Tiramisu: Black-Box Simulation Extractable NIZKs in the Updatable CRS Model

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Abstract. In CRYPTO'18, Groth et al. introduced the *updatable* CRS model that allows bypassing the trust in the setup of NIZK arguments. Zk-SNARKs are the well-known family of NIZK arguments that are ubiquitously deployed in practice. In applications that achieve *universal composability*, e.g. Hawk [S&P'16], Gyges [CCS'16], Ouroboros Crypsinous [S&P'19], the underlying SNARK is lifted by the COCO framework [Kosba et al.,2015] to achieve Black-Box Simulation Extractability (BB-SE). The COCO framework is designed in the standard CRS model, consequently, all BB-SE NIZK arguments built with it need a trusted setup phase. In a promising research direction, recently subversion-resistant and updatable SNARKs are proposed that can eliminate/bypass the needed trust in schemes. However, none of the available subversion-resistant/updatable schemes can achieve BB-SE, as Bellare et al.'s result from ASIACRYPT'16 shows that achieving simultaneously Sub-ZK (ZK without trusting a third party) and BB extractability is impossible.

In this paper, we propose Tiramisu [3], as a construction to build BB-SE NIZK arguments in the *updatable* CRS model. Similar to the COCO, Tiramisu is suitable for modular use in larger cryptographic systems and allows building BB-SE NIZK arguments, but with *updatable* parameters. Our results show that one can bypass the impossibility of achieving Sub-ZK and BB extractability in the updatable CRS model. In new NIZKs, in cost of updating, all parties can eliminate the trust on a third-party and the protocol satisfies ZK and BB-SE. Meanwhile, we define public-key cryptosystems with updatable keys and present an efficient construction based on the El-Gamal cryptosystem which can be of independent interest. We instantiate Tiramisu and present efficient BB-SE zk-SNARKs with updatable parameters that can be used in protocols like Hawk, Gyges, Ouroboros Crypsinous while allowing the end-users to update the parameters and eliminate the needed trust.

Keywords: zk-SNARKs, updatable CRS, Black-Box Simulation Extractability, C0C0 framework, UC-Security

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[3] In Italian, Tiramisu literally means "pull me up, lift me up", or more literally "pull it up". This work is done during a self-quarantine period of authors to reduce the spread of COVID-19.

1   Introduction

Zero-Knowledge (ZK) [GMR89] proof systems, particularly Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) arguments [BFM88] are one of the elegant tools in the modern cryptography that due to their impressive advantages and practical efficiency, they are ubiquitously deployed in practical applications [BCG$^+$14,KMS$^+$16,JKS16,KKKZ19]. A NIZK proof system allows a party P (called prover) to non-interactively prove the truth of a statement to another party V (called verifier) without leaking any information about his/her secret inputs. For instance, they allow a prover P to convince a verifier V that for a (public) statement x, he knows a (secret) witness w that satisfies a relation $\mathbf{R}$, $(x, w) \in \mathbf{R}$, without leaking any information about w.

Generally, they are constructed to provide security against malicious parties, meaning that the parties are restricted to follow the protocol. Typically, a NIZK argument is expected to satisfy, (i) *Completeness*, which implies that an honest prover always convinces an honest verifier (ii) *Soundness*, which ensures that an adversarial prover cannot convince an honest verifier except with negligible probability. (iii) *Zero-Knowledge* (ZK), which guarantees that an honestly generated proof does not reveal any information about the (secret) witness w. ZK is the desired notion for the prover, and to prove ZK in an argument, one needs to construct a new algorithm called *simulator* Sim that without getting access to the witness w, but some secret information (related to public parameters) or some extra power, can generate *simulated* proofs that are indistinguishable from the *real* ones. On the other hand, soundness is the desired notion for verifier as it does not allow the prover to cheat. However, in most of the practical cases, it is shown that bare *soundness* is not sufficient and it needs either to be amplified [KMS$^+$16] or the protocol needs to be supported by other cryptographical primitives [BCG$^+$14]. To deal with such concerns, various constructions are proposed that can achieve either of the following notions, which each one is an amplified variation of soundness. (iv) *Simulation Soundness*, (SS), which ensures that an adversarial prover cannot convince an honest verifier, even if he has seen polynomially time simulated proofs (generated by Sim), except with negligible probability. (v) *Knowledge Soundness* (KS), which guarantees that an adversarial prover cannot convince an honest verifier, unless he *knows* a witness w for statement x such that $(x, w) \in \mathbf{R}$. (vi) *Simulation Extractability* (SE) (a.k.a. *Simulation Knowledge Soundness*), which guarantees that an adversarial prover cannot convince an honest verifier, even if he has seen polynomially time simulated proofs, unless he *knows* a witness w for statement x.

The term *knowledge* in notions KS (in item v) and SE (in item vi) means that a successful (adversarial) prover should *know* a witness. In constructions, the concept of *knowing* is formalized by showing that there exists an extraction algorithm Ext, which can extract the witness w (from either the prover or the proof) in either *non-Block-Box* (nBB) or *Black-Box* (BB) manner. Typically, nBB extraction can result in more efficient constructions, as it allows $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}$ to get access to the source-code and random coins of the adversary $\mathcal{A}$. While, the constructions that achieve BB extractability are less efficient, but they provide

stronger security guarantees, as there exists only one Ext for *any* $\mathcal{A}$. The term *simulation* in notions SS (in item iv) and SE (in item vi) guarantees that the proofs are non-malleable and an adversary cannot change an old (simulated) proof to a new one such that the verifier will accept it. The notion SE provides the strongest security and also implies non-malleability of proofs as defined in [DDO+01]. Moreover, in [Gro06], it is shown that SE is a sufficient requirement for a NIZK argument to deploy them in a Universally Composability (UC) protocol [Can01].

NIZK Arguments and zk-SNARKs in the CRS Model. In the Common Reference String (CRS) model [BFM88], the construction of NIZK arguments requires a trusted setup phase that outputs some public parameters, known as CRS, and shares with the parties. During the last two decades, there has been considerable progress in constructing CRS-based NIZK arguments. Based on the underlying assumptions, they are constructed either using standard assumptions (a.k.a. falsifiable assumption) or non-standard assumption (a.k.a. non-falsifiable assumption) [Nao03]. Although the early constructions mostly were based on the standard assumptions, they were inefficient and impractical, e.g. Groth-Sahai proofs [GS08].

Following this fact, at the beginning of the last decade, a line of research initiated that focused on constructing NIZK arguments with shorter proofs and more efficient verification. This direction, finally led to a very efficient family of NIZK arguments, called zero-knowledge Succinct Non-interactive ARgument of Knowledge (zk-SNARK) [Gro10,Lip12,PHGR13,BCTV13,Gro16,GM17,BG18], [Lip19]. Zk-SNARKs have *succinct* proofs and efficient verifications [4]. Their efficiency mainly comes from the fact that they all are constructed based on non-falsifiable assumptions (e.g. knowledge assumptions [Dam91]) that allow having *succinct* proofs, and also achieve nBB extractability. Meanwhile, in 2011, Gentry and Wichs's impossibility result [GW11] confirmed that NIZK arguments with *succinct* proofs cannot be built based on falsifiable assumptions. Beside *succinct* proofs (e.g. constant number of group elements), all initial constructions of zk-SNARKs were designed to achieve completeness (in item i), ZK (in item iii) and KS (in item v) with nBB extraction [Gro10,Lip12,PHGR13,BCTV13,Gro16]. As KS does not guarantee the non-malleability of the proofs, so in practice to prevent man-in-the-middle attacks, users needed to support the protocol with extra primitives. For instance, the cryptocurrency Zcash [BCG+14] does extra efforts with hash functions to guarantee the non-malleability of transactions and proofs. Following this concern, in 2017, Groth and Maller [GM17] presented a zk-SNARK that can achieve SE (in item vi) with nBB extractability, consequently guarantees non-malleability of proofs. Recent works in this direction have led to construct more efficient schemes with the same security guarantees [BG18,AB19,Lip19,KLO19].

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[4] In 2018, zk-SNARKs were listed as one of "10 Breakthrough Technologies of 2018", published by MIT technology review. Available on `https://www.technologyreview.com/lists/technologies/2018/`.

Mitigating the Trust on the Setup Phase of zk-SNARKs. Due to constructing zk-SNARKs in the CRS model, both the prover and verifier are required to trust the CRS generator. As a common approach to mitigate the trust, in 2015, Ben Sasson et al. [BCG+15] proposed an efficient MPC protocol that can be used to sample CRS of the majority of pairing-based zk-SNARKs. While using such MPC protocol for CRS generation, both prover and verifier need to trust *1 out of n* parties, instead of trusting a single party entirely, where n denotes the number of parties participated in the MPC protocol [BGM17,BGG19,ABL+19].

In a different research direction, in 2016, Bellare et al. [BFS16] studied the security of CRS-based NIZK arguments in the face of subverted parameters and presented some negative and positive results. They first defined (vii) *Subversion-Soundness*, (Sub-SND), which ensures that the protocol guarantees soundness (in item ii) even if $\mathcal{A}$ has generated the CRS, and (viii) *Subversion-ZK*, (Sub-ZK), which ensures that the protocol guarantees ZK (in item iii) even if $\mathcal{A}$ has generated the CRS. Then, they showed some of new definitions are not compatible and we cannot construct NIZK arguments that would achieve Sub-SND together with (standard) ZK, and also constructions that will satisfy Sub-ZK together with BB extractability (either KS or SE with BB extraction). Considering those results, two works [ABLZ17,Fuc18] showed that most of pairing-based zk-SNARKs [PHGR13,BCTV13,Gro16], can be lifted to achieve Sub-ZK (in item viii) and KS (in item v) with *nBB* extraction (nBB-KS). Then, Baghery [Bag19c] showed that using the folklore OR technique [BG90] any zk-SNARK that satisfies Sub-ZK and nBB-KS, can be lifted to achieve Sub-ZK and SE (in item vi) with nBB extraction (nBB-SE). The latest result showed that one can construct NIZK arguments that the prover does not need to trust the CRS generator to achieve ZK, and the construction achieves nBB-SE.

Meanwhile, as an extension to the MPC approach and subversion security, in 2018 Groth et al. [GKM+18] introduced a new variation of the CRS model, called *updatable* CRS model. In this model, the CRS is updatable and both prover and verifier can update the CRS and bypass the needed trust on a third party. Groth et al. first defined, (ix) *Updatable KS*, (U-KS), which ensures that the protocol guarantees KS (in item v) as long as the initial CRS generation or one of CRS updates is done by an honest party, and (x) *Updatable ZK*, (U-ZK), which ensures that the protocol guarantees ZK as long as the initial CRS generation or one of CRS updates is done by an honest party [5]. Then, they presented a zk-SNARK that can achieve Sub-ZK and U-KS with nBB extraction (U-nBB-KS). Namely, the prover achieves ZK without trusting the CRS generator and the verifier achieves nBB-KS without trusting the CRS generator but by one-time CRS updating. Recent constructions in this direction have better efficiency [MBKM19,GWC19]. In this direction, recently, Abdolmaleki, Ramacher, and Slamanig [ARS20a] presented a construction, called LAMASSU, and showed

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[5] Note that, as also shown in Lemma 2 in [GKM+18], Sub-ZK is a stronger notion than U-ZK, as in Sub-ZK the protocol achieves ZK even if an adversary has generated the CRS. But the later achieves ZK if the initial CRS generation or at least one of CRS updates is done honestly.

that using a similar folklore OR technique [BG90,DS16,Bag19c] any zk-SNARK that satisfies Sub-ZK (in item viii) and U-nBB-KS (in item ix), can be lifted to achieve Sub-ZK and U-nBB-SE. (xi) <u>U-nBB-SE</u> ensures that the protocol guarantees SE (in item vi) with nBB extraction as long as the initial CRS generation or one of CRS updates is done by an honest party. Considering the impossibility of achieving Sub-ZK and BB extraction at the same time [BFS16], such constructions (either with universal string [ARS20a] or with two-phase update [BGM17,BG18]) achieve the strongest notion with nBB extraction, but still they cannot be deployed in UC-protocols directly.

Using zk-SNARKs in UC-Protocols. During the last decade, zk-SNARKs have made huge impact in various applications [PHGR13,BCG+14,KMS+16], [KMS+16,JKS16,Woo14,KKKZ19]. Some of those protocols including privacy-preserving smart contract systems Hawk [KMS+16] and Gyges [JKS16], and private proof-of-stake system Ouroboros Crypsinous [KKKZ19] are constructed to achieve UC-security [Can01]. Thus, the composability of the deployed zk-SNARK was imperative in designing the main protocol.

Universal Composability or UC is a very powerful security guarantee in constructing cryptographic primitives and protocols, which is proposed by Canetti in [Can01]. A UC primitive/protocol does not interfere with other primitives/protocols and can be composed arbitrary times with other protocols. To prove that a cryptographic primitive achieves UC-security, one needs to show that the target primitive securely realizes the ideal functionality defined for that primitive [Can01]. In 2006, Groth [Gro06] showed that a NIZK argument that can achieve BB-SE can realize the ideal NIZK-functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{NIZK}}$ [GOS06]. This basically showed that to be able to use NIZK arguments in UC-protocols, the target NIZK argument should achieve BB-SE. Following this result, in 2015 Kosba at al. [KZM+15] proposed a framework called C∅C∅ along with several constructions that allows lifting a sound NIZK argument to a BB-SE NIZK argument, such that the lifted version can be deployed in UC-protocols. In summary, given a sound NIZK argument for language $\mathbf{L}$, the C∅C∅ defines a new extended language $\mathbf{L}'$ appended with some primitives and returns a NIZK argument that can achieve BB-SE. The strongest construction of the C∅C∅ framework is reviewed in App. A.

