

Forward Secret Encrypted RAM: Lower Bounds and Applications

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Abstract. In this paper, we study *forward secret encrypted RAMs* (FS eRAMs) which enable clients to outsource the storage of an n -entry array to a server. In the case of a catastrophic attack where both client and server storage are compromised, FS eRAMs guarantee that the adversary may not recover any array entries that were deleted or overwritten prior to the attack. A simple folklore FS eRAM construction with $O(\log n)$ overhead has been known for at least two decades. Unfortunately, no progress has been made since then. We show the lack of progress is fundamental by presenting an $\Omega(\log n)$ lower bound for FS eRAMs proving that the folklore solution is optimal. To do this, we introduce the *symbolic model* for proving cryptographic data structures lower bounds that may be of independent interest.

Given this limitation, we investigate applications where forward secrecy may be obtained without the additional $O(\log n)$ overhead. We show this is possible for oblivious RAMs, memory checkers, and multicast encryption by incorporating the ideas of the folklore FS eRAM solution into carefully chosen constructions of the corresponding primitives.

1 Introduction

In recent years, there is an increasing desire to outsource the storage of data to remote servers (such as cloud service providers). By outsourcing, organizations can avoid dealing with problems arising from storing data such as global availability, replication, handling outages, etc. On the other hand, outsourcing incurs new problems with respect to privacy. In many settings, the outsourced data is stored by third-party entities that may not be completely trustworthy. As a result, there is a need for cryptographic protocols that guarantee the outsourced data remains private even when stored by the potentially untrusted storage servers.

A straightforward attempt to obtain privacy is to encrypt all data before being sent to the servers. In more detail, the data owner (also referred to as the client) will store a private key locally and encrypt all data that will be outsourced to the servers. The storage servers will never see the outsourced data in plaintext. Unfortunately, this protocol critically assumes that the client’s storage always remains secure. In the case of a catastrophic attack where the client storage is compromised, the adversary may be able to decrypt all prior ciphertexts observed by the server to obtain the outsourced data in plaintext. Catastrophic attacks will inevitably leak the current state of outsourced data as the client should be able to retrieve the current outsourced data for use. However, we can still aim to provide strong privacy guarantees for prior iterations of outsourced data that may have been overwritten and/or deleted in the past. This is the core problem that we will study in our work.

In more precise terminology, we denote this primitive as *forward secret encrypted RAMs* or *FS eRAMs*. The notion of forward secret encrypted RAMs is not new and has been studied several times in the past two decades under different names such as “secure deletion” [41, 43, 44, 7, 45], “how to forget a secret” [20], “self-destruction” [22] and “revocability” [11] to list some examples. FS eRAMs consider the setting with a client and server where the client outsources the storage of an array with n entries to the potentially untrusted server that enables the client to perform read and write operations to any of the n array entries. Note that deletion is supported by simply writing \perp to any array entry. For security, FS eRAMs guarantee that even after a catastrophic corruption of both the client and server storage (and with knowledge of the access pattern to server storage cells from reads and writes), the adversary may only decrypt the array’s contents at the time of the compromise. Any array entries that have been overwritten prior to the attack may not be recovered.




Fig. 1. Folklore Forward Secret Encrypted RAM construction from [20]. In this case, we have $s = 2, n = 8$, and so we have two trees rooted at the secret cells, each with four leaves corresponding to data cells. The two roots store encryption keys, while every other interior node stores an encryption of a key which was used to encrypt the contents of the node’s children. All cells, except for the two roots, reside in public storage. We depict with red font the execution of the operation $\text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}, d'_4, 4)$ by showing that the keys at the interior nodes on the path of the leaf holding $\mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_4)$ are replaced by new keys which in turn are used to re-encrypt their children (including new data d'_4). This operation reads and overwrites $O(\log(n/s))$ cells asymptotically and deletes from Sec any keys that could be used to recover the old data d_4 .

All prior FS eRAM constructions may be unified with a single folklore solution with logarithmic overhead that was, to our knowledge, first presented in [20]. The folklore construction utilizes a binary tree with n leaf nodes that will be used to store array entries. Each internal node stores a symmetric encryption key that is used to encrypt the contents of its two children. The leaf nodes store array entries encrypted by their parent node’s key. Finally, the root’s encryption key is stored in client memory. To read an array entry, the corresponding root-to-leaf path is downloaded and decrypted sequentially starting from the root node. For writing to an array entry, the root-to-leaf path is downloaded along with the children of all nodes in the path and the leaf node’s contents are replaced with the new entry. All encryption keys of internal nodes in the root-to-leaf path are re-generated randomly and all ciphertexts are re-encrypted using the new keys before being uploaded back to the server. Figure 1 presents a diagram of the folklore construction. For both operations, the communication and computation costs are $O(\log n)$. If the client has the capability to store $O(s)$ keys, the efficiency may be reduced to $O(\log(n/s))$ by storing the top $O(\log s)$ levels of the tree in client storage. This folklore construction has been extended in many interesting ways such as handling dynamic array sizes [44] and more complex tree structures like B-trees [45].

Even though this folklore solution has been known for more than two decades, there have been no improvements on the asymptotic efficiency. This leads to the very important question of “Is the folklore forward secret encrypted RAM construction optimal?”. Another important question is “If the folklore solution is optimal, are there important applications or settings where one can incorporate forward secret encrypted RAMs without incurring the additional logarithmic overhead?”. In this work, we study both questions and answer affirmatively.

1.1 Our Main Result: Lower Bound

As the main result of our work, we present a lower bound for forward secret encrypted RAMs showing the folklore construction is optimal. In the past, lower bounds for cryptographic data structures were mainly proved in either the balls-and-bins [23, 12] or cell probe model [53, 32, 30, 40, 29, 39, 33] that lie on opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of flexibility. The balls-and-bins model insists that each server memory location (bins) may store at most one opaque encrypted array entry (balls). Nothing else may be stored in server memory. Therefore, the balls-and-bins model does not encompass the folklore FS eRAM construction that utilizes server memory to store encrypted keys. On the other hand, the cell probe model allows arbitrary encodings of array entries to be stored in server memory. Due to this flexibility, proving cell probe lower bounds is viewed as the holy grail. However, cell probe lower bounds are very difficult to prove and there are long-standing gaps between lower bounds in the cell probe model and more restrictive models.

At a high level, the cell probe model only charges data structures for probing (either reading/writing) a cell. Probing a single cell accounts for one unit cost of computation. All other resources of the data

structure may be used without cost, including computation *besides* cell probes, randomness generation, etc. However, this does not apply to adversaries who are typically expected to be PPT. We refer readers to [53] for a formal definition with respect to data structures and [32] with respect to cryptographic data structures.

It turns out that when computation is free, we can construct a simple FS eRAM with only $O(1)$ cell probes. Each of the n entries are encrypted using authenticated encryption. To retrieve an entry, the data structure retrieves the ciphertext and tries to decrypt with all keys until succeeding. This is technically a valid, but practically infeasible, construction in the cell probe model.

To circumvent this problem, one could also require that the data structure is a PPT algorithm. However, this only rules out natural usages of encryption and other cryptographic primitives. Data structures may use cryptographic primitives in unnatural manners (like with weaker security parameters) trying to find an encryption scheme that is breakable by the data structure yet is intractable for the adversary. Unfortunately, this phenomenon occurs due to the assumptions of the adversary’s and data structure’s computational powers (along with the data structure’s private state) as opposed to studying the hardness of the FS eRAM problem.

To address this gap, we introduce the *symbolic model* for proving lower bounds for cryptographic data structures inspired by prior works [35, 9] for other primitives. The symbolic model enables server cells to only store strings that are derived from a structured grammar that incorporates *natural usage* of important cryptographic primitives (encryption, (dual)PRFs, etc.). The symbolic model strikes a balance between the balls-and-bins and cell probe model by enabling more flexible server storage beyond just encrypted array entries (like the balls-and-bins model) but not arbitrary encodings (like the cell probe model). Importantly, our symbolic model encompasses the folklore solution. In the symbolic model, we prove our main result showing that the folklore solution is optimal.

Theorem 1 (Informal). *For any client storage s , any forward secret encrypted RAM in the symbolic model must use $\Omega(\log(n/s))$ overhead.*

Our Lower Bound Techniques. We provide a simple, non-adaptive adversary that at each time t selects a random virtual cell to overwrite with new data. We show that after each of these operations, in expectation, the contents of logarithmically (in n/s) many public and secret cells that were used by the protocol become unusable by the protocol. I.e., because the protocol must force itself to delete some of the secrets which it used to recover the old data, for any encoding of some other secret in a public or secret cell, if decoding requires a deleted secret, the encoding is useless. Since we show that we can identify $\Omega(\log(n/s))$ different such cells at each instant, we reach our lower bound.

To show that the contents of logarithmically-many cells become useless at each t , we abstract the relationship between the contents of the secret cells, the keys that the protocol uses, and the virtual cells at each instant into a directed graph \mathcal{G} in Definition 9, which we call the *key-data* graph. More specifically, the contents in each secret cell, the keys that the protocol uses (and can thus recover using the contents of the secret and public cells), and the virtual cells at some time t are the vertices of \mathcal{G} . Each key vertex has an edge to another vertex if it was used in a (d)PRF computation to generate the target vertex, or it was used in the generation of a string (e.g., as an encryption key) in one of the public or secret cells that encodes the target vertex. Additionally, each vertex corresponding to the contents of a secret cell that is not a key has an edge to another vertex if it encodes the target vertex.

By correctness, we show that at each instant of the protocol, for every data item stored in the virtual cells, there exists a collection of paths starting from vertices corresponding to secret cells and ending at the vertex corresponding to the data. These paths abstract the notion that together with the contents of the public cells at that instant, those secret cells (and not any subset of them) can recover the data. Moreover, these paths satisfy the special property that if the corresponding data cell is overwritten, all of the vertices along at least one of these paths must be made indefinitely inaccessible by the protocol for it to no longer be able to recover the old data. This choice of paths is completely determined by the protocol and indeed the protocol may make this choice in an effort to minimize the amount of computation it has to do. By proving a graph-theoretic lemma about the out-degrees of the nodes on any such chosen path in the key-data graph (i.e. that they sum to $\log n/s$), we show that in expectation over the virtual cell which the adversary chooses to overwrite, the number of cells which can no longer be used to access the secrets they encode as a consequence of all of the vertices on the path becoming inaccessible is $\Omega(\log(n/s))$ in expectation.

1.2 “Bypassing” the Lower Bound

Equipped with the knowledge that the folklore solution is optimal, we investigate applications where FS eRAMs may be incorporated without the additional logarithmic overhead. At a high level, we will show that the folklore FS eRAM construction may be overlaid into constructions that already utilize tree-like structures. We prove this is true for three such primitives.

Oblivious RAMs. Oblivious RAMs (ORAMs) [23, 42, 24, 48, 38, 5] are cryptographic primitives in the client-server setting that obfuscate the client’s access pattern to the underlying array entry even when the server observes physical accesses to server storage. Note ORAMs do not protect against client corruption. The best ORAM constructions require $O(\log n)$ overhead. A naive composition with FS eRAMs incurs $O(\log^2 n)$ overhead. In Section 5, we provide a construction that essentially avoids additional overhead over ORAM:

Theorem 2 (Informal). *There exists a construction that is both a forward secret encrypted RAM and an oblivious RAM with $O(\log n \cdot f(n))$ overhead and $O(1)$ client storage for any function $f(n) = \omega(1)$.*

As an additional contribution, we also show that stronger notions of forward secret obliviousness are expensive in the cell probe model. One natural notion might be to provide forward secrecy for access patterns. After client compromise, the server may not learn information about the prior accesses to data. We denote this as strong oblivious forward secret encrypted RAMs. We note a similar lower bound was presented in [45], but only in the balls-and-bins model. Our result is slightly stronger since it is proved in the cell probe model.

Theorem 3 (Informal). *For any client storage s , any strong oblivious forward secret encrypted RAM in the cell probe model must use $\Omega(n - s)$ overhead.*

Memory Checkers. Memory checkers (MCs) [10, 37, 15], are cryptographic primitives in the client-server setting which provide authenticity of an outsourced data array for the client. MCs require $\Omega(\log n / \log \log n)$ overhead [21], and the best known constructions require $O(\log n)$ overhead.¹ Again, a naive composition with FS eRAM also provides forward secrecy of the data, but requires $O(\log^2 n)$ overhead. In Section 6, we provide a construction that avoids the extra overhead:

Theorem 4 (Informal). *There exists a forward secret memory checker with $O(\log n)$ overhead and $O(1)$ client storage.*

Multicast Encryption. Multicast encryption (ME) is a primitive that allows a group manager to securely and efficiently distribute secrets to an evolving group of users. After each group membership change, a new epoch is initiated, and the group manager sends ciphertexts over a broadcast channel which allow only the *current* group members to derive the next group secret.² ME has been widely studied in the literature [51, 52, 27, 28, 13, 36, 47]. Indeed, these works can be unified into a folklore construction based on binary trees which tightly achieves optimal $O(\log n)$ communication and computational complexity per epoch with respect to the lower bound of [35]. However, this folklore construction has large group manager secret state and does not protect against corruption of this state. In Section 7, we provide a construction that achieves group manager FS, while reducing its secret state to $O(1)$ size and retaining the optimal efficiency of the folklore solution, without an extra $O(\log n)$ factor of computational overhead:

Theorem 5 (Informal). *There exists an ME construction that is forward secret with respect to group manager corruptions, has $O(1)$ group manager secret storage, and $O(\log n)$ communication and computation per epoch.*

¹ In both cases, for *online* MCs that access the remote storage in a deterministic and non-adaptive manner. Online MCs report any inauthentic retrieval from the server immediately, as opposed to after a long sequence of retrievals. Recall that the folklore FS eRAM construction also makes deterministic, non-adaptive accesses.

² In Section 7, we briefly compare ME with a harder setting called Continuous Group Key Agreement.

2 Lower Bound Model

In this section, we present a general framework for proving computational lower bounds on cryptographic or privacy-preserving data structures using a symbolic model, then formalize it for the case of FS eRAM. The symbolic model we present is inspired by the one used for communication complexity lower bounds originally by Micciancio and Panjwani in [35] for multicast encryption and also recently in [9] for concurrent group ratcheting.³

2.1 Framework for Symbolic Private Data Structure Lower Bounds

The first step in proving a lower bound on some private data structure in our symbolic framework is to decide which primitives are allowed in the constructions. Based on these primitives, one has to define a *grammar* within the model which specifies exactly the types of strings that can be created and stored in the structure to keep the data private. For example, if one of the allowed primitives is encryption, then the grammar must specify strings that correspond to encryption keys and encryptions of certain other strings derived from the grammar. If no other primitives are allowed, for example PRFs, then the constructions can only use such a key to generate more ciphertexts according to the grammar, and not other keys through PRF computations, for example. This grammar only defines the exact form of strings that can be generated by the allowed primitives, but does not on its own define how these strings can be used to recover the data.

