

ABY2.0: Improved Mixed-Protocol Secure Two-Party Computation (Full Version)*

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Abstract

Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) allows a set of mutually distrusting parties to jointly evaluate a function on their private inputs while maintaining input privacy. In this work, we improve semi-honest secure two-party computation (2PC) over rings, with a focus on the efficiency of the online phase.

We propose an efficient mixed-protocol framework, outperforming the state-of-the-art 2PC framework of ABY. Moreover, we extend our techniques to multi-input multiplication gates without inflating the online communication, i.e., it remains independent of the fan-in. Along the way, we construct efficient protocols for several primitives such as scalar product, matrix multiplication, comparison, maxpool, and equality testing. The online communication of our scalar product is two ring elements *irrespective* of the vector dimension, which is a feature achieved for the first time in the 2PC literature.

The practicality of our new set of protocols is showcased with four applications: i) AES S-box, ii) Circuit-based Private Set Intersection, iii) Biometric Matching, and iv) Privacy-preserving Machine Learning (PPML). Most notably, for PPML, we implement and benchmark training and inference of Logistic Regression and Neural Networks over LAN and WAN networks. For training, we improve online runtime (both for LAN and WAN) over SecureML (Mohassel et al., IEEE S&P'17) in the range $1.5\times-6.1\times$, while for inference, the improvements are in the range of $2.5\times-754.3\times$.

1 Introduction

Secure Multi-Party Computation (MPC) [14, 50, 105] allows n mutually distrusting parties to jointly compute a function on their private inputs. The computation guarantees i) privacy—no set of t corrupt parties can learn more information than the output, and ii) correctness—corrupt parties cannot force others to accept a wrong output. Due to its immense potential, MPC can be used for solving real-life applications such as

privacy-preserving auctions [84] and remote diagnostics [27], secure genome analysis [15, 103], and recently in the domain of privacy-preserving machine learning (PPML) [17, 31, 34, 35, 57, 63, 73, 82, 91, 98, 108].

MPC protocols can be broadly classified into two categories: i) low-latency [32, 51, 81, 88] and ii) high-throughput [4, 31, 34, 35, 73, 74, 91] protocols. The low-latency protocols are built using Yao's garbled circuits (GC) [11, 72, 105, 106] and result in constant-round solutions. Secret-sharing (SS) based solutions have been used for high-throughput protocols, but require a number of communication rounds linear in the multiplicative depth of the circuit. However, less communication than GC-based protocols facilitates several instances of SS-based protocols to be executed in parallel, leading to high throughput. The characteristics of the categories mentioned above put forth the need for a mixed-protocol framework [35, 43, 74, 80, 82, 99], where the protocol is split into blocks and each block is executed in one of the following three worlds: i) Arithmetic, ii) Boolean, and iii) Yao. While the arithmetic world performs operations on ℓ -bit rings (or fields), both boolean and Yao world perform operations on bits. Also, arithmetic and boolean worlds operate using an SS-based approach while the Yao world uses a GC-based approach.

To achieve practical runtimes, several works [13, 30, 31, 34, 35, 42, 67, 73, 98] considered the paradigm of having an *input-independent* setup phase where the parties generate a lot of correlated randomness (e.g., Beaver multiplication triples [9]) which are then used in the *input-dependent* online phase to enable a very fast computation on the parties' inputs. Moreover, the benchmarking results of [101] and the works of [18, 38, 39, 41, 43] have showcased the efficiency improvements of protocols compared to rings over their field counterparts. The 32/64-bit computations done in standard CPUs, emulating ring operations, allow for very simple and efficient implementations. Also, several algorithms as well as hardware have been optimized for this domain since it has been the norm for several years.

In this work, we focus on the specific problem of secure

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two-party computation (2PC) [42, 43] with mixed protocols over rings. Our aim is to minimize the online communication and rounds keeping high throughput as our end-goal.

1.1 Our Contributions

We propose an efficient mixed-protocol framework for secure 2PC over an ℓ -bit ring. Our protocols are secure against a *semi-honest* adversary and use an *input-independent* setup. We build several building blocks with the focus on online efficiency. Our contributions can be summed up as follows:

2PC (§3) We propose an efficient 2PC protocol over ℓ -bit rings, requiring a communication of just 2 ring elements per multiplication in the online phase. Our construction relies on Beaver’s circuit randomization technique [9] (§3.1.1), but uses a different perspective of the technique. Moreover, our protocol helps in realising efficient primitives as will be shown in §5. We believe that our new perspective can bring several further optimizations where Beaver’s randomization technique is currently being used.

Protocol	Ref.	Setup	Online	
		Comm [bits]	Comm [bits]	Rounds
MULT $y = ab$	[43]	$2\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	4ℓ	1
	[13]	$2\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	2ℓ	1
	[85]	$2\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	4ℓ	1
	ABY2.0	$2\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	2ℓ	1
MULT3 $y = abc$	[43]	$4\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	8ℓ	2
	[13]	$4\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	4ℓ	2
	[85]	$8\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	6ℓ	1
	ABY2.0	$8\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	2ℓ	1
MULT4 $y = abcd$	[43]	$6\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	12ℓ	2
	[13]	$6\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	6ℓ	2
	[85]	$22\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	8ℓ	1
	ABY2.0	$22\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	2ℓ	1

Table 1: Comparison of ABY2.0 and existing works for 2PC protocols. Best values for the online phase are marked in bold.

Tab. 1 shows our improvement over previous works. For 2-input multiplication, we achieve the same complexity as [13], but using a completely different approach. Moreover, for an N -input multiplication gate, our solution has a *constant* cost of 2 ring elements and one round of interaction. This is a massive improvement over [85], where they require communication of $2N$ ring elements. Round complexity wise, the naive method of multiplying N elements by taking two at a time requires $\log_2(N)$ online rounds and overall communication of $4(N - 1)$ ring elements for [43] and $2(N - 1)$ for [13].

Mixed Protocol Conversions (§4) The mixed world conversions, that enable easy transition between Arithmetic (A), Boolean (B) and Yao (Y) sharing, are now celebrated in the literature [3, 30, 63, 82, 98] due to their potential in building practically-efficient protocols. We propose a new set of conversions that outperform the state-of-the-art conversions of ABY [43] in the online phase. Our solution reduces the

number of online rounds of ABY from 2 to 1 for most of the conversions. We achieve this because, in contrast to ABY, we forgo OTs in the online phase of our conversions.

Tab. 2 provides the concrete costs for the mixed protocol conversions. The conversion from sharing type S to sharing type D is denoted as $S2D$, where $S, D \in \{A, B, Y\}$. For the setup phase, we use correlated OTs (cOT) [5] which incur a communication of $\ell + \kappa$ bits per cOT on ℓ -bit strings, where κ is the computational security parameter. It is evident from Tab. 2 that for all except the Y2B conversion, our conversions outperform ABY’s in the online phase.

Conv.	Ref.	Setup	Online	
		Comm [bits]	Comm [bits]	Rounds
Y2B	ABY [43]	0	0	0
	ABY2.0	ℓ	ℓ	1
B2Y	ABY [43]	$2\ell\kappa$	$\ell\kappa + \ell$	2
	ABY2.0	$2\ell\kappa$	$\ell\kappa$	1
A2Y	ABY [43]	$4\ell\kappa$	$2\ell\kappa + \ell$	2
	ABY2.0	$4\ell\kappa$	$\ell\kappa$	1
Y2A	ABY [43]	$2\ell\kappa$	$(\ell^2 + 3\ell)/2$	2
	ABY2.0	$3\ell\kappa + 2\ell$	ℓ	1
A2B	ABY [43]	$4\ell\kappa$	$2\ell\kappa + \ell$	2
	ABY2.0	$4\ell\kappa + \ell$	$\ell\kappa + \ell$	2
B2A	ABY [43]	$\ell\kappa$	$(\ell^2 + \ell)/2$	2
	ABY2.0	$\ell\kappa + \ell^2$	2ℓ	1

Table 2: Comparison of ABY2.0 and ABY for the conversions. The values are reported for ℓ -bit values. Best values for the online phase are marked in bold.

Building Blocks (§5) We propose efficient constructions for widely-used building blocks that include Scalar Product, Depth-Optimized Circuits, Matrix Multiplication, Comparison, Non-linear Activation functions, and Maxpool. The highlights include:

- Scalar Product (§5.1): Our new protocol incurs an online communication that is *independent* of the vector dimension n . This feature is achieved for the first time in the 2PC literature. Concretely, we require communication of just 2 ring elements as opposed to $4n$ elements of [43]. Since scalar product forms an essential building block for most of the widely used ML algorithms [31, 34, 35, 62, 80, 82, 98] such as Linear Regression, Logistic Regression, and Clustering, our solution substantially improves the performance of their secure 2PC implementations by several orders of magnitude.
- Matrix Multiplication (§5.2): Matrix multiplication is the fundamental building block in most ML algorithms. For instance, the linear layer in a Neural Network (NN) can be viewed as an instance of matrix multiplication. Also the convolution operation in a Convolutional Neural Network can be phrased as an instance of matrix multiplication using standard methods [102]. We extend the 2PC multiplication protocol to support vector operations and provide an efficient matrix multiplication protocol.

- Depth Optimized Circuits (§5.3): The Parallel Prefix Adder (PPA) [8, 52] used in the recent PPML literature [80] incurs a multiplicative depth of $\log_2(\ell)$ since it uses two-input AND gates only. We propose round efficient PPA constructions using a combination of two, three, and four input AND gates. Concretely, for a 64-bit ring, our solution has $2\times$ fewer rounds and also less online communication compared to the PPA used in [80].
- Comparison (§5.4): Our new protocol for checking less than relation improves the online communication of the comparison protocol of [85] by $6\times$ and reduces the number of online rounds from 4 to 3.
- Maximum of three elements (§5.7): Our new protocol improves the online communication of [85] by $14\times$ while reducing the online rounds from 5 to 4.
- Equality Test (§5.10): Our new protocol for checking the equality of two ℓ -bit values, improves the online rounds of [94] from $\log_2(\ell)$ to $\log_4(\ell)$.

Applications (§6) The practicality of our constructions are showcased in these four popular applications:

- *AES S-box* (§6.2): Using our protocol for 3-input multiplication, we obtain an S-box with an AND-depth of 3 instead of 4 before. This improves the online round complexity of AES by factor $1.33\times$.
- *Circuit-based PSI* (§6.3): Using our efficient equality testing protocol, we improve the online communication of the state-of-the-art circuit-based PSI [94] by $2.35\times$ and the online round complexity by $1.3\times$.
- *Biometric Matching* (§6.4): We propose a round-optimized as well as a communication-optimized solution for computing the minimum Euclidean distance, which forms the core for biometric matching. For the round-optimized variant, we improve over ABY [43] by $2.2\times$ in communication and $1.6\times$ in rounds in the online phase. Similarly, for the communication-optimized variant, we improve over [85] by $20.8\times$ in communication and $1.3\times$ in rounds.
- *Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning* (§6.5): Here we implement the training and inference of Logistic Regression and Neural Networks in a LAN and a WAN setting and benchmarked over datasets with various feature sizes. For training, we obtain online runtime improvements over

Algorithm	Ref.	LAN		WAN	
		TP ($\times 10^4$)	Improvem.	TP ($\times 10^4$)	Improvem.
Logistic Regression	[82]	1,344.4		4.0	
	ABY2.0	42,372.4	31.5\times	39.9	9.9\times
Neural Networks	[82]	43.0		0.1	
	ABY2.0	30,797.0	716.0\times	92.39	710.7\times

Table 3: Comparison of the online throughput (TP) of ABY2.0 and SecureML [82] for inference on the MNIST [77] dataset.

SecureML [82] in the range $2.7\times$ – $6.1\times$ for LAN and $1.5\times$ – $2.8\times$ for WAN. For inference, we used *throughput* as one

metric to capture the effect of runtime and communication utilization in a single shot. Our improvement for inference ranges from $7.9\times$ – $754.3\times$ for LAN, while it ranges from $2.5\times$ – $753.2\times$ for WAN. Tab. 3 provides the concrete details for inference over the MNIST [77] dataset.

1.2 Related Work

Here, we provide a concise summary of related work. More details on the preliminaries are given in §A.

Secret Sharing (SS). The works of [42, 67] proposed efficient SS-based solutions for the dishonest majority setting over fields, which was then extended to the ring setting in [37]. The solution involves the generation of Beaver multiplication triples [9] in the setup phase and evaluation of the circuit (multiplication gates) in the online phase using the generated triples. For the 2PC case, the aforementioned approach requires two public reconstructions among the parties per multiplication gate in the online phase. In contrast, we require only one public reconstruction among the parties. Later, works like [65, 66, 86] focused on improving the setup cost using techniques like Oblivious Transfer (OT) and Homomorphic Encryption (HE). [13] improved the number of public reconstructions required in the online phase from two to one using a function-dependent preprocessing, but requires additional communication of four ring elements in the preprocessing phase.

Multi-Input Multiplication. In the boolean setting, [44] extended two-input AND gates to the general N -input case using lookup tables. As shown in §B.3.4, we have significantly better online communication of N -input AND gates (ANDN) by $N\times$. Recently, [85] extended the multiplication from two-input to arbitrary input using Beaver triple extension with a focus on minimizing the online rounds. However, the online communication of [85] scale with the fan-in of the multiplication gates as opposed to ours, where we achieve an online communication of 2 ring elements.

Mixed-Protocol Conversions. Mixed 2PC protocols that combine GC-based and SS-based approaches benefit from their respective advantages and were used in many privacy-preserving applications such as face recognition [54], fingerprint recognition [28], biometric matching [43], and machine learning [63, 80, 82, 98]. The first mixed-protocol framework for MPC was TASTY [54, 71], which combined garbled circuits with homomorphic encryption. ABY [43] then proposed an efficient framework in the semi-honest model combining state-of-the-art 2PC approaches based on Arithmetic sharing, Boolean sharing, and GCs. The work of [99] shows conversions between MPC based on arithmetic secret sharing and garbled circuits with malicious security. Later, the ABY framework was extended to the three and four party honest-majority setting by [35, 80]. HyCC [30] provides a compiler to automatically partition a function (specified in ANSI C)

into sub-functions such that each sub-function is evaluated with either Arithmetic sharing, Boolean sharing or GCs. The partitioning takes into account the real-world setup such as the network between the parties. The work of [61] has shown a method to find an optimal partitioning in polynomial time.

2 Preliminaries

Here, we describe our security model and the parameters and notations used. More details along with a brief overview of the state-of-the-art 2PC protocols are given in §A.

Semi-honest Security Model In this work, we consider a semi-honest (aka passive) adversary [36, 58, 107], who is “honest-but-curious”. The adversary is guaranteed to follow the protocol steps but will try to learn additional information from the messages that he has seen during the protocol execution. Though not the strongest model, this model forms the first step towards achieving protocols with stronger security guarantees [6, 33, 75, 78]. Also, the setting facilitates practically-efficient protocols with higher performance especially for PPML applications [34, 82, 98]. In practical scenarios where the computation is outsourced to a set of servers, the reputation of the servers forces them to behave semi-honestly. Moreover, in many application scenarios, semi-honest behaviour can be enforced by attestation using tools like Intel SGX or ARM TrustZone. We refer the reader to [49] for details on the model.

Parameters and Notation In our framework, we have two parties $\mathcal{P} = \{P_0, P_1\}$ who are connected by a bidirectional synchronous channel (eg. instantiated via TLS over TCP/IP). Our protocols are designed to work over an ℓ -bit ring denoted by \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ} . κ denotes the computational security parameter. In our implementation, we use $\ell = 64$ and $\kappa = 128$.

For two vectors \vec{a}, \vec{b} of length n , the scalar dot product is denoted by $\vec{a} \odot \vec{b} = \sum_{j=1}^n a_j b_j$. Here a_j and b_j denote the j^{th} elements of vectors \vec{a} and \vec{b} respectively. For a bit $u \in \{0, 1\}$, \bar{u} denotes the complement value $1 \oplus u$. For two matrices \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} , matrix multiplication is denoted by $\mathbf{A} \circ \mathbf{B}$. Table 4 depicts notation that we use throughout the paper.

Our protocols are cast into an *input-independent* setup phase and an *input-dependent* online phase. To enable parties to non-interactively sample a random value, parties perform a one-time key-setup that establishes random keys among them for a pseudo-random function (PRF) which can be instantiated, for instance, using AES in counter mode. Towards this, each party P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ samples a random key $K_i \in_R \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and sends it to the other party. The shared key is now defined as $K = K_0 + K_1$.

For applications such as machine learning where the inputs are decimal numbers, we use the Fixed-Point Arithmetic (FPA) representation [31, 34, 35, 80, 82] to embed the value in the underlying ring. Decimal value is treated as an ℓ -bit integer in signed 2’s complement representation. The most significant

P_0, P_1	Parties performing secure computation
\mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ}	Ring of size ℓ bits; $\ell = 64$ in this work
κ	Symmetric security parameter; $\kappa = 128$ in this work
a_j	j -th element of vector \vec{a}
$\vec{a} \odot \vec{b}$	Scalar dot product between two vectors \vec{a} and \vec{b}
$\mathbf{A} \circ \mathbf{B}$	Multiplication of two matrices \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{B}
$[v]_i$	$[\cdot]$ -sharing of $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ held by P_i s.t. $v = [v]_0 + [v]_1$
$\langle v \rangle_i = ([\delta v]_i, \Delta v)$	$\langle \cdot \rangle$ -sharing of $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ held by P_i s.t. $v = \Delta v - [\delta v]_1 - [\delta v]_0$
$t \in \{A, B, Y\}$	Type of sharing: Arithmetic, Boolean, or Yao
$x^s = s2t(x')$	Sharing conversion from source s to target t
OT	Oblivious Transfer
HE	Homomorphic Encryption
cOT_n^t	n instances of Correlated OT on ℓ -bit strings
MSB/LSB	Most / Least Significant Bit
FPA	Fixed-point Arithmetic
SED	Squared Euclidean Distance

Table 4: Notations used throughout this paper.

bit (MSB) represents the sign while the least significant x bits represent the fractional part. For our implementation, we use $\ell = 64$ and $x = 13$.

