

On Sufficient Oracles for Secure Computation with Identifiable Abort

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Abstract. Identifiable abort (IA) is the strongest security guarantee that is achievable for secure multi-party computation in the dishonest majority setting. Protocols that achieve IA ensure that, in case of an abort, all honest parties agree on the identity of at least one corrupt party who can be held accountable for the abort. It is important to understand what computational primitives must be used to obtain secure computation with identifiable abort. This can be approached by asking which oracles can be used to build perfectly secure computation with identifiable abort. Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Zikas (Crypto 2014) show that an oracle that returns correlated randomness to all n parties is sufficient; however, they leave open the question of whether oracles that return output to fewer than n parties can be used.

In this work, we show that for $t \leq n - 2$ corruptions, oracles that return output to $n - 1$ parties are sufficient to obtain perfectly secure computation with identifiable abort. Using our construction recursively, we see that for $t \leq n - \ell - 2$ and $\ell \in \mathcal{O}(1)$, oracles that return output to $n - \ell - 1$ parties are sufficient.

For our construction, we introduce a new kind of secret sharing scheme which we call *unanimously identifiable secret sharing with public and private shares* (UISSwPPS). In a UISSwPPS scheme, each share holder is given a public and a private shares. Only the public shares are necessary for reconstruction, and the knowledge of a private share additionally enables the identification of at least one party who provided an incorrect share in case reconstruction fails. The important new property of UISSwPPS is that, even given all the public shares, an adversary should not be able to come up with a different public share that causes reconstruction of an incorrect message, or that avoids the identification of a cheater if reconstruction fails.

1 Introduction

In the setting of secure multiparty computation we have n parties, each having their own private input x_i , that would like to compute an arbitrary function $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ of their inputs in the presence of an adversary, who may actively corrupt up to t of the parties. In particular, the parties would like to compute the function in a way that prevents the adversary from learning any unnecessary information, i.e. the corrupted parties should learn no more than what they can deduce from their own inputs and outputs. From a correctness point of view, we would ideally like to guarantee that the honest parties always obtain the output no matter what the corrupted parties do, but unfortunately, such strong guarantees are unattainable when $t \geq n/2$ parties are corrupt, as was shown by Cleve [Cle86].

For this reason, protocols tolerating this many corruptions usually aim for the weaker notion of *active security with unanimous abort (UA)*, where the honest parties either all obtain the correct output or all unanimously output abort. The drawback of such protocols, however, is that they do not provide the honest parties with a mechanism for determining *who* caused the abort in a failed execution, thus potentially allowing an adversary to perform a denial-of-service attack on the whole computation by only corrupting a single party. To overcome this issue, Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Zikas [IOZ14] introduced the notion of *active security with identifiable abort (IA)*, which enables the honest parties to always unanimously agree on at least one corrupted party that will be held responsible for an abort.

To eventually construct efficient protocols for either notion, it is important to understand the minimal computationally secure building blocks necessary. Towards this goal, it is convenient to study the task of constructing information-theoretically secure protocols in a world where the parties have access to oracles

that compute certain sub-functions correctly and securely on their behalf. In such a world, the question of finding the minimal building blocks reduces to finding the “simplest” oracles. The hope of this approach is that simpler oracles lead to computationally less expensive solutions in an oracle-free world, where the oracles are replaced by computationally secure protocols that often represent the main efficiency bottleneck of the overall protocol.

For secure n -party computation with UA or IA in the presence of an adversary that corrupts less than half of the parties, i.e. $t < n/2$, no oracles are needed [RB89, Bea90].¹ For UA and any $t \geq n/2$, oracles are necessary and oracles that realize two-party oblivious transfer [Rab81] are sufficient [Kil88, CvT95]. In contrast to this, an impossibility result by Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu [IOS12] rules out secure computation with IA from *any* two-party oracle for $t \geq 2n/3$.² On the positive side, the authors of [IOZ14] show that an n -party oracle for setting up correlated randomness is sufficient for secure computation with IA for any t . For $t > n/2$ and oracles that realize k -party functionalities for $2 < k < n$, very little is known about the feasibility of IA. The only known (upper) bounds are due to Brandt et al. [BMMM20], who show that IA with security against t corruptions can be realized from certain $(t + 2)$ -party oracles, when $n \in \mathcal{O}(\log \lambda / \log \log \lambda)$, where λ is the security parameter. The authors conjecture that analogous results for larger n are not possible unless $P = NP$.

1.1 Our Contribution

In this work, we make the first progress towards constructing n -party protocols with IA for any $n \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$ from k -party oracles for $k < n$. In particular, we show that such protocols can be constructed for any $t \leq n - \ell - 2$ and $k = n - \ell - 1$, where $\ell \in \mathcal{O}(1)$. Our result thereby refutes the conjecture of Brandt et al.

As a key technical tool, we introduce the notion of *unanimously identifiable secret sharing with public and private shares* (UISSwPPS), which is inspired by the notion of unanimously identifiable secret sharing (UISS) of Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu [IOS12]. We believe that this notion may be of independent interest and could potentially find other applications.

1.2 Technical Overview

The starting point of our work is a result of Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Zikas [IOZ14], which shows that an n -party oracle with IA for distributing correlated randomness is sufficient for general n -party computation with IA. An n -party oracle generating correlated randomness takes no private inputs from the parties, computes $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$, and returns r_i to party i . In this work, we focus on realizing those oracles from $(n - 1)$ -party oracles. We require that the number of corruptions t is at most $n - 2$ to ensure that every oracle call includes at least one honest party, which we need for our construction.

At its core, our approach is to pick a party $x \in [n]$ and exclude it from the computation. The remaining $n - 1$ parties use their oracle access to compute a function Setup'_x , which uses Setup to generate correlated randomness, provides every party with its output and additionally secret shares the output r_x belonging to party x among the $n - 1$ parties. After calling the oracle, all parties send their share of r_x to party x , who reconstructs its correlated randomness. If all parties behave honestly, then everybody receives the correct output. Privacy of the value r_x is guaranteed, since at least one honest party participated in the oracle call.

However, the adversary may actively misbehave in the above protocol sketch. Any corrupt party in the set $[n] \setminus \{x\}$, for instance, may send an incorrect share or nothing at all to party x . Through the use of an appropriate secret sharing scheme, we ensure that any tampering of the shares is detectable during reconstruction. If tampering is detected, the excluded party proceeds to a complain phase, which establishes

¹ We assume that parties have access to point-to-point and broadcast channels, and we do not consider those as explicit oracles in this paper.

² In addition to their impossibility result, the authors of [IOZ14] also show that *blackbox* access to adaptively-secure two-party oblivious transfer is sufficient for constructing protocols with IA for $t > n/2$. We note that assuming blackbox access to a primitive is a stronger assumption than assuming oracle access, which is the focus of this work.

conflicts between parties. Two parties are in conflict if they accuse each other of misbehaving in the protocol execution.

At the end of this complain phase, one of two things happens. If sufficiently many conflicts have been established, all honest parties are guaranteed to unanimously abort, blaming the same corrupt party. If the honest parties do not have sufficient information for agreeing on a malicious party, they make a new attempt at generating fresh correlated randomness as above; possibly using a different excluded party.

To ensure that our protocol can establish “good” conflicts during the complain phase, we rely on our new secret sharing notion of UISSwPPS. In a nutshell, this secret sharing scheme provides every participant with a public and a private share. The public shares are used for reconstructing the secret, whereas the private shares are used for checking the integrity of other parties’ public shares. Our scheme ensures that even an adversary who gets to see *all* public shares cannot come up with a set of bad public shares that will fool a party holding a private share into reconstructing an incorrect message. Moreover, the scheme ensures that all parties holding private shares agree on the set of public shares that they believe to be malformed.

1.3 Notation

We write $[n]$ to denote the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$.

2 Secure Multiparty Computation (MPC) Definitions

We follow the real/ideal world simulation paradigm.

