

On the (In)Security of the Diffie-Hellman Oblivious PRF with Multiplicative Blinding^{*}

Stanisław Jarecki¹, Hugo Krawczyk², and Jiayu Xu³

¹ University of California, Irvine, stasio@ics.uci.edu

² Algorand Foundation, hugokraw@gmail.com

³ George Mason University, jiayux@uci.edu

Abstract. Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) is a protocol between a client holding input x and a server holding key k for a PRF F . At the end, the client learns $F_k(x)$ and nothing else while the server learns nothing. OPRF’s have found diverse applications as components of larger protocols, and the currently most efficient instantiation, with security proven in the UC model, is $F_k(x) = H_2(x, (H_1(x))^k)$ computed using so-called *exponential blinding*, i.e. the client sends $a = (H_1(x))^r$ for random r , the server responds $b = a^k$, which the client unblinds as $v = b^{1/r}$ to compute $F_k(x) = H_2(x, v)$.

However, this protocol requires two variable-base exponentiations on the client, while a more efficient *multiplicative blinding* scheme replaces one or both client exponentiations with fixed-base exponentiation, leading to the decrease of the client’s computational cost by a factor between two to six, depending on pre-computation.

We analyze the security of the above OPRF with multiplicative blinding, showing surprising weaknesses that offer attack avenues which are not present using exponential blinding. We characterize the security of this OPRF implementation as a “Correlated OPRF” functionality, a relaxation of UC OPRF functionality used in prior work.

On the positive side, we show that the Correlated OPRF suffices for the security of OPAQUE, the asymmetric PAKE protocol, hence allowing OPAQUE the computational advantages of multiplicative blinding. Unfortunately, we also show examples of other OPRF applications which become insecure when using such blinding. The conclusion is that usage of multiplicative blinding for $F_k(x)$ defined as above, in settings where correct value g^k (needed for multiplicative blinding) is not authenticated, and OPRF inputs are of low entropy, must be carefully analyzed, or avoided all together. We complete the picture by showing a simple and safe alternative definition of function $F_k(x)$ which offers (full) UC OPRF security using either form of blinding.

1 Introduction

An *Oblivious Pseudorandom Function* (OPRF) scheme consists of a Pseudorandom Function (PRF) F for which there exists a two-party protocol

^{*} An abridged version of this paper appears in PKC’2021.

between a server S holding a PRF key k and a client C holding an input x through which C learns $F_k(x)$ and S learns nothing (in particular, nothing about the input x or the output $F_k(x)$). More generally, the security properties of the PRF, namely indistinguishability from a random function under polynomially many queries, must be preserved by the protocol. The OPRF notion was introduced explicitly in [10] but constructions, particularly those based on *blinded DH*, were studied earlier (e.g., [6, 25, 9]). OPRF has been formally defined under different models [10, 20, 12, 13] with the last two works framing them in the Universally Composable (UC) framework [5]. The OPRF notion has found many applications, and recently such applications have been proposed for actual deployment in practice, including the Privacy Pass protocol [7] and the OPAQUE password-authenticated key exchange protocol [17]. This gave rise to standardization proposals for OPRFs [27] and the OPAQUE protocol [24, 23, 28], which further motivates understanding the costs and benefits of possible OPRF implementations.

Exponential vs. multiplicative blinding in Hashed Diffie-Hellman PRF.⁴ In several of the above mentioned applications, the underlying PRF is instantiated with a (*Double*) *Hashed Diffie-Hellman* construction (2HashDH) [13], namely:

$$F_k(x) = H_2(x, (H_1(x))^k) \quad (1)$$

where hash functions H_1, H_2 are defined respectively as $H_1 : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G} \setminus \{1\}$ and $H_2 : \{0, 1\}^* \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\tau$ for a multiplicative group \mathbb{G} of prime order q , and the PRF key k is a random element in \mathbb{Z}_q , while τ is a security parameter. The protocol for the oblivious computation of 2HashDH used e.g. in [9, 3, 12, 13] employs the so-called *exponential blinding* method, i.e. protocol Exp-2HashDH shown in Fig. 1: Client C sends to server S its input x blinded as $a = (H_1(x))^r$, for $r \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{Z}_q$, and then unblinds the server’s response $b = a^k$ as $v = b^{1/r} [= (a^k)^{1/r} = (((H_1(x))^r)^k)^{1/r} = (H_1(x))^k]$ and outputs $H_2(x, v)$. It is easy to see that the client’s input is perfectly hidden from the server because if $H_1(x) \neq 1$ then a is a random element in \mathbb{G} independent from x .

An alternative *multiplicative blinding* technique, denoted Mult-2HashDH, is shown in Fig. 2. The protocol is an equivalent of Chaum’s technique for blinding RSA signatures: Given generator g of group \mathbb{G} , the client blinds its input as $a = H_1(x) \cdot g^r$, and using the server’s *public key* $z = g^k$ corresponding to the PRF key k , the client unblinds the server’s response $b = a^k$ as $v = b \cdot z^{-r} [= a^k \cdot (g^k)^{-r} = (H_1(x) \cdot g^r)^k \cdot g^{-kr} = (H_1(x))^k]$. It is easy to see that this blinding hides x with perfect security, as in the case of Exp-2HashDH.

Comparing the computational cost of the two techniques, we see that both require a single variable-base exponentiation for the server. However, for the client, Exp-2HashDH requires two variable-base exponentiations (for blinding and unblinding) while Mult-2HashDH involves a single *fixed-base* exponentiation

⁴ In the context of additive groups, “multiplicative” would be replaced with “additive” and “exponential” with “scalar-multiplicative”. A less confusing terminology could refer to these as fixed-base and var-base blindings, respectively.




Fig. 1. Exp-2HashDH: Oblivious PRF using *Exponential* Blinding [13]




Fig. 2. Mult-2HashDH: Oblivious PRF using *Multiplicative* Blinding

for blinding and a variable-base exponentiation (to the base z) for unblinding. In applications where the client stores z ,⁵ the latter exponentiation can use fixed-base optimization, reducing the client’s total computation to two-fixed base exponentiations. Given that exponentiation with a fixed base is about 6-7 times faster than with a variable base (cf. [4, 15]), Mult-2HashDH becomes at least 1.7 faster than Exp-2HashDH and 6x faster if z is stored at the client and treated as a fixed base. On the other hand, in cases where the client does not hold z , Mult-2HashDH requires the server to store z and send it with each execution of the OPRF protocol. This cost may not be significant in some cases but in constrained environments where bandwidth and/or storage is a costly resource (e.g., mobile and IoT scenarios) [11], Exp-2HashDH may be preferred. Fortunately, 2HashDH allows an application to choose the blinding mechanism that best fits its needs, possibly choosing one technique or the other depending on the network setting and client configuration.

These are good news for performance and implementation flexibility, but regarding security, things are not as straightforward, as we explain next.

Is multiplicative blinding secure? On the face of it, it would seem that exponential and multiplicative blindings are equivalent, functionally and security-wise, thus allowing for performance optimization and flexibility as

⁵ For example, in a password protocol such as OPAQUE [17], a user can cache values z corresponding to servers it accesses frequently, e.g., Google, Facebook, etc.

discussed above. However, determining the security of Mult-2HashDH turns out to be non-trivial, showing unexpected attack avenues which are not present in Exp-2HashDH. In particular, while Exp-2HashDH has been proven to satisfy the UC OPRF notion from [13], protocol Mult-2HashDH is *not secure* under this same definition. The problem is, broadly speaking, that the dependency of the protocol on z implies that multiplicative blinding does not ensure full independence between OPRF instances indexed by different public keys.⁶

Let us elaborate. In protocol Exp-2HashDH, server's response b to the client's message $a \neq 1$ defines a unique key $k = \text{DL}(a, b)$ for which C computes $y = F_k(x)$. (Since client's output is $y = H_2(x, v)$ for $v = b^{1/r}$ and $a = (H_1(x))^r$, it follows that $v = a^{k/r} = (H_1(x))^k$ and therefore $y = F_k(x)$ for $k = \text{DL}(a, b)$.) In other words, server's response b commits the server to a single value k , hence to a unique function $F_k(x)$. This commitment to a unique function is central to the OPRF UC modeling from [13]. The same, however, does *not* hold for Mult-2HashDH where the server's response (b, z) to the client's message a gives the attacker an additional degree of freedom in manipulating C 's output $y = H(x, b \cdot z^{-r})$. Specifically, response (b, z) given a determines pair (δ, z) where $\delta = b/a^k$ for $k = \text{DL}(g, z)$, thus leading to the following function:

$$F_{(\delta, z)}(x) \triangleq H_2(x, \delta \cdot (h_x)^k) \quad \text{for } z = g^k \text{ and } h_x = H_1(x) \quad (2)$$

which an honest C computes on its input x given S 's response (b, z) in the Mult-2HashDH protocol. Indeed, if $a = h_x \cdot g^r$, $z = g^k$ and $\delta = b/a^k$ then

$$v = b \cdot z^{-r} = b \cdot (g^k)^{-r} = b \cdot (g^r)^{-k} = b \cdot (a/h_x)^{-k} = (b/a^k) \cdot (h_x)^k = \delta \cdot (h_x)^k$$

The important point is that value $\delta = b/a^k$ for $k = \text{DL}(g, z)$ introduces a multiplicative shift in the value v computed by C . Moreover, an adversarial S can exploit this shift to create correlated responses that leak information on the client's input. In particular, for any choice of client input \bar{x} , an attacker S can find values $\delta_1, \delta_2, k_1, k_2$ such that

$$\delta_1 \cdot (h_{\bar{x}})^{k_1} = \delta_2 \cdot (h_{\bar{x}})^{k_2} \quad \text{for } z_1 = g^{k_1}, z_2 = g^{k_2} \text{ and } h_{\bar{x}} = H_1(\bar{x}) \quad (3)$$

Using these values the attacker can respond to the first client's query a_1 with $(b_1, z_1) = (\delta_1 a_1^{k_1}, g^{k_1})$, and to a second query a_2 with $(\delta_2 a_2^{k_2}, g^{k_2})$, leading C to compute values v_1, v_2 that coincide if C 's input is $x = \bar{x}$ and do not coincide if $x \neq \bar{x}$. In other words, $F_{(\delta_1, z_1)}(\bar{x}) = F_{(\delta_2, z_2)}(\bar{x})$, showing that in contrast to the family $\{F_k\}$ defined by equation (1), the function family $\{F_{(\delta, z)}\}$ defined by equation (2) is *not* a family of *independent* random functions in ROM.⁷

Potential vulnerabilities. The core advantage a corrupt server may gain by exploiting the above correlations is the ability to test whether a given value of

⁶ The potential insecurity of multiplicative blinding as UC OPRF was pointed out in [17], which left its security analysis as an open question.

⁷ Note that an honest server's response $(b, z) = (a^k, g^k)$ corresponds to $\delta = 1$ and the evaluated function $F_{(1, z)}$ is identical to the intended function F_k .

x has been input by the client in a previous interaction with the server. Our analysis of Mult-2HashDH shows that the server can test at most one such input per interaction. For OPAQUE, this property suffices to *prove the security of the protocol with Mult-2HashDH*. The intuitive reason is that in OPAQUE, a malicious server already has the ability to test guesses for the client’s inputs (a password in the case of OPAQUE) with each interaction with the client, thus the above attack based on correlation does not add to the attacker’s power. In contrast, in Section 7 we show examples of applications where the correlated nature of Mult-2HashDH opens attack avenues not available with exponential blinding. This demonstrates that the two OPRF implementations, Exp-2HashDH and Mult-2HashDH, are not equivalent vis-à-vis security, and replacing one with another within some application needs to be analyzed on a per-case basis, as we do here for OPAQUE.

Modeling Mult-2HashDH as Correlated OPRF. To analyze the security of applications that use Mult-2HashDH, we show that there are limits on the correlations which an adversary can create among the functions effectively evaluated in the Mult-2HashDH protocol. Specifically, each pair of functions can be correlated only as in equation (3) and *only on one* argument x . We prove this formally by introducing a relaxation of the UC OPRF functionality of [13] which we call *Correlated OPRF*. The purpose of this relaxation is to model the exact nature of function correlations which multiplicative blinding gives to a malicious server. We show that Mult-2HashDH realizes the Correlated OPRF functionality under the Gap⁺-OMDH assumption in ROM, a mild strengthening of the Gap-OMDH assumption which sufficed for Exp-2HashDH to satisfy the UC OPRF functionality [13].

Security of OPAQUE under both blindings. Based on the UC modeling of Mult-2HashDH as a Correlated OPRF, we prove the OPAQUE strong asymmetric PAKE protocol [17] secure using 2HashDH with multiplicative blinding. (*Strong* asymmetric PAKE is secure against pre-computation of password hashes before server compromise.) Specifically, we show that OPAQUE remains secure if the OPRF building block it uses is relaxed from the UC OPRF notion of [13] to the Correlated OPRF defined here. This means that the asymmetric PAKE standard being defined by the IETF on the basis of OPAQUE [24, 23, 28] can use the 2HashDH function and leave the choice of exponential or multiplicative blinding to individual implementations.