The manner in which constructions can use sets of strings derived from the grammar to recover other strings, including data, is specified by an *entailment relation*. We emphasize that this relation takes as input strings derived from the grammar, generated by the functionality of the allowed primitives, and outputs other strings within the grammar, also based on the functionality of the allowed primitives. For example, if a construction stores a set of strings which include a ciphertext within the grammar that is generated by an encryption algorithm, along with the encryption key, the entailment relation specifies that the plaintext that also falls within the grammar can be recovered via the decryption algorithm. We note that unlike in traditional models, we only define the syntax and security of the allowed primitives implicitly within the grammar and entailment relation. Further utilizing the encryption example, if the key for a ciphertext is not available, then the entailment relation prohibits derivation of the underlying plaintext (and thus it is secure).

Grammars and corresponding entailment relations can generally be used for lower bounds on any private data structures. Indeed, we will provide our own in Section 2.2. However, we again stress that for some arbitrary private data structure, one might use a completely different grammar and entailment relation to show a lower bound in the symbolic framework. To apply the grammar and entailment relation to a lower bound for a specific private data structure, one has to provide syntax, correctness, and security definitions in the symbolic model. For correctness, in general, constructions must derive strings from the grammar to store in the data structure and later use these strings, along with the entailment relation, to derive the plaintext data that they store. For security, we use the implicit security definitions for the allowed primitives within the grammar and entailment relation to show that an adversary cannot derive certain data using certain other strings (e.g., encrypted storage). In general, such security definitions may not be as strong as the standard (e.g., indistinguishability based) definitions for private data structures. However, proving a lower bound based on a weaker adversarial model only strengthens the result.

2.2 Symbolic Definitions for Allowed Primitives

Our symbolic model allows the FS eRAM cells (secret and public) to store only certain types of strings generated by the functionality of our allowed primitives and specified by our grammar, which can only be interpreted and utilized via our entailment relation. We introduce the allowed primitives, the grammar and entailment relation in this section. Note again: our grammar and entailment relation for these primitives can be used for other private data structure lower bounds in the symbolic framework, but some such lower bounds may also allow for other primitives (e.g., public key techniques), and use some other grammar, and/or entailment relation.

³ The model is also related to that of automated protocol verification (see e.g., [31]).

Cryptographic primitives. The primitives which we choose to consider in our lower bound encompass all of the reasonable primitives which one would use for FS eRAM, while excluding those that are too powerful and inefficient in practice. Indeed, a trivial construction exists from Puncturable Encryption (PE) [14, 16, 25, 26, 19, 50, 49], by simply revoking all overwritten ciphertexts. However, PE is a strong primitive and is seen as too computationally inefficient for most practical applications (see e.g., [6]). Therefore, we do not consider PE in our model and indeed view a corollary of our lower bound as a lower bound on the overhead of PE schemes from practical primitives.

Thus, we choose to include only those primitives that are natural and useful for FS eRAM, as well as not too powerful as to make the problem trivial. Since FS eRAM protocols are carried out by a single entity, we only consider symmetric techniques. Namely, we include symmetric encryption, (dual) pseudorandom functions, and secret sharing. These are all of the primitives (and more) which the folklore construction and all other constructions in the literature use [44, 11, 20]. In fact, only symmetric encryption is used in these prior constructions. We include (dual) pseudorandom functions, as they have been shown to achieve speedups for many other primitives. We note that FS eRAMs are easy to achieve with two non-colluding servers as the array may be secret shared between the two servers. Therefore, we add secret sharing in the case that it may be useful even in the single-server setting. We introduce the primitives here, before defining them formally in our grammar and entailment relation.

An encryption algorithm \mathbf{E} takes as input a key K and string C , and outputs a ciphertext $C' = \mathbf{E}_K(C)$. Informally, $\mathbf{E}_K(C)$ hides the string C . Symbolically, the string C can be recovered from the ciphertext, only by using the key K and corresponding decryption algorithm: $\mathbf{D}_K(\mathbf{E}_K(C)) = C$.

A PRF is an efficiently computable function \mathbf{F} that takes as input a single key K_1 and some string C and outputs a pseudorandom and independent key K_2 : $\mathbf{F}(K_1, C) = K_2$. Symbolically, K_2 can only be computed with \mathbf{F} on input K_1 and not some other input key $K'_1 \neq K_1$.

We also consider dPRFs which are efficiently computable functions \mathbf{dF} that take as input two keys K_1 and K_2 and output a pseudorandom and independent key K_3 : $\mathbf{dF}(K_1, K_2) = K_3$. Symbolically, K_3 can only be computed with \mathbf{dF} on input K_1 and K_2 and not some other pair of keys (K'_1, K'_2) such that *either* $K'_1 \neq K_1$ *or* $K'_2 \neq K_2$. The output key of both PRFs and dPRFs can be used as encryption keys.

A secret sharing scheme allows one to *split* a string C into shares $\mathbf{S}_1(C), \dots, \mathbf{S}_n(C)$, for some fixed integer n , such that C can only be recovered from certain subsets of the shares. These subsets are defined using an *access structure* $\Gamma \subseteq 2^{\{1, \dots, n\}}$. For each subset $I \in \Gamma$, if we are given the set of shares $\mathbf{S}_I(C) = \{\mathbf{S}_i(c)\}_{i \in I}$ of some string C , then we can efficiently recover C using the reconstruction function \mathbf{R} : $\mathbf{R}(I, \mathbf{S}_I(C)) = C$. Symbolically, if we only have a set of shares $\mathbf{S}_{I'}(C)$ for some $I' \notin \Gamma$, then we cannot recover C .

Grammar and entailment relation definitions. We will allow cells of the FS eRAM to contain strings which are arbitrary nested combinations of encryption, PRFs, dPRFs, and secret sharing. We formally allow cell contents to be described by strings derived from the grammar in the left of Figure 2.

$C \rightarrow K \mathbf{E}_K(C) \mathbf{S}_1(C) \dots \mathbf{S}_n(C) D$ $K \rightarrow R \mathbf{F}(K, C) \mathbf{dF}(K, K)$	$c \in \mathcal{C} \implies \mathcal{C} \vdash c$ $\mathcal{C} \vdash k \implies \mathcal{C} \vdash \mathbf{F}(k, c), \forall c$ $\mathcal{C} \vdash k_1, k_2 \implies \mathcal{C} \vdash \mathbf{dF}(k_1, k_2)$ $\mathcal{C} \vdash \mathbf{E}_k(c), k \implies \mathcal{C} \vdash c$ $\exists I \in \Gamma : \forall i \in I, \mathcal{C} \vdash \mathbf{S}_i(c) \implies \mathcal{C} \vdash c$
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Fig. 2. Definitions of: 1. (left) the grammar used in our symbolic model to describe the strings which any FS eRAM protocol can create and store in secret and public cells, and 2. (right) the entailment relation \vdash , where in the second through fourth rules, k, k_1, k_2 are of type K in our grammar.

The variables C and K in the grammar represent strings and keys, D is a variable that ranges over the arbitrarily large set of plaintext strings which we allow the user to write into the virtual cells of the FS eRAM, and R ranges over an arbitrarily large set of truly random keys. We will call strings created from variable K as keys and those from variable D as data throughout the next two sections. Observe that the input to PRFs that is not the key can be any string C derived from the grammar. Some remarks:

- We emphasize that the data cells can only hold strings of type D . We mainly make this restriction for simplicity so that data cannot be used as keys, secret shares, or ciphertexts in any protocol. Note: the adversary in the security definition, as will be later seen, chooses the contents of the data cells.
- For convenience, we do not allow ciphertexts or secret shares to be encryption keys or (d)PRF keys. Our proof may be modified to enable ciphertexts or secret shares to be keys if desired.
- We assume that all cells are of approximately the same length, and that each of them can hold any one string derived from the grammar. This means that the functions $\mathbf{E}, \mathbf{F}, \mathbf{dF}, \mathbf{S}$ have outputs of about the same length.

Again, it is important to observe that the strings specified by the above grammar are *purely syntactic* and without any meaning. Their only intended meaning is described by the entailment relation $C \vdash c$, specifying which strings c can be recovered given a set of strings C . This entailment relation follows naturally from the standard cryptographic definitions for the primitives we consider (and inductively from the base case): 1. For PRFs, one can only compute the function if the key is revealed; 2. For dPRFs, one can only derive an output for a given input if they have *both* keys (security holds if only one key is revealed); 3. For encryption, one can only derive the underlying plaintext of a ciphertext if they have the key; and 4. For secret sharing, one can reconstruct a secret that has been shared only if they have all shares for a given subset of the access structure. We formally define the relation in the right part of Figure 2 and add the following useful definition.

Definition 1. For any C , we denote the set of strings that can be recovered from C using \vdash as $\text{Rec}(C)$.

2.3 FS eRAM Symbolic Definition

Now we provide the formal definition of FS eRAM in our symbolic model. Throughout the execution of an FS eRAM protocol Π , it forward secretly stores a user-chosen ordered n -element array \mathbf{D} of virtual cells, which hold strings of type D in our grammar. We refer to these cells as the *data cells* and their initial contents as array \mathbf{D}_0 . We again emphasize that data cells can only hold strings of type D in our grammar, and thus cannot hold strings arbitrarily derived from C in our grammar.

At each instant t , Π is given one data cell $i \in [n]$ to overwrite with new data d so that the contents of the data cells at time t , \mathbf{D}_t , satisfy: $\mathbf{D}_t[i] = d$ and $\mathbf{D}_t[j] = \mathbf{D}_{t-1}[j]$, $\forall j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}$. Π proceeds using an array of s ($\ll n$) secret cells, \mathbf{Sec} , and a (possibly arbitrarily large) array of public cells \mathbf{Pub} , which can hold strings derived from our above grammar.⁴ We emphasize that in normal protocol execution, the cells in \mathbf{Pub} can always be viewed by an adversary \mathcal{A} , while the cells in \mathbf{Sec} cannot be viewed by \mathcal{A} until corruption. Π has the following syntax:

Definition 2 (Syntax). A Forward Secret Encrypted RAM protocol $\Pi = (\text{init}, \text{write})$ consists of the following algorithms:

- $\text{init}(\mathbf{D}_0 = (d_1, \dots, d_n))$, which takes in the n initial data cell contents \mathbf{D}_0 and computes the initial state of the cells \mathbf{Sec} and \mathbf{Pub} using strings derived from C in our grammar.
- $\text{write}(i, d)$, which takes in a cell index i and new data d and overwrites the contents of some cells of \mathbf{Sec} and \mathbf{Pub} using strings derived from C in our grammar.
- $\text{read}(i)$, which takes in a cell index i and using the contents of the cells of \mathbf{Sec} and \mathbf{Pub} (and the entailment relation) returns the data d_i stored there.

We note that Π need not be deterministic either in choosing contents of cells or in choosing which cells to write to, i.e., Π could have access to an arbitrarily long, finite random string \mathcal{R} at each instant. However, as we will later describe, the adversary that we consider to reach our lower bound is agnostic to any randomness that Π uses.

An adversary \mathcal{A} specifies the data \mathbf{D}_0 input to the init algorithm, as well as for each $t > 0$, the cell i and data d input to the write algorithm. At each instant t , we refer to the contents of \mathbf{Sec} and \mathbf{Pub} as arrays \mathbf{Sec}_t and \mathbf{Pub}_t , respectively. For any sequence of data cells chosen by \mathcal{A} , $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t = (\mathbf{D}_0, \mathbf{D}_1, \dots, \mathbf{D}_t)$, let $\mathbf{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$ denote the union of all strings written to public cells by Π when $\mathbf{D}_0, \mathbf{D}_1, \dots, \mathbf{D}_t$ are specified by calls to init and write , i.e. $\mathbf{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t) = \cup_{i=0}^t \mathbf{Pub}_i$. Similarly, let $\mathbf{Sec}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$ denote the union of all strings

⁴ Every cell of \mathbf{Sec} and \mathbf{Pub} initially contains the special *empty* symbol \perp .

written to secret cells by Π as a result of $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t$, i.e., $\mathbf{Sec}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t) = \cup_{i=0}^t \mathbf{Sec}_i$. Additionally, at any time t , we refer to all of the previous strings of each cell of \mathbf{D}_t as $\mathit{Prev}(\mathbf{D}_t) = (\cup_{j=0}^{t-1} \mathbf{D}_j) \setminus \mathbf{D}_t$.⁵

For correctness, we intuitively require that with \mathbf{Sec}_t and \mathbf{Pub}_t , Π should be able to recover and successfully return $\mathbf{D}_t[i] \leftarrow \mathit{read}(i)$ for all $i \in [n]$. For forward secrecy, at each instant t , we also want to protect all data that used to be in \mathbf{D} , but was since overwritten, in case of a corruption of \mathbf{Sec}_t by \mathcal{A} . We abstract the above conditions (without explicitly providing read or corruption oracles to \mathcal{A}) using the following definition:

Definition 3 (Correctness and Security). Π is correct and secure if for all t , and all sequences $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t$ determined by an adversary \mathcal{A} :

- (Correctness): All of the data cells \mathbf{D}_t can be recovered by the contents of the secret and public cells and successfully returned at time t : For every $i \in [n]$, $d_i \leftarrow \mathit{read}(i)$, where $d_i = \mathbf{D}_t[i]$ and $\mathbf{D}_t[i] \in \mathit{Rec}(\mathbf{Sec}_t \cup \mathbf{Pub}_t)$.⁶
- (Security): The previous contents of all cells in \mathbf{D} with respect to time t cannot be recovered by the contents of the secret cells at time t and all public cells written to up to time t : $\forall d \in \mathit{Prev}(\mathbf{D}_t), d \notin \mathit{Rec}(\mathbf{Sec}_t \cup \mathbf{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t))$.

Again, we note that the security of this definition is not as strong as an indistinguishability-based definition, as we require explicit recovery of previous data to break security. However, this only strengthens our lower bound.

We will measure the computational complexity of the protocol Π by amortizing over the number of unique strings derived from our grammar that are written to the public and secret cells throughout the execution of the protocol. This measure of course does not track *all* of the computation of some protocol Π , which only strengthens our lower bound. For example, we do not count the computational cost of any of our primitives. Formally, the computational cost $c(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$, incurred by an execution of the protocol when run on input $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t$, is defined as

$$c(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t) := \frac{|\mathbf{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t) \cup \mathbf{Sec}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)|}{t + 1}.$$

3 Forward Secret Encrypted RAM Lower Bound

In this section, we prove the following Theorem in several steps.

Theorem 6. *There exists a non-adaptive, randomized adversarial sequence of init and write operations such that for any FS eRAM protocol Π that is correct and secure with respect to Definition 3, the amortized computational complexity cost incurred by the protocol when executed against that strategy is in expectation $\Omega(\log(n/s))$.*

Before we formalize our lower bound, we start with a simple example which demonstrates an important observation needed in our proof, and which we will refer to throughout the proof. Suppose that at time t , we have $s = 1$, $n = 4$ and keys k_1, k_2, k_3 such that $k_1 \in \mathbf{Sec}_t$. Further, we have $\{\mathbf{E}_{k_1}(k_2), \mathbf{E}_{k_1}(k_3), \mathbf{E}_{k_2}(d_1), \mathbf{E}_{k_2}(d_2), \mathbf{E}_{k_2}(\mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_3)), \mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_4)\} \subseteq \mathbf{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$, for $\mathbf{D}_t = \{d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4\}$. We can informally abstract this into a graph depicting the relations between keys and data shown in Figure 3.