An n -party protocol $\Pi = (P_1, \dots, P_n)$ is an n -tuple of probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) interactive Turing machines (ITMs), where each party P_i is initialized with input $x_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and random coins $r_i \in \{0, 1\}^*$. We let \mathcal{A} denote a special ITM that represents the adversary and that is initialized with input that contains the identities of the corrupt parties, their respective private inputs, and an auxiliary input. The protocol is executed in rounds (i.e., the protocol is synchronous), where each round consists of the send phase and the receive phase, where parties can respectively send the messages from this round to other parties and receive messages from other parties. In every round parties can communicate either over a broadcast channel or a fully connected point-to-point (P2P) network, where we additionally assume all communication to be private and ideally authenticated.

During the execution of the protocol, the corrupt parties receive arbitrary instructions from the adversary \mathcal{A} , while the honest parties faithfully follow the instructions of the protocol. We consider the adversary \mathcal{A} to be rushing, i.e., during every round the adversary can see the messages the honest parties sent before producing messages from corrupt parties.

At the end of the protocol execution, the honest parties produce output, the corrupt parties produce no output, and the adversary outputs an arbitrary function of its view. The view of a party during the execution consists of its input, random coins and the messages it sees during the execution.

Definition 1 (Real-world execution). *Let $\Pi = (P_1, \dots, P_n)$ be an n -party protocol and let $C \subseteq [n]$, of size at most t , denote the set of indices of the parties corrupted by \mathcal{A} . The joint execution of Π under (\mathcal{A}, C) in the real world, on input vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, auxiliary input \mathbf{aux} to \mathcal{A} and security parameter λ , denoted $\text{REAL}_{\Pi, C, \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{aux})}(\mathbf{x}, \lambda)$, is defined as the output vector of P_1, \dots, P_n and $\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{aux})$ resulting from the protocol interaction.*

Definition 2 (Ideal Computation). *Let $f : (\{0, 1\}^*)^n \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^*)^n$ be an n -party function and let $C \subseteq [n]$, of size at most t , be the set of indices of the corrupt parties. Then, the joint ideal execution of f under (\mathcal{S}, C) on input vector $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$, auxiliary input \mathbf{aux} to \mathcal{S} and security parameter λ , denoted $\text{IDEAL}_{f, C, \mathcal{S}(\mathbf{aux})}(\mathbf{x}, \lambda)$, is defined as the output vector of P_1, \dots, P_n and $\mathcal{S}(\mathbf{aux})$ resulting from the interaction to the ideal functionality \mathcal{F} (Figure 1) with the simulator \mathcal{S} and the honest parties. After interacting with \mathcal{F} , the honest parties output the message received from \mathcal{F} . The corrupt parties output nothing. The simulator \mathcal{S} outputs an arbitrary function of the initial inputs $\{x_i\}_{i \in C}$, the messages received by the corrupt parties from the trusted party and its auxiliary input.*




Fig. 1. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{f,n}$ for secure computation of function f among n parties with identifiable abort.

Definition 3. Let $f : (\{0, 1\}^*)^n \rightarrow (\{0, 1\}^*)^n$ be an n -party function. A protocol Π t -securely computes the function f if for every real-world adversary \mathcal{A} there exists a simulator \mathcal{S} whose running time is polynomial in the running time of \mathcal{A} such that for every $C \subseteq [n]$ of size at most t , it holds that

$$\{\text{REAL}_{\Pi, C, \mathcal{A}(\text{aux})}(x, \lambda)\}_{x \in (\{0, 1\}^*)^n, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}} \equiv \{\text{IDEAL}_{f, C, \mathcal{S}(\text{aux})}(x, \lambda)\}_{x \in (\{0, 1\}^*)^n, \lambda \in \mathbb{N}}.$$

3 Unanimously Identifiable Secret Sharing with Public and Private Shares

A secret sharing schemes allows a dealer to split a message into shares such that certain authorized subsets of those shares can be used to reconstruct the message, whereas unauthorized subsets reveal no information about the message whatsoever.

Definition 4 (Secret Sharing Scheme). A secret sharing scheme for message space $\{0, 1\}^*$ consists of a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm **Share** and a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm **LRec** with the following syntax:

Share(msg) $\rightarrow (s_1, \dots, s_n)$: takes as input a message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and outputs shares s_1, \dots, s_n .
LRec($s_i, \{s_j\}_{j \in S}$) $\rightarrow (\text{msg}, \mathbf{L})$: takes as input a share s_i and a subset of shares $\{s_j\}_{j \in S}$, where $i \in S \subset [n]$, and outputs a reconstructed message in $\{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$ and a set of accusations $\mathbf{L} \subset [n]$.

Furthermore, (**Share**, **LRec**) should satisfy correctness (Definition 8, with appropriate syntactic modifications and ignoring the requirements on **Rec**, which we do not have in a regular secret sharing scheme) and privacy (Definition 9, with appropriate syntactic modifications).

We introduce the notion of unanimously identifiable secret sharing with public and private shares (UISwPPS). In such a scheme, each share holder will receive one private and one public share. On an intuitive level, the public shares will correspond to a secret sharing of the message shared by the dealer. The private shares, on the other hand, will be used by the share holders to detect any tampering with public shares. In particular, having additional private shares for each share holder allows us to satisfy a stronger notion of local identifiability, which we define below. We show a construction of UISSwPPS in Section 5.

Definition 5 (Secret Sharing Scheme with Public and Private Shares). A secret sharing scheme with public and private shares for message space $\{0, 1\}^*$ consists of a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm **Share** and deterministic polynomial-time algorithms **Rec** and **LRec** with the following syntax:

Share(msg) $\rightarrow (s_1^{\text{pub}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{pub}}, s_1^{\text{priv}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{priv}})$: takes as input a message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and outputs public shares $s_1^{\text{pub}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{pub}}$ and private shares $s_1^{\text{priv}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{priv}}$.
Rec($\{s_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in S}$) $\rightarrow \text{msg}/\perp$: takes as input a subset of public shares $\{s_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in S}$ (where $S \subset [n]$) and outputs a value in $\{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$.

$\text{LRec}(s_i^{\text{priv}}, \{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in S}) \rightarrow (\text{msg}, \mathbf{L})$: takes as input a private share s_i^{priv} and a subset of public shares $\{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in S}$ (where $S \subset [n]$) and outputs a reconstructed message in $\{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$ and a list of accusations $\mathbf{L} \subset [n]$.

Furthermore, $(\text{Share}, \text{Rec}, \text{LRec})$ should satisfy correctness (Definition 8), privacy (Definition 9), adaptive local identifiability (Definition 10), publicly detectable failures (Definition 11), consistent failures (Definition 12) and predictable failures (definitions 13 and 14).

We will use our new secret sharing scheme in combination with a new access structure that effectively corresponds to a threshold access structure with additional observers that hold no information about the dealer's message. Even though these observers are not helpful for reconstructing the message, they will still be able to verify whether other published shares are valid or not.

Definition 6 (Threshold Access Structure). For an arbitrary but fixed threshold $t \in [n]$, the t -threshold access structure is defined as $\mathbb{A}_{n,t} = \{S \subset [n] \mid |S| \geq t\}$.

Definition 7 (Threshold Access Structure with Observers). For an arbitrary but fixed threshold $t \in [n]$ and set $O \subset \{1, \dots, n\}$, the t -threshold access structure with observers O is defined as $\mathbb{A}_{n,t}^O = \{S \subset \{1, \dots, n\} \mid |S \setminus O| \geq t\}$.

Definition 8 (Correctness). A secret sharing scheme with public and private shares $(\text{Share}, \text{Rec}, \text{LRec})$ for access structure \mathbb{A} is correct if for any $S \in \mathbb{A}$, for any $i \in S$, for any message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$, there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr \left[\begin{bmatrix} s_1^{\text{pub}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{pub}} \\ s_1^{\text{priv}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{priv}} \end{bmatrix} \leftarrow \text{Share}(\text{msg}), (\overline{\text{msg}}, \perp) \leftarrow \text{LRec}(s_i^{\text{priv}}, \{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in S}) : \overline{\text{msg}} = \text{msg} \right] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

and

$$\Pr \left[\begin{bmatrix} s_1^{\text{pub}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{pub}} \\ s_1^{\text{priv}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{priv}} \end{bmatrix} \leftarrow \text{Share}(\text{msg}), \overline{\text{msg}} \leftarrow \text{Rec}(\{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in S}) : \overline{\text{msg}} = \text{msg} \right] = 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins of the Share algorithm.