We believe that the same holds for another construction from [17], which shows that a composition of UC OPRF and any asymmetric PAKE results in a strong asymmetric PAKE. This transformation was proven secure using UC OPRF, implemented by Exp-2HashDH and we believe that this result can also be “upgraded” to the case of UC Correlated OPRF, i.e. using Mult-2HashDH, but we leave the formal verification of that claim to future work.

When is it safe to use Mult-2HashDH? In cases where the client has access to the value g^k in some authenticated/certified form, such as in applications requiring a Verifiable OPRF [12], e.g., Privacy Pass [7], one can use (1) with

either blinding. For multiplicative blinding, one just uses the authenticated z in the unblinding. However, when z is received from the server in unauthenticated way, much care is needed, and security under multiplicative blinding needs to be proven on a per-application basis. Even then, small changes in applications and implementations may turn this mechanism insecure as evidenced by the case of using OPAQUE with a threshold OPRF which we show in Section 7 to be insecure if used with Mult-2HashDH. As a rule of thumb, *it seems prudent to advise not to use Mult-2HashDH in setting with unauthenticated g^k and where the input to the OPRF is taken from a low-entropy space.*

An alternative OPRF specification. Another fix is to replace function 2HashDH defined in eq. (1) with the following simple modification, where $z = g^k$ is included under the hash, which is secure using *either* blinding:

$$F'_k(x) = H_2(x, z, H_1(x)^k) \quad \text{where } z = g^k \quad (4)$$

It can be shown that this scheme avoids the correlation attacks⁸, and therefore can be proven secure with either blinding method as a realization of the UC OPRF functionality from [13]. The security holds even when the value z input into the hash by the client is the (unauthenticated) z received from the server.

However, while this scheme allows an implementation to choose (even at execution time) the blinding mechanism it prefers, it forces the transmission of z from server to client even in the case of exponential blinding, a drawback in constrained settings discussed above, e.g. [11]. In the case of OPAQUE, one can still use the simpler 2HashDH without transmitting z but with the subtleties and warnings surrounding security as demonstrated in this paper.⁹

2 Preliminaries

The Gap One-More Diffie-Hellman assumptions. The security of protocol Mult-2HashDH as UC Correlated OPRF relies on the interactive *Gap⁺ One-More Diffie-Hellman* (Gap⁺-OMDH) assumption, a mild strengthening of the Gap-OMDH assumption used to realize UC OPRF [13] or *verifiable* UC OPRF [12]. Let \mathbb{G} be a group of prime order q , and let g be an arbitrary generator of \mathbb{G} . Let $(\cdot)^k$ for $k \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ denote an oracle which returns $y = x^k$ on input $x \in \mathbb{G}$. Let CDH_g denote a CDH oracle which returns g^{xy} on input (g^x, g^y) . Let DDH_g denote a DDH oracle which returns 1 on input (A, B, C) s.t. $C = \text{CDH}_g(A, B)$, and 0 otherwise. Let DDH_g^+ denote an oracle which returns 1 on input (A, B, A', B', C) s.t. $C = \text{CDH}_g(A, B) \cdot \text{CDH}_g(A', B')$, and 0 otherwise. The (N, Q) -Gap⁺-OMDH assumption on group \mathbb{G} states that for any polynomial-time algorithm \mathcal{A} ,

$$\Pr_{k \leftarrow \mathbb{R}\mathbb{Z}_q, h_1, \dots, h_N \leftarrow \mathbb{R}\mathbb{G}} \left[\mathcal{A}^{(\cdot)^k, \text{DDH}_g^+}(g, g^k, h_1, \dots, h_N) = (J, S) \right]$$

⁸ The correlation between functions $F_{(\delta_1, z_1)}$ and $F_{(\delta_2, z_2)}$ would now require that $z_1 = z_2$, hence $k_1 = k_2$, in which case eq. (3) holds only if $\delta_1 = \delta_2$, hence $(\delta_1, z_1) = (\delta_2, z_2)$.

⁹ Another way for 2HashDH to realize UC OPRF with multiplicative blinding, is to add to Mult-2HashDH a zero-knowledge proof that (g, z, a, b) is a DDH tuple, but this would void the performance benefit of Mult-2HashDH.

is negligible, where $J = (j_1, \dots, j_{Q+1})$, $S = ((h_{j_1})^k, \dots, (h_{j_{Q+1}})^k)$, Q is the number of \mathcal{A} 's $(\cdot)^k$ queries, and j_1, \dots, j_{Q+1} are *distinct* elements in $\{1, \dots, N\}$.

In other words, Gap^+ -OMDH models the following experiment: Let \mathcal{A} have access to a DDH^+ oracle and an “exponentiation to k -th power” oracle for random k in \mathbb{Z}_q , and the number of queries to the latter is limited by Q . \mathcal{A} is given N random elements in \mathbb{G} as the challenge values, and since \mathcal{A} is allowed to query the exponentiation oracle Q times, it is able to compute the k -th power of any Q of the N elements, but the assumption postulates that it is infeasible that \mathcal{A} computes the k -th power of any $Q+1$ of the N group elements, i.e. that it computes the k -th power of “one more” element.

The Gap -OMDH assumption is defined in the exact same way as Gap^+ -OMDH, except \mathcal{A} has access to oracle DDH_g instead of DDH_g^+ . We believe that Gap^+ -OMDH is a mild strengthening of Gap -OMDH because assuming OMDH in a group with a bilinear map implies both assumptions: Given an efficiently computable map $e : \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$ s.t. $e(g^a, g^b) = e(g, g)^{ab}$, one can implement DDH_g oracle, by checking if $e(A, B) = e(g, C)$, as well as DDH_g^+ oracle, by checking if $e(A, B) \cdot e(A', B') = e(g, C)$. In Appendix B we show that the Gap^+ -OMDH assumption holds in the generic group model, which extends similar argument given for Gap -OMDH in [14].

Random-key Robust and Equivocable Authenticated Encryption. As shown in [17], protocol OPAQUE needs to use a *random-key robust* and *equivocable* authenticated encryption scheme as a building block. An authenticated encryption scheme $\text{AE} = (\text{AuthEnc}, \text{AuthDec})$ is *random-key robust* if for any efficient algorithm \mathcal{A} , the following probability is negligible in τ :

$$\Pr_{k_1, k_2 \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^\tau} [c \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(k_1, k_2) \text{ s.t. } \text{AuthDec}_{k_1}(c) \neq \perp, \text{AuthDec}_{k_2}(c) \neq \perp]$$

In other words, random-key robustness states that given two random keys, it is infeasible to find a ciphertext which is valid under both of them. Similar notions were introduced in [1] in the public-key setting, and [8] in the private-key setting. In the random oracle model (ROM), the following authenticated encryption scheme AE achieves random-key robustness. Let (Enc, Dec) be any symmetric-key encryption scheme. Define $\text{AuthEnc}_k(m)$ to set $c' \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m)$ and return $c \leftarrow (c', H(k, c'))$, where H is a hash function modeled as a random oracle. $\text{AuthDec}_k(c)$ parses $c = (c', h)$ and checks if $h = H(k, c')$; if so it outputs $\text{Dec}_k(c)$, otherwise it outputs \perp .

An authenticated encryption AE is *equivocable* if for any efficient algorithm \mathcal{A} , there is an efficient *stateful* simulator SIM_{EQV} such that the distinguishing advantage of \mathcal{A} 's views in the following two games is negligible in τ :

- The real game: \mathcal{A} interacts with oracles $\text{AuthEnc}(\cdot, \cdot)$ and $\text{Reveal}(\cdot)$, where $\text{AuthEnc}(i, m_i)$ picks $k_i \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \{0, 1\}^\tau$ and returns $c_i \leftarrow \text{AuthEnc}_{k_i}(m_i)$, and $\text{Reveal}(i)$ returns k_i ;
- The ideal game: \mathcal{A} interacts with SIM_{EQV} , such that when \mathcal{A} queries $\text{AuthEnc}(i, m_i)$, $\text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(i, |m_i|)$ returns c_i , and when \mathcal{A} queries $\text{Reveal}(i)$, $\text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(i, m_i)$ returns k_i .

In other words, there must exist an efficient simulator which first generates a ciphertext without any knowledge about the plaintext, except for its length, and then once the plaintext is known it can reveal a key which explains that ciphertext as an encryption of the provided plaintext.

Common encryption modes including CTR and CBC satisfy equivocability in the Ideal Cipher model. Let E be a block cipher model as an ideal cipher and let $|m|$ be equal to n times E 's block length. SIM_{EQV} chooses random IV and sets ciphertext $c = (IV, c_1, \dots, c_n)$ where c_i 's are all random blocks, and when SIM_{EQV} gets $m = (m_1, \dots, m_n)$ it sets n input/output points of $E(k, \cdot)$ as follows. For CTR, SIM_{EQV} sets $E(k, IV + i) = m_i \oplus c_i$ for all i ; and for CBC, it sets $E(k, m_i \oplus c_{i-1}) = c_i$ for all i and $c_0 = IV$. Either way by randomness of c_i 's this sets $E(k, \cdot)$ outputs on n points to random values, it creates collisions in $E(k, \cdot)$ with negligible probability, and by randomness of k there is negligible probability that any points of $E(k, \cdot)$ were queried before. This can be extended to an Authenticated Encryption scheme by computing a MAC on the ciphertext with SIM_{EQV} acting as follows. SIM_{EQV} responds to an AE query by choosing a random MAC key k and outputting $(c, \text{MAC}_k(c))$ where c is computed as above. To output the MAC key upon a Reveal query with message m , SIM_{EQV} outputs k (which is independent of the message hence it works with any message). Implementing the MAC function with a random oracle hash provides simultaneously equivocability and random-key robustness.

We refer to [17] or our full version [19] for the definition of these notions and their implementation. Here we only comment that these notions can be achieved using regular symmetric encryption schemes (e.g., CTR or CBC modes) under the random oracle or ideal cipher models.

3 The Correlated OPRF Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$

As we explain in Section 1, we will model the type of PRF-correlations which protocol Mult-2HashDH allows with a correlated OPRF functionality, and here we define it as functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ shown in Fig. 3. In Section 4 we will argue that protocol Mult-2HashDH, i.e. the multiplicative blinding protocol together with the PRF defined in equation (1), realizes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ under Gap-OMDH assumption in ROM.

Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ is a relaxation of the OPRF functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ of [17], which is an adaptive extension of the UC OPRF defined in [13]. To make this relation easier to see we mark in Fig. 3 all the code fragments which are novel with respect to functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ of [17]. Below we will first explain the basic properties which $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ shares with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$, and then we explain the crucial differences which make $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ a relaxation of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$.

Correlated OPRF model: basic logic. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ models OPRF in a similar way as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ of [13, 17]. First, when an honest server S initializes a PRF by picking a random key, this is modeled in the ideal world via call INIT from S , which initializes a random function $F_S : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$. Second, the real-world S can evaluate F_S off-line on any argument, which is modeled

Public Parameters: PRF output-length ℓ , polynomial in security parameter τ .
Conventions: $\forall i, x$ value $F_i(x)$ is initially undefined, and if undefined $F_i(x)$ is referenced then $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ sets $F_i(x) \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^\ell$. Variable \mathbf{P} ranges over all *honest* network entities and \mathcal{A}^* , and we assume *all corrupt entities are operated by \mathcal{A}^** .

Initialization

- On (INIT, sid) from \mathbf{S} , set $\text{tx} \leftarrow 0$, $\mathcal{N} \leftarrow [\mathbf{S}]$, $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \{\}$, $\mathcal{G} \leftarrow (\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{E})$.
 Ignore all subsequent INIT messages.
 Below “ \mathbf{S} ” stands for the entity which sent the INIT message.

Server Compromise

- On (COMPROMISE, sid) from \mathcal{A}^* , declare server \mathbf{S} as COMPROMISED.
 (If \mathbf{S} is corrupted then it is declared COMPROMISED as well.)

Offline Evaluation

- On (OFFLINEEVAL, sid, i, x, \mathbf{L}) from \mathbf{P} do:
 - (1) If $\mathbf{P} = \mathcal{A}^*$ and $i \notin \mathcal{N}$ then append i to \mathcal{N} and run CORRELATE(i, \mathbf{L});
 - (2) Ignore this message if $\mathbf{P} = \mathcal{A}^*$, \mathbf{S} is not COMPROMISED, and $(i, \mathbf{S}, x) \in \mathcal{E}$;
 - (3) Send (OFFLINEEVAL, sid, $F_i(x)$) to \mathbf{P} if (i) $\mathbf{P} = \mathbf{S}$ and $i = \mathbf{S}$ or (ii) $\mathbf{P} = \mathcal{A}^*$ and either $i \neq \mathbf{S}$ or \mathbf{S} is COMPROMISED.

