

On the Guaranteed Number of Activations in XS-circuits ^{*†}

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Abstract

XS-circuits describe cryptographic primitives that utilize 2 operations on binary words of fixed length: X) bitwise modulo 2 addition and S) substitution. The words are interpreted as elements of a field of characteristic 2. In this paper, we develop a model of XS-circuits according to which several instances of a simple round circuit containing only one S operation are linked together and form a compound circuit called a cascade. S operations of a cascade are interpreted as independent round oracles. When a cascade processes a pair of different inputs, some round oracles get different queries, these oracles are activated. The more activations, the higher security guarantees against differential cryptanalysis the cascade provides. We introduce the notion of the guaranteed number of activations, that is, the minimum number of activations over all choices of the base field, round oracles and pairs of inputs. We show that the guaranteed number of activations is related to the minimum distance of the linear code associated with the cascade. It is also related to the minimum number of occurrences of units in segments of binary linear recurrence sequences whose characteristic polynomial is determined by the round circuit. We provide an algorithm for calculating the guaranteed number of activations. This algorithm can also be used to deal with linear activations related to linear cryptanalysis.

Keywords: circuit, differential cryptanalysis, linear cryptanalysis, linear code, linear recurrence sequence.

1 Introduction

XS-circuits describe cryptographic primitives that utilize 2 operations on binary words of fixed length: X) bitwise modulo 2 addition and S) substitution. A circuit may describe a block cipher when instantiating S with key-dependent round functions which usually have a complicated internal structure being circuits of the same (of smaller word length) or other types. Or a circuit may describe an encryption or authentication mode when S is a keyed permutation of a block cipher. One of the directions here is constructing wide-block and variable-input-length ciphers, that is, extending the block length of the underlying cipher to some fixed or even arbitrary length.

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†Related programs and materials can be found at <https://github.com/agievich/xs>.

We interpret binary words that are processed in an \mathbf{XS} -circuit as elements of a field of characteristic 2. A circuit becomes arithmetic if all its operations \mathbf{S} are instantiated using only the addition (actually, \mathbf{X}) and multiplication in the base field. Arithmetic circuits designed for symmetric cryptography are demanded in universal ZK-proof systems, especially if the circuits have low multiplicative complexity (an example of the approach can be found in [2]). We see another area of application of \mathbf{XS} -circuits.

In this paper, we follow the model of \mathbf{XS} -circuits proposed in [1]. According to this model, several instances of a simple round circuit containing only one \mathbf{S} operation are linked together and form a compound circuit called a cascade. \mathbf{S} operations of a cascade are interpreted as independent round oracles. We extensively use notions and notation from [1]. In particular, the notion of regular circuits that are in a sense the best elementary circuits and the only ones worth considering when constructing cascades.

When a cascade processes a pair of different inputs, some round oracles get different queries, these oracles are called *activated*. The more activations, the higher security guarantees against differential cryptanalysis the cascade provides.

In Section 2 we introduce the notion of the guaranteed number of activations, that is, the minimum number of activations over all choices of the base field, round oracles and pairs of inputs. In Section 3 we show that the guaranteed number of activations is related to the minimum distance of the linear code associated with the target cascade. This number is also related to the minimum number of occurrences of units in segments of binary linear recurrence sequences whose characteristic polynomial is determined by the round circuit. This is shown in Section 4. Finally, in Section 5 we provide an algorithm for calculating the guaranteed number of activations. This algorithm can also be used to deal with linear activations related to linear cryptanalysis.

Bringing the problem of lower bounding the number of activations to the context of coding theory and showing how to solve it algorithmically, we introduce a systematic approach for constructing sound cryptographic mappings. Interestingly, another systematic approach of this kind, the so-called Wide trail strategy, also relates to coding theory. This approach was proposed in [5, 6] and was implemented in numerous block ciphers including AES and Kuznyechik (see [3] for a fairly complete list).

