

UC Non-Interactive, Proactive, Threshold ECDSA with Identifiable Aborts*

Ran Canetti^{†‡} Rosario Gennaro[§] Steven Goldfeder[¶] Nikolaos Makriyannis^{||}
Udi Peled^{||}

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Abstract

Building on the Gennaro & Goldfeder and Lindell & Nof protocols (CCS '18), we present threshold ECDSA protocols, for any number of signatories and any threshold, that improve as follows over the state of the art:

- Only the last round of our protocols requires knowledge of the message, and the other rounds can take place in a preprocessing stage, lending to a *non-interactive* threshold ECDSA protocol.
- Our protocols withstand adaptive corruption of signatories. Furthermore, they include a periodic refresh mechanism and offer full proactive security.
- Our protocols realize an ideal threshold signature functionality within the UC framework, in the global random oracle model, assuming Strong RSA, DDH, semantic security of the Paillier encryption, and a somewhat enhanced variant of existential unforgeability of ECDSA.
- Both protocols achieve accountability by identifying corrupted signatories in case of failure to generate a valid signature.

The protocols provide a tradeoff between the number of rounds to generate a signature and the computational and communication overhead for the identification of corrupted signatories. Namely:

- For one protocol, signature generation takes only 4 rounds (down from the current state of the art of 8 rounds), but the identification process requires computation and communication that is quadratic in the number of parties.
- For the other protocol, the identification process requires computation and communication that is only linear in the number of parties, but signature generation takes 7 rounds.

These properties (low latency, compatibility with cold-wallet architectures, proactive security, identifiable abort and composable security) make the two protocols ideal for threshold wallets for ECDSA-based cryptocurrencies.

*This work combines [20, 34]. An extended abstract of this work appears in the proceedings of the 2020 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS'20) [19].

[†]Authors are listed in alphabetical order.

[‡]Boston University. Member of CPIIS. canetti@bu.edu

[§]The City College of New York. rosario@ccny.cuny.edu

[¶]Cornell Tech/Offchain Labs. goldfeder@cornell.edu

^{||}Fireblocks. nikos@fireblocks.com, udi@fireblocks.com

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1 Introduction

Introduced by Desmedt [26] and Desmedt and Frankel [27], threshold signatures allow a number of signatories to share the capability to digitally sign messages, so that a given message is signed if and only if a certain threshold of the signatories agree to sign it. In more detail, a t -out-of- n threshold signature scheme is a mechanism whereby a set of n signatories, presented with a message m , jointly and interactively compute a *signature* σ such that (1) if at least t of the signatories agree to sign m , then the pair m, σ is accepted as a valid by a pre-determined public verification algorithm, and (2) no attacker that controls up to $t - 1$ signatories can forge signatures – namely, it cannot come up with a pair m', σ' such that the verification algorithm accepts σ' as a valid signature on m' , if the latter was never signed before.

Threshold signatures are an instance of “threshold cryptography” which, in turn, is one of the main application areas of the more general paradigm of secure multi-party computation. Threshold cryptography offers an additional layer of security to the entity performing a cryptographic task that involves using a private key, by distributing the capabilities that require using the secret key among multiple servers/devices. Indeed, this way the system has no single point of failure. Examples include threshold El-Gamal, RSA, Schnorr, Cramer-Shoup, ECEIS and others [53, 24, 52, 54, 13].

With the advent of blockchain technologies and cryptocurrencies in the past decade, there has been a strong renewed interest in threshold cryptography and threshold signatures in particular. Specifically, because transactions are made possible via digital signatures, many stakeholders are looking to perform signature-generation in a distributed way, and many companies are now offering solutions based on (or in combination with) threshold cryptography.¹

Threshold ECDSA The *digital signature algorithm* (DSA) [44] in its elliptic curve variant (ECDSA) [50] is one of the most widely used signature schemes. ECDSA has received a lot of attention from the cryptography community because, apart from its popularity, it is viewed as somewhat “threshold-unfriendly”, i.e. (naive) threshold protocols for ECDSA require heavy cryptographic machinery over many communication rounds. Early attempts towards making threshold (EC)DSA practically efficient include Gennaro et al. [35] in the honest majority setting and MacKenzie and Reiter [49] in the two-party setting; of course, threshold ECDSA can be done using generic MPC protocols such as [38, 16]. Furthermore, these solutions would even allow for non-interactive signing with preprocessing. However, they are prohibitively costly.

In recent years, there has been an abundance of protocols for threshold ECDSA [36, 2, 32, 45, 48, 28, 29, 23, 21, 22] that support any number n of parties and allow any threshold $t < n$ of corrupted parties. The protocols that stand out here in terms of overall efficiency are the ones by Gennaro and Goldfeder [32], Lindell et al. [48] and Doerner et al. [29], and the recent work of Castagnos et al. [22].

We note that all recent protocols achieve competitive practical performance (with trade-offs between computation and communication costs depending on the tools used). Furthermore, all recent protocols require at least eight communication rounds, which for many modern communication settings (involving geographically dispersed servers and/or mobile devices) is the most time-consuming resource.

1.1 Our Results.

We present two new threshold ECDSA protocols. The protocols build on the techniques of Gennaro and Goldfeder [32] and Lindell et al. [48], but provide new functionality, and have improved efficiency and security guarantees. We first discuss the new characteristics of the protocols at high level, and then provide more details on the construction and the analysis. Figure 1 provides a rough comparison between the main cost and security guarantees of our protocols and those of Gennaro and Goldfeder [32], Lindell et al. [48], Doerner et al. [29], and Castagnos et al. [22].

Non-Interactive Signing. As seen in Figure 1, in all of these protocols the signing process is highly interactive, i.e. the parties exchange information in a sequence of rounds to compute a signature for a given message. However, in many real-life situations it is desirable to have non-interactive signature generation, namely have each signatory, having seen the message, generate its own “signature share” without having to interact with any other signatory, and then have a public algorithm for combining the signature shares into a

¹See <https://www.mpcalliance.org/> for companies in the threshold cryptography space.

| <i>Signing Protocol</i> | <i>Rounds</i> | <i>Group Ops</i> | <i>Ring Ops</i> | <i>Communication</i> | <i>Proactive</i> | <i>ID Abort</i> | <i>UC</i> |
|--|---------------|------------------|-----------------|------------------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------|
| Gennaro and Goldfeder [32] | 9 | $10n$ | $50n$ | $10\kappa + 20N$ (7 KiB) | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| Lindell et al. [48] (Paillier) ^{†‡} | 8 | $80n$ | $50n$ | $50\kappa + 20N$ (7.5 KiB) | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| Lindell et al. [48] (OT) [†] | 8 | $80n$ | 0 | 50κ (190 KiB) | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| Doerner et al. [29] | $\log(n) + 6$ | 5 | 0 | $10 \cdot \kappa^2$ (90 KiB) | ✗ | ✗ | ✓ |
| Castagnos et al. [22]* | 8 | $15n$ | 0 | $100 \cdot \kappa$ (4.5 KiB) | ✗ | ✗ | ✗ |
| This Work: <i>Interactive</i> [§] | 4 or 7 | $10n$ | $90n$ | $10\kappa + 50N$ (15 KiB) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| This Work: <i>Non-Int. Presign</i> [§] | 3 or 6 | $10n$ | $90n$ | $10\kappa + 50N$ (15 KiB) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |
| This Work: <i>Non-Int. Sign</i> | 1 | 0 | 0 | κ (256 bits) | ✓ | ✓ | ✓ |

Figure 1: Comparison of our scheme with those of [32, 48, 29, 22] for signing. Costs are displayed per party for an n -party protocol secure against $n - 1$ corrupted parties, for computational security of 128 bits and statistical security of 80 bits. Ring operations contain two types of operations (mod N and N^2) that we do not distinguish in the table; operations modulo N^2 represent less than a third of the total number of ring operations for all protocols. The communication column describes the number of group elements (encoded by κ bits) and ring elements (encoded by N bits) sent between each pair of parties; in parentheses we provide estimates, including the constant overhead, for concrete implementation for the curve size of Bitcoin and the standard security recommendation of Paillier, i.e. $\kappa = 256$ and $N = 2048$. ([†]Estimates for [48] include optimizations that do not preserve UC – c.f. Section 1.3. [‡]Reported numbers are different than [48] because of how ring operations are accounted for. *We note that [22] relies on somewhat incomparable hardness assumptions, and it involves operations in a different group than the underlying elliptic curve – c.f. Section 1.3. [§]We report two round-complexities for our work to reflect the two different variants of our protocol, which incur different costs for identifying corrupted parties.)

single signature. For instance, such a mechanism is mandatory if one wants to use a “cold wallet” mechanism for some of the signatories — which is a common practice in the digital currency realm for securing non-threshold wallets. Indeed, a number of popular signature schemes do admit threshold protocols with non-interactive signing (e.g. RSA [42], BLS [1]).

In our protocols, the signing process can be split into two phases: A first, preprocessing, phase that takes 3 rounds (or 6) and can be performed before the message is known, followed by a non-interactive step where each signatory generates its own signature share, after the message to be signed becomes known. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first threshold ECDSA protocols in the literature that have manageable performance and allows for non-interactive signing with preprocessing. Furthermore, the non-interactive step is very efficient: it boils down to computing and sending a single field-element (i.e. 256 bits for the Bitcoin curve). We mention that a similar pre-signing capability for ECDSA was noticed by Dalskov et al. [23] who employed generic (i.e. all-purpose) MPC to compute the ECDSA functionality in the context of securing DNSSEC Keys.

Round-Minimal Interactive Signing. We stress that, even in their interactive variants, our protocols are the most round-efficient among the state-of-the-art protocols and thus notably improve the performance of many applications that require ECDSA (e.g. cryptocurrency custody).

Proactive Key Refresh [51, 41, 14, 43]. While threshold signatures do provide a significant security improvement over plain signature schemes, they may still be vulnerable to attacks that compromise all shareholders one by one, in an adaptive way, over time. This vulnerability is particularly bothersome in schemes that need to function and remain secure over long periods of time. Proactive security is designed to alleviate this concern: In a proactive threshold signature scheme, time is divided into *epochs*, such that at the end of each epoch the parties engage in a protocol for refreshing their keys and local states. The security guarantee is that the scheme remains unforgeable as long as at most $t - 1$ signatories are compromised *within a single epoch*, or more precisely *in any time period that starts at the beginning of one key refreshment and ends at the*

end of the next key refreshment. It is stressed that the public signature verification algorithm (and key) of the scheme remains the same throughout.

Our protocols offer a three-round key refresh phase. We stress that none of the other protocols in Figure 1 support proactive key refreshing. In fact, these protocols are not even known to provide traditional threshold security against an adversary that corrupts parties adaptively as the system progresses.

Identifiable Aborts. Our protocols contain an additional mechanism that allows the signatories to identify, should the parties fail to obtain a valid signature on a given message, at least one out of the signatories that has failed to participate in the generation of the signature, or has otherwise deviated from the prescribed protocol.

The communication model. We assume that the signatories are connected via an authenticated and synchronous broadcast mechanism. That is, the communication is public, and every message that is sent will be received by all parties in the next round, or not at all. We note that the use of authenticated communication is in fact *essential* for obtaining proactive security. Indeed, without already-established authenticated communication, an adversary that formally “left” a previously corrupted party and controls all the communication between the party and the rest of the network can continue impersonating that party indefinitely [15]. Furthermore, the use of a synchronous broadcast mechanism is essential for accountability: Accountability by definition requires consensus, and without bounded communication delay it is impossible to hold a signatory accountable for not responding.

Security & Composability. We provide security analysis of our protocols within the Universally Composable (UC) Security framework [10]. For this purpose, we first formulate an ideal threshold signature functionality which guarantees that legitimate signatures are verifiable by the standard ECDSA verification algorithm, and, at the same time, guarantees ideal and unconditional unforgeability, as well as identifiable abort. We show that our protocols UC-realize this ideal functionality even in the presence of an attacker that adaptively corrupts and controls parties under the sole restriction that at most t parties are corrupted in-between two consecutive refresh phases. This way, we can use universal composability to assert that the protocol remains unforgeable even when put together with arbitrary other protocols. Such a strong property is of particular importance in decentralized, complex and highly security sensitive distributed systems such as cryptocurrencies.

We describe two related protocols that obtain the above properties. The two protocols are distinguished by the round-complexity of the presigning and complexity overhead of the identification process to achieve accountability. Namely, for one protocol the presigning runs in three rounds and the identification process requires computation and communication that is quadratic in the number of parties while. For the second protocol, the presigning runs in six rounds but the identification process requires computation and communication that is only linear in the number of parties while. In a sense, the latter protocol may be viewed as a “stretched-out” variant of the former that achieves more efficient accountability. Aside for the aforementioned differences, both protocols may be run either non-interactively or completely online and they support the same security guarantees.

We also sketch a more lightweight seven-round protocol that takes about half the work as the other ones, at the price of restricting the signature generation process to be sequential: the signatories start processing a new signature only after the processing of all previous signatures has completed (c.f. Appendix A).

Security of the interactive protocols is proven assuming the unforgeability of ECDSA, the semantic security of Paillier encryption and strong-RSA. For the six-round version of the presigning, we also assume DDH. It might appear a bit unsatisfying to have the unforgeability of ECDSA as an underlying assumption, given that it is an interactive – and by no means “simple” – assumption. We do this since this is the weakest assumption that one can hope for: indeed, recall that unforgeability of ECDSA is not known to follow from any standard hardness assumption on elliptic curve groups (we do however know that ECDSA is existentially unforgeable in the generic group model [6]).

Security of the non-interactive protocols is proven under the same assumptions, but with a somewhat stronger unforgeability property of ECDSA, that considers situations where the adversary obtains, ahead of time, some “leakage” information on the random string that the signer will be using for generating the upcoming several signatures. Still, the adversary should not be able to forge signatures, even given this leakage. We call

this property *enhanced unforgeability*, and demonstrate that (a) ECDSA is enhanced unforgeable in the generic group model, and (b) in some cases, enhanced unforgeability of ECDSA follows from standard unforgeability of ECDSA, in the random oracle model.

Remark 1.1. In the remainder of the introduction, we focus on the three-round presign version of the protocol, and, where appropriate, we point out how the description and analysis differs from the six-round version.

1.2 Our Techniques

Hereafter, \mathbb{F}_q denotes the finite field with q elements and $\mathcal{H} : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ denotes a hash function used for embedding messages into the field with q elements. Furthermore, let (\mathbb{G}, q, g) denote the group-order-generator tuple associated with the ECDSA curve. We use multiplicative notation for the group-operation.

1.2.1 Background

Plain (Non-Threshold) ECDSA. Recall that an ECDSA signature for secret key $x \in \mathbb{F}_q$ and message msg has the form $(\rho, k \cdot (m + \rho x)) \in \mathbb{F}_q^2$, where $m = \mathcal{H}(\text{msg})$, ρ is the x-projection (mod q) of the point $g^{k^{-1}} \in \mathbb{G}$, and k is a uniformly random element of \mathbb{F}_q . The verification algorithm accepts a signature (ρ, σ) as valid for message $\text{msg} \in \mathcal{M}$ with respect to public key $X = g^x \in \mathbb{G}$, if ρ is the x-projection of $g^{m\sigma^{-1}} \cdot X^{\rho\sigma^{-1}}$, where $m = \mathcal{H}(\text{msg})$.

Overview of the threshold ECDSA of Gennaro and Goldfeder [32]. We first describe the basic protocol for the honest-but-curious case with security threshold $t = n - 1$, i.e. the case where all signatories follow the protocol. Each signatory (henceforth, party) \mathcal{P}_i chooses a random $x_i \in \mathbb{F}_q$ and sends $X_i = g^{x_i}$ to all other parties. The public key is defined as $X = X_1 \cdots X_n \in \mathbb{G}$.² The secret key then corresponds to the value $x = x_1 + \dots + x_n$ (it is stressed that no one knows x). In addition, each party \mathcal{P}_i is associated with parameters for an additively homomorphic public encryption scheme (specifically, Paillier encryption). That is, all parties know \mathcal{P}_i 's public encryption key, and \mathcal{P}_i knows its own decryption key. We write $\text{enc}_i, \text{dec}_i$ for the encryption and decryption algorithm associated with \mathcal{P}_i . It is stressed that all parties can run the encryption algorithm.

To sign a message msg , the parties $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$ generate local shares k_1, \dots, k_n , respectively, of the random value $k = k_1 + \dots + k_n$, as well as local shares $\gamma_1, \dots, \gamma_n$, respectively, of an ephemeral value $\gamma = \gamma_1 + \dots + \gamma_n$ which will be used to mask k . Using their respective encryption schemes, each pair of parties $\mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j$ computes additive shares $\alpha_{i,j}, \hat{\alpha}_{i,j}$ for \mathcal{P}_i and $\beta_{j,i}, \hat{\beta}_{j,i}$ for \mathcal{P}_j , such that $\alpha_{i,j} + \beta_{j,i} = \gamma_j k_i$ and $\hat{\alpha}_{i,j} + \hat{\beta}_{j,i} = x_j k_i$. In more detail, the share computation phase between \mathcal{P}_i and \mathcal{P}_j for computing $\alpha_{i,j}$ and $\beta_{j,i}$ proceeds as follows ($\hat{\alpha}_{i,j}$ and $\hat{\beta}_{j,i}$ are analogously constructed). Party \mathcal{P}_i sends $K_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i)$ to \mathcal{P}_j , i.e. K_i an encryption of k_i under his own public key. Then, \mathcal{P}_j samples a random $\beta_{j,i}$ from a suitable range, and, using the homomorphic properties of the encryption scheme, \mathcal{P}_j computes $D_{i,j} = (\gamma_j \odot K_i) \oplus \text{enc}_i(-\beta_{j,i})$,³ i.e. $D_{i,j}$ is an encryption of $\gamma_j k_i - \beta_{j,i}$ under \mathcal{P}_i 's public key. Finally, \mathcal{P}_j sends $D_{i,j}$ to \mathcal{P}_i who sets $\alpha_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(D_{i,j})$, and the share-computation phase terminates. Upon completion, each party \mathcal{P}_i can compute $\delta_i = \gamma_i k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \alpha_{i,j} + \beta_{i,j}$, where $\delta_1, \dots, \delta_n$ is an additive sharing of γk , i.e. $\gamma k = \delta_1 + \dots + \delta_n$.

Next, each \mathcal{P}_i sends (g^{γ_i}, δ_i) to all, and the parties compute $g^{k^{-1}} = (\prod_i g^{\gamma_i})^{(\sum_j \delta_j)^{-1}}$, and obtain their respective shares $\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n$ of $\sigma = k(m + \rho x)$, by setting $\sigma_i = k_i m + \rho(x_i k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \hat{\alpha}_{i,j} + \hat{\beta}_{i,j})$, where $m = \mathcal{H}(\text{msg})$ is the hash-value of msg and ρ is the x-projection of $g^{k^{-1}}$. Finally, each \mathcal{P}_i sends σ_i to all, and the signature is set to (ρ, σ) . To sum up, the protocol proceeds as follows from party \mathcal{P}_i 's perspective, where each item denotes a round:

1. Sample k_i, γ_i and send $K_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i)$ to all.
2. When obtaining $\{K_j\}_{j \neq i}$, set $\{D_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i}\}_{j \neq i}$ as prescribed, and send $(D_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i})$ to \mathcal{P}_j , for each $j \neq i$.
3. When obtaining $\{(D_{i,j}, \hat{D}_{i,j})\}_{j \neq i}$, set δ_i as prescribed, and send $(\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}, \delta_i)$ to all.

²For presentation purposes we use additive n -out-of- n secret-sharing of the private key, instead of n -out-of- n Shamir secret-sharing that is prescribed in [32].

³We emphasize that \oplus and \odot denote homomorphic evaluation of addition and (scalar) multiplication, respectively, rather than standard addition and multiplication.

4. When obtaining $\{(\Gamma_j, \delta_j)\}_{j \neq i}$, set σ_i as prescribed, and send it to all.

Output. When obtaining $\{\sigma_j\}_{j \neq i}$, set σ and ρ as prescribed, and output (ρ, σ) .

The above protocol takes four rounds of communication. For security, it can be seen that, *if everything was computed correctly*, then up to the point where the σ_i 's are released, no coalition of up to $n - 1$ parties gains any information on the secret key x . Furthermore, releasing σ_i is equivalent to releasing the signature (ρ, σ) .

However, if a corrupted party deviates from the specification of the protocol, then releasing an honest party's (maliciously influenced) signature-share σ_i may reveal information about the secret key share (potentially the entirety of it). To mitigate this problem, Gennaro and Goldfeder [32] devise a special-purpose, clever technique that allows the parties to verify the validity of the signature-shares before releasing them. However, this alternative technique ends up adding five rounds of communication.

1.2.2 Our Approach

Using the above blueprint, we show how the parties can verify the validity of the signature shares without adding any rounds on top of the 4 rounds of the basic protocol, and at a comparable computational cost to that of [32]. Interestingly, we achieve this result by employing the “generic” (and often deemed prohibitively expensive) GMW-approach of proving in zero-knowledge the validity of every computation along the way, with optimizations owing to the nature of the signature functionality. Furthermore, our approach preserves the natural property of the basic protocol, whereby the message is used only in the fourth and last round. This, in turn, leads to our non-interactive variant. Proactive key-refresh phases are also built in a natural way, on top of the basic protocol, with appropriate zero-knowledge proofs.

For the analysis, we take a different approach than that taken by either [32] or [48]. Recall that Gennaro and Goldfeder [32] only demonstrate that an adversary which interacts with a stand-alone instance of their protocol and (non-adaptively) corrupts $t < n$ parties cannot forge ECDSA signatures under the public key chosen by the parties. On the other hand, Lindell et al. [48] show that their protocol UC-realizes the ECDSA functionality, in the presence of an adversary that non-adaptively corrupts $t < n$ parties. The latter is indeed a stronger property than stand-alone unforgeability, in two ways: First, this result holds even when the threshold signature protocol is part of a larger system. Second, secure evaluation of the ECDSA functionality is significantly stronger than mere unforgeability. While the first strengthening is clearly needed, the second is perhaps overly strong (for instance, it implies that the distribution of the secret randomness k is almost uniform for all signatures, regardless of the message).

We take a mid-way approach: We formulate a threshold variant of the ideal signature functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sign}}$ of [11] and show that our protocol UC-realizes this functionality. This way, we obtain a result that holds even when our threshold signature protocol is part of a larger system. On the other hand, we avoid the need to show that our protocol UC-realizes the ECDSA functionality. This seemingly small difference turns out to be crucial: For one, this is what allows us to prove security under *adaptive* (and even mobile [51]) corruption of parties. It also allows for a number of significant simplifications in the protocol.

1.2.3 Protocol overview

We proceed with an overview of our protocol. For simplicity, we have omitted many of the details, especially regarding the zero-knowledge proofs. We refer the reader to the subsequent technical sections for further details. Let $\mathcal{P} = \{\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n\}$ denote the set of parties. Let $(\text{enc}_i, \text{dec}_i)$ denote the Paillier encryption-decryption algorithms associated with party \mathcal{P}_i ; the public key is specified below. Throughout, when we say that some party broadcasts a message, we mean that the party simply sends the message to all other parties.

Key-Generation. As in the basic protocol, Each \mathcal{P}_i samples a local random secret share $x_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ of the (master) secret key $x = \sum_i x_i$ and then reveals $X_i = g^{x_i}$ by committing and then decommitting to the group-element in a sequential fashion. In addition, each party \mathcal{P}_i broadcasts a Schnorr NIZK (non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge) of x_i .

Auxiliary Info & Key-Refresh. Each \mathcal{P}_i locally generates a Paillier key N_i and sends it to the other parties together with a NIZK that N_i is well constructed (i.e., that it is a product of suitable primes). Next,

each \mathcal{P}_i chooses a random secret sharing of $0 = \sum_j x_i^j$ and computes $X_i^j = g^{x_i^j}$ and $C_i^j = \text{enc}_j(x_i^j)$, for every $j \neq i$. Then, each \mathcal{P}_i broadcasts $(X_i^j, C_i^j)_j$, together with a PoK that he knows the discrete logarithms of $\{X_i^j\}_j$. The parties update their key shares by setting $x_i^* = x_i + \sum_j \text{dec}_i(C_i^j) \pmod q$ if all the proofs are valid and $\prod_k X_j^k = \text{id}_{\mathbb{G}}$, for every j .

Presigning. One technical innovation that differentiates our protocol from [32] is our use of the Paillier cryptosystem as a commitment scheme. Namely, the process of encrypting values under the parties’ own public keys yields a commitment scheme that is perfectly binding and computationally hiding (as long as Paillier is semantically secure). Therefore, in the protocol we instruct each party to commit to γ_i and k_i by encrypting those values *under their own keys* and broadcast $G_i = \text{enc}_i(\gamma_i)$ and $K_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i)$.⁴ Concurrently, the parties initiate the share-computation phase (for $x_j k_i = \alpha_{i,j} + \beta_{j,i}$ and $\gamma_j k_i = \hat{\alpha}_{i,j} + \hat{\beta}_{j,i}$), while proving in zero-knowledge that the values used in the multiplication are the same as the values encrypted in G_i, K_i , as well as the exponent of the public key-share $X_i = g^{x_i}$. Finally, when the aforementioned share-computation phase terminates, the parties communicate an additional message to obtain information for computing the point $R = g^{k^{-1}} \in \mathbb{G}$ on the curve which corresponds to the nonce of the (future) signature, while proving in zero-knowledge that the relevant message is consistent with the committed values K_i, G_i and X_i . At the end of the presigning phase, each party \mathcal{P}_i stores in memory the tuple (k_i, χ_i, R) , i.e. the share k_i of k (i.e. $\sum_i k_i = k$), the share χ_i of kx (i.e. $\sum_i \chi_i = kx$), and the nonce $R = g^{k^{-1}} \in \mathbb{G}$.

The advantage of using the Paillier cryptosystem as a commitment scheme is twofold. On one hand, Paillier ciphertexts are amenable to Schnorr-type proofs for proving the correctness of a prescribed computation. On the other hand, in the security analysis, it allows the simulator to extract the adversary’s secrets, because the corrupted parties’ Paillier keys are extracted during the preceding auxiliary information phase. We expand on this point in the following subsection.

The main purpose of the ZK-proofs is to bypass the security pitfalls (also highlighted in [32] and [48]) that arise from using Paillier encryption (which resides in a ring of integers modulo an RSA modulus) to derive group elements on the elliptic curve associated with ECDSA. In more detail, malicious choices of k ’s and γ ’s may allow the adversary to probe bits of the honest parties’ secrets which may have devastating effect. To remedy this, similarly to [32, 48], we use ZK-range proofs with purpose of “forcing” the adversary to choose values from a suitable range, thus preventing the aforementioned attack. For this purpose we devise new and more efficient range proofs, taking advantage of the use of Paillier encryption as a perfectly binding commitment.

In summary, by virtue of the “Paillier commitments” and the accompanying ZK-proofs, party \mathcal{P}_i is confident that the tuple (R, k_i, χ_i) is well-formed at the end of pre-signing phase, and there is no need for additional communication rounds to verify the correctness of the tuple, as opposed to [32, 48, 29, 22].

Signing. Once a message msg is known, to generate a signature for pre-signing data (R, k_i, χ_i) , each \mathcal{P}_i sets $m = \mathcal{H}(\text{msg})$, computes $\rho = R|_{x\text{-axis}}$, and sends $\sigma_i = k_i m + \rho \chi_i \pmod q$ to all parties. After receiving the other parties’ sigmas, the parties output the signature $(\rho, \sum_i \sigma_i) = (\rho, k(m + \rho x))$.

1.2.4 Identifying Corrupted Parties

Whenever a NIZK fails for some party, the remaining parties attribute the fault to that party and report it as corrupted. The hard part is identifying corrupted parties when either the nonce (i.e. the R) is malformed, or the signature-string does not verify. In these cases, we describe two (distinct) processes for identifying the corrupted party. The first one does not require any changes to the presigning process, but incurs a somewhat heavy penalty in terms of computation/communication and memory allocation. The second identification process is more efficient with respect to the aforementioned costs but requires three extra rounds of communication during the presigning stage.

Less Efficient $O(n^2)$ Identification with 3-round Presigning. If the nonce is malformed, then the parties prove in zero-knowledge that the delta they transmitted was obtained by decrypting (and summing up

⁴Notice that the ciphertexts are computationally hiding and thus the adversary cannot correlate his own k ’s and γ ’s with the honest parties’ values.

mod q) all the relevant ciphertexts. Similarly, if the signature-string does not verify, then the parties prove in zero-knowledge that the signature-share they transmitted was obtained by decrypting (and computing the right formula mod q) all the relevant ciphertexts. This process involves an $O(n^2)$ penalty, because it entails re-proving the entire transcript to all parties. Furthermore, in its non-interactive variant, it requires storing (parts of) the transcript in memory in order to identify the culprit during the online phase, in case the signature-string does not verify.

More Efficient $O(n)$ Identification with 6-round Presigning. In the second variant of the identification process, the parties are instructed to open up the relevant ciphertexts and check (algebraically) if the right message was sent.⁵ In more detail, if the nonce is malformed, then the parties open up all the ciphertexts resulting from the pairwise multiplication of the k 's and the γ 's (i.e. $K_i, G_i, D_{i,j}$). At this point, all parties can agree on who sent the wrong value. The above process requires one additional round of communication because the parties' Γ_i 's must be revealed only after they reveal to each other the δ_i 's. The reason is that, in the security proof, the simulator must now in advance if the nonce will be malformed before it reveals the (simulated) honest parties' Γ_i 's.⁶

The more challenging part in achieving a more efficient identification process is the case that the signature-string does not verify, because we cannot simply open all the ciphertexts like before, since (1) it would require storing (parts of) the transcript for the online phase and (2), more importantly, it would reveal the master secret key. Here, we make the following observation: each party's signature-share ($\sigma_i = k_i m + r\chi$) can be verified in the exponent by publishing⁷ $\bar{R}_i = R^{k_i}$ and $S_i = R^{x_i}$ via the formula $R^{\sigma_i} = \bar{R}_i^m \cdot S_i^r$ (observe that the parties now only need to store the "pseudo-keys" $\{\bar{R}_i, S_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{P}}$ and not the entire transcript for the online phase).

It thus remains for the parties to convince each other that the pseudo-keys are well-formed. We only explain here how to verify the S_i 's. Notice that if $\prod_j S_j = X$, then the corrupted parties used the "right" presigning shares, i.e. modulo the randomness used amongst the corrupted parties, the S_j 's are well-formed. If, on the other hand, $\prod_j S_j \neq X$ then by carefully⁸ opening up (parts of) the pairwise multiplication of the k 's and the x 's, the parties can check in the exponent *without compromising security* which party used the wrong presigning share. We refer the reader to the description of the protocol for full details.

1.2.5 Online vs Non-Interactive Signing

Online Signing. For interactive (online signing), the parties simply run the presigning stage followed by the signing stage, for a total of 4 rounds (or 6 rounds).

Non-interactive Signing. To be able to sign non-interactively, the parties need to prepare some number of pre-signatures in an offline stage. That is, for some pre-signing parameter $L \in \mathbb{N}$, the parties run the pre-signing phase L -times concurrently and obtain pre-signing data $\{(\ell, R_\ell, k_i^\ell, \chi_i^\ell)\}_{\ell=1, \dots, L}$. Later, for each signature request using pre-signing data $(\ell, R_\ell, k_i^\ell, \chi_i^\ell)$ and message msg , the parties run the signing phase for the relevant input to generate a signature. The parties then erase the pre-signing tuple (ℓ, \dots) . It is important to make sure that, as part of the refresh stage, any unused pre-signatures are discarded.⁹

Remark 1.2. It is stressed that the security analysis of the non-interactive protocol is different than the online protocol, because the signature nonces (the R 's) are known well in advance of the corresponding messages to be signed. As mentioned earlier, to prove security we rely on a stronger assumption about the unforgeability of the underlying (non-threshold) scheme, and we present it in more detail in the next section.

1.2.6 Security

The present section assumes some familiarity with the ideal-vs-real paradigm and the UC-framework.

⁵For technical reasons, the opening of the ciphertext is done in ZK by revealing only the plaintext, not the randomizer.

⁶To elaborate further, if the nonce is malformed, then the simulator uses Γ_i 's for which he knows the discrete logarithm, whereas if the adversary does not deviate from the protocol, the simulator will use values it cannot discrete-log to match the nonce it obtains from the ECDSA oracle.

⁷This step requires another two extra rounds in the presigning phase, bringing the total number of rounds to six.

⁸Since the master secret key x cannot be simply revealed (like in the case for γ), this step is rather subtle.

⁹Alternatively, it is possible to keep the presigning data as long as it is appropriately refreshed, i.e. by re-randomizing (k_i, χ_i) .

Real-vs-Ideal Paradigm & UC. We prove security via the real-vs-ideal paradigm and the Universal Composability framework. Namely, we show that our protocol emulates an ideal process involving an idealized version of the task at hand, and we prove that for every adversary attacking the protocol, there is an ideal adversary (referred to as a simulator) that achieves the same goals. In the non-UC (standalone) framework, this is done using the adversary’s code and by extracting the adversary’s secrets (typically via rewinding).

The UC-framework augments the above paradigm with an entity, called the *environment*, that interacts with the adversary (in the real world) or the simulator (in the ideal world), together with the parties in the computation. The goal of the environment is to guess which process (real or ideal) is executed. If no environment can tell the difference between the real and ideal processes, it follows that the protocol is secure even “in the wild”; i.e. even when it is composed arbitrarily with other (cryptographic or non-cryptographic) components of some larger system.

One major technical difference between standalone-secure and UC-secure protocols is that, in the security analysis of the latter, the simulator’s arsenal of extraction techniques lacks rewinding. This typically makes the protocol more complicated because it requires tools that are amenable to so-called online extraction (see e.g. the non-rewinding version of Schnorr’s NIZK proof of knowledge in Fischlin [30]). Disallowing the rewinding technique in the security analysis is also one of the major obstacles towards achieving security against adaptive party corruptions.

UC-Secure Threshold ECDSA vs Threshold Signature. One important difference between our security proof and the simulation-based security proof of [48, 29] is that our protocol UC-realizes a “generic” ideal threshold signature functionality, rather than the ECDSA functionality per se. We opted for the former for the following reasons. First, it captures more accurately the purpose of our protocol; our goal is to compute unforgeable signatures that are verifiable with the ECDSA algorithm, rather than realizing the ECDSA functionality itself. Second, and more importantly, it allows us to reintroduce the rewinding technique in the security analysis, which greatly simplifies both the protocol and the security analysis, as we explain next.

Threshold Signature Ideal Functionality & UC-simulation. We define an ideal threshold signature functionality modeled after the (non-threshold) signature functionality of Canetti [11]. The definition of the functionality aims at capturing the essence of any threshold signature scheme. Namely (and very loosely):

1. Authorized sets of parties may generate valid signatures for any given message.
2. Unauthorized sets of parties cannot compute valid signatures for messages that were never signed before.

We stress that the ideal functionality is utterly oblivious to the format of the signature scheme (there are effectively no private/public keys). Consequently, the UC simulator is straightforward: It runs the programs of the uncorrupted parties without modification, interacting with the environment in away that is distributed identically as in the real system — as long as the environment doesn’t manage to forge a signature. Indeed, as long as the environment does not forge a signature, the simulation is *perfect*.

To demonstrate the validity of the simulation, it remains to show that the environment *cannot forge* signatures for some message that was never signed before; this is the crux of our security proof. Before we describe the proof, we stress that here we are only interested in demonstrating validity of the UC simulation, by way of reduction to the hardness of the underlying assumptions. These reductions are allowed to “take the environment offline” and employ the entire arsenal of extraction techniques, including rewinding. What’s more, this approach gives full power to the proof over the random oracle, so that any reduction may suitably program the environment’s queries to the random oracle, as long as these were never queried before.

