Neural Aided Statistical Attack for Cryptanalysis

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Abstract. Gohr improved attacks on 11-round Speck32/64 using deep learning [17] at Crypto 2019, which is the first work of neural aided cryptanalysis. But we find that the key recovery attack model proposed by Gohr is limited by several properties. It relies heavily on the neutral bit which doesn't always exist in the attacked cipher. Besides, the data complexity, computation complexity, and success rate can only be estimated through the practical attack.
In this paper, we propose a *neural aided statistical attack* that can be as generic as the differential cryptanalysis. It has no special requirements about the attacked cipher and allows us to estimate the theoretical complexities and success rate. For reducing the key space to be searched, we propose a *Bit Sensitivity Test* to identify which ciphertext bit is informative. Then specific key bits can be recovered by building neural distinguishers on related ciphertext bits. Applications to round reduced Speck32/64, Speck48/72, Speck48/96, DES prove the correctness and superiorities of our neural aided statistical attack.

Keywords: Cryptanalysis · Neural network · Normal distribution · Statistical attack · Bit sensitivity · Speck families · DES.

1 Introduction

1.1 Background and motivation

Block ciphers are the most widely used class of symmetric-key primitives nowadays. Our confidence in the security of block ciphers stems from analyzing their resistance with respect to all known cryptanalytic techniques. Developing generic cryptanalysis techniques with great potential is the main way for further understanding the practical security of block ciphers.

Differential cryptanalysis [8] is one of the generic cryptanalysis techniques. In the key recovery attack for a cipher with a block size of L, a *differential* with a probability p_0 higher than 2^{-L} is the only requirement. The data complexity, computation complexity, and success rate can be directly calculated once the needed differential is found. Besides, the adversary can focus on specific key bits

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instead of the complete subkey. These good properties make it generic and result in many advanced developments such as truncated differential [22], higher-order differential [22].

Neural aided cryptanalysis is another cryptanalysis technique that has received much expectation since the last century. Deep learning has shown its superiorities in various fields including computer vision [23], natural language processing [7], smart medical [12], and so on. But the application of deep learning in the field of cryptography has been stagnant.

A few valuable applications are only concentrated in the side-channel analysis [11][5][21]. Few researchers have also tried to apply deep learning to conventional cryptanalysis. Rivest in [27] reviewed various connections between machinne learning and cryptography. Some possible directions of research in cryptanalytic applications of machine learning were also suggested. Greydanus proved that a simplified version of Enigma can be simulated by recurrent neural networks [18].

At Crypto 2019, Gohr firstly proposed a distinguisher model based on deep learning [17]. By prepending a differential before neural distinguishers, Gohr improved the key recovery attack on 11-round Speck32/64. Gohr's attack requires enough neutral bits [14] in the prepended differential. The neural distinguisher's output for ciphertext pairs is directly linked with the rank score for key guesses in [17]. A key guess is returned as a candidate when its rank score exceeds a threshold. However, a clear theoretical basis isn't provided for the choice of the threshold in [17]. Then the attack complexities and success rate can only be estimated by practical attacks. These properties limit its application.

In this paper, our target is to develop a new neural aided cryptanalysis technique that is as generic as the *differential cryptanalysis*. Our *neural aided statistical attack* can achieve this target. Applications of our attack also prove its superiorities.

1.2 Our Contribution

In this paper, we mainly explore neural aided cryptanalysis.

The neural aided statistical attack. From a Bayesian perspective, a neural network solving binary classification problems can be viewed as a stable posterior probability estimation[24]. Once we set a posterior probability threshold, it's equivalent to create a stable classification hyperplane in the input space. Thus the probability that the posterior probability of samples coming from a certain distribution is higher than the threshold is stable and estimable.

Inspired by the fact above, we propose a *neural aided statistical distinguisher* based on a statistic related to multiple samples' classification results instead of the network's raw outputs (Section 3). In the key recovery setting, the distribution of the statistic resulted from the right key is different from that resulted from the wrong keys. Thus a basic attack model based on the statistical distinguisher for key recovery is proposed and verified (Section 4).

Our attack model has no extra requirements (eg. neutral bits) about the attacked cipher. The distinguishing of two distributions provides a theoretical framework for calculating the attack complexities and expected success rate.

Reduce key guess space by identifying informative bits. The input of Gohr's neural distinguisher is a complete ciphertext pair. In the key recovery setting, the adversary needs to guess all the bits of the subkey at the same time. This is a serious bottleneck when the subkey has a large size.

In order to significantly reduce the key guess space, a *Bit Sensitivity Test* is designed to identify which ciphertext bit is informative for neural distinguishers (Section 5). Identified informative bits can guide us build new neural distinguishers on partial ciphertext bits for recovering specific subkey bits. An improved attack model adopting this technique is proposed and verified (Section 6). This technique can also be applied to improving Gohr's work.

Applications to round reduced Speck. Speck [6] is a family of block ciphers containing 10 variants. We have performed attacks on three round-reduced variants. The summary of our attacks together with the previous best ones is shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Summary of key recovery attacks on round reduced Speck. SD: neural aided statistical distinguisher. CP: Chosen-Plaintext

cipher	Distinguisher Type	Rounds	Complexity[1]	Data	Source
Speck32/64	Differential Distinguisher	11	$2^{46.7}$	$2^{30.1}CP$	[2]
	Differential Distinguisher	11	2^{46}	$2^{14}CP$	[13]
	Neural Distinguisher	11	2^{38}	$2^{14.5}CP$	[17]
	SD	11	$2^{32.29}$	$2^{23.44}CP$	Section 7.3
	Differential Distinguisher	12	2^{51}	$2^{19}CP$	[13]
	Neural Distinguisher	12	-[2]	-	[17]
	SD	12	$2^{40.35}$	$2^{27.93}CP$	Section 7.3
	Differential Distinguisher	13	2^{57}	$2^{25}CP$	[13]
	SD	13	2^{58}	$2^{28.7}CP$	Section 7.3
Speck48/72	Differential Distinguisher	12	2^{43}	$2^{43}CP$	[9]
	SD	12	$2^{50.91}$	$2^{37.32}CP$	Section 7.4
	Differential Distinguisher	14	2^{65}	$2^{41}CP$	[13]
Speck48/96	Differential Distinguisher	12	2^{43}	$2^{43}CP$	[9]
	SD	13	$2^{75.19}$	$2^{37.77}CP$	Section 7.4
	Differential Distinguisher	15	2^{89}	$2^{41}CP$	[13]

For Speck32/64 reduced to $11, 12$ rounds, we can obtain the best attack. Gohr's attack model can't attack 13-round Speck32/64, but we can attack that with similar complexities as in [13]. For Speck48/72 reduced to 12 rounds, we can reduce the data complexity compared to the attack[9]. For reduced Speck48/96, our attack model can attack one more round than the attack[9].

Applications to round reduced DES. The previous best attack on 6-round DES is presented in [8]. The previous best attack on 8-round DES is

[1] Complexity is given in terms of the full decryption of the attacked cipher.

[2] Gohr also provided an attack on 12-round Speck32/64, but the data, computation complexity were not presented in [17].

presented in [4]. We have also performed attacks on DES reduced to 6, 7, 8 rounds. Table 2 summarizes the attack results.

Table 2. Summary of key recovery attacks on round reduced DES

Distinguisher Type	Rounds	Complexity	Data	Source
Differential Distinguisher	6	practical	240 CP	[8]
SD	6	practical	136 CP	Section 7.2
SD	7	practical	5052 CP	Section 7.2
Differential-Linear Distinguisher	8	practical	20000 CP	[4]
SD	8	$2^{50.3}$	5052 CP	Section 7.2

All the code used in this paper will be released on the Github.

2 Review of Gohr's Key Recovery Attack

Complete information about Gohr's work can refer to [17]. We first review the neural distinguisher model which is also the basis of constructing our neural aided statistical distinguisher. Taking the key recovery with 1-round decryption as an example, we then review the core idea of Gohr's key recovery attack.

2.1 Neural Distinguisher Model

Let (P_0, P_1) denote a plaintext pair. Corresponding intermediate states, ciphertexts are (S_0, S_1), (C_0, C_1). The target of the neural distinguisher [17] is to distinguish two classes of ciphertext pairs

$$Y\left(C_0, C_1\right) = \begin{cases} 1, if\ S_0 \oplus S_1 = \Delta S \\ 0, if\ S_0 \oplus S_1 \neq \Delta S \end{cases} \tag{1}$$

If the difference between S_0 and S_1 is the target difference ΔS, the pair (C_0, C_1) is regarded as a positive sample drawn from the target distribution. Or (C_0, C_1) is regarded as a negative sample that comes from a uniform distribution. $Y = 1$ or $Y = 0$ is the corresponding label of (C_0, C_1).

A neural network is trained over $\frac{N}{2}$ positive samples and $\frac{N}{2}$ negative samples. The neural network can be used as a distinguisher if the distinguishing accuracy over a testing database is higher than 0.5. Given a sample (C_0, C_1), the output of the neural distinguisher is used as the posterior probability

$$Pr(Y = 1\,|(C_0, C_1)\,) = Z = F(C_0, C_1), \quad Z \in [0, 1] \tag{2}$$

where $F(\cdot)$ stands for the neural distinguisher. A neural distinguisher against the cipher reduced to r rounds is also denoted as ND_r.

2.2 Gohr's Key Recovery Attack on 11-round Speck32/64

Algorithm 1 summarizes the core idea of Gohr's key recovery attack.

Algorithm 1 Gohr's key recovery attack model

Require: k neutral bits [14] that exist in the prepended differential $\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$;
A neural distinguisher $F(\cdot)$ built from ΔS;
A key rank score threshold, c_1;
A maximum number of iterations.
Ensure: A possible key candidate.

repeat
  Random generate a plaintext pair $(P_0^1, P_1^1), P_0^1 \oplus P_1^1 = \Delta P$;
  Create a plaintext structure consisting of 2^k plaintext pairs by k neutral bits;
  Collect corresponding ciphertext pairs, $(C_0^i, C_1^i), i \in [1, 2^k]$;
  for each key guess kg **do**
    Partially decrypt 2^k ciphertext pairs with kg;
    Feed decrypted ciphertext pairs to $F(\cdot)$ and collect the outputs $Z_i, i \in [1, 2^k]$;
    Calculate the key rank score v_{kg} based on collected outputs;
    if $v_{kg} > c_1$ **then**
      stop the key search and return kg as the key candidate;
    end if
  end for
until a key candidate is returned or the maximum number of iterations is reached.

