

Dual-Mode NIZKs from Obfuscation

Dennis Hofheinz¹, Bogdan Ursu¹

Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
{dennis.hofheinz,bogdan.ursu}@kit.edu

Abstract. Two standard security properties of a non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) scheme are soundness and zero-knowledge. But while standard NIZK systems can only provide one of those properties against unbounded adversaries, *dual-mode NIZK systems* allow to choose dynamically and adaptively which of these properties holds unconditionally. The only known dual-mode NIZK systems are Groth-Sahai proofs (which have proved extremely useful in a variety of applications), and the concurrent and independent FHE-based NIZK constructions of Canetti et al. and Peikert et al. However, all these constructions rely on specific algebraic settings.

Here, we provide a generic construction of dual-mode NIZK systems for all of NP. The public parameters of our scheme can be set up in one of two indistinguishable ways. One way provides unconditional soundness, while the other provides unconditional zero-knowledge. Our scheme relies on subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation and subexponentially secure one-way functions, but otherwise only on comparatively mild and generic computational assumptions. These generic assumptions can be instantiated under any one of the DDH, k -LIN, DCR, or QR assumptions.

As an application, we reduce the required assumptions necessary for several recent obfuscation-based constructions of multilinear maps. Combined with previous work, our scheme can be used to construct multilinear maps from obfuscation and a group in which the strong Diffie-Hellman assumption holds. We also believe that our work adds to the understanding of the construction of NIZK systems, as it provides a conceptually new way to achieve dual-mode properties.

Keywords: non-interactive zero-knowledge, dual-mode proof systems, indistinguishability obfuscation.

1 Introduction

Obfuscation and structured assumptions. Indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) is a powerful cryptographic object, and along with one-way functions, it implies almost every cryptographic primitive, from deniable encryption [42] to functional encryption [26] and fully-homomorphic encryption [18]. However, it is not currently known whether iO gives rise to structures in which algebraic assumptions hold (such as DDH, DCR, LWE etc.). In this work, we are motivated by the following open problem:

Can structured objects (such as DDH groups) be bootstrapped from unstructured objects (like generic one-way functions and iO)?

We make progress in this direction by developing the first construction of dual-mode non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof systems from unstructured assumptions (iO, one-way functions and lossy trapdoor functions). This dual-mode NIZK can be used in the constructions from [1,2,21], allowing us to answer this question in the affirmative.

Zero-knowledge proof systems. Zero-knowledge (ZK) proof systems [28,29] are (implicitly or explicitly) at the heart of countless cryptographic constructions. In a ZK proof system, a prover P tries to convince a verifier V of the validity of a statement x . “Validity” usually means that $x \in L$ for some language $L \in \text{NP}$. In this case, P obtains a witness w to $x \in L$. For security, we require *soundness*, which means that no dishonest prover can convince V of a false statement $x \notin L$. Additionally, we may want to protect P (and in particular the used witness w) in several ways. For instance, the protocol is *zero-knowledge* if it is possible to efficiently simulate (transcripts of) protocol runs even without w . Alternatively, we can require the protocol to be *witness-hiding* or *witness-indistinguishable* [23].

ZK proof systems can be interactive or non-interactive (the latter of which means that the prover sends only one message to the verifier). In this work, we are interested in non-interactive ZK (NIZK) proof systems [10]. There exist already various NIZK proof systems, ranging from generic [22,24,42] to highly efficient constructions based on concrete number-theoretic assumptions [24,32,44]. Some of these systems only allow to prove $x \in L$ for specific languages L , while others can be used to prove statements from arbitrary languages $L \in \text{NP}$.

Dual-mode proof systems. Some NIZK systems enjoy statistical security, i.e., information-theoretic soundness or zero-knowledge guarantees. However, interestingly, no NIZK system can be statistically sound *and* statistically zero-knowledge simultaneously. Hence, a NIZK system can be secure only *either* against unbounded malicious provers *or* against unbounded malicious verifiers.

Fortunately, there is a compromise that combines the best of both worlds: Groth-Sahai proofs [32] are statistically sound or statistically zero-knowledge depending on the choice of public parameters crs . Furthermore, both choices of parameters are computationally indistinguishable. This “dual-mode” property leads to comparatively simple proofs for complex protocols (e.g., for anonymous credentials [4] or payment systems [33]). In the case of [2,21], a proof without using dual-mode properties in fact does not seem obvious at all.¹

Until recently, only Groth-Sahai proofs [32] (and their variants, e.g., [9,20,35]) were known to possess this dual-mode property.² These proof systems all rely on

¹ A bit more technically, dual-mode NIZK proofs allow to use both witness extraction or simulation trapdoors in different stages of the proof, depending on the chosen mode. (This is helpful in case of [4,33] and crucial in [2,21].) Furthermore, in complex settings with mutually dependent statements and witnesses, statistical properties are easier seen to compose.

² We do not consider NIZK proofs in the random oracle model (such as [37]) here.

a very specific and structured algebraic setting (pairing-friendly cyclic groups). In contrast, we rely on generic rather than algebraic techniques, resulting in a fundamentally new way of obtaining dual-mode proof systems.

Concurrent work Concurrently and independently to this work, [19, 39] have put forward breakthrough approaches to obtain dual-mode NIZKs from the LWE assumption. These constructions rely on rich algebraic structures and are non-blackbox. In contrast, our techniques are generic and our perspective is closer to computational complexity, in that we investigate whether the existence of a powerful non-algebraic object (iO) can lead to algebraic ones.

Our contribution In this paper, we give the first generic construction of dual-mode NIZK proofs from (the combination of) the following ingredients:

- subexponentially secure indistinguishability obfuscation (iO, [3, 26]),
- subexponentially secure one-way functions,
- a (selectively) subexponentially secure functional encryption scheme,
- lossy encryption [5, 40], and
- lossy functions (LFs), a relaxation of lossy trapdoor functions [41] which we introduce in this paper.

We stress that some of our ingredients are implied by (a combination of) others: Functional encryption can be constructed from iO and one-way functions [26]. Conversely, subexponentially secure functional encryption implies subexponentially secure iO and one-way functions (e.g., [8] and the references therein). Furthermore, both LFs and lossy encryption are implied by lossy trapdoor functions [41].

As a side note, we remark that thus, a subexponential variant of any of the DDH, k -LIN, QR, DCR, or LWE assumptions, along with subexponential iO implies all of our ingredients.³

Of course, since we assume iO, our construction is far from practical. Still, it has interesting theoretical applications. For instance, it allows to instantiate dual-mode NIZK proofs in the recent works [1, 2, 21] without any additional assumptions, and in particular without pairing-friendly groups. (Incidentally, these works already assume what we need for our construction.)

In particular, combining our results with the scheme from [1], shows that it is possible to obtain a very structured object (namely, a cyclic group in which Diffie-Hellman and similar assumptions hold) solely from an unstructured and generic object (iO), and a mildly structured object (a lossy trapdoor function).⁴

³ See [11, 25, 41] for the corresponding instantiations of lossy trapdoor functions from these concrete assumptions.

⁴ Indeed, except for a dual-mode NIZK proof system, all assumptions in [1] can be instantiated from subexponentially secure iO and a subexponentially secure lossy trapdoor function. We note, however, that [1] construct a group in which elements have only a non-unique representation and no canonical form. Hence, their group might not be considered a “standard group”, but still has a rich algebraic structure.

Similarly, implementing [2, 21] with our system (instead of with Groth-Sahai proofs) yields a pairing-friendly group (with non-unique representation) from iO and a DDH group (both subexponentially secure). Therefore, we also give an answer to the following open problem:

Can bilinear groups be bootstrapped from DDH groups and iO?

Previous work	This work + [1, 2, 21]
[2] iO + Pairings + SDDH \Rightarrow Multilinear Maps	iO + SDDH \Rightarrow Multilinear Maps
[21] iO + Pairings + SDDH \Rightarrow Graded Encoding Schemes	iO + SDDH \Rightarrow Graded Encoding Schemes
[1] iO + Pairings \Rightarrow Interactively Secure Groups	iO + LTDF \Rightarrow Interactively Secure Groups

Fig. 1. Some implications on previous results. “iO”, “LTDF” and “SDDH” denote subexponential versions of indistinguishability obfuscation, lossy trapdoor functions and the “Strong Diffie-Hellman assumption” (a q -type variant of the Diffie-Hellman assumption).

Open problems. We note that the groups from [1, 2, 21] all enjoy non-unique representations of group elements. That is, equality of group elements can be tested, but there does not exist a canonical form. Removing this limitation remains an open problem.

Our techniques

Existing generic approaches. Before explaining our main ideas, we first mention that generic constructions of NIZKs from iO already exist. Namely, [42] present a NIZK construction that only assumes iO and one-way functions. Their construction is (even perfectly) zero-knowledge. However, proofs are in their case simply signatures of the corresponding statement x . Thus, their construction is inherently limited to computational soundness, in the sense that it is not clear how to tweak this construction to obtain statistical soundness.

Secondly, it is possible to construct a notion of trapdoor permutations from iO that is in turn sufficient to construct statistically sound NIZK proofs [17] (cf. [6, 7, 22, 30]). However, it is not clear how to tweak this NIZK construction to obtain statistical zero-knowledge.

The hidden bits model. Similarly to [17], our starting point is also the generic NIZK construction from [22]. This work presents a statistically sound and perfectly zero-knowledge NIZK protocol in an ideal model of computation called the “hidden bits model” (HBM).⁵ It will be helpful to first recall the HBM before going further. In a nutshell, the HBM gives the prover P access to an ideal random bitstring $\text{hrs} = (\text{hrs}_1, \dots, \text{hrs}_t) \in \{0, 1\}^t$. Next, P selects a subset $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [t]$ and a proof π . Then, the verifier V is activated with \mathcal{I}, π , the subset $(\text{hrs}_i)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$

⁵ Since their protocol is formulated in an ideal model of computation, it does not contradict our remark above about the impossibility of simultaneously achieving statistical soundness and statistical zero-knowledge. One of the two statistical properties will be lost when implementing this ideal model.

of hrs that is selected by \mathcal{I} , and of course the instance x . Finally, V is supposed to output a verdict $b \in \{0, 1\}$.

Two ways to implement the HBM. Note that the power of the HBM stems from the fact that hrs is ideally random (and cannot be tampered with by P), but only revealed in part to V . When implementing the HBM, we will necessarily have to compromise on some of these properties. However, it will be interesting to see what the consequences of such compromises are. Specifically, when implementing the HBM in the HBM-based NIZK protocol of [22], we can observe the following:

- (a) if we implement the HBM such that hrs is truly random (or selected from a small set of possible hrs values, each of which is individually truly random), then the resulting NIZK protocol is statistically sound and computationally zero-knowledge,
- (b) if we implement the HBM such that the unopened bits $(\text{hrs}_i)_{i \notin \mathcal{I}}$ are statistically hidden from V , then the resulting NIZK protocol is statistically zero-knowledge and computationally sound.

Known implementations of the HBM (e.g., [22, 30, 31]) follow (a), and thus enjoy statistical soundness guarantees. Our main strategy will be to build a dual-mode NIZK proof system by implementing the HBM in a way that allows to switch (by switching public parameters) between (a) and (b).

A first approach. Our first step will be to set up the hidden string hrs as

$$\text{hrs} = H(X) \oplus \text{crs}$$

for a value X chosen freely by P , a yet-to-be-defined function H , and a truly random “randomizing string” crs fixed in the public parameters. If H is a pseudorandom generator (that admits a suitable partial opening process, see [31] for an explicit formulation), this yields the core of existing HBM implementations. In particular, if H has a small image, then we are in case (a) above, and the resulting NIZK is statistically sound.

However, suppose we can switch (in a computationally indistinguishable way) $H(X)$ to have a large image, such that in fact $H(X) \in \{0, 1\}^t$ is close to uniformly distributed for random X . We call such a “switchable” object a lossy function (LF). An LF can be easily constructed, e.g., by universally hashing the output of a lossy trapdoor function F . For suitable choices of parameters, $H(X) := h(F(X))$ is close to uniform if F is injective (and X random), and has a small range if F does.

With $H(X)$ close to uniform, we are in case (b) above, assuming that the process itself of revealing $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$ does not reveal additional information about other bit positions. Hence, we obtain a statistically zero-knowledge NIZK protocol, and in summary even a dual-mode NIZK that can be switched between statistically sound and statistically zero-knowledge modes of operation.

Managing the opening process. The main problem with our first approach is that it is not clear how to *partially* open a subset $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$ of hrs to a verifier V . Previous HBM implementations (e.g., [22, 31]) devised elaborate ways to partially

open suitably designed pseudorandom generators (in the role of H above). We cannot use those techniques for two reasons. First, their opening process might reveal statistical information about the unopened parts of hrs . Second, these techniques require specific H functions, and do not appear to work with “switchable” functions H as we need. Hence, we use the strong ingredients mentioned above to design our own opening process.

We will use a functional encryption scheme FE . We will publicize a truly random crs , a statement Z from a language L' that is hard to decide, along with an FE public key fmpk , and a corresponding secret key sk_f for the following function f :

$$f(X, \mathcal{I}, z, T) := \begin{cases} (T, \mathcal{I}) & \text{if } z \text{ is a witness to } Z \in L' \\ (H(X)_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}) & \text{else.} \end{cases}$$

An opening consists of an encryption

$$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (X, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0))$$

that will decrypt to $f(X, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0) = H(X)_{\mathcal{I}}$ under sk_f . The verifier will receive this opening, retrieve $H(X)_{\mathcal{I}}$ with sk_f , and compute $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}} = H(X)_{\mathcal{I}} \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}}$.

Observe that this process has the following properties:

- If $Z \notin L'$, then $\text{sk}_f(C) = (H(X)_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I})$ always. Hence, if additionally H has a small range, we are in case (a) above, and the corresponding NIZK protocol is statistically sound.
- If $Z \in L'$ with witness z , then any prover who knows z can efficiently open $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$ arbitrarily, by encrypting $(0, \mathcal{I}, z, T)$ for $T = \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}} \oplus \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$ and the desired $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$. Furthermore, such openings obviously do not contain any information about potential other positions of hrs . This means we are in case (b) above, and the corresponding NIZK protocol is statistically zero-knowledge.

By using FE 's security, it is possible to show that these two types of openings are indistinguishable to a verifier. However, as formulated, they are of course not indistinguishable to a prover yet. Hence, we will additionally publicize an obfuscated algorithm PC that will get as input a statement x with witness w , and random coins r . Depending on the mode (sound or zero-knowledge), $\text{PC}(x, w, r)$ will then either encrypt $(X, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0)$ or $(0, \mathcal{I}, z, T)$, for pseudorandom X and T derived from r .

A taste of the security proof. For security, we will show that the public parameters in both modes are computationally indistinguishable. The security proof is somewhat technical, and we would like to highlight only one interesting theme here. Namely, observe that the prover algorithm PC is inherently probabilistic. In the proof, we need to modify PC 's behavior, and in particular decouple its output distribution from its input w . Specifically, when aiming at statistical soundness, the output of PC will encrypt, and thus depend on w . But when trying to achieve zero-knowledge, PC 's output should not reveal (in a statistical sense) which witness w has been used.⁶

⁶ Formally, to achieve zero-knowledge, we must achieve witness-indistinguishability.