Unforgeability Proof. We show unforgeability via reduction to the unforgeability of non-threshold ECDSA. In more detail, we consider the following experiments involving a simulator attempting to simulate the environment’s interaction with the honest parties.

1. In the first experiment, the simulator follows the specifications of the protocol except that:
 - (a) The simulator samples an ECDSA key-pair (x, X) and fixes the public key of the threshold protocol to X (this is achieved by rewinding the environment).

- (b) The simulator extracts the corrupted parties' Paillier keys (this is achieved by programming the random oracle).
 - (c) The simulator never decrypts the ciphertexts encrypted under the honest parties' Paillier keys. Rather, to carry on the simulation, the simulator extracts the relevant values from the corrupted parties' messages, using the Paillier keys extracted in Item 1b.
 - (d) To compute the honest parties' ZK-proofs, the simulator invokes the zero-knowledge simulator to generate valid proofs, and programs the random oracle accordingly.
2. The second experiment is identical to the first one except that:
- (a) At the beginning of the experiment, the simulator picks a random honest party that is henceforth deemed as special (in fact, to handle adaptive corruptions, this random party is chosen afresh every time the key-refresh phase is executed. If the environment decides to corrupt the special party, then the experiment is reset to the last preceding key-refresh; by rewinding the environment).
 - (b) Every time an honest party is instructed to encrypt a value under the special party's Paillier key and send it to the corrupted parties, the simulator sends a random encryption of 0 instead.
3. The third experiment is similar to the second one, except that the simulation is carried out *without* knowledge of the special party's secrets, using a standard/enhanced ECDSA oracle.

We show that our scheme is unforgeable by showing that if an environment forges signatures in an execution of our protocol, then the environment also forges signatures in all three experiments above, and from the third experiment we conclude that the environment forges signatures for the plain (non-threshold) ECDSA signature scheme, in contradiction with its presumed security.

The first two experiments are stepping stones towards proving that the environment forges in the third experiment. In more detail, the real execution and the first experiment are statistically close as long as all the ZK-proofs are sound (and the simulator extracts the right values). The first and the second experiment are computationally close as long as the Paillier cryptosystem is semantically secure. Finally, the second and the third experiment are identical (in a perfect sense).

Dealing w/ Adaptive Party Corruptions. To show that our protocol achieves security against adaptive party corruption, it is enough to argue that experiments 2 & 3 terminate. Assuming CDR and strong-RSA, our analysis yields that both experiments terminate in time quasi-proportional to the number of parties, and the environment forges signatures in the third experiment, in contradiction with the presumed security of plain ECDSA. Consequently, under suitable cryptographic assumptions, unless the environment corrupts all parties simultaneously in-between key-refresh phases, our scheme is unforgeable.

Overall UC-Security of our Protocol. From the above, it follows that if the ECDSA signature scheme is existentially unforgeable, then the online variant of our protocol UC-realizes the ideal signature functionality. Similarly, if ECDSA is *enhanced* existentially unforgeable, then the offline variant of our protocol UC-realizes the ideal signature functionality.

We remind the reader that existential unforgeability is defined via a game where a prospective forger is given access to a signing oracle allowing the attacker to sign (arbitrary) messages of his own choosing. The attacker wins the game if he manages to generate a valid signature for a previously unsigned message. We define an enhanced variant of the unforgeability game where the data of the signature that is independent of the message (i.e. $g^{k^{-1}}$, henceforth referred to as the signature's *nonce*) can be queried by the attacker *before* producing a message to be signed; that way the attacker can potentially choose messages for the signing oracle that are correlated with the random nonce, which may be useful towards generating a forgery.

Evidence for Enhanced Unforgeability. To support our assumption that ECDSA is *enhanced* existentially unforgeable, we show that it holds in the following idealized model:

1. In the random oracle model, as long as not too-many nonces are queried in advance, and standard (non-enhanced) ECDSA is existentially unforgeable.

2. In the random oracle and generic group model, unconditionally.¹⁰

Both of the above are shown via reduction. For Item 1, the reduction simulates the random oracle and attempts to guess the messages the adversary is going to request signatures for; this is why not too-many nonces may be queried in advance, since the guessing probability decreases (super) exponentially. For Item 2, the reduction simulates the group *as if* it were a free-group generated by two base-points G and X (corresponding to the group-generator and ECDSA public key, respectively). Since the simulated (free) group is indistinguishable from a generic group, it follows that any forgery exploits a weakness in the hash-function, which we rule out by assumption.

1.2.7 Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge

Our protocol makes extensive use of Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge (NIZK) via the standard technique of compiling three-move zero-knowledge protocols (also known as Σ -protocols) with the Fiat-Shamir transform (FS), i.e. the Verifier’s messages are computed by the Prover himself by invoking a predetermined hash function.

In the random-oracle model, the Fiat-Shamir transform gives rise to NIZK proof-systems. Furthermore, because we completely avoid the need for “online extraction” (c.f. Section 1.2.6), our use of the Fiat-Shamir transform *does not* interfere with universal composability, and our protocol is UC as described.

We conclude the overview of our techniques by presenting a vanilla version of the (interactive) zero-knowledge technique we employ. The technique is somewhat standard [3, 7, 8, 31, 49]; we spell it out here for convenience. However, the analysis is somewhat complicated, and it is not crucial for understanding our threshold signature protocol. Thus the present section may be skipped, if so desired.

Paillier & Strong-RSA. We recall that Paillier ciphertexts have the form $C = (1 + N)^{xr^N} \pmod{N^2}$, where N denotes the public key, $x \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ the plaintext, and r is a random element of \mathbb{Z}_N^* . We further recall the strong-RSA assumption: for an RSA modulus N of unknown factorization, for uniformly random $y \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, it is infeasible to find (x, e) such that $e > 1$ and $x^e = y \pmod{N}$. Finally, before we describe the zero-knowledge technique, we (informally) define ring-Pedersen commitments.¹¹

Definition 1.3 (Ring-Pedersen – Informal). Let N be an RSA modulus and let $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ be non-trivial quadratic residues. A ring-Pedersen commitment of $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$ with public parameters (N, s, t) is computed as $C = s^m t^\rho \pmod{N}$ where $\rho \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$.

Vanilla ZK Range-Proof. Consider the following relation:

$$R = \{(C_0, N_0, C_1, N_1, s, t; \alpha, \beta, r) \mid C_0 = (1 + N_0)^{\alpha} r^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2} \\ \wedge C_1 = s^{\alpha} t^{\beta} \pmod{N_1} \wedge \alpha \in \pm 2^\ell\}.$$

In words, the Prover must show that the Paillier plaintext of C_0 is equal to the hidden value in the ring-Pedersen commitment C_1 , and that it lies in the range $\pm 2^\ell = [-2^\ell, +2^\ell]$ where $2^\ell \ll N_0, N_1$. It is assumed that the Paillier modulus N_0 was generated by the Prover and the ring-Pedersen parameters (N_1, s, t) were generated by the Verifier. We further assume that N_0 and N_1 were generated as products of suitable¹² primes and that s and t are non-trivial quadratic residues in $\mathbb{Z}_{N_1}^*$. This assumption does not incur loss of generality, since in the actual protocol we instruct the parties to prove in zero-knowledge that all the parameters were generated correctly.¹³

We now turn to the description of the ZK-proof for the relation R under its interactive variant (the actual proof is compiled to be non-interactive using the Fiat-Shamir transform). We perform a Schnorr-type proof as follows: the Prover encrypts a random value γ as $D_0 = (1 + N_0)^\gamma \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$ for suitable random ρ , computes a ring-Pedersen commitment $D_1 = s^\gamma t^\delta \pmod{N_1}$ to γ for suitable random δ , and sends (D_0, D_1) to the Verifier. The Verifier then replies with a challenge $e \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell$ and the Prover solves the challenge by sending $z_1 = \gamma + e\alpha$. The Verifier accepts only if z_1 is in a suitable range and passes two equality checks (one

¹⁰To be more precise, we show that any generic forger finds x, y such that $\mathcal{H}(x)/\mathcal{H}(y) = e$, for a random $e \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$, where \mathcal{H} denotes the hash-function. We conjecture that the latter is hard also for the actual implementation of ECDSA involving SHA.

¹¹We use the prefix “ring” to distinguish between “group” Pedersen commitments which reside in groups of known order.

¹² N_0 and N_1 should be bi-primes obtained as products of safe primes.

¹³In reality, for efficiency reasons, we prove much weaker statements that are sufficient for our purposes.

for the encryption and one for the commitment). Intuitively, the Prover cannot fool the Verifier because “the only way” for the Prover to cheat is knowing the order of $\mathbb{Z}_{N_1}^*$, which was secretly generated by the Verifier and therefore would violate the strong-RSA assumption. In more detail:

1. The Prover computes $D_0 = (1 + N_0)^\gamma \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$ and $D_1 = s^\gamma t^\delta \pmod{N_1}$, for random elements $\gamma \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$, $\delta \leftarrow \pm N_1 \cdot 2^\varepsilon$ and $\rho \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_0}^*$, and sends (D_0, D_1) to the Verifier.
2. The Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell$.
3. The Prover computes

$$\begin{cases} z_1 &= \gamma + e\alpha \\ z_2 &= \delta + e\beta \\ w &= \rho \cdot r^e \pmod{N_0} \end{cases}$$

and sends (z_1, z_2) to the Verifier.

- **Verification:** Accept if the $z_1 \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$ and $(1 + N_0)^{z_1} w^N = C_0^e \cdot D_0 \pmod{N_0^2}$ and $s^{z_1} t^{z_2} = C_1^e \cdot D_1 \pmod{N_1}$.

We remark that there is a discrepancy between the range-check of z_1 and the desired range by a (multiplicative factor) of 2^ε , referred to as the slackness-parameter; this is a feature of the proof since the range of α is only guaranteed within that slackness-parameter. We now turn to the analysis of the ZK-proof (completeness, honest verifier zero-knowledge & soundness).

It is straightforward to show that the above protocol satisfies completeness and (honest-verifier) zero-knowledge with some statistical error. The hard task is showing soundness [8, 31, 49]. Following the standard paradigm, we show special soundness by extracting the secrets from two accepting transcripts of the form $(D_0, D_1, e, z_1, z_2, w)$ and $(D_0, D_1, e', z'_1, z'_2, w')$ such that $e \neq e'$. Let $\Delta_e, \Delta_{z_1}, \Delta_{z_2}$ denote the relevant differences. We observe that if Δ_e divides Δ_{z_1} and Δ_{z_2} (in the integers), then all the values can be extracted without issue as follows: α and β are set to $\Delta_{z_1}/\Delta_e \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$ and Δ_{z_2}/Δ_e , respectively, and ρ can be extracted from the equality $(w \cdot w'^{-1})^N = (C_0(1 + N_0)^{-\alpha})^{\Delta_e} \pmod{N_0^2}$ (which allows to compute a Δ_e -th root of w/w' modulo N_0 c.f. Fact E.2). Thus, the soundness-proof boils down to showing that Δ_e divides both Δ_{z_1} and Δ_{z_2} , *unless the strong-RSA problem is tractable*. Namely, there exists an algorithm \mathcal{S} with black-box access to the Prover that can solve the strong-RSA challenge t (the second ring-Pedersen parameter).¹⁴

To elaborate further, it is assumed that \mathcal{S} knows λ such that $t^\lambda = s \pmod{N_1}$ and that λ is sampled from $[N_1^2]$ (and not just $[N_1]$). Thus, without getting too deep into the details, if $\Delta_e \nmid \Delta_{\mathbf{z}} = \lambda \Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_2}$, then \mathcal{S} can solve the strong-RSA challenge by computing Euclid’s extended algorithm on Δ_e and $\Delta_{\mathbf{z}}$. On the other hand, if $\Delta_e \nmid \Delta_{z_1}$ or Δ_{z_2} , we claim that $\Delta_e \mid \Delta_{\mathbf{z}}$ with probability at most $1/2$. To see why, observe that there exists at least another $\lambda' \neq \lambda$ in $[N_1^2]$ such that $t^{\lambda'} = t^\lambda = s \pmod{N_1}$, because t has order $\phi(N_1)/4 = O(N_1)$ and λ was sampled uniformly in $[N_1^2]$. Since the Prover cannot distinguish between the two λ ’s (in a perfect information-theoretic sense), if $\Delta_e \nmid \Delta_{z_1}$ or Δ_{z_2} , then the probability that Δ_e divides $\lambda \Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_2}$ is at most $1/2$ (i.e. the Prover guessed correctly which of the λ ’s the algorithm \mathcal{S} knows).¹⁵ In conclusion, the probability that extraction fails is at most twice the probability of breaking strong-RSA, which is assumed to be negligible.

Removing the Computational Assumption in the ZK-Proof. We point at that there is a somewhat standard way [3, 4, 7] to tweak the above ZK-proof to obtain an unconditional extractor (that does not rely on strong-RSA or any other hardness assumption), at the expense of higher communication costs.¹⁶ Consider the relation

$$R = \{(C_0, N_0; \alpha, r) \mid C_0 = (1 + N_0)^\alpha r^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2} \wedge \alpha \in \pm 2^\ell\}.$$

Notice that it’s the same as the previous relation except that we got rid of the ring-Pedersen commitment. Then, by removing D_1 and z_2 from the protocol above, *and restricting* $e \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ (instead of $\pm 2^\ell$), we obtain a zero-knowledge proof of knowledge with unconditional extraction and soundness error $1/2$. Using the same notation as before, notice that the new protocol guarantees that Δ_e divides Δ_{z_1} since $\Delta_e \in \{-1, 1\}$, and thus

¹⁴Parameter t is not completely random in \mathbb{Z}_{N_1} since it’s a quadratic residue, but this does not affect the analysis.

¹⁵The argument is more subtle because we need to show that Δ_e cannot divide both values simultaneously (see Section 6.1).

¹⁶A similar trick in a different context appears in Lindell [45], from Boudot [3] and Brickell et al. [4]

divisibility is guaranteed without any hardness assumption. On the downside, a malicious Prover may always cheat with probability $1/2$ and thus the protocol must be repeated to achieve satisfactory soundness. Since the protocol involves Paillier operations, this would incur a rather expensive (super-logarithmic) blowup factor of the proof size.

1.2.8 Extension to t -out-of- n Access Structure

In this work we mainly focus on n -out-of- n multi-party signing, and do not explicitly consider the more general t -out-of- n threshold signing for $t < n$. Such a protocol can be derived almost immediately from our protocol herein for the online variant using Shamir secret-sharing, with relevant changes to the protocol’s components, similarly to Gennaro and Goldfeder [32].

The same technique can also be applied for the non-interactive variant, but special care must be taken regarding the preprocessed data that the parties store in memory. Specifically, each distinct set of “authorized” parties (of size at least t) should generate fresh independent preprocessed data. A party taking part in different authorized sets must *not* use the same preprocessed data between the sets. We stress that signing two distinct messages using dependant shared preprocessed data can enable an attack revealing the private key.

1.3 Additional Related Work

Threshold ECDSA. All recent protocols for threshold ECDSA follow (variants) of the blueprint described in Section 1.2.1 where the parties locally generate shares $k_1^* \dots k_n^*$ of k [48, 29] or k^{-1} [32, 22] and then jointly compute $r = g^{k^{-1}}|_{x\text{-axis}}$ and shares of $k(m + rx)$ via a pairwise-multiplication protocol in combination with the masking technique described at the beginning of the present section. Furthermore, all protocols take a somewhat optimistic approach, where the correctness of the computed values in the multiplication is verified only after the computation takes place; this is the main source of the round-complexity cost.

Security-wise, as mentioned previously, Gennaro and Goldfeder [32] show that their protocol satisfies a game-based definition of security (i.e. unforgeability of their protocol) under standard assumptions (DDH, CDR, strong-RSA, ECDSA). The protocol of Castagnos et al. [22] follows the same template, except that it replaces Paillier with an encryption scheme based on class groups [21]. Specifically, they show that their scheme is unforgeable assuming DDH and additional assumptions on class groups of imaginary quadratic fields, specifically hard subgroup membership, low-order assumption and strong root.¹⁷

Lindell et al. [48] and Doerner et al. [29] show secure-function evaluation of the ECDSA functionality and prove that their respective protocols UC-realize said functionality in a hybrid model with ideal commitment and zero-knowledge, assuming DDH. However, as pointed out by the authors themselves, the practical subroutines they recommend to replace the ideal calls do not preserve Universal Composability (even in the ROM). We stress that our protocol satisfies Universal Composability *as is* (albeit in the Random Oracle model).

Concurrent Work. We discuss the contemporaneous works of Damgård et al. [25] and Gagol and Straszak [40]. In [25], the authors consider threshold ECDSA in the *honest-majority* setting and they design a protocol based on the earlier honest-majority protocol of Gennaro et al. [35]. The authors show that their protocol is UC-secure with abort and they also show how to bootstrap their protocol to achieve fairness. The authors also mention a non-interactive variant of their protocol by pre-processing all-but-one of the rounds, however no security analysis is provided for the latter.

In [40], motivated by the application of MPC wallets with *large* number of signers, the authors design a protocol based on [48] that also supports robustness in the form of identifiable abort by augmenting the protocol with additional ZK-proofs, and they show that their protocol is secure in a hybrid model with ideal commitments and zero-knowledge in the standalone (non-UC) setting. We stress that neither [25], nor [40] support proactive refreshment of the keys, and these protocols are not known to provide traditional threshold security against an adversary that corrupts parties adaptively as the system progresses.

Alternatives to Non-Interactive Signing. Recently there have been alternative proposals to achieve MPC signing with compatibility for offline devices (cold wallets), by building on top of the MPC system – rather than incorporating such a capability within the MPC system [46, 47]. In more detail, [46, 47] have two

¹⁷These assumptions may be viewed as analogues of CDR & strong-RSA for class groups.

types of trustees: signing trustees and decrypting trustees. The signing trustees are instructed to (jointly) compute an *encrypted* signature that is later forwarded to the decrypting trustees who jointly decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the signature. While the communication between the signers and the decryptors is indeed only unidirectional, the overall process of signature generation is still slowed down by potentially significant interaction. Furthermore, as soon as all signers are corrupted they can generate signatures on their own, without the participation of any of the decryptors.

Bootstrapping authentication for proactive security. Kondi et al. [43] consider the case where some signatories remain offline during a proactive refreshment phase, and furthermore do not have reliable authenticated communication with the other signatories when they get back online. (Indeed, in the context of cryptocurrency custody, it may be desirable for offline “cold” wallets to participate in the refreshment at their own pace, which, in turn, may open the door to attacks.) They show how such a late signatory can regain authenticated communication with the rest of the system by way of using the blockchain itself as a means to authenticate the public keys of the other signatories. This solution can be seen as a way to use the blockchain as a way to implement the persistent threshold signature scheme in the Canetti et al. [15] solution.

2 Preliminaries

Notation. Throughout the paper \mathbb{G} denotes a group of prime order q , and \mathbb{F}_q the finite field with q elements. We let \mathbb{Z}, \mathbb{N} denote the set of integers and natural number, respectively. We use sans-serif letters ($\text{enc}, \text{dec}, \dots$) or calligraphic ($\mathcal{S}, \mathcal{A}, \dots$) to denote algorithms. Secret values are always denoted with lower case letters (p, q, \dots) and public values are *usually* denoted with upper case letters (A, B, N, \dots). Furthermore, for a tuple of both public and secret values, e.g. an RSA modulus and its factors (N, p, q) , we use a semi-colon to differentiate public from secret values (so we write $(N; p, q)$ instead of (N, p, q)). For $t \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, we write $\langle t \rangle = \{t^k \bmod N \mid k \in \mathbb{Z}\}$ for the multiplicative group generated by t . For $\ell \in \mathbb{Z}$, we let $\pm\ell$ denote the interval of integers $\{-|\ell|, \dots, 0, \dots, |\ell|\}$. We write $x \leftarrow X$ for sampling x uniformly from a set X (or according to the distribution X). Finally, let $\text{gcd} : \mathbb{N}^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ and $\phi : \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \mathbb{N}$ denote the gcd operation and Euler’s phi function, respectively.

2.1 Definitions

Definition 2.1. We say that $N \in \mathbb{N}$ is a Paillier-Blum integer iff $\text{gcd}(N, \phi(N)) = 1$ and $N = pq$ where p, q are primes such that $p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$.

Definition 2.2 (Paillier Encryption). Define the Paillier cryptosystem as the three tuple ($\text{gen}, \text{enc}, \text{dec}$) below.

1. Let $(N; p, q) \leftarrow \text{gen}(1^\kappa)$ where p and q are $\kappa/2$ -long primes and $N = pq$. Write $\text{pk} = N$ and $\text{sk} = (p, q)$.
2. For $m \in \mathbb{Z}_N$, let $\text{enc}_{\text{pk}}(m; \rho) = (1 + N)^m \cdot \rho^N \bmod N^2$, where $\rho \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.
3. For $c \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$, letting $\mu = \phi(N)^{-1} \bmod N$,

$$\text{dec}_{\text{sk}}(c) = \left(\frac{[c^{\phi(N)} \bmod N^2] - 1}{N} \right) \cdot \mu \bmod N.$$

Definition 2.3 (ECDSA). Let (\mathbb{G}, g, q) denote the group-generator-order tuple associated with a given curve. We recall that elements in \mathbb{G} are represented as pairs $a = (a_x, a_y)$, where the a_x and a_y are referred to as the projection of a on the x -axis and y -axis respectively, denoted $a_x = a|_{x\text{-axis}}$ and $a_y = a|_{y\text{-axis}}$, respectively. The security parameter below is implicitly set to $\kappa = \log(q)$.

Parameters: Group-generator-order tuple (\mathbb{G}, g, q) and hash function $\mathcal{H} : \mathbf{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$.

1. $(X; x) \leftarrow \text{gen}(\mathbb{G}, g, q)$ such that $x \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $X = g^x$.
2. For $\text{msg} \in \mathbf{M}$, let $\text{sign}_x(m; k) = (r, k(m + rx)) \in \mathbb{F}_q^2$, where $k \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $m = \mathcal{H}(\text{msg})$ and $r = g^{k-1}|_{x\text{-axis}} \bmod q$.
3. For $(r, \sigma) \in \mathbb{F}_q^2$, define $\text{vrfy}_X(m, \sigma) = 1$ iff $r = (g^m \cdot X^\sigma)^{\sigma^{-1}}|_{x\text{-axis}} \bmod q$.

2.2 NP-relations

Schnorr. For parameters (\mathbb{G}, g) consisting of element g in group \mathbb{G} , the following relation verifies that the prover knows the exponent of the group-element X . For PUB_0 of the form (\mathbb{G}, g) , define

$$R_{\text{sch}} = \{(\text{PUB}_0, X; x) \mid X = g^x\}.$$

Dlog with El-Gamal Commitment. For public parameter (\mathbb{G}, g) , the following relation verifies that the discrete log of Y base h is equal to the discrete log base g of the El-Gamal plaintext associated with ciphertext (L, M) and public key X . Define

$$R_{\text{elog}} = \{(L, M, h, X; y, \lambda) \mid L = g^\lambda \wedge M = g^y X^\lambda \wedge Y = h^y\}.$$

Paillier Encryption in Range. For Paillier public key N_0 , the following relation verifies that the plaintext value of Paillier ciphertext C is in a desired range \mathcal{I} . Define

$$R_{\text{enc}} = \{(N_0, \mathcal{I}, C; x, \rho) \mid x \in \mathcal{I} \wedge C = (1 + N_0)^x \rho^{N_0} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0^2}^*\}.$$

Paillier Encryption in Range with El-Gamal Commitment. For parameters (\mathbb{G}, g, N) consisting of element g and in group \mathbb{G} and Paillier public key N , the following relation verifies that the plaintext value of Paillier ciphertext C is equal to the secret value of El-Gamal commitment $(A, Y, X) \in \mathbb{G}^3$ in range \mathcal{I} . Define

$$R_{\text{enc-elg}} = \{(N_0, \mathcal{I}, C, A, Y, X; x, \rho, a) \mid x \in \mathcal{I} \wedge C = (1 + N_0)^x \rho^{N_0} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0^2}^* \wedge A = g^a \wedge X = g^x \cdot Y^a\}.$$

Dlog vs Paillier Encryption in Range. For parameters (\mathbb{G}, N) consisting of group \mathbb{G} and Paillier-Blum Modulus N , the following relation verifies that the discrete logarithm of X base g is equal to the plaintext value of C and is in range \mathcal{I} . For PUB_1 of the form (\mathbb{G}, N) , define

$$R_{\text{log}*} = \{(\text{PUB}_1, \mathcal{I}, C, X, g; x, \rho) \mid x \in \mathcal{I} \\ \wedge C = (1 + N)^x \rho^N \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^* \wedge X = g^x\}$$

Paillier Affine Operation with Group Commitment in Range. For parameters $(\mathbb{G}, g, N_0, N_1)$ consisting of element g and in group \mathbb{G} and Paillier public keys N_0, N_1 , the following relation verifies that a Paillier ciphertext $C \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0^2}^*$ was obtained as an affine-like transformation on C_0 such that the multiplicative coefficient (i.e. ε) is equal to the exponent of $X \in \mathbb{G}$ in the range \mathcal{I} , and the additive coefficient (i.e. δ) is equal to the plaintext-value of $Y \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_1}$ and resides in the the range \mathcal{J} . For PUB_2 of the form $(\mathbb{G}, g, N_0, N_1)$, define $R_{\text{aff-g}}$ to be all tuples $(\text{PUB}_2, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{J}, C, C_0, Y, X; \varepsilon, \delta, r, \rho)$ such that

$$(\varepsilon, \delta) \in \mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{J} \wedge C = C_0^\varepsilon \cdot (1 + N_0)^\delta r^{N_0} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0^2}^* \\ \wedge Y = (1 + N_1)^\delta \rho^{N_1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_1^2}^* \wedge X = g^\varepsilon \in \mathbb{G}$$

Paillier Affine Operation with Paillier Commitment in Range. This is a variant of the previous relation, the only difference is that now ε is equal to the plaintext-value of $X \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_1^2}^*$ (rather than the exponent of $X \in \mathbb{G}$, as before). For PUB_3 of the form (N_0, N_1) , define $R_{\text{aff-p}}$ to be all tuples $(\text{PUB}_3, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{J}, C, C_0, Y, X; \varepsilon, \delta, r, \rho, \mu)$ such that

$$(\varepsilon, \delta) \in \mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{J} \wedge C = C_0^\varepsilon \cdot (1 + N_0)^\delta r^{N_0} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0^2}^* \\ \wedge Y = (1 + N_1)^\delta \rho^{N_1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_1^2}^* \wedge X = (1 + N_1)^\varepsilon \mu^{N_1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_1^2}^*$$

2.2.1 Auxiliary Relations

Paillier-Blum Modulus. The following relation verifies that a modulus N is coprime with $\phi(N)$ and is the product of exactly two suitable odd primes, where $\phi(\cdot)$ is the Euler function.

$$R_{\text{mod}} = \{(N; p, q) \mid \text{PRIMES} \ni p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4} \\ \wedge N = pq \wedge \gcd(N, \phi(N)) = 1\}.$$

No Small Factor Modulus. For parameter ℓ , the following relation verifies that a modulus N can be factored into two numbers greater than 2^ℓ .

$$R_{\text{fac}} = \{(\ell, N; p, q) \mid N = pq \wedge p, q > 2^\ell\}.$$

Ring-Pedersen Parameters. The following relation verifies that an element $s \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ belongs to the (multiplicative) group generated by $t \in \mathbb{Z}_N$.

$$R_{\text{prm}} = \{(N, s, t; \lambda) \mid s = t^\lambda \pmod{N}\}.$$

2.2.2 Relations for ID-Processes of Corrupted Parties

Dlog Equality. For public parameter (\mathbb{G}, g) , the following relation verifies that the discrete log of Y base h is equal to the discrete log of X base g . For PUB_0 of the form (\mathbb{G}, g) , define, define

$$R_{\text{log}} = \{(\text{PUB}_0, X, h, Y; x) \mid X = g^x \wedge Y = h^x\}.$$

N -th Residues. For parameter N , the following relation verifies that r admits an N -th root modulo N^2 . Alternatively, in the context of Paillier, the relation states that r is an encryption of zero for Paillier public key N .

$$R_{\text{nth}} = \{(N, r; \rho) \mid r = \rho^N \pmod{N^2}\}.$$

Paillier Decryption modulo q . For Paillier public key N_0 and prime q , the following relation verifies that the plaintext-value of Paillier ciphertext C is equal to x modulo q . Define

$$R_{\text{dec}} = \{(N_0, q, C, x; y, \rho) \mid x = y \pmod{q} \wedge C = (1 + N_0)^y \cdot \rho_0^N \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0^2}^*\}.$$

Paillier Multiplication. For Paillier public key N_0 , the following relation verifies that the plaintext-value of Paillier ciphertext D is equal to the multiplication of the plaintext-values of C_1 and C_2 . Define R_{mul} to consist of all tuples $(N_0, D, C_1, C_2, x, r, \rho)$ such that

$$C_1 = (1 + N_0)^x r^{N_0} \pmod{N_0} \wedge D = C_2^x \cdot \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$$

Multiplication Paillier vs Group Commitment. For parameters (\mathbb{G}, g, N_0) consisting of element g and in group \mathbb{G} and Paillier public key N_0 , the following relation verifies that a Paillier ciphertext $C \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0^2}^*$ hides the plaintext value of C_0 multiplied by the exponent of $X \in \mathbb{G}$ (which lies in the range \mathcal{I}). For PUB_2 of the form (\mathbb{G}, g, N_0) , define R_{mul^*} to be all tuples $(\text{PUB}_2, \mathcal{I}, C, C_0, X; x, r, \rho)$ such that

$$x \in \mathcal{I} \wedge C = C_0^x \cdot r^{N_0} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0^2}^* \wedge X = g^x \in \mathbb{G}$$

Remark 2.4. In what follows, to alleviate notation when no confusion arises, we omit writing the public parameters described by PUB_* .

2.3 Sigma-Protocols

In this section we define zero-knowledge protocols with focus on interactive three-move protocols, known as Σ -protocols. In Section 2.3.1, we compile these protocols using the random oracle via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic to generate (non-interactive) proofs. We define two notions of Σ -protocols. The first one is “non-extractable” zero-knowledge with standard soundness, i.e. for relation R and x such that there *does not* exist w satisfying $(x, w) \in R$, the probability that a cheating Prover convinces the Verifier that x satisfies the relation is negligible. The second definition augments the soundness property to enable extraction from two suitable accepting transcripts; the latter property is known as special soundness.

Definition 2.5. A Σ -protocol Π for relation R is a tuple (P_1, P_2, V_1, V_2) of PPT algorithms such that

- P_1 takes input $\kappa = |x|$ and random input τ and outputs A , and V_1 outputs its random input e .
- P_2 takes input (x, w, τ, e) and outputs z , and V_2 takes input (x, A, e, z) and (deterministically) outputs a bit b .

Security properties:

- *Completeness.* If $(x, w) \in R$ then with overwhelming probability over the choice of $e \leftarrow V_1$ (as a function of $|x|$), for every $A \leftarrow P_1(\tau)$ and $z \leftarrow P_2(x, w, \tau, e)$, it holds that $V_2(x, A, e, z) = 1$.
- *Soundness.* If x is false with respect to R (i.e. $(x, w) \notin R$ for all w), then for any PPT algorithm P^* and every A , the following holds with overwhelming probability over $e \leftarrow V_1$ (as a function of κ): If $z \leftarrow P^*(x, A, e)$ then $V_2(x, A, e, z) = 0$.
- *HVZK.* There exists a simulator \mathcal{S} such that $(A, e, z) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(x)$ it holds and $V_2(x, A, e, z) = 1$ for every x , with overwhelming probability over the random coins of \mathcal{S} . Furthermore, the following distributions are statistically indistinguishable. For $(x, w) \in R$:
 - * (A, e, z) where $e \leftarrow V_1$ and $A \leftarrow P_1(x, w, \tau)$, and $z = P_2(x, w, \tau, e)$.
 - * (A, e, z) where $e \leftarrow V_1$ and $(A, z) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}(x, e)$.

We use Σ -protocols to prove that the Paillier-Blum modulus is well-formed (R_{mod}) and that the ring-Pedersen Parameters are suitable (R_{prm}), we denote these Σ -protocols Π^{mod} and Π^{prm} , respectively. Note that for Π^{mod} the first message A is empty, so we can assume that A is some constant default string.

Definition 2.6. A Σ -protocol Π_σ with setup σ and special soundness for relation R is a tuple (S, P_1, P_2, V_1, V_2) of PPT algorithms satisfying the same functionalities and security properties of the Σ -protocol definition (w/o setup and special soundness), with the following changes:

1. Setup algorithm S initially generates σ which is a common input to all other algorithms.
2. Soundness property is replaced with:
 - *Special Soundness.* There exists an efficient extractor \mathcal{E} such that for any x and P^* the following holds with overwhelming probability (over the choice of $\sigma \leftarrow S$): If $(A, e, z), (A, e', z') \leftarrow P^*(x, w, \sigma)$ such that $V_2(x, A, e, z) = V_2(x, A, e', z') = 1$ and $e \neq e'$, then for $w' \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(x, A, e, e', z, z')$ it holds that $(x, w') \in R$.

We remark that the Schnorr proof of knowledge (c.f. Appendix C.1) is a Σ -protocol with special soundness that does not take any setup parameter, and we denote the protocol Π^{sch} (note σ is omitted). By contrast, our protocols for $R_{\text{enc}}, R_{\text{log}^*}, R_{\text{aff-g}}$ and $R_{\text{aff-p}}$ (i.e. the range proofs) require a setup parameter in the form of an RSA modulus N and ring-Pedersen parameters $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$, and we denote the respective protocols as $\Pi_\sigma^{\text{enc}}, \Pi_\sigma^{\text{log}^*}, \Pi_\sigma^{\text{aff-g}}$ and $\Pi_\sigma^{\text{aff-p}}$, respectively. However, our threshold signature protocol does not assume any trusted setup, and in reality the setup parameter is generated by the parties themselves (a different one for each party). We expand on this point next.

Generating the Setup Parameter for the Range Proofs. Looking ahead to the security analysis of our threshold signature protocol, we stress that although the above definition prescribes a trusted setup for $\sigma = (N, s, t)$, in actuality the setup parameter is generated by the Verifier (the intended recipient of the proof) and is accompanied by a ZK-proof that N is well formed (using Π^{mod} and the compiler below) and that $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ are suitable (using Π^{prm} and the compiler below). In particular, the Prover generates distinct proofs (one for each Verifier using its personal σ) to prove the same statement x to multiple verifying parties.

Notation 2.7. In the sequel, we incorporate the setup parameter σ in the protocol description, and we write Π_j^* for the corresponding protocol using \mathcal{P}_j 's setup parameter (acting as the Verifier), for $*$ \in $\{\text{enc}, \text{log}^*, \text{aff-g}, \text{aff-p}\}$, and we omit mentioning the “trusted” algorithm S .

2.3.1 ZK-Module

Next, we present how to compile the protocols above using a random oracle via the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Namely, to generate a proof, the Prover computes the challenge e by querying the oracle on a suitable input, which incorporates the theorem and the first message. Then, the Prover completes the transcript by computing the last message with respect to e and communicates the entire transcript as the proof. Later, the Verifier accepts the proof if it is a valid transcript of the underlying Σ -protocol and e is well-formed (verified by querying the oracle as the Prover should have).

Formally, we define the compiler via the ZK-Module from Figure 2. Notice that on top of the standard prove/verify operations, the ZK-module contains a commit operation for generating the first message $A \leftarrow P_1$ of the ZK-Proof. This will be useful for the signature protocol later, and specifically for the security analysis that requires extraction, because we force the adversary to commit to the first message of the (future) proof. The properties of completeness, zero-knowledge, soundness and special soundness are analogously defined for the resulting proof system.

