

Subset Attacks on Ring-LWE with Wide Error Distributions I

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Abstract

Since the Lyubashevsky-Peikert-Regev Eurocrypt 2010 paper the Ring-LWE has been the hard computational problem for lattice cryptographic constructions. The fundamental problem is its hardness which has been based on the conjectured hardness of approximating ideal-SIVP or ideal-SVP. Though it is now widely conjectured both are hard in classical and quantum computation model there is no sufficient attacks proposed and considered. In this paper we propose subset attacks on Ring-LWE over an arbitrary number field from *feasible subset quadruples for general wide error distributions*. From the view of subset attacks, the error distributions of feasible non-negligible subset quadruples should be calculated and checked to test the "hardness" of Ring-LWE. A lower bound for the Gaussian error distribution is proved to construct suitable feasible non-negligible subsets.

Keywords: Ring-LWE, Error distribution, Subset attack, Feasible subset quadruples.

1 Introduction

1.1 Algebraic number fields

An algebraic number field is a finite degree d extension of the rational number field \mathbf{Q} . Let \mathbf{K} be an algebraic number field and $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ be its ring of integers in \mathbf{K} . From the primitive element theorem there exists an element $\theta \in \mathbf{K}$ such that $\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{Q}[x]/(f) = \mathbf{Q}[\theta]$, where $f(x) \in \mathbf{Z}[x]$ is an

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irreducible monic polynomial of degree d satisfying $f(\theta) = 0$ (see [15, 7]). It is well-known there is a positive definite inner product on $\mathbf{K} \otimes \mathbf{C}$ defined by $\langle u, v \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^d \sigma_i(u) \sigma_i(\tilde{v})$, where σ_i , $i = 1, \dots, d$, are d embeddings of \mathbf{K} in \mathbf{C} , and \tilde{v} is complex conjugate. Sometimes we use $\|u\|_{tr}$ to represent the norm $\langle u, u \rangle^{1/2}$. This is the norm with respect to the canonical embedding (see [28]). An ideal in $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ is a subset of $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ which is closed under ring addition and multiplication by an arbitrary element in $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$. An ideal is a sub-lattice in $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ of dimension $\deg(\mathbf{K}/\mathbf{Q})$. For an ideal $\mathbf{I} \subset \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$, the (algebraic) norm of ideal \mathbf{I} is defined by the cardinality $N(\mathbf{I}) = |\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/\mathbf{I}|$, we have $N(\mathbf{I} \cdot \mathbf{J}) = N(\mathbf{I})N(\mathbf{J})$. For a principal ideal $\mathbf{xR}_{\mathbf{K}}$ generated by an element \mathbf{x} , then $N(\mathbf{x}) = N(\mathbf{xR}_{\mathbf{K}})$, we refer to [7, 14] for the detail. The dual of a lattice $\mathbf{L} \subset \mathbf{K}$ of rank $\deg(\mathbf{K}/\mathbf{Q})$ is defined by $\mathbf{L}^\vee = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{K}, tr_{\mathbf{K}/\mathbf{Q}}(\mathbf{ax}) \in \mathbf{Z}, \forall \mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{L}\}$. An order $\mathbf{O} \subset \mathbf{K}$ in a number field \mathbf{K} is a subring of \mathbf{K} which is a lattice with rank equal to $\deg(\mathbf{K}/\mathbf{Q})$. We refer to [14, 15, 7] for number theoretic properties of orders in number fields.

Let ξ_n be a primitive n -th root of unity, the n -th cyclotomic polynomial Φ_n is defined as $\Phi_n(x) = \prod_{j=1, \gcd(j,n)=1}^n (x - \xi_n^j)$. This is a monic irreducible polynomial in $\mathbf{Z}[x]$ of degree $\phi(n)$, where ϕ is the Euler function. The n -th cyclotomic field is $\mathbf{Q}(\xi_n) = \mathbf{Q}[x]/(\Phi_n(x))$. When $n = p$ is an odd prime $\Phi_p(x) = x^{p-1} + x^{p-2} + \dots + x + 1$ and when $n = p^m$, $\Phi_{p^m}(x) = \Phi_p(x^{p^{m-1}}) = (x^{p^{m-1}})^{p-1} + \dots + x^{p^{m-1}} + 1$. The ring of integers in $\mathbf{Q}(\xi_n)$ is exactly $\mathbf{Z}[\xi_n] = \mathbf{Z}[x]/(\Phi_n(x))$ (see Theorem 2.6 in [?]). Hence the cyclotomic number field $\mathbf{Q}[\xi_n]$ is a monogenic field. The discriminant of the cyclotomic field (also the discriminant of the cyclotomic polynomial Φ_n) is

$$(-1)^{\frac{\phi(n)}{2}} \frac{n^{\phi(n)}}{\prod_{p|n} p^{\frac{\phi(n)}{p-1}}}.$$

A polynomial $f(X) = X^n + a_{n-1}X^{n-1} + \dots + a_1X + a_0 \in \mathbf{Z}[X]$ satisfies the condition of the Eisenstein criterion at a prime p , if $p|a_i$ for $0 \leq i \leq n-1$ and p^2 not dividing a_0 . A polynomial satisfying this condition is irreducible in $\mathbf{Z}[x]$ from the Eisenstein criterion (see [7, 15]).

