

Towards Defeating Mass Surveillance and SARS-CoV-2: The Pronto-C2 Fully Decentralized Automatic Contact Tracing System*

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May 5, 2020

Abstract

Mass surveillance can be more easily achieved leveraging fear and desire of the population to feel protected while affected by devastating events. Indeed, in such scenarios, governments can adopt exceptional measures that limit civil rights, usually receiving large support from their citizens.

The COVID-19 pandemic is currently affecting daily life of many citizens in the world. People are forced to stay home for several weeks, unemployment rates quickly increase, uncertainty and sadness generate an impelling desire to join any government effort in order to stop as soon as possible the spread of the virus.

Following recommendations of epidemiologists, governments are proposing the use of smart-phone applications to allow automatic contact tracing of citizens. Such systems can be an effective way to defeat the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus since they allow to gain time in identifying potentially new infected persons that should therefore be in quarantine. This raises the natural question of whether this form of automatic contact tracing can be a subtle weapon for governments to violate the privacy of their citizens as part of new and more sophisticated mass surveillance programs.

In order to preserve privacy and at the same time to contribute to the containment of the pandemic, several research partnerships are proposing privacy-preserving contact-tracing systems where pseudonyms are updated periodically to avoid linkability attacks. A core component of such systems is Bluetooth low energy (BLE, for short) a technology that allows two smart-phones to detect that they are in close proximity. Among such systems there are some proposals like DP-3T, PACT and the Apple&Google exposure notification system that through a decentralized approach guarantee better privacy properties compared to other centralized approaches (e.g., PEPP-PT-NTK, PEPP-PT-ROBERT). On the other hand, advocates of centralized approaches claim that centralization gives to epidemiologists more useful data, therefore allowing to take more effective actions to defeat the virus.

Motivated by Snowden's revelations about previous attempts of governments to realize mass surveillance programs, in this paper we first analyze mass surveillance attacks that leverage

*Disclaimer: this work is based on our understanding of all sources of information specified in the bibliography. New relevant documents and revisions of previous documents appear on-line on a daily basis. Not everything is clear to us and thus we ask in the Introduction several natural questions. In case we have misunderstood something or the answers to our questions are known already, we would be happy to be notified and then we will promptly make proper updates.

weaknesses of automatic contact-tracing systems. We focus in particular on the DP-3T system (still our analysis is significant also for PACT and Apple&Google systems) that has been endorsed by Apple&Google. The endorsement has the impact of integrating in the forthcoming updates of Android and iOS special features like a synchronous rotation of the BLE MAC address of the smartphone with the update of the pseudonyms used in the DP-3T system.

Based on recent literature and new findings, we discuss how a government can exploit the use of DP-3T to successfully mount privacy attacks as part of a mass surveillance program.

Interestingly, we also show that the privacy issues in DP-3T are not intrinsic in any BLE-based contact tracing system. Indeed, we propose a different system named **Pronto-C2** that, in our view, enjoys a much better resilience with respect to mass surveillance attacks still relying on BLE. **Pronto-C2** is based on a paradigm shift: instead of asking smartphones to send keys to the Big Brother (this corresponds to the approach of DP-3T), we construct a decentralized BLE-based ACT system where smartphones anonymously and confidentially talk to each other in the presence of the Big Brother.

Pronto-C2 can optionally be implemented using Blockchain technology, offering complete transparency and resilience through full decentralization, therefore being more appealing for citizens. Only through a large participation of citizens contact tracing systems can be very useful to defeat COVID-19, and our proposal goes straight in this direction.

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1 Introduction

Uncertainty and fear may strongly affect citizens' psychology. Public dangers like crimes, terrorism and natural disasters can be an excuse used by a government to set up a mass surveillance program with the actual goal of controlling the population.

In 2013 Edward Snowden disclosed global surveillance programs [CHRT20] opening a worldwide discussion about the tradeoff between individual privacy and collective security.

A common opinion of scientists after those facts is that the task of establishing standards to be used for cryptographic protocols should not be assigned to an organization that decides on its own, without providing the full transparency that such processes deserve.

SARS-CoV-2. A major threat is currently affecting humanity: the COVID-19 pandemic. The aggressiveness and fast spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus have a strong impact on public opinion. Several governments are taking the most restrictive measures of the last decades in order to contain the loss of human lives and to preserve their economies. Fear is spreading, citizens are forced to stay home, many jobs have been lost, and more dramatically the number of deaths goes up very fast day by day.

Automatic contact tracing. According to epidemiologists, a major problem with COVID-19 is that the virus spreads very quickly while current procedures to detect infected people and to find and inform potentially infected people are slow. When a new infected person is detected, too much time is spent to inform her recent contacts and to take proper restrictive actions. Commonly when a new infected person is discovered, by the time her recent contacts are informed they have had already a significant chance to infect others.

In order to improve current systems many researchers are proposing automatic systems for contact tracing. Such systems can dramatically increase chances that recent contacts of an infected person are informed before infecting others. Essentially, whenever a person is diagnosed as infected, immediately all her recent contacts (i.e., persons that have been in close proximity to the infected one) are informed. This allows to promptly take appropriate countermeasures.

Automatic contact tracing (ACT, for short) is therefore considered an important component that in synergy with physical distancing and other already existing practices can contribute to defeating the SARS-CoV-2 virus.

Privacy threats. There are serious risks that ACT systems might heavily affect privacy. Citizens could be permanently traced and arguments like "If you have nothing to hide, you have nothing to fear" (Joseph Goebbels - Reich Minister of Propaganda of Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945) are already circulating in social networks. Governments could leverage the world-wide fear to establish automatic contact tracing systems in order to realize mass surveillance programs.

Motivated by such risks, several researchers and institutions are advertising to citizens the possibility of realizing automatic contact tracing systems that also preserve privacy to some extent. Such systems crucially rely on Bluetooth low energy (BLE, for short).

The BLE-based approach. BLE is a technology that allows smartphones physically close to each other to exchange identifiers requiring an extremely low battery consumption. Such communication mechanism avoids GPS technology and third-party devices like Wi-Fi routers or base stations

of cellular networks. It is therefore a viable technology to allow the design of privacy-preserving ACT systems.

BLE-based tracing is used by Apple in a privacy-preserving system to find lost devices [Gre19]. Matthew Green in a interesting webinar with Yehuda Lindell [GL20] explicitly proposed to start with Apple’s tracing system when trying to design a privacy-preserving proximity ACT system for citizens. Apple and Google have very recently announced a partnership to provide an application program interface for exposure notification (AGEN, for short) [AG20] that can be used to include such features in smartphone applications.

In parallel with the Apple&Google initiative, other BLE-based approaches very similar in spirit have been integrated in ACT systems and are currently used or about to be used in many countries. Such BLE-based systems commonly rely on the use of pseudonyms that smartphones announce through BLE identifier beacons. After a short period each smartphone replaces the already announced pseudonym with a (seemingly independent) new one. Each smartphone receives pseudonyms sent by others and stores them locally. Therefore a smartphone will have a database of the announced pseudonyms and a database of the received pseudonyms. The central idea is that whenever a person is detected infected then smartphones that have been physically close to the smartphone of the infected person should be notified and should compute a local risk scoring. In order to realize this, the smartphone of the infected person should use the above two databases to somehow reach out the smartphones that have recently been physically close to it. This communication is achieved through a backend server as follows. First the smartphone of the infected person will use the above two databases to communicate data to the backend server. The server could run some computations on data received from smartphones of infected citizens. The server will also use collected/computed data to answer pull requests of smartphones that desire to check if there is any notification for them.

Intuitively, the above approach through the unlinkability of the pseudonyms guarantees some degree of privacy. Despite the privacy-preserving nature of the BLE-based approach, the risk that such systems can be misused to realize mass surveillance programs remains a major concern that might slowdown the actual adoption of such systems. Indeed, most governments will not impose their use, leaving to citizens the option to decide¹.

Centralized vs Decentralized BLE-Based ACT. An important point of the design of a BLE-based ACT system is the generation of pseudonyms used by smartphones. Two major approaches have been proposed so far.

In a centralized approach pseudonyms are generated by the server. Each smartphone, during the setup of the ACT smartphone application connects to the server and receives its pseudonyms. Therefore the server knows all the pseudonyms honestly used in the system. This is pretty obviously a clear open door to mass surveillance. Such dangers are discussed in [DT20a]. Currently the centralized approach is part of the protocols named NTK and ROBERT that are developed inside the Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (PEPP-PT) initiative [PEP20].

The decentralized approach breaks the obvious linkability of pseudonyms belonging to the same smartphone by letting the smartphone itself generate such pseudonyms.