3 2PC in Arithmetic, Boolean and Yao’s World

The contribution of this section is our new 2PC over ring \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ} . This construction gives us a new 2PC in the arithmetic world and in the Boolean world. The latter is easily derived by having $\ell = 1$. The 2PC in Yao’s world is borrowed from ABY [43]. Below, we start with our new 2PC over \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ} . We describe the secret-sharing semantics, the sharing and reconstruction protocols, and the multiplication protocols (both for setup and online phase) with various fan-ins. Our final 2PC for any functionality represented over an arithmetic circuit over \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ} can be obtained by running the following steps in sequence: (a) sharing all the inputs via the sharing protocols, (b) gate by gate evaluation (using linearity of our secret sharing and the multiplication protocols) and (c) output reconstruction via the reconstruction protocol.

3.1 2PC in Arithmetic World

We provide the details for our 2PC scheme here. Before going into the details, we present a high-level overview of our scheme and a side-by-side comparison with the well-known Beaver’s circuit randomization technique [9]. Our protocol, inspired by the 3PC protocol of ASTRA [34], achieves a communication similar to [13]. The highlight of our protocol is its effectiveness towards efficient realisations for multiple input multiplication gates and dot product operations as will be explained in §3.1.4 and §5.1 later.

3.1.1 High-level Overview of Our 2PC over Ring

Consider two parties P_0, P_1 with values a, b additively shared among them who want to compute a multiplication gate with output c .

Beaver’s technique [9] on gate inputs (cf. left of Fig. 1) In 2PC, there has been a lot of works [42, 43, 63, 67, 98] that use Beaver’s [9] circuit randomization technique to compute the product $a \cdot b$. In this technique (cf. left side of Fig. 1), the inputs of the multiplication gate are randomized first and the corresponding correlated randomness is generated independently (preferably in a setup phase). In detail, parties interactively generate an additive sharing of the multiplication triple $(\delta_a, \delta_b, \delta_{ab})$ with $\delta_{ab} = \delta_a \delta_b$ during the setup phase before the actual inputs are known. Now, we can write

$$\begin{aligned} a \cdot b &= ((a + \delta_a) - \delta_a)((b + \delta_b) - \delta_b) \\ &= (a + \delta_a)(b + \delta_b) - (a + \delta_a)\delta_b - (b + \delta_b)\delta_a + \delta_{ab}. \end{aligned}$$

Let $\Delta_a = (a + \delta_a)$ and $\Delta_b = (b + \delta_b)$ be the randomized versions of the input values of a multiplication gate. Then, during the online phase, parties locally compute an additive sharing of Δ_a using additive shares of a and δ_a . Similarly, an additive sharing of Δ_b is computed. This is followed by the parties mutually exchanging the shares of Δ_a and Δ_b to enable public reconstruction of Δ_a and Δ_b . Then using the above equation, parties can locally compute a sharing of $a \cdot b$. Note that this method requires communicating 4 elements per multiplication (2 elements per reconstruction). We observe that the communication is required for enabling parties to obtain the value of Δ_a and Δ_b in clear.




Figure 1: High level overview of Beaver’s [9] and ABY2.0

Our technique on gate outputs (cf. right of Fig. 1) With this insight, we modify the sharing semantics so that the parties are ensured to have the Δ value as a part of their share, corresponding to every wire value (including the inputs of a multiplication gate). As a result, the reconstructions of Δ_a and Δ_b are no longer required. This may give the wrong impression that no communication is required for evaluating a multiplication gate. It is true that now the parties can locally evaluate the additive sharing of $y = a \cdot b$. But in order to proceed further, a sharing for y according to the new sharing semantics needs to be generated. This requires both parties to obtain Δ_y in clear. Hence, the parties locally compute an additive sharing of Δ_y using the shares of y computed earlier and mutually exchange their shares to reconstruct Δ_y .

Our technique, in summary, shifts the need of reconstruction (which alone causes communication for a multiplication gate) from per input wire to the *output* wire alone for a multiplication gate. For a traditional 2-input multiplication gate, we

reduce the number of reconstructions (each involves sending 2 elements) from 2 to 1. As a result, we improve communication by a factor of $2 \times$. The impact is much higher for an N -input multiplication gate (cf. §3.1.4) and a scalar product of two N -dimensional vectors (cf. §5.1). For scalar product, Beaver’s circuit re-randomization required $2N$ reconstructions, whereas our techniques need a *single* one, offering a gain of $2N \times$. Our constructions can be generalized to the n -party scenario (which is out of scope for this work) and bring a significant pay-off, as the cost per reconstruction depends linearly on the number of parties.

3.1.2 Sharing Semantics

$[\cdot]$ -sharing A value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ is said to be $[\cdot]$ -shared among \mathcal{P} , if party P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ holds $[v]_i$ such that $v = [v]_0 + [v]_1$.

$\langle \cdot \rangle$ -sharing A value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ is said to be $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -shared among \mathcal{P} , if there exist values $\delta_v, \Delta_v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ such that i) δ_v is $[\cdot]$ -shared among P_0, P_1 , ii) $\Delta_v = v + \delta_v$, and iii) Δ_v is known to both P_0, P_1 in clear. We denote the shares of individual parties as $\langle v \rangle_i = ([\delta_v]_i, \Delta_v)$ for $i \in \{0, 1\}$.

We use $\delta_{v_1 \dots v_n}$ to represent the product $\delta_{v_1} \delta_{v_2} \dots \delta_{v_n}$. Similarly, $\Delta_{v_1 \dots v_n}$ represents $\Delta_{v_1} \Delta_{v_2} \dots \Delta_{v_n}$.

3.1.3 Protocols

Sharing Protocol Protocol SHARE enables party P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ to generate a $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -sharing of its input value v . During the setup, P_i samples random $[\delta_{v,i}]$ while the parties together sample $[\delta_{v,1-i}]$ so that P_i will get to know $\delta_v = [\delta_v]_0 + [\delta_v]_1$ in clear. During the online phase, P_i computes $\Delta_v = v + \delta_v$ and sends it to P_{1-i} .

Reconstruction Protocol To reconstruct value v given $\langle v \rangle$, protocol REC proceeds as follows: parties mutually exchange their missing $[\cdot]$ -share of δ_v and locally compute $v = \Delta_v - [\delta_v]_0 - [\delta_v]_1$.

Linear Operations Our sharing scheme is linear in the sense that given $\langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle$ and public constants c_1, c_2 , parties can locally compute $\langle y \rangle = c_1 \cdot \langle a \rangle + c_2 \cdot \langle b \rangle$. For this, P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally sets $\Delta_y = c_1 \cdot \Delta_a + c_2 \cdot \Delta_b$ and $[\delta_y]_i = c_1 \cdot [\delta_a]_i + c_2 \cdot [\delta_b]_i$.

Multiplication Protocol Given the $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -sharing of a, b , the goal of protocol MULT (cf. Fig. 2) is to generate $\langle y \rangle$ where $y = ab$. For correctness to hold, we will need

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_y &= y + \delta_y = ab + \delta_y = (\Delta_a - \delta_a)(\Delta_b - \delta_b) + \delta_y \\ &= \Delta_a \Delta_b - \Delta_a \delta_b - \Delta_b \delta_a + \delta_a \delta_b + \delta_y. \end{aligned}$$

Since the δ -values are not available in clear to any of P_0, P_1 , they cannot compute the value Δ_y on their own. But if we enable the parties obtain a $[\cdot]$ -sharing of $\delta_{ab} = \delta_a \delta_b$, then each of them can compute a $[\cdot]$ -sharing of Δ_y which they can mutually exchange to obtain Δ_y in clear. So the problem of multiplication reduces to generating $[\delta_{ab}]$ given $[\delta_a]$ and

$[\delta_b]$. We use protocol `setupMULT` to accomplish this task, the details of which is provided later in this subsection. We note that `Turbospeedz` [13] achieves same online cost as that of ours, but with a more expensive preprocessing. We provide more details in §A.3.




Figure 2: Multiplication Protocol

To summarize, during the setup phase, parties first locally sample the $[\cdot]$ -shares for δ_y . In parallel, parties execute the `setupMULT` protocol on $[\delta_a]$ and $[\delta_b]$ to obtain $[\delta_{ab}]$. During the online phase, the parties locally compute $[\Delta_y]$ and subsequently reconstruct Δ_y .

We now provide the details for instantiating `setupMULT` using two of the well-known primitives: i) Oblivious Transfer (OT) as used in [43, 65] and ii) Homomorphic Encryption (HE) as used in [42, 54, 97]. These two approaches have been rallied against each other in terms of practical efficiency in the past and fair competition is still going on. In our work, we make only black-box access to these primitives, and hence any improvement in any of them will have a direct impact on the overall efficiency of the setup phase of our protocols.

Note that $\delta_{ab} = ([\delta_a]_0 + [\delta_a]_1)([\delta_b]_0 + [\delta_b]_1) = [\delta_a]_0 [\delta_b]_0 + [\delta_a]_0 [\delta_b]_1 + [\delta_a]_1 [\delta_b]_0 + [\delta_a]_1 [\delta_b]_1$. Here P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ can locally compute $[\delta_a]_i [\delta_b]_i$ and hence the problem reduces to computing $[\delta_a]_0 [\delta_b]_1$ and $[\delta_a]_1 [\delta_b]_0$.

OT based setupMULT In our OT-based approach, we use Correlated OTs (cOT) [5] where the sender inputs a correlation function $f(\cdot)$ to cOT and obtains (m_0, m_1) , where m_0 is a random element and $m_1 = f(m_0)$. We use cOT_ℓ^n to represent n parallel instances of 1-out-of-2 Correlated OTs on ℓ bit input strings.

To compute $[[[\delta_a]_0 [\delta_b]_1]]$, the parties execute cOT_ℓ^ℓ with P_0 being the sender and P_1 being the receiver. For the j -th instance of cOT where $j \in \{0, \dots, \ell - 1\}$, P_0 inputs the correlation $f_j(x) = x + 2^j [\delta_a]_0$ and obtains $(m_{j,0} = r_j, m_{j,1} = r_j + 2^j [\delta_a]_0)$. P_1 inputs choice bit b_j as the j -th bit of $[\delta_b]_1$ and obtains m_{j,b_j} as output. Now the $[\cdot]$ -shares are defined as $[[[\delta_a]_0 [\delta_b]_1]]_0 = \sum_{j=0}^{\ell-1} (-r_j)$ and $[[[\delta_a]_0 [\delta_b]_1]]_1 = \sum_{j=0}^{\ell-1} m_{j,b_j}$. Computation of $[[[\delta_a]_1 [\delta_b]_0]]$ proceeds similarly with the role of the parties reversed.

HE-based setupMULT In a HE based solution, P_0 , using his public key pk_0 , encrypts its messages $[\delta_a]_0, [\delta_b]_0$ in independent ciphertexts and sends the ciphertexts to P_1 . In parallel,

P_1 computes the ciphertexts corresponding to $[\delta_a]_1, [\delta_b]_1$ and a random element $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ using pk_0 . Upon receiving the ciphertexts from P_0 , P_1 computes the ciphertext corresponding to $v = [\delta_a]_0 [\delta_b]_1 + [\delta_a]_1 [\delta_b]_0 - r$ using the homomorphic property of the underlying HE. P_1 then sends encryption of v to P_0 who then decrypts it using his secret key sk_0 . Note that (v, r) forms an additive sharing of the desired value: $[\delta_a]_0 [\delta_b]_1 + [\delta_a]_1 [\delta_b]_0 = v + r$.

Recently, Ring LWE-based AHE [97] was shown to outperform the solutions based on OT for generating multiplication triples. The work uses the Microsoft SEAL library and ciphertext packing. A more detailed description for instantiating `setupMULT` using OT and HE is provided in §B.2.1.

3.1.4 Multi-Input Multiplication Gates

3-Input Multiplication gate We show how to compute a 3-input multiplication gate with three inputs a, b, c with each input being $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -shared. Protocol `MULT3` (cf. Fig. 5 in §B.3.1) generates $\langle y \rangle$ where $y = abc$. Similar to 2-input multiplication, we can write

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_y &= abc + \delta_y = (\Delta_a - \delta_a)(\Delta_b - \delta_b)(\Delta_c - \delta_c) + \delta_y \\ &= \Delta_{abc} - \Delta_{ab}\delta_c - \Delta_{bc}\delta_a - \Delta_{ac}\delta_b + \Delta_a\delta_{bc} + \Delta_b\delta_{ac} \\ &\quad + \Delta_c\delta_{ab} - \delta_{abc} + \delta_y. \end{aligned}$$

Here we need to generate the $[\cdot]$ -sharing of four terms, namely $\delta_{ab}, \delta_{bc}, \delta_{ac}$ and δ_{abc} which is done by protocol `setupMULT3`. The protocol can be instantiated using either OT or HE in a similar fashion to that of `setupMULT` and the details are deferred to §B.

Multi-Input Multiplication gate We can extend our method to handle a 4-input multiplication (MULT4) gate and in the most general case, an N -input multiplication gate (MULTN) for any positive constant N , without inflating the online communication which remains just 2 ring elements independent of the fan-in of the gate. In contrast, the previous solution [85] requires an online communication of $2N$ ring elements for an N -input multiplication gate. Note that our improved online communication comes at the cost of an expensive setup (cf. §B.3) and hence to maintain balance, we use $N \in \{3, 4\}$ in our applications. A more detailed description of MULT4 and MULTN is given in §B.3 and the security proof is given in §F. Also, we provide more details of [85] along with a comparison to our protocol in §A.3.

3.2 2PC in Boolean World

All the protocols mentioned above work over a Boolean ring (\mathbb{Z}_2) as well. This can be achieved by replacing additions (or subtractions) with XORs and multiplications with ANDs. Here, we introduce an additional protocol for secure negation as below.

Negation Protocol Given the **B**-sharing of a bit u as $\langle u \rangle^{\mathbf{B}} = ([\delta_u], \Delta_u)$, the goal of a NOT protocol is to generate the boolean sharing of \bar{u} . This can be done locally by setting $\Delta_{\bar{u}} = 1 \oplus \Delta_u$ and $[\delta_{\bar{u}}] = [\delta_u]$.

3.3 2PC in Yao World

For the Yao world, we follow the sharing semantics introduced by ABY [43]. For a wire u with value $v \in \{0, 1\}$, party P_0 acts as the garbler with the zero-key on the wire (K_u^0) being its share, while P_1 acts as the evaluator with the actual key (K_u^v) as its share. More formally, $\langle v \rangle_0 = K_u^0$ and $\langle v \rangle_1 = K_u^v$.

We use the free-XOR technique [72] in the garbling scheme, which enables the XOR gates to be evaluated without any communication. Here, the one-key for a wire is defined as a fixed offset from the zero-key as $K_u^1 = K_u^0 \oplus R$ with the least significant bit (LSB) of value R being set to 1 to enable point-and-permute [11]. The value R is chosen by P_0 and is fixed across all the wires in the circuit.

To generate a $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -sharing of a bit v , protocol $\text{SHARE}(P_i, v)$ proceeds as follows: P_0 chooses a random zero-key $K_u^0 \in_R \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and sets $K_u^1 = K_u^0 \oplus R$, where κ denotes the computational security parameter. If $P_i = P_0$, P_0 sends K_u^v to P_1 . For the case when $P_i = P_1$, parties engage in a cOT_κ^1 with P_0 being the sender and P_1 being the receiver. Here P_0 inputs the correlation function $f_R(x) = x \oplus R$ and obtains $(K_u^0, K_u^1 = K_u^0 \oplus R)$ while P_1 inputs v as choice bit and receives K_u^v as the output.

To generate a $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -sharing of an ℓ -bit value v , parties execute the $\text{SHARE}()$ protocol on each of its bits ($v[j]$ for $j \in \{0, \ell - 1\}$) in parallel. For a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$, we abuse the notation slightly and use $\langle v \rangle$ to denote the $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -sharing corresponding to each bit of v . We refer readers to ABY [43] for a formal description of the two-party Yao world and the operations within it.

4 Mixed Protocol Conversions

In this section, we show techniques to convert the shared values among the three protocols, namely– Arithmetic, Boolean, and Yao. We use the superscripts $\{\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{Y}\}$ to distinguish the sharing and the respective protocols in the Arithmetic, Boolean, and Yao respectively.

4.1 Standard Conversions

Here we detail the conversions amongst the three protocols. While most of the conversions of ABY [43] demand the execution of OT in the online phase, our protocols invoke OT in the setup phase only. This makes the online phase of the conversions– (a) free of any cryptographic operations and (b) run for just one round as opposed to two rounds for OT in ABY (cf. Tab. 2), except the Arithmetic to Boolean conversion.

Y2B: Given the $\langle \cdot \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ -sharing of a bit $u \in \{0, 1\}$, the goal is to generate its equivalent Boolean sharing. As observed in ABY, since the last bit of the zero and one key are distinct, XORing the LSB of K_u^0 and K_u^u results in the underlying bit u . Hence, each P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ Boolean-shares the LSB of their respective shares $\langle u \rangle_i^{\mathbf{Y}}$ followed by locally XORing the shares to obtain the desired result. We note that P_0 can perform $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{B}}(P_0, \text{LSB}(K_u^0))$ already in the setup phase.

B2Y: To convert $\langle u \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$ to its equivalent $\langle \cdot \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ -sharing, P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ first locally sets $u_i = (1 - i) \cdot \Delta_u \oplus [\delta_u]_i$. It is easy to verify that $u = u_0 \oplus u_1$. This is followed by party P_i generating $\langle u_i \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ by executing the $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{Y}}(P_i, u_i)$ protocol as described in §3.3. Given $\langle u_0 \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}, \langle u_1 \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$, the parties can locally compute $\langle u \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}} = \langle u_0 \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}} \oplus \langle u_1 \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ using the free-XOR technique [72]. In our solution, we observe that parties can generate $\langle u_1 \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ in the setup phase, with u_1 available in the setup phase itself. This allows us to shift the OT run to the setup phase, as opposed to ABY [43].