Definition 9 (Privacy). A secret sharing scheme $(\text{Share}, \text{LRec})$ for access structure \mathbb{A} is private if for any $S \notin \mathbb{A}$, any two messages $\text{msg}, \text{msg}' \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $|\text{msg}| = |\text{msg}'|$, any possible vector of shares $\{(\tilde{s}_i^{\text{pub}}, \tilde{s}_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in S}$, it holds that

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr \left[\begin{bmatrix} s_1^{\text{pub}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{pub}} \\ s_1^{\text{priv}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{priv}} \end{bmatrix} \leftarrow \text{Share}(\text{msg}) : \{(\tilde{s}_i^{\text{pub}}, \tilde{s}_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in S} = \{(s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in S} \right] \\ & - \Pr \left[\begin{bmatrix} s_1^{\text{pub}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{pub}} \\ s_1^{\text{priv}}, \dots, s_n^{\text{priv}} \end{bmatrix} \leftarrow \text{Share}(\text{msg}') : \{(\tilde{s}_i^{\text{pub}}, \tilde{s}_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in S} = \{(s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in S} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda), \end{aligned}$$

where the probability is taken over the randomness of the secret sharing algorithm.

For our new notion of (adaptive) local identifiability, we consider an adversary that can see *all* public shares before outputting any tampered shares.

Definition 10 (Adaptive Local Identifiability). Consider the game described in Figure 2. A secret sharing scheme with public and private shares $(\text{Share}, \text{Rec}, \text{LRec})$ for access structure \mathbb{A} has adaptive local identifiability if for any message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins game}_{\text{ali}}(\mathcal{A})] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins of the \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{A} .




Fig. 2. Security game for adaptive local identifiability.

Remark 1. We will assume that local reconstruction outputs message \perp whenever the list of accusations is not empty.

We require a UISSwPSS to satisfy a mild notion of error detection for outside parties that receive a set of potentially tampered shares and attempt to reconstruct the secret.

Definition 11 (Publicly Detectable Failures). Consider the game described in Figure 3. A secret sharing scheme with public and private shares ($\text{Share}, \text{Rec}, \text{LRec}$) has publicly detectable failures if for any message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins game}_{\text{pdf}}(\mathcal{A})] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins of Share and \mathcal{A} .




Fig. 3. Security game for publicly detectable failures.

Finally, we require that Rec fails whenever LRec fails.

Definition 12 (Consistent Failures). Consider the game described in Figure 4. A secret sharing scheme with public and private shares ($\text{Share}, \text{Rec}, \text{LRec}$) for access structure \mathbb{A} has consistent failures if for any message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins game}_{\text{cf}}(\mathcal{A})] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins of \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{A} .

Definition 13 (Predictable Failures with respect to LRec). Consider the game described in Figure 5. A secret sharing scheme ($\text{Share}, \text{LRec}$) for access structure \mathbb{A} has predictable failures if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm SLRec such that for any message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins game}_{\text{pflrec}}(\mathcal{A})] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins of \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{A} .




Fig. 4. Security game for consistent failures.




Fig. 5. Security game for predictable failures with respect to LRec .

Definition 14 (Predictable Failures with respect to Rec). Consider the game described in Figure 6. A secret sharing scheme with public and private shares ($\text{Share}, \text{Rec}, \text{LRec}$) for access structure \mathbb{A} has predictable failures with respect to Rec if there exists a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm SRec such that for any message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins } \text{game}_{\text{pfrec}}(\mathcal{A})] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins of \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{A} .




Fig. 6. Security game for predictable failures with respect to Rec .

4 Bootstrapping MPC With Identifiable Abort

In this section, we describe how to instantiate MPC with identifiable abort for n parties and $t \leq n - 2$ given MPC with identifiable abort for $n - 1$ parties and $t \leq n - 2$. In Section 4.1, we describe the protocol. In Section 4.2, we prove its security.

4.1 Protocol

Ishai et al. [IOZ14] show that given correlated randomness, it is possible to securely compute any function with any threshold t , with identifiable abort and with information-theoretic security. Let $\text{Setup}() \rightarrow (r_1, \dots, r_n)$ be the randomized function that produces the appropriate correlated randomness. Setup takes no inputs (since correlated randomness is independent of the parties' inputs), and outputs n correlated objects, one for each party.

We would like to make use of the availability of MPC with identifiable abort for $n - 1$ parties to run Setup (for n parties). In order to do this, we define Setup'_x to be Setup augmented to return shares of r_x to parties $i \in [n] \setminus \{x\}$, and nothing to party x . We then expect parties $i \in [n] \setminus \{x\}$ to send those shares to party x . Of course, we need to make sure that party x won't accept incorrect shares; so, we use UISSwPPS to authenticate the shares.

If party x is dissatisfied with the shares she receives, she broadcasts all the shares. Then, one of two things happens. Either (1) all parties acknowledge that they sent the broadcast shares to party x , in which case, because of the adaptive local identifiability (Definition 10) of the secret sharing, we obtain identifiable abort among the parties who participated in the MPC; or (2) one of the parties (say, party i) claims that party x misrepresented the share she sent, in which case we have established a conflict between parties i and x , and can repeat the MPC excluding party i from the set of parties who hold shares of r_x .

We define $\text{Setup}'_{x,O}$ to be the augmented correlated randomness setup function that distributes shares of r_x to parties $i \in [n]$ with observers $O \subseteq [n]$ (where $x \in O$). (We only create an observer share for party x for ease of notation; this share is never used.) $\text{Setup}'_{x,O}$ is described in Figure 7.

Algorithm $\text{Setup}'_{x,O}$

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 $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$ 
 $\{s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}}\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{Share}(\mathbb{A}_t^O, r_x)$ 
return  $\{(r_i, s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in [n] \setminus \{x\}}$ 

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Fig. 7. Algorithm $\text{Setup}'_{x,O}$

Figure 8 describes the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n}$ that computes Setup with identifiable abort; Figure 12 describes the protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n}$ that realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n}$. This protocol calls upon a weaker ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$, which is described in Figure 9; this ideal functionality only has identifiable abort among $n - 1$ of the parties (party x cannot necessarily identify a cheater). $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ either (1) distributes the correlated randomness successfully, (2) identifiably aborts, or (3) identifiably aborts only among $[n] \setminus \{x\}$, in which case $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n}$ calls $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ again with a different x . Figure 11 describes the protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ that realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$. $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ in turn calls upon an ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n,x,O}$; this ideal functionality computes Setup' among $n - 1$ parties with identifiable abort. We do not give a protocol realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n,x,O}$, as we assume that secure protocols with identifiable abort exist for any $(n - 1)$ -party function.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n}$

1. Run $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$;
2. Send $\{r_i\}_{i \in C}$ to \mathcal{S} ;
3. Receive either **continue** or **(abort, \bar{i})** (for some $\bar{i} \in C$) from \mathcal{S} ;
4. If \mathcal{S} sent **continue**: send r_i to each party $i \in [n] \setminus C$;
5. If \mathcal{S} sent **(abort, \bar{i})**: send **(abort, \bar{i})** to each party $i \in [n] \setminus C$.

Fig. 8. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n}$ for secure computation of the correlated randomness setup function Setup among n parties with identifiable abort.

Theorem 1. Protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n,x}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}}$ (Figure 11) securely realizes the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ (Figure 9) against $t \leq n-2$ corruptions, assuming the availability of a broadcast channel and oracle access to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$.




Fig. 9. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ for secure computation of the correlated randomness setup function **Setup** among n parties with identifiable abort among all the parties except for x .