While the decentralized approach has a better potential to protect privacy, the centralized approach has a better potential to provide useful data to epidemiologists.

¹There is an explicit recommendation of the EU commission [Com20] towards leaving optional the use of such systems in addition to make sure that privacy is preserved.

Straight-forward decentralized BLE-Based ACT. The most trivial way to realize a decentralized BLE-Based ACT system consists of giving to the server the role of proxy that forwards to non-infected persons the pseudonyms of those infected persons that decide to upload their pseudonyms² after being detected infected. Therefore, everyone, including the server, clearly learns directly pseudonyms that have been used during the previous days by a recently infected persons. Instead the pseudonyms generated by smartphones belonging to non-infected persons are not uploaded to the server. Such pseudonyms remain visible only to whoever was physically close to those smartphones. In terms of privacy, such straight-forward decentralized systems seemingly have a potential to offer a better protection compared to known systems that use the centralized approach. There are a few proposals based on the straight-forward decentralized approach, most notably Decentralized Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing (DP-3T, for short) and Private Automated Contact Tracing (PACT, for short).

Is privacy-preserving ACT a fig leaf? The unlinkability of pseudonyms advertised in BLE identifier beacons is completely useless if the BLE MAC address associated to a smartphone does not change in a synchronized way with the pseudonyms [BLS19]. Notice that iOS and Android are (almost completely) the currently deployed operating systems for smartphones and have some serious restrictions on updating a BLE MAC address. The smartphone application should obviously work in the background and should have control over the BLE MAC address so that this value can rotate along with the pseudonyms announced in the BLE identifier beacons. This contrasts with the above restrictions. Therefore it is absolutely problematic to realize BLE-based privacy-preserving smartphone applications that can efficiently (in the sense of battery consumption) work on (almost) all currently used BLE smartphones, unless some flexibility is allowed by Apple&Google through updates of iOS and Android.

The move of Apple&Google. Interestingly, Apple&Google are promising forthcoming updates for iOS and Android providing AGEN at operating system level³ resolving along with it also the MAC address linkability problem. However the two features are seemingly connected, more precisely: if you want to design a smartphone application that needs to rotate the BLE MAC address synchronously with the content of the BLE identifier beacon then you must use their API and therefore you must use their approach for pseudonym generation and exposition.

This lack of flexibility generates some interesting consequences. First of all, the centralized approach does not seem to be implementable since it relies on pseudonyms generated by the server and then advertised in the BLE identifier beacon by the smartphone. However the generation of pseudonyms can only happen inside the smartphone when using AGEN. Such mismatch seems to imply that the decision of Apple&Google will exclude the centralized approach to privacy-preserving ACT, making non-applicable some decisions of some governments that have a bias towards centralization. Sadly, it also excludes better approaches that avoid reply attacks [Pie20].

In Italy the government assigned to the company “Bending Spoons” the task of realizing a centralized privacy-preserving ACT named “Immuni” [ds]. While the company was initially part of PEPP-PT, “Bending Spoons” has very recently decided to switch to the decentralized approach

²The actual information uploaded is a seed that generates the pseudonyms.

³They will provide only the part concerning the generation, rotation, and exposure of pseudonyms along with a flag to activate/dis-activate this service in the settings. There will not be user applications and neither a server collecting pseudonyms.

using AGEN. This motivates the following natural question. *Q1: Is the change from the centralized to the decentralized approach against the will of the Italian government and therefore forced by Apple&Google’s decision to offer support only for systems compatible with AGEN? More in general, are we fine with being forced to choose the ACT approach decided by Apple&Google?*

Snowden’s revelations included memos confirming the existence of backdoors (e.g., see Dual_EC_DRBG) in standardized cryptographic algorithms [Wik]. Above doubts therefore motivate the following natural question. *Q2: Can we exclude that the system decided by Apple&Google will not be abused to realize mass surveillance programs?*

1.1 Our Contribution

Starting with the inspiring list of attacks presented by Vaudenay [Vau20] and taking into account the answers given by DP-3T in [DT20c], in this work we first analyze the degree of privacy protection achieved by DP-3T with respect to mass surveillance attacks. In such attacks a government through its natural power controls (even partially) the server, the laboratories that check infections and the national territory to realize mass surveillance programs.

We consider quite dangerous the fact that in DP-3T (and all analogue systems) one can be traced even when walking alone, silently. Indeed, a passive antenna can detect the pseudonym without transmitting anything, and can later on check if it belongs to the list of infected persons. It is easy to link the real identity of an infected person with the pseudonyms she used in the last two weeks. Indeed, such antennas can also be installed nearby laboratories where one is tested to check infection and this allows to connect pseudonyms to identity. We believe that this is an open door to mass surveillance and one should instead focus on privacy-preserving systems where silent tracing attempts are ineffective. Also other BLE devices that are in general used for other purposes (e.g., information kiosks) can be used to trace people. Obviously one can not expect that nothing else will be done with BLE except contact tracing, and thus preserving privacy while other uses of BLE continue is a necessary goal. Notice also that the use of active kiosks running precisely the BLE-based contact tracing protocol is actually recommended in [Tea20] (see Remark II in Section 3.2). Instead, we believe that they can be a source of privacy attacks. The lack of privacy with respect to such adversaries is a major thorn in the side of DP-3T and other analogue systems⁴. We stress that the issues exist regardless of the update of the MAC address of the BLE device. Technically speaking, the key weakness of DP-3T is actually a weakness of the straight-forward decentralized approach: asking smartphone applications to hand over the used keys/pseudonyms to the server is like asking citizens to kneel down in front of the Big Brother.

Recently several scientists mainly specialized in cryptography and information security have signed a joint statement [doc20] on contact tracing to state that when multiple possible options are possible one should select the most privacy-preserving solution (as long as it is as effective as others). The decision of Apple&Google is in complete contrast with the above statement since it does not allow to choose among different options and could penalize options that offer more privacy. This motivate the following natural question. *Q3: Since Apple&Google are seemingly excluding the implementation of decentralized privacy-preserving ACT systems that do not follow the straight-forward approach, will the same community of scientists ask Apple&Google to release an update of iOS and Android in order to allow governments to wisely choose the most privacy-preserving*

⁴We will instead show that our Pronto-C2 system does not suffer of such drawbacks, see the paragraphs entitled “Silent tracing” and “Shameless tracing”.

solutions (as specified in [doc20])?

Next we present **Pronto-C2**, a new decentralized privacy-preserving automatic proximity contact tracing system based on BLE. We show that our system is arguably more resilient than DP-3T against mass surveillance attacks, while remaining useful for epidemiologists. Our system can be implemented through government servers but also can be fully decentralized using blockchain technology. We believe that full decentralization can play an important role to help the work of epidemiologists since citizens obviously prefer to use their smartphones in ACT systems that are transparent and resilient to attacks, in addition to being privacy preserving.

1.2 High-Level Overview of Pronto-C2

Our solution can be seen as a paradigm shift compared to the straight-forward decentralized approach. Indeed instead of asking infected people to hand over their keys to the Big Brother, we allow citizens to anonymously and confidentially call each other in the presence of the Big Brother. The way we do it is explained below.

In the 70s Merkle, Diffie and Hellman invented public-key cryptography. Starting with Merkle's puzzles, Diffie and Hellman proposed a key exchange protocol [DH76] (i.e., the Diffie-Hellman protocol) where two parties can establish a secret key K by just sending one message each on a public channel. A message consists of a group element in a setting where the so called Decision Diffie-Hellman assumption holds.

In our view, the most natural way to realize a privacy-preserving ACT system consists of having as pseudonym a group element that corresponds to a message in the DH protocol. This natural idea was also proposed to the DP-3T team by the github user a8x9 [a8x]. In order to actually realize such form of ACT system, one needs to solve the following two main problems.

Anonymous call: realizing a mechanism that allows an infected party to use K in order to call the other party in a secure and privacy-preserving way.

Shortening pseudonyms: making sure that the size of a group element fits the number of available bits in a BLE identifier beacon.

Calling (anonymously) the infected person. We solve the first problem by asking the infected party, after having received a proper authorization from the laboratory that detected the infection, to upload K along with the authorization to a bulletin board. The bulletin board can be just managed by a server as in DP-3T, but we actually suggest to implement the bulletin board with a decentralized blockchain so that we can decentralize the server making the entire process transparent and reliable.