Notation 2.8. Sometimes we omit writing the randomness τ in the tuple $(\text{prove}, \Pi, \text{aux}, x; w, \tau)$, indicating that fresh randomness is sampled.

FIGURE 2 (ZK-Module \mathcal{M} for Σ -protocols)

Parameter: Hash Function $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^h$.

- On input $(\text{com}, \Pi, 1^\kappa)$, interpret $\Pi = (P_1, \dots)$:
sample τ from the prescribed domain, compute $A = P_1(\tau, 1^\kappa)$ and output $(A; \tau)$.
- On input $(\text{prove}, \Pi, \text{aux}, x; w, \tau)$, interpret $\Pi = (P_1, P_2, \dots)$:
compute $A = P_1(\tau)$ and $e = \mathcal{H}(\text{aux}, x, A)$ and $z = P_2(x, w, \tau, e)$ and output (A, e, z) .
- On input $(\text{vrfy}, \Pi, \text{aux}, x, \psi)$, interpret $\Pi = (\dots, V_2)$ and $\psi = (A, e', z)$:
output 1 if $V_2(x, A, e', z) = 1$ and $e' = \mathcal{H}(\text{aux}, x, A)$, and 0 otherwise.

Figure 2: ZK-Module \mathcal{M} for Σ -protocols

3 Protocol Overview

Our ECDSA protocol consists of four phases; one phase for generating the (shared) key which is run once (Figure 5), one phase to refresh the secret key-shares and to generate the auxiliary information required for signing (Figure 6), i.e. Paillier keys, ring-Pedersen parameters, etc., one to preprocess signatures before the messages are known (Figure 7), and, finally, one for calculating and communicating the signature-shares once the message to be signed is known (Figure 8).

We present two variants for our protocol which are distinguished (mostly) by the identification process to detect corrupted parties. We recall that we have two distinct processes for identifying corrupted parties; one that is less efficient in the identification process – $O(n^2)$ costs – but achieves presigning in three rounds, and one that is more efficient in the identification process – $O(n)$ costs – but incurs three extra rounds of presigning. Both variants of our protocol further support two distinct modes of operation depending on whether signature generation is performed non-interactively or fully online. The fully online mode of operation of the protocol is described in Figure 3 while the non-interactive mode of operation is described in Figure 4.

The protocols from Figures 3 and 4 are different only in how the aforementioned components are combined. Namely, for the online mode of operation, the parties are instructed to run (sequentially) the presigning and signing phases every time a new signature is requested for some message known to all parties. For the offline mode of operation, the presigning phase is ran ahead of time, before the message is known. Finally, for both modes of operation, the key generation is executed upon activation, and the auxiliary info and key-refresh phase is executed according to the key-refresh schedule.

Remark 3.1. Our protocol is parametrized by a hash function \mathcal{H} , which is invoked to obtain a hash-values in domains of different length (e.g the finite field with q elements or an ℓ -size stream of bits). Formally, this is captured by introducing multiple hash functions of varying length. However, to alleviate notation, we simply write \mathcal{H} for each (separate) hash function.

FIGURE 3 (Threshold ECDSA: Online Signing)

- **Key-Generation:** Upon activation on input (**keygen**, sid, i) from \mathcal{P}_i do:
 1. Run the key generation phase from Figure 5 and obtain (rid, \mathbf{X}, x_i) .
 2. Run the auxiliary info. phase from Figure 6 on input (**aux-info**, sid, rid, \mathbf{X}, i) and do:
 - When obtaining output $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$ and (x_i, y_i, p_i, q_i) , set $ssid = (sid, rid, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$
- **Signing:** On input (**sign**, $ssid, \ell, i, msg$) from \mathcal{P}_i , do:
 1. Run the pre-signing phase from Figure 9 (resp. Figure 7) on input (**pre-sign**, $ssid, 0, i$).
 2. Set $m = \mathcal{H}(msg)$ and run the signing phase from Figure 13 (resp. Figure 8) on input (**sign**, $ssid, 0, i, m$).
 - When obtaining output standby.
- **Key-Refresh:** On input (**key-refresh**, sid, rid, \mathbf{X}, i) from \mathcal{P}_i ,
 1. Run the auxiliary info. phase from Figure 6 on input (**aux-info**, sid, rid, \mathbf{X}, i).
 2. Upon obtaining output $(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$ and (x_i, y_i, p_i, q_i) , do:
 - Erase all pre-signing and auxiliary info of the form (sid, \dots) .
 - Reset $ssid = (sid, rid, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$ and standby.

Figure 3: Threshold ECDSA: Online Signing

FIGURE 4 (Threshold ECDSA: Non-Interactive Signing)

- **Key-Generation:** Same as in Figure 3.
- **Pre-Signing:** On input (**pre-sign**, $ssid, L, i$) from \mathcal{P}_i , do:
 1. Erase all pre-signing data (sid, \dots) .
 2. Run the pre-signing phase from Figure 9 (resp. Figure 7) concurrently on inputs $\{(\mathbf{pre-sign}, ssid, \ell, i)\}_{\ell \in [L]}$
 - When obtaining output standby.
- **Signing:** On input (**sign**, $ssid, \ell, i, msg$) from \mathcal{P}_i , set $m = \mathcal{H}(msg)$ and do:

Run the signing phase from Figure 13 (resp. Figure 8) on input (**sign**, $ssid, \ell, i, m$).

 - When obtaining output standby.
- **Key-Refresh:** Same as in Figure 3.

Figure 4: Threshold ECDSA: Non-Interactive Signing

3.1 Key Generation

Next, we describe the key-generation phase. At its core, the key-generation consists of each party $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathcal{P}$ sampling $x_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and sending the public-key share $X_i = g^{x_i}$ to all other parties, together with a Schnorr proof of knowledge of the exponent. The public key is then set to $X = \prod_j X_j$. For malicious security, we instruct the parties to commit (using the oracle) to their public-key share X_i as well as the first message A_i of the Schnorr proof. Thus, the adversary cannot influence the distribution of the private-key by choosing an X as a function of the honest parties' public key shares, and the adversary is committed to the first message of the Schnorr proof (i.e. A_i), which will be used to extract the witness later in the reduction.

Upon obtaining all the relevant values, if no inconsistencies were detected, set $X = \prod_j X_j$ and store the secret key-share x_i as well as the public key-shares $\mathbf{X} = (X_1, \dots, X_n)$. For full details see Figure 5.

Remark 3.2. We observe that the protocol instructs the parties to (verifiably) broadcast some of their messages (as opposed to messages which are “sent to all”, where equality verification is not required). For non-unanimous halting [39], this can be achieved in a point-to-point network using echo-broadcasting with one extra round of communication.




Figure 5: ECDSA Key-Generation

3.2 Key-Refresh & Auxiliary Information

At a very high-level, the auxiliary info. and key-refresh phase proceeds as follows. Each party \mathcal{P}_i samples a Paillier modulus N_i obtained as a product of safe-primes, as well as ring-Pedersen parameters (s_i, t_i) . Then, \mathcal{P}_i samples a secret sharing (x_i^1, \dots, x_i^n) of $0 \in \mathbb{F}_q$, computes $\mathbf{X}_i = (X_i^1 = g^{x_i^1}, \dots, X_i^n = g^{x_i^n})$, and broadcasts $\mathbf{X}_i, N_i, s_i, t_i$ to all. After receiving all the relevant values, party \mathcal{P}_i encrypts each x_i^k under \mathcal{P}_k 's Paillier public key N_k and obtains ciphertexts C_i^k , for all $k \neq i$, which he sends to all parties.

Then, each \mathcal{P}_i refreshes to a new private key-shares $x_i^* = x_i + \sum_\ell x_\ell^i \pmod q$, updates public key-shares of all parties $X_j^* = X_j \cdot \prod_\ell X_\ell^j$, and stores new $(N_1, s_1, t_1), \dots, (N_n, s_n, t_n)$. Concurrently, each \mathcal{P}_i (locally) samples $y_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and communicates the value $Y_i = g^{y_i}$; we refer to as \mathcal{P}_i 's El-Gamal key, and it plays a crucial role in the six-round version of our presigning phase (it is redundant for the three-round version), c.f. Section 5.

For malicious security, the aforementioned process is augmented with the following ZKP's:

- (a) N_i is a Paillier-Blum Modulus and it does not admit small factors.

- (b) N_i can be factored into two factors no larger than $\sqrt{N} \cdot 2^{\ell+\epsilon}$.
- (c) ZK-Proof that s_i belongs to the multiplicative group generated by t_i in $\mathbb{Z}_{N_i}^*$.
- (d) Schnorr PoK for the discrete logarithms of X_i^1, \dots, X_i^n and Y_i .
- (e) Verify that the plaintext value of C_j^i is equal to the discrete logarithm of X_j^i , for all $j \neq i$.

Looking ahead to the security analysis, we point that our simulator extracts the Paillier keys of the malicious parties in Item (a) and the discrete logarithms of X_i^1, \dots, X_i^n and Y_i are extracted by rewinding the adversary. The steps described above are interleaved to obtain the three-round protocol from Figure 6.

4 Three-Round Presigning w/ $O(n^2)$ Identification Cost

4.1 Presigning

Next we present the presigning phase (Figure 7). Recall that at the end of the aux-info. phase, each party \mathcal{P}_i has a Paillier encryption scheme $(\text{enc}_i, \text{dec}_i)$ with public key N_i , as well as ring-Pedersen parameters $s_i, t_i \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_i}$. Further recall that a ECDSA signature has the form $(r = g^{k^{-1}}|_{x\text{-axis}}, \sigma = k(m + rx))$ where \mathcal{P}_i has an additive share x_i of x .

For comparison, we also recall that the gist of the G&G protocol [32]. The parties (jointly) compute a random point $g^{k^{-1}}$ together with local additive shares k_i, χ_i of k and $k \cdot x$, respectively. Further recall that $g^{k^{-1}}$ is obtained from $(g^\gamma)^{\delta^{-1}}$, for some jointly computed random value $\delta = k\gamma$, where γ is a (hidden) jointly generated mask for k . In more detail, the protocol proceeds as follows (each numbered item below denotes a round):

1. Each party \mathcal{P}_i generates local shares k_i and γ_i , computes Paillier encryptions $K_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i)$ and $G_i = \text{enc}_i(\gamma_i)$, under \mathcal{P}_i 's key, and broadcasts (K_i, G_i) .
2. For each $j \neq i$, party \mathcal{P}_i samples $\beta_{i,j}, \hat{\beta}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{J}_\epsilon$ and computes $D_{j,i} = \text{enc}_j(\gamma_i \cdot k_j - \beta_{i,j})$ and $\hat{D}_{j,i} = \text{enc}_j(x_i \cdot k_j - \hat{\beta}_{i,j})$ using the homomorphic properties of Paillier. Furthermore, \mathcal{P}_i encrypts $F_{j,i} = \text{enc}_i(\beta_{i,j})$, $\hat{F}_{j,i} = \text{enc}_i(\hat{\beta}_{i,j})$, sets $\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}$, and sends $(D_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i}, F_{j,i}, \hat{F}_{j,i})$ to all parties.
3. Each \mathcal{P}_i decrypts (and reduces modulo q) $\alpha_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(D_{i,j})$ and $\hat{\alpha}_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(\hat{D}_{i,j})$. and computes $\delta_i = \gamma_i \cdot k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \alpha_{i,j} + \beta_{i,j} \pmod q$, $\chi_i = x_i \cdot k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \hat{\alpha}_{i,j} + \hat{\beta}_{i,j} \pmod q$. Finally, \mathcal{P}_i sets $\Gamma = \prod_j \Gamma_j$, $\Delta_i = \Gamma^{k_i}$ and sends δ_i, Δ_i to all parties.

When obtaining all δ_j 's, party \mathcal{P}_i sets $\delta = \sum_j \delta_j \pmod q$ and verifies that $g^\delta = \prod_j \Delta_j$. If no inconsistencies are detected, \mathcal{P}_i sets $R = \Gamma^{\delta^{-1}}$ and stores (R, k_i, χ_i) . For malicious security, the aforementioned process is augmented with the following ZK-proofs:

- (a) The plaintext of K_i lies in range \mathcal{I}_ϵ .
- (b) The ciphertext $D_{j,i}$ was obtained as an affine-like operation on K_j where the multiplicative coefficient is equal to the exponent of Γ_i , and it lies in range \mathcal{I}_ϵ , and the additive coefficient is equal to hidden value of $F_{j,i}$, and lies in range \mathcal{J}_ϵ .
- (c) The ciphertext $\hat{D}_{j,i}$ was obtained as an affine operation on K_j where the multiplicative coefficient is equal to the exponent of X_i , and it lies in range \mathcal{I}_ϵ , and the additive coefficient is equal to hidden value of $\hat{F}_{j,i}$, and it lies in range \mathcal{J}_ϵ .
- (d) The exponent of Γ_i is equal to the plaintext-value of G_i .

Looking ahead to the security analysis, in order to simulate the protocol, it is enough to extract the k 's, γ 's, and β 's of the adversary. Since the aforementioned values are encrypted under the malicious parties' Paillier keys, and the Paillier keys were extracted in previous phase, we can extract the desired values without issue.

FIGURE 6 (Auxiliary Info. & Key Refresh in Three Rounds)

Round 1.

On input (**aux-info**, $ssid, i$) from \mathcal{P}_i , do:

- Sample two 4κ -bit long safe primes (p_i, q_i) . Set $N_i = p_i q_i$.
- Sample $y_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and set $Y_i = g^{y_i}$. Sample $(B_i, \tau) \leftarrow \mathcal{M}(\text{com}, \Pi^{\text{sch}})$.
- Sample $x_i^1, \dots, x_i^n \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ subject to $\sum_j x_i^j = 0$. Set $X_i^j = g^{x_i^j}$, $\mathbf{X}_i = (X_i^j)_j$, $\mathbf{x}_i = (x_i^j)_j$.
- Sample $r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_i}^*$, $\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N_i)}$, set $t_i = r^2 \pmod{N_i}$ and $s_i = t_i^\lambda \pmod{N_i}$.

Compute $\hat{\psi}_i = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{prm}}, (ssid, i), (N_i, s_i, t_i); \lambda)$.

- Sample $(A_i^j, \tau_j) \leftarrow \mathcal{M}(\text{com}, \Pi^{\text{sch}})$, for $j \in \mathbf{P}$. Set $\mathbf{A}_i = (A_i^j)_j$.
- Sample $\rho_i, u_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and compute $V_i = \mathcal{H}(ssid, i, \mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{A}_i, Y_i, B_i, N_i, s_i, t_i, \hat{\psi}_i, \rho_i, u_i)$.

Broadcast $(ssid, i, V_i)$.

Round 2.

When obtaining $(ssid, j, V_j)$ from all \mathcal{P}_j , send $(ssid, i, \mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{A}_i, Y_i, B_i, N_i, s_i, t_i, \hat{\psi}_i, \rho_i, u_i)$ to all.

Round 3.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \mathbf{X}_j, \mathbf{A}_j, Y_j, B_j, N_j, s_j, t_j, \hat{\psi}_j, \rho_j, u_j)$ from \mathcal{P}_j , do:
 - Verify $N_j \geq 2^{8\kappa}$ and $\prod_k X_j^k = \text{id}_{\mathbb{G}}$ and $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{prm}}, (ssid, j), (N_j, s_j, t_j), \hat{\psi}_j) = 1$.
 - Verify $\mathcal{H}(ssid, j, \mathbf{X}_j, \mathbf{A}_j, Y_j, B_j, N_j, s_j, t_j, \hat{\psi}_j, \rho_j, u_j) = V_j$.
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , set $\rho = \bigoplus_j \rho_j$ and do:
 - Compute $\psi_i = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{mod}}, (ssid, \rho, i), N_i; (p_i, q_i))$
 - Compute $\phi_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{fac}}, (ssid, \rho, i), (N_i, \kappa); p_i, q_i)$, for all $j \neq i$.
 - For $j \in \mathbf{P}$, set $C_i^j = \text{enc}_j(x_i^j)$ and $\psi_i^j = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{sch}}, (ssid, \rho, i), X_i^j; x_i^j, \tau_j)$.
 - Compute $\pi_i = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{sch}}, (ssid, \rho, i), Y_i; y_i, \tau)$

Send $(ssid, i, \psi_i, \phi_{j,i}, \pi_i, C_i^j, \psi_i^j)$ to each \mathcal{P}_j .

Output.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \psi_j, \phi_{j,i}, \pi_i, C_j^i, \psi_j^i)$ from \mathcal{P}_j , set $x_j^i = \text{dec}_i(C_j^i) \pmod{q}$ and do:
 - Verify $g^{x_j^i} = X_j^i$. If $g^{x_j^i} \neq X_j^i$ calculate $\mu = (C_j^i \cdot (1 + N_i)^{-x_j^i})^{1/N_i} \pmod{N^2}$ and do
Dec Error: Send to all $(\mathcal{P}_j, C_j^i, x_j^i, \mu)$ and halt.
 - Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{mod}}, (ssid, \rho, j), N_j, \psi_j) = 1$ and $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{fac}}, (ssid, \rho, j), (N_j, \kappa), \phi_{i,j}) = 1$.
 - Interpret $\pi_j = (\hat{B}_j, \dots)$, and verify $\hat{B}_j = B_j$ and $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{sch}}, (ssid, \rho, j), Y_j, \pi_j) = 1$.
 - For $k \in \mathbf{P}$, interpret $\psi_j^k = (\hat{A}_j^k, \dots)$, and verify $\hat{A}_j^k = A_j^k$ and $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{sch}}, (ssid, \rho, j), X_j^k, \psi_j^k) = 1$.
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , do:
 - Set $x_i^* = x_i + \sum_j x_j^i \pmod{q}$.
 - Set $X_k^* = X_k \cdot \prod_j X_j^k$ for every k .

Output $(ssid, i, \mathbf{X}^* = (X_k^*)_k, \mathbf{Y} = (Y_j)_j, \mathbf{N} = (N_j)_j, \mathbf{s} = (s_j)_j, \mathbf{t} = (t_j)_j)$.

Errors. When failing a verification or receiving a Dec Error report the culprit and halt.

Stored State. Store x_i^*, y_i, p_i, q_i .

Figure 6: Auxiliary Info. & Key Refresh in Three Rounds

Preparing Multiple Signatures. To prepare L signatures, the parties follow the steps above L times concurrently. At the end of the presigning phase, each \mathcal{P}_i stores the tuples $\{(\ell, R_\ell, k_{i,\ell}, \chi_{i,\ell})\}_{\ell \in [L]}$, and goes on standby.

Nota Bene. Recall that the public-key shares $\{X_i = g^{x_i}\}_{i \in [n]}$ are known to all parties, and let $\mathcal{I} = \pm 2^\ell$, $\mathcal{J} = \pm 2^{\ell'}$, $\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon = \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$ and $\mathcal{J}_\varepsilon = \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon}$ denote integer intervals where ℓ , ℓ' and ε are fixed parameters (to be determined by the analysis). We represent integers modulo N in the interval $\{-N/2, \dots, N/2\}$ (rather than the canonical representation); this convention is crucial to the security analysis.

4.2 Signing

Once the (hash of the) message m is known, on input $(\mathbf{sign}, \ell, i, m)$ for the ℓ -th revealed point on the curve, the signing boils down to retrieving the relevant data and computing the right signature share. Namely, retrieve (ℓ, R, k, χ) compute $r = R|_{x\text{-axis}}$ and send $\sigma_i = km + r\chi \pmod q$ to all. Erase the tuple (ℓ, R, k, χ) . See Figure 8 for full details.

4.2.1 Identification Process

In this version of the protocol, the identification process is conceptually simpler but computationally more demanding. In case of failure, the parties are instructed to prove in zero knowledge that the values they sent are consistent with all the commitments from the transcript. In more detail, if $\prod \Delta_j \neq g^\delta$, the parties publish the following data:

- (a) For each $j \neq i$, reprove that $\{D_{j,i}\}_{j \neq i}$ are well-formed according to $\Pi_\ell^{\text{aff-p}}$, for $\ell \neq j$.
- (b) Compute $H_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i \cdot \gamma_i)$ and prove in ZK that H_i is well formed wrt K_i and G_i .
- (c) Prove in ZK that δ_i is the plaintext value mod q of the ciphertext obtained as $H_i \cdot \prod_{j \neq i} D_{i,j} \cdot F_{j,i}$.

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4.3.1 Identification Process

If the signature fails, then the parties retrieve the presigning transcript and publish the following data:

- (a) For each $j \neq i$, reprove that $\{\hat{D}_{j,i}\}_{j \neq i}$ are well-formed according to $\Pi_\ell^{\text{aff-p}}$, for $\ell \neq j$.
- (b) Compute $\hat{H}_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i \cdot x_i)$ and prove in ZK that \hat{H}_i is well-formed wrt K_i and X_i .
- (c) Prove in ZK that σ_i is the plaintext value mod q of the ciphertext obtained as $K_i^m \cdot (\hat{H}_i \cdot \prod_{j \neq i} \hat{D}_{i,j} \cdot \hat{F}_{j,i})^r$.

FIGURE 7 (ECDSA Pre-Signing)

Recall that P_i 's secret state contains x_i, y_i, p_i, q_i such that $X_i = g^{x_i}$, $Y_i = g^{y_i}$ and $N_i = p_i q_i$.

Round 1.

On input (**pre-sign**, $ssid, \ell, i$) from \mathcal{P}_i , interpret $ssid = (\dots, \mathbb{G}, q, g, P, rid, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, N, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$, and do:

- Sample $k_i, \gamma_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$, $\rho_i, \nu_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_i}^*$ and set $G_i = \text{enc}_i(\gamma_i; \nu_i)$, $K_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i; \rho_i)$.
- Compute $\psi_{j,i}^0 = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{enc}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, K_i); (k_i, \rho_i))$ for every $j \neq i$.

Broadcast $(ssid, i, K_i, G_i)$ and send $(ssid, i, \psi_{j,i}^0)$ to each \mathcal{P}_j .

Round 2.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, K_j, G_j, \psi_{i,j}^0)$ from \mathcal{P}_j , do:
 - Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{enc}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, K_j), \psi_{i,j}) = 1$.
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , set $\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}$ and do:

For every $j \neq i$, sample $r_{i,j}, s_{i,j}, \hat{r}_{i,j}, \hat{s}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_j}$, $\beta_{i,j}, \hat{\beta}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{J}$ and compute:

- $D_{j,i} = (\gamma_i \odot K_j) \oplus \text{enc}_j(-\beta_{i,j}, s_{i,j})$ and $F_{j,i} = \text{enc}_i(\beta_{i,j}, r_{i,j})$.
- $\hat{D}_{j,i} = (x_i \odot K_j) \oplus \text{enc}_j(-\hat{\beta}_{i,j}, \hat{s}_{i,j})$ and $\hat{F}_{j,i} = \text{enc}_i(\hat{\beta}_{i,j}, \hat{r}_{i,j})$.
- $\psi_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{aff-g}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, D_{j,i}, K_j, F_{j,i}, \Gamma_i); (\gamma_i, \beta_{i,j}, s_{i,j}, r_{i,j}))$.
- $\hat{\psi}_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{aff-g}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, \hat{D}_{j,i}, K_j, \hat{F}_{j,i}, X_i); (x_i, \hat{\beta}_{i,j}, \hat{s}_{i,j}, \hat{r}_{i,j}))$.
- $\psi'_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{log*}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, G_i, \Gamma_i, g); (\gamma_i, \nu_i))$.

Send $(ssid, i, \Gamma_i, D_{j,i}, F_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i}, \hat{F}_{j,i}, \psi_{j,i}, \hat{\psi}_{j,i}, \psi'_{j,i})$ to each \mathcal{P}_j .

Round 3.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \Gamma_j, D_{i,j}, F_{i,j}, \hat{D}_{i,j}, \hat{F}_{i,j}, \psi_{i,j}, \hat{\psi}_{i,j}, \psi'_{i,j})$ from \mathcal{P}_j , do
 - Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{aff-g}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, D_{i,j}, K_i, F_{j,i}, \Gamma_j), \psi_{i,j}) = 1$.
 - Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{aff-g}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, \hat{D}_{i,j}, K_i, \hat{F}_{j,i}, X_j), \hat{\psi}_{i,j}) = 1$.
 - Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{log*}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, G_j, \Gamma_j, g), \psi'_{i,j}) = 1$.
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , set $\Gamma = \prod_j \Gamma_j$ and $\Delta_i = \Gamma^{k_i}$, and do:

- For every $j \neq i$, set $\alpha_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(D_{i,j})$ and $\hat{\alpha}_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(\hat{D}_{i,j})$ and

$$\begin{cases} \delta_i = \gamma_i k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} (\alpha_{i,j} + \beta_{i,j}) \pmod q \\ \chi_i = x_i k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} (\hat{\alpha}_{i,j} + \hat{\beta}_{i,j}) \pmod q \end{cases}$$

- For every $j \neq i$, compute $\psi''_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{log*}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, K_i, \Delta_i, \Gamma); (k_i, \rho_i))$.

Send $(ssid, i, \delta_i, \Delta_i, \psi''_{j,i})$ to each \mathcal{P}_j .

Output.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \delta_j, \Delta_j, \psi''_{i,j})$ from \mathcal{P}_j , do:
 - Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{log*}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, K_j, \Delta_j, \Gamma), \psi''_{i,j}) = 1$.
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , set $\delta = \sum_j \delta_j$, and do:
 - Verify $g^\delta = \prod_j \Delta_j$. **In case of failure do:**
 - (a) For each $j \neq i$, reprove that $\{D_{j,i}\}_{j \neq i}$ are well-formed according to $\Pi_\ell^{\text{aff-g}}$, for $\ell \neq j, i$.
 - (b) Compute $H_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i \cdot \gamma_i)$ and prove in ZK that H_i is well formed wrt K_i and G_i in Π^{mul} .
 - (c) Prove in ZK that δ_i is the plaintext value mod q of the ciphertext obtained as $H_i \cdot \prod_{j \neq i} D_{i,j} \cdot F_{j,i}$ according to Π_ℓ^{dec} , for $\ell \neq i$.
Broadcast the above proofs.
 - Set $R = \Gamma^{\delta^{-1}}$ and output $(ssid, i, R, k_i, \chi_i)$ and record the transcript (including randomness).

Errors. When failing a NIZK, report the culprit and halt.

Stored State. Store $\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, N, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}$ and (x_i, y_i, p_i, q_i) .

Figure 7: ECDSA Pre-Signing

FIGURE 8 (ECDSA Signing)**Round 1.**

On input $(\text{sign}, ssid, \ell, i, m)$, if there is record of $(ssid, \ell, R, k, \chi)$, do:

- Set $r = R|_{x\text{-axis}}$ and $\sigma_i = km + r\chi$.
 - Send $(ssid, i, \sigma_i)$ to all \mathcal{P}_j .
- Erase $(ssid, \ell, R, k, \chi)$ from memory.

Output.

Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \sigma_j)$ from all \mathcal{P}_j , do:

- Set $\sigma = \sum_j \sigma_j$.
 - Verify (r, σ) is a valid signature.
- Output $(\text{signature}, ssid, m, r, \sigma)$.

If the above fails, then retrieve the presigning transcript and **do**:

- (a) For each $j \neq i$, reprove that $\{\hat{D}_{j,i}\}_{j \neq i}$ are well-formed according to $\Pi_\ell^{\text{aff-g}}$, for $\ell \neq j, i$.
 - (b) Compute $\hat{H}_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i \cdot x_i)$ and prove in ZK that \hat{H}_i is well-formed wrt K_i and X_i according to $\Pi_\ell^{\text{mul*}}$, for $\ell \neq i$.
 - (c) Prove in ZK that σ_i is the plaintext value mod q of the ciphertext obtained as $K_i^m \cdot (\hat{H}_i \cdot \prod_{j \neq i} \hat{D}_{i,j} \cdot \hat{F}_{j,i})^r$ according to Π_ℓ^{dec} , for $\ell \neq i$.
- Broadcast all proofs above.

Errors. When failing a NIZK, report the culprit and halt.

Figure 8: ECDSA Signing

5 Six-Round Presigning w/ $O(n)$ Identification Cost

5.1 Presigning

We now turn to the six-round version of the presigning phase (Figure 9). The six-round version of our presigning algorithm crucially makes use of the El-Gamal keys $\{Y_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{P}}$ that were sampled during the key-refresh phase. The main purpose of these keys is to generate commitments which are extractable *in the exponent*,¹⁸ thus allowing the simulation to be carried out accordingly. In Section 5.1.3, we further explain the function of these commitments and why extraction-in-the-exponent suffices for our needs. Finally, the use of El-Gamal commitments also enable an efficiency optimization by replacing the range proof for the nonce-verification (i.e. the Δ 's) with a simple Schnorr-style proof performed solely over the elliptic curve, thus avoiding the need of generating a different proof for each party.¹⁹

5.1.1 Differences from the Three-Round Version

As mentioned in the introduction, the six-round version of the protocol may be viewed as a “stretched-out” of the previous one. Other than the introduction of the El-Gamal commitments, various items are moved around and an auxiliary group-element is introduced to facilitate efficient identification of corrupted parties; certain proofs are also tweaked to account for these changes. The two main differences between the two variants of our protocol are that (1) the parties publish their ephemeral nonce, i.e. $\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}$, only *after* they have computed $\delta = k \cdot \gamma$, and, (2) the parties commit in El-gamal fashion to their share of $k \cdot x$, i.e. χ_i , in order to (provably) generate an auxiliary “pseudo-key” $S_i = R^{\chi_i}$ which will be used in the identification of corrupted parties during signing.

¹⁸From El-Gamal commitment $(B, Y, Z) = (g^b, g^y, g^z \cdot Y^b)$, since y was extracted during the key-refresh simulation, the simulator extracts g^z , i.e. the secret in the exponent.

¹⁹We mention that such an optimization may also be realized for the three-round variant of the protocol, at the price of adding DDH to its list of assumptions.

FIGURE 9 (ECDSA Pre-Signing (Rounds 1 to 4))

Recall that P_i 's secret state contains x_i, y_i, p_i, q_i such that $X_i = g^{x_i}$, $Y_i = g^{y_i}$ and $N_i = p_i q_i$.

Round 1.

On input (**pre-sign**, $ssid, \ell, i$) from \mathcal{P}_i , interpret $ssid = (\dots, \mathbb{G}, q, g, \mathbf{P}, rid, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$, and do:

- Sample $k_i, b_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$, $\rho_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_i}^*$, and set $K_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i; \rho_i)$ and $\mathbf{Z}_i = (g^{b_i}, g^{k_i} \cdot Y_i^{b_i})$.
- Sample $\gamma_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$, $\nu_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and set $\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}$ and $G_i = \mathcal{H}(ssid, i, \Gamma_i, \nu_i)$.
- Compute $\psi_{j,i}^0 = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{enc-eg}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, K_i, Y_i, \mathbf{Z}); (k_i, \rho_i, b_i))$ for every $j \neq i$.

Broadcast $(ssid, i, K_i, G_i, \mathbf{Z}_i)$ and send $(ssid, i, \psi_{j,i}^0)$ to each \mathcal{P}_j .

Round 2.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, K_j, G_j, \mathbf{Z}_j, \psi_{i,j}^0)$ from \mathcal{P}_j , do:

- Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{enc-eg}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, K_j, Y_j, \mathbf{Z}_j), \psi_{i,j}) = 1$.

2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , do:

For every $j \neq i$, sample $r_{i,j}, s_{i,j}, \hat{r}_{i,j}, \hat{s}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_j}$, $\beta_{i,j}, \hat{\beta}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{J}$ and compute:

- $D_{j,i} = (\gamma_i \odot K_j) \oplus \text{enc}_j(-\beta_{i,j}, s_{i,j})$ and $F_{j,i} = \text{enc}_i(\beta_{i,j}, r_{i,j})$.
- $\hat{D}_{j,i} = (x_i \odot K_j) \oplus \text{enc}_j(-\hat{\beta}_{i,j}, \hat{s}_{i,j})$ and $\hat{F}_{j,i} = \text{enc}_i(\hat{\beta}_{i,j}, \hat{r}_{i,j})$.
- $\psi_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{aff-p}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, D_{j,i}, K_j, F_{j,i}, G_i); (\gamma_i, \beta_{i,j}, s_{i,j}, r_{i,j}, \nu_i))$.
- $\hat{\psi}_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{aff-g}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, \hat{D}_{j,i}, K_j, \hat{F}_{j,i}, X_i); (x_i, \hat{\beta}_{i,j}, \hat{s}_{i,j}, \hat{r}_{i,j}))$.

Send $(ssid, i, D_{j,i}, F_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i}, \hat{F}_{j,i}, \psi_{j,i}, \hat{\psi}_{j,i})$ to each \mathcal{P}_j .

Round 3.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, D_{i,j}, F_{i,j}, \hat{D}_{i,j}, \hat{F}_{i,j}, \psi_{i,j}, \hat{\psi}_{i,j})$ from \mathcal{P}_j , do

- Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{aff-p}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, D_{i,j}, K_i, F_{j,i}, G_j), \psi_{i,j}) = 1$.
- Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{aff-g}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, \hat{D}_{i,j}, K_i, \hat{F}_{j,i}, X_j), \hat{\psi}_{i,j}) = 1$.

2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , do:

- For every $j \neq i$, set $\alpha_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(D_{i,j})$ and $\hat{\alpha}_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(\hat{D}_{i,j})$ and sample $\hat{b}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and set

$$\begin{cases} \delta_i = \gamma_i k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} (\alpha_{i,j} + \beta_{i,j}) \pmod q \\ \chi_i = x_i k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} (\hat{\alpha}_{i,j} + \hat{\beta}_{i,j}) \pmod q \\ \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i = (g^{\hat{b}_i}, g^{\chi_i} \cdot Y_i^{\hat{b}_i}) \end{cases} .$$

Send $(ssid, i, \delta_i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i)$ to all.

Round 4.

When obtaining all $(ssid, j, \delta_j, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_j)$ from each \mathcal{P}_j , set $\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}$ and do:

- For $j \neq i$, $\psi'_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{log*}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, G_i, \Gamma_i, g); (\gamma_i, \nu_i))$.

Send $(ssid, i, \Gamma_i, \psi'_{j,i})$ to each \mathcal{P}_j .

Figure 9: ECDSA Pre-Signing (Rounds 1 to 4)

FIGURE 10 (ECDSA Pre-Signing (Round 5, 6 & Output))

Round 5.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \Gamma_j, \psi'_{i,j})$ from \mathcal{P}_j , do
 - Verify $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{log*}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{L}_\varepsilon, G_j, \Gamma_j, g), \psi'_{i,j}) = 1$.
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , set $\Gamma = \prod_\ell \Gamma_\ell$ and $\Delta_i = \Gamma^{k_i}$, and do:
 - For every $j \neq i$, compute $\psi_j = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{log}}, (ssid, i), (Y_i, \mathbf{Z}_i, \Delta_i, \Gamma); (k_i, b_i))$.
 Send $(ssid, i, \Delta_i, \psi_i)$ to all.

Round 6.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \Delta_j, \psi_j)$ from \mathcal{P}_j , do:
 - Check $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{log}}, (ssid, j), (Y_j, \mathbf{Z}_j, \Delta_j, \Gamma), \psi_j) = 1$
2. When obtaining all tuples, do:
 - Set $\delta = \sum_j \delta_j$ and $R = \Gamma^{\delta^{-1}}$, and verify $g^\delta = \prod_j \Delta_j$ (if fail then **red alert #1**).
 - Compute $S_i = R^{x_i}$ and $\{\hat{R}_j = \Delta_j^{\delta^{-1}}\}_{j \in \mathcal{P}}$.
 - Compute $\pi_i = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{log}}, (ssid, i), (Y_i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i, S_i, R); (\chi_i, \lambda_i))$
 Send $(ssid, i, S_i, \pi_i)$ to all.

