Compressed Σ -Protocol Theory and Practical Application to Plug & Play Secure Algorithmics

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Version 2 - March 17, 2020^4

Abstract. Σ -Protocols form a well-understood basis for *plug-and-play* secure algorithmics. Bulletproofs (Bünz et al., SP 2018) have been introduced as a "drop-in" for Σ -Protocols in some important applications; notably, zero-knowledge (ZK) for arithmetic circuits and range proofs, each with logarithmic communication instead of linear. At the heart of Bulletproofs is an ingenious, logarithmic-size proof of knowledge (PoK), denoted BP, showing that a compact Pedersen commitment to a long vector satisfies a quadratic equation ("an inner product relation"). However, *applications*, like those mentioned, meet with *technical difficulties*: (1) BPs are not ZK and (2) protocol theory requires "reinvention" with the quadratic constraint proved as its "pivot". This leads to practical, yet complex ZK protocols where applying natural plug-and-play intuition appears hard.

Our approach is radically different. We reconcile Bulletproofs with the theory of Σ -Protocols such that (a) applications can follow established protocol theory, thereby dispensing with the need for "reinventing" it, while (b) enjoying exactly the same communication reduction. We do this by giving a precise perspective on BPs as a *significant strengthening* of the power of Σ -protocols. We believe this novel perspective is rather useful for practical design.

Our program combines two essential components. First, we isolate a natural Σ -Protocol as *alternative* pivot that directly yields ZK proofs for arbitrary linear statements (i.e., about the compactly committed secret vector), while deploying suitable BPs to compress communication. We also develop some convenient utility enhancements of the pivot to handle different, natural proof scenarios.

Second, to enable ZK proofs of nonlinear statements, we integrate the pivot as a black-box with a novel variation on – hitherto largely overlooked – arithmetic secret sharing based techniques for Σ -Protocols (Cramer et al., ICITS 2012); this linearizes "all nonlinear statements" using the fact that arbitrary linear ones can be proved. This yields simple circuit ZK with logarithmic communication. Similarly for range proofs, which are now trivial. Our results are based on either of three assumptions: the Discrete Logarithm assumption, an assumption derived from the Strong-RSA assumption, or a Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption (KEA). In the latter case - thus, at the cost of relying on an unfalsifiable assumption - the communication complexity is constant instead of logarithmic.

Keywords: Σ -protocols, Bulletproofs, Zero-Knowledge, Plug-and-Play, Secure Algorithmics.

1 Introduction

The theory of Σ -Protocols provides a well-understood basis for *plug-and-play* secure algorithmics. Recently, Bulletproofs [BBB⁺18] have been introduced as a "drop-in replacement" for Σ -Protocols in several important applications. Notably, this includes ZK for arithmetic circuits with communication $O(\log |C| \cdot \kappa)$ bits where

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⁴ Change log w.r.t. Version 1 - February 11, 2020: (a) minor editorial changes throughout, (b) simplification of the compression mechanism including the observation that it achieves unconditional soundness with an improved knowledge error, see Section 4, (c) added full details for sketch of case 1 compactification protocol, see Section 5.3, (d) described two approaches for achieving unconditional soundness, see Section 4.4, (e) added instantiation of our program from KEA, see Section 9.

|C| is the circuit size⁵ and κ is the security parameter, down from $O(|C| \cdot \kappa)$ bits. A similar result holds for range proofs.

At the heart of Bulletproofs is an interactive proof of knowledge between a Prover and Verifier showing that a Pedersen commitment to a vector of large length n satisfies a multi-variate polynomial equation of degree 2, defined with an inner product. We refer to this PoK by BP. Concretely, suppose \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of prime order q (denoted multiplicatively) supporting discrete-log-based cryptography. Suppose, furthermore, that $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \ldots, g_n) \in \mathbb{G}^n$ and $h \in \mathbb{G}$ (each g_i as well as h generators of \mathbb{G}) have been set up once-and-for-all such that, for parties that may subsequently act as provers, finding nontrivial linear relations between them is computationally as hard as computing discrete logarithms in \mathbb{G} . For each $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, define $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} = \prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{x_i}$. A Pedersen-commitment P to a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is then computed as $P = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} \cdot h^{\rho}$ where $\rho \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is selected uniformly at random. This commitment is information-theoretically hiding and, on account of the set-up, computationally binding. Note that it is compact in the sense that, independently of n, a commitment is a single \mathbb{G} -element. Suppose that n is even and write n = 2m. Setting $\mathbf{x} = (\mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, a Bulletproof allows the prover to prove that it can open P such that the inner-product $\langle \mathbf{x}_0, \mathbf{x}_1 \rangle$ equals some value claimed by the prover.⁶

BPs stand out in that they ingeniously reduce communication to $O(\log n)$ group elements from O(n) via traditional methods. Although this is at the expense of introducing logarithmic number of moves (instead of constant), its public-coin nature ensures that it can be rendered non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86]. However, design of BP *applications* meet with a number of *technical difficulties*. First, BPs are not zero-knowledge, and second, cryptographic protocol theory has to be "reinvented" with the quadratic constraint proved as its "pivot". This leads to practical yet rather opaque, complex protocols where applying natural plug-and-play intuition appears hard.

1.1 Summary of Our Contributions and Organization of the Paper

In this work we take a radically different approach. We reconcile Bulletproofs with theory of Σ -Protocols such that (a) applications can follow (established) cryptographic protocol theory, thereby dispensing with the need for "reinventing" it, while (b) enjoying exactly the same communication reduction. We do this by giving a precise perspective on BPs as a *significant strengthening* of the power of Σ -protocols. We believe this novel perspective is rather useful for intuitive, plug-and-play design of practical secure algorithmics. Perhaps surprisingly our approach yields the same communication complexity; up to and including the constants.

We combine two essential components. First, we isolate a natural, *alternative pivot*: compact commitment with "arbitrary linear form openings". Given a Pedersen commitment to a long vector \mathbf{x} , consider ZKPoK that the prover knows \mathbf{x} , while also revealing, for an *arbitrary*, *public*, *linear form* L, the scalar $L(\mathbf{x})$ correctly and nothing else. This has a simple Σ -Protocol. We then *compress* it by replacing the final (long) prover-message with an appropriate BP that the prover knows it. Indeed, the relation that this message is required to satisfy turns out amenable to deployment of a suitable BP. As a result, PoK and honest-verifier ZK are preserved, but overall communication drops from linear to logarithmic. In the process, we simplify known run-time analyses of knowledge extractors involved and give concrete estimates. On top of this, we introduce further necessary utility enhancements. To begin, without harming overall complexity, we show, using the pivot as black-box, how to open several linear form evaluations instead of just one. Furthermore, we show how to apply these ideas in a setting where the secret, long vector is actually "dispersed" across several compact commitments, by compactifying these into a single compact commitment. This is useful in important applications. From this point on, the only facts about the pivot that we will need is that we have access to a compact commitment scheme that allows a ZKPoK with low overall communication, showing that the prover knows the long secret committed vector and showing the correct openings of several linear evaluations on that committed vector; the technical details do not matter anymore.

Second, the pivot's significance now surfaces when integrated with a novel variation on – hitherto largely overlooked – arithmetic secret sharing based techniques for Σ -Protocols [CDP12], inspired by MPC. These

⁵ Actually, the result in question only depends on the number of inputs and multiplication gates.

⁶ Alternatively, this inner-product value may be taken as part of the committed vector.

techniques allow for *linearization* of "nonlinear relations". It is here that free choice of linear forms in the pivot is fully exploited; the maps arising from our adaptation of [CDP12] do not form a well-structured subclass of maps. All in all, this yields *simple* logarithmic communication solutions for circuit ZK. Similarly for range proofs, which are now trivial to design. We also offer trade-offs, i.e., "square-root" complexity in constant rounds. Our results are based on either of two assumptions, the Discrete Logarithm assumption, or an assumption derived from the Strong-RSA assumption [BP97].

We proceed as follows. We start by outlining our program, in nearly exclusively conceptual fashion. We believe that the fact that it is possible to do so further underscores our main points. Later on we detail how this program deviates exactly from the paths taken in the recent literature.

1.2 A More Detailed View of Our Program

A. Our Pivotal Σ -Protocol

We isolate a basic Σ -protocol Π_0 that, given a compact commitment to a secret vector \mathbf{x} of large length n, allows to partially open it. Concretely, given an arbitrary, public, linear form L, only the value $L(\mathbf{x})$ is released and nothing else. Briefly, the prover has a compact commitment P to a long secret vector \mathbf{x} . By a simple twist on basic Σ -protocol theory, the prover then selects a compact commitment A to a secret random vector \mathbf{r} . The prover sends, as first move, this commitment A and the values $y = L(\mathbf{x})$ and $y' = L(\mathbf{r})$. In the second move, the verifier sends a random challenge $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. In the third, final move, the prover then opens the commitment AP^c to a vector \mathbf{z} (i.e., \mathbf{z} is its committed vector; we leave the randomness underlying the commitment implicit here). Finally, the verifier checks the opening of the commitment and checks that $L(\mathbf{z}) = cy + y'$. The communication in this Σ -protocol is dominated by the opening of AP^c . The latter amounts to $O(n\kappa)$ bits (where κ is the security parameter), whereas the remainder of the protocol has $O(\kappa)$ bits in total. That said, it is an honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge (with unconditional soundness). In addition, we describe an amortized version of this basic Σ -protocol, i.e., a Σ -protocol Π_0^{Am} that, given s compact commitments to secret vectors $\mathbf{x}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_s$ and a linear form L, allows to open $L(\mathbf{x}_1), \ldots, L(\mathbf{x}_s)$ and nothing else. The communication costs of this amortized Σ -protocol are exactly s - 1 elements more than that of the basic Σ -protocol (i.e., the evaluations at the s - 1 additional input vectors).

Using the pivotal Σ -protocol as a black-box, its utility can be *enhanced*, which will be important later on. More concretely, many linear forms can be opened for essentially the price of a single one. First, by deploying a "polynomial amortization trick" (known, e.g., from MPC) we can do any number of nullity checks without any substantial increase in complexity. Second, building on this trick, we can extend the utility to the opening of several arbitrary linear forms L_1, \ldots, L_s instead of a single one, at the cost of increasing the communication by exactly s - 1 values in \mathbb{Z}_q (i.e., the evaluations of s - 1 additional forms). Finally, we note the entire discussion on these enhancements holds verbatim when we replace linear forms by affine forms.⁷

Note that we have identified two distinct *intractability assumptions*, each of which supports this pivot: the Discrete Logarithm assumption (as used in prior work involving Bulletproofs [BCC⁺16, BBB⁺18]) but also one derived from the Strong-RSA assumption (as nailed down in a recent, unpublished work [BFS19] on Bulletproofs and their improved applications). The introduction focuses on the DL assumption, but the Σ -protocol for the solution derived from the Strong-RSA assumption follows similarly. Our program can be based on either platform. In addition, we show how to base the program on a specific knowledge of exponent assumption. However, such assumptions are known to be unfalsifiable and, therefore, not without controversy.

The details of our pivotal Σ -protocol can be found in Section 3, and the utility enhancements are described in Section 5.

B. Compressing the Pivot

We argue that protocol Π_0 can be *compressed* using the ideas underlying Bulletproofs, yielding a protocol Π_c that has the same functionality and is still an honest-verifier zero-knowledge proof of knowledge for the

⁷ I.e., a linear form plus a constant.

relation in question, but that has communication $O(\kappa \log n)$ bits *instead*, and $O(\log n)$ moves. Technically the compression degrades the soundness from unconditional to computational, and protocols with computational soundness are called arguments of knowledge. However, we will use the terms proof and argument of knowledge interchangeably. The compression techniques directly carry over to amortized Σ -protocol Π_0^{Am} . See below for variations achieving unconditional soundness.

Main compression idea. The idea is simply as follows, starting from Π_0 . Suppose that P is the commitment in question. The linear forms are constants as they are part of the relation proved, so they will not be made explicit for now. Furthermore suppose that the prover has sent the message a as first move of Π_0 , and that the verifier has subsequently sent challenge c as the second move. Thus, in the third –and final– move, the prover would be required to send the reply z. The verifier would, finally, apply the verification function ϕ attached to Π_0 to check that $\phi(P; a, c, z) = 1$, and accept only if this is the case. To define the compressed protocol Π_c , instead of requiring the prover to send the long vector z, a suitable adaptation of Bulletproof's PoK (BP) will be deployed to let the prover convince the verifier that it knows some z such that $\phi(P; a, c, z) = 1$, which is much more efficient. Note that it is immaterial that the Bulletproof part is not zero knowledge as, in Π_0 , the prover would have revealed z anyway.

This will ensure the claimed communication reduction, i.e., $O(\kappa \log n)$ bits in $O(\log n)$ moves. We show that, as a *trade-off*, we may opt for *constant* number of rounds (instead of logarithmic) and $O(\kappa \sqrt{n})$ communication (instead of logarithmic). But of course, in non-interactive Fiat-Shamir mode (which clearly applies here), the logarithmic variant may be preferable.

Note that this compression idea equally applies to the enhancements of the basic utility as discussed above. It gives essentially the same complexities. Of course, this assumes that the number of openings of linear forms is not too large; it is not sensitive to the number of nullity checks though.

The details of the compression idea can be found in Section 4.

Refined Analysis of Knowledge Extractors. In the theory of Σ -protocols, it is well known that special soundness implies knowledge soundness with knowledge error 1/q, where q is the size of the challenge set. This result can be shown to follow from the convexity of the function f(X) = X(X - 1/q) and an application of Jensen's inequality [Cra97]. Recently, and particularly for the above mentioned compressing techniques, natural generalizations of special soundness have become relevant. These more general notions of special soundness can again be shown to imply knowledge soundness. However, the proof technique using Jensen's inequality is no longer directly applicable. For this reason prior works [BCC+16, BBB+18] resort to heavy row type arguments without computing the exact knowledge error. Here, we show that an adaptation of the proof using Jensen's inequality does apply. This results in a simple proof and a refined analysis of the protocols in this paper.

The details of the extractor analysis can be found in Appendix A.

Compressed Pivot with Unconditional Soundness.

In addition, we show two approaches for realizing our compressed pivot with *unconditional* knowledge soundness, rather than computational. In our first approach we simply omit the step of the BP compression in which the linear-form evaluation is incorporated into the commitment, and execute that part "in the open". This works for us here since we only consider linear constraints in the compressed pivot and no quadratic ones. As a result, unconditional soundness is achieved. However, this approach increases the communication costs by a factor 2.

Our second approach is based on the observation that an unconditionally sound ZKPoK for opening linear forms can be based on *black-box access* to an unconditionally sound ZKPoK for just proving knowledge of an opening of a Pedersen vector commitment. The reduction uses structural information of a given linear form (i.e., it depends on the null-space and selection of a basis for it). By removing the provisions for linear forms from the compressed pivot Π_c the required black-box is realized.

The details can be found in Section 4.4.

C. Compactifying a Vector of Commitments

Our compressed pivot may be summarized as compact commitments to long secret vectors that allow for very efficient partial openings, i.e., arbitrary linear forms applied to the secret committed vector. As we show later on, this is sufficient for proving any (nonlinear) relation. To make this work, all relevant prover data (secret data vector plus secret auxiliary data, such a random coins) is required to be committed to in a *single* compact commitment.

However, in many relevant practical scenarios, we must assume that the commitment to the prover's secret data vector, about which something is to be proved in zero knowledge, has already been produced *before* the zero knowledge protocol is run. In order to handle this, we require the prover to *compactify* these commitments together with the secret auxiliary data in a single compact commitment.

We consider two extreme scenarios: (1) the prover has a single compact commitment to the secret data vector about which some zero knowledge proof is to be conducted and (2) same, except that the prover has *individual* commitments to the coordinates of that secret data vector.

For the first scenario the prover uses new generators to commit to the auxiliary information. Using the compressed Σ -protocol, the prover shows that this is indeed a commitment that *exclusively* involves the new generators. Prover and verifier multiply the two compact commitments to obtain a single compact commitment to all relevant data.

For the second scenario, a basic (amortized) Σ -protocol shows that the prover knows openings to all individual commitments. From this basic protocol, we define a new Σ -protocol as follows. The prover appends the first message *a* of the basic protocol with a compact commitment containing all relevant data *and* the randomness sampled in the first move of the basic Σ -protocol. After receiving the challenge the prover's response can now be computed as a public linear form (parameterized by the challenge *c*) evaluated at the vector to which the prover committed. Instead of sending this message directly, the prover and verifier run the interactive protocol to open the associated linear form on the compact vector commitment. The verifier checks that the opening of the vector commitment is also an opening of the commitment in the Σ -protocol. As a result the prover has shown that it knows openings to all the individual commitments and that these openings are contained in the compact commitment together with the auxiliary data.

The details on the compactification of vector commitments can be found in Section 5.3.