Unfortunately, the default security of zk-SNARKs is very weak to directly deploy in UC-protocols. The reason is that zk-SNARK achieves nBB extraction and the extractor $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}$ requires to get access to the source code and random coins of $\mathcal{A}$, while in UC-secure NIZK arguments, the simulator of *ideal-world* should be able to simulate corrupted parties. To do so, the simulator should be able to extract witnesses without getting access to the source code of the environment's algorithm. Due to this fact, all those UC-secure applications that use zk-SNARKs [KMS+16,JKS16,KKKZ19], use the C∅C∅ to lift the underlying zk-SNARK to achieve BB-SE, equivalently UC-security [Gro06]. Note that the lifted zk-SNARKs that achieve BB-SE are not *witness* succinct any more, but they still are *circuit* succinct.

Problem statement. Currently several popular UC-secure protocols are using BB-SE zk-SNARKs, which are built with the CØCØ framework. However, as the CØCØ framework is built in the standard CRS model, so the output BB-SE NIZK arguments require a trusted setup phase. In this research, we consider if it is possible to construct an alternative to the CØCØ framework but in the *updatable* CRS model, such that, similarly we will be able to build BB-SE zk-SNARKs but with *updatable* parameters. Having updatable parameters can allow all parties to bypass the imposed trust in the setup phase by individually updating the CRS elements.

Our Contributions. The core of our results is, presenting TIRAMISU as an alternative to the CØCØ framework but in the *updatable* CRS model. Technically speaking, TIRAMISU allows one to build BB-SE NIZK arguments with updatable parameters such that the parties in the protocol can update the parameters themselves instead of trusting a third party. The construction is suitable for modular uses in larger cryptographic protocols, which aim to build BB-SE NIZK arguments, while avoiding to trust the parameter generators.

To construct TIRAMISU, we start with the CØCØ's strongest construction and lift it to a construction that works in the updatable CRS model. Meanwhile, to attain fast practical performance, we consider the state-of-the-art constructions proposed in the updatable CRS model and show that we can simplify the construction of CØCØ and still achieve the same goal in the updatable CRS model. Technically speaking, the strongest construction of the CØCØ framework, gets a sound NIZK argument for the language $\mathbf{L}$ and lifts it to a new NIZK argument for the extended language $\mathbf{L}'$, that can achieve (strong) BB-SE. The language $\mathbf{L}'$ is an extension of $\mathbf{L}$ appended with some necessary and sufficient primitives, including an encryption scheme to encrypt witness and a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) along with a commitment scheme that commits to the secret key of PRF (more details in App. A and Sec. 4). In composing the TIRAMISU, we show that due to the recent developments in building NIZK arguments with updatable parameters, namely due to the existence of nBB-SE NIZK arguments with updatable parameters (either with a two-phase updatable CRS [Gro16,BGM17,BG18] or with a universal updatable string [GKM+18,ARS20a,ARS20b]) we can simplify the definition of $\mathbf{L}'$ by removing the commitment and PRF but still achieving the same goal with simpler construction and *updatable* parameters. We show that, TIRAMISU also can be added as a layer on top of the construction proposed in [ARS20a], called LAMASSU, and act as a generic approach to lift any sound NIZK argument to an U-BB-SE NIZK argument in the updatable CRS model. However, later we observe that the arguments build with this approach are less efficient currently. Fig. 1 illustrates how one can use the CØCØ and TIRAMISU to build BB-SE NIZK arguments in the *standard* and *updatable* CRS models, respectively. Similar to the construction lifted by the CØCØ framework, TIRAMISU results in NIZK arguments that their proof size and verification time are (quasi-)linear in the *witness* size, but still independent of the size of the circuit, which encodes $\mathbf{L}'$. Currently, it seems to be an undeniable fact for achieving BB-SE [GW11] and constructing UC-secure NIZK argument [Can01].

Fig. 1: Using the CØCØ framework and Tiramisu to build BB-SE NIZK arguments in the *standard* and *updatable* CRS models. Tiramisu can be instantiated with either ad-hoc constructions like [BGM17,BG18], or using the schemes that are lifted with the Lamassu construction [ARS20a,ARS20b].

Constructing Tiramisu shows that one can bypass a known negative result in the standard CRS model. In [BFS16], Bellare et al. observed that achieving Sub-ZK and BB extractability is impossible at the same time. As BB extractability requires the simulator to create a CRS with a trapdoor it withholds, then it can extract the witness from a valid proof. But Sub-ZK requires that even if $\mathcal{A}$ generates the CRS, it should not be able to learn about the witnesses from the proof. However, if a NIZK argument achieves BB extractability, an adversary (CRS subvertor) can generate the CRS like the simulator. So it has the trapdoor and can also extract the witness and break Sub-ZK. Considering the above negative result, Tiramisu achieves the best possible combination with downgrading Sub-ZK (in item viii) to U-ZK (in item x) while achieving updatable BB extractability (either U-BB-SE or U-BB-KS). Fig. 2 illustrates the relation between the notions U-ZK, U-BB-SE, and U-BB-KS that are achieved in constructions built with Tiramisu and other notions that typically are achieved in other subversion-resistant or updatable NIZK arguments.

Fig. 2: Relations between various notions in subversion-resistant or updatable zk-SNARKs. Constructions build with Tiramisu can achieve updatable BB extractability (SE & KS) along with updatable ZK that are shown with Gray background. Sub: Subversion, ZK: Zero-Knowledge, U: Updatable, BB: Black-Box, nBB: non-Black-Box, SE: Simulation Extractability, KS: Knowledge Soundness.

Tiramisu uses a semantically secure public-key cryptosystem with *updatable keys* that we define in this work. We show that such cryptosystems can be constructed from key-homomorphic encryption schemes [AHI11]. We present a variation of El-Gamal cryptosystem [ElG84] instantiated in the pairing-based groups which fulfill the requirements of a cryptosystem with updatable keys. We

Table 1: A comparison of Tiramisu with related works that achieve a flavor of zero-knowledge and simulation extractability. ZK: Zero-knowledge, U-ZK: Updatable ZK, Sub-ZK: Subversion ZK, nBB-SE: Non-Black-Box Simulation Extractable, BB-SE: Black-Box Simulation Extractable, U-nBB-SE: Updatable Non-Black-Box Simulation Extractable, U-BB-SE: Updatable Black-Box Simulation Extractable. ✓: Achieves the notion, ×: Does not achieve.

	Zero-Knowledge			Simulation Extractability			
	ZK	U-ZK	Sub-ZK	nBB-SE	BB-SE	U-nBB-SE	U-BB-SE
Tiramisu	✓	✓	×	✓	✓	✓	✓
CØCØ [KZM+15,Bag19a]	✓	×	×	✓	✓	×	×
[GM17,AB19,KLO19]	✓	×	×	✓	×	×	×
[Bag19c,Lip19]	✓	✓	✓	✓	×	×	×
[BGM17,BG18,ARS20a]	✓	✓	✓*	✓	×	✓	×

*Theorem 4 in [ARS20a] (and Theorem 3 in [ARS20b]) states that their proposed construction Lamassu, can achieve U-ZK and U-nBB-SE, but it can be shown that the same construction can achieve Sub-ZK along with U-nBB-SE which is a stronger combination.

believe the new syntax can be of independent interest, particularity for building other primitives in the updatable CRS model, e.g. Quasi-Adaptive NIZK arguments [DGP+19] or subversion-resistant commitment schemes [Bag19b].

Tab. 1 compares the NIZK arguments built with Tiramisu along with existing schemes that can achieve a flavor of SE and ZK. As it can be seen, since constructions built with CØCØ achieve BB extractability, therefore they cannot achieve S-ZK [6], and the constructions that achieve Sub-ZK [BG18,Bag19c,Lip19,ARS20a,ARS20b] can achieve (U-)nBB-SE. In Sec. 5, we discuss more details about efficiency of the BB-SE NIZK arguments built with the CØCØ framework and Tiramisu.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows; Sec. 2 introduces notations and presents necessary preliminaries for the paper. Sec. 3 defines the syntax of a public-key cryptosystem with updatable keys and presents an efficient variation of the El-Gamal cryptosystem as an instantiation. The proposed construction Tiramisu and its security proofs are described in Sec 4. In Sec. 5, we present two U-BB-SE NIZK arguments built with Tiramisu and discuss their deployment in UC-secure applications. Finally, we conclude the paper in Sec 6.

2   Preliminaries

Next, we summarize our notations along with some preliminaries necessary for the paper. Throughout, we suppose the security parameter of the scheme be λ

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[6] Note that in the abstracts of [ARS20a,ARS20b], authors state that the CØCØ framework is compatible with subversion SNARKs, but not compatible with updatable SNARKs. But, following the result of [BFS16], here we discuss and show that the CØCØ framework cannot be compatible with subversion SNARKs, while it can be upgraded to be compatible with updatable SNARKs.

and $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ denotes a negligible function. We use $x \leftarrow_\$ X$ to denote x sampled uniformly according to the distribution X. Also, we use $[1 .. n]$ to denote the set of integers in range of 1 to n.

Let PPT and NUPPT denote probabilistic polynomial-time and non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time, respectively. For an algorithm $\mathcal{A}$, let $\mathrm{im}(\mathcal{A})$ be the image of $\mathcal{A}$, i.e., the set of valid outputs of $\mathcal{A}$. Moreover, assume $\mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A})$ denotes the random tape of $\mathcal{A}$, and $r \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A})$ denotes sampling of a randomizer r of sufficient length for $\mathcal{A}$'s needs. By $y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x; r)$ we mean given an input x and a randomizer r, $\mathcal{A}$ outputs y. For algorithms $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathsf{Ext}_\mathcal{A}$, we write $(y \,\|\, y') \leftarrow (\mathcal{A} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_\mathcal{A})(x; r)$ as a shorthand for "$y \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(x; r)$, $y' \leftarrow \mathsf{Ext}_\mathcal{A}(x; r)$". Two computationally indistinguishable distributions A and B are shown with $A \approx_c B$.

In pairing-based groups, we use additive notation together with the bracket notation, i.e., in group $\mathbb{G}_\mu$, $[a]_\mu = a\,[1]_\mu$, where $[1]_\mu$ is a fixed generator of $\mathbb{G}_\mu$. A *bilinear group generator* $\mathsf{BGgen}(1^\lambda)$ returns $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, [1]_1, [1]_2)$, where p (a large prime) is the order of cyclic abelian groups $\mathbb{G}_1$, $\mathbb{G}_2$, and $\mathbb{G}_T$. Finally, $\hat{e} : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \to \mathbb{G}_T$ is an efficient non-degenerate bilinear pairing, s.t. $\hat{e}([a]_1, [b]_2) = [ab]_T$. Denote $[a]_1 \bullet [b]_2 = \hat{e}([a]_1, [b]_2)$.

2.1 Zk-SNARKs in the Updatable CRS Model

We adopt the definition of NIZK arguments in the updatable CRS model from [GKM$^+$18]. Let $\mathcal{R}$ be a relation generator, such that $\mathcal{R}(1^\lambda)$ returns a polynomial-time decidable binary relation $\mathbf{R} = \{(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})\}$, where x is the statement and w is the corresponding witness. We assume one can deduce λ from the description of $\mathbf{R}$. The relation generator also outputs auxiliary information $\xi_\mathbf{R}$, which both the honest parties and the adversary have access to it. $\xi_\mathbf{R}$ can be a value returned by $\mathsf{BGgen}(1^\lambda)$ [Gro16]. Consequently, we also give $\xi_\mathbf{R}$ as an input to the honest parties; if needed, one can include an additional auxiliary input to the adversary. Let $\mathbf{L_R} = \{\mathsf{x} : \exists\, \mathsf{w} \mid (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R}\}$ be an **NP**-language including all the statements which there exist corresponding witnesses in relation $\mathbf{R}$.

A *NIZK argument* Ψ_{NIZK} in the updatable CRS model for $\mathcal{R}$ consists of PPT algorithms $(\mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}, \mathsf{CU}, \mathsf{CV}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V}, \mathsf{Sim}, \mathsf{Ext})$, such that:

- $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_\mathbf{R})$: CRS generator is a PPT algorithm that given $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_\mathbf{R})$, where $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_\mathbf{R}) \in \mathrm{im}(\mathcal{R}(1^\lambda))$, first samples the trapdoors $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0'$ and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_0'$ and then uses them to generate $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0$ along with $\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}$ as a proof for its well-formedness. Then, stores the trapdoors associated with $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0$ including the simulation trapdoor $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0 := \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0'$, and the extraction trapdoor $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_0 := \vec{\mathsf{te}}_0'$. Finally, it returns $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0})$ as the output.
- $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{CU}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_\mathbf{R}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{i-1})$: CRS Updating is a PPT algorithm that given the tuple of $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_\mathbf{R}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{i-1})$, where $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{i-1}$ is an input CRS, returns the pair of $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i})$, where $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i$ is the updated CRS and $\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}$ is a proof that guarantees the correctness of updating. Note that after each update, the simulation and extraction trapdoors are updated, for instance $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i := \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_{i-1} + \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i'$, and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i := \vec{\mathsf{te}}_{i-1} + \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i'$.

- $(\bot, 1) \leftarrow \mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i})$: CRS Verification is a polynomial-time algorithm that given a potentially updated $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i$, and $\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}$ returns either $\bot$ on the condition that the $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i$ is incorrectly formed (and updated) or 1.
- $(\pi, \bot) \leftarrow \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$: Prove is a PPT algorithm that for $\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}) = 1$, given the tuple of $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$, such that $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R}$, outputs an argument π. Otherwise, it returns $\bot$.
- $(0, 1) \leftarrow \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \pi)$: Verify is a polynomial-time algorithm that for $\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}) = 1$, given the set of parameters as $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \pi)$, returns either 0 (reject π) or 1 (accept π).
- $(\pi) \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i, \mathsf{x})$: Simulator is a PPT algorithm that for $\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}) = 1$, given the tuple $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i, \mathsf{x})$, where $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i$ is the simulation trapdoor associated with the latest CRS, namely $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i$, outputs a simulated argument π.
- $(\mathsf{w}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Ext}(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \pi, \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i)$: BB Extractor is a polynomial-time algorithm that, given $(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \pi, \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i)$ extracts the witness w, where $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i$ is the extraction trapdoor associated with the latest well-form CRS, namely $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i$. In nBB extraction algorithms, the $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i$ can be the source code and random coins of the adversary.