Fig. 10. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$ for secure computation of function **Setup'** _{x,O} with identifiable abort among $n-1$ parties (parties $i \in [n] \setminus \{x\}$).

Theorem 2. *Protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n}$ (Figure 12) securely realizes the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n}$ (Figure 8) against $t \leq n - 2$ corruptions, assuming the availability of a broadcast channel.*

Of course, given a protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n}$ realizing $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n}$, we can use that setup to achieve secure computation with identifiable abort of any function f using the approach of Ishai et al. Since $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n}$ only requires oracle access to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ — which in turn can be realized given only oracle access to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$ — we can claim the following lemma.

Lemma 3. *For any function f , there exists a protocol that securely realizes the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{f,n}$ (with identifiable abort) against $t \leq n - 2$ corruptions, given oracle access to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$.*

By using our construction recursively to realize $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$ given oracle access to a $(n - 2)$ -party ideal functionality, and so on, we can claim the following lemma.

Lemma 4. *For any function f , for any constant ℓ , there exists a protocol that securely realizes the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{f,n}$ (with identifiable abort) against $t \leq n - \ell - 2$ corruptions, given oracle access to $(n - \ell)$ -party ideal functionalities (with identifiable abort).*

We require that the recursion depth ℓ be constant because every $(n - \ell)$ -party instance calls at most $n - \ell$ $(n - \ell - 1)$ -party instances, and additionally may require $p'(n - \ell, \lambda) = p(\lambda)$ work for some polynomials p', p . Thus, we can only guarantee that the protocol is polynomial time if $p^\ell(\lambda) \in \text{poly}(\lambda)$, which is only true when ℓ is constant.

Conflict Graphs Before presenting our protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n}$, which requires keeping track of conflict graphs, we introduce some notation that we use for such graphs. We let S_x be the set of conflicts (denoted as tuples (i, j)) occurring among parties $[n] \setminus \{x\}$. These conflicts result from a call to a functionality with identifiable abort among these $n - 1$ parties. Parties i and j are considered to be in conflict if they accuse different parties of aborting the functionality. Since we do not allow a party to accuse itself, this includes the case when one of them accuses the other. For simplicity, we let S_x^i denote the set of parties that party i is in conflict with within S_x .

4.2 Security

Proof of Theorem 1 We prove this theorem by demonstrating a sequence of hybrids. In the first hybrid, a dummy simulator interfaces with a real-world adversary \mathcal{A} , executing the protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n,x}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}}$ on behalf of the honest parties exactly as in the real world. In the last hybrid, the simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ interfaces with the real-world adversary \mathcal{A} and the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$. We show a number of intermediate hybrids, wherein the simulator “imagines” interfacing with a partially-functional ideal functionality.

H_0 is the real world, where \mathcal{S}_0 acts on behalf of the honest parties in the protocol. Note that at this point, \mathcal{S}_0 is already responsible for running the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$; it does so honestly (by running $\{(r_i^*, s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{Setup}'_{x,O}(\cdot)$).

H_1 is the same as H_0 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_1 starts using a partially-functional ideal functionality \mathcal{F}' in its head. \mathcal{F}' runs $(r_1^*, \dots, r_n^*) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(\cdot)$, sends $\{r_i^*\}_{i \in C}$ to \mathcal{S}_1 , and does nothing further. \mathcal{S}_1 uses (r_1^*, \dots, r_n^*) to respond to the first call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$.

Of course, since (r_1^*, \dots, r_n^*) is picked from the same distribution (whether by an honest run of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$ or by a partially-functional \mathcal{F}'), H_1 is indistinguishable from H_0 .

H_2 is the same as H_1 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_2 rewinds the adversary \mathcal{A} in the appropriate steps as described for $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$. During the rewind \mathcal{S}_2 will run with freshly generated $\{(r_i, s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in GS}$. In each rewind, \mathcal{A} 's view is completely identical and a fresh output is used. The set of adversarial actions that cause rewind to be set to true, when `rewind = false`, is identical to the set of actions that will set it to false, when `rewind = true`. Thus, if the adversary performs such an action with probability ϵ initially, then it

Protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup}, n, x}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}', n-1, x, O}}$

Let $\text{GS} = [n] \setminus \{x\}$. Let $O = \{x\}$. (GS denotes the fixed set of parties calling the ideal functionality; O denotes the set of parties who do not get a share of r_x , which might change over time.)

The parties repeat the three phases described below until one of the following termination conditions occurs:

1. The parties $i \in \text{GS}$ receive a special broadcast message **done** from party x . When this happens, each party $i \in [n]$ outputs r_i .
2. All of the parties $i \in \text{GS}$ identify party x as a cheater. When this happens, the parties $i \in \text{GS}$ output **(abort, x)**.
3. One of the calls to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}', n-1, x, O}$ results in an (identifiable) abort. When this happens, the parties $i \in \text{GS}$ output **(abort, \bar{i})** (where $\bar{i} = \min(L_i)$ and L_i is the list of parties identified by party i).
4. Though $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}', n-1, x, O}$ did not abort, the honest parties among the $n - 1$ parties who called the functionality unanimously identify (a) cheater(s). When this happens, the parties $i \in \text{GS}$ output **(abort, \bar{i})** (where $\bar{i} = \min(L_i)$ and L_i is the list of parties identified by party i).

Call the Ideal Functionality:

1. The parties $i \in \text{GS}$ invoke the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}', n-1, x, O}$ to compute **Setup'** $_{x, O}$, so that each party $i \in \text{GS}$ learns $(r_i, s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})$.
2. If $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}', n-1, x, O}$ aborts, we are in termination condition 3; otherwise the parties proceed to the reconstruct phase.

Reconstruct:

3. Each party $i \in \text{GS} \setminus O$ sends s_i^{pub} to party x .
4. Party x runs $r_x \leftarrow \text{Rec}(\{s_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in \text{GS} \setminus O})$. If $r_x \neq \perp$, party x broadcasts **done**. (We are now in termination condition 1; the parties all output r_i .) If $r_x = \perp$, party x broadcasts **complain** and the parties proceed to the complain phase.

Complain:

1. Party x broadcasts the shares it received as $\{\tilde{s}_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in \text{GS} \setminus O}$.
2. Each party $i \in \text{GS} \setminus O$ broadcasts s_i^{pub} .
3. If there is an i such that $\tilde{s}_i^{\text{pub}} \neq s_i^{\text{pub}}$:
 - (a) All parties set $O = O \cup \{i\}_{i \in \text{GS} \text{ s.t. } \tilde{s}_i^{\text{pub}} \neq s_i^{\text{pub}}}$.
 - (b) If $O = \text{GS}$ (that is, all parties have had conflicting claims with party x), all parties output $(\perp, \{x\})$.
4. Otherwise:
 - (a) If $\text{Rec}(\{\tilde{s}_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in [n] \setminus O}) \neq \perp$: all parties $i \in \text{GS}$ identify party x as a cheater. (We are now in termination condition 2; the parties broadcast and output **(abort, x)**.)
 - (b) Otherwise: all parties $i \in \text{GS}$ compute $(\perp, L_i) \leftarrow \text{LRec}(s_i^{\text{priv}}, \{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in \text{GS}})$, and broadcast and output **(abort, \bar{i})** where $\bar{i} = \min(L_i)$. (We are now in termination condition 4.)

Fig. 11. Protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup}, n, x}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}', n-1, x, O}}$ for secure computation of the correlated randomness setup function **Setup** among n parties (with identifiable abort among all of the parties except for x , with threshold $t = n - 2$) given access to an ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}', n-1, x, O}$ that distributes the output of **Setup'** to $n - 1$ parties (with identifiable abort, with threshold $t = n - 2$).




Fig. 12. Protocol $\Pi_{\text{Setup},n}$ for secure computation of the correlated randomness setup function **Setup** among n parties (with identifiable abort, with threshold $t = n - 2$) given access to an ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ that distributes the output of **Setup** to n parties (with identifiable abort among all the parties except for x , with threshold $t = n - 2$).

will perform such an action again after $1/\epsilon$ rewinding steps in expectation. It follows that H_2 terminates in expected polynomial time, returning an output that is identically distributed to the output of H_1 . Thus the two hybrids are statistically close (not identical, since one runs in strict polynomial time and one in expected polynomial time).