D. Plug-and-Play Secure Algorithmics from Compressed Pivot

We will now explain the power of our compressed pivot. It will turn out that we only need black-box access. Our key point is to show how to combine this with a hitherto largely overlooked part of Σ -protocol theory, namely the work of [CDP12] that shows how to prove arbitrary constraints on committed vectors by exploiting techniques from secure multi-party computation based on arithmetic secret sharing, more concretely, the ideas underlying the Commitment Multiplication Protocol from [CDM00]. For more information, see Section 12.5.3 in [CDN15] for a general description of efficient zero-knowledge verification of secret multiplications in terms of arbitrary (strongly-multiplicative) arithmetic secret sharing. It is this combination of "compact commitments with linear openings" and arithmetic secret sharing that allows for "linearizing nonlinear relations". So this explains also why our compressed pivot does not need any "direct" provision to handle nonlinearity.

We need to make some appropriate adaptations to make this work for us here. We first outline the technique from [CDP12] and then we discuss adaptations. The work of [CDP12] considers homomorphic commitment schemes where the secret committed to is not a vector of large length, but a *single element* of \mathbb{Z}_q instead. The primary result is a Σ -protocol showing the correctness of commitments to m multiplication triples $(\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i := \alpha_i \beta_i)$, with *low amortized complexity* for large m. In other words, the protocol verifies the multiplicative relations, and the costs per triple are relatively small.

Each of the α_i 's (resp., the β_i 's and γ_i 's) is individually committed to. Their solution employs stronglymultiplicative packed-secret sharing. For instance, consider Shamir's scheme over \mathbb{Z}_q , with privacy parameter t = 1, but with secret-space dimension m. This uses random polynomials of degree $\leq m$, subject to the evaluations on the points $1, \ldots, m$ comprising the desired secret vector. Note that, for each sharing, a single random \mathbb{Z}_q -element is required (which can be taken as the evaluation at 0).

It is important to note that, given secret vector and random element, it holds by Lagrange Interpolation that, for each $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, the evaluation f(c) of such polynomial f(X) is some public \mathbb{Z}_q -linear combination over the coordinates of the secret vector and the random element. Namely, consider the map that takes m + 1arbitrary evaluations on the points $0, \ldots, m$ and that outputs the unique polynomial f(X) of degree $\leq m$ interpolating them to the evaluations of f(X) in all other points. A transformation matrix describing this map does not correspond to a Vandermonde-matrix, but it can be determined from it.

Now, assume that 2m < q (for strong-multiplicativity). The protocol goes as follows.

- The vectors of commitments to the multiplication triples are assumed to be part of the common input.
- The prover selects a random polynomial f(X) that defines a packed secret sharing of the vector $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m)$. The prover also selects a random polynomial g(X) that defines a packed secret sharing of the vector $(\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_m)$. Finally, the prover computes the product polynomial

$$h(X) := f(X)g(X)$$

of degree $\leq 2m < q$.

- The prover commits to the random \mathbb{Z}_q -element for the sharing based on f(X), i.e., f(0), and commits to the random \mathbb{Z}_q -element for the sharing based on g(X), i.e., g(0). The prover also commits the evaluations of h(X) on the points $0, m + 1, \ldots, 2m$.⁸ Note that the "absent" evaluations at $1, \ldots, m$ comprise the γ_i 's and their commitments are already assumed to be part of the common input.
- The prover sends these commitments to the verifier.
- The verifier selects a random challenge $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ distinct from $1, \ldots, m$ and sends it to the prover.
- By public linear combinations, both prover and verifier can compute three commitments: one to u := f(c), one to v := g(c) and one to w := h(c). The prover opens each of these (assuming, of course, that c is in the right range). The verifier checks each of these three openings and checks whether

w = uv.

If the committed polynomials do not satisfy f(X)g(X) = h(X), and under the assumption that the commitment scheme is binding, there are at most 2m values of c out of the q-m possibilities such that the final check goes through. So a lying prover is caught with probability greater than 1 - 2m/(q-m). With q exponential in the security parameter and m, say, polynomial in it, this is exponentially close to 1. Honest-verifier zero-knowledge essentially follows from 1-privacy of the secret sharing scheme.

Our first observation here is as follows. In the above protocol, the prover may as well use our compressed pivot as a black-box. Indeed, the entire vector

$$\mathbf{y} = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_m, f(0), g(0), h(0), h(1), \dots, h(2m)) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{4m+3}$$

of data that the prover commits to in the protocol above can be committed to in a *single* compact commitment. Note that, by definition, $\gamma_i = h(i)$ for all $1 \le i \le m$. Furthermore, all of the data *opened* to the verifier is some fixed linear form on the (long) secret committed vector **y**. Indeed:

- 1. Each of the values u, v correspond to an opening of a public linear form applied to **y**. The linear form is determined by some row in a transformation matrix as addressed above, under the convention that the form takes zeros on the portion of the coordinates of x not relevant to the computation.
- 2. Similarly for the value w, except that this simply corresponds to an "evaluation of a polynomial whose coefficients are defined by a part of \mathbf{y} ". So evaluation is a public linear form as well.

Overall, we get an honest-verifier proof of knowledge for showing correctness of m secret multiplicationtriples with $O(k \log m)$ bits communication in $O(\log m)$ moves (or in constant rounds but with $O(k\sqrt{m})$ bits communication).

Our second observation here is as follows. Suppose we have an arithmetic circuit⁹ C over \mathbb{Z}_q with n inputs, s outputs and m multiplication gates.¹⁰ We can easily turn the observation above into a solution for

⁸ By Lagrange interpolation these points, together with the γ_i 's, uniquely determine h(X).

⁹ Each addition/multiplication gate of the circuit has fan-in two, but unbounded fan-out.

¹⁰ We only count multiplication gates with *variable* inputs. Addition gates and multiplications by constants are implicitly handled and are immaterial to the communication complexity.

"circuit zero-knowledge", i.e., the prover convinces the verifier that the committed vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ satisfies some constraint captured by a given circuit C which (w.l.o.g.) returns 0. We note that [CDP12] also gives a solution for circuit zero-knowledge. But that one does not work for us here as it gives too large complexity. So we make some changes.

By the aforementioned compactification techniques it is *sufficient* to consider the ZK scenario where the prover wants to demonstrate that C is satisfiable; this means that we may assume that the prover commits to all relevant data (inputs *and* all auxiliary data) in a *single* compact commitment. Other ZK scenarios, in which the prover has already committed to input data, are dealt with by first *compactifying* existing commitments and auxiliary information into a single compact commitment.

The protocol goes as follows. The prover first determines the computation graph implied by instantiating the circuit C with its input vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. The m multiplication gates in C will be handled as above, i.e., via polynomials f(X), g(X) and h(X) defining packed-secret sharings of the left inputs, the right inputs and outputs of the multiplication gates. The prover commits to each of the coordinates of \mathbf{x} and to the auxiliary data $\mathsf{aux} = (f(0), g(0), h(0), h(1), \ldots, h(2m)) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{2m+3}$ in one single compact commitment. The length γ of the committed vector \mathbf{y} thus equals n + 2m + 3.

A simple fact about arithmetic circuits shows that all wire values are accessible as affine combinations of the coefficients committed to. These affine combinations are uniquely defined by the addition and scalar multiplication gates of the circuit. This explains why, in contrast to the discussion above, it is no longer necessary to commit explicitly to the α_i 's and the β_i 's as these are now implicitly committed to via said affine functions of \mathbf{y} . Therefore, since the values f(0), g(0) are still included in \mathbf{y} , the polynomials f(X), g(X) and h(X) are well-defined by \mathbf{y} , and their evaluations are, by composition of the appropriate maps, also affine evaluations on \mathbf{y} .

With the above observations in hand, the protocol is reduced to opening the affine map Φ that, on input **y**, outputs $(C(\mathbf{x}), f(c), g(c), h(c))$ for a challenge $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{1, \ldots, m\}$ sampled uniformly at random by the verifier. First, the verifier checks that h(c) = f(c)g(c) which, as above, shows that the required multiplicative relations hold with high probability. Second, the verifier checks that $C(\mathbf{x}) = 0$, which shows that the circuit is satisfiable and that the prover knows a witness \mathbf{x} . By the amortized nullity checks (A) the costs of these openings can be amortized. As a result, circuit zero knowledge can be done $O(k \log \gamma)$ bits in $O(\log \gamma)$ moves. In particular, the communication costs are independent of the number of output vertices s. Trade-off between communication and moves applies as above.

More details on circuit ZK can be found in Section 6.

E. Range Proofs

In a basic range proof a prover wishes to commit to a secret integer v and show that this integer is in a public range, say $[0, 2^{n-1}]$. From the above circuit ZK protocols, range proofs immediately follow. A prover simply considers the bit decomposition $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ of the integer v, the length of this decomposition determines the range. Note that v can be accessed as a linear form evaluated at \mathbf{b} and thereby a commitment to \mathbf{b} is an implicit commitment to v. Prover and verifier run the above circuit satisfiability protocol to commit to \mathbf{b} and prove that $C(\mathbf{b}) = 0$ for $C : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, $x \mapsto x * (1 - x)$, where * represents the component-wise product. The nullity check for C shows that the committed coefficients are indeed bits. The communication complexity of this range proof is $O(k \log n)$ bits.

Using the techniques described in Section 5.3, this functionality can be extended to scenario where a prover has to prove that a Pedersen commitment to $v \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is in a certain range.

The details can be found in Section 7.

F. Our Program from the Strong-RSA Assumption

Thus far, we have implemented our program in the discrete log setting, starting from Pedersen commitments and their basic Σ -protocols. Besides some minor details in the compressed pivot, we show that the above discussion holds *verbatim* for a commitment scheme based on a assumption derived from the Strong-RSA assumption. More precisely, we show how the polynomial commitment scheme from a recent unpublished work [BFS19] can be adapted to open arbitrary linear forms. Our adaptations of the linearization techniques from [CDP12] are directly applicable to the Strong-RSA derived pivot.

The details can be found in Section 7 and Appendix D.

F. Our Program from the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption

In addition to the discrete log and strong-RSA derived assumptions, our program can also be based on an assumption derived from the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption (KEA). Note that KEA is unfalsifiable and its application is not completely without controversy [Nao03]. Moreover, this approach introduces a trusted set-up phase, which might be undesirable in many applications. The main benefit of the KEA based approach is that it reduces the communication complexity from logarithmic to constant, i.e., independent of the dimension of the committed vector.

In Section 9 we describe the main techniques and for more details we refer to [Gro10].

1.3 Comparison with Earlier Work

Traditional solutions for circuit ZK in the discrete logarithm setting have a communication complexity that is linear in the circuit size. Building on the work of Groth [Gro09], an ingenious recursive approach achieved logarithmic communication complexity [BCC⁺16]. At its heart lies an earlier version of the BP protocol discussed earlier. Further improvements were introduced in [BBB⁺18] and later revisited in [HKR19]. Recently, in an unpublished work [BFS19], Bünz, Fisch and Szepieniec show that similar results can be derived from the Strong-RSA assumption. The main merit of the Strong-RSA derived solutions is a significant reduction in the number of public parameters. In addition, [BFS19] deploys proofs of exponentiation [Wes19] to reduce the computational complexity.

A common denominator in the aforementioned works is the use of a quadratic constraint as a main pivot. In [Gro09], a specific inner-product relation is introduced, and it is shown how basic Σ -protocols for this relation can be enhanced to achieve sub-linear communication complexity. A similar inner-product relation lies at the foundation of the logarithmic size protocols of [BCC⁺16], except that it also uses an earlier version of the BP idea. In [BBB⁺18], it is subsequently shown that a modification of the quadratic relation leads to better constants. In [HKR19], more general quadratic constraints were considered with a view towards reducing *computational* complexity in specific ZK scenarios. Also they strive for a more modular approach. However, this induces (minor) communication overhead in comparison to Bulletproofs [BBB⁺18].

Furthermore, it is worth mentioning that in [BCC⁺16], as an intermediate stepping stone, a polynomial commitment scheme is constructed. A polynomial commitment is a commitment to the coefficient vector of a polynomial together with the functionality of opening the evaluation at any given point. The solution derived from the Strong-RSA assumption [BFS19] bases itself entirely on this polynomial functionality. For general relations it uses recent, but complicated, reductions [GWC19, MBKM19, XZZ⁺19].

Constructing protocols from quadratic constraints, either directly or via a polynomial commitment scheme, leads to a complex theory in which plug-and-play secure algorithmics appears hard. Significant effort is required to realize higher level applications such as circuit ZK or range proofs.

As for zero-knowledge, the work of [BBB⁺18] and [HKR19] establishes this property at a higher level, and not, as do the other works, at the level of their main pivot, which leads to additional difficulties in designing ZK protocols. In fact, in [HKR19], zero-knowledge, reduced communication and reduced computation is achieved in an integrated manner.

The most significant difference between our approach and that of the aforementioned works is our simple and direct construction of a compressed pivot to open *arbitrary* linear forms and to combine this with the simple (MPC inspired) linearization techniques from [CDP12]. The compression is achieved by a suitable adaptation of the BP ideas [BBB⁺18], and the linearization techniques discard the need for a direct provision to handle nonlinearity. Moreover, plug & play design of applications according to this compressed Σ -protocol theory is just as easy as with the standard Σ -protocol theory. Despite the conceptual simplicity, the communication complexities of our approach are, even including the constants, equal to that of Bulletproofs [BBB⁺18].

Note that polynomial evaluation, as used in some of the other works, of course also comes down to the evaluation of a linear form, albeit a specific one. Therefore these approaches are not amenable to the linearization techniques we use. Opening *arbitrary* linear forms therefore seems to be a sweet spot in that it achieves conceptual simplicity, both in designing ZK protocols and in implementing the pivot.

2 Notation and Conventions

In this section we introduce the basic notation used in the remainder of the paper. To this end, let us consider dummy Protocol 1 for relation R_d , denoted by Π_d .

Let $(x; w) \in R_d$, then x is called a statement and w is is called a witness for x. An interactive protocol Π_d for relation R_d is a protocol that allows a prover to convince a verifier it knows a witness w for statement x. The protocol Π_d takes as public input x and as prover's private input w, which we write as either $\Pi_d(x; w)$ or, in the graphical protocol description, as INPUT(x; w).

The verifier always implicitly outputs reject or accept. Optionally, the protocol can output a public string y to both verifier and prover, and a private string w' only to the prover. In this case we write OUTPUT(y; w').

In addition to the input and output of the protocol, the prover's claim (i.e, $(x; w) \in R_d$) is made explicit in the graphical protocol description.

Finally, we write

$$\mathcal{L}\left(\mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n}\right) := \{ (L: Z_{q}^{n} \to \mathbb{Z}_{q}) : L \text{ linear} \},$$

$$\tag{1}$$

for the set of linear forms on \mathbb{Z}_a^n .

Protocol 1 Dummy Protocol Π_d for Relation R_d
$\operatorname{INPUT}(x;w) \ \operatorname{Output}(y;w')$
$(x;w)\in R_d$
Prover Verifier
$\cdots \longrightarrow$
·
$\dots \longrightarrow \dots$

3 The Basic Pivot

This section formally describes the Pedersen vector commitment scheme and our pivotal Σ -protocol, as discussed in Section 1.2 (A). In addition, we describe a standard amortized Σ -protocol for opening a linear form on many commitments. Compression is described in Section 4.

3.1 The Basic Σ -protocol

The primary commitment scheme under consideration in this paper is the Pedersen vector commitment scheme.

Definition 1 (Pedersen Vector Commitment [Ped91]). Let \mathbb{G} be an Abelian group of prime order q. Pedersen vector commitments are defined by the following setup and commitment phase:

- Setup: $\mathbf{g} = (g_1, \ldots, g_n) \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}^n, h \leftarrow_R \mathbb{G}.$
- $Commit: \operatorname{COM}: \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q \to \mathbb{G}, \quad (\mathbf{x}, \gamma) \mapsto h^{\gamma} \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} := h^{\gamma} \prod_{i=1}^n g_i^{x_i}.$

We define $\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} := \prod_{i=1}^{n} g_{i}^{x_{i}}$ and $\mathbf{g}^{c} := (g_{1}^{c}, g_{2}^{c}, \dots, g_{n}^{c})$ for any $\mathbf{g} \in \mathbb{G}^{n}$, $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n}$ and $c \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}$. Moreover, the component-wise product between two vectors $\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h} \in \mathbb{G}^{n}$ is written as $\mathbf{g} * \mathbf{h} = (g_{1}h_{1}, g_{2}h_{2}, \dots, g_{n}h_{n})$.

Pedersen vector commitments are perfectly hiding and computationally binding under the assumption that the prover does not know a non-trivial discrete log relation between the generators g_1, \ldots, g_n, h .

