


ConTra Corona: Contact Tracing against the Coronavirus by Bridging the Centralized–Decentralized Divide for Stronger Privacy

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Abstract. Contact tracing is one of the most important interventions to mitigate the spread of any epidemic. Smartphone-facilitated *digital contact tracing* may help to increase tracing capabilities and extend the coverage to those contacts one does not know in person. Most implemented protocols use local Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) communication to detect contagion-relevant proximity, together with cryptographic protections, as necessary to improve the privacy of the users of such a system. However, current decentralized protocols, including DP3T [T⁺20], do not sufficiently protect infected users from having their status revealed to their contacts, which raises fear of stigmatization.

We alleviate this by proposing a new and practical solution with stronger privacy guarantees against active adversaries. It is based on the upload-what-you-observed paradigm, includes a separation of duties on the server side, and a mechanism to ensure that users cannot deduce which encounter caused a warning with high time resolution. Finally, we present a simulation-based security notion of digital contact tracing in the real-ideal setting, and prove the security of our protocol in this framework.

Keywords: Digital Contact Tracing · Privacy · SARS-CoV-2 · COVID-19 · Active Security · Anonymity · Security Modeling · Ideal Functionality

1 Introduction

One of the most important interventions to contain the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic is – besides the reduction of face-to-face encounters in general – the consequent isolation of infected persons, as well as those who have been in close contact with them (“contacts”) to break the chain of infections. However, tracing contacts manually (by interviews with infected persons) is not feasible when the number of infections is too high. Hence, more scalable and automated solutions are needed

to safely relax restrictions of personal freedom imposed by a strict lockdown, without the risk of returning to a phase of exponential spread of infections. *Digital contact tracing* using off-the-shelf smartphones has been proposed as one alternative (or an additional measure) that is more scalable, does not depend on infected persons’ ability to recall their location history during the days before the interview, and can even track contacts between strangers.

In many digital contact tracing protocols, e.g. [AHL18; CGH⁺20; R⁺20; CTV20; RCC⁺; T⁺20; P20a; BRS20; CIY20; BBH⁺20; AG20], users’ devices perform automatic proximity detection via short-distance wireless communication mechanisms, such as Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE), and jointly perform an ongoing cryptographic protocol which enables users to check whether they have been colocated with contagious users. However, naïve designs for digital contact tracing may pose a significant risk to users’ privacy, as they process (and may expose) confidential information about users’ location history, meeting history, and health condition [KBS20].

This has sparked a considerable research effort to design protocols for privacy-preserving contact tracing, most of which revolve around the following idea: Participating devices continuously broadcast ephemeral, short-lived pseudonyms and record pseudonyms broadcast by close-by devices. When a user is diagnosed with COVID-19, she submits either all the pseudonyms her device used while she was contagious or all the pseudonyms her device has recorded (during the same period) to a server. The first approach is the *upload-what-you-sent* paradigm, while the second is called *upload-what-you-observed* paradigm. Users’ devices are then either actively notified by the server, or they regularly query the server for pseudonyms uploaded by infected users.

Some of the designs that received the most attention are the centralized PEPP-PT proposals ROBERT [P20c] and NTK [P20b], as well as the more decentralized approach by Canetti, Trachtenberg, and Varia [CTV20], DP3T [T⁺20], which served as sketches for the subsequently proposed Apple/Google-API (GAEN) [AG20]. While the “centralized” approaches of PEPP-PT do not provide any privacy guarantees towards the users against the central server infrastructure [D20b; D20c], the DP3T approach [T⁺20], as well as the similar protocol by Canetti, Trachtenberg, and Varia [CTV20], expose the ephemeral pseudonyms of every infected user, which enables her contacts to learn whether she is infected. The interested reader is referred to [F20] for a detailed comparison.

We argue that both, *protection against a centralized actor*, as well as *protection of infected users from being stigmatized for their status*³, is important for any real-world solution. By specifying a protocol that achieves both of these goals and detailing the corresponding design choices, we aim to contribute to the ongoing discussion on privacy-preserving digital contact tracing.

³ See <https://coronadetective.eu> for a service that detects the contacts that caused a warning for DP3T-based approaches.

1.1 Contribution

We propose a strong and encompassing simulation-based security notion via an ideal contact tracing functionality (in [Section 5](#)) that allows us to capture the following privacy and security guarantees.

- It makes the exact leakage an attacker would gather by participating in our protocol explicit. This leakage can be described by a partially anonymized, partially pseudonymized contact graph (described and motivated in detail in [Section 5](#) and [Figure 3](#)), a list of positively tested and corrupted participants, and their warning status. This (minimal) leakage is inherent to BLE-based contact tracing schemes.
- It captures that the locally exchanged identifiers do change quickly (each “short-term epoch”, as specified below) in an unlinkable fashion, but upon warning from a risk contact, the user can only learn about this contact the time up to “long-term epoch” granularity. In other words, while observed identifiers change, e.g. every 15 minutes, a positive warning query does only give away the day (or another globally-fixed long-term epoch) of the encounter.
- It captures the worst-case guarantees in the sense that our guarantees hold, no matter how history unfolds, people meet, move and get infected, i.e., the environment can fully control the (directed) contact graph and infection status per short-term epoch.
- It provides guarantees against not being warned despite a (BLE-detectable) risk contact with an honest user (false negatives). For this, we assume that an attacker does not jam any local communication.
- It provides guarantees against being warned without a corresponding risk contact (false positives), *unless* the user was in proximity to a corrupted user *and* a corrupted user is infected or in proximity to an infected user. (This restriction is necessary, as in any protocol not protecting against malicious replays of proximity beacons, any attacker can cause a false positive under these conditions. However, protecting against replays would require processing time and location information, which is deemed undesirable.)

As a second part, we specify a privacy-preserving contact tracing protocol that achieves this security notion. It follows the upload-what-you-observed paradigm and achieves its goals by the following mechanisms:

- We split up the identifiers into short-lived *public identifiers* (**pids**) used for broadcasting, and longer-lived secret identifiers used for querying for warnings (cf. [Sections 3.1](#) and [3.2](#)).
- We employ a strict server separation concept, where the servers (for uploading the lookup table for this split-up identifiers, for matching, and for warning queries) carry out different functions (cf. [Section 3.3](#)). While server corruption is not included in our ideal functionality, we provide an informal discussion of this case in [Section 6.2](#).

- We employ strong, but anonymous anti-Sybil protections coupled to, e.g., an SMS challenge, to ensure that the guarantees cannot be circumvented by registering multiple Sybil identities (cf. [Section 3.4](#)).

Additionally, we argue that our protocol is similar in efficiency to DP3T, on the side of the smartphone used, see our efficiency analysis on p. 17.

Moreover, we propose a new and additional security feature, namely, allowing a user to prove the fact that they have been warned, e.g., towards medical professionals. Without this, anybody who is curious about their status but not at risk could get tested (assuming that a warning issued in the app makes the user eligible of being tested), e.g., by showing a screenshot of a warning from someone else’s smartphone – which would be unacceptable in times of restricted testing resources.

Finally, [Appendix B](#) includes extensions, such as identifying the timing of Bluetooth beacons as a side-channel that can be exploited to link distinct public identifiers, and using secret sharing to ensure a lower bound on necessary contact time for a warning.

1.2 Outline

We define our informal security model for BLE-based contact tracing in [Section 2](#), the formal version is given in [Section 5](#). For this protocol, [Section 3](#) proposes a number of core security mechanisms in a modular way, which are applied to obtain our overall protocol presented in [Section 4](#). An informal security and privacy analysis of the protocol follows in [Section 6](#).

2 Security Model

Our main goals are *privacy*, i.e. limiting disclosure of information about participating individuals, and *security*, i.e. limiting malicious users’ abilities to produce “wrong protocol outcomes”, such as being warned without a (BLE-detectable) risk contact (false negatives), or not being warned despite a risk contact (false positives). For privacy, we consider the following types of private information: (i) where users have been at which point in time, (ii) whom they have met (and when and where), (iii) whether a user has been infected with SARS-CoV-2, (iv) whether a user has received a warning because she was colocated with an infected user. We will later have a precise analysis of which of these goals are achieved under which conditions, and refer to [Sections 5](#) and [6](#) for details. Moreover, we refer the interested reader to [\[KBS20\]](#) for a systematization of different privacy desiderata.

Ideal–Real Paradigm. Formally, we cast our security guarantees in the ideal–real paradigm [\[MR91; B92\]](#), to obtain strong, simulation-based security definitions, as is also common in proofs in the Universal Composability framework [\[C01\]](#). In contrast to a fixed list of security properties, which might leave doubt about

whether everything the system should guarantee is captured, this has the advantage that the correctness guarantees and exact privacy leakage (dependent on the behavior of the adversary) are made explicit. We refer the interested reader to [L17]. Slightly more specific, we consider a scenario in which an interactive distinguisher \mathcal{Z} (also called *environment*) that can choose the parties’ inputs, observe their outputs and can communicate with the adversary arbitrarily during the execution, has to find out if an it running as part of a “real” experiment (“real world”) or an “ideal” experiment (“ideal world”).

In the “real” experiment, the protocol is executed and an attacker interferes with it. In the “ideal” experiment, the attacker is replaced by a Simulator \mathcal{S} (which simulates protocol messages so that they look like in the real experiment) and all honest parties calculate their result via an ideal (contact tracing) functionality \mathcal{F}_{CT} (later given in Section 5). The real-world protocol is considered secure if no PPT distinguisher \mathcal{Z} has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing an execution of the real protocol (in the “real” setting) from an execution in the ideal setting. In this sense, the real world only permits attacks that would also be possible in the ideal world, which behaves perfectly as prescribed/is secure by definition. Hence, \mathcal{F}_{CT} formalizes the security guarantees we require for a contact tracing protocol.

Modeling Time. We assume time is divided into disjoint, consecutive intervals called *epochs* (or *short-term epochs*). A *long-term epoch* is the union of a fixed number of consecutive short-term epochs. Again, all long-term epochs are disjoint and consecutive. In the following, we assume each short-term epoch corresponds to a 15 minute interval, and each long-term epoch corresponds to a day. Hence, there are 96 short-term epochs in a long-term epoch, and a tuple from $\mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$ specifies a short-term epoch. (The duration of these epochs are parameters for our protocol, but for simplicity we describe our protocol with these parameters fixed.)

Allowing the Distinguisher to Define Reality. We let the distinguisher \mathcal{Z} define the physical reality for each epoch $t \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$, i.e. who meets whom (defined by a contact graph G_t) and who is infected (a set of parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected},t}$). Nodes in G_t correspond to participating parties, and G contains an edge (P_1, P_2) if P_2 registered a contact with P_1 . Since who registered a contact with whom might not be a symmetric relation (e.g. due to noise in the wireless signal), each G_t is a *directed graph*.⁴ (We do not impose any restrictions on G_t or $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected},t}$, the environment may set these arbitrarily, even in ways that would be impossible in the physical world.) The distinguisher \mathcal{Z} defines these values by sending them to a party P_{mat} (named after the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{mat} as explained below). Each such input marks the beginning of a new short-term epoch. In the ideal experiment, this is a dummy party which forwards these inputs to \mathcal{F}_{CT} . In the real

⁴ This captures a relaxed notion of “proximity”, as high-gain antennas could be used to register a contact, although not physically being in proximity.

experiment, P_{mat} sends $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ to \mathcal{F}_{med} and G to \mathcal{F}_{mat} . This *hybrid* (i.e. ideal, but used in the real world to abstract from a realization of it) functionality \mathcal{F}_{mat} represents the “world state” or “material world”⁵, including a representation of who met whom (controlable by the environment), and a synchronized “epoch-wise” clock. This functionality is used for local broadcast and to decide which participant receives a particular public identifier pid . Here, `Servers` constitutes a set of centralized servers, see [Section 3.3](#).

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{mat}}(\mathcal{P}, P_{\text{mat}}, \text{Servers})$

State:

- Current contact graph $G = (\mathcal{P}, E)$
- Current time $e = (e_{lt}, e_{st}) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$.

Set Neighborhood:

1. Receive and store directed contact graph $G = (\mathcal{P}, E)$ from party P_{mat} .
2. Increment e_{st} (in \mathbb{Z}_{96}). If $e_{st} = 0$, increment e_{lt} and send (*newLongTermEpoch*) to all the servers, and then to all parties except P_{mat} .

Receiving Broadcasts:

1. Receive (pid) from a participant P , where pid is a public identifier.
2. Send (pid) to all P' with $(P, P') \in E$.

As mentioned above, the incorruptible party P_{mat} just forwards the the contact graph G and the set of infected parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ to the relevant functionalities \mathcal{F}_{mat} and \mathcal{F}_{med} (which represents the medical professional that is informed about who is infected, and will be given in [Section 4](#) on p. 13), respectively.

Protocol of P_{mat} in the Real Setting

Update Neighborhood and Infections:

1. Receive a contact graph G and a set of infected parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ from the environment as input.
2. Send G to \mathcal{F}_{mat} .
3. Send $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ to \mathcal{F}_{med} .

Communication Channels. Channels between the parties, functionalities and the servers are assumed to be confidential and authentic (in the fitting direction). We assume the attacker does not jam any wireless communication between honest parties. (The distinguisher \mathcal{Z} can emulate a suppression of broadcasts by leaving out edges in the contact graph.)

⁵ Internally, the author(s) humorously prefer to read the name of \mathcal{F}_{mat} as “the matrix”.

When a user, e.g. uploads data used in the protocol that should not be linked to the person (e.g. public or secret identifiers), the server can easily link these pairs with communication metadata (such as the user’s IP address), which might be used to ultimately link this data to a specific individual. We therefore use an anonymous communication channel for all communication with the servers. In practice, one can communicate via publicly available proxies that are managed by operators separate from the protocol servers. Alternatively, one might also employ the TOR onion routing network [TOR]. (We analyze the load that would be placed on TOR on p. 17.)