1.2 Gaussian and discrete Gaussian

Set $\rho_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x}) = e^{-\pi\|\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{c}\|^2/s^2}$ for any vector \mathbf{c} in \mathbf{R}^n and any $s > 0$, $\rho_s = \rho_{s,\mathbf{0}}$, $\rho = \rho_1$. The Gaussian distribution around \mathbf{c} with width s is defined by its

probability density function $D_{s,\mathbf{c}} = \frac{\rho_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})}{s^n}, \forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{R}^n$.

Discretization. For any discrete subset $\mathbf{A} \subset \mathbf{R}^n$ we set $\rho_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{A}) = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{A}} \rho_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})$ and $D_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{A}) = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{A}} D_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})$. Let $\mathbf{L} \subset \mathbf{R}^n$ be a dimension n lattice, the discrete Gaussian distribution over \mathbf{L} is the probability distribution over \mathbf{L} defined by

$$\forall \mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}, D_{\mathbf{L},s,\mathbf{c}} = \frac{D_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})}{D_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{L})} = \frac{\rho_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})}{\rho_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{L})}.$$

When $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{0}$, the discrete Gaussian distribution is denoted by $\mathbf{D}_{\mathbf{L},s}$. We refer to [33] for the following properties of discrete Gaussian distributions.

- 1) If \mathbf{x} is distributed according to $\mathbf{D}_{s,\mathbf{c}}$ and conditioned on $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}$, the conditional distribution of \mathbf{x} is $D_{\mathbf{L},s,\mathbf{c}}$.
- 2) For any lattice \mathbf{L} and any vector $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbf{R}^n$ we have $\rho_{s,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{L}) \leq \rho_s(\mathbf{L})$.
- 3) Set $C = c\sqrt{2\pi}ee^{-\pi c^2} < 1$ for any $c > \frac{1}{\sqrt{2\pi}}$, and n dimensional lattice \mathbf{L} and $\mathbf{v} \in \mathbf{R}^n$, $\rho(\mathbf{L} - c\sqrt{n}\mathbf{B}_n) \leq C^n \rho(\mathbf{L})$, $\rho((\mathbf{L} + \mathbf{v}) - c\sqrt{n}\mathbf{B}_n) \leq C^n \rho(\mathbf{L})$, where \mathbf{B}_n is the unit-ball centered at the origin.
- 4) If a $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbf{R}^n$ is sampled according to a Gaussian distribution with width σ , then the Euclid norm $\|\mathbf{e}\|$ of \mathbf{e} satisfies $\|\mathbf{e}\| \leq \sqrt{3n}\sigma$ with an overwhelming probability.

Width with the canonical embedding

The Gaussian distribution depends on coordinates and the norm. We need to pay special attention to coordinates (or the basis with which coordinates are obtained) and the norm used when we say the "width" of a Gaussian distribution. The "canonical embedding" was used to define the Gaussian distribution on $\mathbf{K} \otimes \mathbf{C}$ (see [28, 29, 39, 9]). We refer the further analysis to [9, 41].

1.3 SVP and SIVP

A lattice \mathbf{L} is a discrete subgroup in \mathbf{R}^n generated by several linear independent vectors $\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_m$ over the ring of integers, where $m \leq n$, $\mathbf{L} := \{a_1\mathbf{b}_1 + \dots + a_m\mathbf{b}_m : a_1 \in \mathbf{Z}, \dots, a_m \in \mathbf{Z}\}$. The volume $vol(\mathbf{L})$ of this lattice is $\sqrt{\det(\mathbf{B} \cdot \mathbf{B}^T)}$, where $\mathbf{B} := (b_{ij})$ is the $m \times n$ generator matrix of this lattice, $\mathbf{b}_i = (b_{i1}, \dots, b_{in}) \in \mathbf{R}^n$, $i = 1, \dots, m$, are base vectors of this lattice. The length of the shortest non-zero lattice vectors is denoted by

$\lambda_1(\mathbf{L})$. The well-known shortest vector problem (SVP) is defined as follows. Given an arbitrary \mathbf{Z} basis of an arbitrary lattice \mathbf{L} to find a lattice vector with length $\lambda_1(\mathbf{L})$ (see [34]). The approximating shortest vector problem $SV P_{f(m)}$ is to find some lattice vectors of length within $f(m)\lambda_1(\mathbf{L})$ where $f(m)$ is an approximating factor as a function of the lattice dimension m (see [34]). The Shortest Independent Vectors Problem ($SIVP_{\gamma(m)}$) is defined as follows. Given an arbitrary \mathbf{Z} basis of an arbitrary lattice \mathbf{L} of dimension m , to find m independent lattice vectors such that the maximum length of these m lattice vectors is upper bounded by $\gamma(m)\lambda_m(\mathbf{L})$, where $\lambda_m(\mathbf{L})$ is the m -th Minkowski's successive minima of lattice \mathbf{L} (see [34]). A breakthrough result of M. Ajtai [5] showed that SVP is NP-hard under the randomized reduction. Another breakthrough proved by Micciancio asserts that approximating SVP within a constant factor is NP-hard under the randomized reduction (see [34]). For the latest development we refer to Khot [22]. It was proved that approximating SVP within a quasi-polynomial factor is NP-hard under the randomized reduction. For the hardness results about $SV P$ and $SIV P$ we refer to [22, 23, 45, 2], we refer to [21] for Minkowski's first and second theorems on successive minima of lattices.

