Semi-Adaptively Secure Offline Witness Encryption from Puncturable Witness PRF

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Abstract. In this work, we introduce the notion of *puncturable witness pseudorandom function* (pWPRF) which is a stronger variant of WPRF proposed by Zhandry, TCC 2016. The punctured technique is similar to what we have seen for puncturable PRFs and is capable of extending the applications of WPRF. Specifically, we construct a *semi-adaptively* secure *offline witness encryption* (OWE) scheme using a pWPRF, an indistinguishability obfuscation ($i\mathcal{O}$) and a symmetric-key encryption (SKE), which enables us to encrypt messages along with NP statements. We show that replacing $i\mathcal{O}$ with extractability obfuscation, the OWE turns out to be an *extractable offline witness encryption* scheme. To gain finer control over data, we further demonstrate how to convert our OWEs into *offline functional witness encryption* (OFWE) and *extractable* OFWE. All of our OWEs and OFWEs produce an optimal size ciphertext, in particular, encryption of a message is as small as the size of the message plus the security parameter multiplied with a constant, which is optimal for any public-key encryption scheme. On the other hand, in any previous OWE, the size of a ciphertext increases polynomially with the size of messages. Finally, we show that the WPRF of Pal et al. (ACISP 2019) can be extended to a pWPRF and an *extractable* pWPRF.

Keywords: puncturable witness pseudorandom function, offline witness encryption, offline functional witness encryption, obfuscation.

1 Introduction

Witness Pseudorandom Function. The purpose of a pseudorandom function is to generate a pseudorandom value for an input $x \in \mathcal{X}$ using a secret-key. Zhandry [26] proposed an enhanced primitive called *witness pseudorandom function* (WPRF) which enables us to produce pseudorandom values corresponding to statements of an NP language L with a relation $R : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{W} \to \{0, 1\}$. If $x \in L$ then there exists a witness $w \in \mathcal{W}$ such that $R(x, w) = 1$, otherwise R maps to 0. In the setup of WPRF, we generate two keys: a secret function key fk and a public evaluation key ek. To compute a pseudorandom value $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ corresponding to a statement $x \in \mathcal{X}$, we use the secret function key fk. The same pseudorandom value y can only be recovered using the public evaluation key ek if we have a

witness w such that $R(x, w) = 1$. The security of pseudorandomness is ensured by the fact that y is completely uniform over $\mathcal{Y}$ if $x \notin L$. In *extractable* WPRF, we relax the requirement by allowing x to be in L. However, in such a scenario, if an adversary can distinguish the honestly computed y from a uniformly chosen element of $\mathcal{Y}$ then we can extract a valid witness of x using an efficient extractor.

A list of cryptographic primitives have been realized from WPRF in [26] such as multiparty non-interactive key exchange without trusted setup, poly-many hardcore bits for one-way functions and secret sharing for monotone NP languages. More interestingly, WPRF directly implies a modern primitive called witness encryption (WE) [18] which encrypts messages with respect to a NP statement and a valid witness for the statement is capable of decrypting the ciphertext to the original message. Furthermore, one can construct a more refined variant of WE, termed as reusable WE [26], using WPRF. The main goal of reusable WE was to make the encryption algorithm relatively efficient and ciphertext size *optimal*, besides it provides security in chosen ciphertext attack model. On the other hand, extractable WPRF was used to build a fully distributed broadcast encryption [26] where the size of secret-keys, public-keys and ciphertexts are all poly-logarithmic in the number of users.

Our Contribution. Inspired by the applications of WPRF in [26], we are keen to build more advanced primitives from WPRF. It is desirable to begin with a relatively closer primitive such as offline witness encryption (OWE) [1] maintaining the same encryption efficiency of the reusable WE. An OWE is more preferable over the normal WE because the computationally hard work is shifted from the encryption algorithm by introducing an additional setup phase. Unfortunately, WPRF does not immediately achieve OWE or offline functional WE [8]. Existing OWEs [1,24,12] do not have optimal ciphertext size as in reusable WE of [26].

In this work, we extend the applications of WPRF by introducing a puncturing technique akin to puncturable pseudorandom function (pPRF) [25]. In the security model of normal WPRF, an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ is given access to an oracle $\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, \cdot)$ which on input $x \in \mathcal{X}$ of $\mathcal{A}$'s choice outputs a pseudorandom value corresponding to x. Naturally, $\mathcal{A}$ is restricted to query on the challenge statement x^* which is not in L. In our setting, instead of giving access to $\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, \cdot)$, $\mathcal{A}$ is provided with a punctured key fk_{x^*} which enables $\mathcal{A}$ to learn the pseudorandom value corresponding to any x except x^*. The WPRF is secure if $\mathcal{A}$ is unable to distinguish $\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, x^*)$ from a random element. We call this variant of WPRF a *puncturable* WPRF (pWPRF). In *extractable* pWPRF, we allow x^* to be in L. In that case, there exists an extractor $\mathcal{E}$ which outputs a witness of x^* with high probability and the run time of $\mathcal{E}$ depends on the distinguishing advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ between $\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, x^*)$ and a random element. A pWPRF having this extractability property is called *puncturable witness-extractable pseudorandom function* (pWEPRF).

Both WE and WPRF have been realized using various assumptions on multilinear maps [18,26], but recent attacks on multilinear maps [11,13] introduce threats on the security of those schemes. We bring the punctured program technique of PRF [25] in case of WPRF. The main idea is to build two equivalent programs P and P' where P uses the secret-key oblivious to the adversary and

P' uses a punctured key available to the adversary. An important tool in this setup is indistinguishability obfuscation ($i\mathcal{O}$) [16]. We build following primitives using the additional punctured technique of WPRF:

- We build a semi-adaptively secure OWE scheme (Sec. 3) using a pWPRF, an $i\mathcal{O}$, a pseudorandom generator (PRG) and a symmetric key encryption (SKE) scheme. Our OWE is the first to achieve optimal ciphertext-size, namely $|m|+\text{poly}(\lambda)$ where $|m|$ is the size of message and λ is the security parameter.
- Replacing $i\mathcal{O}$ with extractability obfuscation ($e\mathcal{O}$) [8], we convert the OWE into an *extractable* OWE (EOWE) in Sec. 3. The ciphertext-size remains the same which is optimal for any public-key encryption scheme.
- In a plain OWE, a user having a valid witness can learn the whole message. This all-or-nothing type encryption may not be sufficient for applications where we need fine-grained access control over the data. In such a scenario, *offline functional* WE (OFWE), introduced by Boyle et al. [8], can be utilized as the user having a valid witness can now learn a function of the message and witness. In this work, we show that our techniques of achieving OWE can be extended to realize semi-adaptively secure OFWE and selectively secure *extractable* OFWE schemes (Sec. 4).

Finally, we show that the WPRF of [24] satisfies our definition of pWPRF (Sec. 5). In particular, we can construct pWPRF using a pPRF and an $i\mathcal{O}$. Furthermore, a pWEPRF can be achieved by replacing the $i\mathcal{O}$ with an $e\mathcal{O}$. We emphasize the implausibility results of [17,9] on $e\mathcal{O}$ or extractable WE do not have any impact on our $e\mathcal{O}$-based constructions as the results can only be applied for circuits with specific auxiliary inputs.

Feasibility of $i\mathcal{O}$. A natural question is why we build cryptographic primitives based on $i\mathcal{O}$ which is not yet realized from standard assumptions. Recent attacks on multilinear maps bring cryptographers attention to find new techniques to build $i\mathcal{O}$. Bitansky and Vaikunthanathan [7] and Ananth and Jain [3] developed a transformation that achieves $i\mathcal{O}$ assuming just functional encryption. Achieving such functional encryptions from smaller constant degree multilinear maps and special pseudorandom generators with certain locality properties has been discussed in [5,22,23]. New ideas were formalized in [2,4] to construct $i\mathcal{O}$ from bilinear maps and specific pseudorandom tools that are conjectured to be secure.

Recently, a very interesting and simple approach is developed by Brakerski et al. [10] that utilizes fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE) schemes [19,20] to get full fledge $i\mathcal{O}$. In particular, they proposed a new primitive called split FHE and showed that split FHE is sufficient for constructing $i\mathcal{O}$. The transformation is provably secure and relies on (heuristic but) appropriately defined oracle model. Note that, split FHE can be realized from existing FHEs (based on learning with errors problem [19,20]) and linearly homomorphic encryption schemes (such as Damgård-Jurik encryption scheme based on decisional composite residues problem [14]). In the view of recent developments, it is believed that the community will arrive at a practical construction of $i\mathcal{O}$ in the near future. On the other hand, we note that all existing constructions of WPRF and OWE are either built from multilinear maps vulnerable to practical attacks or depend on $i\mathcal{O}$.

Related Works. Zhandry [26] constructed WPRF from subset-sum Diffie-Hellman assumption related to multilinear maps. Getting a pseudorandom value using an evaluation key is computationally expensive as one need to apply a multilinear map with linearity much larger than the size of the NP relation. On the other hand, we extend the $i\mathcal{O}$-based WPRF of [24] into a puncturable WPRF to enhance the field of application. We note that, although obfuscation itself is a powerful assumption, a wide range of functionalities, including the function classes required in this work, can be efficiently realized using Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs), Intel's Software Guard Extensions (SGXs) [6,15].

Abusalah et al. [1] introduced OWE with the purpose of making encryption much more efficient than the existing WEs. However, the OWE of [1] is selectively secure and the size of ciphertexts are not promising as it contains a simulation sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proof along with two (public-key) encryptions of the same message. OWE with semi-adaptive security is built in [12] relying on $i\mathcal{O}$, but the size of ciphertext is not as compact as one would have wanted for lightweight devices. Our OWEs deliver semi-adaptive security with an optimal size ciphertext similar to the reusable WE of [26].

2 Preliminaries

Notations. We denote $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ by a security parameter. If $x \in \{0,1\}^*$, then we denote $|x|$ by size of the string x. For any set S, the notation $x \leftarrow S$ denotes the process of sampling x uniformly at random from the set S. Let Algo be a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm, then $y \leftarrow \mathsf{Algo}(x)$ denotes the execution of Algo with an input x using a fresh randomness and assign the output to y. If the randomness, say r, is provided externally then we denote this execution by $y \leftarrow \mathsf{Algo}(x; r)$. We call $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$ as a family of polynomial sized circuits if there exists a fixed polynomial p such that $|C| < \mathsf{p}(\lambda)$ for any $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$. We say $\mathsf{negl}\colon \mathbb{N} \to \mathbb{R}$ be a negligible function of λ if for every positive polynomial p, there exists an integer $n_\mathsf{p} \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\mathsf{negl}(\lambda) < 1/\mathsf{p}(\lambda)$ for all $n > n_\mathsf{p}$.