H_3 is the same as H_2 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_3 augments the (simulated) partially-functional \mathcal{F}' to expect either **continue** or (abort, \bar{i}) after sending $\{r_i^*\}_{i \in C}$. If it receives **continue** or (abort, x) , \mathcal{F}' does nothing further; otherwise, it sends (a) $(\text{gadgabort}, \bar{i})$ to each (simulated) honest party $i \in [n] \setminus (\{x\} \cup C)$ and (b) gadgabort to (simulated) party x if $x \notin C$. Those simulated parties use that output. If the execution reaches step 2, \mathcal{S}_3 sends (abort, \bar{i}) to \mathcal{F}' , where (abort, \bar{i}) is the output of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$.

H_3 is indistinguishable from H_2 since the distributions are identical.

H_4 is the same as H_3 , except that, if the execution reaches step 4b, \mathcal{S}_4 sends (abort, \bar{i}) to \mathcal{F}' , where \bar{i} is computed as $\bar{i} := \min(L_i)$ for $i = \min(\text{GS} \setminus C)$ and $(\perp, L_i) \leftarrow \text{LRec}(s_i^{\text{priv}}, \{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in \text{GS}})$.

We observe that the only way in which H_4 can differ from H_3 is when, in the protocol, termination condition 4 occurs. In H_4 , if termination condition 4 occurs, each party $i \in [n] \setminus (\{x\} \cup C)$ outputs (abort, \bar{i}) for the *same* index \bar{i} . The same is true in H_3 because (1) in H_4 (in case of a termination condition 4) Rec outputs \perp and by the consistent failure property of UISSwPPS we can be sure that LRec outputs a list of cheater(s); (2) from the locally identifiable property of UISSwPPS it follows that each party $i \in [n] \setminus (\{x\} \cup C)$ agrees on the same set of cheater(s).

H_5 is the same as H_4 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_5 augments the (simulated) partially-functional \mathcal{F}' so that if it receives (abort, x) , it sends (abort, x) to each (simulated) honest party $i \in [n] \setminus C$. Those simulated parties use that output. If the execution reaches step 4a, \mathcal{S}_5 sends (abort, x) to \mathcal{F}' .

We observe that H_5 is distributed as H_4 because when termination condition 2 occurs, \mathcal{S}_5 in H_5 acts in the exact same way as the honest parties in H_4 .

H_6 is the same as H_5 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_6 augments the (simulated) partially-functional \mathcal{F}' so that if it receives **continue**, it sends r_i^* to each (simulated) honest party $i \in [n] \setminus C$. Those simulated parties use that output. If the execution reaches step 4, \mathcal{S}_6 sends **continue** to \mathcal{F}' .

Simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$

Let $\text{GS} := [n] \setminus \{x\}$, $O := \{x\}$, $\text{rewind} := \text{false}$ and $\text{simulated} := \text{false}$.

As a first action $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ invokes $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ and obtains $\{r_i^*\}_{i \in C}$, then proceeds to *repeatedly* start with the “call the ideal functionality” phase until $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ terminates.

Call the Ideal Functionality: Upon receiving a call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n-1,x,O}$ from \mathcal{A} , $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ does the following:

1. If $\text{rewind} = \text{true}$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ computes $\{(r_i, s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in \text{GS}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}'_{x,O}()$.
2. Otherwise:
 - (a) If $x \in C$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ computes $\{(s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{Share}(\mathbb{A}_t^O, r_x^*)$;
 - (b) Otherwise (if $x \notin C$): $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ computes $\{(s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{Share}(\mathbb{A}_t^O, 0)$.
3. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ sends $\{(r_i, s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in \text{GS} \cap C}$ (on behalf of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup}',n,x,O}$) to \mathcal{A} .
4. If \mathcal{A} sends (abort, \bar{i}) :
 - (a) If $\text{rewind} = \text{false}$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ sends (abort, \bar{i}) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ and terminates returning \mathcal{A} 's output.
 - (b) Otherwise: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ rewinds \mathcal{A} to the beginning of step 1.

Reconstruct:

5. If $x \in C$:
 - (a) For each $i \in \text{GS} \setminus (O \cup C)$, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ sends s_i^{pub} to \mathcal{A} (on behalf of party i).
 - (b) If \mathcal{A} broadcasts done (on behalf of party x):
 - i. If $\text{rewind} = \text{false}$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ terminates returning \mathcal{A} 's output.
 - ii. Otherwise: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ rewinds \mathcal{A} to the beginning of step 1.
6. Otherwise (if $x \notin C$):
 - (a) $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ receives \bar{s}_i^{pub} from \mathcal{A} on behalf of each party $i \in \text{GS} \cap C \setminus O$.
 - (b) Let $\tilde{s}_i^{\text{pub}} := s_i^{\text{pub}}$ for $i \in \text{GS} \setminus (C \cup O)$. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ computes $r_x \leftarrow \text{Rec}(\{\tilde{s}_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in \text{GS} \setminus O})$.
 - i. If $r_x \neq \perp$:
 - A. If $\text{rewind} = \text{false}$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ broadcasts done (on behalf of party x) and terminates returning \mathcal{A} 's output.
 - B. Otherwise: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ rewinds \mathcal{A} to the beginning of step 1.
 - ii. Otherwise (if $r_x = \perp$): $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ broadcasts complain (on behalf of party x) and proceeds to the complain phase.

Complain:

1. If $x \in C$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ receives $\{\bar{s}_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in C \setminus O}$ from \mathcal{A} (on behalf of party x).
2. Otherwise (if $x \notin C$): $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ broadcasts the shares it received as $\{\bar{s}_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in \text{GS} \setminus O}$ (on behalf of party x).
3. For each party $i \in \text{GS} \setminus (O \cup C)$, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ sets $\bar{s}_i^{\text{pub}} := s_i^{\text{pub}}$ and broadcasts \bar{s}_i^{pub} .
4. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ receives $\{\bar{s}_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in \text{GS} \cap C \setminus O}$ from \mathcal{A} .
5. If there is an i such that $\bar{s}_i^{\text{pub}} \neq s_i^{\text{pub}}$:
 - (a) If $\text{rewind} = \text{false}$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ sets $\text{rewind} := \text{true}$ and rewinds \mathcal{A} to the beginning of step 1 of the “call the ideal functionality” phase.
 - (b) Otherwise: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ sets $O = O \cup \{i\}_{i \in \text{GS} \text{ s.t. } \bar{s}_i^{\text{pub}} \neq s_i^{\text{pub}}}$, and $\text{rewind} := \text{false}$. If $O = \text{GS}$, $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ sends (abort, x) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$.
6. Otherwise:
 - (a) If $\text{Rec}(\{\bar{s}_i^{\text{pub}}\}_{i \in [n] \setminus O}) \neq \perp$ (and thus $x \in C$):
 - i. If $\text{rewind} = \text{false}$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ sends (abort, x) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$, and broadcasts (abort, x) (on behalf of each party $i \in \text{GS} \setminus C$). $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ terminates returning \mathcal{A} 's output.
 - ii. Otherwise: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ rewinds \mathcal{A} to the beginning of step 1 of the “call the ideal functionality” phase.
 - (b) Otherwise:
 - i. If $\text{rewind} = \text{false}$: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ chooses an (arbitrary) index $i \in \text{GS} \setminus C$, and lets $(\perp, L_i) \leftarrow \text{LRec}(s_i^{\text{priv}}, \{\bar{s}_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in \text{GS}})$. $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ sends (abort, \bar{i}) (where $\bar{i} = \min(L_i)$) to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$, and broadcasts (abort, \bar{i}) (on behalf of each party $i \in \text{GS} \setminus C$). $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ terminates returning \mathcal{A} 's output.
 - ii. Otherwise: $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ rewinds \mathcal{A} to the beginning of step 1 of the “call the ideal functionality” phase.