When implementing this step using a blockchain, the verification of the authorization must be performed by a smart contract and thus the check should be accomplished uniquely with public information. For this reason, we suggest the use of digital signatures. In order to make unlinkable the upload of K with the real identity of the infected person, we suggest the use of blind signatures [Cha83]. The basic idea is that laboratories receive from the government some unpredictable activation codes that are then one by one given to infected persons. Then an infected person connects to a service in order to exchange the authorization code with some blind signatures that will be useful to then upload on the bulletin board data associated to calls. In case of use of a blockchain to implement the bulletin board, this exchanges of authorization code with blind signatures is performed off-chain since the server will use a signature secret key and thus it can not be

directly implemented by a smart contract.

In this work when referring generically to a blockchain we always mean a permissioned blockchain (e.g., Hyperledger Fabric [ABB⁺18]). If performance issues require to use a centralized server, then we insist that all data should remain public without leaving any specific private data of the citizens to the server. The only secrets of the server should be the ones that intrinsically identify it as special player in the system (i.e., the TLS secret key associated to the certificate, the secret keys used to identify the action of an organization in the governance of the permissioned blockchain, the secret key associated to the service that exchanges authorization codes with blind signatures). Moreover the server should periodically (e.g., every 10 minutes) notarize on the Bitcoin blockchain the cryptographic hash of the new data arrived in last time interval. This notarization mechanism can represent public evidence of cheating in case there is any fraud on the server, and citizens can obviously switch off the application since a mass surveillance attack might be in progress.

Notice that our approach is therefore completely different from DP-3T. Indeed while in DP-3T the pseudonyms of the infected person are broadcast to everyone (or added to a Cuckoo filter by the server that then transmits the filter) we instead ask the infected party to send a message that is understandable uniquely by the party with which she was in close proximity. Therefore K is more like a phone call where the infected party sends to the answering party the following message⁵ “Hello, it is you that were next to me... and I’ve just discovered that I’m infected”.

Every person that is not infected will connect to the server (or to the blockchain) and will download the recently uploaded keys to search for K (data don’t need to be stored, the search can happen while downloading data). Notice that there is a different key K to check for every BLE identifier beacon received in the last two weeks that has not been already discovered. This step should be preferably performed while the phone is connected to the charger and to a Wi-Fi network. Moreover, for those cases where the daily amount of data to download is excessive, one can think of specifying target states/regions in the country, in order to manage a restricted amount of information. In this case a call would also specify a corresponding state/region.

In addition to K , the infected person can also upload the root of a Merkle tree where the leaves contain committed information (e.g., about BLE signal, location, body temperature) that later on the infected person might like to share with epidemiologists. The binding of the commitment is important to avoid that such information are adaptively changed. The hiding through a Merkle tree is important to leave the ownership of this information to the person until she decides to selectively disclose it.

We remark that avoiding that two smartphones with pseudonyms A and B upload the same K (this would leak some –most likely irrelevant – information), is straightforward: A could just upload $H(K|A|B)$ while B could just upload $H(K|B|A)$ where H is a cryptographic hash function.

Shortening pseudonyms. Current standards suggest at least 256 bits for a group element to safely run the DH protocol over elliptic curves. This size however exceeds the space available in a BLE identifier beacon. Moreover we really stand for defeating mass surveillance attacks and therefore we suggest to be more conservative, using 384 or even 512 bits. One might think to resolve the issue of the small space in a BLE identifier beacon by just resorting to very short (and therefore in our view too risky in case of mass surveillance attacks) keys [a8x20a] or by splitting

⁵The Italian word “Pronto” stays for “Hello” and C2 pronounced in English stays for “it is you” in Neapolitan language as in the title of a very popular song of Nino D’Angelo [D’A83] (see also the movie [Lau83], min. 59:00).

the information into multiple identifier beacons that rotate quickly. We instead propose a different approach that allows to use many bits for the group element while still remaining with one identifier beacon only.

Our main idea follows a different approach: we decouple the group element from the pseudonym precisely like in operating systems a large amount of data is represented by a pointer. Recall that following also previous work, a value announced in a BLE identifier beacon should last only for a few minutes, to then be replaced by a new one. The smartphone will periodically generate new independent group elements for DH and will keep them locally. Since they are too large to be sent in BLE identifier beacons, the smartphone will upload them to a bulletin board. Again, our design is flexible and the bulletin board can be maintained by a server or alternatively be implemented with a blockchain. As above, we support the second option since it gives full decentralization and makes more citizens willing to participate, having more chances to defeat the virus. Notice that this generation of group elements is done only once in a while, and therefore can typically be performed when the smartphone is on charge and is connected to a Wi-Fi network.

Our choice of decoupling the group element from the pseudonym is implemented by setting the 128 bit⁶ pseudonym as the address on the bulletin board of the corresponding group element. In other words, a pseudonym is a pointer to a public memory, therefore one can just refer to a short string to refer to an arbitrarily large amount of data⁷. By using as pseudonym a short representation of the group element, we need a different mechanism to implement the key exchange. Recall that the infected person must compute the key K and push it to the server, while the non-infected person needs to compute the key K to then check if it exists on the server. Starting from a short pseudonym every player will recover the actual group element from the bulletin board that records all group members. This is a fast operation since the pseudonym is the address of the group element and thus there is no need to download a large amount of data or to do any expensive search.

Silent tracing. Our system being based on virtual anonymous call for whoever has been in close proximity with a recently detected infected person, is immediately secure with respect to silent tracing. Indeed when a person walks alone and passes by a silent tracing device, the sole transmission of the pseudonym used in that moment by the smartphone does not allow to understand if later on that person is infected, since there will be no key K that can be found in the list of virtual anonymous calls.

Shameless tracing. A government can also try to trace citizens by having on its territory many devices that behave as smartphones, therefore announcing pseudonyms with the hope of receiving a call or making calls in order to infer some information on the locations and identities of the citizens. It goes without saying that this can be an easy to detect attempt. Indeed the smartphone application could easily inform the owner at any time on the number of BLE identifier beacons that are currently received. Therefore citizens can realize the existence of a malicious device and ask police to destroy them and to identify the criminals that were trying to abuse the ACT system. Any government that would like to save its reputation convincing citizens to still use the smartphone application should take severe actions against such criminals. Obviously if there is no prompt

⁶This is the size for a pseudonym that is commonly allowed by BLE identifier beacons.

⁷A similar idea is used in IPFS [PL20].

reaction of the government then citizens will feel that some attempts of mass surveillance are in progress and will simply switch off the smartphone application.

Notice that the only dangerous BLE devices are the ones that announce the very specific identifier beacon for the location tracing system. There are specific codes to differentiate identifier beacons for different systems. Therefore, in our system, it is still completely fine (i.e., they do not have to be destroyed) to have on the territory devices (e.g., information kiosks) that use BLE to provide other services.

Unlinkability over TCP/IP, timing, and other side-channel attacks. As in all ACT systems, the person owning a smartphone could be identified through the IP address when connecting to servers. Moreover when uploading a batch of group elements some attention should be paid so that they are not linkable. We therefore suggest the use of mixnets, programmed delays, onion routing and uploads of bogus data with the only purpose to confuse and make harder to achieve any profiling attempt.

Replacing DH with other key-exchange protocols. We have proposed the DH protocol because it is computationally efficient and has very low space requirements. Nevertheless our design is flexible and one can use other key-exchange systems as long as there is just one message per party that is moreover independently computed from the other message.

Countermeasures to DoS attacks. Typical DoS attacks can be mitigated with pretty standard approaches, just to mention some: CAPTCHAs, proofs of work, anonymous tokens.

Removing old data from the bulletin boards (even from the blockchains). The entire information available on the bulletin boards does not disclose identities. Moreover it does not allow to link calls with pseudonyms to any player that is not a sender of the call and nor a receiver of the call. Nevertheless, in order not to overload servers with old information (e.g., anything uploaded more than 20 days ago), past data can be removed from the bulletin board pretty easily. If the bulletin board is managed by a server, then old data can just be deleted. If instead the bulletin board is realized through a blockchain, then we suggest that periodically the pointer to the genesis block moves forward to the next block. Essentially the blockchain will always consists of the blocks generated in the last relevant time period (e.g., 20 days). Moreover this process can be made even more transparent by uploading every 10 minutes on the Bitcoin blockchain the cryptographic hash of the blocks generated in the last 10 minutes. This allows everyone to constantly verify that the bulletin board is correctly decentralized and redacted.

Remark on the actual realization of the Pronto-C2 system. As far as we understand, the main obstacle to a realization of the Pronto-C2 system is the decision of Apple&Google to have pseudonyms chosen according to their design only. We hope that this will change soon and Apple&Google will allow also other systems like ours to have the possibility (efficiently, when running in the background) of rotating the MAC address of the BLE device synchronously with the rotation of the pseudonyms. We believe that scientists and governments should join forces to put strong pressure on Apple&Google so that citizens can be ensured that behind their imposed design there is not an attempt to offer a feature for mass surveillance programs.