This decoupling process is particularly cumbersome to go through because PC itself is public and can be run on arbitrary inputs. Any change that essentially makes PC ignore its w input will be easily detectable. Hence, we add an indirection that helps to remove dependencies on w . Specifically, we let PC first compute $a = \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w); r)$ using a lossy encryption scheme LE. If the corresponding public key lpk is injective (i.e., leads to decryptable ciphertexts), then a determines w . Hence, any case distinction (or hybrid argument) we make for different values of w can alternatively be made for different values of a . On the other hand, if lpk is lossy, then a will be statistically independent of the plaintext (x, w) .

Hence, a can be used as a single value that (a) can serve as a “fingerprint” of (or in some sense even as a substitute for) w in the proof, but (b) can be easily made independent of w by switching lpk into lossy mode. Equipped with this gadget, we will structure the proof as a large hybrid argument over all values of a (encrypted at this point with an injective lpk). In each step, we modify PC’s behavior for one particular value of (x, w) , and change the corresponding FE ciphertext C from an encryption of $(X, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0)$ to $(0, \mathcal{I}, z, T)$ for a pseudorandom value T derived from a .

Roadmap. After recalling some preliminaries in Sec. 2, we present our proof system in Sec. 3, followed by its analysis in Sec. 4. The appendix contains a schematic overview over our main proof (App. A), a proof of a technical lemma (App. B), a recap of the HBM-based NIZK from [22] (App. C), and an analysis of the (statistical) extractability of our scheme (App. D).

2 Preliminaries

Notation. Throughout this paper, λ denotes the security parameter. For a natural number $n \in \mathbb{N}$, $[n]$ denotes the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$. A probabilistic polynomial time algorithm (PPT, also denoted *efficient* algorithm) runs in time polynomial in the (implicit) security parameter λ . A positive function f is *negligible* if for any polynomial p there exists a bound $B > 0$ such that, for any integer $k \geq B$, $f(k) \leq 1/|p(k)|$. An event depending on λ occurs with *overwhelming probability* when its probability is at least $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ for a negligible function negl . Given a finite set S , the notation $x \leftarrow_{\text{R}} S$ means a uniformly random assignment of an element of S to the variable x . If A is a probabilistic algorithm, $y \leftarrow_{\text{R}} A(\cdot)$ denotes the process of running A on some appropriate input and assigning its output to y . The notation $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}}$ indicates that the algorithm \mathcal{A} is given oracle access to \mathcal{O} . We denote $a \leftarrow A; b \leftarrow B(a); \dots$ for running the experiment where a is chosen from A , after which b is chosen from B , which might depend on a and so on. This determines a probability distribution over the outputs and we write $\Pr[a \leftarrow A; b \leftarrow B(a); \dots : C(a, b, \dots)]$ for the probability of the condition $C(a, b, \dots)$ being satisfied after running the experiment. For two distributions D_1, D_2 , we denote by $\Delta(D_1, D_2)$ the statistical distance. We also write $D_1 \equiv D_2$ when the distributions are identical, $D_1 \approx_{\text{c}} D_2$ when the distributions are computationally indistinguishable and $D_1 \approx_{\epsilon} D_2$ when $\Delta(D_1, D_2) \leq \epsilon$.

2.1 Puncturable Pseudorandom Function

A pseudorandom function (PRF) originally introduced in [27], is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\text{PRF} = (\text{PRF.KeyGen}, \text{PRF.Eval})$. Let \mathcal{K} denote the key space, \mathcal{X} denote the domain, and \mathcal{Y} denote the range. The key generation algorithm PRF.KeyGen on input of 1^λ , outputs a random key from \mathcal{K} and the evaluation algorithm PRF.Eval on input of a key K and $x \in \mathcal{X}$, evaluates the function $F: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{X} \mapsto \mathcal{Y}$. The core property of PRFs is that, on a random choice of key K , no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary should be able to distinguish $F(K, \cdot)$ from a truly random function, when given black-box access to it. Puncturable PRFs (pPRFs) have the additional property that some keys can be generated *punctured* at some point, so that they allow to evaluate the PRF at all points except for the punctured point. As observed in [13, 14, 36], it is possible to construct such punctured keys for the original construction from [27], which can be based on any one-way functions [34].

Definition 1 (Puncturable Pseudorandom Function [13, 14, 36]). A puncturable pseudorandom function (pPRF) is with punctured key space \mathcal{K}_p is a triple of PPT algorithms $(\text{PRF.KeyGen}, \text{PRF.Puncture}, \text{PRF.Eval})$ such that:

- $\text{PRF.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ outputs a random key $K \in \mathcal{K}$,
- $\text{PRF.Puncture}(K, x)$, on input $K \in \mathcal{K}$, $x \in \mathcal{X}$, outputs a punctured key $K\{x\} \in \mathcal{K}_p$,
- $\text{PRF.Eval}(K', x')$, on input a key K' (punctured or not), and a point x' , outputs an evaluation of the PRF.

We require PRF to meet the following conditions:

Functionality preserved under puncturing. For all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all $x \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[K \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRF.KeyGen}(1^\lambda), K\{x\} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRF.Puncture}(K, x): \\ & \quad \forall x' \in \mathcal{X} \setminus \{x\}: \text{PRF.Eval}(K, x') = \text{PRF.Eval}(K\{x\}, x')] = 1. \end{aligned}$$

Pseudorandom at punctured points. For every stateful PPT adversary \mathcal{A} and every security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, the advantage of \mathcal{A} in Exp-s-pPRF (described in Figure 2) is negligible, namely:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{s-cPRF}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) := |\Pr[\text{Exp-s-pPRF}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Sub-exponential security We say that PRF is sub-exponentially secure when it satisfies Definition 1 and in addition it satisfies: for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , the advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{s-cPRF}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) \leq \frac{1}{2^{\lambda^\epsilon}}$, for some positive constant $0 < \epsilon < 1$.

Definition 1 corresponds to a selective security notion for puncturable pseudorandom functions; adaptive security could be considered, but will not be required in our work. For ease of notation we often write $F(\cdot, \cdot)$ instead of $\text{PRF.Eval}(\cdot, \cdot)$.

Experiment $\text{Exp-s-pPRF}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A})$
Experiment $\text{Exp-s-pPRF}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$
$x^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda), b \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\},$
$K \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{PRF.KeyGen}(1^\lambda),$
$K\{x^*\} \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{PRF.Puncture}(K, x^*),$
$y_0 \leftarrow \text{PRF.Eval}(K, x^*), y_1 \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{Y}$
$b' \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{A}(K\{x^*\}, y_b)$
Return $b = b'$

Fig. 2. Experiment $\text{Exp-s-pPRF}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ for the pseudo-randomness at punctured points.

2.2 Lossy functions

We generalize the notion of LTDF (lossy trapdoor function) due to [41] and introduce lossy functions. LTDFs (Lossy trapdoor functions) can be sampled in two indistinguishable modes: an injective and a lossy mode. When sampling injective functions, the setup also provides a trapdoor which can be used to invert the function. Unlike LTDFs, for lossy functions we require that functions can be sampled in two modes, but in which one mode is “more lossy” than the other. Thus, instead of an injective and a lossy mode, we have a “less lossy” and a “more lossy” mode, which we denote as “dense” and “lossy” modes. Since we do not necessarily have injectivity in the dense setting, we also do not have trapdoors as in LTDFs.

Definition 2 (Lossy Functions). *A tuple $\text{LF} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Eval})$ of PPT algorithms is a family of (n, k, m, i) -lossy functions if the following properties hold:*

- *Sampling functions: Both $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})$ of dense functions and $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$ of lossy functions output a function index s . We require that $\text{Eval}(s, \cdot)$ is a deterministic function on $\{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ in both cases. In the following, we use the shorthand notation $s(\cdot) := \text{Eval}(s, \cdot)$.*
- *Dense functions have images statistically close to uniformly random: for all $s \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{LF}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})$, we have that:*

$$\Delta((s(U_n), s), (U_m, s)) \leq \frac{1}{2^i}.$$

- *Lossy functions have small image size: The image size of lossy functions is bounded by 2^k . In particular, for all $s \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$,*

$$|\{\text{Eval}(s, x) : x \in \{0, 1\}^n\}| \leq 2^k.$$

- *Indistinguishability: The outputs of $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$ and $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})$ are computationally indistinguishable, i.e. $\{\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})\} \approx_c \{\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})\}$*

We can generalise Definition 2 even further. Instead of asking that in dense mode the evaluation of the function is statistically close to a uniformly random, we may instead define the dense mode as having $H_\infty(\text{Eval}(s, U_n)) \geq m + 2 \log(\frac{1}{\epsilon})$. Then, by the leftover hash lemma, we can combine LF with a 2-universal hash function to ensure that the output is statistically close to uniformly random as in Definition 2. For clarity, we do not use this generalization in our proofs.

Concrete instantiations: The lossy trapdoor functions from [41] are also lossy functions in the sense of Definition 2. Moreover, composed with 2-universal hash functions, they satisfy the necessary parameters in our construction (see Section 3). This would yield suitable lossy functions based on DDH and LWE.

2.3 Lossy Encryption

Definition 3. [5, 40]: A lossy public-key encryption scheme is a tuple $\text{LE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ of polynomial-time algorithms such that

- $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{inj})$ outputs keys (pk, sk) , keys generated by $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{inj})$ are called injective keys.
- $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$ outputs keys $(\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, \perp)$, keys generated by $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$ are called lossy keys.
- $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, \cdot, \cdot) : M \times R \rightarrow C$.

Additionally, the algorithms must satisfy the following properties:

1. Correctness on injective keys. For all plaintexts $x \in X$,

$$\Pr[(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{inj}); r \leftarrow R : \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, x, r)) = x] = 1.$$

2. Indistinguishability of keys. Public keys pk are computationally indistinguishable in lossy and injective modes. Specifically, if $\text{proj} : (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \rightarrow \text{pk}$ is the projection map, then:

$$\{\text{proj}(\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{inj}))\} \approx_{\text{C}} \{\text{proj}(\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy}))\}.$$

3. Lossiness of lossy keys. For all $(\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, \perp) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$, and all $x_0, x_1 \in M$, the two distributions $\{r \leftarrow_{\text{R}} R : (\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, x_0, r))\}$ and $\{r \leftarrow_{\text{R}} R : (\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, x_1, r))\}$ are statistically close, i.e. the statistical distance is negligible in λ .

We define a lossy encryption scheme LE to be μ -lossy if for all $(\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, \perp) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$ and for all x_0, x_1 , we have that:

$$\{r \leftarrow_{\text{R}} R : (\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, x_0, r))\} \approx_{\mu} \{r \leftarrow_{\text{R}} R : (\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_{\text{lossy}}, x_1, r))\}$$

2.4 Functional Encryption

Definition 4. [12, 38, 43] A functional encryption scheme for a class of functions $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}(1^\lambda)$ over message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathcal{M}_\lambda$ consists of four polynomial time algorithms $\text{FE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$:

1. $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ – on input the security parameter λ outputs master public key mpk and master secret key msk .
2. $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f)$ – on input the master secret key msk and a description of function $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and outputs a corresponding secret key sk_f .
3. $\text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, x)$ – on input the master public key mpk and a string x , outputs a ciphertext ct .

4. $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_f, \text{ct})$ – on inputs the secret key sk_f and a ciphertext encrypting message $m \in M$, outputs $f(m)$.

A functional encryption scheme is perfectly correct for \mathcal{F} if for all $f \in \mathcal{F}$ and all messages $m \in M$:

$$\Pr[(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) : \text{Dec}(\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, f), \text{Enc}(\text{mpk}, m)) = f(m)] = 1$$

Definition 5 (Selectively Indistinguishable Security). A functional encryption scheme FE is selectively indistinguishable secure (SEL-IND-FE-CPA) if for all stateful PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , the advantage of \mathcal{A} in the experiment Exp-s-IND-FE-CPA described in Figure 3 is negligible, namely:

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Exp-s-IND-FE-CPA}}^{\text{FE}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) := \left| \Pr[\text{Exp-s-IND-FE-CPA}^{\text{FE}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - \frac{1}{2} \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

<p style="text-align: center;">Experiment $\text{Exp-s-IND-FE-CPA}^{\text{FE}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A})$</p> <p>$(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda);$ $(\text{mpk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ $b \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}$ $\text{ct} \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{FE.Enc}(\text{mpk}, m_b)$ $b' \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \mathcal{A}^{\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)}(\text{mpk}, \text{ct})$ Return $b = b'$</p>

Fig. 3. Experiment Exp-s-IND-FE-CPA for the selective indistinguishable security of FE. The queries of \mathcal{A} to oracle $\text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, \cdot)$ are restricted to functions f such that $f(m_0) = f(m_1)$.

Definition 6 (Sub-exponential Selectively Indistinguishability Security).

A functional encryption scheme FE is sub-exponentially selectively indistinguishability secure if it satisfies Definition 5 and in addition: for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} :

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Exp-s-IND-FE-CPA}}^{\text{FE}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) \leq \frac{1}{2^{\lambda^\epsilon}}, \text{ for some positive constant } 0 < \epsilon < 1.$$

2.5 Indistinguishability Obfuscation

Definition 7 ([3, 26] Indistinguishability Obfuscator). A uniform PPT machine iO is called an indistinguishability obfuscator for a circuit class \mathcal{C}_λ if the following conditions are satisfied:

- For all security parameters $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, for all inputs x , we have:

$$\Pr[C'(x) = C(x) : C' \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{iO}(\lambda, C)] = 1$$

- For any (not necessarily uniform) PPT distinguisher \mathcal{A} , for all security parameters $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all pairs of circuits $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, we have that if $C_0(x) = C_1(x)$ for all inputs x , then:

$$\text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) := \left| \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{iO}(\lambda, C_0)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\text{iO}(\lambda, C_1)) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Sub-exponential security We say that iO is sub-exponentially secure when it satisfies Definition 7 and also it satisfies that: for every (not necessary uniform) PPT distinguisher \mathcal{A} , the advantage $\text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A})$ is bounded by $\frac{1}{2^{\lambda^\epsilon}}$, for some positive constant $0 < \epsilon < 1$.

2.6 Dual-Mode NIWI Proof Systems

A dual-mode non-interactive witness indistinguishable (DM-NIWI) proof system [32] is a special type of non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) proof system, in which the common reference string (CRS) generation is dual-mode. The dual-mode property means that these systems have common reference string algorithms which generate indistinguishable CRS in “binding” or “hiding” modes. The system satisfies statistical soundness and extractability in binding mode and statistical witness indistinguishability in hiding mode.