We observe that the only way in which H_6 can differ from H_5 is in protocol termination condition 1, which is when party x recovers the output r_x . Note that, in H_5 , if party $x \notin C$ outputs r_x^* , then r_x^* must be the message secret shared during the execution of $\text{Setup}'_{x,O}()$. The above observation follows from the detectable failure property of UISSwPPS. We can conclude that, in H_6 , if termination condition 1 occurs, the simulated party x outputs r_x^* which corresponds to the value that party x would have reconstructed via Rec in H_5 .

H_7 is the same as H_6 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_7 augments the (simulated) partially-functional \mathcal{F}' to use $r_x^* = 0$ to generate the shares $\{(s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in [n]} \leftarrow \text{Share}(\mathbb{A}_t^O, r_x^*)$ if $x \notin C$. Note that, at this point, \mathcal{F}' is the same as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$.

The view of \mathcal{A} in H_7 is distributed statistically close to the view of \mathcal{A} in H_6 . To see that this is true, observe that: (1) Due to the privacy property of UISSwPPS, the shares $\{(s_i^{\text{pub}}, s_i^{\text{priv}})\}_{i \in [C]}$ do not reveal any information about the secret shared message; (2) Due to the predictable failure property of UISSwPPS, if the reconstruction algorithms Rec and LRec fail, no information about the secret shared message is revealed.

H_8 is the ideal game. $\mathcal{S}_8 = \mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ uses $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ instead of \mathcal{F}' . At this point, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ returns output directly to the honest parties, so $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ never sees the honest party values.

H_8 is indistinguishable from H_7 because the distributions are identical.




Fig. 14. The simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n}$.

Proof of Theorem 2 We start by making several simple observations about conflict graphs.

Observation 1 *Within a given conflict graph S_x , all honest parties are in conflict with the same other parties. This is apparent because all honest parties accuse the same party — the one who really aborted the functionality; thus, any party who disagrees with one honest party disagrees with them all.*

Observation 2 *If two parties i and j are in conflict within a given conflict graph S_x , then every other participating party k is in conflict with at least one of these two parties:*

$$j \in S_x^i \Rightarrow \forall k \in [n] \setminus \{i, j, x\}, k \in S_x^i \vee k \in S_x^j.$$

This is true because, assuming no party accuses themselves, two parties who are in conflict always make different accusations; every other party must thus disagree with at least one of them.

As before, we prove Theorem 2 by demonstrating a sequence of hybrids. In the first hybrid, a dummy simulator interfaces with a real-world adversary \mathcal{A} , executing the protocol $\Pi_{\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n}}^{\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}}$ on behalf of the honest parties exactly as in the real world. In the last hybrid, the simulator $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n}$ (described in Figure 14) interfaces with the real-world adversary \mathcal{A} and the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n}$. We show a number of intermediate hybrids, wherein the simulator “imagines” interfacing with a partially-functional ideal functionality.

H_0 is the real world, where \mathcal{S}_0 acts on behalf of the honest parties in the protocol. Note that at this point, \mathcal{S}_0 is already responsible for running the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$; it does so honestly (by running $(r_1, \dots, r_n) \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$).

H_1 is the same as H_0 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_1 starts using a partially-functional ideal functionality \mathcal{F}' in its head. \mathcal{F}' runs $(r_1^*, \dots, r_n^*) \leftarrow \text{Setup}()$, sends $\{r_i^*\}_{i \in C}$ to \mathcal{S}_1 , and does nothing further. \mathcal{S}_1 uses (r_1^*, \dots, r_n^*) to respond to the first call to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$.

H_1 is indistinguishable from H_0 because the distributions are identical.

H_2 is the same as H_1 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_2 rewinds the adversary \mathcal{A} in the appropriate steps as described for $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n}$. During the rewind \mathcal{S}_2 will run with freshly generated (r_1, \dots, r_n) . The set of adversarial actions that cause rewind to be set to true, when $\text{rewind} = \text{false}$, is identical to the set of actions that will set it to false, when $\text{rewind} = \text{true}$. Thus, if the adversary performs such an action with probability ϵ initially, then it will perform such an action again after $1/\epsilon$ rewinding steps in expectation. It follows that H_2 terminates in expected polynomial time, returning an output that is identically distributed to the output of H_1 . Thus the two hybrids are statistically close (not identical, since one runs in strict polynomial time and one in expected polynomial time).

H_3 is the same as H_2 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_3 augments the (simulated) partially-functional \mathcal{F}' to expect either `continue` or `(abort, \bar{i})` after sending $\{r_i\}_{i \in C}$. If it receives `(abort, \bar{i})`, \mathcal{F}' does nothing further; otherwise (if it receives `continue`), it sends r_i^* to each (simulated) honest party $i \in [n] \setminus C$. Those simulated parties use that output. If the execution reaches step 1b, \mathcal{S}_3 sends `continue` to \mathcal{F}' .

H_3 is indistinguishable from H_2 because the distributions are identical.

H_4 is the same as H_3 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_4 augments the (simulated) partially-functional \mathcal{F}' to send `(abort, \bar{i})` to each (simulated) honest party $i \in [n] \setminus C$ if it receives `(abort, \bar{i})` from \mathcal{S}_4 . Those simulated parties terminate giving in output `(abort, \bar{i})`. If the execution reaches step 1c, \mathcal{S}_4 sends `(abort, \bar{i})` to \mathcal{F}' .

H_4 is indistinguishable from H_3 because the distributions are identical.

H_5 is the same as H_4 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_5 sends `(abort, \bar{i})` to \mathcal{F}' if the execution reaches step 1(c)iA.

H_5 is indistinguishable from H_4 because the distributions are identical.

H_6 is the same as H_5 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_6 sends `(abort, $\min(\{i, j\})$)` to \mathcal{F}' if the execution reaches step 2(a)iA.

H_6 is indistinguishable from H_5 because the only thing that might change is that if, in the previous hybrid, parties disagreed about whom to blame in this step, now \mathcal{F}' forces unanimity. However, thanks to the broadcast accusations, all parties have the same view of the conflict graphs. By Observation 1, if it holds for one, it holds for *all* honest parties k that $i \in S_j^k$ and $j \in S_i^k$; so, the honest parties unanimously accuse $\min(\{i, j\})$.

H_7 is the same as H_6 , except that the simulator \mathcal{S}_7 sends (**abort**, \bar{i}) to \mathcal{F}' if the execution reaches step 2(a)iB. H_7 is indistinguishable from H_6 because the only thing that might change is that if, in the previous hybrid, parties disagreed about whom to blame in this step, now \mathcal{F}' forces unanimity. However, due to the same logic as in the previous hybrid, unanimity is guaranteed in this hybrid as well.

Informally, in H_6 the honest parties are guaranteed to unanimously accuse a corrupt party because an honest party j knows that all honest parties but party i are already in conflict with \bar{i} (by Observation 1), and i is now also in conflict with \bar{i} . Similarly, an honest party i knows that all honest parties but party j are already in conflict with \bar{i} (by Observation 1), and j is now also in conflict with \bar{i} .

H_8 is the ideal game. $\mathcal{S}_8 = \mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n}$ uses $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n}$ instead of \mathcal{F}' . At this point, $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n}$ returns output directly to the honest parties, so $\mathcal{S}_{\text{Setup},n}$ never sees the honest party values.

To argue that H_8 is indistinguishable from H_7 , we need to show that we always end up in one of the termination conditions already covered in previous hybrids; in other words, that, if we reach step 2, we are guaranteed to have parties i, j such that $S_i^j \cap S_j^i \neq \emptyset$.

We prove this by contradiction. Assume that all of the calls to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{Setup},n,x}$ result in an **abort**, and that $S_i^j \cap S_j^i = \emptyset$ for all $i, j \in [n], i \neq j$. That is, $i \in S_j^i \Leftrightarrow j \notin S_i^i$. We make Observation 3 under this assumption, which is a clear contradiction.

First, we define a *clique*. Let a *clique* C in a conflict graph S_x be a set of parties all of whom share a conflict with the same party.