To open a commitment to a linear form

$$L: \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n} \to \mathbb{Z}_{q}, \quad \mathbf{x} \mapsto L(\mathbf{x}),$$

$$(2)$$

means that the prover wishes to reveal $L(\mathbf{x})$ together with a proof of validity without revealing any additional information on \mathbf{x} . Achieving this functionality amounts for the prover to send the value $L(\mathbf{x})$ along with a ZKPoK for the relation

$$R = \left\{ \left(\mathbf{g} \in \mathbb{G}^n, \ h, P \in \mathbb{G}, L \in \mathcal{L}\left(\mathbb{Z}_q^n\right), y \in \mathbb{Z}_q; \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_q \right) : P = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} h^{\gamma}, y = L(\mathbf{x}) \right\}.$$
(3)

Protocol 2, denoted by Π_0 , shows a basic Σ -protocol for relation R. Π_0 was informally described in Section 1.2 (A). Theorem 1 shows that Π_0 is indeed a special honest-verifier zero-knowledge (SHVZK) Proof of Knowledge (PoK). Both the communication costs from the prover \mathcal{P} to the verifier \mathcal{V} and vice versa are given. Note that in the non-interactive Fiat-Shamir [FS86] mode the communication costs from verifier to prover might be irrelevant.

Theorem 1 (Basic Pivot). Π_0 is a 3-move protocol for relation R. It is perfectly complete, special honestverifier zero-knowledge and unconditionally knowledge sound with knowledge error 1/q. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $- \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}: 1$ element of \mathbb{G} and n+2 elements of \mathbb{Z}_q . $- \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: 1$ element of \mathbb{Z}_q .

Protocol 2 Σ -protocol Π_0 for relation R Σ -protocol to prove correctness of a linear form evaluation

2-protocol to prove correctness of a linear form	i evaluation.		
In	PUT $(\mathbf{g}, h, P, L, y; \mathbf{x}, \gamma)$	()	
Prover	$P = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} h^{\gamma} \in \mathbb{G}$ $y = L(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$	Verifier	
		Vermer	
$\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \rho \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$ $t = L(\mathbf{r})$ $A = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{r}} h^{\rho}$			
	$\xrightarrow{t,A}$	$c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$	
	\leftarrow		
$\mathbf{z} = c\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r} \ \phi = c\gamma + ho$			
	$\xrightarrow{\mathbf{z},\phi}$		
		$\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{z}}h^{\phi} \stackrel{?}{=} AP^{c}$	
		$L(\mathbf{z}) \stackrel{?}{=} cy + t$	

3.2 Amortization over Many Commitments

A standard amortization technique allows a prover to show correctness of s evaluations of the linear form Lon s committed vectors for the costs of one evaluation. We denote the corresponding relation by R^{Am} , i.e., every element of R^{Am} is composed of s elements of R. Note that the same linear form L is evaluated on different commitments.

More precisely, let $A, P_1, \ldots, P_s \in \mathbb{G}$ be Pedersen vector commitments to $\mathbf{r}, \mathbf{x}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, respectively, with $L(\mathbf{x}_i) = y_i$ for all $1 \leq i \leq s$. Then for a uniform random challenge $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, the group element $\tilde{P} = A \prod_{i=1}^s P_i^{c^i}$ is a Pedersen commitment to $\tilde{\mathbf{x}} = \mathbf{r} + \sum_{i=1}^s \mathbf{x}_i c^i \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ with $L(\tilde{\mathbf{x}}) = L(\mathbf{r}) + \sum_{i=1}^s y_i c^i$. Moreover, if there is a commitment P_j for which the prover does not know an opening then the prover

Moreover, if there is a commitment P_j for which the prover does not know an opening then the prover knows an opening to \tilde{P} with probability at most s/q. Informally, a cheating prover succeeds when c is the zero of some polynomial of degree at most s. When s is polynomial and q exponential in the security parameter this probability is exponentially close to 0.

The first two moves of the amortized Σ -protocol, denoted by Π_0^{Am} , are identical to that of Π_0 . In the third move, the prover sends an opening to \tilde{P} , instead of an opening of AP^c , and the verifier performs the appropriate checks. Protocol Π_0^{Am} is (s+1)-special sound and knowledge soundness follows from Lemma 11 (Appendix A.1). The discussion is summarized in the following theorem.

Theorem 2 (Basic Pivot Amortized). Π_0^{Am} is a 3-move protocol for relation \mathbb{R}^{Am} . It is perfectly complete, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and unconditionally knowledge sound with knowledge error s/q. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $-\mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}$: 1 element of \mathbb{G} and n+2 elements of \mathbb{Z}_q .

 $-\mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: 1 \text{ element of } \mathbb{Z}_q.$

4 Compressing the Pivot

This section shows how Bulletproof techniques can be applied to compress our pivotal Σ -protocol Π_0 , as mentioned in Section 1.2 (B). The key observation is that sending the final message $\hat{\mathbf{z}} := (\mathbf{z}, \phi) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ is actually a (trivial) proof of knowledge for the relation

$$R_1 = \left\{ \left(\widehat{\mathbf{g}}, \widehat{P}, \widehat{L}, \widehat{y}; \widehat{\mathbf{z}} \right) : \widehat{\mathbf{g}}^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}} = \widehat{P} \land \widehat{y} = \widehat{L}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}) \right\},\tag{4}$$

where, with respect to relation R, $\hat{\mathbf{g}} := (g_1, \ldots, g_n, h) \in \mathbb{G}^{n+1}$, $\hat{P} := AP^c$, $\hat{y} := cy + t$ and $\hat{L}(\mathbf{z}, \phi) := L(\mathbf{z})$ for all (\mathbf{z}, ϕ) . Another PoK would also suffice, in particular a PoK with a smaller communication complexity. Moreover, it is immaterial that the PoK is zero-knowledge as the original PoK clearly is not. In [BCC⁺16] this observation was applied to Groth's Σ -protocol [Gro09]. The main difference is that we start with linear form relation R, whereas Groth's Σ -protocol is for a specific quadratic relation.

Let Π be a PoK for relation R_1 . We call the new protocol obtained by replacing the final move of protocol Π_0 by protocol Π the *composition* and write $\Pi \diamond \Pi_0$. Since Π_0 is SHVZK it immediately follows that the composition is also SHVZK.

The essence of Bulletproofs is a PoK, denoted by BP, with logarithmic communication complexity for the following inner product relation,

$$R_{\text{bullet}} = \left\{ \left(\mathbf{g}, \mathbf{h} \in \mathbb{G}^n, P \in \mathbb{G}, u \in \mathbb{Z}_q; \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \right) : P = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{a}} \mathbf{h}^{\mathbf{b}} \land u = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} \rangle \right\}.$$
(5)

The quadratic relation R_{bullet} is quite similar to the relation R_1 and it turns out that minor adaptations of BP give a logarithmic size PoK for relation R_1 . We will now describe the components of the BP protocol, while simultaneously adapting these to our relation R_1 .

4.1 Reduction from Relation R_1 to Relation R_2

The first step of the BP PoK is to incorporate the linear form *into* the Pedersen vector commitment. For this step an additional generator $k \in \mathbb{G}$ is required such that the prover does not know a discrete log relation

between the generators g_1, \ldots, g_n, h, k . More precisely, the problem of finding a proof for relation R_1 is reduced to the problem of finding a proof for relation

$$R_{2} = \left\{ \left(\widehat{\mathbf{g}} \in \mathbb{G}^{n+1}, k \in \mathbb{G}, Q \in \mathbb{G}, \widetilde{L} \in \mathcal{L}\left(\mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n+1}\right); \widehat{\mathbf{z}} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n+1} \right) : Q = \widehat{\mathbf{g}}^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}} k^{\widetilde{L}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}})} \right\}.$$
(6)

where, with respect to relation R_1 , $Q := \hat{P}k^{\hat{y}}$ and $\tilde{L} := c\hat{L}$ for a random challenge $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ sampled by the verifier. The reduction is described in Protocol 3 and denoted by Π_1 . Theorem 1 shows that Π_1 is an argument of knowledge for relation R_1 .

Lemma 1. Π_1 is a 2-move protocol for relation R_1 . It is perfectly complete and computationally knowledge sound with knowledge error 1/q under the discrete logarithm assumption. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $\begin{aligned} &- \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}: n+1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \\ &- \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: 1 \text{ element of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \end{aligned}$

Proof. Completeness follows directly.

Knowledge soundness: We show that there exists an efficient algorithm χ that, on input two accepting transcripts, either extracts a witness for R_1 , or finds a non-trivial discrete log relation. So let $(c_1, \hat{\mathbf{z}}_1)$ and $(c_2, \hat{\mathbf{z}}_2)$ be two accepting transcripts with $c_1 \neq c_2$, then

$$\mathbf{g}^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_1 - \widehat{\mathbf{z}}_2} k^{c_1 \widehat{L}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_1) - c_2 \widehat{L}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_2)} = k^{(c_1 - c_2) \widehat{y}}.$$
(7)

Hence, either we have found a non-trivial discrete log relation, or $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_1 = \hat{\mathbf{z}}_2$ and $c_1 \hat{L}(\hat{\mathbf{z}}_1) - c_2 \hat{L}(\hat{\mathbf{z}}_2) = (c_1 - c_2)\hat{y}$. In the latter case, it follows that $\hat{L}(\hat{\mathbf{z}}_1) = \hat{L}(\hat{\mathbf{z}}_2) = \hat{y}$. Hence, we have found a witness $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_1$ for relation R_1 . From basic Σ -protocol theory the existence of an efficient extractor now follows, which proves the theorem.

Protocol 3 Argument of Knowledge Π_1	for R_1
Reduction from relation R_1 to relation R_2	2.
In	NPUT $(\widehat{\mathbf{g}}, \widehat{P}, \widehat{L}, \widehat{y}; \widehat{\mathbf{z}})$
	$\widehat{P} = \widehat{\mathbf{g}}^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}} \in \mathbb{G}$ $\widehat{y} = \widehat{L}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
Prover	Verifier
	$\xleftarrow{c}{} c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$
	$\xrightarrow{\hat{\mathbf{z}}} \widehat{\mathbf{g}}^{\hat{\mathbf{z}}} k^{c\hat{L}(\hat{\mathbf{z}})} \stackrel{?}{=} \widehat{P} k^{c\hat{y}}$

4.2 Logarithmic Size PoK for Linear Relation R_2

Next we deploy the main technique of the Bulletproof protocol to construct an efficient PoK for relation R_2 . For simplicity let us assume that n + 1 is a power of 2. If this is not the case the vector can be appended with zeros. The protocol is recursive and in each iteration the dimension of the witness is halved until its dimension equals 2. We could add one additional step to the recursion and only send the response when the dimension equals 1. This would reduce the communication costs by one field element, but it would increase the number of group elements sent by the prover by 2. For any even dimension m and vector $\mathbf{g} \in \mathbb{G}^m$, we define $\mathbf{g}_{\mathbf{L}} = (g_1, \ldots, g_{m/2})$ as its left half and $\mathbf{g}_{\mathbf{R}} = (g_{m/2+1}, \ldots, g_m)$ as its right half. The same notation is used for vectors in \mathbb{Z}_q^m . For a linear form $L : \mathbb{Z}_q^m \to \mathbb{Z}_q$, we define

$$L_L : \mathbb{Z}_q^{m/2} \to \mathbb{Z}_q, \quad \mathbf{x} \mapsto L(\mathbf{x}, 0),$$

$$L_R : \mathbb{Z}_q^{m/2} \to \mathbb{Z}_q, \quad \mathbf{x} \mapsto L(0, \mathbf{x}),$$
(8)

where $(\mathbf{x}, 0), (0, \mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ are the vectors \mathbf{x} appended with m/2 zeros on the right and left, respectively. Recall that the component-wise product between two vectors is denoted by *.

The compression is described in Protocol 4 and denoted by Π_2 . Theorem 3 shows that protocol Π_2 is an proof of knowledge for relation R_2 . Note that, in contrast to the compression mechanism of [BBB+18], protocol Π_2 is unconditionally knowledge sound.

Theorem 3 (Compression Mechanism). Π_2 is a $(2\mu + 1)$ -move protocol for relation R_2 . It is perfectly complete and unconditionally knowledge sound with knowledge error

$$\kappa = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{\mu} 2q^{\mu-i}(q-2)^{i-1}}{q^{\mu}} \le \frac{2\mu}{q},\tag{9}$$

where $\mu = \lceil \log_2(n+1) \rceil - 1$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $\begin{aligned} &- \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}: 2 \left[\log_2(n+1) \right] - 2 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } 2 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \\ &- \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: \left[\log_2(n+1) \right] - 1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \end{aligned}$

Proof. Completeness follows directly.

Knowledge soundness follows in a similar manner as it does for the amortized Σ -protocol of Theorem 2. Namely, by the same "polynomial amortization trick" the commitments A, Q, B are combined in a single commitment $Q' := AQ^cB^{c^2}$ where c is a random challenge. Informally, if a prover can open commitment Q', it follows, with high probability, that a prover can open all three commitments A, Q and B. For completeness we include the detailed proof.

We show that Π_2 is $(3, \ldots, 3)$ -special sound (Appendix A.2), i.e., that there exists an efficient algorithm χ that, on input a depth μ $(3, \ldots, 3)$ -tree of accepting transcripts finds a witness for relation R_2 . Knowledge soundness then follows from Lemma 3.

For simplicity we assume that we only run one of the recursive steps, i.e., we consider the 3-move variant of protocol Π_2 , where the prover sends the response \mathbf{z}' regardless of its dimension, and we show that this protocol is 3-special sound. From there $(3, \ldots, 3)$ -special soundness follows by an inductive argument of which we omit the details.

So let us show that there exists an efficient algorithm χ that, on input 3 accepting transcripts $(A, B, c_1, \mathbf{z}_1)$, $(A, B, c_2, \mathbf{z}_2)$, $(A, B, c_3, \mathbf{z}_3)$, with $c_i \neq c_j$ for all i, j, outputs a witness for relation R_2 . Given these transcripts let us define Vandermonde matrix

$$V = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 1 & 1 \\ c_1 & c_2 & c_3 \\ c_1^2 & c_2^2 & c_3^2 \end{pmatrix},$$
(10)

with $det(V) = (c_3 - c_1)(c_3 - c_1)(c_3 - c_2)$. Hence, since $c_i \neq c_j$ for all i, j, it follows that V is invertible and that we can define

$$\begin{pmatrix} a_1\\a_2\\a_3 \end{pmatrix} := V^{-1} \begin{pmatrix} 0\\1\\0 \end{pmatrix}.$$
(11)

Now it is easily seen that, for $\bar{\mathbf{z}} := \left(\sum_{i=1}^{3} a_i \mathbf{z}_i, \sum_{i=1}^{3} a_i c_i \mathbf{z}_i\right) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$, it holds that

$$\mathbf{g}^{\bar{\mathbf{z}}}k^{\sum_{i=1}^{3}a_{i}(\tilde{L}_{L}(\mathbf{z}_{i})+c_{i}\tilde{L}_{R}(\mathbf{z}_{i}))}=Q.$$
(12)

Moreover,

$$\sum_{i=1}^{3} a_i \left(\widetilde{L}_L(\mathbf{z}_i) + c_i \widetilde{L}_R(\mathbf{z}_i) \right) = \widetilde{L}_L \left(\sum_{i=1}^{3} a_i \mathbf{z}_i \right) + \widetilde{L}_R \left(\sum_{i=1}^{3} a_i c_i \mathbf{z}_i \right) = \widetilde{L}(\bar{\mathbf{z}}).$$
(13)

Hence, \mathbf{z} is a witness for relation R_2 , which proves the claim.

rotocol 4 Compressed Argumen	t of knowledge Π_2 for R_2	
	INPUT $(\widehat{\mathbf{g}}, k, Q, \widetilde{L}; \widehat{\mathbf{z}})$	
Prover	$Q = \widehat{\mathbf{g}}^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}} k^{\widetilde{L}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}})}$	Verifier
$\begin{aligned} A &= \widehat{\mathbf{g}}_{R}^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_{L}} k^{\widetilde{L}_{R}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_{L})} \\ B &= \widehat{\mathbf{g}}_{L}^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_{R}} k^{\widetilde{L}_{L}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_{R})} \end{aligned}$	4.7	
	$\xrightarrow{A,B} \xrightarrow{c} \xrightarrow{c} \xrightarrow{(c+1)} (0)$	$c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$
	$\mathbf{g}' := \widehat{\mathbf{g}}_L^c * \widehat{\mathbf{g}}_R \in \mathbb{G}^{(n+1)/2} \ Q' := AQ^c {B^c}^2 \ L' := c\widetilde{L}_L + \widetilde{L}_R$	
$\mathbf{z}' = \widehat{\mathbf{z}}_L + c\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_R$		
$ ext{if}\left(\mathbf{z}'\in\mathbb{Z}_q^2 ight):$	$\xrightarrow{\qquad \mathbf{z}' \qquad \qquad }$	$\left(\mathbf{g}'\right)^{\mathbf{z}'}k^{L'(\mathbf{z}')} \stackrel{?}{=} Q'$
else :	$\begin{array}{c} \operatorname{Run} \Pi_2 \text{ on} \\ (\mathbf{g}',k,Q',L';\mathbf{z}') \end{array}$	

4.3 Composing the Building Blocks

The compressed Σ -protocol Π_c for relation R is the composition of the previously mentioned protocols, i.e., $\Pi_c := \Pi_2 \diamond \Pi_1 \diamond \Pi_0$. The entire protocol is summarized in Protocol 5 and Theorem 4 shows that Π_c is indeed a SHVZK argument of knowledge for relation R with a logarithmic communication complexity.