Plaintext structure created from k neutral bits. In order to extend the neural distinguishers for key recovery, a 3-round differential $\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$ extended from a 2-round differential $0x211/0xa04 \rightarrow 0x0040/0$ is prepended.

There are 6 high probabilistic neutral bits $\{14, 15, 20, 21, 22, 23\}$ in this 2-round differential. Neutral bits don't influence the differential transition. Thus a plaintext structure consisting of 64 plaintext pairs can be generated. These plaintext pairs can pass the prepended differential together. Such a good property is the main reason why Gohr's attack model can attack 11-round Speck32/64.

The link between key guess and score from a neural distinguisher. Decrypt 2^k ciphertext pairs drawn from the target distribution with the same key guess kg, the following formula

$$v_{kg} = \sum_{i=1}^{2^k} \log_2 \left(\frac{Z_i}{1 - Z_i} \right) \tag{3}$$

is used to combine the scores Z_i of individual decrypted ciphertext pairs into a rank score for kg. When the rank score v_{kg} exceeds a threshold c_1, kg is regarded as a key candidate.

The rank score is likely to be very high only when the plaintext structure passes the prepended differential and the key guess is right. If the plaintext structure doesn't pass the differential or the key guess is wrong, the rank score would be very low. Then the right key can be told from the wrong keys by comparing the rank score with a threshold. When the performance of the neural distinguisher is weak, N needs to be large. Then there should be more neutral bits in the prepended differential.

Since Gohr's attack model recovers the right key based on a subset that is from the same distribution, such a strategy is too dependent on neutral bits. If

the number of neutral bits is not large enough, Gohr's attack can't attack longer rounds by prepending a differential. The key rank score threshold is set without any clear theoretical basis. Thus we can't estimate the attack complexities and success rate in advance.

2.3 Comparison between Gohr's Attack Model and Classic Differential Cryptanalysis

Compared with the differential cryptanalysis, there are three following properties in Gohr's attack model

1. Enough neutral bits must exist in the prepended differential $\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$.
2. The data complexity, computation complexity, and final success rate can only be obtained by performing practical attacks.
3. All the decryption key bits are considered at the same time.

These three properties lead to the fact that Gohr's attack model can't be applied as generic as the differential cryptanalysis. We guess this is also the main reason why Gohr argued 'we do not think that machine learning methods will supplant traditional cryptanalysis' in [17]. However, we will show that our neural aided statistical attack can do better.

3 Neural Aided Statistical Distinguisher

In this paper, all the neural distinguishers to be used are built based on Gohr's distinguisher model(Section 2.1). Besides, the neural network is the residual network used by Gohr in [17]. But the depth of the residual block is set 1. The size of the input layer is adjusted according to the concrete cipher. If there are no special instructions, the number of training samples is 10^7. Other settings about the training can refer to [17]. These changes don't influence the conclusions of our work.

3.1 A Chosen Plaintext Statistical Distinguisher

Generate N chosen-plaintext pairs $(P_0^i, P_1^i), P_0^i \oplus P_1^i = \Delta P, i \in [1, N]$ randomly and collect corresponding ciphertext pairs $\left(C_0^i, C_1^i\right), i \in [1, N]$ using a cipher with a block size of L. Given a neural distinguisher $F\left(C_0, C_1\right)$, the adversary needs to distinguish between this cipher and a random permutation.

The concrete process is as follows. For each ciphertext pair $\left(C_0^i, C_1^i\right)$, the adversary feeds it into the neural distinguisher and obtain its output Z_i. Setting a threshold value c_2, the adversary calculates the statistic T

$$T = \sum_{i=1}^{N} \phi\left(Z_i\right), \quad \phi\left(Z_i\right) = \begin{cases} 1, if\ Z_i > c_2 \\ 0, if\ Z_i \leqslant c_2 \end{cases} \tag{4}$$

When the probability of the prepended differential $\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$ is higher than 2^{-L}, it's expected that the value of the statistic T for the cipher is higher than

that for a random permutation. In a key recovery setting, the right key will result in the statistic T being among the highest values for all candidate keys if N is large enough. In the sequel, we give this a theoretical analysis.

3.2 Distribution of the Statistic under Right and Wrong keys

First, let's regard a ciphertext pair as a point in a high-dimensional space. For a given threshold, it's equivalent to create a stable classification hyperplane in this space using a neural distinguisher. Thus the classification over a random ciphertext pair can be modeled as a Bernoulli experiment. It provides us with a theoretical analysis framework.



Fig. 1. Four situations of Decrypting a ciphertext pair with a key guess.

According to the key recovery process, there are four possible situations when we decrypt a ciphertext pair with a key guess as Figure 1 shows:

(1) Decrypting a positive sample with the right key: the ciphertext pair passes the prepended differential and the key guess is right.

(2) Decrypting a positive sample with wrong keys: the ciphertext pair passes the prepended differential but the key guess is wrong.

(3) Decrypting a negative sample with the right key: the ciphertext pair does not pass the prepended differential but the key guess is right.

(4) Decrypting a negative sample with wrong keys: the ciphertext pair does not pass the prepended differential and the key guess is wrong.

Given a neural distinguisher, we denote the probability of $Z > c_2$ as p_1, p_2, p_3, p_4 for the four situations respectively. Then the distributions of the statistic (formula (4)) in these four situations are

$$\begin{aligned}
T_1 &\sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_1, \sigma_1), \mu_1 = N_1 \times p_1, \sigma_1 = \sqrt{N_1 \times p_1 \times (1 - p_1)} \\
T_2 &\sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_2, \sigma_2), \mu_2 = N_2 \times p_2, \sigma_2 = \sqrt{N_2 \times p_2 \times (1 - p_2)} \\
T_3 &\sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_3, \sigma_3), \mu_3 = N_3 \times p_3, \sigma_3 = \sqrt{N_3 \times p_3 \times (1 - p_3)} \\
T_4 &\sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_4, \sigma_4), \mu_4 = N_4 \times p_4, \sigma_4 = \sqrt{N_4 \times p_4 \times (1 - p_4)}
\end{aligned} \tag{5}$$

if N_1, N_2, N_3, N_4 are high enough. $\mathcal{N}(\mu_i, \sigma_i)$ is a normal distribution with mean μ_i and standard deviation $\sigma_i, i \in [1, 4]$. An empirical condition is

$$N_i \times p_i > 5, \quad N_i \times (1 - p_i) > 5, \quad i \in [1, 4] \tag{6}$$

Now come back to the key recovery attack. If the probability of the prepended differential $\Delta P \to \Delta S$ is p_0 and N ciphertext pairs are collected randomly, then

$$N_1 = N_2 = N \times p_0, \quad N_3 = N_4 = N \times (1 - p_0) \tag{7}$$

Besides, the distributions of the statistic (formula (4)) under the right key and wrong keys are both a mixture of two normal distributions.

Right key guess. This case contains two situations in which corresponding distributions are $\mathcal{N}(\mu_1, \sigma_1)$ and $\mathcal{N}(\mu_3, \sigma_3)$. Since a mixture of two independent normal distributions is still a normal distribution, the distribution of the statistic (formula (4)) under the right key guess is:

$$T_p = T_1 + T_3 \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_p, \sigma_p) \tag{8}$$

$$\mu_p = N \times (p_0 p_1 + (1 - p_0) p_3) \tag{9}$$

$$\sigma_p = \sqrt{N \times p_0 \times p_1 \times (1 - p_1) + N (1 - p_0) \times p_3 \times (1 - p_3)} \tag{10}$$

Wrong key guess. This case also contains two situations in which corresponding distributions are $\mathcal{N}(\mu_2, \sigma_2)$ and $\mathcal{N}(\mu_4, \sigma_4)$. Then the distribution of the statistic (formula (4)) under wrong key guesses is:

$$T_n = T_2 + T_4 \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu_n, \sigma_n) \tag{11}$$

$$\mu_n = N \times (p_0 p_2 + (1 - p_0) p_4) \tag{12}$$

$$\sigma_n = \sqrt{N \times p_0 \times p_2 \times (1 - p_2) + N (1 - p_0) \times p_4 \times (1 - p_4)} \tag{13}$$

Negative samples in the high-dimensional space approximately obey uniform distribution, thus p_3 and p_4 are theoretically equal. $p_3 \approx p_4$ can also be verified by experiments. Since the accuracy of neural distinguishers is higher than 0.5, $p_1 > p_2$ also holds with a high probability. When we set $c_2 = 0.5$, we can ensure $p_1 > p_2$. Thus $\mu_p > \mu_n$ also holds.

From the analysis above, we know that the distributions of T_p, T_n are different. Then the key recovery attack can be performed based on this finding.

3.3 Distinguishing between Two Normal Distributions

The distinguishing between two normal distributions is also adopted in zero correlation cryptanalysis [10]. Here, we still give the details.

Consider two normal distributions: $\mathcal{N}(\mu_p, \sigma_p)$, and $\mathcal{N}(\mu_n, \sigma_n)$. A sample s is sampled from either $\mathcal{N}(\mu_p, \sigma_p)$ or $\mathcal{N}(\mu_n, \sigma_n)$. We have to decide if this sample is from $\mathcal{N}(\mu_p, \sigma_p)$ or $\mathcal{N}(\mu_n, \sigma_n)$. The decision is made by comparing the value s to some threshold t. Without loss of generality, assume that $\mu_p > \mu_n$. If $s \geqslant t$, the decision is $s \in \mathcal{N}(\mu_p, \sigma_p)$. If $s < t$, the decision is $s \in \mathcal{N}(\mu_n, \sigma_n)$. Then there are error probabilities of two types:

$$\begin{aligned} \beta_p &= Pr\{s \in \mathcal{N}(\mu_n, \sigma_n) \,|\, s \in \mathcal{N}(\mu_p, \sigma_p)\} \\ \beta_n &= Pr\{s \in \mathcal{N}(\mu_p, \sigma_p) \,|\, s \in \mathcal{N}(\mu_n, \sigma_n)\} \end{aligned} \tag{14}$$

Here a condition is given on μ_p, μ_n, σ_p, σ_n such that the error probabilities are β_p and β_n. The proof can refer to related research [15][16].