2.1 Pseudorandom Generator

Definition 1 A pseudorandom generator (PRG) is a deterministic polynomial time algorithm PRG that on input a seed $s \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ outputs a string of length $\ell(\lambda)$ such that the following holds:

- *expansion*: For every λ it holds that $\ell(\lambda) > \lambda$.
- *pseudorandomness*: For all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and $s \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda, r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}$ there exists a negligible function negl such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRG}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{PRG}(s)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, r) = 1]\ | < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda).$$

2.2 Puncturable Pseudorandom Function

Definition 2 A puncturable pseudorandom function (pPRF) is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Gen, PuncKey, Eval, PuncEval) defined as follows:

- $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$: on input a security parameter λ, returns a secret-key K.
- $\mathsf{K}_x \leftarrow \mathsf{PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x)$: returns K_x, a punctured key for an element $x \in \mathcal{X}$.
- $y \leftarrow \mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{K}, x)$: returns a pseudorandom value $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ for $x \in \mathcal{X}$.
- $\mathsf{PuncEval}(\mathsf{K}_x, x') \in \mathcal{Y} \cup \{\perp\}$: on input a punctured key K_x and an element $x' \in \mathcal{X}$, returns a pseudorandom value $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ if $x \neq x'$, otherwise returns $\perp$.

We note that, each of the above algorithms except Gen is a deterministic algorithm. The pPRF is said to be correct if the following holds:

– *correctness*: For all distinct pair of elements $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^2$, $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, we require that $\Pr[\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{K}, x') = \mathsf{PuncEval}(\mathsf{PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x), x')] = 1$.

Definition 3 A puncturable pseudorandom function (pPRF) is said to be secure (or preserves pseudorandomness at punctured point) if, for all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and any $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, $\mathsf{K}_x \leftarrow \mathsf{PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x)$ there exists a negligible function negl such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pPRF}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{K}_x, \mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{K}, x)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{K}_x, y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}) = 1]| < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda).$$

2.3 Symmetric Key Encryption

Definition 4 A symmetric key encryption (SKE) scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) defined as follows:

- $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$: on input a security parameter λ, returns a key K.
- $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{K}, m)$: a deterministic algorithm that returns c, an encryption of the message $m \in \mathcal{M}$.
- $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{K}, c) \in \mathcal{M} \cup \{\perp\}$: a deterministic algorithm that decrypts the ciphertext c and returns a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, or $\perp$ if it fails.

The SKE is said to be correct if the following holds:

– *correctness*: For all $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda)$, we require that

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{K}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{K}, m)) = m] = 1$$

Definition 5 A symmetric key encryption SKE is said to satisfy ciphertext indistinguishability (CIND) security if, for all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and any pair of equal length messages (m_0, m_1) there exists a negligible function negl such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SKE}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{K}, m_0)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(1^\lambda, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{K}, m_1)) = 1]| < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

2.4 Puncturable Witness Pseudorandom Function

Definition 6 A puncturable witness pseudorandom function (pWPRF) for an NP language L with a relation R is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Gen, F, $\mathsf{PuncKey}$, PuncF, Eval) defined as follows:

- $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, R)$: on input a security parameter λ and a relation circuit $R : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{W} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, returns a secret function key fk and a public evaluation key ek.

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{fk},\ \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, R)$
3. $\mathsf{fk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, x^*)$
4. $y_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, x^*),\ y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
5. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
6. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, y_b)$
7. return 1 if $(b' = b) \wedge (x^* \notin L)$

Fig. 1: $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R}(1^\lambda)$

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, R)$
3. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
4. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
5. $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp_e}, x^*, m_b)$
6. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
7. return 1 if $(b' = b) \wedge (x^* \notin L) \wedge (|m_0| = |m_1|)$

Fig. 2: $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{OWE},R}(1^\lambda)$

- $y \leftarrow \mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, x)$: returns a pseudorandom value $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ for $x \in \mathcal{X}$.
- $\mathsf{fk}_x \leftarrow \mathsf{PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, x)$: returns fk_x, a punctured key for an element $x \in \mathcal{X}$.
- $\mathsf{PuncF}(\mathsf{fk}_x, x') \in \mathcal{Y} \cup \{\perp\}$: on input a punctured key fk_x and an element $x' \in \mathcal{X}$, returns a pseudorandom value $y \in \mathcal{Y}$ if $x \neq x'$, otherwise returns $\perp$.
- $\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{ek}, x, w) \in \mathcal{Y} \cup \{\perp\}$: on input an evaluation key ek, an element $x \in \mathcal{X}$ and a witness $w \in \mathcal{W}$, returns an element $y \in \mathcal{Y}$, or $\perp$ if it fails.

We note that, each of the above algorithms except Gen is a deterministic algorithm. The pWPRF is said to be correct if the following properties hold:

– *correctness of* Eval: For all $x \in \mathcal{X}, w \in \mathcal{W}$ and $(\mathsf{fk},\ \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, R)$, we require that

$$\mathsf{Eval}(\mathsf{ek}, x, w) = \begin{cases} \mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, x) & \text{if } R(x,w) = 1 \\ \perp & \text{if } R(x,w) = 0 \end{cases}$$

– *correctness of* PuncF: For all distinct pair of elements $x, x' \in \mathcal{X}^2$ and $(\mathsf{fk},\ \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(1^\lambda, R)$, we require that

$$\Pr[\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, x') = \mathsf{PuncF}(\mathsf{PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, x), x')] = 1.$$

Note that, our definition of pWPRF is crafted in a similar fashion like Sahai and Waters [25] formalized pPRF from PRF. Instead of providing an oracle to learn $\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, x')$ as in the case of normal WPRF given by Zhandry [26], the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can use a punctured key fk_x to compute the pseudorandom value $\mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, x')$ by itself if $x \neq x'$. The security experiment $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R}(1^\lambda)$ of our pWPRF is defined in Fig. 1. We consider the selective model for our applications. At the last step of the experiment, the challenger verifies that $x^* \notin L$ which means our challenger is not efficient. In this context, we note that WEs, OWEs and WPRFs are defined in the same way and the definition has been proven useful in developing many interesting cryptographic primitives [18,21,1,26].

Definition 7 A puncturable witness pseudorandom function pWPRF for an NP language L with a relation R is said to be selectively secure if, for all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, there exists a negligible function negl such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R}(1^\lambda) = 1] - \tfrac{1}{2}| < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

In extractable pWPRF, we allow the challenge statement x^* to be in L. Accordingly, we modify the security experiment defined in Fig. 1 (in particular, line 7) and rename it as $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWEPRF},R}(1^\lambda)$.

Definition 8 A puncturable witness pseudorandom function is said to be extractable or puncturable witness-extractable pseudorandom function (pWEPRF) for an NP language L with a relation R, if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and any polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ there exists a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}$ such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWEPRF},R}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWEPRF},R}(1^\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)}$$
$$\Rightarrow \Pr[w^* \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, x^*) : R(x^*, w^*) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)}$$

The extractability says that when the adversary can distinguish the honestly computed $y = \mathsf{F}(\mathsf{fk}, x^*)$ from a uniformly chosen element, then it must know a witness w^* satisfying $R(x^*, w^*) = 1$.

2.5 Offline Witness Encryption

Definition 9 An offline witness encryption (OWE) scheme for an NP language L with a relation R is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup, Enc, Dec) defined as follows:

- $(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, R)$: on input a security parameter λ and a relation $R : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{W} \to \{0,1\}$, returns two public parameters $\mathsf{pp_e}$ for encryption and $\mathsf{pp_d}$ for decryption.
- $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp_e}, x, m)$: returns c, an encryption of the message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ with respect to the statement $x \in \mathcal{X}$.
- $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{pp_d}, c, w) \in \mathcal{M} \cup \{\perp\}$: a deterministic algorithm that decrypts the ciphertext c using a witness $w \in \mathcal{W}$ and returns a message $m \in \mathcal{M}$, or $\perp$.

The OWE scheme is said to be correct if the following holds:

– *correctness*: For all $x \in \mathcal{X}$, $w \in \mathcal{W}$, $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and $(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, R)$, we require that

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{pp_d}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp_e}, x, m), w) = m : R(x, w) = 1] = 1$$

The semi-adaptive security experiment $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{OWE},R}(1^\lambda)$ is defined in Fig. 2.

Definition 10 An offline witness encryption OWE for an NP language L with a relation R is said to be semi-adaptively secure if, for all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, there exists a negligible function negl such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{OWE},R}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{OWE},R}(1^\lambda) = 1] - \tfrac{1}{2}| < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

For extractable offline witness encryption we modify the experiment defined in Fig. 2 so that x^* may belong to L and rename it as $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{EOWE},R}(1^\lambda)$.