In the CRS model, a NIZK argument for $\mathcal{R}$ has a tuple of algorithms $(\mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V}, \mathsf{Sim}, \mathsf{Ext})$, while subversion-resistant constructions [BFS16] additionally have a CV algorithm which is used to verify the well-formedness of CRS elements to achieve S-ZK [BFS16,ABLZ17,Fuc18,Bag19c]. But as listed above, in the *updatable* CRS model, a NIZK argument additionally has a CU algorithm that allows the parties (prover or verifier) to update the CRS elements and inject their own private shares to the CRS elements [7] and avoid trusting a third party.

Below we recall various security requirements that a NIZK argument can satisfy in the *updatable* CRS model [GKM+18,ARS20a] and refer App. B for the standard and subversion-resistant notions.

Definition 1 (Perfect Updatable Completeness). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is perfectly updatable complete for $\mathcal{R}$, if for all λ, all $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \in \mathrm{im}(\mathcal{R}(1^\lambda))$, and $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R}$,*

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} (\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^\lambda), (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), \\ (\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0), \{\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^i : \\ (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \leftarrow \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \wedge \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1 \end{bmatrix} = 1 \ .$$

where $\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}$ is a proof for the correctness of the initial CRS generation or CRS updating.

Note that in the above definition and all the following ones, without loss of generality, $\mathcal{A}$ can also first generate $\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j\}_{j=0}^{i-1}$ and then an honest updater updates $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{i-1}$ to $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i$.

---

[7] Analogously this can be considered equivalent to the setting that one uses an MPC protocol(e.g. [BGM17]) with *variable parties* to generate the public parameters. Such that, any party can join the parameter generation protocol in the future.

Definition 2 (Updatable Zero-Knowledge). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is statistically updatable ZK for $\mathcal{R}$, if for all λ, all $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \in \mathrm{im}(\mathcal{R}(1^\lambda))$, and for all computationally unbounded $\mathcal{A}$, $\varepsilon_0^{unb} \approx_\lambda \varepsilon_1^{unb}$, where ε_b is equal to*

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} (\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^\lambda), ((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}) \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0 := \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0') \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), \\ r_s \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), ((\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j'\}_{j=1}^i) \\ \leftarrow (\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_s) : \\ \{\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^i \wedge \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}_b(\cdot, \cdot)}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i) = 1 \end{bmatrix}.$$

Here, the oracle $\mathsf{O}_0(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$ returns $\perp$ (reject) if $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R}$, and otherwise it returns $\mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$. Similarly, $\mathsf{O}_1(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$ returns $\perp$ (reject) if $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R}$, and otherwise it returns $\mathsf{Sim}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i := \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j'\}_{j=0}^i)$, where $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i$ is the simulation trapdoor associated with $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i$ that can be computed using $\{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j'\}_{j=0}^i$. We say Ψ_{NIZK} is perfect updatable ZK for $\mathcal{R}$ if one requires that $\varepsilon_0 = \varepsilon_1$.

Definition 3 (Updatable nBB Knowledge Soundness). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is updatable non-black-box knowledge sound for $\mathcal{R}$, if for every PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and any subvertor Sub, there exists a PPT extractor $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}$ s.t. for all λ,*

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} (\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^\lambda), (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), r_s \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), \\ (\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Sub}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_s), \{\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^i, \\ r_{\mathcal{A}} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A}), ((\mathsf{x}, \pi) \,\|\, \mathsf{w}) \leftarrow (\mathcal{A} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}) \\ (\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}; r_{\mathcal{A}}) : (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R} \wedge \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1 \end{bmatrix} \approx_\lambda 0 .$$

Here $\mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub})$, and $\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}$ is a proof for correctness of CRS generation or updating process. In the definition, $\xi_{\mathbf{R}}$ can be seen as a common auxiliary input to $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}$ that is generated by using a benign [BCPR14] relation generator and ξ_{Sub} can be auxiliary information provided by Sub to $\mathcal{A}$.

Definition 4 (Updatable Simulation Soundness). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is updatable simulation soundness for $\mathcal{R}$, if for any subvertor Sub, and every PPT $\mathcal{A}$, for all λ,*

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} (\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^\lambda), ((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}) \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{te}}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), \\ r_s \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), (\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Sub}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_s), \\ \{\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^i, (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i) : \\ (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \notin Q \wedge \mathsf{x} \notin \mathbf{L} \wedge \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1 \end{bmatrix} \approx_\lambda 0 .$$

where $\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}$ is a proof for correctness of CRS generation/updating. Q is the set of simulated statement-proof pairs generated by $\mathsf{O}(.)$.

Definition 5 (Updatable nBB Simulation Extractability). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is updatable non-black-box simulation-extractable*

for $\mathcal{R}$, *if for every PPT $\mathcal{A}$ and any subvertor* Sub, *there exists a PPT extractor* $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}$ *s.t. for all λ,*

$$
\Pr
\begin{bmatrix}
(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^{\lambda}), (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), r_s \leftarrow_{\$} \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), \\
(\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Sub}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_s), \\
\{\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^i, r_{\mathcal{A}} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A}), \\
((\mathsf{x}, \pi) \,\|\, \mathsf{w}) \leftarrow (\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(.)} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}})(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i; r_{\mathcal{A}}) : \\
(\mathsf{x}, \pi) \notin Q \wedge (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R} \wedge \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1
\end{bmatrix}
\approx_{\lambda} 0 \ .
$$

where $\varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}$ is a proof for correctness of CRS generation or updating. Here, $\mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub})$ *and Q is the set of simulated statement-proof pairs returned by $\mathcal{A}$'s queries to* O.

Note that *updatable nBB-SE* implies *updatable nBB knowledge soundness*, as in the former additionally $\mathcal{A}$ is allowed to make query to the proof simulation oracle. It also implies *updatable simulation soundness*, as if there exists a witness w s.t. $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R}$, therefore the instance x belongs to the language [Gro06]. Next, we extended the definition of updatable nBB-SE in definition 5 to the updatable BB-SE which constructions with TIRAMISU can achieve.

Definition 6 (Updatable Black-Box Simulation Extractability). *A non-interactive argument $\varPsi_{\mathsf{NIZK}}$ is updatable black-box (strong) simulation-extractable for $\mathcal{R}$, if for every PPT $\mathcal{A}$ and any subvertor* Sub, *there exists a PPT extractor* Ext *s.t. for all λ,*

$$
\Pr
\begin{bmatrix}
(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^{\lambda}), ((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}) \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{te}}_0 := \vec{\mathsf{te}}'_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), \\
r_s \leftarrow_{\$} \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), ((\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{te}}'_j\}_{j=1}^i) \\
\leftarrow (\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_s), \{\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^i, \\
r_{\mathcal{A}} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A}), (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(.)}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}; r_{\mathcal{A}}), \\
\mathsf{w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Ext}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i; \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i := \{\vec{\mathsf{te}}'_j\}_{j=0}^i) : \\
(\mathsf{x}, \pi) \notin Q \wedge (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R} \ \wedge \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1
\end{bmatrix}
\approx_{\lambda} 0 \ .
$$

where $\varPi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}$ is a proof for correctness of CRS generation/updating and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i$ is the extraction trapdoor associated with the final CRS that can be computed using $\{\vec{\mathsf{te}}'_j\}_{j=0}^i$. Here, $\mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A}) = \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub})$ *and Q is the set of the statment and simulated proofs returned by* O.

A key note about Def. 6 is that the extraction algorithm Ext is black-box and unlike the nBB case, it works for all adversaries $\mathcal{A}$. Consequently, *updatable BB simulation extractability* implies *updatable nBB simulation extractability* (given in Def. 5). One can also define Updatable Black-Box Knowledge Soundness (U-BB-KS) as a weaker version of U-BB-SE, where in the case of U-BB-KS, $\mathcal{A}$ would not have access to the oracle $\mathsf{O}(\cdot)$.

2.2 Public-key Cryptosystems

Definition 7 (Public-key Cryptosystem). *A public-key cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} over the message space of $\mathcal{M}$ and ciphertext space of $\mathcal{C}$, consists of three PPT algorithms defined as follows,*

- $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$: *Key Generation is a PPT that given security parameter 1^λ returns a key-pair $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk})$.*
- $(c) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, m)$: *Encryption is a PPT algorithm that given a public-key pk and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, outputs a ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$.*
- $(\bot, m) \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}, c)$: *Decryption is a deterministic algorithm that given a ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$ and a secret-key sk, returns either $\bot$ (reject) or $m \in \mathcal{M}$ (successful).*

The primary security requirements for an encryption scheme is correctness and INDistinguishability Under Chosen Plaintext Attacks (IND-CPA) that are defined as below.

Definition 8 (Perfect Correctness). *A public-key cryptosystem $\Psi_{\mathsf{Enc}} := (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ satisfies perfect correctness, if*

$$\Pr\left[(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda), c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, m) : \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}, c) = m\right] = 1 \ .$$

where the probability is taken over the randomness of the encryption algorithm.

Definition 9 (IND-CPA Security). *A public-key cryptosystem $\Psi_{\mathsf{Enc}} := (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ satisfies IND-CPA, if for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$,*

$$\Pr\left[\begin{matrix}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda), b \leftarrow_\$ \{0, 1\}, (m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}), \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, m_b)) : b = b'\end{matrix}\right] \approx_\lambda \frac{1}{2} \ .$$

El-Gamal Cryptosystem. One of the known IND-CPA secure cryptosystems is proposed by El-Gamal [ElG84] that its algorithms $(\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ work as below,

- $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$: Given the security parameter 1^λ, generate an efficient description of a cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$ of order p with generator g; sample $\mathsf{sk} \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and set $h = g^{\mathsf{sk}}$; return $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) := ((g, h), \mathsf{sk})$.
- $(c) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, m)$: Given $\mathsf{pk} := (g, h)$ and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, sample a randomness $r \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and return $c := (c_1, c_2) := (m \cdot h^r, g^r)$.
- $(\bot, m) \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}, c)$: Given sk and a ciphertext $c := (c_1, c_2) := (m \cdot h^r, g^r)$ returns, $m := c_1/c_2^{\mathsf{sk}} = m \cdot h^r/g^{\mathsf{sk}r}$.

2.3 Key-Homomorphic Cryptosystems

Let $\Psi_{\mathsf{Enc}} = (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be a key-homomorphic cryptosystem and the secret and public keys are chosen from the cyclic groups of $(\mathbb{H}, +)$ and $(\mathbb{G}, \cdot)$, respectively.

Definition 10 (Secret-key to Public-key Homomorphisms [TW14]).
We say the cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} over the message space $\mathcal{M}$ admits a secret-key to public-key homomorphism if there exists a map $\mu : \mathbb{H} \to \mathbb{G}$ such that:

- *μ is a homomorphism. i.e., for all $\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{sk}' \in \mathbb{H}$, we have $\mu(\mathsf{sk} + \mathsf{sk}') = \mu(\mathsf{sk}) \cdot \mu(\mathsf{sk}')$;*
- *Every output $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$, satisfies $\mathsf{pk} = \mu(\mathsf{sk})$.*

In particular, similar to Def. 8, such construction satisfies *completeness* if for a valid secret key sk output by KG, the probability $\Pr[\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mu(\mathsf{sk}), m)) \neq m]$ is negligible for all messages $m \in \mathcal{M}$, where the probability is over the coins of Enc. It satisfies *perfect completeness* if the probability is zero.

In the discrete logarithm setting, it is usually the case $\mathsf{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and $\mathsf{pk} := g^{\mathsf{sk}}$ such that g is the generator of a cyclic group $\mathbb{G}$ of prime order p, e.g., for El-Gamal cryptosystem [ElG84].

Definition 11 (Key-Homomorphic Cryptosystems [AHI11]). *We say the cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} over the message space $\mathcal{M}$ and ciphertext space $\mathcal{C}$ satisfies key-homomorphism property, if there exists an efficient PPT algorithm Adapt, that given a public-key pk, ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$, and a shift amount $\Delta \in \mathbb{H}$. Then Adapt returns a new public-key pk' and a new ciphertext $c' \in \mathcal{C}$, namely $(\mathsf{pk}', c') \leftarrow \mathsf{Adapt}(\mathsf{pk}, c, \Delta)$, such that for every $\Delta \in \mathbb{H}$, for all $(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$ and message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ we have,*

$$(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk} \cdot \mu(\Delta), m)) \approx_\lambda (\mathsf{pk}', c')$$

where $(\mathsf{pk}', c') \leftarrow \mathsf{Adapt}(\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}, m), \Delta)$ and the distribution is induced by the random coins of Enc and Adapt.

For instance, an Adapt algorithm for El-Gamal [ElG84] cryptosystem (that we later use in Sec. 3) can be written below,

- $(\mathsf{pk}', c') \leftarrow \mathsf{Adapt}(\mathsf{pk}, c, \Delta)$: Given $\mathsf{pk} := (g, h := g^{\mathsf{sk}})$, $c := (c_1, c_2) = (mh^r, g^r)$, sample the shift parameter $\Delta \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_p^*$, and computes $\mathsf{pk}' := (g, h' := h \cdot g^\Delta)$; $c' := (c_1', c_2') = (mh^r \cdot g^{r\Delta}, g^r)$; Return (pk', c').

