

Double point compression for elliptic curves of j -invariant 0

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Abstract

The article provides a new double point compression method (to $2\lceil\log_2(q)\rceil + 4$ bits) for an elliptic curve $E_b: y^2 = x^3 + b$ of j -invariant 0 over a finite field \mathbb{F}_q such that $q \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$. More precisely, we obtain explicit simple formulas transforming the coordinates x_0, y_0, x_1, y_1 of two points $P_0, P_1 \in E_b(\mathbb{F}_q)$ to some two elements of \mathbb{F}_q with four auxiliary bits. In order to recover (in the decompression stage) the points P_0, P_1 it is proposed to extract a sixth root $\sqrt[6]{Z} \in \mathbb{F}_q$ of some element $Z \in \mathbb{F}_q$. It is known that for $q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, $q \not\equiv 1 \pmod{27}$ this can be implemented by means of just one exponentiation in \mathbb{F}_q . Therefore the new compression method seems to be much faster than the classical one with the coordinates x_0, x_1 , whose decompression stage requires two exponentiations in \mathbb{F}_q .

Keywords: finite fields, pairing-based cryptography, elliptic curves of j -invariant 0, double point compression.

1 Introduction

In many protocols of elliptic cryptography one needs a *compression method* for points of an elliptic curve E over a finite field \mathbb{F}_q of characteristic p . This is done for quick transmission of the information over a communication channel or for its compact storage in a memory. There exists a classical method, which considers an \mathbb{F}_q -point on $E \subset \mathbb{A}_{(x,y)}^2$ as the x -coordinate with one auxiliary bit to uniquely recover the y -coordinate by solving the quadratic equation over \mathbb{F}_q .

Consider an elliptic curve $E_b: y^2 = x^3 + b$ for $b \in \mathbb{F}_q^*$, which is of j -invariant 0. Ordinary curves of such the form have become very popular in elliptic cryptography, especially in *pairing-based cryptography* [1]. This is due to the existence of (maximally possible) degree 6 twists for them, leading

to faster pairing computation [1, §3.3]. One of the latest reviews of standards, commercial products and libraries for this type of cryptography is given in [2, §5]. Last time, the most popular choice for the 128-bit security level is the so-called Barreto-Lynn-Scott \mathbb{F}_p -curve *BLS12-381* [3], where $p \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, $p \equiv 10 \pmod{27}$, and $\lceil \log_2(p) \rceil = 381$.

The simultaneous compression of two points $(x_0, y_0), (x_1, y_1)$ from $E(\mathbb{F}_q)$ (so-called *double point compression*) also has reason to live. It occurs, for example, in pairing-based protocols of succinct *non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK)*. One of the most notable recent works in this field is [4].

Double point compression has already been discussed in [5] not only for $j(E) = 0$, but in a slightly different way. In that article authors do not try to compress points as compact as possible. Instead of this they find formulas transforming the coordinates x_0, y_0, x_1, y_1 to some three elements of the field \mathbb{F}_q . The advantage of their approach is the speed, because it should not solve any equations in the decompression stage.

By virtue of [6, Example V.4.4] the ordinarity of the curve E_b means that $p \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$ or, equivalently, $\omega := \sqrt[3]{1} \in \mathbb{F}_p$, where $\omega \neq 1$. There is on E_b the order 6 automorphism $[-\omega]: (x, y) \mapsto (\omega x, -y)$. Consider the geometric quotient $GK'_b := E_b^2/[-\omega]^{\times 2}$, which is an example of so-called *generalized Kummer surface* [7, §1.3].

Our double compression is based on \mathbb{F}_q -rationality of GK'_b , which is almost obvious (see §3). This concept of algebraic geometry means that for almost all (in some topological sense) points of GK'_b their compression (and subsequent decompression) can be accomplished by computing some rational functions defined over \mathbb{F}_q . To recover the original point belonging to $E_b^2(\mathbb{F}_q)$ from a given \mathbb{F}_q -point on GK'_b we find an inverse image of the natural map $E_b^2 \rightarrow GK'_b$ of degree 6. Since $\omega \in \mathbb{F}_q$, it is a *Kummer map*, that is the field $\mathbb{F}_q(E_b^2)$ is generated by a sixth root of some rational function from $\mathbb{F}_q(GK'_b)$.