Definition 11 An offline witness encryption OWE is said to be semi-adaptively secure extractable offline witness encryption (EOWE) for an NP language L with a relation R, if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and any polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ there exists a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}$ such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EOWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{EOWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)}$$
$$\Rightarrow \Pr[w^* \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, x^*) : R(x^*, w^*) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)}$$

2.6 Obfuscation

Definition 12 A PPT algorithm $i\mathcal{O}$ is said to be an indistinguishability obfuscator for a class of circuits $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$, if it satisfies the following properties:

- *Functionality*: For all security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, for all inputs x, we require that

$$\Pr[\widetilde{C}(x) = C(x) : \widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C)] = 1$$

- *Indistinguishability*: For any PPT distinguisher $\mathcal{D}$, there exists a negligible function negl such that for all pair of circuits $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ that compute the same function and are of same size, we require that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{i\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[b \leftarrow \{0,1\}, \widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C_b) : \mathcal{D}(\widetilde{C}, C_0, C_1) = b] - \tfrac{1}{2}| < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

Definition 13 A PPT algorithm $e\mathcal{O}$ is said to be an extractability obfuscator for a class of circuits $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$, if it satisfies the following properties:

- *Functionality*: For all security parameter $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, for all $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, for all inputs x, we require that

$$\Pr[\widetilde{C}(x) = C(x) : \widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C)] = 1$$

- *Extractability*: For any PPT distinguisher $\mathcal{D}$ and polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda)$, there exists an extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}$ such that for all pair of circuits $C_0, C_1 \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ that are of same size, for all auxiliary input $z \in \{0,1\}^*$, we require that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{e\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda) = \big|\Pr\big[b \leftarrow \{0,1\}, \widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C_b) : \mathcal{D}(\widetilde{C}, C_0, C_1, z) = b\big] - \tfrac{1}{2}\big| \geq \tfrac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda)}$$
$$\Rightarrow \Pr[x \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, C_0, C_1, z) : C_0(x) \neq C_1(x)] \geq \tfrac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)}$$

3 Construction: (Extractable) Offline Witness Encryption

In this section, we describe our construction of $\mathsf{OWE} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ for an NP language L and a relation $R : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{W} \to \{0,1\}$. We consider the statement space $\mathcal{X}$ to be $\{0,1\}^\lambda$ (containing L) and $\mathcal{W} = \{0,1\}^n$ where n is a polynomial in the security parameter λ. The following primitives are utilized in our construction:



Fig. 3: Construction of OWEs with optimal ciphertexts where $\mathcal{O}$ is either $i\mathcal{O}$ for normal OWE or $e\mathcal{O}$ for extractable OWE (EOWE)

- A pseudorandom generator $\mathsf{PRG} : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$.
- A CIND secure symmetric key encryption SKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec).
- A pWPRF = (Gen, F, PuncKey, PuncF, Eval) for the NP language $L' = \{(x, v) : \exists u \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ such that $\mathsf{PRG}(x \oplus u) = v\}$ with a relation $R' : \mathcal{X}' \times \mathcal{W}' \to \{0,1\}$. So, $R'((x, v), u) = 1$ if $\mathsf{PRG}(x \oplus u) = v$, 0 otherwise.
- An obfuscator $\mathcal{O}$ for the class of circuits $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ required in the constructions. The only difference between the constructions of OWE and extractable OWE (EOWE) is that: $\mathcal{O}$ is an indistinguishability obfuscator ($i\mathcal{O}$) for OWE whereas $\mathcal{O}$ is an extractability obfuscator ($e\mathcal{O}$) for EOWE.

Our OWE construction is shown in Fig. 3 where we assume that the circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}] \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ and $\mathcal{O}$ is an $i\mathcal{O}$. For *correctness*, we need to verify that the same key $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$ is generated during encryption and decryption of OWE. In particular, the same randomness y should be utilized in Enc as well as in Dec. Note that, we compute y using the pWPRF.Eval(ek, $(x, v), \cdot$) with a witness u corresponding to the relation R'. While decrypting, by the correctness of Eval, we generate the same y inside the circuit $\widetilde{C}$ using pWPRF.F(fk, (x, v)) extracted from the ciphertext. Therefore, $\mathsf{SKE.Dec}(\mathsf{K}, c_s)$ returns the same message that was encrypted in Enc if $R(x, w) = 1$. Finally, we conclude the correctness by observing that $C[\mathsf{fk}]$ and $\widetilde{C}$ compute the same function because of the functionality of $i\mathcal{O}$. We skip the correctness of EOWE as it can be argued similarly.

Comparison: The ciphertext size of our OWEs is as compact as one can desire: excluding the instance, it is only $|c_s| + |v| = |m| + 2\lambda$ which is *optimal* for any public-key encryption. More precisely, the bit size of a ciphertext encrypting a λ-bit message is 3λ. Let us compare our ciphertext size with all existing OWEs when encrypting a λ-bit message. The $i\mathcal{O}$ and SSS-NIZK based construction of Abusalah et al. [1] delivers a ciphertext size of at least 64λ-bit (assuming a group element is of size 2λ-bit [1]). Both the OWE constructions of Pal et al. [24] and Chvojka et al. [12] achieve a ciphertext of size at least 10λ-bit. The encryption

process of [12] uses a puncturable public-key encryption scheme to produce a ciphertext corresponding to the pair (x, m). We shift the computation power in the setup phase as much as possible to accomplish a more compact ciphertext size for our OWE than any other OWEs. This reduces the communication cost in practical applications. All existing OWEs utilize $i\mathcal{O}$ during the setup phase. This implies either $\mathsf{pp_e}$ or $\mathsf{pp_d}$ (or both) contains an obfuscated circuit the size of which depends on the simplicity of the circuit. The size of the public parameter for encryption ek (or $\mathsf{pp_e}$) is proportional to the size of the relation R'. We observe that the relation R' is as simple as checking a PRG computation, which means the evaluation key ek is independent of the relation R, and hence our OWE encryptions are more efficient than the reusable WE of Zhandry [26]. Furthermore, the notion of functional WE cannot be directly achieved from reusable WE whereas we extend our OWE to OFWE.

Theorem 1 *The* OWE = (Setup, Enc, Dec) *described in Figure 3 with* $\mathcal{O} = i\mathcal{O}$ *is a semi-adaptively secure offline witness encryption if* PRG *is a secure pseudorandom generator,* pWPRF *is a selectively secure puncturable witness pseudorandom function,* $i\mathcal{O}$ *is an indistinguishability obfuscator for the circuit class* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ *and* SKE *is a* CIND *secure symmetric key encryption. More specifically, for any PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, there exist PPT adversaries* $\mathcal{B}_1$*,* $\mathcal{B}_2$*,* $\mathcal{B}_3$ *and a PPT distinguisher* $\mathcal{D}$ *such that:*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{OWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRG}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R'}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SKE}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{i\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda)$$

Proof. We prove the theorem using the following sequence of games. We start with Game 0 which is the standard security experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{OWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda)$ as defined in Fig. 2. For Game i, we denote by $\mathsf{G_i}$ the event $b = b'$. In each game, we assume that $\mathcal{A}$ submits two messages of equal length and that $x^* \notin L$ as otherwise the challenger always returns 0. The circuits used in the proof are assumed to be padded to a maximum size.

Game 0 $\Rightarrow$ Game 1: In Game 0, we compute the encryption key as $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$ where $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{ek}, (x^*, v), u)$. But, Game 1 (Fig. 4) sets $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$ without using the witness u. By the correctness Eval:

$$\mathsf{pWPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{ek}, (x^*, v), u) = \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v)) \text{ as } R'((x^*, v), u) = 1.$$

Therefore, the distribution of ciphertexts in both the games are identical and hence they are indistinguishable from $\mathcal{A}$'s view. We have $\Pr[\mathsf{G_0}] = \Pr[\mathsf{G_1}]$.

Game 1 $\Rightarrow$ Game 2: In Game 2, described in Fig. 5, we pick v uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$ instead of setting it as $v \leftarrow \mathsf{PRG}(x^* \oplus u)$. Note that, given x^*, the distribution of $x^* \oplus u$ is uniform over $\{0,1\}^\lambda$ for $u \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$. Let, $\mathcal{B}_1$ is a PRG-adversary. Then, by the security of PRG (Def. 1), the distinguishing advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ between Game 1 and Game 2 can be written as $|\Pr[\mathsf{G_1}] - \Pr[\mathsf{G_2}]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRG}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda)$.

Game 2 $\Rightarrow$ Game 3: In Game 3, described in Fig. 6, we replace the circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}]$ by a new circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*]$ and set the public parameter for decryption $\mathsf{pp_d} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*])$. The new circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*]$ is defined as follows:

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
3. $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}])$
4. set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
5. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
6. $u \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda, v \leftarrow \mathsf{PRG}(x^* \oplus u)$
7. $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$
8. $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$
9. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
10. $c_s \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Enc}(\mathsf{K}, m_b)$
11. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
12. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
13. return 1 if $(b = b')$

Fig. 4: Game 1

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
3. $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}])$
4. set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
5. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
6. $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$
7. $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$
8. $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$
9. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
10. $c_s \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Enc}(\mathsf{K}, m_b)$
11. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
12. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
13. return 1 if $(b = b')$

Fig. 5: Game 2

$C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*](c, w)$

1. parse $c = (c_s, x, v)$
2. if $x = x^*$
3. return $\perp$
4. else if $R(x, w) = 1$
5. $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncF}(\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, (x, v))$
6. $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$
7. return $\mathsf{SKE.Dec}(\mathsf{K}, c_s)$
8. else
9. return $\perp$

Note that, the two circuits $C[\mathsf{fk}]$ and $C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*]$ are functionally equivalent. Let $(\bar{c}, \bar{w})$ be any arbitrary input where $\bar{c} = (\bar{c}_s, \bar{x}, \bar{v})$. If $\bar{x} = x^*$, then $C[\mathsf{fk}](\bar{c}, \bar{w})$ outputs $\perp$ since $x^* \notin L$ implies that $R(x^*, \bar{w}) = 0$ for any $\bar{w} \in \mathcal{W}$, and $C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*](\bar{c}, \bar{w})$ outputs $\perp$ because of the check in line 2 of the circuit. If $\bar{x} \neq x^*$, then $z^* \neq (\bar{x}, \bar{v})$ and by the correctness of PuncF we have

$$\mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (\bar{x}, \bar{v})) = \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncF}(\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, (\bar{x}, \bar{v}))$$

and hence $C[\mathsf{fk}](\bar{c}, \bar{w}) = C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*](\bar{c}, \bar{w})$. Considering $\mathcal{D}$ as a PPT distinguisher for $i\mathcal{O}$, the indistinguishability property of $i\mathcal{O}$ (Def. 12) implies that

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_2] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_3]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{i\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda)$$

Game 3 $\Rightarrow$ Game 4: In Game 4, described in Fig. 7, we pick y uniformly at random from $\mathcal{Y}$ which is the co-domain of $\mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, \cdot)$. We show that if $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish between these two games, then there is an adversary $\mathcal{B}_2$ which will break the selective security of pWPRF (defined in Fig. 1). Let $z^* = (x^*, v)$ be the challenge statement of $\mathcal{B}_2$ for a random $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$.