Online Evaluation

- On (EVAL, sid, ssid, \mathbf{S}' , x) from \mathbf{P} , send (EVAL, sid, ssid, \mathbf{P}, \mathbf{S}') to \mathcal{A}^* . On prfx from \mathcal{A}^* , reject it if prfx was used before. Else record $(\text{ssid}, \mathbf{P}, x, \text{prfx}, 0)$ and send (Prefix, ssid, prfx) to \mathbf{P} .
- On (SNDRCOMPLETE, sid, ssid') from \mathbf{S} , send (SNDRCOMPLETE, sid, ssid', \mathbf{S}) to \mathcal{A}^* . On prfx' from \mathcal{A}^* send (Prefix, ssid', prfx') to \mathbf{S} . If there is a record $(\text{ssid}, \mathbf{P}, x, \text{prfx}, 0)$ s.t. $\text{prfx} = \text{prfx}'$, change it to $(\text{ssid}, \mathbf{P}, x, \text{prfx}, 1)$, else set $\text{tx}++$.
- On (RCVCOMPLETE, sid, ssid, $\mathbf{P}, i, \mathbf{L}$) from \mathcal{A}^* , retrieve $(\text{ssid}, \mathbf{P}, x, \text{prfx}, \text{ok?})$ (ignore the message if there is no such record) and do:
 - (1) If $i \notin \mathcal{N}$ then append i to \mathcal{N} and run CORRELATE(i, \mathbf{L});
 - (2) If \mathbf{S} is not COMPROMISED and $\text{ok?} = 0$ do:
 If $i = \mathbf{S}$ or $[(i, \mathbf{S}, x) \in \mathcal{E} \text{ and } \mathbf{P} = \mathcal{A}^*]$ do:
 If $\text{tx} = 0$ then ignore this message, else set $\text{tx}--$;
 - (3) Send (EVAL, sid, ssid, $F_i(x)$) to \mathbf{P} .

CORRELATE(i, \mathbf{L}):

- Reject if list \mathbf{L} contains elements $(j, x), (j', x')$ s.t. $j = j'$ and $x \neq x'$.
 Else, for all $(j, x) \in \mathbf{L}$ s.t. $j \in \mathcal{N}$, add (i, j, x) to \mathcal{E} and set $F_i(x) \leftarrow F_j(x)$.

Fig. 3. The Correlated OPRF functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$. The (adaptive) OPRF functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ of [18] is formed by omitting all text in gray boxes .

in the ideal world by call (OFFLINEEVAL, sid, i, x, L) from S with $i = S$ and $L = \perp$, which gives $F_S(x)$ to S . (The role of list L , which a malicious server can make non-empty, is discussed further below.) Third, in addition to the off-line evaluation, any client C can start an on-line OPRF protocol instance with S on local input x , which is modeled by call (EVAL, $\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, S', x$) from $P = C$ with $S' = S$, where ssid stands for *sub-session ID*, a fresh identifier of this OPRF instance. If S honestly engages in this protocol, which is modeled by call (SNDRCOMPLETE, sid, ssid) from S , functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ increments the server-specific ticket-counter tx , initially set to 0. If the real-world adversary allows an uninterrupted interaction between C and S , which is modeled by a call (RCVCOMPLETE, $\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C, i, L$) with $i = S$ and $L = \perp$ from the ideal-world adversary \mathcal{A}^* , then $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ decrements counter tx and sends $F_S(x)$ to C .¹⁰

The man-in-the-middle adversary (our OPRF model does not rely on authenticated links) who interacts with client C , can make C output $F_i(x)$ for a different function $F_i \neq F_S$, using a call (RCVCOMPLETE, ssid, C, i, L) for $i \neq S$, which models a real-world adversary acting like the server but on a wrong key $k_i \neq k$ in this interaction. To model a real-world adversary choosing different PRF keys in either offline or online evaluations, functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ keeps a list of indexes \mathcal{N} of independent random functions, and effectively associates each real-world key with a distinct index in \mathcal{N} , whereas the key of the honest server S is associated with a special symbol S .

Practical implications. Note that RCVCOMPLETE computes function F_S on P 's input x only if $\text{tx} > 0$, i.e. if the number of instances completed by S is greater than the number of instances completed by any client. This implies that if S engages in n OPRF instances this allows function F_S to be computed, by all other parties combined, on at most n arguments. However, the functionality does not establish strict binding between these server and client instances. Indeed, this *ticket-based* enforcement allows an OPRF functionality to be realized using homomorphic blinding without zero-knowledge proofs. Note that in protocol Exp-2HashDH of Fig. 1 the interaction between C and S can be “double blinded” by the network adversary, who can modify P 's original message a as $a' = a^s$, and then modify S 's response $b = a^k$ as $b' = b^{1/s}$. Such interaction produces the correct output on the client, but a' which S sees is a random group element, independent of a sent by C , which makes it impossible to identify the pair of C and S instances which the network adversary effectively pairs up.

Another feature which enables efficient $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ realization is that the argument x of client C engaging in an OPRF instance can be defined only *after* server S completes this instance. Note that in the ideal world C outputs $F_S(x)$ even if S completes an OPRF instance first, by sending message (SVRCOMPLETE, sid, ssid), and C only afterwards sends (EVAL, $\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, S, x$), followed by RCVCOMPLETE from \mathcal{A}^* . Indeed, this “delayed input extraction”

¹⁰ As in the adaptive version of UC OPRF $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ [17], we allow server S to be adaptively compromised, via call COMPROMISE from \mathcal{A}^* , which models a leakage of the private state of S , including its PRF key and all its authentication tokens. One consequence of server compromise is that RCVCOMPLETE will no longer check that $\text{tx} > 0$.

feature of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ enables protocol Exp-2HashDH to realize it in ROM, where the ideal-world adversary can extract argument x from the local computation of the real-world client, namely from H_2 query (x, v) for $v = (H_1(x))^k$, but that computation (and input-extraction) happens *after* S completes the protocol.

In some applications, notably OPAQUE [17], see Section 5, it is useful for OPRF to output a transcript, or its prefix, as a handle on OPRF instance in a higher-level protocol. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ allows each party to output a transcript prefix prfx , and if prfx output by S and C match then $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ allows C session to compute the PRF output without using the tx counter. This does not affect the logic of tx-checking: Each run of SDRCOMPLETE either increments tx or ok's some particular client OPRF instance, so either way the number of on-line OPRF evaluations is limited by the number of SDRCOMPLETE instances.

Relaxation of the UC OPRF model. The crucial difference between the Correlated OPRF functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ and the OPRF functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ of [13] is that when any party evaluates function F_i for a *new* index $i \notin \mathcal{N}$, which corresponds to a real-world adversary evaluating the (O)PRF either offline or online on a new key, the adversary can supply a list L of *correlations* which the new function F_i will have with previously initialized functions F_j , $j \in \mathcal{N}$, potentially including the honest server function F_S . Such correlations were not allowed in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$, and indeed $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ reduces to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ if \mathcal{A}^* sets L as an empty list in OFFLINEEVAL and RCVCOMPLETE messages. Argument L can specify a sequence of pairs (j, x) where $j \in \mathcal{N}$ is an index of a previously initialized function F_j , and the correlation consists of setting the value of the new function F_i on x as $F_j(x)$. After setting $F_i(x) \leftarrow F_j(x)$ for all $(j, x) \in L$, the values of F_i on *all other arguments* are set at random by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ keeps track of these correlations in a graph $\mathcal{G} = (\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{E})$, where $(i, j, x) \in \mathcal{E}$ if $F_i(x)$ is set to $F_j(x)$ in the above manner, i.e., an edge between i and j , labeled x , represents a correlation between functions F_i and F_j on argument x .

A crucial constraint on the correlation list L is that for each $j \in \mathcal{N}$ list L can contain only one entry of the form (j, \cdot) , i.e. two functions F_i, F_j can be correlated on *at most one* argument. (This allows Correlated OPRF to be secure in applications where an on-line attack that chooses a single correlation point is equivalent to an attack which guesses the counterparty's input.) Note that if the adversary correlates F_i with the honest server function F_S on argument x , and then evaluates $F_i(x)$ via the online OPRF instance, i.e. EVAL and RCVCOMPLETE where $\mathsf{P} = \mathcal{A}^*$, functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ treats this as an evaluation of F_S and decrements the ticket-counter tx. This restriction is necessary because otherwise the adversary could effectively compute F_S on more than n arguments even if an honest server S engages in only n OPRF instances: It could first correlate $n' > n$ adversarial functions $F_1, \dots, F_{n'}$ with F_S , each function F_i on a different argument x_i , and each evaluation of $F_i(x_i)$ would reveal the value of F_S on all these arguments as well. However, our $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ model allows \mathcal{A}^* to let any *honest* party P compute $F_i(x)$ for F_i correlated with F_S without decrementing the ticket-counter tx. This is a weakness, e.g. if the higher-level application reveals these OPRF outputs to the

attacker. A stronger version of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ would decrement tx even if $F_i(x) = F_S(x)$ is computed by honest parties, but we used a weaker version for two reasons: First, it suffices for OPAQUE security. Second, we can show that Mult-2HashDH realizes this weaker version under Gap^+ -OMDH, and it is an open problem whether the same can be shown for the stronger version of the functionality.

Necessity of the relaxation. As noted in Section 1, Exp-2HashDH satisfies the UC OPRF notion of [13] because S’s response b to C’s message a defines key $k = \text{DL}(a, b)$ s.t. C outputs $y = F_k(x)$ for function F_k defined in eq. (1). However, in Mult-2HashDH, S’s response (b, z) defines the function which C effectively computes as $F_{(\delta, z)}$ defined in eq. (2). Moreover, different choices of (δ, z) do *not* define independent random functions. Indeed, an efficient attacker can easily pick (δ_1, z_1) and (δ_2, z_2) which satisfy equation (3) for any x , which implies that the two functions will be correlated by constraint $F_{(\delta_1, z_1)}(x) = F_{(\delta_2, z_2)}(x)$.

The consequences of such correlations can be illustrated by the following example. Assume that the higher-level application allows a malicious server to detect whether in two OPRF instances the client outputs the same two values or not. Let x_1 and x_2 be two client input candidates. If the server picks two indexes (δ_1, z_1) and (δ_2, z_2) s.t. $F_{(\delta_1, z_1)}(x_1) = F_{(\delta_2, z_2)}(x_1)$ and $F_{(\delta_1, z_1)}(x_2) \neq F_{(\delta_2, z_2)}(x_2)$ and inputs (δ_1, z_1) into the first OPRF instance and (δ_2, z_2) into the second one, then the client’s outputs in these two executions will be the same if its input is x_1 and different if its input is x_2 , and by the assumption on the application context the server will learn which one is the case. (In Section 7 we show examples of applications where this knowledge creates an attack avenue.)

The UC OPRF notion of [13] does not allow for this attack avenue because in that model each choice of a function index which server S can input into an OPRF instance defines an *independent* (pseudo)random function. However, no choice of two functions F_i, F_j for these two instances allows S to distinguish between C’s input x_1 and x_2 : If $F_i = F_j$ then C’s output in the two instances will be the same for any x , and if $F_i \neq F_j$ then C’s output in the two instances will be different, also for any x , except for a negligible probability that S finds two functions F_i, F_j among the polynomially-many random functions it can query offline s.t. $F_i(x) = F_j(x)$ for $x \in \{x_1, x_2\}$.

The above correlation example can be extended, and indeed if an adversarial server S executes n instances of Mult-2HashDH it can effectively input into them indexes $(\delta_1, z_1), \dots, (\delta_n, z_n)$ s.t. for example, for any arguments x_1, \dots, x_{n-1} it holds that $F_{(\delta_i, z_i)}(x_i) = F_{(\delta_{i+1}, z_{i+1})}(x_i)$. This holds if S chooses any δ_1 and any k_1, \dots, k_n and sets $\delta_{i+1} = \delta_i \cdot (H_1(x_i))^{k_i - k_{i+1}}$ for $i = 1, \dots, n-1$. Note that this pattern forms an acyclic graph of correlations between these functions, and we do not know how an efficient S can create correlations which involve cycles, e.g. by adding to the above a constraint $F_{(\delta_n, z_n)}(x_n) = F_{(\delta_1, z_1)}(x_n)$ for some x_n . We do not know of an OPRF application for which it would matter whether the number of correlations among n adversarial functions is bounded by $O(n)$ instead of $O(n^2)$, but the treatment of Mult-2HashDH as Correlated OPRF can probably be extended to show that under a reasonable computational

assumptions the protocol realizes a restricted variant of functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ which prevents the adversary from forming cycles in the correlation graph.

4 Security Analysis of Multiplicative DH-OPRF

Fig. 2 in Section 1 shows the OPRF protocol Mult-2HashDH, which uses multiplicative blinding for oblivious evaluation of the (Double) Hashed Diffie-Hellman function defined in eq. (1), i.e. $F_k(x) = H_2(x, (H_1(x))^k)$. Here, in Fig. 4, we render the same protocol as a realization of the Correlated OPRF functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ defined in Fig. 3. As we explain in Section 3, functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ reflects the correlations which a real-world adversary can introduce in the PRF functions the honest users compute in this protocol. Indeed, as we show in Theorem 1 below, under the *Gap One-More Diffie-Hellman* assumption protocol Mult-2HashDH securely realizes this functionality in ROM.




Fig. 4. Protocol Mult-2HashDH of Fig. 2 as a realization of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$.