The Wide trail strategy allows to achieve a high activation rate, close to 1/2, when MDS (Maximum Distance Separable) codes are used to build a diffusion layer. The drawback of the strategy is that the layer becomes quite complicated and usually has to be implemented through a table lookup. For comparison, the diffusion layer of an \mathbf{XS} -circuit can be made very simple. However, \mathbf{S} operations of the circuit cannot be applied in parallel although this is allowed by the Wide trail strategy.

2 Preliminaries

Let (a, B, c) be a regular \mathbf{XS} -circuit of order n (see [1] for definitions and further details). We assume that the circuit is in the first canonical form, that is, a is a nonzero column vector, B is a Frobenius cell, $c = (0, \dots, 0, 1)$. Denote by b the last column of B . All the vectors a, b, c are binary of dimension n .

Instantiating the circuit over a field \mathbb{F} of characteristic 2 and substituting an oracle $S: \mathbb{F} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}$

for the operation \mathbf{S} , we get the mapping

$$(a, B, c)[S]: \mathbb{F}^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}^n, (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) \mapsto (x_2, x_3, \dots, x_n, x_{n+1}),$$

$$x_{n+1} = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)b + S((x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n)a).$$

Let $(a, B, c)^t$ be the t -round cascade built by connecting t instances of (a, B, c) . The cascade utilizes t operations \mathbf{S} . Instantiating these operations by oracles S_1, \dots, S_t , we obtain the mapping $(a, B, c)^t[S_1, \dots, S_t]$. It may be described algorithmically as follows: having received an input (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) , the sequence

$$x_{\tau+n} = (x_\tau, \dots, x_{\tau+n-1})b + S_\tau((x_\tau, \dots, x_{\tau+n-1})a), \quad \tau = 1, 2, \dots, t,$$

is calculated and the vector $(x_{t+1}, \dots, x_{t+n})$ is returned as the output.

Example 1 (GFN1). The GFN1 family of XS-circuits was introduced in [14]. The circuit of dimension $n \geq 2$ has the second canonical form: $a = (1, 0, \dots, 0)^T$, B is a Frobenius cell with $b = a$, $c = a^T$. Replacing (a, B, c) with

$$(B^{-1}a, B^{-1}BB, cB) = ((0, \dots, 0, 1)^T, B, (0, \dots, 0, 1)),$$

we obtain the first canonical form for which

$$x_{\tau+n} = x_\tau + S_\tau(x_{\tau+n-1}), \quad \tau = 1, 2, \dots$$

□

Let us suppose now that the cascade processes not one but two inputs simultaneously. From there, (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) is the X-difference of input vectors and $(x_{\tau+1}, \dots, x_{\tau+n})$ is the difference of the τ th round outputs. See [1, Section 4] for further details. These differences are denoted using the symbol Δ but here we simplify the notation.

The difference u_τ at the input of S_τ has the form $(x_\tau, \dots, x_{\tau+n-1})a$. The corresponding output difference v_τ can be written as $(x_\tau, \dots, x_{\tau+n-1})b + x_{\tau+n}$. Due to the bijectivity of S_τ , the equality $u_\tau = 0$ holds if and only if $v_\tau = 0$. In other words,

$$(x_\tau, \dots, x_{\tau+n-1})a = 0 \Leftrightarrow (x_\tau, \dots, x_{\tau+n-1})b + x_{\tau+n} = 0.$$

Let us construct a matrix $G = G(n, a, b, t)$ of dimensions $(t+n) \times 2t$. Its columns go in pairs, the τ th pair has the form:

$$\left. \begin{array}{cc} 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 \end{array} \right\} \tau - 1$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{cc} a & b \\ 0 & 1 \end{array} \right\} n + 1$$

$$\left. \begin{array}{cc} 0 & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 \end{array} \right\} t - \tau$$

With this,

$$(x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{t+n})G = (u_1, v_1, u_2, v_2, \dots, u_t, v_t).$$

We require that in each pair (u_τ, v_τ) both elements are either zero or nonzero together. Denote by \mathcal{W} the set of all vectors

$$w = (u_1, v_1, \dots, u_t, v_t) = xG, \quad x \in \mathbb{F}^{t+n},$$

for which the requirement holds. The set \mathcal{W} is completely determined by the base field \mathbb{F} , the vectors a, b and the number of rounds t . The zero vector obviously belongs to \mathcal{W} .