$\mathcal{B}_2(1^\lambda, z^*)$:

1. send z^* to its challenger
2. The pWPRF-challenger does the following:
   (a) generate $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
3. $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$, set $z^* = (x^*, v)$
4. $\mathsf{fk}_{z^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$
5. $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*])$
6. set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
7. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
8. $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$
9. $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$
10. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
11. $c_s \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Enc}(\mathsf{K}, m_b)$
12. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
13. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
14. return 1 if $(b = b')$

Fig. 6: Game 3

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
3. $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$, set $z^* = (x^*, v)$
4. $\mathsf{fk}_{z^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$
5. $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*])$
6. set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
7. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
8. $y \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
9. $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$
10. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
11. $c_s \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Enc}(\mathsf{K}, m_b)$
12. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
13. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
14. return 1 if $(b = b')$

Fig. 7: Game 4

   (b) compute a punctured key $\mathsf{fk}_{z^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$
   (c) set $y_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$ and $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
   (d) pick $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
   (e) return $(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, y_{\tilde{b}})$ to $\mathcal{B}_2$
3. compute $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*])$ and set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
4. receive $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
5. compute the encryption key as $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y_{\tilde{b}})$
6. pick $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
7. compute the ciphertext as $c_s \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Enc}(\mathsf{K}, m_b)$
8. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
9. get $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
10. return 1 if $(b = b')$

First, we note that $z^* = (x^*, v) \notin L'$ with overwhelming probability. Since $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$, the probability that $\mathsf{PRG}(x^* \oplus u) = v$ for some $u \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ is at most $2^{-\lambda}$ which is negligible in λ. So, $\mathcal{B}_2$ is a legitimate pWPRF-adversary. If the pWPRF-challenger picks $\tilde{b} = 0$ then $\mathcal{B}_2$ simulates Game 3, and if it chooses $\tilde{b} = 1$ then $\mathcal{B}_2$ simulates Game 4. Therefore, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in distinguishing between Game 3 and Game 4 is the same as the advantage of $\mathcal{B}_2$ in breaking the selective security of pWPRF. Hence the following holds:

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_3] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_4]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pWPRF}, R'}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda)$$

Next, we note that in Game 4, the encryption key is computed as $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$ with a fresh randomness y which is independent of the challenge statement x^*. Therefore, by the CIND security of SKE (Def. 5) we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_4] - \tfrac{1}{2}| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SKE}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{B}_3$ is an adversary of CIND security game. Finally, we conclude the proof by combining all the probabilities.

In the next theorem, we proof the security of EOWE (Fig. 3 with $\mathcal{O} = e\mathcal{O}$) utilizing the extractor of $e\mathcal{O}$.

Theorem 2 *The* $\mathsf{EOWE} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *described in Figure 3 with* $\mathcal{O} = e\mathcal{O}$ *is a semi-adaptively secure extractable offline witness encryption if* PRG *is a secure pseudorandom generator,* pWPRF *is a selectively secure puncturable witness pseudorandom function,* $e\mathcal{O}$ *is an extractability obfuscator for the circuit class* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ *and* SKE *is a* CIND *secure symmetric key encryption.*

Proof. We start with the standard EOWE experiment $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{EOWE},R}(1^\lambda)$ (Def. 11). We call it as $\mathsf{EGame\ 0}$. Here, we denote the security games by $\mathsf{EGame\ i}$ and for each $\mathsf{EGame\ i}$, let $\mathsf{EG_i}$ be the event $b = b'$. We assume that $\mathcal{A}$ submits two messages of equal length in each game and all the circuits used in the proof are padded to a maximum size.

$\underline{\mathsf{EGame\ 0} \Rightarrow \mathsf{EGame\ 1}}$: $\mathsf{EGame\ 1}$ is exactly the same as $\mathsf{EGame\ 0}$ except we replace the circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}]$ with a new circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}, x^*]$ defined in Fig. 8. Suppose, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish between $\mathsf{EGame\ 0}$ and $\mathsf{EGame\ 1}$ with an advantage

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_0] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_1]| \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)}$$

for some polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$. Then, we show that there is a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}$ such that $\mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, x^*)$ outputs a witness w^* satisfying $R(x^*, w^*) = 1$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)}$.

We note that two games differ only in the obfuscated circuits. So, we consider a PPT distinguisher $\mathcal{D}$ of $e\mathcal{O}$ as defined in Def. 13. In particular, $\mathcal{D}$ collects two circuits from a circuit sampler $\mathsf{S}(1^\lambda, \cdot)$ and an obfuscated circuit (from it's challenger), then it simulates the security game for $\mathcal{A}$ as follows:

$\underline{\mathcal{D}(1^\lambda, \widetilde{C}, C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})}$:

1. parse $\mathsf{aux} = (\mathsf{ek}, x^*)$
2. set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
3. $(m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
4. follow steps 6-10 as in $\mathsf{EGame\ 1}$
5. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
6. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
7. return 1 if $b = b'$

$\underline{\mathsf{S}(1^\lambda, x^*)}$

1. $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
2. construct $C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, x^*]$
3. set $\mathsf{aux} = (\mathsf{ek}, x^*)$
4. return $(C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})$

If $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}])$ then $\mathcal{D}$ simulates $\mathsf{EGame\ 0}$ and if $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}, x^*])$ then $\mathcal{D}$ simulates $\mathsf{EGame\ 1}$. Therefore, $\mathcal{D}$ can distinguish between the obfuscated circuits with the same advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in distinguishing $\mathsf{EGame\ 0}$ and $\mathsf{EGame\ 1}$. By the extractability property of $e\mathcal{O}$ (Def. 13), there exists a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}'$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}$ such that $\mathcal{E}'(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})$ outputs $(\bar{c}, \bar{w})$ at which the two circuits differ with probability at least $\frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}(\lambda)}$. Note that, the two circuits differ only when $\bar{c} = (\bar{c}_s, x^*, \bar{v})$ is well formed and $R(x^*, \bar{w}) = 1$.

Now, the extractor $\mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, x^*)$ of EOWE simply runs $\mathsf{S}(1^\lambda, x^*)$ to obtain $(C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})$ and then executes $\mathcal{E}'(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})$ to get a witness w^* satisfying $R(x^*, w^*) = 1$ with probability $\geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}(\lambda)}$. Thus we can set $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}} = \mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}$ and



Fig. 8: EGame 1

more importantly we note that $\mathcal{E}$ is a PPT extractor since $\mathsf{S}(\cdot)$ runs in poly(λ) time and $\mathcal{E}'$ is a PPT extractor.

EGame 1 $\Rightarrow$ EGame 2: EGame 2 is exactly the same as EGame 1 except in line 7 of Fig. 8 where we compute $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$. By the correctness Eval (using the same argument as in the transition from Game 0 to Game 1 of Th. 1), we have $\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_1] = \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_2]$.

EGame 2 $\Rightarrow$ EGame 3: In EGame 3, we choose $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$ instead of computing $v \leftarrow \mathsf{PRG}(x^* \oplus u)$ as in EGame 2. By the security of PRG (Def. 1), we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_2] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_3]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRG}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{B}_1$ is a PRG-adversary.

EGame 3 $\Rightarrow$ EGame 4: In EGame 4, we set $\mathsf{pp_d} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*])$ where $\mathsf{fk}_{z^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$ and $z^* = (x^*, v)$ for some $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$. The circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*]$ is the same circuit defined in Fig. 8 except we replace fk by fk_{z^*} and use $\mathsf{pWPRF.PuncF}(\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, (x, v))$ to compute y in line 6. It is easy to follow that the circuits $C[\mathsf{fk}, x^*], C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, x^*]$ compute the same function by the correctness of PuncF. Suppose, $(\bar{c} = (\bar{c}_s, \bar{x}, \bar{v}), \bar{w})$ is any arbitrary input to the circuits. If $\bar{x} \neq x^*$, then $z^* \neq (\bar{x}, \bar{v})$ and hence $\mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (\bar{x}, \bar{v})) = \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncF}(\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, (\bar{x}, \bar{v}))$. If $\bar{x} = x^*$, then both the circuits return $\perp$ because of the check in line 2 or 3. By the extractability property of $e\mathcal{O}$ (Def. 13), we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_3] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_4]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{e\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda) = \mu(\lambda)$$

where μ is a negligible function of λ. If the advantage is not bounded by a negligible function of λ, then there exists an extractor $\mathcal{E}'$ which would produce an input where the two circuits differ, leading towards a contradiction as the circuits are equivalent.

EGame 4 $\Rightarrow$ EGame 5: EGame 5 samples y uniformly at random from $\mathcal{Y}$ instead of computing $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$ as in EGame 4, where $\mathcal{Y}$ is the co-domain of $\mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, \cdot)$. Note that the probability of $z^* = (x^*, v) \in L'$ for a random $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$ is negligible in λ. By the selective security of pWPRF, we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_4] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_5]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R'}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{B}_2$ is a pWPRF-adversary. We skip the reduction as it is similar to the reduction described in the transition from Game 3 to Game 4 of Th. 1.

Finally, the encryption key in EGame 5 is computed as $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$ where y is a fresh randomness which is independent of the challenge statement x^*. The CIND security of SKE (Def. 5) guarantees that

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_5] - \tfrac{1}{2}| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SKE}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda).$$

where $\mathcal{B}_3$ is an adversary of CIND game. Finally, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EOWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_0] - \frac{1}{2}| &\leq \sum_{i=0}^{4} |\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_i] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_{i+1}]| + |\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_5] - \frac{1}{2}| \\
&= \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRG}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda) + \mu(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R'}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SKE}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda) \\
&< \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{(by the assumptions in the theorem)}
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $|\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EOWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ implies $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EOWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ excluding the negligible term. Hence, by the similar arguments as in the transition from EGame 0 to EGame 1, we conclude that if $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EOWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)}$ for some polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$, then there is a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}$ such that $\Pr[w^* \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, x^*) : R(x^*, w^*) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)}$.

4 Informal Description: (Extractable) Offline Functional Witness Encryption

Apart from an NP language L with a witness relation R, *Offline functional witness encryption* (OFWE) is associated with a function class $\{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}$. It encrypts a pair of function and message $(f, m) \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda \times \mathcal{M}$ with respect to a statement x. Instead of getting the whole message, a valid witness w for the statement x can only get a user to learn $f(m, w)$. The OWE described in Fig. 3 can be modified to achieve OFWE. While encryption, we use the key K (computed utilizing pWPRF.Eval for the statement (x, v)) to encrypt (f, m) via SKE encryption. The ciphertext becomes $c = (c_s, x, v)$ with $|c_s| = |f| + |m|$ where $|f|, |m|$ denote the sizes of f, m respectively. In Setup, we modify $C[\mathsf{fk}]$ in line 5 so that the circuit computes $(f, m) \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Dec}(\mathsf{K}, c_s)$ and then returns $f(m, w)$ if $R(x, w) = 1$ holds. The rest of the construction remains the same. Note that the size of ciphertext is optimal and the encryption maintains similar efficiency akin to our OWE. For security, we consider semi-adaptive model where the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ commits on the challenge statement x^* before the setup and adaptively selects two pairs (f_0, m_0), (f_1, m_1) such that $f_0(m_0, w) = f_1(m_1, w)$ for all w satisfying $R(x^*, w) = 1$. Detail construction with security (Th. 5) is described in App. C.