Definition 8. *A binary relation R is polynomially bounded if it is decidable in polynomial time and there is a polynomial p such that $|w| \leq p(|x|)$, for all $(x, w) \in R$. For any such relation and any x we set $L_R = \{x \mid \exists w \text{ s.t. } (x, w) \in R\}$.*

Definition 9 ([32] Dual-mode non-interactive witness indistinguishable proof systems). *Let R be a polynomially-bounded binary relation R . A dual-mode non-interactive witness indistinguishable (DM-NIWI) proof system for language $\mathcal{L}_R \in \text{NP}$ is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\text{DM-NIWI} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify}, \text{Extract})$.*

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding})$ on input the security parameter, outputs a common reference string crs which we call binding. It also outputs the corresponding extraction trapdoor td_{ext} .

$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{hiding})$ on input the security parameter, outputs a common reference string crs , which we call a hiding crs .

$\text{Prove}(\text{crs}, x, w)$, on input crs , a statement x and a witness w , outputs a proof π .

$\text{Verify}(\text{crs}, x, \pi)$, on input crs , a statement x and a proof π , outputs either 1 or 0.

$\text{Extract}(\text{td}_{\text{ext}}, x, \pi)$ on input the extraction trapdoor td_{ext} , a statement x and a proof π , it outputs a witness w .

We require the DM-NIWI to meet the following properties:

CRS indistinguishability. *Common reference strings generated via $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding})$ and $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{hiding})$ are computationally indistinguishable. More formally, for all non-uniform PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , the advantage of \mathcal{A} in the experiment Exp-CRS-IND described in Figure 4 is negligible, namely:*

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{Exp-CRS-IND}}^{\text{DM-NIWI}}(\lambda, \mathcal{A}) := \left| \Pr[\text{Exp-CRS-IND}_0^{\text{DM-NIWI}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp-CRS-IND}_1^{\text{DM-NIWI}}(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1] \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

Experiment Exp-CRS-IND _b ^{DM-NIWI} (1 ^λ , \mathcal{A}) if $b = 0$ then $(\text{crs}, \text{td}_{\text{ext}}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding})$ else $(\text{crs}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{hiding})$ $b' \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \mathcal{A}(\text{crs})$ Return $b = b'$

Fig. 4. Experiment Exp-CRS-IND_b^{DM-NIWI} for CRS indistinguishability.

Perfect completeness in both modes. For every $(x, w) \in R$, we have that:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding}), \\ \pi \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, x, w) \end{array} : \text{Verify}(\text{crs}, x, \pi) = 1 \right] = 1.$$

The same holds when instead of $\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding})$, we have $\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{hiding})$.

Statistical soundness in binding mode. The system is statistically sound if for every (possibly unbounded) adversary \mathcal{A} , we have that

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{crs}, \text{td}_{\text{ext}}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding}), \\ (x, \pi) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \mathcal{A}(\text{crs}) \end{array} : \text{Verify}(\text{crs}, x, \pi) = 1 \wedge x \notin \mathcal{L}_R \right] = \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Statistical extractability in binding mode For any (x, π) , it holds that:

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{crs}, \text{td}_{\text{ext}}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding}), \\ w \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Extract}(\text{crs}, \text{td}_{\text{ext}}, x, \pi) \end{array} : \left(\text{Verify}(\text{crs}, x, \pi) = 1 \right) \implies (x, w) \in R \right] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Note: In binding mode, statistical extractability implies statistical soundness.

Statistical witness-indistinguishability in hiding mode We say that the DM-NIWI system is statistically witness-indistinguishable if for every x, w_0, w_1 with both $(x, w_0) \in R$ and $(x, w_1) \in R$, proofs of x with witness w_0 are indistinguishable from proofs of x with witness w_1 . More formally, for every interactive (potentially unbounded) adversary \mathcal{A} :

$$\left| \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{hiding}), \\ (x, w_0, w_1) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \mathcal{A}(\text{crs}), \\ b \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}, \\ \pi \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{Prove}(\text{crs}, x, w_b) \end{array} : \mathcal{A}(\text{crs}, \pi) = b \right] - \frac{1}{2} \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where \mathcal{A} is restricted to choosing (x, w_0, w_1) , such that both $(x, w_0) \in R$ and $(x, w_1) \in R$.

Remark. Like with the original presentation of Groth and Sahai [32], we focus our presentation on *witness-indistinguishable* (and not zero-knowledge) proof systems. Unlike zero-knowledge, witness-indistinguishability has useful compositional properties (see [23]). If zero-knowledge is desired, however, a simple transformation is possible: instead of proving $x \in L$, prove $x \in L \vee \hat{x} \in \hat{L}$ with

our system, where \hat{L} is any fixed hard-to-decide language, and \hat{x} is a fixed instance determined in crs . In binding mode, set up $\hat{x} \notin \hat{L}$, so that $x \in L \vee \hat{x} \in \hat{L}$ implies $x \in L$. In hiding mode, set up $\hat{x} \in \hat{L}$, in which case a witness to this fact can be used as a simulation trapdoor to efficiently simulated proofs that achieve statistical zero-knowledge.

2.7 Hidden Bits Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge

In our construction, we rely on a NIZK protocol in the hidden bits model. The hidden-bits model was introduced by [22] and is an idealized setting in which the bits of the common reference string are hidden from the verifier (but not from the prover). We call this the hidden reference string hrs .

When the prover computes a proof, it can choose which bits of hrs to reveal to the verifier. Denote the revealed bit set by \mathcal{I} , then by $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$ we will refer to the corresponding revealed bits of the hrs . Our construction can be based on the hidden-bits NIZK from [22], which proves graph Hamiltonicity and therefore covers any NP statement. Nevertheless, our construction is generic enough to be based on any hidden-bits NIZK with statistical soundness and perfect zero-knowledge (if we only had statistical ZK then we will only get statistical correctness of DM-NIWI). The hidden-bits NIZK from [22] satisfies both statistical soundness and perfect ZK and we briefly recap it in Appendix C.

Definition 10. [22] *A pair of PPT algorithms $\text{NIZK}_H = (\text{P}_H, \text{V}_H)$ is a NIZK proof system in the hidden-bits model if it satisfies the following properties:*

1. *Completeness: there exists a polynomial r denoting the length of the hidden random string, such that for every $(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}$ we have that:*

$$\Pr_{\text{P}_H, \text{hrs} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{t(|x|, \lambda)}} [(\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs}) : \text{V}_H(x, \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}, \pi) = 1] = 1$$

where $\mathcal{I} \subseteq [t(|x|, \lambda)]$ and $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}} = \{\text{hrs}[i] : i \in \mathcal{I}\}$.

2. *Statistical Soundness: for every $x \notin \mathcal{L}$ we have that:*

$$\Pr_{\text{hrs} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{t(|x|, \lambda)}} [\exists \pi, \mathcal{I} : \text{V}_H(x, \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}, \pi) = 1] < \frac{1}{2^{\lambda + |x|}}.$$

3. *Perfect Zero-Knowledge: there exists a PPT algorithm S_H such that:*

$$\begin{aligned} D_0 &:= \{(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \pi, \mathcal{I}) : \text{hrs} \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{t(|x|, \lambda)}, (\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs})\}_{(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}} \equiv \\ &\equiv \{\text{S}_H(x)\}_{(x, w) \in \mathcal{R}} =: D_1 \end{aligned}$$

For ease of notation, we denote by $\Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda) := \Delta(D_0, D_1)$ the statistical distance between distributions D_0 and D_1 . In the case of perfect ZK, $\Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda) := \Delta(D_0, D_1) = 0$.

3 Construction

In Figure 5, we describe our DM-NIWI candidate. Our scheme uses a hidden-bits NIZK proof system $\text{NIZK}_H = (\text{P}_H, \text{V}_H)$ as a building block. To distinguish common reference strings and proofs between the two proof systems, we denote by

lowercase (π, hrs) the proofs and hidden reference strings for NIZK_H . In contrast, the common reference string and proofs of DM-NIWI are denoted as CRS and II , respectively.

The CRS of DM-NIWI contains the public key lpk of a lossy encryption scheme LE , a lossy function H , uniformly random Z and crs , a functional decryption function sk_f and an obfuscated program PC . Prover program $\text{PC}(x, w, r)$ first encrypts (x, w) using randomness r to obtain $a = \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w); r)$. Then it computes either a `HidingProof` or a `BindingProof` depending on the mode and outputs as proof a FE ciphertext C and a hidden-bits proof π . The verifier decrypts C using sk_f and then uses the hidden-bits verifier to check proof π .

Notation and parameters For security parameter λ , we denote by $p(|x| + \lambda)$ the ciphertext size of LE . By $p_2(|x|, \lambda)$, we denote the size of the randomness needed to compute FE ciphertexts, while $p_3(|x|, \lambda)$ denotes the size of the random tape needed by the hidden-bits simulator S_H . Recall that $t(|x|, \lambda)$ is the polynomial from Definition 10. Then LF must be a $(p_1(|x|, \lambda), \lambda, t(|x|, 2\lambda + |x|), p(|x| + \lambda) + \lambda)$ -lossy function. Consider the subexponential security level of iO , FE and PRF to be $\frac{1}{2^{\kappa^\epsilon}}$, for some constant $0 < \epsilon < 1$. Then κ must be chosen as $(p(|x| + \lambda) + \lambda)^{(1/\epsilon)}$.

4 Security Proof

Theorem 11. *Let PRF be a subexponentially-secure puncturable pseudo-random function, iO be a subexponentially-secure obfuscator, PRG a secure pseudo-random generator, LE a secure lossy encryption scheme and FE a subexponentially-secure selectively-IND-CPA functional encryption scheme, then the scheme $\text{DM-NIWI} = (\text{DM-NIWI.Setup}, \text{DM-NIWI.Prover}, \text{DM-NIWI.Verifier})$ described in Figure 5 is a secure dual-mode non-interactive witness-indistinguishable system.*

4.1 Completeness

Lemma 12. *The DM-NIWI system in Figure 5 is perfectly complete.*

Proof. Completeness follows from the completeness of the hidden-bits NIZK_H , the perfect ZK of NIZK_H , the perfect correctness of FE and the functionality of iO (the fact that for all programs C , we have that $\text{iO}(C)$ is functionally equivalent to C). Consider any $(x, w) \in R$ and $(C, \pi) = \text{DM-NIWI.Prover}(\text{CRS}, x, w, r)$. We want to show that $\text{DM-NIWI.Verifier}(C, \pi, \text{CRS}) = 1$ with probability 1.

Case 1: $\text{CRS} \leftarrow_{\mathbf{r}} \text{DM-NIWI.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding})$ Since (C, II) is a proof computed by the honest prover, we know that $(\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$, where hrs is derived from a , the lossy encryption of (x, w) . From the perfect correctness of FE, we have that indeed $(T \oplus \text{crs})_{\mathcal{I}} = \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$. Therefore, from the perfect correctness of NIZK_H , it follows that $\text{V}_H(\mathcal{I}, (T \oplus \text{crs})_{\mathcal{I}}, x, \pi)$ accepts with probability 1.

Case 2: $\text{CRS} \leftarrow_{\mathbf{r}} \text{DM-NIWI.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{hiding})$ Since (C, II) is a proof computed by the honest prover, we know that $(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{S}_H(x; r_3)$, where r_3 is

<p><u>Setup($1^\lambda, \text{mode}$)</u> $\text{PRG} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRG.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ if mode = binding then $\text{H} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LF.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$ else $\text{H} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LF.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})$ $(\text{lpk}, \text{lsk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LE.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$ $K_1, K_2, K_3 \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRF.KeyGen}(1^\kappa)$ $(\text{fmpk}, \text{fmsk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{FE.Setup}(1^\kappa)$ $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{fmsk}, f)$ $\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{\ell(x , 2\lambda + x)}$ $z \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ if mode = binding then $Z \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda + x }$ else $Z \leftarrow \text{PRG}(z)$ $\text{PC} = \text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{\text{mode}, \text{crs}})$ $\text{CRS} := (\text{H}, \text{fmpk}, \text{lpk}, \text{sk}_f, \text{crs}, Z, \text{PC})$ if mode = binding then Return (CRS, $\text{td}_{\text{ext}} := \text{fmsk}$) Return CRS</p> <p><u>Prover(PC, x, w, r)</u> Return $\Pi := \text{PC}(x, w, r)$</p> <p><u>Verifier(CRS, $x, \Pi := (C, \pi)$)</u> $(T, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{FE.Dec}(\text{sk}_f, C)$ $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}} \leftarrow T \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}}$ return $\text{V}_H(x, \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}, \pi)$</p>	<p><u>ProgProv$_{\text{mode}, \text{crs}}(x, w, r)$</u> Hardcoded: Keys K_1, K_2, K_3, z if $(x, w) \notin R$ Return \perp $a \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w); r)$ if mode = binding then $(C, \pi) = \text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ else $(C, \pi) = \text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, a)$ Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p> <p><u>BindingProof$_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$</u> Hardcoded : Keys K_1, K_2 $X \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_1, a)$ $\text{hrs} \leftarrow \text{H}(X) \oplus \text{crs}$ $(\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$ $r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$ $C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (X, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2)$ Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p> <p><u>HidingProof$_{\text{crs}}(x, a)$</u> Hardcoded : Keys K_2, K_3 $r_3 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_3, a)$ $(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{S}_H(x; r_3)$ $T \leftarrow \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}} \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}}$ $r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$ $C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}, z, T); r_2)$ Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p> <p><u>$f(C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (X, \mathcal{I}, z, T)))$</u> Hardcoded : Parameters Z, H if $\text{PRG}(z) = Z$ then return (T, \mathcal{I}). else return $(\text{H}(X)_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I})$</p>
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------	------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Fig. 5. Dual-mode NIWI scheme $\text{DM-NIWI} = (\text{Setup}, \text{Prover}, \text{Verifier})$. LF is a class of lossy functions, PRG.Setup outputs pseudo-random generators from $\{0, 1\}^\lambda$ to $\{0, 1\}^{2\lambda + |x|}$, FE is a functional encryption scheme, LE is a lossy encryption scheme, iO is an indistinguishability obfuscator and (P_H, V_H) is the hidden-bits model NIZK from [22]. Parameter κ is chosen so that the sub-exponential security level is sufficient.

the random tape used by the hidden-bits simulator S_H . By the perfect correctness of FE, decrypting C yields indeed $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}} \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}}$, therefore we can recover $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$. Now, since NIZK_H has perfect zero-knowledge, it follows that $\text{V}_H(\mathcal{I}, (T \oplus \text{crs})_{\mathcal{I}}, x, \pi)$ accepts with probability 1 (or otherwise simulated proofs would not be identically distributed to real ones).

4.2 Soundness

Theorem 13. *When in binding mode, the DM-NIWI system in Figure 5 is statistically sound.*

Proof. Here we use the soundness of the hidden-bits scheme, coupled with the lossiness of function H .

Since crs is uniformly random, computing $\text{hrs} := H(\text{PRF}(K_1, a)) \oplus \text{crs}$ will yield another uniformly random string and will allow us to use the soundness of the hidden-bits system. Moreover, we leverage the lossiness of H to ensure that an adversary cannot influence the hrs sufficiently enough as to be able to cheat. This is because the honest verifier applies H automatically when it functionally decrypts ciphertext C .