1.4 Plain LWE, Ring-LWE and LWE over number field lattices

Plain LWE

Plain LWE and its lattice-based cryptographic construction was originated from [43]. We refer to [44] for a survey. Let n be the security parameter, q be an integer modulus and χ be an error distribution over \mathbf{Z}_q . Let $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbf{Z}_q^n$ be a secret chosen uniformly at random. Given access to d samples of the form

$$(\mathbf{a}, [\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s} + e]_q) \in \mathbf{Z}_q^n \times \mathbf{Z}_q,$$

where $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{Z}_q^n$ are chosen uniformly at random and e are sampled from the error distribution χ , the search LWE is to recover the secret \mathbf{s} . In general χ is the discrete Gaussian distribution with the width σ . Here $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \sum a_i s_i$ is the inner product of two vectors in \mathbf{Z}_q^n .

Write the d coefficient vectors $\mathbf{a}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}_d$ as columns of a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbf{Z}_q^{n \times d}$, Then the search LWE problem $LWE_{n,q,d,\chi}$ is to recover the secret from $\mathbf{A}^\tau \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} = \mathbf{b} \text{ mod } q$ from public (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) . Here τ is the transposition

of a matrix and (\mathbf{s}, \mathbf{e}) is an unknown vector.

Solving decision $LWE_{n,q,d,\chi}$ is to distinguish with non-negligible probability whether $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbf{Z}_q^{n \times d} \times \mathbf{Z}_q^d$ is sampled uniformly at random, or if it is of the form $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}^\tau \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e})$ where \mathbf{e} is sampled from the distribution χ .

Here $[\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s} + e]_q$ is the residue class in the interval $(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2}]$. We refer to [44] for the detail and the background. When q is prime and polynomial bounded by $poly(n)$, there is a polynomial-time reduction between the search and decision LWE (see [44]). For plain LWE without the ring structure the reduction results from approximating SIVP to plain LWE were given in [44, 36, 8].

Ring-LWE

The algebraic structure of ring was first introduced to the hardness of computational problems of lattices in [31] (also in [26, 27]) for the consideration of efficiency. This is Ring-SIS (Short Integer Solution over Ring, see [31]) and it is the analogue of Ajtai's SIS problem. The one-wayness of some function was proved in [31] by assuming the hardness of some computational problems of cyclic lattices (ideal lattices). Ring-LWE was originated from 2010 paper [28] and then extended in [29]. We refer to [38] for a survey of the history of development, the theory and cryptographic constructions based on Ring-LWE and Ring-SIS. In particular suggested homomorphic encryption standard in [4] was based on Ring-LWE over two-to-power cyclotomic integer rings.

If the \mathbf{Z}_q^n in plain LWE is replaced by $\mathbf{P}_q = \mathbf{P}/q\mathbf{P}$ where $\mathbf{P} = \mathbf{Z}[x]/(f)$, $f(x)$ is a monic irreducible polynomial of degree n in $\mathbf{Z}[x]$, this is the polynomial learning with errors (PLWE). The inner product $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \sum a_i s_i$ is replaced by the multiplication $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s}$ in the ring \mathbf{P}_q . The error distribution χ is defined as the discrete Gaussian distributions with respect to the basis $1, x, x^2, \dots, x^{n-1}$ (see [20, 9]). We refer to [46] for relations and reductions between Ring-LWE and PLWE.

If the \mathbf{Z}_q^n is replaced by $(\mathbf{R}_K)_q = \mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K$ where \mathbf{R}_K is the ring of integers in an algebraic number field \mathbf{K} of degree n , this is the Ring-LWE, learning with errors over the ring \mathbf{R}_K . The secret \mathbf{s} is in the dual $(\mathbf{R}_K^\vee)_q = \mathbf{R}_K^\vee/q\mathbf{R}_K^\vee$ and $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{R}_K$ is chosen uniformly at random. The inner product $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s} = \sum a_i s_i$ is replaced by the multiplication $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s}$ in $(\mathbf{R}_K^\vee)_q$. The error \mathbf{e} is in $(\mathbf{R}_K^\vee)_q = \mathbf{R}_K^\vee/q\mathbf{R}_K^\vee$. In this case the width of error

distribution is defined by the trace norm on $\mathbf{K} \otimes \mathbf{R}$ via the canonical embedding (see [28, 9]). This is called the dual form of Ring-LWE problem. When $\mathbf{s} \in (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}})_q$ and $\mathbf{e} \in (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}})_q$ are assumed it is called the non-dual form of Ring LWE problem. As indicated in [39] page 10 in monogenic case a "tweak factor" $f'(\theta)$ can be used to make two versions equivalent.