Observation 3 *If there exists a size- c clique in some conflict graph S_i , then there also exists a size- $(c+1)$ clique in some (different) conflict graph.*

Proof. Let $C_i = \{j_1, \dots, j_c\}$ be the size- c clique in S_i .

By definition, there exists l such that $l \in S_i^{j_k}$ for $k \in [c]$. (Otherwise, the relevant call to the ideal functionality cannot have resulted in an **abort**.)

Now, consider the conflict graph S_l . By assumption,

$$l \in S_i^{j_k} \Rightarrow i \notin S_l^{j_k}.$$

We know that $S_l^i \neq \emptyset$; without loss of generality, say $m \in S_l^i, m \notin C_i$.

By Observation 2, for $k \in [c]$, $m \in S_l^i \Rightarrow j_k \in S_l^m \vee j_k \in S_l^i$. Since $j_k \notin S_l^i$, it follows that $j_k \in S_l^m$. Therefore, $C_i \cup \{i\}$ form a size- $(c+1)$ clique all of are in conflict with m in S_l .

Note that Observation 3 is a contradiction, since the base case of a size-1 clique trivially exists, and since Observation 3 will lead to cliques larger than $n-1$, which is the number of parties participating in each call to the ideal functionality.

5 Building UISSwPPS

In this section, we build a unanimously identifiable secret sharing scheme with public and private shares. In Section 5.1, we describe two building blocks: unanimously identifiable commitments and unanimously identifiable secret sharing. In Section 5.2, we describe our construction and prove its security.

5.1 Building Blocks

Unanimously Identifiable Commitments Unanimously identifiable commitments (UIC) have been introduced by Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu [IOS12]. Such commitments allow a trusted dealer to commit to a message msg by distributing $\text{com}_1, \dots, \text{com}_n$ among n recipients and providing a sender with decommitment information dec . From a security point of view, we require that the joint view of all recipients should contain no information about msg and that any decommitment information dec' published by the sender either causes all honest parties to reconstruct msg or all parties to unanimously abort. Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu have shown how to construct such commitments with information-theoretic security.

Definition 15 (Unanimously Identifiable Commitments). A UIC scheme consists of a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm Commit and a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm Open with the following syntax:

$\text{Commit}(s) \rightarrow (\text{com}_1, \dots, \text{com}_n, \text{dec})$: takes as input a message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and outputs n commitments $\text{com}_1, \text{com}_2, \dots, \text{com}_n$, and decommitment information dec .

$\text{Open}(\text{com}_i, \text{dec}) \rightarrow \text{msg}/\perp$: takes as input com_i and the decommitment information dec , and outputs a value in $\{0, 1\}^* \cup \{\perp\}$.

Furthermore, $(\text{Commit}, \text{Open})$ should satisfy correctness (Definition 16), privacy (Definition 17), and binding with agreement on abort (Definition 18).

Definition 16 (Correctness). A UIC $(\text{Commit}, \text{Open})$ is correct if for any $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and any $i \in [n]$,

$$\Pr[(\text{com}_1, \text{com}_2, \dots, \text{com}_n, \text{dec}) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(\text{msg}) : \text{Open}(\text{com}_i, \text{dec}) = \text{msg}] = 1.$$

Definition 17 (Privacy). A UIC $(\text{Commit}, \text{Open})$ is private if for any $\text{msg}, \text{msg}' \in \{0, 1\}^*$ with $|\text{msg}| = |\text{msg}'|$

$$\begin{aligned} & \{(\text{com}_1, \dots, \text{com}_n) \mid (\text{com}_1, \text{com}_2, \dots, \text{com}_n, \text{dec}) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(\text{msg})\} \\ \equiv & \{(\text{com}_1, \dots, \text{com}_n) \mid (\text{com}_1, \text{com}_2, \dots, \text{com}_n, \text{dec}) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(\text{msg}')\}. \end{aligned}$$

Definition 18 (Binding with Agreement on Abort). Consider the security game described in Figure 15. A UIC $(\text{Commit}, \text{Open})$ is binding with agreement on abort if for any message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins } \text{game}_{\text{baa}}(\mathcal{A})] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins of \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{A} .




Fig. 15. Security game for binding with agreement on abort.

Remark 2. For technical convenience, we slightly modified the security game $\text{game}_{\text{baa}}(\mathcal{A})$ by allowing the adversary to first obtain dec and then query the set C . The original UIC construction of Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu [IOS12] directly satisfies our new notion and if necessary all of our proofs can also be done with the original security definition; albeit with a slightly larger security loss.

Unanimously Identifiable Secret Sharing Unanimously identifiable secret sharing (UISS) is another primitive that has been introduced and constructed with information-theoretic security by Ishai, Ostrovsky, and Seyalioglu [IOS12].

Definition 19 (Unanimously Identifiable Secret Sharing Scheme). A unanimously identifiable secret sharing scheme for message space $\{0, 1\}^*$ is a secret sharing scheme (Definition 4) that additionally satisfies local identifiability (Definition 20) and predictable failures (Definition 14 with the appropriate syntactic modifications).

A secret sharing scheme is said to be unanimously identifiable if all share holders either reconstruct the correct message, or unanimously agree on some subset of shares which they consider to be invalid.

Definition 20 (Local Identifiability). Consider the game described in Figure 16. A secret sharing scheme $(\text{Share}, \text{LRec})$ for access structure \mathbb{A} is locally identifiable if for any message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists negligible function $\text{negl}(\cdot)$ such that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins } \text{game}_{\text{li}}(\mathcal{A})] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$$

where the probability is taken over the random coin of \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{A} .




Fig. 16. Security game for local identifiability.

5.2 Construction

Theorem 5. Let $\mathbb{A}_{n,t}^O$ be a threshold access structure with k observers, where $k < n$. Let $(\text{UISS.Share}, \text{UISS.Rec})$ be a UISS for $\mathbb{A}_{m,t}$, where $m = n - k$. Let $(\text{Commit}, \text{Open})$ be a n -party UIC. Then, the construction in Figure 17 is a UISSwPPS for $\mathbb{A}_{n,t}^O$.

Proof. We will now proceed to prove all the properties of the UISSwPPS.

Correctness. Follows by inspection.

Privacy. Follows by the privacy of UIC and UISS.

UISSwPPS

Share(msg):

1. Compute $\{s_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus O} \leftarrow \text{UISS.Share}(\text{msg})$;
2. For each $i \in [n] \setminus O$, compute $(\text{com}_i^1, \dots, \text{com}_i^n, \text{dec}_i) \leftarrow \text{Commit}(s_i)$;
3. If $i \in O$, then $s_i^{\text{pub}} := \perp$; otherwise, $s_i^{\text{pub}} := (s_i, \text{dec}_i)$;
4. Set $s_i^{\text{priv}} := (\{\text{com}_j^i\}_{j \in [n] \setminus O}, s_i^{\text{pub}})$.

LRec($s_i^{\text{priv}}, \{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in S}$):

1. Let $L_i := \emptyset$;
2. For each $j \in S \setminus O$, if $\text{Open}(\text{com}_j^i, \text{dec}_j) \neq s_j$, then $L_i = L_i \cup \{j\}$;
3. If $L_i \neq \emptyset$, then return (\perp, L_i) ;
4. If $i \in O$, then
 - (a) Set $s' := s_j$ where $j = \min(S)$;
 - (b) Return $(\overline{\text{msg}}, \perp)$, where $\overline{\text{msg}} = \text{UISS.Rec}(s', \{s_j\}_{j \in S})$.
5. Otherwise, if $i \notin O$, then return $(\overline{\text{msg}}, \perp)$, where $\overline{\text{msg}} = \text{UISS.Rec}(s_i, \{s_j\}_{j \in S})$.

Rec($\{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in S}$):

1. For each $i \in S$, compute $(\text{msg}_i, L_i) = \text{LRec}(s_i, \{s_j\}_{j \in S})$;
2. If $\exists i, j$ s.t. $\text{msg}_i \neq \text{msg}_j$ output \perp , otherwise output msg_k with $k = \min(S)$.

