{\mathrm{Up}.3}$, and obtain
$$|x\rangle\,|y \oplus \mathsf{LR}_3(x)\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \otimes |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle\,. \tag{22}$$

5. Uncompute Steps 2 and 3 to obtain

$$|x\rangle\,|y \oplus \mathsf{LR}_3(x)\rangle\,. \tag{23}$$

6. Return $|x\rangle\,|y \oplus \mathsf{LR}_3(x)\rangle$.

The above implementation is illustrated in Fig. 5.



Fig. 5. Implementation of LR_3.

Quantum oracle of LR'_3. The quantum oracle of LR'_3 is implemented in the same way as LR_3, except that the third round state update oracle $O_{\mathrm{UP}.3}$ is replaced with another oracle $O'_{\mathrm{UP}.3}$ defined as

$$O'_{\mathrm{UP}.3} : |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle\,|y_L, y_R\rangle \mapsto |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle\,|(y_L, y_R) \oplus (F(x_{2L}, x_{2R}) \oplus x_{2R}, x_{2L})\rangle\,.$$

$O'_{\mathrm{UP}.3}$ is implemented by making one query to O_F, i.e., the quantum oracle of F (see Fig. 6).



Fig. 6. Implementation of $O'_{\mathrm{UP}.3}$. F will be implemented by using the compressed standard oracle with errors.

Below, we show the claim of the proposition by applying the compressed oracle technique with errors to f_1, f_2, f_3, and F. We consider that the oracles of these functions are implemented as the compressed standard oracles with errors, and we use D_1, D_2, D_3, and D_F to denote (valid) databases for f_1, f_2, f_3, and F, respectively. In particular, after the i-th query of an adversary to LR_3, the joint quantum states of the adversary and functions can be described as

$$\sum_{xyzD_1D_2D_3} a_{xyzD_1D_2D_3}\,|xyz\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle\,|D_2\rangle\,|D_3\rangle \tag{24}$$

for some complex numbers $a_{xyzD_1D_2D_3}$ such that $\sum_{xyzD_1D_2D_3} |a_{xyzD_1D_2D_3}|^2 = 1$. Here, x, y, and z correspond to the adversary's query, answer, and output registers, respectively. (If the oracle is LR'_3, then the registers $|D_3\rangle$, which corresponds to f_3, are replaced with $|D_F\rangle$, which corresponds to F.)

Next, we define good and bad databases for LR_3 and LR'_3. Intuitively, we say that a tuple (D_1, D_2, D_3) (resp., (D_1, D_2, D_F)) for LR_3 (resp., LR'_3) is bad if and only if it contains the information that some inputs to f_3 (resp., the left halves of some inputs to F) collide. Roughly speaking, we define good and bad databases in such a way that there exists a one-to-one correspondence between good databases for LR_3 and those for LR'_3, so that adversaries will not be able to distinguish LR'_3 from LR_3 as long as databases are good.

Good and bad databases for LR_3. Here we introduce the notion of *good* and *bad* for each tuple (D_1, D_2, D_3) of valid database for LR_3. We say that (D_1, D_2, D_3) is good if, for each entry $(x_{2L}, \gamma) \in D_3$, there exists exactly one pair $((x_{0L}, \alpha), (x_{1L}, \beta)) \in D_1 \times D_2$ such that $\beta \oplus x_{0L} = x_{2L}$. We say that (D_1, D_2, D_3) is bad if it is not good.

Good and bad databases for LR'_3. Next we introduce the notion of *good* and *bad* for each tuple (D_1, D_2, D_F) of valid database for LR'_3. We say that a valid database D_F is *without overlap* if each pair of distinct entries (x_{2L}, x_{2R}, γ) and $(x'_{2L}, x'_{2R}, \gamma')$ in D_F satisfies $x_{2L} \neq x'_{2L}$. We say that (D_1, D_2, D_F) is good if D_F is without overlap, and for each entry $(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma) \in D_F$, there exists exactly one pair $((x_{0L}, \alpha), (x_{1L}, \beta)) \in D_1 \times D_2$ such that $\beta \oplus x_{0L} = x_{2L}$ and $x_{2R} = x_{1L}$. We say that (D_1, D_2, D_F) is bad if it is not good.

Compatibility of D_F with D_3. Let D_F be a valid database for F without overlap, and D_3 be a valid database for f_3. We say that D_F is compatible with D_3 if the following conditions are satisfied:

1. If $(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma) \in D_F$, then $(x_{2L}, x_{2R} \oplus \gamma) \in D_3$.
2. If $(x_{2L}, \gamma) \in D_3$, there is a unique x_{2R} and $(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, x_{2R} \oplus \gamma) \in D_F$.

For each valid D_F without overlap, there exists the unique valid database for f_3, which we denote by $[D_F]_3$.

Remark 2. For each good database (D_1, D_2, D_3) for LR_3, there exists a unique D_F without overlap such that $[D_F]_3 = D_3$ and (D_1, D_2, D_F) is a good database for LR'_3, by definition of good databases. Similarly, for each good database (D_1, D_2, D_F) for LR'_3, $(D_1, D_2, [D_F]_3)$ becomes a good database for LR_3.

Next we define regular and irregular quantum states for the oracles O_{LR_3} and $O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3}$. Roughly speaking, we will treat irregular states as some small error terms, and focus on regular states.

Regular and irregular states of oracles. Recall that, in addition to database registers, the quantum oracle O_{LR_3} uses ancillary $2n$-qubit registers to compute intermediate state after the first and second rounds (see (21) and (22)). We say that a state vector $|D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_3\rangle \otimes |x_1\rangle \otimes |x_2\rangle$ for O_{LR_3}, where $|x_1\rangle \otimes |x_2\rangle$ is the ancillary $2n$ qubits, is *irregular* if $x_1 \neq 0^n \vee x_2 \neq 0^n$ holds, or at least one of the three databases, D_1, D_2, or D_3, is invalid. We say that the state vector is *regular* if it is not irregular. We define regular and irregular states for $O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3}$ similarly.

Next we define some modified versions of LR_3 and LR'_3, which we denote by LR_3-det and LR'_3-det, respectively ("det" is an abbreviation of "detection of bad database").

The oracles LR_3-det and LR'_3-det. The oracle LR_3-det is defined in the same way as LR_3, except that the oracle checks whether the database is bad (or the state of the oracle is irregular) after each query, and writes the result to an additional qubit. Note that we define regular and irregular states for LR_3-det in the same way as for LR_3. Additional qubits are prepared before an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ runs (q additional qubits are sufficient if $\mathcal{A}$ is a q query adversary). If $i \neq j$, the results of "detection of bad database" for the i-th and j-th queries are written in distinct qubits.

Intuitively, LR_3-det behaves as follows when $\mathcal{A}$ makes the i-th query:

1. Check if the j-th additional qubit is 1 for $1 \leq j \leq i-1$ (i.e., check if the database has been bad before the i-th query). If so, do nothing. If not, go to the next step.
2. Make a query to O_{LR_3}.
3. Check if the database is bad, or the quantum state of O_{LR_3} is irregular. If so, flip the i-th additional qubit.

Next, we formally explain how the above procedures can be realized as a unitary operator. Let Π_{bad} be the projection to the space spanned by the vectors of *bad* databases, and irregular state vectors. In addition, let $\Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}}$ be the projection onto the space spanned by the vectors such that the j-th additional qubit is 1 for some $1 \leq j \leq i-1$, and irregular state vectors.

Formally, for the i-th query, the behavior of the quantum oracle of LR_3-det is described by the unitary operator

$$\begin{aligned} O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} := (\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes X + (I - \Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}) \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \\ \cdot (O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \cdot ((I - \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}}) \otimes I_1) \\ + \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}} \otimes I_1, \end{aligned} \tag{25}$$

where I_{i-1} is the identity operator which acts on the first $(i-1)$ additional qubits, in addition that I_1 and X are the identity operator and the operator such that $X|0\rangle = |1\rangle$ and $X|1\rangle = |0\rangle$, respectively, which act on the i-th additional qubit.

LR'_3-det is constructed from LR'_3 in the same way as LR_3-det is constructed from LR_3-det as above. The behaviors of the oracles of LR'_3-det and LR_3-det

depend on i, though for simplicity, we always use the notations $O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3\text{-det}}$ and $O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}$ without i.

Below we first show that LR_3-det is hard to distinguish from LR'_3-det, and second show that LR_3-det (resp., LR'_3-det) is hard to distinguish from LR_3 (resp., LR'_3).

Hardness of distinguishing LR_3-det from LR'_3-det. Let $|\psi_i\rangle$ and $|\psi'_i\rangle$ be the state just before the i-th query to LR_3-det and LR'_3-det, respectively. By abuse of notation, we let $|\psi_{(q+1)}\rangle, |\psi'_{(q+1)}\rangle$ denote the quantum states $(U_q \otimes I) O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} |\psi_q\rangle$ and $(U_q \otimes I) O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3\text{-det}} |\psi'_q\rangle$, respectively.

We need the following lemma. Intuitively, the lemma claims that any adversary cannot distinguish LR_3-det from LR'_3-det if databases are "good".

Lemma 1. *For each j, let $|\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ and $|\psi_j^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ denote $(I - \Pi_{\mathsf{flipped}}^{[i-1]}) |\psi_j\rangle$ and $(I - \Pi_{\mathsf{flipped}}^{[i-1]}) |\psi'_j\rangle$, respectively. Let $\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}$ and $\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}$ denote the partial trace over databases and additional qubits for LR_3-det and LR'_3-det, respectively. Then, $\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right) = \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi_i^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right)$ holds for $1 \leq i \leq q+1$.*

Proof intuition. Lemma 1 can be shown by straightforward algebraic calculations using the strict formulas of the second and third properties in Proposition 1. The equality holds owing to the one-to-one correspondences between good databases for LR_3 and those for LR'_3 (see Remark 2). A complete proof of Lemma 1 is given in Section B in the appendix.

We also need the following lemma, which intuitively claims that "good" states change to "bad" states only with a negligible probability.

Lemma 2. *For for each j, $\left\|\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right\|$ and $\left\|\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3} |\psi_j^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right\|$ are in $O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})$.*

Proof intuition. Here we give a proof intuition for LR_3. Owing to the second and third properties of Proposition 1 with errors, we can use classical lazy-sampling intuition (see explanations below Proposition 1). Roughly speaking, good databases change to bad if and only if a fresh query is made to f_1 or f_2, and the corresponding input to f_3 collides with some existing record in the database for f_3.

Since each database of $|\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ has at most $(j-1)$ entries and outputs of f_1 and f_2 are $(n/2)$-bits, the input to f_3 that corresponds to a fresh input to f_1 or f_2 collides with one of the existing records in D_3 with a probability at most $O(j/2^{n/2})$. This corresponds to the claim that $\left\|\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right\|^2 \leq O(j/2^{n/2})$ holds. This argument actually ignores some errors, but the errors will be in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$ due to Proposition 1. The claim for LR'_3 can be shown in a similar way. A complete proof of Lemma 2 is given in Section C in the appendix.

The following proposition guarantees that it is hard to distinguish LR_3-det from LR'_3-det.

Proposition 3. $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det},\mathsf{LR}'_3\text{-det}}(\mathcal{A})$ *is in* $O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^{n/2}}\right)$.