LWE over number field lattice

Learning with errors over a number field lattice was introduced in [40]. Let $\mathbf{L} \subset \mathbf{K}$ be a rank $\deg(\mathbf{K})$ lattice and

$$\mathbf{O}^{\mathbf{L}} = \{x \in \mathbf{K} : x \cdot \mathbf{L} \subset \mathbf{L}\}.$$

Then $\mathbf{O}^{\mathbf{L}}$ is an order. Set $\mathbf{O}^{\mathbf{L}}_q = \mathbf{O}^{\mathbf{L}}/q\mathbf{O}^{\mathbf{L}}$, $\mathbf{L}^{\vee}_q = \mathbf{L}^{\vee}/q\mathbf{L}^{\vee}$. The secret vector \mathbf{s} is in \mathbf{L}^{\vee}_q and \mathbf{a} is in $\mathbf{O}^{\mathbf{L}}_q$. Here we notice that $\mathbf{O} \cdot \mathbf{L}^{\vee} \subset \mathbf{L}^{\vee}$. Then the error $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbf{L}^{\vee}_q$. For the detail and hardness reduction we refer to [40].

1.5 Hardness reduction

The reduction results from approximating ideal- $SIVP_{poly(d)}$ (or approximating ideal- $SV P_{poly(d)}$) to Ring-LWE were first given in [28, 29] for search version and then a general form to decision version was proved for arbitrary number fields in [41]. We refer to [41] Corollary 6.3 for the following hardness reduction result.

Hardness reduction for decision Ring-LWE. *Let \mathbf{K} be an arbitrary number field of degree n and $\mathbf{R} = \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$. Let $\alpha = \alpha(n) \in (0, 1)$, and let $q = q(n)$ be an integer such that $\alpha q \geq 2\omega(1)$. Then there exists a polynomial-time quantum reduction from $\mathbf{K} - SIVP_{\gamma}$ to average-case, decision $\mathbf{R} - LWE_{q, \Upsilon_{\alpha}}$, for any $\gamma = \max\{\frac{\eta(\mathbf{I}) \cdot 2}{\alpha \cdot \omega(1)}, \frac{\sqrt{2n}}{\lambda_1(\mathbf{I})}\} \leq \max\{\omega(\sqrt{n \log n}/\alpha), \sqrt{2n}\}$. Here $\mathbf{K} - SIVP_{\gamma}$ is the Shortest Independent Vector Problems for any fractional ideal lattice in \mathbf{K} . \mathbf{I} is any ideal lattice and $\eta(\mathbf{I})$ is the smoothing parameter of \mathbf{I} .*

1.6 Known attacks

1.6.1 Attacks on LWE

The famous Blum-Kalai-Wasserman (BKW) algorithm in [6] was improved in [1, 24]. On the other hand some provable weak instances of Ring-LWE

was given in [19, 20, 13] and analysed in [9, 39]. As showed in [39, 9] these instances of Ring-LWE can be solved by polynomial time algorithms mainly because the widths of Gaussian distributions of errors are too small or Gaussian distributions of errors are too skew. In [10] these attacks were improved for these modulus parameters which are factors of $f(u)$, where f is the defining equation of the number field and u is an arbitrary integer. However the Gaussian distribution is still required to be narrow such that this type of attack can be succeed. We refer to [3] for the dual lattice attack to LWE with small secrets.

1.6.2 Approximating ideal-SVP

In [16] it was proved approximating *SVP* with factor $2^{O(\sqrt{n \log n})}$ for principal ideals in cyclotomic integer rings $\mathbf{Z}[\xi_n]$ with $n = p^m$ can be found from an arbitrary generator within polynomial time by an efficient bounded distance decoding algorithm for the log-unit lattice. This work was extended in [17] and [42] such that sub-exponential complexity algorithms with some pre-processing for approx-SVP with some sub-exponential factor for ideal lattices can be achieved. The analysis of the approximating factor was recently published in [18]. For the recent developments we refer to [25, 35].

1.7 The idea attack is very restricted

In previous attacks on Ring-LWE in [20] (then analysed in [9, 39]) the Ring-LWE equation $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \equiv \mathbf{b} \pmod{q}$ was transformed to consider $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e} \equiv \mathbf{b} \pmod{\mathbf{P}}$, where \mathbf{P} is a prime ideal factor of the modulus parameter q with a polynomially bounded algebraic norm $N(\mathbf{P})$. This kind of attack initiated in [20] and then analysed in [9, 39] can be called ideal attack on Ring-LWE. In ideal attack on Ring-LWE $\lambda_1(\mathbf{P}^\vee)$ satisfies

$$\lambda_1(\mathbf{P}^\vee) \geq \sqrt{d} N(\mathbf{P}^\vee)^{1/d} \geq d^{1/2-c/d} \frac{1}{|\Delta_{\mathbf{K}}|^{1/d}}.$$

Since \mathbf{P} has a polynomially bounded algebraic norm, the width has a small upper bound for solvable instances for some fixed positive integer c .

When the modulus parameter q is a prime number such that $q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ is a prime ideal in $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$, it is obvious we get nothing from the ideal attack. In

our sublattice attack and subset attack we propose to find subtle polynomially bounded index sublattices \mathbf{L} or feasible non-negligible subsets \mathbf{B} , then to test the samples from the Ring-LWE equation in $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/\mathbf{L}$ or the feasible subset \mathbf{B} . Sublattice attacks was proposed in [10]. In this paper we extend it to subset attacks.