Output.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, S_j, \pi_{i,j})$ from \mathcal{P}_j , verify:
 - Check $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{log}}, (ssid, j), (Y_j, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_j, S_j, R), \pi_j) = 1$.
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , do:
 - Verify $S_1 \cdot S_2 \cdot \dots \cdot S_n = X$ (if fail then **red alert #2**).
 Output $(\ell, R, \{\hat{R}_j, S_j\}_j, k_i, \chi_i)$ and standby.

Errors. If a NIZK fails, report the culprit and halt. For a **red alert**, refer to the relevant subprotocol.

Stored State. Store \mathbf{X} , \mathbf{N} , \mathbf{s} , \mathbf{t} and (x_i, y_i, p_i, q_i) .

Figure 10: ECDSA Pre-Signing (Round 5, 6 & Output)

Next, we describe the protocol in more detail, and we highlight where appropriate where it departs from the three-round variant. We remark that each numbered item below denotes a round.

1. Each party \mathcal{P}_i generates local shares k_i and γ_i , computes Paillier encryptions $K_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i)$ and $G_i = \text{enc}_i(\gamma_i)$, under \mathcal{P}_i 's key, as well as an El-Gamal Commitment $\mathbf{Z}_i = (g^{b_i}, g^{k_i} \cdot Y_i^{b_i})$ to k_i using its El-Gamal key and random value $b_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$, and broadcasts (K_i, G_i, \mathbf{Z}_i) .
 - (*) Note the introduction of the El-Gamal commitment which simplifies (the accompanying ZK-proof of) the nonce-verification in round 5.
2. For each $j \neq i$, party \mathcal{P}_i samples $\beta_{i,j}, \hat{\beta}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon$ and computes $D_{j,i} = \text{enc}_j(\gamma_i \cdot k_j - \beta_{i,j})$ and $\hat{D}_{j,i} = \text{enc}_j(x_i \cdot k_j - \hat{\beta}_{i,j})$ using the homomorphic properties of Paillier. Furthermore, \mathcal{P}_i encrypts $F_{j,i} = \text{enc}_i(\beta_{i,j})$, $\hat{F}_{j,i} = \text{enc}_i(\hat{\beta}_{i,j})$, sets $\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}$, and sends $(D_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i}, F_{j,i}, \hat{F}_{j,i})$ to all parties.
 - (*) Note that Γ_i is not revealed at this point (c.f. Section 5.1.3).
3. Each \mathcal{P}_i decrypts (and reduces modulo q) $\alpha_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(D_{i,j})$ and $\hat{\alpha}_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(\hat{D}_{i,j})$. and computes $\delta_i = \gamma_i \cdot k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \alpha_{i,j} + \beta_{i,j} \pmod q$, $\chi_i = x_i \cdot k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} \hat{\alpha}_{i,j} + \hat{\beta}_{i,j} \pmod q$. Each \mathcal{P}_i is instructed to commit to χ_i in an El-Gamal fashion (i.e. $\hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i = (g^{\hat{b}_i}, g^{\chi_i} \cdot Y_i^{\hat{b}_i})$) and sends $(\delta_i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i)$ to all.
 - (*) In the end of round 3, the parties have reconstructed δ and they are committed to χ_i . The parties reveal their Γ 's only in the next round.
4. Each \mathcal{P}_i sends Γ_i to all.
5. Each \mathcal{P}_i sets $\Gamma = \prod_j \Gamma_j$, $R = \Gamma^{\delta^{-1}}$, $\Delta_i = \Gamma^{k_i}$ and sends Δ_i to all parties.
6. When obtaining all Δ_j 's, party \mathcal{P}_i sets $\delta = \sum_j \delta_j \pmod q$ and verifies that $g^\delta = \prod_j \Delta_j$. If no inconsistencies are detected, \mathcal{P}_i sets $S_i = R^{x_i}$ and sends it to all parties.
 - (*) The introduction of the ‘‘pseudo-key’’ $S_i = R^{x_i}$ is an innovation of the six-round variant of the protocol.

When obtaining all S_j 's, party \mathcal{P}_i verifies that $X = \prod_j S_j$. If no inconsistencies are detected, \mathcal{P}_i sets $R = \Gamma^{\delta^{-1}}$ and stores $(R, \{\hat{R}_j, S_j\}_j, k_i, \chi_i)$, where $\hat{R}_j = \Delta_j^{\delta^{-1}}$. For malicious security, the aforementioned process is augmented with the following ZK-proofs:

- (a) The plaintext of K_i is equal to the secret value of \mathbf{Z}_i and lies in range \mathcal{I}_ε .
 - (*) Notice that, contrary to the previous variant, the above proof incorporates \mathbf{Z}_i into the statement.
- (b) The ciphertext $D_{j,i}$ was obtained as an affine-like operation on K_j where the multiplicative coefficient is equal to the hidden value of G_i , and it lies in range \mathcal{I}_ε , and the additive coefficient is equal to hidden value of $F_{j,i}$, and lies in range \mathcal{J}_ε .
 - (*) Notice that the above proof is performed against G_i instead of Γ_i , since it will not be revealed yet.
- (c) The ciphertext $\hat{D}_{j,i}$ was obtained as an affine operation on K_j where the multiplicative coefficient is equal to the exponent of X_i , and it lies in range \mathcal{I}_ε , and the additive coefficient is equal to hidden value of $\hat{F}_{j,i}$, and it lies in range \mathcal{J}_ε .
- (d) The exponent of Γ_i base g is equal to the plaintext-value of G_i .
- (e) The exponent of Δ_i base Γ is equal to the secret value of \mathbf{Z}_i .
 - (*) Notice that the above proof is performed against \mathbf{Z}_i instead of K_i ; thus it is not a verifier-dependent range proof.
- (f) The exponent of S_i base R is equal to the secret value of $\hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i$. See Figure 9 for full details.

5.1.2 Identification Process

There are two steps where the protocol might fail and yet the fault is not immediately attributable to a specific party. These two steps occur in the ultimate and penultimate round respectively in the case that $g^\delta \neq \prod_i \Delta_i$ and $\prod_i S_i \neq X$. Depending on which failure occurred, the parties are instructed to open in zero-knowledge (without revealing the randomizer) the plaintext values of K_i , $\{D_{i,j}\}$ and the discrete log of Γ_i , for the first case, and plaintext values of K_i , $\{\hat{D}_{i,j}\}$ and the secret (in the exponent) of Z_i , for the second case. At this point, the parties have enough information to check which δ_i (or χ_i) was malformed.

FIGURE 11 (Nonce-Reveal Fail)

Round 1. If **red alert #1**, set $\{\mu_{i,j} = ((1 + N_i)^{-\alpha_{i,j}} D_{i,j})^{N_i^{-1}} \bmod N_i\}_{j \neq i}$ and do:

- $\psi_i = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{Nth}}, (ssid, i), (N_i, \rho_i^N), \rho_i)$.
 - $\psi_{i,j} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{Nth}}, (ssid, i), (N_i, \mu_{i,j}^N, \mu_{i,j}^N))$, for $j \neq i$.
- Send $(ssid, i, k_i, \rho_i^{N_i}, \psi_i, \gamma_i, (\alpha_{i,j}, \mu_{i,j}^N, \psi_{i,j})_{i \neq j})$ to all (i.e. open all $K_i, \Gamma_i, \{D_{i,j}\}_{j \neq i}$)

Output. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, k_j, \tilde{\rho}_j, \psi_j, \gamma_j, (\alpha_{j,k}, \tilde{\mu}_{j,k}, \psi_{j,k})_{k \neq j})$ from \mathcal{P}_j , do

- Check $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{Nth}}, (ssid, j), (N_j, \tilde{\rho}_j), \psi_j) = 1$ and $K_j = (1 + N_j)^{k_j} \tilde{\rho}_j \bmod N_j^2$.
- Check $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{Nth}}, (ssid, j), (N_j, \tilde{\mu}_{j,k}), \pi_{j,k}) = 1$ and $D_{j,k} = (1 + N_j)^{\alpha_{j,k}} \tilde{\mu}_{j,k} \bmod N_j^2$, for $k \neq j$.
- Check $g^{\gamma_j} = \Gamma_j$ and $\delta_j = k_j \gamma_j + \sum_{\ell \neq j} (\alpha_{j,\ell} + k_\ell \gamma_\ell - \alpha_{\ell,j}) \bmod q$.

In case of failure, report \mathcal{P}_j as corrupt.

Figure 11: Nonce-Reveal Fail

FIGURE 12 (Pseudo-Key Reveal Fail)

Round 1. If **red alert #2**, set $\{\hat{\mu}_{i,j} = ((1 + N_i)^{-\hat{\alpha}_{i,j}} \hat{D}_{i,j})^{N_i^{-1}} \bmod N_i\}_{j \neq i}$ and $\tilde{Y}_i = Y_i^{b_i}$ and do:

- $\psi'_i = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{log}}, (ssid, i), (g^{b_i}, Y_i, \tilde{Y}_i; b_i, y_i))$.
 - $\psi_i = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{Nth}}, (ssid, i), (N_i, \hat{\rho}_i^N), \rho_i)$.
 - $\psi_{i,j} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{Nth}}, (ssid, i), (N_i, \hat{\mu}_{i,j}^N, \hat{\mu}_{i,j}^N))$, for $j \neq i$.
- Send $(ssid, i, k_i, \rho_i^{N_i}, \psi_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \psi'_i, (\hat{\alpha}_{i,j}, \hat{\mu}_{i,j}^N, \psi_{i,j})_{i \neq j})$ to all (i.e. open all $K_i, Z_i, \{\hat{D}_{i,j}\}_{j \neq i}$)

Output.

When obtaining $(ssid, j, k_j, \tilde{\rho}_j, \psi_j, \tilde{Y}_j, \psi'_j, (\hat{\alpha}_{j,k}, \tilde{\mu}_{j,k}, \psi_{j,k})_{j \neq k})$, interpret $Z_j = (B_j, M_j)$ and do:

- Check $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{log}}, (ssid, i), (B_j, Y_j, \tilde{Y}_j), \psi'_j) = 1$
- Check $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{Nth}}, (ssid, j), (N_j, \tilde{\rho}_j), \psi_j) = 1$ and $K_j = (1 + N_j)^{k_j} \tilde{\rho}_j \bmod N_j^2$.
- Check $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{Nth}}, (ssid, j), (N_j, \tilde{\mu}_{j,k}), \pi_{j,k}) = 1$ and $D_{j,k} = (1 + N_j)^{\alpha_{j,k}} \tilde{\mu}_{j,k} \bmod N_j^2$, for $k \neq j$.
- Check $\tilde{Y}_j^{-1} M_j = X_j^{k_j} \cdot \prod_{\ell \neq j} (g^{\hat{\alpha}_{j,\ell}} \cdot X_j^{k_\ell} \cdot g^{-\hat{\alpha}_{\ell,j}})$.

In case of failure, report \mathcal{P}_j as corrupt.

Figure 12: Pseudo-Key Reveal Fail

5.1.3 Snippet of the Simulation.

As explained at the beginning of this section, the two main differences between the two variants of our protocol are that (1) the parties publish their ephemeral nonce, i.e. $\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}$, only *after* they have computed $\delta = k \cdot \gamma$, and, (2) the parties commit in El-gamal fashion to their share of $k \cdot x$, i.e. χ_i , in order to (provably) generate a “pseudo-key” $S_i = R^{X_i}$ which will be used in the identification of corrupted parties during signing.

Looking ahead to the security analysis and the simulation, we emphasize that the (simulation of the) identification process must be handled carefully. Specifically, in the reduction to unforgeability of ECDSA,

the simulator typically invokes the ECDSA oracle to obtain a signature, and then “lies” about the honest parties’ secret values to match the nonce/signature of the oracle. However, when the nonce and/or signature-string is malformed the protocol prescribes to “open-up” certain values (e.g. the k ’s, the γ ’s, . . .), and therefore the simulator is required to “explain” the transcript by revealing (some of) the honest parties’ secrets. In such a case, to successfully simulate a faulty execution, the simulator must discard the nonce/signature of the oracle, and rather send values for which he knows the corresponding secret, for all secrets that can be verified publicly (e.g. the Γ ’s).

Our simulator can do so without issue by virtue of to the two innovations that we introduce in the protocol. Specifically, since $\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}$ is revealed only after δ is constructed, and since g^{χ_j} is extracted from \tilde{Z}_j using the adversary’s El-Gamal (secret) keys, our simulator can check whether the corrupted parties δ ’s and χ ’s are well formed,²⁰ and thus carry out the simulation using a nonce from the ECDSA oracle, or a totally random nonce that can be fully explained whenever the adversary deviates from the protocol.

5.2 Signing

Once the (hash of the) message m is known, on input $(\text{sign}, \ell, i, m)$ for the ℓ -th revealed point on the curve, the signing boils down to retrieving the relevant data and computing the right signature share. Namely, retrieve (ℓ, R, k, χ) , compute $r = R|_{x\text{-axis}}$ and send $\sigma_i = k_i m + r \chi_i \pmod q$ to all. After receiving the other parties’ sigmas, each party checks that $R^{\sigma_j} = \bar{R}_j^m \cdot S_j^r$ and outputs $(R, \sum_j \sigma_j)$ if all the checks pass. See Figure 13 for full details.




Figure 13: ECDSA Signing

6 Underlying Σ -Protocols

We present the Σ -protocols associated with the NP-relations of Section 2.2. The Schnorr-style protocols as well as the protocols that are very similar to the ones below are moved to Appendix C.

6.1 Paillier Encryption in Range ZK (Π^{enc})

In Figure 14 we give a Σ -protocol for tuples of the form $(\mathcal{I} = \pm 2^\ell, C; k, r_0)$ satisfying relation R_{enc} . Namely, the Prover claims that he knows $k \in \pm 2^\ell$ such that $C = (1 + N_0)^k \cdot r_0^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$. Let (\tilde{N}, s, t) be an auxiliary set-up parameter for the proof, i.e \tilde{N} is a suitable (safe bi-prime) Blum modulus and s and t are random squares in $\mathbb{Z}_{\tilde{N}}^*$ (which implies $s \in \langle t \rangle$ with overwhelming probability).

²⁰We remark that it is sufficient to extract g^{χ_j} , rather than χ_j , since the “true” value of the latter was extracted at an earlier

FIGURE 14 (Paillier Encryption in Range ZK – Π^{enc})

- **Setup:** Auxiliary RSA modulus \hat{N} and Ring-Pedersen parameters $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^*$.

- **Inputs:** Common input is (N_0, K) .

The Prover has secret input (k, ρ) such that $k \in \pm 2^\ell$, and $K = (1 + N_0)^k \cdot \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$.

1. Prover samples

$$\alpha \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \text{ and } \begin{cases} \mu \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N} \\ r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_0}^* \\ \gamma \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N} \end{cases}, \text{ and computes } \begin{cases} S = s^k t^\mu \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ A = (1 + N_0)^\alpha \cdot r^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2} \\ C = s^\alpha t^\gamma \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases},$$

and sends (S, A, C) to the Verifier.

2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$

3. Prover sends (z_1, z_2, z_3) to the Verifier, where

$$\begin{cases} z_1 = \alpha + ek \\ z_2 = r \cdot \rho^e \pmod{N_0} \\ z_3 = \gamma + e\mu \end{cases}$$

- **Equality Checks:**

$$\begin{cases} (1 + N_0)^{z_1} \cdot z_2^{N_0} = A \cdot K^e \pmod{N_0^2} \\ s^{z_1} t^{z_3} = C \cdot S^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases}$$

- **Range Check:**

$$z_1 \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$$

The proof guarantees that $k \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$.

Figure 14: Paillier Encryption in Range ZK – Π^{enc}

Completeness. The protocol may reject a valid statement only if $|\alpha| \geq 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} - q2^\ell$ which happens with probability at most $q/2^\varepsilon$. \square

Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge. The simulator samples $z_1 \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$, $z_2 \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_0}^*$, $z_3 \leftarrow \pm \hat{N} \cdot 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$, and $S \leftarrow \langle t \rangle$ by $S = t^\lambda \pmod{\hat{N}}$ where $\lambda \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N}$, and sets $A = (1 + N_0)^{z_1} w^{N_0} \cdot K^{-e} \pmod{N_0^2}$ and $C = s^{z_1} t^{z_3} \cdot S^{-e} \pmod{\hat{N}}$. We observe that the real and simulated distributions are $2 \cdot q2^{-\varepsilon} + 2^{-\ell} \approx 3q2^{-\varepsilon}$ statistically close (by choosing $\ell = \varepsilon$ as we do in the analysis). This follows from Facts E.6, E.7, which imply z_1, z_3 are (each) $q2^{-\varepsilon}$ close to the real distribution, and S is $2^{-\ell}$ close to the real distribution. \square

Soundness. The soundness property follows from special soundness (see bellow) and the fact that the set $\{(e, e' \in (\pm q)^2) \text{ s.t. } e - e' \text{ divides } N_0\}$ is negligibly small compared to $(\pm q)^2$ (since the divisors of N_0 are greater than $2^\ell \approx q$). \square

Special Soundness. Let $(S, A, C, e, z_1, z_2, z_3)$ and $(S, A, C, e', z'_1, z'_2, z'_3)$ denote two accepting transcripts and let $(\Delta_e, \Delta_{z_1}, \Delta_{z_2}, \Delta_{z_3})$ denote the relevant differences and assume that $\Delta_e \neq 0$ does not divide N_0 . Notice that if Δ_e divides Δ_{z_1} and Δ_{z_3} (in the integers), then all the values can be extracted without issue as follows: k and μ are set to Δ_{z_1}/Δ_e and Δ_{z_3}/Δ_e . Finally, ρ can be extracted from the equality $(z_2/z'_2)^{N_0} = ((1 + N_0)^{-k} \cdot K)^{\Delta_e} \pmod{N_0^2}$ and Fact E.2. Therefore, it suffices to prove the claim below.

Claim 6.1 (Fujisaki and Okamoto [31], MacKenzie and Reiter [49]). *Assuming sRSA, it holds that $\Delta_e \mid \Delta_{z_1}$ and $\Delta_e \mid \Delta_{z_3}$ with probability at least $1 - \text{negl}(\kappa)$.*

stage from ciphertexts $\{\hat{F}_{i,j}\}$. Thus, once g^{X_j} is obtained, the simulator checks in the exponent by simple equality check that this is the right value.

Define the predicate $\neg\text{extract} \equiv (\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_1}) \vee (\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_3})$. We show that if $\neg\text{extract}$ occurs with noticeable probability, then there is an algorithm \mathcal{S} with black-box access to the Prover that can break sRSA with noticeable probability. More precisely, we show how to break sRSA as follows. The strong-RSA challenge is the second ring-Pedersen parameter t .²¹ We assume that \mathcal{S} knows $\lambda \in [\hat{N}^2]$ such that $s = t^\lambda \pmod{\hat{N}}$, and λ is uniform in $[\hat{N}^2]$. We emphasize that the choice of \hat{N}^2 rather than \hat{N} is crucial to the reduction.

Claim 6.2. *If $\Delta_e \not\mid (\lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3})$, then sRSA breaks.*

Proof of Claim 6.2. Define $\delta = \langle \lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3}, \Delta_e \rangle$ and let $\delta_e = \Delta_e/\delta$ and $\delta_z = (\lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3})/\delta$. Notice that $(S^{\nu_z} t^{\nu_e})^{\delta_e} = t \pmod{\hat{N}}$, where (ν_e, ν_z) are the Bézout coefficients of δ_z and δ_e (i.e. $\nu_e\delta_e + \nu_z\delta_z = 1$), since $S^{\delta_e} = t^{\delta_z}$. Deduce that the pair $(S^{\nu_z} t^{\nu_e}, \delta_e)$ is a successful response to the strong-RSA challenge, if $\Delta_e \not\mid (\lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3})$. \square

To conclude, we rule out (bound the probability) that $\Delta_e \mid \lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3}$ and $\neg\text{extract}$; it suffices to bound the probability that $(\Delta_e \mid \lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3}) \wedge (\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_1})$.²² Write $\lambda = \lambda_0 + p_0q_0\lambda_1$, where $(p_0, q_0) = ((p-1)/2, (q-1)/2)$. Since Δ_z does not divide $p_0q_0\Delta_{z_1}$ (because $\langle \Delta_e, p_0q_0 \rangle = 1$ with overwhelming probability over the Prover's coins) we remark that, by Fact E.4, there exists a prime power a^b such that $a^b \mid p_0q_0\Delta_{z_1}$, $a^{b+1} \not\mid \Delta_{z_1}$, and $\Delta_z = (\lambda_0\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3}) + \lambda_1p_0q_0\Delta_{z_1} = 0 \pmod{a^{b+1}}$ and thus λ_1 is uniquely determined modulo a . On the other hand, conditioned on the Prover's view, λ_1 has full entropy since $t^\lambda = t^{\lambda_0} \pmod{\hat{N}}$, since t is a quadratic residue modulo \hat{N} , which means that, if $\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_1}$, then the probability that $\Delta_e \mid \lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3}$ is at most $\frac{1}{a} + \text{negl} \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}$ over the Prover's coins, where the negligible term is of the form $(p+q) \cdot \text{polylog}(\hat{N})/\hat{N}$. In conclusion, the probability that $\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_1}$ or $\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_3}$ is at most the probability of solving the RSA challenge divided by $(1/2 - \text{negl})$, which is negligible overall. In more detail,

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\neg\text{extract}] &= \Pr[\Delta_e \mid (\lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3}) \wedge \neg\text{extract}] + \Pr[\Delta_e \not\mid (\lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3}) \wedge \neg\text{extract}] \\ &= \Pr[\Delta_e \mid (\lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3}) \wedge \Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_1}] + \Pr[\text{sRSA}] \\ &\leq (1/2 + \text{negl}) \cdot \Pr[\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_1}] + \Pr[\text{sRSA}] \\ &\leq (1/2 + \text{negl}) \cdot \Pr[\neg\text{extract}] + \Pr[\text{sRSA}] \end{aligned}$$

\square

6.2 Paillier Operation with Group Commitment in Range ZK ($\Pi^{\text{aff-g}}$)

In Figure 15 we give a Σ -protocol for tuples of the form $(\mathcal{I} = \pm 2^\ell, \mathcal{J} = \pm 2^{\ell'}, C, Y, X; x, y, k, r_0)$ satisfying relation $R_{\text{aff-g}}$. Namely, the Prover claims that he knows $x \in \pm 2^\ell$ and $y \in \pm 2^{\ell'}$ in range corresponding to group-element $X = g^x$ (on the curve) and Paillier ciphertext $Y = \text{enc}_{N_1}(y) \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_1}^*$ and $C, D \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0}^*$, such that $D = C^x(1 + N_0)^y \cdot \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$, for some $\rho \in \mathbb{Z}_{N_0}^*$. Let (\hat{N}, s, t) be an auxiliary set-up parameter for the proof, i.e \hat{N} is a suitable (safe bi-prime) Blum modulus and s and t are random squares in $\mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^*$ (which implies $s \in \langle t \rangle$ with overwhelming probability).

Completeness. The protocol may reject a valid statement only if $|\alpha| \geq 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} - q2^\ell$ or $|\beta| \geq 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon} - q2^{\ell'}$ which happens with probability at most $q/2^{\varepsilon-1}$, by union bound. \square

Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge. The simulator samples $z_1 \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$, $z_2 \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon}$, $z_3 \leftarrow \pm \hat{N} \cdot 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$, $z_4 \leftarrow \pm \hat{N} \cdot 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon}$, $w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_0}^*$ and $S, T \leftarrow \langle t \rangle$ by $S = t^{\lambda_1} \pmod{\hat{N}}$, $T = t^{\lambda_2} \pmod{\hat{N}}$ where $\lambda_1, \lambda_2 \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N}$, and sets $A = C^{z_1}(1 + N_0)^{z_2} w^{N_0} \cdot D^{-e} \pmod{N_0^2}$ and $B = g^{z_1} X^{-e} \in \mathbb{G}$ and $E = s^{z_1} t^{z_3} \cdot S^{-e} \pmod{\hat{N}}$ and $F = s^{z_2} t^{z_4} \cdot T^{-e} \pmod{\hat{N}}$. We observe that the real and simulated distributions are at most $4q \cdot 2^{-\varepsilon}$ far apart, by union bound and Facts E.6, E.7. \square

Soundness. The soundness property follows from special soundness (see bellow) and the fact that the set $\{(e, e' \in (\pm q)^2) \text{ s.t. } e - e' \text{ divides } N_1\}$ is negligibly small compared to $(\pm q)^2$ (since the divisors of N_1 are greater than $2^\ell \approx q$). \square

²¹With probability 1/4, a uniform element in $\mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}$ is a random quadratic residue, and therefore computing non-trivial roots of t breaks sRSA, since t is a random quadratic residue.

²²Since $\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_3}$ and $\Delta_e \mid \lambda\Delta_{z_1} + \Delta_{z_3}$ implies $\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_1}$.

FIGURE 15 (Paillier Affine Operation with Group Commitment in Range ZK – $\Pi^{\text{aff-g}}$)

- **Setup:** Auxiliary Paillier Modulus \hat{N} and Ring-Pedersen parameters $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^*$.

- **Inputs:** Common input is $(\mathbb{G}, g, N_0, N_1, C, D, Y, X)$ where $q = |\mathbb{G}|$ and g is a generator of \mathbb{G} .

The Prover has secret input (x, y, ρ, ρ_y) such that $x \in \pm 2^\ell$, $y \in \pm 2^{\ell'}$, $g^x = X$, $(1 + N_1)^y \rho_y^{N_1} = Y \pmod{N_1^2}$, and $D = C^x (1 + N_0)^y \cdot \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$.

1. Prover samples $\alpha \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$ and $\beta \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon}$ and

$$\begin{cases} r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_0}^*, r_y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_1}^* \\ \gamma \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N}, m \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N} \\ \delta \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N}, \mu \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell'} \cdot \hat{N} \end{cases} \quad \text{and computes} \quad \begin{cases} A = C^\alpha \cdot ((1 + N_0)^\beta \cdot r^{N_0}) \pmod{N_0^2} \\ B_x = g^\alpha \in \mathbb{G} \\ B_y = (1 + N_1)^\beta r_y^{N_1} \pmod{N_1^2} \\ E = s^\alpha t^\gamma, S = s^x t^m \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ F = s^\beta t^\delta, T = s^y t^\mu \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases}$$

and sends (S, T, A, B, E, F) to the Verifier.

2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$.

3. Prover Prover sends $(z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4, w, w_y)$ to the Verifier where

$$\begin{cases} z_1 = \alpha + ex \\ z_2 = \beta + ey \\ z_3 = \gamma + em \\ z_4 = \delta + e\mu \\ w = r \cdot \rho^e \pmod{N_0} \\ w_y = r_y \cdot \rho_y^e \pmod{N_1} \end{cases}$$

- **Equality Checks:**

$$\begin{cases} C^{z_1} (1 + N_0)^{z_2} w^{N_0} = A \cdot D^e \pmod{N_0^2} \\ g^{z_1} = B_x \cdot X^e \in \mathbb{G} \\ (1 + N_1)^{z_2} w_y^{N_1} = B_y \cdot Y^e \pmod{N_1^2} \\ s^{z_1} t^{z_3} = E \cdot S^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ s^{z_2} t^{z_4} = F \cdot T^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases}$$

- **Range Check:**

$$\begin{cases} z_1 \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \\ z_2 \in \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon} \end{cases}$$

The proof guarantees that $x \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$ and $y \in \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon}$.

Figure 15: Paillier Affine Operation with Group Commitment in Range ZK – $\Pi^{\text{aff-g}}$

Special Soundness. Let $(S, T, A, B, E, F, e, z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4, w, w_y)$ and $(S, T, A, B, E, F, e', z'_1, z'_2, z'_3, z'_4, w', w'_y)$ denote two accepting transcripts such that $e \neq e'$ and let $\Delta_e, \Delta_{z_1}, \Delta_{z_2}, \Delta_{z_3}, \Delta_{z_4}$ denote the relevant differences, and it is assumed that Δ_e does not divide N_1 . Similarly to the previous range proof, we show that Δ_e divides (over the integers \mathbb{Z}) each one of $\Delta_{z_1}, \Delta_{z_2}, \Delta_{z_3}, \Delta_{z_4}$ and all the secrets can be extracted without issue. Using the same argument as in the previous proof, we observe that the probability that Δ_e does not divide Δ_{z_1} or Δ_{z_3} is at most $\Pr[\text{sRSA}]/(\frac{1}{2} - \text{negl}_1)$ and the probability that Δ_e does not divide Δ_{z_2} or Δ_{z_4} is at most $\Pr[\text{sRSA}]/(\frac{1}{2} - \text{negl}_2)$. Therefore, by union bound, we conclude that

$$\Pr[\neg\text{extract}_1 \vee \neg\text{extract}_2] \leq 2 \cdot \Pr[\text{sRSA}] \cdot \left(\frac{1}{2} - \max(\text{negl}_1, \text{negl}_2)\right)^{-1}$$

where $\neg\text{extract}_j$ denotes the event $(\Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_j} \vee \Delta_e \not\mid \Delta_{z_{j+2}})$. \square

6.3 Paillier-Blum Modulus ZK (Π^{mod})

In Figure 16 we give a Σ -protocol for tuples $(N; p, q)$ satisfying relation R_{mod} . The Prover claims that N is a Paillier-Blum modulus, i.e. $\gcd(N, \phi(N)) = 1$ and $N = pq$ where p, q are primes satisfying $p, q \equiv 3 \pmod{4}$. The following protocol is a combination (and simplification) of van de Graaf and Peralta [55] and Goldberg et al. [37].

FIGURE 16 (Paillier-Blum Modulus ZK – Π^{mod})

- **Inputs:** Common input is N . Prover has secret input (p, q) such that $N = pq$.
- 1. Prover samples a random $w \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N$ of Jacobi symbol -1 and sends it to the Verifier.
- 2. Verifier sends $\{y_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$
- 3. For every $i \in [m]$ set:
 - $x_i = \sqrt[4]{y_i} \pmod{N}$, where $y_i' = (-1)^{a_i} w^{b_i} y_i$ for unique $a_i, b_i \in \{0, 1\}$ such that x_i is well defined.
 - $z_i = y_i^{N-1} \pmod{\phi(N)} \pmod{N}$
 Send $\{(x_i, a_i, b_i), z_i\}_{i \in [m]}$ to the Verifier.
- **Verification:** Accept iff all of the following hold:
 - N is an odd composite number.
 - $z_i^N = y_i \pmod{N}$ for every $i \in [m]$.
 - $x_i^4 = (-1)^{a_i} w^{b_i} y_i \pmod{N}$ and $a_i, b_i \in \{0, 1\}$ for every $i \in [m]$.

Figure 16: Paillier-Blum Modulus ZK – Π^{mod}

Completeness. Probability 1 by construction. \square

Soundness. We first observe that the probability that y_i admits an N -th root if $\langle N, \phi(N) \rangle \neq 1$ is at most $1/\langle N, \phi(N) \rangle \leq 1/2$. Therefore, with probability 2^{-m} , it holds that $\langle N, \phi(N) \rangle = 1$, and, in particular, N is square-free. Next, if N is the product of more than 3 primes, the probability that $\{y_i, -y_i, wy_i, -wy_i\}$ contains a quadratic residue (which is necessary for being a quartic), for every i , is at most $(1/2)^m$, for any w .

On the other hand, if $N = pq$ and either q or $p \equiv 1 \pmod{4}$, then the probability that $\{y_i, -y_i, wy_i, -wy_i\}$ contains a quartic for every i is at most $(1/2)^{-m}$ for the following reason. Write $\mathcal{L} : \mathbb{Z}_N^* \mapsto \{-1, 1\}^2$ such that $\mathcal{L}(x) = (a, b)$ where a is the Legendre symbol of x with respect to p and b is the Legendre symbol of x with respect to q . For fixed w , the table below upper bounds the probability that $\{y_i, -y_i, wy_i, -wy_i\}$ contains a quartic depending on the value of $\mathcal{L}(-1)$ and $\mathcal{L}(w)$; in **red** is the probability that it contains a square, and in **blue** is the probability that a random square is also a quartic, since the set contains exactly one square in those cases.

| $\mathcal{L}(w) \setminus \mathcal{L}(-1)$ | (1, 1) | (-1, 1) | (1, -1) | (-1, -1) |
|--|--------|---------|---------|----------|
| (1, 1) | 1/4 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 |
| (-1, 1) | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 |
| (1, -1) | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 |
| (-1, -1) | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 | 1/2 |

It follows that the probability that a square-free non-Blum modulus passes the above test is 2^{-m} , at most. Overall, the probability of accepting a wrong statement is at most 2^{-m+1} . \square

Honest Verifier Zero-Knowledge. Sample a random γ_i and set $z'_i = \gamma_i^4$, and $x_i = \gamma_i^N$ and $y'_i = z'^{iN} = x_i^4 \pmod N$. Sample a random u with Jacobi symbol -1 and set $w = u^N \pmod N$. Finally sample iid random bits $(a_i, b_i)_{i=1\dots m}$ and do:

- For each $i \in [m]$, set $y_i = (-1)^{a_i} w^{-b_i} y'_i$ and $z_i = (-1)^{a_i} u^{-b_i} z'_i$
- Output $[w, \{y_i\}_i, \{(x_i, a_i, b_i), z_i\}_i]$.

Knowing that -1 is not a square modulo N with Jacobi symbol 1, the real and simulated distributions are identical. \square

6.3.1 Extraction of Paillier-Blum Modulus Factorization

We stress that the above protocol is zero-knowledge only for *honest* Verifiers, which we strongly exploit in the security analysis of our threshold signature protocol. Specifically, assuming the Prover solves all challenges successfully, if the Verifier sends y_i 's for which he secretly knows v_i such that $v_i^2 = (-1)^{a_i} w^{b_i} y_i \pmod N$, then, for some i , the Verifier can deduce v'_i such that $v'_i \neq v_i, -v_i \pmod N$ and $v_i'^2 = y_i \pmod N$ with overwhelming probability. Thus, a malicious Verifier may efficiently deduce the factorization of N using the pair (v_i, v'_i) (c.f. Fact E.5).

We strongly exploit the above in the security analysis our protocol. Specifically, when the adversary queries the random oracle to obtain a challenge for the ZK-proof that his Paillier-Blum modulus is well formed, the simulator programs the oracle accordingly in order to extract the factorization of the modulus. Namely:

Extraction. Sample random $\{v_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N\}_{i \in [m]}$ and iid bits $\{(a_i, b_i)\}_{i \in [m]}$ and set $y_i = (-1)^{a_i} w^{-b_i} v_i^2 \pmod N$. Send $\{y_i\}_i$ to the Prover. If N is a Paillier-Blum modulus, then -1 is not a square modulo N with Jacobi symbol 1, and thus the y_i 's are truly random, as long as w has Jacobi symbol -1 . \square

6.4 Ring-Pedersen Parameters ZK (Π^{prm})

The Σ -protocol of Figure 17 for the relation R_{prm} is a ZK-protocol for proving that s belongs to the multiplicative group generated by t modulo N .

FIGURE 17 (Ring-Pedersen Parameters ZK – Π^{prm})

- **Inputs:** Common input is (N, s, t) . Prover has secret input λ such that $s = t^\lambda \pmod N$.
- 1. Prover samples $\{a_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}\}_{i \in [m]}$ and sends $A_i = t^{a_i} \pmod N$ to the Verifier.
- 2. Verifier replies with $\{e_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}\}_{i \in [m]}$
- 3. Prover sends $\{z_i = a_i + e_i \lambda \pmod{\phi(N)}\}_{i \in [m]}$ to the Verifier.
- **Verification:** Accept if $t^{z_i} = A_i \cdot s^{e_i} \pmod N$, for every $i \in [m]$.