Note that since protocol Π_1 has computational soundness so does the compressed pivot Π_c . By eliminating reduction Π_1 from above composition and making minor adaptations to the compression mechanism, an unconditionally sound compressed pivot can be derived at the cost of increasing the communication costs by a factor 2. For details we refer to Section 4.4.

Theorem 4 (Compressed Pivot). Π_c is a $(2\mu + 3)$ -move protocol for relation R. It is perfectly complete, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and computationally knowledge sound, under the discrete logarithm assumption, with knowledge error

$$\kappa = \frac{(2q-1)q^{\mu} + (q-1)^2 \sum_{i=1}^{\mu} 2q^{\mu-i}(q-2)^{i-1}}{q^{\mu+2}} \le \frac{2\mu+2}{q},\tag{14}$$

where $\mu = \lfloor \log_2(n+1) \rfloor - 1$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $- \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}: 2 \lceil \log_2(n+1) \rceil - 1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } 3 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q.$

 $- \mathcal{V} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}: \lceil \log_2(n+1) \rceil + 1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q.$

Proof. Completeness follows directly from the completeness of Π_0, Π_1 and Π_2 .

SHVZK follows since Π_0 is SHVZK. The simulator for Π_c namely runs the simulator for Π_0 and continues with honest executions of Π_1 and Π_2 .

Knowledge soundness follows from Lemma 3 (Appendix A.2).

Protocol 5 Compressed Σ -protocol Π_c for relation RCompressed Σ -protocol to prove correctness of a linear form evaluation.

	$\text{INPUT}(\mathbf{g}, h, k, P, L, y; \mathbf{x}, \gamma)$	
Prover	$P = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}} h^{\gamma} \in \mathbb{G}$ $y = L(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$	Verifier
$\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_{R} \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n}, \rho \leftarrow_{R} \mathbb{Z}_{q}$ $t = L(\mathbf{r})$ $A = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{r}} h^{\rho}$	t, A	
$\mathbf{z} = c_0 \mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r}$	$\xrightarrow{c_0,c_1}$	$c_0, c_1 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$
$egin{aligned} \phi &= c_0 \gamma + ho \ \widehat{\mathbf{z}} &:= (\mathbf{z}, \phi) \end{aligned}$	$\widehat{\mathbf{g}} := (\mathbf{g}, h)$ $Q := AP^{c_0}k^{c_1(c_0y+t)}$	
$\begin{split} A &= \widehat{\mathbf{g}}_{R}^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_{L}} k^{\widetilde{L}_{R}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_{L})} \\ B &= \widehat{\mathbf{g}}_{L}^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_{R}} k^{\widetilde{L}_{L}(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_{R})} \end{split}$	$\widetilde{L}(\mathbf{z},\phi) := c_1 L(\mathbf{z})$	
- oL	$\xrightarrow{A,B} \xrightarrow{c} \xrightarrow{c}$	$c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$
$\mathbf{z}' = \widehat{\mathbf{z}}_L + c\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_R$	$\mathbf{g}' := \widehat{\mathbf{g}}_L^c * \widehat{\mathbf{g}}_R \in \mathbb{G}^{(n+1)/2}$ $Q' := AQ^c B^{c^2}$ $L' := c\widetilde{L}_L + \widetilde{L}_R$	
$\mathbf{z}' = \mathbf{z}_L + c \mathbf{z}_R$ $ ext{if} \left(\mathbf{z}' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2 ight) :$	$\xrightarrow{\mathbf{z}'}$	$\left(\mathbf{g}'\right)^{\mathbf{z}'}k^{L'(\mathbf{z}')} \stackrel{?}{=} Q'$
else :	$\begin{array}{l} \operatorname{Run}\Pi_2 \mathrm{on} \\ (\mathbf{g}',k,Q',L';\mathbf{z}') \end{array}$	

In a completely analogous manner, the amortized Σ -protocol Π_0^{Am} of Section 3.2 can be compressed. The result is a compressed Σ -protocol $\Pi_c^{\text{Am}} := \Pi_2 \diamond \Pi_1 \diamond \Pi_0^{\text{Am}}$ for relation R^{Am} . The properties of Π_c^{Am} are summarized in the following theorem.

Theorem 5 (Compressed Pivot Amortized). Π_c^{Am} is a $(2\mu + 3)$ -move protocol for relation \mathbb{R}^{Am} . It is perfectly complete, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and computationally knowledge sound, under the

discrete logarithm assumption, with knowledge error

$$\kappa = \frac{((s+1)q-s)q^{\mu} + (q-1)(q-s)\sum_{i=1}^{\mu} 2q^{\mu-i}(q-2)^{i-1}}{q^{\mu+2}} \le \frac{2\mu+s+1}{q},$$
(15)

where $\mu = \lceil \log_2(n+1) \rceil - 1$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $\begin{array}{l} -\mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}: 2 \left\lceil \log_2(n+1) \right\rceil - 1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } 3 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \\ -\mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: \left\lceil \log_2(n+1) \right\rceil + 1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \end{array}$

4.4 Compressed Pivot with Unconditional Soundness

In this section we describe two approaches to implement the compressed pivot with unconditional knowledge soundness, rather than computational.

First, observe that, in contrast to Bulletproofs [BBB⁺18], our compression mechanism by itself achieves unconditional soundness. The reason is that our pivot only considers linear constraints and no quadratic ones. The only building block that does not achieve unconditional soundness is the reduction of protocol Π_1 . To achieve unconditional soundness, we simply omit this reduction. Only minor adaptations of the compression mechanism are required. A negative consequence of this approach is that the communication costs, while still logarithmic, are increased by a factor 2.

Second, we describe an approach that achieves unconditional soundness without incurring this factor 2 loss in communication efficiency. To this end, we show a conceptual simplification of Σ -protocol Π_0 that reduces the requirements for the compressed pivot to a minimum. Namely, to open linear forms, it turns out to be *sufficient* to have access to an efficient ZKPoK for just opening Pedersen vector commitments. Thus, in principle, a direct provision within the compressed pivot to show that a committed vector satisfies a linear constraint is no longer required.

We begin by showing that a ZK protocol for opening linear forms can be derived from a ZK protocol for *only* proving knowledge of an opening of a Pedersen vector commitment. More precisely, we show that a ZK protocol for relation

$$R' = \{ (\mathbf{k} \in \mathbb{G}^{n-1}, P \in \mathbb{G}; \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n-1}, \gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_q) : \mathbf{k}^{\mathbf{z}} h^{\gamma} = P \},$$
(16)

implies a ZK protocol for relation R of Equation 3.

The main observation is that proving that a committed vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ satisfies $L(\mathbf{x}) = y$, for some linear form L and scalar y, is equivalent to proving that \mathbf{x} lies in the affine subspace

$$A_{L,y} = \{ \mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n : L(\mathbf{z}) = y \}.$$

$$\tag{17}$$

We assume (w.l.o.g.) that y = 0 and that $L \neq 0$. Then $V_L := A_{L,0} \subset \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is a linear subspace of dimension n-1. Both prover and verifier use the same deterministic algorithm to compute a basis $\mathbf{v}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{v}_{n-1}$ for V_L and a new set of generators $\mathbf{k} := (\mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{v}_1}, \ldots, \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{v}_{n-1}}) \in \mathbb{G}^{n-1}$. Note that, since $\mathbf{v}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{v}_{n-1}$ is a basis, a non-trivial discrete log relation between k_1, \ldots, k_{n-1}, h implies a non-trivial discrete log relation between g_1, \ldots, g_n, h .

By black-box application of the ZK protocol for relation R' the prover shows that it knows an opening of commitment P with respect to generators k_1, \ldots, k_{n-1}, h . From this it follows that the prover knows an opening $(\mathbf{x}, \gamma) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ of P with respect to generators g_1, \ldots, g_n, h such that $\mathbf{x} \in V_L$ and therefore $L(\mathbf{x}) = 0$, i.e., (\mathbf{x}, γ) is a witness for relation R which completes the reduction.

Subsequently, we note that the simplified compressed pivot is immediately obtained from protocols Π_0 and Π_2 by "stripping them of their linear forms", i.e., all protocols steps involving the linear form L can be omitted. The reduction of protocol Π_1 is no longer required. As a result, the minimized compressed pivot described here achieves unconditional soundness.

Although this view may be superior from a conceptual standpoint, it does increase the computational costs for both the prover and the verifier. Both have to compute a basis for V_L and a new set of generators of \mathbb{G} . Moreover, at the point of writing, it is not clear how smoothly this approach carries over to assumptions other than the discrete log assumption. For these reasons, the remainder of this paper will be based on the compressed pivot of Section 4.3.

4.5 A Remark on Sublinear Communication Complexity

For his protocols Groth [Gro09] made the observation that there is a trade-off between the communication complexity and the number of rounds. A similar trade-off applies to our situation. Protocol Π_2 achieves a logarithmic communication complexity at the cost of a logarithmic number of rounds. The protocol recursively divides the witness into two parts, left and right. This idea is easily generalized to the situation in which the witness $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is divided into k parts.

For simplicity we assume n to be a power of k. A quick inspection of this generalization shows that instead of the two group elements A and B in the first round of Π_2 , the prover has to sent 2k - 2 group elements. Recursing the protocol $\log_k(n) - 1$ times results in a total communication of $(2k-2)\log_k(n) - 2k+2$ elements of \mathbb{G} and k elements of \mathbb{Z}_q from prover to verifier. It is easily seen that these communication costs are minimized for k = 2, justifying the choices of [BCC⁺16, BBB⁺18].

In contrast, $k = \sqrt{n/2}$ results in a constant round protocol with sublinear communication costs of $\sqrt{2n}-2$ elements of \mathbb{G} and $\sqrt{2n}$ elements of \mathbb{Z}_q from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{V} . Of course, in the non-interactive Fiat-Shamir mode the logarithmic variant might be preferable.

5 The Compressed Pivot as a Black-Box

From this point on, the only facts about the pivot that we need is that we have access to a compact vector commitment scheme that allows a prover to open *arbitrary* linear forms on *multiple* commitments. Hence, we assume black-box access to such a pivot. First, we show that Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) is given as a direct application of our pivot. Second, we treat the utility enhancements mentioned in Section 1.2 (A). Third, we describe the compactification techniques as discussed in Section 1.2 (C).

We use the following notation. We write $[\mathbf{x}]$ for a compact commitment to a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and for a (public) linear form L we write $\Pi_{\text{OPEN}}([\mathbf{x}], L; \mathbf{x})$ for the interactive protocol that reveals $L(\mathbf{x})$ and nothing else to the verifier. For completeness the diagram of Π_{OPEN} is depicted in Protocol 6. Recall that our notation $\Pi_{\text{OPEN}}([\mathbf{x}], L; \mathbf{x})$ means that interactive protocol Π_{OPEN} takes as public input $[\mathbf{x}]$ and L and as prover's private input \mathbf{x} . The communication costs of Π_{OPEN} are equal to the cost of the underlying interactive protocol (Π_c) plus 1 field element from \mathcal{P} to \mathcal{V} (the output of L), unless of course the output is known in advance. Similarly, we write $\Pi_{\text{OPEN}}([\mathbf{x}_1], \ldots, [\mathbf{x}_s], L; \mathbf{x}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{x}_s)$ for the (amortized) interactive protocol that exclusively reveals $L(\mathbf{x}_i)$ for $1 \leq i \leq s$ to the verifier.

At this point, the implementation details of the compact commitment scheme do not matter anymore. However, when we give concrete knowledge errors and communication costs it is implicitly assumed that $[\cdot]$ is instantiated with Pedersen vector commitments and compressed Σ -protocol Π_c .

Protocol 6 Protocol Π_{OPEN} for Opening a Linear Form Evaluated in a Committed Vector
The randomness and generators of the underlying commitment scheme [·] are left implicit.INPUT([x], L; x)
OUTPUT(L(x))Prover
 $y = L(\mathbf{x})$ YVerifieryRun $\Pi_c([\mathbf{x}], L, y; \mathbf{x})$


5.1 Many Nullity Checks for the Price of One

A "polynomial amortization trick" (known, e.g., from MPC) allows us to do many nullity checks on the committed vector \mathbf{x} without a substantial increase in complexity. Consider linear forms L_1, \ldots, L_s and suppose the prover claims that $L_i(\mathbf{x}) = 0$ for $i = 1 \ldots, s$. The verifier then samples $\rho \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ uniformly at random and asks the prover to open the linear form $L(\mathbf{x}) := \sum_{i=1}^{s} L_i(\mathbf{x})\rho^{i-1}$, i.e., prover and verifier run $\Pi_{\text{OPEN}}([\mathbf{x}], L; \mathbf{x})$. The opening of $L(\mathbf{x})$ equals the evaluation of some polynomial of degree at most s - 1. If this polynomial is non-zero, it has at most s - 1 zero's. Hence, $L(\mathbf{x}) = 0$ implies that $L_i(\mathbf{x}) = 0$ for all i with probability at least 1 - (s - 1)/q. When q is exponential and s is polynomial in the security parameter this probability is exponentially close to 1.

We write $\Pi_{\text{NULLITY}}([\mathbf{x}], L_1, \dots, L_s; \mathbf{x})$ and its diagram is formally described in Protocol 7. The communication costs are equal to the costs of a single nullity-check (i.e., s = 1) plus one additional \mathbb{Z}_q element from \mathcal{V} to \mathcal{P} (the challenge ρ).

The above discussion holds *verbatim* when we replace the linear forms by affine forms Φ_1, \ldots, Φ_s , for which we also write $\Pi_{\text{NULLITY}}([\mathbf{x}], \Phi_1, \ldots, \Phi_s; \mathbf{x})$. Moreover, by the amortized and compressed Σ -protocol Π_c^{Am} these techniques directly carry over to the scenario where the prover makes the *same* nullity claims over many *different* commitments.

Protocol 7 Amortized Protocol Π_{NULLITY} for Many Nullity Checks at Once The randomness and generators of the underlying commitment scheme $[\cdot]$ are left implicit.



5.2 Opening Affine Maps

Many ZK scenarios can be reduced to nullity-checks and, as such, the above utility enhancement is extremely powerful. As an often encountered example, we specifically mention the functionality of opening arbitrary affine maps

$$\Phi: \mathbb{Z}_a^n \to \mathbb{Z}_a^s, \quad x \mapsto Ax + b, \tag{18}$$

at the cost of increasing the communication by exactly s-1 values in \mathbb{Z}_q in comparison to opening one linear form (i.e., the evaluations of s-1 additional outputs). Note that Φ is the combination of s affine forms. The protocol goes as follows. The prover reveals the evaluation $y = \Phi(\mathbf{x})$ followed by an amortized nullity-check on the affine forms $\Phi_1(\mathbf{x}) - y_1, \ldots, \Phi_s(\mathbf{x}) - y_s$. For the interactive protocol that opens an affine map Φ we write $\Pi_{\text{OPEN}}([\mathbf{x}], \Phi; \mathbf{x})$.

As before, this protocol directly caries over the scenario where a prover opens the evaluations of Φ on many committed vectors. The communications costs are only increased by the additional evaluations, i.e., the communication costs of the underlying compressed Σ -protocol remain the same. Note that in this case amortization is applied twice. First, at the Σ -protocol level, allowing many commitments to be considered. Second, only requiring black-box access to the pivotal Σ -protocols, allowing many affine forms to be considered.

5.3 Compactifying a Vector of Commitments

So far, we have shown how to open many linear forms L applied to a compactly committed secret vector \mathbf{x} with low complexity. Dealing with nonlinear functions of a secret-vector-of-interest \mathbf{x} will, as shown in Section 6, require that the prover, at the starting point, is *also* committed to a vector *aux* consisting of *correlated secret randomness*. As the method will consist of opening appropriate linear forms on the *entire vector* given by the pair (\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{aux}), it will be assumed that the prover is committed to this pair via a *single* compact commitment.

Now, from a practical application perspective, it is likely that the prover is *already* committed to \mathbf{x} before the start of a ZK proof. Consider, for example, the following two extreme cases:

- Case 1: The prover is committed to **x** in a *single* compact commitment. This scenario may be said to correspond to a "textbook" ZK setting.
- Case 2: The prover is committed to the coordinates of x *individually*. This scenario is relevant in practical situations with a natural dynamic where provers deliver committed data in subsequent transactions and only periodically prove in ZK some property on the compound information.

In order to deal with each of these scenarios, we need some further utility enhancements of the compressed pivot in order to bring about the desired starting point for the methods from Section 6, *without too much loss in communication*. It turns out that this is just a matter of "technology," i.e., plug & play with our compressed pivot and its basic theory suffices.

Besides these extreme cases one can consider hybrid scenarios in which the secret-vector-of-interest \mathbf{x} is dispersed over various compact commitments. The methods described below *both* carry over to hybrid scenarios. The optimal approach depends on specific properties of the scenario. Namely, the communication complexity of the "Case 1 enhancement" is linear in the number of commitments, whereas the communication complexity of the "Case 2 enhancement" is linear in the (maximum) dimension of the committed vectors.