We believe that the adoption of the Apple&Google AGEN APIs to trace citizens in several countries via DP-3T and other similar systems should be reconsidered in favor of privacy-preserving solutions as requested by [doc20].

1.3 Related Work

Our work mainly focuses on the security of DP-3T [DT20a]. However, the attacks we present are significant to many other straightforward decentralized ACT systems such as MIT-PACT [Tea20], UW-PACT [CFG⁺20] and TCN [TCN20]. Although this has gone unnoticed in the public debate, straightforward decentralized ACT systems are very prone to be abused for mass surveillance purposes. This vulnerability has been acknowledged, as an example, in [CFG⁺20] (Section 3.1.3) it is affirmed: “This can be abused for surveillance purposes, but arguably, surveillance itself could be achieved by other methods”. As previously discussed in MIT-PACT there is even an explicit recommendation to have active BLE-devices that do not correspond to citizens but that can collect pseudonyms of citizens in close proximity.

Several vulnerabilities of DP-3T have been previously analyzed in various works [Tan20, Pie20, Vau20]. Vaudenay [Vau20] presents a detailed list of attacks against DP-3T; some of the attacks in our work are indeed inspired to the ones of Vaudenay, but show with more emphasis the possibility to exploit such attacks for mass surveillance. The DP-3T team reacted to the Vaudenay’s work by presenting a public response to his attacks [DT20c] that does not object on their applicability, and mainly tries to convey the message that those attacks are inherent to any decentralized approach.

Pietrzak [Pie20] proposes solutions and mitigations to replay and relay attacks against DP-3T. Furthermore, Pietrzak identifies the issue of the fact that users in the DP-3T system can easily provide digital evidence of contact with infected users. Tang [Tan20] observes that DP-3T may be subject to identification attacks and presents a comprehensive survey on proximity tracing systems.

Pinkas and Ronen [PR20], building upon a design similar to DP-3T, propose a system with an improved resilience to relay attacks, a better verification of risks and other useful features.

The aforementioned works all focus on decentralized ACT systems. In contrast, there are several centralized proximity tracing systems, in particular TraceTogether[Tra], adopted in Singapore and ROBERT [IPT20], designed by Inria and Fraunhofer (a French and a German research institution respectively).

In [AIS20] the authors review the most prominent European proximity tracing systems, DP-3T, NTK, and ROBERT, analyzing the different adversarial models assumed by each system.

2 Brief Description of DP-3T

In this section, we briefly overview the DP-3T system as reported in the white paper [DT20a]. Two versions of the system are described: the first one, termed as “low-cost”, is more efficient but provides lower privacy guarantees than the second one, which is termed “unlinkable”.

Low-cost design. As in every straightforward decentralized ACT system, smartphones broadcast locally generated ephemeral pseudonyms (EphIDs) via BLE advertisements.

Whenever a smartphone detects an incoming EphID, it locally stores this pseudonym EphID along with a coarse time information and every data which might be needed later to compute the

risk of contagion (e.g., signal strength, duration of the contact). As the word ephemeral suggests, the broadcasted pseudonyms are periodically changed to prevent tracing.

All the EphIDs that a device will ever generate can be deterministically derived from a short uniformly random secret key sk_0 . At each day t , a new secret key is derived as $sk_t = H(sk_{t-1})$ where H is a cryptographic hash function.

Starting from sk_t the whole set of EphIDs for day t , is determined partitioning in 16-byte chunks a string whose length depends on how frequently the EphIDs are changed. Such string is computed as $PRG(PRF(sk_t, c))$ where PRF is a pseudo-random function, c is a fixed public string, and PRG is a stream cipher. The EphIDs obtained with this procedure will be eventually broadcasted in random order.

When a user is tested positive, she uploads the pair (sk_t, t) to a backend server which is trusted to provide this information to all other users and to check that the uploads are performed by authorized users, therefore preventing the dissemination of false positives. In [DT20d], three candidate authorization mechanisms are proposed. After this step, the infected user’s device disappears from the application scenario and her device generates a completely new random secret key sk_0 .

Each user can periodically query (e.g., at the end of the day) the backend server in order to get an update on the new pairs that have been added to the system. Given these pairs, the device can generate the corresponding values EphIDs seeking for matches in its local contact database. If a match is found, the risk of infection is computed given the auxiliary information and the user is notified when needed.

Unlinkable design. In order to get better privacy guarantees at the cost of a larger volume of downloads and storage space needed by the smartphone, the DP-3T team also proposes a slightly different design which they term unlinkable.

In this design, different EphIDs are randomly and independently generated in the following manner: when a new ephemeral pseudonym is needed, the smartphone generates the ephemeral pseudonym $EphID_i$ as $TRUNCATE_{128}(H(seed_i))$.

Smartphones store all the seeds used in a relevant time window (e.g., 14 days). When a patient is tested positive, she can selectively decide which pseudonyms she wants to communicate to the server (e.g., she can exclude pseudonyms used in the presence of specific person).

After this decision has been made, the smartphone uploads the set composed by the selected pairs $(seed_i, i)$. Upon receiving them, for each pair the server computes $H(TRUNCATE_{128}(H(seed_i))||i)$ and inserts it in a Cuckoo filter⁸. Such filters are generated and made available to the users on a regular basis.

Each smartphone uses these filters to determine if contacts with infected individuals occurred. In this regard, the smartphone checks the inclusion of all its recorded ephemeral pseudonyms into the filters.

3 Mass Surveillance Attacks

Mass surveillance is an activity put in place to watch, even discontinuously, over a substantial fraction of the population by monitoring, for example, their movements and/or habits.

⁸A Cuckoo filter is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure used to test whether an element is a member of a set. False positive matches are possible, but false negatives are not.

Even though decentralized solutions guarantee, in general, better privacy compared to centralized ones, mass surveillance is still a possible threat and must be mitigated as much as possible when introducing new intrusive technologies.

Unfortunately, the DP-3T’s low-cost design, as acknowledged by the DP-3T team (cf. SR4 in [DT20b]), opens up the mass surveillance of infected users over the contagion time window. Since it is fairly possible than soon or later everyone will be infected, this means that a very large percentage of the population could be controlled, at least for a time window. This mass surveillance attack can be performed even by an attacker not colluding with the server or the health authorities.

In particular, an attacker can locally store all observed pseudonyms along with a fine-grained time and location log. Since all EPHIDs of a user are deterministically defined by the announced secret key, the attacker is able to link pseudonyms that belong to the same infected individual and can, therefore, leverage this information to track a user’s path over the contagion period. The tracing is limited to the contagion time window and is relative only to infected individuals. Although the impact of this attack could seem limited at a first glance, it can easily scale up to way more creepy scenarios.

In the following paragraphs, we present several possible attacks towards contact tracing systems which, when successful, undermine users’ privacy, eventually leading to undetectable mass surveillance attacks. Furthermore, we evaluate and compare the resilience of DP-3T and our Pronto-C2 system (see Section 4) against such attacks.

Our attacks are inspired by the works of Vaudenay [Vau20], Pietrzak [Pie20] and by the issues reported in the DP-3T git repository [a8x20b, a8x20a]. We carefully take into account these issues and attacks to illustrate more precise scenarios unveiling significant mass surveillance attacks.

3.1 ATK 1 (Paparazzi Attack): Tracing Infected Users With Trusted Server

This attack is similar to the Paparazzi attack reported in [Vau20]. The main difference between the two, is that the Paparazzi attack has as a purpose to de-anonymize infected users, while our attack puts his focus on building a mass surveillance infrastructure to trace citizens.

- **Attacker’s capabilities:** The attacker Adv is anyone with enough economical resources. Adv has the ability to install, in a sufficiently large number of different locations, passive BLE devices. The only capability of a passive device is to operate over BLE channels in reception mode. We also assume that such devices are provided with enough memory to store a significant amount of received data (i.e., pseudonyms and auxiliary information).
- **Attack description:** The passive devices record the observed pseudonyms along with a fine-grained time log. The location of each device is fixed and determined by the attacker Adv . When a user B is tested positive and uploads data into the ACT system, the system itself provides related data to all users. Adv then combines these data with his logs.
- **Attack’s outcome:** Adv computes a fine-grained tracing of infected users during the contagion time window. Furthermore, the attack is practically undetectable by the users since the BLE devices operate only in reception mode.

The low-cost design of DP-3T is vulnerable to ATK 1. It is not difficult to imagine the feasibility of such an attack, as an example, one could consider a company with many stores spread

over the territory. This corporation can have an interest in tracing infected costumers, even if it is not particularly interested in their health conditions, in order to use their movements to perform accurate profiling without costumers' consent.