Replacing $i\mathcal{O}$ with an $e\mathcal{O}$ leads us to an *extractable* OFWE which is selectively secure means that $\mathcal{A}$ submits a challenge tuple (x^*, f, m_0, m_1) before setup. Depending on the wining advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in guessing the bit b hidden inside



Fig. 9: Construction of pWPRFs where $\mathcal{O}$ is either $i\mathcal{O}$ for normal pWPRF or $e\mathcal{O}$ for extractable pWPRF (pWEPRF)

a ciphertext corresponding to (x^*, f, m_b), there exists an extractor $\mathcal{E}$ which on input the challenge tuple outputs a witness w satisfying $f(m_0, w) \neq f(m_1, w)$ and $R(x^*, w) = 1$ with high probability. We prove the security in Th. 6, App. C.

5 Construction: Puncturable Witness(-Extractable) Pseudorandom Function

In this section, we show that WPRF construction of [24] satisfies our definition of pWPRF. In addition, we observe that if the indistinguishability obfuscator is replaced with an extractability obfuscator then the pWPRF becomes extractable. We now describe the pWPRF = (Gen, F, PuncKey, PuncF, Eval) for any NP language L with a relation $R : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{W} \to \{0, 1\}$. The following primitives are required for the construction.

- A pPRF = (Gen, PuncKey, Eval, PuncEval) with domain $\mathcal{X}$ and co-domain $\mathcal{Y}$.
- An obfuscator $\mathcal{O}$ for the class of circuits $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ required in the constructions. The only difference between the constructions of pWPRF and pWEPRF is that: $\mathcal{O}$ is an indistinguishability obfuscator ($i\mathcal{O}$) for pWPRF whereas $\mathcal{O}$ is an extractability obfuscator ($e\mathcal{O}$) for pWEPRF.

The constructions of pWPRFs are shown in Fig. 9. The correctness directly follows from the correctness of the underlying pPRF and functionality of $\mathcal{O}$.

Theorem 3 *The* pWEPRF = (Gen, F, PuncKey, PuncF, Eval) *described in Figure 5 with $\mathcal{O} = i\mathcal{O}$ is a selectively secure puncturable witness pseudorandom function if* pPRF *is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function and $i\mathcal{O}$ is an indistinguishability obfuscator for the circuit class $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$. More specifically, for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, there exist a PPT adversary $\mathcal{B}$ and a PPT distinguisher $\mathcal{D}$ such that:*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pPRF}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{i\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda)$$

Proof sketch. As usual, we start with game 0 which is the standard security experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda)$ as defined in Fig. 1. Next, in game 1, we replace the circuit $C[\mathsf{K}]$ with a new circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*]$ where $\mathsf{fk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$. For any arbitrary input (x, w), the new circuit returns the pseudorandom value as $\mathsf{pPRF.PuncEval}(\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x)$ if $x \neq x^*$ and $R(x, w) = 1$ hold, otherwise it returns $\perp$. It is easy to verify that the two circuits are functionally equivalent and hence by the security of $i\mathcal{O}$, game 0 and game 1 are indistinguishable. Now, the adversary knowing fk_{x^*} cannot distinguish $\mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, x^*)$ from a random element due to the security of underlying pPRF (Def. 3). A formal proof is given in App. A.

We discuss the security of pWEPRF in App. B where the extractibility property of obfuscation (Def. 13) is utilized.

6 Conclusion

In this paper, we initiate the study of puncturable WPRF(pWPRF). We demonstrate that this puncturing technique enhances the applicability of WPRF. We construct semi-adaptively secure OWE that produces optimal size ciphertexts, in particular a ciphertext c for a message m has the size of only $|m| + 2\lambda$ bits where $|m|$ denotes the bit-length of m. Note that, existing OWEs do not satisfy such optimality. We further show that our OWE can be extended to offline functional WE (OFWE) providing more control over data. Moreover, using $e\mathcal{O}$ we construct extractable OWE and extractable OFWE with similar efficiency of encryption.

In future, we expect more cryptographic primitives realized from pWPRF. In terms of security, it is desirable to construct WPRF in adaptive model without multilinear maps [26]. This may lead us to OWE with full adaptive security. Finally, we note that a significant open problem in this area is to construct WPRF or OWE based on standard assumptions related to bilinear maps or lattices.

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A A Formal Proof of Theorem 3

Proof. We prove the security using two games. We start with Game 0 which is the standard selective security experiment as in Def. 6. Let G_i be the event $b = b'$ in each Game i.

Game 0 $\Rightarrow$ Game 1: Game 1 is exactly same as the Game 0 except we replace the circuit $C[\mathsf{K}]$ with a new circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*]$ defined in Fig. 10, where $\mathsf{fk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$. We show that the two circuits $C[\mathsf{K}]$ and $C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*]$ are functionally equivalent. For any arbitrary input $(\bar{x}, \bar{w})$ to the circuits, we see that if $\bar{x} \neq x^*$, then both the circuits return the same value as $\mathsf{pPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{K}, \bar{x}) = \mathsf{pPRF.PuncEval}(\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, \bar{x})$. Otherwise, if $\bar{x} = x^*$ then the circuit $C[\mathsf{K}]$ returns $\perp$, because $x^* \notin L$ implies that $R(\bar{x}, \bar{w}) = 0$ for all $\bar{w} \in \mathcal{W}$, and the circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*]$ returns $\perp$ because of the check in line 2 (Fig. 10). Thus, the indistinguishability property of $i\mathcal{O}$ (Def. 12) guarantees that

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_0] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_1]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{i\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{D}$ is a PPT distinguisher for $i\mathcal{O}$.

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda)$
3. $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*])$
4. set $\mathsf{ek} = \widetilde{C}$
5. $\mathsf{fk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$
6. $y_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{K}, x^*), y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
7. $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$
8. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, y_b)$
9. return 1 if $b = b'$

$C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*](x, w)$

1. if $R(x, w) = 1$
2. if $x = x^*$
3. return $\perp$
4. else
5. $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.PuncEval}(\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x)$
6. return y
7. else
8. return $\perp$

Fig. 10: Game 1

Suppose, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in Game 1 is non-negligible. Then we construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ against the security of pPRF (Def. 2) with the same advantage as follow.

$\mathcal{B}(1^\lambda, x^*)$:

1. send x^* to its challenger
2. The pPRF-challenger does the following:
   (a) generate $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda)$
   (b) compute $\mathsf{fk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$
   (c) set $y_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$ and $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
   (d) pick $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$
   (e) return (fk_{x^*}, y_b) to $\mathcal{B}$
3. compute $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*])$ and set $\mathsf{ek} = \widetilde{C}$
4. get $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, y_b)$
5. return 1 if $b = b'$

Note that $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates Game 1 for $\mathcal{A}$. If $\mathcal{A}$ can guess the bit b in Game 1 with a non-negligible advantage, then $\mathcal{B}$ breaks the security of pPRF with the same advantage. From the security of pPRF, we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_1] - \tfrac{1}{2}| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pPRF}}_{\mathcal{B}}(\lambda)$$

Finally, combining all the probabilities we conclude the proof.

B Security of pWEPRF

Theorem 4 *The* pWEPRF = (Gen, F, PuncKey, PuncF, Eval) *described in Figure 5 with* $\mathcal{O} = e\mathcal{O}$ *is a selectively secure puncturable witness-extractable pseudorandom function if* pPRF *is a secure puncturable pseudorandom function and* $e\mathcal{O}$ *is an extractability obfuscator for the circuit class* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$.

Proof. We prove the security by showing indistinguishability of the following games. We start with Game 0 which is the standard selective security experiment as in Def. 8. Let G_i be the event $b = b'$ in each Game i.
Game 0 $\Rightarrow$ Game 1: Game 1 is exactly same as the Game 0 except we replace the circuit $C[\mathsf{K}]$ with a new circuit $C[\mathsf{K}, x^*]$ defined in Fig. 11. Suppose, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish between Game 0 and Game 1 with non-negligible advantage then

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{Game\ 0\text{-}1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{G}_0] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_1]| \geq \tfrac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)}$$

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda)$
3. $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{K}, x^*])$
4. set $\mathsf{ek} = \widetilde{C}$
5. $\mathsf{fk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$
6. $y_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{K}, x^*), y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
7. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
8. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, y_b)$
9. return 1 if $b = b'$

$C[\mathsf{K}, x^*](x, w)$

1. if $R(x, w) = 1$
2. if $x = x^*$
3. return $\perp$
4. else
5. $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{K}, x)$
6. return y
7. else
8. return $\perp$

Fig. 11: Game 1

for some polynomial $\mathsf{p}_\mathcal{A}(\lambda)$. We show that there exists a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_\mathcal{E}$ such that $\mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, x^*)$ outputs a witness w^* satisfying $R(x^*, w^*) = 1$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_\mathcal{E}(\lambda)}$.

The two games differ only in the obfuscated circuits. So, we consider a PPT distinguisher $\mathcal{D}$ of $e\mathcal{O}$ as defined in Def. 13. Specifically, $\mathcal{D}$ collects two circuits from a circuit sampler $\mathsf{S}(1^\lambda, \cdot)$ and an obfuscated circuit (from it's challenger), then it simulates the security game for $\mathcal{A}$ as follows:

$\underline{\mathcal{D}(1^\lambda, \widetilde{C}, C[\mathsf{K}], C[\mathsf{K}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})}$:

1. parse $\mathsf{aux} = (\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, y^*)$
2. set $\mathsf{ek} = \widetilde{C}, y_0 = y^*$
3. $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
4. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
5. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, y_b)$
6. return 1 if $b = b'$

$\underline{\mathsf{S}(1^\lambda, x^*)}$

1. $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda)$
2. construct $C[\mathsf{K}], C[\mathsf{K}, x^*]$
3. $y^* \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$
4. $\mathsf{fk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$
5. set $\mathsf{aux} = (\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, y^*)$
6. return $(C[\mathsf{K}], C[\mathsf{K}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})$

If $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{K}])$, then $\mathcal{D}$ simulates Game 0 and if $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{K}, x^*])$, then $\mathcal{D}$ simulates Game 1. Therefore, $\mathcal{D}$ can distinguish between the obfuscated circuits with the same advantage $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{Game\ 0\text{-}1}}(\lambda)$ of $\mathcal{A}$. By the extractability property of $e\mathcal{O}$, there exists a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}'$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}$ such that $\mathcal{E}'(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{K}], C[\mathsf{K}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})$ outputs an input $(\bar{x}, \bar{w})$ at which the two circuits differ with probability at least $\frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}(\lambda)}$. Note that, the two circuits differ only when $\bar{x} = x^*$ and $R(x^*, \bar{w}) = 1$.