A2Y: The conversion from $\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$ to its equivalent $\langle \cdot \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ -sharing proceeds similar to that of the B2Y conversion. Party P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally sets $v_i = (1 - i) \cdot \Delta_v - [\delta_v]_i$ so that $v = v_0 + v_1$. During the setup phase, P_0 garbles a two-input adder circuit which computes $y = x_0 + x_1$, given the inputs $x_0, x_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$. The garbled circuit is then sent to P_1 . In parallel, parties execute $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{Y}}(P_1, v_1)$ to generate $\langle v_1 \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$. During the online phase, parties execute $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{Y}}(P_0, v_0)$ to generate $\langle v_0 \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$. This is followed by P_1 locally evaluating the garbled adder circuit to generate $\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ which is our desired result. The adder circuit consists of ℓ AND gates [21]. Using the half-gates technique [106], this has setup communication of $2\ell\kappa$ bits.

Y2A: To convert $\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ to $\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$, parties proceed similarly to ABY [43] as follows: During the setup phase, P_0 samples a random value $r \in_R \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ and executes $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{Y}}(P_0, r)$ and $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{A}}(P_0, r)$ to generate $\langle r \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ and $\langle r \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$ respectively. In parallel, P_0 garbles an Adder circuit and sends the garbled circuit along with the decoding information to P_1 . During the online phase, P_1 evaluates the garbled circuit with inputs $\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ and $\langle r \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$ to generate $\langle v + r \rangle^{\mathbf{Y}}$. Using the decoding information, P_1 obtains the value $(v + r)$ in clear followed by executing $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{A}}(P_1, v + r)$ to generate $\langle v + r \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$. Parties then locally compute $\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{A}} = \langle v + r \rangle^{\mathbf{A}} - \langle r \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$.

A2B: To convert an arithmetic share $\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$ to its equivalent Boolean share, parties use a Boolean Adder circuit similar to that of the A2Y conversion. Here, party P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally sets $v_i = (1 - i) \cdot \Delta_v - [\delta_v]_i$ followed by executing $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{B}}(P_i, v_i)$ to generate $\langle v_i \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$. Parties then evaluate the circuit using the 2PC protocol as described in §3. As mentioned in ABY [43] and ABY3 [80], the adder circuit can either be instantiated in its size-optimized [21] or depth-optimized variant (Parallel-prefix Adder [76]) and both these methods result in a non-constant (dependent on ℓ) number of rounds. A constant-round solution is to use $\text{Y2B}(\text{A2Y}(\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}))$.

Bit2A: Here the goal is to generate the arithmetic sharing of a bit $v \in \{0, 1\}$, given its Boolean sharing $\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$. Let v^a denote the value of bit v when viewed over an ℓ -bit ring. Then for $v = v_0 \oplus v_1$, we can write $v^a = v_0^a + v_1^a - 2v_0^a v_1^a$. We make use of this observation in the rest of the paper several times. Note that $v^a = (\Delta_v \oplus \delta_v)^a = \Delta_v^a + \delta_v^a - 2\Delta_v^a \delta_v^a$.

During the setup phase, parties interactively generate the $[\cdot]$ sharing of value δ_v^a . During the online phase, P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally computes $[v^a]_i = i \cdot \Delta_v^a + (1 - 2\Delta_v^a) \cdot [\delta_v^a]_i$ and executes $\text{SHARE}^A(P_i, [v^a]_i)$ to generate $\langle [v^a]_i \rangle^A$. This is followed by parties locally computing $\langle v^a \rangle^A = \langle [v^a]_0 \rangle^A + \langle [v^a]_1 \rangle^A$.

Now we describe how to generate $[\delta_v^a]$ in the setup phase, given the $[\cdot]$ -sharing of bit δ_v . Since $\delta_v = [\delta_v]_0 \oplus [\delta_v]_1$, we can write $\delta_v^a = [\delta_v]_0^a + [\delta_v]_1^a - 2([\delta_v]_0^a [\delta_v]_1^a)$. The parties first execute cOT_ℓ^1 with P_0 as sender and P_1 as receiver. P_0 inputs the correlation $f_j(x) = x + [\delta_v]_0^a$ and obtains $(s_0 = r, s_1 = r + [\delta_v]_0^a)$. P_1 inputs the choice bit as $[\delta_v]_1^a$ and obtains $s_{[\delta_v]_1^a} = r + [\delta_v]_1^a \cdot [\delta_v]_0^a$ as the output. P_0 locally sets $[(\delta_v]_0^a [\delta_v]_1^a)]_0 = -r$ while P_1 sets $[(\delta_v]_0^a [\delta_v]_1^a)]_0 = s_{[\delta_v]_1^a}$. Party P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally sets the $[\cdot]$ -share of $[\delta_v^a]$ as $[\delta_v^a]_i = (1 - i) \cdot [\delta_v]_0^a + i \cdot [\delta_v]_1^a - 2([\delta_v]_0^a [\delta_v]_1^a)_i$.

B2A: To convert a value $v \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ from its $\langle \cdot \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$ -sharing to its equivalent arithmetic sharing $\langle v \rangle^A$, one simple solution is to follow steps similar to the Y2A conversion. Here, parties evaluate a Boolean subtraction circuit with $\langle v \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$ and $\langle r \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$ as the inputs, where r denotes a random value chosen by P_0 . In addition, P_0 executes $\text{SHARE}^A(P_0, r)$ to generate $\langle r \rangle^A$ as well. After the evaluation, the value $(v - r)$ is reconstructed to P_1 , who further generates $\langle v - r \rangle^A$. Parties then locally compute $\langle v \rangle^A = \langle v + r \rangle^A - \langle r \rangle^A$.

As the above solution results in a non-constant round protocol in the online phase, we propose a *novel* round efficient variant which makes use of the Bit2A protocol. Our protocol was inspired from [35] that proposed a similar solution for the four party honest majority case. Here we make use of the fact that $v = \sum_{j=0}^{\ell-1} 2^j \cdot v[j]$ where $v[j]$ denotes the j^{th} bit of v . Since the parties possess $\langle v[j] \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$ for each $j \in [0, \ell)$, they execute Bit2A conversion on $\langle v[j] \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$ to generate its arithmetic equivalent $\langle v[j] \rangle^A$. This results in a communication corresponding to ℓ instances of Bit2A conversions.

We observe that the online cost can be brought down to just 2 ring elements using the following approach. For each bit $v[j]$, parties locally compute the $[\cdot]$ -sharing corresponding to $(v[j])^a$ as mentioned in Bit2A. Now, instead of generating the $\langle \cdot \rangle^A$ -share corresponding to each bit, P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally computes $[v]_i = \sum_{j=0}^{\ell-1} 2^j \cdot [(v[j])^a]_i$ and executes $\text{SHARE}^A(P_i, [v]_i)$ to generate $\langle [v]_i \rangle^A$. Both parties then locally compute $\langle v \rangle^A = \langle [v]_0 \rangle^A + \langle [v]_1 \rangle^A$. It is easy to verify that $v = [v]_0 + [v]_1$.

4.2 Special Conversions

For the three special conversions described below, the inputs are either Boolean shares or a mix of Boolean and arithmetic shares. The goal is to compute the equivalent arithmetic sharing of the product of the inputs. These conversions use the techniques of the Bit2A protocol (§4.1).

- a) Protocol PQ($\langle p \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}, \langle q \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$) : $\langle p \rangle^{\mathbf{B}} \langle q \rangle^{\mathbf{B}} \rightarrow \langle pq \rangle^A$
 Prep: $[\delta_p^a], [\delta_q^a], [\delta_p^a \delta_q^a]$
 $(pq)^a = (\Delta_p^a + (1 - 2\Delta_p^a)\delta_p^a)(\Delta_q^a + (1 - 2\Delta_q^a)\delta_q^a)$
- b) Protocol PV($\langle p \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}, \langle v \rangle^A$) : $\langle p \rangle^{\mathbf{B}} \langle v \rangle^A \rightarrow \langle pv \rangle^A$
 Prep: $[\delta_p^a], [\delta_p^a \delta_v]$
 $(pv)^a = (\Delta_p^a + (1 - 2\Delta_p^a)\delta_p^a)(\Delta_v - \delta_v)$
- c) Protocol PQV($\langle p \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}, \langle q \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}, \langle v \rangle^A$) : $\langle p \rangle^{\mathbf{B}} \langle q \rangle^{\mathbf{B}} \langle v \rangle^A \rightarrow \langle pqv \rangle^A$
 Prep: $[\delta_p^a], [\delta_q^a], [\delta_p^a \delta_q^a], [\delta_p^a \delta_v], [\delta_q^a \delta_v], [\delta_p^a \delta_q^a \delta_v]$
 $(pqv)^a = (\Delta_p^a + (1 - 2\Delta_p^a)\delta_p^a)(\Delta_q^a + (1 - 2\Delta_q^a)\delta_q^a)(\Delta_v - \delta_v)$

During the online phase, parties locally generate a $[\cdot]$ -sharing of the value to be computed followed by executing the SHARE^A protocol on it to generate its equivalent arithmetic sharing. Then, parties locally add the resulting arithmetic shares to obtain the final result. The difference lies in the setup required for each of the conversions. The expression provided above shows the desired result in terms of corresponding Δ and δ values and the setup data (labelled as Prep) to be prepared.

As observed in the Bit2A protocol, the online phase of all these conversions consists of both parties executing arithmetic sharing of a single element resulting in one round with a communication of just 2 ring elements. We defer a detailed description of the conversions to §C.2.

5 Building Blocks for Applications

In this section, we provide details for our building blocks that form the core of the applications that we explore in §6. The formal details and communication cost analysis are given in §D.

5.1 Scalar Product

Given the arithmetic sharing of n -element vectors \vec{a}, \vec{b} , the goal is to generate $\langle y \rangle^A$ where $y = \vec{a} \odot \vec{b} = \sum_{i=1}^n a_i b_i$. One trivial way is to invoke the multiplication protocol from §3.1.3 corresponding to each of the n underlying multiplications. This would result in online communication linear in the vector size n . We now show how to make the online communication *independent* of the vector size.

The parties first execute the preprocessing corresponding to each of the n multiplications in parallel. Here we observe that there is no need to sample the shares of $[\delta_{y_j}]$ corresponding to each of the underlying multiplications. Instead, the

parties locally sample the shares of $[\delta_y]$. During the online phase, parties first locally compute the $[\cdot]$ -sharing of value Δ_{y_j} where y_j denotes $a_j b_j$. P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ now locally computes $[\Delta_y]_i = \sum_{j=1}^n [\Delta_{y_j}]_i$. This is followed by the parties mutually exchanging $[\Delta_y]$ -shares to reconstruct Δ_y . The formal details are shown in Fig. 7 in §D.1.

Compared with the state-of-the-art 2PC solutions in ABY [43] which require communication of $4n$ elements in the online phase, our protocol requires an online communication of just 2 ring elements.

5.2 Matrix Multiplication

Here we provide the details for extending our 2PC multiplication (§3.1.3) to the matrix setting. We abuse the notation slightly and use ‘+’ for addition of matrices and ‘-’ for subtraction. Also, we follow the $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -sharing semantics for matrices as well. For $\mathbf{X}^{m \times n}$, we have $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}} = \mathbf{X} + [\delta_{\mathbf{X}}]_0 + [\delta_{\mathbf{X}}]_1$. Here $\Delta_{\mathbf{X}}$, $[\delta_{\mathbf{X}}]_0$ and $[\delta_{\mathbf{X}}]_1$ are matrices with dimension $m \times n$ and $x_{i,j}$ denote the $[i : j]$ -th entry of \mathbf{X} .

Given $\mathbf{A}^{p \times q}$, $\mathbf{B}^{q \times r}$, protocol MATMULT (Fig. 8 in §D.2), proceeds as follows: During the setup phase, for $i \in [p]$, $j \in [q]$, $k \in [r]$, parties execute $\text{setupMULT}([\delta_{a_{i,j}}], [\delta_{b_{j,k}}])$ to generate $[\delta_{a_{i,j} b_{j,k}}]$. This results in a $[\cdot]$ -sharing of $\gamma_{\mathbf{AB}} = \delta_{\mathbf{A}} \circ \delta_{\mathbf{B}}$ among P_0, P_1 . During the online phase, parties locally compute a $[\cdot]$ -sharing of $\Delta_{\mathbf{C}}$ using the following relation:

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_{\mathbf{C}} &= \mathbf{C} + \delta_{\mathbf{C}} = \mathbf{A} \circ \mathbf{B} + \delta_{\mathbf{C}} = (\Delta_{\mathbf{A}} - \delta_{\mathbf{A}}) \circ (\Delta_{\mathbf{B}} - \delta_{\mathbf{B}}) + \delta_{\mathbf{C}} \\ &= \Delta_{\mathbf{A}} \circ \Delta_{\mathbf{B}} - \Delta_{\mathbf{A}} \circ \delta_{\mathbf{B}} - \delta_{\mathbf{A}} \circ \Delta_{\mathbf{B}} + \gamma_{\mathbf{AB}} + \delta_{\mathbf{C}}. \end{aligned}$$

Finally, parties mutually exchange $[\Delta_{\mathbf{C}}]$ and obtain $\Delta_{\mathbf{C}}$ completing the protocol. Our protocol improved the online communication from $O(pqr)$ to $O(pr)$ ring elements, eliminating the dependency on dimension q .

5.3 Depth-Optimized Circuits

Parallel-prefix Adders (PPA) offer a depth-optimized solution to the binary addition between two ℓ -bit binary numbers. The best-known PPAs have $\log_2(\ell)$ depth [52]. Using ideas from [8, 52], we design a PPA using two, three, and four input AND gates combined and obtain depth-optimized PPAs. Concretely, for a 64-bit ring, we achieve a $2\times$ improvement in depth over existing designs along with a reduction in online communication.

As shown in [80], the PPA circuit can be optimized to obtain just the most significant bit (MSB), which we denote as Bit Extraction (BitExt) circuits. The efficiency gain in our PPA construction extends to BitExt circuits as well. Tab. 5 provides a summary of the results and the details are given in §E.

Circuit	ℓ	#AND2	#AND3	#AND4	Depth
Adder	8	15 (24)	6	1	2 (3)
BitExt	8	7 (14)	4	1	2 (3)
Adder	64	216 (384)	184	179	3 (6)
BitExt	64	41 (126)	27	47	3 (6)

Table 5: Depth-optimized Circuits for ℓ -bit rings. Previous circuits from ABY3 [80] are given in brackets.

5.4 Comparison

As pointed out in [34, 80], checking $x < y$ in the Fixed-Point Arithmetic (FPA) representation is equivalent to checking the sign of $v = x - y$, which is stored in the MSB position of v .

The corresponding protocol LT begins with parties locally computing $\langle v \rangle = \langle x \rangle - \langle y \rangle$. Let $v = a + b$ where $a = -[\delta_v]_0$ and $b = \Delta_v - [\delta_v]_1$. P_0, P_1 execute $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{B}}$ on a, b respectively to generate its equivalent boolean sharing. The parties then use the Bit Extraction (BitExt, §5.3) circuit to compute $\text{MSB}(v)$ in the boolean sharing format.

5.5 Truncation

In Fixed-Point Arithmetic (FPA), repeated multiplications result in an overflow with the fractional part doubling up in size after each multiplication. The naive solution of choosing a large enough ring to avoid the overflow is impractical for ML algorithms where the number of sequential multiplications is large. To tackle this, truncation [35, 80, 82] is used where the result of the multiplication is brought back to the FPA representation by chopping off the last x bits.

Below we explain how to perform truncation without affecting the communication cost for the multiplication. Our protocol is inspired by SecureML [82] and works as follows: During the online phase of multiplication, the parties first locally compute $[y]$ directly instead of $[\Delta_y]$. This is possible since $[y] = [\Delta_y] - [\delta_y]$. Now each party locally truncates $[y]$ to obtain the truncated value denoted by $[y']$. This is followed by parties executing the $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{A}}$ protocol on $[y']$ to generate its arithmetic sharing. Finally, the parties locally compute $\langle y' \rangle^{\mathbf{A}} = \langle [y']_0 \rangle^{\mathbf{A}} + \langle [y']_1 \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$. The correctness of the method follows trivially from SecureML. The formal details for multiplication with truncation are given in Fig. 9 in §D.4.

5.6 MAX2 / MIN2

The MAX2 protocol is used to compute the maximum among two values a, b in a secure manner given $\langle a \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$ and $\langle b \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$. For this, the parties execute the LT protocol from §5.4 on $\langle a \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}, \langle b \rangle^{\mathbf{A}}$ to obtain $\langle u \rangle^{\mathbf{B}} = \langle a < b \rangle^{\mathbf{B}}$. Note that $\text{MAX2}(a, b) = u \cdot (b - a) + a$. Hence, parties can use the PV protocol from §4.2 to compute the desired result. The MIN2 protocol proceeds similarly except that $\text{MIN2}(a, b) = u \cdot (a - b) + b$.

5.7 MAX3 / MIN3

Given the arithmetic sharing $\langle a \rangle^A, \langle b \rangle^A, \langle c \rangle^A$, the goal of the MAX3 protocol is to find the maximum value among the three. For this, we optimize the solution proposed by [85] which results in an improvement of $24.5\times$ in terms of the communication and $1.3\times$ in rounds in the online phase. The parties first securely compare the pairs $(a, b), (a, c)$ and (b, c) using the LT protocol from §5.4 and obtain $\langle u_1 \rangle^B, \langle u_2 \rangle^B$ and $\langle u_3 \rangle^B$ respectively. Here $u_1 = 1$ if $a < b$ and 0 otherwise. u_2 and u_3 are defined likewise. Now the maximum among the three, denoted by y , can be written as $y = \overline{u_1} \cdot \overline{u_2} \cdot a + u_1 \cdot \overline{u_3} \cdot b + u_2 \cdot u_3 \cdot c$.