Proposition 1. *For the test to have error probabilities of at most β_p and β_n, the parameters of the normal distribution $N(\mu_p, \sigma_p)$ and $N(\mu_n, \sigma_n)$ with $\mu_p \neq \mu_n$ have to be such that*

$$\frac{z_{1-\beta_p} \times \sigma_p + z_{1-\beta_n} \times \sigma_n}{|\mu_p - \mu_n|} = 1 \tag{15}$$

where $z_{1-\beta_p}$ and $z_{1-\beta_n}$ are the quantiles of the standard normal distribution.

3.4 Data Complexity of the Statistical Distinguisher

Based on Proposition 1, one obtains the condition:

$$\frac{z_{1-\beta_p}\sigma_p + z_{1-\beta_n}\sigma_n}{\mu_p - \mu_n} = 1 \tag{16}$$

where the values of $\mu_p, \sigma_p, \mu_n, \sigma_n$ refer to formula (9), (10), (12), (13) respectively. In a key recovery setting, $1 - \beta_p$ is the probability that the right key survives, β_n is the probability that the wrong keys survive.

Since we can't know the real classification hyperplane learned by the neural distinguisher, p_1, p_2, p_3, and p_4 can only be estimated experimentally. Then the estimated values of p_3 and p_4 will be slightly different even they should be theoretically equal. When the probability p_0 of the prepended differential is very low, the slight distinction $p_3 - p_4$ may dominate $\mu_p - \mu_n$, which is wrong. Thus we neglect the minor difference and replace p_3, p_4 with p_n.

Then the final condition can be simplified:

$$\sqrt{N} = \frac{z_{1-\beta_p} \times \sqrt{a_1} + z_{1-\beta_n} \times \sqrt{a_2}}{(p_1 - p_2) \times p_0} \tag{17}$$

$$a_1 = p_0 p_1(1 - p_1) + (1 - p_0)p_n(1 - p_n) \tag{18}$$

$$a_2 = p_0 p_2(1 - p_2) + (1 - p_0)p_n(1 - p_n) \tag{19}$$

p_1, p_2, p_n are all constant values that are only related to the neural distinguisher. p_0 is the probability of the prepended differential. The data complexity N can be directly calculated when β_p and β_n are set.

The decision threshold t is:

$$t = \mu_p - z_{1-\beta_p}\sigma_p = \mu_n + z_{1-\beta_n}\sigma_n \tag{20}$$

3.5 Estimation of p_1, p_n

Consider a neural distinguisher $F(\cdot)$ against a cipher reduced to r rounds, the calculation of p_1, p_n can be performed as:

$\boldsymbol{p_1}$ **:** Randomly generate M positive samples and decrypt them for 1 round with the right subkeys. Feed partially decrypted samples into $F(\cdot)$. The final ratio of $Z > c_2$ is the statistical expectation of p_1.

$\boldsymbol{p_n}$ **:** Randomly generate M negative samples and decrypt them for 1 round with random subkeys. Feed partially decrypted samples into $F(\cdot)$. The final ratio of $Z > c_2$ is the statistical expectation of p_n.

A large M can help make the statistical expectation accurate enough.

3.6 Further Analysis and Estimation of p_2

When we decrypt a positive sample with a wrong key guess (Figure 1(2)), the final value of p_2 is rather complex and related to characteristics of the wrong key guess. Such a phenomenon is based on Property 1 and Property 2.

Property 1. Decrypt a ciphertext for one round with two different subkeys,

$$C^1_{r-1} = DecOneRound(C_r, sk_r), \quad C^2_{r-1} = DecOneRound(C_r, kg) \tag{21}$$

where sk_r is the right subkey, and kg is the key guess. If kg and sk_r are only different at a few bits (e.g. just 1 bit or 2 bits), C^1_{r-1} and C^2_{r-1} will be very similar. In other words, the Hamming distance between C^1_{r-1} and C^2_{r-1} will be very small.

Property 2. Given a neural network $F(\cdot)$ for solving a binary classification problem, if two input samples X_1, X_2 are very close to each other in the input space, two outputs $F(X_1)$ and $F(X_2)$ obtained from the neural network may satisfy $F(X_1) \approx F(X_2)$ with a high probability.

Although the distance metric in the input space of neural networks is complex and unknown, the Hamming distance is still a good alternative. Thus it is expected that p_2 is related to the Hamming distance between the right key and wrong key guesses. Besides, we need to consider multiple Hamming distances when the decryption covers multiple rounds.

For example, we decrypt a positive sample $(C_{r+x,0}, C_{r+x,1})$ with x subkey guesses at the same time

$$C_{r+j-1,0/1} = DecOneRound(C_{r+j,0/1}, kg_{r+j}), \quad j \in [1, x] \tag{22}$$

where kg_{r+j} is the key guess of the $(r+j)$-th round. $(C_{r,0}, C_{r,1})$ is fed into an r-round neural distinguisher for estimating p_2.

When the last $x-1$ key guesses $kg_{r+j}, j \in [2, x]$ are all right, $(C_{r+1,0}, C_{r+1,1})$ is a positive sample. The probability of $Z > c_2$ is p_2. If $kg_{r+j}, j \in [2, x]$ are not all right, then $(C_{r+1,0}, C_{r+1,1})$ isn't a positive sample anymore. The resulted probability of $Z > c_2$ is closer to p_n.

Since x key guesses have different influences on the probability of $Z > c_2$, we need to consider x Hamming distances for estimating p_2. Let d_j denotes the Hamming distance between the right key and key guess in the $(r+j)$-th round, and $p_{2|d_1,\cdots,d_x}$ denotes the probability of $Z > c_2$. Algorithm 2 is proposed for the estimation of $p_{2|d_1,\cdots,d_x}$.

Verification. We have performed tests on five neural distinguishers against round reduced Speck32/64. The difference constraint is $\Delta S = (0x0040, 0)$. We train the 4-round neural distinguisher ND_4 from scratch. The other 4 neural distinguishers ND_5, ND_6, ND_7, ND_8 are provided in [17]. Let $M = 10^7$, Table 3, 4 show the estimation results of $p_{2|d_1}$ and $p_{2|d_1,d_2}$ respectively.

Tests above have verified the analysis of p_2. Besides, when two subkeys are guessed at the same time, $p_{2|d_1,d_2}$ will decrease sharply even if the key guess of the last round is wrong at only 1 bit.

Algorithm 2 Estimation of $p_{2|d_1,\cdots,d_x}$

Require: a cipher with a subkey size of L;
a neural distinguisher against this cipher reduced to r rounds, $F(\cdot)$;
M random plaintext pairs, $(P_0^i, P_1^i), P_0^i \oplus P_1^i = \Delta P, i \in [1, M]$;
M random master keys, $MK_i, i \in [1, M]$;
The threshold c_2;
Ensure: $p_{2|d_1,\cdots,d_x}$.