2.4   Assumptions

Definition 12 (Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Knowledge of Exponent (BDH-KE) Assumption). *We say BGgen is BDH-KE secure for relation set $\mathcal{R}$ if for any λ, $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \in \mathrm{im}(\mathcal{R}(1^\lambda))$, and PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ there exists a PPT extractor $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}$, such that,*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, [1]_1, [1]_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{BGgen}(1^\lambda), r \leftarrow_s \mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A}), \\ ([\alpha_1]_1, [\alpha_2]_2 \,\|\, a) \leftarrow (\mathcal{A} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}})(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}; r) : \\ [\alpha_1]_1 \bullet [1]_2 = [1]_1 \bullet [\alpha_2]_2 \wedge a \neq \alpha_1 \end{array} \right] \approx_\lambda 0 \ .$$

Where $\xi_{\mathbf{R}}$ is the auxiliary information related to the underlying group.

The BDH-KE assumption [ABLZ17] is an asymmetric-pairing version of the original knowledge assumption [Dam92].

3   Public-Key Cryptosystems with Updatable Keys

As briefly discussed in Sec. 1, one of the key building blocks used in TIRAMISU is the cryptosystem schemes with updatable keys that we define in this section. Such definitions recently are proposed for signatures [ARS20a], but to the best of our knowledge this is the first time that this notion is defined for the public-key cryptosystems. In contrast to subversion-resilient encryption schemes [ABK18] that the key-generation phase might be subverted, here we consider the case that the output of the key-generation phase is updatable and parties can update the keys. We aim to achieve the standard security requirements of a cryptosystem as long as either the original key generation or at least one of the updates was done honestly.

3.1   Definition and Security Requirements

Definition 13 (Public-key Cryptosystems with Updatable Keys).   *A public-key cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} with updatable keys over the message space of $\mathcal{M}$ and ciphertext space of $\mathcal{C}$, consists of five PPT algorithms $(\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{KU}, \mathsf{KV}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ that are defined as follows,*

- *$(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$: Key Generation is a PPT algorithm that given the security parameter 1^λ returns the corresponding key pair $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \mathsf{sk}_0)$ and Π_{pk_0} as a proof of correctness.*
- *$(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KU}(\mathsf{pk}_{i-1})$: Key Updating is a PPT algorithm that given a valid (possibly updated) public key pk_{i-1} (first time $i = 1$) outputs $(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i})$, where pk_i denotes the updated public (with a hidden secret-key sk_i) and Π_{pk_i} is a proof for the correctness of the updating process.*
- *$(1, \bot) \leftarrow \mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i})$: Key Verification is a polynomial-time algorithm that given a potentially updated pk_i and Π_{pk_i}, checks the validity of the updated key. It returns either $\bot$ on the condition that the pk_i is incorrectly formed (and updated) otherwise it outputs 1.*
- *$(c) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, m)$: Encryption is a randomize algorithm that given a potentially updated public key pk_i and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, outputs a ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$.*
- *$(\bot, m') \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}, c)$: Decryption is a deterministic algorithm that given a ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$ and a potentially updated secret key sk_i, returns either $\bot$ (reject) or $m' \in \mathcal{M}$ (successful). Note that in the standard public-key cryptosystems (and in this definition before any updating) $sk_i = sk_0$.*

A primary requirements for a public-key cryptosystem with updatable keys $\Psi_{\mathsf{Enc}} := (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{KU}, \mathsf{KV}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ can be considered as follows,

Definition 14 (Perfect Updatable Correctness).   *A public-key cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} with updatable keys is perfect updatable correct, if*

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} (\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0 := \mathsf{sk}_0') \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda), r_{\mathsf{Sub}} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), \\ ((\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=1}^i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \,\|\, \{\mathsf{sk}_j'\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow (\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}}), \\ \{\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^i : \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_i := \{\mathsf{sk}_j'\}_{j=0}^i, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, m)) = m \end{bmatrix} = 1 \ .$$

where sk'_j is the individual secret-key of each party and pk_i is the final public-key updated by all parties. The probability is taken over the randomness of the encryption algorithm. Note that Sub can also first generate $\{\mathsf{pk}_j\}_{j=0}^{i-1}$ and then an honest updater updates pk_{i-1} to pk_i.

Definition 15 (Updatable Key Hiding). *In a cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} with updatable keys, for $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0 := \mathsf{sk}'_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$ and $(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KU}(\mathsf{pk}_{i-1})$, we say that the updatable key hiding (i.e. $\mathsf{pk}_0 \approx_\lambda \mathsf{pk}_i$) holds if one of the following cases holds,*

- *the original pk_0 was honestly generated and the KV algorithm returns 1, namely $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$ and $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}) = 1$,*
- *the original pk_0 verifies successfully with KV and the key-update was generated honestly once, namely $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}) = 1$ and $(\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow \mathsf{KU}(\mathsf{pk}_0)$ such that $\{\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) = 1\}_{j=1}^i$.*

Definition 16 (Updatable IND-CPA). *A public-key cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} with updatable keys satisfies updatable IND-CPA, if for all PPT subvertor Sub, for all λ, and for all PPT adversaries $\mathcal{A}$,*

$$
\Pr \left[
\begin{array}{l}
(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0 := \mathsf{sk}'_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda), r_{\mathsf{Sub}} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), \\
(\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=1}^i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Sub}(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}}), b \leftarrow_{\$} \{0,1\}, \\
(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pk}_i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}), b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, m_b)) : \\
\{\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^i \wedge b' = b
\end{array}
\right] \approx_\lambda \frac{1}{2} ,
$$

where ξ_{Sub} is the auxiliary information which is returned by the subvertor Sub. Note that Sub can also generate the initial pk_0 and then an honest key updater KU updates it and outputs pk_i (associated with the secret key $\mathsf{sk}_i := \{\mathsf{sk}'_j\}_{j=0}^i$), and the proof Π_{pk_i} (then we require that $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}) = 1$). Note that Sub can also first generate $\{\mathsf{pk}_j\}_{j=0}^{i-1}$ and then an honest updater updates pk_{i-1} to pk_i.

In the rest, we prove the following theorem which gives a generic approach for building a public-key cryptosystem with updatable keys using the key-homomorphic cryptosystems [AHI11].

Theorem 1 (Cryptosystem with Updatable Keys). *Every correct, IND-CPA secure, and key-homomorphic cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} with an efficient extractor $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}$, satisfies updatable correctness, updatable key hiding and updatable IND-CPA security.*

Proof. To consider the updatable correctness, let the key updating and the key verification algorithms KU and KV be defined as follows,

- $(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KU}(\{\mathsf{pk}_j\}_{j=0}^{i-1})$: Given the public keys $\{\mathsf{pk}_j\}_{j=0}^{i-1}$, where the pk_{i-1} is the latest updated public-key, act as follows: choose $\Delta \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{H}$; set $\mathsf{sk}'_i := \Delta$, where sk'_i is the secret key of the updater; set $\mathsf{pk}_i = \mathsf{pk}_{i-1} \cdot \mu(\Delta)$ and $\Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i} := \mu(\Delta)$; Output $(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i})$, where pk_i denotes the updated public and Π_{pk_i} is a proof for the correctness of the updating process.

– $(1, \perp) \leftarrow \mathsf{KV}(\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \mathit{\Pi}_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=0}^i)$: Given a potentially updated pk_i along with previous keys $\{\mathsf{pk}_j\}_{j=0}^{i-1}$, and $\mathit{\Pi}_{\mathsf{pk}_i}$ (along with $\{\mathit{\Pi}_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=0}^{i-1}$), returns 1 either if $\mathsf{pk}_i = \mathsf{pk}_0$ or $\mathsf{pk}_i := \mathsf{pk}_{i-1} \cdot \mathit{\Pi}_{\mathsf{pk}_i}$, otherwise it responses by $\perp$.

It is straightforward to see that $\mathsf{sk}_i := \mathsf{sk}_{i-1} + \Delta := \mathsf{sk}_{i-1} + \mathsf{sk}_i'$, where sk_i is the secret key associated with pk_i, sk_{i-1} is the secret key associated with public-key pk_{i-1}, and $\mathsf{sk}_i' := \Delta$ is the secret-key of the updater. Consequently, due to the existence of $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}$, (which allows to extract all the secret keys injected in the key updates by Sub, namely $\{\mathsf{sk}_j'\}_{j=1}^i$) the updatable correctness follows from the correctness of $\mathit{\Psi}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$.

Updatable key hiding directly comes from the key-homomorphic property (in Def. 11) of the cryptosystem $\mathit{\Psi}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$, and the algorithms KU and KV required in Def. 15 act as defined above.

Next, we prove updatable IND-CPA security by a reduction to the IND-CPA security of the cryptosystem $\mathit{\Psi}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$. Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ is a successful adversary against updatable IND-CPA of $\mathit{\Psi}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$. Namely, let pk_0 be the public-key generated by challenger of $\mathit{\Psi}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$, and $(\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \mathit{\Pi}_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=1}^i)$ be the output of $\mathcal{A}$ on input pk_0. Then, if $\{\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \mathit{\Pi}_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) = 1\}_{j=1}^i$, so one can use the extractor $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}$ to extract $\{\mathsf{sk}_j'\}_{j=1}^i$ (the secret keys of Sub in each update) and also conclude that $\mathsf{pk}_i := \mathsf{pk}_{i-1} \cdot \mathit{\Pi}_{\mathsf{pk}_i}$. Next, for random bit $b \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}$ taken by challenger, and (m_0, m_1) taken by $\mathcal{A}$, the challenger sends back $c_b = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, m_b)$ to $\mathcal{A}$ and with non-negligible probability adversary $\mathcal{A}$ guesses b, correctly.

Now, consider a new adversary $\mathcal{B}$ for IND-CPA of $\mathit{\Psi}_{\mathsf{Enc}}$ that given pk_0 sends it to $\mathcal{A}$ and gets $(\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \mathit{\Pi}_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=1}^i)$ and (m_0, m_1) from $\mathcal{A}$. Then $\mathcal{B}$ sends (m_0, m_1) to the challenger and gets $c_b = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_0, m_b)$ which is encrypted with pk_0. Next, the adversary $\mathcal{B}$ uses $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}$ and extracts all $\{\mathsf{sk}_j'\}_{j=1}^i$ from $\mathcal{A}$ (subvertor Sub) and uses them to compute sk. After that, executes $(\mathsf{pk}_i, c_b') \leftarrow \mathsf{Adapt}(\mathsf{pk}_0, c_b, \mathsf{sk})$ and sends c_b' (which is encrypted with pk_i) to the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and gets b'. Finally, adversary $\mathcal{B}$ returns the same b' to the challenger and wins the IND-CPA game with the same probability that $\mathcal{A}$ wins the game updatable IND-CPA. The case that first pk_{i-1} is subverted and then one-time honest updating is done can be shown analogously, which is omitted.   □

3.2   A Pubic-key Cryptosystem with Updatable Keys

In this section, we show that the El-Gamal cryptosystem [ElG84] instantiated in a bilinear group $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, [1]_1, [1]_2)$ can be represented as an encryption scheme with updatable keys. In bilinear group based instantiation, in contrast to the standard El-Gamal encryption (reviewed in Sec. 2.2)), the public key consists of a pair $([x]_1, [x]_2)$. Consequently, the algorithms of new variation can be expressed as follows,

– $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \mathit{\Pi}_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0 := \mathsf{sk}_0') \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$: Given the security parameter 1^λ, first obtain $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, [1]_1, [1]_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{BGgen}(1^\lambda)$; sample $\mathsf{sk}_0' \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and return the corresponding key pair $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \mathsf{sk}_0) := ((\mathsf{pk}_0^1, \mathsf{pk}_0^2), \mathsf{sk}_0) :=$

$(([\mathsf{sk}_0']_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_0']_2), \mathsf{sk}_0')$ and $\Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0} := (\Pi^1_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \Pi^2_{\mathsf{pk}_0}) := ([\mathsf{sk}_0']_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_0']_2)$ as a proof of correctness (a.k.a. well-formedness).

- $(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KU}(\mathsf{pk}_{i-1})$: Obtain $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, [1]_1 , [1]_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{BGgen}(1^\lambda)$; then for a given $\mathsf{pk}_{i-1} := (\mathsf{pk}_0^1, \mathsf{pk}_0^2) := ([\mathsf{sk}_{i-1}]_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_{i-1}]_2)$, for $i \geq 1$, sample $\mathsf{sk}_i' \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and output,

$$(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) := (([\mathsf{sk}_{i-1} + \mathsf{sk}_i']_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_{i-1} + \mathsf{sk}_i']_2), ([\mathsf{sk}_i']_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_i']_2)),$$

where $\mathsf{pk}_i := (\mathsf{pk}_i^1, \mathsf{pk}_i^2)$ denotes the updated public-key associated with the secret key $\mathsf{sk}_i := \mathsf{sk}_{i-1} + \mathsf{sk}_i'$ and $\Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i} := (\Pi^1_{\mathsf{pk}_i}, \Pi^2_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) := ([\mathsf{sk}_i']_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_i']_2)$ is the proof for correctness of the update.