We call the situation when $(u_\tau, v_\tau) \neq (0, 0)$ the *activation* of S_τ . Let $\text{wt}_2(w)$ be the total number of activations, that is, nonzero pairs (u_τ, v_τ) , in the vector w .

For $t \geq n$ we are interested in the quantity

$$d(\mathcal{W}) = \min_{w \in \mathcal{W}, w \neq 0} \text{wt}_2(w).$$

It is the minimum number of activations when applying the mappings $(a, B, c)^t[S_1, \dots, S_t]$ to pairs of different vectors from \mathbb{F}^n . Note that the minimization covers all admissible tuples (S_1, \dots, S_t) and all admissible input pairs.

For $t < n$ we set $d(\mathcal{W}) = 0$. This reflects the fact that as long as the number of rounds is less than the dimension of the circuit, it is possible to avoid activations by manipulating the initial difference $(x_1, \dots, x_n) \neq 0$ (see [1, Section 8]).

The quantity $d(\mathcal{W})$ can also be denoted as $d(\mathbb{F}, n, a, b, t)$ implying that \mathcal{W} is uniquely determined by the parameters (\mathbb{F}, n, a, b, t) . Let

$$d(n, a, b, t) = \min_{\mathbb{F}} d(\mathbb{F}, n, a, b, t),$$

where the minimum is taken over all fields of characteristic 2. Any such field is an extension of \mathbb{F}_2 and therefore

$$d(n, a, b, t) \leq d(\mathbb{F}, n, a, b, t) \leq d(\mathbb{F}_2, n, a, b, t).$$

The cascade $(a, B, c)^t$ guarantees at least $d(n, a, b, t)$ activations regardless of the choice of \mathbb{F} , round oracles and input pairs. We call $d(n, a, b, t)$ the *guaranteed* number of activations.

3 Connection to the linear codes

The set \mathcal{W} is a subset of the vector space

$$\mathcal{C} = \{xG : x \in \mathbb{F}^{t+n}\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^{2t}.$$

The following lemma means that for $t \geq n$ the space \mathcal{C} has dimension $t + n$ and, therefore, it is a linear code with the parameters $[2t, t + n]$.

Lemma 1. *Let vectors a and b define a regular XS-circuit of the first canonical form of dimension n . If $t \geq n$, then the matrix $G = G(n, a, b, t)$ has full rank: $\text{rank } G = t + n$.*

Proof. Let us associate with the first two columns of G the polynomials $a(\lambda) = \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} a_i \lambda^i$ and $f_B(\lambda) = \lambda^n + \sum_{i=0}^{n-1} b_i \lambda^i$. Here a_i and b_i are coordinates of a and b respectively. We follow the notation introduced in [1, Section 7]. Note that Theorem 9 of the cited paper states that for a regular XS-circuit the polynomials $a(\lambda)$ and $f_B(\lambda)$ are coprime.

The monomial λ^i in $a(\lambda)$ marks the position in the first column in which the coefficient a_i is located. The same holds for $f_B(\lambda)$ and the second column. In general, the τ th pair of columns is described by the polynomials $\lambda^{\tau-1}a(\lambda)$ and $\lambda^{\tau-1}f_B(\lambda)$.

The first $2t$ columns of G are linearly dependent if there exist nonzero polynomials $p(\lambda)$ and $q(\lambda)$ whose degrees are less than t and which satisfy

$$p(\lambda)a(\lambda) + q(\lambda)f_B(\lambda) = 0.$$

For $t = n$, since $a(\lambda)$ and $f_B(\lambda)$ are coprime, there are no suitable polynomials $p(\lambda)$, $q(\lambda)$ and the matrix G has full rank.