Corruption Model. In the formal modeling and our security proofs – to keep the complexity of the description and proofs manageable – centralized servers are perfectly trusted. However, the protocol was designed in a way that the information leakage to the servers is still acceptable in the case of a passive (honest-but-curious) server corruption, as will be explained in Section 6.2.

Regarding the users, we do only consider static corruptions, i.e. corruptions that happen at the beginning the the protocol execution. We do not distinguish between “the attacker” and corrupted, malicious, or compromised parties.

Modeling Medical Professionals. Furthermore, we trust medical professionals to not disclose data regarding the users who are under their care, as is their duty under standard medical confidentiality. This is abstracted by introducing a hybrid functionality \mathcal{F}_{med} , which represents medical professionals who are aware about the infection status of all users. \mathcal{F}_{med} is defined in Section 4 on p. 13.

3 Core Security Mechanisms

We start by giving a relatively generic, abstract template of contact tracing protocols, which are characterized by send-what-you-observed upon infection. This allows us to put our core security mechanisms in context and serve as a starting point for describing them.

Generation of “Random” Identifiers. For every time period t , the device generates an identifier pid_t . (These identifiers can look uniformly random and be computationally unlinkable, unless they incorporate additional time/location information for replay/relay protections.)

Broadcasting and Recording. During the time period t the identifier pid_t is repeatedly broadcast so nearby participants can record it, together with the date/time (maybe involving additional postcomputation before storing them).

Warning Co-located Users. When a user is positively tested for SARS-CoV-2, one extracts a list of all recorded pid' from the infected user’s device (assuming that old ones are periodically deleted). The user is then given a TAN code that she can use to send this list to a central server. The server marks the respective pids as potentially infected, and then allows users to

query for a given `pid`, answering whether it has been marked as potentially infected.

We now describe the security mechanisms our protocol is built upon:

3.1 Splitting of Identifiers

We propose to use, instead of just one public identifier `pid` that is used for both, broadcasts and warning queries, two versions of identifiers: public identifiers `pid` that are used for broadcasting, and a secret identifiers `sid` which are used to query the server for warnings. The server internally keeps a table linking `sids` to `pids`, where users can submit new entries to. This split-up of identifiers achieves better privacy, because malicious users cannot just use public identifiers they have observed to query the server for the warning status of the `pids`' owners. Note that later mechanisms from [Sections 3.2](#) and [3.3](#) will further modify this procedure.

Generation of “Random” Identifiers. For every time period t , the device generates `pidt`, `sidt` in a such way that one cannot efficiently derive `sidt` from `pidt`. Moreover, given a set of `pids` which are either all from the same user, or all from different users, it should not be possible to distinguish which is the case. Finally, we require that only the user to whom these ids belong can submit them, e.g. by her knowing a preimage that is used to generate both in tandem and also submitting the preimage.⁶

Broadcasting and Recording. Proceeds as above.

Warning Co-Located Users. When an infected user sends a list of all recorded `pid'` as above, the server looks up the respective `sids` in his database of `(sid, pid)` tuples and marks them as potentially infected. The server then allows users to query for `sids`, answering whether they have been marked as potentially infected.

3.2 Lower-Resolution Secret Identifiers for Improved Infection-Status Privacy

In the protocol sketch described in [Section 3.1](#), users receiving a warning can immediately observe which of their secret identifiers `sid` was published. By correlating this information with the knowledge on when they used which public identifier `pid`, they can learn at which time they have met an infected person,

⁶ We give a simple example of how this might be done. Note however, our protocol uses a different method, see [Section 3.2](#). For this example, let H be a hash function, such that $H(k||x)$ is a pseudorandom function (PRF) with key $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ evaluated on input x . For every time period t , the device generates a random key $k_t \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$, and computes `sidt` := $H(k_t||0)$ and `pidt` := $H(k_t||1)$, stores them, and anonymously uploads k_t to the central server, who recomputes `sidt`, `pidt` in the same way. Both parties store `(sidt, pidt)`.

which poses a threat to the infected person’s privacy. Note that the DP3T protocol [T⁺20] and the scheme by Canetti, Trachtenberg, and Varia [CTV20] succumb to analogous problems.

To mitigate this risk, we propose to associate a secret identifier sid with many public identifiers pid , i.e. we use the same sid during a long-term epoch, but change pids per short-term epoch. As the example of deriving $(\text{sid}_t, \text{pid}_t)$ pairs for time epoch t from Footnote 6 does not allow such longer-term secret identifiers, we modify this procedure as follows:

Generation of “Random” Identifiers. The user generates a single random key, now called *warning identifier*, once per long-term epoch. More concretely, a user generates a random warning identifier $\text{wid}_{e_{lt}} \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ per long-term epoch e_{lt} (e.g. a day), and encrypts it with the server’s public key $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{W}}$ to obtain $\text{sid} := \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\mathcal{W}}}(\text{wid}_{e_{lt}})$, using a *rerandomizable* public-key encryption scheme. For each shorter time period t (e.g., 15 minutes), the user generates a rerandomization sid'_t of sid , where the randomness is derived from a PRG, and computes $\text{pid}_t := \text{H}(\text{sid}'_t)$. Once per long-term epoch, the user uploads sid and the PRG seed to the server, who performs the same rerandomization, obtaining the same pid_t values, and the corresponding $\text{wid}_{e_{lt}}$ by decryption.

The user then broadcasts the pid_t in random order during the current long-term epoch. The warning of co-located users proceeds as before, with the only change that the server maintains a database of (wid, pid) tuples, and allows users to query for wids (instead of sids).

There is a trade-off regarding the length of the long-term epochs: while warnings are more precise for shorter long-term epochs, they also give more information about when the encounter of the warning happened. In practice, choosing a long-term epoch of a day is reasonable.

3.3 Splitting-Up the Server into a Pipeline

The change introduced in Section 3.2 allows to split the process of warning co-located users into three tasks for three non-colluding servers, the submission server, the matching server, and the warning server:

- The *submission server* collects the uploaded secret and public identifiers from different users (more precisely, it receives sid and the seed for the PRG) and then computes the $(\text{sid}'_i, \text{pid}_i)$ pairs using the PRG with the given seed. It rerandomizes the sid'_i values another time with fresh, non-reproducible randomness (obtaining sid''_i), and stores $(\text{sid}''_i, \text{pid}_i)$ for a short period of time. When the submission server has a sufficient number of submissions, it shuffles them and sends them to the matching server. For ease of notation, we assume that this transaction happens at the beginning of the next long-term epoch. (We exclude the case that too few users participate in the system that would render this batching useless.)
- The *matching server* collects the $(\text{sid}''_i, \text{pid}_i)$ pairs and stores them. Upon receiving the pids recorded by the devices of infected users, which we call




Fig. 1. Overview of the application’s infrastructure. The figure depicts different possible scenarios: In the morning, Alice uploads her daily public/secret identifiers to the submission server, and periodically queries the warning server for warnings. Throughout the day, while she is in proximity to Bob, Carlos and Carol, the application exchanges public identifiers with their phones.

- a *match request*, the matching server looks up the respective sid''_i s of all potentially infected users and sends them to the warning server.
- The *warning server* decrypts sid''_i to recover $wid := Dec_{sk_{wy}}(sid''_i)$ for all potentially infected users. It then allows to query for warning ids by the users, which we call *warning query* in the following.

For illustration, see [Figure 1](#). We assume all communication between the servers uses confidential and authenticated channels. [Section 6.2](#) contains a privacy analysis in case of compromised, honest-but-curious and partly colluding servers.

3.4 Protecting from Encounter-wise Warning Identifiers and Sybil Attacks

Our measures from [Section 3.2](#), namely having a lower resolution for the secret/warning identifiers are not yet sufficient to hide the infection against the following, more motivated attack: An attacker that is able to upload an unlimited number of sid and PRG seed values to the submission server, can change to a set of pids that belong to a different warning identifier, after each short-term epoch. Upon warning, the attacker can then deduce which of the warning identifiers have been warned, and from that deduce the exact short-term epoch the encounter happened. A simple rate-limiting on the side of the app is ineffective against malicious attackers, and a simple traffic-based rate-limiting on the side of the

servers per app instance is not possible due to the anonymized communication. Moreover, the above attacker can run a so-called *Sybil attack*, i.e. creating multiple (seemingly) independent app instances. Hence, we aim to prevent this type of attack and ideally to ensure a limitation of uploads to the submission server to one per user (identifier) per day. For this, it is helpful to use a users identifier that is difficult to obtain in larger numbers, to force the adversary to invest additional resources for spawning Sybil instances. While there are a number of solutions, for concreteness, we propose to bind each app instance to a phone number (as the aforementioned user identifier) and require a registration process using an SMS challenge. (Note that this approach does not prevent an attacker from performing a Sybil attack on lower scale, as the attacker might own multiple phone numbers.⁷)

Binding an app to an identifiable resource (such as a valid phone number) while ensuring the user’s anonymity, requires a bit of care. For this, we use the periodic n -times anonymous authentication scheme from [CHK⁺06]. In such a scheme, *token dispensers* are issued to parties using an **Obtain** protocol. These dispensers can be used n times in a **Show** protocol in a given epoch. The server participating in the **Obtain** protocol can not link these requests to the executions of the **Show** protocol. In our setting, we choose $n = 1$ and choose as time period the long-term epoch period, i.e. the user can obtain one “e-token” per long-term epoch to upload a new *sid* and PRG seed to the submission server. The submission server validates the “e-tokens” and only accepts submissions with valid tokens while checking for double-spending. The token dispenser is then issued to the user during a registration process, which uses the aforementioned SMS challenges.

Formally, we define the hybrid functionality \mathcal{F}_{reg} , which represents the party towards which parties run the registration protocol, and which keeps a list of registered parties, and is given below. This is e.g. for obtaining a token dispenser to perform the regular uploads. To keep the model simple, we do not incorporate SMS challenges into \mathcal{F}_{reg} . (An SMS challenge, as well as the upload TAN, might be modeled via an authenticated channel from the party, for which an adversary can break authentication by guessing. See [AGH⁺19] for a formalization).

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{reg}}(\mathcal{P})$

State:

- Set of registered parties and their public keys as pairs \mathcal{RP} .
- Issuer secret and public key for e-token dispensers $(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{I}}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{I}})$

Registering a Party:

1. Upon $(\text{register}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{U}})$ from party P : if P is not already in a pair in \mathcal{RP} , store $(P, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{U}})$ in \mathcal{RP} , else abort.
2. Issue a new e-token dispenser for P acting as \mathcal{U} by participating as \mathcal{I} in the protocol $\text{Obtain}(\mathcal{U}(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{I}}, \text{sk}_{\mathcal{U}}, 1), \mathcal{I}(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{U}}, \text{sk}_{\mathcal{I}}, 1))$.

⁷ One might use remotely verifiable electronic ID cards instead.

3.5 Proving a Warning

In order to enable a user to prove to a third party a warning has been issued for her, her warning identifier wid is chosen as a Pedersen commitment to a representation rid of her real identity (e.g. her name), i.e. $\text{wid} := g^u \cdot h^{\text{rid}}$, where g, h are distinct generators of a group \mathbb{G} (such that the discrete logarithm between g and h is not known) and u is a random number between zero (including) and the group order (excluding).

When a user wants to prove she has received a warning (e.g. to a medical professional to be tested for an infection), she discloses the respective warning identifier wid she has received a warning for and her real identity rid , and issues a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge showing she could open the commitment to rid . This way each warning is bound to a fixed real identity rid , even though this identity is perfectly hidden in the Pedersen commitment. The receiver verifies the proof, verifies the user’s real identity and queries the warning server to check that wid is at-risk. Honest users have an interest in honestly declaring their real identity as otherwise they will not be able to prove possession of their warnings.

4 Our Contact-Tracing Protocol

We can now describe the full protocol. For this, let n denote the security parameter, \mathbb{G} be a group of prime order q such that the decisional Diffie-Hellman problem in \mathbb{G} is intractable, and let g, h be generators of \mathbb{G} . We assume a IND-CPA secure, rerandomizable public key encryption scheme $(\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{ReRand})$ having message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}$. (We propose standard ElGamal for instantiation.) Let PRG be a secure pseudorandom generator, and H be a collision-resistant hash function. Finally, let $\Sigma_{\text{tok}} = (\text{Gen}_{\mathcal{I}}, \text{Gen}_{\mathcal{U}}, \text{Obtain}, \text{Show}, \text{Identify})$ be an anonymous e-token dispenser scheme as in [CHK⁺06].

App Setup. When the proximity tracing software is first installed on a user’s device, the user enters her real identity rid , such as her name. (This information will only be shared with medical professionals treating her.) To avoid fears, the application should present an understandable explanation of why this is necessary (cf. Section 3.5). Additionally, for anti-Sybil measures as described in Section 3.4, the application proves possession of a phone number (e.g. via an SMS challenge) and obtains an e-token dispenser.

Creating Secret Warning Identifiers. For each long-term epoch, the application generates a *warning identifier* wid as a Pedersen commitment [P91] to the user’s real identity. (That is, wid is computed as $\text{wid} := g^u h^{\text{rid}}$, where $u \leftarrow_{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$. We assume rid is implicitly mapped to \mathbb{Z}_q in a collision resistant manner.) The application stores the unveil information u for later use, deleting it after four weeks.

Deriving Public Identifiers. For each warning identifier wid , the app computes $\text{sid} := \text{Enc}(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{W}}, \text{wid})$, where Enc is the encryption algorithm of a rerandomizable, IND-CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme, and $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{W}}$

is the warning server’s public key. Additionally, the app chooses a random $\text{seed} \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ (*rerandomization seed*) per warning identifier.