- $(1, \bot) \leftarrow \mathsf{KV}(\{\mathsf{pk}_j\}_{j=0}^i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i})$: Obtain $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, [1]_1 , [1]_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{BGgen}(1^\lambda)$, and then,
  - for $i = j = 0$, by giving the public key $\mathsf{pk}_0 := (\mathsf{pk}_0^1, \mathsf{pk}_0^2) := ([\mathsf{sk}_0]_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_0]_2)$, and the corresponding proof $\Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0} := (\Pi^1_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \Pi^2_{\mathsf{pk}_0}) := ([\mathsf{sk}_0']_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_0']_2)$, checks the following equations,

$$\left[\Pi^1_{\mathsf{pk}_0}\right]_1 \bullet [1]_2 \stackrel{?}{=} [1]_1 \bullet [\mathsf{pk}_0^2]_2 ,$$

$$[1]_1 \bullet \left[\Pi^2_{\mathsf{pk}_0}\right]_2 \stackrel{?}{=} [\mathsf{pk}_0^1]_1 \bullet [1]_2 ,$$

$$[1]_1 \bullet \left[\Pi^2_{\mathsf{pk}_0}\right]_2 \stackrel{?}{=} \left[\Pi^1_{\mathsf{pk}_0}\right]_1 \bullet [1]_2 ,$$

  - for $i \geq 1$, by taking public key $\mathsf{pk}_{i-1} := (\mathsf{pk}_{i-1}^1, \mathsf{pk}_{i-1}^2) := ([\mathsf{sk}_{i-1}]_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_{i-1}]_2)$, a potentially updated public key $\mathsf{pk}_i := (\mathsf{pk}_i^1, \mathsf{pk}_i^2) := ([\mathsf{sk}_{i-1} + \mathsf{sk}_i']_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_{i-1} + \mathsf{sk}_i']_2)$, and $\Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i} := (\Pi^1_{\mathsf{pk}_i}, \Pi^2_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) := ([\mathsf{sk}_i']_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_i']_2)$, checks the following equations,

$$\left[\mathsf{pk}_{i-1}^1 + \Pi^1_{\mathsf{pk}_i}\right]_1 \bullet [1]_2 \stackrel{?}{=} [1]_1 \bullet [\mathsf{pk}_i^2]_2 ,$$

$$[1]_1 \bullet \left[\mathsf{pk}_{i-1}^2 + \Pi^2_{\mathsf{pk}_i}\right]_2 \stackrel{?}{=} [\mathsf{pk}_i^1]_1 \bullet [1]_2 ,$$

$$[1]_1 \bullet \left[\Pi^2_{\mathsf{pk}_i}\right]_2 \stackrel{?}{=} \left[\Pi^1_{\mathsf{pk}_i}\right]_1 \bullet [1]_2 ,$$

in each case, if both the equations hold, it returns 1, otherwise $\bot$.

- $(c) \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, m)$: Obtain $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, [1]_1 , [1]_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{BGgen}(1^\lambda)$ and then given a (potentially updated) public key $\mathsf{pk}_i := ([\mathsf{sk}_i]_1 , [\mathsf{sk}_i]_2)$, such that $\mathsf{sk}_i := \mathsf{sk}_{i-1} + \mathsf{sk}_i'$, and a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, samples a randomness $r \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ and outputs the corresponding ciphertext as below,

$$c := (c_1, c_2) := (m \cdot [r\mathsf{sk}_i]_1 , [r]_1).$$

– $(\bot, m) \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_i, c)$: Obtain $(p, \mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2, \mathbb{G}_T, \hat{e}, [1]_1, [1]_2) \leftarrow \mathsf{BGgen}(1^\lambda)$ and then given a ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$ and a potentially updated secret key $\mathsf{sk}_i = \mathsf{sk}_{i-1} + \boxed{\mathsf{sk}'_i}$ it returns,

$$\frac{c_1}{c_2^{\mathsf{sk}}} = \frac{m \cdot [r\mathsf{sk}_i]_1}{[r\mathsf{sk}_i]_1} = m.$$

In the proposed construction, for the case that $\{\mathsf{KV}(\{\mathsf{pk}_j\}_{j=0}^i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) = 1\}_{j=0}^i$, under the BDH-KE knowledge assumption (in Def. 12) with checking $[1]_1 \bullet \left[\Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}^2\right]_2 \stackrel{?}{=} \left[\Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}^1\right]_1 \bullet [1]_2$ for $0 \le j \le i$, there exists an efficient nBB extractor $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}$ that can extract all sk'_j from the subvertor Sub_j. Note that here we considered the standard version of the El-Gamal cryptosystem, but we also could take its *lifted* version, which encrypts g^m instead of m.

4 TIRAMISU: Constructing BB-SE NIZK Arguments in the Updatable CRS Model

Next, we present TIRAMISU, as a construction that allows to build NIZK arguments in the updatable CRS model which can satisfy BB-SE (in Def. 6) and ZK (in Def. 2). Our main goal is to construct an alternative to the C∅C∅ framework but in the *updatable* CRS model, such that in new constructions the end-users can bypass the blind trust on the setup phase by one-time updating the shared parameters. Our starting point is the strongest construction of the C∅C∅ framework (reviewed in App. A) that gets a sound NIZK argument and lifts it to a BB-SE NIZK argument. To do so, given a language **L** with the corresponding **NP** relation $\mathbf{R_L}$, the C∅C∅ framework defines a new language **L'** such that $((\mathsf{x}, c, \mu, \mathsf{pk}_s, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho), (r, r_0, \mathsf{w}, s_0)) \in \mathbf{R_{L'}}$ iff:

$$c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_e, \mathsf{w}; r) \wedge ((\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R_L} \vee (\mu = f_{s_0}(\mathsf{pk}_s) \wedge \rho = \mathsf{Com}(s_0; r_0))),$$

where $\{f_s : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^\lambda\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda}$ is a pseudo-random function family, $(\mathsf{KG}_e, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ is a set of algorithms for a semantically secure encryption scheme, $(\mathsf{KG}_s, \mathsf{Sig}_s, \mathsf{Vfy}_s)$ is a one-time signature scheme and $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Vfy})$ is a perfectly binding commitment scheme.

As a result, given a sound NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} for $\mathcal{R}$ constructed from PPT algorithms $(\mathsf{K}_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V}, \mathsf{Sim}, \mathsf{Ext})$, the C∅C∅ framework returns a BB-SE NIZK argument Ψ'_{NIZK} with PPT algorithms $(\mathsf{K}'_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}, \mathsf{P}', \mathsf{V}', \mathsf{Sim}', \mathsf{Ext}')$, where $\mathsf{K}'_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}$ is the CRS generator for new construction and acts as follows,

– $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}' \| \vec{\mathsf{ts}}' \| \vec{\mathsf{te}}') \leftarrow \mathsf{K}'_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}})$: Given $(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}})$, sample $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}} \| \vec{\mathsf{ts}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}})$; $(\mathsf{pk}_e, \mathsf{sk}_e) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}_e(1^\lambda)$; $s_0, r_0 \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}^\lambda$; $\rho := \mathsf{Com}(s_0; r_0)$; and output $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}' \| \vec{\mathsf{ts}}' \| \vec{\mathsf{te}}') := ((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho) \| (s_0, r_0) \| \mathsf{sk}_e)$, where $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'$ is the CRS of Ψ'_{NIZK} and $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}'$ and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}'$, respectively, are the simulation trapdoor and extraction trapdoor associated with $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'$.

Considering the description of algorithm $\mathsf{K}'_{\overrightarrow{\mathsf{crs}}}$, to construct an alternative to the C∅C∅ framework but in the *updatable* CRS model, a naive solution is to construct three above primitives (with gray background) in the *updatable* CRS model, and then define a similar language but using the primitives constructed in the updatable CRS model. But, considering the fact that currently there exists efficient NIZK arguments with updatable parameters, a more efficient solution is to simplify the language $\mathbf{L}'$ and construct more efficient BB-SE NIZK arguments with updatable parameters.

Continuing the second solution, since currently there exists some ad-hoc constructions that allow two-phase updating (e.g.using the MPC protocol proposed is [BGM17] for the variation of Groth's zk-SNARK [Gro16] proposed in [BG18]) or even there exists a lifting construction to build updatable nBB-SE zk-SANRKs in the updatable CRS model (e.g.Lamassu proposed in [ARS20a,ARS20b]), therefore we simplify the original language $\mathbf{L}'$ defined in C∅C∅ and show that given a simulation sound NIZK argument with updatable parameters, we can construct updatable BB-SE NIZK arguments simpler than the mentioned naive way. To this end, we use the cryptosystem with updatable keys, which we defined and constructed in Sec. 3.

4.1   Construction

Assume $\Psi_{\mathsf{Enc}} := (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{KU}, \mathsf{KV}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be a set of algorithms for a semantically secure cryptosystem with updatable keys $(\mathsf{pk}_i, \mathsf{sk}_i)$. Similar to the C∅C∅ framework, we define a new language $\mathbf{L}'$ based on the main language $\mathbf{L}$ corresponding to the input updatable nBB-SE NIZK $\Psi_{\mathsf{NIZK}} := (\mathsf{K}_{\overrightarrow{\mathsf{crs}}}, \mathsf{CU}, \mathsf{CV}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V}, \mathsf{Sim}, \mathsf{Ext})$. The language $\mathbf{L}'$ is embedded with the encryption of witness with the *potentially updated* public key pk_i given in the CRS. Namely, given a language $\mathbf{L}$ with the corresponding **NP** relation $\mathbf{R_L}$, we define $\mathbf{L}'$ for a given random element $r \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}_p$, such that $((\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), (\mathsf{w}, r)) \in \mathbf{R_{L'}}$ iff:

$$c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, \mathsf{w}; r) \wedge (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R_L}.$$

The intuition behind $\mathbf{L}'$ is to enforce the P to encrypt its witness with a potentially updated public key pk_i, given in the CRS, and send the ciphertext c along with a *simulation sound* proof. Consequently, in proving BB-SE, the updated sk_i of the defined cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} is given to the Ext, which makes it possible to extract the witness in a *black-box* manner. By sending the encryption of witnesses, the proof will not be *witness* succinct anymore, but still, it is succinct in the size of the circuit that encodes $\mathbf{L}'$.

In security proofs, we show that due to updatable simulation soundness (in Def. 4) of the underlying NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK}, the *updatable IND-CPA* security (in Def. 16) and perfect *updatable completeness* (in Def. 14) of Ψ_{Enc} is sufficient to achieve BB-SE in the updatable NIZK argument Ψ'_{NIZK} for the language $\mathbf{L}'$. By considering new language $\mathbf{L}'$, the modified construction $\Psi'_{\mathsf{NIZK}} := (\mathsf{K}'_{\overrightarrow{\mathsf{crs}}}, \mathsf{CU}', \mathsf{CV}', \mathsf{P}', \mathsf{V}', \mathsf{Sim}', \mathsf{Ext}')$ for $\mathbf{L}'$ can be written as in Fig. 3.

CRS and trapdoor generation, $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0', \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}') \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}})$: Given $(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}) \in \mathrm{im}(\mathcal{R}(1^\lambda))$ act as follows: execute key generation of Ψ_{Enc} as $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0 := \hat{\mathsf{sk}}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$; run CRS generator of NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} and sample $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0 := \hat{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}})$, where $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0$ is the simulation trapdoor associated with $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0$; set $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0' \,\|\, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}' \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0' \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{te}}_0') := ((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \mathsf{pk}_0) \,\|\, (\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}) \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0 \,\|\, \mathsf{sk}_0)$; where $\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}'$ is the proof of well-formedness of $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0'$, $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0'$ is the simulation trapdoor associated with $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0'$, and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_0'$ is the extraction trapdoor associated with $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0'$; Return $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0', \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}')$.

CRS Updating, $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}') \leftarrow \mathsf{CU}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{i-1}')$: Given $(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}) \in \mathrm{im}(\mathcal{R}(1^\lambda))$, and $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{i-1}'$ as an input CRS, act as follows: Parse $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{i-1}' := (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{i-1}, \mathsf{pk}_{i-1})$; execute $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{CU}(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{i-1})$; run $(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KU}(\mathsf{pk}_{i-1})$; set $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i' \,\|\, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}') := ((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i) \,\|\, (\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}))$, where $\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}'$ is the proof of well-formedness of $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i'$; Return $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}')$. Note that after each update, the simulation and extraction trapdoors are updated, for instance $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i' := \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_{i-1}' + \hat{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}}_i$, and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i' := \vec{\mathsf{te}}_{i-1}' + \hat{\vec{\mathsf{te}}}_i := \mathsf{sk}_{i-1}' + \hat{\mathsf{sk}}_i$.

CRS Verify, $(\bot, 1) \leftarrow \mathsf{CV}'(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i'})$: Given $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i' := (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i)$, and $\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i'} := (\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i})$ act as follows: if $\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}) = 1$ and $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_i, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) = 1$ return 1 (i.e., the updated $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i'$ is correctly formed), otherwise $\bot$.

Prover, $(\pi', \bot) \leftarrow \mathsf{P}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$: Parse $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i' := (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i)$; Return $\bot$ if $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R_L}$; sample $r \leftarrow_{\$} \{0,1\}^\lambda$; compute encryption of witnesses $c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, \mathsf{w}; r)$. Then execute prover P of the input NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} and generate $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), (\mathsf{w}, r))$; and output $\pi' := (c, \pi)$.

Verifier, $(0, 1) \leftarrow \mathsf{V}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \mathsf{x}, \pi')$: Parse $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i' := (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i)$ and $\pi' := (c, \pi)$; call verifier of the input NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} as $\mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), \pi)$ and returns 1 if $((\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), (\mathsf{w}, r)) \in \mathbf{R_{L'}}$, otherwise it responses by 0.

Simulator, $(\pi') \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \mathsf{x}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i')$: Parse $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i' := (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i)$ and $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i' := \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i$; sample $z, r \leftarrow_{\$} \{0,1\}^\lambda$; compute $c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, z; r)$; execute simulator of the input NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} and generate $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i)$; and output $\pi' := (c, \pi)$.

Extractor, $(\mathsf{w}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Ext}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i', \mathsf{x}, \pi')$: Parse $\pi' := (c, \pi)$ and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i' := \mathsf{sk}_i$; extract $\mathsf{w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_i, c)$; output w.

Fig. 3: Tiramisu : a construction for building BB-SE NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK}' with updatable parameters.