Proof intuition. Due to Lemma 1, $\mathcal{A}$ cannot distinguish LR_3-det from LR'_3-det as long as databases are good. Thus, intuitively, the distinguishing advantage is upper bounded by the square root of the probability that databases become bad while $\mathcal{A}$ makes q queries, which is further upper bounded by $\sum_{1\leq j\leq q}\|\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}|\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\|+\sum_{1\leq j\leq q}\|\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3\text{-det}}|\psi_j^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\|$. From Lemma 2, this can be upper bounded by $\sum_{1\leq j\leq q}O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})+\sum_{1\leq j\leq q}O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})=O(\sqrt{q^3/2^{n/2}})$. A complete proof of Proposition 3 is given in Section D in the appendix.

Hardness of distinguishing LR_3-det and LR'_3-det from LR_3 and LR'_3. The following proposition guarantees that it is hard to distinguish LR_3-det and LR'_3-det from LR_3 and LR'_3, respectively.

Proposition 4. $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_3,\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}(\mathcal{A})$ *and* $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}'_3,\mathsf{LR}'_3\text{-det}}(\mathcal{A})$ *are in* $O\left(\sqrt{q^3/2^{n/2}}\right)$.

Proof intuition. We give a proof intuition for LR_3-det and LR_3. Since the databases of round functions for LR_3-det are the same as those for LR_3, $\mathcal{A}$ cannot distinguish LR_3-det from LR'_3-det as long as databases are good. Thus, roughly speaking, the distinguishing advantage is upper bounded by the square root of the probability that databases become bad while $\mathcal{A}$ makes q queries. Owing to Lemma 2, we can show the claim in the same way as the proof intuition for Proposition 3. The claim for LR'_3-det and LR'_3 can be shown in a similar way. A proof of Proposition 4 is given in Section E in the appendix.

Proof of Proposition 2. Finally, we show Proposition 2.

Proof (of Proposition 2). $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_3,\mathsf{LR}'_3}(\mathcal{A})$ is upper bounded by $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_3,\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}(\mathcal{A})$ + $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det},\mathsf{LR}'_3\text{-det}}(\mathcal{A})$ + $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}'_3\text{-det},\mathsf{LR}'_3}(\mathcal{A})$. Thus, the claim of Proposition 2 follows from Proposition 3 and Proposition 4. □

4.2 Hardness of Distinguishing FRP from RF

Recall that $\mathsf{FamP}(\{0,1\}^{n/2})$ is the set of functions $F:\{0,1\}^{n/2}\times\{0,1\}^{n/2}\to\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ such that $F(x,\cdot)$ is a permutation for each x, and if P is chosen uniformly at random from $\mathsf{FamP}(\{0,1\}^{n/2})$, we say that P is a *family of random permutations*, or shortly FRP.

The following proposition claims that it is hard to distinguish FRP from RF.

Proposition 5. *For any quantum adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that makes at most q quantum queries,* $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{FRP},\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{A})\leq O\left(\sqrt{q^6/2^{n/2}}\right)$ *holds.*

Actually this proposition can be proven by just combining two previous works.

Let $\mathcal{O}_1$ and $\mathcal{O}_2$ be (stateless) oracles of functions $f_1, f_2 : X \to Y$ which are chosen according to distributions D_1 and D_2 on $\mathsf{Func}(X,Y)$, respectively. In addition, let D_1^Z be the distribution on $\mathsf{Func}(Z \times X, Y)$ such that, if we sample a function F according to D_1^Z, $F(z,\cdot) \in \mathsf{Func}(X,Y)$ is sampled according to D_1 independently for each $z \in Z$. Let D_2^Z be the distribution which is defined from D_2 in the same way. Define $\mathcal{O}_1^Z$ and $\mathcal{O}_2^Z$ to be the (stateless) oracles of functions $F_1, F_2 : Z \times X \to Y$ which are chosen according to distributions D_1^Z and D_2^Z, respectively. Then the following proposition holds, which is essentially shown by Zhandry [33]. We also refer to Theorem 3.3 of [32] for a generalized version, which is shown by Song and Yun. Note that, in the following proposition, we consider (quantum) information theoretic adversaries, and do not care about whether they are efficient quantum algorithms.

Proposition 6 (Theorem 1.1 in [33], Theorem 3.3 in [32]). *For any quantum query adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that makes at most q quantum queries, there exists an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that makes $2q$ quatum queries and satisfies*

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathcal{O}_1^Z,\mathcal{O}_2^Z}(\mathcal{A}) \leq 12\sqrt{q^3 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathcal{O}_1,\mathcal{O}_2}(\mathcal{B})}. \tag{26}$$

In addition to Proposition 6, we use the following proposition shown by Zhandry [35].

Proposition 7 (Theorem 2 in of [35]). *For any quantum query adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that makes at most q quantum queries, $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{RP}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq O(q^3/2^{n/2})$ holds. (Here we consider a random permutation over $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$.)*

Combining Propositions 6 and 7, we can prove Proposition 5 as follows.

Proof (of Proposition 5). Let X, Y, and Z be $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$. In addition, let $\mathcal{O}_1$, $\mathcal{O}_2$ denote the oracle of a random function and a random permutation (from $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ to $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$), respectively. Then $\mathcal{O}_1^Z$ and $\mathcal{O}_2^Z$ become the oracles of FRP and RF, respectively (here, RF denotes a random function from n-bit to $n/2$-bit). Then, from Propositions 6 and 7, it follows that there exists a quantum adversary $\mathcal{B}$ that makes at most $2q$ quantum queries and satisfies

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathcal{O}_1^Z,\mathcal{O}_2^Z}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq 12\sqrt{q^3 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathcal{O}_1,\mathcal{O}_2}(\mathcal{B})} = 12\sqrt{q^3 \cdot \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{RP}}(\mathcal{B})} \\ &\leq O\left(\sqrt{q^6/2^{n/2}}\right), \end{aligned} \tag{27}$$

which completes the proof. □

4.3 Proof of Theorem 3

This subsection finishes our proof of Theorem 3, by using the results given in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.

Proof (of Theorem 3). First, let us modify LR_4 in such a way that the state updates of the third and fourth rounds are replaced with

$$(x_{2L}, x_{2R}) \mapsto (x_{3L}, x_{3R}) := (F(x_{2L}, x_{2R}), x_{2L})$$

and

$$(x_{3L}, x_{3R}) \mapsto (x_{4L}, x_{4R}) := (F'(x_{3L}, x_{3R}), x_{3L}),$$

respectively, where $F, F' : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \times \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ are random functions. Let us denote the modified function by LR''_4. In addition, by $\mathsf{LR}''_2(F, F')$ we denote the function defined by $(x_L, x_R) \mapsto (F'(F(x_L, x_R), x_L), F(x_L, x_R))$ (see Fig. 7).



Fig. 7. LR''_4 and $\mathsf{LR}''_2(F, F')$.

Then, by applying Proposition 2 twice we can show that

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_4, \mathsf{LR}''_4}(q) \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{q^3}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \tag{28}$$

holds.

Let us modify $\mathsf{LR}''_2(F, F')$ in such a way that F is replaced with a family of random permutations P, and denote the resulting function by $\mathsf{LR}''_2(P, F')$. Then, from Proposition 5 it follows that $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}''_2(F,F'), \mathsf{LR}''_2(P,F')}(q) \leq O(\sqrt{q^6/2^{n/2}})$ holds. Next, let us define a function G by $G(x_L, x_R) = F'(x_L, x_R) \| P(x_L, x_R)$, where F' is a random function and P is a family of random permutations (see Fig. 8). Then, the function distribution of $\mathsf{LR}''_2(P, F')$ is the same as that of G. (Note that $P(x_L, x_R) \neq P(x_L, x'_R)$ always holds if $x_R \neq x'_R$. Thus, if $(x_L, x_R) \neq (x'_L, x'_R)$, the corresponding inputs to F' will be distinct.) Therefore we have that $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}''_2(P,F'), G}(q) = 0$ holds. Moreover, from Proposition 5 $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{RF}, G}(q) \leq O\left(\sqrt{q^6/2^{n/2}}\right)$ holds. Therefore $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}''_2(P,F'), \mathsf{RF}}(q) \leq O\left(\sqrt{q^6/2^{n/2}}\right)$ follows, which implies that

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}''_4, \mathsf{RF}}(q) \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{q^6}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \tag{29}$$



Fig. 8. $\mathsf{LR}_2''(P, F')$ and G.

holds.

Hence, from (28) and (29), it follows that $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_4,\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq O\left(\sqrt{q^6/2^{n/2}}\right)$ holds for any quantum adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that makes at most q quantum queries. In addition, $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{RP},\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq O(q^6/2^n)$ follows from Proposition 7. Therefore

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_4,\mathsf{RP}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{q^6}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \tag{30}$$

follows, for any quantum adversary $\mathcal{A}$ that makes at most q quantum queries, which completes the proof of the theorem. □

Remark 3. In the above proof, we went back and forth between random functions and (families of) random permutations, which may seem unnatural. Our proof strategy was motivated to avoid complex arguments that are specific to the quantum setting as much as possible.

5 A Query Upper Bound

Here we give a query upper bound for the problem of distinguishing LR_4 from a random permutation by showing a distinguishing attack. Again, we consider the case that all round functions of LR_4 are truly random functions, and show the following theorem.

Theorem 4. *There exists a quantum algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ that makes $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries and satisfies $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRP}}_{\mathsf{LR}_4}(\mathcal{A}) = \Omega(1)$.*

Proof intuition. Intuitively, our distinguishing attack is just a quantum version of a classical collision-finding-based distinguishing attack [28]. Classical attack distinguishes LR_4 from a random permutation by finding a collision of a function that takes values in $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$, which requires $O(\sqrt{2^{n/2}}) = O(2^{n/4})$ queries in the quantum setting. However, finding a collision of the function requires only $O(\sqrt[3]{2^{n/2}}) = O(2^{n/6})$ queries in the quantum setting, which enables us to make a $O(2^{n/6})$-query quantum distinguisher. (Note that, in general, we can find a collision of random functions from $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ to $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ with $O(\sqrt[3]{2^{n/2}}) = O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries [35].) A complete proof is given in Section F in the appendix.

6 Concluding Remarks

This paper showed that $\Omega(2^{n/12})$ quantum queries are required to distinguish the (n-bit block) 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction from a random permutation by qCPAs. In particular, the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction becomes a quantumly secure PRP against qCPAs if round functions are quantumly secure PRFs. We also gave a qCPA that distinguishes the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction from a random permutation with $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries. To give security proofs, we modified the compressed oracle technique by Zhandry and applied it.

To give the tight bound for the problem of distinguishing the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction from a random permutation is an important future work. It would be interesting to see if the provable security bound improves when we increase the number of rounds. Also, analyzing the security of the Luby-Rackoff constructions against *qCCAs* is left as an interesting open question. It would be a challenging problem since we have to treat inverse (decryption) queries to quantum oracles. Oracles that allow inverse quantum queries are usually much harder to deal with than the ones that allow only forward quantum queries, and some entirely new techniques would be required for the analysis.

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A Proof of Proposition 1

This section gives a proof of Proposition 1.

Proof (of Proposition 1). Recall that CstOE is decomposed as

$$\mathsf{CstOE} = (I \otimes \mathsf{CH}) \cdot (I \otimes U_{\mathrm{toggle}}) \cdot (I \otimes \mathsf{IH}) \mathsf{stO} (I \otimes \mathsf{IH}^*) \cdot (I \otimes U^*_{\mathrm{toggle}}) \cdot (I \otimes \mathsf{CH}^*), \quad (31)$$

and that each D is described as a bit string $(b_0 \| \alpha_0) \| \cdots \| (b_{2^m-1} \| \alpha_{2^m-1})$, where $b_x \in \{0,1\}$ and $\alpha_x \in \{0,1\}^n$ for each $x \in \{0,1\}^m$.