Thus, the extractor $\mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, x^*)$ of pWEPRF simply runs $\mathsf{S}(1^\lambda, x^*)$ to obtain $(C[\mathsf{K}], C[\mathsf{K}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})$ and then executes $\mathcal{E}'(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{K}], C[\mathsf{K}, x^*], \mathsf{aux})$ to get a witness w^* such that $R(x^*, w^*) = 1$ holds with probability at least $\frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}(\lambda)}$. Hence, we can set $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}} = \mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}$ and we note that $\mathcal{E}$ is a PPT extractor since $\mathsf{S}(\cdot)$ runs in $\mathrm{poly}(\lambda)$ time and $\mathcal{E}'$ is a PPT extractor.

Game 1 $\Rightarrow$ Game 2: In Game 2, we set $\mathsf{ek} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*])$. The circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*]$ is the same as the circuit $C[\mathsf{K}, x^*]$ defined in Fig. 11 except that we compute $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.PuncEval}(\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x)$ in line 5. We see that the two circuits are functionally equivalent. Suppose, $(\bar{x}, \bar{w})$ be any arbitrary input to the circuits. If $\bar{x} \neq x^*$, then the circuits return the same value as $\mathsf{pPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{K}, \bar{x}) = \mathsf{pPRF.PuncEval}(\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, \bar{x})$. If $\bar{x} = x^*$ then the circuits return $\perp$ because of the check in line 1 or 2. Therefore, by the extractability property of $e\mathcal{O}$ (Def. 13), we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_1] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_2]| = \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{D}}^{e\mathcal{O}}(\lambda) = \mu(\lambda)$$

where μ is a negligible function of λ. If the advantage is not bounded by a negligible function of λ, then there exists an extractor $\mathcal{E}'$ which would produce an input where the two circuits differ, leading towards a contradiction as the circuits are equivalent.

Suppose, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in Game 2 is non-negligible. Then we construct an adversary $\mathcal{B}$ which will break the security of pPRF with the same advantage.
$\underline{\mathcal{B}(1^\lambda, x^*)}$:

1. send x^* to its challenger
2. The pPRF-challenger does the following:
   (a) generate $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda)$
   (b) compute $\mathsf{fk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$
   (c) set $y_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{pPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{K}, x^*)$ and $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
   (d) pick $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
   (e) return (fk_{x^*}, y_b) to $\mathcal{B}$
3. compute $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, x^*])$ and set $\mathsf{ek} = \widetilde{C}$

4. get $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{fk}_{x^*}, y_b)$
5. return 1 if $b = b'$

Note that $\mathcal{B}$ perfectly simulates Game 2 for $\mathcal{A}$. If $\mathcal{A}$ can guess the bit b in Game 2 with a non-negligible advantage, then $\mathcal{B}$ breaks the security of pPRF with the same advantage. Therefore, the security of pPRF guarantees that

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_2] - \tfrac{1}{2}| = \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{pPRF}}(\lambda)$$

Combining all the advantages we have

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWEPRF},R}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{G}_0] - \frac{1}{2}| &\leq \sum_{i=0}^{1} |\Pr[\mathsf{G}_i] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_{i+1}]| + |\Pr[\mathsf{G}_2] - \frac{1}{2}| \\
&= \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{Game\ 0\text{-}1}}(\lambda) + \mu(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{B}}^{\mathsf{pPRF}}(\lambda) \\
&< \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{Game\ 0\text{-}1}}(\lambda) + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{(by the assumptions in the theorem)}
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $|\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWEPRF},R}(\lambda) - \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{Game\ 0\text{-}1}}(\lambda)| < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ implies $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{Game\ 0\text{-}1}}(\lambda) = \mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWEPRF},R}(\lambda)$ excluding the negligible term. Hence, by the similar arguments as in the transition from Game 0 to Game 1, we conclude that if $\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{pWEPRF},R}(\lambda) \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)}$ for some polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$, then there exists an extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}$ such that $\Pr[w^* \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, x^*) : R(x^*, w^*) = 1] \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)}$.

C Offline Functional Witness Encryption

Definition 14 An offline functional witness encryption (OFWE) scheme for an NP language L with a relation R and a class of functions $\{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}$ is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup, Enc, Dec) defined as follows:

- $(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, R)$: on input a security parameter λ and a relation $R : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{W} \to \{0,1\}$, returns two public parameters $\mathsf{pp_e}$ for encryption and $\mathsf{pp_d}$ for decryption.
- $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp_e}, x, f, m)$: returns c, an encryption of the message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ under a function $f : \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{W} \to \mathcal{M}'$ with respect to the statement $x \in \mathcal{X}$.
- $\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{pp_d}, c, w) \in \mathcal{M}' \cup \{\perp\}$: a deterministic algorithm that decrypts the ciphertext c using a witness $w \in \mathcal{W}$ and returns a value $m' \in \mathcal{M}'$, or $\perp$ if it fails.

The OFWE scheme is said to be correct if the following holds:

– *correctness*: For all $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}, x \in \mathcal{X}$, $w \in \mathcal{W}$, $m \in \mathcal{M}, f \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda$ and $(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, R)$, we require that

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Dec}(\mathsf{pp_d}, \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp_e}, x, f, m), w) = f(m, w) : R(x, w) = 1] = 1$$

We consider semi-adaptive security model for OFWE described in the experiment $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{OFWE},R}(1^\lambda)$ (Fig. 12).

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, R)$
3. $((f_0, m_0), (f_1, m_1)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
4. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
5. $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp_e}, x^*, f_b, m_b)$
6. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
7. return 1 if $(b' = b) \wedge (|f_0| + |m_0| = |f_1| + |m_1|) \wedge (f_0(m_0, w) = f_1(m_1, w) \forall w \in \mathcal{W}$ s.t. $R(x^*, w) = 1)$

Fig. 12: $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{OFWE},R}(1^\lambda, b)$

1. $(x^*, f, m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^\lambda, R)$
3. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
4. $c \leftarrow \mathsf{Enc}(\mathsf{pp_e}, x^*, f, m_b)$
5. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}, c)$
6. return 1 if $(b' = b) \wedge (|m_0| = |m_1|)$

Fig. 13: $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{EOFWE},R}(1^\lambda, b)$

Definition 15 An offline functional witness encryption OFWE for an NP language L with a relation R and a class of functions $\{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}$ is said to be semi-adaptively secure if, for all PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$, there exists a negligible function negl such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{OFWE},R}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{OFWE},R}(1^\lambda) = 1] - \tfrac{1}{2}| < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$$

For extractable offline functional witness encryption we consider security in selective model where $\mathcal{A}$ has to submit a challenge tuple (x^*, f, m_0, m_1) before the setup. We call this experiment as $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{EOFWE},R}(1^\lambda)$ defined in Fig. 13.

Definition 16 An offline functional witness encryption OFWE is said to be selectively secure extractable offline functional witness encryption (EOFWE) for an NP language L with a relation R and a class of functions $\{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}$, if for any PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and for any polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ there exist a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}$ such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{EOFWE},R}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{EOFWE},R}(1^\lambda) = 1] - \frac{1}{2}| \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)}$$

$$\Rightarrow \Pr\left[w^* \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, (x^*, f, m_0, m_1)) : \begin{matrix} R(x^*, w^*) = 1 \wedge \\ f(m_0, w^*) \neq f(m_1, w^*) \end{matrix}\right] \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)}$$

C.1 Construction: (Extractable) Offline Functional Witness Encryption

Here, we present our construction of OFWE = (Setup, Enc, Dec) for an NP language L with a relation $R : \mathcal{X} \times \mathcal{W} \to \{0,1\}$ and a class of functions $\{\mathcal{F}_\lambda\}$. We consider the statement space $\mathcal{X}$ to be $\{0,1\}^\lambda$ and $\mathcal{W} = \{0,1\}^n$ where n is a polynomial in the security parameter λ. We utilize the following set of primitives for our construction:

- A pseudorandom generator $\mathsf{PRG} : \{0,1\}^\lambda \to \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$.
- A CIND secure symmetric key encryption SKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec).
- A pWPRF = (Gen, F, PuncKey, PuncF, Eval) for the NP language $L' = \{(x, v) : \exists u \in \{0,1\}^\lambda$ such that $\mathsf{PRG}(x \oplus u) = v\}$ with a relation $R' : \mathcal{X}' \times \mathcal{W}' \to \{0,1\}$. So, $R'((x, v), u) = 1$ if $\mathsf{PRG}(x \oplus u) = v$, 0 otherwise.



Fig. 14: Construction of OFWEs with optimal ciphertexts where $\mathcal{O}$ is either $i\mathcal{O}$ for normal OFWE or $e\mathcal{O}$ for extractable OFWE (EOFWE)

– An obfuscator $\mathcal{O}$ for the class of circuits $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ required in the constructions. The only difference between the constructions of OFWE and extractable OFWE (EOFWE) is that: $\mathcal{O}$ is an indistinguishability obfuscator ($i\mathcal{O}$) for OFWE whereas $\mathcal{O}$ is an extractability obfuscator ($e\mathcal{O}$) for EOFWE.

Our OFWE construction is described in Fig. 3. We assume that the circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}] \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$ and $\mathcal{O}$ is an $i\mathcal{O}$. For correctness, we need to ensure that the same key $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$ is generated during encryption and decryption of OFWE. Note that, we evaluate y using the $\mathsf{pWPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{ek}, \cdot, \cdot)$ with a statement (x, v) and a witness u such that $R'((x, v), u) = 1$. In decryption, we generate y inside the circuit $\widetilde{C}$ using $\mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, \cdot)$ with the statement (x, v) extracted from the ciphertext. By the correctness of Eval, we ensure that the same randomness y is used while decryption and hence $\mathsf{SKE.Dec}(\mathsf{K}, c_s)$ returns (f, m) that was encrypted in Enc if $R(x, w) = 1$. Finally, the functionality of $i\mathcal{O}$ guarantees that $\widetilde{C}$ returns $f(m, w)$ as required.