The first linear dependence appears in G at $t = n + 1$ when choosing $p(\lambda) = f_B(\lambda)$ and $q(\lambda) = a(\lambda)$. The penultimate column becomes dependent on the previous ones. But the last column remains independent, since it is the only one containing 1 in the last row. Thus, $\text{rank } G = 2n + 1 = t + n$ and G is again full-ranked.

The argument can be repeated: each new pair of columns adds 1 to the rank of G . Full rank is preserved, which was to be proven. \square

The minimum distance of \mathcal{C} is the quantity

$$d(\mathcal{C}) = \min_{w \in \mathcal{C}, w \neq 0} \text{wt}(w),$$

where $\text{wt}(w)$ is the Hamming weight of w . According to the Singleton bound (see, for example, [10]),

$$d(\mathcal{C}) \leq 2t + 1 - (t + n) = t - n + 1.$$

Since $\text{wt}(w)/2 \leq \text{wt}_2(w) \leq \text{wt}(w)$ and $\mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathcal{C}$, it holds that

$$d(\mathcal{C})/2 \leq d(\mathcal{W}) \leq d(\mathcal{C}).$$

In particular, $d(\mathcal{W}) \leq t - n + 1$. This estimate means that over $t \geq n$ rounds we cannot guarantee more than $t - n + 1$ activations. Further we are interested in lower bounds for $d(\mathcal{W})$.

Let $t \geq n$ and, therefore, $\text{rank } G = t + n$ by Lemma 1. Suppose that when processing a nonzero input difference using some round oracles, activations occur only in rounds whose numbers belong to a set $\mathcal{T} \subseteq \{1, 2, \dots, t\}$. We call \mathcal{T} the *activation profile*. Following this profile, let us divide G into two parts: G_0 and G_1 . The matrix G_1 consists of pairs of columns whose numbers are in \mathcal{T} and G_0 consists of the remaining columns. By construction, there exists a nonzero vector $x \in \mathbb{F}^{t+n}$ such that $xG_0 = 0$ and xG_1 does not contain zeros. This means that the partition (G_0, G_1) is feasible in the sense of the following definition.

Definition. Let G_0 and G_1 be matrices composed of different pairs of columns of G . The partition (G_0, G_1) is *feasible* if

- 1) $\text{rank } G_0 < t + n$;
- 2) $\text{rank}(G_0 \mid g) > \text{rank } G_0$ for each column g of G_1 .

Indeed, if $\text{rank } G_0 = t + n$, then from $xG_0 = 0$ it follows that $x = 0$ which contradicts the construction. And if $\text{rank}(G_0 \mid g) = \text{rank } G_0$, then from $xG_0 = 0$ it follows that $xg = 0$. The latter means that xG_1 contains zero, again a contradiction.

In the following lemma, we show that feasibility of a partition (G_0, G_1) is not only necessary but also a sufficient condition for the feasibility of the underlying activation profile.

Lemma 2. *Let vectors a and b define a regular XS-circuit of the first canonical form of dimension n . Let $t \geq n$ and k be the maximum number of pairs of columns in the matrix G_0 where the maximum is taken over all feasible partitions (G_0, G_1) of $G = G(n, a, b, t)$. Then*

$$d(n, a, b, t) = t - k.$$

Proof. Let (G_0, G_1) be a feasible partition of G . It is necessary to prove that there exists an extension \mathbb{F} of the field \mathbb{F}_2 and a vector $x \in \mathbb{F}^{t+n}$ such that $xG_0 = 0$ and xG_1 does not contain zeros.

The set

$$L = \{xG_1 : x \in \mathbb{F}^{t+n}, xG_0 = 0\} \subseteq \mathbb{F}^{2(t-k)}$$

is a vector space of dimension $r = t + n - \text{rank } G_0$. It can be written as

$$L = \{yP : y \in \mathbb{F}^r\},$$

where P is a binary matrix of dimensions $r \times 2(t - k)$. The matrix P does not contain a zero column due to the second restriction on the feasibility of the partition (G_0, G_1) .