Theorem 1. *Protocol Mult-2HashDH realizes correlated OPRF functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ in the \mathcal{F}_{RO} -hybrid world under the Gap-OMDH assumption.*

Proof: We show that for any efficient environment \mathcal{Z} and the real-world adversary \mathcal{A} (more precisely, for \mathcal{A} in the \mathcal{F}_{RO} -hybrid world, i.e. the real world amended by random oracle hash functions), there exists an efficient simulator SIM , a.k.a. an “ideal-world adversary”, s.t. the environment’s view in the real world, where the honest parties implement the Mult-2HashDH protocol interacting with adversary \mathcal{A} , is indistinguishable from its view in the ideal world, where the honest parties are “dummy” entities which pass their inputs to (and outputs from) the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$, and where the real-world adversary \mathcal{A} is replaced by the simulator SIM (who locally interacts with \mathcal{A}). The construction of SIM is shown in Fig. 5. While the real-world adversary \mathcal{A} works in a hybrid world with the random oracle modeled by functionality \mathcal{F}_{RO} , for notation simplicity in Fig. 5 we short-circuit the \mathcal{F}_{RO} syntax and we assume that SIM implements oracles H_1, H_2 . Without loss of generality, we assume that \mathcal{A} is a “dummy” adversary who merely passes all messages between \mathcal{Z} and SIM , hence we will treat \mathcal{A} as just an interface of \mathcal{Z} . For brevity we also denote $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ as \mathcal{F} , and we omit the (fixed) session identifier sid from all messages. Also, the simulator assumes that a unique party S for which this \mathcal{F} instance is initialized is honest, and that its identity “ S ” encoded as a bitstring is different from any pair $(\delta, z) \in \mathbb{G}^2$.

For a fixed environment \mathcal{Z} , let q_{H_1}, q_{H_2} be the number of \mathcal{A} ’s queries to resp. H_1 and H_2 hash functions, and let q_C, q_S be the number of \mathcal{Z} ’s invocations of resp. client and server OPRF instances, via resp. queries EVAL sent to some C and query SNDRCOMplete sent to S .

The simulator. The simulator SIM , shown in Fig. 5, follows a similar simulation strategy to the one used to show that exponential blinding protocol realizes UC OPRF notions of [12, 13, 17]. At initialization, the simulator picks a random key k on behalf of server S . If SIM receives SNDRCOMplete from \mathcal{F} , i.e. server S wants to complete an OPRF instance, and SIM receives message a with matching ssid from adversary \mathcal{A} playing a client, SIM replies as the real-world S would, i.e. with $(b, z) = (a^k, g^k)$. Responding to \mathcal{A} playing a server is more complex. The simulator prepares for this by embedding discrete-logarithm trapdoors in H_1 outputs and in messages a formed on behalf of honest clients. Namely, for each x , SIM defines $H_1(x)$ as $h_x = g^u$ for random u , and it forms each message a on behalf of some honest client as $a = g^w$ for random w . The discrete-logarithm trapdoor $u = \text{DL}(g, a)$ enables SIM to compute, given response (b, z) sent by \mathcal{A} on behalf of some server, the function index $i = (\delta, z)$ for which a real-life honest client would effectively compute its output as $y = F_{(\delta, z)}(x)$ for $F_{(\delta, z)}$ defined as in eq. (2). This is done by setting $\delta = b/z^w$ because then $\delta = b/a^k$ for $k = \text{DL}(g, z)$. (See *Is multiplicative blinding secure?* in Section 1 for why the client effectively evaluates $F_{(\delta, z)}$ for $\delta = b/a^k$.) If \mathcal{A} responds as the honest server S (or forwards S ’s response), SIM detects it because then $\delta = 1$, in which case SIM sets the function index to the “honest S function”, $i \leftarrow \text{S}$.

Finally, SIM checks if $i = (\delta, z)$ is in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} , a sequence of function indices which SIM has previously identified, and if $i \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$, i.e. if it is a new function, SIM uses the trapdoors it embedded in H_1 outputs to detect if $F_i(x) = F_j(x)$

<p>Initialization: Pick $k \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ //SIM picks S's key//, set T_{H_1} as an empty table, set functions H_1, H_2 as undefined on all arguments, and set $\mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}} \leftarrow [\text{S}]$ //\mathcal{N}_{SIM} is the list of identified function indices//.</p> <p>Server Compromise: On (COMPROMISE, S) from \mathcal{A}, send (COMPROMISE, S) to \mathcal{F} and reveal k to \mathcal{A}.</p> <p>Hash query to H_1: On \mathcal{A}'s fresh query x to H_1, pick $u \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{0\}$, define $h_x \triangleq g^u$, set $H_1(x) \leftarrow h_x$, and add (x, u, h_x) to table T_{H_1}. //T_{H_1} records $h_x = H_1(x)$ and the discrete-logarithm trapdoor $u = \text{DL}(g, h_x)$//</p> <p>Online Evaluation:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. On (EVAL, ssid, C, S') from \mathcal{F}, pick $w \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{Z}_q$, record (C, ssid, w), send (ssid, a) for $a \leftarrow g^w$ to \mathcal{A}, and send $\text{prfx} = a$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$. (Abort if $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ rejects it.) 2. On (SNDRCOMPLETE, ssid', S) from \mathcal{F} and message (ssid, a') from \mathcal{A} s.t. $a' \in \mathbb{G}$, send ssid and $(b', z^*) = ((a')^k, g^k)$ to \mathcal{A} and $\text{prfx}' = a'$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$. 3. On message (ssid, b, z) to C from \mathcal{A} s.t. $b, z \in \mathbb{G}$, retrieve record (C, ssid, w) (ignore the message if there is no such record) and do: //C should output $F_{(\delta, z)}(x)$ for $\delta = b/a^{\text{DL}(g, z)} = b/z^w$// <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Set $\delta \leftarrow b/z^w$, $i \leftarrow (\delta, z)$, $L \leftarrow []$; (2) If $i = (1, g^k)$ //A lets C evaluate on F_S// then (re)set $i \leftarrow S$; (3) If $i \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ then for each $(x', u, h_{x'}) \in T_{H_1}$ and $(\delta', z') \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ do: If $\delta' \cdot (z')^u = \delta \cdot z^u$ then add (j, x') for $j = (\delta', z')$ to L; //correlation on x' between F_i and F_j for $j = (\delta', z')$// If $(h_{x'})^k = \delta \cdot z^u$ then add (S, x') to L; //correlation on x' with F_S// (4) Send (RCVCOMPLETE, ssid, C, i, L) to \mathcal{F}, and append i to \mathcal{N}_{SIM} if $i \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$. <p>Hash query to H_2: On \mathcal{A}'s fresh query (x, v) to H_2, do:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. If $(x, u, h_x) \in T_{H_1}$ and $v = (h_x)^k$ //A evaluates $F_S(x)$// then do: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – If S is compromised, send (OFFLINEEVAL, S, x, \perp) to \mathcal{F}; on \mathcal{F}'s response (OFFLINEEVAL, y), set $H_2(x, v) \leftarrow y$; – Otherwise send (EVAL, ssid, S, x) and then (RCVCOMPLETE, ssid, SIM, S, \perp) to \mathcal{F} for a fresh ssid; if \mathcal{F} replies (EVAL, ssid, y) then set $H_2(x, v) \leftarrow y$, otherwise output HALT and abort. 2. If $(x, u, h_x) \in T_{H_1}$ and $v \neq (h_x)^k$ then for the first $(\delta, z) \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ s.t. $v = \delta \cdot z^u$ //A evaluates $F_{(\delta, z)}(x)$// send (OFFLINEEVAL, $i = (\delta, z), x, \perp$) to \mathcal{F}; on \mathcal{F}'s response (OFFLINEEVAL, y), set $H_2(x, v) \leftarrow y$. 3. If $H_2(x, v)$ remains undefined set $i = (v, 1)$ and: //A evaluates $F_{(v, 1)}(x)$// <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) If $i \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ then for each $(x', u, h_{x'}) \in T_{H_1}$ and $(\delta', z') \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ do: If $\delta' \cdot (z')^u = v$ then add (j, x') for $j = (\delta', z')$ to L; If $(h_{x'})^k = v$ then add (S, x') to L; (2) Send (OFFLINEEVAL, i, x, L) to \mathcal{F}; on \mathcal{F}'s response (OFFLINEEVAL, y), set $H_2(x, v) \leftarrow y$, and append i to \mathcal{N}_{SIM} if $i \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$.

Fig. 5. Simulator SIM for Protocol Mult-2HashDH //with comments inline//

for any x queried to H_1 (without such query \mathcal{A} cannot establish a correlation on x except for negligible probability) and any previously seen function index $j \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ or $j = \text{S}$. The first condition holds if $\delta' \cdot (h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,z')} = \delta \cdot (h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,z)}$ for $i = (\delta, z)$ and $j = (\delta', z')$ while the second one holds if $(h_x)^k = \delta \cdot (h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,z)}$. The simulator cannot compute $\text{DL}(g, z)$ for an adversarial public key z , but the trapdoor in the hash function output $H_1(x) = h_x = g^u$ allows for computing $(h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,z)}$ as z^u .

There is a further complication in the simulator's code, in responding to \mathcal{A} 's local H_2 queries (x, v) . Such calls can represent either (I) an offline PRF evaluation on argument x of function $F_{(\delta,z)}$ s.t. $v = \delta \cdot (h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,z)}$, where $(\delta, z) \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$, or, if S is compromised (or corrupted), for $(\delta, z) = (1, g^k)$; or (II) in case $v = (h_x)^k$ and S is not compromised, they can represent a finalization of the computation of $F_{\text{S}}(x)$ by a malicious client in the online OPRF instance. Case (I) is treated similarly as the detection of the correlations explained above: SIM searches for index $i = (\delta, z)$ in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} s.t. $v = \delta \cdot (h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,z)} = \delta \cdot z^u$ where $H_1(x) = h_x = g^u$, in which case this is interpreted as evaluation of F_i and SIM sets $H_2(x, v)$ to the value of $F_i(x)$ which the functionality defines in response to the offline evaluation call $(\text{OFFLINEEVAL}, i, x, \cdot)$. If S is compromised then the simulator does this also for $i = \text{S}$ if $v = (h_x)^k$. However, in Case (II), i.e. if $v = (h_x)^k$ but S is not compromised, such query could come from \mathcal{A} 's post-processing of an online OPRF evaluation, hence SIM in this case sends $(\text{EVAL}, \text{ssid}, \text{S}, x)$ and $(\text{RCVCOMPLETE}, \text{ssid}, \text{SIM}, \text{S}, \perp)$ to \mathcal{F} . If \mathcal{F} allows this call to evaluate successfully, i.e. if $\text{tx} > 0$, then \mathcal{F} return $y = F_{\text{S}}(x)$ and SIM defines $H_2(x, v) \leftarrow y$. Otherwise \mathcal{F} will ignore this RCVCOMPLETE call, in which case SIM outputs HALT and aborts, which the environment will detect as a simulation failure. Indeed, this case corresponds to \mathcal{A} evaluating function F_{S} on more arguments than the number of OPRF instances performed by S , i.e. the number of SNDRCOMPLETE calls from an ideal-world S to \mathcal{F} .

Finally, SIM must carefully handle $H_2(x, v)$ queries which are *not* recognized as evaluations of $F_i(x)$ for any $i \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}} \cup \{\text{S}\}$, because they can correspond to evaluating $F_{(\delta,z)}(x)$ for index (δ, z) which \mathcal{A} will reveal in the future. SIM picks the simplest pair (δ, z) s.t. $\delta \cdot (h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,z)} = v$, namely $(\delta, z) = (v, 1)$. If any future index $(\delta, z) \neq (v, 1)$ defined in a subsequent OPRF evaluation satisfies $\delta \cdot (h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,z)} = v$, this will be detected by SIM as a correlation between $F_{(\delta,z)}$ and $F_{(v,1)}$. Note that SIM must process $H_2(x, v)$ query as evaluation of $F_{(v,1)}(x)$ even if $H_1(x)$ is undefined, because regardless of the value of $h_x = H_1(x)$ it will hold that $F_{(v,1)}(x) = H_2(x, v)$, because $v \cdot (h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,1)} = v \cdot (h_x)^0 = v$. Indeed, an adversary can first query $H_2(x, v)$ for some (x, v) , then compute $h_x = H_1(x)$, and then input (δ, z) into an OPRF instance for $\delta = v / (h_x)^{\text{DL}(g,z)}$, which corresponds to oblivious evaluation of $F_{(\delta,z)}$, which is correlated with $F_{(v,1)}$ on argument x .

Sequence of games. Our proof uses the standard sequence of games method, starting from the interaction of \mathcal{Z} (and “dummy” adversary \mathcal{A}) with the real-world protocol, and ending with the ideal world, in which \mathcal{Z} instead interacts with the simulator SIM and functionality \mathcal{F} . We fix an arbitrary efficient environment \mathcal{Z} which without loss of generality outputs a single bit,

we use \mathbf{G}_i to denote the event that \mathcal{Z} outputs 1 when interacting with GAME i , and for each two adjacent games, GAME i and GAME $i+1$, we argue that these games are indistinguishable to \mathcal{Z} , i.e. that there is a negligible difference between the probabilities of events \mathbf{G}_i and \mathbf{G}_{i+1} , which implies that \mathcal{Z} 's advantage in distinguishing between the real world and the ideal world is also negligible. Let q_{H_1}, q_{H_2} be the total number of resp. H_1, H_2 queries made in the security game with \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{Z} . Let q_C and q_S and q'_S be the number of resp. C and S sessions and S offline PRF evaluations started by \mathcal{Z} via resp. the EVAL, SNDRCOMPLETE, and (OFFLINEEVAL, S, \cdot, \cdot) commands. Let $\epsilon_{\text{OMDH}}(\mathbb{G}, N, Q)$ be the maximum advantage of any algorithm with computational resources comparable to \mathcal{Z} against the (N, Q) -Gap⁺-OMDH problem in \mathbb{G} .