1.8 The motivation of subset attacks

In previous attacks on Ring-LWE, when polynomially bounded many samples $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) \in \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}} \times \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ are given, only the distributions of these samples over $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/\mathbf{I}$ for some **ideals** satisfying $q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}} \subset \mathbf{I} \subset \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ and $|\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/\mathbf{I}| \leq \text{poly}(d)$ have been checked. This is not natural and not sufficient. We need to check the distributions of samples in $\mathbf{A} \subset \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ where \mathbf{A} can be any feasible non-negligible subsets, that is, the condition

$$\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}$$

can be computed within polynomial time and the size of \mathbf{A} satisfies

$$\frac{|\mathbf{A}|}{|\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}|} \geq \frac{1}{d^c},$$

where c is a fixed positive integer. In general when the learning with error problems with algebraic structures are used to improve the efficiency, subset attacks as above to analysis the distributions of samples over $\mathbf{A} \subset \mathbf{M}/q\mathbf{M}$ should be considered, where \mathbf{M} is module over which the module-LWE is defined and \mathbf{A} takes over all feasible subsets of $\mathbf{M}/q\mathbf{M}$ satisfying

$$\frac{|\mathbf{A}|}{|\mathbf{M}/q\mathbf{M}|} \geq \frac{1}{\text{poly}(d)}.$$

The previous attacks where \mathbf{A} is restricted to ideals or sub-modules are not natural, special and not sufficient to guarantee the security, we refer to our next paper [12].

The basic point here is as follows. When we want to use the algebraic structure to improve the efficiency of lattice-based cryptographic constructions. The adversary is not restricted to only check the distributions of samples over algebraic-structured object, the adversary can attack the problem by using feasible non-negligible subsets without any structure.

1.9 Subset quadruples are needed

We need to find three non-negligible subsets \mathbf{A}_i , $i = 1, 2, 3$ satisfying that

$$\frac{|\mathbf{A}_i|}{|\mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K|} \geq \frac{1}{d^c},$$

and \mathbf{A}_1 and \mathbf{A}_3 are feasible, that is the condition $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}_i$, $i = 1, 2$, can be checked within polynomial time. Here

$$\mathbf{A}_1 \cdot \mathbf{A}_2 = \{\mathbf{as} : \mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{s} \in \mathbf{A}_2\}.$$

For two subsets \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{B} in $\mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K$ we define a subset $\mathbf{A} + \mathbf{B} = \{\mathbf{a} + \mathbf{b} : \mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{B}\}$ in $\mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K$. A subset $\mathbf{A}_4 \subset \mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K$ is needed to satisfy that $\mathbf{A}_1 \cdot \mathbf{A}_2 + \mathbf{A}_4 \subset \mathbf{A}_3$ and

$$Prob(\mathbf{e} \in proj^{-1}(\mathbf{A}_4)) \geq \frac{d^C}{|\mathbf{A}_3|},$$

where C is a fixed positive integer and $proj$ is the natural mapping

$$\mathbf{R}_K \longrightarrow \mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K.$$

Then the samples from the Ring-LWE equations can be distinguished from uniformly distributed samples. Hence it is important to calculate the error distributions over these feasible non-negligible subsets.

In the case that \mathbf{A}_1 and \mathbf{A}_2 are additive, that is,

$$\mathbf{A}_i + \mathbf{A}_i \subset \mathbf{A}_i,$$

we recover the sublattice pair attack in [10] and the previous versions of this paper. When \mathbf{A}_i is restricted an ideal, it is the very restricted case of ideal attack considered in [20, 9] and analysed in [39]. The "sublattice pair with ideal" construction for the required sublattices proposed in the previous versions of the paper can not work as indicated in [39]. However the comment in [39] can not be applied to the general sublattice attack or its extended version of subset attack considered in this version. The only problem in previous versions is the usage of ideals in the construction of the required sublattices (or feasible non-negligible subsets).

2 Our contribution

2.1 Subset quadruples

Let $\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{Q}[x]/(f(x)) = \mathbf{Q}[\theta]$ be a degree d extension field of the rational field \mathbf{Q} , where f is a monic irreducible polynomial in $\mathbf{Z}[x]$ and $\theta \in \mathbf{C}$ is a root of f . Let $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ be its ring of integers. We consider the non-dual Ring-LWE over $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ with a modulus parameter q .

Definition 3.1. *We assume that the modulus parameter q satisfies $d^{C_1} \leq q < d^{C_2}$ where C_1 and C_2 are two fixed positive integers. Let $\mathbf{A}_i \subset \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$, $i = 1, 2, 3, 4$, be four subsets in $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ satisfying the following conditions.*

- 1) $\frac{|\mathbf{A}_i|}{|\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}|} \geq \frac{1}{d^{C_3}}$ for $i = 1, 2, 3$, where C_3 is fixed positive integer;
- 2) $\mathbf{A}_1 \cdot \mathbf{A}_2 + \mathbf{A}_4 \subset \mathbf{A}_3$;
- 3) The set \mathbf{A}_1 and \mathbf{A}_3 are feasible, that is, the condition $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}_1$ and the condition $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{A}_3$ for $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ and $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ can be checked within polynomial time;
- 4) The probability $\text{Prob}(\mathbf{e} \in \text{proj}^{-1}(\mathbf{A}_4)) > \frac{d^{C_4}}{|\mathbf{A}_3|}$, where C_4 is a fixed positive integer.