Given $\langle u_1 \rangle^B, \langle u_2 \rangle^B, \langle u_3 \rangle^B$ and $\langle a \rangle^A, \langle b \rangle^A, \langle c \rangle^A$, the parties can use the PQV protocol from §4.2 to obtain each term in the expression for y and can locally add them to obtain the desired result. As an optimization, we can combine the online phase corresponding to all three executions of the PQV protocol into one. This reduces the online communication from 6 to 2 ring elements. The details are given in Fig. 10 in §D.6.

The protocol for MIN3, which computes the minimum among the three values can be obtained by slightly modifying the protocol for MAX3. The difference lies in the expression for computing the minimum which will now be $y = u_1 \cdot u_2 \cdot a + \overline{u_1} \cdot u_3 \cdot b + \overline{u_2} \cdot \overline{u_3} \cdot c$.

We observe that the protocol described above can be modified slightly to compute the index of the maximum (or minimum) among a set of three values. We use ArgMax/ArgMin to denote such a protocol and the details are given in §D.7.

5.8 Non-linear Activation Functions

We show how to compute two of the most widely used non-linear activation functions for PPML: ReLU and Sigmoid. While ReLU is used in Neural Networks, Sigmoid is used in functions like Logistic Regression.

ReLU The ReLU function on a value v is defined as $\text{ReLU}(v) = \max(0, v)$. To compute this, parties first execute the LT protocol from §5.4 on v to obtain $\langle u \rangle^B$, where $u = 1$ if $v < 0$ and 0 otherwise. Parties can then locally compute $\langle \overline{u} \rangle^B$, followed by executing the PV protocol from §4.2 on $\langle \overline{u} \rangle^B$ and $\langle v \rangle^A$ to obtain the desired result.

Sigmoid We use the MPC-friendly version of the Sigmoid function [34, 80, 82], which is defined as:

$$\text{Sig}(v) = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } v < -\frac{1}{2} \\ v + \frac{1}{2} & \text{if } -\frac{1}{2} \leq v \leq \frac{1}{2} \\ 1 & \text{if } v > \frac{1}{2} \end{cases}$$

Note that the value $\text{Sig}(v) = \overline{u_1}u_2(v + 1/2) + \overline{u_2}$, where $u_1 = 1$ if $v + 1/2 < 0$ and $u_2 = 1$ if $v - 1/2 < 0$. To compute this, the parties first execute the LT protocol from §5.4 on $v + 1/2$ and $v - 1/2$ to generate $\langle u_1 \rangle^B$ and $\langle u_2 \rangle^B$, respectively. Similar to ReLU, both parties can then use PQV from §4.2 and Bit2A from §4.1 to obtain the desired result.

5.9 Maxpool and Minpool

Given the arithmetic sharing of an n -element vector $\vec{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ of values with $x_j \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$ for $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, the goal of the Maxpool protocol is to compute the arithmetic sharing of the maximum value among the n values.

For this, parties arrange the n values into an N -ary tree (tournament) composed of MAXN blocks with depth $\log_N(n)$ and evaluate in a top-down fashion [70]. In the recent work of [85], a maxpool using MAX3 was proposed where three values are compared at a time. In this work, we use our optimized MAX3 protocol from §5.7 as the building block for computing Maxpool. The improvement in rounds as well as communication of our MAX3 protocol over [85] directly translates to this case as well. We provide an empirical comparison for the Maxpool protocol in §6.1. Note that using MIN3 instead of MAX3 will directly provide a solution for Minpool, where the goal is to find the minimum among the values.

5.10 Equality Testing

Given $\langle a \rangle^A, \langle b \rangle^A$, the goal of the Equality Testing (EQ) protocol is to check whether $a \stackrel{?}{=} b$ or not. An equivalent formulation of the problem [19, 85] is to check if all the bits of $a - b$ are 0 or not. This simple primitive is crucial in building efficient protocol for applications like Circuit-based Private Set Intersection [92, 94, 95] (cf. §6.3), the Table Lookup Protocol from [44], and Data Mining [19].

We begin with the observation that if $x = y$, then using our sharing semantics we can write $\Delta_x - [\delta_x]_0 - [\delta_x]_1 = \Delta_y - [\delta_y]_0 - [\delta_y]_1$. Assuming $v_0 = (\Delta_x - [\delta_x]_0) - (\Delta_y - [\delta_y]_0)$ and $v_1 = [\delta_x]_1 - [\delta_y]_1$, the problem now reduces to checking whether $v_0 \stackrel{?}{=} v_1$ or not. Note that the value v_i can be locally computed by party P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$.

Protocol EQ (cf. Fig. 12 in §D.9) proceeds as follows: P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally computes v_i and executes SHARE^B to generate $\langle v_i \rangle^B$. The parties then compute $\langle v \rangle^B = \text{NOT}(\langle v_0 \rangle^B \oplus \langle v_1 \rangle^B)$. Note that checking $v_0 = v_1$ is the same as checking whether all the bits of v are 1 or not. For this, the parties use AND4 gates and a tree structure, where 4 bits are taken at a time and the AND of them is computed in one go. This approach improves the round complexity by a factor of 2 over the traditional approach using AND2 gates. In concrete terms for a 64 bit ring, our solution improves over the protocol of [19] by $2\times$ in online rounds and by $2.4\times$ in online communication.

6 Applications and Benchmarks

All secure two-party applications using Boolean sharing (B) or Arithmetic sharing (A) directly benefit from our improvement in the online phase of our protocols. In this section, we give four applications with further improvements: i) AES

which benefits from AND3 gates (§6.2), ii) Circuit-based Private Set Intersection (PSI) which benefits from our improved Equality Tests (§6.3), ii) Biometric Matching which benefits from our new *dimension-independent* Scalar Product and Minpool protocols (§6.4), and iv) Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning (PPML), specifically training and inference of Logistic Regression and Neural Networks which benefit from many of our improved protocol building blocks (§6.5). Since Maxpool/Minpool is an essential building block for several applications like K-means clustering [29], face-recognition [100], and fingerprint-matching [16, 48], we provide a separate analysis for Maxpool in §6.1.

To showcase the practicality of our constructions, we have implemented our protocols and compare them with their closest competitors. We implemented our protocols using the ENCRYPTO library [45] in C++17 over a 64-bit ring. Each experiment is run 15 times and the average values are reported. The benchmarking is performed over a LAN of 25Gbps bandwidth and a WAN of 75Mbps bandwidth. Over the LAN, we use two machines, each equipped with a 3.5 GHz Intel (R) Xeon (R) Gold 6144 CPU and 64 GB of RAM. The WAN was instantiated using n1-standard-8 instances of Google Cloud¹ with machines located in East Australia (P_0) and South East Asia (P_1). Over the WAN, machines are equipped with 2.3 GHz Intel Xeon E5 v3 (Haswell) processors supporting hyper-threading, with 8 vCPUs, and 30 GB of RAM. The average round-trip time (rtt), which was taken as the time for communicating 128 KB of data, turned out to be 0.056 ms for LAN and 60.19 ms for WAN.

Update: The recent work of Braun et al. [25] contains implementations and further optimizations from this work (among several other protocols) and is based on the MOTION [26] MPC framework.

6.1 Maxpool

Here we provide an empirical analysis of our Maxpool protocol from §5.9 and compare it with its competitors. For the analysis, we consider vectors with dimensions $n \in \{1024, 65536\}$.

We have evaluated both round-optimized and communication-optimized variants of the Maxpool protocol. In the round-optimized variant proposed by SecureML [82], a garbled circuit is used to evaluate the maximum among n elements. This method requires converting Arithmetic shares to Yao shares and back, which can be tackled using A2Y and Y2A conversions. In the communication-optimized variant, we use the tree-based approach where either two or three elements are compared at a time as described in §5.9.

Based on the building block used to instantiate Maxpool, the analysis can be divided into three cases – i) *Case I*: where the garbled circuit is used, ii) *Case II*: only MAX2 is used, and iii) *Case III*: a mix of MAX3 and MAX2 are used. For Case I,

we compare with SecureML [82], while ours is compared with [85] for the rest. Table 6 summarizes the cost for the online phase of the Maxpool protocol. It is evident from the table that our protocols outperform [82, 85] in both communication and rounds for the online phase in all three cases.

Ref.	Type	n = 1,024		n = 65,536	
		Comm [KB]	Rounds	Comm [KB]	Rounds
[82]	GC	2,056	4	131,584	4
ABY2.0	GC	1,024	2	65,536	2
[85]	MAX2	258	50	16,512	80
ABY2.0	MAX2	53	40	3,408	64
[85]	MAX3	492	35	31,679	55
ABY2.0	MAX3	63	28	4,080	44

Table 6: Online communication and rounds of Maxpool protocols. Best results in bold. n is the number of input elements.

For Case I, our round-optimized variant has a $2\times$ improvement over SecureML [82] in both online communication and rounds. This is due to our efficient A2Y and Y2A conversions. For Case II, we improve upon [85] by a factor of $6.2\times$ in online communication and $1.3\times$ in rounds. Similarly, for Case III, the respective improvements over [85] are $9.6\times$ and $1.3\times$. For cases II&III, while the improvement in online rounds is due to our efficient comparison protocol, improvement in communication is primarily contributed by our PQV protocol from §4.2. We also note that [85] improved the online rounds by $1.4\times$ by switching from MAX2 to MAX3 as the building block for Maxpool at the expense of $1.9\times$ higher online communication. In contrast, our solution improves the online rounds by $1.4\times$ with a minimal overhead of $1.2\times$ in online communication.

For the round-optimized variant, our protocol incurs an additional communication of just 2KB over SecureML in the setup phase. For the communication-optimized variant, we improve upon [85] for both MAX2 and MAX3 in terms of communication in the setup phase. This improvement results from our improved comparison protocol.

6.2 Improved S-box for AES

In a privacy-preserving AES [56, 93], the goal is to enable P_0 to encrypt her message x using a key k held P_1 . The privacy guarantee is that P_0 gets the corresponding ciphertext while leaking nothing else. This has several applications in PSI [53, 64] and encrypted databases [2, 24]. Since the MixColumns and AddRoundKey operations can be evaluated using only free XOR gates [56], the focus was shifted to building efficient protocols for evaluating S-boxes as its core block. While [22] gives a depth-optimized S-box of 34 AND gates with an AND-Depth of 4, [20] gives a size-optimized solution with 32 AND gates and AND-Depth 6.

We give a new construction for the AES S-box that results in an effective AND-Depth of only 3. On a high level, we

¹<https://cloud.google.com/>

start with the three-layer construction of [20, 22] and optimize the middle layer (inversion layer) by replacing some of the AND2 gates with AND3 gates. This optimization is crucial since AES-128, AES-192 and AES-256 have 10, 12, and 14 sequential calls to layers of S-boxes resulting in a respective saving of 10, 12, and 14 rounds of interaction over [22]. We provide the empirical analysis in Table 7 and defer a detailed description to §E.3.

Cipher	Ref.	#AND	Setup	Online	
			Comm [KB]	Comm [KB]	Rounds
AES 128	[22]	5,440	88.98	2.66	40
	[20]	5,120	83.75	2.50	60
	ABY2.0	5,440	98.13	1.33	30

Table 7: Communication and rounds for Secure evaluation of AES. Best results in bold.

In the setup phase, we used 4-OT_1^1 for AND2 gates and 8-OT_4^1 for AND3 gates. With the optimization of [44] applied, one instance of 4-OT_1^1 requires communication of 134 bits while 8-OT_4^1 takes 253 bits. Our protocol outperforms its competitors in terms of both online communication and rounds.

6.3 Circuit-Based PSI

Circuit-based PSI [55] allows us to efficiently compute *variants* of the Private Set Intersection (PSI) functionality by securely evaluating a Boolean circuit. Today’s most efficient protocols in this area [92, 94–96] do this by using hashing techniques and then evaluating a Boolean circuit that checks for equality among several bit strings using secure 2PC.

In fact, for today’s most efficient circuit-based PSI protocol of [94], the majority of the computation, as well as communication, is spent on this two-party Equality Checking protocol. To be precise, 96% of the overall communication (cf. [94, Tab. 3]) and 34% – 63% of the overall runtime (cf. [94, Tab. 5]) is spent on Equality Checking. Plugging in our efficient Equality Checking protocol from §5.10 into the PSI protocol of [94] results in a direct improvement of $\approx 1.3\times$ in runtime and $\approx 2.4\times$ in communication in the online phase.

6.4 Biometric Matching (Minimum Euclidean Distance)

Given a database owner with m biometric samples $(\vec{s}_1, \dots, \vec{s}_m)$ and a party with its biometric sample \vec{c} , the goal of privacy-preserving biometric matching is to find out the “minimum distance” of \vec{c} from the database. This method is used for various traits of biometrics such as face-recognition [46, 54] and fingerprint-matching [16, 56]. Some of these works use the Squared Euclidean Distance (SED) as the metric to compute the distance between two vectors. For two n -element vectors

\vec{a}, \vec{b} , SED is defined as $\text{SED}(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) = \sum_{j=1}^n (a_j - b_j)^2$. Note that for $\vec{y} = \vec{a} - \vec{b}$, $\text{SED}(\vec{a}, \vec{b}) = \vec{y} \odot \vec{y}$.

In our framework, P_0 is the database owner while P_1 is the party with the sample to be checked. For finding the nearest sample securely, the parties first generate an arithmetic sharing of both the database samples and the query according to our sharing semantics. Given $\langle \vec{s}_j \rangle^A$ for $j \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ and $\langle \vec{c} \rangle^A$, the parties locally compute $\langle \vec{x}_j \rangle^A = \langle \vec{s}_j \rangle^A - \langle \vec{c} \rangle^A$. This is followed by running the dot product protocol from §5.1 on each $\langle \vec{x}_j \rangle^A$ with itself to generate $\langle y_j \rangle^A = \langle \vec{x}_j \odot \vec{x}_j \rangle^A$. Note that the vector $\langle \vec{y} \rangle^A = \{\langle y_1 \rangle^A, \dots, \langle y_m \rangle^A\}$ represents the SED of the query with each of the database samples. To find the minimum among the elements of \vec{y} given the arithmetic sharing of its elements, the parties can use either of the two methods described below.

In the first method, P_0 generates a garbled circuit that can compute the minimum among m inputs and sends this circuit to P_1 . The parties then execute the A2Y conversion on each $\langle y_j \rangle^A$ for $j \in \{1, \dots, m\}$ to generate $\langle y_j \rangle^Y$. P_1 evaluates the circuit to obtain the desired result in $\langle \cdot \rangle^Y$ -sharing. This method will result in a constant round solution, but the communication will be large. Another option is to use our Minpool protocol from §5.9 which results in a communication-efficient solution, but will require a non-constant number of rounds.

Ref.	Type	$m = 1,024$		$m = 4,096$		$m = 16,384$	
		Rounds	Comm [KB]	Rounds	Comm [KB]	Rounds	Comm [KB]
[43] ABY2.0	A+Y	5	2,312	5	9,248	5	36,992
	A+Y	3	1,040	3	4,160	3	16,640
[85] ABY2.0	A+B	36	748	41	3,003	46	12,014
	A+B	29	51	33	205	37	818

Table 8: Online rounds and communication of Minimum Euclidean Distance. Best results in bold. m is the number of biometric samples.

An empirical analysis for the online phase of the two aforementioned variants is given in Tab. 8. We consider databases with $m \in \{1,024, 4,096, 16,384\}$ samples. Each biometric sample has a dimension of $n = 8$.

For the round-optimized variant, we improve upon ABY [43] by $2.2\times$ in communication and by $1.6\times$ in rounds in the online phase. Similarly, for the communication-optimized variant, our improvements over [85] are $14.7\times$ in communication and $1.3\times$ in rounds. The overhead in the setup cost for our protocol over ABY [43] and [85] is similar to that of Maxpool (§6.1) since Minpool forms the majority of the computation for Biometric Matching.

6.5 Privacy-Preserving Machine Learning (PPML)

In the domain of PPML [34, 35, 80, 82], we show that Logistic Regression and Neural Networks can be substantially improved with our building blocks. While we chose the above applications, our building blocks are sufficient to perform

training and inference of Linear Regression and Convolutional Neural Networks [35] as well as inference of Support Vector Machines [34] and Binarized Neural Networks [31].

The training phase for the aforementioned algorithms consists of two stages: (i) a *forward propagation* phase, where the model computes the output given the input; and (ii) a *backward propagation* phase, where the model parameters are adjusted according to the difference in the computed output and the actual one. The inference phase can be viewed as one pass of the forward propagation alone. In our work, we use the technique of Batching [80, 82], where the entire set of samples is divided into batches of size B and a combined update function is applied to the weight vectors.

For the training phase, we follow [35, 80] and benchmark the *number of iterations per minute* (#it/min) over both LAN and WAN. The values are reported over batch sizes of {128, 256, 512} and with feature sizes $n \in \{100, 900\}$. For the inference, we report the online runtime as well as the *throughput* (TP) for the aforementioned feature sizes. Runtime shows the impact of rounds on the overall performance, while TP denotes the numbers of queries the framework can process in a minute and allows to analyse the impact of communication.

Logistic Regression In Logistic Regression, one iteration comprises of updation of the weight vector \vec{w} using the gradient descent algorithm (GD) as follows:

$$\vec{w} = \vec{w} - \frac{\alpha}{B} \mathbf{X}_i^T \circ (\text{Sig}(\mathbf{X}_i \circ \vec{w}) - \mathbf{Y}_i).$$

Here α denotes the learning rate and \mathbf{X}_i denotes a subset of batch size B, randomly selected from the entire dataset in the i -th iteration.

Batch Size	Ref.	LAN (#it/min)		WAN (#it/min)	
		n = 100	n = 900	n = 100	n = 900
128	[82]	29,112	27,273	108	104
	ABY2.0	176,471	149,626	162	162
256	[82]	25,829	24,058	107	97
	ABY2.0	163,043	117,188	162	162
512	[82]	23,292	22,247	104	83
	ABY2.0	110,906	98,847	162	162

Table 9: Comparison of the online throughput of ABY2.0 and SecureML [82] for Logistic Regression Training. Best results are in bold and larger is better. n is the number of features.