GAME 1: (*Real world, except for discrete-logarithm trapdoors in H_1 outputs*) This is the real-world interaction, shown in Fig. 6, i.e. the interaction of environment \mathcal{Z} and its subroutine \mathcal{A} with honest entities C and S executing protocol Mult-2HashDH of Fig. 4. We assume that the interaction starts with server initialization, triggered by INIT command from \mathcal{Z} to S. We denote the public key of server S as $z^* = g^k$. For visual clarity we omit the fixed ssid tag and the variable ssid tags from all messages in Fig. 6. We assume that when functions H_1, H_2 are executed by C1, C2, and S2, these hash function calls are serviced as described in the lower-half of Fig. 6. Queries $H_2(x, v)$ are implemented as in the real world except that the game records tuples $(x, v, H_2(x, v))$ in table T_{H_2} . However, queries $H_1(x)$ are implemented with trapdoors embedded in values $h_x = H_1(x)$ by setting $h_x = g^{u_x}$ for random $u_x \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and recording (x, u_x, h_x) in table T_{H_1} .




Fig. 6. GAME 1: Interaction of \mathcal{Z}/\mathcal{A} with Mult-2HashDH protocol.

GAME 2: (*Abort on hash H_1 collisions*) Abort if the security game ever encounters a collision in H_1 , i.e. if for some argument x queried either by \mathcal{A} or by the security game in oracles C1 and S2 (see Fig. 6), oracle H_1 picks u s.t. tuple (x', u, g^u) for some $x' \neq x$ is already in T_{H_1} . Clearly

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_2] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_1]| \leq \frac{(q_{H_1})^2}{q}$$

GAME 3: (*Making C's message input-oblivious*) We change how oracle C1 generates message a so that it is generated obliviously of input x . Namely, instead of computing $a = H_1(x) \cdot g^r = g^{u_x+r}$ for $r \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{Z}_q$, oracle C1 will now generate $a = g^w$ for $w \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{Z}_q$. The input x for this session ssid will be then passed to oracle C2, which (1) queries H_1 on x to retrieve (or create) tuple (x, u_x, g^{u_x}) from T_{H_1} , and (2) outputs $y = H_2(x, v)$ for $v = b \cdot z^{u_x-w}$. Note that for every x , and hence every u_x , value $w = (u_x + r) \bmod q$ is random in \mathbb{Z}_q if r random in \mathbb{Z}_q , hence this modification does not change the distribution of values a output by C1. Moreover, if $w = (u_x + r) \bmod q$ then $z^{-r} = z^{u_x-w}$, thus C2's output is the same as in GAME 2, hence GAME 3 and GAME 2 are externally identical.

GAME 4: (*Defining adversarial functions*) We make a notational change in oracle C2, so that it outputs $y = H_2(x, v)$ for $v = \delta \cdot z^{u_x}$ where $\delta = b/z^w$. Since this is a merely notational difference, GAME 4 and GAME 3 are identical.

Note that this change makes oracles C1/C2 implement the following process: C1's message $a = g^w$ together with \mathcal{A} 's response (b, z) define (δ, z) s.t. $\delta = b/z^w$, which defines a function which C2 evaluates on \mathcal{Z} 's input x as $F_{(\delta, z)}$ for

$$F_{(\delta, z)}(x) \triangleq H_2(x, \delta \cdot z^{u_x}) \quad \text{where } u_x \triangleq \text{DL}(g, H_1(x)) \quad (5)$$

Note that equation (5) is equivalent to equation (2) where $F_{(\delta, z)}(x) = H_2(x, \delta \cdot (H_1(x))^k)$ for k s.t. $z = g^k$. For notational convenience we define also a ‘‘helper’’ function family $f_i : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}$ for $i \in \mathbb{G}^2$ s.t.

$$f_{(\delta, z)}(x) = \delta \cdot z^{u_x} \quad \text{where } u_x \triangleq \text{DL}(g, H_1(x)) \quad (6)$$

Note that $F_{(\delta, z)}(x) = H_2(x, f_{(\delta, z)}(x))$.

We will argue that pairs (δ, z) encountered in the security game can be thought of as indexes of random functions, including pair $(\delta, z) = (1, z^*)$ for $z^* = g^k$ which defines the ‘‘honest’’ random function of \mathbf{S} , except that the adversary can ‘‘program’’ a limited number of correlations in these functions, by setting $i = (\delta, g^k)$ and $j = (\delta', g^{k'})$ s.t. $\delta'/\delta = (h_x)^{k-k'}$, which implies that $F_i(x) = F_j(x)$. In the next few game changes we will show that these correlations are constrained as prescribed by functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$, i.e. that (1) each two functions can be ‘‘programmed’’ to have equal output only for a single argument, (2) that if an adversarial function F_i is correlated on some x with function $F_{\mathbf{S}}$ of the honest server \mathbf{S} then evaluating $F_i(x)$ is treated the same as $F_{\mathbf{S}}(x)$, and in particular requires that $\text{tx} > 0$, and (3) that otherwise all

adversarial functions are indistinguishable from independent random functions.

GAME 5: (*Building correlation graph*) The security game will build a graph of correlations between functions $F_{(\delta,z)}$ occurring in the game. In particular the game will maintain sequence \mathcal{N}_{SIM} and sets X_{H_1}, \mathcal{E} , all initially empty:

1. Set X_{H_1} contains all inputs x queried to H_1 , by either \mathcal{A} , C2, or S2.
2. Set \mathcal{N}_{SIM} contains all (δ, z) function indexes, including (1) the honest server function index $(1, z^*)$, (2) each (δ, z) defined by \mathcal{A} 's interaction with oracles C1/C2, as described in GAME 4, and (3) $(\delta, z) = (v, 1)$ for every direct query (x, v) of \mathcal{A} to H_2 .
3. Set \mathcal{E} contains *labeled edges* between indexes in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} , maintained as follows:
 - (1) When function index $i = (\beta, z) \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ is specified in C1/C2 then for each $j = (\delta', z')$ in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} and $x' \in X_{H_1}$, test if $f_j(x') = f_i(x')$, and if so then add (i, j, x') , i.e. an edge (i, j) with label x' , to \mathcal{E} .
 - (2) If H_2 is queried on new (x, v) by \mathcal{A} or by oracles C2 or S2 for $(v, 1) \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ then do step (1) above for $i = (v, 1)$. (Note that $f_{(v,1)}(x') = v$ for all x' .)

Since these are only notational changes GAME 5 and GAME 4 are identical.

GAME 6: (*Discarding double links*) We add an abort if there are two distinct values x, x' in X_{H_1} and two distinct function indexes $i = (\delta, z)$ and $j = (\delta', z')$ in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} s.t. $f_i(x) = f_j(x)$ and $f_i(x') = f_j(x')$. These conditions imply respectively that $\delta'/\delta = (z/z')^{u_x}$ and $\delta'/\delta = (z/z')^{u_{x'}}$. Since H_1 collisions are discarded beginning in GAME 2, it follows that $u_{x'} \neq u_x$, which implies that $(\delta, z) = (\delta', z')$, i.e. this abort cannot happen. Consequently, GAME 6 and GAME 5 are identical.

GAME 7: (*Discarding future correlations*) We add an abort in H_1 processing if new query $x \notin X_{H_1}$ samples $h_x = H_1(x)$ s.t. there exists two distinct function indexes $i, j \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ s.t. $f_i(x) = f_j(x)$. Note that in this case there would be no edge (i, j, x) in \mathcal{E} , and that this is *the only* case in which $f_i(x) = f_j(x)$ but $(i, j, x) \notin \mathcal{E}$. However if query x to H_1 is made after defining i, j then $h_x = H_1(x)$ is independent of i, j , in which case $\Pr[f_i(x) = f_j(x)] = 1/q$, because this equation holds only for a single value h_x s.t. $u_x = \text{DL}(g, h_x) = \text{DL}((z_i/z_j), (\delta_j/\delta_i))$. If there are q_C instances of C2 and q_{H_2} queries to H_2 then there can be at most q_C indexes (δ, z) in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} s.t. $z \neq 1$ and at most q_{H_2} indexes (δ, z) s.t. $z = 1$. Since condition $f_i(x) = f_j(x)$ cannot be met if $i = (v, 1)$ and $j = (v', 1)$ for $v \neq v'$, each new query x to H_1 causes an abort only if u_x falls in the solution set of at most $q_C \cdot (q_{H_2} + q_C)$ equations, which implies that

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_7] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_6]| \leq \frac{q_{H_1} \cdot q_C \cdot (q_{H_2} + q_C)}{q}$$

GAME 8: (*Implementing H_2 using correlated random functions*) We replace hash function H_2 using an oracle \mathcal{R} that maintains a random function family, in which the adversary can “program” correlations as follows:

- When \mathcal{R} starts it initializes a random function $R : \{0, 1\}^* \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$ and an index sequence $\mathcal{I} \leftarrow [(1, z^*)]$;
- On query $\text{CORRELATE}(i, L)$, \mathcal{R} rejects if $i \notin \mathcal{I}$ or list L contains (j, x) and (j', x') s.t. $j = j'$ and $x \neq x'$. Otherwise it appends i to \mathcal{I} , and for each $(j, x) \in L$ it re-defines $R(i, x) \leftarrow R(j, x)$;
- On query $\text{EVAL}(i, x)$, \mathcal{R} replies $R(i, x)$ if $i \in \mathcal{I}$, else ignores this query.

We use oracle \mathcal{R} to change the implementation of H_2 function called by oracles S2, C2, or the direct calls to H_2 :

1. When \mathcal{A} calls S2 on x : Assign $H_2(x, f_i(x)) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}.\text{EVAL}(i, x)$ for $i = (1, z^*)$.
2. When oracle C2 calls H_2 on $(x, f_i(x))$ for some $i = (\delta, z)$:
 - (a) if $i \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ then send $\text{CORRELATE}(i, L)$ to \mathcal{R} where L consists of all tuples (j, x') s.t. $f_i(x') = f_j(x')$ for some $j \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ and $x' \in X_{H_1}$;
 - (b) set $H_2(x, f_i(x)) \leftarrow \mathcal{R}.\text{EVAL}(i, x)$.
3. When \mathcal{A} calls H_2 on (x, v) : Service it as in Step 2 but use $i = (v, 1)$.

To see the correspondence between GAME 8 and GAME 7, observe that starting from GAME 5 function H_2 is evaluated only on pairs of the form $(x, f_i(x))$ for some $i \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$. Define $\mathcal{R}(i, x)$ as $H_2(x, f_i(x))$. Function \mathcal{R} is not random even if H_2 is, because we have that $\mathcal{R}(i, x) = \mathcal{R}(j, x)$ for any i, j, x s.t. $f_i(x) = f_j(x)$. However, from GAME 7 this equation can hold, for any i, x s.t. H_2 is queried on $(x, f_i(x))$, only if i is a new index, $i = (\delta, z)$ or $i = (v, 1)$, appended to \mathcal{N}_{SIM} in a query to oracles resp. C1/C2 and H_2 , for values j, x s.t. $j \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ and $x \in X_{H_1}$ at the time this query is made. Note that list L sent for a new function f_i to \mathcal{R} in GAME 8 by oracles C1/C2 and H_2 consists exactly of all such pairs (j, x) , hence it follows that GAME 8 and GAME 7 are identical.

GAME 9: (*Walking back aborts in H_1*) We remove the aborts in H_1 introduced in GAME 2 and GAME 7, i.e. we no longer abort if (1) the same u_X was chosen before on some previous query to H_1 , or (2) if there are two function indices $i = (z, \delta)$ and $j = (z', \delta')$ in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} s.t. $f_i(x) = f_j(x)$, i.e. $\delta \cdot z^{u_x} = \delta' \cdot (z')^{u_x}$. By the same arguments used above where these games are introduced, these two changes can be observed with probability at most $(q_{H_1}^2)/q$ and $(q_{H_1} \cdot q_C \cdot (q_{H_2} + q_C))/q$, respectively, which implies that

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_9] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_8]| \leq \frac{q_{H_1}^2 + q_{H_1} \cdot q_C \cdot (q_{H_2} + q_C)}{q}$$

Security game review. In Fig. 7 we put together all the changes made so far and review how the game oracles operate in GAME 9.

GAME 10: (*Identifying existing functions in H_2 processing*) In GAME 9 a fresh query (x, v) to H_2 is answered as $R(i, x)$ for $i = (v, 1)$, and if $(v, 1) \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ then function $R((v, 1), \cdot)$ is created and correlated with all previous functions $\{R(i, \cdot)\}_{i \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}}$ by the rule that $R((v, 1), x') \leftarrow R(i, x')$ for each $x' \in X_{H_1}$ and $i \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ s.t. $f_i(x') = v$. In GAME 10 we modify the code of oracle H_2 so that when it gets a fresh query (x, v) s.t. $x \in X_{H_1}$ it first checks if

$$v = f_i(x) \text{ for any index } i \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}} \quad (7)$$




Fig. 7. Interaction defined by GAME 9.