Figure 17: Ring-Pedersen Parameters ZK – Π^{prm}

Completeness. Probability 1, by construction. \square

Soundness. Suppose that $s \notin \langle t \rangle$. First observe that for any $z \in \phi(N)$, it holds that $s^{-1} \cdot t^z \notin \langle t \rangle$. Next notice that if $A \notin \langle t \rangle$, then $t^z \neq A \pmod N$, for every z . It follows that the adversary generates an accepting transcript if he can guess correctly all the challenges, which happens with probability 2^{-m} . \square

Zero-Knowledge. Sample $\{z_i \leftarrow \pm N/2\}_{i \in [m]}$ and $\{e_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}\}_{i \in [m]}$ and set $A_i = s^{-e_i} \cdot t^{z_i}$. The real and simulated distributions are statistically $m \cdot (1 - \phi(N)/N)$ -close. \square

Finally the Pedersen parameters can be generated as follows; sample $\tau \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ and $\lambda \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}$ and set $t = \tau^2 \bmod N$ and $s = t^\lambda \bmod N$.

6.4.1 On the Auxilliary RSA moduli and the ring-Pedersen Parameters

The auxilliary moduli always belong to the Verifier and must be sampled as safe bi-prime RSA moduli. Furthermore, the pair (s, t) should consist of non-trivial quadratic residues in $\mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}$. In the actual setup, we sample \hat{N} as a Blum (safe-prime product) integer and $s = \tau^{2d} \bmod \hat{N}$ and $t = \tau^2 \bmod N$ for a uniform $\tau \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}$. During the auxiliary info phase, the (future) Verifier proves to the Prover that $s \in \langle t \rangle$.

The second issue which was implicitly addressed in the proofs above is how to sample uniform elements in $\langle t \rangle$. The naive idea is to sample random elements in $\phi(\hat{N})$ by sampling elements in \hat{N} . However, if \hat{N} has small factors,²³ then small values close to zero will have noticeably more weight than other values, modulo $\phi(\hat{N})$. To fix this issue, we instruct the Prover (and the simulator in the proof of zero-knowledge) to sample elements from $\pm 2^\ell \cdot N$. That way, modulo $\phi(\hat{N})$, the resulting distribution is $\frac{1}{2^\ell}$ -far from the uniform distribution in $\phi(N)$, by Fact E.7.

Choice of Moduli. With respect to our ECDSA protocol, for the Π^{enc} protocol, N_0 is the Paillier modulus of the Prover and \hat{N} is the Paillier modulus of the Verifier. And for the $\Pi^{\text{aff-g}}$ protocol, N_0, \hat{N} are the Paillier modulus of the Verifier, which is “reciever” of the homomorphic evaluation, and N_1 is the modulus of the Prover, which is the homomorphic “evaluator”. Consult the Pre-Signing protocol at Figure 7 for all details.

7 Security Analysis

In this section we show that our protocol UC-realizes a proactive ideal threshold signature functionality ($\mathcal{F}_{\text{tsig}}$ from Figure 19). The present section presumes familiarity with the UC framework (see Appendix B for a brief overview). We adopt the random oracle model for our security analysis and we assume that all hash values (e.g. for the Fiat-Shamir Heuristic) are obtained by querying the random oracle, defined next.

7.1 Global Random Oracle

We use the formalism of Canetti et al. [18], Camenisch et al. [9] for incorporating the random oracle model within the UC framework. This formalism accounts for the fact that the random oracle is an abstraction of an actual public hash function that is used globally across the analyzed system and its environment. Specifically the random oracle is modeled as an ideal functionality that is globally accessible, both in the real system *and also in the ideal system*. Canetti et al. [18], Camenisch et al. [9] provide a number of alternative formulations for the functionality that represents the random oracle. Here we use the simplest (and most restrictive) formulation, called the *strict random oracle*.²⁴

The functionality takes inputs of arbitrary size and is parametrized by the output length h . When queried on a new message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, the functionality returns a value uniformly chosen from $\{0, 1\}^h$. All future queries for m return the same value.

7.2 Ideal Threshold Signature Functionality

Next, we describe our ideal threshold signature functionality. The functionality is largely an adaptation of the (non-threshold) signature functionality from Canetti [11], with an important addition to account for proactive security. See Figure 19 for the formal description of the functionality.

²³If N has very small factors it’s not an issue. The more problematic range of parameters is (as a function of the security parameter κ) $\hat{N} = \hat{p}\hat{q}$ where $q \sim \text{poly}(\kappa)$ and $p \sim 2^\kappa / \text{poly}(\kappa)$

²⁴The fact that our analysis works even with the strict formalization of the random oracle means that it would work with any of the other (more elaborate) variants discussed in Canetti et al. [18], Camenisch et al. [9].

FIGURE 18 (The Global Random Oracle Functionality \mathcal{H})

Parameter: Output length h .

- On input (query, m) from machine \mathcal{X} , do:
 - If a tuple (m, a) is stored, then output (answer, a) to \mathcal{X} .
 - Else sample $a \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^h$ and store (m, a) .
- Output (answer, a) to \mathcal{X} .

Figure 18: The Global Random Oracle Functionality \mathcal{H}

High-Level Description. When activated by all parties, the functionality requests a public key X and a verification algorithm \mathcal{V} from the ideal-world adversary \mathcal{S} . Then, when all parties invoke the functionality to obtain a signature for some message m , the functionality requests a “signature” σ from \mathcal{S} and records that σ is a valid signature for m . Finally, when the functionality is asked to verify some signature σ for a message m , the functionality either returns true/false if the pair (m, σ) is recorded as valid/invalid, or it applies the verification algorithm \mathcal{V} and returns its output.

Proactive Security. The functionality is augmented with a corrupt/decorrupt and key-refresh interface capturing proactive security as follows: (1) the adversary may register parties as corrupted throughout the (ideal) process, (2) the adversary may decide to decorrupt parties, and those parties are recorded as “quarantined”, and (3) if the key-refresh interface is activated, then the functionality erases all records of quarantined players. At any point in time, if the functionality records that all parties are corrupted/quarantined simultaneously, then the functionality effectively cedes control of the verification process to the adversary.

7.3 Security Claims

We show that our protocol, for both subvariants (six vs three-round presign), UC-realizes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{tsig}}$ from Figure 19. Our proof follows by contraposition; under suitable cryptographic assumptions, we show that if our protocol does not UC-realize functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{tsig}}$, then there exists a PPT algorithm that can distinguish Paillier ciphertexts *or* there exists a PPT existential forger for the standard/enhanced ECDSA algorithm, in contradiction with the presumed security of the Paillier cryptosystem and the ECDSA signature scheme, respectively.

Theorem 7.1. *Assuming semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem, strong-RSA assumption, DDH, and existential unforgeability of ECDSA, it holds that the protocol from Figure 3 UC-realizes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{tsig}}$ from Figure 19 in the presence of the global random oracle functionality \mathcal{H} .²⁵*

Theorem 7.2. *Assuming semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem, strong-RSA assumption, DDH, and enhanced existential unforgeability of ECDSA, it holds that the protocol from Figure 4 UC-realizes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{tsig}}$ from Figure 19 in the presence of the global random oracle functionality \mathcal{H} .²⁵*

The rest of this section is dedicated to the analysis (simulators & proof) of Theorem 7.2. The analysis for Theorem 7.1 is essentially identical. The two subvariants of our protocol (six vs three-round presign) admit rather similar proofs. Therefore, we have made an attempt to write a single modular proof, where the simulator pointed to by the proof depends on which variant is executed. Wherever appropriate, we have added explanations and footnotes to clarify which claims or conditions only apply to one variant of the protocol and not the other.

7.3.1 Proof of Theorem 7.2

Theorem 7.2 is a corollary of the following two lemmas.

²⁵The DDH assumption only applies to the six-round presigning variant of the protocol.

FIGURE 19 (Ideal Threshold Signature Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{tsig}}$)

Key-generation:

1. Upon receiving $(\text{keygen}, \text{sid})$ from some party \mathcal{P}_i , interpret $\text{sid} = (\dots, \mathbf{P})$, where $\mathbf{P} = (\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n)$.
 - If $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{P}$, send to \mathcal{S} and record $(\text{keygen}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{P}_i)$.
 - Otherwise ignore the message.
2. Once $(\text{keygen}, \text{sid}, j)$ is recorded for all $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathbf{P}$, send $(\text{pubkey}, \text{sid})$ to the adversary \mathcal{S} and do:
 - (a) Upon receiving $(\text{pubkey}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{V})$ from \mathcal{S} , record $(\text{sid}, \mathcal{V})$.
 - (b) Upon receiving $(\text{pubkey}, \text{sid})$ from $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{P}$, output $(\text{pubkey}, \text{sid}, \mathcal{V})$ if it is recorded.
Else ignore the message.

Signing:

1. Upon receiving $(\text{sign}, \text{sid}, m)$ from \mathcal{P}_i , send to \mathcal{S} and record $(\text{sign}, \text{sid}, m, i)$.
2. Upon receiving $(\text{sign}, \text{sid}, m, j)$ from \mathcal{S} , record $(\text{sign}, \text{sid}, m, j)$ if \mathcal{P}_j is corrupted.
Else ignore the message.
3. Once $(\text{sign}, \text{sid}, m, i)$ is recorded for all $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{P}$, send $(\text{sign}, \text{sid}, m)$ to the adversary \mathcal{S} and do:
 - (a) Upon receiving $(\text{signature}, \text{sid}, m, \sigma, \mathcal{C})$ from \mathcal{S} , where $\mathcal{C} \in \mathbf{P}$:
 - If the tuple $(\text{sid}, m, \sigma, 0)$ is recorded, output an error.
 - Else, if $\mathcal{V}(m, \sigma) = 1$, then record $(\text{sid}, m, \sigma, 1)$.
 - Else (ie, $\mathcal{V}(m, \sigma) = 0$), if \mathcal{C} is corrupted then record \mathcal{C} as the exposed party for this signature.
 - Else record the lexicographically first corrupted party to be the exposed party for this signature. “Identifiability”
 - (b) Upon receiving $(\text{signature}, \text{sid}, m)$ from $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{P}$:
 - If $(\text{sid}, m, \sigma, 1)$ is recorded, output $(\text{signature}, \text{sid}, m, \sigma)$ to \mathcal{P}_i .
 - Else output the identity of the exposed party for this signature.

Verification:

- Upon receiving $(\text{sig-vrfy}, \text{sid}, m, \sigma, \mathcal{V})$ from a party \mathcal{Q} , send the tuple $(\text{sig-vrfy}, \text{sid}, m, \sigma, \mathcal{V})$ to \mathcal{S} and do:
- If a tuple (m, σ, β') is recorded, then set $\beta = \beta'$.
 - Else, if m was never signed and not all parties in \mathbf{P} are corrupted/quarantined, set $\beta = 0$. “Unforgeability”
 - Else, set $\beta = \mathcal{V}(m, \sigma, \mathcal{V})$.

Record (m, σ, β) and output $(\text{istrue}, \text{sid}, m, \sigma, \beta)$ to \mathcal{Q} .

Key-Refresh:

- Upon receiving **key-refresh** from $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{P}$, send **key-refresh** to \mathcal{S} , and do:
- If not all parties in \mathbf{P} are corrupted/quarantined, erase all records of $(\text{quarantine}, \dots)$.

Corruption/Decorruption:

1. Upon receiving $(\text{corrupt}, \mathcal{P}_j)$ from \mathcal{S} , record \mathcal{P}_j is corrupted.
2. Upon receiving $(\text{decorrupt}, \mathcal{P}_j)$ from \mathcal{S} :
 - If not all parties are corrupted/quarantined do:
 - If there is record that \mathcal{P}_j is corrupted, erase it and record $(\text{quarantine}, \mathcal{P}_j)$.
 - Else do nothing.

Figure 19: Ideal Threshold Signature Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{tsig}}$

Lemma 7.3. *If the protocol from Figure 4 does not UC-realize functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{tsig}}$ in the presence of the global random oracle functionality \mathcal{H} , then there exists an environment \mathcal{Z} that can forge signatures for previously unsigned messages in an execution of the protocol from Figure 4 in the presence of the global random oracle functionality \mathcal{H} .*

Proof. The claim is immediate, since the ideal-process simulation is perfect (c.f. Section 7.4.1). \square

Lemma 7.4. *The following holds assuming strong-RSA and DDH. If there exists an environment \mathcal{Z} that can forge signatures for previously unsigned messages in an execution of the protocol from Figure 4, then there exists algorithms \mathcal{R}_1 and \mathcal{R}_2 with blackbox access to \mathcal{Z} such that at least one of the items below is true in the presence of the global random oracle functionality \mathcal{H} .²⁵*

1. \mathcal{R}_1 wins the semantic security experiment for Paillier with probability noticeably greater than $1/2$.
2. \mathcal{R}_2 wins the enhanced existential unforgeability experiment for (non-threshold) ECDSA with noticeable probability.

Proof of Lemma 7.4. Let \mathcal{Z} denote environment that can forge signatures for previously unsigned messages in an execution of the protocol from Figure 4, and let $T \in \text{poly}$ denote an upper bound on the number of times the auxiliary-info phase is ran before the forgery takes place. Let N^1, \dots, N^T and (X, x) denote Paillier public keys and ECDSA key-pair respectively, sampled according to the specifications of the protocol, and let \mathcal{R}_1 and \mathcal{R}_2 denote the processes from Sections 7.4.2 and 7.4.3, respectively. Consider the following three experiments:

Experiment A. Run \mathcal{Z} with \mathcal{R}_1 on parameters (X, x) and $(N^k, c^k)_{k=1, \dots, T}$ where $c^k = \text{enc}_{N^k}(1)$.

Experiment B. Run \mathcal{Z} with \mathcal{R}_1 on parameters (X, x) and $(N^k, c^k)_{k=1, \dots, T}$ where $c^k = \text{enc}_{N^k}(0)$.

Experiment C. Run \mathcal{Z} with \mathcal{R}_2 on parameter X .

In words, process \mathcal{R}_1 , dubbed the *Paillier-distinguisher*, simulates an interaction of the honest parties with the environment as follows. In the key-generation phase, \mathcal{R}_1 chooses the master-secret key x , and chooses the honest parties secret keys such that the master public key is equal to $X = g^x$ (this step requires rewinding the environment). Next, at the beginning of each key-refresh phase, \mathcal{R}_1 chooses a random honest party \mathcal{P}_b and proceeds as follows. For all honest parties except \mathcal{P}_b , the simulation simply follows the instructions of the protocol. For \mathcal{P}_b , the simulation chooses Paillier keys drawn from $N^1 \dots, N^T$ (viewed as a stack) and its messages are computed by (1) extracting the environments' secrets and (2) using the homomorphic properties of the Paillier cryptosystem. To elaborate further on the latter, notice that \mathcal{R}_1 takes as input a sequence of ciphertexts c^1, \dots, c^T . The reason is that \mathcal{P}_b 's ciphertexts under its own key, say N^t , are computed as transformations on c^t , rather than as fresh encryptions. Furthermore, all of \mathcal{P}_b 's proofs are simulated using the relevant simulators and programming the oracle accordingly. Presigning and signing are simulated in a similar fashion.

Depending on the underlying plaintext value of c^t (either zero or one), the transcript of the interaction of \mathcal{R}_1 with \mathcal{Z} is either “true”, i.e. statistically close, modulo the El-Gamal commitment,²⁶ to the actual transcript of the real interaction between honest parties and environment, or it is “fake” because all of the special party's ciphertexts are encryptions of zero. Finally, we remark that the special party's identity is rerandomized with every refresh-phase, and, if the environment requests to corrupt the special party, the experiment is reset (by rewinding) to the last refresh.

Claim 7.5. *Assuming strong-RSA and DDH, if \mathcal{Z} outputs a forgery in an execution of the protocol from Figure 4 in time τ with probability α , then \mathcal{Z} outputs a forgery in experiment A in time $\tau \cdot n \log(n)$ with probability at least $\alpha^2/2 - \text{negl}(\kappa)$.²⁷*

Remark 7.6 (Some perspective on the parameters.). Observe that there is a $n \log(n)$ multiplicative blowup in the running time and the forgery probability decreased from α to $\alpha^2/2$. The security loss is due to the all the rewinding happening in the experiment. In more detail, we pay $n \log(n)$ in the running time for rewinding whenever the environment guesses the special party in any given epoch, and we pay α^2 in the forgery-probability for rewinding the ZK proofs. The $\alpha^2/2$ -loss is an artifact of the security analysis (because the simulator detects **Dec Error** only half of the time).

²⁶The El-Gamal commitment only applies to the six-round presigning variant of the protocol.

²⁷The DDH assumption only applies to the six-round presigning variant of the protocol.

Claim 7.7. *Assuming semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem, if \mathcal{Z} outputs a forgery in experiment A in time τ with probability α , then \mathcal{Z} outputs a forgery in experiment B in time τ with probability at least $\alpha - \text{negl}(\kappa)$.*

The second process \mathcal{R}_2 , dubbed the *ECDSA-Forgery*, simulates the interaction of the environment with the honest parties using only the public key and an enhanced signing oracle for plain (non-threshold) ECDSA, and it does not take any auxiliary input. The simulation proceeds as follows. In the key-generation phase, \mathcal{R}_2 chooses the honest parties' public keys such that the master public key is equal to X (this step requires rewinding the environment). To be more precise, the simulator chooses values as prescribed for all-but-one of the honest parties, and assigns public key share $X_b = X \cdot \prod_{j \neq b} X_j$ for the randomly chosen special party. The remaining stages of the protocol are simulated in a similar fashion (by ‘‘compensating’’ for the unknown values using the special party) with the following important difference:

1. The presigning simulation invokes the enhanced oracle to obtain a point on the curve for (future) signing.
2. The signing simulation requests signatures from the oracle for points that were released earlier.
3. In case the adversary triggers a **red alert** (by submitting faulty δ 's and Z 's), the simulator discards the nonce (the R) that was received by the ECDSA oracle, and rather sends Γ 's for which he knows the discrete log (and sets all other values accordingly, including k). That way, during the identification process, the simulator is able to report ‘‘true’’ values for the failed transcript.²⁸

Finally, similarly to the Paillier distinguisher, we remark that the special party's identity is rerandomized with every refresh-phase and the experiment is reset (by rewinding) to the last refresh, whenever the environment requests to corrupt the special party.

Claim 7.8. *If \mathcal{Z} outputs a forgery in experiment B in time τ with probability α , then \mathcal{Z} outputs a forgery in experiment C in time τ with probability α .*

□

7.4 Simulators

In this section, we formally describe the UC-simulation, as well as two separate reductions to the semantic security of the Paillier cryptosystem (\mathcal{R}_1) and the (enhanced) existential unforgeability of ECDSA (\mathcal{R}_2), respectively. In Section 7.5, we describe standalone simulators which are invoked by the aforementioned reductions for each of the different phases of our protocol. Each of these simulators is parametrized by a list \mathbf{L} of query-answer pairs for the (simulated) random oracle so far, as well as auxiliary data that depends on the reduction. For instance, when the Paillier distinguisher \mathcal{R}_1 invokes the standalone simulator for, say, the auxiliary info phase \mathcal{S}^2 , the reduction also supplies the simulator with the challenge (Paillier key-ciphertext pair (N, c)) for the distinguishing game it is trying to win.²⁹ Similarly, when the ECDSA forger \mathcal{R}_2 invokes the standalone simulator for, say, the key generation phase \mathcal{S}^1 , the reduction also supplies the simulator with the challenge (ECDSA public key X) for the existential forgery game it is trying to win.²⁹

7.4.1 UC Simulator

As mentioned in the introduction, the description of the ideal-process adversary is essentially trivial. Namely, the simulator samples all values for the honest parties as prescribed, and follows the instructions of the protocol, for every phase. In broad strokes:

1. At the end of the key generation phase, the simulator sends the obtained public key X together with the ECDSA verification algorithm to the functionality.
2. At the end of each signing phase for some message msg , the simulator sends the computed signature (r, σ) to the functionality.

²⁸Item 3 only applies to the six-round presigning variant of the protocol.

²⁹In turn, the standalone simulator ‘‘injects’’ the challenge into its interaction with the environment.

3. When the environment decides to corrupt/decorrupt a certain party, the simulator forwards the request to the functionality.
4. In case of fault, i.e. whenever the execution of some phase is aborted prematurely, report the corrupted party/parties as prescribed by the functionality.

7.4.2 Paillier Distinguisher (\mathcal{R}_1)

The Paillier distinguisher \mathcal{R}_1 is parametrized by $T \in \text{poly}(\kappa)$ which denotes an upper bound on the number of epochs and Paillier public keys and ciphertexts N^1, \dots, N^T and C^1, \dots, C^T , and an ECDSA key-pair (X, x) . Let ctr denote a counter variable initialized as $\text{ctr} = 0$. Let \mathbf{L} denote a list of query-answers that the simulator keeps in memory, initialized as an empty set. Algorithm \mathcal{R}_1 is defined by the following interaction with an environment \mathcal{Z} .

Oracle Calls.

Upon receiving $(\text{query}, m) = (\text{query}, \text{sid}', \text{rid}', \dots)$ from \mathcal{Z} , do:

1. If $(\text{sid}', \text{rid}') \neq (\text{sid}, \text{rid})$ return $(\text{answer}, a = \mathcal{H}(m))$.
2. Else if $m = ([\text{ssid}, j, \psi], N)$ resulting from a rewinding step, then:
 - Program the oracle and extract p, q such that $N = pq$ (c.f. Section 6.3.1).
 - Add the relevant tuple to \mathbf{L} .
3. Else
 - (a) If $(m, a) \in \mathbf{L}$, return (answer, a) .
 - (b) Else sample a uniformly at random, return (answer, a) and add (m, a) to \mathbf{L} .

Key-Generation.

The environment writes $(\text{keygen}, \text{sid} = (\dots, \mathbf{P}), i)$ on the input tape of \mathcal{P}_i , for each \mathcal{P}_i and corrupts a strict subset of parties $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$. Invoke $\mathcal{S}^1(\text{ssid}, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{L}, X)$ and obtain output and obtain output $b, \mathbf{L}, \text{rid}, \{x_k\}_{k \neq b}$. Set $x_b = x - \sum_{j \neq b} x_j \pmod q$.

Aux-Info.

The environment writes $(\text{aux-info}, \text{ssid}, \ell, i)$ on \mathcal{P}_i and corrupts a strict subset of parties $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$. Sample $N_0 = p_0 q_0$ according to the prescribed distribution and set $C_0 = (1 + N_0)\rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$ for $\rho \leftarrow [N_0]$. Set $\text{aux}_0 = (\{x_i\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}, N_0, C_0)$. Increment $\text{ctr} := \text{ctr} + 1$ and set $\text{aux} = (\{x_i\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}, N^{\text{ctr}}, C^{\text{ctr}})$.

1st Run. Invoke $\mathcal{S}^2(\text{ssid}, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{C}, \text{aux}_0)$. Once completed, if no other cheat is detected, verify that no **Dec Error** occurred by decrypting the relevant ciphertext.

2nd Run. Rewind the environment to step $(\star\star)$ of \mathcal{S}^2 , resample ρ_b and use input $(\text{ssid}, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{C}, \text{aux})$. Obtain output b and $\{Y_j, N_j, s_j, t_j\}_{j \in \mathbf{P}}$ and retrieve and/or reassign $\{(p_j, q_j), x_j, y_j\}_{j \neq b}$, and $x_b = x - \sum_{j \neq b} x_j$.

Presigning.

The environment writes $(\text{pre-sign}, \text{ssid}, \ell, i)$ on \mathcal{P}_i and corrupts a strict subset of parties $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$. Sample k_b and $\gamma_b \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and set $\mathbf{x}^{\setminus b} = (x_j)_{j \neq b}$, $\mathbf{y}^{\setminus b} = (y_j)_{j \neq b}$ and $\text{aux} = (c^{\text{ctr}}, k_b, x_b, \gamma_b)$.

- (a) Invoke $\mathcal{S}^3(\text{ssid}, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{C}, b, \mathbf{x}^{\setminus b}, \mathbf{y}^{\setminus b}, \text{aux})$ for the six-round variant of the presign.
- (b) Or invoke $\hat{\mathcal{S}}^3$ for the three-round variant of the presign on the relevant input.

Signing.

The environment writes $(\text{sign}, \text{ssid}, \ell, m, i)$ on \mathcal{P}_i and corrupts $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$.

1. Retrieve R and $\{(k_i, \chi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}$, set $r = R_\ell|_{x\text{-axis}}$.
2. Hand over $\{(\text{ssid}, i, \sigma_i = k_i m + r \chi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}$.

Errors for Signing from Three-Round Presign. ³⁰

If the signature-string does not verify:

- For $\mathcal{P}_i \notin \mathcal{C} \cup \{\mathcal{P}_b\}$, compute all values as prescribed and send the data to \mathcal{Z} .
- For \mathcal{P}_b , set $\hat{H}_b = K_b^{x_b} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0)$, invoke the relevant ZK simulators to generate the corresponding proofs and send the relevant data to \mathcal{Z} .

Dynamic Corruptions.

- If \mathcal{Z} corrupts $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, then reveal that party's (simulated) secret state.
- Else go back to (\star) at the beginning of of the last invocation of simulator \mathcal{S}^2 .

Erase all items added to \mathbf{L} since then.

7.4.3 ECDSA Forger (\mathcal{R}_2)

Our ECDSA forger \mathcal{R}_2 is parametrized by a public key X , and is defined by the following interaction with an environment \mathcal{Z} and an enhanced ECDSA signing oracle for public key X . Let \mathbf{L} denote a list of query-answers that the simulator keeps in memory, initialized as empty.

Oracle Calls.

Upon receiving $(\text{query}, m) = (\text{query}, \text{sid}', \text{rid}', \dots)$ from \mathcal{Z} , do:

1. If $(\text{sid}', \text{rid}') \neq (\text{sid}, \text{rid})$ return $(\text{answer}, a = \mathcal{H}(m))$.
2. Else if $m = ([\text{ssid}, j, \psi], N)$ resulting from a rewinding step, then:
 - Program the oracle and extract p, q such that $N = pq$ (c.f. Section 6.3.1).
 - Add the relevant tuple to \mathbf{L} .
3. Else
 - (a) If $(m, a) \in \mathbf{L}$, return (answer, a) .
 - (b) Else sample a uniformly at random, return (answer, a) and add (m, a) to \mathbf{L} .

Key-Generation.

The environment writes $(\text{keygen}, \text{sid} = (\dots, \mathbf{P}), i)$ on the input tape of \mathcal{P}_i , for each \mathcal{P}_i and corrupts a strict subset of parties $\mathcal{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$. Invoke $\mathcal{S}^1(\text{sid}, \mathcal{C}, \mathbf{L}, X)$ and obtain output and obtain output $b, \mathbf{L}, \text{rid}, \{x_k\}_{k \neq b}$ and $\mathbf{X} = (X_1, \dots)$.

Aux-Info.

The environment writes $(\text{aux-info}, \text{ssid} = (\text{sid}, \text{rid}, \dots), i)$ on \mathcal{P}_i and corrupts a strict subset of parties $\mathcal{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$. Invoke $\mathcal{S}^2(\text{ssid}, \mathbf{L}, \mathcal{C}, \perp)$. Once the simulation terminates, rewind the environment to step $(\star\star)$ of \mathcal{S}^2 and resample ρ_b . Output b and $\{Y_j, N_j, s_j, t_j, \}_{j \in \mathbf{P}}$, retrieve and/or reassign $(p_j, q_j)_{j \in \mathbf{P}}$ and $\{x_j, y_j\}_{j \neq b}$.

Presigning.

The environment writes $(\text{pre-sign}, \text{ssid}, \ell, i)$ on \mathcal{P}_i and corrupts parties $\mathcal{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$.

Set $\mathbf{x}^b = (x_j)_{j \neq b}$, and do:

- (a) Call the ECDSA oracle to obtain a point $R \in \mathbb{G}$. Sample $\delta \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and set $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$.
- (b) Invoke \mathcal{S}^3 for the six-round or $\hat{\mathcal{S}}^3$ for the three-round variant of the presign.

Signing.

The environment writes $(\text{sign}, \text{ssid}, \ell, m, i)$ on the input tape of \mathcal{P}_i and corrupts $\mathcal{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$.

- Retrieve $(\text{ssid}, \ell, \eta^0, \eta^1)$ and $(\text{ssid}, \ell, R, k_i, \chi_i)_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$.

³⁰Only applies to the three-round presigning variant of the protocol.

- Call the ECDSA oracle to sign m on point R to obtain signature (r, σ) and do:
 - (a) For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute σ_i as prescribed and hand over $(ssid, i, \sigma_i)$.
 - (b) For \mathcal{P}_b , set $\sigma_b = \sigma - m\eta^0 - r\eta^1$ and hand over $(ssid, b, \sigma_b)$.

Errors for Signing from Three-Round Presign. ³¹

If the signature-string does not verify:

- For $\mathcal{P}_i \notin \mathbf{C} \cup \{\mathcal{P}_b\}$, compute all values as prescribed and send the data to \mathcal{Z} .
- For \mathcal{P}_b , set $\hat{H}_b = \text{enc}_b(0)$, invoke the relevant ZK simulators to generate the corresponding proofs and send the relevant data to \mathcal{Z} .

Dynamic Corruptions.

- If \mathcal{Z} corrupts $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, then reveal that party's (simulated) secret state.
 - Else go back to (\star) in round 2 of the auxiliary info simulator \mathcal{S}^2 .
- Erase all items added to \mathbf{L} since then.

7.5 Standalone Simulators

Notation 7.9. Write \mathcal{S}^{prt} for the ZK-simulator of Π^{prt} , where $\text{prt} \in \{\text{sch}, \text{mul}, \text{log}, \text{elog}, \text{dec}, \text{log}^*_j, \text{enc}, \text{aff}\}$.

7.5.1 Key-Generation Simulator (\mathcal{S}^1)

The simulator $\mathcal{S}^1(sid, \mathbf{C}, \mathbf{L}, X)$ takes input the session identifier sid , a list \mathbf{L} for the (simulated) oracle query-answers, a set of parties $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$ and proceeds as follows.

Round 1.

- Initialize $\text{ext} = 0$.
- Sample $\{V_i\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}$ in the prescribed domain and send (sid, i, V_i) to \mathcal{Z} , for each $\mathcal{P}_i \notin \mathbf{C}$.

Round 2.

- (\dagger) When obtaining (sid, j, V_j) for all $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathbf{C}$,
1. If $\text{ext} = 0$ compute all values as prescribed and hand over $\{(sid, i, rid_i, X_i, A_i, u_i)\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}$ to \mathcal{Z}
 2. Else choose $\mathcal{P}_b \leftarrow \mathbf{P} \setminus \mathbf{C}$ uniformly at random and let $\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{P} \setminus \mathbf{C} \cup \{\mathcal{P}_b\}$ and do:
 - (a) For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, sample all items as prescribed and hand over $(sid, i, rid_i, X_i, A_i, u_i)$ to \mathcal{Z} .
 - (b) For special party \mathcal{P}_b , set $X_b = X \cdot \prod_{j \neq b} X_j^{-1}$.
 Invoke ZK simulator $\psi_b = (A_b, \dots) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{sch}}(X_b, \dots)$.
 Hand over $(sid, b, rid_b, X_b, A_b, u_b)$ to \mathcal{Z} , where (rid_b, u_b) are sampled as prescribed.
 Add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} .

Round 3.

When obtaining all tuples $(sid, j, rid_j, X_j, A_j, u_j)$, for every $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathbf{C}$, add $\{\psi_j\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$ to \mathbf{E} and do:
 Set $rid = \oplus_j rid_j$ and hand over $\{(sid, i, \psi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}$ to \mathcal{Z} . Add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L}

Output.

1. If $\text{ext} = 0$, set $\text{ext} = 1$ and go back to (\dagger) in round 2. Delete the pairs added to \mathbf{L} since that point.
2. Else, extract $\{x_j\}_{j \notin \mathbf{C}}$.
 Output $b, \mathbf{L}, rid, \{x_k\}_{k \neq b}$.

³¹Only applies to the three-round presigning variant of the protocol.

7.5.2 Auxiliary Info. & Key-Refresh Simulator (\mathcal{S}^2)

The auxiliary info. simulator $\mathcal{S}^2(ssid, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{C}, \text{aux})$ takes input $ssid = (sid, rid, \dots)$, a list \mathbf{L} for the (simulated) oracle query-answers, a set of parties $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$, and auxiliary information $\text{aux} = \perp$ or $\text{aux} = (\{x_i\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}, N^*, C)$.

Round 1.

- (\star) Choose $\mathcal{P}_b \leftarrow \mathbf{P} \setminus \mathbf{C}$ uniformly at random and set $\mathbf{H} = \mathbf{P} \setminus \mathbf{C} \cup \{\mathcal{P}_b\}$.
Sample V_i at random and hand over $(ssid, i, V_i)$ to \mathcal{Z} , for all $i \notin \mathbf{C}$.

Round 2.

($\star\star$) When obtaining $(ssid, j, V_j)$ for all $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{C}$.

1. If $\text{aux} \neq \perp$, set $N_b = N^*$ and do
 - Sample $\{x_i^k\}_k$ uniformly subject to $0 = \sum_k x_i^k$ and set $\{X_i^k = g^{x_i^k}\}_k$.
 - Sample $Y_b \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$ and set $\pi_b = (B_b, \dots) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{sch}}(Y_b, \dots)$.
 - Sample all other items as prescribed.
2. If $\text{aux} = \perp$, retrieve $\{\mathbf{X}_j\}_{j \in \mathbf{P}}$, and do:
 - Sample $\{x_i^*\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ and $\{x_i^k\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}, k \neq b, i}$ uniformly at random, and set $x_b^b = -\sum_{k \neq b} x_b^k$.
 - Set $\{X_i^* = g^{x_i^*}\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ and $\{X_i^k = g^{x_i^k}\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}, k \neq b, i}$ and $X_b^b = g^{x_b^b}$.
 - For $i \in \mathbf{H}$, assign X_i^i, X_i^b subject to

$$X_i^* = X_i \cdot \prod_k X_k^i, \quad \text{id}_{\mathbb{G}} = \prod_k X_k^k.$$

- Set $\psi_i^i = (A_i^i, \dots) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{sch}}(X_i^i, \dots)$ and $\psi_i^b = (A_i^b, \dots) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{sch}}(X_i^b, \dots)$ for $i \in \mathbf{H}$.
- Sample $Y_b \leftarrow \mathbb{G}$ and set $\pi_b = (B_b, \dots) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{sch}}(Y_b, \dots)$.
- Sample all other items as prescribed.

Add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} and hand over $(ssid, i, \mathbf{X}_i, \mathbf{A}_i, Y_i, B_i, N_i, s_i, t_i, \hat{\psi}_i, \rho_i, u_i)$ for all $i \notin \mathbf{C}$.

Round 3.

When obtaining all tuples $(ssid, j, \mathbf{X}_j, \mathbf{A}_j, Y_j, B_j, N_j, s_j, t_j, \hat{\psi}_j, \rho_j, u_j)$ for every $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathbf{C}$, do:

1. If $\text{aux} \neq \perp$, sample all items as prescribed and do:
 - Set $\{C_i^k = \text{enc}_k(x_i^k)\}_{k \neq i, b}$ and $C_i^b = C_i^{x_i^b} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0)$.
 - Invoke the ZK-simulators

$$\begin{cases} \psi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{mod}}(N_b, \dots) \\ \phi_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{fac}}(\ell, N_b, \dots), \quad j \neq b \end{cases}$$

and $\{\psi_i \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{sch}}(X_i^b, \dots)\}_{j \neq i}$, compute all other proofs as prescribed.