In the article [7] the author solves a similar task (almost in the same way), namely the compression task of points from $E_b(\mathbb{F}_{q^2})$, where $q \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$, $q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, and $b \in \mathbb{F}_{q^2}^*$. Its actuality for pairing-based cryptography is explained in the introduction of [7]. There we use so-called *Weil restriction (descent) R_b* of E_b with respect to the extension $\mathbb{F}_{q^2}/\mathbb{F}_q$ (see [7, §1.2.1]). For this \mathbb{F}_q -surface we have $R_b(\mathbb{F}_q) = E_b(\mathbb{F}_{q^2})$. Besides, the map $[-\omega]$ is naturally induced to the order 6 automorphism $[-\omega]_2: R_b \xrightarrow{\sim} R_b$.

We next consider the generalized Kummer surface $GK_b := R_b/[\omega]_2$ under the order 3 automorphism $[\omega]_2 := ([-\omega]_2)^2$. In order to prove \mathbb{F}_q -rationality of GK_b we use quite complicated algebraic geometry (unlike GK'_b). In ac-

cordance with [8, §8] from \mathbb{F}_q -rationality of GK_b it follows \mathbb{F}_q -rationality of the generalized Kummer surface $R_b/[-\omega]_2 \simeq_{\mathbb{F}_q} GK_b/[-1]$. However, this fact does not provide explicit formulas of a birational \mathbb{F}_q -isomorphism $R_b/[-\omega]_2 \simeq \mathbb{A}^2$. Nevertheless, such formulas can be easily derived in the same way as for GK'_b (for details see §4).

2 Double compression

For the sake of generality we will consider any pair of elliptic \mathbb{F}_q -curves of j -invariant 0, where $q \equiv 1 \pmod{3}$, i.e., $\omega \in \mathbb{F}_q$. Namely, for $i = 0, 1$ let $E_i: y_i^2 = x_i^3 + b_i$, that is E_{b_i} in our old notation. These curves are isomorphic at most over \mathbb{F}_{q^6} by the map

$$\varphi: E_0 \simeq E_1, \quad (x_0, y_0) \mapsto (\sqrt[3]{\beta}x_0, \sqrt{\beta}y_0),$$

where $\beta := b_1/b_0$. Also, for $k \in \mathbb{Z}/6$ let $\varphi_k := \varphi \circ [-\omega]^k = [-\omega]^k \circ \varphi$ and

$$S_i := \{(x_i, y_i) \in E_i \mid x_i y_i = 0\} \cup \{(0 : 1 : 0)\} \subset E_i[2] \cup E_i[3].$$

Using the fractions

$$X := \frac{x_0}{x_1}, \quad Y := \frac{y_0}{y_1},$$

we obtain the compression map

$$\begin{aligned} \text{com}: (E_0 \times E_1)(\mathbb{F}_q) \setminus S_0 \times S_1 &\hookrightarrow \mathbb{F}_q^2 \times \mathbb{Z}/6 \times \mathbb{Z}/2, \\ \text{com}(P_0, P_1) &:= \begin{cases} (X, Y, n, 0) & \text{if } \forall k \in \mathbb{Z}/6: \varphi_k(P_0) \neq P_1, \\ (x_0, y_0, k, 1) & \text{if } \exists k \in \mathbb{Z}/6: \varphi_k(P_0) = P_1, \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

where $n \in \mathbb{Z}/6$ is the position number of the element $z := x_1 y_1 \in \mathbb{F}_q^*$ in the set $\{(-1)^i \omega^j z\}_{i=0, j=0}^{1,2}$ ordered with respect to some order in \mathbb{F}_q^* . For example, in the case $q = p$ this can be the usual numerical one. Note that the condition $\varphi_k(P_0) = P_1$ is possible only if the isomorphism φ is defined over \mathbb{F}_q , that is $\sqrt[6]{\beta} \in \mathbb{F}_q$. Finally, if it is necessary, points from $(S_0 \times S_1)(\mathbb{F}_q)$ can be separately processed, using few additional bits.