We begin with showing the first property. Let α be an n-bit string, and $U_{\mathrm{toggle1}} := (I_1 \otimes |0^n\rangle\langle 0^n| + X \otimes (I_n - |0^n\rangle\langle 0^n|))$. Then

$$\begin{aligned}
&(I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \cdot U_{\mathrm{toggle1}} \cdot CH\,|1\|\alpha\rangle \\
&\quad = (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \cdot U_{\mathrm{toggle1}} \left(\sum_{u \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha \cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}}\,|1\|u\rangle \right) \\
&\quad = (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \left(\sum_{u \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha \cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}}\,|0\|u\rangle \right) \\
&\qquad + (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}(|1\|0^n\rangle - |0\|0^n\rangle) \right) \\
&\quad = |0\|\alpha\rangle + |\epsilon\rangle
\end{aligned} \tag{32}$$

holds, where $|\epsilon\rangle := (I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}(|1\|0^n\rangle - |0\|0^n\rangle) \right)$, and

$$(I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \cdot U_{\mathrm{toggle1}} \cdot CH\,|0\|0^n\rangle = \sum_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n}}\,|0\|y\rangle \tag{33}$$

holds. Since $U^*_{\mathrm{enc}} = \left((I_1 \otimes H^{\otimes n}) \cdot U_{\mathrm{toggle1}} \cdot CH\right)^{\otimes 2^m}$ holds by definition of U^*_{enc}, we have that

$$U^*_{\mathrm{enc}}\,|D\rangle = \bigotimes_{j=0}^{2^m-1} |\eta_j\rangle \tag{34}$$

holds, where

$$|\eta_j\rangle = \begin{cases} |0\|\alpha_j\rangle + |\epsilon\rangle & \text{if } b_j = 1, \\ \sum_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^n}}\,|0\|y\rangle & \text{if } b_j = 0. \end{cases}$$

Without loss of generality, we assume that $b_j = 1$ for $0 \leq j \leq i-1$ and $b_j = 0$ for $j \geq i$. Let us define $|\eta\rangle := \bigotimes_{j=i}^{2^m-1} \left(\sum_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} \sqrt{1/2^n}\,|0\|y\rangle \right)$. Then we have

$$\begin{aligned}
U^*_{\mathrm{enc}}\,|D\rangle &= \bigotimes_{j=0}^{i-1} (|0\|\alpha_j\rangle + |\epsilon\rangle) \otimes |\eta\rangle \\
&= \bigotimes_{j=0}^{i-1} |0\|\alpha_j\rangle \otimes |\eta\rangle \\
&\qquad + \sum_{0 \leq k \leq i-1} \left(\bigotimes_{j=0}^{k} |0\|\alpha_j\rangle \right) \otimes |\epsilon\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{j=k+2}^{i-1} (|0\|\alpha_j\rangle + |\epsilon\rangle) \right) \otimes |\eta\rangle \\
&= \sum_{f \in \mathsf{comp}(D)} \sqrt{\frac{1}{|\mathsf{comp}(D)|}}\,|f\rangle + |\epsilon'\rangle\,,
\end{aligned} \tag{35}$$

where $|\epsilon'\rangle = \sum_{0\le k\le i-1}(\bigotimes_{j=0}^{k}|0\|\alpha_j\rangle)\otimes|\epsilon\rangle\otimes(\bigotimes_{j=k+2}^{i-1}(|0\|\alpha_j\rangle+|\epsilon\rangle))\otimes|\eta\rangle$. Because $\| |\epsilon\rangle \| = \sqrt{1/2^{n-1}}$, $\| |\epsilon'\rangle \|$ is in $O(i\sqrt{1/2^n}) = O(\sqrt{i^2/2^n})$. Thus the first property holds.

Next, we show the second property. Since now the operator CstOE does not affect the registers of entry of x' in D for $x' \neq x$, it suffices to show that the claim holds for the case that D is empty. In addition, without loss of generality, we can assume that $x = 0^m$. Now $D \cup (x,\alpha)$ corresponds to the bit string $(1\|\alpha)\|(0\|0^n)\|\cdots\|(0\|0^n)$. We have that $U_{\mathrm{enc}}^* = \mathsf{IH}^* U_{\mathrm{toggle}}^* \mathsf{CH}^* = \mathsf{IH} U_{\mathrm{toggle}} \mathsf{CH}$ and

$$\begin{aligned}
U_{\mathrm{enc}}^* |D\cup(x,\alpha)\rangle &= \mathsf{IH} U_{\mathrm{toggle}} \left(\sum_{u\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha\cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |1\|u\rangle \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\|0^n\rangle \right) \\
&= \mathsf{IH} \left(\sum_{u\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha\cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |0\|u\rangle \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\|0^n\rangle \right) \\
&\quad + \mathsf{IH} \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1\|0^n\rangle - |0\|0^n\rangle) \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\|0^n\rangle \right) \\
&= |0\|\alpha\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle\, |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \right) + |\epsilon_1\rangle\,, \qquad (36)
\end{aligned}$$

where $|\widehat{0^n}\rangle := H^{\otimes n}|0^n\rangle$ and $|\epsilon_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}(|1\rangle - |0\rangle)\,|\widehat{0^n}\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|\widehat{0^n}\rangle\right)$. Thus we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathsf{stO}\,(I\otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}}^*)\,|x,y\rangle\otimes|D\cup(x,\alpha)\rangle \\
&\quad = |x,y\oplus\alpha\rangle\otimes|0\|\alpha\rangle\otimes\left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|\widehat{0^n}\rangle\right) + \mathsf{stO}(|x,y\rangle\otimes|\epsilon_1\rangle). \qquad (37)
\end{aligned}$$

Note that, from (36) it follows that

$$U_{\mathrm{enc}}\left(|0\|\alpha\rangle\otimes\left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|\widehat{0^n}\rangle\right)+|\epsilon_1\rangle\right) = |D\cup(x,\alpha)\rangle\,. \qquad (38)$$

Therefore

$$\begin{aligned}
&(I\otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}})\,\mathsf{stO}\,(I\otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}}^*)\,|x,y\rangle\otimes|D\cup(x,\alpha)\rangle \\
&\quad = (I\otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}})\left(|x,y\oplus\alpha\rangle\otimes|0\|\alpha\rangle\otimes\left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|\widehat{0^n}\rangle\right)+\mathsf{stO}(|x,y\rangle\otimes|\epsilon_1\rangle)\right) \\
&\quad = (I\otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}})\left(|x,y\oplus\alpha\rangle\otimes|0\|\alpha\rangle\otimes\left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|\widehat{0^n}\rangle\right)+|x,y\oplus\alpha\rangle\otimes|\epsilon_1\rangle\right) \\
&\qquad - (I\otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}})\,(|x,y\oplus\alpha\rangle\otimes|\epsilon_1\rangle) + (I\otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}})\mathsf{stO}(|x,y\rangle\otimes|\epsilon_1\rangle)
\end{aligned}$$

$$= |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)\rangle + |\epsilon_2\rangle \tag{39}$$

holds, where $|\epsilon_2\rangle = -(I \otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}})(|x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle) + (I \otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}})\mathsf{stO}(|x, y\rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle)$. Now we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
&(I \otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}})\mathsf{stO}(|x, y\rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle) \\
&\quad = (I \otimes \mathsf{CH} \cdot U_{\mathrm{toggle}} \cdot \mathsf{IH})\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes (|1\rangle - |0\rangle) \\
&\qquad\qquad \otimes |\gamma\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|\widehat{0^n}\rangle\right) \\
&\quad = (I \otimes \mathsf{CH} \cdot U_{\mathrm{toggle}})\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma,\delta}\frac{(-1)^{\gamma\cdot\delta}}{2^n}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes (|1\rangle - |0\rangle) \\
&\qquad\qquad \otimes |\delta\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|0^n\rangle\right) \\
&\quad = (I \otimes \mathsf{CH})\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma,\delta}\frac{(-1)^{\gamma\cdot\delta}}{2^n}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes (|0\rangle - |1\rangle) \otimes |\delta\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|0^n\rangle\right) \\
&\qquad + (I \otimes \mathsf{CH})\frac{2}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma}\frac{1}{2^n}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes (|1\rangle - |0\rangle) \otimes |0^n\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|0^n\rangle\right) \\
&\quad = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes \left(|0\rangle \otimes \left(H^{\otimes n}|\gamma\rangle\right) - |1\rangle \otimes |\gamma\rangle\right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|0^n\rangle\right) \\
&\qquad + \frac{2}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma}\frac{1}{2^n}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes \left(|1\rangle \otimes \left(H^{\otimes n}|0^n\rangle\right) - |0\rangle \otimes |0^n\rangle\right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|0^n\rangle\right) \\
&\quad = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |0\rangle \otimes \left(H^{\otimes n}|\gamma\rangle\right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|0^n\rangle\right) \\
&\qquad - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |1\rangle \otimes |\gamma\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|0^n\rangle\right) \\
&\qquad + \frac{2}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma}\frac{1}{2^n}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes \left(\sum_{\delta}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}|D \cup (x, \delta)\rangle - |D\rangle\right) \\
&\quad = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |0\rangle \otimes \left(\sum_{\delta}\frac{(-1)^{\gamma\cdot\delta}}{\sqrt{2^n}}|\delta\rangle\right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|0^n\rangle\right) \\
&\qquad - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}\sum_{\gamma}\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}|x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |1\rangle \otimes |\gamma\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1}|0\rangle\,|0^n\rangle\right)
\end{aligned}$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
&+ \frac{2}{2^n} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes \left(\sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta)\rangle - |D\rangle \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |0\rangle \otimes \left(\sum_{\delta \neq 0^n} \frac{(-1)^{\gamma \cdot \delta}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |\delta\rangle \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m - 1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \\
&+ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |0\rangle \otimes \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |0^n\rangle \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m - 1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \\
&- \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |1\rangle \otimes |\gamma\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m - 1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \\
&+ \frac{2}{2^n} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes \left(\sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta)\rangle - |D\rangle \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |D_{\gamma}^{\mathsf{invalid}}\rangle \\
&+ \frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |D\rangle \\
&- \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \gamma)\rangle \\
&+ \frac{2}{2^n} |x\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \otimes \left(\sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta)\rangle - |D\rangle \right) \\
&= -\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes \left(|D \cup (x, \gamma)\rangle - |D_{\gamma}^{\mathsf{invalid}}\rangle \right) \\
&+ \frac{1}{2^n} |x\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \otimes \left(2 \sum_{\delta} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta)\rangle - |D\rangle \right), \qquad (40)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $|D_{\gamma}^{\mathsf{invalid}}\rangle$ is a superposition of invalid databases for each γ.

In addition, we have that

$$
\begin{aligned}
U_{\mathrm{enc}} |\epsilon_1\rangle &= (\mathsf{CH} U_{\mathrm{toggle}} \mathsf{IH}) \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1\rangle - |0\rangle) |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m - 1} |0\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \right) \\
&= \mathsf{CH} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1\rangle - |0\rangle) |0^n\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m - 1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} (|1\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle - |0\rangle |0^n\rangle) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m - 1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \\
&= \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \gamma)\rangle - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D\rangle \qquad (41)
\end{aligned}
$$

holds. Thus

$$(I \otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}}) |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |\epsilon_1\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \left(\left(\sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \gamma)\rangle \right) - |D\rangle \right) \tag{42}$$

holds. Therefore

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathsf{CstOE} |x, y\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)\rangle \\
&\quad = |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x, \alpha)\rangle \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \left(|D\rangle - \left(\sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \gamma)\rangle \right) \right) \\
&\qquad - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \gamma\rangle \otimes \left(|D \cup (x, \gamma)\rangle - |D^{\mathsf{invalid}}_\gamma\rangle \right) \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{2^n} |x\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \otimes \left(2 \sum_\delta \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x, \delta)\rangle - |D\rangle \right)
\end{aligned} \tag{43}$$

holds, and this proves the second property.