2. If $\text{aux} = \perp$, sample all items as prescribed for each $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, and do:
 - Set $\{C_i^k = \text{enc}_k(x_i^k)\}_{k \neq i, b}$ and $C_i^b = \text{enc}_b(0)$.
 - Invoke the ZK-simulators

$$\begin{cases} \psi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{mod}}(N_b, \dots) \\ \phi_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{fac}}(\ell, N_b, \dots), \quad j \neq b \end{cases}$$

and $\{\psi_i \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{sch}}(X_i^b, \dots)\}_{j \neq i}$, compute all other proofs as prescribed.

Add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} and hand over $(ssid, i, \psi_i, \phi_{j,i}, C_i^1, \dots)$ for all $\mathcal{P}_i \notin \mathbf{C}$ and $\mathcal{P}_j \in \mathbf{C}$.

Output. Output $b \in \mathbf{P}$ and $\{Y_j, N_j, s_j, t_j\}_{j \in \mathbf{P}}$.

7.5.3 Presigning Simulator (\mathcal{S}^3) for Six-Round Presign

The presigning simulator $\mathcal{S}^3(ssid, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{C}, b, \mathbf{x}^{\setminus b}, \text{aux})$ takes inputs $ssid = (\dots, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$, a list \mathbf{L} for the (simulated) oracle query-answers, a set of parties $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$, an index b and $\mathbf{x}^{\setminus b} = (x_j)_{j \neq b}$, $\mathbf{y}^{\setminus b} = (y_j)_{j \neq b}$ such that $\mathcal{P}_b \notin \mathbf{C}$ and $g^{x_j} = X_j$ and $g^{y_j} = Y_j$ for $j \neq b$, and auxiliary information $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$ or $\text{aux} = (c, x_b, k_b, \gamma_b)$.

Round 1.

1. For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all items as prescribed and hand over $(ssid, i, K_i, G_i, \mathbf{Z}_i, \psi_{j,i}^0)$ to \mathcal{Z} , for $j \neq i$.
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , sample $\mathbf{Z}_b \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^2$ and set

$$K_b = \begin{cases} c^{k_b} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{if } \text{aux} \neq (R, \delta) \\ \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$G_b = \begin{cases} c^{\gamma_b} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{if } \text{aux} \neq (R, \delta) \\ \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Invoke the ZK-simulators $\psi_{j,b}^0 \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{enc-elg}}(K_b, \dots)$.

Hand over $(ssid, b, K_b, G_b, \mathbf{Z}_b, \psi_{j,b}^0)$ to \mathcal{Z} , for $j \neq b$, and add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} .

Round 2. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, K_j, G_j, \dots)$ for $j \in \mathbf{C}$ retrieve (k_j, γ_j) .

When obtaining all relevant tuples, do:

1. For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all values are computed as prescribed.
Send the tuple $(ssid, i, D_{j,i}, F_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i}, \hat{F}_{j,i}, \psi_{j,i}, \hat{\psi}_{j,i})$ to \mathcal{Z} , for each $j \neq i$,
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , sample $\{(\alpha_{\ell,b}, \hat{\alpha}_{\ell,b}) \leftarrow \mathcal{J}^2\}_{\ell \neq b}$ and set $\hat{D}_{\ell,b} = \text{enc}_\ell(\hat{\alpha}_{\ell,b})$ and $D_{\ell,b} = \text{enc}_j(\alpha_{\ell,b})$, and

$$\hat{F}_{b,\ell} = \begin{cases} c^{k_\ell x_b - \hat{\alpha}_{\ell,b}} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{if } x_b \neq \perp \\ \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$F_{b,\ell} = \begin{cases} c^{k_\ell \gamma_b - \alpha_{\ell,b}} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{if } \gamma_b \neq \perp \\ \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Then, for each $j \neq b$, invoke the ZK-simulator

$$\begin{cases} \psi_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{aff}}(D_{j,b}, K_j, \dots), \\ \hat{\psi}_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{aff}}(\hat{D}_{j,b}, K_j, \dots) \end{cases}$$

Hand over the tuple $(ssid, b, D_{j,b}, F_{j,b}, \hat{D}_{j,b}, \hat{F}_{j,b}, \psi_{j,b}, \hat{\psi}_{j,b})$, for $j \neq b$.

Add the relevant pairs for the corresponding oracle calls to \mathbf{L} .

Round 3. Upon receiving all $(ssid, j, D_{i,j}, F_{i,j}, \hat{D}_{i,j}, \hat{F}_{i,j}, \psi_{i,j}, \hat{\psi}_{i,j})$ for $j \in \mathbf{C}$, $i \notin \mathbf{C}$, do:

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$ retrieve $\{\alpha_{j,b}, \hat{\alpha}_{j,b}, \beta_{j,b}, \hat{\beta}_{j,b}\}_{j \neq b}$ from $\{F_{b,j}, \hat{F}_{b,j}\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$, and set

$$\begin{cases} \eta^0 = \sum_{j \neq b} k_j \\ \eta^1 = \sum_{j, i \neq b} k_i x_j + \sum_{j \neq b} \hat{\alpha}_{j,b} + \hat{\beta}_{j,b} \\ \delta_b = \delta - \sum_{j \neq b} \alpha_{j,b} + \beta_{j,b} + \sum_{i, j \neq b} k_i \gamma_j \\ \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_b \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^2 \end{cases}$$

Hand over $\{(ssid, i, \delta_i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i)\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}$ to \mathcal{Z} , where $\{\delta_i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ are computed as prescribed.

2. Else, retrieve $\{\alpha_{j,b}, \hat{\alpha}_{j,b}, \beta_{j,b}, \hat{\beta}_{j,b}\}_{j \neq b}$ from $\{F_{b,j}, \hat{F}_{b,j}\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$, and set

$$\begin{cases} \chi_b = k_b x_b + \sum_{j \neq b} (k_b x_j - \hat{\beta}_{j,b}) + (k_j x_b - \hat{\alpha}_{j,b}) \\ \delta_b = k_b \gamma_b + \sum_{j \neq b} (k_b \gamma_j - \beta_{j,b}) + (k_j \gamma_b - \alpha_{j,b}) \\ \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_b \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^2 \end{cases} .$$

Hand over $\{(ssid, i, \delta_i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ to \mathcal{Z} , where $\{\delta_i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ are computed as prescribed.

Round 4. When obtaining $\{(ssid, i, \delta_i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i)\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$ retrieve $\{g^{x_j}\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$ from $\{y_j, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$.

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$, set

$$\chi_{\mathcal{C}} = \sum_{j, \ell \in \mathcal{C}} k_j x_\ell + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}, \ell \notin \mathcal{C}} \alpha_{j, \ell} + \beta_{j, \ell} \pmod q$$

(a) If $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} \delta_j = \delta$ and $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{C}} g^{x_j} = g^{\chi_{\mathcal{C}}}$

- Set $\Gamma_b = R^\delta \cdot \prod_{i \neq b} g^{-\gamma_i}$ invoke the ZK simulator $\{\psi'_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{log}^*}(\Gamma_b, g, G_b, \dots)\}_{j \in \mathcal{P}}$.
- Set $\{(ssid, i, \Gamma_j, \psi'_{j,i})\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}, j \in \mathcal{P}}$ as prescribed.

Hand over $\{(ssid, i, \Gamma_j, \psi'_{j,i})\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}, j \in \mathcal{P}}$ to \mathcal{Z} and add the relevant pairs to \mathbf{L} .

(b) Else

- Sample $k \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and set $\gamma = \delta \cdot k^{-1}$ and

$$\begin{cases} k_b = k - \sum_{i \neq b} k_i \\ \gamma_b = \gamma - \sum_{i \neq b} \gamma_i \\ \Gamma_b = g^{\gamma_b} \\ S_b = X \cdot g^{-k\chi_{\mathcal{C}}} \prod_{i \in \mathcal{H}} g^{-k\chi_i} \\ \alpha_{b, \ell} = k_b \gamma_\ell + \beta_{\ell, b} & \text{for } \ell \neq b \\ \hat{\alpha}_{b, \ell} = k_b x_\ell + \hat{\beta}_{\ell, b} & \text{for } \ell \neq b \end{cases}$$

- Set $\{\psi'_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{log}^*}(\Gamma_b, g, G_b, \dots)\}_{j \in \mathcal{P}}$ and assign $\{(ssid, i, \Gamma_j, \psi'_{j,i})\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}, j \in \mathcal{P}}$ as prescribed.
- Hand over $\{(ssid, i, \Gamma_j, \psi'_{j,i})\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}, j \in \mathcal{P}}$ to \mathcal{Z} and add the relevant pairs to \mathbf{L} .

2. Else send $\{(ssid, i, \Gamma_j, \psi'_{j,i})\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}, j \in \mathcal{P}}$ to \mathcal{Z} where all values are computed as prescribed.

Round 5. When obtaining $\{(ssid, j, \Gamma_j, \psi'_{j,i})\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}, i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ do

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$ and $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} \delta_j = \delta$ and $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{C}} g^{x_j} = g^{\chi_{\mathcal{C}}}$

- Set $\Delta_b = g^\delta \cdot \prod_{j \neq b} \Gamma_j^{k_j}$ and Invoke ZK-simulator $\psi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{elog}}(Y_b, \mathbf{Z}_b, \Delta_b, \Gamma, \dots)$.
- Send $\{(ssid, i, \Delta_i, \psi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$, where $\{\Delta_i, \psi_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ are computed as prescribed.
- Add the relevant pairs for the corresponding oracle calls to \mathbf{L} .

2. Else send $(ssid, i, \Delta_i, \psi_i)$ for all $\mathcal{P}_i \notin \mathcal{C}$, where all values are computed as prescribed.

Round 6. When obtaining $\{(ssid, j, \Delta_j, \psi_j)\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$ do

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$ and $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} \delta_j = \delta$ and $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{C}} g^{x_j} = g^{\chi_{\mathcal{C}}}$

- Set $S_b = X \cdot R^{-\chi_{\mathcal{C}}} \prod_{i \in \mathcal{H}} R^{-\chi_i}$ and invoke ZK-simulator $\pi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{elog}}(Y_b, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_b, S_b, R, \dots)$.
- Send $\{(ssid, i, S_i, \pi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$, where $\{S_i, \pi_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ are computed as prescribed.
- Add the relevant pairs for the corresponding oracle calls to \mathbf{L} .

2. Else

- Invoke ZK-simulator $\pi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{elog}}(Y_b, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_b, S_b, R, \dots)$.
- Send $\{(ssid, i, S_i, \pi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$, where $\{S_i, \pi_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ are computed as prescribed.
- Add the relevant pairs for the corresponding oracle calls to \mathbf{L} .

Output. Upon receiving all $(ssid, j, S_j, \pi_j)$ for $j \in \mathcal{C}$, do:

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$, output $(ssid, \ell, \eta^0, \eta^1)$ and $(ssid, \ell, R, k_i, \chi_i)_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ and $\{\bar{R}_j, S_j\}_j$.
2. Else, set $R = \Gamma^{(\sum_j \delta_j)^{-1}}$ and output $(ssid, \ell, R, k_i, \chi_i)_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ and $\{\bar{R}_j, S_j\}_j$.

Red Alert #1. When failing the nonce generation:

1. For $P_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all values as prescribed and
 - Send $(ssid, i, k_i, \tilde{\rho}_i, \psi_i, \gamma_i, (\alpha_{i,j}, \tilde{\mu}_i, \psi_{i,j})_{j \neq i})$ to \mathcal{Z} .
2. For \mathcal{P}_b ,
 - Set $\tilde{\rho}_b = K_b \cdot (1 + N_b)^{-k_b}$ and $\{\tilde{\mu}_{b,j} = D_{b,j} \cdot (1 + N_b)^{-\alpha_{b,j}}\}_{j \neq b}$
 - Invoke ZK-simulator $\psi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{Nth}}(N_i, \tilde{\rho}_b, \dots)$ and $\{\psi_{b,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{Nth}}(N_i, \tilde{\mu}_{b,j}, \dots)\}$.
 - Send $(ssid, b, k_b, \tilde{\rho}_b, \psi_b, \gamma_b, (\alpha_{b,j}, \tilde{\mu}_b, \psi_{b,j})_{j \neq b})$ to \mathcal{Z} .
 Add the relevant pairs for the corresponding oracle calls to \mathbf{L} .

Red Alert #2. When failing the pseudo-keys check:

1. For $P_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all values as prescribed and
 - Send $(ssid, i, k_i, \tilde{\rho}_i, \psi_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \psi'_i, (\hat{\alpha}_{i,j}, \tilde{\mu}_i, \psi_{i,j})_{j \neq i})$ to \mathcal{Z} .
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , interpret $\hat{\mathbf{Z}}_b = (B_b, M_b)$ and set $\tilde{Y}_b = M_b \cdot \left(X_b^{k_b} \prod_{j \neq b} g^{\hat{\alpha}_{b,j}} X_b^{k_j} g^{-\hat{\alpha}_{j,b}} \right)^{-1}$
 - Set $\tilde{\rho}_b = K_b \cdot (1 + N_b)^{-k_b}$, $\{\tilde{\mu}_{b,j} = D_{b,j} \cdot (1 + N_b)^{-\hat{\alpha}_{b,j}}\}_{j \neq b}$
 - Invoke $\psi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{Nth}}(N_i, \tilde{\rho}_b, \dots)$, $\{\psi_{b,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{Nth}}(N_i, \tilde{\mu}_{b,j}, \dots)\}$, $\psi'_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{log}}(B_b, Y_b, \tilde{Y}_b, \dots)$
 - Send $(ssid, b, k_b, \tilde{\rho}_b, \psi_b, \tilde{Y}_b, \psi'_b, (\hat{\alpha}_{b,j}, \tilde{\mu}_b, \psi_{b,j})_{j \neq i})$ to \mathcal{Z} .
 Add the relevant pairs for the corresponding oracle calls to \mathbf{L} .

7.5.4 Presigning Simulator ($\hat{\mathcal{S}}^3$) for Three-Round Presign

The presigning simulator $\hat{\mathcal{S}}^3(ssid, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{C}, b, \mathbf{x}^{\setminus b}, \text{aux})$ takes inputs $ssid = (\dots, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$, a list \mathbf{L} for the (simulated) oracle query-answers, a set of parties $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$, an index b and $\mathbf{x}^{\setminus b} = (x_j)_{j \neq b}$ such that $\mathcal{P}_b \notin \mathbf{C}$ and $g^{x_j} = X_j$ for $j \neq b$, and auxiliary information $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$ or $\text{aux} = (c, x_b, k_b, \gamma_b)$.

Round 1.

1. For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all items as prescribed and hand over $(ssid, i, K_i, G_i, \psi_{j,i}^0)$ to \mathcal{Z} .
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , proceed as follows:
 - Set

$$K_b = \begin{cases} c^{k_b} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{if } \text{aux} \neq (R, \delta) \\ \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$G_b = \begin{cases} c^{\gamma_b} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{if } \text{aux} \neq (R, \delta) \\ \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- Invoke the ZK-simulators $\psi_{j,b}^0 \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{enc}}(K_b, \dots)$.

Hand over $(ssid, b, K_b, G_b, \psi_{j,b}^0)$ to \mathcal{Z} and add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} .

Round 2. Upon receiving $\{(ssid, j, K_j, G_j, \dots)\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}, i \notin \mathbf{C}}$ retrieve $\{(k_j, \gamma_j)\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$.

1. For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all values as prescribed.
 - Hand over the tuple $(ssid, i, \Gamma_i, D_{j,i}, F_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i}, \hat{F}_{j,i}, \psi_{j,i}, \hat{\psi}_{j,i}, \psi'_{j,i})$ to \mathcal{Z} , for each $j \neq i$.
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , sample $\{(\alpha_{\ell,b}, \hat{\alpha}_{\ell,b}) \leftarrow \mathcal{J}^2\}_{\ell \neq b}$ and do
 - Set $\hat{D}_{\ell,b} = \text{enc}_\ell(\hat{\alpha}_{\ell,b})$ and $D_{\ell,b} = \text{enc}_j(\alpha_{\ell,b})$, and

$$\hat{F}_{b,\ell} = \begin{cases} c^{k_\ell x_b - \hat{\alpha}_{\ell,b}} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{if } x_b \neq \perp \\ \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$F_{b,\ell} = \begin{cases} c^{k_\ell \gamma_b - \alpha_{\ell,b}} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{if } \gamma_b \neq \perp \\ \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

$$\Gamma_b = \begin{cases} g^{\gamma_b} & \text{if } \gamma_b \neq \perp \\ R^\delta \cdot g^{-\sum_{j \neq b} \gamma_j} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

- For each $j \neq b$, invoke the ZK-simulator

$$\begin{cases} \psi_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{aff}}(D_{j,b}, K_j, \dots), \\ \hat{\psi}_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{aff}}(\hat{D}_{j,b}, K_j, \dots) \\ \psi'_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{log}^*}(\Gamma_b, g, G_b, \dots) \end{cases}$$

Hand over the tuple $(ssid, b, \Gamma_b, D_{j,b}, F_{j,b}, \hat{D}_{j,b}, \hat{F}_{j,b}, \psi_{j,b}, \hat{\psi}_{j,b}, \psi'_{j,b})$, for each $j \neq b$.

Add the relevant pairs for the corresponding oracle calls to \mathbf{L} .

Round 3. Upon receiving all $(ssid, j, \Gamma_j, D_{i,j}, F_{i,j}, \hat{D}_{i,j}, \hat{F}_{i,j}, \psi_{i,j}, \hat{\psi}_{i,j}, \psi'_{i,j})$ for $j \in \mathbf{C}, i \notin \mathbf{C}$, do:

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$, retrieve $\{\alpha_{j,b}, \hat{\alpha}_{j,b}, \beta_{j,b}, \hat{\beta}_{j,b}\}_{j \neq b}$ from $\{F_{b,j}, \hat{F}_{b,j}\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$, and do
 - Set $\Delta_b = g^\delta \cdot \prod_{j \neq b} \Gamma^{k_j}$ and set

$$\begin{cases} \eta^0 = \sum_{j \neq b} k_j \\ \eta^1 = \sum_{j, i \neq b} k_i x_j + \sum_{j \neq b} \hat{\alpha}_{j,b} + \hat{\beta}_{j,b} \\ \delta_b = \delta - \sum_{j \neq b} \alpha_{j,b} + \beta_{j,b} + \sum_{i, j \neq b} k_i \gamma_j \end{cases}$$

- Invoke ZK-simulator $\psi''_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{log}^*}(\Delta_b, \Gamma, K_b, \dots)$, for $j \neq b$.
- Compute $\{\delta_i, \Delta_i, \psi''_{j,i}\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ as prescribed.

Hand over $\{(ssid, i, \delta_i, \Delta_i, \psi''_{j,i})\}_{j \neq i}$ to \mathcal{Z} and add the relevant pairs to \mathbf{L} .

2. Else, retrieve $\{\alpha_{j,b}, \hat{\alpha}_{j,b}, \beta_{j,b}, \hat{\beta}_{j,b}\}_{j \neq b}$ from $\{F_{b,j}, \hat{F}_{b,j}\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$, and do:
 - Set

$$\begin{cases} \chi_b = k_b x_b + \sum_{j \neq b} (k_b x_j - \hat{\beta}_{j,b}) + (k_j x_b - \hat{\alpha}_{j,b}) \\ \delta_b = k_b \gamma_b + \sum_{j \neq b} (k_b \gamma_j - \beta_{j,b}) + (k_j \gamma_b - \alpha_{j,b}) \end{cases}$$

- Invoke ZK-simulator $\psi''_{j,b} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{log}^*}(\Delta_b, \Gamma, K_b, \dots)$, for $j \neq b$.
- Compute $\{\delta_i, \Delta_i, \psi''_{j,i}\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ as prescribed.

Hand over $\{(ssid, i, \delta_i, \Delta_i, \psi''_{j,i})\}_{j \neq i}$ to \mathcal{Z} and add the relevant pairs to \mathbf{L} .

Output. Upon receiving all $(ssid, j, \delta_j, \Delta_j, \psi''_{i,j})$ for $j \in \mathbf{C}, i \notin \mathbf{C}$, do:

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$, output $(ssid, \ell, \eta^0, \eta^1)$ and $(ssid, \ell, R, k_i, \chi_i)_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$.
2. Else, set $R = \Gamma^{(\sum_j \delta_j)^{-1}}$ and output $(ssid, \ell, R, k_i, \chi_i)_{i \notin \mathbf{C}}$.

Errors. When failing the nonce generation:

- For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all values as prescribed and send the data to \mathcal{Z} .
- For \mathcal{P}_b , proceed as follows:
 - (a) If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$, set $H_b = \text{enc}_b(0)$, invoke the relevant ZK simulators to generate the corresponding proofs and send the relevant data to \mathcal{Z} .
 - (b) Else, set $H_b = K_b^{\gamma_b} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0)$, invoke the relevant ZK simulators to generate the corresponding proofs and send the relevant data to \mathcal{Z} .

Add the relevant pairs for the corresponding oracle calls to \mathbf{L} .

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A A Lightweight Protocol for UC Sequential Presigning

In this Section we present a lightweight version of the ECDSA signing protocol. It incurs less computational cost than our main protocol but at the cost of not being able to prove security when too many signatures are generated concurrently, and an increase in the number of rounds.

The main difference between the two protocols is that in the lightweight protocol we do not use encryption to commit to values. Since commitment can be implemented with faster primitives than encryption, we reduce the needed amount of computation. However commitment by encryption is “extractable”, i.e. it allows the simulator to know the values committed to by an adversary during the simulation. To achieve extractability therefore we use the fact that all the ZK proofs used in the protocol are also proofs of knowledge and can allow the simulator to extract the secret values by *rewinding*. However the use of rewinding can lead to an exponential-time simulation in a fully concurrent model. Therefore we can only claim security in a sequential mode or with limited concurrency (where only few executions are run simultaneously at each given time).

The only different part is the pre-signing protocol: key generation, key refresh and online signing are the same. We describe the protocol below. Because we use interactive proofs the number of rounds increases to seven. There are five ZK proofs in our protocol all implemented by Σ protocols; they are identical or simplified versions of the ones we use in the main protocol.

There are two proofs which are required to be proofs of knowledge (and they cannot be extracted from the Paillier ciphertext) and therefore we run them interactively. We point out that we run the 3-round version of the Σ protocols where the Verifier does not have to commit to the challenge in advance. To achieve zero-knowledge against malicious verifiers, we “pass” the verifier’s second round message through the random oracle to compute the challenge of the Σ protocol. In other words if the Prover is proving statement thm and the first message is A , and the Verifier’s second message is e , then the Prover answers as if in the Σ protocol the Verifier sent $\mathcal{H}(\text{thm}, A, e)$ (we note that in our protocol the statement thm always include the session id $ssid$ and the identity of the prover in this particular Σ protocol).

A number of proofs are not required to be proofs of knowledge (or they are extractable via the Paillier ciphertext), so we run them non-interactively using the Fiat-Shamir transform. We emphasize that only the first three proofs are verifier-specific and therefore each player computes $n - 1$ non-interactive proofs. The remaining proofs are verifier-independent, so each player computes a single non-interactive proof and sends it to the other parties. The protocol is described in Figure 20 and Figure 21.

Security & Simulation. We note that the lightweight presigning protocol and the subsequent simulator (Appendix A.2) can be replaced in the protocol and security analysis of the main body in a plug-and-play fashion. The only restriction is that only logarithmically many signatures may be generated concurrently. We stress that no such restriction applies when multiple signatures are generated in parallel in perfect lockstep, i.e. the $(i + 1)$ -th round of one signature generation is only performed after the i -th round of all parallel executions was completed.

A.1 Additional NP-Relations

Paillier Affine Operation with Group Element in Range. This is a simplified version of $R_{\text{aff-g}}$. The difference is that in R_{afflog} we do not commit to δ via an additional Paillier ciphertext under a different key. For parameters (\mathbb{G}, g, N) consisting of element g and in group \mathbb{G} and Paillier public key N , the following relation verifies that a Paillier ciphertext $C \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ was obtained as an affine-like transformation on C_0 such that the multiplicative coefficient (i.e. ε) is equal to the exponent of $X \in \mathbb{G}$ in the range \mathcal{I} , and the additive coefficient (i.e. δ) resides in the the range \mathcal{J} . For PUB_2 of the form (\mathbb{G}, g, N) , define $R_{\text{aff-g}}$ to be all tuples $(\text{PUB}_2, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{J}, C, C_0, X; \varepsilon, \delta, r)$ such that

$$(\varepsilon, \delta) \in \mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{J} \wedge C = C_0^\varepsilon \cdot (1 + N)^\delta r^N \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^* \wedge X = g^\varepsilon \in \mathbb{G}$$

A Σ -protocol for this relationship appears in [33] (Appendix A.2). In this paper we refer it to as Π^{afflog} .

Paillier Affine Operation in Range. This is a simplified version of the previous relation. Here we only require ε to be in range, not the discrete log of a public group element. For parameters (\mathbb{G}, g, N) consisting of element g and in group \mathbb{G} and Paillier public key N , the following relation verifies that a Paillier ciphertext

FIGURE 20 (Lightweight ECDSA Pre-Signing Rounds 1-4)

Recall that P_i 's secret state contains x_i, y_i, p_i, q_i such that $X_i = g^{x_i}, Y_i = g^{y_i}$ and $N_i = p_i q_i$.

Round 1.

On input (**pre-sign**, $ssid, \ell, i$) from \mathcal{P}_i , interpret $ssid = (\dots, \mathbb{G}, q, g, \mathbf{P}, rid, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$, and do:

- Sample $k_i, b_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q, \rho_i \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_i}^*$, and set $K_i = \text{enc}_i(k_i; \rho_i)$ and $\mathbf{Z}_i = (g^{b_i}, g^{k_i} \cdot Y_i^{b_i})$.
- Sample $\gamma_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q, u_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and set $\Gamma_i = g^{\gamma_i}$ and $U_i = \mathcal{H}(ssid, i, \Gamma_i, u_i)$.
- Compute $\psi_{j,i}^0 = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{enc-elig}}, (ssid, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, K_i, Y_i, \mathbf{Z}); (k_i, \rho_i, b_i))$ for every $j \neq i$.

Broadcast $(ssid, i, K_i, \mathbf{Z}_i, U_i)$ and send $(ssid, i, \psi_{j,i}^0)$ to each \mathcal{P}_j .

Round 2.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, K_j, \mathbf{Z}_j, U_j, \psi_{i,j}^0)$ from each \mathcal{P}_j
 - Check $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{enc-elig}}, (ssid, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, K_j, Y_j, \mathbf{Z}_j), \psi_{i,j}^0) = 1$.
2. When passing above for all, sample $s_{i,j}, \hat{s}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_j}^*, \beta_{i,j}, \hat{\beta}_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{J}$ for every $j \neq i$, and compute:
 - $D_{j,i} = (\gamma_i \odot K_j) \oplus \text{enc}_j(-\beta_{i,j}, s_{i,j})$
 - $\hat{D}_{j,i} = (x_i \odot K_j) \oplus \text{enc}_j(-\hat{\beta}_{i,j}, \hat{s}_{i,j})$
 - Sample $\text{ch}_i, v_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and set $V_i = \mathcal{H}(ssid, i, \text{ch}_i, v_i)$.
 - Sample $(A_{j,i}; \tau_j) \leftarrow \mathcal{M}(\text{com}, \Pi_j^{\text{aff}})$ and $(\hat{A}_{j,i}; \hat{\tau}_j) \leftarrow \mathcal{M}(\text{com}, \Pi_j^{\text{afflog}})$.

Broadcast $(ssid, i, V_i)$ and send $(ssid, i, D_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i}, A_{j,i}, \hat{A}_{j,i})$ to each \mathcal{P}_j .

Round 3.

When obtaining $(ssid, j, D_{i,j}, \hat{D}_{i,j}, A_{i,j}, \hat{A}_{i,j}, V_j)$ from all \mathcal{P}_j , do

- For every $j \neq i$, set $\alpha_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(D_{i,j})$ and $\hat{\alpha}_{i,j} = \text{dec}_i(\hat{D}_{i,j})$ and compute

$$\begin{cases} \delta_i = \gamma_i k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} (\alpha_{i,j} + \beta_{i,j}) \pmod q \\ \chi_i = x_i k_i + \sum_{j \neq i} (\hat{\alpha}_{i,j} + \hat{\beta}_{i,j}) \pmod q \end{cases}$$

- Sample $\hat{b}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $v_i \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and set

$$\begin{cases} \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i = (g^{\hat{b}_i}, g^{x_i} \cdot Y_i^{\hat{b}_i}) \\ W_i = \mathcal{H}(ssid, i, \delta_i, v_i) \end{cases}$$

Broadcast $(ssid, i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i, W_i, \text{ch}_i, v_i)$.

Round 4.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_j, W_j, \text{ch}_j, v_j)$ from \mathcal{P}_j ,
 - Check that $V_j = \mathcal{H}(ssid, j, \text{ch}_j, v_j)$
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , set $\text{ch} = \bigoplus_{j \in \mathcal{P}} \text{ch}_j$ and compute for $j \neq i$
 - $\psi_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{aff}}, (ssid, \text{ch}, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, D_{j,i}, K_j); (\gamma_i, \beta_{i,j}, s_{i,j}, \tau_j))$.
 - $\hat{\psi}_{j,i} = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi_j^{\text{afflog}}, (ssid, \text{ch}, i), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, \hat{D}_{j,i}, K_j, X_i); (\gamma_i, \hat{\beta}_{i,j}, \hat{s}_{i,j}, \hat{\tau}_j))$.

Send $(ssid, i, \psi_{j,i}, \hat{\psi}_{j,i})$ to \mathcal{P}_j

Figure 20: Lightweight ECDSA Pre-Signing Rounds 1-4

FIGURE 21 (Lightweight ECDSA Pre-Signing Rounds 5-7)

Round 5.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \psi_{i,j}, \hat{\psi}_{i,j})$ from \mathcal{P}_j , parse $\psi_{i,j} = (A_{i,j}^*, \dots)$ and $\hat{\psi}_{i,j} = (\hat{A}_{i,j}^*, \dots)$, and check
 - $A_{i,j} = A_{i,j}^*$ and $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{aff}}, (ssid, \text{ch}, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, D_{i,j}, K_i); \psi_{i,j}) = 1$.
 - $\hat{A}_{i,j} = \hat{A}_{i,j}^*$ and $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{afflog}}, (ssid, \text{ch}, j), (\mathcal{I}_\varepsilon, \mathcal{J}_\varepsilon, \hat{D}_{i,j}, K_i, X_j); \hat{\psi}_{i,j}) = 1$.
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , send $(ssid, i, \delta_i, v_i, \Gamma_i, u_i)$ to all.

Round 6.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \delta_j, v_j, \Gamma_j, u_j)$, verify that
 - $U_j = \mathcal{H}(ssid, j, \Gamma_j, u_j)$ and $W_j = \mathcal{H}(ssid, j, \delta_j, w_j)$
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , compute
 - $\delta = \sum_j \delta_j$, $\Gamma = \prod_j \Gamma_j$, $R = \Gamma^{\delta^{-1}}$ and $\Delta_i = \Gamma^{k_i}$.
 - For every $j \neq i$, set $\psi_i = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{ellog}}, (ssid, i), (Y_i, \mathbf{Z}_i, \Delta_i, \Gamma); (k_i, b_i))$.
 Send $(ssid, i, \Delta_i, \psi_i)$ to all.

Round 7.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, \Delta_j, \psi_j)$ from \mathcal{P}_j , verify that
 - $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi_i^{\text{ellog}}, (ssid, j), (Y_i, \mathbf{Z}_i, \Delta_j, \Gamma), \psi_{i,j}^1) = 1$.
2. When passing above verification for all $j \neq i$,
 - Verify $g^\delta = \prod_j \Delta_j$. (if fail then **red alert #1**).
3. When passing above verification, set $S_i = R^{x_i}$ and compute
 - $\pi_i = \mathcal{M}(\text{prove}, \Pi^{\text{ellog}}, (ssid, i), (Y_i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i, S_i, R); (\chi_i, \hat{b}_i))$.
 Send $(ssid, i, S_i, \pi_i)$ to all.

Output.

1. Upon receiving $(ssid, j, S_j, \pi_j)$ from \mathcal{P}_j , verify:
 - $\mathcal{M}(\text{vrfy}, \Pi^{\text{ellog}}, (ssid, j), (Y_j, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_j, S_j, R), \pi_j) = 1$
2. When passing above verification for all \mathcal{P}_j , do
 - Verify $X = \prod_j S_j$ (if fail then **red alert #2**).
3. When passing above verification, set $\{\bar{R}_j = \Delta_j^{\delta^{-1}}\}_{j \neq i}$ and output $(ssid, \ell, i, R, k_i, \chi_i, \{\bar{R}_j, S_j\}_{j \neq i})$.
Erase all items except the stored state.

Errors. If a NIZK fails, report the culprit and halt. For a **red alert**, refer to the relevant subprotocol.

Stored State. Store $\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t}$ and (x_i, y_i, p_i, q_i) .

Figure 21: Lightweight ECDSA Pre-Signing Rounds 5-7

$C \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$ was obtained as an affine-like transformation on C_0 such that the multiplicative coefficient (i.e. ε) is in the range \mathcal{I} , and the additive coefficient (i.e. δ) resides in the the range \mathcal{J} . For PUB_2 of the form (\mathbb{G}, g, N) , define R_{aff} to be all tuples $(\text{PUB}_2, \mathcal{I}, \mathcal{J}, C, C_0, X; \varepsilon, \delta, r)$ such that

$$(\varepsilon, \delta) \in \mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{J} \wedge C = C_0^\varepsilon \cdot (1 + N)^\delta r^{N^2} \in \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}^*$$

A Σ -protocol for this relationship appears in [33] (Appendix A.3). In this paper we refer it to as Π^{aff} .

A.2 Simulator ($\tilde{\mathcal{S}}^3$) for Seven-Round Lightweight Presign

The presigning simulator $\tilde{\mathcal{S}}^3(ssid, \mathbf{L}, \mathbf{C}, b, \mathbf{x}^{\setminus b}, \mathbf{y}^{\setminus b}, \text{aux})$ takes inputs $ssid = (\dots, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{X}, \mathbf{Y}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$, a list \mathbf{L} and a set of parties $\mathbf{C} \subsetneq \mathbf{P}$, an index b and $\mathbf{x}^{\setminus b} = (x_j)_{j \neq b}$, $\mathbf{y}^{\setminus b} = (y_j)_{j \neq b}$ such that $\mathcal{P}_b \notin \mathbf{C}$ and $g^{x_j} = X_j$ and $g^{y_j} = Y_j$ for $j \neq b$, and auxiliary information $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$ or $\text{aux} = (c, x_b, k_b, \gamma_b)$.

Round 1.

1. For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all items as prescribed, and hand over $(ssid, i, K_i, \mathbf{Z}_i, U_i, \psi_{j,i}^0)$ to \mathcal{Z} , for $j \neq i$.
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , sample set $\mathbf{Z}_b \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^2$, $U_b \leftarrow \$$ and

$$K_b = \begin{cases} c^{k_b} \cdot \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{if } \text{aux} \neq (R, \delta) \\ \text{enc}_b(0) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

Invoke the ZK-simulators $\psi_{j,b}^0 \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{enc-elig}}(K_b, \dots)$.

Hand over $(ssid, b, K_b, \mathbf{Z}_b, U_b, \psi_{j,b}^0)$ to \mathcal{Z} for $j \neq b$, and add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} .