Case 1. We describe a straightforward approach. We use the homomorphic property of Pedersen commitments. The prover has a compact commitment P to \mathbf{x} . Taking from the public set-up information a new set of generators disjoint from the initial set that, supposedly, underlies P, the prover creates a compact commitment Q to aux. Eventually, the prover will set $P' := P \cdot Q$ as the compact commitment to the secret pair (\mathbf{x} , \mathbf{aux}), a join. But, first, the prover must show that \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{aux} "live on disjoint sets of generators". This is just a nullity check, basically. The prover shows that, in P, there is a window of zeros w.r.t. the new generators, i.e., each occurs to the power 0. Similarly for Q but with a window of zeros w.r.t. the initial set of generators. By the methods for amortized nullity checks described earlier, this is handled with logarithmic communication. In fact, for the methods of Section 6 to work, it is easy to see that it suffices to perform the check on Q only.

However, since the methods of Section 6 would be applied *serially*, i.e., *after* the join above, this would incur a constant multiplicative factor 2 loss in communication efficiency. We show how it can be done *in parallel*, thereby avoiding any such loss.

The amortized pivot allows a prover to open *one* linear form on *many* compact commitments efficiently. By the amortized nullity checks a prover can open *many* linear forms on *one* compact commitments efficiently. Together these amortization techniques almost suffice, except that they force a prover to open linear forms "intended" for one particular commitment on *other* commitments as well; they reveal the *cross-terms*. Thus, to prevent a privacy breach, we need to mask these cross-terms appropriately and we do this by constructing a small *shell* around commitments containing sufficient randomness. Masking the appropriate cross-terms returns us to the "standard" amortization scenario where the prover wishes to open one affine map on multiple compact commitments. The shells cause unintended evaluations to return random values, whereas intended evaluations are left unaltered. For the details we refer to Appendix B.1.

For simplicity, we work with the serial approach in Section 6.2, with the understanding that the incurred factor 2 loss is prevented using the method from Appendix B.1.

Case 2. In this case we describe a simple, single protocol that integrates the compactification of a vector of commitments to individual coordinates of \mathbf{x} together with a compact commitment to aux. See Appendix B.2 for the details. Performing this integration in parallel with the methods of Section 6 is a straightforward application of the amortized nullity checks.

6 Proving Nonlinear Relations via Arithmetic Circuits

Using our compressed pivot as a black-box, this section describes how to obtain efficient zero-knowledge arguments for arbitrary arithmetic circuits. We consider arithmetic circuits C over \mathbb{Z}_q with n inputs, s outputs and m multiplication gates. Addition and multiplication gates have fan-in 2 and unbounded fan-out. The number of addition gates is immaterial, as is the number of gates for scalar multiplication. For this reason m only refers to the multiplication gates that take two variable inputs. We fix an ordering $1, \ldots, n$ of the inputs and an ordering $1, \ldots, m$ of the multiplication gates.

The main idea is to combine the compressed pivot with an adaptation of the work of [CDP12] that shows how to prove arbitrary constraints on vectors of committed elements by exploiting techniques from secure multi-party computation. Concretely, we use the ideas underlying the Commitment Multiplication Protocol from [CDM00].¹¹ A detailed overview of the approach has been given in Section 1.2 (D). Here, we summarize the key points and formalize the main properties of the resulting protocols.

6.1 Basic Circuit Satisfiability

First, we consider the basic circuit satisfiability scenario in which a prover shows that it knows an input $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ for which the arithmetic circuit C evaluates to 0. More precisely, we construct a ZK protocol for the following circuit satisfiability relation:

$$R_{cs} = \{ (C; \mathbf{x}) : C(\mathbf{x}) = 0 \}.$$
(19)

If C is an affine map, i.e., without multiplication gates, the protocol follows directly from the (enhanced) functionality of our pivot. Namely, the prover commits to \mathbf{x} and runs $\Pi_{\text{NULLITY}}([\mathbf{x}], C; \mathbf{x})$. Hence, addition gates and scalar multiplications, are implicitly handled since our pivot allows the opening of *arbitrary* linear forms.

Multiplication gates are handled by an appropriate adaptation of the techniques from [CDP12]. Their primary result is a Σ -protocol showing correctness of m multiplication triples $(\alpha_i, \beta_i, \gamma_i)$. First, we recall the adaptation of their approach that uses our compressed pivot as a black-box. See also the first observation made in Section 1.2 (D). The protocol goes as follows.

- The prover selects a random polynomial $f(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq m}$ that defines a packed secret sharing of the vector $(\alpha_1, \ldots, \alpha_m)$. The prover also selects a random polynomial $g(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\leq m}$ that defines a packed secret sharing of the vector $(\beta_1, \ldots, \beta_m)$. Finally, the prover computes the product polynomial h(X) := f(X)g(X) of degree $\leq 2m < q$.
- The prover commits to the vector

$$\mathbf{y} = (\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_m, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_m, f(0), g(0), h(0), h(1), \dots, h(2m)) \in \mathbb{Z}_a^{4m+3}$$

in a single compact commitment and sends the commitment to the verifier. Note that, by Lagrange interpolation, the polynomials f(X), g(X) and h(X) are uniquely defined by the vector \mathbf{y} .

- The verifier selects a random challenge $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ distinct from $1, \ldots, m$ and sends it to the prover.
- Public linear combinations of the coefficients of **y** define three values: u := f(c), v := g(c) and w := h(c). These values are opened and the verifier checks whether w = uv. A cheating prover is caught with probability greater than $1 - \frac{2m}{(q - m)}$ and honest-verifier zero-knowledge essentially follows from 1-privacy of the secret sharing scheme.

¹¹ For a general description of efficient zero-knowledge verification of secret multiplications, in terms of arbitrary (strongly-multiplicative) arithmetic secret sharing, see Section 12.5.3 in [CDN15].

Now we adapt this approach to the circuit satisfiability scenario, where we let $C : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_q^s$ be an arbitrary arithmetic circuits with m multiplication gates. We use a simple fact about a circuit C. Consider the computation graph induced by evaluation at *input-vector* $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Write $\gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ for the resulting *outputs of the multiplication gates*. For each i, write $(\alpha_i, \beta_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^2$ for the resulting *inputs to the i-th multiplication gate*. Finally, write $\omega \in \mathbb{Z}_q^s$ for the resulting *output of the circuit*. Then, for each i, there are affine forms¹² $u_i, v_i : \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+m} \to \mathbb{Z}_q$, depending only on C, such that, for all $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, it holds that $\alpha_i = u_i(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m)$ and $\beta_i = v_i(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m)$. These forms are uniquely determined by the addition and scalar multiplication gates. Similarly, there is an affine function $w : \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+m} \to \mathbb{Z}_q^s$ such that, for all $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, it holds that $\omega = w(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m)$. In other words, a given pair $(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ can be completed to an accepting computation graph if and only if $u_i(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m) \cdot v_i(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m) = \gamma_i$ (for $i = 1, \ldots, m$) and $w(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m) = 0$.

The vector \mathbf{y} , from the above multiplication-triples approach, is now adapted as follows. The prover includes the input vector \mathbf{x} . *However*, the α_i 's and the β_i 's are *omitted* from \mathbf{y} . Otherwise, the vector \mathbf{y} is unchanged. In particular,

$$\mathbf{y} = (\mathbf{x}, f(0), g(0), h(0), h(1), \dots, h(2m)) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n+2m+3}$$

and $(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m) := (\mathbf{x}, h(1), \ldots, h(m))$ is a subvector of \mathbf{y} . Subsequently, the prover compactly commits to this adapted vector \mathbf{y} . By the handle discussed above, the prover needs to convince the verifier that (1) $w(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m) = 0$, and that (2) $\alpha_i \cdot \beta_i = \gamma_i$ for all $1 \le i \le m$. The α_i 's and β_i 's are now taken as the evaluation at $(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m)$ of the affine functions u_i, v_i introduced above. Note that we may capture all these as affine functions evaluated at \mathbf{y} .

As for (1), checking that $w(\mathbf{x}, \gamma_1, \ldots, \gamma_m) = 0$ is just a nullity check as provided by the pivot. As for (2), the polynomials f(X), g(X) are *still* well-defined by the prover's compact commitment to \mathbf{y} . Namely, $\rho := f(0)$, i.e., the randomness underlying its selection, is *still* included in \mathbf{y} . As the α_i 's thus defined are affine functions of \mathbf{y} , the prover is still (implicitly) committed to a polynomial f(X) of degree $\leq m$ such that $f(0) = \rho$ and $f(i) = \alpha_i$ $(i = 1, \ldots, m)$ and evaluation of f(X) in a point c is *still*, by composition of appropriate maps, an affine evaluation at \mathbf{y} , as enabled by the pivot. Since $\rho' := g(0)$ is also still included in \mathbf{y} , a similar conclusion is drawn about the β_i 's, g(X), and evaluation of the latter. As no changes with respect to h(X) were made in \mathbf{y} , we conclude that the required check can be performed in the same way as before.

The costs of the different openings are reduced by applying the amortized nullity checks of Section 5.1. In fact, the communication costs are independent of the number of outputs s.

The protocol is formally described in Protocol 8 and denoted by Π_{cs} . Protocol Π_{cs} only requires black-box access to the commitment scheme [·]. For notational convenience, we write

$$\Pi_{\text{NULLITY}}\left([\mathbf{z}], C(\mathbf{x}), f(c) - y_1, g(c) - y_2, h(c) - y_3; \mathbf{z}\right)$$
(20)

for the amortized nullity check on the affine forms associated to the s+3 coefficients of $(C(\mathbf{x}), f(c)-y_1, g(c)-y_2, h(c)-y_3)$.

Theorem 6 shows that, when $[\cdot]$ is instantiated with Pedersen vector commitments and compressed Σ protocol Π_c , Π_{cs} is a SHVZK argument of knowledge for relation R_{cs} . The theorem also shows that the
knowledge error depends on the number of multiplication gates in the circuit. If the circuit size is polynomial
in the security parameter and q is exponential, then the knowledge error is exponentially close to 0.

Theorem 6 (Basic Circuit ZK). Π_{cs} is a $(2\mu+5)$ -move protocol for relation R_{cs} . It is perfectly complete, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and computationally knowledge sound, under the discrete logarithm assumption, with knowledge error

$$\kappa \le \frac{2\mu + 2m + s + 4}{q - m},\tag{21}$$

where $\mu = \lfloor \log_2(n+2m+4) \rfloor - 1$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

¹² \mathbb{Z}_q -linear forms plus a constant.


- $\begin{aligned} &- \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V} \colon 2 \left\lceil \log_2(n+2m+4) \right\rceil \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } 6 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \\ &- \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P} \colon \left\lceil \log_2(n+2m+4) \right\rceil + 3 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \end{aligned}$

Proof (Sketch). Completeness follows directly.

Knowledge soundness: By Lagrange interpolation there exists an efficient algorithm to reconstruct a polynomial of degree t given t + 1 evaluations. Hence, the packed secret sharing and the amortized nullitychecks are (2m + 1)-special sound and 4-special sound, respectively. The proof now follows from Lemma 4 (Appendix A.2).

SHVZK follows from 1-privacy of the secret sharing scheme and the fact that Π_c is SHVZK.

Protocol 8 Circuit Satisfiability Argument Π_{cs} for Relation R_{cs} The polynomials f and g are sampled uniformly at random such that their evaluations in $1, \ldots, m$ coincide with the left and, respectively, right inputs of the m multiplication gates of C evaluated at \mathbf{x} .



6.2 Circuit ZK from Compactification

Thus far we have restricted ourselves to the basic circuit satisfiability scenario where the prover commits to all input and auxiliary data at once. However, there is a great variety of other scenarios, where the circuit takes as input committed values. As in Section 5.3 we consider two extreme cases for circuit ZK:

- Case 1. Prove that $C(\mathbf{x}) = 0$ for a vector commitment $[\mathbf{x}]$ with $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.
- **Case 2.** Prove that $C(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = 0$ for commitments $[x_i]$ with $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ for all i. _

These cases are dealt with by compactifying the commitments into a single compact commitment to all relevant data. The resulting protocol for Case 1 is denoted by $\Pi_{cs}^{(1)}$ with corresponding relation $R_{cs}^{(1)}$ and its properties are given by Theorem 7. Note that the suboptimal compactification incurs a factor 2 increase of the communication costs that can be avoided by the more involved techniques of Appendix B.1.

Theorem 7 (Circuit ZK Case 1). $\Pi_{cs}^{(1)}$ is a $(2\mu + 5)$ -move protocol for relation $R_{cs}^{(1)}$. It is perfectly complete, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and computationally knowledge sound, under the discrete logarithm assumption, with knowledge error

$$\kappa \le \frac{4\mu + 2m + n + s + 5}{q - m},\tag{22}$$

where $\mu = \lceil \log_2(n+2m+4) \rceil - 1$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $\begin{aligned} &- \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}: 4 \left\lceil \log_2(n+2m+4) \right\rceil - 1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } 9 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \\ &- \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: 2 \left\lceil \log_2(n+2m+4) \right\rceil + 5 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \end{aligned}$

The protocol for Case 2 is denoted by $\Pi_{cs}^{(2)}$ with corresponding relation $R_{cs}^{(2)}$ and its properties are given by Theorem 8. Note that in this case we can restrict ourselves to $n \leq 2m$. For if n is larger than the number of inputs to multiplication gates there must exist linear reductions that can be applied directly to the Pedersen commitments $[x_i]$ using its homomorphic properties. Hence, the communication costs from prover to verifier are upper-bounded by

$$2\left[\log_2(4m+5)\right] + 9 \le 2\left[\log_2(m+2)\right] + 13\tag{23}$$

elements. In comparison, Bulletproofs achieve a communication cost of $2 \lceil \log(m) \rceil + 13$ elements. Hence, perhaps surprisingly, our plug-and-play approach almost never increases the communication costs.

Theorem 8 (Circuit ZK Case 2). $\Pi_{cs}^{(2)}$ is a $(2\mu + 5)$ -move protocol for relation $R_{cs}^{(2)}$. It is perfectly complete, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and computationally knowledge sound, under the discrete logarithm assumption, with knowledge error

$$\kappa \le \frac{2\mu + n + s + 2m + 5}{q - m},\tag{24}$$

where $\mu = \lceil \log_2(n+2m+5) \rceil - 1$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $\begin{aligned} &- \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}: 2 \left[\log_2(n+2m+5) \right] + 1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } 8 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \\ &- \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: \left[\log_2(n+2m+5) \right] + 4 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \end{aligned}$

7 Range Proofs

In a basic range proof a prover wishes to commit to a secret integer v and show that this integer is in a public range, say $[0, 2^{n-1}]$. As mentioned in Section 1.2 (E), range proofs follow as an immediate consequence of the circuit ZK protocols. First, we treat the basic scenario and, second, we consider the scenario where the prover wishes to convince a verifier that many different integer commitments are all in some fixed range.

7.1 Basic Range Proofs

In the basic scenario the prover commits to the integer $v \in \{0, \ldots, 2^{n-1}\}$ and the required auxiliary data **aux** at once in a single compact commitment. In the following solution the prover does not commit to the integer v explicitly, but only via its bit-decomposition $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. Namely, note that v can be computed as linear form evaluated at \mathbf{b} , hence a compact commitment to \mathbf{b} is an *implicit* commitment to v. To show that v is in the range $[0, 2^{n-1}]$, the prover now only has to convince the verifier that the committed vector \mathbf{b} is comprised of 0's and 1's, which can be done by a simple application of the circuit ZK protocol Π_{cs} .

To this end, let $C : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \mathbf{x} \mapsto \mathbf{x} * (1 - \mathbf{x})$. Prover and verifier run Π_{cs} on input $(C; \mathbf{b})$ to obtain a ZK protocol for relation

$$R_r = \{ (C; \mathbf{b}) : C(\mathbf{b}) = 0 \}.$$
(25)

Minor improvements to the circuit satisfiability proof can be introduced by observing that:

- 1. All multiplications gates have inputs of the form α and 1α . Hence, instead of sampling a random polynomial g(X) for the right inputs of multiplication gates we take g(X) = 1 f(X).
- 2. All outputs of multiplications gates are 0, hence $h(1) = h(2) = \cdots = h(n) = 0$ and these values do not have to be included in the compact commitment.

The full protocol, denoted by Π_r , is described in Protocol 11 (Appendix C). Theorem 9 shows that Π_r is a SHVZK argument of knowledge for relation R_r .

Theorem 9 (Basic Range Proof). Π_r is a $(2\mu+5)$ -move protocol for relation R_r . It is perfectly complete, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and computationally knowledge sound, under the discrete logarithm assumption, with knowledge error

$$\kappa \le \frac{2\mu + 3n + 3}{q - n},\tag{26}$$

where $\mu = \lceil \log_2(2n+3) \rceil - 1$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $\begin{aligned} & - \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}: 2 \left\lceil \log_2(2n+3) \right\rceil \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } 5 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \\ & - \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: \left\lceil \log_2(2n+3) \right\rceil + 3 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \end{aligned}$

7.2 Compactifying Many Pedersen Commitments

Let us now consider the case of a prover that wishes to show that s Pedersen commitments to $v_1, \ldots, v_s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ are all in the range $[0, 2^{n-1}]$. For the corresponding relation we write $R_r^{(s)}$. The protocol, denoted by $\Pi_r^{(s)}$, is constructed by deploying the "Case 2" compactification techniques of Section 5.3 to obtain a single compact commitment to all relevant data. The properties of $\Pi_r^{(s)}$ are given by the following theorem.