The app (interactively) presents an e-token τ to the submission server via an anonymous channel, and uploads $(\text{sid}, \text{seed})$ to the submission server via the same channel. If the e-token is invalid (or the server detects double-spending of this e-token), the server refuses to accept $(\text{sid}, \text{seed})$. Both the submission server and the app compute 96 rerandomization values $r_1, \dots, r_{96} = \text{PRG}(\text{seed})$, and rerandomize sid using these values, obtaining $\text{sid}'_i := \text{ReRand}(\text{sid}; r_i)$ for $i \in \{1, \dots, 96\}$. The ephemeral public identifiers of the user are defined as $\text{pid}_i := \text{H}(\text{sid}'_i)$ for all i . The app saves the public identifiers for broadcasting during the day of validity of wid . The submission server rerandomizes each sid'_i again (using non-reproducible randomness) to obtain sid''_i and stores the $(\text{sid}''_i, \text{pid}_i)$ pairs.

Broadcasting and Recording. During each time period i , the device repeatedly broadcasts pid_i . When it receives a broadcast value pid' from someone else, it stores (e_{lt}, pid') , where e_{lt} is the current long-term epoch. Every long-term epoch, the device deletes all pid' s that are old enough to no longer be epidemiologically relevant.

Sending a Warning. When a user is tested positively for SARS-CoV-2, the medical personnel generates a TAN and registers it at the matching server. The user collects a list of public identifiers pid' that have been received by his device while the user was likely infectious, and sends this list together with the TAN to the matching server, see p. 16.

The medical professional is modeled by the hybrid functionality \mathcal{F}_{med} , which gives out a TAN to parties which are deemed infected, as given below. In a bit more detail, \mathcal{F}_{med} stores a set $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ of infected/positively tested participants as provided by the environment \mathcal{Z} . If such a participant $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ requests a TAN (using *warningRequest*), \mathcal{F}_{med} chooses a TAN, registers it with the matching server and sends it to P . For an illustration, see Figure 2.

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{med}}(P_{\text{mat}}, \text{Matching Server})$

State:

- Set of infected parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$.

Set Infected:

1. Receive and store set of infected parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ from a party P_{mat} .

Handling Warning Request:

1. Upon (*warningRequest*) from $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$.
2. Generate $\text{tan} \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$.
3. Send (tan) to the *Matching Server*.
4. Send (tan) to P .

Retrieving Warnings. The application regularly queries the warning server for the warning identifiers it has used during the last 28 days itself. This is

done via an anonymous channel with proper authentication of the warning server. If the query returns that the warning identifier has been marked as at-risk, it informs the user she has been in contact with an infected person during the long-term epoch when the warning identifier was used.

Protocol of the App/Users

State:

- Current epoch $e = (e_{lt}, e_{st}) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$
- Current token dispenser D .
- Set of recorded broadcasts of pids.
- Let $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{W}}$ and $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{I}}$ be the hardwired public key of the warning server, and e-token dispenser issuer, respectively. Let g, h be the hardwired parameters for the commitment.
- Let $(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{U}}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{U}})$ be the generated user secret/public key pair during the registration.
- Warning identifier info $(\text{rid}, \text{wid} := g^u h^{\text{rid}}, u)$
- Set of earlier tuples $(\text{wid} := g^u h^{\text{rid}}, u, k)$, where k is the according long-term epoch.
- The public identifiers of the current long-term epoch $(\text{pid}_j)_{j \in [1, \dots, 96]}$

Register:

1. When a new party with real identity rid is created by the environment, it first generates a token-dispenser secret/public key pair $(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{U}}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{U}})$ and then sends $(\text{register}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{U}})$ to \mathcal{F}_{reg} .
2. Obtain a token dispenser D by participating as \mathcal{U} in $\text{Obtain}(\mathcal{U}(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{I}}, \text{sk}_{\mathcal{U}}, 1), \mathcal{I}(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{U}}, \text{sk}_{\mathcal{I}}, 1))$ with \mathcal{F}_{reg} acting as \mathcal{I} .
3. Initialize the state and run “Upload Submission”.

Upload Submission:

1. Generate fresh $(\text{wid}, \text{seed}, \text{sid})$ and the according list of $\{(\text{sid}'_j, \text{pid}_j)\}_{j \in [1, \dots, 96]}$.
2. Enqueue the current $(\text{wid} = g^u h^{\text{rid}}, u, e_{lt})$.
3. Submit a token by participating as \mathcal{U} in $\text{Show}(\mathcal{U}(D, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{I}}, e_{lt}, 1), \mathcal{V}(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{I}}, e_{lt}, 1))$ to the *Submission Server*, which acts as \mathcal{V} .
4. Send $(\text{seed}, \text{sid})$ over the same channel to the *Submission Server*.

Scheduled Upload:

1. Upon $(\text{newLongTermEpoch})$ from \mathcal{F}_{mat} .
2. Increment e_{lt} .
3. Dequeue outdated wids and recorded pids.
4. Continue as in “Upload Submission”.

Sending Broadcasts:

1. Upon (sendBroadcast) from the environment.
2. Send $(\text{pid}_{e_{st}})$ to \mathcal{F}_{mat} and increment e_{st} .

Recording Broadcasts:

1. Upon (pid) from \mathcal{F}_{mat} .
2. Enqueue (pid, e_{lt}) .

Match Request:

1. Upon (positive) from the environment.
2. Send (warningRequest) to \mathcal{F}_{med} .
3. Receive (tan) from \mathcal{F}_{med} .
4. Extract the list L of all recorded/received public identifiers from the queue.
5. Send (L, tan) to the *Matching Server*.

Querying a Warning:

1. Upon (query, t) from the environment.
2. Find the corresponding wid for long-term epoch t and send (wid) to the *Warning Server*.
3. Receive bit b from the warning server.
4. Output b to the environment.

Collecting Daily Submissions. The submission server rerandomizes all the sid'_i values using fresh randomness, obtaining $\text{sid}''_i := \text{ReRand}(\text{sid}'_i)$, and saves a list of the $(\text{sid}''_i, \text{pid}_i)$ tuples. When the submission server has accumulated a sufficiently large list, originating from sufficiently many submissions, it shuffles the list, forwards all tuples to the matching server and clears the list afterwards.

Protocol of the Submission Server

State:

- Current epoch e_{lt} .
- The current batch of $\{(\text{sid}''_j^k, \text{pid}_j^k)\}_{j \in [1, \dots, 96]}$.

Handling Submissions:

1. Verify the token by participating as \mathcal{V} in $\text{Show}(\mathcal{U}(D, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{I}}, e_{lt}, 1), \mathcal{V}(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{I}}, e_{lt}, 1))$.
2. Detect possible double spending.
3. Receive $(\text{seed}, \text{sid})$ from \mathcal{U} .
4. Generate $\{(\text{sid}'_j, \text{pid}_j)\}_{j \in [1, \dots, 96]}$ with the help of seed .
5. Rerandomize the sid'_j using fresh randomness, i.e. $\text{sid}''_j = \text{ReRand}(\text{sid}'_j)$
6. Add the generated tuples (with rerandomization) $\{(\text{sid}''_j, \text{pid}_j)\}_{j \in [1, \dots, 96]}$ to the batch of e_{lt} .

Forwarding Submissions:

1. Upon (*newLongTermEpoch*) from \mathcal{F}_{mat} .
2. Shuffle the last batch and send the complete batch to the *Matching Server* together with e_{lt} .
3. Increment e_{lt} .
4. Create a new empty batch for the new epoch.

Performing Contact Matching. The matching server maintains a list of all TANs issued by medical professionals and all tuples it has received from the submission server, deleting each tuple after three weeks.⁸ When a user submits a list of public identifiers together with a valid TAN, the matching server marks the TAN as invalid by deleting it from its list. The server looks up the corresponding secret identifiers *sid* and sends them to the warning server.

Protocol of the Matching Server

State:

- The current epoch e_{lt} .
- Per long-term epoch t a set \mathcal{B}_t of (*sid'*, *pid*) pairs.
- Set of TANs of pending matching requests T .

Removing Outdated Information:

1. Upon (*newLongTermEpoch*) from \mathcal{F}_{mat} .
2. Increment e_{lt} and delete all sets \mathcal{B}_t where $0 \leq t \leq e_{lt} - 14$.

Handling Submissions:

1. Receive a set of (*sid'*, *pid*) tuples and an epoch t from the *Submission Server* and store it as \mathcal{B}_t .

Preparing Match Request:

1. Receive (*tan*) from \mathcal{F}_{med} and insert (*tan*, e_{lt}) into T .

Handling Match Request:

1. Receive (S , *tan*) from party P , where S is a set of *pids*.
2. If there is an index $t \in \mathbb{N}$ such that there is an entry (*tan*, t) $\in T$, remove this entry from T , otherwise abort.
3. Let $M := \{(\text{sid}'_l, t_l) : \exists \text{pid}_l \in S, t_l \in \mathbb{N} \text{ such that } (\text{sid}'_l, \text{pid}_l) \in \mathcal{B}_{t_l} \wedge t_l \leq t\}$.
4. Rerandomize all the $\text{sid}'_l \in M$ from the previous step and send $\{(\text{sid}''_l := \text{ReRand}(\text{sid}'_l), t_l) : (\text{sid}'_l, t_l) \in M\}$ to the warning server.

⁸ If some user A has been in contact with an infected user B who observes the respective *pid*, and even if B takes up to three weeks to show symptoms and have a positive test result, the data retention on the matching server is sufficient to deliver a warning to A.

Processing of Warnings. The warning server decrypts the secret identifiers received from the matching server to recover the warning identifier wid contained in them. Users may query the warning server for specific $wids$. On such queries, the warning server returns either 1 (if this wid was recovered by decryption during the last two weeks) or 0 (otherwise).

Protocol of the Warning Server

State:

- The current epoch e_{it} .
- PKE key pair (sk_W, pk_W) .
- Set \mathcal{WL} of released $wids$ and their validity epoch t .

Removing Outdated Information:

1. Upon (*newLongTermEpoch*) from \mathcal{F}_{mat} .
2. Increment e_{it} and delete all $(wid, t) \in \mathcal{WL}$, with $0 \leq t \leq e_{it} - 14$.

Issuing Warnings:

1. Receive a list $\{(sid'_l, t_l)\}$ from the *Matching Server*.
2. Decrypt, deduplicate and add the received warning identifiers $\{(wid_l = Dec_{sk_W}(sid'_l), t_l)\}$ to \mathcal{WL} .

Warning Query:

1. Receive warning identifier (wid).
2. Search all finished *epoch* for wid and return 1 if a match is found, 0 otherwise.

This concludes the description of our protocol. [Figures 1](#) and [2](#) serve as an illustration of the protocol.

Efficiency. The most expensive operations, i.e. operations needed for using the token-dispenser scheme, have to be performed only once a day (long-term epoch). These are 12 multi-base exponentiations in the domain group of a pairing and 23 multi-base exponentiations in the target group as was shown in [\[CHK⁺06\]](#). The remaining computations are costwise similar to currently deployed solutions for contact tracing and thus the overall battery consumption is comparable. Another important efficiency metric is the bandwidth consumption. As we are proposing, as an alternative to normal proxies, to use the Tor network for communications between the smartphone and the server pipeline, we would like to point out that this is in fact a feasible option. As of 2020 the advertised bandwidth of the TOR network is approx. 500 Gbit/s and the consumed bandwidth is approx. 250Gbit/s (cf. <https://metrics.torproject.org/bandwidth.html>). Our estimation shows that a daily upload by our protocol is at most 240 kbit. With 84 million participants (e.g., the population of Germany) this sums up to 20 Gbit. As the uploads will not happen in the same second but are spread around several hours this consumption is definitely within TOR’s capacity.




Fig. 2. Information flow upon issuing a warning. When the doctor is informed about a positive test, she generates a new TAN and sends it to the matching server and then communicates it to COVID-19-positive Alice. Then, using this TAN, Alice uploads all public identifiers she observed during her (approximation of the) infectious period. The application regularly queries for its warnings to its the warning server. In the case of Carlos and Carol, who have been in contact with Alice in [Figure 1](#), this check will turn out to be positive.

5 Formal Security Notion

Before we are ready to state our ideal contact-tracing functionality, let us begin with several assumptions that allow us to simplify our proof and reduce complexity:

- (i) We assume that the servers are uncorruptible, and leave the formal modeling of server corruption as future work. However, we provide a discussion on security against server corruptions in [Section 6.2](#).
- (ii) The per-day uploads are synchronous. We assume that before any `pid` is broadcast, all parties have made their per-day upload.
- (iii) All parties, even corrupted ones, send exactly one broadcast per epoch. (The distinguisher can emulate a single corrupted party making multiple broadcasts by using additional corrupted parties with similar/equal sets of recipients.)
- (iv) For formal reasons, parties can only perform computations and broadcasts when they receive an input. Hence, we assume the distinguisher \mathcal{Z} inputs a dummy message (`sendBroadcast`) to all honest participants at the beginning of a new epoch.
- (v) Contacts happening on the day an infected person is uploading their list do not incur immediate warnings. These are delayed until the next long-term epoch. This is also a privacy feature, ensuring that no one can learn the time of an encounter with an infected person with precision higher than a long-term epoch.

We are now ready to describe important aspects and notions used in our ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{CT} , which formalizes our security and privacy guarantees: Whenever the environment \mathcal{Z} starts a new short-term epoch by sending $G_i = (\mathcal{P}, E_i)$ and $\mathcal{P}_{infected}$ to \mathcal{F}_{CT} (via P_{mat}), \mathcal{F}_{CT} creates two derived graphs G'_i and (\mathcal{P}, \hat{E}_i) . G'_i is a partially anonymized, partially pseudonymized version of G_i . We let \mathcal{F}_{CT} output G'_i and $\mathcal{P}_{infected} \cap \mathcal{P}_{corrupted}$ to the simulator, hence this is the information leakage of our protocol. The edge set \hat{E}_i represents who will receive warnings from whom, hence the simulator's abilities to modify \hat{E}_i represent the attacker's abilities to induce and suppress warnings.