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Encrypt each plaintext pair (P_0^i, P_1^i) with a master key MK_i for r + x rounds.
Save resulting ciphertext pair (C_0^i, C_1^i);
Save the (r + j)-th subkey sk_{r+j}^i, j ∈ [1, x];
for d_1 = 0 to L, ···, d_x = 0 to L do
    for i = 1 to M do
        Randomly draw x key guesses kg_j^i, j ∈ [1, x] where the Hamming distance
        between kg_j^i and sk_{r+j}^i is d_j;
        Decrypt (C_0^i, C_1^i) with kg_j^i, j ∈ [1, x] for x rounds;
        Feed the decrypted ciphertext pair into F(·) and save the output as Z_{i|d_1,···,d_x};
    end for
    Count the number of Z_{i|d_1,···,d_x} > c_2, and denote it as T_{d_1,···,d_x};
    Save p_{2|d_1,···,d_x} = T_{d_1,···,d_x} / M;
end for
```

Table 3. The estimation of $p_{2|d_1}$ of the neural distinguishers against round reduced Speck32/64. For ND_4, ND_5, ND_6, ND_7, $c_2 = 0.55$. For ND_8, $c_2 = 0.5$.

ND_4	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.995	0.5065	0.2815	0.1686	0.1088	0.0735	0.0521	0.039	0.0301
	d_1	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.0239	0.0198	0.0169	0.0146	0.0129	0.0117	0.0107	0.01	
ND_5	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.8889	0.5151	0.3213	0.2168	0.1556	0.1189	0.0956	0.08	0.0694
	d_1	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.0617	0.056	0.0516	0.0483	0.0456	0.0436	0.0419	0.0407	
ND_6	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.6785	0.4429	0.3135	0.2384	0.1947	0.1684	0.1518	0.1408	0.1334
	d_1	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.1283	0.1247	0.1219	0.1201	0.1183	0.117	0.1171	0.1188	
ND_7	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.4183	0.3369	0.2884	0.2607	0.2442	0.234	0.2276	0.2236	0.2211
	d_1	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.2193	0.2183	0.2175	0.2172	0.2167	0.2159	0.2161	0.209	
ND_8	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.5184	0.5056	0.4993	0.4957	0.4939	0.4927	0.4925	0.4918	0.4917
	d_1	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.4914	0.4913	0.4913	0.4911	0.4913	0.4914	0.491	0.4914	

Thus, **the choice of p_2 depends on the target of the key recovery attack**. If we think the attack is successful as long as the Hamming distance between the key guess and the right key is not higher than a threshold d, the

Table 4. The estimation of $p_{2|d_1,d_2}$ of the 7-round distinguisher [17] against Speck32/64. $c_2 = 0.55$. Elements in the same column have the same Hamming distance d_2. Elements in the same row have the same Hamming distance d_1. Limited to the width of the table, all results only retain two decimal places. The same value is replaced by a uppercase letter. $Y = 0.21$, $E = 0.22$, $J = 0.23$, $U = 0.25$, and $V = 0.26$.

	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
0	0.42	V	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
1	0.33	U	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
2	0.29	J	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
3	V	J	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
4	J	J	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
5	E	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
6	E	Y	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
7	E	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	E
8	E	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
$9 \sim 16$	$\leqslant Y$																

value of p_2 should be

$$p_2 = \max\left\{p_{2|d_1,\cdots,d_x} | d_1 + \cdots + d_x > d\right\} \tag{23}$$

This choice is based on the following truth. By setting a proper threshold c_2 such as $c_2 \geqslant 0.5$, we can ensure

$$p_{2|d_1,\cdots,d_x} \leqslant 0.5, \quad if \quad d_1 + \cdots + d_x > d \tag{24}$$

According to formula (21), the higher p_2 is, the higher the required data complexity is. Thus we only need to focus on the highest data complexity needed for filtering wrong keys.

Take the 7-round neural distinguisher as an example. Let $d = 2$, it means that the attack is successful if the recovered key is different from the right key at most 2 bits. Then $p_2 = p_{2|3} = 0.2607$ or $p_2 = p_{2|0,1} = p_{2|3,0} = 0.26$.

4 Neural Aided Statistical Attack

Algorithm 3 Statistical test for a key guess

Require: A neural distinguisher; A key guess, kg;
A posterior probability threshold, c_2; The decision threshold, t;
N ciphertext pairs (C_0^i, C_1^i) encrypted from $(P_0^i, P_1^i), P_0^i \oplus P_1^i = \Delta P, i \in [1, N]$.

1: Decrypt N ciphertext pairs with kg;
2: Feed decrypted ciphertext pairs into the neural distinguisher;
3: Collect the neural distinguisher's outputs $Z_i, i \in [1, N]$;
4: Calculate the statistic T in formula (4);
5: **if** $T \geqslant t$ **then**
6: Return kg as a key candidate
7: **end if**

This neural aided statistical distinguisher can be used to determine whether a key guess may be the right key. This is accomplished by the *Statistical Test* as Algorithm 3 shows.

4.1 Basic Attack Model

Let's take the key recovery with 1-round decryption as the example, Algorithm 4 summarizes the basic attack model based on the neural aided statistical distinguisher.

Algorithm 4 Basic model of our neural aided statistical attack

Require: The attacked cipher;
The prepended differential with a probability of p_0, $\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$;
Two maximum error probabilities, β_p, β_n;
A posterior probability threshold, c_2.
Ensure: All possible key candidates.
1: Train a teacher distinguisher $F(C_0, C_1)$ based on ΔS;
2: Estimate p_1, p_n, p_2 using $F(C_0, C_1)$ (Section 3.5, Algorithm 2);
3: Calculate the data complexity N and the decision threshold t (Section 3.4);
4: Randomly generate N plaintext pairs $(P_0^i, P_1^i), P_0^i \oplus P_1^i = \Delta P, i \in [1, N]$;
5: Collect corresponding N ciphertext pairs, $(C_0^i, C_1^i), i \in [1, N]$;
6: **for** each key guess kg **do**
7: Perform the statistical test (Algorithm 3);
8: **end for**
9: Test surviving key candidates against a necessary number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs according to the unicity distance for the attacked cipher.

4.2 Verification of Basic Attack Model

In order to verify our neural aided statistical attack, four practical key recovery attacks on round reduced Speck32/64 are performed. For Speck32/64 reduced to r rounds, our target is to recover the last subkey sk_r. It's expected that returned key guesses are different from the right key at most $d = 2$ bits.

Our attack model should work as long as the neural distinguisher has an accuracy higher than 0.5. Besides, the data complexity should be correctly estimated once $\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$, ND, d, β_p, and β_n are provided. Thus, different settings about these factors are considered.

Three neural distinguishers ND_5, ND_7, ND_8 are adopted. Table 5 shows two different differentials of Speck32/64 adopted in the verification. Since no key addition happens in Speck before the first nonlinear operation, these two differentials can be extended to a 2/3-round differential respectively.

Table 5. Two options of prepended differential of Speck32/64. nr is the number of encryption rounds covered by the prepended differential.

ID	$\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$	p_0	nr
1	$(0x2800, 0x10) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-2}	1
2	$(0x211, 0xa04) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-6}	2

The verification plan consists of three steps:
1. Set the value of β_p and β_n. Calculate the data complexity N.
2. Perform the neural aided statistical attack 100 times with N samples.
3. Check the following observation indexes:
   (a) The ratio that the right key passes the statistical test.

(b) The average number of surviving keys in 100 trails.
(c) The ratio that the number of surviving keys is smaller than the expected upper bound.

Table 6 summarizes the settings related to four attacks.

Table 6. Settings of the four attacks against round reduced Speck32/64. DID is the prepended differential's ID in Table 5.

Attack ID	Attack rounds	ND	DID	p_0	c_2	p_1	d	p_2	p_n	β_p	β_n
1	10	ND_7	1	2^{-2}	0.55	0.4183	2	0.2607	0.2162	0.005	0.003
2	10	ND_7	1	2^{-2}	0.55	0.4183	2	0.2607	0.2162	0.005	2^{-16}
3	10	ND_8	-	1	0.5	0.5184	2	0.4957	0.4914	0.001	2^{-16}
4	9	ND_5	2	2^{-6}	0.55	0.8889	2	0.2168	0.0384	0.005	2^{-16}

Table 3 shows the estimations of $p_{2|d_1}$ related to ND_5, ND_7, ND_8. The value of p_2 should be $p_{2|d_1=3}$ in four attacks.

Attack 1: recover sk_{10} of 10-round Speck32/64. In the first attack setting, we get $N = 3309 \approx 2^{11.69}$ according to formula (17). The decision threshold is $t = 818$. The right key should survive with a $1-\beta_p = 99.5\%$ probability while the wrong keys should survive with a $\beta_n = 0.3\%$ probability. Since $d = 2$, the number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed $137 \times 0.995 + (2^{16} - 137) \times 0.003 = 332.512$.

We have performed this attack 100 times with $N = 3309$ plaintext pairs. Corresponding results are:

1. The right key has passed the test in all the 100 experiments.
2. The average number of surviving keys is 124.21 that is far smaller than 332.512.
3. The number of surviving keys is smaller than 332.512 in 97 experiments.

Based on the Hamming distance between the right key and key guess, the whole subkey space can be divided into 17 subspaces. We further calculate the average ratio that keys in each subspace survive the attack. Table 7 shows the average surviving ratios of 17 key subspaces.

Table 7. Average surviving ratios (SR) of key guesses in 17 subspaces.