Finally, we show the third property. Since now the operator CstOE does not affect the registers of entry of x' in D for $x' \neq x$, it suffices to show that the claim holds for the case that D has no entry. In addition, we can without loss of generality assume that $x = 0^m$. Now D corresponds to the bit string $(0\|0^n)\|(0\|0^n)\|\cdots\|(0\|0^n)$, and we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
U^*_{\mathrm{enc}} |D\rangle &= \mathsf{IH} U_{\mathrm{toggle}} \mathsf{CH} |D\rangle \\
&= \left(\sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |0\rangle |\alpha\rangle \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m - 1} |0\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \right).
\end{aligned} \tag{44}$$

Hence it holds that

$$\mathsf{stO}(I \otimes U^*_{\mathrm{enc}}) |x, y\rangle \otimes |D\rangle = \sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |0\rangle |\alpha\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m - 1} |0\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \right). \tag{45}$$

In addition, we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
&(I \otimes U_{\mathrm{enc}}) \mathsf{stO}(I \otimes U^*_{\mathrm{enc}}) |x, y\rangle \otimes |D\rangle \\
&\quad = (I \otimes (\mathsf{CH} U_{\mathrm{toggle}} \mathsf{IH})) \left(\sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \otimes |0\rangle |\alpha\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m - 1} |0\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \right) \right) \\
&\quad = (I \otimes (\mathsf{CH} U_{\mathrm{toggle}})) \left(\sum_{\alpha \in \{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y \oplus \alpha\rangle \right.
\end{aligned}$$

$$\otimes \left(\sum_{u\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha\cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |0\|u\rangle \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \Bigg)$$

$$= (I \otimes \mathsf{CH}) \Bigg(\sum_{\alpha\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y\oplus\alpha\rangle \otimes \left(\sum_{u\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{(-1)^{\alpha\cdot u}}{\sqrt{2^n}} |1\rangle |u\rangle \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \Bigg)$$

$$+ (I \otimes \mathsf{CH}) \Bigg(\sum_{\alpha\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y\oplus\alpha\rangle \otimes \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}(|0\rangle - |1\rangle) \otimes |0^n\rangle \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right) \Bigg)$$

$$= \sum_{\alpha\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y\oplus\alpha\rangle \otimes |1\rangle |\alpha\rangle \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right)$$

$$+ \sum_{\alpha\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y\oplus\alpha\rangle \otimes \left(\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}}(|0\rangle |0^n\rangle - |1\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle) \right) \otimes \left(\bigotimes_{i=1}^{2^m-1} |0\rangle |0^n\rangle \right)$$

$$= \sum_{\alpha\in\{0,1\}^n} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x, y\oplus\alpha\rangle \otimes |D \cup (x,\alpha)\rangle$$

$$+ \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle \otimes \left(|D\rangle - \sum_{\gamma} \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |D \cup (x,\gamma)\rangle \right) \tag{46}$$

holds. Therefore the third property also holds. □

B Proof of Lemma 1

This section proves Lemma 1. First we show the following lemma, which shows that the behavior of $O'_{\mathrm{UP.3}}$ for D_F without overlap is the same as that of $O_{\mathrm{UP.3}}$ for $[D_F]_3$. In this section we omit writing the additional q qubits that are introduced to write detection results for LR_3-det and LR'_3-det, and the $2n$ ancillary qubits that are used to compute the intermediate states after the first and second rounds (see (21) and (22)), as long as they are $|0^q\rangle$ and $|0^{2n}\rangle$, respectively, for short.

Lemma 3. *It holds that*

$$\begin{aligned} &\langle x'_{2L}, x'_{2R}, y'_L, y'_R| \otimes \langle D'_F|\, O'_{\mathrm{UP.3}} \,|x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |D_F\rangle \\ &= \langle x'_{2L}, x'_{2R}, y'_L, y'_R| \otimes \langle [D'_F]_3|\, O_{\mathrm{UP.3}} \,|x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |[D_F]_3\rangle \end{aligned} \tag{47}$$

for any $x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R, x'_{2L}, x'_{2R}, y'_L, y'_R \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and any valid databases D_F and D'_F without overlap.

Proof. It suffices to consider the case that $x'_{2L} = x_{2L}$, $x'_{2R} = x_{2R}$, and $y'_R = y_R$. Since the database $O'_{\mathrm{UP}.3}$ affects only the entry of (x_{2L}, x_{2R}) in D_F when it acts on $|x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |D_F\rangle$, it suffices to show the claim for the cases that (1) D_F has only a single entry (x_{2L}, x_{2R}, α), or (2) D_F has no entry.

First we show the claim for the first case that $D_F = \{(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \alpha)\}$. In this case, by Proposition 1 we have that

$$
\begin{aligned}
&O'_{\mathrm{UP}.3} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |D_F\rangle \\
&\quad = |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \alpha, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \alpha)\rangle \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \alpha, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \left(|\emptyset\rangle - \left(\sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma)\rangle \right) \right) \\
&\qquad - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \gamma, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma)\rangle \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{2^n} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle |y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes \left(2 \sum_\delta \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \delta)\rangle - |\emptyset\rangle \right) \\
&\qquad + |\mathsf{invalid}\rangle
\end{aligned} \tag{48}
$$

holds, where $\emptyset$ is the empty database and $|\mathsf{invalid}\rangle$ is a vector containing invalid databases. In addition, we have that $[D_F]_3 = \{(x_{2L}, \alpha \oplus x_{2R})\}$, and

$$
\begin{aligned}
&O_{\mathrm{UP}.3} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |[D_F]_3\rangle \\
&\quad = |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \alpha, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |(x_{2L}, \alpha \oplus x_{2R})\rangle \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \alpha, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \left(|\emptyset\rangle - \left(\sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |(x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle \right) \right) \\
&\qquad - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \gamma \oplus x_{2R}, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |(x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{2^n} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle |y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes \left(2 \sum_\delta \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |(x_{2L}, \delta)\rangle - |\emptyset\rangle \right) \\
&\qquad + |\mathsf{invalid}'\rangle \\
&= |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \alpha, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |[(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \alpha)]_3\rangle \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \alpha, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \left(|\emptyset\rangle - \left(\sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |[(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma \oplus x_{2R})]_3\rangle \right) \right) \\
&\qquad - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \gamma \oplus x_{2R}, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |[(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma \oplus x_{2R})]_3\rangle \\
&\qquad + \frac{1}{2^n} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle |y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes \left(2 \sum_\delta \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |[(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \delta \oplus x_{2R})]\rangle - |\emptyset\rangle \right) \\
&\qquad + |\mathsf{invalid}'\rangle
\end{aligned}
$$

$$
\begin{aligned}
&= |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \alpha, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |[(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \alpha)]_3\rangle \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \alpha, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \left(|\emptyset\rangle - \left(\sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |[(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma)]_3\rangle \right) \right) \\
&\quad - \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_\gamma \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}, y_L \oplus \gamma, y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |[(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \gamma)]_3\rangle \\
&\quad + \frac{1}{2^n} |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle |\widehat{0^n}\rangle |y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes \left(2 \sum_\delta \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} |[(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \delta)]_3\rangle - |\emptyset\rangle \right) \\
&\quad + |\mathsf{invalid}'\rangle\,, \qquad (49)
\end{aligned}
$$

where $|\mathsf{invalid}'\rangle$ is a vector containing invalid databases. From (48) and (49), the claim immediately follows for the first case that $D_F = \{(x_{2L}, x_{2R}, \alpha)\}$.

We can similarly show that the claim holds for the second case that D_F is empty by straightforward calculations using the third property of Proposition 1. □

Next we show the following lemma, which shows that the behavior of LR'_3 for good databases is the same as that of LR_3.

Lemma 4. *It holds that*

$$
\begin{aligned}
&\langle x'_{0L}, x'_{0R}, y'_L, y'_R| \otimes \langle D'_1, D'_2, D'_F|\, O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |D_1, D_2, D_F\rangle \\
&= \langle x'_{0L}, x'_{0R}, y'_L, y'_R| \otimes \langle D'_1, D'_2, [D'_F]_3|\, O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |D_1, D_2, [D_F]_3\rangle \qquad (50)
\end{aligned}
$$

for any $x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R, x'_{0L}, x'_{0R}, y'_L, y'_R \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ *and any valid and good databases* (D_1, D_2, D_F) *and* (D'_1, D'_2, D'_F) *for* LR'_3.

Proof. Note that $O_{\mathrm{UP}.i} = O^*_{\mathrm{UP}.i}$ for $i = 1, 2$, and recall that

$$O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} = (O_{\mathrm{UP}.2} O_{\mathrm{UP}.1})^* O_{\mathrm{UP}.3} (O_{\mathrm{UP}.2} O_{\mathrm{UP}.1})$$

and

$$O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3} = (O_{\mathrm{UP}.2} O_{\mathrm{UP}.1})^* O'_{\mathrm{UP}.3} (O_{\mathrm{UP}.2} O_{\mathrm{UP}.1})$$

hold (see Fig. 6). Since $O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$ and $O_{\mathrm{UP}.2}$ do not affect the D_3 and D_F registers, the claim follows from Lemma 3. □

Next we show Lemma 1. Actually we prove a stronger claim below.

Lemma 5. *For each* i*, there exists a complex number* $a^{(i)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}$ *for each tuple* (x, y, z) *(here* x *and* y *correspond to the query and answer registers of* $\mathcal{A}$*, and* z *corresponds to the remaining register of* $\mathcal{A}$*), such that*

$$\sum_{\substack{x,y,z \\ (D_1,D_2,D_F):good}} |a^{(i)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}|^2 \leq 1$$

holds, in addition that

$$|\psi_i^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle = \sum_{\substack{xyz \\ (D_1,D_2,D_F):good}} a^{(i)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F} |x,y,z\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_F\rangle \tag{51}$$

and

$$|\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle = \sum_{\substack{xyz \\ (D_1,D_2,D_F):good}} a^{(i)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F} |x,y,z\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |[D_F]_3\rangle \tag{52}$$

hold. In particular,

$$\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right) = \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi_i^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right) \tag{53}$$

holds for $1 \leq i \leq q+1$.

Proof. We show the claim by induction. Since all databases are empty before the first query, the claim holds for $i = 2$ (i.e., the claim holds for $|\psi_1^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ and $|\psi_1^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle$). Assume that the claim holds for i. We show the claim also holds for $(i+1)$.

Recall that for each good database (D_1, D_2, D_3) for LR_3, there exists a unique D_F without overlap such that $[D_F]_3 = D_3$ and (D_1, D_2, D_F) is a good database for LR'_3, by definition of good databases. Similarly, for each good database (D_1, D_2, D_F) for LR'_3, $(D_1, D_2, [D_F]_3)$ becomes a good database for LR_3. Thus, there exists $a^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}$ and $b^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}$ for each tuple (x, y, z) and good (D_1, D_2, D_F) such that

$$\sum_{\substack{x,y,z \\ (D_1,D_2,D_F):good}} |a^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}|^2, \sum_{\substack{x,y,z \\ (D_1,D_2,D_F):good}} |b^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}|^2 \leq 1.$$

holds, in addition that

$$|\psi_{i+1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle = \sum_{\substack{xyz \\ (D_1,D_2,D_F):good}} a^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F} |x,y,z\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_F\rangle \tag{54}$$

and

$$|\psi_{i+1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle = \sum_{\substack{xyz \\ (D_1,D_2,D_F):good}} b^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F} |x,y,z\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |[D_F]_3\rangle \tag{55}$$

hold.