Fig. 3. *Left:* An example of a contact graph $G_t = (\mathcal{P}, E_t)$ with two honest parties A and C and two corrupted parties B and D . The edges indicate where a broadcast is delivered. *Middle:* The pseudonymized graph $G'_t = (\mathcal{Q}_t, E'_t)$ of G_t as leaked by \mathcal{F}_{CT} to the simulator. Dashed node borders indicate that the node name is replaced with an opaque pseudonym. *Right:* An example for (\mathcal{P}, \hat{E}_t) . This graph is initialized with all edges from G_t between honest parties (shown in solid black). The adversary has already inserted edges using the commands $(relay, t, pseudonymize(C), D, B, pseudonymize((B, A)))$ as in “Replay/Relay” (shown in dotted purple) and $(sendBroadcast, t, t, B, D)$ as in “Broadcasts From Corrupted User” (shown in dashed green). Note that warnings from honest parties are delivered *against* the direction of all the edges. So an infected A would warn C and D , an infected C would warn A and D .

Information Leakage on the Contact Graph. We now describe the anonymization and pseudonymization process for G'_i in detail, cf. [steps 3 to 5](#) in “[Set Neighborhood/Infected](#)” below. The process is exemplified by the graphs G_t and G'_t shown in [Figure 3](#) (left and middle, respectively). Nodes corresponding to uncorrupted parties are renamed to a pseudonym chosen independently for each epoch (in the example, the nodes of A and C are shown as dashed). This means that an attacker cannot re-identify participants encountered earlier and hence cannot track them over time. Edges between uncorrupted parties are removed entirely (in the example the edge (A, C) is removed), hence the attacker is completely oblivious of contacts between honest parties. Edges between corrupted parties (in the example (B, D)) are preserved without modifications, since we assume they are fully controlled by the attacker and hence the attacker is completely aware of any contacts between them. Before the pseudonymization takes place, nodes corresponding to honest receivers are duplicated for each

incoming edge, leaving only the outgoing edges on the original node, since corrupted senders cannot detect if they are broadcasting to the same participant. This step anonymizes edges to honest nodes. In the example the newly introduced nodes by this step are: (D, A) , (B, A) and (B, C) . The outgoing edges are left at their original node (for example from A), since corrupted receivers (in the example B and D) can easily detect they were in contact with the same person at approximately the same time by comparing the broadcast values. Note that this disadvantage is shared by many contact tracing protocols.

Additionally, all users of the protocol can query \mathcal{F}_{CT} to check if they have received a warning, which might enable them to infer additional information about the infection status of other participants. (However, this information is inherent to all contact tracing protocols.)

Manipulation of Warnings. We now discuss the attacker’s ability to manipulate warnings issued by the protocol, i.e. the attacker’s options to influence \hat{E}_i . Note that \hat{E}_i is initialized to contain all edges between honest parties (step 7 in “Set Neighborhood/Infected” below). The simulator does not have the ability to remove edges from \hat{E}_i , but it can introduce new edges (under certain conditions) by causing \mathcal{F}_{CT} to execute “Replay/Relay” and “Broadcasts From Corrupted User”.

“Replay/Relay” models a situation where a corrupted user re-broadcasts a value previously broadcast by an honest party: In this scenario – see the dotted purple edges of Figure 3 (right) – an honest party C broadcasted certain value during an epoch t , received by the corrupted party D . D cooperates with B and B re-broadcasts the same value in the presence of A . Hence, in our protocol, if A was infected, it would cause a warning to be delivered to C (regarding a contact during epoch t), even if those parties did not meet.

“Broadcasts From Corrupted User” models a situation, see the dashed green edges of Figure 3 (right), where a corrupted user B broadcasts a pid potentially uploaded by another corrupted user D , or potentially not even uploaded, yet. Broadcasting another user’s pid causes warnings to be delivered to that user (D), as if D had been performing the broadcast instead of B , hence we add corresponding edges to \hat{E}_i . Note that the time of broadcast can be different from the long-term epoch for which the pid was (or will be) uploaded.

In addition to the ability to manipulate \hat{E}_i discussed above, the attacker is able to directly send warnings in case a corrupted party is infected. \mathcal{F}_{CT} enforces that the attacker can only send warnings to honest parties who have been in contact with any corrupted party during the last 14 long-term epochs and a corrupted party is infected after this encounter took place (see step 6 of “Handling Match Requests” on p. 22). The simulator is allowed to specify honest parties fulfilling these conditions (via their pseudonyms). \mathcal{F}_{CT} will add these parties to the set \mathcal{WP} of parties who have received a warning. When these parties next send ($query, t$) for the corresponding long-term epoch t to \mathcal{F}_{CT} , \mathcal{F}_{CT} will find the warning in \mathcal{WP} and return 1, indicating a warning has been issued.

$$\mathcal{F}_{CT}(\mathcal{P}, P_{\text{mat}})$$

State:

- Current epoch $(e_{lt}, e_{st}) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_{96} =: I$.
- Set of corrupted parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$.
- Set of honest parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{honest}} = \mathcal{P} \setminus \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$.
- A sequence $(\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}, i})_{i \in I}$ of sets of infected parties, i.e. the history of infected parties.
- Set of currently infected parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$
- A sequence of all contact graphs so-far $(G_i = (\mathcal{P}_i, E_i))_{i \in I}$, i.e. the global meeting history.
- Current contact graph $G = (\mathcal{P}, E) = G_{(e_{lt}, e_{st})}$ and its pseudonymized version $G' = (\mathcal{Q}, E')$
- Parties at risk $\mathcal{WP} \subseteq \mathcal{P} \times \mathbb{N}$, which signifies which parties have encountered a positive participant (that generated a warning) in the last 14 long-term epochs and during which long-term epochs the encounters took place.
- A sequence of edge sets $(\hat{E}_i)_{i \in I}$ on \mathcal{P}_i which does some bookkeeping necessary to know who is to be warned. Let \hat{E} be the edge set of the current epoch.

Set Neighborhood/Infected:

1. Receive a contact graph $G = (\mathcal{P}, E)$ and a set of infected parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ from party P_{mat} .
2. Add G to the global meeting history, and $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ to the history of infected parties.
3. Set $E' = \{(P_0, P_1) \in E \mid P_0 \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}} \vee P_1 \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}\}$.
4. For all $\alpha = (P_0, P_1) \in E'$ with $P_0 \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$, $P_1 \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{honest}}$, replace α with $\alpha' = (P_0, \alpha)$.
5. Select a random, injective mapping $\text{pseudonymize}_i: \mathcal{P}_{\text{honest}} \cup (\mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{P}) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$. Extend it by $\text{pseudonymize}_i(P) = P$ for all $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$. Set $E' := \{(\text{pseudonymize}_i(x), \text{pseudonymize}_i(y)) : (x, y) \in E'\}$, i.e. rename all nodes in E' . Let \mathcal{Q} be the set of nodes used in the set of edges E' .
6. Leak (\mathcal{Q}, E') , $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}} \cap \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ to the adversary.
7. Let $\hat{E} := (\mathcal{P}_{\text{honest}} \times \mathcal{P}_{\text{honest}}) \cap E$.
8. Increment e_{st} (in \mathbb{Z}_{96}).
9. If $e_{st} = 0$ then increment e_{lt} and delete all (P, t) pairs from \mathcal{WP} where $0 \leq t \leq e_{lt} - 14$.

Send Broadcast:

1. Receive and ignore (*sendBroadcast*) from a participant P .

Broadcasts From Corrupted User:

1. Receive (*sendBroadcast*, t_1, t_2, P_1, P_2) from the adversary, with $t_1, t_2 \in [e_{lt} - 14, e_{lt}] \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$, $P_1, P_2 \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ (with the meaning that P_1 broadcasts in the name of (i.e. the pids registered by) P_2).
2. For each $(P_1, x) \in E_{t_1}$, add edge (P_2, x) to \hat{E}_{t_2} .

Replay/Relay:

1. Receive $(relay, t, P'_1, P'_2, P'_3, P'_4)$ from the adversary, where $P'_1 \in \text{pseudonymize}(\mathcal{P})$, $P'_2, P'_3 \in \mathcal{P}_{corrupted}$, $P'_4 \in \text{pseudonymize}(\mathcal{P}_{corrupted} \times \mathcal{P}_{honest})$.
2. Let $P_j := \text{pseudonymize}_i^{-1}(P'_j)$ for $j = 1, 2, 3, 4$. (Note that $P_2 = P'_2$, $P_3 = P'_3$.)
3. If $(P_1, P_2) \in E_t$, $(P'_3, P'_4) \in E'$, let $\hat{P}_4 \in \mathcal{P}$ be the node such that $P_4 = (P_3, \hat{P}_4)$, and add the new edge (P_1, \hat{P}_4) to \hat{E}_t .

Handling Match Requests:

1. Receive *(positive)* from party P .
2. If $P \in \mathcal{P}_{corrupted}$, skip to [step 6](#).
3. If $P \notin \mathcal{P}_{infected}$, return. Otherwise, continue:
4. Let $R := \mathbb{N} \cap [e_{lt} - 14, e_{lt})$. For each epoch $i \in R \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$ (the relevant time period), determine the set $\Delta\mathcal{WP}_i$ (new parties at risk) of nodes P' such that $(P', P) \in \hat{E}_i$.
5. Skip to [step 7](#).
6. Let $lastInfected_{lt} := \max\{i \in \mathbb{N} : \exists j \in \mathbb{Z}_{96}, \text{ such that } P \in \mathcal{P}_{infected, (i, j)}\}$. (Let $lastInfected_{lt} := -\infty$ if this set is empty.) Let $R := \mathbb{N} \cap [e_{lt} - 14, e_{lt}) \cap [0, lastInfected_{lt}]$. Send *(forceWarning)* to the adversary, asking for subsets S_i of (the pseudonyms of) uncorrupted parties which have been in proximity to a corrupted party during epochs in R , i.e. $S_i \subseteq \{q \in \text{pseudonymize}_i(\mathcal{P}_{honest}) \mid \exists q' \in \mathcal{P}_{corrupted} \text{ where } (\text{pseudonymize}_i^{-1}(q), q') \in E_i\}$. After the response, set $\Delta\mathcal{WP}_i = \text{pseudonymize}_i^{-1}(S_i)$ as the set of parties that will be warned for the current epoch.
7. For each $i = (i_{lt}, i_{st}) \in R \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$, add $\{(P', i_{lt}) \mid P' \in \Delta\mathcal{WP}_i\}$ to the list of active warnings \mathcal{WP} .

Handling Warning Query:

1. Receive $(query, t)$ from party P
2. Return 1 if $(P, t) \in \mathcal{WP}$, otherwise return 0.

6 Security and Privacy Analysis

Our protocol's security is summarized as follows.

Theorem 1. *Under the following list of assumptions, the real protocol (as specified in [Section 4](#)) realizes the ideal protocol \mathcal{F}_{CT} (cf. [Section 5](#)) in the $\mathcal{F}_{med}, \mathcal{F}_{mat}, \mathcal{F}_{reg}$ -hybrid model and with static corruptions, assuming that P_{mat} as well as the submission, matching and warning server are honest. Assumptions:*

- Let $\Sigma_R = (\text{Gen}_R, \text{Enc}_R, \text{Dec}_R, \text{ReRand})$ be the rerandomizable encryption scheme with message space $\mathcal{M} = \mathbb{G}$ and ciphertext space \mathcal{C} . We assume Σ_R is IND-CPA-secure, and the distribution of ciphertexts generated by Enc_R

are computationally indistinguishable from a uniform distribution on the ciphertext space. (We also assume that uniformly sampling from the ciphertext space is possible in polynomial time.) We assume $\text{ReRand}(\text{Enc}_R(\text{pk}, m))$ is identically distributed as $\text{Enc}_R(\text{pk}, m)$ for all public keys pk output by Gen_R and all messages m in the message space.

- Let PRG be a secure pseudorandom generator.
- Let H be a collision-resistant hash function. We additionally assume that for uniformly random inputs $c \in \mathcal{C}$ the distribution of $H(c)$ is computationally indistinguishable from the uniform distribution on the output space $\{0, 1\}^{2^n}$ of H .⁹
- Let $\Sigma_{\text{tok}} = (\text{Gen}_I, \text{Gen}_U, \text{Obtain}, \text{Show}, \text{Identify})$ be a sound, anonymous e-token dispenser scheme with identification of double-spending.

Having stated the formal security guarantee that we capture with this theorem, and proof in [Appendix A](#), we proceed to discuss the interpretation and limitations on what we achieve exactly. For example, the extensive powers of the environment, also in determining the number and place of corrupted users, make it less clear what, e.g. our anti-Sybil protections actually achieve w.r.t. the privacy of the users. While in our argumentation in [Section 3.4](#) we state that the e-token dispenser is meant to guarantee that not too many malicious users/Sybils exists because they are hard to create, in our formal terms this only corresponds to the guarantee that the number of daily uploads is bounded by the number of users (cf. [Game 8](#)). Hence, for real-word security we believe that we can exclude excessive Sybil attacks.

Note that this points at a larger aspect that is typical for security modeling in general, but also relevant to fully understand the scope of our modeling: Giving the environment a lot of power to shape the scenarios in which the protocols are used, is an instance of a strong worst-case modelling. By quantifying over all environments (and implicitly over all computable “real world” scenarios of contact graphs and infection statuses), without a proper analysis of the costs and impracticalities of achieving this in the real, physical world¹⁰, we simplify the analysis and abstract from the many scenarios that may arise in its actual use. In the light of this, we give, in the following, an interpretation of our security guarantees and a discussion of guarantees and limitations not captured by our model, in the following:

6.1 Privacy

For our privacy analysis, we assume corrupted users can link some public identifiers they directly observe to the real identities of the corresponding user, e.g. by

⁹ This condition simplifies the proofs and was chosen for convenience only. A simple modification to the proofs will allow for proving the statement without this condition.

¹⁰ While it would be perfectly possible for an environment to use as a contact graph a fresh, and independently sampled random graph on \mathcal{P} for each short-term epoch, the costs of implementing this in real time for 15 minute epochs would be quite challenging.

accidentally meeting someone they know. This pessimistic approach yields a worst-case analysis regarding the information available to corrupted users.