Fig. 17. UISSwPPS construction.

Adaptive Local Identifiability. Suppose for contradiction that the adversary \mathcal{A} wins the game in Figure 2.

Reduction R . Let us first recall that a public share s_j^{pub} of our UISSwPPS is of the form $s_j^{\text{pub}} = (s_j, \text{dec}_j)$ and the corresponding private share is of the form $s_j^{\text{priv}} = (\{\text{com}_j^i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus O}, s_j^{\text{pub}})$. We show a reduction R that will act as a proxy between the challenger \mathcal{C} of the game described in Figure 15 and \mathcal{A} which is playing the game in Figure 2.

R picks a random index $i^* \in [n]$ and a random message $\text{msg} \in \{0, 1\}^*$. She then computes $\{s_i\}_{i \in [n] \setminus O} \leftarrow \text{UISS.Share}(\text{msg})$ and sends s_{i^*} to \mathcal{C} obtaining back dec_{i^*} . R sets $s_{i^*}^{\text{pub}} = (s_{i^*}, \text{dec}_{i^*})$; for all $i \in [n] \setminus \{i^*\}$, R computes s_i^{pub} honestly (Figure 17). R receives the corrupted set C from \mathcal{A} and forward it to \mathcal{C} ; \mathcal{C} sends back the set $\{\text{com}_{i^*}^j\}_{j \in [n]}$. R aborts if $i^* \notin C$ or $i^* \in O$. Otherwise, R uses the honestly generated shares and the ones received from \mathcal{C} to compute the private shares honestly. R sends $\{s_j^{\text{priv}}\}_{j \in C}$ to \mathcal{A} receiving the set $\{\tilde{s}_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in C}$. R retrieves dec' from $\tilde{s}_{i^*}^{\text{pub}}$, which she forwards to \mathcal{C} . We finish the proof observing that since by hypothesis \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible probability of winning the game in Figure 2, R has a non-negligible advantage of winning the game in Figure 15 (in particular, R provides dec' which will make cause some — but not all — parties to abort). The reduction has a loss of $\frac{1}{n}$.

If a list L_i is empty then step 3 in of LRec (Figure 17) is not executed, and by the correctness of UIC and UISS we are guaranteed that a correct message is reconstructed.

Publicly Detectable Failures. Suppose for contradiction that with non-negligible probability \mathcal{A} wins the game in Figure 3. Then $\exists S \in \mathbb{A}_{n,t}^O$ (which contains an index not corrupted by \mathcal{A}) s.t. Rec returns a message $\overline{\text{msg}} \notin \{\perp, \text{msg}\}$. If this is the case \mathcal{A} could be used to break the local identifiability of UISS.

Reduction R . Let us first recall that the public share s_j^{pub} of our UISSwPPS is of the form $s_j^{\text{pub}} = (s_j, \text{dec}_j)$. We show a reduction R that will act as a proxy between the challenger \mathcal{C} of the game described in Figure 16 and \mathcal{A} which is playing the game in Figure 3. R receives the corrupted set C from \mathcal{A} and forward it to \mathcal{C} receiving back the shares $\{s_j\}_{j \in C}$. R acting as a challenger for \mathcal{A} computes Commit on input s_j for $j \in C$ to complete the public shares $\{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in C}$ that R forwards to \mathcal{A} . R receives from \mathcal{A} the set $\{\tilde{s}_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in C}$ and

uses it to constructs the set $\{\tilde{s}_j\}_{j \in C}$ that she forwards to \mathcal{C} . We finish the proof observing that since by hypothesis \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible probability of winning the game in Figure 3 R has a non-negligible advantage of winning the game in Figure 16 (in particular, R provides shares that are able to make reconstruct a different message from the one shared).

Consistent Failures. Suppose for contradiction that \mathcal{A} wins the game in Figure 4. Then $\exists S \in \mathbb{A}_{n,t}^O$ s.t. $\text{Rec}(\{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in S})$ outputs \perp .

Looking at Rec defined in Figure 17 if it returns \perp , then it must be the case that there exist i, j s.t. $\text{msg}_i = \text{UISS.Rec}(s_i, \{s_k\}_{k \in S})$, $\text{msg}_j = \text{UISS.Rec}(s_j, \{s_k\}_{k \in S})$ and $\text{msg}_j \neq \text{msg}_i$, since UISS is perfect correct we can conclude that at least one share, say s_j with $j \in S$, was changed by \mathcal{A} . Considering the public share s_j^{pub} of our UISSwPPS are of the form $s_j^{\text{pub}} = (s_j, \text{dec}_j)$ we observe that \mathcal{A} could have left dec_i unchanged or not. In the first case from the correctness of UIC we can conclude that LRec outputs \perp ; in the second case from the binding with agreement on abort property of UIC follows that LRec outputs \perp (the reduction follows very closely to the one described for adaptive local identifiability).

Predictable Failure.

Predictable failure for LRec. Roughly speaking, the predictable failure property requires the existence of an algorithm SLRec which “predicts” the output of the adversary when she run LRec . Below we show the algorithm SLRec .

$\text{SLRec}(C, S, i^*, \{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in [n]}, \{s_j^{\text{priv}}\}_{j \in C}, \{\tilde{s}_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in S \cap C})$ computes the following steps:

1. Parse s_j^{priv} as $(\{\text{com}_k^j\}_{k \in [n] \setminus O}, s_j^{\text{pub}})$ and s_j^{pub} as (s_j, dec_j) for $j \in C$.
2. Parse \tilde{s}_j^{pub} as $(\tilde{s}_j, \text{dec}_j)$ for $j \in S \cap C$.
3. Let $L_{i^*} := \emptyset$;
4. If $i^* \in C$:
 - (a) For each $j \in C \setminus O$, if $\text{Open}(\text{com}_j^{i^*}, \text{dec}_j) = \perp$, then $L_{i^*} = L_{i^*} \cup \{j\}$.
 - (b) If $L_{i^*} \neq \emptyset$: $(b_{i^*}, L_{i^*}) = \text{UISS.SRec}(C, S, i^*, \{s_j\}_{j \in C}, \{\tilde{s}_j\}_{j \in S \cap C})$.
 - (c) If $L_{i^*} = \emptyset$ output $(1, \perp)$ otherwise output $(0, L_{i^*})$
5. Otherwise:
 - (a) For randomly selected $k \in C$: for each $j \in C \setminus O$, if $\text{Open}(\text{com}_j^k, \text{dec}_j) \neq s_j$, then $L_k = L_k \cup \{j\}$.
 - (b) If $L_k = \emptyset$ output $(1, \perp)$ otherwise output $(0, L_k)$

It remain to observe that if \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible probability of winning in the predictable failure game, then when $i \in C$ we could construct a reduction that wins binding with agreement on abort property of UIC; otherwise (when $i \notin C$) we could construct a reduction that wins the predictable failure game of UISS.

Predictable failure for Rec. Roughly speaking, the predictable failure property requires the existence of an algorithm SRec which ”predicts” the output of the adversary when she run Rec . Therefore we show how the algorithm SRec works, intuitively SRec relays on the algorithms UISS.SRec which it exists by the predictable failure property of UISS.

The algorithm $\text{SRec}(C, S, \{s_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in C}, \{\tilde{s}_j^{\text{pub}}\}_{j \in S \cap C})$ computes the following steps:

- Parse s_j^{pub} as (s_j, dec_j) for $j \in C$.
- Parse \tilde{s}_j^{pub} as $(\tilde{s}_j, \tilde{\text{dec}}_j)$ for $j \in S \cap C$.
- For each $i \in C$, compute $b_i = \text{UISS.SRec}(C, S, i, \{s_j\}_{j \in C}, \{\tilde{s}_j\}_{j \in S \cap C})$;
- If $\exists j$ s.t. $b_j = 0$ output 0, otherwise output 1.

It remain to observe that if \mathcal{A} has a non-negligible probability of winning in the predictable failure game, then we could construct a reduction that wins the predictable failure game of UISS.

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