For the case of training, the data owner possesses the matrices \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y} and the initial weights (\vec{w}) are all set to 0. During the forward propagation, $\mathbf{X}_i \circ \vec{w}$ is first computed followed by applying the sigmoid (Sig) function on it. During the backward propagation, the weight vector is updated according to the equation above. The update function requires computation of a series of matrix multiplications, which can be achieved using our dot product protocol from §5.1. The operations of subtraction as well as multiplication by a public constant can be performed locally.

Tab. 9 gives our benchmarks for Logistic Regression training. Over SecureML [82], we have improvements in the range $4.4 \times - 6.1 \times$ for LAN and in the range $1.5 \times - 2.0 \times$ for WAN. The improvement stems from our round efficient comparison protocol from §5.4 that forms the building block for the activation function ReLU as well as our scalar product protocol from §5.1 that has a communication independent of the size of the vector. Note that over WAN, the throughput of our protocol remains unchanged across feature sizes as well as batch sizes. This discrepancy is due to the effect of communication on the rtt. In detail, the rtt is in the order of microseconds for LAN and scales with the communication size, whereas rtt in the WAN is in the order of milliseconds and does not scale with communication up to a threshold, within which all our protocols operate.

Parameter	Ref.	LAN		WAN	
		n = 100	n = 900	n = 100	n = 900
Runtime (ms)	[82]	1.60	1.69	496.08	504.96
	ABY2.0	0.29	0.29	308.16	308.16
Throughput (Queries/min)	[82]	5,342.61	1,193.01	16.08	3.58
	ABY2.0	42,372.41	42,371.11	39.88	39.88

Table 10: Comparison of the online runtime and throughput of ABY2.0 and SecureML [82] for Logistic Regression Inference. Best results in bold. n is the number of features.

Tab. 10 gives our benchmarks for Logistic Regression inference. We improve the online runtime over SecureML [82] by $5.5 \times$ for LAN and $1.6 \times$ for WAN, and the online throughput by $7.9 \times - 35.5 \times$ in LAN and $2.5 \times - 11.1 \times$ in WAN.

Neural Networks (NN) Neural Networks are stronger than regression algorithms since they can learn more complex relationships between high dimensional input and output data. NNs are used in a wide variety of applications such as image processing, voice, and text recognition.

Batch Size	Ref.	LAN (#it/min)		WAN (#it/min)	
		n = 100	n = 900	n = 100	n = 900
128	[82]	3,593	3,559	17	17
	ABY2.0	12,448	12,343	42	42
256	[82]	3,578	3,521	17	17
	ABY2.0	9,259	9,156	42	42
512	[82]	3,330	3,323	15	15
	ABY2.0	9,177	9,146	42	42

Table 11: Comparison of the online throughput of ABY2.0 and SecureML [82] for NN Training. Best results in bold and larger is better. n is the number of features.

In our work, we follow previous works [34, 80, 82] and consider a Neural Network with two hidden layers, each having 128 nodes followed by an output layer of 10 nodes. We use ReLU as the activation function over the nodes. Moreover, for training we use the MPC-friendly variant

of the softmax function [82] which is defined as $f(v_i) = \text{ReLU}(v_i) / \sum_{j=1}^m \text{ReLU}(v_j)$. The division is performed using a garbled circuit where we use the conversion from Arithmetic to Yao.

Tab.11 gives our benchmarks for NN Training. Over SecureML [82], we have improvements in the range $2.7\times$ - $3.46\times$ for LAN and $2.4\times$ - $2.8\times$ for WAN. Here the improvement is further boosted with our implementation of the softmax function that requires 2 online rounds as opposed to 4 rounds in SecureML.

Parameter	Ref.	LAN		WAN	
		n = 100	n = 900	n = 100	n = 900
Runtime (ms)	[82] ABY2.0	8.68 2.66	8.77 2.66	1,759.92 744.12	1,759.95 744.12
TP (queries/min)	[82] ABY2.0	62.02 30,796.99	40.89 30,795.17	0.19 92.39	0.12 91.57

Table 12: Comparison of the online runtime and throughput of ABY2.0 and SecureML [82] for NN Inference. Best results in bold. n is the number of features.

Tab. 12 gives our benchmarks for NN Inference. Here we improve the online runtime of SecureML [82] by a factor of $3.3\times$ in LAN and $2.4\times$ in WAN. Regarding the online throughput, we observe huge improvements in the range $496\times$ - $754\times$ for both LAN and WAN. This improvement is primarily due to our efficient dot product protocol from §5.1 which has a dimension-independent online communication.

Setup Costs for PPML We incur a minimal overhead of just 1.6% over SecureML [82] in terms of communication in the setup phase for Logistic Regression, while the overhead is 0.7% for the case of Neural Networks. The overhead results from the expensive communication required by our activation functions (Sigmoid and ReLU) over the garbled circuit based solutions of SecureML [82].

7 Conclusion and Future Work

In this work, we presented a new 2PC protocol for securely evaluating a circuit over the ring \mathbb{Z}_{2^ℓ} . Our new sharing semantics allow for new mixed protocol conversions that outperform ABY [43] in terms of both rounds and online communication. We then design a set of efficient building blocks which are by several orders of magnitude better than previous works. Finally we show four example applications that leverage the improvements of our constructions.

Potential future works are: i) Improving the efficiency of our constructions using recent works like eDaBits [47] and Ferret [104], ii) Extending our work for low-end devices, e.g. similar to [7] iii) Extending our work to the malicious setting, and iv) Extending our protocols to more than two parties.

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A Preliminaries

A.1 Oblivious Transfer (OT)

In a 1-out-of- n Oblivious Transfer [59, 83] (OT) over ℓ -bit messages, the sender S inputs n messages (x_1, \dots, x_n) each of length ℓ bits, while the receiver R inputs the choice $c \in \{1, \dots, n\}$. R receives x_c as output while S receives \perp as output. The privacy guarantee is that S learns nothing about c , while R learns nothing about the inputs of S other than x_c . We use $n\text{-OT}_\ell^m$ to denote m instances of 1-out-of- n OT on ℓ bit inputs.

OT is a fundamental building block for MPC [68] and requires expensive public-key cryptography [59]. The technique of OT Extension [5, 60, 69, 89] allows us to generate many OTs from a small number (equal to the security parameter) of base OTs at the expense of symmetric-key operations alone. This reduces the cost of OT mainly to highly efficient symmetric-key primitives. Concretely, the OT Extension implementation of [5] generates around 1 million 2-OT_ℓ^1 per second with passive security. An orthogonal line of work considered pre-computation of OT [10], where all the cryptographic operations can be shifted to a setup phase, independent of the function to be evaluated. This technique enables a very efficient online phase for protocols that use OT. In the semi-honest setting, the state-of-the-art solution for OT extension [5] has communication $\kappa + 2\ell$ bits per OT for 2-OT_ℓ^1 where κ denotes the computational security parameter.

A correlated OT (cOT) [5] is a variant of the traditional OT where the sender's input messages are correlated. In a cOT, the sender inputs a correlation function $f(\cdot)$ and obtains the message pair $(x_0 \in_R \{0, 1\}^\ell, x_1 = f(x_0))$ as the output. The

receiver, on the other hand, inputs her choice c and obtains x_c as output. We use cOT_ℓ^m to denote m instances of 1-out-of-2 correlated OT on ℓ bit inputs. In the semi-honest setting, cOT_ℓ^1 has communication $\kappa + \ell$ bits [5].

A.2 Secure 2PC

The three main generic approaches for 2PC are based on homomorphic encryption (HE), garbled circuits (GC), or secret-sharing (SS) as described next.

Homomorphic Encryption (HE) The homomorphic property allows us to compute a ciphertext from a set of ciphertexts such that the plaintext underlying the former is a function of the underlying plaintexts of the latter. Towards this, one party called client generates a key-pair (pk, sk) for the HE scheme and sends pk to the other party called server. To perform a secure computation operation, the client encrypts its data using pk and sends this to the server. Now the server can locally compute the ciphertext corresponding to the operation and return the encrypted result to the client. The client can now decrypt the received ciphertext using her private key sk . An *additively HE* allows us to generate the ciphertext corresponding to the sum of the underlying plaintexts by doing operations on the ciphertexts. Prominent examples of additively HE schemes are Paillier [87], DGK [40] and RLWE-AHE [97]. On the other hand, fully homomorphic encryption schemes allow arbitrary computations under encryption but are less efficient. See [1] for a more detailed description.

Garbled Circuits (GC) In the two-party setting, Yao’s garbled circuit protocol [79, 105] provides a constant-round solution. This method is particularly useful in high-latency networks like the Internet. Here, one party called *garbler* generates the garbled circuit (GC) corresponding to the function to be evaluated. On a high level, garbling the circuit consists of associating two keys per wire corresponding to the bit values of $\{0, 1\}$ and preparing garbled tables corresponding to each gate in the circuit. The garbler then sends the GC to the other party called *evaluator*. The evaluator, upon obviously obtaining the keys corresponding to the inputs via OT, evaluates the GC and obtains the output.

Today’s most efficient solution for garbled circuits is the combination of point-and-permute [11], free-XOR [72], fixed-key AES [12], and half-gates [106]. With these optimizations, each AND gate requires communication 2κ bits in the setup phase, and XOR gates have no communication. GC-based protocols perform in the online phase symmetric-key operations for each AND gate and need substantial memory to store the garbled tables. To avoid storing the garbled tables, their generation and transfer can be pipelined [54, 56], but this shifts all the setup communication to the online phase.

Secret Sharing (SS) In the SS-based protocols, two parties compute a function in a secret-shared manner. Here, for every wire with value v , party P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ holds

an additive sharing of the value denoted by $[v]_i$ such that $v = [v]_0 + [v]_1 \pmod{2^\ell}$. All the linear gates can be evaluated non-interactively. To securely evaluate a multiplication gate, parties use Beaver’s [9] circuit randomization technique where the additive sharing of a random arithmetic triple is generated in the setup phase (cf. §3.1.1). The shares of the triple are then used in the online phase to compute the shares of the product. This requires communication of 4 ring elements per multiplication gate in the online phase. Later, [13] reduced online communication to 2 ring elements using a function-dependent preprocessing.

In this line of work, the GMW protocol [50] takes a function represented as Boolean circuit (i.e., $\ell = 1$) and the values are secret-shared using XOR-based secret sharing. To precompute a multiplication triple $(c_1 \oplus c_2) = (a_1 \oplus a_2) \wedge (b_1 \oplus b_2)$, the solution of [5] which uses 1-out-of-2 OT, requires 2κ bits of communication. As shown in [44], this cost can be improved by factor $1.2\times$ by using the 1-out-of- N OT extension of [69].

A.3 Comparison with Turbospeetz [13] and [85]

In this section, we compare our results with Turbospeetz [13] and [85].

Comparison with Turbospeetz [13]: For the 2-input multiplication, Turbospeetz [13] presented a protocol that reduces the online communication of SPDZ-style protocols from 4 to 2 ring elements using a function-dependent preprocessing. Turbospeetz first executes a SPDZ-like preprocessing where random multiplication triples are generated. These triples are then associated to the multiplication gates using additional values that they call “external values” (cf. [13], §3.2). On the contrary, we obtain the preprocessing data directly and hence save communication of 4 ring elements as well as storage of 5 ring elements when compared with Turbospeetz. Tab. 13 provides the communication and storage required for the 2-input multiplication protocol of ABY [43], Turbospeetz [13] and ABY2.0.

Phase	Parameter	ABY [43]	Turbospeetz [13]	ABY2.0
Setup	Storage	3ℓ	9ℓ	4ℓ
	Communication	Triple	Triple + 4ℓ	Triple
Online	Storage	5ℓ	5ℓ	3ℓ
	Communication	4ℓ	2ℓ	2ℓ
Total	Storage	8ℓ	14ℓ	7ℓ
	Communication	Triple + 4ℓ	Triple + 6ℓ	Triple + 2ℓ

Table 13: Comparison of ABY2.0 with ABY [43] and Turbospeetz [13] in terms of storage and communication for a single multiplication. All values are given in bits. |Triple| denotes the communication required to generate a multiplication triple. Best values for the online phase are marked in bold.

For the multi-input multiplication (fan-in of N), the tree-based method (multiplying N elements by taking two at a time) requires $\log_2(N)$ rounds for both ABY [43] and Turbospeedz [13], while it requires communication of $4(N-1)$ ring elements for ABY [43] and $2(N-1)$ elements for Turbospeedz [13] in the online phase.

Comparison with [85]: Recently, [85] proposed round-efficient solutions for multi-input multiplication using a preprocessing for which the communication cost grows exponentially with the fan-in of the multiplication gate. However, for an N -input multiplication, [85] requires an online communication of $2N-2$ ring elements. On the contrary, ABY2.0 requires only an online communication of 2 ring elements and the preprocessing cost remains same as that of [85]. Note that since the preprocessing cost grows exponentially with the number of inputs to the multiplication gate, [85] considered only up to 5-input multiplication gates in their work. In our work, we use three and four input multiplication gates.

MULT when input parties are the computing parties: For the case of a two-input multiplication gate, [85] considered a special case where the input parties are the computing parties (cf. [85], §3.4). For this case, [85] proposed a protocol for which the online communication is 2 ring elements. For the same setting, we observe that our solution results in a protocol with zero online communication. To see this, recall the online phase of our multiplication protocol $\text{MULT}(\langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle)$ (Fig. 2). The modified protocol is as follows: During the online phase, party P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally computes $[\text{ab}]_i = i \cdot \Delta_{\text{ab}} - \Delta_a [\delta_b]_i - \Delta_b [\delta_a]_i + [\delta_{\text{ab}}]_i$. Now to generate $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -shares corresponding to $y = \text{ab}$, the parties locally set $[\delta_y]_i = -[\text{ab}]_i$ and $\Delta_y = 0$. It is easy to see that $y = \Delta_y - [\delta_y]_0 - [\delta_y]_1 = 0 - ([\text{ab}]_0 + [\text{ab}]_1) = \text{ab}$.

B 2PC Arithmetic

B.1 Basic Protocols

Lemma B.1 (Communication of SHARE). *Protocol SHARE (cf. Fig. 3) requires 1 round and communication of ℓ bits in the online phase.*

Proof. The setup phase is completely non-interactive. During the online phase, P_i communicates one ring element to P_{1-i} resulting in 1 round and a communication of ℓ bits. \square




Figure 3: Sharing Protocol SHARE

Lemma B.2 (Communication of MULT). *Protocol MULT (cf. Fig. 2) requires communication of $2\ell(\ell + \kappa)$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. For the setup phase (setupMULT), we use 2 instances of correlated OTs (cOT) [5] which incur a communication of $\ell + \kappa$ bits per cOT on ℓ -bit strings, where κ is the computational security parameter. During the online phase, parties mutually exchange one share of Δ_y value, resulting in 1 round and a communication of 2ℓ bits. \square

Lemma B.3 (Communication of REC). *Protocol REC (cf. Fig. 4) requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase.*

Proof. During the online phase, parties mutually exchange one missing share resulting in 1 round and a communication of 2ℓ bits. \square




Figure 4: Reconstruction Protocol REC

B.2 Setup Phase for Multiplication

Here we provide the details for instantiating the setup phase for multiplication using Homomorphic Encryption (HE) and Oblivious Transfer (OT) Techniques.

B.2.1 setupMULT for MULT

Here we provide concrete details for instantiating the setupMULT protocol where the goal is to generate $[\delta_{\text{ab}}]$ from $[\delta_a]$ and $[\delta_b]$. Recall from §3.1.3 that setupMULT can be instantiated with either HE or OT schemes.

In the HE-based approach [42, 54, 97], P_0 is given the key pair $(\text{pk}_0, \text{sk}_0)$ for the public key encryption scheme. P_0 encrypts his messages $[\delta_a]_0, [\delta_b]_0$ and sends these ciphertexts along with pk_0 to P_1 , who then computes the ciphertext corresponding to $\delta_{\text{ab}} - r$ encrypted under the public key pk_0 . Here r denotes a random ring element chosen by P_1 . P_1 then sends back the ciphertext to P_0 , who then decrypts using sk_0 to obtain $\delta_{\text{ab}} - r$. The shares are now defined as $[\delta_{\text{ab}}]_0 = \delta_{\text{ab}} - r, [\delta_{\text{ab}}]_1 = r$. In [97], the authors observed that the plaintext space is much larger than the range of the values being encrypted. Thus they used the technique of *ciphertext packing*, where ciphertexts corresponding to multiple plaintexts are packed into a single ciphertext. This optimizes the amount of ciphertexts being sent back as well as the number of decryptions on P_0 's side. In [97], the amortized communication cost for performing one instance of setupMULT over a

64-bit ring with a security level of 128 bits is 448 bytes, which is a $7\times$ improvement over the best OT-based solutions [43] available at that time.

In the OT-based approach [43, 65], the technique of OT extension [5, 69, 89] can be used. As mentioned in §3.1.3, one instance of setupMULT requires two instances of cOT_ℓ^ℓ where each instance has communication $\ell(\kappa + \ell)$ bits. Over a 64-bit ring, this corresponds to 3072 bytes.

Recently, [23] came up with a very efficient OT extension technique named Silent OT Extension which claims to outperform state-of-the-art solutions for performing setupMULT. Since our protocol makes black-box calls to setupMULT, it can directly benefit from the performance improvements of [23].

B.2.2 setupMULT3 for MULT3

The setupMULT3 protocol proceeds similar to that of setupMULT apart from four values being computed instead of one in setupMULT. Concretely, setupMULT3 computes a $[\cdot]$ -sharing of $\delta_{ab}, \delta_{ac}, \delta_{bc}$ and δ_{abc} given $[a], [b]$ and $[c]$.