Since $|\psi_{i+1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle = (I - \Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}) \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3} |\psi_i^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ holds, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} &a^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F} \\ &= \langle x,y,z| \langle D_1,D_2,D_F| (I - \Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}) \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3} |\psi_i^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle \end{aligned}$$

$$= \sum_{\substack{x'y'z' \\ (D_1',D_2',D_F'):good}} a^{(i)}_{x'y'z'D_1'D_2'D_F'} \langle x,y,z| \langle D_1,D_2,D_F| O_{\mathsf{LR}_3'} |x',y',z'\rangle |D_1',D_2',D_F'\rangle \tag{56}$$

holds for good (D_1, D_2, D_F). In addition, since $|\psi_{i+1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle = (I - \Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}) \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ holds, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} & b^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F} \\ &= \langle x,y,z| \langle D_1,D_2,[D_F]_3| (I - \Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}) \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle \\ &= \sum_{\substack{x'y'z' \\ (D_1',D_2',D_F'):good}} a^{(i)}_{x'y'z'D_1'D_2'D_F'} \langle x,y,z| \langle D_1,D_2,[D_F]_3| O_{\mathsf{LR}_3'} |x',y',z'\rangle |D_1',D_2',[D_F']_3\rangle \end{aligned} \tag{57}$$

holds for good (D_1, D_2, D_F).

From Lemma 4, the right hand side of (56) is equal to that of (57). Thus $b^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F} = a^{(i+1)}_{xyzD_1D_2D_F}$ holds for each x, y, z and each good (D_1, D_2, D_F). Therefore the claim also holds for $(i+1)$, which completes the proof. □

C Proof of Lemma 2

Proof (of Lemma 2). We show that the claim holds for LR_3 and $|\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle$. The claim for LR_3' and $|\psi_j^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ can be shown in a similar way. In this proof we omit writing the additional q qubits that are introduced to write detection results for LR_3-det and LR_3'-det, and the $2n$ ancillary qubits that are used to compute the intermediate states after the first and second rounds (see (21) and (22)), as long as they are $|0^q\rangle$ and $|0^{2n}\rangle$, respectively, for short. Remember that the oracle of LR_3 is decomposed as $O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} = O_{\mathrm{UP}.1} \cdot O_{\mathrm{UP}.2} \cdot O_{\mathrm{UP}.3} \cdot O_{\mathrm{UP}.2} \cdot O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$. Since the computational basis is the orthonormal basis, it suffices to show that the claim holds for the case $|\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle = |x_0, y, z\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2\rangle |D_3\rangle$ for each $x = x_{0L}\|x_{0R}, y = y_L\|y_R, z$ (x and y correspond to $\mathcal{A}$'s first and second n-qubit register, respectively, and z correspond to $\mathcal{A}$'s remaining register), and each good database (D_1, D_2, D_3). Note that $|D_1|, |D_2| \leq 2(j-1)$ and $|D_3| \leq j-1$ hold, since each query to the compressed oracle with errors CstOE affects only the qubits that correspond to a single entry of each database. Since O_{LR_3} does not affect the $|z\rangle$ register, for simplicity, we omit writing it in this proof.

We consider three separate cases I, II, and III, and study how the quantum state will change when $O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$, $O_{\mathrm{UP}.2}$, $O_{\mathrm{UP}.3}$, $O_{\mathrm{UP}.2}$, $O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$, and Π_{bad} act on $|\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle$, in a sequential order. Case I is the one that $(x_{0L}, \alpha) \in D_1$ and $(x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, \beta) \in D_2$ for some α and β. Case II is the one that $(x_{0L}, \alpha) \in D_1$ for some α and there is no entry of $x_{0R} \oplus \alpha$ in D_2. Case III is the one that there is no entry of x_{0L} in D_1.

Remark 4. Intuitively, Case I is the case that the queries to f_1 and f_2 are not fresh. Case II is the one that the query to f_1 is not fresh but the query to f_2 is fresh. Case III is the one that the query to f_1 is fresh.

Case I: $(x_{0L}, \alpha) \in D_1$ and $(x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, \beta) \in D_2$ for some α and β.
In this case, after the first query to $O_{\mathrm{UP}.2}$, by Proposition 1 the whole quantum state becomes

$$|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle\,|D_2\rangle\,|D_3\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle \otimes |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle\,, \tag{58}$$

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Here $x_{1L} = x_{0R} \oplus \alpha$, $x_{1R} = x_{0L}$, $x_{2L} = x_{1R} \oplus \beta$, and $x_{2R} = x_{1L}$. We further separate Case I into two sub-cases Case I-i and Case I-ii.
Case I-i: $(x_{2L}, \gamma) \in D_3$ for some γ.
Let $x_{3L} := x_{2R} \oplus \gamma$ and $x_{3R} := x_{2L}$. Then, after the final query to $O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$, by Proposition 1 the whole quantum state becomes

$$|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus x_{3L}, y_R \oplus x_{3L}\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle\,|D_2\rangle\,|D_3\rangle \tag{59}$$

with errors in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. In particular, the database remains good with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Therefore $\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\,|\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle = 0$ with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$, which implies that the claim holds for this Case I-i.
Case I-ii: There is no entry of x_{2L} in D_3.
In this case, after the query to $O_{\mathrm{UP}.3}$, by Proposition 1 the whole quantum state becomes

$$\sum_{\gamma} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}}\,|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (x_{2R} \oplus \gamma), y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle\,|D_2\rangle\,|D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle\,|x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle \tag{60}$$

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Thus, after the final query to $O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$, each normalized summand of (60) becomes

$$|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (x_{2R} \oplus \gamma), y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle\,|D_2\rangle\,|D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle \tag{61}$$

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. In particular, the database of (61) remains good. Therefore (61) becomes 0 with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$ after the operation of Π_{bad}, with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Since the summands of (60) are orthogonal to each other, $\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\,|\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle = 0$ with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$, which implies that the claim holds for this Case I-ii.

Case II: $(x_{0L}, \alpha) \in D_1$ for some α and there is no entry of $x_{0R} \oplus \alpha$ in D_2.
Again, let $x_{1L} := x_{0R} \oplus \alpha$ and $x_{1R} := x_{0L}$. In this case, after the first query to $O_{\mathrm{UP}.2}$, by Proposition 1 the whole quantum state becomes

$$\sum_{\beta} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}}\,|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle$$

$$\otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |\beta \oplus x_{1R}, x_{2R}\rangle$$

$$= \sum_{\substack{\beta\text{: } \exists\text{an entry of} \\ \beta\oplus x_{1R} \text{ in } D_3}} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle$$

$$\otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |\beta \oplus x_{1R}, x_{2R}\rangle \quad (62)$$

$$+ \sum_{\substack{\beta\text{: } \nexists\text{an entry of} \\ \beta\oplus x_{1R} \text{ in } D_3}} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle$$

$$\otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |\beta \oplus x_{1R}, x_{2R}\rangle , \quad (63)$$

where $x_{2R} = x_{1L}$, with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Below we further separate Case II into sub-cases Case II-i and Case II-ii. Case II-i is the case that there exists an entry of $\beta \oplus x_{1R}$ in D_3, which corresponds to the term (62). Case II-ii is the case that there exists no entry of $\beta \oplus x_{1R}$ in D_3, which corresponds to the term (63).

Case II-i: $(\beta \oplus x_{1R}, \gamma) \in D_3$ for some γ.

Let us denote the term (62) by $|\text{II-i}\rangle$. Then, since $|D_3| \leq j - 1$ holds,

$$|\{\beta|\ \exists\text{an entry of } \beta \oplus x_{1R} \text{ in } D_3\}| \leq j - 1$$

follows. In addition, since the summands of (62) are orthogonal to each other, $\| |\text{II-i}\rangle \|^2 \leq O(j/2^{n/2})$ holds. Therefore $\| |\text{II-i}\rangle \| \leq O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})$ follows.

Case II-ii: There is no entry of $\beta \oplus x_{1R}$ in D_3.

After the operation of $O_{\text{UP.3}}$, by Proposition 1 each normalized summand of the term (63) becomes

$$\sum_{\gamma} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (x_{2R} \oplus \gamma), y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle$$

$$\otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle$$

$$\otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle \quad (64)$$

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$, where $x_{2L} = \beta \oplus x_{1R}$. Thus, after the last operations of $O_{\text{UP.2}}$ and $O_{\text{UP.1}}$, each normalized summand of the term (64) becomes

$$|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (x_{2R} \oplus \gamma), y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle \otimes |D_1\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle \quad (65)$$

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. In particular, the database of the term (65) is good with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$, which implies that the term (65) becomes 0 with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$ after the operation of Π_{bad}. Hence, due to orthogonality of each summands, the term (64) will be 0 after the operations of $O_{\text{UP.2}}$, $O_{\text{UP.1}}$, and Π_{bad}, with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$. Therefore, due to orthogonality of each summands, the term (63) will be 0 after the operations of $O_{\text{UP.3}}$, $O_{\text{UP.2}}$, $O_{\text{UP.1}}$, and Π_{bad}, with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$.

Combining analyses of Cases II-i and II-ii,

$$\left\| \Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \left|\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\right\rangle \right\| \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \tag{66}$$

follows in Case II.

Case III: there is no entry of x_{0L} in D_1.

In this case, after the first query to $O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$, by Proposition 1 the whole quantum state becomes

$$\begin{aligned}
&\sum_{\alpha} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \left|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\right\rangle \otimes \left|D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\right\rangle \left|D_2\right\rangle \left|D_3\right\rangle \otimes \left|x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, x_{0L}\right\rangle \\
&= \sum_{\alpha : \exists (\alpha \oplus x_{0R})\text{-entry in } D_2} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \left|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\right\rangle \\
&\qquad\qquad \otimes \left|D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\right\rangle \left|D_2\right\rangle \left|D_3\right\rangle \otimes \left|x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, x_{0L}\right\rangle \qquad (67) \\
&+ \sum_{\alpha : \nexists (\alpha \oplus x_{0R})\text{-entry in } D_2} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \left|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\right\rangle \\
&\qquad\qquad \otimes \left|D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\right\rangle \left|D_2\right\rangle \left|D_3\right\rangle \otimes \left|x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, x_{0L}\right\rangle \qquad (68)
\end{aligned}$$

with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$.

Below we further separate Case III into sub-cases Case III-i and Case III-ii. Case III-i is the case that there exists an entry of $\alpha \oplus x_{0R}$ in D_2, which corresponds to the term (67). Case III-ii is the case that there exists no entry of $\alpha \oplus x_{0R}$ in D_2, which corresponds to the term (68).

Case III-i: $(\alpha \oplus x_{0R}, \beta) \in D_2$ for some β.

Since $|D_2| \leq 2(j-1)$, we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\left\| \sum_{\alpha : \exists (\alpha \oplus x_{0R})\text{-entry in } D_2} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \left|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\right\rangle \right. \\
&\qquad\qquad \left. \otimes \left|D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\right\rangle \left|D_2\right\rangle \left|D_3\right\rangle \otimes \left|x_{0R} \oplus \alpha, x_{0L}\right\rangle \right\|^2 \\
&= \frac{1}{2^{n/2}} \cdot \left|\{\alpha | \exists \beta \text{ s.t. } (\alpha \oplus x_{0R}, \beta) \in D_2\}\right| \leq O\left(\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}\right) \qquad (69)
\end{aligned}$$

holds. Hence the norm of (67) is upper bounded by $O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})$.