(Note that if $x \in X_{H_1}$ the game can evaluate $f_{(\delta, z)}(x) = \delta \cdot z^{u_x}$ for any δ, z .) If $v = f_i(x)$ for some $i \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ then GAME 10 takes *the first* index i in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} s.t. $v = f_i(x)$ holds, replies $R(i, x)$, and does not create a new function $R((v, 1), \cdot)$ even if $(v, 1) \notin \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$. (Note that this condition can hold for several indexes i in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} , and indeed it will hold for all indexes of functions which are correlated on argument x . Note also that the index $i = (1, z^*)$ of the “honest server function” occurs as the first in \mathcal{N}_{SIM} .) If $x \notin X_{H_1}$ or for all $i \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$ $v \neq f_i(x)$ then the processing is as before, i.e. the game processes this query as a call to $R((v, 1), x)$. We show the modification done by GAME 10 in Figure 8.




Fig. 8. GAME 10: modification in Fig. 7

Note that this modification doesn't change the value returned by $H_2(x, v)$: If condition (7) holds then either way $H_2(x, v) = R(i, x)$. The only other change this modification causes is that if (7) holds then function $R((v, 1), \cdot)$ is not created. However, this does not affect any future interactions with the random function R . Let X_{H_1} and \mathcal{N}_{SIM} are the values of these variables at the time $R((v, 1), \cdot)$ is created in GAME 9. Consider that at some subsequent step

an evaluation call, either C2 or H_2 , creates a new function $R(i, \cdot)$ s.t. $f_i(x) = f_{(v,1)}(x)$ for some $x \in X'_{H_1}$ where X'_{H_1} and $\mathcal{N}'_{\text{SIM}}$ denote the new values of these variables. Assume also that until this point there was no other opportunity to create $\mathcal{R}((v,1), \cdot)$ in GAME 10, i.e. $i = (v,1)$ was not used in oracle C2, and $H_2(x', v)$ was not queried on any x' s.t. $f_i(x') \neq v$ for some $i \in \mathcal{N}'_{\text{SIM}}$. (This is the case when the modification of GAME 10 can affect the security experiment.) There are two cases to consider: (1) If $x \in X_{H_1}$ and $f_{(v,1)}(x) = f_j(x)$ for some $j \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$, then whether or not $R((v,1), \cdot)$ is created in both games it holds that $R(i, x) = R(j, x)$; (2) If $x \notin X_{H_1}$, or $x \in X_{H_1}$ but $f_{(v,1)}(x) \neq f_j(x)$ for any $j \in \mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}}$, then $R((v,1), x)$ is uncorrelated with previous functions, but since $R((v,1), x)$ is not used before, it does not matter if $R(i, x)$ is chosen at random or assigned as $R(i, x) \leftarrow R((v,1), x)$. It follows that GAME 10 and GAME 9 are identical.

GAME 11: (*Ideal-world interaction*) In Figure 9 we show the ideal-world game, denoted GAME 11, defined by the interaction of simulator SIM of Figure 5 and functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ of Figure 3. We use the same notation used for GAME 9 for the correlated random functions, i.e. we define $F_S(x) = R((1, z^*), x)$ and for all $i \neq S$ we define $F_i(x) = R(i, x)$. Also, we rename oracles which the game implements as in GAME 9: S1 implements \mathcal{Z} 's query SDRCOMPLETE to S, S2 implements \mathcal{Z} 's query OFFLINEEVAL to S, C1 implements \mathcal{Z} 's query EVAL to C, and C2 responds to \mathcal{A} 's message (b, z) to C.

Figure 9 simplifies the ideal-world game by not accounting for function correlations using edge set \mathcal{E} , as done by $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$, and ignoring some of the conditional clauses in the code of simulator SIM. However, we argue that these overlooked clauses are never triggered. Assume that whenever sub-procedure PROCESS(i) programs a correlation $R(i, x) \leftarrow R(j, x)$ the game adds set (i, j, x) to \mathcal{E} . The conditional clauses missing from GAME 11 figure are in clauses (2) and (3) in H_2 processing. In clause (2), SIM ignores this call, and the game does not send $R(i, x)$ to \mathcal{A} , if S was not compromised and either $i = (1, g^k)$ or $(i, (1, g^k), x) \in \mathcal{E}$. However, condition $i = (1, g^k)$ implies that $v = (g^k)^{u_x}$, which is excluded by case (2). Likewise, condition $(i, (1, g^k), x) \in \mathcal{E}$ implies that $f_i(x) = f_{(1, g^k)}(x) = (g^k)^{u_x}$, which would trigger case (1) and is excluded in case (2). In clause (3) SIM would ignore this call and not send $R(i, x)$ to \mathcal{A} under the same conditions, i.e. if S was not compromised and either $i = (1, g^k)$ or $(i, (1, g^k), x) \in \mathcal{E}$. Case $i = (v, 1) = (1, g^k)$ implies $k = 0$, which is excluded by sampling k in $\mathbb{Z}_q^* = \mathbb{Z}_q \setminus \{0\}$, and case $(i, (1, g^k), x) \in \mathcal{E}$ implies that $x \in X_{H_1}$ and $f_i(x) = f_{(1, g^k)}(x)$, which would trigger clause (1).

Finally, in Figure 9 in two clauses when $\text{tx} = 0$, in C2 and H_2 case (1), we wrote that the game *aborts*. In the actual ideal-world game, the first case corresponds to functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ dropping the (RCVCOMPLETE, ..., C, ...) call from SIM, and not sending $R(i, x)$ to C, and thus to \mathcal{Z} . The second case corresponds to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ not responding with $R(i, x)$ to SIM's call (RCVCOMPLETE, ..., SIM, ...), in which case SIM aborts. The difference is in the first case, but it is a syntactical difference because we can equate \mathcal{Z} 's not




Fig. 9. GAME 11: Interaction of \mathcal{Z}/\mathcal{A} with the ideal-world execution

receiving any output from C in response to $(\text{RCVCOMPLETE}, \dots, \text{C}, \dots)$, or any output from H_2 call, with the game returning an abort symbol.

The differences between GAME 10 and GAME 11, apart of the trivial difference of constraining key k s.t. $k \neq 0$ in GAME 11, consist of the following:

1. S1 either increments tx or changes ok? in some C1-record from 0 to 1.
2. C2 decrements tx if S not compromised, $\text{ok?} = 0$, $i = (1, g^k)$, and $\text{tx} > 0$.
3. C2 aborts the game if S not compromised, $\text{ok?} = 0$, $i = (1, g^k)$, and $\text{tx} = 0$.
4. H_2 , clause 1, decrements tx if S not compromised, $i = (1, g^k)$, and $\text{tx} > 0$
5. H_2 , clause 1, aborts the game if S not compromised, $i = (1, g^k)$, and $\text{tx} = 0$.

Let E be the event that game aborts either in C2 or H_2 , denoted resp. E_{C_2} and E_{H_2} . Note that unless event E happens GAME 10 and GAME 11 are identical (except for $1/q$ probability that $k = 0$ in GAME 10), and that event E can happen only if S is not compromised, thus the two games diverge only before S compromise. Note that E_{C_2} requires that $i = (1, g^k)$, i.e. that \mathcal{A} sends (b, z) to C2 s.t. $z = g^k$ and $b = z^w = g^{kw} = a^k$. Call such C2 query *k-computed*. Note that E_{H_2} requires that $i = (1, g^k)$, i.e. that \mathcal{A} queries H_2 on (x, v) for $v = (h_x)^k$. Call such H_2 query *k-computed* as well. Since counter tx is decremented, or C-record

$(x, w, a, 1)$ is “processed” only on such k -computed C2 and H_2 queries, and tx is incremented or record $(x, w, a, 1)$ is created with each query to S1, hence E happens only if \mathcal{A} triggers more k -computed C2/ H_2 queries than S1 queries.

Correlations monitored only at evaluation. Before we show that event E can happen with at most negligible probability, we need to change the way GAME 10 and GAME 11 build correlations in function R . Instead of setting them at the time a new function is added, in the modified games the correlations are checked only when a function is evaluated, i.e. the game keeps track of each referenced value of function R , i.e. each triple (δ', z', x') s.t. $R((\delta', z'), x')$ was queried either in S2, C2, or H_2 . When the game queries a new point, $R(i, x)$ for $i = (\delta, z)$, the game looks for the first record (δ, z', x') on the list of queries s.t. $x' = x$ and $f_{(\delta', z')}(x) = f_{(\delta, z)}(x)$, i.e. $\delta'(z')^{u_x} = \delta(z)^{u_x}$. If so, the game first assigns $R(i, x) \leftarrow R(i', x)$ for $i = (\delta, z)$ and $i' = (\delta', z')$ and only then replies $R(i, x)$. It is easy to see that this is an equivalent process of keeping correlations because indeed the only information about these functions $R(i, \cdot)$ which the game reveals is through evaluated points, so it makes no difference if we postpone correlating values of $R(i, x)$ with $R(i', x)$ until $R(i, x)$ is actually queried.

We show a reduction to the Gap^+ -OMDH assumption in the case E happens in GAME 10. Reduction \mathcal{R} takes the Gap^+ -OMDH challenge $(g, z^*, h_1, \dots, h_N)$ where $N = (q_{H_1} + q_C)$, and responds to \mathcal{A} 's queries as follows:

1. Initialize $\mathcal{N}_{\text{SIM}} \leftarrow [(1, z^*)]$ and $\mathcal{S} \leftarrow []$.
2. Embed OMDH challenges into H_1 and C1 outputs, i.e. assign each $H_1(x)$ output, and each value a sent by C1, to a unique OMDH challenge h_i .
3. On message a to S1, use oracle $(\cdot)^k$ to send back $b = a^k$ and $z = z^*$.
4. On query x to S2, set $(a, b, z) \leftarrow (1, 1, z^*)$, run $\text{CORRELATE}((a, b, z), x)$, and output $R((a, b, z), x)$.
5. On message (b, z) to C2, recovers C1 input x and output a , run $\text{CORRELATE}((a, b, z), x)$, and output $R((a, b, z), x)$.
6. On query (x, v) to H_2 , set $(a, b, z) \leftarrow (1, v, 1)$, run $\text{CORRELATE}((a, b, z), x)$, and output $R((a, b, z), x)$.
7. If \mathcal{A} queries S-Compromise, \mathcal{R} aborts.
8. $\text{CORRELATE}((a, b, z), x)$: Return if $(a, b, z, x) \in \mathcal{S}$. Otherwise, set $h_x \leftarrow H_1(x)$, and if $\exists (a', b', z', x)$ in \mathcal{S} s.t.

$$b \cdot \text{CDH}_g(z, h_x/a) = b' \cdot \text{CDH}_g(z', h_x/a') \quad (8)$$

then set $R((a, b, z), x) \leftarrow R((a', b', z'), x)$. Otherwise add (a, b, z, x) to \mathcal{S} .

Observe that \mathcal{R} can verify equation (8) using oracle DDH_g^+ . Secondly, observe that $b \cdot \text{CDH}_g(z, h_x/a)$ correctly evaluates $f_i(x)$ for the corresponding index i : In S2 we set $(a, b, z) = (1, 1, z^*)$, so $b \cdot \text{CDH}_g(z, h_x/a) = \text{CDH}_g(z^*, h_x) = (h_x)^k$ where $z^* = g^k$, as in GAME 10; In C2, in GAME 10 we compute $f_i(x) = f_{(\delta, z)}(x) = \delta \cdot (z)^{u_x} = \delta \cdot \text{CDH}(z, h_x)$, but since $\delta = b/z^w = b \cdot \text{CDH}(z, a^{-1})$ this implies that $f_i(x) = \delta \cdot \text{CDH}(z, h_x/a)$; In H_2 we set $(a, b, z) = (1, v, 1)$, so $b \cdot \text{CDH}_g(z, h_x/a) = v \cdot \text{CDH}_g(1, h_x) = v$, also as in GAME 10.

Therefore \mathcal{R} presents a view which is ideal to GAME 10 as long as S-Compromise is not queried. Therefore event E occurs in the interaction with \mathcal{R} with the same probability as in GAME 10. Let $Q = q_S$ be the number of S1 queries, hence the number of $(\cdot)^k$ oracle accesses by \mathcal{R} . Event E implies that the number of k -computed C2 queries and k -computed H_2 queries is larger than Q , i.e. at least $Q+1$. Note that a k -computed H_2 query is a pair (x, v) s.t. $v = (h_x)^k$, so each such query computes $(h_i)^k = \text{CDH}(h_i, z^*)$ on a unique OMDH challenge h_i . Likewise, a k -computed C2 query is a response $(b, z) = (a^k, g^k)$ to C1's message a , and since \mathcal{R} embeds a unique OMDH challenge h_i into each a , such query also computes $a^k = \text{CDH}(h_i, z^*)$ on a unique OMDH challenge h_i . Since \mathcal{R} can use DDH_g^+ oracle to implement DDH, and test whether any H_2 or C2 query is k -computed, \mathcal{R} will solve $Q + 1$ OMDH challenges if event E happens, which implies

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{11}] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{10}]| \leq \epsilon_{\text{OMDH}}(\mathbb{G}, q_{H_1}, q_S)$$

Summing up we conclude that the real-world and the ideal-world interactions are indistinguishable under the Gap-OMDH assumption.