Privacy of Positively Tested Participants. In the ideal functionality (\mathcal{F}_{CT} in Section 5), the attacker is provided with $\mathcal{P}_{infected} \cap \mathcal{P}_{corrupted}$, so the infection status of honest parties is protected here. The pseudonymized contact graph is independent of the infection status. Apart from the inherent leakage about the infection status from warning queries, this models that the protocol does not introduce any additional information leaks on the infection status of honest participants. Note that is in contrast to DP3T, where short-term identifiers of a whole day can be linked together, upon uploading data in case of an infection.

Privacy of Warned Participants. Our protocol naturally protects the privacy of warned participants and their social graph as the published warning identifier is computationally unlinkable to any information that can be recorded locally. As each honestly generated warning identifier wid is a Pedersen commitment to the user’s real identity and Pedersen commitments are perfectly hiding, the attacker cannot infer the user’s real identity rid from wid , and also deciding whether some identifiers belong to the same user, is impossible. Thus, a wid does not help the attacker in breaking the users’ privacy.

6.2 Privacy in the Case of Compromised Servers

This section presents an analysis of the privacy guarantees offered by our protocol if servers are compromised.

Linking Public Identifiers from the Long-Term Epoch. If the submission server is compromised, the attacker will be able to link different public identifiers pid to the same secret sid , and hence can link the public identifiers the user is using during the same long-term epoch. This poses a privacy threat, if the attacker additionally has observed some of the targeted public identifiers pid , which requires users colluding with the server.

Similarly, if both the matching server and the warning server are corrupted, the attacker can decrypt the sid values stored by the matching server to recover the wid value, and hence again link public identifiers to the secret identifiers sid and the respective warning identifier wid . Such an attacker that also colludes with corrupted users may be able to link public identifiers to times and places where these identifiers have been broadcast, and hence observe parts of the user’s location history and track a user for up to one day. We stress that even if all servers are compromised, an attacker will not be able to link public identifiers used on different days (assuming the use of anonymous channels).

Contact Information of Infected Users. Information about encounters between users is stored strictly on the user’s devices. Only the meeting history,

i.e. the list of encountered public identifiers, without times and places of meetings, of infected users is transmitted to the central servers. If the attacker has compromised the matching server *and* is able to link public identifiers used on the same long-term epoch (as in the previous scenario), the attacker might be able to infer repeated meetings of the infected user, i.e. she can learn how many encounters with the same persons the infected user’s device has registered within each day. If the attacker has additionally observed some of the warned public identifiers at specific times and places, the attacker will also learn where and when the encounter took place, and hence learn parts of the location history of the infected user as well as the warned users.

Warnings Issued. If the attacker has compromised the matching server, she can immediately observe the public identifiers of all users who have been colocated with infected users. If the attacker can additionally link a public identifier to a specific individual, the attacker can conclude this person has received a warning. (Note that a similar attack is possible in the DP3T protocol [T⁺20], but even without compromising a server.)

6.3 Security

We now analyze an attacker’s ability to cause false negatives or false positives. As above, we assume central servers to follow the protocol.

Creating False Negatives. A false negative occurs when an uncorrupted user A has been in colocation with an uncorrupted infected user B but A does not receive a warning. These false negatives are not possible in our protocol. In \mathcal{F}_{CT} this property is modeled by, \hat{E} initially containing all edges between honest users, and during the protocol edges can only be added and never removed. (Note that we excluded jamming of the BLE signal by the adversary, as motivated in Section 2.)

False Positives Regarding Honest Users. An honest user A is subject of a false positive if she has not been colocated with an infected user, but she nonetheless receives a warning. Our security goal is to prevent false positives, unless i) A was in proximity to a corrupted user, *and* ii) the attacker is in proximity to an infected user, or has been infected themselves.

This is captured by the following fact: In order for an honest party A to be warned, the party has to be included in \mathcal{WP} . It can only be included in \mathcal{WP} , if there is an outgoing edge from A in \hat{E} (warning triggered from an honest party) or there is an outgoing edge from A to a corrupted party in E (warning triggered from a corrupt party). If A was not in proximity to a corrupted user, the attacker cannot use “Replay/Relay” to add new outgoing edges to \hat{E} (as $(P'_3, P'_4) \notin E'$ in step 3, because P'_3 is corrupted and $\hat{P}_4 = A$ is not in proximity to a corrupted user) and hence cannot trigger a false warning from an honest party. The attacker

cannot trigger a warning from a corrupt party, as [step 6](#) of “[Handling Match Requests](#)” requires all S_i to be empty in this case.

If the attacker is not in proximity to an infected user and no corrupted party has been infected, the attacker can only insert edges into \hat{E} using “[Replay/Relay](#)” where the target will never be infected. So a false warning cannot be triggered from an honest party. Regarding warnings triggered from a corrupt party, $lastInfected_{it}$ will always be $-\infty$ in [step 6](#) of “[Handling Match Requests](#)” and parties can be added to \mathcal{WP} . This concludes our argument that producing a false positive for an honest user requires proximity of the attacker to both, the honest user and to an infected user (or the a corrupted user is infected).

Proving a Warning by Corrupted Users. We now analyze corrupted users’ ability to prove possession of warnings. We want that an attacker can only prove possession of a warning if corrupted users received a warning and only for the real identifiers for which those corrupted users have previously uploaded wids.

Since part of the verification is that the verifier queries the warning server for wid, a warning can only be proven for wids which received a warning. If wid was generated by an honest user, it is a Pedersen commitment to the real identity rid of the honest user created with a decommitment value u . Since honest users never share the unveil information, we consider it unlikely an attacker learns the value u . Thus, proving the ownership of wid would require the attacker to present a real identity rid' and a zero-knowledge proof showing she knows a corresponding unveil information u' . However, since the Pedersen commitment scheme is computationally binding (under the discrete logarithm assumption in \mathbb{G}), and if the zero-knowledge proof system is sound, the attacker will not be able to forge a proof.

If wid was generated by a corrupted user, the attacker may be able to prove ownership of the respective warning identifier wid. In this case, however, the attacker will have to make sure one of the public identifiers pid derived from wid is reported to the matching server, and hence must have been warned. If the infected user is corrupted herself, this is trivial. If the infected user is honest, causing her to output pid requires her device registering an encounter.

7 Related Work

Canetti et al. [[CTV20](#)] mention an extension of their protocol using private set intersection protocols in order to protect the health status of infected individuals. However, it is unclear how feasible such a solution is with regard to the computational load incurred on both, the smartphone and the server, cf. [[D20d](#), P3]. Whereas DP3T [[T+20](#)] claims that protecting the infection status of individuals in decentralized protocols is impossible by [[D20a](#), IR 1] and therefore does not address further countermeasures.

Chan et al. [[CGH+20](#), Sect. 4.1] include a short discussion of protocols in the upload-what-you-observed paradigm, and propose a form of rerandomization of identifiers at the side of the smartphone. In this protocol, a user downloads all

published identifiers and checks whether they are a rerandomization of their own identifier (requiring one exponentiation). Hence, this approach puts a regular heavy computation cost on the user’s device, and is likely not practical. Bell et al. [BBH⁺20] propose a solution for digital contact tracing based on homomorphic equality tests, aimed at protecting the infection status. However, there the central server learns the full contact graph for infected and non-infected users alike, as all users periodically upload their observations.

Besides BLE-based approaches, there are also proposals that use GPS traces of infected individuals to discover COVID-19 hot spots as well as colocation, such as [BBV⁺20; FMP⁺20]. However, there is a consensus that GPS-based approaches do not offer a sufficient spatial resolution to estimate the distance between two participants with sufficient precision.

The protocols of Garofalo et al. [GhP⁺20], and DESIRE [CBB⁺20] (another hybrid approach, constituting concurrent work), broadcast public keys and compute Diffie-Hellman shared secret upon receiving a broadcast. Both are very similar to a proposal from Cho, Ippolito, and Yu [CIY20]. Both constructions compute two separate hashes of a shared secret, which constitutes an encounter, and use one for reporting contacts at risk and another one for querying their status. An advantage of registering an encounter by computing a shared secret from a Non-Interactive Key Exchange is the protection against certain kinds of replay attacks as observing a public key is not enough for impersonation. The main disadvantage, is that a public key does usually not fit into a single advertisement packet and therefore additional workarounds are necessary. Also, the security model of DESIRE is different from ours, e.g. if two corrupted users would like to know whether and when they met the same honest non-infected user, they could cooperate with the DESIRE server (which can link all encounter tokens of a user together, because a user has to upload all of them at once when querying for a warning) to link both encounters. Garofalo et al. introduce a Central Health Authority server, and a matching server that has some similarities to our server pipeline.

Instead of broadcasting large public keys, the protocol Pronto-C2 by [ABI⁺20] broadcasts addresses, where the public keys can be retrieved from. This requires the public keys to be anonymously uploaded in advance, which is similar to the submission routine in our protocol. Pronto-C2 separates the task for authenticating app requests from the central server and leaves the task for matching and risk-computation to the smartphone, which might incur a significant workload on the smartphone. On the other hand, our protocol utilizes a dedicated party for every privacy-sensitive task, i.e. submission, matching, warning and registering, and leaves only the task of risk-computation to the smartphone. The interested reader is referred to [V20] for a general discussion on hybrid approaches. The protocol Epione by [TSS⁺20], as well as the protocol Catalic by [DPT20] make use of private set intersection to improve on the privacy side.

Canetti et al. [CKL⁺20] introduce two protocols and also feature a universal composability (UC) modeling of contact tracing functionalities, which constitutes concurrent and independent work. While their modelling takes broad strokes by

employing a global functionality for interacting with the physical world, via a set of allowable measurement functions and faking functions to the physical world, we specifically model the aspect of people being in relevant closeness to each other using a contact graph, and can hence model the leakage and e.g. relay attacks by certain operations on the graph – yielding a more easy-to-handle criterion. Moreover, only an extension of one of their protocols, called CertifiedCleverParrot, incorporates anti-Sybil protections, but this is not modeled and proven secure in their UC setting. For an alternative modelling and analysis of security notions using game-based definitions, such as forward security, see the concurrent work of Danz et al. [DDL⁺20].

8 Summary

Our protocol “ConTra Corona” provides a new and “hybrid” approach to digital contact tracing that protects both, the contact graph/encounter history, and the infection status. For this, it is important to fully understand, what security and privacy of contact tracing protocols mean, and to formalize this in a rigorous manner, with a simulation-based security notion in the real–ideal paradigm constituting a gold standard for such an endeavour in the cryptography landscape. Our notion makes the exact leakage and the attacker capabilities (in terms of inducing false positives/negatives) explicit. In [Appendix A](#) we present a proof that our protocol fulfills this security notion.

In order to reduce the required trust into the central server components, we described how the server’s functions may be separated by distributing core functions to different organizations. We argued that, even if all servers are compromised and colluding with malicious participants, our protocol still achieves almost the same privacy guarantees as previous works, such as DP-3T [T⁺20]. In conclusion, we argue that our protocol represents an overall improvement regarding security and privacy and remains practical.

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A Proof of Theorem 1

We first give the pseudocode of the simulator. A proof showing the distinguisher \mathcal{Z} cannot distinguish the “real world” experiment (where a real adversary tries to attack the real protocol) and the “ideal world” (where the simulator \mathcal{S} interacts with the ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{CT}) is given below. Note that the simulator internally executes the adversary and thereby all corrupted parties.

Simulator \mathcal{S}

State:

- Short term epoch $e_{st} \in \mathbb{Z}_{96}$ and long term epoch $e_{lt} \in \mathbb{N}$. We write e for (e_{lt}, e_{st}) .
- Set of corrupted parties $\mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$.
- Set of infected corrupted parties $(\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}})_i$.
- A sequence of all pseudonymized contact graphs so-far $(G'_i = (\mathcal{Q}_i, E'_i))_i$, i.e. a pseudonymized meeting history from the point of view of the adversary.
- Current pseudonymized contact graph $G' = (\mathcal{Q}, E') = G'_{(e_{lt}, e_{st})}$.
- List \mathcal{WL} of active warnings (wid, t) from corrupted parties to corrupted parties.
- Issuer key pair for token dispensers $(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{T}}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{T}})$.
- The key pair $(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{W}}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{W}})$ of the simulated warning server.
- Set \mathcal{R} , which records the information exchanged between corrupted parties and the simulated parties by storing tuples $(P, \text{wid}, e_{lt}, \text{pid}_1, \dots, \text{pid}_{96})$.
- A set \mathcal{H} of tuples (pid, P, t) indicating broadcasts by corrupted parties.
- Tuple (L, t) which represents the current pending match request.
- A set T of tuples (tan, t, P) consisting of TANs, the day during which each tan was generated and the party which requested it.

Register a Party:

1. Upon $(\text{register}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{U}})$ from $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ for \mathcal{F}_{reg} .
2. Issue a new token dispenser for P like \mathcal{F}_{reg} does.

Next Epoch:

1. Upon receiving $((\mathcal{Q}, E'), \mathcal{P}'_{\text{infected}})$ from \mathcal{F}_{CT} replace the current contact graph and add it to the history of pseudonymized contact graphs.
2. Increment e_{st} (in \mathbb{Z}_{96}).
3. If $e_{st} = 0$ then increment e_{lt} and remove all entries (wid, t) from \mathcal{WL} where $t \leq e_{lt} - 14$.
4. Assign random pids to all honest nodes $q \in \mathcal{Q}$.
5. For each edge $(P_1, P_2) \in E'$, where $P_1 \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{honest}}$ and $P_2 \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$, send the pid assigned to P_1 to P_2 on behalf of \mathcal{F}_{mat} .