What is needed is merely the capability to install, in a sufficiently large number of different locations, passive BLE devices recording the received EphIDs. The attack is carried out as follows. The attacker Adv controls a set of passive devices $\{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$.

1. Each passive device D_i collects the information of people that pass nearby D_i , the information stored consists of a set of pairs (EphID_j, τ_j) , where EphID_j is the pseudonym of a user that passes near D_i and τ_j is a fine-grained time log.
2. At the end of the day, Adv downloads the secret key of each infected user from the server and collects all data from each device D_i .
3. Adv checks if each collected EphID_j is generated starting by a secret key sk_j downloaded from the server.
4. Adv tracks the infected individuals who passed nearby the passive devices over a given contagion time window.

In the scenario we envision, the amount of gathered data can be considerably large, thus resulting in a possibly very fine-grained tracing.

The key issue of the low-cost design, leading to the applicability of ATK 1, lies in the fact that when the secret key of an infected person is added to the system everyone can derive all the related EphIDs, enabling the linking of pseudonyms to infected individuals. We point out that this attack is practically undetectable, at least at the application level, since the devices do not need to propagate any signal. Given the huge impact that this easy-to-deploy attack can have on users' privacy, the DP-3T's low-cost design appears utterly unsuitable for practical deployment, unless one wants to give up on protecting citizens from mass surveillance attacks.

3.2 ATK 2 (Orwell Attack): Tracing Infected Users With Colluding Server

ATK 2 differs from ATK 1 only for the capabilities of the attacker.

- **Attacker's capabilities:** The attacker Adv is the same as ATK 1. However, in addition, Adv can collude with the server. Note that the server could be under a significant influence of the government.
- **Attack description:** Adv is analogous to the one described in ATK 1. The only difference is that, along with data provided to all regular users, Adv receives all data that are in possession of the server.
- **Attack's outcome:** see ATK 1.

Unlinkable design of DP-3T is vulnerable to ATK 2. Since the Cuckoo filter allows users to only test inclusion of seemingly uncorrelated EphIDs in the filter itself, the unlinkable design succeeds in preventing ATK 1. However, the claim that “infected people in the unlinkable design are not traceable”, as affirmed in [DT20a] is oversimplified and requires a deeper treatment. In fact,

such claim is true only with respect to attackers who do not cooperate with the server. Considering also the fact that governments might have control over the servers, an attack similar to the one described for the low-cost design can be put in place.

The devices listening on the BLE channels could be deployed or hidden in many ways. As an example consider smart kiosks, which are already used in many cities to provide useful functionalities to the citizens. For the purpose of the description, we will refer to all possible passive devices as kiosks. The attack works as follows:

1. Each kiosk D collects the information of people that pass near D , the information stored consists of (EphID_j, τ_j) where the EphID_j are the pseudonyms of the users that pass near D and τ_j is a fine-grained time log.
2. At the end of the day, D downloads the filters from the server.
3. Each kiosk checks if the collected EphIDs are included in the filters.
4. Adv , that controls the kiosks and colludes with the server, obtains from the server all the seeds of the infected citizens.
5. Adv matches the EphIDs of records stored in the kiosks with the ones generated from the seeds of the infected individuals, thus tracing the infected individuals who passed nearby the kiosks over a given contagion time window.

The element of centralization in DP-3T requiring the server to compute the Cuckoo filter of the EphIDs , enables mass surveillance with low overhead. Moreover, it is almost impossible to determine if a process of surveillance is actually active or not.

Another important point is that governments can do a further step associating a pseudonym to the real identity of an infected user: whenever there is a police checkpoint to control people, the police can be instructed to collect EphIDs and associate them to the name and surname of the controlled persons. When a person is tested positive, the government can check data collected by the police. If one of the EphIDs comes from the seed of an infected person B , the governments can obtain all the movements of B during the contagion time window.

The same thing can happen when a citizen gets tested for SARS-CoV-2. In fact the tests are typically performed after some form of identification. If a citizen B goes to a laboratory and the smartphone application of B is active in the laboratory, EphIDs of B can be detected by a kiosk. If B is eventually tested positive and B uploads the seeds related to time in which he visited the lab, a match between B 's real identity and his movements during the contagion time window can be easily exposed.

Remark I. It is worth noting that these tracking strategies are not only theoretical speculations. Let us consider unpopular citizens or political dissidents, like anarchists. In many countries these persons are observed by governments who want to track them and discover their contacts. Let us say that B is a dissident and consider the following possible scenarios:

- If B goes to a medical laboratory to check if he is infected, the government can force the laboratory to communicate to B that he is positive to SARS-CoV-2. At this point B may choose to send the seeds used in the contagion time window to the server, who eventually puts them in the Cuckoo filter. If B sends these data to the server, the Big Brother can track all movements of B in the last days.

- After **B** is declared positive to SARS-CoV-2 and **B** sends his seeds to the server, it is very likely that someone among contacts of **B** would desire to perform the medical test as well. This opens the possibility for the government to track all persons that were in close proximity to **B** and attack their privacy possibly linking them to the dissident.
- In another possible scenario, the government could control whether a close relative **R** of **B** gets tested and force the laboratory to notify **R** that she is currently infected. In this case, it is likely that **B** will go to the medical laboratory to get tested for the virus as well. From now on, this scenario is analogous to the previous ones.

Remark II. The idea of having kiosks spread over the territory could seem somewhat artificial. However, as stated by MIT-PACT [Tea20], it is possible to justify kiosks as a way to add functionalities to contact tracing systems. In particular, the authors of MIT-PACT state that there should be a way to inform persons if a surface can be contaminated due to the prior presence of an infected individual. Therefore, in their system, kiosks actively participate to the protocol registering and relaying pseudonyms of people who have been in close proximity to the kiosks. By doing so, the kiosks could inform people about the risk of having been in contact with a contaminated surface. In this system, where kiosks are active players and are justified to actively propagate BLE messages, there would be no ways to distinguish malicious kiosks from honest ones. In turn, this could easily open doors to mass surveillance programs operated by governments without being detected.

3.3 ATK 3 (Bombolo Attack ⁹): Leakage of Contacts of Infected Users

- **Attacker’s capabilities:** The attacker **Adv** has the same capabilities as a regular user.
- **Attack description:** When users are tested positive, they upload data to the system. The attacker uses such data to compute additional information beyond his own risk factor.
- **Attack’s outcome:** **Adv** succeeds in computing data about contacts of infected users such as the number of their contacts and co-location information among other infected users.

Systems in which the infected users upload an encoding of the observed pseudonyms are more prone to this attack since the content and the amount of communicated data depend on the actual number of experienced contacts. One could think to mitigate this issue by putting a bound on the number of contacts that a user can notify. However, it is not evident what is the appropriate value for this bound to effectively fight the pandemic.

Also, co-location of infected users is more likely to be exposed since infected users who met each other might end up reporting some linkable information. If at some point two infected users met each other, the information that these users sent to the server may enable the reconstruction of clusters of infected users who have been co-located. Nevertheless, it is hard to imagine how such leakage could be exploited by mass surveillance attacks that are the focus of our work. We remark that systems like DP-3T are not affected by this attack.

⁹Franco Lechner, best known as Bombolo, was an Italian comedian. His characters usually played hilarious but harmless jokes.

3.4 ATK 4 (Brutus ¹⁰ Attack): Creation of Mappings Between Real Identities and Pseudonyms

- **Attacker’s capabilities:** The attacker Adv consists of the server and the health authorities colluding together.
- **Attack description:** Adv exploits the authorization mechanism, also used to avoid uploads of false positives, to find a mapping between the real identity of a user B and her pseudonyms.
- **Attack’s outcome:** a mapping between the real identity of B and her pseudonyms.

Every ACT system where the authorization mechanism to grant an user U permission to upload data consists of simply forwarding to the authentication server some data (e.g., an activation code) provided to U by a health authority, is vulnerable to this attack. In fact, the health authority, who is aware of the real identity of U, can communicate the mapping between the activation code and the real identity of U to the server, which can in turn derive the mapping between this code and data uploaded by U (i.e., U’s pseudonyms). The authorization mechanism is not made explicit in many relevant proposals [Tea20, PR20]. A reason advocated for this choice is flexibility to different deployment scenarios. However, we want to point out that the way this check is performed reflects into serious implications on users’ privacy. DP-3T proposes three candidate authorization mechanisms [DT20d], however none of them address the problem of collusion between the server and the health authority.

3.5 ATK 5 (Gossip Attack): Proving Contact With an Infected User

This attack deals with the possibility to exploit ACT in order to produce plausible digital evidence of an encounter. An attack of this type against DP-3T has already been reported by Pietrzak [Pie20]. Starting from Pietrzak’s work, we give a formulation of such attack against a general ACT.