The graph demonstrates that k_1 encodes information about k_2 and k_3 , while k_2 and k_3 both encode some information about d_3 . Additionally, k_2 encodes information about d_1 and d_2 , while k_3 encodes information about d_4 . Now suppose that virtual cell 3 (corresponding to d_3) is overwritten by some adversary. The goal of the protocol is effectively to create a new graph that retains as much reachability, in the graph theoretic sense, from the secret cells as possible (since we want to minimize the amount of computation needed to achieve correctness), while still disabling any ability to recover d_3 if any of the keys in the new graph are obtained by the adversary.

⁵ All set operations specified in the definitions of $\mathbf{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$, $\mathbf{Sec}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$, $\mathit{Prev}(\mathbf{D}_t)$, and the remainder of the proof are taken with respect to the sets containing the unique elements of the corresponding operands, ignoring cells with \perp . We may in fact directly refer to these defined arrays as sets in the remainder. While such definitions will not consider duplicate cells, our lower bound proof will not have to take into account the number of duplicates.

⁶ Condition $\mathbf{D}_t[i] \in \mathit{Rec}(\mathbf{Sec}_t \cup \mathbf{Pub}_t)$ forces Π to be a proper symbolic construction.




Fig. 3. Key-data graph $\mathcal{G}_{II}(\tilde{D}_{t-1})$ at time $t - 1$ as defined by Definition 9 for an execution of an FS eRAM protocol Π in which $s = 1$, $n = 4$, $k_1 \in \text{Sec}_{t-1}$ (denoted by its square border), $\{\mathbf{E}_{k_1}(k_2), \mathbf{E}_{k_1}(k_3), \mathbf{E}_{k_2}(d_1), \mathbf{E}_{k_2}(d_2), \mathbf{E}_{k_2}(\mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_3)), \mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_4)\} \subseteq \text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_{t-1})$, and $D_{t-1} = \{d_1, d_2, d_3, d_4\}$. Since k_1 *minimally recovers* d_3 according to Definition 4, the collection of paths \mathcal{P}_3^{t-1} that exist according to Lemma 1 are $P_{3,1} := k_1 \rightarrow k_2 \rightarrow d_3$, represented by blue edges, and $P_{3,2} := k_1 \rightarrow k_3 \rightarrow d_3$, represented by thick red edges. By Lemma 2, if at time t , d_3 is overwritten, all of the vertices on one of these paths must become indefinitely useless (see Definitions 5, 6). Since k_2 can be used to recover more data (besides d_3) than k_3 can, the protocol may choose to make the vertices of $P_{3,2}$ useless at time t (represented by dashed borders). In this case, all of the strings in $\text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_t)$ corresponding to the dashed edges $k_1 \rightarrow k_2$, $k_1 \rightarrow k_3$, $k_3 \rightarrow d_3$, and $k_3 \rightarrow d_4$ become indefinitely useless at time t (see Definition 8), as the protocol can no longer recover the keys and data that they encapsulate. However, we stress that the choice of the path $P_{3,1}$ or $P_{3,2}$ on which all nodes must become useless at time t is determined by the protocol.

In our example, it is sufficient to remove k_1 , as then k_2 and k_3 , and thus d_3 cannot be recovered. However, this may be a rather inefficient method, as k_2 and k_3 also encode information about data d_1, d_2, d_4 , and thus the protocol would have to generate fresh encodings of them for correctness. Unfortunately, we cannot retain reachability to both k_2 and k_3 : it is necessary to remove *either* one of the edges $k_2 \rightarrow d_3$ or $k_3 \rightarrow d_3$ in the graph (which is done by removing k_2 or k_3 , respectively), since together, they can be used to recover d_3 from $\mathbf{E}_{k_2}(\mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_3))$, but the absence of one of them enables secrecy of d_3 . Furthermore, it is still necessary to remove k_1 , as it alone can recover d_3 by recovering k_2 and k_3 . In this case, the protocol may want to remove just k_1 and k_3 , as retaining reachability to k_2 retains reachability to two data cells, without any extra computation (as opposed to just one if reachability to k_3 is retained). However, we emphasize that the choice of which key to retain reachability to is indeed completely decided by the protocol, and the adversary does not have any control over this. The key to our proof is to lower bound the minimal amount of reachability, corresponding to edges in the graph and ciphertexts stored in public and secret cells in the protocol, that must be lost after each operation. Note that this is not the exact formalization, as the proof needs to handle several subtleties and complex cases, as later detailed in this section.

To do this, we will first abstract a meaningful graph-theoretic notion to determine the (amortized) minimum number of unique strings that any FS eRAM protocol, captured by our symbolic model, must write to its public and secret cells during each operation to preserve forward secrecy and correctness.

3.1 Minimality and Usefulness

We first introduce the notion of sets of strings defined by our grammar *minimally* recovering other sets of strings. Intuitively, a set C of strings minimally recovers another set C' of strings if the strings of C can together recover the strings of C' (using the contents of the public cells up to time t , too), but the removal of any string $c \in C$ prevents the recovery of at least one string $c' \in C'$.

Definition 4. A set C of strings minimally recovers set C' of strings if $C' \subseteq \text{Rec}(C \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_t))$ and for any $c \in C$, $C' \not\subseteq \text{Rec}((C \setminus \{c\}) \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_t))$.

If C' contains a single element c' , we may only write “ C recovers c' ” at certain points throughout our exposition (instead of C' or $\{c'\}$).

Now, for any execution of an FS eRAM protocol Π , at certain instants some of the keys that have been used by it may be accessible by the secret cells, while others may not. We call such keys *useful* and *useless*, respectively.

Definition 5. A key k is useful at time t if $\exists S \subseteq \text{Sec}_t$ such that S minimally recovers k . It is useless otherwise.

The set of useful keys at time t is denoted $\text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$. The intuition behind this definition is that as data cells are overwritten, at least some of the keys that the protocol used to recover the previous data (if there are any) for correctness cannot be used anymore, for otherwise, previous data would be accessible, which would violate security. For example, in Figure 3, keys k_1 and k_3 become useless at time t , because they can be used to recover d_3 . Similarly, we can define data in terms of *usefulness*.

Definition 6. Data d is useful at time t if $d \in \mathbf{D}_t$. It is useless otherwise.

We also define *usefulness* for strings derived by our grammar (that are not keys), based on the keys that are used to create them, and if they are accessible by the adversary at a given time. We first recall that there are four types of cryptographic operations we allow to derive strings from our grammar: encryptions, secret sharing, and (d)PRF computations. Based on this, we define how a string from our grammar can *encapsulate* a key or data:

Definition 7. We say that a string c encapsulates key or data c' , if c is the result of arbitrarily nested encryption and secret sharing operations on c' ; i.e., $c = e_1(e_2(\dots(e_l(c'))\dots))$ for some $l \geq 1$, where each e_i is either \mathbf{E}_{k_i} for some key k_i or \mathbf{S}_j for some $j \in [n]$.

Definition 8. A string c that encapsulates c' , as in Definition 7 above, is useless at time t if

- at least one e_i corresponds to \mathbf{E}_{k_i} for $k_i \notin \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$, or
- $c \notin \text{Sec}_t \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$.⁷

Otherwise, it is useful.

It is important to note that usefulness is dynamic: keys and strings that are useful at one instant may be useless at another instant. As noted above, every time a data cell is overwritten, some of the keys that can be used to recover its old contents must become useless for security and thus all strings that were in part generated by such keys (via the encryption algorithm, \mathbf{E}), as well as some strings which encapsulated these keys or the data, must become useless too. For example, in Figure 3, since keys k_1 and k_3 become useless at time t , strings $\{\mathbf{E}_{k_1}(k_2), \mathbf{E}_{k_1}(k_3), \mathbf{E}_{k_2}(\mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_3)), \mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_4)\} \subseteq \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$ must too.

Our goal is to show that after every write operation, logarithmically many (in n/s) strings stored in public and secret cells must become useless. Such strings may have been generated and stored in their respective cells at any time in the past, but the protocol incurs a computational cost of at least one per string.

3.2 Key-Data Graph

We will interpret secret cells, keys, and data using graph-theoretic terminology. For any execution of the protocol Π on a sequence of data cells $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t$, we associate a directed graph $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$ called the *key-data graph* at that time. Each vertex in the graph is either a string in a secret cell at time t , a useful key at time t , or a data cell at time t , and edges between the vertices abstract the process of key or data recovery (by use of the entailment relation \vdash).

Definition 9. Let Π be a Forward Secret Encrypted RAM protocol executed with a sequence of data cells $\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t$. The Key-Data Graph for the protocol at time t is a directed graph $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t) = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$, where $\mathcal{V} = \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t) \cup \text{Sec}_t \cup \mathbf{D}_t$ and \mathcal{E} is the set of all ordered pairs $(v_1, v_2) \in \mathcal{V} \times \mathcal{V}$ such that at least one of the following is true:

1. $\exists c$ s.t. $v_2 = \mathbf{F}(v_1, c)$.
2. $\exists k \in \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t)$ s.t. $v_2 = \mathbf{dF}(v_1, k)$ or $v_2 = \mathbf{dF}(k, v_1)$.
3. $\exists c \in \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t) \cup \text{Sec}_t$ s.t. $c = e_1(\mathbf{E}_{v_1}(e_2(v_2)))$ (for arbitrary sequences of encryption and sharing operations e_1, e_2).

⁷ Note that we do not say $c \notin \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_t \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t))$, since for our lower bound we want to only count those strings that were actually stored in some secret cell and are erased at some time. Also, as will be seen later, it must be that for any such string that we count in our lower bound, it must further be that $c \notin \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_t \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathbf{D}}_t))$.

4. $v_1 \in \text{Sec}_t, v_2 \in \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t) \cup \mathcal{D}_t$ and v_1 encapsulates v_2 .

We note that in Figure 3, we depict exactly $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_{t-1})$ for the simple example, which demonstrates that this definition can flexibly handle general schemes

In the following lemma, we show that if a set of vertices \mathcal{C} in $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ minimally recovers some other vertex v_j , then there is a collection of paths from the vertices of \mathcal{C} to v_j in $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ such that every vertex on the path (except for the vertices of \mathcal{C}) is minimally recovered by its predecessors on these paths.

Lemma 1. *For any FS eRAM protocol Π , for every $t \geq 0$, for every sequence of data cell updates $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t$ performed by \mathcal{A} and for every useful key or data $v_j \in \mathcal{V}$ and (non-empty) set $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$, if \mathcal{C} minimally recovers v_j , then there exists a collection of paths \mathcal{P} from all $v_i \in \mathcal{C}$ to v_j (at least one per individual vertex v_i) in $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ such that for every v along these paths, except for the $v_i \in \mathcal{C}$, the set of strings $\{v_1, \dots, v_\ell\} \subseteq \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t) \cup \text{Sec}_t$ that have an edge to v on one of the paths minimally recover v .*

Proof. Consider some \mathcal{C} and v_j satisfying the conditions in the lemma statement. Let $q \geq 1$ be the smallest number of applications of the entailment relation \vdash required to recover v_j from \mathcal{C} and $\text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$. We prove the lemma using induction over q . I.e., for all $q \geq 1$ and every \mathcal{C} that can minimally recover v_j in q steps, there is a collection of paths \mathcal{P} originating from the v_i in \mathcal{C} and ending at v_j in $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ satisfying the lemma statement.

The statement is true for $q = 1$ since in this case $\mathcal{C} = \{v_j\}$ and so there is a trivial path from v_j to itself. Now, suppose that the statement is true for all values of q smaller than an integer $Q > 1$. So, for all $q < Q$, every set $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ that can minimally recover v_j in q steps has a collection of paths in $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ leading from every $v_i \in \mathcal{C}$ to v_j and for every vertex v along the paths, the vertices from which it has incoming edges along the paths form a set which minimally recovers v .

Consider any set $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathcal{V}$ that can minimally recover v_j in Q steps. It must be that there exists some set \mathcal{C}' such that 1. \mathcal{C}' can minimally recover v_j in less than Q steps, and 2. for each $c' \in \mathcal{C}'$, either

- (i) there exists some $k \in \mathcal{C}$ and some string c such that $\mathbf{F}(k, c) = c'$ and k minimally recovers c' , or
- (ii) there exists keys $k_1, k_2 \in \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ such that (a) $k_1 \in \mathcal{C}$, (b) $k_2 \in \mathcal{C}$, or (c) both $k_1, k_2 \in \mathcal{C}$ and $\mathbf{dF}(k_1, k_2) = c'$, where in cases (a), (b), (c), just k_1 , just k_2 , or $\{k_1, k_2\}$ minimally recover c' , respectively, or
- (iii) c' is a key or data and there exists sets $\mathcal{C}'' \subseteq \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ and $\mathcal{C}''' \subseteq \text{Sec}_t \cap \mathcal{C}$ (each possibly empty) whose strings encapsulate c' and $\mathcal{C}_e \subseteq \mathcal{C}$, a set of useful encryption keys used in the generation of these strings, such that $\mathcal{C}''' \cup \mathcal{C}_e$ minimally recovers c' ,⁸ or
- (iv) $c' \in \mathcal{C}$.

Moreover, for any string $c' \in \mathcal{C}'$ satisfying case (i), it must be $c' \in \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ because $c' \in \text{Rec}(\{k\}) \subseteq \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_t \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t))$, since $k \in \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$. For any string satisfying case (ii), it must be that $c' \in \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ because $c' \in \text{Rec}(\{k_1, k_2\}) \subseteq \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_t \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t))$, since $k_1, k_2 \in \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$. For any key or data $c' \in \mathcal{C}'$ satisfying case (iii), it must be that $c' \in \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t) \cup \mathcal{D}_t$ because: If c' is a key, we have that $c' \in \text{Rec}(\mathcal{C}_e \cup \mathcal{C}''' \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)) \subseteq \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_t \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t))$, since $\mathcal{C}_e \subseteq \text{UsefulKeys}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ and $\mathcal{C}''' \subseteq \text{Sec}_t$. If c' is data, we must have that $v_j \in \mathcal{V}$ so $c' = v_j \in \mathcal{D}_t$, for otherwise, since data cells have no outgoing edges, \mathcal{C}' does not minimally recover v_j . Thus, we have shown that $\mathcal{C}' \subseteq \mathcal{V}$.

We also note that we can choose to consider only \mathcal{C}' that contain c' corresponding to case (iii) that are the keys or data which are encapsulated by \mathcal{C}'' and \mathcal{C}''' (and not some intermediary strings c_{bad} encapsulating c' in \mathcal{C}' , which could be in Sec_t , for example) because v_j in the lemma statement is a useful key or data. Therefore the encapsulated c' must either be v_j itself or some key that must be used to minimally recover v_j . Thus, if \mathcal{C} contains enough keys which were used in the generation of the strings of $\mathcal{C}'' \cup \mathcal{C}'''$ that (in addition to the cells of \mathcal{C}''') can minimally recover c' anyway, then we can just directly include c' in \mathcal{C}' . If \mathcal{C} does not contain enough of those keys, then we can just choose \mathcal{C}' that lessens the number of applications of the entailment relation needed to recover a sufficient set of those keys, and defer inclusion of c' until some later set.

Continuing, by the inductive hypothesis, there are a collection of paths from the $c' \in \mathcal{C}'$ satisfying the lemma statement, and prepending the paths with:

⁸ This is the case in which c' is recovered through secret share reconstruction (using $\mathcal{C}'' \cup \mathcal{C}'''$), decryption (using keys of \mathcal{C}_e and possibly some that can be recovered using only $\text{Pub}(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$, along with $\mathcal{C}'' \cup \mathcal{C}'''$), or possibly a combination of both.