Suppose that L does not contain a vector without zero coordinates. Then we choose an arbitrary vector $yP \in L$, build an extension \mathbb{F}' of the field \mathbb{F} and extend y to a vector y' of the same dimension but over \mathbb{F}' . We construct y' in such way that a particular zero coordinate of yP becomes nonzero in $y'P$ while nonzero coordinates of yP remain nonzero in $y'P$. After constructing the pair (\mathbb{F}', y') we interpret it as (\mathbb{F}, y) and repeat the extension until we get the vector yP without zeros. It remains to show how to extend y to y' .

Define \mathbb{F}' as an extension of \mathbb{F} of degree 2. Without loss of generality, let elements of \mathbb{F}' be $(m + 1)$ -bit words $\alpha = \alpha_1 \dots \alpha_m \alpha_{m+1}$ and $\alpha \in \mathbb{F}$ if and only if $\alpha_{m+1} = 0$. Let the addition in \mathbb{F}' be the usual XOR. The extension of y consists in setting the last (zero) bits of its coordinates. Let β be a vector composed of these bits. Since P does not contain zero columns, it is possible to choose β so that a particular coordinate of βP is nonzero. The corresponding coordinate of $y'P$ is also nonzero. Moreover, if a certain coordinate yP is nonzero, then the corresponding coordinate $y'P$ remains nonzero. That was to be proven. \square

Remark 1. *The minimum distance of the code $\mathcal{C} = \{xG\}$ can also be defined as $d(\mathcal{C}) = t - k$, where k is the maximum number of columns in G_0 and the maximum is taken over all feasible partitions (G_0, G_1) of G (see, for example, [8, Theorem 1.4.5]). The difference is in changing the partitioning restrictions. Now G_i not necessarily consists of pairs of related columns, the requirement $\text{rank } G_0 < t + n$ is preserved, but the requirement $\text{rank}(G_0 | g) > \text{rank } G_0$ becomes redundant.*

Remark 2. *Let $\text{rank } G_0 = t + n - 1$. Then in the proof above, the vector space L has dimension 1 and the matrix P becomes the row vector $(1, 1, \dots, 1)$. This means that with $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}_2$ there exists a nonzero $x \in \mathbb{F}^{t+n}$ such that $xG_0 = 0$ and $xG_1 = (1, 1, \dots, 1)$. In other words, the activation profile associated with the partition (G_0, G_1) is feasible over \mathbb{F}_2 . Moreover, as we see below, this profile is a segment of a linear recurrence sequence over \mathbb{F}_2 .*

4 The case $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}_2$

In the case $\mathbb{F} = \mathbb{F}_2$, the condition $u_\tau = 0 \Leftrightarrow v_\tau = 0$ is equivalent to $u_\tau = v_\tau$. With this,

$$x_{\tau+n} = (x_\tau, \dots, x_{\tau+n-1})(a + b), \quad \tau = 1, 2, \dots, t,$$

that is, the sequence (x_1, \dots, x_{t+n}) is a segment of a nonzero linear recurrence sequence (LRS) over \mathbb{F}_2 . The characteristic polynomial of the sequence is

$$f(\lambda) = \lambda^n + f_{n-1}\lambda^{n-1} + \dots + f_1\lambda + f_0, \quad (f_0, f_1, \dots, f_{n-1}) = a + b.$$

The vectors $(x_\tau, \dots, x_{\tau+n-1})$, $\tau = 1, 2, \dots$, stand as states of the linear feedback shift register (LFSR) associated with $f(\lambda)$. When choosing the first bits of LFSR states, we get the sequence (x_τ) , and when choosing the linear combinations $(x_\tau, \dots, x_{\tau+n-1})a$, we get the sequence (u_τ) . The latter sequence is also a LRS with the same characteristic polynomial $f(\lambda)$.

The sequence (u_τ) is nonzero. Indeed, the underlying XS-circuit is regular and for any nonzero input difference (x_1, \dots, x_n) at least one activation must occur over the first n rounds (see the discussion before Theorem 10 in [1]) which means that $(u_1, \dots, u_n) \neq (0, \dots, 0)$.