d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
SR	1	0.47063	0.17858	0.05911	0.01697	0.00412	0.00097	0.00025	0.00008
d_1	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	
SR	0.00003	0.00002	0.00001	0.00001	0	0	0	0	

Attack 2: recover sk_{10} of 10-round Speck32/64. In the second attack setting, $N = 5274 \approx 2^{12.34}$ and $t = 1325$. The number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed $137 \times 0.995 + (2^{16} - 137) \times 2^{-16} \approx 137.31$.

We have performed this attack 100 times with $N = 5274$ plaintext pairs. Corresponding results are:

1. The right key has passed the test in 99 experiments.
2. The average number of surviving keys is 63.54 that is far smaller than 137.31.
3. The number of surviving keys is smaller than 137.31 in 98 experiments.

Table 8 shows the average surviving ratios of 17 subspaces.

Table 8. Average surviving ratios (SR) of key guesses in 17 subspaces.

d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	$8 \sim 16$
SR	0.99	0.37875	0.1245	0.03429	0.00795	0.00144	0.00018	0.00001	0

Attack 3: recover sk_{10} of 10-round Speck32/64. In the third attack setting, $N = 25680 \approx 2^{14.65}$ and $t = 13064$. The number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed $137 \times 0.999 + (2^{16} - 137) \times 2^{-16} \approx 138$.

We have performed this attack 100 times with $N = 25680$ plaintext pairs. Corresponding results are:

1. The right key has passed the test in all the 100 experiments.
2. The average number of surviving keys is 77.47 that is far smaller than 138.
3. The number of surviving keys is smaller than 138 in 85 experiments.
   In the other 15 experiments, the ratio that keys with $d_1 = 3$ survive is a little higher than that in the 85 experiments.

Table 9 shows the average surviving ratios of 17 subspaces.

Table 9. Average surviving ratios (SR) of key guesses in 17 subspaces.

d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	$9 \sim 16$
SR	1	0.44438	0.14592	0.04055	0.00949	0.00194	0.00032	0.00006	0.00001	0

Attack 4: recover sk_9 of 9-round Speck32/64. ND_8 is a very weak distinguisher. Its accuracy is only about 0.518. In the fourth attack setting, $N = 15905 \approx 2^{13.957}$ and $t = 758$. The number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed $137 \times 0.995 + (2^{16} - 137) \times 2^{-16} \approx 137.31$.

We have performed this attack 100 times with $N = 15905$ plaintext pairs. Corresponding results are:

1. The right key has passed the test in all the 100 experiments.
2. The average number of surviving keys is 18.41 that is far smaller than 137.31.
3. The number of surviving keys is smaller than 138 in 100 experiments.

Table 10 shows the average surviving ratios of 17 subspaces.

Table 10. Average surviving ratios (SR) of key guesses in 17 subspaces.

d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	$7 \sim 16$
SR	1	0.27813	0.05617	0.0082	0.00071	0.00006	0.00001	0

It's clear that these four attacks have achieved the most important two targets of the basic attack model. Although the ratio that keys of each subset pass the test is not strictly consistent with the theoretical value, the total number of surviving keys is within the upper bound. This shows the Hamming distance is a good distance metric for the estimation of p_2. The correctness of our neural aided statistical distinguisher can be also well verified.

Our neural aided statistical attack doesn't care about which samples pass the prepended differential $\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$. Thus neutral bits are not needed. Once we set two maximum error probabilities β_p, β_n, the data complexity can be estimated correctly in advance. Our neural aided statistical attack is almost as generic as the differential attack.

5 Reduce the Key Space

So far we still need to guess all the bits of the subkey at the same time, since the neural distinguisher takes the complete ciphertext pairs (C_0, C_1) as the input. When the subkey has a large size, this is a serious bottleneck.

5.1 An Intuitive Method for Reducing the Key Space

An intuitive method for reducing the key space is building the neural distinguisher on partial ciphertext bits

$$C_i = C_i[L-1]||\cdots||C_i[0], i \in [0,1] \tag{25}$$

$$\Gamma = \{x_1, x_2, \cdots, x_k\}, x_1 > \cdots > x_k, k <= L \tag{26}$$

$$\varphi(C_i, \Gamma) = C_i[x_1]||C_i[x_2]||C_i[x_k], i \in [0,1] \tag{27}$$

$$Y(\varphi(C_0,\Gamma), \varphi(C_1,\Gamma)) = \begin{cases} 1, & if\ S_0 \oplus S_1 = \Delta S \\ 0, & if\ S_0 \oplus S_1 \neq \Delta S \end{cases} \tag{28}$$

$$Pr(Y = 1\,|(\varphi(C_0,\Gamma), \varphi(C_1,\Gamma))) = Z = f(\varphi(C_0,\Gamma), \varphi(C_1,\Gamma)) \tag{29}$$

where $C_i[0]$ is the least significant bit of the ciphertext C_i, Γ is the subscript set of selected ciphertext bits, $f(\cdot)$ is the neural distinguisher built on selected ciphertext bits.

Such a method can significantly reduce the key space to be searched. But **which ciphertext bits should we select for building $f(\cdot)$? Can we develop a generic and efficient framework for guiding this selection?** In order to better introduce our work for solving these problems, three new concepts are proposed first.

Definition 1 *An **informative bit** is the ciphertext bit that is helpful to distinguish the cipher and a pseudo-random permutation.*

Definition 2 *For a cipher reduced to r rounds, the neural distinguisher $F(\cdot)$ trained on the complete ciphertexts (C_0, C_1) is denoted as the **teacher distinguisher** ND_r^t, the neural distinguisher $f(\cdot)$ trained on selected ciphertext bits $(\varphi(C_0,\Gamma), \varphi(C_1,\Gamma))$ is denoted as the **student distinguisher** ND_r^s. The teacher distinguisher can be viewed as a special student distinguisher.*

5.2 Identify Informative Bits by Bit Sensitivity Test

It's clear that student distinguishers should be built on informative bits. However, it's hard to identify informative bits according to **Definition 1**. Thus we propose an approximate definition of the informative bit.

Definition 3 *For a teacher distinguisher $F(C_0, C_1)$, if the distinguishing accuracy is greatly affected by the j-th bit of C_0, C_1, the j-th ciphertext bit is an **informative bit**.*

The reason why a teacher distinguisher can work is that it has learned knowledge from ciphertext bits. According to **Definition 1**, only the informative bit can provide knowledge. Thus the ciphertext bit that has a significant influence on the performance of the teacher distinguisher must be the *informative bit*.

Definition 3 can't ensure each informative bit that obeys the **Definition 1** is identified successfully. But we only care about informative bits that can be captured by a teacher distinguisher. This approximate definition can help develop a simple but effective framework for identifying informative bits.

The proposed framework is named **Bit Sensitivity Test**. Its core idea is to test whether the teacher distinguisher's accuracy drops after we remove some knowledge related to the specific bit. This framework is based on the following property

Property 3. Let X denote a variable which has the following distribution.

$$Pr(X = 1) = p; \quad Pr(X = 0) = 1 - p \tag{30}$$

By XOR X with a random mask $\eta \in [0, 1]$, X can be randomized since

$$Pr(X \oplus \eta = 1) = Pr(X \oplus \eta = 0) = 0.5 \times (p + 1 - p) = 0.5 \tag{31}$$

Property 3 provides a way to remove the knowledge related to a specific ciphertext bit. The input of a teacher distinguisher is a ciphertext pair (C_0, C_1). Gohr in [17] has proved that teacher distinguishers can capture the knowledge about the ciphertext difference and some unknown features. We can remove the knowledge about the j-th ciphertext bit's difference by

$$C_0 = C_0 \oplus (\eta << j) \quad or \quad C_1 = C_1 \oplus (\eta << j) \tag{32}$$

where η is a random mask that could be 0 or 1. We have performed an extreme test on teacher distinguishers against 4/5/6/7/8-round Speck32/64. If we XOR each bit of C_0 or C_1 with a random mask, teacher distinguishers can't distinguish positive samples and negative samples anymore. These tests imply that knowledge about unknown features can also be removed by one of the two operations above. Subsequent reverse verification can further prove it.

After we remove the knowledge related to a specific ciphertext bit, the decrease of the teacher distinguisher's accuracy is denoted as the **bit sensitivity**, which is used to identify informative bits. Algorithm 5 shows the details of **Bit Sensitivity Test**.

Bit sensitivity test against 7-round Speck32/64. Let $\Delta S = (0x0040, 0)$, we have trained ND_7^t from scratch. The final distinguishing accuracy is 60.67%. Let $M = 10^7$, Table 11 shows the results sen_0, sen_1, $sen_{0,1}$ of the bit sensitivity test under three scenarios.

According to Table 11, we can observe that $sen_0 \approx sen_1$. This can prove that $C_0 \oplus (\eta << j)$ is equivalent to $C_1 \oplus (\eta << j)$. Besides, we can know

1. If $sen_0[j] > 0$, the j-th ciphertext bit is an informative bit, such as $\{12, 13\}$.
2. If $sen_{0,1}[j] > 0$, the teacher distinguisher has learned unknown features from the j-th ciphertext bit, such as $\{2 \sim 4\}$.

Algorithm 5 Bit Sensitivity Test

Require: a cipher with a block size of L;
a teacher distinguisher against this cipher, $F(C_0, C_1)$;
a test dataset consisting of $\frac{M}{2}$ positive samples and $\frac{M}{2}$ negative samples;
Ensure: An array sen that saves the bit sensitivity of L ciphertext bits.