4.2 Efficiency

In the rest, we highlight the key criteria about the efficiency of BB-SE NIZK arguments build with Tiramisu .

Considering new language $\mathbf{L}'$, in new argument Ψ_{NIZK}' the CRS generation (CRS updating and CRS verification) of the input argument Ψ_{NIZK} will be done for a larger instance, and one also needs to generate (update and verify) the key pairs of the updatable public-key cryptosystem. The corresponding circuit

of the newly defined language $\mathbf{L}'$, expands by the number of constraints needed for the encryption function. Recall that the language $\mathbf{L}'$ is an appended form of language $\mathbf{L}$ by encryption of witnesses. However, due to our simplifications in defining language $\mathbf{L}'$, the overhead in TIRAMISU will be less than the case one uses the C∅C∅ framework. Meanwhile, as we later show in Sec.5 the efficiency of final constructions severely depends on the input NIZK argument.

The prover of the new construction Ψ'_{NIZK} needs to generate a proof for new language $\mathbf{L}'$ that would require extra computations. The proofs will be the proof of input nBB-SE updatable NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} appended with the ciphertext c which leads to having proofs linear in *witness* size but still succinct in the *circuit* size. It is a known result that having proofs linear in witness size is an undeniable fact to achieve BB extraction and UC-security [Can01,GW11].

As the verifier is unchanged, so the verification of new constructions will be the same as NIZK Ψ_{NIZK} but for a larger statement.

4.3 Security Proof

Theorem 2 (Perfect Updatable Completeness). *If the input NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} guarantees perfect updatable completeness for the language $\mathbf{L}$, and the public-key cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} be perfectly updatable correct, then the NIZK argument constructed in Sec. 4 for language $\mathbf{L}'$, is perfectly updatable complete.*

Proof. By considering the construction in Fig. 3, and the fact that both Ψ_{NIZK} and Ψ_{Enc} are *perfectly updatable correct* (given in Def. 1 and Def. 14), one can conclude the statement. Namely, if $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_0, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}})$, $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_i, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}) \leftarrow \mathsf{CU}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_j\}_{j=0}^{i-1})$ and $\left(\{\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_j, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^{i} \wedge (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R}_L\right)$, then with probability 1, $\mathsf{V}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_i, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{P}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_i, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})) = 1$.

Theorem 3 (Computationally Updatable Zero-Knowledge). *If the input NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} guarantees (perfect) zero-knowledge, and the public-key cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} be updatable IND-CPA and satisfy updatable key hiding, then the NIZK argument constructed in Sec. 4 for language $\mathbf{L}'$ satisfies computational updatable ZK.*

Proof. Note that the *updatable ZK* property (in Def. 2) of the input NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} along with the *updatable* completeness of the encryption scheme Ψ_{Enc} imply that for one-time honest CRS generation, namely $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_0, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_0 := \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}})$, and arbitrary time *acceptable* [8] (possibly malicious) CRS updating $(\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_j, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^{i}, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Sub}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_0, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_s)$, there exists an nBB extraction algorithm $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}$, that given access to the source code and random coins of Sub, under a knowledge assumption, can extract $\{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=1}^{i}$, namely $\{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j \leftarrow \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_j, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}, r_s)\}_{j=1}^{i-1}$. So, given the $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0$ provided by the honest CRS generator (or an updater) along with the extracted trapdoors $\{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=1}^{i}$ from subvertor, the simulator Sim of argument Ψ'_{NIZK} can compute $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_i$ using $\{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=0}^{i}$ (i.e.

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[8] By acceptable, we mean CV' accepts them, namely $\{\mathsf{CV}'(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_j, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) = 1\}_{j=0}^{i}$.

$\vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_i = \sum_{j=0}^{i} \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j$) and simulate the proofs as described in Fig. 3, where $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_i$ is the simulation trapdoor associated with final CRS $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_i$.

In the rest, we write a series of hybrid experiments starting from an experiment that encrypts a random value and uses the Sim, and finally getting to an experiment that uses the real prover. While moving on between the experiments, we show that they all are indistinguishable two-by-two. Consider the following experiments,

$\underline{\mathsf{EXP}^{zk}_1(\text{simulator})}$:

- *Setup:* $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda),\ (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0) \leftarrow$ $\mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}}),\quad r_{\mathsf{Sub}} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), (\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}^i_{j=1}, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \leftarrow$ $\mathsf{Sub}(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}}), (\{(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j})\}^i_{j=1} \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}^i_{j=1}) \leftarrow$ $(\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}}),\quad \text{Return}\quad (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_i \,\|\, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_i) :=$ $((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i) \,\|\, (\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}^i_{j=0});$
- *Define function* $\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$: Abort **if** $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R_L}$; Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) \neq 1$; Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) \neq 1$; Sample $z, r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda;\ c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, z; r);\ \pi \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), \vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_i);$
- $b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_i, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i});$
  return $b;$ **fi**

$\underline{\mathsf{EXP}^{zk}_2(\text{simulator with witness})}$:

- *Setup:* $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda),\ (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0) \leftarrow$ $\mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}}),\quad r_{\mathsf{Sub}} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), (\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}^i_{j=1}, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \leftarrow$ $\mathsf{Sub}(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}}), (\{(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j})\}^i_{j=1} \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}^i_{j=1}) \leftarrow$ $(\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}}),\quad \text{Return}\quad (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_i \,\|\, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_i) :=$ $((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i) \,\|\, (\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}^i_{j=0});$
- *Define function* $\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$: Abort **if** $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R_L}$; Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) \neq 1$; Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) \neq 1$; Sample $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda;\ \boxed{c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, \mathsf{w}; r)};\ \pi \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), \vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_i);$
- $b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_i, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i});$
  return $b;$ **fi**

Lemma 1. *If the cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} deployed in the above games satisfies updatable IND-CPA (in Def. 16) and updatable key hiding (in Def. 15), then we have $\Pr[\mathsf{EXP}^{zk}_2] \approx_c \Pr[\mathsf{EXP}^{zk}_1]$.*

Proof. The updatable key hiding properties of the cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} guarantees that $\mathsf{pk}_0 \approx_\lambda \mathsf{pk}_i$, and the *updatable* IND-CPA of Ψ_{Enc} implies that no PT algorithm can distinguish an oracle that encrypts $z \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$ and uses the simulator Sim from the case that it encrypts witness w and uses Sim. $\square$

$\underline{\mathsf{EXP}^{zk}_3(\text{prover})}$:

- *Setup:* $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$, $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0) \leftarrow$
  $\mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}})$, $r_{\mathsf{Sub}} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub})$, $(\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=1}^i, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) \leftarrow$
  $\mathsf{Sub}(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}})$, $(\{(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j})\}_{j=1}^i \| \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow$
  $(\mathsf{Sub} \| \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}})$, Return $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i' \| \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}' \| \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i') :=$
  $((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i) \| (\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \| \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=0}^i)$;
- *Define function* $\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$: Abort **if** $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}}$; Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) \neq 1$; Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) \neq 1$; Sample
  $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$; $c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, \mathsf{w}; r)$; $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), (\mathsf{w}, r))$;
- $b \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}')$;
  return b; **fi**

Lemma 2. *If the NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} used in above experiments satisfies updatable ZK, the for two experiments EXP_3^{zk} and EXP_2^{zk} we have $\Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_3^{zk}] \approx_c \Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_2^{zk}]$.*

Proof. The *updatable* ZK of the NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} implies that the real proof (generated by prover) in experiment EXP_3^{zk} is indistinguishable from the simulated proof (generated by simulator) in experiment EXP_2^{zk}. $\square$

This completes proof of the theorem. More precisely, the Lemma 1 and 2 show that $\Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_1^{zk}] \approx \Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_2^{zk}]$ and $\Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_2^{zk}] \approx \Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_3^{zk}]$, respectively. Since the indistinguishability of the defined experiments is transitive then we can conclude,

$$\Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_1^{zk}] \approx_c \Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_3^{zk}].$$

$\square$

Theorem 4 (Updatable Black-Box Simulation Extractability). *If the input NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} guarantees updatable correctness, updatable simulation soundness and updatable zero-knowledge, and the public-key cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} satisfies updatable perfect correctness, updatable key hiding, and updatable IND-CPA, then the NIZK argument constructed in Sec. 4 for language $\mathbf{L}'$ satisfies updatable BB simulation extractability.*

Proof. Recall that the notion of updatable BB-SE guarantees that for a one time honest CRS generation/updating, even if $\mathcal{A}$ has seen an arbitrary number of simulated proofs, he cannot come up with a *fresh* valid proof unless he knows the witness. The concept of knowing is formalized by showing that there exists a BB extraction algorithm Ext that given extraction trapdoor generated in the setup phase, it can extract the witness from the proof. In this setting, the decryption function of cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} plays the role of the mentioned Ext, such that given the extraction trapdoor $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i'$ (secret key) associated with the final public key pk_i, can decrypt a valid c and obtain w. The key idea behind our construction is that in order to provide $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i'$ to the Ext, and $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i'$ to the Sim, we use the extraction algorithm $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}$ constructed in the setup phase of Ψ_{Enc} and Ψ_{NIZK} to extract the simulation and extraction trapdoors from the *untrusted* key

generator or key updaters (maximum i parties) and then along with one honestly sampled simulation and extraction trapdoors (without loss of generality, sk_0 and $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0$) calculate $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i' := \{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j=0}^i$, (e.g. $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i' = \sum_{j=0}^i \mathsf{sk}_j$), and $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i' := \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=0}^i$, (e.g. $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i' = \sum_{j=0}^i \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j$), and finally provide them to the Ext and Sim. Note that, the updatable correctness of the cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} and the updatable ZK of the NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} guarantee the existence of such $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}$ for both primitives that allow to extract the extraction trapdoors $\{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j=1}^i$ and the simulation trapdoors $\{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=1}^i$ from i malicious CRS updaters. Next, we go through a sequence of hybrid experiences which two-by-two are indistinguishable. Starting from the actual experiment of BB-SE, consider the following experiments,

$\underline{\mathsf{EXP}_1^{BB-SE}}$(simulator):

- *Setup:* $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$, $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}})$, $r_{\mathsf{Sub}} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub})$, $(\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=1}^i \,\|\, \{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow (\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}})$, $(\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^i \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow (\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}})$, Return $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i' \,\|\, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i' \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i') := ((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i) \,\|\, (\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=0}^i \,\|\, \{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j=0}^i)$; where $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i'$ and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i'$ are the simulation and extraction trapdoors associate with the last CRS, $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i'$.
- *Define function* $\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x})$: Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) \neq 1$; Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) \neq 1$; Sample $r, z \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$; $c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, z; r)$; $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i')$; Output $\pi' := (c, \pi)$
- $(\mathsf{x}, \pi') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x})}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i')$;
- Parse $\pi' := (c, \pi)$; extract witness $\mathsf{w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(c, \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i')$;
- **if** $((\mathsf{x}, \pi') \notin Q) \wedge (\mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', (\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), \pi) = 1) \wedge ((\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}})$: **return** 1. where Q shows the set of statement-proof pairs generated by $\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x})$. **fi**

$\underline{\mathsf{EXP}_2^{BB-SE}}$(simulator while encrypting w):

- *Setup:* $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$, $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}})$, $r_{\mathsf{Sub}} \leftarrow_\$ \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub})$, $(\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=1}^i \,\|\, \{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow (\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}})$, $(\{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^i \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow (\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}})$, Return $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i' \,\|\, \Pi'_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i' \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i') := ((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i) \,\|\, (\Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i}, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \,\|\, \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=0}^i \,\|\, \{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j=0}^i)$; where $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i'$ and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}_i'$ are the simulation and extraction trapdoors associate with the last CRS, $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i'$.
- *Define function* $\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x})$: Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{CV}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) \neq 1$; Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) \neq 1$; Sample $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$; $c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, \mathsf{w}; r)$; $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{Sim}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_i')$; Output $\pi' := (c, \pi)$
- $(\mathsf{x}, \pi') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\mathsf{x})}(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i', \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i')$;
- Parse $\pi' := (c, \pi)$; extract witness $\mathsf{w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(c, \vec{\mathsf{te}}_i')$;

- **if** $((x, \pi') \notin Q) \wedge (V(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}}, \tilde{\mathsf{crs}}'_i, (x, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), \pi) = 1) \wedge ((x, w) \notin \mathbf{R_L})$:
  return 1.
  where Q shows the set of statement-proof pairs generated by $\mathsf{O}(x)$. **fi**

Lemma 3. *If the cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} used in above experiments be updatable IND-CPA and updatable key hiding, then for two experiments EXP_2^{BB-SE} and EXP_1^{BB-SE}, we have $\Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_2^{BB-SE}] \leq \Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_1^{BB-SE}] + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. Due to updatable key hiding of Ψ_{Enc}, $\mathsf{pk}_0 \approx_\lambda \mathsf{pk}_i$. The updatable IND-CPA property of Ψ_{Enc} implies that after a one-time honest key generation/updating, no polynomial-time algorithm (adversary) can distinguish an oracle that encrypts randomly chosen value z with the public key pk_i and uses the simulator Sim, from the case that it encrypts the true witness w with the pk_i and again uses the simulator Sim, even if it has updated the public-key pk_i arbitrary times, i.e. $(i-1)$ times. $\square$

$\underline{\mathsf{EXP}_3^{BB-SE}}$(prover):