- **Attacker’s capabilities:** The attacker Adv has the same power as a regular user. Additionally, Adv might get access to a service making him able to prove the ownership of some data at a specific time (e.g., a blockchain).
- **Attack’s outcome:** Adv provides a plausible evidence of having met an infected user B before B declared himself as positive through the ACT system.

Using ATK 5 as a feature. Suppose that, due to the pandemic, laboratories are overwhelmed by requests for tests. In this scenario, having a way to prioritize the requests could be certainly useful. In fact, there could be malicious users trying to fake risk notifications so that they eventually get tested, even if it is not actually needed.

To address this issue, one could leverage ATK 5 as a feature. Laboratories could give a higher priority to users who are able to provide a plausible evidence of having met an infected individual. Depending on the system, a malicious user attempting to provide such fake proof would need collaboration of someone who actually observed at least a pseudonym of an infected user. Such

¹⁰Marcus Junius Brutus was a close friend of Julius Caesar, who took a leading role in his assassination. His name has become synonymous with severe acts of betrayal.

complications might reduce the noise of malicious users trying to create a fake plausible evidence. Therefore, prioritizing users with plausible (though not formally provable) evidence can concretely result in an overall benefit for the society.

This feature could be also very useful in assuring that reliable data are provided to epidemiologists. For example, the DP-3T white paper [DT20a] proposes that users, who are willing to do it, can share additional data with epidemiologists to help them in their analysis. Such additional data are mainly related to encounters between infected individuals, therefore, providing evidence of these encounters could help to ensure that data provided to the epidemiologists are more reliable.

DP-3T is vulnerable to ATK 5. As plausible evidence of an encounter with a user B , A proves to have been in possession, at a time $t_1 < t_2$, of the pseudonym EphID_B of B , who, after having been tested, reported himself as positive to the ACT system at time t_2 . The attack is really straightforward and it is instantiated as in [Pie20]. Whenever A receives a pseudonym from a user B , he commits it to the Bitcoin blockchain. If B is later diagnosed infected and decides to upload his data to the system, A could then prove that he knew the pseudonym of B prior to this upload. To do so, A just needs to open the commitment on the blockchain. This procedure works in the same way for both designs of DP-3T, since the revealed EphID can be easily matched both with the published filters and secret keys. Notice that there is no guarantee about the fact that A himself received the pseudonym over the BLE channel. For example a device D in another (even remote) location could have committed the pseudonym and transferred its opening to A , by e-mail. However, in this case the attacker is actually the pair (A,D) , who indeed met B . As noted in [Pie20], the attack becomes a more serious threat if coupled with de-anonymization of B .

Using ATK 5 as a feature is very problematic in DP-3T. Even though in DP-3T it is possible to provide a plausible evidence of being at risk by leveraging ATK 5 as a feature, it seems, at least at a first glance, that it would not be easily scalable to a considerable portion of the users.

DP-3T does not refer to any explicit procedure to take advantage of this feature. However, the actual utility to provide additional data to the epidemiologists may be seriously compromised if ATK 5 is not taken into account as a feature. In fact, the way the functionality to help epidemiologists is implemented, at least as in the current version of DP-3T white paper [DT20a], presents some shortcomings. In fact, users who want to give a further help in fighting SARS-CoV-2 anonymously communicate data related to contacts they had with infected users. However, in both designs, the system does not provide a mechanism to verify the legitimacy of the alleged contacts. Furthermore, there is also the need to trust the correctness of any additional metadata provided by users, although this seems an inherent problem.

3.6 ATK 6 (Matteotti Attack ¹¹): Putting Opponents in Quarantine

- **Attacker's capabilities:** The attacker Adv colludes with the sever and the health authority. In addition, Adv can place passive BLE devices at selected locations.

¹¹Giacomo Matteotti was an Italian socialist politician who openly denounced the electoral fraud committed by Fascists. He was kidnapped and killed by Fascists. The day he was murdered, Matteotti should have taken a speech at the parliament in which he would have disclosed significant scandals about the Duce.

- **Attack description:** The aim of Adv is to produce false alerts causing non-at-risk users to get tested.
- **Attack’s outcome:** A non-at-risk user is erroneously alerted and declared as positive.

Unlinkable design of DP-3T is vulnerable to ATK 6. Even though the unlinkable design solves in part the issue of linkability of the pseudonyms, the attacker Adv that controls the server gets more power, since Adv can add in the Cuckoo filter every EphID that Adv gets to know. This can cause additional false positives.

If Adv observes EphID_B and EphID_C in the same location and during the same time slot, Adv could add EphID_B and EphID_C to the filter. The probability that checking the filter both B and C are notified a risk is high, since B will find EphID_C in the filter as well as C will find EphID_B. Let’s assume that B is the target of the attack. At this point, if B goes to a laboratory to get tested, the health authority would declare B as positive to SARS-CoV-2.

We motivate the attack with the following example. In the vast majority of world’s country e-voting is not currently deployed, and, also at parliamentary level, voting is always held in presence. Suppose that a law, proposed by the government, risks not to get the approval of the parliament for very few votes. Then a malicious government could attempt to falsely report hostile parliamentarians as positive. Let B be a hostile parliamentarian.

Hidden passive BLE devices could be put in place near the house of B during a given period of time. These BLE devices will intercept the pseudonyms EphID_{Bs} of B and the pseudonyms EphID_{Cs} of C, the wife of B. The EphID_{Bs} and EphID_{Cs} are then added to the filter by the government. Since there is a good chance that B and C will be in close contact during the given period of time, then B and C will be notified a risk. So, it is very likely that the next day B will go to get tested. In this case, the malicious health authority, colluding with the government, could issue an order of quarantine for B so that B will be unable to join the next parliament session.

4 Pronto-C2: Design and Analysis

One of the main drawbacks in previous solutions, in particular in DP-3T [DT20a] and MIT-PACT [Tea20] systems (in all their variants) is the possibility for an attacker to test weather a set of pseudonyms belongs to the same infected person and thus to infer the victim’s movements. The problem is evident in the basic DP-3T protocol but, as analyzed in Section 2, also arises in the DP-3T’s “unlinkable” variant.

Our approach diverges radically from DP-3T in that we turn the paradigm upside down. In our system it is the infected person in charge of publish data directly to people with whom he/she got in touch. It is up to each participant to verify the occurrence of a risk. This is done through careful use of cryptography, still maintaining the system practical.

Pronto-C2: brief overview. In a nutshell, Pronto-C2 works as follows. We assume the generator g of an elliptic curve group of prime order to be known to all participants. For simplicity, we will describe our scheme using a server Server that manages a bulletin board accessible to all participants. As explained in Section 1, our design is flexible, we can have blockchains or just servers depending on the desired level of transparency and performances.

Periodically, each user U performs the following update operation. Let i be the current time slot. U setups a set of ephemeral and secret keys ($\text{Eph}_{U,i+j} = g^{\text{sk}_{U,i+j}}, j = 0, \dots, n-1$ for some parameter n). For $k = i, \dots, i+n-1$, U sends to **Server** the string $\text{Eph}_{U,k}$ and privately stores the address $\text{addr}_{U,k}$ in which $\text{Eph}_{U,k}$ appears on the bulletin board. The idea is that these addresses will be used for the next n time slots. Each n time slots U runs again the update operation, previous keys are not overridden.

At each time slot i , user U proceeds as follows. U broadcasts addr_i and listens for addresses sent by other users. Each address received can be recorded along with auxiliary information.

Consider a simple scenario in which Bob is declared infected for COVID-19 by a medical laboratory and moreover he has been in close proximity to her neighbor Alice at time i (among possibly many other contacts). Let us denote by $\text{Eph}_A = g^{\text{sk}_A}$ (resp., $\text{Eph}_B = g^{\text{sk}_B}$) Alice’s (resp., Bob’s) ephemeral key at the time of the contact. Bob computes $K' = \text{Eph}_A^{\text{sk}_B}$ and uploads to **Server** the “key” $K = H(K' || \text{Eph}_B || \text{Eph}_A)$ after requiring some authentication service **AuthService** to blind sign K . We require signatures by the authentication service to prevent DoS attacks and we use blind signatures to prevent the government to link patients to information on the server. To perform the authentication Bob needs to send to **AuthService** an *activation code* that Bob received by the laboratory when he got the diagnosis. We assume that **Server** accepts only keys with valid signatures.