- in case (i), the edge $k \rightarrow c'$,
- in case (ii,a), the edge $k_1 \rightarrow c'$, in case (ii,b) the edge $k_2 \rightarrow c'$, in case (ii,c) the edges $k_1 \rightarrow c'$ and $k_2 \rightarrow c'$,
- in case (iii), the edges $k \rightarrow c'$, for each $k \in C_e$, and the edges $c_{\text{Sec}} \rightarrow c'$, for each $c_{\text{Sec}} \in C'''$, and
- in case (iv), nothing,

extends these paths appropriately. Indeed, by the case analysis above, for each $c' \in C'$ the nodes in C corresponding to its incoming edges on the paths minimally recover c' . Furthermore, if any nodes $c \in C$ do not have any edges to nodes in C' , then since C' minimally recovers v_j and all of the nodes in C' can be recovered by the other nodes of C , C does not minimally recover v_j , a contradiction. Thus we have shown the inductive step holds for all $Q > 1$. \square

Now we show a quick proposition which establishes that at each time t , any data $d_i \in D_t$ cannot be solely recovered by the contents of the public cells up to time t and thus there must exist some non-empty set of strings in the secret cells that minimally recovers d_i :

Proposition 1. *For any $d_i \in D_t$, it must be that $d_i \notin \text{Rec}(\text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_t))$ and thus $\exists S_i \subseteq \text{Sec}_t$ such that $S_i \neq \emptyset$ and S_i minimally recovers d_i .*

Proof. The proof for this is quite basic: if $d_i \in \text{Rec}(\text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_t))$, then if the adversary's next operation is $\text{write}(i, d)$ for some data d , then at time $t + 1$, for example, it is clear that $d_i \in \text{Prev}(D_{t+1})$ and also that $d_i \in \text{Rec}(\text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_{t+1})) \subseteq \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_{t+1} \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_{t+1}))$, which violates security. Thus, a contradiction is reached.

Now, by correctness, it must be that $d_i \in \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_t \cup \text{Pub}_t)$, so with the above, it must be that there exists some non-empty $S_i \subseteq \text{Sec}_t$ such that S_i minimally recovers d_i . \square

As a result of this proposition, we have that for each $d_i \in D_t$ at time t , there exists *at least one* collection of paths \mathcal{P}_i^t from the $s_j \in S_i$ to d_i satisfying the conditions of Lemma 1. In the example of Figure 3, the collection of paths $\mathcal{P}_3^{t-1} = \{P_{3,1}, P_{2,1}\}$, where $P_{3,1} := k_1 \rightarrow k_2 \rightarrow d_3$ and $P_{3,2} := k_1 \rightarrow k_3 \rightarrow d_3$, represents one such collection of paths that must exist as a result of Lemma 1, since $\{k_1\}$ minimally recovers d_3 . Observe, however, that in general, there could be multiple such path collections (even from the same $S_i \subseteq \text{Sec}_t$) for each d_i (for example, if in Figure 3 we also have $\mathbf{E}_{k_1}(d_3) \in \text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_{t+1})$, then we also have the collection consisting of just $k_1 \rightarrow d_3$); we cannot restrict protocols to just one collection, even though having more does not seem fruitful. So, for each $i \in [n]$, there may exist r_i non-empty secret cell subsets $S_{i,j} \subseteq \text{Sec}_t, j \in [r_i]$ that minimally recover d_i , and $r'_i \geq r_i$ corresponding path collections $\mathcal{P}_{i,l}^t, l \in [r'_i]$, which therefore must exist by Lemma 1.

We also note that by the proof of Lemma 1, every string stored in a secret cell $c_{\text{Sec}} \in \text{Sec}_t$ that exists on these paths and is not a key or data has no incoming edges on the paths from other path nodes.

We now show how any FS eRAM protocol Π must handle such collections of paths at every time t in order to preserve security.

Lemma 2. *If at time t , an adversary \mathcal{A} executes $\text{write}(i, d'_i)$ for $d'_i \neq D_{t-1}[i]$, then, for every collection of paths $\mathcal{P}_{i,l}^{t-1}, l \in [r'_i]$, from some non-empty $S_{i,j} \subseteq \text{Sec}_{t-1}$ that minimally recovers $D_{t-1}[i]$, all of the vertices (data, keys, and strings in secret cells) on at least one of the paths $P_i^* \in \mathcal{P}_{i,l}^{t-1}$, must become useless for all times $t' \geq t$.*

Proof. Since \mathcal{A} queries $\text{write}(i, d'_i)$, Π must alter the contents of the secret cells and the partition of useful and useless keys so that $d_i \notin \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_{t'} \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_{t'}))$ for all $t' \geq t$, where d_i was the string stored in data cell i at time $t - 1$ (i.e., what d'_i replaces at time t).

Now, consider one such collection of paths $\mathcal{P}_{i,l}^{t-1}$. If $d_i \in \text{Sec}_{t-1}$, i.e., $\mathcal{P}_{i,l}^{t-1}$ only consists of the trivial path from d_i to itself, then, looking ahead to Section 3.3, the adversary will never again write d_i to D , and thus d_i becomes useless for all $t' \geq t$. Otherwise, we will proceed inductively starting from the sink of all of these paths, d_i (and ending at a node right after the source of one of them). Let V_i and E_i be the set of vertices and edges in all of the paths of $\mathcal{P}_{i,l}^{t-1}$, respectively. We know from Lemma 1 that the set $R := \{v : v \in V_i, (v, d_i) \in E_i\}$, indeed minimally recovers d_i . Thus, for security, since we must have that $d_i \notin \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_{t'} \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_{t'}))$, it must be that $\exists v^* \in R$ such that $v^* \notin \text{Rec}(\text{Sec}_{t'} \cup \text{Pub}(\tilde{D}_{t'}))$ for all $t' \geq t$, i.e., $v^* \notin \text{UsefulKeys}_{\Pi}(\tilde{D}_{t'}) \cup \text{Sec}_{t'}$. So, if v^* was in $\text{UsefulKeys}_{\Pi}(\tilde{D}_{t-1})$ or Sec_{t-1} , it can no longer be useful at each time t' (it is deleted at time t and can never be generated again, by definition of

the symbolic model). We must then recurse on v^* , continuing until we reach some source in $\mathcal{P}_{i,l}^{t-1}$, i.e., some key or string $c^* \in \text{Sec}_{t-1}$, that must become useless.

Therefore, we conclude that all of the vertices on at least one of the paths $P_i^* \in \mathcal{P}_{i,l}^{t-1}$ must become indefinitely useless at time t . \square

It is important to note that the protocol Π has control over which path P_i^* in each $\mathcal{P}_{i,l}^{t-1}$ must have all of its nodes become useless at time t (and there could in fact be overlap between collections, even for the same i). For example in Figure 3, it may be that either of $P_{3,1}$ or $P_{3,2}$ have all of their nodes become useless at time t . We depict in that figure that the path which Π chooses is $P_{3,2}$.

The rest of the lower bound proof will proceed by considering for each t and $i \in [n]$, an arbitrary collection of paths \mathcal{P}_i^t and for each such collection, the path P_i^* that minimizes the sum of the number of outgoing edges of type 3 or 4 in Definition 9 from its vertices. We do so to focus on the minimum number of strings that are actually stored in public and secret cells, corresponding to tangible actions that Π took in the past to put them there, that Π must make useless at each time t . In particular, we remove all edges (such as those for (d)PRFs) that may not require such storage. We do this by, in Definition 11, first choosing an arbitrary collection \mathcal{P}_i^t for each $i \in [n]$ and considering only the edges on those paths, then restricting these paths to only edges of type 3 or 4, and finally further restricting to only those edges on path P_i^* for each $i \in [n]$. First, a helpful definition:

Definition 10. Let $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ be a directed graph and let P be some path in G . The out-degree of P in G , denoted $\text{out}_G(P)$, is the number of edges in \mathcal{E} that start from a node in P . That is,

$$\text{out}_G(P) = \sum_{v \in P} \text{out}_G(v).$$

Definition 11. For any FS eRAM protocol Π , executed with a sequence of data cell updates $\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t$, the succinct key-data graph at time t , denoted $\hat{\mathcal{G}}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$, is a modification of $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ formed by

- first, choosing for each $i \in [n]$ an arbitrary collection of paths \mathcal{P}_i^t in $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ specified by Lemma 1 and which must exist by Proposition 1, starting from the vertices of some arbitrary non-empty $S_i \in \text{Sec}_t$ that minimally recovers d_i and ending at d_i ,
- second, including an edge from $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ if and only if it is contained in the collection of paths \mathcal{P}_i^t for some $i \in [n]$,
- third, for each $i \in [n], l \in [\ell_i]$, where ℓ_i the number of paths in \mathcal{P}_i^t , for any non-empty sequence of edges (e_1, \dots, e_m) on path $P_{i,l} \in \mathcal{P}_i^t$ such that each $e_j = (v_{j-1}, v_j)$ for $j \in [m-1]$ is a (d)PRF edge of type 1 or 2, $e_m = (v_{m-1}, v_m)$ is not a (d)PRF edge, and v_0 does not have any incoming (d)PRF edges on $P_{i,l}$, removing all of the edges in the sequence and replacing them with the single edge $e = (v_0, v_m)$ for only $P_{i,l}$,
- fourth, taking the union of these edges for all $i \in [n]$, and finally
- including an edge if and only if it is contained in the path P_i^* for some $i \in [n]$ such that $\text{out}(P_i^*) = \min_{P_{i,l} \in \mathcal{P}_i^t} \text{out}(P_{i,l})$, where the outdegree of the nodes is over only the edges from the last step.

One can observe that vertices representing data cells are of course sinks, i.e., they have no outgoing edges, in $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ and $\hat{\mathcal{G}}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$. In addition, at most s secret cells can be represented in $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ and $\hat{\mathcal{G}}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$, by definition. Furthermore, if a data cell d_i is not itself in Sec_t at time t , by Proposition 1, it must be that some non-empty subset $S_i \subseteq \text{Sec}_t$ minimally recovers d_i , and so there must be some collection of paths \mathcal{P}_i^t in $\mathcal{G}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ starting at the secret cells of S_i and ending in edges of type 3 or 4 at d_i . Thus, there must still be one path in $\hat{\mathcal{G}}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$ starting at some secret cell $c_{\text{Sec}} \in \text{Sec}_t$ and ending at d_i . We will call such paths \hat{P}_i^* .

3.3 Adversarial Strategy

We now describe the strategy used by the adversary to prove the lower bound. The adversary will use a simple non-adaptive randomized strategy. Initially, the adversary inputs n distinct strings of type D to be stored in the data cells: $\mathcal{D}_0 = (d_1, \dots, d_n)$ to the init algorithm. At each instant t , the adversary will pick a cell i uniformly at random to write data d that has never before been in $\mathcal{D}_{t'}$ for $0 \leq t' \leq t$, i.e. write(i, d). We will show that in expectation, the number of strings stored in secret and public cells combined that become *useless* after time t is logarithmically-many (in terms of n/s). Before proving Theorem 6, we provide an instrumental graph-theoretic lemma in proving our lower bound.

Lemma 3. Let $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ be an arbitrary graph and let $S = \{u_1, \dots, u_s\}$, $D = \{v_1, \dots, v_n\}$ be any sets of nodes in the graph such that for each $v_i \in D$, $\exists u_j \in S$ such that there is a path P_i from u_j to v_i and there is no $k \neq i$ such that v_k occurs in P_i . Then if $i \in [n]$ is chosen uniformly at random:

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{out}_G(P_i)] \geq \log_2(n/s).$$

We first show two lemmas that are important for our proof of Lemma 3. The proof of Lemma 4 is provided in Appendix A.

Lemma 4. The sum $S = \sum_{i=1}^d \log(x_i) \cdot \frac{x_i}{m}$, with the constraints that $\forall i \in [d]$, $x_i > 0$, $m > 0$, and $\sum_{i=1}^d x_i = m$, is such that $S \geq \log(m/d)$.

Lemma 5. Let $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ be an arbitrary graph and let $\{v, v_1, \dots, v_m\}$ be any set of nodes in the graph such that for each $i \in [m]$, there is a path P_i from v to v_i and there is no $j \neq i$ such that v_i occurs in P_j . Then, if $i \in [m]$ is chosen uniformly at random:

$$\mathbb{E}[\text{out}_G(P_i)] \geq \log_2(m).$$

Proof. We will prove this lemma by induction over m . We will treat paths as sequences of nodes and for any two paths P and Q , $P \cdot Q$ denotes the path that is formed by concatenating P and Q .

For $m = 1$, the lemma is trivially true. The path from v to v_1 , P_1 , is the only path under consideration and has out-degree at least $\log_2(1) = 0$.

We now hypothesize that for all values of m less than some $\tilde{m} \geq 2$, the statement of the lemma is true: for all $m < \tilde{m}$, all sets of nodes $\{v_1, \dots, v_m\} \in \mathcal{V}$ and all sets of paths $\{P_1, \dots, P_m\}$, such that for all $i \leq m$, P_i is a path from v to v_i and v_i does not lie on P_j for any $j \neq i$, if $i \in [m]$ is chosen uniformly at random, then $\mathbb{E}[\text{out}_G(P_i)] \geq \log_2(m)$.

Now consider any subset of \mathcal{V} , $\{v_1, \dots, v_{\tilde{m}}, v\}$, such that there are paths $\{\tilde{P}_1, \dots, \tilde{P}_{\tilde{m}}\}$, each path \tilde{P}_i going from v to v_i and no v_i lying on \tilde{P}_j for $j \neq i$. Without loss of generality, we can assume that all of these paths are loop free. Let P be the largest common prefix of $\tilde{P}_1, \dots, \tilde{P}_{\tilde{m}}$; that is, P is the longest path such that for each \tilde{P}_i , there is a path \tilde{Q}_i for which $\tilde{P}_i = P \cdot \tilde{Q}_i$. Let \tilde{v} be the last node in P . We assumed the \tilde{P}_i 's to be loop-free, so there is exactly one path \tilde{Q}_i for each \tilde{P}_i such that $\tilde{P}_i = P \cdot \tilde{Q}_i$. We now partition the set $\{\tilde{Q}_1, \dots, \tilde{Q}_{\tilde{m}}\}$ based on the first node in these paths: for each set \mathcal{Q}_j in the partition, the first node on each of the \tilde{Q}_i 's in \mathcal{Q}_j is the same, say \tilde{v}_j . We let d be the size of this partition (must be $d \geq 2$). Corresponding to the partition of the \tilde{Q}_i 's, we can partition the nodes into d sets: let $\mathcal{V}_1, \dots, \mathcal{V}_d$ be these sets.