Upload from Corrupted User:

1. When $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ wants to show a token, act as \mathcal{V} and verify the token.
2. If the token is correct (and not reused) receive $(\text{seed}, \text{sid})$ from $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ for the *Submission Server*.
3. Compute sid' and $\text{pid}_1, \dots, \text{pid}_{96}$ as prescribed by the protocol based on sid, seed .
4. Compute $\text{wid} := \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{W}}, \text{sid})$.
5. If there is a P' s.t. $(P', \text{wid}, e_{lt}, \text{pid}_1, \dots, \text{pid}_{96}) \in \mathcal{R}$, return.
6. Otherwise, choose $P' \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ with $(P', \cdot, e_{lt}, \cdot, \dots, \cdot) \notin \mathcal{R}$. If such a P' does not exist, abort the simulation.
7. For each $(\text{pid}, P'', t) \in \mathcal{H}$, with $\text{pid} = \text{pid}_i$ (for an $i \in \mathbb{Z}_{96}$) send $(\text{sendBroadcast}, t, (e_{lt}, i), P'', P')$
8. Store $(P', \text{wid}, e_{lt}, \text{pid}_1, \dots, \text{pid}_{96})$ in \mathcal{R} .

Broadcast from Corrupted User:

1. Upon receiving (pid) from a participant $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ for \mathcal{F}_{mat} .
2. Insert (pid, P, e) into \mathcal{H} .
3. For each $(P_2, \cdot, t, \dots, \text{pid}_i = \text{pid}, \dots) \in \mathcal{R}$, send $(\text{sendBroadcast}, e, (t, i), P, P_2)$ to \mathcal{F}_{CT} .
4. Determine the set of receivers of this broadcast, i.e. the set of corrupted parties $P' \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ such that $(P, P') \in G'$. For each such P' send (pid) to P' as coming from \mathcal{F}_{mat} .
5. Look up if one of the nodes in one of the G'_i (or G') was assigned pid . If so, let P_1 be the node, P_2 be an arbitrary corrupted receiver of the broadcast from P_1 , $P_3 = P$, t be the corresponding epoch of G'_i (or G'). For each target P_4 , send $(\text{relay}, t, P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4)$ to \mathcal{F}_{CT} .

Warning Request from Corrupted User:

1. Upon receiving (warningRequest) from $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}(e_{lt}, e_{st})} \cap \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ for \mathcal{F}_{med} .
2. Generate a TAN $\text{tan} \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}^{2n}$.
3. Add (tan, e_{lt}, P) to the list of valid tans T .
4. Send tan to P from \mathcal{F}_{med} .

Handle Match Request:

1. Upon receiving (L, tan) from an arbitrary corrupted party for the *Matching Server*, where L is a finite set of public identifiers.
2. Look up an entry $(\text{tan}, t, P') \in T$ to find t and P' . If there is no such entry, ignore the request.
3. For each $\text{pid} \in L$ try looking up pid in \mathcal{R} . For each match with corresponding warning identifier wid and long-term epoch t' , where $e_{lt} - 14 \leq t' \leq t$, mark wid as at-risk by inserting (wid, t') into \mathcal{WL} .
4. Store (L, t) in the state.
5. Remove (tan, t, P') from T .
6. Send (positive) to \mathcal{F}_{CT} from P' .

Force a Warning:

1. Upon receiving (*forceWarning*) from \mathcal{F}_{CT} .
2. Find the corresponding set L which the corrupted party was trying to send to the matching server and epoch t in the state.
3. Let $R := \mathbb{N} \cap [e_{lt} - 14, e_{lt}) \cap [0, t]$.
4. Let $S_i := \emptyset$ for $i \in R \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$.
5. For each $\text{pid} \in L$: Search the graphs G'_i (for $i \in R \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$) for a node q labeled pid . If a node is found in graph G'_i , insert q into S_i .
6. Send the sets S_i back to \mathcal{F}_{CT} .

Warning Query from Corrupted User:

1. Upon receiving (*wid*) from a participant $P \in \mathcal{P}_{corrupted}$ for the *Warning Server*.
2. If there is a t s.t. (wid, t) is in \mathcal{WL} , return 1.
3. Else, for each (P', t') with $(P', \text{wid}, t', \cdot, \dots) \in \mathcal{R}$, send (*query, t'*) from party P' to \mathcal{F}_{CT} , compute the logical or of all the replies from \mathcal{F}_{CT} to P' , and return the result to P .
4. If *wid* is neither in \mathcal{WL} nor in \mathcal{R} , return 0.

Proof (Proof Sketch). It is sufficient to prove there is a simulator \mathcal{S} (running in the ideal experiment) which can replace the attacker \mathcal{A} (running in the real version of the experiment), such that all environment machines \mathcal{Z} have at most negligible advantage in distinguishing these games. We claim the simulator given above achieves this. We prove this by giving a sequence of “hybrid” games/experiments and showing that each pair of consecutive games is indistinguishable. We briefly sketch the sequence of games. For brevity, we only describe the differences of each game to the previous one.

Game 0 (Real Experiment). This is real experiment, running the code of all machines as given in [Section 4](#).

Game 1 (All-powerful Simulator). The game is modified to redirect all communication between the environment and other parties to the simulator. We introduce an intermediate simulator \mathcal{S}_1 , who internally runs the attacker \mathcal{A} as well as the code (as given in [Section 4](#)) of all parties and hybrid functionalities, including the honest parties and P_{mat} , and forwards the communication between them accordingly.

Proposition 1. *The views of the environment \mathcal{Z} in [Games 0](#) and [1](#) are perfectly indistinguishable.*

Game 2 (Replacing r_i by Random Values). The simulator behaves as in the previous game, with the following difference: When the simulator is running the “[Upload Submission](#)” code of honest parties and the “[Handling Submissions](#)” upload handling code of the submission server, it no longer uses the seed to generate the rerandomization values r_1, \dots, r_{96} used for the [ReRand](#)

procedure (applied to sid). Instead, it chooses the values r_1, \dots, r_{96} uniformly and independently at random (making sure that both the honest party and the submission server use the same randomness).

Proposition 2. *If there exists an environment \mathcal{Z} which can distinguish between Games 1 and 2 with non-negligible advantage in polynomial time, then there exists a PPT attacker breaking the security of the PRG with non-negligible advantage.*

Game 3 (Replacing the sid' by Random Ciphertexts). The simulator acts as before, with the following differences: When an honest party uploads $(\text{seed}, \text{sid})$ to the submission server, the values sid'_j are no longer derived by rerandomizing the ciphertext sid , but instead chosen uniformly (and independently) at random from the encryption scheme's ciphertext space \mathcal{C} . For corrupted parties, the sid' continue to be generated as prescribed by the protocol. Public identities pid_j continue to be chosen as $\text{pid}_j := \text{H}(\text{sid}'_j)$. For both honest and corrupted parties P , the simulator decrypts sid to recover wid , and sets $x := P$ (if P is honest) and $x := \perp$ otherwise, where \perp is a placeholder symbol to be replaced in a later game. The (simulated) submission server stores $(x, \text{wid}, e_{lt}, \text{pid}_1, \dots, \text{pid}_{96})$ in the current batch (instead of the generated $(\text{sid}'_j, \text{pid}_j)$ tuples). The simulator keeps track of all tuples generated this way by adding them to a list \mathcal{R} . When the current long-term epoch ends, the batch is forwarded to the matching server. The matching server (simulated by \mathcal{S}) is adapted accordingly: It stores the received set as \mathcal{B}_t and continues to delete old sets $\mathcal{B}_{t'}$ where $t' \leq e_{lt} - 14$. When a match request (S, tan) is received by the matching server the matching server (as before) first checks the tan and removes it from the list. Afterwards, the matching server looks up the corresponding wid_l and epoch t_l for each $\text{pid}_l \in S$ in his state and forwards the list of all corresponding (wid_l, t_l) to the warning server. The warning server (simulated by \mathcal{S}) omits the decryption, and directly adds all received (wid_l, t_l) tuples to its list \mathcal{WL} .

Proposition 3. *If there exists an environment \mathcal{Z} which can distinguish between Games 2 and 3 with non-negligible advantage in polynomial time, then there exists a PPT attacker with non-negligible advantage in distinguishing ciphertexts from random elements of the ciphertext space \mathcal{C} .*

Game 4 (Replacing the pids by Random Data). The simulator acts as before, with the following differences: When an honest party uploads a $(\text{seed}, \text{sid})$ pair to the submission server, the pid_j values are no longer generated as hashes of the sid'_j values, but chosen (uniformly and independently) at random from $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$. For corrupted parties, the simulator continues as before.

Proposition 4. *If there exists an environment \mathcal{Z} which can distinguish between Games 3 and 4 with non-negligible advantage in polynomial time, then there exists a PPT attacker with non-negligible advantage in distinguishing the distribution of H on uniformly random inputs from the uniform distribution on H 's output space $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$.*

Game 5 (TANs are unique). The simulator acts as before, but whenever \mathcal{F}_{med} generates a new tan, the simulator checks whether the tan has already been assigned, i.e. there exists a tuple $(\text{tan}, \cdot) \in T$. If this is the case, the simulator aborts. Otherwise, \mathcal{F}_{med} proceeds as in the previous games (i.e. the tan is sent to the requesting infected participant and the matching server).

Proposition 5. *For all PPT environments \mathcal{Z} , the probability of an abort in game [Game 5](#) is negligible in n .*

Proof (Proof Sketch). The number of tans in the tan list T is at most polynomial, and all tans are chosen uniformly and independently at random. Hence, the probability of a collision is given by the so-called “birthday bound”. Since tans are chosen from a space of exponential size $(\{0, 1\}^{2n})$, the probability of a collision is negligible in n .

Game 6 (Honest Users’ TANs cannot be Guessed). The simulator acts as before, but maintains *two* lists of tans: T , holding tans (and their creation date t and requester P) sent out by \mathcal{F}_{med} to *corrupted* users (and the matching server) and T' , holding tans (and, again, their creation date t and requester P) sent out by \mathcal{F}_{med} to *honest* users (and the matching server).

When \mathcal{F}_{med} generates a new tan, the simulator still checks the tan’s uniqueness, but now uses $T \cup T'$ for this check, i.e. the simulator aborts if there is a tuple $(\text{tan}, \cdot, \cdot) \in T \cup T'$. Otherwise, \mathcal{F}_{med} proceeds as before.

[Step 2](#) of “[Handling Match Request](#)” of the matching server (see p. 16) is adapted as follows: When a party $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{honest}}$ sends a match request to the matching server, the simulator uses T' to check the tan, and removes the corresponding entry (tan, t, P) from T' if the tan is found. When a party $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ sends a match request, the simulator checks if there is a tuple $(\text{tan}, \cdot, \cdot) \in T$ and rejects the request if this is not the case. If the request succeeds, tan is removed from T .

Proposition 6. *Every PPT environment \mathcal{Z} has at most negligible advantage in distinguishing [Games 5](#) and [6](#).*

Proof (Proof Sketch). From the perspective of \mathcal{Z} , [Game 6](#) is the same as [Game 5](#), except that corrupted parties cannot call “[Handling Match Request](#)” with tans of honest users. Since these tans are uniformly random on $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$ and perfectly hidden from the attacker (and \mathcal{Z}), the attacker can only try to guess these tans. However, there are at most polynomially many tans of honest users in an exponentially large space, hence \mathcal{Z} ’s chance of guessing one of them is negligible.

Game 7 (Warnings from Honest to Honest Parties). The simulator acts as before with the following differences. The ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(7)}$ now acts as follows:

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(7)}$

State:

- Current epoch $(e_{lt}, e_{st}) \in \mathbb{N} \times \mathbb{Z}_{96} =: I$.
- Set of corrupted parties $\mathcal{P}_{corrupted}$.
- Set of honest parties $\mathcal{P}_{honest} = \mathcal{P} \setminus \mathcal{P}_{corrupted}$.
- A sequence $(\mathcal{P}_{infected,i})_{i \in I}$ of sets of infected parties, i.e. the history of infected parties.
- Set of currently infected parties $\mathcal{P}_{infected}$
- A sequence of all neighbourhood graphs so-far $(G_i = (\mathcal{P}_i, E_i))_i$, i.e. the global meeting history.
- Current contact graph $G = (\mathcal{P}, E) = G_{(e_{lt}, e_{st})}$.
- Parties at risk $\mathcal{WP} \subseteq \mathcal{P} \times \mathbb{N}$, which signifies which parties have encountered a positive participant (that generated a warning) in the last 14 long-term epochs and during which long-term epochs the encounters took place.
- A sequence of edge sets $(\hat{E}_i)_i$ on \mathcal{P}_i which does some bookkeeping necessary to know who is to be warned. Let \hat{E} be the edge set of the current epoch.

Set Neighborhood/Infected:

1. Receive a contact graph $G = (\mathcal{P}, E)$ and a set of infected parties $\mathcal{P}_{infected}$ from party P_{mat} .
2. Add G to the global meeting history and $\mathcal{P}_{infected}$ to the history of infected parties.
3. Set $E' = \{(P_0, P_1) \in E \mid P_0 \in \mathcal{P}_{corrupted} \vee P_1 \in \mathcal{P}_{corrupted}\}$.
4. Leak (\mathcal{P}, E') , $\mathcal{P}_{infected}$ to the adversary.
5. Execute [steps 7 to 9](#) of “Set Neighborhood/Infected” from \mathcal{F}_{CT} (p. 21).

Send Broadcast: As in “Send Broadcast” of \mathcal{F}_{CT} .

Handling Match Requests:

1. Receive (*positive*) from party P .
2. If $P \in \mathcal{P}_{corrupted}$, abort.
3. If $P \notin \mathcal{P}_{infected}$, return. Otherwise, continue:
4. Let $R := \mathbb{N} \cap [e_{lt} - 14, e_{lt})$. For each epoch $i \in R \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$, determine the set $\Delta\mathcal{WP}_i$ of nodes P' such that $(P', P) \in \hat{E}_i$.
5. For each $i = (i_{lt}, i_{st}) \in R \times \mathbb{Z}_{96}$, add $\{(P', i_{lt}) \mid P' \in \Delta\mathcal{WP}_i\}$ to the list of active warnings \mathcal{WP} .