Round 2. Upon receiving $\{(ssid, j, K_j, \mathbf{Z}, U_j, \dots)\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$, retrieve $\{(k_j, \Gamma_j)\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}, i \notin \mathbf{C}}$ and do:

1. For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all as prescribed.
Hand over the tuple $(ssid, i, D_{j,i}, \hat{D}_{j,i}, A_{j,i}, \hat{A}_{j,i})$ and V_i to \mathcal{Z} , for each $j \neq i$.
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , sample $\{(\alpha_{\ell,b}, \hat{\alpha}_{\ell,b}) \leftarrow \mathcal{J}^2\}_{\ell \neq b}$ and do:
 - Set $\hat{D}_{\ell,b} = \text{enc}_\ell(\hat{\alpha}_{\ell,b})$ and $D_{\ell,b} = \text{enc}_j(\alpha_{\ell,b})$
 - for each $j \neq b$, invoke the ZK-simulator

$$\begin{cases} \psi_{j,b} = (A_{j,b}, \dots) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{aff}}(D_{j,b}, K_j, \dots), \\ \hat{\psi}_{j,b} = (\hat{A}_{j,b}, \dots) \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{afflog}}(\hat{D}_{j,b}, K_j, \dots) \end{cases}$$

Hand over the tuple $(ssid, b, D_{j,b}, A_{j,b}, \hat{D}_{j,b}, \hat{A}_{j,b})$ and $V_b \leftarrow \$$, for each $j \neq b$.

Round 3. When obtaining $\{(ssid, j, D_{i,j}, A_{i,j}, \hat{D}_{i,j}, \hat{A}_{i,j}, V_j)\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}, i \notin \mathbf{C}}$ retrieve $\{\text{ch}_j\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$.

1. For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, compute all items as prescribed and hand over $(ssid, i, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i, W_i, \text{ch}_i, v_i)$ to \mathcal{Z} .
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , sample $W_b \leftarrow \$$ and $\text{ch}_b, v_b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and $\hat{\mathbf{Z}}_i \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^2$. Hand over $(ssid, b, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_b, W_b, \text{ch}_b, v_b)$.
Add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} for the corresponding oracle calls.

Round 4. Upon receiving all $(ssid, j, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_j, W_j, \text{ch}_j, v_j)$ for $j \in \mathbf{C}$, retrieve $\{\delta_j\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$ from $\{W_j\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$, and do:

1. For $\mathcal{P}_i \in \mathbf{H}$, set all items as prescribed and hand over $(ssid, i, \psi_{j,i}, \hat{\psi}_{j,i})$ to \mathcal{Z} , for $j \neq i$.
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , hand over $(ssid, b, \psi_{j,b}, \hat{\psi}_{j,b})$ to \mathcal{Z} , for $j \neq b$, where $\psi_{j,b}, \hat{\psi}_{j,b}$ were computed in round 2.

Round 5 (First Shot). Upon receiving $\{(ssid, j, \psi_{i,j}, \hat{\psi}_{i,j})\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}, j \in \mathbf{C}}$, do:

Store $\{\psi_{i,j}, \hat{\psi}_{i,j}\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}, j \in \mathbf{C}}$ and go back (rewind \mathcal{Z}) to round 4. Remove all tuples added to \mathbf{L} since.

Round 5 (Second Shot). Upon receiving $\{(ssid, j, \psi_{i,j}, \hat{\psi}_{i,j})\}_{i \notin \mathbf{C}, j \in \mathbf{C}}$, retrieve $\{g^{x_j}\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$ from $\{y_j, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_j\}_{j \in \mathbf{C}}$.

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$, retrieve $\{\alpha_{j,b}, \hat{\alpha}_{j,b}, \beta_{j,b}, \hat{\beta}_{j,b}\}_{j \neq b}$ and $\{\gamma_j\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$ from $\{(\psi_{b,j}, \hat{\psi}_{b,j})\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$ and set

$$\begin{cases} \eta^0 = \sum_{j \neq b} k_j \\ \eta^1 = \sum_{j, i \neq b} k_i x_j + \sum_{j \neq b} \hat{\alpha}_{j,b} + \hat{\beta}_{j,b} \\ \delta_b = \delta - \sum_{j \neq b} \alpha_{j,b} + \beta_{j,b} + \sum_{i, j \neq b} k_i \gamma_j \pmod{q} \\ \chi_{\mathcal{C}} = \sum_{j, \ell \in \mathcal{C}} k_j x_\ell + \sum_{j \in \mathcal{C}, \ell \notin \mathcal{C}} \alpha_{j,\ell} + \beta_{j,\ell} \end{cases}$$

(a) If $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} \delta_j = \delta$ and $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{C}} g^{x_j} = g^{x_{\mathcal{C}}}$, do:

– Set $\Gamma_b = R^\delta \cdot \left(\prod_{j \neq b} \Gamma_j \right)^{-1}$.

– Sample $w_b, u_b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and set $\{\delta_i, w_i, \Gamma_i, u_i\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ as prescribed.

Add the relevant tuples \mathbf{L} and hand over $\{(ssid, i, \delta_i, w_i, \Gamma_i, u_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ to \mathcal{Z} .

(b) Else

– Sample $k \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and set $\gamma = \delta \cdot k^{-1}$ and

$$\begin{cases} k_b = k - \sum_{i \neq b} k_i \\ \gamma_b = \gamma - \sum_{i \neq b} \gamma_i \\ \Gamma_b = g^{\gamma_b} \\ S_b = X \cdot g^{-k \chi_{\mathcal{C}}} \prod_{i \in \mathbf{H}} g^{-k \chi_i} \\ \alpha_{b,\ell} = k_b \gamma_\ell + \beta_{\ell,b} & \text{for } \ell \neq b \\ \hat{\alpha}_{b,\ell} = k_b x_\ell + \hat{\beta}_{\ell,b} & \text{for } \ell \neq b \end{cases}$$

– Sample $w_b, u_b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and set $\{\delta_i, w_i, \Gamma_i, u_i\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ as prescribed.

Add the relevant tuples \mathbf{L} and hand over $\{(ssid, i, \delta_i, w_i, \Gamma_i, u_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ to \mathcal{Z} .

2. Else, retrieve $\{\alpha_{j,b}, \hat{\alpha}_{j,b}, \beta_{j,b}, \hat{\beta}_{j,b}\}_{j \neq b}$, and set

$$\begin{cases} \Gamma_b = g^{\gamma_b} \\ \chi_b = k_b x_b + \sum_{j \neq b} (k_b x_j - \hat{\beta}_{j,b}) + (k_j x_b - \hat{\alpha}_{j,b}) \\ \delta_b = k_b \gamma_b + \sum_{j \neq b} (k_b \gamma_j - \beta_{j,b}) + (k_j \gamma_b - \alpha_{j,b}) \pmod{q} \end{cases}$$

– Sample $w_b, u_b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and set $\{\delta_i, w_i, \Gamma_i, u_i\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ as prescribed.

Add the relevant tuples \mathbf{L} and hand over $\{(ssid, i, \delta_i, w_i, \Gamma_i, u_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ to \mathcal{Z} .

Round 6. Upon receiving $\{(ssid, j, \delta_j, w_j, \Gamma_j, u_j)\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$ do:

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$ and $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} \delta_j = \delta$ and $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{C}} g^{x_j} = g^{x_{\mathcal{C}}}$,

– Set $\Delta_b = g^\delta \cdot \prod_{j \neq b} \Gamma^{-k_j}$ and invoke ZK-simulator $\psi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{elog}}(\Delta_b, \Gamma, \mathbf{Z}_b, \dots)$.

– Compute $\{(ssid, i, \Delta_i, \psi_i)\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ as prescribed.

Hand over $\{(ssid, i, \Delta_i, \psi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ to \mathcal{Z} , and add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} .

2. Else

– Set $\Delta_b = \Gamma^{k_b}$ and $\psi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{elog}}(\Delta_b, \Gamma, \mathbf{Z}_b, \dots)$.

– Compute $\{(ssid, i, \Delta_i, \psi_i)\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}}$ as prescribed.

Hand over $\{(ssid, i, \Delta_i, \psi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ to \mathcal{Z} , and add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} .

Round 7. When obtaining $\{(ssid, j, \Delta_j, \psi_j)\}_{j \in \mathcal{C}}$ do

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$ and $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} \delta_j = \delta$ and $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{C}} g^{x_j} = g^{x_{\mathcal{C}}}$

– Set $S_b = X \cdot R^{-x_{\mathcal{C}}} \prod_{i \in \mathbf{H}} R^{-x_i}$ and invoke ZK-simulator $\pi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{elog}}(Y_b, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_b, S_b, R, \dots)$.

Send $\{(ssid, i, S_i, \pi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$, where $\{S_i, \pi_i\}_{i \in \mathbf{H}, j \in \mathcal{P}}$ are computed as prescribed.

2. Else

- Invoke ZK-simulator $\pi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}_j^{\text{ellog}}(Y_b, \hat{\mathbf{Z}}_b, S_b, R, \dots)$.
Send $\{(ssid, i, S_i, \pi_i)\}_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$, where $\{S_i, \pi_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ are computed as prescribed.

Output. Upon receiving all $(ssid, j, S_j, \pi_j)$ for $j \in \mathcal{C}$, do:

1. If $\text{aux} = (R, \delta)$ and $\sum_{j \in \mathcal{P}} \delta_j = \delta$ and $\prod_{j \in \mathcal{C}} g^{\chi_j} = g^{\chi^{\mathcal{C}}}$,
Output $(ssid, \eta^0, \eta^1)$ and $(ssid, \ell, R, k_i, \chi_i)_{i \in \mathcal{H}}$ and $\{\bar{R}_j, S_j\}_j$.
2. Else, set $R = \Gamma(\sum_j \delta_j)^{-1}$ and output $(ssid, \ell, R, k_i, \chi_i)_{i \notin \mathcal{C}}$ and $\{\bar{R}_j, S_j\}_j$.

Red Alert #1. When failing the nonce generation:

1. For $P_i \in \mathcal{H}$, compute all values as prescribed.
Send $(ssid, i, k_i, \tilde{\rho}_i, \psi_i, \gamma_i, (\alpha_{i,j}, \tilde{\mu}_i, \psi_{i,j})_{j \neq i})$ to \mathcal{Z} .
2. For \mathcal{P}_b ,
 - Set $\tilde{\rho}_b = K_b \cdot (1 + N_b)^{-k_b}$ and $\{\tilde{\mu}_{b,j} = D_{b,j} \cdot (1 + N_b)^{-\alpha_{b,j}}\}_{j \neq b}$
 - Invoke ZK-simulator $\psi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{Nth}}(N_i, \tilde{\rho}_b, \dots)$ and $\{\psi_{b,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{Nth}}(N_i, \tilde{\mu}_{b,j}, \dots)\}$.
Send $(ssid, b, k_b, \tilde{\rho}_b, \psi_b, \gamma_b, (\alpha_{b,j}, \tilde{\mu}_{b,j}, \psi_{b,j})_{j \neq b})$ to \mathcal{Z} .
Add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} for the corresponding oracle calls.

Red Alert #2. When failing the pseudo-keys check:

1. For $P_i \in \mathcal{H}$, compute all values as prescribed and
Send $(ssid, i, k_i, \tilde{\rho}_i, \psi_i, \tilde{Y}_i, \psi'_i, (\hat{\alpha}_{i,j}, \tilde{\mu}_i, \psi_{i,j})_{j \neq i})$ to \mathcal{Z} .
2. For \mathcal{P}_b , interpret $\hat{\mathbf{Z}}_b = (B_b, M_b)$ and set $\tilde{Y}_b = M_b \cdot \left(X_b^{k_b} \prod_{j \neq b} g^{\hat{\alpha}_{b,j}} X_b^{k_j} g^{-\hat{\alpha}_{j,b}} \right)^{-1}$
 - Set $\tilde{\rho}_b = K_b \cdot (1 + N_b)^{-k_b}$, $\{\tilde{\mu}_{b,j} = D_{b,j} \cdot (1 + N_b)^{-\hat{\alpha}_{b,j}}\}_{j \neq b}$
 - Invoke $\psi_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{Nth}}(N_i, \tilde{\rho}_b, \dots)$, $\{\psi_{b,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{Nth}}(N_i, \tilde{\mu}_{b,j}, \dots)\}$, $\psi'_b \leftarrow \mathcal{S}^{\text{log}}(B_b, Y_b, \tilde{Y}_b, \dots)$
Send $(ssid, b, k_b, \tilde{\rho}_b, \psi_b, \tilde{Y}_b, \psi'_b, (\hat{\alpha}_{b,j}, \tilde{\mu}_{b,j}, \psi_{b,j})_{j \neq i})$ to \mathcal{Z} .
Add the relevant tuples to \mathbf{L} for the corresponding oracle calls.

B Overview of the UC Model

We present a brief overview of the Universally Composable (UC) security framework [12]; see the full details there.³² In the rest of this section we provide a quick reminder of the framework.

Recall that a definition of security within the UC framework consists of two main components: First, one needs to specify the *real model*, namely the model of computation that represents the actual execution environment, the capabilities of the entities executing the protocol, and the capabilities of the attackers under consideration. Next, one needs to specify the *ideal functionality*, namely the expected behavior of the system, as a function of the various inputs provided to the system (both legitimate an adversarial ones) and the information gathered by the adversary. Crucially, “expected behavior” pertains both to correctness properties regarding desired outputs, and also to secrecy properties regarding internal values that should not be observable from the outside.

The UC framework also provides with a basic formal model for representing a system of communicating computational element, as well as way to express protocols, or distributed programs. It also formalizes the general concept of protocol π *UC-realizing* an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} , with the interpretation that from the point of view of any external entity, interacting with the protocol π is no worse than interacting with the ideal functionality \mathbb{F} . The framework also allows for a general security-preserving composition theorem that, essentially, guarantees that any composite protocol ρ that was designed with the use of \mathcal{F} as an idealized component, will continue to preserve all its security properties even when the (potentially many) instances of \mathcal{F} are replaced by instances of π .

³²Specifically, [12, Section 2 in Version of 2020] presents a self-contained account of a simplified variant of the framework. This variant fully suffices for the purpose of representing and analysing the protocols in this work.

The model for executing protocol an n -party protocol π . For the purpose of modeling the protocols in this work, we consider a system that consists of the following $n + 2$ *machines*, where each machine is a computing element (say, an interactive Turing machine) with a specified program and an identity. First, we have n machines with program π and identities $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$. Next, we have a machine \mathcal{A} representing the adversary and a machine \mathcal{Z} representing the environment. All machines are initialized on a security parameter κ and are polynomial in κ . The environment \mathcal{Z} is activated first, with an external input z . \mathcal{Z} activates the parties, chooses their input and reads their output. \mathcal{A} can corrupt parties and instruct them to leak information to \mathcal{A} and to perform arbitrary instructions. \mathcal{Z} and \mathcal{A} communicate freely throughout the computation. The real process terminates when the environment terminates. Let $\text{REAL}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}}(1^\kappa, z)$ denote the environment's output in the above process.

Communication between machines over a network is modeled by way of subroutine-machines that represent the behavior of the actual communication network under consideration. In this work we assume for simplicity that the parties are connected via an authenticated, synchronous broadcast channel. That is, the computation proceeds in rounds, and each message sent by any of the parties at some round is made available to all parties at the next round. Formally, synchronous communication is modeled within the UC framework by way of \mathcal{F}_{syn} , the ideal synchronous communication functionality from [10, Section 7.3.3]. The broadcast property is modeled by having \mathcal{F}_{syn} require that all messages are addressed at all parties.

Ideal Process. the ideal process is identical to the real process, with the exception that now the machines $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$ do not run π . Instead, they all forward all their inputs to a subroutine machine, called the *ideal functionality* \mathcal{F} . Functionality \mathcal{F} then processes all the inputs locally and returns outputs to $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$. Let $\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}}(1^\kappa, z)$ denote the environment's output in the above process.

Definition B.1. We say that π UC-realizes \mathcal{F} if for every real adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists an ideal adversary \mathcal{S} such that for every environment \mathcal{Z} it holds that

$$\{\text{REAL}_{\pi, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}}(1^\kappa, z)\}_{z \in \{0,1\}^*, \kappa \in \mathbb{N}} \stackrel{c}{=} \{\text{IDEAL}_{\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}}(1^\kappa, z)\}_{z \in \{0,1\}^*, \kappa \in \mathbb{N}}.$$

The Adversarial Model. The adversary can corrupt parties adaptively throughout the computation. Once corrupted, the party reports all its internal state to the adversary, and from now on follows the instructions of the adversary. We also allow the adversary to *leave*, or *decorrupt* parties. A decorrupted party resumes executing the original protocol and is no longer reporting its state to the adversary. Still, the adversary knows the full internal state of the decorrupted party at the moment of decorruption.

We note that this adversarial model is more realistic than the “static” variant where the identity of the corrupted parties is determined in advance and never changes.

Handling global functionalities. As mentioned above, the basic model of executing some protocol π only involves the parties of a single instance of π , in addition to \mathcal{Z} and \mathcal{A} . This restriction greatly simplifies the analysis, but sometimes it is important to be able to formalize the concept of a protocol π that UC-realizes an ideal functionality \mathcal{F} *in the presence of* \mathcal{G} , where \mathcal{G} is some global construct that exists irrespective of π or \mathcal{F} . (For instance, \mathcal{G} can be a reference string or a PKI. In our setting we will model a cryptographic hash function as a *global* random oracle H . This way, we can guarantee that the analysis captures even cases where the same hash function is used not only in the analyzed protocol but also in other parts of the system.) For this purpose we slightly augment the model of computation, to include \mathcal{G} in both the ideal and the real models.

In [17] it is shown how to augment the model of protocol execution of the general UC framework to incorporate global functionalities. However in our case, namely for the basic model of [12, Section 2], it is possible to capture UC with global functionalities within the plain UC framework. Specifically, having π UC-realize ideal functionality \mathcal{F} in the presence of global functionality \mathcal{G} is represented by having the protocol $[\pi, \mathcal{G}]$ UC-realize the protocol $[\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{G}]$ within the plain UC framework. Here $[\pi, \mathcal{G}]$ is the $n + 1$ -party protocol where machines $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_n$ run π , and the remaining machine runs \mathcal{G} . Protocol $[\mathcal{F}, \mathcal{G}]$ is defined analogously, namely it is the $n + 2$ -party protocol where the first $n + 1$ machines execute the ideal protocol for \mathcal{F} , and the remaining machine runs \mathcal{G} .

C Missing Sigma Protocols

C.1 Discrete Logarithm Proofs

Figure 22 is a Σ -protocol for the relation R_{sch} .

FIGURE 22 (Schnorr PoK – Π^{sch})

- **Inputs:** Common input is (\mathbb{G}, q, g, X) where $q = |\mathbb{G}|$ and g is generators of \mathbb{G} .
The Prover has secret input x such that $g^x = X$.
1. Prover samples $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and sends $A = g^\alpha$ to the verifier.
 2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$
 3. Prover sends $z = \alpha + ex \pmod q$ to the verifier.
- **Verification:** Verifier checks that $g^z = A \cdot X^e$.

Figure 22: Schnorr PoK – Π^{sch}

Figure 23 is a Σ -protocol for the relation R_{log} .

FIGURE 23 (Dlog Equality – Π^{log})

- **Inputs:** Common input is $(\mathbb{G}, q, g, h, X, Y)$ where $q = |\mathbb{G}|$ and g and h are elements of \mathbb{G} .
The Prover has secret input x such that $g^x = X$ and $Y = h^x$.
1. Prover samples $\alpha \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and sends $A = g^\alpha$ and $B = h^\alpha$ to the verifier.
 2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$
 3. Prover sends $z = \alpha + ex \pmod q$ to the verifier.
- **Verification:** Verifier checks that $g^z = A \cdot X^e$ and $h^z = B \cdot X^e$.

Figure 23: Dlog Equality – Π^{log}

Figure 24 is a Σ -protocol for the relation R_{elog} .

FIGURE 24 (Dlog with El-Gamal Commitment – Π^{elog})

- **Inputs:** Common input is $(\mathbb{G}, g, L, M, X, Y, h)$.
The Prover has secret input (y, λ) such that $L = g^\lambda$, $M = g^y X^\lambda$ and $Y = h^y$.
1. Prover samples
$$\alpha, m \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q \text{ and computes } \begin{cases} A = g^\alpha, N = g^m X^\alpha \\ B = h^m \end{cases}$$
and sends (A, N, B) to the verifier.
 2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$.
 3. Prover Prover sends (z, u) to the verifier where $z = \alpha + e\lambda \pmod q$ and $u = m + ey \pmod q$.
- **Equality Checks:** $g^z = A \cdot L^e$ and $g^u X^z = N \cdot M^e$ and $h^u = B \cdot Y^e$.

Figure 24: Dlog with El-Gamal Commitment – Π^{elog}

C.2 Group Element vs Paillier Encryption in Range ZK (Π^{\log^*})

Figure 25 is a Σ -protocol for the relation R_{\log^*} .

FIGURE 25 (Knowledge of Exponent vs Paillier Encryption – Π^{\log^*})

- **Setup:** Auxiliary safe bi-prime \hat{N} and Ring-Pedersen parameters $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^*$.
- **Inputs:** Common input is $(\mathbb{G}, q, N_0, C, X, g)$.
The Prover has secret input (x, ρ) such that $x \in \pm 2^\ell$, and $C = (1 + N_0)^x \cdot \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$ and $X = g^x \in \mathbb{G}$.

1. Prover samples

$$\alpha \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \text{ and } \begin{cases} \mu \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N} \\ r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^* \\ \gamma \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N} \end{cases}, \text{ and computes } \begin{cases} S = s^x t^\mu \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ A = (1 + N_0)^\alpha \cdot r^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2} \\ Y = g^\alpha \in \mathbb{G} \\ D = s^\alpha t^\gamma \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases},$$

and sends (S, A, Y, D) to the verifier.

2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$
3. Prover sends (z_1, z_2, z_3) to the verifier, where

$$\begin{cases} z_1 = \alpha + ex \\ z_2 = r \cdot \rho^e \pmod{N_0} \\ z_3 = \gamma + e\mu \end{cases}$$

- **Equality Checks:**

$$\begin{cases} (1 + N_0)^{z_1} \cdot z_2^{N_0} = A \cdot C^e \pmod{N_0^2} \\ g^{z_1} = Y \cdot X^e \in \mathbb{G} \\ s^{z_1} t^{z_3} = D \cdot S^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases}$$

- **Range Check:**

$$z_1 \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$$

The proof guarantees that $x \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$.

Figure 25: Knowledge of Exponent vs Paillier Encryption – Π^{\log^*}

C.3 Paillier Operation with Paillier Commitment ZK ($\Pi^{\text{aff-p}}$)

Figure 26 is a Σ -protocol for the relation $R_{\text{aff-p}}$.

FIGURE 26 (Paillier Affine Operation with Paillier Commitment ZK-Proof – $\Pi^{\text{aff-p}}$)

- **Setup:** Auxiliary safe bi-prime \hat{N} and Ring-Pedersen parameters $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^*$.

- **Inputs:** Common input is (N_0, N_1, D, C, X, Y) where $q = |\mathbb{G}|$ and g a generator \mathbb{G} .

The Prover has secret input $(x, y, \rho, \rho_x, \rho_y)$ such that $x \in \pm 2^\ell$, $y \in \pm 2^{\ell'}$, $(1 + N_1)^x \rho_x^{N_1} = X$ and $(1 + N_1)^y \rho_y^{N_1} = Y$ and $D = C^x (1 + N_0)^y \cdot \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$.

1. Prover samples $\alpha \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$ and $\beta \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon}$ and

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_0}^*, \\ r_x, r_y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_1}^*, \\ \gamma \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N}, m \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N} \\ \delta \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N}, \mu \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell'} \cdot \hat{N} \end{array} \right. \text{ and computes } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} A = C^\alpha \cdot ((1 + N_0)^\beta \cdot r^{N_0}) \pmod{N_0^2} \\ B_x = (1 + N_1)^\alpha r_x^{N_1}, B_y = (1 + N_1)^\beta r_y^{N_1} \pmod{N_1^2} \\ E = s^\alpha t^\gamma, S = s^x t^m \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ F = s^\beta t^\delta, T = s^y t^\mu \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{array} \right.$$

and sends $(A, B_x, B_y, E, S, F, T)$ to the verifier.

2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$.

3. Prover sends $(z_1, z_2, z_3, z_4, w, w_x, w_y)$ to the verifier where

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} z_1 = \alpha + ex \\ z_2 = \beta + ey \\ z_3 = \gamma + em \\ z_4 = \delta + e\mu \\ w = r \cdot \rho^e \pmod{N_0} \\ w_x = r_x \cdot \rho_x^e \pmod{N_1} \\ w_y = r_y \cdot \rho_y^e \pmod{N_1} \end{array} \right.$$

- **Equality Checks:**

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} C^{z_1} (1 + N_0)^{z_2} w^{N_0} = A \cdot D^e \pmod{N_0^2} \\ (1 + N_1)^{z_1} w_x^{N_1} = B_x \cdot X^e \pmod{N_1^2} \\ (1 + N_1)^{z_2} w_y^{N_1} = B_y \cdot Y^e \pmod{N_1^2} \\ s^{z_1} t^{z_3} = E \cdot S^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ s^{z_2} t^{z_4} = F \cdot T^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{array} \right.$$

- **Range Check:**

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} z_1 \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \\ z_2 \in \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon} \end{array} \right.$$

The proof guarantees that $x \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$ and $y \in \pm 2^{\ell'+\varepsilon}$.

Figure 26: Paillier Affine Operation with Paillier Commitment ZK-Proof – $\Pi^{\text{aff-p}}$

C.4 Range Proof w/ El-Gamal Commitment ($\Pi^{\text{enc-elg}}$)

Figure 27 is a Σ -protocol for the relation $R_{\text{enc-elg}}$.

FIGURE 27 (Range Proof w/ EL-Gamal Commitment – $\Pi^{\text{enc-elg}}$)

- **Setup:** Auxiliary safe bi-prime \hat{N} and Ring-Pedersen parameters $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^*$.

- **Inputs:** Common input is $(\mathbb{G}, q, g, N_0, C, A, B, X)$.

The Prover has secret input (x, ρ, a, b) such that $x \in \pm 2^\ell$, and $C = (1 + N_0)^x \cdot \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$ and $(A, B, X) = (g^a, g^b, g^{ab+x}) \in \mathbb{G}^3$.

1. Prover samples

$$\alpha \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \text{ and } \begin{cases} \mu \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N} \\ r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^* \\ \beta \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q \\ \gamma \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N} \end{cases}, \text{ and computes } \begin{cases} S = s^x t^\mu \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ D = (1 + N_0)^\alpha \cdot r^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2} \\ Y = A^\beta g^\alpha, Z = g^\beta \in \mathbb{G} \\ T = s^\alpha t^\gamma \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases},$$

and sends (S, T, D, Y, Z) to the verifier.

2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$

3. Prover sends (z_1, z_2, z_3, w) to the verifier, where

$$\begin{cases} z_1 = \alpha + ex \\ w = \beta + eb \pmod{q} \\ z_2 = r \cdot \rho^e \pmod{N_0} \\ z_3 = \gamma + e\mu \end{cases}.$$

- **Equality Checks:**

$$\begin{cases} (1 + N_0)^{z_1} \cdot z_2^{N_0} = D \cdot C^e \pmod{N_0^2} \\ A^w g^{z_1} = Y \cdot X^e \in \mathbb{G} \\ g^w = Z \cdot B^e \in \mathbb{G} \\ s^{z_1} t^{z_3} = T \cdot S^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases}$$

- **Range Check:**

$$z_1 \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$$

The proof guarantees that $x \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$.

Figure 27: Range Proof w/ EL-Gamal Commitment – $\Pi^{\text{enc-elg}}$

C.5 No Small Factor Proof (Π^{fac})

Figure 28 is a Σ -protocol for the relation R_{fac} .

FIGURE 28 (No Small Factor Proof)

- **Setup:** Auxiliary safe bi-prime \hat{N} and Ring-Pedersen parameters $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^*$.
- **Inputs:** Common input RSA modulus N_0 . The Prover has secret input (p, q) such that $p, q < \pm\sqrt{N_0} \cdot 2^\ell$.

1. Prover samples

$$\alpha, \beta \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \sqrt{N_0} \text{ and } \begin{cases} \mu, \nu \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N} \\ \sigma \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot N_0 \cdot \hat{N} \\ r \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot N_0 \cdot \hat{N} \\ x, y \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N} \end{cases}, \text{ and computes } \begin{cases} P = s^p t^\mu, Q = s^q t^\nu \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ A = s^\alpha t^x \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ B = s^\beta t^y \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ T = Q^\alpha t^r \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases},$$

and sends (P, Q, A, B, T, σ) to the verifier.

2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$
3. Prover sets $\hat{\sigma} = \sigma - \nu p$ and sends (z, u, v) to the verifier, where

$$\begin{cases} z_1 = \alpha + ep \\ z_2 = \beta + eq \\ w_1 = x + e\mu \\ w_2 = y + e\nu \\ v = r + e\hat{\sigma} \end{cases}$$

- **Equality Checks:** Verifier set $R = s^{N_0} t^\sigma$ and checks

$$\begin{cases} s^{z_1} t^{w_1} = A \cdot P^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ s^{z_2} t^{w_2} = B \cdot Q^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ Q^{z_1} t^v = T \cdot R^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases}$$

- **Range Check:**

$$z_1, z_2 \in \pm\sqrt{N_0} \cdot 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$$

The proof guarantees that each $p, q > 2^\ell$ (assuming $2^{2\ell+\varepsilon} \approx \sqrt{N_0}$).

Figure 28: No Small Factor Proof

Special Soundness. Analogously to all other range proofs, the extractor can get $p, q, \mu, \nu, \hat{\sigma}$ to decommit P & Q and $Q^p t^{\hat{\sigma}} = s^{pq} t^{\nu p + \hat{\sigma}} = s^{N_0} t^\sigma$. Notice that if $N_0 \neq pq$, then the binding property of Pedersen is broken which, in turn, breaks strong RSA. \square

HVZK. Sample $P, Q \leftarrow \langle t \rangle$. Sample $z_1, z_2 \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \sqrt{N_0}$ and $w_1, w_2 \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N}$ and $v \leftarrow 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot N_0 \cdot \hat{N}$ and $\sigma \leftarrow 2^\ell \cdot N_0 \cdot \hat{N}$. Finally, sample e and set A, B and T accordingly. \square

C.6 Sigma Protocols for $O(n^2)$ -Identification in Three-Round Presign

Next we describe the missing protocols for the relations in Section 2.2.2.

FIGURE 29 (Paillier Multiplication – Π^{mul})

- **Inputs:** Common input is (N, X, Y, C) .
The Prover has secret input (x, ρ, ρ_x) such that $(1 + N)^x \rho_x^N = X$ and $C = Y^x \cdot \rho^N \pmod{N^2}$.
1. Prover samples

$$\begin{cases} \alpha, r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*, \\ s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^* \end{cases} \quad \text{and computes} \quad \begin{cases} A = Y^\alpha \cdot r^N \pmod{N^2} \\ B = (1 + N)^\alpha s^N \pmod{N^2} \end{cases}$$
 and sends (A, B) to the verifier.
 2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$.
 3. Prover Prover sends (z, u, v) to the verifier where $z = \alpha + ex$, $u = r \cdot \rho^e$, and $v = s \cdot \rho_x^e \pmod{N}$.
- **Equality Checks:** $Y^z u^N = A \cdot C^e \pmod{N^2}$ and $(1 + N)^z v^N = B \cdot X^e \pmod{N^2}$

Figure 29: Paillier Multiplication – Π^{mul}

FIGURE 30 (Paillier Decryption modulo q – Π^{dec})

- **Setup:** Auxiliary RSA modulus \hat{N} and Ring-Pedersen parameters $(s, t) \in \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^{*2}$.
 - **Inputs:** Common input is (q, N_0, C, x) .
The Prover has secret input y, ρ such that $C = (1 + N_0)^y \cdot \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$ and $x = y \pmod{q}$.
1. Prover samples $\alpha \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$ and

$$\begin{cases} \mu \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N}, \nu \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N} \\ r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^* \end{cases} \quad \text{and computes} \quad \begin{cases} S = s^y t^\mu, T = s^\alpha t^\nu \pmod{\hat{N}} \\ A = (1 + N_0)^\alpha r^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2} \\ \gamma = \alpha \pmod{q} \end{cases}$$
 and sends (A, γ) to the verifier.
 2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$
 3. Prover sends (z_1, z_2) where

$$\begin{cases} z_1 = \alpha + ey \\ z_2 = \nu + e\mu \\ w = r \cdot \rho^e \pmod{N_0} \end{cases}$$
- **Equality Checks:**

$$\begin{cases} (1 + N_0)^{z_1} \cdot w^{N_0} = A \cdot C^e \pmod{N_0^2} \\ z_1 = \gamma + ex \pmod{q} \\ s^{z_1} t^{z_2} = T \cdot S^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases}$$

Figure 30: Paillier Decryption modulo q – Π^{dec}

FIGURE 31 (Multiplication Paillier vs Group – $\Pi^{\text{mul*}}$)

- **Setup:** Auxiliary Paillier Modulus \hat{N} and Ring-Pedersen parameters $s, t \in \mathbb{Z}_{\hat{N}}^*$.
- **Inputs:** Common input is $(\mathbb{G}, g, N_0, C, D, X)$ where $q = |\mathbb{G}|$ and g is a generator of \mathbb{G} .
The Prover has secret input (x, ρ) such that $x \in \pm 2^\ell$, $g^x = X$ and $D = C^x \cdot \rho^{N_0} \pmod{N_0^2}$.

1. Prover samples $\alpha \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$ and

$$\begin{cases} r \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_0}^*, r_y \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{N_1}^* \\ \gamma \leftarrow \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon} \cdot \hat{N}, m \leftarrow \pm 2^\ell \cdot \hat{N} \end{cases} \quad \text{and computes} \quad \begin{cases} A = C^\alpha \cdot ((1 + N_0)^\beta \cdot r^{N_0}) \pmod{N_0^2} \\ B_x = g^\alpha \in \mathbb{G} \\ E = s^\alpha t^\gamma, S = s^x t^m \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases}$$

and sends (A, B, S, E) to the Verifier.

2. Verifier replies with $e \leftarrow \pm q$.
3. Prover Prover sends (z_1, z_2, w) to the Verifier where

$$\begin{cases} z_1 = \alpha + ex \\ z_2 = \gamma + em \\ w = r \cdot \rho^e \pmod{N_0} \end{cases}$$

- **Equality Checks:**

$$\begin{cases} C^{z_1} w^{N_0} = A \cdot D^e \pmod{N_0^2} \\ g^{z_1} = B_x \cdot X^e \in \mathbb{G} \\ s^{z_1} t^{z_2} = E \cdot S^e \pmod{\hat{N}} \end{cases}$$

- **Range Check:**

$$z_1 \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$$

The proof guarantees that $x \in \pm 2^{\ell+\varepsilon}$.