For the same reason, $f_0 = 1$ and the sequences (x_τ) , (u_τ) are purely periodic. Indeed, otherwise, a nonzero input difference $(x_1, \dots, x_n) = (1, 0, \dots, 0)$ induces a zero difference after $n - 1$ rounds, which is impossible due to the regularity.

The number of activations over t rounds is the number of nonzero elements (units) in the segment (u_1, \dots, u_t) . We can use known results on the number of occurrences of particular elements in segments of LRS. Let r be the least period of (u_τ) , R be the order of f (the maximum least period of nonzero LRS with the characteristic polynomial f). Then according to Theorems 8.82 and 8.85 from [9], the number of activation is at least

$$\frac{t}{2} - 2^{n/2-1} \left(\frac{r}{R}\right)^{1/2} \left(t_0 + \frac{2}{\pi} \log r + \frac{2}{5} + \frac{t_1}{r}\right).$$

Here t_0 and t_1 are respectively the quotient and remainder when dividing t by r . If $t_1 = 0$, then only the term t_0 can be left in the last brackets.

It makes sense to apply the estimate above only for large n , t and r . In practice, these parameters are small and the minimum number of activations can be found by exhaustive search over all LRS profiles (u_1, \dots, u_t) in time of order 2^{nt} .

Example 2 (SMS4). The SMS4 circuit is used in the block cipher of the same name (which is often shortened to SM4). See [7] for details of the cipher and [1] for details of the circuit.

The circuit is already in the first canonical form, its dimension is 4, the characteristic polynomial $f(\lambda) = \lambda^4 + \lambda^3 + \lambda^2 + \lambda + 1$. The polynomial $f(\lambda)$ is irreducible of order 5. Therefore, the least period of (u_τ) equals 5.

The minimum number of activations is achieved on the start segments of the following LRS:

$$0, 0, 0, 1, 1, \quad 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, \quad \dots$$

If $t = 5t_0 + t_1$, $0 \leq t_1 < 5$, then this number is

$$\begin{cases} 2t_0, & t_1 = 0, 1, 2, 3, \\ 2t_0 + 1, & t_1 = 4. \end{cases}$$

□

Example 3 (GFN1, continued). Let us continue Example 1 and consider the GFN1 circuit of dimension n in the first canonical form. For this circuit, $a = (0, 0, \dots, 0, 1)^T$, $b = (1, 0, \dots, 0, 0)^T$ and $f(\lambda) = \lambda^n + \lambda^{n-1} + 1$.

For $n = 2, 3, 4$, the polynomial $f(\lambda)$ is primitive. The least period of (u_τ) equals $r = 2^n - 1$ and every full period (u_1, \dots, u_r) contains exactly 2^{n-1} units. Therefore,

$$d(\mathbb{F}_2, n, a, b, 2^n - 1) = 2^{n-1}$$

and the activation rate over $2^n - 1$ rounds can potentially achieve the value $2^{n-1}/(2^n - 1) > 1/2$. This value is indeed achieved for $n = 2, 3$ but, as we show later, not for $n = 4$. \square

5 The algorithm

The following algorithm summarizes our constructions and reasoning.

Algorithm GNA (THE GUARANTEED NUMBER OF ACTIVATIONS)

Input: (n, a, b, t) , where a and b are binary vectors of dimension n that define a regular XS-circuit in the first canonical form, t is a number of rounds.

Output: $d(n, a, b, t)$, the guaranteed number of activations over t rounds of the input circuit.