More formally, fix some $x \in \{0, 1\}^n \setminus \mathcal{L}$. We prove that with overwhelming probability over the common reference string, there is no proof Π which will be accepted by the verifier. This is a selective notion which we later amplify to obtain the security notion from Definition 9.

We want to bound $\Pr_{(\text{CRS}, \text{td}_{\text{ext}}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding})} [\exists \Pi : \text{Verifier}(\Pi, \text{CRS}) = 1]$. We can rewrite this probability as:

$$\Pr_{\substack{Z \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda+|x|} \\ \text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{t(|x|, 2\lambda+|x|)} \\ H, \text{PC}, \text{fmpk}, \text{fmsk}, \text{sk}_f}} [\exists(\pi, C) : \text{Verifier}((\pi, C), (H, \text{fmpk}, \text{lpk}, \text{sk}_f, \text{crs}, Z, \text{PC})) = 1]$$

Now, we condition on the event E that Z does not have a PRG preimage, which happens with probability $1 - \frac{1}{2^{\lambda+|x|}}$. If Z has no preimage, then from the functionality of iO and the correctness of the FE scheme, the adversary must produce a ciphertext of the form $C = \text{FE.Enc}(X, \mathcal{I}, \cdot, \cdot)$. Note that both the functional equivalence of iO and the correctness of the functional encryption scheme are statistical properties. Therefore, the probability above is less or equal than:

$$\Pr_{\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{t(|x|, 2\lambda+|x|)}} [\exists(\pi, X, \mathcal{I}) : \mathbf{V}_H(x, (\text{crs} \oplus H(X))_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}, \pi) = 1]$$

The next step is to bound the number of possible values of hrs . Recall that $\text{hrs} := H(\text{PRF}(K_1, a)) \oplus \text{crs}$. From the lossiness of H , we know that there are at most 2^k images of H , where k is the second parameter of H (see Definition 2). Thus, we can compute an union bound over all these images $H(X)$, bounding the above probability by:

$$2^k \times \Pr_{\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{t(|x|, 2\lambda+|x|)}} [\exists(\pi, \mathcal{I}) : \mathbf{V}_H(x, (\text{crs} \oplus H(X))_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}, \pi) = 1]$$

Now, recall that we denote $\text{crs} \oplus H(X)$ as hrs . Since crs is uniformly randomly distributed, so is hrs , and we can rewrite the probability above as:

$$2^k \times \Pr_{\text{hrs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{t(|x|, 2\lambda+|x|)}} [\exists(\pi, \mathcal{I}) : \mathbf{V}_H(x, \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}, \pi) = 1]$$

Finally, by using the soundness of the hidden-bits NIZK, we know that:

$$\Pr_{\text{hrs} \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^{t(|x|, 2\lambda + |x|)}} [\exists(\pi, \mathcal{I}) : \mathbb{V}_H(x, \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \mathcal{I}, \pi) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2^{2\lambda + |x|}}$$

Therefore, we can conclude that:

$$\Pr_{(\text{CRS}, \text{td}_{\text{ext}}) \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding})} [\exists \Pi : \text{Verifier}(\Pi, \text{CRS}) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2^{2\lambda + |x| - k}}.$$

The only remaining step is to amplify the security from the selective variant we have just proven to the adaptive one from Definition 9. We eliminate the restriction that x is fixed by computing a union bound over all possible values of x . In particular, for H parameter $k = \lambda$, we conclude that for every unbounded adversary \mathcal{A} :

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{CRS}, \text{td}_{\text{ext}}) \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding}), \\ (x, \Pi) \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \mathcal{A}(\text{CRS}) \end{array} : \text{Verifier}(\text{CRS}, x, \Pi) = 1 \wedge x \notin \mathcal{L}_R \right] = \frac{1}{2^\lambda}.$$

As a last check, we must ensure that event $\neg E$ still happens with negligible probability. If we compute the same union bound as above, the probability of $\neg E$ is now bounded by $\frac{1}{2^\lambda}$. Therefore, the system is statistically sound.

4.3 Witness Indistinguishability

Theorem 14. *In hiding mode, the DM-NIWI system from Figure 5 is statistically witness-indistinguishable.*

Proof. By using the statistical lossiness of LE, we show that no (potentially unbounded) adversary \mathcal{A} can break the witness-indistinguishability of DM-NIWI. Recall that the lossiness of LE implies that for all $(\text{lpk}, \perp) \leftarrow \text{LE.Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$, and for all x, w_0, w_1 , encryptions of (x, w_0) are statistically indistinguishable from encryptions of (x, w_1) . More formally:

$$\begin{aligned} D_0 &:= \{r \leftarrow R : (\text{lpk}, \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w_0), r))\} \approx_{\frac{1}{2^\lambda}} \\ &\approx_{\frac{1}{2^\lambda}} \{r \leftarrow R : (\text{lpk}, \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w_1), r))\} =: D_1. \end{aligned}$$

The goal is to show that for every hiding CRS and for every (x, w_0, w_1) , with both $(x, w_0) \in R$ and $(x, w_1) \in R$, proofs for (x, w_0) are statistically indistinguishable from proofs for (x, w_1) . Fix (x, w_0, w_1) and let D'_b be the following distribution:

$$D'_b := \{\text{CRS} \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \text{DM-NIWI.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{hiding}) : \pi \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \text{DM-NIWI.Prove}(\text{CRS}, x, w_b)\} \quad (1)$$

We want to prove that we have that $D'_0 \approx_{\frac{1}{2^\lambda}} D'_1$. To achieve this, we exhibit a probabilistic function F which on input D_b outputs D'_b , i.e. $F(D_b) = D'_b$, without needing to know bit b . If such an F exists, then $D_0 \approx_{\frac{1}{2^\lambda}} D_1$ implies that $F(D_0) \approx_{\frac{1}{2^\lambda}} F(D_1)$. Function F works as follows:

1. F obtains public key lpk from D_b . Then F essentially computes DM-NIWI. $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ and chooses all the parameters itself, except for lpk which comes from D_b .
 In more detail, F chooses the PRG, a dense function H , keys K_1, K_2, K_3 , master keys $(\text{fmpk}, \text{fmsk})$ and functional key sk_f just as in $\text{DM-NIWI.Setup}(1^\lambda)$. It also draws uniformly random strings z and crs . It then sets $Z = \text{PRG}(z)$ and uses all these parameters to construct program $\text{ProgProv}_{\text{hiding}, \text{crs}}$, which it obfuscates obtaining PC .
2. For hiding CRS, we have that PC obfuscates $\text{ProgProv}_{\text{hiding}, \text{crs}}$. Therefore, F can compute the output of $\text{DM-NIWI.Prove}(\text{CRS}, x, w_b)$ even without knowing bit b : F has access to ciphertext ct from distribution D_b . Ciphertext ct can originate from either (x, w_0) or (x, w_1) . F simply computes $(C, \pi) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, \text{ct})$ and uses (C, π) to construct distribution D'_b . Observe that this is only possible because $\text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, \text{ct})$ crucially only has x and ct as inputs and does not directly depend on witnesses w_0, w_1 themselves.

We have shown that $F(D_0) \approx_{\frac{1}{2^\lambda}} F(D_1)$, for every (x, w_0, w_1) and for all hiding CRS $\leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{DM-NIWI.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{hiding})$. This concludes witness-indistinguishability as defined in Definition 9. (In Definition 9, the adversary can choose (x, w_0, w_1) after seeing the CRS, but since $F(D_0) \approx_{\frac{1}{2^\lambda}} F(D_1)$ for every (x, w_0, w_1) and for every hiding CRS, the adversary will not have advantage greater than $\frac{1}{2^\lambda}$).

4.4 CRS Indistinguishability

Theorem 15. *The DM-NIWI system from Figure 5 satisfies computational indistinguishability between common reference strings generated in binding mode and common reference strings generated in hiding mode.*

Proof. The proof proceeds by a sequence of games where G_0 is defined exactly as $\text{Exp-CRS-IND}_0(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A})$ (see Figure 4). G_0 corresponds to the experiment in which adversary \mathcal{A} against crs indistinguishability receives common reference strings in binding mode. A high-level summary is provided in Figure 6. For any game G_i , we denote by $\text{Adv}_i(\mathcal{A})$ the advantage of \mathcal{A} in G_i , that is, $\Pr[G_i(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1]$, where the probability is taken over the random coins of G_i and \mathcal{A} . At a high level, we use four hybrid games G_0, G_1, G_2 and G_3 . The proof is in three phases:

1. In the first phase, we transition from G_0 to G_1 . Game G_1 is defined to be the same as G_0 , except for the following two changes: First, we switch the mode of the lossy function H from lossy to dense. This is done with the end goal of ensuring that the output of H is uniformly distributed at specific values of a . Secondly, we use the security of the PRG to change Z from being uniformly random to being in the image of the PRG. This is done by setting $Z = \text{PRG}(z)$. To anticipate, this will provide us with a trapdoor for replacing functional ciphertext encoding X with ciphertexts encoding hrs_I . The fact that $G_0 \approx_c G_1$ is proven in Lemma 16.

2. In the second phase, we transition from G_1 to G_2 . Game G_2 is defined to be precisely the same as G_1 , except that $\text{DM-NIWI.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ computes $\text{PC} = \text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{\text{hiding}, \text{crs}})$. This transition only makes changes in the program ProgProv . By iterating over all values of a , for each a we replace real proofs by simulated proofs from the hidden-bits simulator S_H . We carefully leverage PRF security, the injective mode of LE and the density of H to ensure that for a specific a^* , its corresponding hrs^* is of the form $\beta \oplus \text{crs}$, for uniformly random β . Then we use functional encryption security to replace the functional ciphertext corresponding to a^* to one which only leaks hrs_Z . But at this stage, since only hrs_Z is encoded in the ciphertext, we can use the zero knowledge of the hidden-bits NIZK to replace real proofs by simulated ones. We formally prove that $G_1 \approx_c G_2$ in Theorem 18.
3. In the third stage, we define G_3 to be the same as $\text{Exp-CRS-IND}_1(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A})$. The only difference between G_2 and G_3 is that in the later, the public key of the lossy encryption scheme LE is switched from injective to lossy mode. We prove that $G_2 \approx_c G_3$ in Lemma 17.

Game	(lpk, lsk)	H	Z	PC	Mode or Remark
G_0	LE.Setup(1^λ , inj)	LF.Setup(1^λ , lossy)	$Z \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda+ x }$	$\text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{\text{binding}})$	Binding
G_1	LE.Setup(1^λ , inj)	LF.Setup(1^λ , dense)	$Z \leftarrow \text{PRG}(z)$	$\text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{\text{binding}})$	Lemma 16
G_2	LE.Setup(1^λ , inj)	LF.Setup(1^λ , dense)	$Z \leftarrow \text{PRG}(z)$	$\text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{\text{hiding}})$	Theorem 18
G_3	LE.Setup(1^λ , lossy)	LF.Setup(1^λ , dense)	$Z \leftarrow \text{PRG}(z)$	$\text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{\text{hiding}})$	Lemma 17 Hiding

Fig. 6. An overview of the games used in the proof of Theorem 15, changes between consecutive games are highlighted with gray boxes.

Lemma 16 (From G_0 to G_1). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that $|\text{Adv}_0(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_1(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only differences between G_0 and G_1 are the fact that Z is changed from $Z \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^{2\lambda+|x|}$ to $Z \leftarrow \text{PRG}(z)$ and function H is changed from $H \leftarrow \text{LF.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy})$ to $H \leftarrow \text{LF.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})$. The lemma follows from the security of the PRG and from the computational indistinguishability of the modes of the lossy function LF. Namely, if \mathcal{A} can distinguish between G_0 and G_1 , there exists either a PPT adversary \mathcal{B}_1 that can break the security of the PRG or a PPT adversary \mathcal{B}_2 that can distinguish with non-negligible advantage between the lossy and dense modes of LF.

Lemma 17 (From G_2 to G_3). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that $|\text{Adv}_2(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_3(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. The only change between G_2 and G_3 is that the (lpk, lsk) keys of LE are changed from injective to lossy. The lemma follows directly from the fact that $\{\text{proj}(\text{LE.Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{inj}))\} \approx_c \{\text{proj}(\text{LE.Gen}(1^\lambda, \text{lossy}))\}$, where $\text{proj} : (\text{lpk}, \text{lsk}) \rightarrow \text{lpk}$ and from the fact that lsk is not used anywhere in the construction.

Hybrid H_{1,a^*}	$\text{ProgProv}_{1,a^*}(x, w, r)$
$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{mode})$ $\text{PRG} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRG.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ $\text{H} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LF.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})$ $(\text{lpk}, \text{lsk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LE.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{inj})$ $K_1, K_2, K_3 \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRF.KeyGen}(1^\lambda)$ $(\text{fmpk}, \text{fmsk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{fmsk}, \text{f})$ $\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{\ell(x , 2\lambda + x)}$ $z \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ $Z \leftarrow \text{PRG}(z)$ $\text{PC} = \text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{1,a^*})$ $\text{CRS} := (\text{H}, \text{fmpk}, \text{lpk}, \text{sk}_f, \text{crs}, Z, \text{PC})$ Return CRS	$\text{ProgProv}_{1,a^*}(x, w, r)$ if $(x, w) \notin R$ Return \perp Hardcoded: Keys K_1, K_2, K_3, z $a \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w); r)$ if $a < a^*$ then $(C, \pi) = \text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ if $a \geq a^*$ $(C, \pi) = \text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, a)$ Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$

Fig. 7. Hybrid $H_{(1,a^*)}$ for the proofs of Theorems 18 and 19. Note that the Prover, Verifier, BindingProof, HidingProof and function f are the same as defined in Figure 5 and are not represented again for succinctness. Changes between hybrids $H(1, a^*)$ and game G_1 are highlighted in light gray.

Theorem 18 (From G_1 to G_2). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exist PPT adversaries $\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2, \mathcal{B}_3$, such that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_0(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_1(\mathcal{A})| \leq 2^{p(|x|+\lambda)} \left(8 \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}_1) + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{s-cPRF}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}_2) + \text{Adv}_{\text{Exp-s-IND-FE-CPA}}^{\text{FE}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}_3) + \Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda) + \frac{1}{2^{p(|x|+\lambda)+\lambda}} \right).$$

Proof. The proof strategy is to iterate over all values of $a = \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w), r)$ and make changes to the obfuscation of the program ProgProv . We define a series of hybrids H_{1,a^*} , for all $a^* \in \{0, 1\}^{p(|x|+\lambda)}$ in Figure 7. Briefly, hybrid H_{1,a^*} is defined as follows:

Hybrid H_{1,a^*} is defined in the same way as game G_1 , except that:

1. DM-NIWI.Setup is changed such that the computation of the public parameter $\text{PC} = \text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{\text{binding}, \text{crs}})$ is replaced by $\text{PC} = \text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{1,a^*})$.
2. Program $\text{ProgProv}_{1,a^*}$ on inputs x, w, r is the program which first computes $a = \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w), r)$. Then it compares a with hardcoded value a^* and for $a < a^*$, it computes $(C, \pi) = \text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, a)$, while for $a \geq a^*$ it computes $(C, \pi) = \text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$. It then returns proof (C, π) .