Theorem 10 (Range Proof Case 2). $\Pi_r^{(s)}$ is a $(2\mu + 5)$ -move protocol for relation $R_r^{(s)}$. It is perfectly complete, special honest-verifier zero-knowledge and computationally knowledge sound, under the discrete logarithm assumption, with knowledge error

$$\kappa \le \frac{2\mu + 3ns + 2s + 3}{q - ns},\tag{27}$$

where $\mu = \lceil \log_2(2ns + s + 4) \rceil - 1$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $\begin{aligned} &- \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}: 2 \left\lceil \log_2(2ns+s+4) \right\rceil + 1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } 7 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \\ &- \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: \left\lceil \log_2(2ns+s+4) \right\rceil + 4 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \end{aligned}$

8 Our Program from the Strong-RSA Assumption

In this section we describe how our program can be based on assumptions derived from the Strong-RSA assumption, as mentioned in Section 1.2 (F). We treat the main differences and refer to Appendix D and [BFS19] for more details.

A disadvantage of the Pedersen vector commitment scheme is the number of generators required. In fact, to commit to an *n*-dimensional vector, n + 1 generators of the group \mathbb{G} are required. Moreover, the compressed Σ -protocol Π_c has a verification time that is linear in the dimension n.

Alternatively, vector commitment schemes can be constructed via integer commitment schemes [FO97, DF02]. A commitment to the vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is then a commitment to an integer representation $\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathbb{Z}$ of \mathbf{x} . The integer commitment schemes of [FO97, DF02] are constructed by using groups \mathbb{G} of unknown order.

This is precisely the approach followed in a recent unpublished work of Bünz, Fisch and Szepieniec [BFS19]. They construct a polynomial commitment scheme allowing a prover to commit to a polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_q[X]$ of arbitrary degree, via a unique integer representation of its coefficient vector. A commitment to such a representation only requires two group elements $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$. The work of [BFS19] shows how to open arbitrary evaluations $f(a) \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ of a committed polynomial without revealing any additional information about f. Their polynomial evaluation protocol uses recursive techniques similar to those used in Bulletproofs. This approach results in a logarithmic communication complexity. In addition, [BFS19] deploys Proofs of Exponentiation (PoE) [Wes19] to achieve logarithmic verification time.

Their work refers to generic constructions that can be used to obtain more general ZK protocols from polynomial commitment schemes. However, we argue that these constructions are overly complicated and that a stronger functionality (vector commitment scheme with linear form openings) avoids many difficulties in the design of ZK protocols. Moreover, it turns out that the protocols of [BFS19] only require minor adaptations to accommodate this stronger functionality. From this, an instantiation of the black-box functionality of Section 5 is derived, now based on the hardness assumptions related to the Strong-RSA assumption [BP97]. The techniques of Section 6 and Section 7 directly apply, and the higher level applications inherit the logarithmic communication and computation complexity of the vector commitment scheme. The compactification methods of Section 5.3 are tailored to Pedersen (vector) commitments. Minor modifications are required to adapt these techniques to the Strong-RSA setting.

9 Our Program from the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption

If one desires our program can also be instantiated from the the Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption (KEA), i.e., we construct a KEA based vector commitment scheme with compact linear form openings. The techniques from Section 6 apply as before, resulting in ZK protocols for arbitrary arithmetic circuits. Basing our program on KEA reduces communication complexity from logarithmic to *constant*. The protocols do require a trusted setup that depends on the arithmetic circuit under consideration. Moreover, in contrast to other KEA based protocols, the black-box approach of Section 6 renders our solution interactive (although in a setting where Fiat-Shamir applies).

We stress that KEA is of a different nature than the discrete log or strong-RSA assumption. Namely, KEA is not an intractability assumption and it is unfalsifiable. For these reasons, its application is not completely without controversy.

We now, informally, describe the main components of the KEA based vector commitment scheme together with its ZK protocol for opening linear forms. Our approach uses the techniques of [Gro10] and only minor adaptations are required.

A compact commitment to a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is, as before, a Pedersen vector commitment $P = h^{\gamma} \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}}$. A ZKPoK for knowing an opening to P is another Pedersen commitment P' to \mathbf{x} , under the same randomness γ , using a different set of generators $h' := h^{\alpha}, g'_1 := g_1^{\alpha}, \ldots, g'_n := g_n^{\alpha}$. The value $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is sampled uniformly at random in the trusted setup phase and is only shared with a *designated* verifier. Both sets of generators are public and part of the common reference string. The proof P' is verified by checking that $P' = P^{\alpha}$.

The Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption states that an adversary capable of computing pairs (P, P') with $P' = P^{\alpha}$, either knows α or an opening to P. From this assumption knowledge soundness follows. Correctness and zero-knowledge are immediate. Note that the resulting ZKPoK is non-interactive and its size is independent of the dimension n.

Given a bilinear pairing $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \to \mathbb{G}_T$ the verification can be done without knowledge of α , eliminating the restriction to a designated verifier. In this case verification amounts to checking that e(P, h') = e(h, P').

To prove that the committed vector \mathbf{x} satisfies a linear form relation $L(\mathbf{x}) = u$, the generators are taken of a specific form. More precisely, the generators are sampled under the condition that $g_i = h^{\beta^i}$, for some secret $\beta \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, for all $1 \le i \le n$. The associated KEA derived assumption is the *n*-power Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption (*n*-PKEA).

Groth showed that, using this additional structure, together with the bilinear pairing, efficient circuit ZK protocols exist [Gro10]. Moreover, his protocols are easily adapted to our situation, where we simply wish to prove correctness of a linear form evaluation. The adaptation relies on the following observation. Suppose that $\mathbf{a} = (a_1, \ldots, a_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ is such that $L(\mathbf{z}) = \langle \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{z} \rangle$ for all $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and let us define the following

polynomials:

$$f(Y) := \gamma + \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_i Y^i, \quad g(Y) := \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_{n-i} Y^i, \quad h(Y) := f(Y)g(Y) = \sum_{i=0}^{2n-1} c_i Y^i.$$
(28)

Then the *n*-th coefficient of h(Y) equals $c_n = \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{a} \rangle = L(\mathbf{x})$. This observation allows for a straightforward adaptation of the product argument in [Gro10] Section 6, resulting in a constant size ZKPoK for the correctness of a linear form evaluation. We omit further details and refer the reader to [Gro10].

10 Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Toon Segers for his careful reading of the previous version and for his helpful comments and suggestions. Thomas Attema has been supported by EU H2020 project No 780701 (PROMETHEUS). Ronald Cramer has been supported by ERC ADG project No 74079 (ALGSTRONGCRYPTO).

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A Extractor Analysis

This appendix describes the refined extractor analysis for different generalizations of the notion *special-soundness*.

A.1 k-Special Soundness

In the theory of Σ -protocols, special soundness means that there exists an efficient algorithm to extract a witness w for statement x from a "collision," i.e., two accepting conversations (x, a, c, z) and (x, a, c', z') with $c \neq c'$. It is well known that special soundness implies knowledge soundness with knowledge error 1/q, where q is the size of the challenge set. This result can be shown to follow from the convexity of the function f(X) = X(X - 1/q) and an application of Jensen's inequality [Cra97].

To show that a special sound protocol is knowledge sound, the following "collision-game" is defined in [Cra97]. This is essentially the game played by the knowledge extractor and Lemma 2 gives a bound on the success probability when playing this game. Both the game and the lemma are almost identical to the ones found in [Cra97].

Consider a 0/1-matrix with n rows and q columns. The rows will correspond to the prover's randomness and the columns to the verifier's randomness. An entry of the matrix is 1 if the prover is able to supply an accepting response for the associated first message and challenge and 0 otherwise. Let ϵ denote the number of ones in H.

The game goes as follows. Select an entry of H uniformly at random. If this entry is a 1, select another entry of the same row uniformly at random. If this entry is again a 1 the game outputs success.

To bound the success probability of the collision-game, Jensen's inequality is used. Jensen's inequality states that if X is a real random variable and f is a continuous convex function defined on the support of X, it holds that

$$f\left(\mathbb{E}[X]\right) \le \mathbb{E}[f(X)]. \tag{29}$$

Lemma 2 (Lemma 2.1 of [Cra97]). Let H be a 0/1-matrix with n rows and q columns, and let ϵ denote the fraction of 1-entries in H. Suppose $\epsilon > 1/q$. Then the success probability of one iteration of the "collision-game" is greater than or equal to $\epsilon(\epsilon - 1/q)$.

Proof. Let e_i denote the number of 1-entries in the *i*-th row, $i = 1 \dots n$. and let ϵ_i denote the fraction of 1-entries in the *i*-th row, i.e., $\epsilon_i = e_i/q$. Clearly, the success-probability is equal to¹³

$$\sum_{i=1}^{n} \epsilon_i \left(\frac{q\epsilon_i - 1}{q - 1} \right) \le \sum_{i=1}^{n} \epsilon_i \left(\epsilon_i - \frac{1}{q} \right).$$
(30)

Now observe that $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_i] = \epsilon$, put f(x) = x(x - 1/q) on the interval [0, 1] and apply Jensen's inequality.

Instead of showing how knowledge soundness follows from this lemma, we immediately consider a generalization that has recently become relevant, k-special soundness. A 3-move interactive protocol is called k-special sound, if there exists an efficient algorithm that takes as input k accepting conversations $(x, a, c_1, z_1), \ldots, (x, a, c_k, z_k)$ with $c_i \neq c_j$, $\forall i \neq j$, and outputs a witness w for x.

The proof technique using Jensen's inequality is no longer directly applicable, since the associated function is no longer convex. For this reason, prior works [BCC⁺16, BBB⁺18] resort to heavy row type arguments without computing the exact knowledge error. Here, we show that an adaptation of the proof using Jensen's inequality does apply. To this end let us consider the following function.

$$f: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}: \quad x \mapsto \begin{cases} \prod_{j=0}^{k-1} \frac{q}{q-j} \left(x - \frac{j}{q} \right), & \text{if } x \ge \frac{k-1}{q}, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
(31)

Recall that $q := |\mathcal{C}|$.

It is easily seen that f is twice-differentiable and $f''(x) \ge 0$ for all $x \in \mathbb{R} \setminus \left\{\frac{k-1}{q}\right\}$. Moreover, for $x_0 = \frac{k-1}{q}$ it holds that

$$\lim_{x \uparrow x_0} \frac{f(x) - f(x_0)}{x - x_0} = 0 \le \frac{q}{q - k + 1} \prod_{j=0}^{k-2} \frac{k - 1 - j}{q - j} = \lim_{x \downarrow x_0} \frac{f(x) - f(x_0)}{x - x_0}.$$
(32)

Hence, f is a convex function.

Theorem 11. Let $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ be a k-special sound interactive protocol for relation R and let x be some statement, where \mathcal{V} samples the challenge uniformly at from a challenge set of size q. Let \mathcal{P}^* be a prover such that $(\mathcal{P}^*, \mathcal{V})$

¹³ This is minor correction of the original proof, which incorrectly states that the success probability is equal to the right hand side of this inequality.

accepts with probability $\epsilon(x) > \frac{k-1}{q}$. Then there exists a polynomial time extractor \mathcal{E} with rewindable black-box access to \mathcal{P}^* that on input x outputs a witness w for x with probability at least

$$\prod_{j=0}^{k-1} \left(\epsilon(x) - \frac{j}{q} \right) \ge \left(\epsilon(x) - \frac{k-1}{q} \right)^k, \tag{33}$$

in at most k calls to \mathcal{P}^* .

Proof. \mathcal{E} runs $(\mathcal{P}^*, \mathcal{V})$ on a random challenge $c \in \mathcal{C}$. If \mathcal{V} accepts, \mathcal{E} rewinds to move 2 and samples a uniform random challenge from $\mathcal{C} \setminus \{c\}$. \mathcal{E} continues until it aborts or has extracted k accepting transcripts. In the latter case, k-special soundness implies the existence of an efficient algorithm to compute a witness w. So let us now determine the success probability of \mathcal{E} .

Let a be any first message of $(\mathcal{P}^*, \mathcal{V})$ on input $(x; w) \in R$. Let ϵ_a be the probability that \mathcal{P}^* succeeds conditioned on the first message being equal to a. Then $\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_a] = \epsilon(x)$, where the expected value is taken over all possible first messages a.

Moreover, the success probability of \mathcal{E} , conditioned on the first message being equal to a can easily seen to be equal to $f(\epsilon_a)$, where f is defined in Equation 31.

Hence, the unconditional success probability of \mathcal{E} equals

$$\mathbb{E}[f(X)] \ge f\left(\mathbb{E}[X]\right) = f(\epsilon(x)) \ge \prod_{j=0}^{k-1} \left(\epsilon(x) - \frac{j}{q}\right),\tag{34}$$

where the first inequality follows from Jensen's inequality.

A.2 Forking Lemma

A $(2\mu + 1)$ -move protocol is called (k_1, \ldots, k_{μ}) -special sound, if there exists an efficient algorithm that computes a witness from any set of $K := \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} k_i$ accepting transcripts $(x, a, c_{1,j}, z_{1,j}, \ldots, c_{\mu,j}, z_{\mu,j}), 1 \le j \le K$, that they are in a (k_1, \ldots, k_{μ}) -tree structure. The root of a (k_1, \ldots, k_{μ}) -tree is the first message a and every node at depth i has precisely k_i distinct children $c_1, \ldots, c_{k_i} \in C$. This way we obtain precisely K paths from the leaves to the root representing the accepting transcripts. Here, we show that a (k_1, \ldots, k_{μ}) -special sound protocol is knowledge sound.

The following lemma is a refinement of the forking lemma of $[BCC^+16]$. We follow a different extractor analysis and obtain an exact knowledge error. For notational convenience Lemma 3 assumes that all challenges are sampled from \mathbb{Z}_q uniformly at random. Subsequently, Lemma 4 generalizes this to the case where the verifier samples from different subsets of \mathbb{Z}_q in the different rounds of the protocol. In that lemma we only give an upper bound on the soundness error.

Lemma 3. Let $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ be a (k_1, \ldots, k_{μ}) -special sound $(2\mu+1)$ -move interactive protocol for relation R, where \mathcal{V} samples each challenge uniformly at random from a challenge set of size q. Let x be some statement. Let \mathcal{P}^* be a prover such that $(\mathcal{P}^*, \mathcal{V})$ accepts with probability $\epsilon(x) > \kappa$, where

$$\kappa = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{\mu} (k_i - 1) q^{\mu - i} \prod_{j=1}^{i-1} (q - k_j + 1)}{q^{\mu}} \le \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{\mu} (k_i - 1)}{q}.$$
(35)

Then there exists a polynomial time extractor \mathcal{E} with rewindable black-box access to \mathcal{P}^* that on input x outputs a witness w for x with probability at least $(\epsilon(x) - \kappa)^K$ in at most K calls to \mathcal{P}^* , where $K = \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} k_i$.

Proof. We construct a polynomial time algorithm that generates a (k_1, \ldots, k_μ) -tree of accepting transcripts with probability at least $(\epsilon(x) - \kappa)^K$ in at most K calls. The lemma then follows from the definition of (k_1, \ldots, k_μ) -special soundness.

For $0 \le m \le \mu - 1$ and $c_i \in \mathcal{C}$ let $\text{TREE}(x, a, c_1, \ldots, c_m)$ be the algorithm that tries to find a $(k_{m+1}, \ldots, k_{\mu})$ -sub-tree after the first 2m + 1 rounds have been fixed by a, c_1, \ldots, c_m . More precisely, for $m = \mu$ it simply

runs \mathcal{P}^* on challenges c_1, \ldots, c_{μ} and for $m < \mu$ it runs $\text{TREE}(x, a, c_1, \ldots, c_m, y_{\ell})$ for $1 \leq \ell \leq k_{m+1}$ and $y_{\ell} \in \mathcal{C}$ sampled uniformly at random such that $y_i \neq y_j$ for all $i \neq j$. We say TREE aborts if at any stage the verifier \mathcal{V} rejects and write TREE = \perp in this case.

For notational convenience we define $\bar{\mathbf{c}}_m := (x, a, c_1, \dots, c_m)$. For such a vector we define $\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{c}}_m}$ to be the probability that \mathcal{P}^* succeeds conditioned on the first 2m + 1 rounds to coincide with $\bar{\mathbf{c}}_m$. Moreover, let us define

$$\kappa_m := \frac{\sum_{i=m+1}^{\mu} (k_i - 1) q^{\mu - i} \prod_{j=m+1}^{i-1} (q - k_j + 1)}{q^{\mu - m}}.$$
(36)

Finally, we let $K_m = \prod_{i=m+1}^{\mu} k_i$. We will show by induction that the success probability P_m of $\text{TREE}(x, a, c_1, \ldots, c_m)$ is at least $\max(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{c}}_m} - \kappa_m, 0)^{K_m}$ for all $0 \le m \le \mu$.