```
Test the distinguishing accuracy of the neural distinguisher on the test dataset. Save it to sen[L].
for j = 0 to L − 1 do
    for i = 1 to M do
        Generate a random mask η ∈ [0, 1];
        C_0^{i,new} = C_0^i ⊕ (η << j);
        Feed the new sample (C_0^{i,new}, C_1^i) to the neural distinguisher;
    end for
    Count the current accuracy cp;
    sen[j] = sen[L] − cp;
end for
```

Table 11. Results of *Bit Sensitivity Test* of ND_7^t against 7-round Speck32/64 under three scenarios. sen_0 is the results of performing $C_0^i \oplus (\eta << j)$, sen_1 is the results of performing $C_1^i \oplus (\eta << j)$, $sen_{0,1}$ is the results of performing two operations at the same time, $i \in [1, 10^6], j \in [0, 31]$. All results are only to three decimal places.

Bit index	sen_0	sen_1	$sen_{0,1}$	Bit index	sen_0	sen_1	$sen_{0,1}$
0	0	0	0	16	0	0	0
1	0	0	0	17	0.001	0.001	0
2	0.001	0.001	0.001	18	0.007	0.007	0.001
3	0.006	0.006	0.003	19	0.014	0.014	0.003
4	0.054	0.053	0.004	20	0.054	0.054	0.004
5	0.056	0.056	0.001	21	0.056	0.056	0
6	0	0	0	22	0	0	0
7	0.001	0.001	0	23	0.001	0.001	0
8	0	0	0	24	0.002	0.002	0.001
9	0.002	0.002	0.001	25	0.015	0.015	0.003
10	0.006	0.006	0.006	26	0.038	0.038	0.011
11	0.023	0.023	0.021	27	0.058	0.058	0.02
12	0.054	0.054	0.022	28	0.072	0.072	0.022
13	0.053	0.053	0.016	29	0.053	0.053	0.016
14	0.045	0.045	0	30	0.045	0.045	0
15	0	0	0	31	0	0	0

3. If $sen_0[j] \approx sen_{0,1}[j]$, then the j-th ciphertext bit's difference has little influence on the neural distinguisher, such as $\{2, 10\}$

It's clear that this framework doesn't need any human knowledge except for the teacher distinguisher itself. In fact, it can help us understand what knowledge has been learned by the neural distinguisher. But the related work has gone beyond the subject of this paper, so we leave it to future reports.

Reverse verification about identified informative bits. In order to further verify **Definition 3**, a reverse verification about identified informative bits (Table 11) is performed for 7-round Speck32/64.

First, select some informative bits. Second, train a student distinguisher on selected informative bits and observe the distinguishing accuracy. Table 12 shows the corresponding distinguishing accuracies under two settings. For Speck32/64, the j-th and $(j+16)$-th bit are directly related to the same subkey bit. Thus the 8-th and 1-th ciphertext bits are also considered.

Table 12. Accuracies of neural distinguishers trained on selected ciphertext bits

Γ	$\{30 \sim 23, 14 \sim 7\}$	$\{30 \sim 23, 21 \sim 17, 14 \sim 7, 5 \sim 1\}$	$\{31 \sim 0\}$
Accuracy	0.5414	0.6065	0.6067

The accuracy of the teacher distinguisher is 0.6067. When all the identified informative bits are considered, the resulted student distinguisher can obtain a distinguishing accuracy of 0.6065, which is almost the same as 0.6067. Such an experiment shows that the *Bit Sensitivity Test* can successfully identify all informative bits that obey **Definition 3**.

5.3 Improve the Student Distinguisher

Student distinguishers are trained on selected ciphertext bits which only provide partial knowledge about the attacked cipher. One way to improve student distinguishers is pretraining the student distinguisher with the help of the teacher distinguisher.

This is inspired by the idea of knowledge distillation [20]. Hinton in [20] found that the output of a neural network contains the knowledge learned by itself. More details about knowledge distillation can refer to [20][3][25][29]. If we take the output of the teacher distinguisher as the sample label for pretraining the student distinguisher, the student distinguisher is likely to learn extra knowledge that isn't involved in selected ciphertext bits. Algorithm 6 summarizes the training method.

Algorithm 6 Training of the student distinguisher

Require: A training dataset consisting of $\frac{M}{2}$ positive samples and $\frac{M}{2}$ negative samples, $(C_0^i, C_1^i, Y^i), i \in [1, M]$, Y^i is the real sample label;
The subscript set of selected ciphertext bits Γ;
A teacher distinguisher, $F(\cdot)$.
Ensure: The student distinguisher trained on selected ciphertext bits, $f(\cdot)$.
1: **for** $i = 1$ to M **do**
2: get the prediction of (C_0^i, C_1^i) from the teacher distinguisher, $F(C_0^i, C_1^i)$;
3: $\tilde{Y}^i = F(C_0^i, C_1^i) > 0.5 \ ? \ 1 : 0$;
4: **end for**
5: pretrain the student distinguisher on $(\varphi(C_0^i, \Gamma), \varphi(C_1^i, \Gamma), \tilde{Y}^i), i \in [1, M]$
6: train the student distinguisher on $(\varphi(C_0^i, \Gamma), \varphi(C_1^i, \Gamma), Y^i), i \in [1, M]$

We have tested Algorithm 6 on several ciphers. For Speck32/64 reduced to 5/6/7 rounds, if we don't adopt the pretraining, the accuracies of the student distinguisher are $0.7981, 0.6388, 0.5419$ respectively. By adopting the pretraining, the accuracies are $0.7982, 0.6391, 0.5437$ respectively. The training/test dataset, the cyclic learning rate scheme, and other learning parameters are the same.

For Speck128/128 reduced to 8 rounds, the teacher distinguisher built with $\Delta S = (0, 0x80)$ [2] has an accuracy of 0.8304. Let $\Gamma = \{93 \sim 72, 29 \sim 8\}$, if pre-training is not adopted, we have encountered a problem that the training is very unstable. Even if the training epoch is set to 200, it is difficult to obtain a student distinguisher with an accuracy higher than 0.5. After restarting the training many times, we finally get a student distinguisher with an accuracy of 0.6281. If we adopt the pretraining, we can easily obtain a student distinguisher with an accuracy of 0.6406. The training epochs in two stages are both 10.

6 Improved Neural Aided Statistical Attack

6.1 Improved Attack Model

The technique in Section 5 can be used to improve the basic attack model (Algorithm 4). Here we still take the key recovery with 1-round decryption as the example for explanation. Algorithm 7 summarizes the improved attack model.

Algorithm 7 Improved model of our neural aided statistical attack

Require: The attacked cipher;
The prepended differential with a probability of p_0, $\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$;
Ensure: All possible key candidates.
Train a teacher distinguisher $F(C_0, C_1)$ based on ΔS;
Perform the *Bit Sensitivity Test* (Algorithm 5) for identifying informative bits;
Design several stages for the entire key recovery;
The maximum number of generated ciphertext pairs, $N_{max} \leftarrow 0$;
for each stage **do**
  Determine the attack target in current stage;
  Find the subscript set Γ of ciphertext bits related to current attack target;
  Train the student distinguisher $f(\varphi(C_0, \Gamma), \varphi(C_1, \Gamma))$ (Algorithm 6);
  Estimate p_1, p_n, p_2 using the student distinguisher (Section 3.5, 3.6);
  Set β_p, β_n;
  Calculate the data complexity N and the decision threshold t (Section 3.4);
  if $N \leqslant N_{max}$ **then**
    Randomly draw N ciphertext pairs from N_{max} ciphertext pairs;
  else
    Add $N - N_{max}$ plaintext pairs that have the difference ΔP;
    Collect corresponding ciphertext pairs, $(C_0^i, C_1^i), i \in [1, N - N_{max}]$;
    $N_{max} \leftarrow N$;
  end if
  for each key guess kg in the key space **do**
    Perform the statistical test (Algorithm 3);
  end for
end for
Test surviving key candidates against a necessary number of plaintext-ciphertext pairs according to the unicity distance for the attacked cipher.

6.2 Verification of Improved Attack Model

Two practical key recovery attacks are performed on round reduced Speck32/64 using the improved attack model.

Attack 5: recover sk_{10} of 10-round Speck32/64. In order to improve **Attack 2** in Section 4.2, we have trained a student distinguisher ND_7^s using Algorithm 5. The subscript set of selected ciphertext bits is $\Gamma = \{30 \sim 23, 14 \sim 7\}$. Related subkey bits are the 8 bits $sk_{10}[7 \sim 0]$. Let $c_2 = 0.55$, Table 13 shows the estimation of $p_{2|d_1}$ of ND_7^s.

Table 13. The estimation of $p_{2|d_1}$ of ND_7^s when $\Gamma = \{30 \sim 23, 14 \sim 7\}$

d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.3576	0.3230	0.3036	0.2940	0.2893	0.2873	0.2866	0.2863	0.2862

Then this attack is divided into two stages. Table 14 summarizes the attack settings of two stages. The expected maximum Hamming distance between surviving keys and the right key is $d = 2$.

Table 14. Settings of the improved key recovery attack on 10-round Speck32/64. SD_7^t/SD_7^s: the neural aided statistical distinguisher built on ND_7^t/ND_7^s.

stage	SD	β_p	β_n	d	c_2	p_0	p_1	p_2	p_n	N	t	Related keys
1	SD_7^s	0.005	2^{-8}	2	0.55	2^{-2}	0.3576	0.2940	0.2863	22540	6677	$sk_{10}[7 \sim 0]$
2	SD_7^t	0.005	2^{-16}	2	0.55	2^{-2}	0.4183	0.2607	0.2162	5274	1325	sk_{10}

In the first stage, we guess the 8 key bits $sk_{10}[7 \sim 0]$. The number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed $(1+8+28) \times 0.995 + (256-37) \times 2^{-8} = 37.67$. In the second stage, we guess the complete sk_{10} based on each surviving key in the first stage. 5274 samples are randomly sampled from 22540 samples. Finally, The number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed 137.31.

We have performed the attack 100 times with 22540 plaintext pairs, the results are:

1. The right key has passed the whole test in 99 experiments.
2. In the first stage, the average number of surviving keys is only 12.79 that is far smaller than 37.67. In the second stage, the average number of surviving keys is 50.74 that is far smaller than 137.31.
3. The number of surviving keys is smaller than 137.31 in 100 experiments.

Compared with **Attack 2**, the average key space is reduced from 2^{16} to $2^8 + 12.79 \times 2^8 = 2^{11.78}$.

Attack 6: recover sk_{11} of 11-round Speck32/64. The attack settings for **Attack 5** can be used to attack 11-round Speck32/64. Now the prepended 3-round differential is the second differential in Table 5. Table 15 summarizes the settings of the two-stage attack.

Table 15. Settings of the key reovery attack on 11-round Speck32/64.

stage	SD	β_p	β_n	d	c_2	p_0	p_1	p_2	p_n	N	t	Related keys
1	SD_7^s	0.005	2^{-8}	2	0.55	2^{-6}	0.3576	0.2940	0.2863	5678510	1629087	$sk_{11}[7 \sim 0]$
2	SD_7^t	0.005	2^{-16}	2	0.55	2^{-6}	0.4183	0.2607	0.2162	1275708	278679	sk_{11}

In the first stage, the number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed 37.67. In the second stage, the number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed 137.31. We have performed the attack 100 times with 5678510 plaintext pairs, corresponding results are:

1. The right key has passed the whole test in 100 experiments.
2. In the first stage, the average number of surviving keys is only 13.23 that is far smaller than 37.67. In the second stage, the average number of surviving keys is 55.21 that is far smaller than 137.31.