Steps:

1. If $t < n$, then return 0. If $t = n$, return 1.
2. Construct the matrix $G = G(n, a, b, t)$ as explained in Section 3. The dimensions of G are $(t + n) \times 2t$, $\text{rank } G = t + n$. The columns of G are grouped in pairs.
3. Calculate $d(\mathbb{F}_2, n, a, b, t)$ as described in Section 4 and set $k \leftarrow t - d(\mathbb{F}_2, n, a, b, t)$.
4. Make a list of all possible partitions of G into submatrices G_0 and G_1 such that G_0 contains exactly $k + 1$ pairs of columns of G .
5. For each partition (G_0, G_1) :
 - (a) if $\text{rank } G_0 \geq t + n - 1$, then continue (go to the end of the loop);
 - (b) if there is a column g in G_1 such that $\text{rank}(G_0 \mid g) = \text{rank } G_0$, then continue;
 - (c) set $k \leftarrow k + 1$ and go to Step 4.
6. Return $t - k$.

Theorem. *The algorithm GNA is correct.*

Proof. A direct consequence of Lemma 2 and Remark 2.

In Step 5a of the algorithm, we skip the case $\text{rank } G_0 = t + n - 1$ because in this case the activation profile associated with the partition (G_0, G_1) is feasible over \mathbb{F}_2 and the initial bound $d(\mathbb{F}_2, n, a, b, t)$ for $d(n, a, b, t)$ cannot be strengthened. \square

The algorithm GNA gives us the guaranteed number of *differential* activations. We can easily adapt the algorithm to deal with *linear* activations (see [1, Section 9]). To do this, we pass from (a, B, c) to the dual circuit (c^T, B^T, a^T) and determine vectors a' and b' that define its first canonical form (we only need to determine a' , since $b' = b$). The quantity $\text{GNA}(n, a', b', t)$ is the guaranteed number of linear activations.

Example 4 (SMS4, continued). For SMS4 its dual has the same first canonical form. So the guaranteed numbers of differential and linear activations are the same. The outputs of GNA against SMS4 for $t \leq 32$ coincide with the estimates of Example 2. Thus, the activation rate close to $2/5$ is achieved. In particular, the guaranteed number of activations over 32 rounds (exactly the case of the block cipher SMS4/SM4) is 12.

Note that here we are processing the abstract SMS4 circuit, not its instantiation in SMS4/SM4. In this instantiation, S operations are constructed using round keys, table S -boxes, rotations and XORs of binary words. Lower bounds on the number of active S -boxes (not activations / active rounds) in SMS4/SM4 can be found in [11, 12, 13].

Iterating over $\binom{t}{k+1}$ partitions in Step 4 of GNA can be simplified. For example, in the case of SMS4, if any 4 of 5 consecutive pairs of columns fall into G_0 , then the corresponding partition is not feasible and can be immediately rejected. Indeed, the 5 consecutive pairs of columns are linearly dependent while 4 pairs are not (it follows from the same reasoning as in the proof of Lemma 1). Therefore, a pair not included in G_0 contains a column g which is linearly expressed through the columns of G_0 and, therefore, the second condition of feasibility is violated. \square

Example 5 (GFN1, continued). An GFN1 circuit of arbitrary dimension is self-dual: $(a, B, c) = (c^T, B^T, a^T)$. Therefore, a bound on differential activations is also a bound on linear activations.

For the circuit of dimension $n = 4$, GNA gives 7 activations over 15 rounds. It is one less than estimated in Example 3 through LRS profiles. The optimal activation profile found by GNA looks as follows:

0001111011**00100**.

It differs from the related LRS profile

0001111010**11001**

starting from the 10th round. The LRS profile gives 3 activations after the fork while the optimal profile gives only 2 activations. \square

Example 6 (activation times). The i th activation time, ρ_i , is the minimum number of rounds that guarantees i activations (see [1, Section 8]). In the next table, we present the values ρ_i for GFN1 of dimension $n = 4$ and for SMS4. We calculate ρ_i using the GNA algorithm.

i	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
$\rho_i(\text{GFN1})$	4	7	8	10	12	13	14	17	20	22	23	25
$\rho_i(\text{SMS4})$	4	5	9	10	14	15	19	20	24	25	29	30

The time $\rho_7(\text{GFN1}) = 14$ given in the table refines Proposition 5 of [4]. \square

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