Note that hybrid $H_{1,0^{p(|x|+\lambda)}}$ is the same as game G_1 , while hybrid $H_{1,1^{p(|x|+\lambda)}}$ is the same as game $G_2 = \text{Exp-CRS-IND}_1(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A})$. Just as before, for every hybrid H_i , we denote by $\text{Adv}_i(\mathcal{A})$ the advantage of \mathcal{A} in H_i , that is, $\Pr[G_i(1^\lambda, \mathcal{A}) = 1]$. In Theorem 19, we formally prove that every two consecutive hybrids $H(1, a^*)$ and $H(1, a^* + 1)$ are computationally indistinguishable, i.e. $H_{(1,a^*-1)} \approx_c H_{(1,a^*)}$, for every $a^* \in [2^{p(|x|+\lambda)}]$.

Theorem 19 (From $H_{(1,a^*)}$ to $H_{(1,(a^*+1))}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exist PPT adversaries $\mathcal{B}_1, \mathcal{B}_2, \mathcal{B}_3$, such that:*

Hybrid $H_{1,a^*}, \dots, H_{15,a^*}$	$\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, r)$
$\text{Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{mode})$ $\text{PRG} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRG.Setup}(1^\lambda)$ $\text{H} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LF.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})$ $(\text{lpk}, \text{lsk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LE.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{inj})$ $K_1, K_2, K_3 \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRF.KeyGen}(1^\kappa)$ $(\text{fmpk}, \text{fmsk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{FE.Setup}(1^\kappa)$ $\text{sk}_f \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{fmsk}, f)$ $\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{i(x , 2\lambda + x)}$ $z \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ $Z \leftarrow \text{PRG}(z)$ $\text{PC} = \text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}})$ $\text{CRS} := (\text{H}, \text{fmpk}, \text{lpk}, \text{sk}_f, \text{crs}, Z, \text{PC})$ Return CRS	$\text{if } (x, w) \notin R$ Return \perp $a \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w); r)$ if $a < a^*$ then $(C, \pi) = \text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ if $a = a^*$ $(C, \pi) = \text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ if $a > a^*$ $(C, \pi) = \text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$

Fig. 8. Hybrids $H_{(i,a^*)}$ for the proofs of Theorems 18 and 19. Note that the Prover, Verifier, BindingProof, HidingProof and function f are the same as defined in Figure 5 and are not represented again for succinctness. For $i = 1$, subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{1,a^*,\text{crs}} = \text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}$ and for $i = 15$, $\text{HybridProof}_{15,a^*,\text{crs}} = \text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}$. All $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, r)$ are padded so that they have equal sizes.

$$|\text{Adv}_{(1,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(1,(a^*+1))}(\mathcal{A})| \leq 8 \cdot \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}_1) + 4 \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{s-cPRF}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}_2) + \text{Adv}_{\text{Exp-s-IND-FE-CPA}}^{\text{FE}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}_3) + \Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda) + \frac{1}{2^{p(|x|+\lambda)+\lambda}}.$$

Proof. We prove this through a sequence of hybrids $H_{(1,a^*)}$ up to $H_{(15,a^*)}$, where hybrid $H_{(15,a^*)}$ is identical to hybrid $H_{(1,(a^*+1))}$. In terms of notation, hybrid $H_{(i,a^*)}$ will have $\text{PC} = \text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}})$. The proof strategy is to leverage the properties of iO, FE, PRFs, LE and H in order to replace actual proofs computed by the hidden-bits prover P_H to simulated proofs computed by S_H . Notice that in $H_{(1,a^*)}$, proofs corresponding to a are computed by subprogram $\text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$, while in $H_{(15,a^*)}$ they are computed by subprogram $\text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w)$. This is the only difference between the two hybrids. In order to replace subprogram $\text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}()$ by $\text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}()$ we define a series of subprograms $\text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$, for $i \in [15]$. As expected, every hybrid $H_{(i,a^*)}$ will be defined to be identical to H_{1,a^*} , except that for $a = a^*$, $(C, \pi) = \text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$. The hybrids are described in Figure 7. For a detailed description of subprograms $\text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$, see Figures 9 to 12.

Hybrid $H_{(2,a^*)}$ In this hybrid game, the subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{2,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is changed so that key K_1 is punctured at point a^* . This is a standard punctured programming technique. Once we puncture the key, only $K_1\{a^*\}$ is hardcoded in the program, along with the evaluation of $r_1^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_1, a^*)$, but not K_1 itself. Observe that key K_1 is punctured in $\text{ProgProv}_{2,a^*,\text{crs}}$ and all its subprograms as well. In $H_{(i,a^*)}$, $i \in [15]$ subprograms $\text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ and $\text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ are never called on inputs $a \neq a^*$, so they never need the evaluation of $\text{PRF}(K_1, a^*)$.

This puncturing can be done since a^* is a parameter of the hybrid (we are enumerating over all values of a). Since the programs are functionally equivalent,

this change is computationally indistinguishable by the security of iO . Observe that when we hardcode a value in a subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$, it is understood that this value is also hardcoded in $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$. A full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{2,a^*,\text{crs}}$ can be found in Figure 9. This shows the following lemma:

Lemma 20 (From $H_{(1,a^*)}$ to $H_{(2,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that: $|\text{Adv}_{(1,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(2,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B})$.*

Hybrid $H_{(3,a^*)}$ Here subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{3,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is changed so that r_1^* is now a uniformly random value hardcoded inside our program. This change is computationally indistinguishable by the pseudorandomness at punctured points of PRF (we are replacing the evaluation at $K_1\{a^*\}$ by a uniformly random). A full description of subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{3,a^*,\text{crs}}$ can be found in Figure 9. This shows the following lemma:

Lemma 21 (From $H_{(2,a^*)}$ to $H_{(3,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that: $|\text{Adv}_{(2,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(3,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{s-cPRF}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B})$.*

Hybrid $H_{(4,a^*)}$ Subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{2,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is changed so that key K_2 is punctured at point a^* . This is by the same argument as in Lemma 20 and uses the security of iO . Once we puncture the key, only $K_2\{a^*\}$ is hardcoded in all subroutines of $\text{ProgProv}_{4,a^*,\text{crs}}$, along with the evaluation of $r_2^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a^*)$, but not K_2 itself. This shows the following lemma:

Lemma 22 (From $H_{(3,a^*)}$ to $H_{(4,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that: $|\text{Adv}_{(3,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(4,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B})$.*

Hybrid $H_{(5,a^*)}$ Here subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{5,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is changed so that r_2^* is now a uniformly random value hardcoded inside our program. This change is computationally indistinguishable by the pseudorandomness at punctured points of PRF (we are replacing the evaluation at $K_2\{a^*\}$ by a uniformly random). The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{5,a^*,\text{crs}}$ can be found in Figure 10. This shows the following lemma:

Lemma 23 (From $H_{(4,a^*)}$ to $H_{(5,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that: $|\text{Adv}_{(4,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(5,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{s-cPRF}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B})$.*

Hybrid $H_{(6,a^*)}$ Subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{6,a^*,\text{crs}}$ precomputes and hardcodes the (C^*, π^*) corresponding to a^* . For this we make the crucial observation that for every a , there exists only one corresponding (x, w) . This follows from the perfect correctness of the lossy encryption scheme LE , because LE is in injective mode and because $a = \text{LE}.\text{Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w); r)$. To compute this hybrid, we use lsk to decrypt a^* and obtain the corresponding (x^*, w^*) . Thus, if a^* is known in advance this means (x^*, w^*) is also known in advance. Since crs is a parameter of the circuit and also known in advance, we can compute $\text{hrs}^* \leftarrow H(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$, $(\pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow P_H(x^*, w^*, \text{hrs}^*)$ and $C^* = \text{FE}.\text{Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}^*, 0, 0); r_2^*)$. We hardcode (C^*, π^*) and these are also the returned values when $\text{HybridProof}_{6,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is invoked on

<p>HybridProof$_{1,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys K_1, K_2, K_3, z</p> <p>$X \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_1, a)$</p> <p>$\text{hrs} \leftarrow \text{H}(X) \oplus \text{crs}$</p> <p>$(\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$</p> <p>$r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$</p> <p>$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (X, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p>	<p>HybridProof$_{2,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2, K_3, z$</p> <p>$r_1^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_1, a^*)$</p> <p>$\text{hrs} \leftarrow \text{H}(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$</p> <p>$(\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$</p> <p>$r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$</p> <p>$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p>
<p>HybridProof$_{3,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2, K_3, z$</p> <p>$r_1^* \leftarrow_{\text{r}} \{0, 1\}^{p_1(x , \lambda)}$</p> <p>$\text{hrs} \leftarrow \text{H}(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$</p> <p>$(\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$</p> <p>$r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$</p> <p>$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p>	<p>HybridProof$_{4,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2\{a^*\}, K_3, z$</p> <p>$r_1^* \leftarrow_{\text{r}} \{0, 1\}^{p_1(x , \lambda)}$</p> <p>$r_2^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a^*)$</p> <p>$\text{hrs} \leftarrow \text{H}(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$</p> <p>$(\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$</p> <p>$r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$</p> <p>$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p>

Fig. 9. Descriptions of $\text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$, for $i = 1 \dots 4$. In each subprogram, the changes relative to the previous subprogram are highlighted in gray. When we hardcode a value in a subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$, it is understood that this value is also hardcoded in $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$. If a key K is punctured in $\text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$, we understand that it is punctured in $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$ and all its subprograms as well. Note that $\text{HybridProof}_{1,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is the same as $\text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}$.

(x^*, w^*, a^*) . Since $\text{ProgProv}_{6,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is functionally equivalent to $\text{ProgProv}_{5,a^*,\text{crs}}$, this step is justified by iO security. The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{6,a^*,\text{crs}}$ can be found in Figure 10. From all the above, we have the following lemma:

Lemma 24 (From $\text{H}_{(5,a^*)}$ to $\text{H}_{(6,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that: $|\text{Adv}_{(5,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(6,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B})$.*

Hybrid $\text{H}_{(7,a^*)}$ To obtain subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{7,a^*,\text{crs}}$, we use the selective security of the functional encryption scheme FE to switch ciphertext $C^* = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}^*, 0, 0); r_2^*)$ to ciphertext $C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$. We argue that these two ciphertexts are indistinguishable. Consider decryption key sk_f used by the verifier, this key is associated to function f . But from the definition of f , it holds that:

$$f(r_1^*, \mathcal{I}^*, 0, 0) = f(0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*).$$

Since r_2^* used for encryption has been previously switched to a uniformly random, we can therefore reduce the gap between these two games to the SEL-IND-FE-CPA game. Also note that we are only able to use the selective security of the FE scheme because all the values above are known in advance and are derived from a . The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{7,a^*,\text{crs}}$ can be found in Figure 10. We have therefore proven the following lemma:

<p>HybridProof$_{5,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2\{a^*\}, K_3, z$ $r_1^* \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_1(x ,\lambda)}$ $r_2^* \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_2(x ,\lambda)}$ $\text{hrs} \leftarrow \text{H}(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$ $(\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$ $C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2)$ Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p>	<p>HybridProof$_{6,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ Precompute: $r_1^* \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_1(x ,\lambda)}$ $r_2^* \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_2(x ,\lambda)}$ $\text{hrs}^* \leftarrow \text{H}(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$ Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2\{a^*\}, K_3, z$ $(\pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x^*, w^*, \text{hrs}^*)$ $C^* = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}^*, 0, 0); r_2^*)$ Return $\Pi := (C^*, \pi^*)$</p>
<p>HybridProof$_{7,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ Precompute: $r_1^* \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_1(x ,\lambda)}$ $r_2^* \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_2(x ,\lambda)}$ $T^* \leftarrow \text{H}(r_1^*)$ $\text{hrs}^* \leftarrow T^* \oplus \text{crs}$ Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2\{a^*\}, K_3, z$ $(\pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x^*, w^*, \text{hrs}^*)$ $C^* = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$ Return $\Pi := (C^*, \pi^*)$</p>	<p>HybridProof$_{8,a^*,\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$ Precompute: $r_2^* \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_2(x ,\lambda)}$ $T^* \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{t(x , 2\lambda + x)}$ $\text{hrs}^* \leftarrow T^* \oplus \text{crs}$ Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2\{a^*\}, K_3, z$ $(\pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x^*, w^*, \text{hrs}^*)$ $C^* = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$ Return $\Pi := (C^*, \pi^*)$</p>

Fig. 10. Descriptions of $\text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$, for $i = 5 \dots 8$. In each subprogram, the changes relative to the previous subprogram are highlighted in gray. A hardcoded value is understood to also be hardcoded in $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$. If key K is punctured, we understand that it is punctured in $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$ and all its subprograms.