At the end of the day, if Alice wants to know whether she has been in contact with an infected person, she does the following. For each address she received from a nearby user, she retrieves from **Server** the corresponding ephemeral key so she has the Bob’s ephemeral key Eph_B . She computes $K' = \text{Eph}_B^{\text{sk}_A}$ and $K = H(K' || \text{Eph}_B || \text{Eph}_A)$, downloads from **Server** the recent keys and then search for occurrences of K in the downloaded keys. If K is present she is notified the risk.

Pronto-C2’s system and crypto ingredients. The ingredients of our system are:

- A secure elliptic curve group of prime order p . We assume a generator g of the group to be publicly known to all participants.
- A blind signature scheme. The blind signature is used only to authorize an authentication service managed by the government to sign user’s data while hiding the message. We defer to [Cha83, Cha88, PS96] for the syntax and security properties of blind signatures.
- A server **Server** that is used as a bulletin board (see previous discussion and Section 1). The server allows any user to write data of the type “ephemeral keys” whereas, in order to write a data of the type “key”, a valid (blind) signature issued by the authentication service has to be provided. Keys will be written on the server only if the signature is valid.
- We assume the smartphone application has the capability to communicate with **Server** via TOR [TOR], in particular when uploading to **Server** ephemeral keys. TOR is used to break the link between ephemeral keys and real identities and make difficult to figure out whether two ephemeral keys belong to the same user. Alternative solutions are also possible, but they depend on the specific context in which the system operates, therefore for now we remain generic. Communication via TOR is not necessary for all steps; see the discussion in Section 1.

Pronto-C2’s setting and actors. The actors involved in our protocols are:

- The users who run a smartphone application endowed with a BLE identifier beacon. A generic user will be denoted by U .
- The server (**Server**) that manages the bulletin board.

In the Setup Phase each participant runs as follows.

- **U**: configure the smartphone application and set the time slot to 1.
- **Server**: perform any necessary step to accept incoming read and write requests.
- **AuthService**: publish the public-key for the blind signature scheme, choose random activation codes and distribute a set of them to each **HA**.
- **HA**: receive a set of activation codes from **AuthService**.

Figure 1: Setup Phase.

In the Update Phase executed at time slot i , each user **U** interacts with **Server** as follows.

- **U** → **Server**: for $j = 0, \dots, n - 1$ generate a pair of ephemeral and secret keys ($\text{Eph}_{\text{U},i+j} = g^{\text{sk}_{\text{U},i+j}}, \text{sk}_{\text{U},i+j}$) drawing an element $\text{sk}_{\text{U},i+j}$ at random from \mathcal{Z}_p .^a For $j = 0, \dots, n - 1$ upload $\text{Eph}_{\text{U},i+j}$ to **Server** and store the address addr_{i+j} in which $\text{Eph}_{\text{U},i+j}$ appears on the bulletin board. **HAs** do not perform any operation.

^aTo optimize the space, the user could choose a single seed s during the Setup Phase and in each time slot i derive $\text{sk}_{\text{U},i} = \text{PRF}(k, i)$.

Figure 2: Update Phase.

- A set of medical laboratories (**HAs**) who can engage with users in medical examinations and tests for the virus and release the activation codes to users (see below).
- The authentication service (**AuthService**) that is used to get authorization to write on the bulletin board. **AuthService** releases a set of random activation codes to each **HA**. User **U** is handed an activation code **Code** from **HA** when tested positive and **U** can later use **Code** to request a signature on some data K to **AuthService**. The authentication service will sign K only if **Code** is a valid authentication code released by **AuthService**. **U** can then use the signature to upload K to **Server** (recall that, depending on the type of data to upload, the signature may not be necessary).

The Pronto-C2 system. The Pronto-C2 system is described by the following phases and events. During the execution of the system, each user **U** keeps a set P_{U} that is empty at the onset. We assume each user **U** to keep an internal variable called *time slot*. At the start of the protocol **U**'s time slot is set to 0 and each X seconds the time slot is increased by 1. X is a parameter of the protocol (e.g., 300 seconds).

- Setup Phase. There is a setup phase in which all the involved actors perform the basic setup described in Figure 1.
- Update Phase. There is an Update Phase, described in Figure 2, that is run periodically by each user **U** each n time slots (i.e., when **U** is at time slot j and j is a multiple of n).

We assume each time slot to be short enough to prevent significant linkage of ephemeral keys to users' movements, but long enough to correctly evaluate exposure risks. Moreover, we assume the parameter n to be sufficiently large to not require the users to perform the expensive Update Phase too frequently (e.g., n can be set so that the update is performed each week).

In the Broadcast Phase, each user U proceeds as follows.

- U : Let i be the current U 's time slot. Broadcast the address addr_i generated in the last Update Phase using BLE.

Other participants (HAs, Server and AuthService) do not perform any operation.

Figure 3: Broadcast Phase.

When a BLE message is received, the Listen Event is triggered and each user U proceeds as follows.

- U : let addr_R be the address contained in the received message, i the current time slot and t any other auxiliary information (e.g., BLE signal, location, time).
Add $(\text{Eph}_{U,i}, \text{sk}_{U,i}, \text{addr}_R, t)$ to the set P_U , where $\text{Eph}_{U,i}$ (resp., $\text{sk}_{U,i}$) is the ephemeral key (resp., secret key) that U computed in the last Update Phase.

Other participants (HAs, Server and AuthService) do not perform any operation.

Figure 4: Listen Event.

- Broadcast Phase. There is a Broadcast Phase, described in Figure 3. The Broadcast Phase is run multiple times within the time slot. The frequency with which this phase is executed within a single time slot is another parameter of the protocol.
- Listen Event. The Listen Event, described in Figure 4, is triggered when a BLE identifier beacon is received.
- Test Positive Event. The Test Positive Event is triggered when a user tests positive for SARS-CoV-2 at one of the laboratories of one of the HAs. When a user U gets a positive result for SARS-CoV-2 at HA's lab, U gets from HA an activation code Code . After the test (and possibly during a certain number days), U chooses a subset P'_U of P_U . U can decide upon which time slots to insert in P'_U based on any arbitrary criteria (e.g., can exclude time slots in which U suspects to have met some people to whom he wants to hide his disease) and interacts with **AuthService** to get a blind signature and then perform an upload to **Server**.
More in details, when the event is triggered, U interacts with **Server** and **HA** as depicted in Figure 5.
- Verify Phase. The Verify Phase, described in Figure 6, is carried out by a user U who wants to discover whether she got in contact with some other user U^+ who got a positive result for SARS-CoV-2.

4.1 Analysis of Pronto-C2

In this section we informally argue that Pronto-C2 withstands all the attacks shown in Section 3.

- ATK 1 (cfr., Section 3.1):
Recall that this attack assumes the attacker Adv to use only passive devices which operate in reception mode and are not able to transmit any signal. The only information a passive device

- Interaction between U and HA: once U is tested positive at HA, U gets from HA an activation code Code to interact with AuthService.
- U \leftarrow Server: (at any time after the positive test or during some given time window) choose a subset P'_U of P_U and for each quadruple $(\text{Eph}_U, \text{sk}_U, \text{addr}_R, t) \in P'_U$, retrieve from Server the ephemeral key Eph_R stored at address addr_R , compute $K' = \text{Eph}_R^{\text{sk}_U}$ and $K = H(K' || \text{Eph}_U || \text{Eph}_R)$ and add K to \mathbf{K} , where \mathbf{K} is the set of all keys that U wants to store on Server. Next, do the following:
 - * Interaction between U and AuthService: for each value $K \in \mathbf{K}$ computed by U as before, U uses its activation code Code to interact with AuthService to compute a blind signature σ of K .
 - * U \rightarrow Server: for each $K \in \mathbf{K}$ computed by U as before, send K and σ to Server.
 - * Server \leftarrow U: upon receiving any pair (K, σ) from U, verify σ and if the signature is valid add K to the bulletin board.

Figure 5: Test Positive Event.

- When a user U wants to verify whether she got in contact with any user U^+ who got a positive result for SARS-CoV-2, U engages in an interactive protocol with Server as follows.
- U \leftarrow Server: Let P_U the set computed by U during the protocol execution so far. For each quadruple $(\text{Eph}_U, \text{sk}_U, \text{addr}_R, t)$ in P_U do the following:
 - * Retrieve from Server the ephemeral key Eph_R located at address addr_R . Compute $K' = \text{Eph}_R^{\text{sk}_U}$ and $K = H(K' || \text{Eph}_R || \text{Eph}_U)$, download the recently uploaded keys from Server and search for K .^a If K is present, compute the risk and notify U.
- HAs and AuthService do not perform any operation.
-
- ^aAs we described the protocol, the user does not directly check the signature since the validity of the signatures is checked when the keys are uploaded to Server. For a stronger verifiability guarantee we can change the protocol so that the user is given the possibility to download and check the signatures.