Since we pick $i \in [\tilde{m}]$ uniformly at random, the probability that we pick a node in one of these sets is weighted by its size. Consider the set \mathcal{V}_j that v_i is in. Let \tilde{G}_j be the graph formed by taking the union of the \tilde{Q}_i 's corresponding to \mathcal{V}_j . The set of paths $\{\tilde{Q}_i\}_{v_i \in \mathcal{V}_j}$ has the property that each \tilde{Q}_i is a path from \tilde{v}_j to v_i and no v_i lies on a path \tilde{Q}_j for $j \neq i$. Moreover the node $v_i \in \mathcal{V}_j$ that is selected, is done so uniformly at random. Now, for every such set \mathcal{V}_j of size $\hat{m} < \tilde{m}$, we can apply the inductive hypothesis to show that since $i \in [\hat{m}]$ is picked uniformly at random, $\mathbb{E}[\text{out}_{\tilde{G}_j}(P_i)] \geq \log_2(\hat{m})$.

Therefore, we can calculate $\mathbb{E}[\text{out}_G(P_i)]$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[\text{out}_G(P_i)] &= \sum_{j=1}^d \mathbb{E}[\text{out}_G(P_i) | v_i \in \mathcal{V}_j] \cdot \Pr[v_i \in \mathcal{V}_j] \\ &\geq \sum_{j=1}^d \left(d + \mathbb{E}[\text{out}_{\tilde{G}_j}(P_i)] \right) \cdot \Pr[v_i \in \mathcal{V}_j] \geq \sum_{j=1}^d (d + \log_2(|\mathcal{V}_j|)) \cdot \frac{|\mathcal{V}_j|}{m}, \end{aligned}$$

which by Lemma 4, is shown to be:

$$\geq d + \log_2\left(\frac{m}{d}\right) \geq \log_2(m).$$

□

Proof (Lemma 3). For each $v_i \in D$, consider an arbitrary node $u_j \in S$ such that there is a path P_i from u_j to v_i . We can then partition the nodes D according to which node $u_j \in S$ they have a path from. We let s' be the number of sets in this partition ($0 < s' \leq s$) and call these sets U_j (corresponding to the $u_j \in S$ that its nodes have a path from). Let \tilde{G}_j be the graph formed by taking the union of the P_i 's corresponding to the v_i in U_j . Since $i \in [n]$ is chosen uniformly at random, the set U_j which v_i is in is weighted by its size.

We calculate:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{E}[\text{out}_G(P_i)] &= \sum_{j=1}^{s'} \mathbb{E}[\text{out}_G(P_i) | v_i \in U_j] \cdot \Pr[v_i \in U_j] \\ &\geq \sum_{j=1}^{s'} \mathbb{E}[\text{out}_{\tilde{G}_j}(P_i)] \cdot \Pr[v_i \in U_j] \geq \sum_{j=1}^{s'} \log_2(|U_j|) \cdot \frac{|U_j|}{n}, \end{aligned}$$

by Lemma 5,

$$\geq \log_2(n/s') \geq \log_2(n/s),$$

by Lemma 4. □

Now, we are ready to prove Theorem 6:

Proof (Theorem 6). In the setting of succinct key-data graphs, sets S and D in Lemma 3 correspond to the secret cells and data cells, respectively, at time t , i.e., Sec_t and Pub_t . Each path $P_i = \hat{P}_i^*$ corresponds to the path starting from some secret cell u_j to the data cell v_i that has the minimum number of outgoing edges over all $P_{i,l} \in \mathcal{P}_i^t$, for some arbitrary \mathcal{P}_i^t , which correspond to strings that must be stored in the public or secret cells of Π . Since no data cells have outgoing edges, for every $i \in [n]$, no data cell v_k , $k \neq i$ lies on the path \hat{P}_i^* . Thus, Lemma 3 implies that for every $t \geq 1$, the data cell v_i replaced by \mathcal{A} at time t is such that in expectation, \hat{P}_i^* will always have out-degree at least $\log_2(n/s)$ in $\hat{\mathcal{G}}_\Pi(\tilde{\mathcal{D}}_t)$. Since \hat{P}_i^* corresponds to the path from a secret cell to d_i which minimizes the number of outgoing edges corresponding to strings that must be stored in the public or secret cells of Π , any other path that Π chooses whose nodes must become useless after time t (by Lemma 2) must have at least $\log_2(n/s)$ such edges in expectation.

Once all of the vertices on some such path become useless, all strings in public or secret cells that were in part generated by them become useless by definition. For example, in Figure 3, since the vertices on $P_{3,2}$ become useless, each string $\mathbf{E}_{k_1}(k_2), \mathbf{E}_{k_1}(k_3), \mathbf{E}_{k_2}(\mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_3)), \mathbf{E}_{k_3}(d_4)$ becomes useless. So, under the above adversarial strategy, at least $\log_2(n/s)$ strings stored in public or secret cells become useless after time t , in expectation. We only mark each string as useless once because:

- if a key in the set, which minimally recovers the key or data that the string encapsulates, using that string, is indefinitely inaccessible by the protocol, the protocol is indefinitely unable to recover the key or data using the string (and also the string can never be reproduced, by definition of the symbolic model),
- otherwise, if the string was stored in a secret cell on the path P_i^* , then from Lemma 2, we know that it must become useless indefinitely and therefore never be stored in a secret cell again.

Therefore, in both cases, there will never be any edge in any future succinct key-data graph that corresponds to the string. Moreover, since v_i is never added back to a data cell by the adversary, the strings remain useless for all $t' \geq t$.

Therefore, we have shown that throughout the execution of any protocol Π , at least $\frac{t}{t+1} \cdot \log_2(n/s) \geq (1 - \frac{1}{t}) \cdot \log_2(n/s) = (1 - o(1)) \cdot \log_2(n/s)$ strings which were stored in public or secret cells become useless in expectation through time t , proving Theorem 6. ■

4 Stronger Forward Secret Encrypted RAM Definitions

We note that our FS eRAM computational lower bound in Section 3 uses a different, weaker definition in our symbolic model based on recoverability (which only makes our lower bound stronger). For our upper bounds, we will use the typical indistinguishability-based security that we define here in the standard model of computation.

Definition 12 (Forward Secret Encrypted RAM). A Forward Secret Encrypted RAM (FS eRAM) protocol $\Pi = (\text{init}, \text{read}, \text{write})$ consists of the following algorithms:

- $(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}) \leftarrow \text{init}(1^\lambda, s, n)$, which initializes public cells Pub and s secret cells Sec , where n is the number of virtual cells and λ is the security parameter.
- $(\text{Sec}', \text{Pub}', d) \leftarrow \text{read}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}, i)$, which returns data d of virtual cell $i \in [n]$.
- $(\text{Sec}', \text{Pub}') \leftarrow \text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}, d, i)$, which replaces the contents of virtual cell $i \in [n]$ with data d .

Correctness. An FS eRAM scheme is *correct* if for any sequence of operations:

$$\Pr[(\cdot, \cdot, d^*) \leftarrow \text{read}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}, i) : d^* = d] = 1$$

for any execution of $\text{read}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}, i)$ in the sequence after an execution of $\text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}, d, i)$ and before a subsequent execution of $\text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}, d', i)$, for some data d' , in the sequence where the probability is over the random coin tosses of the protocol.

Security. We define security with respect to the following game between a challenger and an adversary. We emphasize that the adversary has read-access to *all* of Pub (which is usually encrypted) on which the FS eRAM operates, as well as the access pattern to cells of Pub during operations.

The challenger initially chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random and runs $(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}) \leftarrow \text{init}(1^\lambda, s, n)$ (where $s \ll n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$). Then, the adversary has access to (polynomial-many queries of) the following oracles:

- **write** (d, i) , which computes $\text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}, d, i)$.
- **corrupt** $()$, which simply returns Sec .
- **chall** (d_0, d_1, i) , which computes $\text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}, d_b, i)$.

An adversary is not allowed to call **corrupt** $()$ after a call to **chall** (d_0, d_1, i) , without first using **write** (d, i) to overwrite the i -th virtual cell with some other data d , since otherwise they would trivially win. Observe that w.l.o.g. there is no oracle for $\text{read}()$ since the adversary already knows the data in cells which they filled using **write** $()$, and should not know the data in cells filled via **chall** $()$. Further observe that the following definition provides forward secrecy, since upon some legal **corrupt** $()$ call after some **chall** (d_0, d_1, i) call, the adversary \mathcal{A} should not be able to guess the bit b , i.e. whether d_0 or d_1 was stored in virtual cell i .

Definition 13 (Forward Secret Encrypted RAM Security). A Forward Secret Encrypted RAM protocol Π is secure if for every adversary \mathcal{A} that runs in time $\text{poly}(\lambda)$: $|\Pr[\mathcal{A} \rightarrow 1 | b = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A} \rightarrow 1 | b = 0]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Recall the folklore construction of Figure 1. It is clear that this construction is secure with respect to Definition 13 due to standard IND-CPA security of symmetric encryption. Once the adversary queries **write** (d, i) after a **chall** (d_0, d_1, i) query, all of the keys on the path of cell i , including those in Sec , are refreshed, and encryptions of the children of the path nodes are recomputed. Thus no information about the challenge bit b can be garnered from a **corrupt** $()$ query.

5 Oblivious Forward Secret Encrypted RAM

In this section, we consider combining the notion of forward secret encrypted RAMs with *oblivious RAMs* (or ORAMs). ORAMs are a well-studied cryptographic primitive (see [23, 42, 24, 48, 38, 5] and references therein) that provides security for the patterns of data access. At a high level, ORAMs guarantee that adversaries may not distinguish between two equal-length operational sequences even when viewing accesses to encrypted data. We note that ORAMs do not consider the setting where adversaries corrupt client storage.

Looking forward, we first formally define oblivious forward secret encrypted RAMs. We present both a strong and a weak notion combining obliviousness and forward secrecy. First, we present a linear cell probe lower bound for the strong variant. To obtain sub-linear overhead, we consider the weaker notion and present an optimal construction with logarithmic overhead. As a result, we show that one can add a weaker notion of obliviousness to forward secret encrypted RAMs without asymptotic overhead.

5.1 Definitions

The syntax of ORAMs are identical to the syntax of FS eRAMs presented in Definition 12 where secret cells Sec are client storage and public cells Pub are server storage. Therefore, we omit a formal notion of ORAM syntax and refer readers back to FS eRAM syntax if needed.

We start by defining the most natural notion of oblivious forward secret encrypted RAMs. When the adversary corrupts client storage and views the current memory contents, the adversary should not be able to distinguish between any two equal-length operational sequences that result in the current memory contents. At a high level, this notion provides forward secrecy for both the memory contents as well as the access patterns performed by the client prior to corruption. We denote this notion as *strong* oblivious forward secret encrypted RAMs.

Definition 14 (Strong Oblivious Forward Secret Encrypted RAM). *Consider any two equal-length sequences of read and write operations O_1 and O_2 such that the contents of the array after both sequences are executed are identical. Let $\mathcal{V}(O)$ be the adversary’s view when executing sequence O that includes contents of server (public) cells, all accesses to server cells and corrupted secret cells after O is executed. For any pair of such sequences O_1 and O_2 and any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , a protocol Π is a strong oblivious forward secret encrypted RAM if*

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{V}(O_1)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{V}(O_2)) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We show in Section 5.2 that this strong notion requires linear overhead in the cell probe model. As a result, we need to consider a weaker security notion to obtain reasonable (or even sub-linear) overhead. Another natural composition of forward secret encrypted RAMs and oblivious RAMs is to trivially combine the two security notions together. If we consider an adversary that never corrupts client storage, then the access pattern to data remains secure (identical to ORAM guarantees). When the adversary corrupts client storage, all deleted memory contents are not recoverable by the adversary (identical to forward secret guarantees). In the case of client corruption, no security guarantees are offered about the client’s access patterns prior to corruption. We denote this security as *weak* oblivious forward secret encrypted RAMs. As this is the notion that enables interesting sub-linear constructions, we will also refer to this notion as simply oblivious forward secret encrypted RAMs. We start by defining oblivious RAM:

Definition 15 (Oblivious RAM). *Consider any two equal-length sequences of read and write operations O_1 and O_2 . Let $\mathcal{V}(O)$ be the adversary’s view when executing sequence O that includes contents of server (public) cells and all accesses to server cells. For any pair of such sequences O_1 and O_2 and any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , a protocol Π is an oblivious RAM if*

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{V}(O_1)) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathcal{V}(O_2)) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Definition 16 ((Weak) Oblivious Forward Secret Encrypted RAM). *A protocol Π is a (weak) oblivious forward secret encrypted RAM if Π is both a forward secret encrypted RAM and an oblivious RAM.*

5.2 Strong Oblivious FS eRAM Requires Linear Overhead

In this section, we prove a very strong lower bound in the cell probe model [53, 32] about constructions that provide our strong notion of oblivious forward secrecy. That is, any construction that protects access patterns even if the adversary is able to corrupt client storage. We show that the expected overhead of such constructions must be on the order of accessing the entire array of n items (except for those stored in client memory). In other words, we note that the trivial construction that downloads the entire array, re-encrypts and re-uploads back to the server is the optimal construction. We note a variant of this lower bound is presented by Roche *et al.* [45] in the balls-and-bins model. Our lower bound is slightly stronger as it is proven in the cell probe model. Formally, we prove the following theorem:

Theorem 7. *Let Π be a construction storing n array entries each of b bits that is a strong oblivious forward secret encrypted RAM in the cell probe model. Let w is the cell size in bits. If Π uses at most s bits of client storage, then the expected amortized overhead of Π must be $\Omega((nb - s)/w)$ cell probes.*

Let Π be a computational protocol that stores an array of n entries and each entry is b bits that uses s bits of client storage. Furthermore, suppose that Π provides strong oblivious forward secrecy. That is, the access pattern remains hidden even when client storage is corrupted by the adversary. We will also assume that using client storage for Π and a subset of server storage, it is possible to determine the subset of array entries that may be decoded using the subset of server storage and client storage. Furthermore, we assume that the decoding of array entries may be done efficiently (that is, PPT). To our knowledge, all forward secret encrypted RAMs and oblivious RAMs satisfy this property. For all prior constructions, one could simply execute the operation $\text{read}(i)$ and check whether all relevant probed cells (ignoring dummy cell probes) appear in the subset of server storage to determine whether the i -th array entry could be decoded.

Our lower bounds are proved in the cell probe model. Server storage is split up into cells each of w bit size. We assume that each cell consists of $w = \Omega(\log n)$ bits such that each cell is large enough to hold cell locations (so there are 2^w cell locations at most). The only cost in the cell probe model is reading and/or overwriting a cell. The action of reading or overwriting a cell is denoted as probing the cell. All other operations outside of cell probes are free of charge. Free operations include computation, accessing or modifying client storage, accessing a random oracle, etc.

Note that the entire array may be encoded using nb/w cells. If we assume that client memory is used to store as much information about the array as possible, then the server must use $(nb - s)/w$ cells to store the array. In other words, the expected overhead of the construction must download on the order of the entire array. A trivial asymptotically optimal construction is to simply download the entire array for each operation, re-encrypt locally with a new key and re-upload the array back to the server. Therefore, our lower bounds are tight.

We note that a variant of our theorem was proven by Roche *et al.* [45] in the weaker balls-and-bins model with the same assumption that there exists a PPT algorithm to determine all array entries that may be decoded with a subset of server memory and client memory. In the balls-and-bins model, each array entry is modelled as an indivisible ball and server memory as bins that may store at most one ball. This is equivalent to a non-coding assumption on the array entries. Our lower bounds in the cell probe model are stronger since they rule out strong oblivious forward secret encrypted RAMs even when data structures perform arbitrary encoding of the array entries before storing in server memory.