- *Setup:* $(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, \mathsf{sk}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(1^\lambda)$, $(\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}_0) \leftarrow \mathsf{K}_{\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}})$, $r_{\mathsf{Sub}} \leftarrow_{\$} \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub})$, $(\{\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}\}_{j=1}^i \| \{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow$ $(\mathsf{Sub} \| \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\mathsf{pk}_0, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}})$, $(\{\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_j, \Pi_{\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_j}\}_{j=1}^i \| \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=1}^i) \leftarrow$ $(\mathsf{Sub} \| \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_0, \Pi_{\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_0}, r_{\mathsf{Sub}})$, Return $(\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}'_i \| \Pi'_{\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_i} \| \vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_i \| \vec{\mathsf{te}}'_i) :=$ $((\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i) \| (\Pi_{\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_i}, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_i}) \| \{\vec{\mathsf{ts}}_j\}_{j=0}^i \| \{\mathsf{sk}_j\}_{j=0}^i)$; where $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}'_i$ and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}'_i$ are the simulation and extraction trapdoors associate with the last CRS, $\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}'_i$.
- *Define function* $\mathsf{O}(x)$: Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{CV}(\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \Pi_{\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_j}) \neq 1$; Abort **if** for any $j \in [0..i]$, $\mathsf{KV}(\mathsf{pk}_j, \Pi_{\mathsf{pk}_j}) \neq 1$; Sample $r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$; $c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, w; r)$; $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}}, \tilde{\mathsf{crs}}_i, (x, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), (w, r))$; Output $\pi' := (c, \pi)$
- $(x, \pi') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(x)}(\tilde{\mathsf{crs}}'_i, \vec{\mathsf{te}}'_i)$;
- Parse $\pi' := (c, \pi)$; extract witness $w \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(c, \vec{\mathsf{te}}'_i)$;
- **if** $((x, \pi') \notin Q) \wedge (V(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}}, \tilde{\mathsf{crs}}'_i, (x, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), \pi) = 1) \wedge ((x, w) \notin \mathbf{R_L})$:
  return 1.
  where Q shows the set of statement-proof pairs generated by $\mathsf{O}(x)$. **fi**

Lemma 4. *If the NIZK argument is updatable simulation sound (in Def.4), and the encryption scheme Ψ_{Enc} is perfect updatable correct (in Def.14) then for two experiments EXP_3^{BB-SE} and EXP_2^{BB-SE} we have $\Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_3^{BB-SE}] \leq \Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_2^{BB-SE}] + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$.*

Proof. We note that if $(x, \pi') \notin Q$, then the tuple (x, c, π) (from (x, π')) is a valid pair in the relation $\mathbf{R_{L'}}$. The updatable simulation soundness property of the NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} impels the non-malleability of proofs, consequently we know that $(x, \pi') \notin Q$.

On the other hand, perfect updatable correctness of the cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} implies that the decrypted witness w is unique for all valid ciphertexts, so due to the soundness of the NIZK argument Ψ_{Enc} the probability that some witness is valid for $\mathbf{L'}$ and $(x, w) \notin \mathbf{R_L}$ is $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$, namely $\Pr[\mathsf{EXP}_3^{BB-SE}] \leq 2^{-\lambda}$. $\square$

Note that, in all the above experiments, the extractor is black-box and extracts the witness from an acceptable proof, without getting access to the source code of the adversary. This completes the main proof.   □

Note that to bypass the impossibility of achieving Sub-ZK and BB extractability in NIZK arguments, observed by Bellare et al. [BFS16], one-time honest key generation/updating on pk_i is a crucial requirement in the above theorem. Roughly speaking, if the prover participates in the generating/updating pk_i once, so due to the updatable key hiding and updatable IND-CPA of the cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc}, even if adversary updates the keys arbitrary times still he/she cannot learn any information about the final secret key $\vec{\mathsf{te}}'_i := \sum_{j=0}^{i} \mathsf{sk}_j$ and consequently from the witness w used in generating $\pi' := (c, \pi)$.

Building Updatable Black-Box Knowledge Sound NIZK Arguments with TIRAMISU. The primary goal of TIRAMISU is constructing BB-SE NIZK arguments in the updatable CRS model. However, due to some efficiency reasons, in practice one might need to build an Updatable Black-Box Knowledge Sound (U-BB-KS) NIZK argument. In such cases, starting from either an updatable sound NIZK or an U-nBB-KS NIZK (e.g. Groth et al.'s updatable zk-SNARK [GKM+18]), the same language $\mathbf{L}'$ defined in TIRAMISU along with our constructed updatable public-key cryptosystem allows one to build an U-BB-KS NIZK argument. Namely, given an updatable cryptosystem $\Psi_{\mathsf{Enc}} := (\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{KU}, \mathsf{KV}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ with updatable keys $(\mathsf{pk}_i, \mathsf{sk}_i)$, and an *updatable sound* NIZK $\Psi_{\mathsf{NIZK}} := (\mathsf{K}_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}, \mathsf{CU}, \mathsf{CV}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V}, \mathsf{Sim})$ for language $\mathbf{L}$ with the corresponding **NP** relation $\mathbf{R_L}$, we define the language $\mathbf{L}'$ for a given random element $r \leftarrow_\$ \mathbb{F}_p$, such that $((\mathsf{x}, c, \mathsf{pk}_i), (\mathsf{w}, r)) \in \mathbf{R_{L'}}$ iff:

$$(c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_i, \mathsf{w}; r)) \wedge ((\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R_L}).$$

Corollary 1. *If the input NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} for $\mathbf{R_L}$ guarantees updatable correctness, updatable soundness and updatable zero-knowledge, and the public-key cryptosystem Ψ_{Enc} satisfies updatable perfect correctness, updatable key hiding, and updatable IND-CPA, then the NIZK argument for language $\mathbf{L}'$ satisfies updatable correctness, updatable knowledge soundness and updatable zero-knowledge.*

The proof can be done similar to the proof of Theorem 4.

5 Instantiations and Application in UC-Protocols

To build an updatable BB-SE NIZK argument with TIRAMISU (described in Fig. 3), one requires two primitives. Namely, (1) a key updatable public-key cryptosystem that satisfies *perfect updatable correctness*, *updatable key hiding*, and *updatable IND-CPA*, and (2) a NIZK argument with updatable CRS that guarantees *updatable simulation soundness* or *nBB simulation extractability*. Next, we instantiate Ψ_{Enc} and Ψ_{NIZK}, and obtain two U-BB-SE NIZK arguments. To

Fig. 4: Instantiating the NIZK argument Ψ_{NIZK} in TIRAMISU .

instantiate Ψ_{Enc}, we use the proposed variation of the El-Gamal cryptosystem in Sec. 3. Whereas to instantiate the Ψ_{NIZK}, one can either use an ad-hoc construction (e.g. [BG18] when its CRS is generated with [BGM17], which will have a two-phase updating), or a construction lifted with LAMASSU [ARS20a] (e.g. using [GKM+18]). A graphical representation of two approaches that we instantiate the input NIZK argument of TIRAMISU is shown in Fig. 4. In a nutshell, considering the above instantiations TIRAMISU results in two BB-SE NIZK arguments with updatable parameters.

Table 2: An efficiency comparison of BB-SE NIZK arguments built with the C∅C∅ and TIRAMISU . n': Number of constraints (multiplication gates) used to encode language $\mathbf{L}'$, $|\mathsf{pk}|$: Size of the public key of Ψ_{Enc}, λ: Security parameter, E_i: Exponentiation in $\mathbb{G}_i$, P : Paring operation, l': the size of statement in new language $\mathbf{L}'$, w : the witness for new relation $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{L}'}$.

	C∅C∅ with [Gro16]	TIRAMISU (with [GKM+18,ARS20a])	TIRAMISU (with [BGM17,BG18])
Trusted Setup?	Yes	No	No
CRS Size	$\approx 3n'\mathbb{G}_1 + n'\mathbb{G}_2$	$\approx 30n'^2\mathbb{G}_1 + 9n'^2\mathbb{G}_2$	$\approx 3n'\mathbb{G}_1 + n'\mathbb{G}_2$
CRS Verifier	—	$\approx 78n'^2 P$	$\approx 14n' P$ (batchable)
CRS Updater	—	$\approx 30n'^2 E_1 + 9n'^2 E_2$	$\approx 6n' E_1 + n' E_2$
Prover	$\approx 4n' E_1 + n' E_2$	$\approx 4n' E_1 + n' E_2$	$\approx 4n' E_1 + n' E_2$
Proof Size	$o(\mathsf{w}) + 3\mathbb{G}_1 + 2\mathbb{G}_2 + \lambda$	$o(\mathsf{w}) + 4\mathbb{G}_1 + 3\mathbb{G}_2$	$o(\mathsf{w}) + 3\mathbb{G}_1 + 2\mathbb{G}_2$
Verifier	$4P + l' E_1$	$6P + l' E_1$	$5P + l' E_1$

In BB-SE NIZK arguments built with TIRAMISU , the parties have to update the shared parameters individually once and check the validity of the previous updates. This is basically the computational cost that the end-users need to pay to bypass the trust in the standard CRS model. As an important practical optimization, it can be shown that the prover can only update the CRS $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}'_i := (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}_i, \mathsf{pk}_i)$ partially, namely only pk_i. Tab. 2 summarizes the efficiency of two BB-SE NIZK arguments built with TIRAMISU and compares them with a construction lifted by the C∅C∅ framework in the standard CRS model. We instantiate C∅C∅ with the state-of-the-art zk-SNARK proposed by Groth [Gro16] and instantiate TIRAMISU with 1) the lifted version of [GKM+18] with LAMASSU [ARS20a], and 2) the variation of Grtoh's zk-SNARK proposed

in [BG18] in the case that its CRS is generated with the MPC protocol proposed in [BGM17], consequently allows two-phase updating.

Both C∅C∅ and Tiramisu constructions result a linear proof in the witness size, but they keep the asymptomatic efficiency of other algorithms in the input NIZK. Consequently, instantiating Tiramisu with a more efficient nBB-SE NIZK argument will result in a more efficient BB-SE NIZK argument. Therefore, as also is shown in Tab. 2, suitable ad-hoc constructions result in more efficient U-BB-SE NIZK arguments. We found constructing more efficient nBB-SE zk-SNARKs as an interesting future research direction. Following, the impossibility result of Gentry and Wichs [GW11], it is undeniable that achieving BB extraction will result in non-succinct proof. Consequently, in all the schemes in Table 2, the proof size is dominated with the size of c which is a ciphertext of IND-CPA cryptosystem and is $o(\mathsf{w})$.

Using Updatable BB-SE NIZK Arguments in UC-Protocols. Following the known result that BB-SE NIZK arguments can realize the ideal NIZK-functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{NIZK}}$ [GOS06,Gro06], the UC-protocols like Hawk [KMS+16], Gyges [JKS16], and Ouroboros Crypsinous [KKKZ19], directly use the BB-SE NIZK arguments constructed by the C∅C∅ framework. Consequently, under *a trusted setup* phase, the deployed BB-SE NIZK argument securely composes with other primitives in the main protocol. But, in BB-SE NIZK arguments that are built with Tiramisu , the parties do not need to trust a third party, instead, they need to update the CRS elements and give a proof $\varPi_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}$ for the correctness of the initial key generation or updating. But, since the proof $\varPi_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}$ relies on a knowledge assumption [Dam91], therefore in the lifted NIZK arguments the setup phase (key generation/updating) can not achieve UC, as the nBB extraction is not allowed in the UC framework. Albeit once the CRS elements are generated and updated by both prover and verifier, rest of the protocol including proof generation and proof verification achieves UC-security. Technically speaking, in comparison with the realization of NIZK-functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{NIZK}}$ and CRS-functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}$ described in [Gro06], U-BB-SE NIZK arguments constructed with Tiramisu only can realize NIZK-functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{NIZK}}$, and not $\mathcal{F}_{\overline{\mathsf{crs}}}$. More details about such realizations will appear in the full version of the paper. Due to construction of current subversion/updatable NIZK arguments that rely on a knowledge assumption in the setup phase, this looks an avoidable fact that one has to take either 1) a UC-secure setup phase *while trusting* a third party, or 2) a non-UC secure setup phase but *without* a need for a trusted third party. In practice, usually, the public parameters are generated once and used for a long-time, therefore having a non-UC secure setup phase might be a more desired option than having a UC-secure setup but with the need for a trusted party for a *long* time.

6   Conclusion

BB-SE (in Def. 22) is shown [Gro06] to be sufficient to realize NIZK-functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{NIZK}}$ in the UC framework [Can01]. The majority of the available NIZK arguments, including the most practical ones, zk-SNARKs, cannot achieve BB-SE. Due to this fact, typically their security is amplified to achieve BB-SE before using in UC-protocols [KMS⁺16,JKS16,KKKZ19]. By now, all such amplifications are done with the only available lifting framework, called C∅C∅ [KZM⁺15] which is constructed in the *standard* CRS model and requires a trusted setup phase.

As an alternative to the C∅C∅, we constructed Tiramisu that allows building BB-SE NIZK arguments but in the *updatable* CRS model. BB-SE NIZK arguments built with Tiramisu allow the parties (both prover and verifier) to bypass the trust on a third party by one-time participation in the CRS generation/updating. We instantiated Tiramisu and presented two NIZK arguments that achieve U-BB-SE without the need for a trusted third party. Meanwhile, as a building block for Tiramisu, we defined the syntax of public-key cryptosystems with updatable keys and presented a variation of the El-Gamal cryptosystem [ElG84] as an efficient construction.

In practice, by deploying the constructed U-BB-SE NIZK arguments in UC-protocols, such as Hawk [KMS⁺16], Gyges [JKS16], Ouroboros Crypsinous [KKKZ19], the end-users can bypass the trust on the setup phase and achieve UC security in the proof generation and proof verification. The extra cost that end-users need to pay is a one-time updating the parameters plus checking the others' updates on parameters. Tiramisu comes with efficient algorithms CU and CV for parameter updating and verification, respectively. Specifically about UC-secure privacy-preserving smart contracts systems like Hawk [KMS⁺16], by deploying an U-BB-SE NIZK argument in a two-party smart contract, both parties can avoid trusting a third party if both individually update the public parameters using CU and also check the other party's update with CV.