Handling Warning Query:

1. Receive (*query*, t) from party P
2. Return 1 if $(P, t) \in \mathcal{WP}$, otherwise return 0.

The party P_{mat} is adapted to forward its inputs G , $\mathcal{P}_{infected}$ to $\mathcal{F}_{CT}^{(7)}$ (instead of \mathcal{F}_{mat} and \mathcal{F}_{med} , respectively). The simulator, when it receives an input $G = (\mathcal{P}, E)$, $\mathcal{P}_{infected}$ from \mathcal{Z} to P_{mat} , does no longer use these inputs directly, but uses

the information G' , $\mathcal{P}_{infected}$ it receives from $\mathcal{F}_{CT}^{(7)}$ instead. (In particular, \mathcal{S} uses these inputs when simulating \mathcal{F}_{mat} and \mathcal{F}_{med} .) The behaviour of the matching server is changed as follows: When an honest participant P reports as infected by sending a set S (of pids of P 's contacts) and a tan, the matching server checks and invalidates the tan as before, but only forwards the (wid, t) pairs uploaded by *corrupted* parties to the warning server. (The matching server's behaviour is unmodified when corrupted parties report themselves infected.) When \mathcal{Z} sends (*sendBroadcast*) to an honest party, the simulator sends the same message to $\mathcal{F}_{CT}^{(7)}$. (Additionally, the honest party sends its current pid to \mathcal{F}_{mat} , as in the real protocol.) When \mathcal{Z} inputs (*positive*) to an honest party P , the simulator forwards this message to $\mathcal{F}_{CT}^{(7)}$ on behalf of P , and (as before) has P run the protocol of the app for “Match Request”. When \mathcal{Z} sends (*query, t*) to an honest party P , the simulator forwards this to \mathcal{F}_{CT} and receives a bit b_1 . Additionally, the simulator executes P 's code, and sends the party P 's warning id wid for epoch t to the warning server, which will return a bit b_2 . The simulator returns $b_1 \vee b_2$ to \mathcal{Z} , where \vee denotes the logical or of the two bits.

Proposition 7. *For every PPT environment \mathcal{Z} the views in [Games 6 and 7](#) are statistically indistinguishable.*

Proof (Proof Sketch). In [Game 7](#), warnings between honest parties are delivered via $\mathcal{F}_{CT}^{(7)}$ (using the complete neighbourhood graph G) instead of via the server pipeline.

In more detail, honest parties no longer broadcast their pids to other honest parties, so the receiving honest party can no longer upload the sending party's pid to the matching server in the case of an infection. However, when the receiving party reports as infected, it will now (additionally) invoke “[Handling Match Requests](#)” of $\mathcal{F}_{CT}^{(7)}$, adding the sending party to the warning list (since \hat{E}_i contains all edges between honest parties). When the sending party later attempts to find out if it has received a warning, it will consider both warnings delivered via $\mathcal{F}_{CT}^{(7)}$ (i.e. warnings from other honest parties) and warnings delivered via the server pipeline (i.e. warnings from corrupted parties).

All other behaviour is unchanged.

Game 8 (Limiting the Number of Uploads). The simulator acts as before, with the following difference: Whenever a *corrupted* party is uploading a (seed, sid) pair (after [Show](#)-ing an e-token) the simulator behaves as described in [steps 3 to 8](#) of “[Upload from Corrupted User](#)” on p. [33](#). (This behavior replaces the behaviour of storing tuples containing \perp introduced in [Game 3](#).) In return, the simulator no longer runs the “real” code of the submission server (“[Handling Submissions](#)” and “[Forwarding Submissions](#)”, see p. [15](#)).

Note that, due to this change, the simulator will abort the simulation if (during any epoch e) the corrupted parties succeed in having the (simulated) submission server (acting as \mathcal{V} in the [Show](#) protocol of the e-token dispenser scheme) accept more than n protocol runs, where n is the total number of corrupted parties. This requires that the attacker has succeeded in having the (simulated) submission

server accept more than n e-tokens in the epoch e , which constitutes a violation of the soundness property of the e-token dispenser scheme.

Proposition 8. *If there exists a PPT environment \mathcal{Z} which causes the game to abort with non-negligible probability, then there exists a PPT attacker breaking the soundness of the e-token dispenser scheme with non-negligible probability.*

Corollary. *If the e-token dispenser scheme is sound, then for every PPT environment \mathcal{Z} , the environment’s probability of distinguishing [Games 7 and 8](#) is negligible.*

Game 9 (Warnings from Corrupted to Honest Users). The ideal functionality is adapted to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$ by inserting, after [step 3](#) of “[Set Neighborhood/Infected](#)”:

4. Select a random, injective mapping $\text{pseudonymize}'_i : \mathcal{P}_{\text{honest}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{2n}$ and extend it to the whole set \mathcal{P} via $\text{pseudonymize}'_i(P) = P$ for all $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$. Set $E' := \{(\text{pseudonymize}'_i(x), \text{pseudonymize}'_i(y)) \mid (x, y) \in E' \wedge y \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}\} \cup \{(x, y) \mid (x, y) \in E' \wedge y \notin \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}\}$. Let \mathcal{Q} be the set of nodes associated with the set of edges E' . (This is a modified version of [step 5](#) of “[Set Neighborhood/Infected](#)” in \mathcal{F}_{CT} .)

[Step 4](#) of “[Set Neighborhood/Infected](#)” (see p. [37](#)) is adapted to leak (\mathcal{Q}, E') (and $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$) to \mathcal{S} (instead of (\mathcal{P}, E')). Moreover, we add [steps 5 and 6](#) of “[Handling Match Requests](#)” of \mathcal{F}_{CT} to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$ at the respective positions, where the functions pseudonymize_i , $\text{pseudonymize}_i^{-1}$ are replaced by $\text{pseudonymize}'_i$ and $\text{pseudonymize}'_i^{-1}$, respectively. [Step 2](#) of “[Handling Match Requests](#)” (see p. [37](#)) is replaced by [step 2](#) of the respective function on p. [22](#).

The simulator \mathcal{S} is adapted as follows. When \mathcal{S} receives $G' = (\mathcal{Q}, E')$ and $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$, it acts as described in “[Next Epoch](#)” on page [32](#). (The simulator continues to send G' to \mathcal{F}_{mat} . Moreover, the simulator continues to use $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ for emulating \mathcal{F}_{med} .)

\mathcal{F}_{mat} now looks up recipients in E' instead of in E .

When a corrupted party sends (L, tan) to the matching server, the simulator looks up whether there is a tuple (tan, t, P') contained in the simulated matching server’s tan list T and ignores the request if this is not the case ([step 2](#) of “[Handle Match Request](#)” of the simulator on p. [33](#)). Otherwise, temporarily store (L, t) in the simulator’s state, remove the corresponding tuple (tan, t, P') from T and send *(positive)* from P' to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$ ([steps 4 to 6](#)). When the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$ responds with *(forceWarning)*, the simulator acts as defined in “[Force a Warning](#)” on page [34](#).

Additionally, the simulator searches through \mathcal{R} to find the respective pids given in L , extracts (wid, t) from the tuples found and adds all of these (wid, t) tuples to the warning server’s list \mathcal{WL} , as before. (This is analogous to [step 3](#) of “[Handle Match Request](#)” on p. [33](#).)

When \mathcal{Z} inputs *(sendBroadcast)* to an honest party P , the simulator no longer sends P ’s current pid to \mathcal{F}_{mat} . (But \mathcal{S} continues to send *(sendBroadcast)* to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$)

from P .) When \mathcal{Z} sends $(query, t)$ to an honest party P , the simulator no longer has P send the corresponding wid to the warning server. Instead, the simulator only sends $(query, t)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{CT}^{(9)}$ on behalf of P , receiving a bit b in return (as before). The simulator sends b to \mathcal{Z} from P .

The simulator skips executing “Register” and “Upload Submission” (p. 14) for honest parties.

Proposition 9. *For each PPT environment \mathcal{Z} the probability of distinguishing Games 8 and 9 is negligible.*

Proof (Proof Sketch). In Game 9 warnings from corrupted parties to honest parties are now delivered via $\mathcal{F}_{CT}^{(9)}$ (instead of via the simulated servers).

Suppose an honest party P broadcasts a pid in Game 8, this pid is received by a corrupted party, and the attacker attempts to generate a warning for this pid at a later point in time. Let e be the epoch of this broadcast.

In Game 8, the honest party P will upload $(seed, sid)$ corresponding to the pid to the submission server, and the simulator will add a corresponding tuple to \mathcal{R} . When \mathcal{Z} in epoch e inputs $(sendBroadcast)$ to the honest party, it will send its current pid to \mathcal{F}_{mat} , which will forward the pid to all corrupted parties P' with $(P, P') \in E$. The corrupted parties will receive this pid but will not be able to determine which honest party broadcasted this pid (except from what is obvious from the structure of the graph G).

When a corrupted party sends a warning (L, tan) to the simulated matching server in Game 8, the simulator will look up all pid_i s (contained in L) in \mathcal{R} and add the corresponding $wids$ to the warning server’s list \mathcal{WL} . Note that the matching server does not store pid_i s older than 14 long term epochs, so these pid_i s cannot be matched. Vice versa, the matching server does not consider pid_i s newer than the TAN for matching (step 3).

The environment can check whether this warning is delivered to P by sending $(query, t)$ to P with the corresponding epoch number t . (The environment also has a chance to detect this warning by having the attacker submit the corresponding wid to the simulated warning server. However, this warning identity is perfectly hidden from the view of \mathcal{Z} , so \mathcal{Z} ’s chance of finding a the corresponding wid is negligible, if wid is from a domain of super-polynomial size.)

In Game 9, the simulator skips simulating the “Register” and “Upload Submission” code for honest parties, so the records of honest parties are no longer added to \mathcal{R} (in particular, pid is no longer contained in \mathcal{R}). Moreover, when \mathcal{Z} in epoch e inputs $(sendBroadcast)$ to an honest party P , pid is no longer sent to \mathcal{F}_{mat} . However, the simulator will now assign random pid_i s to all nodes of honest parties in step 4 of “Next Epoch” (p. 32) and send these pid_i s to neighboring corrupted parties (step 5). (The pid_i s have been chosen uniformly at random from $\{0, 1\}^{2n}$ before, so their distribution is unchanged.)

Honest parties’ pid_i s which are not observed by any corrupted party are effectively removed from the game because \mathcal{S} skips simulating the parties’ “Upload Submission” code. Therefore corrupted parties can no longer send warnings to such pid_i s. However, since the pid_i s have been selected uniformly at random from

$\{0, 1\}^{2n}$ and perfectly hidden from the attacker, the attacker’s chance of sending a warning to such a pid_i was negligible.

When a corrupted party (not necessarily one of the parties who received pid) attempts to send warnings by sending (L, tan) to the matching server in [Game 9](#), the simulator (“[Handle Match Request](#)” on p. 33) first checks ([step 2](#)) the tan and determines the corrupted party P' who requested the tan and the long-term epoch t during which the tan was requested. If the tan is found, it is invalidated later on ([step 5](#)).

As its next step ([step 3](#)), it looks up the pid_i s given in L in \mathcal{R} , and adds the corresponding (wid_i, t') tuples to \mathcal{WL} . (Since, at this point, \mathcal{R} only contains wid_i s and pid_i s uploaded by corrupted users, this only affects warnings from corrupted users to corrupted users, and the behavior for such warnings remains unchanged.) Note that [step 3](#) corresponds to the restrictions from [Game 8](#), preventing warnings for pid_i s older than 14 long-term epochs or newer than tan .

Next, the simulator temporarily stores (L, t) ([step 4](#)) and sends (*positive*) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$ from P' ([step 6](#)). $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$ (“[Handling Match Requests](#)” on p. 22) will determine lastInfected_{it} , the most recent epoch during which P' was infected, and ask the simulator for (pseudonyms of) parties to be warned by sending (*forceWarning*) to \mathcal{S} . Note that as only infected parties are given a tan by the simulator, $\text{lastInfected}_{it} \geq t$. The simulator will look up the pid_j s from L to determine if they were assigned to a graph node q of some graph G'_i , where i refers to the epochs in the time frame from 14 long-term epochs prior to the current epoch until the generation of the tan , as described in [step 5](#) of “[Force a Warning](#)”. Note that this time frame is exactly the same as in [Game 8](#) and contained in the R determined by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$ in [step 6](#) of “[Handling Match Requests](#)”. \mathcal{S} will send the sets S_i of these nodes q (grouped by the corresponding epoch) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$.

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$ depseudonymizes the entries in S_i and ensures that for each entry q there exists a corrupted party q' such that q was in proximity to q' in epoch i . This has to be the case for all S_i returned by the \mathcal{S} , because corrupted parties can only obtain pid_j s using the broadcast functionality which respects the current proximity graph. $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(9)}$ adds the to-be-warned parties to \mathcal{WP} which triggers the same warnings for honest parties as in [Game 8](#).

Game 10 (Warnings from Honest to Corrupted Users). The ideal functionality is replaced by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(10)}$, which acts as before, with the following differences: When $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(10)}$ receives a contact graph $G = (\mathcal{P}, E)$ and $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ from P_{mat} , it behaves as described in “[Set Neighborhood/Infected](#)” of \mathcal{F}_{CT} on page 21. In effect, this adds the step of splitting honest parties ([step 4](#) of \mathcal{F}_{CT}), replaces the modified version of [step 5](#) (introduced as [step 4](#) in [Game 9](#)), and restricts the leakage output by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(10)}$ to \mathcal{S} from $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ to $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}} \cap \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ ([step 6](#) of \mathcal{F}_{CT}). Moreover, we revert the replacement of the pseudonymization functions (introduced in [Game 9](#)) in [step 6](#) of “[Handling Match Requests](#)” in \mathcal{F}_{CT} by replacing the functions $\text{pseudonymize}'_i$, $\text{pseudonymize}'_i{}^{-1}$ by pseudonymize_i and $\text{pseudonymize}_i{}^{-1}$ respectively.

Furthermore, we add “Broadcasts From Corrupted User” and “Replay/Relay” (see p. 21) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(10)}$. Observe that after this change, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(10)} = \mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}$.