3. The number of surviving keys is smaller than 137.31 in 96 experiments.

Similarly, the average key space is reduced from 2^{16} to $2^8+13.23\times 2^8 \approx 2^{11.83}$.

7 Applications

Our neural aided statistical attack is applied to round-reduced DES(practical attacks) and Speck(theoretical security analysis). The master key of r-round Speck$2n/mn$ can be directly recovered once the last m subkeys are recovered. This is based on the key schedule inversion algorithm [13].

Given a sequence of m subkey words $sk_{j-m}, \cdots, sk_{j-1}$ for any $j \in \{m, m+1, \cdots, r\}$, we can determine sk_{j-m-1} using the following key schedule equations

$$\ell_{j+m-3} = sk_{j-1} \oplus (sk_{j-2} \lll \beta) \tag{33}$$

$$\ell_{j-2} = ((\ell_{j+m-3} \oplus (j-2)) \boxminus sk_{j-2}) \lll \alpha \tag{34}$$

$$sk_{j-m-1} = (sk_{j-m} \oplus \ell_{j-2}) \ggg \beta \tag{35}$$

Next, given $sk_{j-m-1}, \cdots, sk_{j-2}$, we iteratively continue the inversion of the key schedule and derive the master key.

7.1 Computation Complexity

The basic operation of a key recovery attack usually contains two parts. The first is the decryption of a ciphertext with a key guess. The second is the verification of a decrypted ciphertext. The key guess space and data complexity determine the total computation complexity. In conventional cryptanalysis, the verification (eg. finding the right ciphertext pair) is usually much simpler than the decryption. Then the time consumption of the second part is neglected.

For neural aided cryptanalysis, the verification is performed by neural networks that contain massive computations. Although there are many efforts about speed optimization[1][26][28][19], the time consumption of neural networks is higher than that of the decryption. Table 16 shows the time consumption of teacher distinguishers against round-reduced Speck32/64. A SIMD-parallelized implementation of Speck32/64 is used.

The neural network for implementing our teacher distinguishers is not too complex (Section 3). If we adopt neural networks that contain more computations, the time difference will be larger.

For neural aided cryptanalysis, we recommend the time consumption of neural distinguishers should be put aside. First, from the perspective of cryptanalysis, we should spend our effort on reducing the data complexity or the key guess space. Second, the verification of neural distinguishers can be executed in parallel if there are more graphics cards. Third, a neural network's inference speed can be optimizied by many methods that are not related to cryptography.

Thus in the sequel attacks, the complexity is in terms of the full decryption of the attacked cipher. This is consistent with previous research.

Table 16. Time consumption of neural distinguishers against round reduced Speck32/64. M: the number of tested ciphertexts. t_1: the average time of decrypting M ciphertexts for 1-round. t_2: the average time of distinguishers' verification for M ciphertexts. The CPU is Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-7500. One graphics card (NVIDIA GeForce GTX 1060(6GB)) is used. The number(batch size) of ciphertext pairs fed into a neural distinguisher each time is 2^{18}. All the results are based on 100 experiments.

M	2^{21}	2^{23}	2^{32}
t_1(seconds)	0.029	0.121	60.392
t_2(seconds, ND^t)	1.779	7.091	3643.392
t_2(seconds, ND^s)	0.945	3.725	1935.36

7.2 Key Recovery Attacks on Round Reduced DES

Key recovery attack on 6-round DES. In order to attack 6-round DES, we have trained a 5-round teacher distinguisher ND_5^t with $\Delta S = (0x200008, 0x0400)$ [8]. The distinguishing accuracy is 0.6289.

Table 17 shows the the result of *Bit Sensitivity Test*. Here we try to recover the 6 bits $sk_6[23 \sim 18]$ that will affect the 4-th Sbox's output in the 6-th round. Then $\Gamma = \{63, 54, 44, 38, 31, 22, 12, 6\}$, and we have trained a student distinguisher ND_5^s using Algorithm 6. The accuracy of the student distinguisher is 0.62. Let $c_2 = 0.55$, Table 18 shows the estimation of $p_{2|d_1}$.

Table 17. Results of *Bit Sensitivity Test* against ND_5^t for 5-round DES.

Index	$0 \sim 31$	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
sen_0	0	0.008	0.002	0	0.021	0.018	0.001	0.021	0.005	0.004	0.001
Index	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52
sen_0	0.005	0.001	0.019	0.008	0.012	0.001	0	0.001	0.004	0.005	0.006
Index	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63
sen_0	0.015	0.024	0.002	0.004	0.004	0	0.001	0.012	0.005	0.005	0.018

Table 18. The estimation of $p_{2|d_1}$ of ND_5^s against 5-round DES when $\Gamma = \{63, 54, 44, 38, 31, 22, 12, 6\}$.

d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.3036	0.0857	0.0745	0.0748	0.0747	0.0836	0.0823

In this attack, we try to recover the right key. Then $p_2 = p_{2|d_1=1}$ since $d = 0$. After test, $p_1 = 0.3036, p_n = 0.0631$. Let $\beta_p = 0.005, \beta_n = 2^{-6}$. we get $N = 68 \approx 2^{6.09}$ and the decision threshold is $t = 10.69$. The number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed $1 \times 0.995 + (64 - 1) \times 2^{-6} = 1.98$. We have performed the attack 100 times, the results are:

1. The right key has passed the test in 100 experiments.
2. The average number of surviving keys is 2.18 that is a little higher than 1.98.
3. The number of surviving keys is 1 or 2 in 65 experiments. The number of surviving keys is 3 in 20 experiments.

Although the average number of surviving keys is a little higher than the upper bound, actually we still achieve the attack target. If we choose $\Gamma = \{60, 53, 45, 35, 28, 21, 13, 3\}$, the student distinguisher can obtain an accuracy of 0.619. The 6 key bits $sk_6[35 \sim 30]$ that affect the 6-th Sbox's output can

also be recovered using 68 chosen-plaintext pairs. Then the left $56 - 12 = 44$ key bits can be recovered through two stages. First, filter the wrong key guesses for each Sbox using the 68 samples. Second, test surviving key guesses with several plaintext-ciphertext pairs. Thus, the 6-round DES can be practically broken with $68 \times 2 = 136$ chosen plaintexts.

The best key recovery attack against 6-round DES provided in [8] needs 240 chosen plaintexts. Our attack can reduce the data complexity of this attack of [8] by a factor of about 1.76.

Key recovery attack on 7-round DES. In order to attack 7-round DES, we have trained a 6-round teacher distinguisher ND_6^t with $\Delta S = (0x200008, 0x0400)$ [8]. The distinguishing accuracy is 0.5499.

Table 19 shows the the result of *Bit Sensitivity Test*. Here we try to recover the 6 bits $sk_7[5 \sim 0]$ that will affect the 1-th Sbox's output in the 7-th round. Then $\Gamma = \{55, 47, 41, 33, 23, 15, 9, 1\}$, and we have trained a student distinguisher using Algorithm 5. The distinguishing accuracy is 0.5249. Let $c_2 = 0.55$, Table 20 shows the estimation of $p_{2|d_1}$.

Table 19. Results of *Bit Sensitivity Test* of ND_6^t for 6-round DES.

Index	$0 \sim 31$	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41
sen_0	0	0	0.018	0.007	0	0.001	0.008	0	0.005	0.011	0.018
Index	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50	51	52
sen_0	0.001	0.008	0	0	0.001	0.018	0.011	0.007	0.004	0.001	0.001
Index	53	54	55	56	57	58	59	60	61	62	63
sen_0	0	0	0.018	0.005	0.001	0.01	0.009	0	0.005	0.001	0

Table 20. The estimation of $p_{2|d_1}$ of ND_6^s against 6-round DES when $\Gamma = \{55, 47, 41, 33, 23, 15, 9, 1\}$.

d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6
$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.0908	0.0655	0.0648	0.0645	0.0644	0.0641	0.0642

In this attack, we try to recover the right key. Thus $p_2 = p_{2|d_1=1}$ since $d = 0$. After test, $p_1 = 0.0908, p_n = 0.0624$. Let $\beta_p = 0.005, \beta_n = 2^{-6}$, we get $N = 2526 \approx 2^{11.3}$ and $t = 192$. The number of surviving keys shouldn't exceed 1.98. We have performed the attack 100 times, the results are:

1. The right key has passed the test in 99 experiments.
2. The average number of surviving keys is 1.67 that is smaller than 1.98.
3. The number of surviving keys is 1 or 2 in 84 experiments. The number of surviving keys is 3 in 10 experiments.

If we choose $\Gamma = \{58, 48, 40, 34, 26, 16, 8, 2\}$, the corresponding student distinguisher can obtain an accuracy of 0.519. The 6 key bits $sk_7[17 \sim 12]$ that affect the 3-th Sbox's output can also be recovered using 2526 chosen-plaintext pairs. Then the left 44 key bits can also be recovered through two stages.

This attack can be extended to the attack on 8-round DES. We just need to guess 36 bits of the subkey in 8-th round. The data complexity is still $N = 2526$. The best key recovery attack on 8-round DES presented in [4] needs 20000 chosen plaintexts. Our attack can reduce the data complexity of this attack of [8] by a factor of about 3.96.

7.3 Key Recovery Attacks on Round Reduced Speck32/64.

To attack Speck32/64 reduced to $11, 12, 13$ rounds, the following 8 neural aided statistical distinguishers are built as Table 21 shows.

Table 21. Eight neural aided statistical distinguishers for attacking Speck32/64. d is the expected maximum Hamming distance between the right key and surviving keys. p_2 is selected based on d and Table 3. p_1, p_n are estimated with $M = 10^7$(Section 3.5).

SD	$\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$	p_0	ND	c_2	p_1	d	p_2	p_n
SD_8^t	$(0x211, 0xa04) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-6}	ND_8^t	0.5	0.5184	1	0.4993	0.4914
SD_7^s	$(0x211, 0xa04) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-6}	ND_7^s	0.55	0.3576	2	0.2940	0.2863
SD_7^t	$(0x211, 0xa04) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-6}	ND_7^t	0.55	0.4183	2	0.2607	0.2162
SD_6^s	$(0x211, 0xa04) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-6}	ND_6^s	0.55	0.5132	1	0.3402	0.2603
SD_6^t	$(0x211, 0xa04) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-6}	ND_6^t	0.55	0.6785	1	0.3135	0.1161
SD_5^s	$(0x211, 0xa04) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-6}	ND_5^s	0.55	0.7192	0	0.5498	0.1291
SD_5^t	$(0x211, 0xa04) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-6}	ND_5^t	0.55	0.8889	0	0.5151	0.0384
SD_4^t	$(0x211, 0xa04) \rightarrow (0x0040, 0)$	2^{-6}	ND_4^t	0.55	0.995	0	0.5065	0.0069

ND_7^s, ND_6^s, ND_5^s are trained using Algorithm 6. The subscript set of selected ciphertext bits is $\Gamma = \{30 \sim 23, 14 \sim 7\}$. The number of encryption rounds covered by $\Delta P \rightarrow \Delta S$ is 2. It is extended to 3 rounds without loss of probability.

Key recovery attack on 11-round Speck32/64. In order to recover the last 4 subkeys, the whole attack is divided into seven stages. Table 22 shows the corresponding attack settings.

Table 22. Settings of the key recovery attack on 11-round Speck32/64. EUB: expected upper bound.

stage	SD	β_p	β_n	N	key space	related keys	surviving key space