We consider the following worst case sequence of the form:

$$\text{write}(1, B_1), \dots, \text{write}(n, B_n)$$

where each B_i is a uniformly random string of b -bits. Our proof will analyze the amortized efficiency over all n operations. Denote $\text{probe}(i)$ to be the set of cells that are probed during the i -th write operation of $\text{write}(i, B_i)$. We will prove the following lemma:

Lemma 6. $\Pr_{i \sim U_n}[|\text{probe}(i)| > (nb/100 - s/2)/w] \geq 1/2$ where U_n is the uniform distribution over the set $\{1, \dots, n\}$.

We quickly note this lemma would complete Theorem 7.

Proof (Theorem 7). Lemma 6 implies the expected total cell probes over n operations is $n/2 \cdot (nb/100 - s/2)/w$. Therefore, the expected amortized number of cell probes over all n operations is $\Omega((nb - s)/w)$. \square

Consider the subset $S_i \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$ of array entries that may be decoded using the knowledge of $\text{probe}(i)$ (both the cell locations and contents) as well as the entire contents of client storage such as private keys. We show that S_i cannot be too large. That is, only a subset of the n array entries may be decoded using the probed cells and client storage. Intuitively, this makes sense the array n entries contain nb bits of entropy but the probed cells and client storage only use $nb/100$ cells. We prove the following about the subset S_i .

Lemma 7. Consider the operational sequence $O = \text{write}(1, B_1), \dots, \text{write}(n, B_n)$ executed by Π . Suppose there exists $i \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ such that $\text{write}(i, B_i)$ probes $\text{probe}(i)$ where $|\text{probe}(i)| \leq (nb/100 - s/2)/w$. If S_i is the set of indices whose array entries may be decoded using $\text{probe}(i)$ and client storage after the execution of $\text{write}(i, B_i)$, then it must be that $\Pr[|S_i| > 99n/100] < 3/4$ over the choice of randomness used by Π to execute the sequence O .

Proof. Towards a contradiction, suppose that $\Pr[|S_i| > 99n/100] \geq 3/4$. We present an impossible one-way compression scheme of a uniformly random nb -bit string using Π . We formally present the scheme using Alice (encoder) and Bob (decoder). Alice receives a uniformly random nb -bit string (or an array of n entries where each entry is a uniformly random b -bit string). Bob will only receive Alice's message and decode the string. For our contradiction, we show that Alice's message size will be smaller than nb bits in expectation.

Alice's Encoding Algorithm. Receives B_1, \dots, B_n as input.

1. Execute Π on $\text{write}(1, B_1), \dots, \text{write}(i-1(i-1), B_{i-1})$.
2. Execute Π on $\text{write}(i, B_i)$ to obtain the subset of probed server cells $\text{probe}(i)$.
3. Set S_i to be the subset of array entries that may be decoded using $\text{probe}(i)$ using the client storage after the execution of $\text{write}(i, B_i)$.
4. If $|S_i| < 99n/100$, then Alice's encoding starts with a 0-bit followed by a trivial encoding of B_1, \dots, B_n using nb bits.
5. When $|S_i| \geq 99n/100$, then Alice's encoding starts with a 1-bit followed by $|\text{probe}(i)|$, then the locations and contents of $\text{probe}(i)$ using $2w|\text{probe}(i)|$ bits and the client storage of s bits. For the remaining array entries B_j such that $j \notin S_i$, Alice encodes them trivially in increasing index order using $b(n - |S_i|)$ bits.

Bob's Decoding Algorithm. Receives Alice's encoding.

1. If Alice's encoding starts with a 0-bit, then decode trivially.
2. Otherwise, Bob decodes $\text{probe}(i)$ and client storage.
3. Bob computes the all array entries whose indices appear in S_i .
4. Using the remainder of Alice's encoding, Bob iterates through indices in $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$ in increasing order. For each $j \notin S_i$, Bob trivially decodes B_j using the next b bits of Alice's encoding. Afterwards, Bob decodes all of B_1, \dots, B_n .

Analysis. If $|S_i| < 99n/100$, then Alice's encoding size is $nb + 1$ bits. This occurs with probability at most $3/4$. For the other case, Alice's encoding size is

$$1 + O(\log n) + (2w)(nb/100 - s/2)/w + s + b(n - |S_i|) \leq O(\log n) + nb/50 + nb/100 \leq nb/20$$

bits since $|\text{probe}(i)| \leq (nb/100 - s/2)/w$ and $|S_i| \geq 99n/100$. Therefore, the Alice's expected message size is:

$$1 + (3nb/4) + nb/20 < nb = H(B_1, \dots, B_n)$$

contradicting Shannon's source coding theorem. □

Proof (Lemma 6). Towards a contradiction, suppose that

$$\Pr_{i \sim U_n} [|\text{probe}(i)| \leq (nb/100 - s/2)/w] \geq 1/2.$$

We construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} that will distinguish the following sequences. The first is the worst case sequence $S_0 = \text{write}(1, B_1), \dots, \text{write}(n, B_n)$. The other sequence S_1 is identical to S_0 except by swapping two random operations. Formally, \mathcal{A} picks two uniformly an index i uniformly at random from $\{1, \dots, 199n/200\}$ and j uniformly at random from $\{199n/200 + 1, \dots, n\}$. S_1 is obtained by swapping the i -th and j -th operation in S_0 .

\mathcal{A} will observe the first j write operations. Furthermore, \mathcal{A} will observe the subset of cells probed in the j -th write operation, denoted by $\text{probe}(j)$. Afterwards, \mathcal{A} will corrupt and gain access to all client storage. At the time of corruption, note that the plaintext array contents are identical as the same j write operations were performed except for the i -th and j -th operation being switched in the two sequences.

Next, \mathcal{A} will utilize the protocol Π to construct the subset of array indices S that may be decoded using the corrupted client storage and the subset of server cells $\text{probe}(j)$. Finally, \mathcal{A} checks whether the indices i and j appear in S . If $i \in S$ and $j \notin S$, then \mathcal{A} will guess that S_1 was executed. If $i \notin S$ and $j \in S$, then \mathcal{A} will guess that S_0 was executed. In any other case, \mathcal{A} will guess between S_0 and S_1 with equal probability by flipping an unbiased coin.

To analyze the adversary’s guessing probability, suppose that S_0 is executed. For correctness, it must be the case that the write operation $\text{write}(j, B_j)$ must have encoded the uniformly random string B_j in the client storage and subset of probed cells $\text{probe}(j)$. Therefore, it must be that $j \in S$. We now analyze the probability that $i \notin S$. By Lemma 7, S contains at most $99n/100$ indices. Note that the choice of i -th operation that was chosen to be swapped with the j -th operation is chosen uniformly at random. Therefore, $\Pr[i \in S] = (99n/100)/(199n/200) \leq 999/1000$. Therefore, \mathcal{A} has advantage at least $1/1000$ when S_0 is executed. For the case when S_1 is executed, we simply note that i must always appear in S . Therefore, the adversary guesses correctly with probability at least $1/2$. Put together, \mathcal{A} has advantage at least $1/2000$ contradicting security and completing the proof. \square

5.3 Oblivious Forward Secret Encrypted RAM Construction

We start by presenting a naive composition of oblivious RAM and forward secret encrypted RAM constructions. Throughout this section, we will measure overhead with respect to encrypted array entries. For example, $O(\log n)$ communication means $O(\log n)$ encrypted array entries. As in the lower bound of Section 5.2, we make the natural assumption that cell size is $\Omega(\log n)$ bits, and also array entries are $O(\log n)$ bits. The idea is to take any forward secret encrypted RAM and replace each memory access using an oblivious RAM. While this guarantees both obliviousness and forward secrecy, the efficiency is not optimal. Note that forward secret encrypted RAMs use $O(\log n)$ memory accesses. Each memory access in an ORAM costs $O(\log n)$ overhead incurring a total $O(\log^2 n)$ overhead. We note that prior works have studied this primitive such as [45]. To our knowledge, the best current construction requires $O(\log^2 n)$ overhead.⁹

Our construction utilizes two observations. First, tree-based ORAMs are quite conducive to incorporate the folklore FS eRAM solution. However, all tree-based ORAMs [48] require $O(\log^2 n)$ overhead. On the other hand, hierarchical ORAMs [23, 42, 38, 5] obtain $O(\log n)$ overhead but there is no straightforward way to incorporate the folklore FS eRAM solution. To obtain our result, we compose tree-based and hierarchical ORAMs to obtain a faster solution. At a high level, we use tree-based ORAMs and replace the recursive position map with a hierarchical ORAMs. We describe our new constructions below.

Overview. Our construction will avoid this additional logarithmic overhead incurred by ORAM over forward secret encrypted RAMs. Without loss of generality, suppose we are storing n array entries $D[0], \dots, D[n-1]$ where n is a power of two. Our construction uses three components: a complete binary tree, a stash and an oblivious RAM. The binary tree is inspired by prior works for tree-based ORAMs [48]. The tree will have n leaf nodes and $\log n$ levels used to store the n array entries. Every node in the binary tree has capacity to store up to a constant number of array entries. Each of the n array entries, $D[i]$, will be uniquely assigned a uniformly random leaf node of the tree denoted by $\text{Leaf}(i)$. The tree maintains the invariant that if any array entry $D[i]$ is stored in the binary tree, then $D[i]$ will be stored in a node that appears on the unique root-to-leaf path for leaf $\text{Leaf}(i)$. If $D[i]$ is not stored in the tree, then it will be stored (along with $\text{Leaf}(i)$) in the *stash* denoted by Stash . Additionally, we need to maintain a *position map*, PMAP , that stores the assigned leaf nodes for each array entry, that is, $\text{PMAP}[i] = \text{Leaf}(i)$.

Binary Tree. Whenever an array entry $D[i]$ is either read or overwritten, the root-to-leaf path to $\text{Leaf}(i)$ will be accessed along with the stash Stash to obtain $D[i]$. Afterwards, $\text{Leaf}(i)$ is re-initialized by picking amongst the n leaf nodes uniformly at random with PMAP being updated accordingly. Finally, $D[i]$ is stored in Stash with its updated $\text{Leaf}(i)$. To ensure Stash remains small, entries in Stash are evicted in a greedy manner whenever a root-to-leaf path is accessed. If there is space in the root node, any item in Stash may be evicted into the root node (as the root appears on every root-to-leaf node path). Generally, for any node accessed in a root-to-leaf path, any data entry $D[i]$ whose leaf node $\text{Leaf}(i)$ appears in the sub-tree rooted at the node may be evicted until reaching the node’s capacity. Prior works proved that the Stash remains small except with negligible probability. Formally, Stash contains at most $\omega(\log n)$ items except with probability negligible in n . Additionally, it has been showing that accessing the tree is oblivious.

To obtain forward secrecy, we embed the folklore FS eRAM ideas into the binary tree. Each internal node in the binary tree will additionally store a random encryption key that will be used to encrypt the

⁹ To be fair, we note that these works appeared before recent developments leading to $O(\log n)$ overhead ORAMs [38, 5]

contents of both children. Each time a root-to-leaf path is accessed, all children of nodes in the root-to-leaf path will also be accessed. All encryption keys of nodes in the path will be re-generated. Furthermore, all nodes will be re-encrypted using their parent’s new encryption key. The newly re-encrypted nodes will be uploaded back to the server for storage. This modification guarantees forward secrecy for the data.

Position Map and Stash. Next, we consider the position map PMAP. Note that PMAP only stores relationships between entries and leaf nodes. In particular, PMAP does not store any information about the array entry contents. As a result, we only need to focus on obliviousness for PMAP. We choose to store PMAP in any oblivious RAM. If we choose the construction in [5], reading or overwriting any entry $\text{PMAP}[i]$ requires only $O(\log n)$ overhead as PMAP contains only n entries. Finally, the **Stash** is handled by encrypting the array entries $\text{D}[i]$ that it contains, along with their corresponding leaves $\text{Leaf}(i)$, and storing the ciphertexts on the server. Making the natural assumption that the cell size is $\Omega(\log n)$ bits and can fit memory addresses, we can encode $\text{Leaf}(i)$ using $O(\log n)$ bits, and thus additionally storing $\text{Leaf}(i)$ does not incur any extra overhead.

Read and Write Algorithms. Altogether, a read or write to the oblivious forward secure encrypted RAM works as follows. To read/overwrite $\text{D}[i]$, the leaf node $\text{Leaf}(i)$ is queried from PMAP using ORAM operations. Next, the root-to-leaf path to $\text{Leaf}(i)$, children of nodes in the root-to-leaf path and **Stash** are downloaded and decrypted. $\text{D}[i]$ is then retrieved and updated if needed. A new uniformly random $\text{Leaf}(i)$ is generated and written back to PMAP, and $\text{D}[i]$ is placed into **Stash** with its new $\text{Leaf}(i)$. Items are greedily evicted from **Stash** into the downloaded root-to-leaf path using their $\text{Leaf}(i)$ as guidance. Each node is padded to the maximum capacity with dummies if needed. All encryption keys of internal nodes are freshly sampled and all nodes are encrypted using the parent node’s encryption keys before being uploaded back to the server. The root is encrypted with a freshly generated client-stored encryption key. Finally, **Stash** is padded to the maximum capacity with dummies and re-encrypted using the new client key before being uploaded to the server.

Theorem 8. *For any function $f(n) = \omega(1)$, there exists a (weak) oblivious forward secret encrypted RAM with $O(\log n \cdot f(n))$ overhead, $O(n)$ server storage and $O(1)$ client storage.*

Our construction is essentially optimal except for the multiplicative $\omega(1)$ factor as we already proved that forward secure encrypted RAMs require $\Omega(\log n)$ overhead. Similarly, it is known that ORAMs also require $\Omega(\log n)$ overhead [23, 32].

Proof. For forward secrecy, we only need to consider the binary tree and **Stash** as PMAP stores no information about memory contents. Using the same proof techniques from the folklore solution, it is straightforward to see that the tree is forward secure. Similarly, **Stash** is re-encrypted using a fresh key that is discarded after each operation. So, our construction is a forward secret encrypted RAM.

To prove obliviousness, we note that **Stash** is always downloaded, re-encrypted and uploaded for each query. So accessing **Stash** is oblivious to the operation being performed. As PMAP is stored in an ORAM, obliviousness is already guaranteed. For the tree, note that each operation queries a uniformly random root-to-leaf path and all children of nodes in the path. Therefore, our construction is an oblivious RAM.

In terms of efficiency, note the total server storage is $O(n)$ and client storage is $O(1)$ consisting of PMAP ORAM client storage and a single encryption key. In terms of overhead, each read/write operation requires download and re-uploading $O(\log n)$ tree nodes each with $O(1)$ array entry capacity, a **Stash** of $\omega(\log n)$ array entries and their corresponding leaves (see [48] for analysis) and two ORAM operations with $O(\log n)$ overhead. Altogether, the total overhead is $\omega(\log n)$ completing the proof. \square

6 Forward Secret Memory Checkers

In this section, we combine forward secret encrypted RAMs with memory checkers (MCs) to get forward secret memory checkers (FS MCs). Memory checking is a well-studied cryptographic notion [10, 37, 15, 21] that provides authenticity for outsourced data storage. Intuitively, MCs use some small local storage to guarantee that an adversarial server cannot alter outsourced data entries without the MC noticing (and outputting that a bug has occurred).