Figure 6: Verify Phase.

D observes consists of ephemeral keys exchanged by users at the position in which D is located. (Precisely, the device observes the addresses on the bulletin board in which such ephemeral keys are stored but for simplicity we will assume that the device observes ephemeral keys.)

Suppose users A and B exchange at D’s location ephemeral keys Eph_A and Eph_B and for simplicity assume A and B to not longer broadcast any other information. So the only information Adv obtains about A and B is thus Eph_A and Eph_B and the keys stored on the bulletin board. (The keys can be related to contacts of users different from A and B occurred at positions not controlled by Adv but Adv can publicly see such keys.)

Suppose H is modelled as a random oracle. Each key K has the form $K = H(K' || \text{Eph}_1 || \text{Eph}_2)$. Consider two mutually exclusive cases.

– Case 1: either $\text{Eph}_1 \neq \text{Eph}_A, \text{Eph}_1 \neq \text{Eph}_B$ or $\text{Eph}_2 \neq \text{Eph}_A, \text{Eph}_2 \neq \text{Eph}_B$.

In this case, K is a random string in Adv’s view since Adv never observed either Eph_1 or Eph_2 . (Precisely, the probability that Adv queries H on either of the two ephemeral keys is negligible.)

– Case 2: this is the negation of case 1, i.e., $\text{Eph}_1 \in \{\text{Eph}_A, \text{Eph}_B\}$ and $\text{Eph}_2 \in \{\text{Eph}_A, \text{Eph}_B\}$. Suppose w.l.o.g. that $\text{Eph}_1 = \text{Eph}_A, \text{Eph}_2 = \text{Eph}_B$.

In this case $K' = \text{Eph}_B^{\text{sk}_A}$. If Adv never queries oracle H on an input with prefix K' then K' is independent from Adv’s view. Moreover, if Adv queries H on an input with prefix K' then Adv can be seen as an adversary of the DH protocol.

In both cases, the only relevant information Adv obtains about A and B are $\text{Eph}_A, \text{Eph}_B$ and a set of random looking keys. Therefore, we conclude that ATK 1’s goal cannot be achieved.

This security argument can be easily generalized.

- ATK 2 (cfr., Section 3.2):

The attack differs from ATK 1 in the fact that the adversary Adv can collude with Server, AuthService and HA. Since U never engages in any interaction with Server, AuthService or HAs on inputs that depend on U’s secret keys, the previous security argument applies to this case as well and this concludes our informal security argument showing that Pronto-C2 is secure w.r.t. ATK 2.

- ATK 3 (cfr., Section 3.3).

Co-location information cannot be leaked since an infected user A will upload to Server a key $K_A = H(\text{Eph}_B^{\text{sk}_A} || \text{Eph}_A || \text{Eph}_B)$ if A passed nearby B and likewise if B is an infected user B will upload the key $K_B = H(\text{Eph}_A^{\text{sk}_B} || \text{Eph}_B || \text{Eph}_A)$ if B passed nearby A. Then, the keys K_A and K_B uploaded by A and B are different and it is hard to “co-locate” these keys. Moreover, in our solution, an attacker cannot infer the number of contacts of an infected user B, since each key K uploaded by B is signed with a different blind signature and B will send these keys to Server one by one adding a delay after sending each of them.

It is important to point out that the unlinkability of the keys introduced by uploading $K = H(K' || \text{Eph}_A || \text{Eph}_B)$ instead of just K' contradicts the message that DP-3T’s risk analysis (SR 6) [DT20b] seems to convey when claiming that “For epochs in which groups of at least three people were in close proximity to each other, this will reveal temporal co-location information about infected individuals to the server”.

- ATK 4 (cfr., Section 3.4):

This attack is not effective against Pronto-C2 since the activation code provided by HA allows the user U to compute a blind signature of the key by interacting with AuthService. This guarantees that neither HA nor AuthService can link the real identity of U to the records U previously stored

on the bulletin board.

- ATK 5 (cfr., Section 3.5):

Notice that all the pseudonyms used by the users are public on the bulletin board. So proving the knowledge of the pseudonym of an infected user B before B declared himself as positive through the system does not help an attacker.

However, with respect to Pronto-C2 one can analyze a variation of ATK 5. In fact, if B is the recipient of an alert $K = H(K' || \text{Eph}_A || \text{Eph}_B)$ raised by an infected user A , B could provide the preimage of K as $(K', \text{Eph}_A, \text{Eph}_B)$ along with the secret key sk_B corresponding to Eph_B . This, similarly to what stated in Section 3.5, could be interpreted by medical laboratories as a form of proof of contact with an infected individual, obtaining a way to prioritize test requests. However what B actually manages to prove is that his publicly known Eph_B has been the target of an alert fired by an infected user. Of course, this does not constitute a firm guarantee that the actual encounter took place.

- ATK 6: (cfr., Section 3.6).

Every key K stored on the bulletin board has the form $K = H(K' || \text{Eph}_B || \text{Eph}_C)$. A user B who at some time t broadcasts Eph_B will be notified of a risk only if B received at time t an ephemeral key Eph_C (here, we are assuming for simplicity that users broadcast ephemeral keys rather than addresses). Therefore, for an adversary Adv to alert B it is needed that B actually met C but in such case the alert corresponds to an actual risk for B and does not represent a successful attack.

5 Conclusion

iiiiii HEAD An unprecedented social pressure is pushing towards the adoption of contact tracing systems in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Automatic contact-tracing system could be abused against citizens. The proven existence of previous attempts to realize mass surveillance programs unveiled by Snowden should urge for a deep and careful scrutiny of the emerging solutions that claim to achieve *privacy-preserving* contact tracing.

In particular, we have analyzed the DP-3T system that has been endorsed by Apple and Google. Currently the DP-3T team and Apple&Google ===== are working together for making possible the deploy of the DP-3T system. Our analysis shows that there are risks that such system can be abused by governments interested in realizing mass surveillance programs. While one can be happy about giving up privacy in order to obtain a more effective response to the spread of the virus, we insist on the fact that the most privacy preserving solution should be used among the ones that are equally useful for epidemiologists, as advocated in [doc20].

We have then shown our new system named Pronto-C2 that is arguably better in defeating mass surveillance attacks and is at least as good as DP-3T in providing data to epidemiologists. In Figure 7 we compare Pronto-C2 with DP-3T in relation to mass surveillance attacks described in Section 3.

Acknowledgments. We thank: Luigi Di Biasi and Stefano Piotto for useful discussions on their BLE-based contact tracing system [ST20] as well as their remarks on decentralized vs centralized approaches in ACT; Alessandra Scafuro and Serge Vaudenay for several constructive comments on our work; Francesco Pasquale for pointing out some unclear sentences in the previous version of this paper; Dario Fiore for some remarks useful to compare DP-3T and Pronto-C2; Aggelos Kiayias for suggesting generically the possibility of using blockchains in decentralized ACT systems; Francesco

Attacks	Description	Low-cost DP-3T	Unlinkable DP-3T	Pronto-C2
ATK 1	Paparazzi attack	✗	✓	✓
ATK 2	Orwell attack	✗	✗	✓
ATK 3	Bombolo attack	✓	✓	✓
ATK 4	Brutus attack	✗	✗	✓
ATK 5	Gossip attack	✗	✗	✗
ATK 6	Matteotti attack	✗	✗	✓

Figure 7: Identified attacks. We show which system is susceptible to which attack. ✗ denotes a system which is vulnerable to the attack, ✓ a system which is safe against an attack, finally ✗ denotes an attack with minimal impact (cf. Section 4.1).

Mogavero for several editorial suggestions; Giuseppe Attardi for suggesting a related work. Finally we wish to thank whoever has spent time reading our work regardless of the positive or negative feedback that we have received.

This research has been supported in part by the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 780477 (project PRIViLEDGE) and in part by region Campania (POR), and by national funds (PON).

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A Differences with Previous Versions

Here we summarize the main changes among versions of our work.

May 5th.

- We have added a discussion on additional related work.
- We have updated the description of low-cost DP-3T system.
- We have associated names to attacks. We have also specified more clearly the connection among our attacks and the ones proposed in related work.
- We have improved the authorization mechanism, removing the need of blind-signature services in medical laboratories.
- We have clarified the impact of Attack 5 on DP-3T and on Pronto-C2, updating also the comparison table.
- We have clarified the feature of allowing users to provide to medical laboratories plausible evidence of having encountered an infected individual.
- We suggest that smartphones of non-infected individuals download the entire list of new calls and check locally the existence of calls for them.

April 27th. This is the original version.