Case III-ii: There is no entry of $(\alpha \oplus x_{0R})$ in D_2.

Let $x_{1L} := x_{0R} \oplus \alpha$ and $x_{1R} := x_{0L}$. After the operation of the $O_{\mathrm{UP}.2}$, each normalized summand of (68) changes to

$$\sum_{\beta} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} \left|x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\right\rangle$$

$$\otimes |D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |x_{1R} \oplus \beta, x_{1L}\rangle$$

$$= \sum_{\beta:\exists(\beta\oplus x_{1R})\text{-entry in } D_3} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle$$

$$\otimes |D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |x_{1R} \oplus \beta, x_{1L}\rangle \tag{70}$$

$$+ \sum_{\beta:\nexists(\beta\oplus x_{1R})\text{-entry in } D_3} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L, y_R\rangle$$

$$\otimes |D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |x_{1R} \oplus \beta, x_{1L}\rangle . \tag{71}$$

Since $|D_3| \leq j-1$, we can show that the norm of (70) is in $O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})$, in the same way as we showed the norm of (67) is in $O(\sqrt{j/2^{n/2}})$.

Next we focus on the term (71). After the operation of $O_{\mathrm{UP}.3}$, each normalized summand of (71) becomes

$$\sum_{\gamma} \sqrt{\frac{1}{2^{n/2}}} |x_{0L}, x_{0R}, y_L \oplus (\gamma \oplus x_{2R}), y_R \oplus x_{2L}\rangle$$

$$\otimes |D_1 \cup (x_{0L}, \alpha)\rangle |D_2 \cup (x_{1L}, \beta)\rangle |D_3 \cup (x_{2L}, \gamma)\rangle \otimes |x_{1L}, x_{1R}\rangle |x_{2L}, x_{2R}\rangle , \tag{72}$$

where $x_{2L} = x_{1R} \oplus \beta$ and $x_{2R} = x_{1L}$. Note that the database of each summand of (72) is good. Thus, after the operations of $O_{\mathrm{UP}.2}$, $O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$, and Π_{bad}, each summand of (72) becomes 0 with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$, by Proposition 1. Therefore, since the summands of (72) are orthogonal to each other, (72) becomes 0 with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$ after the operations of $O_{\mathrm{UP}.2}$, $O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$, and Π_{bad}. Hence it follows that (71) becomes 0 with an error in $O(\sqrt{1/2^{n/2}})$ after the operations of $O_{\mathrm{UP}.3}$, $O_{\mathrm{UP}.2}$, $O_{\mathrm{UP}.1}$, and Π_{bad}, since the summands of (71) are orthogonal to each other.

From analyses of Cases III-i and III-ii, it follows that

$$\left\| \Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_j^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle \right\| \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \tag{73}$$

also holds in Case III. □

D Proof of Proposition 3

Proof (of Proposition 3). Recall that $|\psi_i\rangle$ and $|\psi'_i\rangle$ are the states just before the i-th query to LR_3-det and LR'_3-det, respectively. By abuse of notation, we let $|\psi_{(q+1)}\rangle, |\psi'_{(q+1)}\rangle$ denote the quantum states $(U_q \otimes I)O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} |\psi_q\rangle$ and $(U_q \otimes I)O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3\text{-det}} |\psi'_q\rangle$, respectively. Moreover, let $|\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle, |\phi'_{(q+1)}\rangle$ be the states just before the final measurements for the cases that the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ runs relative

to LR_3-det and LR'_3-det, respectively. Since now we are considering that the random functions f_1, f_2, f_3, F are implemented by the compressed standard oracle with errors, there are unitary operators $U^{123}_{\mathrm{FinDec}}$ and $U^{12F}_{\mathrm{FinDec}}$ that acts on database registers such that $|\phi_{q+1}\rangle = (I \otimes U^{123}_{\mathrm{FinDec}})\,|\psi_{q+1}\rangle$ and $|\phi'_{q+1}\rangle = (I \otimes U^{12F}_{\mathrm{FinDec}})\,|\psi'_{q+1}\rangle$.

First, we have that

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det},\mathsf{LR}'_3\text{-det}}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle\right), \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\phi'_{(q+1)}\rangle\right)\right)\\ &= \mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_{(q+1)}\rangle\right), \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi'_{(q+1)}\rangle\right)\right) \qquad (74)\end{aligned}$$

holds.

Now we show the following claim.

Claim. Let ρ be a mixed state of a joint quantum system $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$. Let $\Pi : \mathcal{H}_B \to \mathcal{H}_B$ be an orthogonal projector and $U_{A1}, U_{A2} : \mathcal{H}_A \to \mathcal{H}_A$ be unitary operators. Define a unitary operator $U : \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B \to \mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$ by $U := U_{A1} \otimes \Pi + U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi)$. Then

$$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{tr}_B\left(U\rho U^*\right) = \mathsf{tr}_B\left((U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)\rho(U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)^*\right)\\ + \mathsf{tr}_B\left((U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))\rho(U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))^*\right) \qquad (75)\end{aligned}$$

holds, where tr_B is the partial trace over $\mathcal{H}_B$. In particular,

$$\mathsf{tr}_B(U\,|\psi\rangle) = \mathsf{tr}_B((U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)\,|\psi\rangle) + \mathsf{tr}_B((U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))\,|\psi\rangle) \qquad (76)$$

holds for any pure state $|\psi\rangle$ of $\mathcal{H}_A \otimes \mathcal{H}_B$.

Proof. First, we have that

$$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{tr}_B\left(U\rho U^*\right) = \mathsf{tr}_B\left((U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)\rho(U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)^*\right)\\ + \mathsf{tr}_B\left((U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))\rho(U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))^*\right)\\ + \mathsf{tr}_B\left((U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)\rho(U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))^*\right)\\ + \mathsf{tr}_B\left((U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))\rho(U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)^*\right) \qquad (77)\end{aligned}$$

holds. Moreover, since $(U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)\rho(U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))^* = (U_{A1} \otimes I)(I \otimes \Pi)\rho(I \otimes (I - \Pi))^*(U_{A2} \otimes I)^*$ holds, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned}\mathsf{tr}_B\left((U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)\rho(U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))^*\right) &= U_{A1}\mathsf{tr}_B\left((I \otimes \Pi)\,\rho\,(I \otimes (I - \Pi))^*\right)U^*_{A2}\\ &= U_{A1}\mathsf{tr}_B\left((I \otimes \Pi)\,(I \otimes (I - \Pi))^*\,\rho\right)U^*_{A2}\\ &= U_{A1}\mathsf{tr}_B\left(I \otimes (\Pi \cdot (I - \Pi))\rho\right)U^*_{A2}\\ &= 0, \qquad (78)\end{aligned}$$

and similarly we have that

$$\mathsf{tr}_B\left((U_{A2} \otimes (I - \Pi))\rho(U_{A1} \otimes \Pi)^*\right) = 0. \qquad (79)$$

The claim follows from (77), (78), and (79). □

Recall that $(I - \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}})\,|\psi_i\rangle$ and $(I - \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}})\,|\psi'_i\rangle$ are denoted by $|\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ and $|\psi_i^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle$, respectively. In addition, let us denote $\Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}}\,|\psi_i\rangle$ and $\Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}}\,|\psi'_i\rangle$ by $|\psi_i^{\mathsf{bad}}\rangle$ and $|\psi_i^{'\mathsf{bad}}\rangle$, respectively. Since $|\psi_i\rangle = U_{i-1}\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}\,|\psi_{i-1}\rangle$ and

$$\begin{aligned} O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} = (\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes I_{i-1}\otimes X + (I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_{i-1}\otimes I_1) \\ \cdot (O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\otimes I_{i-1}\otimes I_1)\cdot((I-\Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}})\otimes I_1) \\ + \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}}\otimes I_1 \end{aligned} \tag{80}$$

holds, from the above claim it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}(|\psi_i\rangle) &= \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(U_{i-1}\cdot(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X + (I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right) \\ &\quad + \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(U_{i-1}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{bad}}\rangle\right) \\ &= \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(U_{i-1}\cdot(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right) \\ &\quad \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(U_{i-1}\cdot((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right) \\ &\quad + \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(U_{i-1}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{bad}}\rangle\right) + \rho + \rho^*, \end{aligned} \tag{81}$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \rho = \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\Big(U_{i-1}\cdot(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\langle\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}| \\ \cdot O^*_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)^*\cdot U^*_{i-1}\Big). \end{aligned} \tag{82}$$

Note that, for any Hilbert space L_1 and L_2, and any Hermite operator A on $L_1\otimes L_2$, $\|\mathsf{tr}_{L_2}(\rho)\|_{\mathsf{tr}} = \|\rho\|_{\mathsf{tr}}$ holds. In addition, $\|\,|\psi\rangle\langle\phi|\,\|_{\mathsf{tr}} \le \|\,|\psi\rangle\,\|\cdot\|\,|\phi\rangle\,\|$ holds for any vectors $|\psi\rangle$ and $|\phi\rangle$. Thus we have that

$$\begin{aligned} &\|\rho\|_{\mathsf{tr}} \\ &= \left\|U_{i-1}\cdot(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\langle\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}|\cdot O^*_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)^*\cdot U^*_{i-1}\right\|_{\mathsf{tr}} \\ &\le \left\|(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right\|\cdot\left\|((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right\| \\ &\le \left\|(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right\| \le O\left(\sqrt{\frac{i}{2^{n/2}}}\right), \end{aligned} \tag{83}$$

where we used the claim of Lemma 2 for the last inequality.

Similarly, for $|\psi'_i\rangle$ we have that

$$\begin{aligned} \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}(|\psi'_i\rangle) &= \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(U_{i-1}\cdot(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right) \\ &\quad \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(U_{i-1}\cdot((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right) \\ &\quad + \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(U_{i-1}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{bad}}\rangle\right) + \rho' + \rho'^*, \end{aligned} \tag{84}$$

where

$$\rho' = \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\Big(U_{i-1}\cdot(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\cdot|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\langle\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}| \cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}^{*}\cdot((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)^{*}\cdot U_{i-1}^{*}\Big), \quad (85)$$

and

$$\|\rho'\|_{\mathsf{tr}} \leq O\left(\sqrt{\frac{i}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \quad (86)$$

holds.

Now we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_i\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi_i'\rangle\right)\right)\\
&\leq \mathsf{td}\Big(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\Big(U_{i-1}\left((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1\right)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\Big),\\
&\qquad \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\Big(U_{i-1}\left((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1\right)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3'}|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\Big)\Big)\\
&\quad+\mathsf{td}\Big(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\Big(U_{i-1}\left(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X\right)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\Big),\\
&\qquad \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\Big(U_{i-1}\left(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X\right)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3'}|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\Big)\Big)\\
&\quad+\mathsf{td}\Big(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(U_{i-1}|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{bad}}\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(U_{i-1}|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{bad}}\rangle\right)\Big)\\
&\quad+\|\rho\|_{\mathsf{tr}}+\|\rho^{*}\|_{\mathsf{tr}}+\|\rho'\|_{\mathsf{tr}}+\|\rho'^{*}\|_{\mathsf{tr}}. \qquad (87)
\end{aligned}$$

In addition, since U_{i-1} affects only $\mathcal{A}$'s register, and td is invariant under unitary transformations, we have that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_i\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi_i'\rangle\right)\right)\\
&\leq \mathsf{td}\Big(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\Big(\left((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1\right)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\Big),\\
&\qquad \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\Big(\left((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1\right)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3'}|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\Big)\Big)\\
&\quad+\mathsf{td}\Big(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\Big(\left(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X\right)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\Big),\\
&\qquad \mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\Big(\left(\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X\right)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3'}|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\Big)\Big)\\
&\quad+\mathsf{td}\Big(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{bad}}\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{bad}}\rangle\right)\Big)+O\left(\sqrt{\frac{i}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \qquad (88)
\end{aligned}$$

holds.