In the HE-based approach, P_0 prepares ciphertexts corresponding to $[\delta_a]_0, [\delta_b]_0, [\delta_c]_0, [\delta_{ab}]_0, [\delta_{ac}]_0, [\delta_{bc}]_0$ and sends these ciphertexts to P_1 . P_1 then homomorphically computes the ciphertext corresponding to $\delta_{abc} - r$ similar to setupMULT and sends it to P_0 . In the OT-based approach, parties use steps similar to that of setupMULT to generate a $[\cdot]$ -sharing of $\delta_{ab}, \delta_{ac}, \delta_{bc}$. Once $[\delta_{ab}]$ is generated, both parties use $[\delta_{ab}]$ and $[\delta_c]$ to compute $[\delta_{abc}]$. Note that this method requires eight instances of cOT_ℓ^ℓ .

B.3 Multi-Input Multiplication Gate

This section describes our multi-input multiplication protocols. We provide formal details for the three and four input cases, which are used in this work. We also show how the technique can be generalised for the case of an N-input multiplication gate.

B.3.1 3-Input Multiplication Gate MULT3

Protocol MULT3($\langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle, \langle c \rangle$)

Setup:

- P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ samples random $[\delta_y]_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$.
- Parties execute setupMULT3($[\delta_a], [\delta_b], [\delta_c]$) to generate $[\delta_{ab}], [\delta_{bc}], [\delta_{ac}], [\delta_{abc}]$.

Online:

- P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally computes and sends to P_{1-i} the value $[\Delta_y]_i = i \cdot \Delta_{abc} - \Delta_{ab} [\delta_c]_i - \Delta_{bc} [\delta_a]_i - \Delta_{ac} [\delta_b]_i + \Delta_a [\delta_{bc}]_i + \Delta_b [\delta_{ac}]_i + \Delta_c [\delta_{ab}]_i - [\delta_{abc}]_i + [\delta_y]_i$.
- P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally sets $\Delta_y = [\Delta_y]_0 + [\Delta_y]_1$.

Figure 5: 3-Input Multiplication Protocol MULT3

Lemma B.4 (Communication of MULT3). *Protocol MULT3 (cf. Fig. 5) requires communication of $8\ell(\ell + \kappa)$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase.*

Proof. For the setup phase (setupMULT3), we need to generate the $[\cdot]$ -shares of four terms, namely $\delta_{ab}, \delta_{bc}, \delta_{ac}$ and δ_{abc} . Each of these terms requires 2 instances of correlated OTs (cOT) [5] which incur a communication of $\ell + \kappa$ bits per cOT on ℓ -bit strings, where κ is the computational security parameter. During the online phase, parties mutually exchange one share of Δ_y value, resulting in 1 round and a communication of 2ℓ bits. \square

B.3.2 4-Input Multiplication Gate MULT4

Here we provide the details for securely evaluating a 4-Input multiplication gate. Given the inputs $\langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle, \langle c \rangle, \langle d \rangle$, the goal is to compute $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -sharing of $y = abcd$. Protocol MULT4 (cf. Fig. 6) proceeds similar to MULT3 (cf. Fig. 5). Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_y &= abcd + \delta_y = (\Delta_a - \delta_a)(\Delta_b - \delta_b)(\Delta_c - \delta_c)(\Delta_d - \delta_d) + \delta_y \\ &= \Delta_{abcd} - \delta_a \Delta_{bcd} - \delta_b \Delta_{acd} - \delta_c \Delta_{abd} - \delta_d \Delta_{abc} + \delta_{ab} \Delta_{cd} + \delta_{ac} \Delta_{bd} \\ &\quad + \delta_{ad} \Delta_{bc} + \delta_{bc} \Delta_{ad} + \delta_{bd} \Delta_{ac} + \delta_{cd} \Delta_{ab} - \delta_{abc} \Delta_d - \delta_{acd} \Delta_b \\ &\quad - \delta_{abd} \Delta_c - \delta_{bcd} \Delta_a + \delta_{abcd} + \delta_y. \end{aligned}$$

Here the parties need to generate the $[\cdot]$ -sharing of the following terms: $\delta_{ab}, \delta_{ac}, \delta_{ad}, \delta_{bc}, \delta_{bd}, \delta_{cd}, \delta_{abc}, \delta_{abd}, \delta_{acd}, \delta_{bcd}, \delta_{abcd}$. This can be computed similar to that of setupMULT (cf. §B.2.1) and setupMULT3 (cf. §B.2.2) and we use setupMULT4 to denote such a computation.

Protocol MULT4($\langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle, \langle c \rangle, \langle d \rangle$)

Setup:

- P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ samples random $[\delta_y]_i \in_R \mathbb{Z}_{2^\ell}$.
- Parties execute setupMULT4 to generate a $[\cdot]$ -sharing of $\delta_{ab}, \delta_{ac}, \delta_{ad}, \delta_{bc}, \delta_{bd}, \delta_{cd}, \delta_{abc}, \delta_{abd}, \delta_{acd}, \delta_{bcd}$ and δ_{abcd} .

Online:

- P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally computes and sends to P_{1-i} the value $[\Delta_y]_i = i \cdot \Delta_{abcd} - [\delta_a]_i \Delta_{bcd} - [\delta_b]_i \Delta_{acd} - [\delta_c]_i \Delta_{abd} - [\delta_d]_i \Delta_{abc} + [\delta_{ab}]_i \Delta_{cd} + [\delta_{ac}]_i \Delta_{bd} + [\delta_{ad}]_i \Delta_{bc} + [\delta_{bc}]_i \Delta_{ad} + [\delta_{bd}]_i \Delta_{ac} + [\delta_{cd}]_i \Delta_{ab} - [\delta_{abc}]_i \Delta_d - [\delta_{acd}]_i \Delta_b - [\delta_{abd}]_i \Delta_c - [\delta_{bcd}]_i \Delta_a + [\delta_{abcd}]_i + [\delta_y]_i$.
- P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally sets $\Delta_y = [\Delta_y]_0 + [\Delta_y]_1$.

Figure 6: 4-Input Multiplication Protocol MULT4

Lemma B.5 (Communication of MULT4). *Protocol MULT4 (cf. Fig. 6) requires communication of $22\ell(\ell + \kappa)$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase.*

Proof. For the setup phase (setupMULT4), we need to generate the $[\cdot]$ -shares of eleven terms, namely

$\delta_{ab}, \delta_{ac}, \delta_{ad}, \delta_{bc}, \delta_{bd}, \delta_{cd}, \delta_{abc}, \delta_{abd}, \delta_{acd}, \delta_{bcd}$ and δ_{abcd} . Each of these terms requires 2 instances of correlated OTs (cOT) [5] which incur a communication of $\ell + \kappa$ bits per cOT on ℓ -bit strings, where κ is the computational security parameter. During the online phase, both parties mutually exchange one share of Δ_y value, resulting in 1 round and a communication of 2ℓ bits. \square

B.3.3 N-Input Multiplication Gate MULTN

Consider an N-Input multiplication gate MULTN with inputs a_1, \dots, a_N and output y . Then, we can write

$$\begin{aligned} \Delta_y = y + \delta_y &= \prod_{j=1}^N (\Delta_{a_j} - \delta_{a_j}) + \delta_y \\ &= \left(\sum_{I \subseteq \{1, \dots, N\}} (-1)^{|I|} \prod_{j \in I} \delta_{a_j} \prod_{k \notin I} \Delta_{a_k} \right) + \delta_y. \end{aligned}$$

Here $I \subseteq \{1, \dots, N\}$ denotes a subset of indices from 1 to N, while $|I|$ denotes the cardinality of the set.

We note that for an N-Input multiplication gate, we would require a total of $2^N - N - 1$ terms to be processed in the setup phase, while the online phase still requires a communication of just 2 ring elements. Instantiating the setup phase using Correlated OTs (cOT) [5] require a communication of $(2^N - N - 1)2\ell(\kappa + \ell)$ bits. Hence, to maintain a balance between the online communication and the setup phase overhead, we consider $N = 3$ and $N = 4$ in this work.

B.3.4 Comparison with the LUT-based protocol of [44]

We compare our multi-input AND gate protocols with [44] for two, three and four inputs. [44] proposed two variants – i) OP-LUT - optimized online communication of $2N$ bits, and ii) SP-LUT - optimized total communication of $2\kappa + 2^N$ bits. The concrete details are given in Tab. 14.

Gate	Protocol	Setup		Online	
		Comm [bits]	Comm [bits]	Rounds	
AND $y = ab$	OP-LUT [44]	206	4	1	
	SP-LUT [44]	190	6	1	
	ABY2.0	134	2	1	
AND3 $y = abc$	OP-LUT [44]	285	6	1	
	SP-LUT [44]	221	11	1	
	ABY2.0	250	2	1	
AND4 $y = abcd$	OP-LUT [44]	492	8	1	
	SP-LUT [44]	236	20	1	
	ABY2.0	412	2	1	

Table 14: Comparison of ABY2.0 and [44]. Best values for the online phase are marked in bold.

C Mixed Protocol Conversions

C.1 Conversions

Lemma C.1 (Communication of Y2B). *Protocol Y2B (cf. §4.1) requires communication of 1 bit in the*

setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 1 bit in the online phase.

Proof. In the setup phase, P_0 executes one instance of $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{B}}(P_0, \text{LSB}(K_0^0))$ resulting in a communication of just 1 bit. Similarly, during the online phase, P_1 executes one instance of $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{B}}(P_1, \text{LSB}(K_1^0))$, resulting in one round and a communication of 1 bit. The cost follows from Lemma B.1. \square

Lemma C.2 (Communication of B2Y). *Protocol B2Y (cf. §4.1) requires communication of 2κ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of κ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. In the setup phase, P_1 executes one instance of $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{Y}}(P_1, u_1)$. This requires a communication of 2κ bits since it requires an invocation of cOT_{κ}^1 . During the online phase, P_0 executes one instance of $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{Y}}(P_0, u_0)$ where P_0 sends the corresponding keys to P_1 . This results in one round and a communication of κ bits. \square

Lemma C.3 (Communication of A2Y). *Protocol A2Y (cf. §4.1) requires communication of $4\ell\kappa$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of $\ell\kappa$ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. In the setup phase, P_1 executes ℓ instances of $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{Y}}(P_1, u_1)$. This requires a communication of $2\ell\kappa$ bits since it requires an invocation of cOT_{κ}^1 . Moreover, P_0 communicates a garbled Adder circuit consisting of ℓ AND gates resulting in a communication of $2\ell\kappa$ bits (using the half gates technique). During the online phase, P_0 executes ℓ instances of $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{Y}}(P_0, u_0)$ where P_0 sends the corresponding keys to P_1 . This results in one round and a communication of $\ell\kappa$ bits. \square

Lemma C.4 (Communication of Y2A). *Protocol Y2A (cf. §4.1) requires communication of $3\ell\kappa + 2\ell$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of ℓ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. In the setup phase, P_0 executes one instance of $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{A}}(P_0, r)$ and $\text{SHARE}^{\mathbf{Y}}(P_0, r)$ each, where r is a ℓ -bit ring element. This requires a communication of $\ell\kappa + \ell$ bits. Moreover, P_0 communicates a garbled Adder circuit consisting of ℓ AND gates resulting in a communication of $2\ell\kappa$ bits (using the half gates technique). Since we use the point-and-permute technique, the decoding information given to P_1 can be simply the LSB bits of the zero keys corresponding to the output wires. Thus the decoding information requires a communication of ℓ bits in this conversion. During the online phase, P_1 executes one instance of

$\text{SHARE}^A(P_1, v+r)$ resulting in 1 round and a communication of ℓ bits (Lemma B.1). \square

Lemma C.5 (Communication of A2B). *Protocol A2B (cf. §4.1) requires communication of $4\ell\kappa + \ell$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 2 rounds and communication of $\ell\kappa + \ell$ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. The conversion requires one instance of A2Y and ℓ instances of Y2B conversions. The cost then follows from A2Y (Lemma C.3) and Y2B (Lemma C.1). \square

Lemma C.6 (Communication of Bit2A). *Protocol Bit2A (cf. §4.1) requires communication of $\kappa + \ell$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of ℓ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. During the setup phase, parties engage in one instance of cOT_ℓ^1 resulting in a communication of $\kappa + \ell$ bits. During the online phase, both parties execute one instance of SHARE^A , resulting in one round and a communication of 2ℓ bits. \square

Lemma C.7 (Communication of B2A). *Protocol B2A (cf. §4.1) requires communication of $\ell\kappa + \ell^2$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. The setup phase involves ℓ instances of the Bit2A protocol resulting in a communication of $\ell\kappa + \ell^2$ bits (Lemma C.6). During the online phase, instead of executing SHARE^A corresponding to each instance, parties can locally sum up their shares according to the semantics and perform SHARE^A on the result, resulting in one round and a communication of just 2ℓ bits. \square

C.2 Special Conversions

Here we provide details for the special conversions mentioned in §4.2. Their complexities in comparison to [85] are summarized in Tab. 15. All the three conversions described below proceed similar to that of the Bit2A protocol.

Conv.	Ref.	Setup	Online	
		Comm [bits]	Rounds	Comm [bits]
Bit2A (cf. §4.1)	[85]	$2\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	1	4 ℓ
	ABY2.0	$\kappa + \ell$	1	2ℓ
PQ	[85]	$50\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	1	28 ℓ
	ABY2.0	$5\kappa + 3\ell + 2$	1	2ℓ
PV	[85]	$10\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	1	10 ℓ
	ABY2.0	$5(\kappa + \ell)$	1	2ℓ
PQV	[85]	$128\ell(\kappa + \ell)$	1	38 ℓ
	ABY2.0	$14\kappa + 12\ell + 2$	1	2ℓ

Table 15: Comparison of ABY2.0 and [85] for special conversions. Best values are marked in bold.

$\text{PQ}(\langle p \rangle^B, \langle q \rangle^B) : \langle p \rangle^B \langle q \rangle^B \rightarrow \langle pq \rangle^A$ Given the $\langle \cdot \rangle^B$ -sharing of bits p, q , the goal of the PQ protocol is to generate an arithmetic sharing of the bit pq . Note that

$$\begin{aligned} (pq)^a &= (\Delta_p^a + (1 - 2\Delta_p^a) \cdot \delta_p^a)(\Delta_q^a + (1 - 2\Delta_q^a) \cdot \delta_q^a) \\ &= \Delta_{pq}^a + \Delta_p^a(1 - 2\Delta_q^a) \cdot \delta_q^a \\ &\quad + \Delta_q^a(1 - 2\Delta_p^a) \cdot \delta_p^a + (1 - 2\Delta_p^a)(1 - 2\Delta_q^a) \cdot \delta_{pq}^a. \end{aligned}$$

During the setup phase, parties proceed similar to the Bit2A protocol and generate $[\delta_p^a]$ and $[\delta_q^a]$ from $\langle p \rangle^B$ and $\langle q \rangle^B$, respectively. In parallel, the parties can use two instances of cOT_1^1 on the $[\cdot]$ -shares of bits p and q to generate $[u]$ where bit $u = pq$. This is followed by both parties generating $[\delta_u^a]$ from $\langle u \rangle^B$ using the idea described in the Bit2A conversion. Given a $[\cdot]$ -sharing of δ_p^a, δ_q^a and δ_{pq}^a , the parties can locally compute $[pq^a]$ followed by executing the SHARE^A protocol to generate its corresponding arithmetic shares. The parties then locally add the arithmetic shares generated to obtain the desired result.

Lemma C.8 (Communication of PQ). *Protocol PQ as described above requires communication of $5\kappa + 3\ell + 2$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. The setup phase involves three instances of cOT_ℓ^1 for generating $[\delta_p^a]$, $[\delta_q^a]$ and $[\delta_u^a]$, resulting in a communication of $3(\kappa + \ell)$ bits. In addition, two instances of cOT_1^1 are executed to compute $[u]$ for $u = pq$, resulting in a communication of $2(\kappa + 1)$ bits. During the online phase, both P_0, P_1 execute one instance of SHARE^A each, resulting in one round and a communication of 2ℓ bits (Lemma B.1). \square

$\text{PV}(\langle p \rangle^B, \langle v \rangle^A) : \langle p \rangle^B \langle v \rangle^A \rightarrow \langle pv \rangle^A$ Given $\langle p \rangle^B$ and $\langle v \rangle^A$, the goal of PV protocol is to generate an arithmetic sharing of the value pv . Note that

$$\begin{aligned} pv &= (\Delta_p^a + (1 - 2\Delta_p^a) \cdot \delta_p^a)(\Delta_v - \delta_v) \\ &= \Delta_{pv} + \Delta_p^a \delta_v + \Delta_v(1 - 2\Delta_p^a) \cdot \delta_p^a + (1 - 2\Delta_p^a)\Delta_v \cdot \delta_{pv}. \end{aligned}$$

Here we need to compute $[\delta_p^a]$ and $[\delta_{pv}]$. $[\delta_p^a]$ can be computed using just one instance of cOT_ℓ^1 similar to the Bit2A protocol and incurs a communication of $\kappa + \ell$ bits. For $[\delta_{pv}]$, multiplying $[\delta_p^a]$ and $[\delta_v]$ requires cOT_ℓ^ℓ . The cost can be optimized further by carefully analysing the value of δ_{pv} . Note that

$$\begin{aligned} \delta_{pv} &= ([\delta_p^a]_0 + [\delta_p^a]_1 - 2[\delta_p^a]_0[\delta_p^a]_1)([\delta_v]_0 + [\delta_v]_1) \\ &= [\delta_p^a]_0[\delta_v]_0 + [\delta_p^a]_0[\delta_v]_1 + [\delta_p^a]_1[\delta_v]_0 + [\delta_p^a]_1[\delta_v]_1 \\ &\quad - 2[\delta_p^a]_0[\delta_p^a]_1[\delta_v]_0 - 2[\delta_p^a]_0[\delta_p^a]_1[\delta_v]_1. \end{aligned}$$

Here P_0 can locally compute $[\delta_p^a]_0[\delta_v]_0$ while P_1 can locally compute $[\delta_p^a]_1[\delta_v]_1$. For the four remaining terms, both parties can proceed similar to the Bit2A protocol and require a total of four instances of cOT_ℓ^1 resulting in a communication of $4(\kappa + \ell)$ bits.