In general if we can construct such subset quadruples for a Ring-LWE over $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ with the polynomially bounded modulus parameter q , then the decision version of this Ring-LWE can be solved by a polynomial in d time algorithm. Moreover we notice that the error distribution is only involved in 4), it is not assumed Gaussian. The property 4) is sufficient for a polynomial time attack on the general Ring-LWE with an error distribution satisfying the property 4). We do not require that \mathbf{A}_4 to be non-negligible in the uniform distribution.

Theorem 3.1. *We consider the decision Ring-LWE over $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ with a general error distribution and a modulus parameter q satisfying $d^{C_1} \leq q < d^{C_2}$ where C_1 and C_2 are two fixed positive integers. Suppose that there exists a subset quadruple as above. Then the decision Ring-LWE over $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ with the modulus parameter q can be solved within a polynomial (in d) time.*

3 Probability computation and number theory

We need the following computation of probability in Theorem 3.2.

Theorem 4.1. *Let \mathbf{L} be a rank d number field lattice in a degree d number field \mathbf{K} . Let \mathbf{L}_1 be rank d sublattice of \mathbf{L}^\vee satisfying that $q\mathbf{L}^\vee \subset \mathbf{L}_1 \subset \mathbf{L}^\vee$ and the cardinality $|\mathbf{L}^\vee/\mathbf{L}_1|$ is polynomially bounded. Suppose that the width of the Gaussian distribution (with respect to the canonical embedding) of errors \mathbf{e} satisfying $\frac{\sqrt{d}}{\lambda_1(\mathbf{L})} \leq \sigma \leq \frac{\sqrt{c_1}}{\sqrt{\pi}\lambda_1(\mathbf{L}_1^\vee)}$ and moreover there are at least $\frac{|\mathbf{L}^\vee/\mathbf{L}_1|}{q^{c_2}}$ lattice vectors in \mathbf{L}_1^\vee satisfying $\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr} \leq \frac{\sqrt{c_1}}{\sqrt{\pi}\sigma}$, where c_1 and c_2 are fixed positive real numbers. Then the probability $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbf{L}_1$ is*

$$\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{L}_1} = \frac{\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}_1} e^{-\pi(\frac{\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr}}{\sigma})^2}}{\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}^\vee} e^{-\pi(\frac{\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr}}{\sigma})^2}}.$$

It satisfies

$$\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{L}_1} \geq \frac{1}{e^{c_1} q^{c_2}}$$

when q is sufficiently large.

Proof. We calculate the probability $\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{L}_1}$ of the condition $\mathbf{e} \equiv 0 \pmod{\mathbf{L}_1}$. It is clear

$$\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{L}_1} = \frac{\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}_1} e^{-\pi(\frac{\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr}}{\sigma})^2}}{\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}^\vee} e^{-\pi(\frac{\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr}}{\sigma})^2}}.$$

Set $Y_3(0) = \frac{\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}^\vee} e^{-\pi(\frac{\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr}}{\sigma})^2}}{\sigma^n}$ and $Y_4(0) = \frac{\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}_1} e^{-\pi(\frac{\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr}}{\sigma})^2}}{\sigma^n}$. From the Poisson summation formula (see [33]) we have

$$Y_3(0) = \frac{1}{\det(\mathbf{L}^\vee)} \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}} e^{-\pi(\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr}\sigma)^2}.$$

and

$$Y_4(0) = \frac{1}{\det(\mathbf{L}_1)} \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in (\mathbf{L}_1)^\vee} e^{-\pi(\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr}\sigma)^2}.$$

Since $\sigma \geq \frac{\sqrt{d}}{\lambda_1(\mathbf{L})}$ then $\sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L} - \mathbf{0}} e^{-\pi(\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr}\sigma)^2} \leq 1 + \frac{1}{2d}$ from Lemma 3.2 in [33]. For lattice vectors $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}_1^\vee$ satisfying

$$\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr} \leq \frac{\sqrt{c_1}}{\sqrt{\pi}\sigma}$$

we have

$$e^{-\pi(\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr\sigma})^2} \geq e^{-c_1}.$$

Hence $\mathbf{P}_{\mathbf{L}_1} \geq \frac{1}{|\mathbf{L}^\vee/\mathbf{L}_1|} (1 + \frac{1}{e^{c_1}} \cdot \frac{|\mathbf{L}^\vee/\mathbf{L}_1|}{q^{e_2}})$. The conclusion follows directly.

The following proposition is useful in this paper. Please refer to [15, 7] for the proof.

Proposition 4.1. *Let $\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{Q}[\theta]$ be a number field of degree n and $f(T) \in \mathbf{Q}[T] = a_n T^n + a_{n-1} T^{n-1} + \dots + a_T + a_0$ be the minimal polynomial of θ . Write*

$$f(T) = (T - \theta)(c_{n-1}(\theta)T^{n-1} + \dots + c_1(\theta)T + c_0(\theta))$$

where $c_j(\theta) = \sum_{i=j+1}^n a_i \theta^{i-j-1}$. The dual base of $\{1, \theta, \theta^2, \dots, \theta^{n-1}\}$ relative to the trace product is

$$\left\{ \frac{c_0(\theta)}{f'(\theta)}, \frac{c_1(\theta)}{f'(\theta)}, \dots, \frac{c_{n-1}(\theta)}{f'(\theta)} \right\}$$

Let p be a positive integer and $p\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}} = \mathbf{P}^{e_1} \dots \mathbf{P}_t^{e_t}$ where \mathbf{P}_i are prime ideals and $e_i \geq 1$ are positive integers, is the factorization of the ideal $p\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ to the product of prime ideals.