From Lemma 1, it follows that

$$\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right)=\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi_i^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle\right) \quad (89)$$

holds for any $1\leq i\leq q+1$. Moreover, $((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle=|\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ and $((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle=|\psi_i^{'\mathsf{good}}\rangle$ hold. Thus

$$\mathsf{td}\Big(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\Big(\left((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1\right)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle\Big),$$

$$\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(((I-\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}})\otimes I_1)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3}\left|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\right\rangle\right)\Big)=0 \tag{90}$$

holds. In addition, from the claim in p. 46 it follows that

$$\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_{i-1}\rangle\right)=\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(\left|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\right\rangle\right)+\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(\left|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{bad}}\right\rangle\right)$$

and

$$\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi'_{i-1}\rangle\right)=\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(\left|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\right\rangle\right)+\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(\left|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{bad}}\right\rangle\right)$$

hold, which implies that

$$\mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_{i-1}\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi'_{i-1}\rangle\right)\right)=\mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(\left|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{bad}}\right\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(\left|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{bad}}\right\rangle\right)\right) \tag{91}$$

holds.

From (88), (90), and (91), we can show that

$$\begin{aligned}
&\mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_i\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi'_i\rangle\right)\right)\\
&\quad\le\mathsf{td}\Big(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left((\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\left|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\right\rangle\right),\\
&\qquad\qquad\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left((\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3}\left|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\right\rangle\right)\Big)\\
&\qquad+\mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_{i-1}\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi'_{i-1}\rangle\right)\right)+O\left(\sqrt{\frac{i}{2^{n/2}}}\right)\\
&\quad\le\left\|\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left((\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}\left|\psi_{i-1}^{\mathsf{good}}\right\rangle\right)\right\|_{\mathsf{tr}}\\
&\qquad+\left\|\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left((\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}\otimes X)\cdot O_{\mathsf{LR}'_3}\left|\psi_{i-1}^{'\mathsf{good}}\right\rangle\right)\right\|_{\mathsf{tr}}\\
&\qquad+\mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_{i-1}\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi'_{i-1}\rangle\right)\right)+O\left(\sqrt{\frac{i}{2^{n/2}}}\right)\\
&\quad\le\mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_{i-1}\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi'_{i-1}\rangle\right)\right)+O\left(\sqrt{\frac{i}{2^{n/2}}}\right)
\end{aligned} \tag{92}$$

holds, where we used the claim of Lemma 2 again for the last inequality. Therefore, by induction it follows that

$$\mathsf{td}\left(\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{123}}\left(|\psi_i\rangle\right),\mathsf{tr}_{\mathcal{D}_{12F}}\left(|\psi'_i\rangle\right)\right)\le\sum_{1\le j\le i-1}O\left(\sqrt{\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}}\right)\le O\left(\sqrt{\frac{i^3}{2^{n/2}}}\right) \tag{93}$$

for each $1\le i\le q+1$. The claim of the proposition follows from (74) and (93). □

E Proof of Proposition 4

Proof (of Proposition 4). We give a proof for LR_3 and LR_3-det. The claim for LR'_3 and LR'_3-det can be proven in the same way. Let $|\eta_i\rangle$ and $|\psi_i\rangle$ be the states

just before $\mathcal{A}$ makes the i-th query, when $\mathcal{A}$ runs relative to LR_3 and LR_3-det, respectively. By abuse of notation, we let $|\eta_{(q+1)}\rangle, |\psi_{(q+1)}\rangle$ denote the quantum states $(U_q \otimes I)O_{\mathsf{LR}_3}|\eta_q\rangle$ and $(U_q \otimes I)O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}|\psi_q\rangle$, respectively. Then we have that $|\eta_1\rangle = |\psi_1\rangle$. Moreover, let $|\xi_{(q+1)}\rangle, |\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle$ be the states just before the final measurements for the cases that the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ runs relative to LR_3 and LR_3-det, respectively. Since now we are considering that the random functions f_1, f_2, and f_3 are implemented by the compressed standard oracle with errors, there is a unitary operator $U^{123}_{\mathrm{FinDec}}$ that acts on database registers such that $|\xi_{q+1}\rangle = (I \otimes U^{123}_{\mathrm{FinDec}})|\eta_{q+1}\rangle$ and $|\phi_{q+1}\rangle = (I \otimes U^{123}_{\mathrm{FinDec}})|\psi_{q+1}\rangle$.

In addition, let us define an operator $\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3}$ by

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} = (O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \cdot ((I - \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}}) \otimes I_1) \\ + \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}} \otimes I_1,\end{aligned} \tag{94}$$

where I_{i-1} is the identity operator on the first $(i-1)$ additional qubits, and I_1 is one on the i-th additional qubit. The definition of this operator depends on i, but we use the same notation $\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3}$ for all i, for simplicity. (Intuitively, $\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3}$ is an intermediate operator between O_{LR_3} and $O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}$: Similarly to $O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}$, the new operator $\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3}$ does nothing if one of the first $(i-1)$ additional qubits is 1. However, unlike $O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}$, $\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3}$ does not flip the i-th additional qubit even if the database becomes bad, after each query.)

Assume that $\mathcal{A}$ has ℓ-qubit states, and the database register has d-qubits in total. Then, since the additional q qubits are set to 0 at the beginning, it holds that

$$|\eta_i\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \cdots \hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^d\rangle \otimes |0^q\rangle) \tag{95}$$

and

$$|\psi_i\rangle = (U_i \otimes I)O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} \cdots O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^d\rangle \otimes |0^q\rangle), \tag{96}$$

for each i (we omit writing the $2n$ ancillary qubits that are used to compute the intermediate states after the first and second rounds).

Now we have that

$$\begin{aligned}&\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_3,\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}(\mathcal{A}) \\ &\quad\le \big\||\xi_{(q+1)}\rangle - |\phi_{(q+1)}\rangle\big\| \\ &\quad= \big\||\eta_{(q+1)}\rangle - |\psi_{(q+1)}\rangle\big\| \\ &\quad= \Big\|(U_q \otimes I)\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \cdots \hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^d\rangle \otimes |0^q\rangle) \\ &\qquad\quad - (U_q \otimes I)O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} \cdots O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^d\rangle \otimes |0^q\rangle)\Big\| \\ &\quad\le \sum_{1\le i\le q} \Big\|(U_q \otimes I)\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \cdots (U_i \otimes I)\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3}(U_{i-1} \otimes I)O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} \\ &\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \cdots O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^d\rangle \otimes |0^q\rangle) \\ &\qquad -(U_q \otimes I)\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \cdots (U_{i+1} \otimes I)\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3}(U_i \otimes I)O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} \\ &\qquad\qquad\qquad\qquad \cdots O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}(U_0 \otimes I)(|0^\ell\rangle \otimes |0^d\rangle \otimes |0^q\rangle)\Big\|\end{aligned} \tag{97}$$

$$= \sum_{1 \le i \le q} \left\| (U_q \otimes I) \hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \cdots (U_i \otimes I) \left(\hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_i\rangle - O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} |\psi_i\rangle \right) \right\|$$
$$= \sum_{1 \le i \le q} \left\| \hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_i\rangle - O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} |\psi_i\rangle \right\| \tag{98}$$

holds.

Let us again denote $\Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}} |\psi_i\rangle$ by $|\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle$. Since

$$\begin{aligned} O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} = (&\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes X + (I - \Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}) \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \\ &\cdot (O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \cdot ((I - \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}}) \otimes I_1) \\ &+ \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}} \otimes I_1 \end{aligned} \tag{99}$$

holds by definition of $O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}$, and

$$\begin{aligned} \hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} = (&\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1 + (I - \Pi_{\mathsf{bad}}) \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \\ &\cdot (O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} \otimes I_{i-1} \otimes I_1) \cdot ((I - \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}}) \otimes I_1) \\ &+ \Pi^{[i-1]}_{\mathsf{flipped}} \otimes I_1 \end{aligned} \tag{100}$$

holds, we have that

$$\begin{aligned} &\left\| \hat{O}_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_i\rangle - O_{\mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}} |\psi_i\rangle \right\| \\ &= \left\| (\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \otimes X) O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle - (\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \otimes I_1) O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_i^{\mathsf{good}}\rangle \right\| \\ &\le 2 \left\| (\Pi_{\mathsf{bad}} \otimes I_1) O_{\mathsf{LR}_3} |\psi_i\rangle \right\|. \end{aligned} \tag{101}$$

From (98), (101), and Lemma 2, it follows that

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{LR}_3, \mathsf{LR}_3\text{-det}}(\mathcal{A}) \le \sum_{1 \le j \le q} O\left(\sqrt{\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}} \right) = O\left(\sqrt{\frac{q^3}{2^{n/2}}} \right) \tag{102}$$

holds, which completes the proof. □

F Proof of Theorem 4

First, we describe an overview of a classical attack [28]. Let us denote the composition of two independent random functions from $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ to $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ by $\mathsf{RF} \circ \mathsf{RF}$.

An overview of a classical attack. Suppose that we are given an oracle access to $\mathcal{O}$, which is either the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction LR_4 or a random permutation from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$. Let us define a function $G^{\mathcal{O}} : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ that depends on $\mathcal{O}$ by

$$G^{\mathcal{O}}(x) := \left(\mathcal{O}(0^{n/2}, x) \right)_R \oplus x, \tag{103}$$

where $\left(\mathcal{O}(0^{n/2}, x)\right)_R$ is the right half $n/2$ bits of $\mathcal{O}(0^{n/2}, x)$. We can implement $G^{\mathcal{O}}$ by making $O(1)$ queries.

When $\mathcal{O}$ is the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction LR_4, we have that $G^{\mathcal{O}}(x) = f_3(f_2(x \oplus f_1(0^{n/2}))) \oplus f_1(0^{n/2})$ holds. Thus, if all round functions of LR_4 are truly random functions, the function distribution of $G^{\mathcal{O}}$ will be the same as that of the composition of two independent random functions $\mathsf{RF} \circ \mathsf{RF}$. On the other hand, when $\mathcal{O}$ is a random permutation from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$, the function distribution of $G^{\mathcal{O}}$ will be almost the same as that of the truly random function RF from $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ to $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$.

Since $\mathsf{RF} \circ \mathsf{RF}$ has twice as many collisions as RF has, we can distinguish LR_4 from a truly random permutation by making $O((2^{n/2})^{1/2}) = O(2^{n/4})$ queries to $G^{\mathcal{O}}$.

Conversion of the classical attack to a quantum attack. Next we explain how to convert the classical attack above to a quantum attack that makes $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries, and prove Theorem 4. The following lemma is crucial, which shows that we can distinguish $\mathsf{RF} \circ \mathsf{RF}$ from RF by making $O((2^{n/2})^{1/3}) = O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries.

Lemma 6. *Let us denote the composition of two independent random functions from $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ to $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ by $\mathsf{RF} \circ \mathsf{RF}$. Then, there exists a quantum algorithm $\mathcal{B}$ that makes $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries and satisfies $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{RF}\circ\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{B}) = \Omega(1)$. That is, there exists an algorithm that distinguishes $\mathsf{RF} \circ \mathsf{RF}$ from a random function with a constant probability, by making $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries.*

Proof. We use the following fact that is shown by Ambainis [2].