We believe our proposed technique to build U-BB-SE NIZK arguments along with the proposed updatable public-key cryptosystem can be of independent interest, particularly in constructing other cryptographic protocols in the updatable CRS model.

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A   C∅C∅: a Framework for Constructing BB-SE NIZK Arguments in the CRS Model

In 2015, Kosba et al. [KZM+15] presented a framework, called C∅C∅, with several constructions which allows to build BB-SE NIZK arguments. Their most

powerful construction gets a sound NIZK and lifts to a NIZK argument that satisfies BB-SE (defined in Def. 22), which is shown to be a sufficient requirement for NIZK arguments to achieve UC-security [Gro06]. Here we review their most powerful construction.

Construction. Given a sound NIZK, to achieve a UC-secure NIZK, the C∅C∅ framework applies several changes in all setup, proof generation and verification procedures of the input NIZK. Initially, the framework defines a new language $\mathbf{L}'$ based on the language $\mathbf{L}$ in underlying NIZK and some new primitives that are needed for the transformation. Let $(\mathsf{KG}_e, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ be a set of algorithms for a semantically secure encryption scheme, $(\mathsf{KG}_s, \mathsf{Sig}_s, \mathsf{Vfy}_s)$ be a one-time signature scheme and $(\mathsf{Com}, \mathsf{Vfy})$ be a perfectly binding commitment scheme. Given a language $\mathbf{L}$ with the corresponding $\mathbf{NP}$ relation $\mathbf{R_L}$, define a new language $\mathbf{L}'$ such that $((\mathsf{x}, c, \mu, \mathsf{pk}_s, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho), (r, r_0, \mathsf{w}, s_0)) \in \mathbf{R_{L'}}$ iff:

$$(c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_e, \mathsf{w}; r)) \wedge ((\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R_L} \vee (\mu = f_{s_0}(\mathsf{pk}_s) \wedge \rho = \mathsf{Com}(s_0; r_0))),$$

where $\{f_s : \{0,1\}^* \to \{0,1\}^\lambda\}_{s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda}$ is a pseudo-random function family. Now, a sound NIZK argument system Ψ_{NIZK} for $\mathcal{R}$ constructed from PPT algorithms $(\mathsf{KG}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V}, \mathsf{Sim}, \mathsf{Ext})$ can be lifted to a BB-SE NIZK Ψ'_{NIZK} with PPT algorithms $(\mathsf{KG}', \mathsf{P}', \mathsf{V}', \mathsf{Sim}', \mathsf{Ext}')$ as follows.

CRS and trapdoor generation $\mathsf{KG}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}})$: Sample $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}})$; $(\mathsf{pk}_e, \mathsf{sk}_e) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}_e(1^\lambda)$; $s_0, r_0 \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}^\lambda$; $\rho := \mathsf{Com}(s_0; r_0)$; and output $(\vec{\mathsf{crs}}' \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}' \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{te}}') := ((\vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho) \,\|\, (s_0, r_0) \,\|\, \mathsf{sk}_e)$.

Prover $\mathsf{P}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$: Parse $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}' := (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho)$; Abort if $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R_L}$; $(\mathsf{pk}_s, \mathsf{sk}_s) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}_s(1^\lambda)$; sample $z_0, z_1, z_2, r_1 \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}^\lambda$; compute $c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_e, \mathsf{w}; r_1)$; generate $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}, (\mathsf{x}, c, z_0, \mathsf{pk}_s, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho), (r_1, z_1, \mathsf{w}, z_2))$; sign $\sigma \leftarrow \mathsf{Sig}_s(\mathsf{sk}_s, (\mathsf{x}, c, z_0, \pi))$; and output $\pi' := (c, z_0, \pi, \mathsf{pk}_s, \sigma)$.

Verifier $\mathsf{V}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}', \mathsf{x}, \pi')$: Parse $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}' := (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho)$ and $\pi' := (c, \mu, \pi, \mathsf{pk}_s, \sigma)$; Abort if $\mathsf{Vfy}_s(\mathsf{pk}_s, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mu, \pi), \sigma) = 0$; call $\mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_{L'}}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mu, \mathsf{pk}_s, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho), \pi)$ and abort if it outputs 0.

Simulator $\mathsf{Sim}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}', \vec{\mathsf{ts}}', \mathsf{x})$: Parse $\vec{\mathsf{crs}}' := (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho)$ and $\vec{\mathsf{ts}}' := (s_0, r_0)$; $(\mathsf{pk}_s, \mathsf{sk}_s) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}_s(1^\lambda)$; set $\mu = f_{s_0}(\mathsf{pk}_s)$; sample $z_3, r_1 \leftarrow_\$ \{0,1\}^\lambda$; compute $c = \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pk}_e, z_3; r_1)$; generate $\pi \leftarrow \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R_{L'}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mu, \mathsf{pk}_s, \mathsf{pk}_e, \rho), (r_1, r_0, z_3, s_0))$; sign $\sigma \leftarrow \mathsf{Sig}_s(\mathsf{sk}_s, (\mathsf{x}, c, \mu, \pi))$; and output $\pi' := (c, \mu, \pi, \mathsf{pk}_s, \sigma)$.

Extractor $\mathsf{Ext}'(\mathbf{R_L}, \xi_{\mathbf{R_L}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}', \vec{\mathsf{te}}', \mathsf{x}, \pi')$: Parse $\pi' := (c, \mu, \pi, \mathsf{pk}_s, \sigma)$, $\vec{\mathsf{te}}' := \mathsf{sk}_e$; extract $\mathsf{w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{sk}_e, c)$; output w.

B Requirements of NIZKs in the CRS Model

Next, we provide security requirement of standard and subversion-resistant NIZK arguments in the CRS model [Gro16,BFS16,ABLZ17,GM17,KZM+15]. A *zk-SNARK* Ψ_{NIZK} in the CRS model for $\mathcal{R}$ consists of tuple of PPT algorithms

$(\mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V}, \mathsf{Sim}, \mathsf{Ext})$, that is expected to satisfy Completeness, ZK and Knowledge soundness defined as bellow,

Definition 17 (Perfect Completeness [Gro16]). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is perfectly complete for $\mathcal{R}$, if for all λ, all $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \in \mathrm{im}(\mathcal{R}(1^\lambda))$, and $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \in \mathbf{R}$,*

$$\Pr\left[\vec{\mathsf{crs}} \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) : \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_\mathsf{V}, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_\mathsf{P}, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})) = 1\right] = 1 \ .$$

Definition 18 (Statistically Zero-Knowledge [Gro16]). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is statistically ZK for $\mathcal{R}$, if for all λ, all $(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \in \mathrm{im}(\mathcal{R}(1^\lambda))$, and for all NUPPT $\mathcal{A}$, $\varepsilon_0^{unb} \approx_\lambda \varepsilon_1^{unb}$, where*

$$\varepsilon_b = \Pr[(\vec{\mathsf{crs}} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) : \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}_b(\cdot, \cdot)}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}) = 1] \ .$$

Here, the oracle $\mathsf{O}_0(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$ returns $\bot$ (reject) if $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R}$, and otherwise it returns $\mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_\mathsf{P}, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$. Similarly, $\mathsf{O}_1(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$ returns $\bot$ (reject) if $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R}$, and otherwise returns $\mathsf{Sim}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \mathsf{x}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}})$. Ψ_{NIZK} is perfect ZK for $\mathcal{R}$ if one requires that $\varepsilon_0 = \varepsilon_1$.

Intuitively, a non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is zero-knowledge if it does not leak extra information besides the truth of the statement.

Definition 19 (Computational Knowledge-Soundness [Gro16]). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is computationally (adaptively) knowledge-sound for $\mathcal{R}$, if for every NUPPT $\mathcal{A}$, there exists a NUPPT extractor $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}$, s.t. for all λ,*

$$\Pr\left[\begin{matrix}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^\lambda), (\vec{\mathsf{crs}} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), \\ r \leftarrow_r \mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A}), ((\mathsf{x}, \pi) \,\|\, \mathsf{w}) \leftarrow (\mathcal{A} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}})(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}; r) : \\ (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R} \wedge \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_\mathsf{V}, \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1\end{matrix}\right] \approx_\lambda 0 \ .$$

Here, $\xi_{\mathbf{R}}$ can be seen as a common auxiliary input to $\mathcal{A}$ and $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}$ that is generated by using a benign [BCPR14] relation generator; A knowledge-sound argument system is called an *argument of knowledge*.

Besides the mentioned properties defined in Def. 17-19, a zk-SNARK has *succinctness* property, meaning that the proof size is $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ and the verifier's computation is $\mathsf{poly}(\lambda)$ and the size of the instance.

Next, we recall some stronger notions of NIZK arguments that usually are needed in cases that one requires to achieve stronger security guarantees in the NIZK argument.

Definition 20 (Simulation Soundness [Gro06]). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is simulation sound for $\mathcal{R}$ if for all NUPPT $\mathcal{A}$, and all λ,*

$$\Pr\left[\begin{matrix}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^\lambda), (\vec{\mathsf{crs}} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}) : \\ (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \notin Q \wedge \mathsf{x} \notin \mathbf{L} \wedge \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_\mathsf{V}, \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1\end{matrix}\right] \approx_\lambda 0 \ .$$

Here, Q is the set of simulated statement-proof pairs generated by adversary's queries to O, that returns simulated proofs.

Definition 21 (Non-Black-Box Simulation Extractability [GM17]). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is* non-black-box simulation-extractable for $\mathcal{R}$, *if for any NUPPT $\mathcal{A}$, there exists a NUPPT extractor $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}}$ s.t. for all λ,*

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} (\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^{\lambda}), (\vec{\mathsf{crs}} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), \\ r \leftarrow_r \mathsf{RND}(\mathcal{A}), ((\mathsf{x}, \pi) \,\|\, \mathsf{w}) \leftarrow (\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathcal{A}})(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}; r) : \\ (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \notin Q \wedge (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R} \wedge \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{\mathsf{V}}, \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1 \end{bmatrix} \approx_{\lambda} 0 \ .$$

Here, Q is the set of simulated statement-proof pairs generated by adversary's queries to O that returns simulated proofs.

It is worth to mention that *non-black-box simulation extractability* implies *knowledge soundness* (given in Def. 19), as the earlier is a strong notion of the later which additionally the adversary is allowed to send query to the proof simulation oracle. Similarly, one can observe that *nBB simulation extractability* implies *simulation soundness* (given in Def. 20) [Gro06].

Definition 22 (Black-Box Simulation Extractability [KZM$^+$15]). *A non-interactive argument Ψ_{NIZK} is* black-box simulation-extractable for $\mathcal{R}$ *if there exists a black-box extractor Ext that for all NUPPT $\mathcal{A}$, and all λ,*

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} (\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}(1^{\lambda}), (\vec{\mathsf{crs}} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{te}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KG}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}), \\ (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}(\cdot)}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}), \mathsf{w} \leftarrow \mathsf{Ext}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \vec{\mathsf{te}}, \mathsf{x}, \pi) : \\ (\mathsf{x}, \pi) \notin Q \wedge (\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R} \wedge \mathsf{V}(\mathbf{R}, \xi_{\mathbf{R}}, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{\mathsf{V}}, \mathsf{x}, \pi) = 1 \end{bmatrix} \approx_{\lambda} 0 \ .$$

Similarly, Q is the set of simulated statement-proof pairs, and $\vec{\mathsf{te}}$ is the extraction trapdoor. A keynote about Def. 22 is that the extraction procedure is BB and unlike the nBB case, the extractor Ext works for all adversaries.

A subversion-resistant *zk-SNARK* Ψ_{NIZK} in the CRS model for $\mathcal{R}$ consists of tuple of PPT algorithms $(\mathsf{K}_{\vec{\mathsf{crs}}}, \mathsf{CV}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V}, \mathsf{Sim}, \mathsf{Ext})$, that beyond Completeness, ZK and Knowledge soundness it is expected to achieve Subversion ZK which is defined as follows,

Definition 23 (Statistically Subversion Zero-Knowledge [ABLZ17]). *A non-interactive argument Ψ is* statistically subversion ZK for $\mathcal{R}$, *if for any NUPPT subvertor Sub there exists a NUPPT extractor $\mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}}$, such that for all λ, all $(\mathbf{R}, \xi) \in \mathrm{im}(\mathcal{R}(1^{\lambda}))$, and for all NUPPT $\mathcal{A}$, $\varepsilon_0 \approx_{\lambda} \varepsilon_1$, where*

$$\Pr \begin{bmatrix} r \leftarrow_r \mathsf{RND}(\mathsf{Sub}), (\vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}} \,\|\, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}) \leftarrow (\mathsf{Sub} \,\|\, \mathsf{Ext}_{\mathsf{Sub}})(\mathbf{R}, \xi; r) : \\ \mathsf{CV}(\mathbf{R}, \xi, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}) = 1 \wedge \mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{O}_b(\cdot, \cdot)}(\mathbf{R}, \xi, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}, \xi_{\mathsf{Sub}}) = 1 \end{bmatrix} \ .$$

Here, ξ_{Sub} is auxiliary information generated by subvertor Sub, and the oracle $\mathsf{O}_0(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$ returns $\perp$ (reject) if $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R}$, and otherwise it returns $\mathsf{P}(\mathbf{R}, \xi, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}_{\mathsf{P}}, \mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$. Similarly, $\mathsf{O}_1(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w})$ returns $\perp$ (reject) if $(\mathsf{x}, \mathsf{w}) \notin \mathbf{R}$, and otherwise it returns $\mathsf{Sim}(\mathbf{R}, \xi, \vec{\mathsf{crs}}, \vec{\mathsf{ts}}, \mathsf{x})$. Ψ is perfectly subversion ZK for $\mathcal{R}$ if one requires that $\varepsilon_0 = \varepsilon_1$.