We will first define our combined notion of FS MCs then provide a scheme which overlays the folklore FS eRAM scheme with a tree-based MC from [10] that uses ideas from Merkle Trees [34]. As a result,

we will achieve $O(1)$ secret storage, $O(n)$ remote storage, and $O(\log n)$ overhead, i.e., a scheme which provides memory checking with no additional asymptotic overhead to the folklore FS eRAM scheme.¹⁰ Our construction is optimal with respect to both our $\Omega(\log n)$ lower bound on the overhead of FS eRAM and the best known $O(\log n)$ overhead construction for MCs (and almost optimal with respect to the $\Omega(\log n / \log \log n)$ MC lower bound of [21]).¹¹

6.1 Forward Secret Memory Checker Definition

For FS MCs, we alter the syntax of FS eRAMs presented in Definition 12 to highlight the interaction between the FS MC and the potentially malicious remote server. Before reading the data from a virtual cell i , the FS MC must first receive the relevant (but possibly maliciously fabricated) public cells from the server. Additionally, to write to a cell i , the FS MC must first receive the relevant public cells from the server as above, then send new public cells to the server, which the FS MC expects to be written in place of the old public cells.

Definition 17 (Forward Secret Memory Checker). A Forward Secret Memory Checker (FS MC) $\Pi = (\text{init}, \text{retrieve}, \text{read}, \text{write}, \text{commit})$ consists of the following algorithms:¹²

- $(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}) \leftarrow \text{init}(1^\lambda, n)$, which initializes public cells Pub and secret cells Sec , where n is the number of virtual cells and λ is the security parameter.
- $S \leftarrow \text{index}(i)$, which the server uses to identify $S \subseteq \{1, \dots, |\text{Pub}|\}$, a sparse subset of indices of the cells of Pub associated with virtual cell i . We refer to these cells of Pub as $\text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}$.
- $(\text{Sec}', d) \leftarrow \text{read}(\text{Sec}, \text{C}, i)$, which the FS MC uses to obtain the data d of virtual cell i , where in the case of an honest server, C is expected to be $\text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}$. In the case that the FS MC wants to report a loss of integrity, it may output $d \leftarrow \text{bug}$.
- $(\text{Sec}', \text{C}') \leftarrow \text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{C}, d, i)$, which the FS MC uses to replace the contents of virtual cell i with data d , where in the case of an honest server, C is expected to be $\text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}$. The FS MC will provide the server with new public cells C' relevant to virtual cell i with which an honest server will replace cells $\text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}$. In the case that the FS MC wants to report a loss of integrity, it may output $\text{C}' \leftarrow \text{bug}$.

Correctness. An FS MC scheme is *correct* if for any sequence of operations executed by the FS MC and an honest server:

$$\Pr[(\cdot, d^*) \leftarrow \text{read}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}, i) : d^* = d] = 1,$$

for any execution of $(\cdot, d^*) \leftarrow \text{read}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}, i)$ in the sequence after an execution of $(\text{Sec}', \text{C}') \leftarrow \text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}, d, i)$, and before a subsequent execution of $(\text{Sec}', \text{C}') \leftarrow \text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}, d', i)$, where the probability is over the random coin tosses of the protocol.

Security. We now provide the security definition of FS MCs. The adversary in the game will adaptively specify the sequence of operations that the FS MC performs and have the ability to choose which cells C to provide to the FS MC challenger for $\text{read}()$ and $\text{write}()$ operations.

Throughout, the security game will store a dictionary $\text{D}[\cdot]$ containing the correct data items at each index $i \in [n]$, corresponding to the most recent adversarial write or challenge to that index i . For every $i \in [n]$, $\text{D}[i] \leftarrow \perp$ initially. The challenger initially chooses $b \in \{0, 1\}$ uniformly at random, runs $(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}) \leftarrow \text{init}(1^\lambda, n)$, sends Pub to the adversary \mathcal{A} , and deletes it. Then the adversary has access to (polynomial-many queries of) the following oracles:

- **read**(C, i): \mathcal{A} sends public cells C for data cell i to the challenger who then computes $(\text{Sec}', d) \leftarrow \text{read}(\text{Sec}, \text{C}, i)$. If $d \notin \{\text{D}[i], \text{bug}\}$, the game outputs *win* and ends. Note: d is not sent to \mathcal{A} .
- **write**(C, d, i): \mathcal{A} sends public cells C and data d to overwrite virtual cell i with to the challenger who then computes $(\text{Sec}', \text{C}') \leftarrow \text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{C}, d, i)$. The challenger then sends C' back to \mathcal{A} , and deletes it. Additionally, if $\text{C}' \neq \text{bug}$, the game sets $\text{D}[i] \leftarrow d$.

¹⁰ Although the solution of [44] informally provides the same guarantees with a similar construction, we provide a complete formal model and construction.

¹¹ For online MCs that access server memory deterministically and non-adaptively.

¹² While our definition is not fully general, i.e., does not allow for arbitrary interaction between the FS MC and server, it suffices for our optimal construction.

- **chall**(C, d_0, d_1, i): \mathcal{A} sends public cells C and data d_0, d_1 to overwrite data cell i with to the challenger who then computes $(\text{Sec}', C') \leftarrow \text{write}(\text{Sec}, C, d_b, i)$. The challenger then sends C' back to \mathcal{A} , and deletes it. Additionally, if $C' \neq \text{bug}$, the game sets $D[i] \leftarrow d_b$.
- **corrupt**(\cdot): The challenger simply sends the contents of Sec to \mathcal{A} .

Finally, \mathcal{A} outputs a bit b' and the game outputs win if and only if $b' = b$.

As in the FS eRAM security definition, \mathcal{A} is not allowed to call **corrupt**(\cdot) after a call to **chall**(C, d_0, d_1, i), without first a call to **write**(C, d, i) to overwrite the i -th virtual cell with some other data d , in which the challenger returns $C' \neq \text{bug}$, since otherwise they would trivially win.

Definition 18 (Forward Secret Memory Checker Security). A Forward Secret Memory checker is secure if for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A} ,

$$\left| \Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}] - \frac{1}{2} \right| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

6.2 Forward Secret Memory Checker Construction




Fig. 4. Depiction of how our Forward Secret Memory Checker overwrites Sec and $\text{Pub}_{\text{index}(01)}$ after an execution of $\text{write}(\text{Sec}, \text{Pub}_{\text{index}(01)}, d'_{01}, 01)$. For every internal node v along the root-to-leaf path of leaf 01, as well as their siblings, the ciphertext $ct'_v = \mathbf{E}_{k'_p}(k'_v)$ is regenerated with the new keys k'_v, k'_p at v and its parent p , respectively (for siblings of path nodes, $k'_v = k_v$, the current key). For leaves 00 and 01, $ct'_{00} = \mathbf{E}_{k'_0}(d_{00})$, $ct'_{01} = \mathbf{E}_{k'_0}(d'_{01})$. For every node u on *only* the root-to-leaf path of leaf 01 (*not* their siblings), the hash function h'_u and corresponding hash value $x'_u = h'_u(ct'_{u.c_1} || h'_{u.c_1} || x'_{u.c_1} || ct'_{u.c_2} || h'_{u.c_2} || x'_{u.c_2})$ is regenerated, where one child $u.c_1$ or $u.c_2$, w.l.o.g., $u.c_1$, is not on the root-to-leaf path, and thus $h'_{u.c_1} = h_{u.c_1}$, $x'_{u.c_1} = x_{u.c_1}$ (their current values). Also, h_w and x_w are the all-zero string if w is a leaf.

Our FS MC construction is depicted in Figure 4. We overlay the folklore FS eRAM solution, which uses IND-CPA secure symmetric encryption for forward secrecy, with the MC solution of [10], which uses universal one-way hash functions (UOWHF) for integrity. Both utilize a binary tree with n leaf nodes to store the data elements in Pub , and store the root in Sec . Note: It is possible to construct a family of UOWHF given any one-way function [46], but the use of UOWHFs requires the assumption that the word size of the RAM is $\ell = n^\epsilon$, for any $\epsilon > 0$.

More specifically, each leaf node i holds $ct_i = \mathbf{E}_{k_p}(d_i)$, where k_p is the encryption key of the parent p of i . Each internal node v holds $(h_v, ct_v = \mathbf{E}_{k_p}(k_v), x_v = h_v(ct_{v.c_1} || h_{v.c_1} || x_{v.c_1} || ct_{v.c_2} || h_{v.c_2} || x_{v.c_2}))$, where here and in the following, $||$ represents concatenation, k_v, k_p are the encryption keys of v and its parent p , respectively, $h_v, h_{v.c_1}, h_{v.c_2}$ are the description of the hash functions used at v and the children $v.c_1, v.c_2$ of v , respectively (which can be described in $O(\ell)$ bits), $ct_{v.c_1}, ct_{v.c_2}$ are the ciphertexts stored at the children $v.c_1, v.c_2$, respectively, and $x_{v.c_1}, x_{v.c_2}$ are the hashes at the children $v.c_1, v.c_2$, respectively. If $v.c_1, v.c_2$ are leaves, $h_{v.c_1}, x_{v.c_1}, h_{v.c_2}, x_{v.c_2}$ are the all-zero string. The root node, stored in Sec contains $(h_r, k_r, x_r = h_r(ct_{r.c_1} || h_{r.c_1} || x_{r.c_1} || ct_{r.c_2} || h_{r.c_2} || x_{r.c_2}))$, where k_r is the root encryption key. The FS MC algorithms are as follows:

- $\text{init}(1^\lambda, n)$: Initializes a complete binary tree with n leaves in Pub , with data \perp at each node, $\text{Sec} \leftarrow \perp$.

- $\text{index}(i)$: Returns the indices of the cells of the root-to-leaf path nodes of leaf i , along with all path nodes' siblings.
- $\text{read}(\text{Sec}, \mathbf{C}, i)$: Given (what the FS MC believes to be) the root-to-leaf path of leaf i and siblings along the path in \mathbf{C} from the server, the FS MC:
 - First checks $x_r = h_r(ct_{r.c_1} || h_{r.c_1} || x_{r.c_1} || ct_{r.c_2} || h_{r.c_2} || x_{r.c_2})$.
 - Then, for every internal node v along the path to i , the FS MC checks $x_v = h_v(ct_{v.c_1} || h_{v.c_1} || x_{v.c_1} || ct_{v.c_2} || h_{v.c_2} || x_{v.c_2})$ and decrypts $k_v \leftarrow \mathbf{D}_{k_p}(ct_v)$.
 - Finally, at leaf node i , the FS MC decrypts $d_i \leftarrow \mathbf{D}_{k_p}(ct_i)$.

If any hash check fails, the FS MC outputs $d_i \leftarrow \text{bug}$, otherwise, it outputs d_i . The FS MC does not change Sec .

- $\text{write}(\text{Sec}, \mathbf{C}, d'_i, i)$: Given (what the FS MC believes to be) the root-to-leaf path of leaf i and siblings along the path in \mathbf{C} , the FS MC
 - First verifies and decrypts all of the nodes (including siblings) in \mathbf{C} as in $\text{read}()$ above; if the test on any node fails, the FS MC outputs $\mathbf{C}' \leftarrow \text{bug}$ and does not change Sec . Otherwise,
 - For each internal node v on the root-to-leaf path of i , except for the parent of i , the FS MC regenerates k'_v and $ct'_{v.c_1} = \mathbf{E}_{k'_v}(k'_{v.c_1})$, $ct'_{v.c_2} = \mathbf{E}_{k'_v}(k'_{v.c_2})$, where if $v.c_1$ is not on the root-to-leaf path, $k'_{v.c_1} = k_{v.c_1}$ (its current key), and symmetrically if $v.c_2$ is not.
 - Then for the parent p of i , the FS MC regenerates k'_p and $ct'_i = \mathbf{E}_{k'_p}(d'_i)$ and for the sibling j of i , $ct'_j = \mathbf{E}_{k'_p}(d_j)$.
 - Next, for each internal node v on the root-to-leaf path of i , the FS MC regenerates h'_v and $x'_v = h'_v(ct'_{v.c_1} || h'_{v.c_1} || x'_{v.c_1} || ct'_{v.c_2} || h'_{v.c_2} || x'_{v.c_2})$ where if $v.c_1$ is not on the root-to-leaf path, $h'_{v.c_1} = h_{v.c_1}$, $x'_{v.c_1} = x_{v.c_1}$ (its current values), and symmetrically if $v.c_2$ is not.

\mathbf{C}' is set to store the updated ciphertexts, hash functions, and hash values at their corresponding nodes, and Sec' is set to store the regenerated hash function h'_r , root key k'_r , and hash value x'_r .

Intuitively, the root key and hash stored in Sec ensure that the ciphertexts at the root's children will decrypt to the correct keys, while still ensuring privacy. Then, inductively, the decrypted keys and corresponding hashes at level i ensure the ciphertexts at level $i + 1$ decrypt to the correct keys, while still ensuring privacy. We formalize this in the following theorem.

Theorem 9. *There exists a secure Forward Secret Memory Checker with $O(\log n)$ overhead, $O(n)$ public storage and $O(1)$ secret storage.*

Proof. It is trivial to see the efficiency of the construction: namely, for operations on data cell i , the client only reads and writes the cells of the $O(\log n)$ nodes, and their siblings, on the root-to-leaf path of leaf i . Moreover, in Sec only the root of the tree is stored, and the $O(n)$ other nodes of the tree are stored in Pub .

For an attacker \mathcal{A} to win the security game with non-negligible probability, they must either

- Make some oracle query $\text{read}(\mathbf{C}, i)$, $\text{write}(\mathbf{C}, d, i)$, or $\text{chall}(\mathbf{C}, d_0, d_1, i)$ with malicious cells $C \neq \text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}$ that with non-negligible probability does not result in the challenger outputting bug (thus either causing the game to output win after some $\text{read}()$ query, or enabling \mathcal{A} to guess the bit b correctly at the end of the game with non-negligible probability), or
- Not do as above (but still guess bit b correctly with non-negligible probability).

In the first case, we will use \mathcal{A} to break security of the UOWHF family (authenticity) and in the second case, we will use \mathcal{A} to break security of the encryption scheme (forward secrecy).

In the first case, we know that \mathcal{A} must have altered the contents of at least one node on the root-to-leaf path of leaf i . Let v be the node whose contents were altered that is closest to the root (excluding the root since it is stored in Sec and thus cannot be altered, even after a $\text{corrupt}()$ query). This means that the hash function h_p and hash value $x_p = h_p(y_p)$ at the parent p of v is unchanged. Since the hash input y_p is determined by the contents of v and its sibling (with the contents of p 's left child always coming first in y_p) before h_p is sampled, h_p is only used once by our FS MC to calculate x_p , and our FS MC verifies x'_p (the value received from the server) during $\text{read}()$ by recomputing x_p , the adversary \mathcal{A} is able to alter the contents of v such that $x'_p = x_p$ even with $y'_p \neq y_p$, due to the new adversarial contents of v . Thus \mathcal{A} can be used to break the security of the UOWHF.

In the second case, with all but negligible probability, all oracle queries (that do not result in the challenger outputting `bug`) are made with correct cells $C = \text{Pub}_{\text{index}(i)}$, and since the construction re-encrypts nodes just as in the folklore FS eRAM solution, after any `corrupt()` query, everything \mathcal{A} obtains is independent of the challenge data. Thus \mathcal{A} can be used to break the security of the encryption.