Lemma 25 (From $\text{H}_{(6,a^*)}$ to $\text{H}_{(7,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(6,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(7,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{Exp-s-IND-FE-CPA}}^{\text{FE}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}).$$

Hybrid $\text{H}_{(8,a^*)}$ Subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{8,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is defined like $\text{HybridProof}_{7,a^*,\text{crs}}$, except that the computation of hrs^* changes. Instead of computing $\text{hrs}^* \leftarrow T^* \oplus \text{crs}$, where $T^* \leftarrow \text{H}(r_1^*)$, we compute $T^* \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_1(|x|,\lambda)}$ and let $\text{hrs}^* \leftarrow T^* \oplus \text{crs}$. This step is justified by the dense mode of H . From Definition 2, we know that for uniformly random r_1^* , we have $\text{H}(r_1^*)$ statistically indistinguishable from a uniformly random. Moreover, by choosing the security parameter in $\text{LF.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})$ to be large enough, we can offset the $2^{p(|x|+\lambda)}$ factor coming from enumerating over all values of a . The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{8,a^*,\text{crs}}$ can be found in Figure 10. We have therefore proven the following lemma:

Lemma 26 (From $\text{H}_{(7,a^*)}$ to $\text{H}_{(8,a^*)}$). *For every (potentially unbounded) adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(7,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(8,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \frac{1}{2^{p(|x|+\lambda)+\lambda}}.$$

Hybrid $\text{H}_{(9,a^*)}$ In this hybrid, we use the zero-knowledge property of the hidden-bits NIZK system to replace real proofs by simulated ones. Subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{9,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is defined like $\text{HybridProof}_{8,a^*,\text{crs}}$, but now the precomputation

<p>HybridProof_{9,a*,crs}(x, w, a)</p> <p>Precompute: $r_2^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_2(x , \lambda)}$ $r_3^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_3(x , \lambda)}$</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2\{a^*\}, K_3, z$ $(\text{hrs}_{I^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_H(x^*; r_3^*)$ $T^* \leftarrow \text{hrs}_{I^*}^* \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}$ $C^* = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C^*, \pi^*)$</p>	<p>HybridProof_{10,a*,crs}(x, w, a)</p> <p>Precompute: $r_2^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a^*)$ $r_3^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_3(x , \lambda)}$</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2\{a^*\}, K_3, z$ $(\text{hrs}_{I^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_H(x^*; r_3^*)$ $T^* \leftarrow \text{hrs}_{I^*}^* \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}$ $C^* = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C^*, \pi^*)$</p>
<p>HybridProof_{11,a*,crs}(x, w, a)</p> <p>Precompute: $r_3^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_3(x , \lambda)}$</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2, K_3, z$ $(\text{hrs}_{I^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_H(x^*; r_3^*)$ $T^* \leftarrow \text{hrs}_{I^*}^* \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}$</p> <p>$r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$</p> <p>$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C, \pi^*)$</p>	<p>HybridProof_{12,a*,crs}(x, w, a)</p> <p>Precompute: $r_3^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_3(x , \lambda)}$</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2, K_3\{a^*\}, z$ $(\text{hrs}_{I^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_H(x^*; r_3^*)$ $T^* \leftarrow \text{hrs}_{I^*}^* \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}$</p> <p>$r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$</p> <p>$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C, \pi^*)$</p>

Fig. 11. Descriptions of $\text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$, for $i = 9 \dots 12$. In each subprogram, the changes relative to the previous subprogram are highlighted in gray. A hardwired value is also hardwired in $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$. If key K is punctured, we understand that it is punctured in $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$ and all its subprograms.

of the program involves choosing a uniformly random $r_3^* \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_3(|x|, \lambda)}$. Polynomial $p_3(|x|, \lambda)$ represents the size of the random tape needed by the hidden-bits simulator \mathcal{S}_H . Proofs are now simulated, i.e. $(\text{hrs}_{I^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_H(x^*; r_3^*)$

We now argue that this hybrid is statistically indistinguishable from the previous one. The reason this works is that we already used FE security to ensure that only the revealed bits of the $\text{hrs}_{I^*}^*$ are encoded in ciphertext C^* and also that $\text{hrs}_{I^*}^*$ is uniformly random. This, coupled with the fact that in $\text{H}_{(9,a^*)}$ only the value of the real proof (C^*, π^*) is hardwired means we can use the ZK property of NIZK_H . In $\text{HybridProof}_{9,a^*,\text{crs}}$ we can hardcode only the simulated proof, and there is no need to include the simulator code in $\text{ProgProv}_{9,a^*,\text{crs}}$.

The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{9,a^*,\text{crs}}$ can be found in Figure 11. We have the following lemma, which we prove in detail in Appendix B:

Lemma 27 (From $\text{H}_{(8,a^*)}$ to $\text{H}_{(9,a^*)}$). *Let $a^* = \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x^*, w^*); r)$. Then it holds that either:*

1. *if $(x^*, w^*) \in R$, then $\text{H}_{(8,a^*)}$ and $\text{H}_{(9,a^*)}$ are statistically close. Namely, for every (potentially unbounded) adversary \mathcal{A} ,*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(8,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(9,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda).$$

2. *if $(x^*, w^*) \notin R$, then $\text{H}_{(8,a^*)}$ and $\text{H}_{(9,a^*)}$ are computationally indistinguishable. Namely, for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(8,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(9,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{IO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}).$$

Hybrid $H_{(10,a^*)}$ In subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{10,a^*,\text{crs}}$, the only change made is that r_2^* is changed from a uniformly random value (as in hybrid $H_{(9,a^*)}$) to $r_2^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a^*)$. This change is justified by the pseudo-randomness of $\text{PRF}(K_2, \cdot)$ at punctured point a^* . The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{10,a^*,\text{crs}}$ can be found in Figure 11. This shows the following lemma:

Lemma 28 (From $H_{(9,a^*)}$ to $H_{(10,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(9,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(10,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{s-cPRF}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}).$$

Hybrid $H_{(11,a^*)}$ In subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{11,a^*,\text{crs}}$, the only change made is that r_2 is not precomputed anymore (as in hybrid $H_{(10,a^*)}$). Value $r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a^*)$ is now computed on the fly. This means C must also be computed on the fly in this hybrid. These changes are justified by the fact that the two programs are functionally equivalent and thus their obfuscations computationally indistinguishable. The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{11,a^*,\text{crs}}$ can be found in Figure 11. This shows the following lemma:

Lemma 29 (From $H_{(10,a^*)}$ to $H_{(11,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(10,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(11,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}).$$

Hybrid $H_{(12,a^*)}$ In subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{12,a^*,\text{crs}}$, we puncture key K_3 at $K_3\{a^*\}$ and only hardcode this punctured key in our programs. This change is justified by the fact that the two programs are functionally equivalent and thus their obfuscations computationally indistinguishable. The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{12,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is given in Figure 11. This shows the following lemma:

Lemma 30 (From $H_{(11,a^*)}$ to $H_{(12,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(11,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(12,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}).$$

Hybrid $H_{(13,a^*)}$ Subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{13,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is changed so that r_3^* is not a hard-wired uniformly random value anymore, but is chosen as $r_3^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_3, a^*)$. This change is justified by the pseudo-randomness of $\text{PRF}(K_3, \cdot)$ at punctured point a^* . The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{13,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is given in Figure 12. From the above, we have shown the following lemma:

Lemma 31 (From $H_{(12,a^*)}$ to $H_{(13,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(12,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(13,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{s-cPRF}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}).$$

<p>HybridProof_{13,a*,crs}(x, w, a)</p> <p>Precompute: $r_3^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_3, a^*)$</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2, K_3\{a^*\}, z$</p> <p>$(\text{hrs}_{I^*}, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_H(x^*; r_3^*)$</p> <p>$T^* \leftarrow \text{hrs}_{I^*} \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}$</p> <p>$r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a^*)$</p> <p>$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C, \pi^*)$</p>	<p>HybridProof_{14,a*,crs}(x, w, a)</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2, K_3, z$</p> <p>$r_3 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_3, a)$</p> <p>$(\text{hrs}_I, \pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_H(x; r_3)$</p> <p>$T \leftarrow \text{hrs}_I \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}}$</p> <p>$r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$</p> <p>$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}, z, T_{\mathcal{I}}); r_2)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p>
<p>HybridProof_{15,a*,crs}(x, w, a)</p> <p>Hardcoded: Keys K_1, K_2, K_3, z</p> <p>$r_3 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_3, a)$</p> <p>$(\text{hrs}_I, \pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_H(x; r_3)$</p> <p>$T \leftarrow \text{hrs}_I \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}}$</p> <p>$r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a)$</p> <p>$C = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}, z, T_{\mathcal{I}}); r_2)$</p> <p>Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$</p>	

Fig. 12. Descriptions of $\text{HybridProof}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$, for $i = 13 \dots 16$. In each subprogram, the changes relative to the previous subprogram are highlighted in gray. A hardcoded value is also hardcoded in $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$. If key K is punctured, we understand that it is punctured in $\text{ProgProv}_{i,a^*,\text{crs}}$ and all its subprograms.

Hybrid H_(14,a*) In subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{14,a^*,\text{crs}}$ the key K_3 is not punctured anymore at a^* . This means that $r_3 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_3, a)$ is not hardcoded anymore. As a consequence, the simulated proofs are also not hardcoded. Since this program is functionally equivalent to $\text{HybridProof}_{14,a^*,\text{crs}}$, we justify this change by the security of iO. The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{14,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is given in Figure 12. From all the above, we have shown the following lemma:

Lemma 32 (From $H_{(13,a^*)}$ to $H_{(14,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(13,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(14,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}).$$

Hybrid H_(15,a*) In subprogram $\text{HybridProof}_{15,a^*,\text{crs}}$ the key K_1 is not punctured anymore at a^* . Key K_1 is not even used anymore in this subprogram, therefore this program is functionally equivalent to $\text{HybridProof}_{14,a^*,\text{crs}}$. We thus justify this change by the security of iO. The full description of $\text{HybridProof}_{15,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is given in Figure 12. Remark that $\text{HybridProof}_{15,a^*,\text{crs}}$ is the same as $\text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}$, which means $H_{(15,a^*)} = H_{(1,(a^*+1))}$. From all the above, we have shown:

Lemma 33 (From $H_{(14,a^*)}$ to $H_{(15,a^*)}$). *For every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that:*

$$|\text{Adv}_{(14,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(15,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}).$$

References

1. Thomas Agrikola and Dennis Hofheinz. Interactively secure groups from obfuscation. In Michel Abdalla and Ricardo Dahab, editors, *PKC 2018, Part II*, volume 10770 of *LNCS*, pages 341–370. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2018.

2. Martin R. Albrecht, Pooya Farshim, Dennis Hofheinz, Enrique Larraia, and Kenneth G. Paterson. Multilinear maps from obfuscation. In Eyal Kushilevitz and Tal Malkin, editors, *TCC 2016-A, Part I*, volume 9562 of *LNCS*, pages 446–473. Springer, Heidelberg, January 2016.
3. Boaz Barak, Oded Goldreich, Russell Impagliazzo, Steven Rudich, Amit Sahai, Salil P. Vadhan, and Ke Yang. On the (im)possibility of obfuscating programs. In Joe Kilian, editor, *CRYPTO 2001*, volume 2139 of *LNCS*, pages 1–18. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2001.
4. Mira Belenkiy, Jan Camenisch, Melissa Chase, Markulf Kohlweiss, Anna Lysyanskaya, and Hovav Shacham. Randomizable proofs and delegatable anonymous credentials. In Shai Halevi, editor, *CRYPTO 2009*, volume 5677 of *LNCS*, pages 108–125. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2009.
5. Mihir Bellare, Dennis Hofheinz, and Scott Yilek. Possibility and impossibility results for encryption and commitment secure under selective opening. In Antoine Joux, editor, *EUROCRYPT 2009*, volume 5479 of *LNCS*, pages 1–35. Springer, Heidelberg, April 2009.
6. Nir Bitansky and Omer Paneth. ZAPs and non-interactive witness indistinguishability from indistinguishability obfuscation. In Yevgeniy Dodis and Jesper Buus Nielsen, editors, *TCC 2015, Part II*, volume 9015 of *LNCS*, pages 401–427. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2015.
7. Nir Bitansky, Omer Paneth, and Daniel Wichs. Perfect structure on the edge of chaos - trapdoor permutations from indistinguishability obfuscation. In Eyal Kushilevitz and Tal Malkin, editors, *TCC 2016-A, Part I*, volume 9562 of *LNCS*, pages 474–502. Springer, Heidelberg, January 2016.
8. Nir Bitansky and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Indistinguishability obfuscation from functional encryption. In Venkatesan Guruswami, editor, *56th FOCS*, pages 171–190. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2015.
9. Olivier Blazy, Georg Fuchsbauer, Malika Izabachène, Amandine Jambert, Hervé Sibert, and Damien Vergnaud. Batch Groth-Sahai. In Jianying Zhou and Moti Yung, editors, *ACNS 10*, volume 6123 of *LNCS*, pages 218–235. Springer, Heidelberg, June 2010.
10. Manuel Blum, Paul Feldman, and Silvio Micali. Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications (extended abstract). In *20th ACM STOC*, pages 103–112. ACM Press, May 1988.
11. Alexandra Boldyreva, Serge Fehr, and Adam O’Neill. On notions of security for deterministic encryption, and efficient constructions without random oracles. In David Wagner, editor, *CRYPTO 2008*, volume 5157 of *LNCS*, pages 335–359. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2008.
12. Dan Boneh, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Functional encryption: Definitions and challenges. In Yuval Ishai, editor, *TCC 2011*, volume 6597 of *LNCS*, pages 253–273. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2011.
13. Dan Boneh and Brent Waters. Constrained pseudorandom functions and their applications. In Kazue Sako and Palash Sarkar, editors, *ASIACRYPT 2013, Part II*, volume 8270 of *LNCS*, pages 280–300. Springer, Heidelberg, December 2013.
14. Elette Boyle, Shafi Goldwasser, and Ioana Ivan. Functional signatures and pseudorandom functions. In Hugo Krawczyk, editor, *PKC 2014*, volume 8383 of *LNCS*, pages 501–519. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2014.
15. Ran Canetti, Yilei Chen, Justin Holmgren, Alex Lombardi, Guy N. Rothblum, and Ron Rothblum. Fiat-shamir from simpler assumptions. *IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive*, 2018:1004, 2018.

16. Ran Canetti, Yilei Chen, and Leonid Reyzin. On the correlation intractability of obfuscated pseudorandom functions. In Eyal Kushilevitz and Tal Malkin, editors, *TCC 2016-A, Part I*, volume 9562 of *LNCS*, pages 389–415. Springer, Heidelberg, January 2016.
17. Ran Canetti and Amit Lichtenberg. Certifying trapdoor permutations, revisited. In *TCC 2018*, 2018. Appears. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2017/631>.
18. Ran Canetti, Huijia Lin, Stefano Tessaro, and Vinod Vaikuntanathan. Obfuscation of probabilistic circuits and applications. In Yevgeniy Dodis and Jesper Buus Nielsen, editors, *TCC 2015, Part II*, volume 9015 of *LNCS*, pages 468–497. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2015.
19. Ran Canetti, Alex Lombardi, and Daniel Wichs. Non-interactive zero knowledge and correlation intractability from circular-secure FHE. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2018/1248, 2018. <http://eprint.iacr.org/>.
20. Alex Escala and Jens Groth. Fine-tuning Groth-Sahai proofs. In Hugo Krawczyk, editor, *PKC 2014*, volume 8383 of *LNCS*, pages 630–649. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2014.
21. Pooya Farshim, Julia Hesse, Dennis Hofheinz, and Enrique Larraia. Graded encoding schemes from obfuscation. In Michel Abdalla and Ricardo Dahab, editors, *PKC 2018, Part II*, volume 10770 of *LNCS*, pages 371–400. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2018.
22. Uriel Feige, Dror Lapidot, and Adi Shamir. Multiple noninteractive zero knowledge proofs under general assumptions. *SIAM Journal on Computing*, 29(1):1–28, 1999.
23. Uriel Feige and Adi Shamir. Witness indistinguishable and witness hiding protocols. In *22nd ACM STOC*, pages 416–426. ACM Press, May 1990.
24. Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to identification and signature problems. In Andrew M. Odlyzko, editor, *CRYPTO'86*, volume 263 of *LNCS*, pages 186–194. Springer, Heidelberg, August 1987.
25. David Mandell Freeman, Oded Goldreich, Eike Kiltz, Alon Rosen, and Gil Segev. More constructions of lossy and correlation-secure trapdoor functions. *Journal of Cryptology*, 26(1):39–74, January 2013.
26. Sanjam Garg, Craig Gentry, Shai Halevi, Mariana Raykova, Amit Sahai, and Brent Waters. Candidate indistinguishability obfuscation and functional encryption for all circuits. In *54th FOCS*, pages 40–49. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 2013.
27. Oded Goldreich, Shafi Goldwasser, and Silvio Micali. How to construct random functions (extended abstract). In *25th FOCS*, pages 464–479. IEEE Computer Society Press, October 1984.
28. Oded Goldreich, Silvio Micali, and Avi Wigderson. Proofs that yield nothing but their validity or all languages in NP have zero-knowledge proof systems. *Journal of the ACM*, 38(3):691–729, 1991.
29. Shafi Goldwasser, Silvio Micali, and Charles Rackoff. The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems (extended abstract). In *17th ACM STOC*, pages 291–304. ACM Press, May 1985.
30. Shafi Goldwasser and Rafail Ostrovsky. Invariant signatures and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs are equivalent (extended abstract). In Ernest F. Brickell, editor, *CRYPTO'92*, volume 740 of *LNCS*, pages 228–245. Springer, Heidelberg, August 1993.
31. Jens Groth, Rafail Ostrovsky, and Amit Sahai. Non-interactive zaps and new techniques for NIZK. In Cynthia Dwork, editor, *CRYPTO 2006*, volume 4117 of *LNCS*, pages 97–111. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2006.