Proposition 4.2. *If $\mathbf{I} \subset \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ is an ideal containing the positive integer p , then \mathbf{I} is of the form*

$$\mathbf{P}_{j_1}^{e'_1} \dots \mathbf{P}_{j_{t'}}^{e'_{t'}}$$

where $t' \leq t$, $e'_i \leq e_{j_i}$.

Proof. Set $\mathbf{I} = \prod_j \mathbf{Q}_j$ the factorization of \mathbf{I} to the product of prime ideals. Then $p \in \mathbf{Q}_j$ and \mathbf{Q}_j is a prime ideal over p . The conclusion follows directly.

From Proposition 4.2 only few ideals \mathbf{I} satisfy the condition $q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}} \subset \mathbf{I}$ and $|\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/\mathbf{I}| \leq poly(d)$. When $p\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ is a prime ideal, it is obvious that there is no ideal satisfy the above two conditions. Hence in sublattice attack or subset attack it is not natural to require a sublattice \mathbf{L} or the feasible non-negligible subsets to be an ideal.

The following Kummer lemma (see [14, 7]) is useful for the decomposition of prime numbers to the product of prime ideals in number fields.

Proposition 4.3. *Let $\mathbf{K} = \mathbf{Q}[\theta]$ be a number field, where θ is an algebraic integer whose monic minimal polynomial is denoted by $f(X)$. Then for any prime p not dividing $|\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/\mathbf{Z}[\theta]|$ one can obtain the prime decomposition of $p\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ as follows. Let $f(X) \equiv \prod_{i=1}^g f_i(X)^{e_i} \pmod{p}$ be the decomposition of $f(X)$ module p into irreducible factors in $\mathbf{F}_p[X]$ where f_i are taken to be monic. Then*

$$p\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}} = \prod_{i=1}^g \mathbf{P}_i^{e_i},$$

where

$$\mathbf{P}_i = (p, f_i(\theta)) = p\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}} + f_i(\theta)\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}.$$

Furthermore the residual index of \mathbf{P}_i is equal to the degree of f_i .

The main construction in Theorem 3.2 is as follows. There should be many very short lattice vectors in the dual \mathbf{L}_1^\vee of the number field lattice \mathbf{L}_1 satisfying $q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}_d} \subset \mathbf{L}_1 \subset \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}_d}$. For given $\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_t$, t elements in $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}^\vee/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}^\vee$, we define a number field lattice $\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_t)$ by the equations $Tr(\mathbf{x}_i \mathbf{y}) \equiv 0 \pmod{q}$, where $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$, $i = 1, \dots, t$. It is obvious $q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}} \subset \mathbf{L} \subset \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$. Moreover it is clear the definition of $\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_t)$ only depends on the residue classes of \mathbf{x}_i 's in $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}^\vee/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}^\vee$.

Proposition 4.4. *The vectors $\frac{\mathbf{x}_1}{q}, \dots, \frac{\mathbf{x}_t}{q}$ are in the dual lattice*

$$\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_t)^\vee \subset \frac{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}^\vee}{q}.$$

If $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$ is an invertible element in $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/q\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}$, then there is a $\mathbf{Z}/q\mathbf{Z}$ linear isomorphism from $\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_t)$ to $\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{a}^{-1}\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}^{-1}\mathbf{x}_t)$ defined by $\mathbf{y} \rightarrow \mathbf{a}\mathbf{y}$. In particular the cardinalities of

$$\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{x}_t)$$

and

$$\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{K}}/\mathbf{L}(\mathbf{a}^{-1}\mathbf{x}_1, \dots, \mathbf{a}^{-1}\mathbf{x}_t)$$

are the same.

Proof. The first conclusion is direct from the definition. The second conclusion is a simple computation.

The following result gives a restriction on the $\lambda_1(\mathbf{L}^\vee)$ of number field lattice \mathbf{L} if \mathbf{L} containing the product of two number field lattices \mathbf{L}_1 and \mathbf{L}_2 satisfying $|\mathbf{R}_\mathbf{K}/\mathbf{L}_i| \leq \text{poly}(n)$.

Theorem 4.2. *Let $\mathbf{L}_1, \mathbf{L}_2$ and \mathbf{L}_3 be three polynomially bounded index sublattices of rank d in the integer ring $\mathbf{R}_\mathbf{K}$ of a degree d number field \mathbf{K} . That is $|\mathbf{R}_\mathbf{K}/\mathbf{L}_i| \leq d^c$ holds for a fixed positive integer c and $i = 1, 2, 3$. We assume $\mathbf{L}_2 \cdot \mathbf{L}_3 \subset \mathbf{L}_1$. Then $\lambda_1(\mathbf{L}_1^\vee) \geq \Omega\left(\frac{1}{|\Delta_\mathbf{K}|^{\frac{3}{2d}d^{\frac{2c}{d}}}}\right)$.*