Lemma C.9 (Communication of PV). *Protocol PV as described above requires communication of $5\kappa + 5\ell$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. The setup phase involves five instances of cOT_ℓ^1 , resulting in a communication of $5(\kappa + \ell)$ bits. During the online phase, both P_0, P_1 execute one instance of SHARE^A each, resulting in one round and a communication of 2ℓ bits (Lemma B.1). \square

$\text{PQV} : \langle p \rangle^B \langle q \rangle^B \langle v \rangle^A \rightarrow \langle pqv \rangle^A$ Given $\langle p \rangle^B, \langle q \rangle^B$ and $\langle v \rangle^A$, the goal of the PQV protocol is to generate an arithmetic sharing of the value pqv . Note that

$$\begin{aligned} pqv &= (\Delta_p^a + (1 - 2\Delta_p^a) \cdot \delta_p^a)(\Delta_q^a + (1 - 2\Delta_q^a) \cdot \delta_q^a)(\Delta_v - \delta_v) \\ &= \Delta_{pqv} + \Delta_{pv}(1 - 2\Delta_q^a) \cdot \delta_q^a + \Delta_{qv}(1 - 2\Delta_p^a) \cdot \delta_p^a \\ &\quad + (1 - 2\Delta_p^a)(1 - 2\Delta_q^a)\Delta_v \cdot \delta_{pq}^a - \Delta_{pq}^a \delta_v - \Delta_p^a(1 - 2\Delta_q^a) \cdot \delta_{qv}^a \\ &\quad - \Delta_q^a(1 - 2\Delta_p^a) \cdot \delta_{pv} - (1 - 2\Delta_p^a)(1 - 2\Delta_q^a) \cdot \delta_{pqv}. \end{aligned}$$

Here parties need to compute $[\cdot]$ -sharings of $\delta_p^a, \delta_q^a, \delta_{pq}^a, \delta_{pv}, \delta_{qv}$ and δ_{pqv} . All except $[\delta_{pqv}]$ are generated similar to that of the PQ and PV protocols. For $[\delta_{pqv}]$, parties first multiply δ_p and δ_q to obtain δ_{pq} . This is followed by executing steps similar to the PV conversion.

Lemma C.10 (Communication of PQV). *Protocol PQV as described above requires communication of $14\kappa + 12\ell + 2$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. The setup phase involves twelve instances of cOT_ℓ^1 , resulting in a communication of $12(\kappa + \ell)$ bits. In addition, two instances of cOT_1^1 are needed, resulting in additional communication of $2(\kappa + 1)$ bits. During the online phase, both P_0, P_1 execute one instance of SHARE^A each, resulting in one round and a communication of 2ℓ bits (Lemma B.1). \square

D Building Blocks

Here we provide the formal details and the communication cost analysis for the building blocks described in §5.

D.1 Scalar Product

Lemma D.1 (Communication of DOTP). *Protocol DOTP (cf. Fig. 7) requires communication of $2n\ell(\ell + \kappa)$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter and n denotes the size of the underlying vectors.*

Proof. The setup phase involves n invocation of setupMULT resulting in a communication of $2n\ell(\ell + \kappa)$ bits (Lemma B.2). During the online phase, instead of exchanging $[\cdot]$ -shares corresponding to each instance, parties can locally sum up their $[\cdot]$ -shares and then perform the exchange, resulting in one round and a communication of 2ℓ bits. \square




Figure 7: Scalar Dot Product Protocol DOTP

D.2 Matrix Multiplication

Protocol MATMULT (Fig. 8) begins with both parties holding $\langle \cdot \rangle$ -shares of two matrices $\mathbf{A}^{p \times q}, \mathbf{B}^{q \times r}$ and the goal is to compute $\langle \mathbf{C} \rangle$ where $\mathbf{C}^{p \times r} = \mathbf{A} \circ \mathbf{B}$.




Figure 8: Matrix Multiplication Protocol MATMULT

Lemma D.2 (Communication of MATMULT). *Protocol MATMULT (cf. Fig. 8) requires communication of $2pqr\ell(\ell + \kappa)$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of $2pr\ell$ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter and $(p \times q), (q \times r)$ denote the dimension of the underlying matrices \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} respectively.*

Proof. The setup phase involves pqr invocations of setupMULT resulting in a communication of $2pqr\ell(\ell + \kappa)$

bits (Lemma B.2). During the online phase, parties can locally compute $[\cdot]$ -shares of Δ_C which is of dimension $(p \times r)$, resulting in one round and a communication of $2pr\ell$ bits. \square

D.3 Comparison

Lemma D.3 (Communication of LT). *Protocol LT (cf. §5.4) requires communication of $x_1(\kappa + 1) + \ell$ bits in the setup phase with $x_1 = 2n_2 + 8n_3 + 22n_4$, while it requires $1 + \log_4(\ell)^2$ rounds and communication of $2x_2 + \ell$ bits in the online phase with $x_2 = n_2 + n_3 + n_4$. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter while n_2, n_3, n_4 denote the number of AND gates in the Bit Extraction (BitExt) circuit of §E.2 with 2,3,4 inputs respectively.*

Proof. P_0, P_1 execute ℓ instances of SHARE^B resulting in a communication of ℓ bits each. In addition, both parties evaluate a Bit Extraction (BitExt, cf. §5.3, §E.2) circuit consisting of n_2 two-input, n_3 three-input and n_4 four-input AND gates. The cost then follows from Lemma B.1 and Lemma B.2. \square

D.4 Truncation

Protocol MULTTR($\langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle$)

Setup: This phase is same as that of $\text{MULT}(\langle a \rangle, \langle b \rangle)$ (Fig. 2).

Online: P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ proceeds as follows:

- Locally computes $[y]_i = i \cdot \Delta_{ab} - \Delta_a [\delta_b]_i - \Delta_b [\delta_a]_i + [\delta_{ab}]_i$ and truncates to obtain $[y']_i$.
- Executes $\text{SHARE}^A(P_i, [y']_i)$ to generate $\langle [y']_i \rangle^A$.
- Locally computes $\langle y' \rangle^A = \langle [y']_0 \rangle^A + \langle [y']_1 \rangle^A$.

Figure 9: Multiplication Protocol with Truncation MULTTR

Lemma D.4 (Communication of MULTTR). *Protocol MULTTR (cf. Fig. 9) requires communication of $2\ell(\ell + \kappa)$ bits in the setup phase, while it requires 1 round and communication of 2ℓ bits in the online phase. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter.*

Proof. The cost follows directly from Lemma B.2. \square

D.5 MAX2 / MIN2

Lemma D.5 (Communication of MAX2/MIN2). *Protocol MAX2/MIN2 (cf. §5.6) requires communication of $(x_1 + 5)\kappa + x_1 + 5\ell$ bits in the setup phase with $x_1 = 2n_2 + 8n_3 + 22n_4$, while it requires $2 + \log_4(\ell)$ rounds and communication of $2x_2 + 3\ell$ bits in the online phase with $x_2 = n_2 + n_3 + n_4$. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter while n_2, n_3, n_4 denote the number of AND gates in the Bit Extraction (BitExt) circuit of §E.2 with 2,3,4 inputs respectively.*

²The $\log_4(\ell)$ factor is the result of having up to 4-input AND gates in our construction for BitExt. We observed that the bound holds for ℓ up to 128 in our construction.

Proof. The protocol involves one instance of the LT protocol followed by an instance of the PV protocol. The cost then follows from Lemma D.3 and Lemma C.9. \square

D.6 MAX3 / MIN3

Protocol MAX3($\langle a \rangle^A, \langle b \rangle^A, \langle c \rangle^A$)

Setup:

- Parties execute the setup phase corresponding to $\langle u_1 \rangle^B = \text{LT}(\langle a \rangle^A, \langle b \rangle^A), \langle u_2 \rangle^B = \text{LT}(\langle a \rangle^A, \langle c \rangle^A)$ and $\langle u_3 \rangle^B = \text{LT}(\langle b \rangle^A, \langle c \rangle^A)$
- Parties execute the setup phase corresponding to $\text{PQV}(\langle \bar{u}_1 \rangle^B, \langle \bar{u}_2 \rangle^B, \langle a \rangle^A), \text{PQV}(\langle u_1 \rangle^B, \langle \bar{u}_3 \rangle^B, \langle b \rangle^A)$ and $\text{PQV}(\langle u_2 \rangle^B, \langle u_3 \rangle^B, \langle c \rangle^A)$.

Online:

- Parties execute the online phase corresponding to $\langle u_1 \rangle^B = \text{LT}(\langle a \rangle^A, \langle b \rangle^A), \langle u_2 \rangle^B = \text{LT}(\langle a \rangle^A, \langle c \rangle^A)$ and $\langle u_3 \rangle^B = \text{LT}(\langle b \rangle^A, \langle c \rangle^A)$.
- For each $j \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, parties locally compute $\langle \bar{u}_j \rangle^B$ by applying the NOT operation on $\langle u_j \rangle^B$.
- P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ locally computes the $[\cdot]$ -share corresponding to $y_1 = \bar{u}_1 \cdot \bar{u}_2 \cdot a, y_2 = u_1 \cdot \bar{u}_3 \cdot b$ and $y_3 = u_2 \cdot u_3 \cdot c$ (as part of the PQV protocol) and sets $[y]_i = [y_1]_i + [y_2]_i + [y_3]_i$.
- P_i for $i \in \{0, 1\}$ executes $\text{SHARE}^A(P_i, [y]_i)$ to generate $\langle [y]_i \rangle^A$. This is followed by both parties locally setting $\langle y \rangle^A = \langle [y]_0 \rangle^A + \langle [y]_1 \rangle^A$.

Figure 10: Maximum among three values MAX3

Lemma D.6 (Communication of MAX3/MIN3). *Protocol MAX3/MIN3 (cf. Fig. 10) requires communication of $(3x_1 + 42)\kappa + 3x_1 + 39\ell + 6$ bits in the setup phase with $x_1 = 2n_2 + 8n_3 + 22n_4$, while it requires $2 + \log_4(\ell)$ rounds and communication of $6x_2 + 5\ell$ bits in the online phase with $x_2 = n_2 + n_3 + n_4$. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter while n_2, n_3, n_4 denote the number of AND gates in the Bit Extraction (BitExt) circuit of §E.2 with 2,3,4 inputs respectively.*

Proof. The protocol involves three instances of the LT protocol followed by three instances of the PQV protocol. Moreover the online communication cost corresponding to three instances of PQV can be brought down to 2ℓ bits by locally adding up the shares and performing SHARE^A on the result. The cost then follows from Lemma D.3 and Lemma C.10. \square

D.7 ArgMax/ArgMin

ArgMax (resp. ArgMin) computes the index of the maximum (resp. minimum) element among a set of elements. Here we provide the details for finding the index of the maximum among three elements a, b, c given their arithmetic sharing. Towards this, note that the index of the maximum element

can be written as $y = \bar{u}_1 \cdot \bar{u}_2 + u_1 \cdot \bar{u}_3 + u_2 \cdot u_3$ where u_1, u_2 and u_3 are the result of $a < b$, $a < c$ and $b < c$ respectively.

The protocol is almost similar to that of the MAX3 protocol apart from the PQ protocol being used instead of the PQV protocol. The formal details of the ArgMax protocol are given in Fig. 11.




Figure 11: ArgMax Protocol

The protocol for ArgMin can be obtained by tweaking the above protocol similar to the MIN3 protocol (cf. §5.7).

Lemma D.7 (Communication of ArgMax/ArgMin). *Protocol ArgMax/ArgMin (cf. Fig. 11) requires communication of $(3x_1 + 45)\kappa + 3x_1 + 12\ell + 6$ bits in the setup phase with $x_1 = 2n_2 + 8n_3 + 22n_4$, while it requires $2 + \log_4(\ell)$ rounds and communication of $6x_2 + 5\ell$ bits in the online phase with $x_2 = n_2 + n_3 + n_4$. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter while n_2, n_3, n_4 denote the number of AND gates in the Bit Extraction (BitExt) circuit of §E.2 with 2,3,4 inputs respectively.*

Proof. The protocol is similar to MAX3/MIN3 except that PQV is replaced with the PQ protocol. Moreover the online communication cost for three instances of PQ can be brought to 2ℓ bits using the same trick. The cost then follows from Lemma D.3 and Lemma C.8. \square

D.8 Non-Linear Activation Functions

Lemma D.8 (Communication of ReLU). *Protocol ReLU (cf. §5.8) requires communication of $(x_1 + 5)\kappa + x_1 + 5\ell$ bits in the setup phase with $x_1 = 2n_2 + 8n_3 + 22n_4$, while it requires $2 + \log_4(\ell)$ rounds and communication of $2x_2 + 3\ell$ bits in the online phase with $x_2 = n_2 + n_3 + n_4$. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter while n_2, n_3, n_4 denote the number of AND gates in the Bit Extraction (BitExt) circuit of §E.2 with 2,3,4 inputs respectively.*

Proof. The protocol involves one instance of the LT protocol followed by an instance of the PV protocol. The cost then follows from Lemma D.3 and Lemma C.9. \square

Lemma D.9 (Communication of Sig). *Protocol Sig (cf. §5.8) requires communication of $(2x_1 + 15)\kappa + 2x_1 + 14\ell + 2$ bits in the setup phase with $x_1 = 2n_2 + 8n_3 + 22n_4$, while it requires $2 + \log_4(\ell)$ rounds and communication of $4x_2 + 4\ell$ bits in the online phase with $x_2 = n_2 + n_3 + n_4$. Here κ denotes the computational security parameter while n_2, n_3, n_4 denote the number of AND gates in the Bit Extraction (BitExt) circuit of §E.2 with 2,3,4 inputs respectively.*

Proof. The protocol involves two instances of the LT protocol followed by one instance each of PQV and Bit2A. Moreover the online communication cost corresponding to PQV and Bit2A can be brought down to 2ℓ bits by locally adding up the shares corresponding to these two instances and performing SHARE^A on the result. The cost then follows from Lemma D.3, Lemma C.10 and Lemma C.6. \square

D.9 Equality Testing

The formal details for EQ are given in Fig. 12.




Figure 12: Equality Testing Protocol EQ for $\ell = 64$ bit ring

E Depth-Optimized Circuits

In this section, we provide concrete details for our depth-optimized Adder circuit constructions. We use ideas from [8, 52] and incorporate three and four input AND gates in addition to the two-input AND gates. We focused on optimizing the multiplicative depth without increasing the total number of gates considerably. We construct a Parallel Prefix Adder (PPA) circuit as well as a Bit Extraction circuit which computes the Most Significant Bit (MSB) of the sum. Here we provide a high level description of the construction and refer the reader [8, 52] for more concrete details.

E.1 Depth-Optimized Adder

Given two ℓ -bit values a and b , the goal is to compute the sum of the inputs. For this, the circuit makes use of intermediate generate (g) and propagate (p) prefix signals [8, 52]. Consider the i -th bit of the inputs, a_i and b_i . Then the corresponding generate (g_i) and propagate (p_i) signals are obtained as:

$$g_i = a_i \cdot b_i, \quad p_i = a_i \oplus b_i. \quad (1)$$

Operators \diamond and \blacklozenge , that takes a pair of (g, p) signals as input, are defined as:

$$\begin{aligned} (g_1, p_1) \diamond (g_2, p_2) &= g_1 \oplus (p_1 \cdot g_2), \\ (g_1, p_1) \blacklozenge (g_2, p_2) &= ((g_1 \oplus (p_1 \cdot g_2)), p_1 p_2). \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

For ease of representation, let $\diamond_i(g, p)$ denote the operation $(g_1, p_1) \diamond (g_2, p_2) \dots \diamond (g_i, p_i)$. Similarly, $\blacklozenge_i(g, p)$ denotes $(g_1, p_1) \blacklozenge (g_2, p_2) \dots \blacklozenge (g_i, p_i)$. Then for sequential operations, we apply the operation recursively and obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \diamond_3(g, p) &= g_1 \oplus p_1(g_2 \oplus (p_2 \cdot g_3)) \\ &= g_1 \oplus p_1 g_2 \oplus p_1 p_2 g_3, \\ \diamond_4(g, p) &= g_1 \oplus p_1(g_2 \oplus (p_2(g_3 \oplus p_3 g_4))) \\ &= g_1 \oplus p_1 g_2 \oplus p_1 p_2 g_3 \oplus p_1 p_2 p_3 g_4, \\ \blacklozenge_3(g, p) &= ((g_1 \oplus p_1(g_2 \oplus (p_2 \cdot g_3))), p_1 p_2 p_3) \\ &= ((g_1 \oplus p_1 g_2 \oplus p_1 p_2 g_3), p_1 p_2 p_3), \\ \blacklozenge_4(g, p) &= ((g_1 \oplus p_1(g_2 \oplus (p_2(g_3 \oplus p_3 g_4))))), p_1 p_2 p_3 p_4) \\ &= ((g_1 \oplus p_1 g_2 \oplus p_1 p_2 g_3 \oplus p_1 p_2 p_3 g_4), p_1 p_2 p_3 p_4). \end{aligned} \quad (3)$$

Note that all of $\blacklozenge_i(g, p)$ and $\diamond_i(g, p)$ in Equation 3 require only 1 online round. This is possible because of the two, three, and four input AND gates, each of which requires 1 online round of communication.

Given the aforementioned details, the circuit evaluation (in a high level) can be summarized in three steps as follows:

- Step 1** For each $i \in [\ell]$, compute generate (g_i) and propagate (p_i) signals according to Equation 1.
- Step 2** Recursively compute the Carry bits using the signals generated in **Step 1** according to Equations 2 and 3.
- Step 3** Compute the Sum bits (s_i for $i \in [\ell]$) using an additional level of XOR gates at the output.