32. Jens Groth and Amit Sahai. Efficient non-interactive proof systems for bilinear groups. In Nigel P. Smart, editor, *EUROCRYPT 2008*, volume 4965 of *LNCS*, pages 415–432. Springer, Heidelberg, April 2008.
33. Gunnar Hartung, Max Hoffmann, Matthias Nagel, and Andy Rupp. BBA+: Improving the security and applicability of privacy-preserving point collection. In Bhavani M. Thuraisingham, David Evans, Tal Malkin, and Dongyan Xu, editors, *ACM CCS 17*, pages 1925–1942. ACM Press, October / November 2017.
34. Johan Håstad, Russell Impagliazzo, Leonid A. Levin, and Michael Luby. A pseudorandom generator from any one-way function. *SIAM Journal on Computing*, 28(4):1364–1396, 1999.
35. Gottfried Herold, Julia Hesse, Dennis Hofheinz, Carla Ràfols, and Andy Rupp. Polynomial spaces: A new framework for composite-to-prime-order transformations. In Juan A. Garay and Rosario Gennaro, editors, *CRYPTO 2014, Part I*, volume 8616 of *LNCS*, pages 261–279. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2014.
36. Aggelos Kiayias, Stavros Papadopoulos, Nikos Triandopoulos, and Thomas Zacharias. Delegatable pseudorandom functions and applications. In Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi, Virgil D. Gligor, and Moti Yung, editors, *ACM CCS 13*, pages 669–684. ACM Press, November 2013.
37. Yehuda Lindell. An efficient transform from sigma protocols to NIZK with a CRS and non-programmable random oracle. In Yevgeniy Dodis and Jesper Buus Nielsen, editors, *TCC 2015, Part I*, volume 9014 of *LNCS*, pages 93–109. Springer, Heidelberg, March 2015.
38. Adam O’Neill. Definitional issues in functional encryption. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2010/556, 2010. <http://eprint.iacr.org/2010/556>.
39. Chris Peikert and Sina Shiehian. Noninteractive zero knowledge for NP from (plain) learning with errors. *IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive*, 2019:158, 2019.
40. Chris Peikert, Vinod Vaikuntanathan, and Brent Waters. A framework for efficient and composable oblivious transfer. In David Wagner, editor, *CRYPTO 2008*, volume 5157 of *LNCS*, pages 554–571. Springer, Heidelberg, August 2008.
41. Chris Peikert and Brent Waters. Lossy trapdoor functions and their applications. In Richard E. Ladner and Cynthia Dwork, editors, *40th ACM STOC*, pages 187–196. ACM Press, May 2008.
42. Amit Sahai and Brent Waters. How to use indistinguishability obfuscation: deniable encryption, and more. In David B. Shmoys, editor, *46th ACM STOC*, pages 475–484. ACM Press, May / June 2014.
43. Amit Sahai and Brent R. Waters. Fuzzy identity-based encryption. In Ronald Cramer, editor, *EUROCRYPT 2005*, volume 3494 of *LNCS*, pages 457–473. Springer, Heidelberg, May 2005.
44. Claus-Peter Schnorr. Efficient identification and signatures for smart cards. In Gilles Brassard, editor, *CRYPTO’89*, volume 435 of *LNCS*, pages 239–252. Springer, Heidelberg, August 1990.

A Summary of Theorem 18

B Proof of Lemma 27

Lemma 27 (From $H_{(8,a^*)}$ to $H_{(9,a^*)}$) Let $a^* = \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x^*, w^*); r)$. Then it holds that either:

Game	hrs	(π, \mathcal{I})	C	remark	justification
$H_{(a^*, 1)}$	$H(\text{PRF}(K_1, a)) \oplus \text{crs}$	$P_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$	$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2)$	$r_1 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_1, a)$	$\text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}$
$H_{(a^*, 2)}$	$H(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$	$P_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$	$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2)$	$K_1\{a^*\}$ punctured $r_1^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_1, a^*)$	iO security
$H_{(a^*, 3)}$	$H(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$	$P_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$	$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2)$	$r_1^* \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_1(x , \lambda)}$	PRF security
$H_{(a^*, 4)}$	$H(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$	$P_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$	$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2^*)$	$K_2\{a^*\}$ punctured $r_2^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a^*)$	iO security
$H_{(a^*, 5)}$	$H(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$	$P_H(x, w, \text{hrs})$	$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}, 0, 0); r_2^*)$	$r_2^* \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_2(x , \lambda)}$	PRF security
$H_{(a^*, 6)}$	$H(r_1^*) \oplus \text{crs}$	$P_H(x^*, w^*, \text{hrs}^*)$	$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (r_1^*, \mathcal{I}^*, 0, 0); r_2^*)$		iO security
$H_{(a^*, 7)}$	$T^* \oplus \text{crs}$	$P_H(x^*, w^*, \text{hrs}^*)$	$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, I^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$	$T^* \leftarrow H(r_1^*)$	SEL-IND-FE-CPA
$H_{(a^*, 8)}$	$T^* \oplus \text{crs}$	$P_H(x^*, w^*, \text{hrs}^*)$	$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, I^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$	$T^* \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^{t(x , 2\lambda + x)}$	Statistical step
$H_{(a^*, 9)}$	$(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow S_H(x^*; r_3^*)$		$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, I^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$	$T^* \leftarrow \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}^* \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}$ $r_3^* \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_3(x , \lambda)}$	ZK of NIZK_H
$H_{(a^*, 10)}$	$(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow S_H(x^*; r_3^*)$		$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, I^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$	$r_2^* \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a^*)$	PRF security
$H_{(a^*, 11)}$	$(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow S_H(x^*; r_3^*)$		$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, I^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2)$	K_2 unpunctured $r_2 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_2, a^*)$	iO security
$H_{(a^*, 12)}$	$(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow S_H(x^*; r_3^*)$		$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, I^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2)$	$K_3\{a^*\}$ punctured	iO security
$H_{(a^*, 13)}$	$(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*) \leftarrow S_H(x^*; r_3^*)$		$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, I^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2)$	$r_3 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_3, a^*)$	PRF security
$H_{(a^*, 14)}$	$(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow S_H(x; r_3)$		$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, I, z, T_{\mathcal{I}}); r_2)$	K_3 unpunctured $r_3 \leftarrow \text{PRF}(K_3, a)$	iO security
$H_{(a^*, 15)}$	$(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow S_H(x; r_3)$		$\text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, I, z, T_{\mathcal{I}}); r_2)$	K_1 unpunctured	iO security $\text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}$

Fig. 13. An overview of the games used in the proof of Theorem 19. Changes between consecutive hybrids are highlighted in light gray. Starred terms represent values hardwired in our programs.

- if $(x^*, w^*) \in R$, then $H_{(8, a^*)}$ and $H_{(9, a^*)}$ are statistically close. Namely, for every (potentially unbounded) adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$|\text{Adv}_{(8, a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(9, a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda).$$

- if $(x^*, w^*) \notin R$, then $H_{(8, a^*)}$ and $H_{(9, a^*)}$ are computationally indistinguishable. Namely that for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , such that:

$$|\text{Adv}_{(8, a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(9, a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \text{Adv}^{\text{iO}}(\kappa, \mathcal{B}).$$

Proof. Recall that because LE is in injective mode, a^* corresponds to a single (x^*, w^*) . The lossy encryption keys (lpk, lsk) are chosen on the fly by hybrid games $H_{(8, a^*)}$ and $H_{(9, a^*)}$. Depending on the keys chosen, a^* can decrypt to either $(x^*, w^*) \in R$ or $(x^*, w^*) \notin R$, therefore we need to show that the hybrids are indistinguishable in both cases:

Case 1: $(x^*, w^*) \notin R$. Making any modifications to $\text{HybridProof}_{8, a^*, \text{crs}}$ does not change the functionality of $\text{ProgProv}_{8, a^*, \text{crs}}$, as this program outputs \perp without ever executing $\text{HybridProof}_{8, a^*, \text{crs}}$. Therefore, the hybrids are computationally indistinguishable.

Case 2: $(x^*, w^*) \in R$. The zero-knowledge property of NIZK_H (see Definition 10) says that for all $(x, w) \in R$, we have that $\Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda) := \Delta(E_0(x, w), E_1(x, w))$ is negligible, where the E_0 and E_1 are defined as:

$$E_0(x, w) := \{(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}, \pi, \mathcal{I}) : \text{hrs} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{t(|x|, \lambda)}, (\pi, \mathcal{I}) \leftarrow \text{P}_H(x, w, \text{hrs})\}$$

$$E_1(x, w) := \{\text{S}_H(x)\}$$

Now let E'_0 be the distribution of the CRS in hybrid game $\text{H}_{(8, a^*)}$ and E'_1 be the distribution of the CRS in hybrid game $\text{H}_{(9, a^*)}$. We show that there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time function F , such that F^{E_b} outputs the distribution E'_b without knowing bit b (Notation F^{E_b} means that F has oracle access to $E_b(x, w)$). Then since $E_0(x, w)$ and $E_1(x, w)$ are close for all values of $(x, w) \in R$, it will necessarily follow that $\Delta(F^{E_0}, F^{E_1}) = \Delta(E'_0, E'_1) \leq \Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda)$.

Firstly, function F generates dense H , then PRG , $(\text{fmpk}, \text{fmsk}), \text{sk}_f, \text{crs}, z$ and Z . It continues by generating and puncturing $K_1\{a^*\}, K_2\{a^*\}, K_3$. Then F chooses $(\text{lpk}, \text{lsk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LE.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{inj})$. Remark that this choice of (lpk, lsk) determines what (x^*, w^*) is encoded in a^* , if any.

Secondly, now that (x^*, w^*) is known to F , it will make an oracle call to $E_b(x^*, w^*)$ and obtain a sample $\Pi^* = (\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*)$. It then draws $r_2 \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_2(|x|, \lambda)}$ and computes $C^* = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$. Finally, it uses (Π^*, C^*) to construct and obfuscate a program we call $\text{ProgProv}_{a^*, \text{crs}}^{\text{S9}}(x, w, r)$ to obtain $\text{PC} := \text{iO}(\text{ProgProv}_{a^*, \text{crs}}^{\text{S9}})$. Finally, F returns $\text{CRS} = (\text{H}, \text{fmpk}, \text{lpk}, \text{sk}_f, \text{crs}, Z, \text{PC})$. Function F^{E_b} and $\text{ProgProv}_{a^*, \text{crs}}^{\text{S9}}$ are described in Figure 14.

Function F	$\text{ProgProv}_{a^*, \text{crs}}^{\text{S9}}(x, w, r)$
$\text{PRG} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRG.Setup}(1^\lambda)$	if $(x, w) \notin R$
$\text{H} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LF.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{dense})$	Return \perp
$(\text{lpk}, \text{lsk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LE.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{inj})$	$a \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{LE.Enc}(\text{lpk}, (x, w); r)$
$K_1, K_2, K_3 \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{PRF.KeyGen}(1^\kappa)$	if $a < a^*$ then
$(\text{fmpk}, \text{fmsk}) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{FE.Setup}(1^\kappa)$	$(C, \pi) = \text{HidingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, w, a)$
$\text{sk}_f \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{fmsk}, f)$	if $a = a^*$
$\text{crs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{t(x , 2\lambda + x)}$	Return (C^*, π^*)
$z \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^\lambda, Z \leftarrow \text{PRG}(z)$	if $a > a^*$
$(x^*, w^*) \leftarrow \text{LE.Dec}(a^*)$	$(C, \pi) = \text{BindingProof}_{\text{crs}}(x, a)$
Oracle call to $E_b(x^*, w^*)$	Return $\Pi := (C, \pi)$
Obtain $(\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}, \pi^*, \mathcal{I}^*)$	
$T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^* \leftarrow \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}^*} \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{I}^*}$	
$r_2 \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{p_2(x , \lambda)}$	
$C^* = \text{FE.Enc}(\text{fmpk}, (0, \mathcal{I}^*, z, T_{\mathcal{I}^*}^*); r_2^*)$	
$\text{PC} = \text{ProgProv}_{a^*, \text{crs}}^{\text{S9}}$	
$\text{CRS} := (\text{H}, \text{fmpk}, \text{lpk}, \text{sk}_f, \text{crs}, Z, \text{PC})$	

Fig. 14. Function F and program $\text{ProgProv}_{a^*, \text{crs}}^{\text{S9}}$ used in the proof of Lemma 27. K_1 and K_2 are punctured at a^* in the subprograms of $\text{ProgProv}^{\text{S9}}$. Also, $\text{ProgProv}_{a^*, \text{crs}}^{\text{S9}}(x, w, r)$, $\text{ProgProv}_{8, a^*, \text{crs}}(x, w, r)$ and $\text{ProgProv}_{9, a^*, \text{crs}}(x, w, r)$ are padded so that they have equal sizes.

To conclude, we have exhibited probabilistic polynomial-time function F , such that $F^{E_b} = E'_b$. Then since $\Delta(E_0, E_1) = \Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda)$, it will necessarily follow that $\Delta(F^{E_0}, F^{E_1}) \leq \Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda)$. This means that the distributions of the CRS in $\text{H}_{(8, a^*)}$ and in $\text{H}_{(9, a^*)}$ are statistically closer than $\Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda)$. Therefore, we can conclude that:

$$|\text{Adv}_{(8,a^*)}(\mathcal{A}) - \text{Adv}_{(9,a^*)}(\mathcal{A})| \leq \Delta_{\text{Zero Knowledge}}^{\text{NIZK}_H}(\lambda).$$

C Hidden Bits NIZK

In this appendix, we briefly go over the hidden-bits NIZK construction from [22]. The scheme is described in Figure 15. This NIZK system computes proofs that graphs G contain a Hamiltonian cycle, without revealing any information about the Hamiltonian cycle itself. Since Hamiltonian Cycle is an NP-complete language, this proof system can be used to prove any statement in NP. Briefly, the way the scheme works is the following: the hidden string hrs is interpreted as a matrix M which will contain a Hamiltonian matrix A with high probability. M will usually be larger than A and when M contains only A and its other entries are set to 0, M is called a “good” matrix. A proof π is a permutation of the graph G such that $A \subseteq \pi(G)$. Such a proof can be computed in polynomial time if the prover knows a Hamiltonian cycle of the graph G . A prover sends π to the verifier and reveals all entries of A which do not correspond to edges in $\pi(G)$.