Fact 1 (Theorem 3 in [2]). *Let X and Y be finite sets, and $F : X \to Y$ be a function. Then there is a quantum algorithm that judges if there exist distinct elements $x_1, x_2 \in X$ such that $F(x_1) = F(x_2)$ with bounded error by making $O(|X|^{2/3})$ quantum queries to F.*

Let $[N] \subset \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ denote the subset $\{0, 1, \ldots, N-1\}$ for each integer $1 \leq N \leq 2^{n/2}$. By using the above fact, we can deduce that for $1 \leq N \leq 2^{n/2}$ there exists a quantum algorithm $\mathcal{D}_N$ such that, given oracle access to a function $F : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, it outputs 1 if there exist distinct elements $x_1, x_2 \in [N]$ such that $F(x_1) = F(x_2)$, and outputs 0 otherwise, with an error that is smaller than $1/30$, by making $O(|N|^{2/3})$ quantum queries. (We can make such $\mathcal{D}_N$ by iteratively running Ambainis' algorithm $O(1)$ times for $F|_{[N]} : [N] \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, which is the restriction of F to $[N]$.)

Here we give an analysis of the qPRF advantage of $\mathcal{D}_N$ on $\mathsf{RF} \circ \mathsf{RF}$, for each N. For a function $F : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ and a subset $Z \in \{0,1\}^{n/2}$, let coll^F_Z denote the event that F has a collision in Z, i.e., there are distinct $x_1, x_2 \in Z$ such that $F(x_1) = F(x_2)$. Then, we have that

$$\Pr_F\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}^F_{[N]}\right] = \left(1 - \frac{1}{2^{n/2}}\right) \cdot \left(1 - \frac{2}{2^{n/2}}\right) \cdots \left(1 - \frac{N-1}{2^{n/2}}\right)$$

$$= \prod_{j=1}^{N-1} \left(1 - \frac{j}{2^{n/2}}\right) \tag{104}$$

holds, where F is chosen from $\mathsf{Func}(\{0,1\}^{n/2}, \{0,1\}^{n/2})$ uniformly at random. In addition, when F_1 and F_2 are chosen from $\mathsf{Func}(\{0,1\}^{n/2}, \{0,1\}^{n/2})$ uniformly at random, we have that

$$\begin{aligned}\Pr_{F_1,F_2}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F_2\circ F_1}\right] &= \Pr_{F_2}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{F_1([N])}^{F_2}\middle|\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F_1}\right]\cdot\Pr_{F_1}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F_1}\right] \\ &= \left(\Pr_{F}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right]\right)^2. \end{aligned} \tag{105}$$

Now we have that

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{RF}\circ\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{D}_N) &= \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{RF},\mathsf{RF}\circ\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{D}_N) \\ &= \left|\Pr_{F}\left[\mathcal{D}_N^{F}() \to 1\right] - \Pr_{F_1,F_2}\left[\mathcal{D}_N^{F_2\circ F_1}() \to 1\right]\right| \\ &\geq \left|\Pr_{F}\left[\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right] - \Pr_{F_1,F_2}\left[\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F_2\circ F_1}\right]\right| - \frac{2}{30}, \end{aligned} \tag{106}$$

where we used the property that the error of $\mathcal{D}_N$ is smaller than $1/30$. In addition, from (105) it follows that

$$\begin{aligned}&\left|\Pr_{F}\left[\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right] - \Pr_{F_1,F_2}\left[\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F_2\circ F_1}\right]\right| \\ &\quad= \Pr_{F_1,F_2}\left[\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F_2\circ F_1}\right] - \Pr_{F}\left[\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right] \\ &\quad= \left(1 - \left(\Pr_{F}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right]\right)^2\right) - \left(1 - \Pr_{F}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right]\right) \\ &\quad= \Pr_{F}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right]\left(1 - \Pr_{F}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right]\right) \end{aligned} \tag{107}$$

holds. Therefore we have that

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{RF}\circ\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{D}_N) \geq \Pr_{F}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right]\left(1 - \Pr_{F}\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}_{[N]}^{F}\right]\right) - \frac{2}{30} \tag{108}$$

holds. Now we show the following claim.

Claim. There exists a parameter N_0 which is in $O(2^{n/4})$ and

$$\frac{3}{5} \geq \prod_{j=1}^{N_0-1} \left(1 - \frac{j}{2^{n/2}}\right) \geq \frac{1}{5} \tag{109}$$

holds for sufficiently large n.

Proof. First, let us denote $p_N := \prod_{j=1}^{N-1} \left(1 - \frac{j}{2^{n/2}}\right)$. For each $1 \leq N \leq 2^{n/2}$, we have that

$$\prod_{j=1}^{N-1} \left(1 - \frac{j}{2^{n/2}}\right) \geq \left(1 - \frac{N}{2^{n/2}}\right)^N = \left(\left(1 - \frac{N}{2^{n/2}}\right)^{-\frac{2^{n/2}}{N}}\right)^{-\frac{N^2}{2^{n/2}}} \tag{110}$$

holds, in addition that

$$\prod_{j=1}^{N-1} \left(1 - \frac{j}{2^{n/2}}\right) \leq \prod_{j=1}^{N-1} \left(e^{-\frac{j}{2^{n/2}}}\right) = e^{-\frac{N(N-1)}{2 \cdot 2^{n/2}}} \tag{111}$$

holds. Thus

$$e^{-\frac{N(N-1)}{2 \cdot 2^{n/2}}} \geq p_N \geq \left(\left(1 - \frac{N}{2^{n/2}}\right)^{-\frac{2^{n/2}}{N}}\right)^{-\frac{N^2}{2^{n/2}}} \tag{112}$$

holds.

Next, let us put $N_0 := 2^{n/4} \cdot \sqrt{2 \log 2}$. Then

$$e^{-\frac{N_0(N_0-1)}{2 \cdot 2^{n/2}}} = e^{-\frac{N_0 \cdot N_0}{2 \cdot 2^{n/2}}} + \left(e^{-\frac{N_0(N_0-1)}{2 \cdot 2^{n/2}}} - e^{-\frac{N_0 \cdot N_0}{2 \cdot 2^{n/2}}}\right) = \frac{1}{2} + \left(\left(\frac{1}{2}\right)^{\frac{N_0-1}{N_0}} - \frac{1}{2}\right) \tag{113}$$

holds, and thus $e^{-\frac{N_0(N_0-1)}{2 \cdot 2^{n/2}}} \leq 3/5$ holds for sufficiently large n. In addition, since the function $f(x) = (1-x)^{-1/x}$ increases as x increases for $0 < x < 1$ and $\lim_{x \to +0} f(x) = e$ holds, we have that

$$\left(1 - \frac{N_0}{2^{n/2}}\right)^{-\frac{2^{n/2}}{N_0}} \leq e + \frac{1}{10} \tag{114}$$

holds for sufficiently large n. Thus

$$\left(\left(1 - \frac{N_0}{2^{n/2}}\right)^{-\frac{2^{n/2}}{N_0}}\right)^{-\frac{N_0^2}{2^{n/2}}} \geq \left(e + \frac{1}{10}\right)^{-\frac{N_0^2}{2^{n/2}}} = \left(e + \frac{1}{10}\right)^{-2 \log 2} \geq \frac{1}{5} \tag{115}$$

holds for sufficiently large n.

Therefore, if we put $N_0 := 2^{n/4} \cdot \sqrt{2 \log 2}$,

$$\frac{3}{5} \geq p_{N_0} \geq \frac{1}{5} \tag{116}$$

holds for sufficiently large n. Hence the claim follows. □

From the above claim and (104), there exists a parameter N_0 which is in $O(2^{n/4})$, and

$$\frac{3}{5} \geq \Pr_F\left[\neg\mathsf{coll}^F_{[N_0]}\right] \geq \frac{1}{5} \tag{117}$$

holds for sufficiently large n. Hence, from (106) we have that

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{RF}\circ\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{D}_{N_0}) \geq \frac{1}{5}\left(1-\frac{3}{5}\right) - \frac{2}{30} = \frac{1}{75} \geq \Omega(1). \tag{118}$$

Therefore, if we put $\mathcal{B} := \mathcal{D}_{N_0}$, this $\mathcal{B}$ satisfies the claim of the lemma, since (118) holds and $\mathcal{D}_{N_0}$ makes at most $O((N_0)^{2/3}) = O((2^{n/4})^{2/3}) = O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries. □

Next we show the following proposition.

Proposition 8. *There exists a quantum algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ that makes $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries and satisfies $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{LR}_4}(\mathcal{A}) = \Omega(1)$.*

Proof. Suppose that we are given an oracle access to $\mathcal{O}$, which is either the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction LR_4 or a random function from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$. Recall that the function $G^{\mathcal{O}} : \{0,1\}^{n/2} \to \{0,1\}^{n/2}$ is defined by

$$G^{\mathcal{O}}(x) := \left(\mathcal{O}(0^{n/2}, x)\right)_R \oplus x, \tag{119}$$

where $\left(\mathcal{O}(0^{n/2}, x)\right)_R$ is the right half $n/2$ bits of $\mathcal{O}(0^{n/2}, x)$. We can implement a quantum circuit that computes $G^{\mathcal{O}}$ by making $O(1)$ queries. [12]

Now we define a quantum algorithm $\mathcal{A}$ as the following procedures.

1. Let $\mathcal{B}$ be the same algorithm in Lemma 6.
2. Run $\mathcal{B}$ relative to $G^{\mathcal{O}}$.
3. If $\mathcal{B}$ returns 1, output 1. If $\mathcal{B}$ returns 0, output 0.

Here we give an analysis of $\mathcal{A}$. When $\mathcal{O}$ is the 4-round Luby-Rackoff construction LR_4, we have that $G^{\mathcal{O}}(x) = f_3(f_2(x \oplus f_1(0^{n/2}))) \oplus f_1(0^{n/2})$ holds. Since we are considering the case that all round functions of LR_4 are truly random functions, the function distribution of $G^{\mathcal{O}}$ will be the same as that of $\mathsf{RF}\circ\mathsf{RF}$. On the other hand, when $\mathcal{O}$ is a random function from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$, the function distribution of $G^{\mathcal{O}}$ will be the same as that of the truly random function from $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$ to $\{0,1\}^{n/2}$. Thus, from Lemma 6 we have that

$$\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{LR}_4}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{RF}\circ\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{B}) = \Omega(1) \tag{120}$$

holds. In addition, since $\mathcal{B}$ makes at most $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries and G makes only $O(1)$ queries to $\mathcal{O}$, $\mathcal{A}$ makes at most $O(2^{n/6})$ quantum queries. Therefore the claim of the proposition holds. □

[12] Here we have to implement truncation of $\mathcal{O}$'s outputs by using a technique observed in [15].

Finally we prove Theorem 4.

Proof (of Theorem 4). Let $\mathcal{A}$ be the same algorithm as in Proposition 8. Then, from Proposition 8 it follows that

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRP}}_{\mathsf{LR}_4}(\mathcal{A}) &\geq \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{qPRF}}_{\mathsf{LR}_4}(\mathcal{A}) - \mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{RP},\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{A}) \\ &\geq \Omega(1) - O(1/2^{n/2}) = \Omega(1), \end{aligned} \tag{121}$$

where we used the fact that, for any quantum adversary $\mathcal{A}'$ that makes at most q queries, the distinguishing advantage $\mathbf{Adv}^{\mathrm{dist}}_{\mathsf{RP},\mathsf{RF}}(\mathcal{A}')$ is upper bounded by $O(q^3/2^n)$ for a random function and a random permutation from $\{0,1\}^n$ to $\{0,1\}^n$ (see Proposition 7). Thus the claim of the theorem holds. □