For $m = \mu$ the induction hypothesis immediately follows by the definition of $\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{c}}_m}$. So let us assume that the success probability of $\text{TREE}(x, a, c_1, \ldots, c_m)$ is at least $\max(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{c}}_m} - \kappa_m, 0)^{K_m}$ for all m > M. Then,

$$P_{M} := P\left(\mathrm{TREE}(x, a, c_{1}, \dots, c_{M}) \neq \bot\right),$$

$$= \prod_{\ell=1}^{k_{M+1}} P\left(\mathrm{TREE}(x, a, c_{1}, \dots, c_{M}, y_{\ell}) \neq \bot\right),$$

$$\geq \prod_{\ell=1}^{k_{M+1}} \max\left(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M}, y_{\ell}} - \kappa_{M+1}, 0\right)^{K_{M+1}},$$

$$\stackrel{(1)}{\geq} \prod_{\ell=1}^{k_{M+1}} \max\left(\frac{q}{q-\ell+1}\left(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M}} - \frac{\ell-1}{q}\right) - \kappa_{M+1}, 0\right)^{K_{M+1}},$$

$$= \prod_{\ell=1}^{k_{M+1}} \max\left(\frac{q}{q-\ell+1}\left(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M}} - \frac{\ell-1+\kappa_{M+1}(q-\ell+1)}{q}\right), 0\right)^{K_{M+1}},$$

$$\stackrel{(2)}{\geq} \prod_{\ell=1}^{k_{M+1}} \left(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M}} - \frac{k_{M+1} - 1 + \kappa_{M+1}(q-k_{M+1}+1)}{q}, 0\right)^{K_{M}},$$

$$= \max\left(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M}} - \frac{k_{M+1} - 1 + \kappa_{M+1}(q-k_{M+1}+1)}{q}, 0\right)^{K_{M}},$$

$$\stackrel{(3)}{=} \max\left(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M}} - \kappa_{M}, 0\right)^{K_{M}}.$$
(37)

For inequality (1) we use that y_{ℓ} is sampled uniformly at random from $\mathcal{C} \setminus \{y_1, \ldots, y_{\ell-1}\}$, hence

$$\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M},y_{\ell}} = \frac{q}{q-\ell+1} \left(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M}} - \frac{1}{q} \sum_{j=1}^{\ell-1} \epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M},y_{j}} \right),$$

$$\geq \frac{q}{q-\ell+1} \left(\epsilon_{\bar{\mathbf{e}}_{M}} - \frac{\ell-1}{q} \right).$$
(38)

For inequality (2) we use that $\ell \leq k_{M+1}$ and that $0 \leq \kappa_m \leq 1$ for all m. For equality (3) we use that

$$\frac{k_{M+1} - 1 + \kappa_{M+1}(q - k_{M+1} + 1)}{q} = \kappa_M.$$
(39)

Hence, by induction the hypothesis is true for all $0 \le m \le \mu$. In particular, we find that $P(\text{TREE}(x, a)) \ge \max(\epsilon_a - \kappa, 0)^K$. Now define the convex function,

$$f: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}: \quad x \mapsto \begin{cases} (x-\kappa)^K, & \text{if } x \ge \kappa, \\ 0, & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
(40)

Then the success probability of the extractor is at least

$$\mathbb{E}[f(\epsilon_a)] \ge f\left(\mathbb{E}[\epsilon_a]\right) = f(\epsilon(x)) = (\epsilon(x) - \kappa)^K,\tag{41}$$

where the first inequality follows by Jensen's inequality. This proves the theorem.

Lemma 4. Let $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ be a (k_1, \ldots, k_{μ}) -special sound $(2\mu + 1)$ -move interactive protocol for relation R, such that the verifier samples challenge c_i in move 2*i* uniformly at random from challenge set \mathcal{C}_i for $1 \leq i \leq \mu$. Let x be some statement. Let $n_i := |\mathcal{C}_i|$ and let \mathcal{P}^* be a prover such that $(\mathcal{P}^*, \mathcal{V})$ accepts with probability $\epsilon(x) > \kappa$, where

$$\kappa \le \sum_{i=1}^{\mu} \frac{k_i - 1}{n_i}.$$
(42)

Then there exists a polynomial time extractor \mathcal{E} with rewindable black-box access to \mathcal{P}^* that on input x outputs a witness w for x with probability at least $(\epsilon(x) - \kappa)^K$ in at most K calls to \mathcal{P}^* , where $K = \prod_{i=1}^{\mu} k_i$.

B Compactifying a Vector of Commitments

This section describes two solutions for the two extreme ZK cases, where the prover wishes to show that some relation holds for data that has already been committed to. Recall the two cases from Section 5.3:

- Case 1: The prover is committed to the input data \mathbf{x} in a *single* compact commitment.
- Case 2: The prover is committed to the coordinates of the input data \mathbf{x} individually.

Both solutions reduce the situation to that of a prover with a single compact commitment $[(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{aux})]$ to all relevant data (i.e., input data and auxiliary data). Applying the methods of Section 6 serially, i.e., after these reductions, induces a factor 2 loss in the communication efficiency. Here, we show how these phases can be executed in *parallel*, amortizing their costs and thereby avoiding the factor 2 loss.

B.1 Case 1

The straightforward *serial* approach for this case is described in Section 5.3. It requires the prover to open one linear form on one compact commitment, and another linear form on another commitment. First, the amortized nullity checks on Pedersen commitment Q to $(0, \mathsf{aux}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+t}$ and, second, an opening on Pedersen commitment P' = PQ to $(\mathbf{x}, \mathsf{aux}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+t}$ when applying the methods of Section 6. Recall that, here, P is a Pedersen commitment to the input data $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. In this section we describe a Σ -protocol for precisely this amortization scenario where the linear form that is to be opened *depends* on the commitment.

More precisely, let us consider the two linear forms $L_1, L_2 : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_q$ and two compact commitments $[\mathbf{x}_1]$ and $[\mathbf{x}_2]$ to $\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. The goal is to efficiently open $L_1(\mathbf{x}_1)$ and $L_2(\mathbf{x}_2)$ in ZK. In particular, the cross-terms $L_1(\mathbf{x}_2)$ and $L_2(\mathbf{x}_1)$ are to remain secret.

The main idea is to build a *shell* around the compact commitments that allows the prover to mask linear form evaluations that are not supposed to be revealed, i.e., the cross-terms. Thereby, the problem can be reduced to a standard amortization scenario where the entire "matrix" of linear form evaluations

$$\begin{pmatrix} L_1(\mathbf{x}_1) \ L_1(\mathbf{x}_2) \\ L_2(\mathbf{x}_1) \ L_2(\mathbf{x}_2) \end{pmatrix}$$

is revealed. More precisely, *intended* evaluations will return the correct value and *unintended* evaluations will return a random, i.e., masked, value.

The solution presented here is constructed at the level of our basic Σ -protocol Π_0 (Section 3). Black-box access to $[\cdot]$ is insufficient and we therefore focus on the Pedersen vector commitment scheme. It suffices to consider a solution with linear communication complexity. A compressed version of this Σ -protocol, with logarithmic communication complexity, directly follows from the compression techniques of Section 4. Let us now consider the details of our solution. Taking from the public set-up information a new pair of generators k_1, k_2 disjoint from the initial set that, supposedly, underlie Pedersen commitments $[\mathbf{x}_1]$ and $[\mathbf{x}_2]$. These additional generators allow the prover to incorporate additional (random) coefficients $u, w \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ in the commitments. However, it is essential that generator k_1 is only used to equip commitment $[\mathbf{x}_1]$ with a shell and generator k_2 is only used to equip commitment $[\mathbf{x}_2]$ with a shell. Shelled Pedersen commitments to \mathbf{x}_1 and \mathbf{x}_2 are obtained by multiplying $[\mathbf{x}_1]$ and $[\mathbf{x}_2]$ with shells k_1^u and k_2^w , respectively, and take the form $[(\mathbf{x}_1, u, 0)]$ and $[(\mathbf{x}_2, 0, w)]$.

Altogether we have reduced the problem to finding a ZK protocol for the following relation,

$$R_{\text{shell}} = \{ (\mathbf{g}, k_1, k_2, h, P_1, P_2, L_1, L_2, y_1, y_2; \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, u, w, \gamma_1, \gamma_2) : P_1 = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}_1} k_1^u h^{\gamma_1}, P_2 = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}_2} k_2^w h^{\gamma_2}, L_1(\mathbf{x}_1) = y_1, L_2(\mathbf{x}_2) = y_2 \},$$

$$(43)$$

where $\mathbf{g} \in \mathbb{G}^n$, $k_1, k_2, h, P_1, P_2 \in \mathbb{G}$, $u, w, y_1, y_2, \gamma_1, \gamma_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$, $\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $L_1, L_2 : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_q$ are linear forms.

Next, we describe how this relation can be reduced to the standard amortization scenario where cross terms *are* revealed. Simultaneously, we introduce amortized nullity checks on the appropriated coordinates of $(\mathbf{x}_1, u, 0)$ and $(\mathbf{x}_2, 0, w)$. These nullity checks have to be incorporated at this stage of the protocol, otherwise they will again introduce cross terms that are to remain secret. So let $\rho \in \mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{-1\}$ be a uniform random challenge and let us consider the following linear forms:

$$\widehat{L}_1: \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+2} \to \mathbb{Z}_q, \quad (\mathbf{x}, a, b) \mapsto L_1(\mathbf{x}) - y_1 + b(\rho + 1),
\widehat{L}_2: \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+2} \to \mathbb{Z}_q, \quad (\mathbf{x}, a, b) \mapsto L_2(\mathbf{x}) - y_2 + a(\rho + 1).$$
(44)

Note that to mask the cross terms it is essential that $\rho \neq -1$.

From these derived linear forms the following relation, with public cross-terms, arises:

$$\widehat{R}_{\text{shell}} = \{ (\mathbf{g}, k_1, k_2, h, P_1, P_2, L_1, L_2, y_1, y_2, y_{11}, y_{21}; \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, u, w, u', w', \gamma_1, \gamma_2) :
P_1 = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}_1} k_1^u k_2^{w'} h^{\gamma_1}, P_2 = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}_2} k_1^{u'} k_2^w h^{\gamma_2}, \widehat{L}_1(\mathbf{x}_1, u, w') = \widehat{L}_2(\mathbf{x}_2, u', w) = 0,
\widehat{L}_1(\mathbf{x}_2, u', w) = y_{12}, \widehat{L}_2(\mathbf{x}_1, u, w') = y_{21} \}.$$
(45)

Standard amortization techniques directly yield a Σ -protocol for \hat{R}_{shell} with the desired communication complexity. However, a ZKPoK for relation \hat{R}_{shell} does not yield a ZKPoK for relation R_{shell} , since information about the masks u and w is revealed. For this reason, the prover first re-randomizes the shells by sending commitments R_1, R_2 to $s_1, s_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ chosen uniformly at random under generators (k_1, h) and (k_2, h) , respectively. The prover and verifier compute the re-randomized commitments R_1P_1 and R_2P_2 and by two standard Σ -protocols the prover shows that commitments R_1 and R_2 exclusively involve the appropriate generators. After re-randomization the prover and verifier run a standard amortized Σ -protocol for relation \hat{R}_{shell} .

To summarize, the ZKPoK for relation R_{shell} contains three components:

- 1. Amortized nullity checks on shelled commitments P_1 and P_2 .
- 2. Re-randomization of the shells, together with the basic Σ -protocols for R_1 and R_2 .
- 3. Amortized Σ -protocol for relation R_{shell} .

The protocol is formally described in Protocol 9 and denoted by Π_{shell} . Theorem 12 summarizes its main properties.

Theorem 12. Π_{shell} is a 4-move protocol for relation R_{shell} . It is perfectly complete, special honest verifier zero-knowledge and unconditionally knowledge sound with knowledge error $(3q - 4)/(q^2 - q) < 3/(q - 1)$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $- \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{V}: 5 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } n+11 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q.$

 $-\mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: 2 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q.$

Proof. Completeness directly follows.

SHVZK: On input $\rho, c \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ with $\rho \neq -1$, the simulator samples $R_1, R_2 \in \mathbb{G}, y_{21}, y_{12}, z_1, z_2, \phi_1, \phi_2, \phi \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+2}$ uniformly at random. From these values the simulator computes:

$$A = (\mathbf{g}, k_1, k_2)^{\mathbf{z}} h^{\phi} (P_1 R_1)^{-c} (P_2 R_2)^{-c^2},$$

$$A_1 = k_1^{z_1} h^{\phi_1} R_1^{-c},$$

$$A_2 = k_2^{z_2} h^{\phi_2} R_2^{-c},$$

$$t_1 = \hat{L}_1(\mathbf{z}) - c^2 y_{12},$$

$$t_2 = \hat{L}_2(\mathbf{z}) - c y_{21}.$$
(46)

The resulting transcript tr is now easily seen to be accepting. Moreover, using the fact that $\rho \neq -1$, it follows that the probability distribution of tr is equal to that of an honest execution.

Soundness: We show that the protocol is (2,3)-special sound which implies knowledge soundness by Lemma 4. From a refined analysis following the approach outlined in the proof of Lemma 3 the knowledge error can be derived. We omit the details of obtaining this knowledge error.

Let us now show that Π_{shell} is (2, 3)-special sound. From three accepting transcripts with coinciding first and second messages and different challenges, the extractor uses standard techniques to extract elements $\bar{\mathbf{z}}_1, \bar{\mathbf{z}}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+2}$ and $\bar{\phi}_1, \bar{\phi}_2, \bar{z}_1, \bar{z}_2, \bar{\phi}_{11}, \bar{\phi}_{21} \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ for which it holds that

$$(\mathbf{g}, k_1, k_2)^{\bar{\mathbf{z}}_1} h^{\phi_1} = P_1 R_1, \qquad \hat{L}_1(\bar{\mathbf{z}}_1) = 0, \qquad k_1^{\bar{z}_1} h^{\phi_{11}} = R_1, (\mathbf{g}, k_1, k_2)^{\bar{\mathbf{z}}_2} h^{\bar{\phi}_2} = P_2 R_2, \qquad \hat{L}_2(\bar{\mathbf{z}}_2) = 0, \qquad k_2^{\bar{z}_2} h^{\bar{\phi}_{21}} = R_2.$$

$$(47)$$

Now let us define $\hat{\mathbf{z}}_1 := \bar{\mathbf{z}}_1 - (0, \dots, 0, \bar{z}_1, 0), \, \hat{\mathbf{z}}_1 := \bar{\mathbf{z}}_2 - (0, \dots, 0, \bar{z}_2), \, \widehat{\phi_1} := \bar{\phi}_1 - \bar{\phi}_{11} \text{ and } \widehat{\phi_2} := \bar{\phi}_2 - \bar{\phi}_{21}.$ Then it holds that

$$(\mathbf{g}, k_1, k_2)^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_1} h^{\phi_1} = P_1, \qquad \widehat{L}_1(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_1) = 0, (\mathbf{g}, k_1, k_2)^{\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_2} h^{\widehat{\phi}_2} = P_2, \qquad \widehat{L}_2(\widehat{\mathbf{z}}_2) = 0.$$

$$(48)$$

Following the same procedure for another first move challenge ρ' allows the extraction of elements $(\bar{\mathbf{x}}, a_1, b_1), (\bar{\mathbf{x}}_2, a_2, b_2) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+2}$ and $\bar{\gamma}_1, \bar{\gamma}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ that satisfy $b_1 = a_2 = 0$ and

$$\mathbf{g}^{\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{1}} h_{1}^{\hat{\alpha}_{1}} h^{\bar{\gamma}_{1}} = P_{1}, \qquad L_{1}(\bar{\mathbf{x}}_{1}) = y_{1}, \\
 \mathbf{g}^{\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{2}} h_{2}^{\hat{b}_{2}} h^{\bar{\gamma}_{2}} = P_{2}, \qquad L_{2}(\hat{\mathbf{x}}_{2}) = y_{2}.$$
(49)

Hence, Protocol Π_{shell} is (2,3)-special sound which proves the Theorem.

B.2 Case 2

Let us consider the case where the prover has s individual Pedersen commitments P_i to $v_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. The goal is to construct an interactive protocol that takes as public input P_1, \ldots, P_s , as prover's private input v_1, \ldots, v_s and $\mathsf{aux} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^t$ and outputs a compact commitment to $[(v_1, \ldots, v_s, \mathsf{aux})]$. In fact, our solution outputs a commitment $[(v_1, \ldots, v_s, r, \mathsf{aux})]$ where $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ is sampled uniformly at random. This additional coefficient r does not introduce any difficulties in applying the methods of Section 6. In contrast to Case 1, we will see that parallelization with this compactification technique immediately follows. Moreover, black-box access to our compressed pivot $[\cdot]$ suffices.