Efficiency: The ciphertext size of our OFWEs is also compact. Excluding the size of the instance, the ciphertext size can be written as $|c_s| + |v| = |m| + |f| + 2\lambda$ where $|m|, |f|$ denote the size of message and function respectively. Note that, in SKE the size of ciphertexts are usually equal to the size of plaintexts. Hence, the ciphertext size of OFWE is *optimal*. To encrypt a larger message with an arbitrary function, one can split the plaintext into blocks of equal length (as supported by the SKE) and then use a suitable modes of operation to encrypt it with the same key K. We use the same key K to decrypt the ciphertext of SKE and get back the original message. The size of the public parameter for encryption ek (or $\mathsf{pp_e}$) is independent of the prime relation R. It depends on the fixed relation R' which verifies only a PRG computation. Hence, our OFWE encryption is the most efficient among the existing constructions.



Fig. 15: Game 1



Fig. 16: Game 2

Theorem 5 *The* OFWE = (Setup, Enc, Dec) *described in Figure 14 with* $\mathcal{O} = i\mathcal{O}$ *is a semi-adaptively secure offline functional witness encryption if* PRG *is a secure pseudorandom generator,* pWPRF *is a selectively secure puncturable witness pseudorandom function,* $i\mathcal{O}$ *is an indistinguishability obfuscator for the circuit class* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ *and* SKE *is a* CIND *secure symmetric key encryption. More specifically, for any PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, there exist PPT adversaries* $\mathcal{B}_1$*,* $\mathcal{B}_2$*,* $\mathcal{B}_3$ *and a PPT distinguisher* $\mathcal{D}$ *such that:*

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{OFWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRG}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R'}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SKE}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{i\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda)$$

Proof. The proof is partly similar to the proof of Th. 1. In contrast to a normal OWE, here we are allowing decryption for the challenge statement x^* whenever $f_0(m_0, w) = f_1(m_1, w)$ holds for a witness w satisfying $R(x^*, w) = 1$.

We start with Game 0 which is the standard security experiment $\mathsf{Expt}^{\mathsf{OFWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(1^\lambda)$ as defined in Fig. 12. For Game i, we denote by $\mathsf{G_i}$ the event $b = b'$. In each game, we assume $\mathcal{A}$ submits $(f_0, m_0), (f_1, m_1) \in \mathcal{F}_\lambda \times \mathcal{M}$ such that $|f_0| + |m_0| = |f_1| + |m_1|$ and for all $w \in \mathcal{W}$ satisfying $R(x^*, w) = 1$ it holds that $f_0(m_0, w) = f_1(m_1, w)$. The circuits used in the security proof are assumed to be padded to a fixed maximum size.

Game 0 $\Rightarrow$ Game 1: In Game 0, we generate the encryption key as $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$ where $y^* \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{ek}, (x^*, v), u)$. But, Game 1 (Fig. 15) directly sets $y^* \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$ without using the witness u. By the correctness of Eval:

$$\mathsf{pWPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{ek}, (x^*, v), u) = \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v)) \text{ as } R'((x^*, v), u) = 1.$$

It is clear that the distribution of ciphertexts in both the games are identical and hence we have $\Pr[\mathsf{G_0}] = \Pr[\mathsf{G_1}]$.

Game 1 $\Rightarrow$ Game 2: In Game 2, described in Fig. 16, we pick v uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$ instead of computing $v \leftarrow \mathsf{PRG}(x^* \oplus u)$. Note that, given x^*, the distribution of $x^* \oplus u$ is uniform over $\{0,1\}^\lambda$ for $u \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda$. By the security of PRG (Def. 1), the distinguishing advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ between Game 1 and Game 2 is written as

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
3. $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$, set $z^* = (x^*, v)$
4. $\mathsf{fk}_{z^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$
5. $y^* \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$
6. $\mathsf{K}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y^*)$
7. $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, z^*])$
8. set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
9. $((f_0, m_0), (f_1, m_1)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
10. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
11. $c_s \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Enc}(\mathsf{K}^*, (f_b, m_b))$
12. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
13. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
14. return 1 if $(b = b')$

Fig. 17: Game 3

1. $x^* \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
3. $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$, set $z^* = (x^*, v)$
4. $\mathsf{fk}_{z^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$
5. $y^* \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
6. $\mathsf{K}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y^*)$
7. $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, z^*])$
8. set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
9. $((f_0, m_0), (f_1, m_1)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
10. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
11. $c_s \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Enc}(\mathsf{K}^*, (f_b, m_b))$
12. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
13. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
14. return 1 if $(b = b')$

Fig. 18: Game 4

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_1] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_2]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRG}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{B}_1$ is a PRG-adversary.

Game 2 $\Rightarrow$ Game 3: We describe Game 3 in Fig. 17 where we replace the circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}]$ by the circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, z^*]$ and set the public parameter for decryption as $\mathsf{pp_d} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, z^*])$. The new circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, z^*]$ works as follows:

$C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, z^*](c, w)$

parse $c = (c_s, x, v)$
if $R(x, w) = 1$
  if $(x, v) = z^*$
    $(f, m) \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Dec}(\mathsf{K}^*, c_s)$
    return $f(m, w)$
  else $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncF}(\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, (x, v))$
      $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$
      $(f, m) \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Dec}(\mathsf{K}^*, c_s)$
      return $f(m, w)$
else
  return $\perp$

Note that, the two circuits $C[\mathsf{fk}]$ and $C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, z^*]$ are functionally equivalent. Let $(\bar{c}, \bar{w})$ be any arbitrary input where $\bar{c} = (\bar{c}_s, \bar{x}, \bar{v})$. If $(\bar{x}, \bar{v}) = z^*$, then both the circuits use K^* to decrypt $\bar{c}_s$ whenever $R(x^*, \bar{w}) = 1$ holds; otherwise output $\perp$. If $(\bar{x}, \bar{v}) \neq z^*$, then by the correctness of PuncF we have

$$\mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (\bar{x}, \bar{v})) = \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncF}(\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, (\bar{x}, \bar{v}))$$

and hence $C[\mathsf{fk}](\bar{c}, \bar{w}) = C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, z^*](\bar{c}, \bar{w})$. Therefore, by the indistinguishability property of $i\mathcal{O}$, we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_2] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_3]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{i\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{D}$ is a PPT distinguisher for $i\mathcal{O}$.

Game 3 $\Rightarrow$ Game 4: In Game 4, described in Fig. 18, we sample y uniformly at random from $\mathcal{Y}$ which is the co-domain of $\mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, \cdot)$. We need to show that if $\mathcal{A}$ is able to distinguish between these two games, then there is an adversary $\mathcal{B}_2$ which will break the selective security of pWPRF (defined in Fig. 1) with the same advantage. Let $z^* = (x^*, v)$ be the challenge statement of $\mathcal{B}_2$ for a random $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$.

$\mathcal{B}_2(1^\lambda, z^*)$:

1. send z^* to its challenger
2. The pWPRF-challenger does the following:
   (a) generate $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
   (b) compute a punctured key $\mathsf{fk}_{z^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$
   (c) set $y_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$ and $y_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{Y}$
   (d) pick $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
   (e) return $(\mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, y_{\tilde{b}})$ to $\mathcal{B}_2$
3. compute the encryption key as $\mathsf{K}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y_{\tilde{b}})$
4. compute $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow i\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, z^*])$ and set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
5. receive $((f_0, m_0), (f_1, m_1)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d})$
6. pick $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
7. compute the ciphertext as $c_s \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Enc}(\mathsf{K}^*, (f_b, m_b))$
8. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
9. get $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(c)$
10. return 1 if $(b = b')$

It is important to observe that $z^* = (x^*, v) \notin L'$ with overwhelming probability. Since $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$, the probability that $\mathsf{PRG}(x^* \oplus u) = v$ for some u drawn uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^\lambda$ is at most $2^{-\lambda}$ which is negligible in λ. So, $\mathcal{B}_2$ is an honest pWPRF-adversary.

If the pWPRF-challenger picks $\tilde{b} = 0$ then $\mathcal{B}_2$ simulates Game 3, and if it chooses $\tilde{b} = 1$ then $\mathcal{B}_2$ simulates Game 4. Therefore, the advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in distinguishing between Game 3 and Game 4 is the same as the advantage of $\mathcal{B}_2$ in breaking the selective security of pWPRF. We get the following:

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_3] - \Pr[\mathsf{G}_4]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pWPRF}, R'}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda)$$

Finally, we note that in Game 4, the encryption key is computed as $\mathsf{K}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y^*)$ where y^* is sampled uniformly and independently from $\mathcal{Y}$. Therefore, by the CIND security of SKE (Def. 5) we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{G}_4] - \tfrac{1}{2}| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SKE}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{B}_3$ is an adversary of CIND security game. We conclude the proof by combining all the adversarial advantages.

Next, we discuss the security of extractable OFWE in the following theorem.

Theorem 6 *The* $\mathsf{EOFWE} = (\mathsf{Setup}, \mathsf{Enc}, \mathsf{Dec})$ *described in Figure 14 with* $\mathcal{O} = e\mathcal{O}$ *is a selectively secure extractable offline functional witness encryption if* PRG *is a secure pseudorandom generator,* pWPRF *is a selectively secure puncturable witness pseudorandom function,* $e\mathcal{O}$ *is an extractability obfuscator for the circuit class* $\mathcal{C}_\lambda$ *and* SKE *is a* CIND *secure symmetric key encryption.*

1. $(x^*, f, m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\lambda)$
2. $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
3. set $X^* = (x^*, f, m_0, m_1)$
4. $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*])$
5. set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
6. $u \leftarrow \{0,1\}^\lambda, v \leftarrow \mathsf{PRG}(x^* \oplus u)$
7. $y^* \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Eval}(\mathsf{ek}, (x^*, v), u)$
8. $\mathsf{K}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y^*)$
9. $b \leftarrow \{0,1\}$
10. $c_s \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Enc}(\mathsf{K}^*, (f, m_b))$
11. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
12. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}, c)$
13. return 1 if $b = b'$

$C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*](c, w)$

1. parse $c = (c_s, x, v)$
2. if $R(x, w) = 1$
3. $\quad y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x, v))$
4. $\quad \mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$
5. $\quad (\hat{f}, \hat{m}) \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Dec}(\mathsf{K}, c_s)$
6. $\quad$ if $(x = x^*) \wedge (f = \hat{f}) \wedge (f(m_0, w) \neq f(m_1, w))$
7. $\quad\quad$ return $\perp$
8. $\quad$ else
9. $\quad\quad$ return $\hat{f}(\hat{m}, w)$
10. else
11. $\quad$ return $\perp$

Fig. 19: EGame 1

Proof. We begin the proof with the standard EOFWE experiment $\mathsf{Expt}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{EOFWE},R}(1^\lambda)$ which is described in Def. 16. Here, we name it as EGame 0 and denote the security games by EGame i. In each EGame i, we consider $\mathsf{EG_i}$ as the event $b = b'$. We assume that $\mathcal{A}$ submits a challenge tuple (x^*, f, m_0, m_1) such that $|m_0| = |m_1|$ and the circuits used in the proof are padded to a maximum size.