Figure 13: PPA Adder for 8-bit input

Fig. 13 shows our PPA construction for the 8-bit inputs and Fig. 14 for 64-bit inputs. A detailed description for the 8-bit case with inputs $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^8}$ is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} G_0 &= a_0 b_0 \\ G_1 &= (g_1, p_1) \diamond (g_0, p_0) = g_1 \oplus p_1 a_0 b_0 \\ G_2 &= (g_2, p_2) \diamond (g_1, p_1) \diamond (g_0, p_0) \\ &= g_2 \oplus p_1 a_1 b_1 \oplus p_2 p_1 a_0 b_0 \\ G_3 &= (g_3, p_3) \diamond (g_2, p_2) \diamond (g_1, p_1) \diamond (g_0, p_0) = g_3 \oplus p_3 G_2 \\ G_4 &= (g_4, p_4) \diamond G_3 = g_4 \oplus p_4 g_3 \oplus p_4 p_3 G_2 \\ G_5 &= (g_5, p_5) \blacklozenge (g_4, p_4) \diamond G_3 = (g_5 \oplus p_5 g_4, p_5 p_4) \diamond G_3 \\ &= g_5 \oplus p_5 g_4 \oplus p_5 p_4 g_3 \oplus p_5 p_4 p_3 G_2 \\ G_6 &= (g_6, p_6) \blacklozenge (g_5, p_5) \blacklozenge (g_4, p_4) \diamond G_3 \\ &= g_6 \oplus p_6 g_5 \oplus p_6 p_5 g_4 \oplus p_6 p_5 p_4 G_3 \\ &= g_6 \oplus p_6 g_5 \oplus p_6 p_5 g_4 \oplus p_6 p_5 p_4 g_3 \oplus (p_6 p_5 p_4 p_3) G_2 \\ s_0 &= p_0, \quad s_i = G_{i-1} \oplus p_i \end{aligned}$$

Note that many of these equations use bit multiplications of 4 values (i.e., $p_2 p_1 a_0 b_0$) for which we can use our efficient AND4 gates.




Figure 14: PPA Adder for 64-bit inputs

E.2 Bit Extraction Circuit

As shown in [80], our proposed PPA adders from §E.1 can be optimized to compute the most significant bit (MSB) and we call this circuit Bit Extraction (BitExt) circuit. This is achieved by removing the unnecessary gates from the respective PPA circuit. Fig. 15 shows the structure for the BitExt circuit with 8-bit inputs and Fig. 16 for 64-bits inputs.




Figure 15: BitExt circuit for 8-bit inputs

Figure 17 provides a more detailed version of the BitExt circuit with 64-bit inputs. Given two inputs $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}_{2^{64}}$, the




Figure 16: BitExt circuit for 64-bit inputs

MSB is computed as s_{63} . Our construction has 41 two-input, 27 three-input, and 47 four-input AND gates. Also, the multiplicative depth was reduced from 6 to 3.

$$\begin{aligned}
 G[i] &= \text{AND2}(X[i], Y[i]), & P[i] &= X[i] \oplus Y[i] \\
 G_{2,1} &= G[2] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[2], X[1], Y[1]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[2], P[1], X[0], Y[0]) \\
 G_{6,1} &= G[6] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[6], X[5], Y[5]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[6], P[5], X[4], Y[4]) \\
 G_{10,1} &= G[10] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[10], X[9], Y[9]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[10], P[9], X[8], Y[8]) \\
 P_{7,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[7], P[6], P[5], P[4]), & P_{11,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[11], P[10], P[9], P[8]) \\
 G_{14,1} &= G[14] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[14], X[13], Y[13]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[14], P[13], X[12], Y[12]) \\
 G_{18,1} &= G[18] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[18], X[17], Y[17]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[18], P[17], X[16], Y[16]) \\
 P_{15,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[15], P[14], P[13], P[12]), & P_{19,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[19], P[18], P[17], P[16]) \\
 G_{22,1} &= G[22] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[22], X[21], Y[21]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[22], P[21], X[20], Y[20]) \\
 G_{26,1} &= G[26] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[26], X[25], Y[25]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[26], P[25], X[24], Y[24]) \\
 P_{23,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[23], P[22], P[21], P[20]), & P_{27,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[27], P[26], P[25], P[24]) \\
 G_{30,1} &= G[30] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[30], X[29], Y[29]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[30], P[29], X[28], Y[28]) \\
 G_{34,1} &= G[34] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[34], X[33], Y[33]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[34], P[33], X[32], Y[32]) \\
 P_{31,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[31], P[30], P[29], P[28]), & P_{35,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[35], P[34], P[33], P[32]) \\
 G_{38,1} &= G[38] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[38], X[37], Y[37]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[38], P[37], X[36], Y[36]) \\
 G_{42,1} &= G[42] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[42], X[41], Y[41]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[42], P[41], X[40], Y[40]) \\
 P_{39,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[39], P[38], P[37], P[36]), & P_{43,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[43], P[42], P[41], P[40]) \\
 G_{46,1} &= G[46] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[46], X[45], Y[45]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[46], P[45], X[44], Y[44]) \\
 G_{50,1} &= G[50] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[50], X[49], Y[49]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[50], P[49], X[48], Y[48]) \\
 P_{47,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[47], P[46], P[45], P[44]), & P_{51,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[51], P[50], P[49], P[48]) \\
 G_{54,1} &= G[54] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[54], X[53], Y[53]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[54], P[53], X[52], Y[52]) \\
 G_{58,1} &= G[58] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[58], X[57], Y[57]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[58], P[57], X[56], Y[56]) \\
 P_{55,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[55], P[54], P[53], P[52]), & P_{59,1} &= \text{AND4}(P[59], P[58], P[57], P[56]) \\
 G_{62,1} &= G[62] \oplus \text{AND3}(P[62], X[61], Y[61]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P[62], P[61], X[60], Y[60]) \\
 P_{62,1} &= \text{AND3}(P[62], P[61], P[60]) \\
 P_{62,15} &= \text{AND4}(P[62], P[61], P[60], P[15]), & P_{62,3} &= \text{AND4}(P[62], P[61], P[60], P[3])
 \end{aligned}$$

Depth = 1

$$\begin{aligned}
 G_{27,1} &= G[27] \oplus \text{AND2}(P[27], G_{26,1}) \\
 G_{39,1} &= G[39] \oplus \text{AND2}(P[39], G_{38,1}) \\
 G_{43,1} &= G[43] \oplus \text{AND2}(P[43], G_{42,1}) \\
 G_{55,1} &= G[55] \oplus \text{AND2}(P[55], G_{54,1}) \\
 G_{59,1} &= G[59] \oplus \text{AND2}(P[59], G_{58,1}) \\
 P_{27,2} &= \text{AND4}(P_{27,1}, P_{23,1}, P_{19,1}, P_{15,1}), & P_{43,2} &= \text{AND4}(P_{43,1}, P_{39,1}, P_{35,1}, P_{31,1}) \\
 P_{59,2} &= \text{AND4}(P_{59,1}, P_{55,1}, P_{51,1}, P_{47,1}) \\
 T_1 &= G_{39,1} \oplus \text{AND2}(P_{39,1}, G[35]) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{39,1}, P[35], G_{34,1}) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{39,1}, P_{35,1}, G[31]) \\
 &\oplus \text{AND4}(P_{39,1}, P_{35,1}, P[31], G_{30,1}) \\
 T_2 &= G_{55,1} \oplus \text{AND2}(P_{55,1}, G[51]) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{55,1}, P[51], G_{50,1}) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{55,1}, P_{51,1}, G[47]) \\
 &\oplus \text{AND4}(P_{55,1}, P_{51,1}, P[47], G_{46,1}) \\
 T_3 &= \text{AND2}(P_{62,1}, G[11]) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{62,1}, P[11], G_{10,1}) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{62,1}, P_{11,1}, G[7]) \\
 &\oplus \text{AND4}(P_{62,1}, P_{11,1}, G[7], G_6) \oplus \text{AND4}(P_{62,1}, P_{11,1}, P_7, G[3]) \oplus \text{AND4}(P_{62,1}, P_{11,1}, P_7, G_2) \\
 T_4 &= \text{AND2}(P_{62,1}, G[23]) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{62,1}, P[23], G_{22,1}) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{62,1}, P_{23,1}, G[19]) \\
 &\oplus \text{AND4}(P_{62,1}, P_{23,1}, G[19], G_{18,1}) \oplus \text{AND4}(P_{62,1}, P_{23,1}, P_{19,1}, G[15]) \\
 &\oplus \text{AND4}(P_{62,15}, P_{23,1}, P_{19,1}, G_{14,1})
 \end{aligned}$$

Depth = 2

$$\begin{aligned}
 G_{62,2} &= G_{62,1} \oplus \text{AND2}(P_{62,1}, G_{59,1}) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{62,1}, P_{59,1}, T_2) \oplus \text{AND3}(P_{62,1}, P_{59,1}, G_{43,1}) \\
 &\oplus \text{AND4}(P_{62,1}, P_{59,1}, P_{43,1}, T_1) \oplus \text{AND4}(P_{62,1}, P_{59,1}, P_{43,1}, G_{27,1}) \oplus \text{AND4}(P_{59,1}, P_{43,1}, P_{27,1}, T_4) \\
 &\oplus \text{AND4}(P_{59,1}, P_{43,1}, P_{27,1}, T_3) \\
 \text{MSB} &= G_{62,2} \oplus P[63]
 \end{aligned}$$

Depth = 3

Figure 17: BitExt circuit description for 64-bit input

E.3 AES S-box

In this section, we elaborate on how to reduce the AND-depth of the AES S-box from 4 to 3. Towards this, we use the 3-input multiplication gate MULT3 (cf. §3.1.4).

To design an optimized S-box, [20,22] divides the overall S-box circuit into three layers: i) top linear layer ([20, Fig. 10]), ii) middle non-linear layer ([20, Fig. 11]), and ii) bottom linear layer ([20, Fig. 12]). In this work, we focus on the middle non-linear layer.

$$\begin{aligned}
 t_2 &= y_{12}y_{15} & t_3 &= y_3y_6 & t_4 &= t_2 \oplus t_3 & t_5 &= y_4x_7 & t_6 &= t_5 \oplus t_2 \\
 t_7 &= y_{13}y_{16} & t_8 &= y_5y_1 & t_9 &= t_8 \oplus t_7 & t_{10} &= y_2y_7 & t_{11} &= t_{10} \oplus t_7 \\
 t_{12} &= y_9y_{11} & t_{13} &= y_{14}y_{17} & t_{14} &= t_{12} \oplus t_{13} & t_{15} &= y_6y_{10} & t_{16} &= t_{15} \oplus t_{12} \\
 t_{17} &= t_4 \oplus t_{14} & t_{18} &= t_6 \oplus t_{16} & t_{19} &= t_9 \oplus t_{14} & t_{20} &= t_{11} \oplus t_{16} & t_{21} &= t_{17} \oplus y_{20} \\
 t_{22} &= t_{18} \oplus y_{19} & t_{23} &= t_{19} \oplus y_{21} & t_{24} &= t_{20} \oplus y_{18}
 \end{aligned}$$

Using our new Inversion based on 3-input AND gates

$$\begin{aligned}
 u_1 &= t_{22}t_{23}t_{24} & u_2 &= (t_{21} \oplus t_{22})t_{23} & t_{37} &= u_1 \oplus u_2 \oplus t_{23} \oplus t_{24} \\
 u_3 &= t_{21}t_{23}t_{24} & u_4 &= t_{22}t_{24} & t_{33} &= u_2 \oplus u_3 \oplus u_4 \oplus t_{24} \\
 u_5 &= t_{21}t_{22}t_{24} & u_6 &= (t_{23} \oplus t_{24})t_{21} & t_{40} &= u_5 \oplus u_6 \oplus t_{21} \oplus t_{22} \\
 u_7 &= t_{21}t_{22}t_{23} & & & t_{29} &= u_7 \oplus u_6 \oplus u_4 \oplus t_{22}
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 t_{41} &= t_{40} \oplus t_{37} & t_{42} &= t_{29} \oplus t_{33} & t_{43} &= t_{29} \oplus t_{40} & t_{44} &= t_{33} \oplus t_{37} & t_{45} &= t_{42} \oplus t_{41} \\
 z_0 &= t_{44}y_{15} & z_1 &= t_{37}y_6 & z_2 &= t_{33}x_7 & z_3 &= t_{43}y_{16} & z_4 &= t_{40}y_1 \\
 z_5 &= t_{29}y_7 & z_6 &= t_{42}y_{11} & z_7 &= t_{45}y_{17} & z_8 &= t_{41}y_{10} & z_9 &= t_{44}y_{12} \\
 z_{10} &= t_{37}y_3 & z_{11} &= t_{33}y_4 & z_{12} &= t_{43}y_{13} & z_{13} &= t_{40}y_5 & z_{14} &= t_{29}y_2 \\
 & & z_{15} &= t_{42}y_9 & z_{16} &= t_{45}y_{14} & & & z_{17} &= t_{41}y_8
 \end{aligned}$$

Figure 18: Non-linear circuit for the middle layer of the Sbox based on [20]

In the middle layer, given the input (x_0, x_1, x_2, x_3) , an inversion over $GF(2^4)$ is applied resulting in the output (y_0, y_1, y_2, y_4) where

- $y_1 = x_2x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4,$
- $y_2 = x_1x_3x_4 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_2x_3 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_4,$
- $y_3 = x_1x_2x_4 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2,$
- $y_4 = x_1x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_4 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2.$

We modify the above inversion to the following and use a 3-input AND gate:

- $y_1 = x_2x_3x_4 \oplus (x_1 \oplus x_2)x_3 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_4,$
- $y_2 = x_1x_3x_4 \oplus (x_1 \oplus x_2)x_3 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_4,$
- $y_3 = x_1x_2x_4 \oplus (x_3 \oplus x_4)x_1 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_2,$
- $y_4 = x_1x_2x_3 \oplus (x_3 \oplus x_4)x_1 \oplus x_2x_4 \oplus x_2.$

For the top and bottom layer, we follow the same structure of [20, 22]. Fig. 18 depicts the non-linear part of the AES-Sbox. This layer maps 22 inputs x_7, y_1, \dots, y_{21} to 18 outputs z_0, \dots, z_{17} . This circuit is based on the size-optimized Sbox proposed by [20] and we use the same notation. The modified circuit has thirty 2-input AND gates and four 3-input AND gates. The overall round complexity was reduced from 4 to 3.

F Security Proof

In this section, we provide a security proof for our 2PC protocol denoted by Π_{2PC} . We use the standard real world/ ideal world paradigm. We provide the simulation for the case of a corrupt P_0 . Since the protocol is symmetric, the simulation for the case of corrupt P_1 follows similarly. Our proof works in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{setupMULT}}$ -hybrid model where $\mathcal{F}_{\text{setupMULT}}$ represents the ideal functionality corresponding to protocol setupMULT.

\mathcal{F}_{2PC} interacts with the parties in $\{P_0, P_1\}$ and the adversary \mathcal{S} and is parametrized by a 2-ary function f , represented by a publicly known arithmetic circuit over \mathbb{Z}_{2^t} .

Input: \mathcal{F}_{2PC} receives the input x_1, \dots, x_l from the respective parties in $\{P_0, P_1\}$, where l denotes the number of inputs to the circuit.

Computation: \mathcal{F}_{2PC} computes $(y_1, \dots, y_O) = f(x_1, \dots, x_l)$, where O denotes the number of outputs of the circuit.

Output: Send (y_1, \dots, y_O) to all the parties in $\{P_0, P_1\}$.

Figure 19: Functionality \mathcal{F}_{2PC}

We present the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{2PC} for the 2PC protocol in Fig. 19.

Theorem 1. In the $\{\mathcal{F}_{\text{setupMULT}}\}$ -hybrid model, Π_{2PC} securely realizes the functionality \mathcal{F}_{2PC} against a semi-honest adversary \mathcal{A} , who corrupts P_0 .

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} denote the semi-honest adversary that corrupts P_0 during the protocol Π_{2PC} . We now present the steps of the ideal-world adversary (simulator) \mathcal{S}_{2PC} for \mathcal{A} for this case. At a high level, \mathcal{S}_{2PC} executes the setup phase honestly on the behalf of P_1 and will simulate the entire circuit-

evaluation, assuming the circuit-inputs of P_1 to be 0. In the output-reconstruction stage, it “adjusts” the shares of circuit-output values on behalf of P_1 so that \mathcal{A} sees the same function output as in the real-world protocol.

- *Shared-key Setup:* \mathcal{S}_{2PC} samples a random key $K_1 \in \{0, 1\}^K$ on behalf of P_1 and sends it to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{S}_{2PC} then receives K_0 from \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_1 and computes the key $K = K_0 + K_1$.
- *Sharing Protocol:* For the instances where P_0 is the owner of the values, \mathcal{S}_{2PC} has to do nothing since \mathcal{A} is not receiving any messages. \mathcal{S}_{2PC} receives Δ_v from \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_1 . For the instances where P_1 is the owner, \mathcal{S}_{2PC} sets $v = 0$ and performs the protocol steps honestly.
- *Reconstruction Protocol:* To reconstruct a value v , the \mathcal{S}_{2PC} is given the output v , which is the output of \mathcal{A} . Using v and shares corresponding to P_1 (i.e., $[\delta_v]_1, \Delta_v$), \mathcal{S}_{2PC} computes $[\delta_v]_0 = \Delta_v - v - [\delta_v]_1$ and sends this to \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_1 . \mathcal{S}_{2PC} receives $[\delta_v]_0$ from \mathcal{A} on behalf of P_1 .
- *Addition gates:* There is nothing to simulate as the protocol is non-interactive.
- *Multiplication gates:* For the setup phase, we consider setupMULT as an ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{setupMULT}}$ which generates the required correlated randomness. Since we make only black-box access to setupMULT, the simulation for the same follows from the security of the underlying primitive used to instantiate $\mathcal{F}_{\text{setupMULT}}$, which is either OT or HE in our case. During the online phase, \mathcal{S}_{2PC} follows the step honestly using the data obtained from the corresponding setup phase.

This concludes the proof. □