The verifier knows that with high probability, M is good, i.e. there exists Hamiltonian matrix A embedded in hrs . And if the verifier trusts that this is the case, then the fact that $A \subseteq \pi(G)$ means that indeed G contains a Hamiltonian cycle. Intuitively, this leaks no information about the actual cycle of G , as only the zeros of matrix A corresponding to non-edges of G are revealed.

This hidden-bits NIZK scheme satisfies statistical soundness and perfect zero-knowledge (note that it is impossible to obtain both statistical soundness and perfect ZK in the standard model, but it is possible to do this in the hidden-bits model).

Lemma 34 ([22]: Probability that M is “good” (contains only a Hamiltonian matrix and nothing else)). *Let $\text{hrs} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^{n^3 \times n^3 \times 5 \log_2 n}$ and $M = \text{Parse}(\text{hrs})$ (see Figure 15). For sufficiently large n , the probability that M is good is greater than $\frac{1}{dn\sqrt{n}}$ for some constant d .*

Proof. Consider the probability that a certain row of M contains more than a single 1 (i.e. at least two ones). This happens with probability $\binom{n^3}{2} \times \frac{1}{(n^5)^2} < \frac{1}{n^4}$. Then with probability greater than $\frac{1}{n}$, every row has at most one entry set to 1.

Now, the bits of the hrs are unbiased and independent, and the the probability that $M_{i,j} = 1$ is $\frac{1}{n^5}$. Therefore, the probability that M has exactly n ones is $\binom{n^6}{n} \times \left(\frac{1}{n^5}\right)^n \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{n^5}\right)^{n^6 - n} \approx \frac{n^{6n}}{n!} \times \frac{1}{n^{5n}} \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{n^5}\right)^{n^6 - n} \approx \frac{n^n}{\sqrt{2\pi n} \left(\frac{n}{e}\right)^n} \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{n^5}\right)^{n^6 - n}$,

which is approximately $\frac{e^n}{\sqrt{2\pi n}} \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{n^5}\right)^{n^6 - n}$. By a series expansion of the second term, this is approximately $\frac{e^n}{\sqrt{2\pi n}} \times \left(1 - \frac{1}{n^5}\right)^{n^6 - n} > \frac{1}{\sqrt{n}}$ for sufficiently large n . By the birthday paradox, with constant probability, each row and each column will have exactly one entry set to 1, so the probability that M contains a permutation matrix and has every other entry set to 0 is greater than $\frac{1}{d\sqrt{n}}$, for some constant

<p><u>Setup(1^λ)</u> $\text{hrs} \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^{n^3 \times n^3 \times 5 \log_2 n}$ Return hrs</p> <p><u>Prover(Graph G, Hamiltonian cycle Cycle, hrs)</u> $M = \text{Parse}(\text{hrs})$ if M is “good” (contains Hamiltonian matrix A and all its other entries are 0) then Reveal entries of M which are not in A Using Cycle, compute π such that $A \subseteq \pi(G)$ Reveal $M_{i,j}$ that correspond to non-edges of $\pi(G)$ Return π</p> <p><u>Verifier(π, Revealed(hrs))</u> if M is not completely revealed then For every non-edge $G_{i,j} = 0$, check if $M_{i,j}$ is revealed and equal to 0. if M is completely revealed then check that M is indeed not “good”. Reject if M good. Accept if all checks are succesful.</p> <p><u>Parse(hrs)</u> “Parse hrs as a $n^3 \times n^3$ Boolean matrix M, with $\Pr[M_{i,j} = 1] = \frac{1}{n^5}, \forall i, j \in [n^3]$” Partition hrs into blocks $B_{i,j}$ of size $5 \log_2 n$ if $B_{i,j}$ is all 1s, then $M_{i,j} = 1$, else $M_{i,j} = 0$ Return M</p>

Fig. 15. Hidden-Bits Non-Interactive ZK scheme NIZK_H , due to [22]. By n we denote the size of G .

d . Now, since there are $n!$ permutation matrices with n rows and n columns, and $(n - 1)!$ of them are Hamiltonian, this means the probability that M contains a Hamiltonian matrix and is “good” is greater than $\frac{1}{dn\sqrt{n}}$.

Theorem 35. [22]: *The NIZK in the hidden-bits model from Figure 15 is perfectly zero-knowledge.*

Proof. Perfect Correctness: In this case, the prover knows a Hamiltonian cycle Cycle of G . When M is not “good”, it will be completely revealed to the verifier, which trivially accepts. Otherwise, if M contains a Hamiltonian matrix A and its other entries are 0, the verifier’s first check passes. Then the verifier checks if every non-edge of $\pi(G)$ corresponds to a revealed 0 in matrix A .

Statistical Soundness Now we suppose that G is not Hamiltonian. By Lemma 34, with probability at least $\frac{1}{dn\sqrt{n}}$, the matrix M is “good” (contains a $n \times n$ Hamiltonian submatrix A and has all its other entries set to 0). Then, the prover must reveal all entries not in the submatrix A since mapping $V(G) \times V(G)$ to any other $n \times n$ submatrix of M will reveal values of 1 in the rest of M . Therefore, the prover must output π such that the entries of $\pi(V(G)) \times \pi(V(G))$ correspond to entries of A . Moreover, each non-edge of G must be mapped to a 0 of

A. This means that the 1s of A have preimages that correspond to edges in G , and since A is a Hamiltonian matrix, this induces a Hamiltonian cycle in G . We do not have perfect soundness, as when M is not “good”, all entries are revealed and the proof is accepted for every x (verifier trivially accepts). Soundness can be amplified by increasing the size of the hrs to encode more than one matrix M . Namely, we amplify by parsing a larger hrs as ℓ matrices $M_1 \dots M_\ell$ and the prover outputs proof π_1, \dots, π_ℓ . It is known that $\lim_{\alpha \rightarrow \infty} (1 - \frac{1}{\alpha})^\alpha = \frac{1}{e}$. Consider some desired security parameter λ . Then if $\ell = n^2 \sqrt{n\lambda}$ then with probability $(1 - \frac{1}{e^{n\lambda}})$ at least one M_i is a good matrix.

The verifier accepts if all checks pass for each (M_i, π_i) , $i = 1 \dots \ell$. Then the probability that a non-Hamiltonian graph is accepted will be $\frac{1}{e^{n\lambda}}$. It is this protocol with amplified soundness the one we use for our construction, and which we denote as $(\mathbf{P}_H, \mathbf{V}_H)$ in our candidate from Figure 5.

Perfect Zero-Knowledge Now we are left to prove perfect zero-knowledge. In Figure 16, we exhibit an efficient simulator that briefly works as follows: on input graph G , it first chooses a permutation π , reveals the non-edges of $\pi(G)$ as zeroes and draws the positions corresponding to edges such that each entry is 1 with probability $\frac{1}{n^5}$, just as in the honest execution of the protocol. If M is “good”, then the simulator outputs the corresponding proof.

```

Sim(Graph  $G$ )
Choose uniform permutation  $\pi$ 
For every non-edge of  $\pi(G)$ 
  Choose  $r \leftarrow_{\text{r}} \{0, 1\}^{5 \log_2 n} \setminus \{1 \dots 1\}$ 
  Reveal  $r$  as a part of hrs and a 0 entry of  $M$ .
For unrevealed positions of  $M$ 
  choose entry of  $M$  by setting hrs  $\leftarrow_{\text{r}} \{0, 1\}^{5 \log_2 n}$ 
if  $M$  contains Hamiltonian cycle in unrevealed positions
  Return  $\pi$ 
else reveal everything

```

Fig. 16. Simulator for the Hidden-Bits NIZK [22]. An alternative way to simulate would be to have matrix M chosen before π and then completely disregarded by revealing a zero for every non-edge of $\pi(G)$.

We show that the distribution of revealed real hrs and real proofs is identical to the distribution of revealed simulated hrs and simulated proofs. In the real case, matrix A (which defines the 0/1 values of M) is randomly chosen with uniform distribution (among the $(n - 1)!$ possibilities). Moreover, note that any two different Hamiltonian cycles A and A' determine two disjoint sets S_A and $S_{A'}$ of n permutations, where each permutation in S_A ($S_{A'}$) maps the Hamiltonian cycle of G onto A (A'). Therefore, for any permutation in $Sym(n)$, the probability that V receives it is $\frac{1}{n!}$. So the real proofs are distributed identically as the simulated proofs.

Now, consider the probability that the hidden matrix M contains only a Hamiltonian cycle, this is the same in both cases and the revealed portions of

the hrs are distributed identically. Note that the distributions are identical only if G indeed contains a Hamiltonian cycle, but this is exactly where zero-knowledge must hold.

D Statistical extractability

Theorem 36. *When in binding mode, the DM-NIWI system in Figure 5 satisfies statistical extractability.*

Proof. This is a non-generic proof, we need to use fine-grained properties of the underlying hidden bits NIZK from [22], which is described in Figure 15, Appendix C. This proof could be made generic if we formalized some notion of extractability of the hidden-bits NIZK_H system. Nevertheless, this would be a non-standard notion and we prefer to give a non-generic proof instead.

Consider any $(x, \Pi = (C, \pi))$. Our goal is to show that for every $(\text{CRS}, \text{td}_{\text{ext}}) \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{DM-NIWI.Setup}(1^\lambda, \text{binding})$, for all $w \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \text{DM-NIWI.Extract}(\text{td}_{\text{ext}}, x, \Pi)$, it holds that if $\text{DM-NIWI.Verify}(\text{CRS}, x, \Pi) = 1$, then w is a witness for x with overwhelming probability.

```

DM-NIWI.Extract(td_ext = fmsk, Π = (C, π))
-----
Decrypt C = FE.Enc(fmpk, (X, ℒ, 0, 0); r₂) using fmsk to recover X.
Compute hrs ← H(X) ⊕ crs
Divide hrs into ℓ blocks hrs¹ . . . hrs^ℓ
M_i ← Parse(hrs^i), for every i ∈ [ℓ]
Find block i where M_i is a good
recover Hamiltonian matrix A_i from M_i
Use π_i and A_i to recover Hamiltonian Cycle w in graph x
Return w

```

Fig. 17. Algorithm DM-NIWI.Extract for the proof of Theorem 36. Algorithm Parse is from the hidden-bits NIZK and is described in Figure 15, Appendix C.

Recall that we are in binding mode. Just as in the soundness proof Theorem 13, we condition on the event E that Z does not have a PRG preimage, which happens with probability $1 - \frac{1}{2^{\lambda+|x|}}$. If Z has no preimage, then from the functionality of iO and the correctness of the FE scheme, the adversary must produce a ciphertext of the form $C = \text{FE.Enc}(X, \mathcal{L}, \cdot, \cdot)$. Note that both the functional equivalence of iO and the correctness of the functional encryption scheme are statistical properties.

Then we deduce that decrypting C will indeed yield the entire X and we know that the verifier computes $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{L}} = H(X) \oplus \text{crs}_{\mathcal{L}}$. We want to prove that $V_H(x, \text{hrs}_{\mathcal{L}}, \mathcal{L}, \pi) = 1$ implies that the witness extracted by Extract is valid. Recall that H is a lossy function in lossy mode and it has only 2^k images. This means that $H(x)$ can only influence k bits of the hidden-bits string hrs .

Let $|x| = n$. In Appendix C, we have shown that for an hrs of size $q(n, \lambda) = n^8 \sqrt{n\lambda}$, the probability that hrs contains no good matrix is $\frac{1}{e^{n\lambda}}$. Then by choosing

an hrs of size $(k + 1) \cdot q(n, \lambda)$ ⁷, we ensure that regardless of the choice of X , the probability that hrs contains no good matrix is $\frac{1}{e^{n\lambda}}$. Intuitively, this is because $H(X)$ can influence only k bits of the hidden-bits string.

Let M_j be the good matrix in hrs and A_j the Hamiltonian matrix embedded inside it. Then this matrix cannot be revealed as a bad matrix, since then V_H will be able to detect that and reject. This means that every accepting proof (C, π) must contain a permutation π_j of the graph x such that $A \subseteq \pi_j(x)$. But then, since we know hrs entirely, we can invert π_j and compute a Hamiltonian cycle w of graph x .

E Comparison with other dual-mode NIZK constructions

Discussion: relation to Groth-Sahai. The only other known dual-mode proof system is due to Groth and Sahai [32]. Their scheme can be used to prove the satisfiability of (systems of) multivariate quadratic equations over cyclic groups.⁸ In their scheme, a proof consists of a commitment com_w to a witness (i.e., a satisfying assignment) w , and helper information open that helps to recognize com_w as such. Specifically, their commitment scheme allows to homomorphically compute a commitment $\text{com}_{f(w)}$ from com_w for any quadratic function f . Here, open simply contains an opening of the so-computed $\text{com}_{f_i(w)}$ for any f_i for which $f_i(w) = 0$ shall be proved. A verifier can then compute $\text{com}_{f_i(w)}$ from com_w and check that open indeed opens $\text{com}_{f_i(w)}$ to 0.

If the used commitment is statistically binding, then the corresponding NIZK proof is statistically sound. Conversely, if the commitment is statistically hiding, then the NIZK system is statistically zero-knowledge.⁹ Interestingly, the commitment scheme can be switched between binding and hiding in a computationally indistinguishable way, by tweaking its public parameters.

Our idea to switch the lossy encryption a of (x, w) between injective and lossy is superficially similar to this step. However, in our system, this switch helps to prove that openings of $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$ do not reveal anything beyond $\text{hrs}_{\mathcal{I}}$. The actual switch between soundness and zero-knowledge happens when switching the function H , as described above. Hence, we do not view our system as an abstraction of Groth-Sahai proofs, but instead as a fundamentally different way to obtain dual-mode features.

Discussion: relation to Canetti, Lombardi and Wichs. Independently and concurrently to this work, [19] introduced a dual-mode NIZK for NP based on circular-secure FHE. We already know from [18] that FHE can be obtained from sub-exponentially secure iO, subexponentially secure one-way functions

⁷ Actually, the value of this polynomial can be greatly reduced, but we choose it as such for simplicity.

⁸ One interesting special case are multivariate quadratic equations over \mathbb{Z}_p for prime p . The language of satisfiable (systems of) equations of this type is NP-complete.

⁹ Technically, Groth and Sahai prove only statistical witness-indistinguishability, which can however be converted to (statistical) zero-knowledge in many cases.

and lossy encryption (or rerandomizable encryption). We note, though, that the FHE scheme from [18] is not known to be circular-secure, therefore using it in the construction of [19] requires a somewhat nonstandard additional assumption to construct dual-mode NIZKs.

Discussion: relation to [16] and [15]. Another approach to obtaining a dual-mode NIZK is by combining the concurrent and independent work of [15] with the one of [16]. This yields a scheme from subexponentially-secure IO, sub-exponentially-secure one-way functions, lossy encryption and (polynomially-secure) virtual grey-box obfuscation (VGB) for evasive circuits.