5 Strong aPAKE Protocol Based on $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$

We show that the OPAQUE protocol of [17] remains secure as UC Strong aPAKE even if it is instantiated with the UC Correlated OPRF of Section 3 instead of UC OPRF of [13]. This implies that one can safely modify the OPAQUE protocol by replacing the *exponential* blinding in the Hashed Diffie-Hellman OPRF with the *multiplicative* blinding (as done in [24]), thus shaving off either 1 variable-base exponentiation from the client, or 2 such exponentiations if the protocol is routinely performed with the same server.

Technically, we show that the OPAQUE compiler construction of [17], which shows that $\text{OPRF} + \text{AKE} \rightarrow \text{saPAKE}$, can be used to construct UC saPAKE from any UC Correlated OPRF and any UC AKE which is adaptively secure and resilient to Key-Compromise Impersonation attack (AKE-KCI). We call this compiler OPAQUE+ and show it in Fig. 10. It is exactly the same as the OPAQUE compiler except that the OPRF functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ used in [18] is replaced with the Correlated OPRF functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$. We show that protocol OPAQUE+ realizes the UC saPAKE functionality.

The saPAKE and AKE-KCI functionalities. Protocol OPAQUE+ and its analysis build on two functionalities from of [18]: The (strong) aPAKE functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{saPAKE}}$ and the adaptively-secure UC AKE-KCI functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$. We refer to that paper for their detailed description and rationale. For completeness we present these functionalities in Appendix C. We note that AKE-KCI protocol can be instantiated, for example, by the 3-message version of the HMQV protocol, called HMQV-C in [22], or the 3-message SIGMA protocol [21] underlying the design of TLS 1.3.

Security of OPAQUE+. We now state the security of OPAQUE+ in Theorem 2. As in [17], we assume that the adversary \mathcal{A} always sends




Fig. 10. OPAQUE+: Strong aPAKE in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}})$ -Hybrid World

$(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid})$ aimed at $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ and $(\text{STEALPWDFILE}, \text{sid})$ aimed at \mathcal{S} simultaneously, since in the real world when the attacker compromises the server, the corresponding OPRF session is always compromised simultaneously.

Theorem 2. *If protocol Π realizes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$, then protocol OPAQUE+ in Fig. 10 realizes the strong aPAKE functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{saPAKE}}$ in the $(\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}, \mathcal{F}_{\text{RO}})$ -hybrid model.*

The security argument is very similar to that of OPAQUE in [17]; we briefly explain the differences. First of all, note that when the adversary acts as the client in Correlated OPRF, its power is exactly the same as the client in OPRF, hence for that case the security argument is the same in OPAQUE+ as in OPAQUE.

Secondly, an additional power which Correlated OPRF gives to the adversary is to make correlations between OPRF functions while acting as the server. Yet, this does not change the fact that for every function index i (no matter if $i = \mathcal{S}$ or i is an index created by the adversary) and every value $y \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$, with

overwhelming probability there is at most one argument x s.t. $y = F_i(x)$. In Correlated OPRF the adversary can find F_i with two arguments that form a collision in F_i if it finds (i_1, x_1) and (i_2, x_2) s.t. $F_{i_1}(x_1) = F_{i_2}(x_2)$ and then sets F_i to be correlated with F_{i_1} on x_1 and with F_{i_2} on x_2 . In OPRF the adversary must look for such collisions within each function separately, but in either case the probability of a collision is upper-bounded by $q^2/2^\ell$ where q is the number of F evaluations on all indices. Hence the ciphertext c^* sent from the adversary to an honest client together with index i^* of the random function F_{i^*} which the adversary makes that honest client compute on its password, together commit to a unique password guess pw^* such that $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}^*}(c^*) \neq \perp$ for $\text{rw}^* = F_{i^*}(\text{pw}^*)$.

Lastly, in the Correlated OPRF an adversarial function F_{i^*} is not guaranteed to be completely independent from the honest server’s function F_k for every $i^* \neq S$. Instead, the adversary can correlate F_{i^*} with F_k , although on only a single point x . This allows the adversary a potentially damaging behavior in which it forwards ciphertext $c^* = c$ from the honest server to the honest client and lets the honest client evaluate F_{i^*} on its password. In case both parties’ passwords are equal to x the client will compute $F_{i^*}(x) = F_k(x)$, and thus the two parties will establish a key if their shared passwords are equal to x , and fail to establish a key otherwise. This “conditional password test” could not be done in protocol OPAQUE, and yet it is not an attack on saPAKE, because it requires the adversary to guess the password; therefore, the simulator can (1) use a TESTABORT command to check if the client and server’s passwords match, and if so, it can then (2) use a TESTPWD command to check if the adversary’s password guess is correct. If both checks pass, the simulator can compromise both client’s and server’s sessions, and make these two sessions connect with the same session key; if either check fails, the simulator can force the client to abort.

We present the full proof of Theorem 2 in Appendix D.

6 Concrete OPAQUE+ Instantiation Using HMQV

Figure 11 shows a concrete instantiation of protocol OPAQUE+ of Figure 10, where the UC Correlated OPRF is instantiated with protocol Mult-2HashDH, and UC AKE is instantiated with HMQV [22]. Note that the protocol takes 3 flows (τ_s can be piggybacked with S’s earlier message), and 2 fixed-base (fb) and 2 variable-base (vb) (multi-base) exp’s for C and resp. 1fb and 2vb exp’s for S.

7 Insecure Applications of Multiplicative Blinding

As we noted in the introduction, the correlations allowed by Mult-2HashDH can be exploited in some applications for the benefit of a corrupt server. We illustrate this ability with several examples.

Consider a setting where a client C with input x interacts using Mult-2HashDH with a server S with key k to compute $y = F_k(x) = H_2(x, (h_x)^k)$ where h_x denotes $H_1(x)$. C then uses y for some task; for concreteness, think of x as a password and y as a key that allows C to

authenticate to some application. At some point S becomes corrupted and wants to check whether a given value x' equals the user's input x . Using correlations as described in the introduction, e.g., equation (3), S mounts the following attack: When C sends its blinded value $a = h_x g^r$, S chooses random k' , sets $z = g^{k'}$ and $b = (h_{x'})^{k-k'} a^{k'}$, and sends (b, z) to C , who computes the unblinded value $v = b(z)^{-r}$ and outputs $y' = H_2(x, v)$. It can be checked that $v = (h_x)^k$ if and only if $x' = x$.¹¹ If S can observe whether C recovered the correct value $y' = y$, e.g. whether it successfully authenticated using the recovered y' , then S learns whether C 's secret x equals S 's guess x' .




Fig. 11. Protocol OPAQUE+ (Fig. 10) with Mult-2HashDH and HMQV

¹¹ Observe that $v = bz^{-r} = (h_{x'})^{k-k'} (h_x g^r)^{k'} (g^{k'})^{-r} = h_{x'}^k (h_{x'}/h_x)^{k'}$, hence $v = (h_x)^k$ iff $h_x = h_{x'}$. Using the terminology of equation (2), C computes $y' = F_{(\delta, z)}(x)$ for $F_{(\delta, z)}$ which is *correlated* with F_k on x' , hence $y' = F_k(x)$ iff $x = x'$.

The Correlated OPRF functionality, which Mult-2HashDH realizes, assures that server S cannot test more than one guess x' per interaction, and while in some applications, like the PAKE protocol OPAQUE, this ability doesn't affect the application, e.g. because the application itself allows the attacker such on-line guess-and-test avenue, in other cases this suffices to break the application. Below we show a few application examples which are all secure with Exp-2HashDH, but not with Mult-2HashDH. In all examples the application doesn't expose the client to on-line attacks, and using Exp-2HashDH ensures that the implementation does not either, but using Mult-2HashDH adds this exposure and breaks the application.

OPAQUE with outsourced envelope. Recall that OPAQUE [17] combines an OPRF with an authenticated key-exchange (AKE) protocol as follows: At registration, the server and the user choose private-public AKE key pairs. The user then runs an OPRF with the server where the user's input is a password pw and the server's input is an OPRF key k . The output of the OPRF, learned only by the user, is a random key $\text{rw} = F_k(\text{pw})$, and the user uses rw to authenticate-encrypt her AKE private key and the server's public key. The ciphertext c that results from this encryption is stored by the server, together with the OPRF key k , the user's public AKE key, and the server's AKE key pair. At login, the user runs the OPRF with the server on input pw , learns rw , uses rw to decrypt its own private key and the server's public key encrypted in c , and uses these keys to run the AKE with the server. Only a user in possession of the registered password can successfully run the AKE.

However, consider a modification where the user stores ciphertext c at some other location than server S , e.g. a laptop or another server. In this case a malicious S , who holds only OPRF key k and the AKE keys, cannot stage either online or offline attacks on the user's password: Without ciphertext c , S cannot test candidate values $\text{rw} = F_k(\text{pw})$. However, this property is *not* ensured if OPRF is implemented with Mult-2HashDH. Indeed, using the strategy described above, a malicious S can test whether the user's password is equal to a chosen pw^* , by running login using function F_{k^*} which is correlated on argument pw^* with function F_k used in registration. If the user recovers its credentials and authenticates in that login, S learns that $\text{pw} = \text{pw}^*$. Crucially, this online attack opportunity for server S is not available using Exp-2HashDH.

Device-enhanced PAKE. [16, 26] presents a password protocol that uses an auxiliary device (typically a smartphone but can also be an online server) in the role of a password manager. When the user wishes to password-authenticate to a server S , it communicates with the device who holds key k for 2HashDH OPRF. The user's input to the OPRF is her password, and the OPRF result $\text{rw} = F_k(\text{pw})$ is used as the "randomized" password with service S . Using Exp-2HashDH, a corrupt device learns nothing about the user's password, but it can test a guess for the user's password at the cost of one online interaction with S per guess. However, using Mult-2HashDH, the corrupt device can validate a guess without interacting with S , by watching if the user's interaction with S succeeded, thus resulting in weaker security guarantees.

Threshold OPRF (including Threshold OPAQUE). A multi-server threshold implementation of Exp-2HashDH is presented in [14]. It ensures the security of the OPRF as long as no more than a threshold of servers are compromised. Such threshold OPRF can be used e.g. to construct Password-Protected Secret Sharing (PPSS) [2, 13], which in turn can implement Threshold PAKE. It is straightforward to see that the above correlation attacks apply to these constructions if Exp-2HashDH is replaced with Mult-2HashDH. They allow a single corrupted server to choose correlated values with which it can verify guesses for the client’s inputs. As an illustration, consider a 2-out-of-2 Threshold OPRF that computes h_x^k as $h_x^{k_1+k_2}$ using two servers S_1, S_2 with respective keys k_1, k_2 . Such a scheme should ensure that nothing can be learned about the input x without compromising both servers. However, a corrupted S_2 can check whether C ’s input x equals any guess x' by mounting the above attack using only key k_2 . If C reconstructs the correct y , then $x = x'$. This attack also applies to OPAQUE with a multi-server threshold implementation of Mult-2HashDH.

All these examples show that in order to use Mult-2HashDH in an application where an authenticated g^k is not available to the client, a dedicated proof of security (as the one we develop here for OPAQUE) is essential. Even in that case, one can consider this as “fragile evidence”, as eventual changes to the application may void the security proof. Thus a safer alternative is to use the scheme (4) presented in the introduction, which implements UC OPRF using both forms of blinding, and would be secure in all the above applications.

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A OPRF Implementation and Modeling Variants

This paper shows the subtle differences in the security properties between the exponential blinding and the multiplicative blinding in Hashed Diffie-Hellman OPRF implementations, and how these differences pertain to one particular application, a strong asymmetric PAKE protocol of [17]. However, it is instructive to see how OPRF applications can be influenced by other possible changes in the implementation of Hashed Diffie-Hellman OPRF, including changes in the underlying trust assumptions. In the introduction we discussed the specification of the OPRF as in equation (4). Here we examine other variants.

Other OPRF Implementations. We discuss some pros and cons of including the function argument x along the *Hashed Diffie-Hellman* value $v = (H_1(x))^k$ in the PRF output computation via the outer hash function H_2 . Namely, we ask whether either the exponential or multiplicative blinding could be safely used with the PRF defined as either of the following two variants:

$$F_k(x) = H_2(H_1(x)^k) \tag{9}$$

$$F_k(x) = H_2(z, H_1(x)^k) \text{ where } z = g^k \tag{10}$$

One application for using either of these (O)PRF proposals is an efficient 3-party protocol for secure computation of functionality $\Pi : [k, x, \perp] \rightarrow [\perp, \perp, F_k(x)]$, i.e. where party A inputs a PRF key k , party B inputs an argument x , and party C outputs $y = F_k(x)$ without learning either k or x . Using F_k defined as in eq. (9) this could be implemented with exponential blinding: B picks $r \leftarrow_{\mathbb{R}} \mathbb{Z}_q$ and sends $a = (H_1(x))^r$ to A and r to C , party A sends $b = a^k$ to C , and C outputs $y = H_2(b^{1/r})$. If party C was allowed to learn the PRF public key $z = g^k$, then F_k could be defined also as in eq. (10), and the protocol could also use the less expensive multiplicative blinding.