3 Double decompression

Let $u := x_1^3$, $v := y_1^2$, and $Z := u^2 v^3 = z^6$. Since $x_0 = X x_1$, we have $x_0^3 = X^3 u$. Hence

$$Y^2 = \frac{y_0^2}{y_1^2} = \frac{x_0^3 + b_0}{x_1^3 + b_1} = \frac{X^3 u + b_0}{u + b_1}$$

and

$$u = \frac{b_0 - b_1 Y^2}{Y^2 - X^3}, \quad v = u + b_1.$$

Using the number $n \in \mathbb{Z}/6$, we can extract the original sixth root

$$z = x_1 y_1 = \sqrt[3]{u} \sqrt{v} = \sqrt[6]{Z} = \sqrt[3]{\sqrt{Z}}.$$

For $q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, $q \not\equiv 1 \pmod{27}$ according to [1, §5.1.7], [9, §4]

$$a := \sqrt{Z} = \pm Z^{\frac{q+1}{4}}, \quad \sqrt[3]{a} = \theta a^e, \quad \text{hence} \quad z = \pm \theta Z^{e \frac{q+1}{4}}$$

for some $\theta \in \mathbb{F}_q^*$, $\theta^9 = 1$ and $e \in \mathbb{Z}/(q-1)$. Moreover, e has an explicit simple expression depending only on q . We eventually obtain the equalities

$$x_1 = f_n(X, Y) := \frac{uv}{z^2}, \quad y_1 = g_n(X, Y) := \frac{z}{x_1}.$$

If $Y^2 = X^3$, then

$$\frac{x_0^3 + b_0}{x_1^3 + b_1} = \frac{x_0^3}{x_1^3} \Leftrightarrow b_0 x_1^3 = b_1 x_0^3 \Leftrightarrow \exists j \in \mathbb{Z}/3: x_1 = \omega^j \sqrt[3]{\beta} x_0.$$

This means that $\varphi_k(P_0) = P_1$ for $k \in \{j, j+3\}$. Thus the decompression map has the form

$$\begin{aligned} \text{com}^{-1}: \text{Im}(\text{com}) &\simeq (E_0 \times E_1)(\mathbb{F}_q) \setminus S_0 \times S_1, \\ \text{com}^{-1}(t, s, m, \text{bit}) &= \begin{cases} (t f_m, s g_m, f_m, g_m) & \text{if } \text{bit} = 0, \\ ((t, s), \varphi_m(t, s)) & \text{if } \text{bit} = 1, \end{cases} \end{aligned}$$

where $f_m := f_m(t, s)$, $g_m := g_m(t, s)$.

Remark 1. *Although the new point compression-decompression method contains a lot of inversion operations in the field \mathbb{F}_q , this is often harmless in regard to timing attacks [1, §8.2.2, §12.1.1]. The point is that this type of conversion is mainly applied to public data.*

4 Extension of the compression technique

Our approach still works well for compressing \mathbb{F}_{q^2} -points on the curve $E_b: y^2 = x^3 + b$, where $b \in \mathbb{F}_{q^2}^*$. For simplicity we take $q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$, i.e., $i := \sqrt{-1} \notin \mathbb{F}_q$. Let $b = b_0 + b_1 i$ (such that $b_0, b_1 \in \mathbb{F}_q$) and

$$x = x_0 + x_1 i, \quad y = y_0 + y_1 i, \quad X := \frac{x_0}{x_1}, \quad Y := \frac{y_0}{y_1}.$$

Building on the equations of the Weil restriction $R_b = R_{\mathbb{F}_{q^2}/\mathbb{F}_q}(E_b)$ (see [7, §1.2.1]), we obtain

$$u := x_1^3 = \frac{2b_0Y - b_1\gamma(Y)}{\alpha(X)\gamma(Y) - 2\beta(X)Y}, \quad v := y_1^2 = \frac{\beta(X)u + b_0}{\gamma(Y)},$$

where

$$\alpha(X) := 3X^2 - 1, \quad \beta(X) := X(X^2 - 3), \quad \gamma(Y) := Y^2 - 1.$$

As above, the degenerate cases (whenever the denominator of X , Y , u , or v equals 0) can be easily handled independently.

Finally, consider an elliptic \mathbb{F}_q -curve $E_a: y^2 = x^3 + ax$ of j -invariant 1728, where $q \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$. According to [1, Example 2.28] the latter condition is necessary for the ordinariness of E_a . Our technique also remains to be valid for compressing \mathbb{F}_q -points of E_a^2 (if $a \in \mathbb{F}_q^*$) and \mathbb{F}_{q^2} -points of E_a , because there is on E_a the \mathbb{F}_q -automorphism $[i]: (x, y) \mapsto (-x, iy)$ of order 4. However in the second case one needs to take another basis of the extension $\mathbb{F}_{q^2}/\mathbb{F}_q$.

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