The simulator is adapted as follows. When the environment \mathcal{Z} inputs (*positive*) to an honest party P , the simulator no longer executes the app’s code for “Match Request” (see page 15). As a consequence, honest parties no longer request tans, and the list T' of tans for honest users is removed from the game. However, \mathcal{S} continues to send (*positive*) to \mathcal{F}_{CT} on behalf of P .

Moreover, “Scheduled Upload” and “Recording Broadcasts” (p. 14) are removed from the honest parties.

The matching server and the warning server are removed from the simulation. Their functionalities are replaced by adding step 3 of “Handle Match Request” (see p. 33) and “Warning Query from Corrupted User” to \mathcal{S} .

When a corrupted party $P \in \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ sends a broadcast pid to \mathcal{F}_{mat} , the simulator runs the code given under “Broadcast from Corrupted User” on p. 33 instead of simulating \mathcal{F}_{mat} . In fact, \mathcal{F}_{mat} is completely removed from the simulation. The party P_{mat} is replaced by the dummy party from the “ideal” world, i.e. it only forwards its inputs to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(10)}$. When \mathcal{Z} sends (*sendBroadcast*) to an honest party P , the simulator no longer forwards the respective pid from P to \mathcal{F}_{mat} .

The ideal functionality \mathcal{F}_{med} is removed from the simulation. The simulator takes over the generation of tans and keeping track of T (see “Warning Request from Corrupted User” on p. 33).

Proposition 10. *For each PPT environment \mathcal{Z} the probability of distinguishing Games 9 and 10 is negligible.*

Proof (Proof Sketch). In Game 10 warnings from honest parties to corrupted parties are now delivered via $\mathcal{F}_{\text{CT}}^{(10)}$ (instead of via the simulated servers).

Suppose a corrupted party P broadcasts a pid in Game 9, this pid is received by an honest party P' , and the environment attempts to generate a warning for this pid at a later point in time. Let $e = (e_{lt}, e_{st})$ be the epoch of this broadcast.

In Game 9, a corrupted party performs this broadcast by sending pid to \mathcal{F}_{mat} . The simulator (who had provided the pseudonymized graph G' to \mathcal{F}_{mat} before) simulates \mathcal{F}_{mat} , effectively sending pid to all parties P'' such that $(P, P'') \in E'$. Note that due to the setup of E' (see step 4 in Game 9 on p. 39), the receiving side y of an edge (x, y) is never pseudonymized: If the receiver y is corrupted, one applies $\text{pseudonymize}'_i$, but $\text{pseudonymize}'_i$ is the identity map on corrupted parties, and if the receiver y is honest, then $\text{pseudonymize}'_i$ is not applied. Thus, the simulator \mathcal{S} (simulating \mathcal{F}_{mat}) will forward pid to all receivers specified in G' (or G , respectively).

Corrupted parties P'' may react to this input in arbitrary ways, \mathcal{S} simply simulates the attacker to imitate this behaviour. Honest parties P' receiving such a pid will store (pid, e_{lt}) (“Recording Broadcasts” on p. 15).

When the environment \mathcal{Z} later (during the long term epochs $e + 1$ through $e + 14$) inputs (*positive*) to an honest, infected party P' who received pid , the party P' will request a TAN from \mathcal{F}_{med} (simulated by \mathcal{S}) and upload a list of

its received pid_i s (together with the tan) to the matching server. The simulator \mathcal{S} (simulating the matching server) will issue warnings to honest parties P'' as described in the proof sketch of [Proposition 7](#) (p. 38).

Warnings to *corrupted* parties are delivered as follows. If the pid matches a pid that was generated from the upload of a corrupted party to the submission server, the simulator has a record $(P'', \text{wid}, t, \dots) \in \mathcal{R}$. The simulator will (upon upload to the simulated matching server) add wid to the warning server’s list \mathcal{WL} allowing a corrupted to query for this warning. wid was uploaded by a corrupted party, the environment will be aware of the wid and can test whether a warning was generated by having an (arbitrary) corrupted party send (wid) to the warning server.

In [Game 10](#), when a corrupted party P broadcasts pid (by sending pid to \mathcal{F}_{mat}), the simulator will (in [step 4](#)) simulate \mathcal{F}_{mat} . Note that in [Game 10](#) \mathcal{F}_{CT} leaks a more thoroughly pseudonymized graph G' in comparison to [Game 9](#) ([step 4 step 5](#) of “[Set Neighborhood/Infected](#)” on p. 21). In particular, honest parties receiving pids broadcasted by corrupted parties have an independent pseudonym for each broadcast received, and an additional one for their own broadcast.

Since corrupted parties are never pseudonymized the leaked graph G' still contains edges between two corrupted parties “in the clear”, so the simulator can simulate \mathcal{F}_{mat} for these edges as before.

For all honest receivers there are three cases: Either the pid was previously uploaded by a corrupted party (handled in [step 3](#)), or the pid was previously broadcast by an honest party (handled in [step 5](#)), or the pid is a new value which is ignored by the simulator. (Note that case 3 is disjunct from cases 1 and 2 by definition. If a corrupted party is able to upload a pid , that was chosen at random as the broadcast of an honest party, this would violate the one-way property of the used hash function, as the corrupted party has to find a sid'_j such that $\text{pid} = \text{H}(\text{sid}'_j)$. Vice versa, the pids for honest parties are chosen at random and are only equal to previously uploaded pids with negligible probability. Hence, the probability of cases 1 and 2 occurring at the same time is negligible for each PPT \mathcal{Z} . Additionally, observe that in case 2, the probability that the pid was assigned to two distinct parties is negligible, because pids are chosen at random from an exponentially large space, but the total number of pids assigned this way is only polynomial.)

If the pid was uploaded by a corrupted party P_2 for an epoch $t = (t_{lt}, t_{st})$ (case 1), \mathcal{S} will send $(\text{sendBroadcast}, e, t, P, P_2)$ to \mathcal{F}_{CT} , which will “copy” all edges $(P, x) \in E$ of the “real” contact graph to \hat{E}_t , replacing P by P_2 . This will cause \mathcal{F}_{CT} to generate a warning for P_2 (regarding long-term epoch t_{lt}) of an encounter with any infected honest party that was in contact with P (in [step 4](#) of “[Handling Match Requests](#)” on p. 22). This matches the behaviour in [Game 9](#) perfectly, so \mathcal{Z} cannot distinguish [Games 9](#) and [10](#) this way.

Regarding case 2, note that a corrupted party P is re-broadcasting a pid which had previously been assigned to an honest user by \mathcal{S} . In this case, the simulator determines the epoch $t = (t_{lt}, t_{st})$ during which the pid was assigned,

the (pseudonym of) the honest party P_1 who initially broadcasted pid , a corrupted receiver P_2 of the initial broadcast, and all targets P_4 (in particular P') of the current re-broadcast by the corrupted party $P = P_3$. For each such party P_4 , the simulator sends $(\text{relay}, t, P_1, P_2, P_3, P_4)$ to \mathcal{F}_{CT} (step 5 of “Broadcast from Corrupted User”). \mathcal{F}_{CT} first maps the pseudonyms back to the actual parties (step 2 of “Replay/Relay” on p. 22). (Again, note that corrupted parties are not pseudonymized.) Then \mathcal{F}_{CT} checks if $(P_1, P_2) \in E_t$. Note that this always is the case, by the choice of P_2 done by the simulator. Such a P_2 has to exist, as otherwise a pid would not have been assigned to the honest party. The choice of P_2 can be arbitrary, if multiple such parties exists, as this is the only occurrence of P_2 in the code of \mathcal{F}_{CT} .

\mathcal{F}_{CT} will then add (P_1, \hat{P}_4) to \hat{E}_t . When P' reports as infected later, \mathcal{F}_{CT} will generate a warning for the original “owner” P_1 of pid in step 4 of “Handling Match Requests” (p. 22).

Observe that a corrupted party P_1 might broadcast a pid in epoch t_1 before the corresponding $(\text{sid}, \text{seed})$ tuple is uploaded. In this case, once $(\text{sid}, \text{seed})$ are uploaded, let P_2 be the party chosen by \mathcal{S} in step 6 of “Upload from Corrupted User”, and let t_2 be the (short-term) epoch for which pid was uploaded. In this case, \mathcal{S} will call $(\text{sendBroadcast}, t_1, t_2, P_1, P_2)$ when the upload happens, again causing \mathcal{F}_{CT} to add corresponding edges to \hat{E}_{t_2} , see step 7 of “Upload from Corrupted User” on p. 33.

When \mathcal{Z} later inputs (query, t_{it}) to the party P_1 , the functionality \mathcal{F}_{CT} will respond with 1, since (P_1, t_{it}) has been added to \mathcal{WP} .

The environment could try to detect the lack of the corresponding wid on the warning server by having a corrupted party query for the wid . In Game 10, the environment \mathcal{Z} ’s chance of receiving a warning for a wid not uploaded by a corrupted user is 0. However, even in Game 9, honest users’ wids are perfectly hidden from the environment (since the pids are chosen uniformly at random and independently from the wids), so the environment’s chance of finding a wid not uploaded by a corrupted user but being present on the warning server is negligible. Hence, any PPT environment’s chance of distinguishing Games 9 and 10 in this way is negligible.

Observe that in both case 1 and 2 the honest party directly communicates with \mathcal{F}_{CT} and does not ever attempts to communicate with \mathcal{F}_{med} . Therefore the simulator does not need to simulate \mathcal{F}_{med} when invoked by an honest party and the leakage of $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}} \cap \mathcal{P}_{\text{corrupted}}$ instead of $\mathcal{P}_{\text{infected}}$ (step 6 of “Set Neighborhood/Infected”, p. 21) is sufficient for the simulator.

In summary, all PPT environment \mathcal{Z} have only negligible probability in distinguishing Games 9 and 10 in cases 1 and 2. In case 3, the broadcast has no effect neither in Game 9, nor in Game 10, hence the games are indistinguishable in this case, too.

Game 11 (Ideal Experiment). \mathcal{F}_{reg} is removed from the game. Its functionality is replaced by adding “Register a Party” (p. 32) to \mathcal{S} . The simulator no longer aborts when generating a new tan that is already contained in T . Observe that, after these changes, the game is identical to the ideal experiment.

Proposition 11. *For each PPT environment \mathcal{Z} the probability of distinguishing Games 10 and 11 is negligible.*

Proof (Proof Sketch). Removing \mathcal{F}_{reg} is indistinguishable for \mathcal{Z} , since the simulator’s “Register a Party” emulates its functionality exactly.

Since tans are chosen uniformly at random from an exponentially large space, the probability of a tan being selected twice is negligible, since a PPT environment \mathcal{Z} can only cause polynomially many tans to be generated. Hence, the probability of an abort in Game 10 was negligible. Removing this abort condition hence only gives at most a negligible advantage in distinguishing Games 10 and 11.

Combining Propositions 1 through 11 shows that the real experiment and the ideal experiment are computationally indistinguishable for any PPT distinguisher \mathcal{Z} . \square

B Security Extensions

B.1 Using Secret Sharing to Enforce a Lower Bound on Contact Time

The DP3T document [T⁺20] proposes splitting the broadcasted identifiers with a secret sharing scheme to ensure that malicious users cannot record identifiers that they observe for less than a specified period of time (e.g. 15 minutes). However, it does not specify how one would rotate such shared identifiers if one wishes to switch to the next public identifier. Just stopping with one set of shares and starting the next set of shares (of a different public identifier) would prevent recording of contact if the contact happens during such an identity rotation.

To solve this issue, we propose to broadcast multiple public identities in parallel with overlapping intervals. As an example we could use a 15-out-of-30 secret sharing scheme and always broadcast two identities, in such a way that the new identity starts to be broadcast when the last identity has already had 15 shares broadcast. That way every contiguous interval of 15 minutes contains enough shares of one identity to be able to reconstruct the identity.

Additionally, care has to be taken that an observer needs to know which beacons belong to the same shared identifier, in order to choose the right shares to combine.

A per-identity marker can be incorporated into the payload. It needs to be long enough to make local collisions unlikely. In this situation the Bluetooth hardware address should be rotated once per beacon to not provide any unnecessary linkability between multiple identities.

Note that, due to the security of the secret sharing scheme, observing a public identity requires being in proximity to the user's device for approximately 15 minutes. This restrains the attacker's ability to observe public identities at specific times and places in the first place.

B.2 Broadcast Timing Side Channel

If the application sends broadcasts in strict, exact intervals, an attacker might be able to link the two public identities by observing the offset of the broadcast times to her own clock. For example, if an application sends a broadcast in exact intervals of one minute and the attacker can observe that one device is continuously broadcasting whenever the attacker's clock is 10 seconds into the current minute, the attacker may be able to link several broadcasts to the same device even if the public identities being broadcast have changed in between. This may be used to link public identities both if they are used in direct succession, and if the attacker did not observe any broadcasts for a longer period of time.

To mitigate this attack, we propose to add random jitter to the starting point for broadcasting identities. When applying jitter, care has to be taken to add a few more shares to each identity to still ensure that the identity can be reconstructed from any 15 minute interval. When broadcasting the identity as a single beacon the jitter adds uncertainty to the observed exposure times.

The two variants, namely absolute or relative jitter, both have their advantages and disadvantages. For ease of exposition, we describe the relative jitter in the following.

When applying relative jitter, one can think of the jitter as a random pause time between broadcasting identities. Using the notation from Variant 1, the user would start to send identity pid_i at $i \cdot \delta + \sum_{j=0}^i \Delta_j$. This way the jitter accumulates over time, and after a long enough period without observation the starting point for broadcasting identities will appear to be random.

As an example, consider 15-out-of-45 secret sharing, with every share being broadcast in 1-minute intervals. When a broadcast is started a random time between 15 and 30 minutes is chosen uniformly at random and after this delay the next ID-broadcast is started. Note that with this change two or three identities are being used simultaneously at every point in time. This ensures that in any 15 minute interval there is at least one public identifier broadcast completely covering the interval. Additionally this jitter accumulates very quickly to destroy the linkability of different broadcasted IDs.