1	SD_7^s	0.005	2^{-8}	$2^{22.44}$	2^8	$sk_{11}[7 \sim 0]$	2^4(Attack 6)
2	SD_7^t	0.005	2^{-16}	$2^{20.28}$	2^{4+8}	sk_{11}	2^6(Attack 6)
3	SD_6^s	0.001	2^{-14}	$2^{20.28}$	2^{6+8}	$sk_{11}, sk_{10}[7 \sim 0]$	2^4(EUB)
4	SD_6^t	0.001	2^{-16}	$2^{17.37}$	2^{4+8}	sk_{11}, sk_{10}	2^4(EUB)
5	SD_5^s	0.001	2^{-12}	$2^{19.43}$	2^{4+8}	$sk_{11}, sk_{10}, sk_9[7 \sim 0]$	2(EUB)
6	SD_5^t	0.001	2^{-16}	$2^{15.89}$	2^{1+8}	sk_{11}, sk_{10}, sk_9	2(EUB)
7	SD_4^t	0.001	2^{-17}	$2^{13.04}$	2^{1+16}	$sk_{11}, sk_{10}, sk_9, sk_8$	2(EUB)

The probability that the right master key can survive is about $(1-0.005)^2 \times (1-0.001)^5 \approx 0.985$. The computation complexity contains seven parts. In stage 2, 3, 5,$(2^{21.28} \times (2^{14} + 2^{12}) + 2^{20.43} \times 2^{12}) \times \frac{1}{11} = 2^{32.29}$. In stage $1, 4, 6, 7$, the computation complexity is negligible. Thus the total complexity is $2^{32.29}$ and the data complexity is $2^{23.44}$.

In **Attack 6**, the time for decryption is about $(2^{23.44+8} + 2^{21.28+12}) \times 2^{-32} \times 60.392 \approx 187.62$ seconds. The time for neural distinguishers' verification is about $(2^{23.44+8} \times 1935.36 + 2^{21.28+12} \times 3643.392) \times 2^{-32} \approx 10160$ seconds. The complexity is very low, but the time consumption of neural distinguishers is too high.

Key recovery attack on 12-round Speck32/64. Table 23 shows the attack settings.

Table 23. Settings of the key recovery attack on 12-round Speck32/64.

stage	SD	β_p	β_n	N	key space	related keys	surviving key space
1	SD_8^t	0.005	2^{-16}	$2^{26.93}$	2^{16}	sk_{12}	2^4(EUB)
2	SD_7^s	0.005	2^{-12}	$2^{22.86}$	2^{4+8}	$sk_{12}, sk_{11}[7 \sim 0]$	2^7(EUB)
3	SD_7^t	0.005	2^{-16}	$2^{20.28}$	2^{7+8}	sk_{12}, sk_{11}	2^8(EUB)
4	SD_6^s	0.001	2^{-16}	$2^{20.41}$	2^{8+8}	$sk_{12}, sk_{11}, sk_{10}[7 \sim 0]$	2^4(EUB)
5	SD_6^t	0.001	2^{-16}	$2^{17.37}$	2^{4+8}	$sk_{12}, sk_{11}, sk_{10}$	2^4(EUB)
6	SD_5^t	0.001	2^{-20}	$2^{16.12}$	2^{4+16}	$sk_{12}, sk_{11}, sk_{10}, sk_9$	2(EUB)

The probability that the right master key can survive is about $(1-0.005)^3 \times (1-0.001)^3 \approx 0.982$. The computation complexity contains six parts. In stage 1, $2^{27.93} \times 2^{16} \times \frac{1}{12} = 2^{40.35}$. In stage $2, 3, 4, 5, 6$, the computation complexity is negligible. Thus the total complexity is $2^{40.35}$ and the data complexity is $2^{27.93}$.

Key recovery attack on 13-round Speck32/64. Table 24 shows the attack settings.

Table 24. Settings of the key recovery attack on 13-round Speck32/64.

stage	SD	β_p	β_n	N	key space	related keys	surviving key space
1	SD_8^t	0.005	2^{-32}	$2^{27.7}$	2^{32}	sk_{12}, sk_{11}	2^5(EUB)
2	SD_7^t	0.005	2^{-21}	$2^{20.58}$	2^{5+16}	$sk_{12}, sk_{11}, sk_{10}$	2^8(EUB)
3	SD_6^t	0.001	2^{-24}	$2^{17.78}$	2^{8+16}	$sk_{12}, sk_{11}, sk_{10}, sk_9$	2^5(EUB)

The probability that the right master key can survive is about $(1-0.005)^2 \times (1-0.001) \approx 0.989$. The computation complexity contains four parts. In stage 1, $2^{28.7} \times 2^{32} \times \frac{2}{13} = 2^{58}$. In stage $2, 3$, the computation complexity is negligible. Thus the total complexity is 2^{58} and the data complexity is $2^{28.7}$.

7.4 Key Recovery Attacks on Round Reduced Speck48/X.

In order to attack round-reduced Speck48/X, we have trained three teacher distinguishers ND_5^t, ND_4^t, ND_3^t. The difference constraint we used is $\Delta S = (0x808000, 0x808004)$ [2]. Experiments show that the subtle distinction of the key schedules for Speck48/X does not affect the performance of teacher distinguishers. Table 25 summarizes the distinguishing accuracy of three teacher distinguishers.

Table 25. Distinguishing accuracies of 3 teacher distinguishers against Speck48/X

round	accuracy	round	accuracy	round	accuracy
3	0.9889	4	0.8089	5	0.5729

We performed the *Bit Sensitivity Test* against three teacher distinguishers. Let $\Gamma = \{47 \sim 32, 23 \sim 8\}$, we can obtain two student distinguishers ND_5^s, ND_4^s.

Table 26. The estimation of $p_{2|d_1}$ of five neural distinguishers against Speck48/X

ND_3^t	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	$8 \sim 24$
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.9871	0.5885	0.3508	0.2158	0.1397	0.095	0.0678	0.051	< 0.05
ND_4^t	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	$8 \sim 24$
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.7494	0.5531	0.4189	0.329	0.2688	0.2299	0.2035	0.1849	< 0.18
ND_4^s	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	$8 \sim 16$
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.6555	0.5057	0.4152	0.3588	0.323	0.3	0.2849	0.2747	< 0.27
ND_5^t	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	$8 \sim 24$
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.3304	0.2906	0.2629	0.2448	0.2312	0.2226	0.2162	0.2106	< 0.21
ND_5^s	d_1	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	$8 \sim 16$
	$p_{2\|d_1}$	0.2942	0.2696	0.2545	0.2454	0.2407	0.2369	0.2354	0.2334	< 0.2334

The number of training samples is 2×10^7. Let $c_2 = 0.55$, Table 26 shows the estimation of $p_{2|d_1}$ of the five neural distinguishers.

Based on these five neural distinguishers above, the following 5 neural aided statistical distinguishers are built as Table 27 shows.

Table 27. Five neural aided statistical distinguishers for attacking Speck48/X.

SD	p_0	ND	c_2	p_1	d	p_2	p_n
SD_5^s	2^{-12}	ND_5^s	0.55	0.2942	1	0.2545	0.2304
SD_5^t	2^{-12}	ND_5^t	0.55	0.3304	1	0.2629	0.1999
SD_4^s	2^{-12}	ND_4^s	0.55	0.6555	1	0.4152	0.2352
SD_4^t	2^{-12}	ND_4^t	0.55	0.7494	0	0.5531	0.1349
SD_3^t	2^{-12}	ND_3^t	0.55	0.9871	0	0.5885	0.0102

Key recovery attack on 12-round Speck48/72. Table 28 shows the attack settings.

Table 28. Settings of the key recovery attack on 12-round Speck48/72 with $p_0 = 2^{-12}$.

$stage$	SD	β_p	β_n	N	key space	related keys	surviving key space
1	SD_5^s	0.005	2^{-16}	$2^{36.32}$	2^{16}	$sk_{12}[15 \sim 0]$	2^4(EUB)
2	SD_5^t	0.001	2^{-24}	$2^{35.27}$	2^{4+8}	sk_{12}	2^5(EUB)
3	SD_4^s	0.001	2^{-21}	$2^{31.64}$	2^{5+16}	$sk_{12}, sk_{11}[15 \sim 0]$	2^5(EUB)
4	SD_4^t	0.001	2^{-24}	$2^{31.73}$	2^{5+8}	sk_{12}, sk_{11}	2(EUB)
5	SD_3^t	0.001	2^{-25}	$2^{26.21}$	2^{1+24}	$sk_{12}, sk_{11}, sk_{10}$	2(EUB)

The probability that the right master key can survive is about $(1 - 0.005) \times (1-0.001)^4 \approx 0.991$. The computation complexity contains five parts. In stage 1, $2^{37.32} \times 2^{16} \times \frac{1}{12} = 2^{49.74}$. In stage 3, $2^{32.64} \times 2^{21} \times \frac{1}{12} = 2^{50.06}$. The computation complexity in stage $2, 4, 5$ is negligible. Thus the total complexity is $2^{50.91}$ and the data complexity is $2^{37.32}$.

Key recovery attack on 13-round Speck48/96. Table 29 shows the attack settings.

The probability that the right master key can survive is about $(1 - 0.005) \times (1-0.001)^3 \approx 0.992$. The computation complexity contains four parts. In stage 1, $2^{37.77} \times 2^{40} \times \frac{2}{12} = 2^{75.19}$. The computation complexity of the last three stages is negligible. Thus the total complexity is $2^{75.19}$ and the data complexity is $2^{37.77}$.

Table 29. Settings of the key recovery attack on 12-round Speck48/72 with $p_0 = 2^{-12}$.

stage	*SD*	β_p	β_n	N	key space	related keys	surviving key space
1	SD_5^s	0.005	2^{-24}	$2^{36.77}$	2^{40}	$sk_{13}, sk_{12}[15 \sim 0]$	2^{16}(EUB)
2	SD_5^t	0.001	2^{-24}	$2^{35.27}$	2^{16+8}	sk_{13}, sk_{12}	2^5(EUB)
3	SD_4^t	0.001	2^{-29}	$2^{31.93}$	2^{5+24}	$sk_{13}, sk_{12}, sk_{11}$	2(EUB)
4	SD_3^t	0.001	2^{-25}	$2^{26.21}$	2^{1+24}	$sk_{13}, sk_{12}, sk_{11}, sk_{10}$	2(EUB)

8 A Special Case Caused by Continuous Non-informative Bits

The connection between the guessed subkey bits and selected ciphertext bit includes direct connection and indirect connection. Take the XOR and modular addition as the example, Figure 2 shows the two kinds of connection.



Fig. 2. The blue bit $C_r[j]$ is the informative bit in the r-th round ciphertext. $C_r[j-1 \sim 0]$ are not informative bits. The blue subkey bit $sk_{r+1}[j]$ is direct related to $C_r[j]$. The red subkey bits $sk_{r+1}[j-1 \sim 0]$ are indirect related to $C_r[j]$.

In the modular operation, key bits $sk_{r+1}[j-1 \sim 0]$ are also related to the informative bit $C_r[j]$. Such a connection is an indirect connection. Since $C_r[j-1 \sim 0]$ are not informative bits, $C_r[j]$ may not be influenced even some bit guesses of $sk_{r+1}[j-1 \sim 0]$ are wrong. When the number of continuous non-informative bits is too large, the data complexity for recovering key bits (eg. $sk_{r+1}[0]$) that have very little influence on $C_r[j]$ may be underestimated.

So far, we find this phenomenon occurs in the Speck128/128 reduced to 8 rounds. Let the difference constraint be $\Delta S = (0x0, 0x80)$ [2], we have trained a 8-round teacher distinguisher. $C_8[29 \sim 22]$ are informative bits but $C_8[21 \sim 8]$ are non-informative bits. A student distinguisher is built by setting $\Gamma = \{93 \sim 86, 29 \sim 22\}$. The data complexity is estimated by considering $sk_9[21 \sim 0]$. Then $sk_9[21 \sim 5]$ can be recovered successfully. But the 5 key bits $sk_9[4 \sim 0]$ that are related to $C_8[12 \sim 8]$ can't be recovered. Until now, this special case can only be solved by an x-round attack where $x > 1$. As we have proved in the estimation of $p_{2|d_1,\cdots,d_x}$, all the bits of sk_{r+1} have a significant influence on C_{r-1}.

9 Conclusions

In this paper, we have proposed a neural aided statistical attack for cryptanalysis. It has no extra requirements about the attacked cipher except for a high probabilistic differential. Besides, it provides a theoretical framework for estimating the needed attack complexities and success rate. In order to reduce the key space to be searched in the key recovery attack, a bit sensitivity test is proposed

to help build neural distinguishers flexibly. Applications to round reduced Speck and DES have proved the correctness and superiorities of our attack model.

Although our neural aided statistical attack is already as generic as the differential cryptanalysis, there is still more work to do. The first is filtering random ciphertext pairs. It is helpful for reducing attack complexities. The second is understanding the knowledge learned by the neural distinguisher. It can help us get rid of the dependence on neural distinguishers and improve the theoretical framework. The practical time consumption can also be reduced significantly. The third is exploring the properties of the neural distinguisher. If we know how to build neural distinguishers against more rounds, the statistical attack model can be greatly improved. We believe neural aided cryptanalysis has great potential for better assessing the security of ciphers.

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