Figure 31: Multiplication Paillier vs Group – $\Pi^{\text{mul*}}$

D Complexity Estimates

We provide computation and communication cost-analysis of our protocol's components in Table 1, mostly derived from the cost-analysis of each of our NIZKs, presented in Table 2.

| <i>Component</i> | <i>Rounds</i> | <i>Computation</i> | <i>Communication</i> |
|----------------------------|---------------|---|--------------------------------|
| Key Generation | 3 | $n \times (2\mathbf{G})$ | $n \times (4\kappa)$ |
| Aux Info. & Key Refresh | 3 | $n \times (2n\mathbf{G} + 160\mathbf{N} + 2\mathbf{N}^2)$ | $n \times (2n\kappa + 325\mu)$ |
| Pre-Signing (Three-Rounds) | 3 | $n \times (12\mathbf{G} + 56\mathbf{N} + 33\mathbf{N}^2)$ | $n \times (57\kappa + 54\mu)$ |
| Pre-Signing (Six-Rounds) | 6 | $n \times (29\mathbf{G} + 49\mathbf{N} + 33\mathbf{N}^2)$ | $n \times (67\kappa + 51\mu)$ |
| Pre-Signing (Lightweight) | 7 | $n \times (26\mathbf{G} + 38\mathbf{N} + 19\mathbf{N}^2)$ | $n \times (67\kappa + 30\mu)$ |
| Signing | 1 | 0 | $n \times (\kappa)$ |

Table 1: We report *total costs per party* (over all rounds); $\mathbf{G}, \mathbf{N}, \mathbf{N}^2$ denote computing exponentiation in the EC group \mathbb{G} and rings $\mathbb{Z}_N, \mathbb{Z}_{N^2}$, respectively. For communication, we report *total incoming communication* (for each party over all rounds); κ and μ correspond to the message size of EC group element and Paillier plaintext ring elements, respectively. Constants and hash (random oracle) invocations were omitted from above.

| <i>ZK-Proof</i> | <i>Computation (Prover)</i> | <i>Computation (Verifier)</i> | <i>Communication</i> |
|------------------------|--|---|----------------------|
| Π^{sch} | $1\mathbf{G}$ | $2\mathbf{G}$ | 2κ |
| Π^{elog} | $4\mathbf{G}$ | $7\mathbf{G}$ | 5κ |
| Π^{enc} | $5\mathbf{N} + 1\mathbf{N}^2$ | $3\mathbf{N} + 2\mathbf{N}^2$ | $6\kappa + 6\mu$ |
| $\Pi^{\text{enc-elg}}$ | $3\mathbf{G} + 5\mathbf{N} + 1\mathbf{N}^2$ | $5\mathbf{G} + 3\mathbf{N} + 2\mathbf{N}^2$ | $9\kappa + 6\mu$ |
| $\Pi^{\text{log*}}$ | $1\mathbf{G} + 5\mathbf{N} + 1\mathbf{N}^2$ | $2\mathbf{G} + 3\mathbf{N} + 2\mathbf{N}^2$ | $7\kappa + 6\mu$ |
| $\Pi^{\text{aff-p}}$ | $11\mathbf{N} + 4\mathbf{N}^2$ | $6\mathbf{N} + 7\mathbf{N}^2$ | $16\kappa + 15\mu$ |
| $\Pi^{\text{aff-g}}$ | $1\mathbf{G} + 10\mathbf{N} + 3\mathbf{N}^2$ | $2\mathbf{G} + 6\mathbf{N} + 5\mathbf{N}^2$ | $17\kappa + 12\mu$ |
| Π^{aff} | $9\mathbf{N} + 2\mathbf{N}^2$ | $6\mathbf{N} + 3\mathbf{N}^2$ | $16\kappa + 9\mu$ |
| Π^{afflog} | $1\mathbf{G} + 9\mathbf{N} + 2\mathbf{N}^2$ | $2\mathbf{G} + 6\mathbf{N} + 3\mathbf{N}^2$ | $17\kappa + 9\mu$ |
| Π^{mod} | $160\mathbf{N}$ | $80\mathbf{N}$ | 160μ |
| Π^{prm} | $80\mathbf{N}$ | $80\mathbf{N}$ | 160μ |

Table 2: To ensure 80-bit statistical security and 128-bit computational security, we chose $m = 80$ in the Π^{mod} and Π^{prm} . In the remaining ZK-Range-Proofs, ℓ, ℓ', ε are respectively 1, 5, 2 factor of the EC element bit-length κ .

E Number Theory & Probability Facts

Fact E.1. Suppose that $\lambda^N = x^k \pmod{M}$ such that $x \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$. Then $\lambda \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$.

Proof. There exists $y \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$ such that $xy = 1 \pmod{M}$. Therefore $\lambda \cdot (\lambda^{N-1} \cdot y^k) = \lambda^N \cdot y^k = x^k y^k = 1 \pmod{M}$. \square

Fact E.2. Suppose that $\lambda^N = x^k \pmod{M}$, where k and N are coprime and $x \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$. Then, there exists $y \in \mathbb{Z}_M^*$ such that $y^k = \lambda \pmod{M}$.

Proof. Since k and N are coprime, there exists $u, v \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $ku + Nv = 1$. Thus $\lambda^{ku+Nv} = \lambda$, and consequently $(\lambda^u \cdot x^v)^k = \lambda^{ku} \cdot (\lambda^N)^v = \lambda \pmod{M}$. For the penultimate equality, we apply Fact E.1 and we remark that λ^u and x^v are well defined in \mathbb{Z}_M^* . \square

Remark E.3. We stress that computing a k -th root of λ in \mathbb{Z}_M^* can be done efficiently via repeated application of Euclid's extended algorithm and exponentiation modulo M , i.e. computing the Bézout coefficients (u, v) , as well as $\lambda^u \pmod{M}$ and $x^v \pmod{M}$.

Fact E.4. Let $a, c \in \mathbb{Z}$ such that $c \nmid a$. There exists a prime power p^d such that $p^{d-1} \mid a$, $p^d \nmid a$ and $p^d \mid c$.

Proof. Any prime factor that divides c but not a will do (taking $d = 1$). If no such p exists, i.e. if every prime factor of c divides a , let p_1, \dots, p_n denote the prime factors of a , and write $a = \prod_{j=1}^n p_j^{d_j}$ and $c = \prod_{j=1}^n p_j^{d'_j}$ (maybe some $d'_j = 0$). If $d'_i \leq d_i$, for every i , then $c \mid a$. Therefore, there exists i such that $d'_i > d_i$, and thus $(p, d) = (p_i, d_i + 1)$ will do. \square

Fact E.5. Let $N = pq$ be the product of two odd primes and let x, y and $z \in \mathbb{Z}_N^*$ such that $x^2 = y^2 = z \pmod{N}$ and $x \neq y, -y \pmod{N}$. Then $\gcd(x - y, N) \in \{p, q\}$.

Proof. Let u, v denote the Bézout coefficients of the extended Euclid's algorithm such that $up + vq = 1$ and notice that $\gcd(p, v) = \gcd(q, u) = 1$. By Chinese remainder theorem, since $x \neq y, -y \pmod{N}$, it follows that $x - y = 2cuq \pmod{N}$ or $x - y = 2cvp \pmod{N}$ for unique element $c \in \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ or $c \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$, respectively. In either case, the claim follows. \square

Fact E.6. Define i.i.d. random variables \mathbf{a}, \mathbf{b} chosen uniformly at random from $\pm R$, and let $\delta \in \pm K$. It holds that $\text{SD}(\mathbf{a}, \delta + \mathbf{b}) \leq K/R$.

Fact E.7. Let N be the product of exactly two arbitrary primes p and q . Let $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\ell \cdot N}$ and $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_{\phi(N)}$. It holds that $\text{SD}(\mathbf{a} \pmod{\phi(N)}, \mathbf{b}) \leq \frac{1}{\ell}$.

Proof. Let $Q = \lfloor \ell \cdot N / \phi(N) \rfloor$ observe that $\text{SD}(\mathbf{a} \pmod{\phi(N)}, \mathbf{b}) \leq \Pr[\mathbf{a} \geq Q \cdot \phi(N)]$. Thus, $\Pr[\mathbf{a} \geq Q \cdot \phi(N)] \leq \Pr[\mathbf{a} \geq \ell \cdot N - \phi(N)] = \phi(N) / (\ell \cdot N) \leq \frac{1}{\ell}$. \square

F Assumptions

Definition F.1 (Semantic Security). We say that the encryption scheme $(\text{gen}, \text{enc}, \text{dec})$ is semantically secure if there exists a negligible function $\nu(\cdot)$ such that for every \mathcal{A} it holds that $\Pr[\text{PaillierSec}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa) = 1] \leq 1/2 + \nu(\kappa)$.

Definition F.2 (Existential Unforgeability). We say that a signature scheme $(\text{gen}, \text{sign}, \text{vrfy})$ is existentially unforgeable if there exists a negligible function $\nu(\cdot)$ such that for every \mathcal{A} and every $n \in \text{poly}$ it holds that $\Pr[\text{ExUnf}(\mathcal{A}, n, 1^\kappa) = 1] \leq \nu(\kappa)$.

Definition F.3 (Strong-RSA). We say that strong-RSA is hard if there exists a negligible function $\nu(\cdot)$ such that for every \mathcal{A} it holds that $\Pr[\text{sRSA}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa) = 1] \leq \nu(\kappa)$.

Definition F.4 (DDH). We say that DDH is hard if there exists a negligible function $\nu(\cdot)$ such that for every \mathcal{A} it holds that $\Pr[\text{DDH}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \nu(\kappa)$.

FIGURE 32 (Semantic Security Experiment $\text{PaillierSec}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa)$)

1. Generate a key pair $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{gen}(1^\kappa)$
 2. \mathcal{A} chooses $m_0, m_1 \in M$ on input $(1^\kappa, \text{pk})$.
 3. Compute $c = \text{enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_b)$ for $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$.
 4. \mathcal{A} outputs b' on input $(1^\kappa, \text{pk}, m_0, m_1, c)$.
- **Output:** $\text{PaillierSec}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa) = 1$ if $b = b'$ and 0 otherwise.

Figure 32: Semantic Security Experiment $\text{PaillierSec}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa)$

FIGURE 33 (Existential Unforgeability Experiment $\text{ExUnf}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{H}, n, 1^\kappa)$)

1. Generate a key pair $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{gen}(1^\kappa)$ and let $(m_0, \sigma_0) = (\emptyset, \emptyset)$.
 2. For $i = 1 \dots n(\kappa)$
 - Choose $m_i \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}(1^\kappa, \text{pk}, m_0, \sigma_0, \dots, m_{i-1}, \sigma_{i-1})$
 - Compute $\sigma_i = \text{sign}_{\text{pk}}(m_i)$.
 3. $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}$ outputs (m, σ) on input $(1^\kappa, \text{pk}, m_0, \sigma_0, \dots, m_{n(\kappa)}, \sigma_{n(\kappa)})$.
- **Output:** $\text{ExUnf}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{H}, n, 1^\kappa) = 1$ if $\text{vrfy}_{\text{pk}}(m, \sigma) = 1$ and $m \notin \{m_1, \dots, m_{n(\kappa)}\}$ and 0 otherwise.

Figure 33: Existential Unforgeability Experiment $\text{ExUnf}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{H}, n, 1^\kappa)$

FIGURE 34 (Strong-RSA Experiment $\text{sRSA}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa)$)

1. Generate an RSA modulus $N \leftarrow \mathcal{N}(1^\kappa)$.
 2. Sample $c \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_N^*$.
 3. \mathcal{A} outputs (m, e) on input $(1^\kappa, N, m)$.
- **Output:** $\text{sRSA}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa) = 1$ if $e > 1$ and $m^e = c \pmod N$, and 0 otherwise.

Figure 34: Strong-RSA Experiment $\text{sRSA}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa)$

FIGURE 35 (DDH Experiment $\text{DDH}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa)$)

1. Generate a group-generator-order tuple $(\mathbb{G}, g, q) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^\kappa)$ such that $\log_2(q) = \kappa$.
 2. Sample $a, b, c \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and $z \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$, and sets $(A, B, C) = (g^a, g^b, g^{abz+(1-z)c})$.
 3. \mathcal{A} outputs $x \in \{0, 1\}$ on input $(1^\kappa, A, B, C)$.
- **Output:** $\text{DDH}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa) = 1$ if $x = z$, and 0 otherwise.

Figure 35: DDH Experiment $\text{DDH}(\mathcal{A}, 1^\kappa)$

F.1 Enhanced Existential Unforgeability of ECDSA

FIGURE 37 (ECDSA Multi-Enhanced Experiment $\text{EnhancedECDSA}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{H}, S, T, 1^\kappa)$)

0. Choose a group-order-generator tuple $(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \text{gen}(1^\kappa)$.
 1. Generate a key-pair $(x \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q, X = g^x)$ and let $(\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{m}_0, \sigma_0) = (\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset)$.
 2. For $i = 1 \dots T$
 - Sample $\mathbf{R}_i = \{R_{i,j} = g^{k_{i,j}^{-1}} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}\}_{j \leq S}$.
 - For $j = 1 \dots S$
 - (a) Choose $m_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}(\mathbb{G}, g, \mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{m}_0, \sigma_0, \dots, \mathbf{R}_{i-1}, \mathbf{m}_{i-1}, \sigma_{i-1}, \mathbf{R}_i, m_{i,<j}, \sigma_{i,<j})$
 - (b) Compute $\sigma_{i,j} = \text{sign}_x(m_{i,j}; k_{i,j})$.Set $\mathbf{m}_i = \{m_{i,j}\}_j$ and $\sigma_i = \{\sigma_{i,j}\}_j$.
 3. $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}$ outputs (m, σ) on input $(\mathbb{G}, g, \mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{m}_0, \sigma_0, \dots, \mathbf{R}_T, \mathbf{m}_T, \sigma_T)$.
- **Output:** $\text{EnhancedECDSA}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{H}, T, \mathbb{G}) = 1$ if $\text{vrfy}_X(m, \sigma) = 1$ and $m \notin \{m_{i,j}\}_{i,j}$ and 0 otherwise.

Figure 36: ECDSA Multi-Enhanced Experiment $\text{EnhancedECDSA}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{H}, S, T, 1^\kappa)$

F.1.1 $O(1)$ -Enhanced Forgeries

Lemma F.5. *If ECDSA is existentially unforgeable, then there exists a negligible function ν such that for any PPTM \mathcal{A} , for every $T \in \text{poly}(\kappa)$ and $S \in O(1)$ it holds that $\Pr[\text{EnhancedECDSA}(\mathcal{A}, S, T, \kappa) = 1] \in \nu(\kappa)$.*

Proof. Let $Q \in \text{poly}$ denote the number of oracle queries that the adversary makes in between each signature query. We show that any adversary that wins the experiment above with noticeable probability p yields an efficient adversary that forges signatures with the same probability in the (plain) ECDSA experiment and complexity most $T \cdot Q^S \log(Q) \in \text{poly}$ queries. Define process \mathcal{R} with black-box access to \mathcal{A} as follows: choose Q messages uniformly at random denoted $\{m'_i\}_{i \in [Q]}$. Then choose $I^* \subset [Q]$ of size S uniformly at random and invoke the (plain) ECDSA oracle on m'_{i^*} , for every $i^* \in I^*$. Write $(R_{i^*}, M_{i^*} = \mathcal{H}(m'_{i^*}), \sigma_{i^*})$ for the signature. Next do:

1. Hand over $\{R_{i^*}\}_{i^* \in I^*}$ to \mathcal{A}
2. For $i = 1 \dots Q$, each time \mathcal{A} queries the oracle on m_i , hand over $(\text{answer}, M_i = \mathcal{H}(m'_i))$.
3. When \mathcal{A} queries the ECDSA oracle on m_{j^*} , do
 - If $j^* \neq i^*$ rewind the adversary and repeat.
 - Else hand over σ .

Observe that $\Pr[\forall i^*, i^* = j^*] = \frac{1}{\binom{Q}{S} \cdot S!} \in O(1/Q^S)$ and that the reduction will guess every j^* with probability close to 1 after $Q^S \cdot \log(Q)$ tries. □

F.2 Enhanced Existential Unforgeability of ECDSA

FIGURE 37 (ECDSA Multi-Enhanced Experiment $\text{EnhancedECDSA}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{H}, S, T, 1^\kappa)$)

0. Choose a group-order-generator tuple $(\mathbb{G}, q, g) \leftarrow \text{gen}(1^\kappa)$.
1. Generate a key-pair $(x \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q, X = g^x)$ and let $(\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{m}_0, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_0) = (\emptyset, \emptyset, \emptyset)$.
2. For $i = 1 \dots T$
 - Sample $\mathbf{R}_i = \{R_{i,j} = g^{k_{i,j}^{-1}} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}\}_{j \leq S}$.
 - For $j = 1 \dots S$
 - (a) Choose $m_{i,j} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}(\mathbb{G}, g, \mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{m}_0, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_0, \dots, \mathbf{R}_{i-1}, \mathbf{m}_{i-1}, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_{i-1}, \mathbf{R}_i, m_{i,<j}, \sigma_{i,<j})$
 - (b) Compute $\sigma_{i,j} = \text{sign}_x(m_{i,j}; k_{i,j})$.
 - Set $\mathbf{m}_i = \{m_{i,j}\}_j$ and $\boldsymbol{\sigma}_i = \{\sigma_{i,j}\}_j$.
3. $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{H}}$ outputs (m, σ) on input $(\mathbb{G}, g, \mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{m}_0, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_0, \dots, \mathbf{R}_T, \mathbf{m}_T, \boldsymbol{\sigma}_T)$.
 - **Output:** $\text{EnhancedECDSA}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{H}, T, \mathbb{G}) = 1$ if $\text{vrfy}_X(m, \sigma) = 1$ and $m \notin \{m_{i,j}\}_{i,j}$ and 0 otherwise.

Figure 37: ECDSA Multi-Enhanced Experiment $\text{EnhancedECDSA}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{H}, S, T, 1^\kappa)$

F.2.1 $O(1)$ -Enhanced Forgeries

Lemma F.6. *If ECDSA is existentially unforgeable, then there exists a negligible function ν such that for any PPTM \mathcal{A} , for every $T \in \text{poly}(\kappa)$ and $S \in O(1)$ it holds that $\Pr[\text{EnhancedECDSA}(\mathcal{A}, S, T, \kappa) = 1] \in \nu(\kappa)$.*

Proof. Let $Q \in \text{poly}$ denote the number of oracle queries that the adversary makes in between each signature query. We show that any adversary that wins the experiment above with noticeable probability p yields an efficient adversary that forges signatures with the same probability in the (plain) ECDSA experiment and complexity most $T \cdot Q^S \log(Q) \in \text{poly}$ queries. Define process \mathcal{R} with black-box access to \mathcal{A} as follows: choose Q messages uniformly at random denoted $\{m'_i\}_{i \in [Q]}$. Then choose $I^* \subset [Q]$ of size S uniformly at random and invoke the (plain) ECDSA oracle on m'_{i^*} , for every $i^* \in I^*$. Write $(R_{i^*}, M_{i^*} = \mathcal{H}(m'_{i^*}), \sigma_{i^*})$ for the signature. Next do:

1. Hand over $\{R_{i^*}\}_{i^* \in I^*}$ to \mathcal{A}
2. For $i = 1 \dots Q$, each time \mathcal{A} queries the oracle on m_i , hand over $(\text{answer}, M_i = \mathcal{H}(m'_i))$.
3. When \mathcal{A} queries the ECDSA oracle on m_{j^*} , do
 - If $j^* \neq i^*$ rewind the adversary and repeat.
 - Else hand over σ .

Observe that $\Pr[\forall i^*, i^* = j^*] = \frac{1}{\binom{Q}{S} \cdot S!} \in O(1/Q^S)$ and that the reduction will guess every j^* with probability close to 1 after $Q^S \cdot \log(Q)$ tries. □

F.2.2 Multi-Enhanced Forgeries: Preliminaries

Brief overview of the Generic Group Model. Let (\mathbb{G}, q, g) denote a group-order-generator tuple and let $\mathbf{G} \subset \{0, 1\}^*$ denote an arbitrary set of size q . The generic group model is defined via a random bijective map $\mu : \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbf{G}$ and a group-oracle $\mathcal{O} : \mathbf{G} \times \mathbf{G} \rightarrow \mathbf{G}$ such that $\mu(gh) = \mathcal{O}(\mu(g), \mu(h))$, for every $g, h \in \mathbb{G}$. In group-theoretic jargon, $(\mathbf{G}, *)$ is isomorphic to (\mathbb{G}, \cdot) via the group-isomorphism μ , letting $* : \mathbf{G} \times \mathbf{G} \rightarrow \mathbf{G}$ such that $G * H = \mathcal{O}(G, H)$.

EC-specific abstraction. We further assume that there exists an efficient 2-to-1 map $\tau : \mathbf{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ such that $\tau(H) = \tau(H^{-1})$. We further assume that this map is efficiently invertible $\tau^{-1} : \mathbb{F}_q \rightarrow \{\{G, H\} \text{ s.t. } G, H \in \mathbf{G}\} \cup \{\perp\}$ such that

$$\tau^{-1} : x \mapsto \begin{cases} \{H, H^{-1}\} & \text{if } \exists H \text{ s.t. } \tau(H) = x \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Notation F.7. Define π such that $\pi(X) = \emptyset$ and $\pi(X_1, \dots, X_\ell) = (X_1, X_2, X_1X_2) \parallel \pi(X_1X_2, X_3, \dots, X_\ell)$, for every $X, X_1, \dots, X_\ell \in \mathbf{G}$. Furthermore, for $X \in \mathbf{G}$ and $k \in \mathbb{F}_q$ let $(k_i)_{i \leq q_0}$ denote the binary representation of k and define

$$(X^k) = \begin{cases} (X, X, X^2, \dots, X^{k/2}, X^{k/2}, X^k) & \text{if } k \text{ is a power of 2} \\ (\text{id}_{\mathbf{G}}, X, X) \parallel (X^{k_1 \cdot 2}) \parallel \dots \parallel (X^{k_{q_0} \cdot 2^{q_0}}) \parallel \pi(X^{k_0}, \dots, X^{k_{q_0} 2^{q_0}}) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases},$$

where $q_0 = \lfloor \log q \rfloor$.

FIGURE 38 (ECDSA Experiment in Generic Group w/ Enhanced Signing Oracle)

- Group Oracle \mathcal{O} :
 - On input (X, Y) , return $Z = X * Y$.
 - Set $\mathbf{Q} = \mathbf{Q} \parallel (X, Y, Z)$.
- Signing oracle $\mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{O}}$:
 - On input pubkey, sample $G \leftarrow \mathbf{G}$ and $x \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and return $(G, H = G^x)$.
 - On input pnt-request, sample $k \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$, return $R = G^{k-1}$, add R to \mathbf{R} and record (R, k) .
 - On input (sign, msg, R), if $R \in \mathbf{R}$ retrieve (R, k) and do:
 1. Return $\sigma = k(m + rx)$, for $r = \tau(R)$ and $m = \mathcal{H}(\text{msg})$.
 2. Set $\mathbf{Q} = \mathbf{Q} \parallel (G^{m/\sigma}) \parallel (H^{r/\sigma}) \parallel (G^{m/\sigma}, H^{r/\sigma}, R)$.
 3. Remove R from \mathbf{R} and add (R, msg, σ) to \mathbf{S} .

Figure 38: ECDSA Experiment in Generic Group w/ Enhanced Signing Oracle

Let \mathcal{A} denote an algorithm interacting with $\mathcal{O}, \mathcal{S}^{\mathcal{O}}$ in the experiment described in Figure 38. Consider the tuple of all oracle calls $\mathbf{Q} = (Q_1, \dots, Q_{3t}) = (X_1, Y_1, Z_1, \dots, X_t, Y_t, Z_t)$, where each pair (X_i, Y_i) denotes the input to \mathcal{O} and Z_i denotes the output.

Definition F.8. We say that $Q_i \in \{X_j, Y_j\}$ is *independent* if $(Q_i, \dots) \notin \mathbf{S}$ and $Q_i \notin \{Q_k, Q_k^{-1}\}$, for every $k < i$.

Lemma F.9 (Brown [5, 6]). *The following holds with all but negligible probability for every efficient algorithm \mathcal{A} interacting with \mathcal{O} . Let $B_1 \dots B_\ell$ denote the independent elements of \mathbf{Q} and let $Q \in \mathbf{Q}$. Suppose that \mathcal{A} outputs two sequences $(\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell)$ and $(\alpha'_1, \dots, \alpha'_\ell)$ such that*

$$Q = \prod_{k \leq \ell} B_k^{\alpha_k} = \prod_{k \leq \ell} B_k^{\alpha'_k}.$$

Then, with probability $1 - 1/\text{poly}(q)$ it holds that $\alpha_i = \alpha'_i \pmod q$, for every $i \in [\ell]$. Furthermore, if $Q = Z_j$, then $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_\ell$ are efficiently computable from $(X_i, Y_i, Z_i)_{i < j}$, the set \mathbf{S} , and random oracle \mathcal{H} .

F.2.3 Multi-Enhanced Forgeries: Proof

Theorem F.10. *Let \mathcal{A} be an algorithm in the generic group experiment with enhanced signing oracle making ℓ queries to the random oracle. If \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery with probability α , then there exists \mathcal{B} making at most ℓ queries to the random oracle such that*

$$\Pr_{e \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q} [(x, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(e) \text{ s.t. } \mathcal{H}(x)/\mathcal{H}(y) = e] \geq \alpha/t^2 - 1/\text{poly}(q),$$

where t is an upper bound on the total number of queries to the group and signing oracle.

The above theorem follows from the claim below by straightforward averaging argument.

Claim F.11. *Let \mathcal{A} be an algorithm in the generic group experiment with enhanced signing oracle making ℓ queries to the random oracle. If \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery with probability α , then there exists \mathcal{B} making at most ℓ queries to the random oracle such that*

$$\Pr_{e_1, \dots, e_t \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q} [(x, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(e_1, \dots, e_t) : \exists i \text{ s.t. } \mathcal{H}(x)/\mathcal{H}(y) = e_i] \geq \alpha/t - 1/\text{poly}(q)$$

where t is an upper bound on the total number of queries to the group and signing oracle.

Proof. Using the notation above, for a tuple of query calls $\mathbf{Q} = (Q_1 \dots)$ and signed points \mathbf{S} , let $\phi : \mathbf{G} \rightarrow (\mathbb{F}_q)^*$ denote the (efficient) function that maps group-elements to their representation with respect to the independent points of \mathbf{Q} . Namely $\phi(Q_i) = \prod_k B_k^{\alpha_k}$ as (uniquely except with negligible probability) determined by $(Q_j)_{j < i}$ and \mathbf{S} . Consider the reduction from Figure 39 and let \mathcal{A} denote a generic forger. In the end of the experiment, assume \mathcal{A} outputs $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and (F, ψ) such that $F = G^{\mathcal{H}(x)/\psi} * H^{\tau(F)/\psi}$ and $(\dots, x, \dots) \notin \mathbf{S}$. We begin by showing that in the following cases (depending on F), the transcript of the reduction yields a ‘‘collision’’ (x, y) in the random oracle of the form $\mathcal{H}(x)/\mathcal{H}(y) = e$ for $e \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$.

Case 1. F was returned to the adversary in Item 2 of the group operation simulation. Using the notation from Figure 39, it holds that $F = G^\alpha H^\beta = G^{\mathcal{H}(x)/\psi} H^{f/\psi}$ for $f = \alpha^{-1} \mathcal{H}(y) e \beta$. Consequently $f/\psi = \beta$ and $\mathcal{H}(x)/\psi = \alpha$ and we deduce that $\mathcal{H}(x)/\mathcal{H}(y) = (\alpha\psi) \cdot (f^{-1} \alpha^{-1} e \beta) = e \cdot (\beta\psi f^{-1}) = e$.

Case 2. F was returned to the adversary in Item 3 of the group operation simulation, and, for $(R, y, \sigma) \in \mathbf{S}$, it holds that $F = G^\alpha H^\beta R^\gamma$ and $\alpha r - \beta m = 0$. Using the notation from Figure 39, it holds that $F = G^\alpha H^\beta R^\gamma$ for $\tau(F) = e \cdot r$ and $r = \tau(R)$. Next, retrieve (R, y, σ) from \mathbf{S} such that $R = G^{\mathcal{H}(y)/\sigma} H^{\tau(R)/\sigma}$ and deduce that $F = G^{\alpha + \gamma m/\sigma} H^{\beta + \gamma r/\sigma}$. Deduce that $\beta/r + \gamma/\sigma = f/\psi = \frac{e r}{\psi}$, and, since $\alpha = m\beta/r$, observe that $m(\beta/r + \gamma/\sigma) = \chi/\psi$ which implies that $e = \chi/m = \mathcal{H}(x)/\mathcal{H}(y)$.

Case 3. F was chosen by the simulator in Item 1 of the signing operation simulation. It holds that $F = G^\alpha H^\beta R^\gamma = G^{\alpha + \gamma m/\sigma} H^{\beta + \gamma r/\sigma} = G^{\mathcal{H}(x)/\psi} H^{f/\psi}$ for σ set as prescribed in Item 1 of the signing operation simulation i.e.

$$\sigma = \gamma(wr f^{-1} - m) \cdot (\alpha - w f^{-1} \beta)^{-1}$$

Therefore, letting $\chi = \mathcal{H}(x)$, since $\chi/\psi = \alpha + \gamma m/\sigma$ and $f/\psi = \beta + \gamma r/\sigma$, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} \chi(\beta + \gamma r/\sigma) &= f(\alpha + \gamma m/\sigma) \Leftrightarrow \\ f\alpha - \chi\beta &= \frac{\gamma}{\sigma} \cdot (\chi r - m f) \Leftrightarrow \\ f\alpha - \chi\beta &= \frac{\gamma}{\sigma} \cdot (\chi r - m f) \Leftrightarrow \\ (f\alpha - \chi\beta)(\chi r - m f)^{-1} &= (w r f^{-1} - m)^{-1} (\alpha - w f^{-1} \beta) \Leftrightarrow \\ (w - \chi)(r\alpha - \beta m) &= 0 \end{aligned}$$

which implies $\mathcal{H}(x)/\mathcal{H}(y) = e$ for $w = \mathcal{H}(y)e$ since $r\alpha - \beta m \neq 0$.

Simulation Indistinguishability. Next we show that if the adversary forges in the real world, then the adversary outputs a forgery in Figure 39. It is enough to argue that the (simulated) points and signatures satisfy the same distribution as in the real world (when \mathcal{A} interacts with a “real” group and signing oracle).

Notice that, when simulating the group-oracle, all the points are simply random uniform elements in \mathbf{G} (since $R \leftarrow \tau^{-1}(r)$ for $r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$). The nontrivial part is to show that the signatures are well-distributed. In the real world, $\sigma = k(\mathcal{H}(x) + rx)$ for a random k , so the signatures are simply uniform elements in \mathbb{F}_q (since in the GGM elements k and $r = \tau(R)$ are independent). We show that the sigmas’s are (almost) uniform elements in Figure 39 by showing that the map $w \mapsto \gamma(wr\zeta^{-1} - m) \cdot (\alpha - w\zeta^{-1}\beta)^{-1}$ is injective when $\gamma\zeta \neq 0$ and $r\alpha - m\beta \neq 0$. So, for $u, v \in \mathbb{F}_q$, if

$$\gamma(ur\zeta^{-1} - m) \cdot (\alpha - u\zeta^{-1}\beta)^{-1} = \gamma(vr\zeta^{-1} - m) \cdot (\alpha - v\zeta^{-1}\beta)^{-1} \Leftrightarrow \quad (1)$$

$$(ur\zeta^{-1} - m) \cdot (\alpha - v\zeta^{-1}\beta) = (vr\zeta^{-1} - m) \cdot (\alpha - u\zeta^{-1}\beta) \Leftrightarrow \quad (2)$$

$$ur\alpha + mv\beta = vr\alpha + mu\beta \Leftrightarrow \quad (3)$$

$$(u - v)(r\alpha - m\beta) = 0 \quad (4)$$

Therefore, for random w , the (simulated) signature is uniform over $\mathbb{F}_q \setminus \{\alpha\zeta\beta^{-1}\}$.³³ By Lemma F.9, we conclude that if \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery in the real world, then \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery in Figure 39 with probability $1 - 1/\text{poly}(q)$.

Putting everything together. We conclude by calculating the probability that the transcript contains a “collision” in the random oracle of the form $\mathcal{H}(x)/\mathcal{H}(y) = e$. Let (F, x, ψ) denote \mathcal{A} ’s forgery. If F was returned to \mathcal{A} in Item 2 of the group operation simulation (case 1), then clearly the transcript yields a suitable collision. The other two cases are slightly more complicated because the reduction is required to guess the attempted forgery. For instance, in Item 3 of the group-operation simulation (case 2), the reduction picks a random (presigning) point R hoping that (F, x, ψ) together with $(R, \text{msg}, \sigma) \in \mathcal{S}$ will result in a “collision”. Similarly, in Item 1 of the signing-operation simulation (case 3), the reduction chooses a random Z hoping that $F = Z$.

In more detail, assume that F was first calculated of the form $G^\alpha H^\beta \prod_i R_i^{\gamma_i}$ and deduce the following about $F = G^{\alpha'} H^{\beta'} R^{\gamma'}$ where R denotes the last point to be signed on $m = \mathcal{H}(\text{msg})$ among $\{R_i\}_i$. If $\alpha'r + \beta'm = 0$, then R was chosen by the reduction in Item 3 of the group operation with probability at least $1/t$ (since t is an upper bound on the number of group-queries), or, if $\alpha'r + \beta'm \neq 0$, then F was chosen by the reduction in Item 1 of the signing operation with probability at least $1/t$ (since t is an upper bound on the number of presigning-queries).

In summary, it holds that the transcript contains a suitable collision with probability $\alpha/t - \frac{1}{\text{poly}(q)}$. \square

³³ $\alpha\zeta\beta^{-1}$ corresponds to the point where the function is undefined.

FIGURE 39 (Reduction in Generic Group w/ Enhanced Signing Oracle)

- Input: $e_1, \dots, e_t \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$ and PPTM \mathcal{A} .
 - Initialize: $\text{ctr} = 1$.
- Group operation simulation:
 - On input (X, Y) from \mathcal{A} to the group-oracle, do:
 1. If $\phi(Z) = \phi(X * Y)$ for some $Z \in \mathbf{Q}$, return Z .
 2. Else If $\phi(X * Y) = G^\alpha H^\beta$ for $\alpha, \beta \neq 0$ do:
 - (a) Sample $y \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$ and set $w = e_{\text{ctr}} \cdot \mathcal{H}(y)$ and $Z \leftarrow \tau^{-1}(\alpha^{-1}w\beta)$.
If $\tau^{-1}(\alpha^{-1}w\beta) = \perp$, repeat the above step. Otherwise, increment ctr and carry on.
 - (b) Return Z .
 3. Else if $\phi(X * Y) = G^\alpha H^\beta \prod_{i \leq t} R_i^{\gamma_i}$ for $R_i \in \mathbf{R}$ and $\gamma_i \neq 0$ do:
 - (a) Choose $i \leftarrow [\ell]$ and set $Z \leftarrow \tau^{-1}(e_{\text{ctr}} \cdot r_i)$, for $r_i = \tau(R_i)$.
If $\tau^{-1}(e_{\text{ctr}} \cdot r_i) = \perp$, repeat the above step. Otherwise, increment ctr and carry on.
 - (b) Return Z .
 4. Else return $Z \leftarrow \mathbf{G}$.
 - Set $\mathbf{Q} = \mathbf{Q} \parallel (X, Y, Z)$.
- Signing operation simulation:
 - On input **pubkey** from \mathcal{A} to the signing-oracle, return $(G, H) \leftarrow \mathbf{G}^2$.
 - On input **pnt-request** from \mathcal{A} to the signing-oracle, return $R \leftarrow \mathbf{G}$, and add R to \mathbf{R} .
 - On input **(sign, msg, R)** from \mathcal{A} to the signing-oracle, if $R \in \mathbf{R}$ set $m = \mathcal{H}(\text{msg})$ and $r = \tau(R)$, and do:
 1. Choose $Z \leftarrow \mathbf{Q}$ such that $\phi(Z) = G^\alpha H^\beta R^\gamma$, for $\gamma \neq 0$ and $\beta m - r\alpha \neq 0$.
 - (a) Sample y and set $w = e_{\text{ctr}} \cdot \mathcal{H}(y)$ and $\sigma = \gamma(wr\zeta^{-1} - m) \cdot (\alpha - w\zeta^{-1}\beta)^{-1}$, for $\zeta = \tau(Z)$.
Increment ctr .
 - (b) If no such Z exists set $\sigma \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_q$.
 2. Return σ and remove R from \mathbf{R} , and add (R, msg, σ) to \mathbf{S} .
 - Set $\mathbf{Q} = \mathbf{Q} \parallel (G^{m/\sigma}) \parallel (H^{r/\sigma}) \parallel (G^{m/\sigma}, H^{r/\sigma}, R)$.

Figure 39: Reduction in Generic Group w/ Enhanced Signing Oracle