EGame 0 $\Rightarrow$ EGame 1: EGame 1 is exactly the same as EGame 0 except we replace the circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}]$ with a new circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*]$ defined in Fig. 19 where $X^* = (x^*, f, m_0, m_1)$. Suppose, the adversary $\mathcal{A}$ can distinguish between EGame 0 and EGame 1 with an advantage

$$\mathsf{Adv}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_0] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_1]| \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)}$$

for some polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$. Then, we build a PPT extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)$ such that $\mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, X^*)$ outputs a witness w^* satisfying $R(x^*, w^*) = 1$ and $f(m_0, w^*) \neq f(m_1, w^*)$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)}$.

We note that two games differ only in the obfuscated circuits. Thus, we consider a PPT distinguisher $\mathcal{D}$ of $e\mathcal{O}$ as defined in Def. 13. In particular, $\mathcal{D}$ collects two circuits from a circuit sampler $\mathsf{S}(1^\lambda, \cdot)$ and an obfuscated circuit (from it's challenger), then it simulates the security game for $\mathcal{A}$ as follows:

$\mathcal{D}(1^\lambda, \widetilde{C}, C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*], \mathsf{aux})$:

1. parse $\mathsf{aux} = (\mathsf{ek}, X^*)$
2. parse $X^* = (x^*, f, m_0, m_1)$
3. set $\mathsf{pp_e} = \mathsf{ek}, \mathsf{pp_d} = \widetilde{C}$
4. follow steps 6-10 as in EGame 1
5. set $c = (c_s, x^*, v)$
6. $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{pp_e}, \mathsf{pp_d}, c)$
7. return 1 if $b = b'$

$\mathsf{S}(1^\lambda, X^*)$

1. $(\mathsf{fk}, \mathsf{ek}) \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.Gen}(1^\lambda, R')$
2. construct $C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*]$
3. set $\mathsf{aux} = (\mathsf{ek}, X^*)$
4. return $(C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*], \mathsf{aux})$

If $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}])$ then $\mathcal{D}$ simulates EGame 0 and if $\widetilde{C} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*])$ then $\mathcal{D}$ simulates EGame 1. Therefore, $\mathcal{D}$ can distinguish between the obfuscated circuits with the same advantage of $\mathcal{A}$ in distinguishing EGame 0 and EGame 1.

By the extractability property of $e\mathcal{O}$ (Def. 13), there exists an extractor $\mathcal{E}'$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}(\lambda)$ such that $\mathcal{E}'(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*], \mathsf{aux})$ outputs an input $(\bar{c}, \bar{w})$ at which the two circuits differ with probability at least $\frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}(\lambda)}$. Note that, the two circuits differ only when $\bar{c} = (\bar{c}_s, x^*, \bar{v})$ is well formed and $\bar{c}_s$ is an encryption of (f, m) such that $f(m_0, \bar{w}) \neq f(m_1, \bar{w})$ with $R(x^*, \bar{w}) = 1$.

Now, the extractor $\mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, X^*)$ of EOFWE simply runs $\mathsf{S}(1^\lambda, X^*)$ to obtain $(C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*], \mathsf{aux})$ and then executes $\mathcal{E}'(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}], C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*], \mathsf{aux})$ to get a witness w^* satisfying $R(x^*, w^*) = 1$ and $f(m_0, w^*) \neq f(m_1, w^*)$ with probability at least $\frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}(\lambda)}$. Therefore, we take $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}} = \mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}'}$ and note that $\mathcal{E}$ is a PPT extractor since $\mathsf{S}(\cdot)$ runs in poly(λ) time and $\mathcal{E}'$ is a PPT extractor.

EGame 1 $\Rightarrow$ EGame 2: EGame 2 is exactly the same as EGame 1 except in line 7 of Fig. 19 where we compute $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$. By the correctness of Eval (using the same argument as in the transition from Game 0 to Game 1 of Th. 5), we have $\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_1] = \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_2]$.

EGame 2 $\Rightarrow$ EGame 3: In EGame 3, we choose $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$ instead of computing $v \leftarrow \mathsf{PRG}(x^* \oplus u)$ as in EGame 2. The distribution of $x^* \oplus u$ is uniform over $\{0,1\}^\lambda$ as u is sampled uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^\lambda$. Hence, the security of PRG (Def. 1) implies that

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_2] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_3]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRG}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{B}_1$ is a PRG-adversary.

EGame 3 $\Rightarrow$ EGame 4: In EGame 4, we set $\mathsf{pp}_{\mathsf{d}} \leftarrow e\mathcal{O}(1^\lambda, C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, X^*])$ where $\mathsf{fk}_{z^*} \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncKey}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$, $z^* = (x^*, v)$ for some $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$ and $\mathsf{K}^* \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y^*)$ such that $y^* = \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, z^*)$. The circuit $C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, X^*]$ is described as follows:

$C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, X^*](c, w)$

1. parse $c = (c_s, x, v)$ and $X^* = (x^*, f, m_0, m_1)$
2. if $R(x, w) = 1$
3. if $(x, v) = (x^*, v)$
4. $(\hat{f}, \hat{m}) \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Dec}(\mathsf{K}^*, c_s)$
5. if $(f = \hat{f}) \wedge (f(m_0, w) \neq f(m_1, w))$
6. return $\perp$
7. else return $\hat{f}(\hat{m}, w)$
8. else $y \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncF}(\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, (x, v))$
9. $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y)$
10. $(\hat{f}, \hat{m}) \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Dec}(\mathsf{K}, c_s)$
11. if $(x = x^*) \wedge (f = \hat{f}) \wedge (f(m_0, w) \neq f(m_1, w))$
12. return $\perp$
13. else return $\hat{f}(\hat{m}, w)$
14. else
15. return $\perp$

It is easy to follow that the circuits $C[\mathsf{fk}, X^*], C[\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, \mathsf{K}^*, X^*]$ compute the same function. Suppose, $(\bar{c} = (\bar{c}_s, \bar{x}, \bar{v}), \bar{w})$ is any arbitrary input to the circuits. If $z^* = (x^*, v) \neq (\bar{x}, \bar{v})$ then by the correctness of PuncF we have pWPRF.F(fk,

$(\bar{x}, \bar{v})) = \mathsf{pWPRF.PuncF}(\mathsf{fk}_{z^*}, (\bar{x}, \bar{v}))$ and hence the circuits compute the same function. On the other hand, if $z^* = (\bar{x}, \bar{v})$, then both circuits use K^* as the SKE decryption key. By the extractability property of $e\mathcal{O}$ (Def. 13), we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_3] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_4]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{e\mathcal{O}}_{\mathcal{D}}(\lambda) = \mu(\lambda)$$

where μ is a negligible function of λ. If the advantage is not bounded by a negligible function of λ, then there exists an extractor $\mathcal{E}'$ which would produce an input where the two circuits differ, leading towards a contradiction as the circuits are equivalent.

EGame 4 $\Rightarrow$ EGame 5: EGame 5 samples y^* uniformly at random from $\mathcal{Y}$ instead of computing $y^* \leftarrow \mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, (x^*, v))$ as in EGame 4, where $\mathcal{Y}$ is the co-domain of $\mathsf{pWPRF.F}(\mathsf{fk}, \cdot)$. Note that the probability of $z^* = (x^*, v) \in L'$ for a random $v \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{2\lambda}$ is negligible in λ. This means z^* is an eligible candidate to become a challenge query for a pWPRF-adversary. By the selective security of pWPRF, we have

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_4] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_5]| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R'}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda)$$

where $\mathcal{B}_2$ is a pWPRF-adversary. We skip the reduction as it is similar to the reduction described in the transition from Game 3 to Game 4 of Th. 5.

Finally, the encryption key in EGame 5 is computed as $\mathsf{K} \leftarrow \mathsf{SKE.Gen}(1^\lambda; y^*)$ where y^* is a fresh randomness which is independent of the challenge statement x^*. Thus,the CIND security of SKE (Def. 5) guarantees that

$$|\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_5] - \tfrac{1}{2}| = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SKE}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda).$$

where $\mathcal{B}_3$ is an adversary of CIND security game. Combining all the probabilities, we get

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EOFWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = |\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_0] - \frac{1}{2}| &\leq \sum_{i=0}^{4} |\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_i] - \Pr[\mathsf{EG}_{i+1}]| + |\Pr[\mathsf{EG}_5] - \frac{1}{2}| \\
&= \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{PRG}}_{\mathcal{B}_1}(\lambda) + \mu(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{pWPRF},R'}_{\mathcal{B}_2}(\lambda) + \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SKE}}_{\mathcal{B}_3}(\lambda) \\
&< \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) + \mathsf{negl}(\lambda) \quad \text{(by the assumptions in the theorem)}
\end{aligned}$$

Thus, $|\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EOFWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) - \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)| < \mathsf{negl}(\lambda)$ implies $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EGame\ 0\text{-}1}}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) = \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EOFWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$ excluding the negligible term. Hence, by the similar arguments as in the transition from EGame 0 to EGame 1, we conclude that if $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EOFWE},R}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda) \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)}$ for some polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{A}}(\lambda)$, then there is an extractor $\mathcal{E}$ and a polynomial $\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}$ such that

$$\Pr\left[w^* \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(1^\lambda, (x^*, f, m_0, m_1)) : \begin{array}{c} R(x^*, w^*) = 1 \wedge \\ f(m_0, w^*) \neq f(m_1, w^*) \end{array}\right] \geq \frac{1}{\mathsf{p}_{\mathcal{E}}(\lambda)}.$$