The main idea is to create a new compact commitment to $(v_1, \ldots, v_s, r, \mathsf{aux}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{s+t+1}$ and use a standard (amortized) Σ -protocol to prove correctness of this compact commitment. The amortized Σ -protocol was, for the more general Pedersen vector commitments, described in Section 3.2. More precisely, from the amortized

$Input(\mathbf{g},$	$k_1, k_2, h, P_1, P_2, L_1, L_2, y_1, y_2; \mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{x}_2, u, u$	$w, \gamma_1, \gamma_2)$
	$P_1 = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}_1} k_1^u h^{\gamma_1} \in \mathbb{G}$ $P_2 = \mathbf{g}^{\mathbf{x}_2} k_2^w h^{\gamma_2} \in \mathbb{G}$ $y_1 = L_1(\mathbf{x}_1), y_2 = L_2(\mathbf{x}_2)$	
Prover		Verifier
	ρ	$\rho \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{-1\}$
	$\hat{L}_1(\mathbf{x}, a, b) := L_1(\mathbf{x}) - y_1 + b(\rho + 1)$ $\hat{L}_2(\mathbf{x}, a, b) := L_2(\mathbf{x}) - y_2 + a(\rho + 1)$	
$s_1, s_2, \psi_1, \psi_2 \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q R_1 = k_1^{s_1} h^{\psi_1}, R_2 = k_2^{s_2} h^{\psi_2}$		
$y_{21} = \hat{L}_2(\mathbf{x}_1, u + s_1, 0)$ $y_{12} = \hat{L}_1(\mathbf{x}_2, 0, w + s_2)$		
$r_1, r_2, \eta_1, \eta_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ $A_1 = k^{r_1} h^{\eta_1}, A_2 = k^{r_2} h^{\eta_2}$		
$\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_{R} \mathbb{Z}_{q}^{n+2}, \omega \leftarrow_{R} \mathbb{Z}_{q} \\ t_{1} = \widehat{L}_{1}(\mathbf{r}), t_{2} = \widehat{L}_{2}(\mathbf{r}) \\ A = (\mathbf{g}, k_{1}, k_{2})^{\mathbf{r}} h^{\omega}$		
	$\xrightarrow{R_1,R_2,A,A_1,A_2,y_{21},y_{12},t_1,t_2} \xrightarrow{c}$	$c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$
$\mathbf{z} = (\mathbf{x}_1, s_1, 0)c + (\mathbf{x}_2, 0, s_2)c^2 + \mathbf{r}$ $\phi = (\gamma_1 + \psi_1)c + (\gamma_2 + \psi_2)c^2 + \omega$ $z_1 = cs_1 + r_1$		
$egin{array}{llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll$		
$\varphi_2 = c\varphi_2 + \eta_2$	$\xrightarrow{ \mathbf{z},\phi,z_1,\phi_1,z_2,\phi_2} \rightarrow$	$(\mathbf{g}, k_1, k_2)^{\mathbf{z}} h^{\phi} \stackrel{?}{=} A(P_1 R_1)^c (P_2 R_2)^{c^2}$
		$\widehat{L}_1(\mathbf{z}) \stackrel{?}{=} c^2 y_{12} + t_1 \ \widehat{L}_2(\mathbf{z}) \stackrel{?}{=} cy_{21} + t_2$
		$k_{1}^{(2)} = k_{21}^{(2)} + k_{2}^{(2)}$ $k_{1}^{(2)} h^{\phi_{1}} \stackrel{?}{=} A_{1}R_{1}^{c}$
		$k_2^{z_2} h^{\phi_2} \stackrel{?}{=} A_2 R_2^c$

Protocol 9 Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge Π_{shell} for relation R_{shell} A

 Σ -protocol for proving knowledge of openings to P_1, \ldots, P_s , we construct a new protocol Π_P . The first message of the basic Σ -protocol is appended with a compact commitment $[\mathbf{y}] = [(v_1, \ldots, v_s, r, \mathsf{aux})]$, where r is the random element to which the prover committed in the first round of the Σ -protocol. After the final round of the Σ -protocol, the prover and verifier run the interactive nullity check on compact commitment $[\mathbf{y}]$ and affine form $L_c(\mathbf{x}) - z = x_{s+1} + \sum_{i=1}^{s} c^i x_i - z$, where c is the verifier's challenge and z is the prover's response. This nullity check shows that the commitment $[\mathbf{y}]$ is of the correct form.

Note that it is immaterial that P is a Pedersen commitment. Any other commitment scheme with a Σ -protocol that satisfies some linearity constraints suffices. In particular, the thirds message should be computed as the evaluation of a public linear form parameterized by the challenge c. Moreover, because Π_P only performs a nullity check on compact commitment $[\mathbf{y}]$, parallelization with the methods of Section 6 directly follows. Namely, these methods follow from partial openings of exactly the same vector $[\mathbf{y}]$.

The protocol is formally described in Protocol 10. It outputs a vector commitment $[\mathbf{y}]$ and is a ZK protocol for the following relation

$$R_P = \{ (P_1, \dots, P_s, [\mathbf{y}]; v_1, \gamma_1, \dots, v_s, \gamma_s, \mathbf{y}) : P_j = g^{v_j} h^{\gamma_j}, v_j = y_j \quad 1 \le j \le s \}.$$
(50)

The properties of Π_P are summarized in Theorem 13.

Theorem 13. Π_P is a $(2\mu + 5)$ -move protocol for relation R_P . It is perfectly complete, special honestverifier zero-knowledge and computationally knowledge sound, under the discrete logarithm assumption, with knowledge error

$$\kappa \le \frac{2\mu + s + 2}{q - 1},\tag{51}$$

where $\mu = \lceil \log_2(s+t+2) \rceil - 1$. Moreover, the communication costs are:

 $\begin{aligned} & - \mathcal{P} \to \mathcal{V}: 2 \left\lceil \log_2(s+t+2) \right\rceil + 1 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{G} \text{ and } 5 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \\ & - \mathcal{V} \to \mathcal{P}: \left\lceil \log_2(s+t+2) \right\rceil + 2 \text{ elements of } \mathbb{Z}_q. \end{aligned}$

Proof. Completeness and SHVZK follow from the associated properties of the Σ -protocol and Π_{NULLITY} . Knowledge soundness: We first recall the proof that shows that the basic amortized Σ -protocol is (s + 1)-special sound. Let $(A, c_j, \mathbf{z}_j, \phi_i)$ be accepting transcripts for $0 \le j \le s$ with $c_i \ne c_j$ for all $i \ne j$. Let V be the $(a + 1) \times (a + 1)$ by advantage matrix generated by a.

V be the $(s+1) \times (s+1)$ Vandermonde matrix generated by c_0, \ldots, c_s . Since the challenges are distinct, it follows that V is invertible. Let $V^{-1} = (a_{i,j})_{0 \le i,j \le s}$ and, for $1 \le \ell \le s$, let

$$\bar{z}_{\ell} := \sum_{j=0}^{s} a_{\ell,j} \mathbf{z}_{j},
\bar{\gamma}_{\ell} := \sum_{j=0}^{s} a_{\ell,j} \phi_{j}.$$
(52)

Then, it holds that $g^{\bar{z}_{\ell}}h^{\bar{\gamma}_{\ell}} = P_{\ell}$ for all ℓ , which proves that the basic amortized Σ -protocol is (s+1)-special sound.

Soundness of the compound protocol now follows by the soundness of Π_{NULLITY} and the fact that for all ℓ

$$\sum_{j=0}^{s} a_{\ell,j} L_{c_j}(\mathbf{x}) = x_{\ell}.$$
(53)

The knowledge error follows from Lemma 4.

C Range Proof

Protocol 11, denoted by Π_r , is a SHVZK argument of knowledge for relation R_r (Theorem 9), where

$$R_r = \{ (C; \mathbf{b}) : C(\mathbf{b}) = 0 \},$$
(54)

and $C : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \mathbf{x} \mapsto \mathbf{x} * (1 - \mathbf{x})$. The polynomial f in this protocol is sampled uniformly at random from all polynomials of degree n for which the evaluations at $1, \ldots, n$ correspond to \mathbf{b} . The protocol is very similar to the circuit satisfiability protocol of Section 6. Minor improvements are possible due to the specific nature of the circuit C.

Protocol 10 Extended Σ -protocol Π_P for s Pedersen commitments

Ini	$\operatorname{PUT}(P_1, \dots, P_s; v_1, \gamma_1, \dots v_s, \gamma_s, aux)$ $\operatorname{OUTPUT}([v_1, \dots, v_s, r, aux])$	x)
Prover	$P_j = g^{v_j} h^{\gamma_j}$ $L_a(\mathbf{x}) := x_{s+1} + \sum_{i=1}^s a^i x_i$	Verifier
$egin{aligned} r &\leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q, ho \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q \ A &= g^r h^ ho \ \mathbf{y} &= (v_1, \dots, v_s, r, aux) \end{aligned}$		
$z = r + \sum_{i=1}^{s} c^{i} v_{i}$	$\xrightarrow{A,[\mathbf{y}]} \rightarrow \qquad $	$c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q$
$\phi = \rho + \sum_{i=1}^{s} c^i \gamma_i$	$\xrightarrow{z,\phi}$	$g^{z}h^{\phi} \stackrel{?}{=} A \prod_{i=1}^{s} P^{c^{i}}$
$\phi = \rho + \sum_{i=1} c \gamma_i$	$\xrightarrow{z,\phi}$ $\Pi_{\text{NULLITY}}\left([\mathbf{y}], L_c - z; \mathbf{y}\right)$	$g^{z}h^{\phi} \stackrel{?}{=} A \prod_{i=1}^{s} P^{c^{i}}$

Protocol 11 Range proof Π_r

	$Input(C; \mathbf{b})$	
Prover	$C: \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_q^n,$ $\mathbf{x} \mapsto \mathbf{x} * (1 - \mathbf{x})$ $C(\mathbf{b}) = 0$	Verifier
Prover		vermer
$f \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q[X]_{\geq n}$ $h(X) = f(X)(1 - f(X))$ $\mathbf{z} = (\mathbf{b}, f(0), h(0), h(n+1), \dots, h(2n))$ $y_1 = f(c)$	$\xrightarrow{ c} c$	$c \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{1, \dots, n\}$
$y_2 = h(c)$	$\xrightarrow{y_1, y_2} \qquad \qquad$	$y_2\stackrel{?}{=}y_1(1-y_1)$

D Strong-RSA Assumption

In this appendix we informally sketch the approach of [BFS19] along with our adaptations to allow for the opening of *arbitrary* linear forms.

D.1 Integer Commitment Scheme

We briefly recall the integer commitment scheme of [DF02]. The commitment space of this scheme is a group \mathbb{G} of unknown order, such as an RSA group or a class group. Although the exact order of \mathbb{G} is unknown, we do assume to know an upper bound B on the order, i.e., $|\mathbb{G}| \leq B$.

The setup phase of the commitment scheme generates two random group elements $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$ such that they both generate the same subgroup of \mathbb{G} . In this case the distribution of h^{γ} for γ chosen uniformly at random from $[0, B \cdot 2^{\kappa})$, where κ is the security parameter, will be exponentially close to the uniform distribution on $\langle g \rangle$. Hence for an arbitrary integer x, the element $[x] = g^x h^{\gamma} \in \mathbb{G}$ statistically hides x.

Intuitively, the binding property follows from the assumption that the prover does not know the order of \mathbb{G} . Formally, the binding property can be shown to follow from the root assumption [DF02, BFS19].

D.2 Vector Encoding

The vector encoding scheme of [BFS19] first lifts vectors $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ to their unique representatives in $\mathbb{Z}\left(\frac{q-1}{2}\right)^n = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^n : \|\mathbf{x}\|_{\infty} \leq \frac{q-1}{2}\}$. Subsequently, for any $b \in \mathbb{Z}$ and Q > 2b the following encoding is applied:

Encode:
$$\mathbb{Z}(b)^{n} \to \mathbb{Z}, \quad \mathbf{x} \mapsto \sum_{i=1}^{n} x_{i}Q^{i-1}.$$
 (55)

This encoding is injective since Q > 2b. For both $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}(b)^n$, we will write $\hat{\mathbf{x}} \in \mathbb{Z}$ for their integer encodings. A commitment $[\mathbf{x}]$ to a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ or $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}(b)^n$ is an integer commitment to $\hat{\mathbf{x}}$.

D.3 Σ -Protocol

The above thus generates a compact vector commitment scheme $[\cdot] : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{G}$. For a linear form $L : \mathbb{Z}_q^n \to \mathbb{Z}_q$, this commitment scheme has a basic Σ -protocol for the relation

$$R_{\mathbb{Z}_q} = \left\{ \left(g, h, P \in \mathbb{G}, u \in \mathbb{Z}_q, Q \in \mathbb{Z}, L; \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n, \gamma \in \mathbb{Z}_q \right) : P = g^{\widehat{\mathbf{x}}} h^{\gamma}, L(\mathbf{x}) = \mathbf{u}, Q > q \right\}.$$
(56)

The main differences between this Σ -protocol and protocol Π_0 from Section 3 is that the protocol is statistically hiding and all exponents are sampled from subsets of \mathbb{Z} . For this reason, the verifier has to check that the final response is of bounded norm. A similar Σ -protocol is described in [BFS19].

D.4 Compressed Σ -Protocol

The protocol can be compressed by observing that the response \mathbf{z} is, in fact, a trivial PoK for the relation $R_{\mathbb{Z}}$.

$$R_{\mathbb{Z}} = \left\{ \left(g, P \in \mathbb{G}, u \in \mathbb{Z}_q, Q, b \in \mathbb{Z}, L; \mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^n \right) : \left\| \mathbf{x} \right\|_{\infty} \le b < q, P = g^{\widehat{\mathbf{x}}}, L(\mathbf{x}) = u \mod p \right\}.$$
(57)

Following Bulletproof's recursive techniques a more efficient PoK for relation $R_{\mathbb{Z}}$ can be constructed. Protocol 13 shows one iteration of the recursion, repeating this recursion $O(\log n)$ times results in a logarithmic complexity. It must be noted that the bound *b* grows in each iteration. For this reason the encoding parameter Q has to be chosen large enough. The polynomial evaluation protocol of [BFS19] replaces the computationally expensive exponentiation after the first move (i.e., computing $A_R^{n/2}$) by a Proof of Exponentiation [Wes19], thereby reducing the verification time. For details we refer to [BFS19].

Another difference between this approach and the compression in the discrete log setting is that here the linear form evaluation $L(\mathbf{x})$ is not included in the commitment. For this reason the cross terms A_R and A_L are part of the first message.

Protocol 12 Basic	Σ -protocol for	inner product	relation $R_{\mathbb{Z}_q}$
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I	NPUT $(g,h,P,Q,L;\mathbf{x},\gamma)$	y)
Prover	$P = g^{\widehat{\mathbf{x}}} h^{\gamma} \in \mathbb{G}$ $u = L(\mathbf{x}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$	Verifier
$\mathbf{r} \leftarrow_R \mathbb{Z} \left((q-1)^2 2^{\kappa-2} \right)^n \\ \rho \leftarrow_R [0, B \cdot 2^{\kappa}) \\ t = L(\mathbf{r}) \mod q$		
$A = g^{\hat{\mathbf{r}}} h^{\rho}$	$\xrightarrow{t,A} \xrightarrow{c}$	$c \leftarrow_R \left[-\frac{q-1}{2}, \frac{q-1}{2}\right]$
$\mathbf{z} = c\mathbf{x} + \mathbf{r} \in \mathbb{Z}^n$ $\phi = c\gamma + \rho \in \mathbb{Z}$	$\xrightarrow{\phi, \mathbf{z}} \rightarrow$	$g^{\mathbf{z}}h^{\phi} \stackrel{?}{=} P^{c}A$
		$\begin{aligned} \ \mathbf{z}\ _{\infty} &\stackrel{?}{\leq} q^2 2^{\kappa-1} \\ L(\mathbf{z}) &\stackrel{?}{=} cu+t \end{aligned}$

Protocol 13 Compressed Argument o	f Knowledge for relation $R_{\mathbb{Z}}$
1	INPUT $(g, P, u, Q, b, L; \mathbf{x})$
	$\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}(b)^n$ $P = g^{\widehat{\mathbf{x}}}$
	$L(\mathbf{x}) = u \mod q$
Prover	Verifier
$\begin{aligned} A_L &\leftarrow g^{\widehat{\mathbf{x}}_L} \\ A_R &\leftarrow g^{\widehat{\mathbf{x}}_R} \\ u_L &= L_R(\mathbf{x}_L) \\ u_R &= L_L(\mathbf{x}_R) \end{aligned}$ $\mathbf{z} &= c\mathbf{x}_L + \mathbf{x}_R \end{aligned}$	$ \xrightarrow{A_L, A_R \mathbf{u}_L, \mathbf{u}_R} $ $ A_L A_R^{n/2} \stackrel{?}{=} P $ $ c \leftarrow_R \left\{ -\frac{p-1}{2}, \dots, \frac{p-1}{2} \right\} $
	$ \begin{array}{ccc} \overset{\mathbf{z}}{-\!$