Proof. For $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{L}_1^\vee$, let \mathbf{X} be the matrix representation of the multiplication of \mathbf{x} with respect to a fixed \mathbf{Z} -base of $\mathbf{R}_\mathbf{K}$. For a number field lattice \mathbf{L} set $\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{L})$ to be the matrix representation of \mathbf{L}^\vee with respect to this fixed base of $\mathbf{R}_\mathbf{K}$. Then

$$|\det(\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{L}_2^\vee))| = |\Delta_\mathbf{K}|^{-1} \cdot |(\det(\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{L}_2)))^{-1}| \geq \frac{1}{|\Delta_\mathbf{K}|^{3/2}d^c}$$

from the definition of dual lattice. Since $\mathbf{x} \in (\mathbf{L}_2 \cdot \mathbf{L}_3)^\vee$, $\mathbf{x}\mathbf{y} \in \mathbf{L}_2^\vee$ for each $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbf{L}_3$. Then

$$\mathbf{B}(\mathbf{L}_3) \cdot \mathbf{X} = \mathbf{M} \cdot \mathbf{B}(\mathbf{L}_2^\vee)$$

for some non-singular integer matrix \mathbf{M} . We have

$$|\det(\mathbf{X})| \geq |\det(\mathbf{M})| \cdot \frac{1}{|\Delta_\mathbf{K}|^{3/2}d^{2c}} \geq \frac{1}{|\Delta_\mathbf{K}|^{3/2}d^{2c}}$$

since $|\det(\mathbf{M})| \geq 1$. It is clear

$$\|\mathbf{x}\|_{tr} = (\sum_{i=1}^d |\sigma_i(\mathbf{x})|^2)^{1/2} \geq \sqrt{d} \left(\prod_{i=1}^d \sigma_i(\mathbf{x}) \right)^{1/d} = \sqrt{d} (N(x\mathbf{R}_\mathbf{K}))^{1/d} = \sqrt{d} |\det(\mathbf{X})|^{1/d}.$$

The conclusion follows directly.

From Theorem 4.2 if a sublattice \mathbf{L} in $\mathbf{R}_\mathbf{K}$ contains the product of two polynomially bounded cardinality sublattices, the $\lambda_1(\mathbf{L}^\vee)$ is lower bounded by $\Omega\left(\frac{1}{|\Delta_\mathbf{K}|^{\frac{3}{2d}d^{\frac{2c}{d}}}}\right)$ when d is sufficiently large. In particular if both \mathbf{L} and $\mathbf{O}^\mathbf{L}$ are with polynomially bounded cardinalities, $\lambda_1(\mathbf{L}^\vee)$ can not be very small. The sublattice attack with non-negligible $\mathbf{O}^\mathbf{L}$ suggested in [10] has a strong restriction on the bound of width as the attack when \mathbf{L}_1 is required to be an ideal as in [20, 9, 39].

4 Proofs of Theorem 3.1.

Proof of Theorem 3.1. First of all the probability that uniformly chosen $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K$ is in the subset \mathbf{A}_1 is at least $\frac{1}{d^{C_3}}$, the probability $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbf{A}_2$ is at least $\frac{1}{d^{C_3}}$ for uniformly distributed $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K$. We check the probability $(\mathbf{a}\mathbf{b}) \in (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_3)$ for d^{C_5} samples (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) 's where C_5 is a fixed sufficiently large positive integer. Since both \mathbf{A}_1 and \mathbf{A}_3 are feasible, this can be done within a polynomial time. Here C_5 is a fixed large positive integer determined from C_3, C_4 and the feasible subsets \mathbf{A}_1 and $\mathbf{A}_1 \cdot \mathbf{A}_3$. When these samples are uniformly distributed, the probability that

$$(\mathbf{a}\mathbf{b}) \in (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_3)$$

is exactly

$$\frac{|\mathbf{A}_1|}{|\mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K|} \cdot \frac{|\mathbf{A}_3|}{|\mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K|}.$$

Since $\mathbf{a} \cdot \mathbf{s} \in \mathbf{A}_1 \cdot \mathbf{A}_2$ for the fixed unknown secret $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbf{A}_2$, when $\mathbf{a} \in \mathbf{A}_1$. Then the probability $\mathbf{b} \in \mathbf{A}_3$ is bigger than or equal to $Prob(\mathbf{e} \in proj^{-1}(\mathbf{A}_4))$ from the condition 2)

$$\mathbf{A}_1 \cdot \mathbf{A}_2 + \mathbf{A}_4 \subset \mathbf{A}_3$$

in the definition of subset quadruples. Then we have

$$Prob((\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) \in (\mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{A}_3)) \geq \frac{|\mathbf{A}_1|}{|\mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K|} \cdot Prob(\mathbf{e} \in proj^{-1}(\mathbf{A}_4)) > \frac{|\mathbf{A}_1|}{|\mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K|} \cdot \frac{2|\mathbf{A}_3|}{|\mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K|}.$$

when samples are from the Ring-LWE equations. Hence for non-negligible secrets $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbf{A}_2$, the d^{C_5} samples (\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b}) 's from the Ring-LWE equation are not uniformly distributed and can be tested within a polynomial time.

5 Conclusion

In this paper we propose a general theory of subset attacks on the Ring-LWE to understand its authentic "hardness". From the point view of subset attacks on the learning with errors problems, the error distributions over feasible non-negligible subsets in $\mathbf{R}_K/q\mathbf{R}_K$ should be calculated and checked. The further constructive results of feasible non-negligible subsets in two-to-power cyclotomic number fields will be presented in [12].

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