Therefore, \mathcal{A} has only negligible advantage in the FS MC game. \square

Remark 1. In practice, a single CRHF can be used in place of a UOWHF family so that there is no need to regenerate the hash functions at the nodes of the root-to-leaf path for every `write()`, nor include them in the hashes at each node. We use a UOWHF family since it is possible to construct one given any OWF.

Remark 2. For the same level of privacy, but weaker integrity (i.e., integrity only before any corruption of `Sec`), one can use *only* AEAD in place of *both* symmetric encryption *and* a UOWHF/CHRF. In this case also, the word size need not be polynomial. This is a generalization of a weaker MC construction from [10].

7 Forward Secret Multicast Encryption

Multicast encryption (ME) is a primitive that allows a group manager to securely and efficiently distribute secrets to an evolving group of users. After each group membership change, a new epoch is initiated, and the group manager sends ciphertexts over a broadcast channel which allow only the *current* group members to derive the next group secret. ME has been widely studied in the literature [51, 52, 27, 28, 13, 36, 47]. Indeed, these works can be unified into a folklore construction based on binary trees which tightly achieves optimal $O(\log n)$ communication and computational complexity per epoch with respect to the lower bound of [35]. All of these works considered a security model in which an adversary with read-access to the broadcast channel could not break security of a given epoch without the secret state of any of the group members or group manager. However, in recent years, more robust security properties have been demanded of cryptographic primitives. Importantly, the group maintained by a ME protocol could exist for a long time (even several years). Therefore, we ideally desire to protect against a catastrophic event in which the secret state of the group manager is corrupted by an adversary, as such events are not uncommon across long periods of time.

The security property which we focus on in this section is *forward secrecy* of the protocol with respect to compromise of the group manager’s secret state. We view it as the property to which ideas from FS eRAM can contribute the most. For this property, we desire that the group secrets of all prior group membership epochs stay hidden from the adversary even after the catastrophic event. Note: one could also consider forward secrecy with respect to corruption of user secret states, as well as a related notion called Post-Compromise Security (PCS) [18], which requires the protocol to be able to recover after such a corruption, such that group secrets of future epochs are secure.

Additionally, the group manager of an ME scheme must store $\Omega(n)$ information at all times, where n is the number of group members, in order to be able to securely communicate with these users. In this section, we show that adapting the folklore ME scheme and applying ideas from the folklore FS eRAM construction can provide FS for the group manager while storing $O(1)$ information in its secret state and retaining optimal communication and computational complexity of $O(\log n)$.

Comparison with Continuous Group Key Agreement. Continuous Group Key Agreement (CGKA) protocols [2, 1, 3, 4, 17] recently developed in the context of the IETF Message Layer Security initiative for group messaging [8] attempt to remove the ME group manager while preserving the same basic security and functionality of ME, as well as providing FS and PCS for users. However, removing the group manager in these protocols results in an exponential loss to $\Omega(n)$ in communication and computation complexity in the worst case (even without FS). Thus we focus on providing the group manager in ME with FS, without the efficiency loss of CGKA.

7.1 Forward Secret Multicast Encryption Definition

First, we provide a definition for ME modeling our desired security properties. For simplicity, we consider groups which always have a constant number, n , of users. Each group membership operation replaces one

user in the group with a new one. However, we note that our construction works for dynamically-sized groups as well.

Definition 19 (Multicast Encryption (ME)). An ME scheme $M = (\text{Minit}, \text{Uinit}, \text{create}, \text{replace}, \text{proc})$ consists of the following algorithms:

- Group Manager Initialization: Minit takes in security parameter λ and the number of users in the group at any moment, n , and outputs an initial state $\Gamma = (\Gamma_{\text{Sec}}, \Gamma_{\text{Pub}})$.
- User Initialization: Uinit takes in security parameter λ , an ID $\text{ID} \in \mathbb{N}$ and outputs an initial state γ .
- Group Creation: create takes a state Γ and a set of users $\mathbf{G} = \{\text{ID}_1, \dots, \text{ID}_n\}$, for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$, each $\text{ID}_i \in \mathbb{N}$, and outputs a new state Γ' and control message T .
- Replace: replace takes a state Γ and IDs $\text{ID}, \text{ID}' \in \mathbb{N}$ and outputs a new state Γ' and a control message T .
- Process: proc takes a state γ and a control message T sent over the broadcast channel and outputs a new state γ' and a group secret S .

Correctness and Security. We encapsulate correctness and security into the following game-based definition. We emphasize that the adversary \mathcal{A} always has read-access to Γ_{Pub} , which represents the storage that the group manager may outsource to some remote server. In addition, \mathcal{A} has read-access to the broadcast channel throughout the game.

The game proceeds in epochs determined by group membership, beginning at epoch $t = 0$. The challenger initially runs $\gamma_{\text{ID}} \leftarrow \text{Uinit}(1^\lambda, \text{ID}), \forall \text{ID}$,¹³ and $\Gamma \leftarrow \text{Minit}(1^\lambda, n)$ (where $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ is determined by \mathcal{A}). Then, for some initial set of n users, $\mathbf{G} = \{\text{ID}_1, \dots, \text{ID}_n\}$ chosen by \mathcal{A} , the challenger executes $(\Gamma', T) \leftarrow \text{create}(\Gamma, \mathbf{G})$. After initialization, the adversary has access to the **replace**(ID, ID') oracle, which first checks that ID and ID' are currently in, and not in, respectively, the group at the current epoch t . Then, it executes $(\Gamma', T) \leftarrow \text{replace}(\Gamma, \text{ID}, \text{ID}')$ followed by $(\gamma'_{\text{ID}}, S_t^{\text{ID}}) \leftarrow \text{proc}(\gamma_{\text{ID}}, T)$ for every member ID of the group, and finally increments the epoch: $t \leftarrow t + 1$. If $\exists \text{ID}_1, \text{ID}_2$ in the group such that $S_t^{\text{ID}_1} \neq S_t^{\text{ID}_2}$, then the challenger outputs win and ends the game.

At the end of the game, the challenger sends Γ_{Sec} to \mathcal{A} , and outputs win if and only if it receives from \mathcal{A} the group secret of a previous epoch.

Definition 20 (Multicast Encryption Security). A Multicast Encryption scheme M is secure if for every PPT adversary \mathcal{A}

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins}]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

7.2 Forward Secrecy with Small Group Manager Secret State

In this section, we modify the folklore construction to both be secure with respect to Definition 20 and have group manager secret state of $O(1)$ size, thus allowing the group manager to outsource the required $\Omega(n)$ storage to Γ_{Pub} , while still retaining optimal efficiency of $\text{replace}()$ operations.

The folklore construction is based off of a complete binary tree τ with n leaves, where each member of the group in a certain epoch is assigned to a unique leaf. The group manager stores τ in Γ_{Sec} and each group member stores their corresponding path P_{ID} from their leaf to the root in γ_{ID} . For simplicity, we will assume n is a power of two. Each node in the tree has an associated symmetric key that may change at each epoch. More specifically, after a $\text{replace}(\Gamma, \text{ID}, \text{ID}')$ operation, the keys on the path from the leaf corresponding to ID' (which takes the leaf of ID) to the root are all (from the leaf, up) refreshed and encrypted to the keys of their children. The symmetric key at the root serves as the group secret for each epoch, which each user in the group can clearly derive given the above ciphertexts, but not user ID , nor any other users that are not in the group.

Here, we make two alterations to the folklore construction to achieve our goals stated above. In order to achieve forward secrecy with respect to corruptions of Γ_{Sec} , we replace the standard symmetric encryption in the construction with forward secret symmetric encryption. One way to achieve this is by using stream ciphers in the following way: The key of each node v in τ is replaced with a seed s_v for a PRG \mathbf{G} and a one-time pad key k_v . Now, after the group manager encrypts to the key of some node v , it computes $\mathbf{G}(s_v) = (s'_v, k'_v)$ and reassigns to v this new seed, key pair. After a group member ID

¹³ We assume the ID space is polynomially large.

decrypts a ciphertext using k_v , they do the same for v in γ_{ID} . Now, when Γ_{Sec} is corrupted by \mathcal{A} , she only sees the seeds and keys at each node that have never been encrypted to and are pseudorandom and independent of all seeds and keys that were previously stored at the nodes. Also, all efficiency measures of this modified scheme are the same as the folklore construction. Namely, Γ_{Sec} is still $O(n)$ size.

As in the (weak) FS ORAM construction of Section 5.3, to reduce the size of Γ_{Sec} , one could naively use the folklore FS eRAM construction to forward secretly outsource storage of an encrypted version of the tree. Thus, Γ_{Sec} would only contain the root key of the FS eRAM construction and Γ_{Pub} would correspond to the public portion of the tree in the FS eRAM construction. Security of the ME construction would then follow from the forward secrecy argument of our first alteration above, combined with the forward secrecy of the FS eRAM. However, for each execution of the `replace()` operation, the manager needs to read and write $O(\log n)$ items in the FS eRAM, leading to $O(\log^2 n)$ total computation.

Instead, we can embed the ideas of the folklore FS eRAM construction directly into the `create()` and `replace()` algorithms of the folklore ME construction. Each node v in τ now not only has an associated PRG seed s_v and one-time pad key k_v , but also an additional *RAM key* rk_v . The group manager stores the RAM key rk_r of the root r of τ in Γ_{Sec} . In Γ_{Pub} , it stores the other nodes of τ in the following manner: at each node v in τ we store $\mathbf{E}_{rk_p}(s_v, k_v, rk_v)$, where rk_p is the RAM key of the parent of v .

We now provide an overview of the protocol operations. First, we describe a useful subroutine called `refresh(V)`. This subroutine takes in a set of nodes V and for each interior node $v \in V$, samples a random PRG seed s_v , one-time pad k_v , and RAM key rk_v . Next, for each interior node $v \in V$, it computes $\mathbf{E}_{k_{c_i}}((s_v, k_v))$ followed by $\mathbf{G}(s_{c_i}) \rightarrow (s'_{c_i}, k'_{c_i})$, for $i \in [2]$, where (s_v, k_v) is the seed, key pair at v , and (s_{c_i}, k_{c_i}) are the seed, key pairs of the children of v . Then, it aggregates these encryptions, labeled with the identifiers of the two nodes whose symmetric keys are being encrypted and encrypted to, respectively, into control message T . Next, it labels each node v (except for the root) in V^{14} (in Γ_{Pub}) with $\mathbf{E}_{rk_p}(s_v, k_v, rk_v)$, where rk_p, rk_v are the RAM keys of the parent p of v and v itself, respectively, and s_v, k_v correspond to the most recent seed, key pair of v . Finally, it stores the RAM key of the root rk_r in Γ_{Sec} and broadcasts control message T .

- `Minit(n)` simply initializes a complete binary tree with n leaves, τ in Γ_{Pub} .
- `Uinit(ID)` samples a random PRG seed s_{ID} and one-time pad k_{ID} for ID and sets $P_{\text{ID}}[v_{\text{ID}}] \leftarrow (s_{\text{ID}}, k_{\text{ID}})$, $\gamma_{\text{ID}} \leftarrow (\text{ID}, P_{\text{ID}})$. We will assume that the group manager can gain access to $(s_{\text{ID}}, k_{\text{ID}})$ at any moment (through some out-of-band channel).
- `create($\Gamma, \mathbf{G} = \{\text{ID}_1, \dots, \text{ID}_n\}$)` first assigns each of the leaves in τ uniquely to the IDs in \mathbf{G} along with their corresponding seed, key pairs $(s_{\text{ID}}, k_{\text{ID}})$ (retrieved via an out-of-band channel). It then computes $T \leftarrow \text{refresh}(\tau)$.
- `replace($\Gamma, \text{ID}, \text{ID}'$)` first assigns the leaf of ID in τ to ID' along with $(s_{\text{ID}'}, k_{\text{ID}'})$ (retrieved via an out-of-band channel). Next, it uses the RAM key rk_r of the root r stored in Γ_{Sec} to iteratively decrypt the seed, key pairs (and RAM keys) of every node on the path to $v_{\text{ID}'}$, $P_{\text{ID}'}$, as well as their children which are not on the path. It then computes $T \leftarrow \text{refresh}(P_{\text{ID}'})$.
- `proc($\gamma = (\text{ID}, P_{\text{ID}}), T$)` first finds in T the ciphertext that is labeled with the identifier of the node $v_{i,j}$ on the path from v_{ID} to the root, which is closest to v_{ID} . Then using $(s_{v_{i,j}}, k_{v_{i,j}}) \leftarrow P_{\text{ID}}[v_{i,j}]$ it decrypts this ciphertext, computes $\mathbf{G}(s_{v_{i,j}}) \rightarrow (s'_{v_{i,j}}, k'_{v_{i,j}})$ and changes the seed, key pair of $P_{\text{ID}}[v_{i,j}]$ and $P_{\text{ID}}[v_{i+1,j_{i+1}}]$ correspondingly. Then, it repeats this for all nodes $v_{i+1,j_{i+1}}, \dots, v_{\log n,1}$ on the path from $v_{i,j}$ to the root, and outputs the group secret for the epoch at the root.

We note that the number of ciphertexts broadcast in `refresh()` can be reduced by a factor of two by using a PRG to compute the seed, key pair at a given node from a seed at one of its children as in [13].

Theorem 10. *There exists a Multicast Encryption scheme that is secure with respect to Definition 20 and has $O(1)$ group manager secret storage, $O(n)$ group manager public storage, $O(\log n)$ user storage, $O(n)$ computational and communication complexity of `create()`, $O(\log n)$ computational and communication complexity of `replace()`, and $O(\log n)$ computational complexity of `proc()`.*

Proof. It is trivial to see the efficiency of the construction: namely, for `replace()`, only ciphertexts for the nodes of a given path and their children are decrypted and encrypted.

For security, all broadcast ciphertexts are encrypted to keys which have been pseudorandomly generated, starting from some randomly sampled seed. When Γ_{Sec} is corrupted, due to the incorporated

¹⁴ Also, their children, in the case of `replace()`.

strategy of the FS eRAM construction of Figure 1, an adversary \mathcal{A} can only recover seeds and keys from the current state of τ , and no seeds or keys that were stored in τ in previous epochs, but are no longer present. Since the seeds and keys currently in τ have never before been used and are pseudorandom and independent of the seeds and keys that used to be in τ and were used to create the ciphertexts of the previous epochs, \mathcal{A} cannot obtain any information about the previous group secrets from them. Thus, \mathcal{A} has only negligible advantage in the ME game. \square

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A Proof of Lemma 4

Proof. First, consider the sum

$$S' = \frac{1}{d} \sum_{i=1}^d \log(x_i) \cdot x_i.$$

Since $f(x) = \log(x) \cdot x$ is convex, we have by Jensen's inequality that

$$S' \geq \log\left(\frac{\sum_{i=1}^d x_i}{d}\right) \cdot \frac{\sum_{i=1}^d x_i}{d} = \log(m/d) \cdot m/d.$$

Thus,

$$S = \frac{d}{m} \cdot S' = \frac{1}{m} \cdot \sum_{i=1}^d \log(x_i) \cdot x_i \geq \log(m/d).$$

□