Regarding the security of either of these implementations, we note that if the PRF is implemented as in eq. (9) then the resulting OPRF does not seem to realize either the OPRF functionality of [13] or the Correlated OPRF functionality defined here. The reason is that when the adversary queries the outer hash H_2 on some v , this is an evaluation of $F_k(x)$ for some (k, x) , but every query x to H_1 defines key k s.t. $v = (H_1(x))^k$ and thus $H_2(v) = F_k(x)$. Therefore, even though the simulator could compute the public key $z = g^k$ corresponding to each such k , e.g. by embedding trapdoors in H_1 outputs, it is

not clear how it can decide on the argument x and a function index i s.t. $H_2(v) = F_i(x)$.¹² On the other hand, if the PRF was defined as in equation (10) then exponential blinding would implement the UC OPRF notion of [13] under the Gap-OMDH assumption in ROM, while multiplicative blinding would under the same assumptions implement a different variant of correlated OPRF: In that variant, a malicious server can correlate any two PRF instances F_i, F_j by specifying a *pair of arguments* $x, x', x \neq x'$, s.t. $F_i(x) = F_j(x')$. Note that it is a different correlation pattern than the one enforced by the Correlated OPRF model which is realized by multiplicative blinding for PRF defined as in equation (1), where for any (i, j) the adversary specifies a *single argument* x s.t. $F_i(x) = F_j(x)$. We do not study such alternative OPRF relaxations and their possible applications in this paper, but the example that we do study, i.e. the Correlated OPRF and its use within OPAQUE, shows the general guidelines one would use if the above OPRF applications were of interest.

Stronger Models and Infrastructural Assumptions. One can consider a strengthened OPRF model which combines the benefits of the verifiable OPRF of [12] and the random-to-the-key-holder OPRF of [13]. Such “best of both worlds” notion can be realized if either protocol Exp-2HashDH or protocol Mult-2HashDH are augmented by a zero-knowledge proof that (g, z, a, b) is a DDH tuple, and by the client C outputting the PRF public key z in addition to the PRF output y . This ZK proof is non-interactive in ROM and can take only one variable-base multi-exponentiation to create and to verify, but as we show in this work, some important OPRF applications, like the OPAQUE password authentication protocol [17], do not need this extra cost.

Alternatively, if the client can trust that it holds server’s *authenticated public key*, i.e., if the PRF public key z is fixed on the client-side, then Mult-2HashDH realizes the UC OPRF functionality of [13], i.e., it does not need the relaxation of UC Correlated OPRF. This holds because for a fixed z a malicious server can only vary the δ part of the PRF index (δ, z) , and functions $F_{(\delta_1, z)}$ and $F_{(\delta_2, z)}$ defined in eq. (2) are independent (in ROM) for any δ_1, δ_2, z s.t. $\delta_1 \neq \delta_2$. The authenticated PRF key assumption would suffice for some applications, e.g., Privacy Pass [7] can be implemented with the multiplicative blinding OPRF because it already assumes that the client holds the server’s certified public key. However, this assumption would restrict other OPRF applications, e.g., it would imply security only in the PKI model for OPAQUE [17].

¹² However, it still seems computationally hard to link any v with more than one pair (k, x) : If H_1 is an RO and the simulator forms honest clients’ messages as $a_i = g^{r_i}$ then $v = (h_x)^k = (h_{x'})^{k'}$, $b_1 = (a_1)^k$, $b_2 = (a_2)^{k'}$ implies that on random $(g, h_x, h_{x'})$ one can find (v, z_1, z_2) s.t. (g, h_x, z_1, v) and $(g, h_{x'}, z_2, v)$ are both DDH tuples, which is hard in a generic group. Thus OPRF with F defined as in eq. (9) probably realizes *some* variant of OPRF notion under *some* reasonable assumptions.

B Proof of the Gap⁺-OMDH Assumption in the Generic Group Model

In this section we prove that the Gap⁺ One More Diffie-Hellman (Gap⁺-OMDH) assumption (see Section 2) holds in the generic group model. The proof closely follows the proof of the OMDH assumption in [14]; we assume familiarity of that proof and only highlight the difference here.

Theorem 3. *Let \mathcal{A} be an algorithm solving the Gap⁺ One More Diffie-Hellman problem in a generic group \mathbb{G} with prime order q and random encoding function ξ . Let u_1, \dots, u_{Q+1} (the challenge values) and k be random integers in \mathbb{Z}_q . \mathcal{A} is given $q, \xi(1), \xi(u_1), \dots, \xi(u_{Q+1})$ as inputs, and is allowed to query the following three oracles:*

- The group operation oracle. \mathcal{A} can query this oracle n times.
- The DDH⁺ oracle, which on inputs $\xi(a), \xi(b), \xi(a'), \xi(b'), \xi(c)$ outputs whether $ab + a'b' = c$. \mathcal{A} can query this oracle d times.
- The “ k -th power” oracle $(\cdot)^k$, which on input $\xi(v)$ outputs $\xi(v \cdot k)$. \mathcal{A} can query this oracle Q times.

Then the probability that \mathcal{A} outputs $\xi(u_1 \cdot k), \dots, \xi(u_{Q+1} \cdot k)$ is upper-bounded by $\frac{(n+2Q+2)^2+4d}{q}$. I.e.

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr_{u_1, \dots, u_{Q+1}, k \leftarrow \mathbb{R}\mathbb{Z}_q} [(\xi(u_1 \cdot k), \dots, \xi(u_{Q+1} \cdot k)) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathbb{G}, \text{DDH}^+, (\cdot)^k}(q, \xi(1), \xi(u_1), \dots, \xi(u_{Q+1}))] \\ & \leq \frac{(n + 2Q + 2)^2 + 4d}{q}, \end{aligned}$$

where \mathcal{A} queries \mathbb{G} n times, DDH⁺ d times, and $(\cdot)^k$ Q times.

Proof (sketch): We first provide an overview of the proof of OMDH assumption in the generic group model (that is, \mathcal{A} does not have access to the DDH⁺ oracle), as in [14]. That proof consists of two steps:

- In the first step, we construct an algorithm \mathcal{B} , which simulates the generic group game challenger by keeping record of *polynomials* corresponding to group elements. Specifically, \mathcal{B} maintains a list $T = \{F_t, \xi_t\}_{t=1, \dots, \tau}$, where τ is the number of group elements that appear in the OMDH game, $F_t(U_1, \dots, U_{Q+1}, X)$'s are polynomials of degree at most 2, and ξ_t 's are distinct elements in \mathbb{G} . \mathcal{B} initializes T by setting $\tau \leftarrow Q + 2$, $F_1 \leftarrow 1, F_2 \leftarrow u_1, \dots, F_{Q+2} \leftarrow u_{Q+1}$, and ξ_1, \dots, ξ_{Q+2} as random *distinct* elements in \mathbb{G} . \mathcal{B} answers \mathcal{A} 's queries as follows:
 - Group operation queries: \mathcal{A} inputs two indices t_1, t_2 and an operation (multiplication “ \cdot ” or division “ $/$ ”). \mathcal{B} computes $F_{\tau+1} \leftarrow F_{t_1} + F_{t_2}$ (if the operation is “ \cdot ”) or $F_{\tau+1} \leftarrow F_{t_1} - F_{t_2}$ (if the operation is “ $/$ ”). If $F_{\tau+1}$ has appeared before, i.e. if there exists $t \leq \tau$ such that $F_{\tau+1} = F_t$, \mathcal{B} sends ξ_t to \mathcal{A} ; otherwise \mathcal{B} picks a random $\xi_{\tau+1} \in \mathbb{G}$ which is *different* from ξ_1, \dots, ξ_τ , sends $\xi_{\tau+1}$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\tau++$.

- $(\cdot)^x$ queries: \mathcal{A} inputs an index t . \mathcal{B} computes $F_{\tau+1} \leftarrow F_t \cdot k$, picks a random $\xi_{\tau+1} \in \mathbb{G}$ which is *different* from ξ_1, \dots, ξ_τ , sends $\xi_{\tau+1}$ to \mathcal{A} , and sets $\tau++$.

Finally, \mathcal{A} outputs $F_{t_1}, \dots, F_{t_{Q+1}}$; it wins if $F_{t_1} = u_1 \cdot k, \dots, F_{t_{Q+1}} = u_{Q+1} \cdot k$. The proof shows that the probability that \mathcal{A} wins this game is upper-bounded by $2/q$.

- In the second step, we consider \mathcal{A} 's distinguishing advantage between the real game and the game interacting with \mathcal{B} . \mathcal{A} 's views in the two games are identical unless there exists t_1 and t_2 such that $F_{t_1} \neq F_{t_2}$ but $F_{t_1}(u_1, \dots, u_{Q+1}, k) = F_{t_2}(u_1, \dots, u_{Q+1}, k)$. This happens with probability $\binom{\tau}{2} \cdot 2/q$, where $\tau = (Q+2) + n + Q = n + 2Q + 2$.

We now proceed to the proof of Theorem 3. The proof is identical to the above, except that we have to take into account the DDH^+ oracle:

- In the first step, \mathcal{B} additionally answers \mathcal{A} 's following oracle queries:
 - DDH^+ oracle queries: \mathcal{A} inputs five indices t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4 and t_5 , and \mathcal{B} outputs whether $F_{t_1}F_{t_2} + F_{t_3}F_{t_4} = F_{t_5}$.

Note that adding this oracle does not change the fact that all F_t 's have degree at most 2. Therefore, the analysis in this step is the same, and we refer the readers to [14] for details: \mathcal{A} 's winning probability while interacting with \mathcal{B} is $2/q$.

- In the second step, the difference of \mathcal{A} 's views in the interaction with \mathcal{B} and in the interaction with the real challenger appears in addition when there exist five different t_1, t_2, t_3, t_4 and t_5 such that $F_{t_1}F_{t_2} + F_{t_3}F_{t_4} \neq F_{t_5}$ but

$$\begin{aligned} & F_{t_1}(u_1, \dots, u_{Q+1}, k)F_{t_2}(u_1, \dots, u_{Q+1}, k) + F_{t_3}(u_1, \dots, u_{Q+1}, k)F_{t_4}(u_1, \dots, u_{Q+1}, k) \\ &= F_{t_5}(u_1, \dots, u_{Q+1}, k). \end{aligned}$$

Note that $\deg(F_{t_1}F_{t_2} + F_{t_3}F_{t_4} - F_{t_5}) \leq 4$, and there are at most d such polynomials evaluated. Therefore, the probability of the event above is at most $d \cdot 4/q$.

In sum, we conclude that \mathcal{A} 's probability of winning the game is upper-bounded by

$$\frac{2}{q} + \binom{n+2Q+2}{2} \cdot \frac{2}{q} + d \cdot \frac{4}{q} \leq \frac{(n+2Q+2)^2 + 4d}{q},$$

which completes the proof.

C UC Functionalities for saPAKE and AKE

In Fig. 13 we include the (strong) aPAKE functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{saPAKE}}$ defined in [18]. Since protocol OPAQUE+ relies on the adaptively secure UC AKE-KCI protocol, we include in Fig. 12 the adaptively secure AKE-KCI functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$ defined in [17].

In the description below, we assume $P, P' \in \{C, S\}$.

- On (USRSESSION, sid, ssid, S) from C, send (USRSESSION, sid, ssid, C, S) to \mathcal{A}^* .
If ssid was not used before by C, record (ssid, C, S) and mark it FRESH.
 - On (SVRSESSION, sid, ssid, C) from S, send (SVRSESSION, sid, ssid, C, S) to \mathcal{A}^* .
If ssid was not used before by S, record (ssid, S, C) and mark it FRESH.
 - On (COMPROMISE, sid, P) from \mathcal{A}^* , mark P COMPROMISED.
 - On (IMPERSONATE, sid, ssid, P) from \mathcal{A}^* , if P is COMPROMISED and there is a record (ssid, P', P) marked FRESH, mark this record COMPROMISED.
 - On (NEWKEY, sid, ssid, P, SK*) from \mathcal{A}^* where $|SK^*| = \tau$, if there is a record (ssid, P, P') not marked COMPLETED, do:
 - If the record is COMPROMISED, or P or P' is corrupted, set $SK \leftarrow SK^*$.
 - If the record is FRESH, a (sid, ssid, SK') tuple was sent to P', and at that time record (ssid, P', P) was marked FRESH, set $SK \leftarrow SK'$.
 - Otherwise pick $SK \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^\tau$.
- Finally, mark (ssid, P, P') COMPLETED and send (sid, ssid, SK) to P.

Fig. 12. Adaptively Secure Functionalities $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$

D Proof of Theorem 2

Proof: We first show the simulator SIM in Fig. 14, Fig. 15 and Fig. 16. Since protocol Π realizes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI-EA}}$, there is a UC simulator SIM_{AKE} which creates an environmental view indistinguishable from the real-world view in protocol Π ; our simulator SIM invokes SIM_{AKE} as a “black box.” As in the proof of Theorem 1, the proof of this theorem goes by a sequence of games. Whenever applicable, we reuse the notations in previous proof (e.g., the notion regarding games). Similar to the previous proof, we denote $\mathcal{F}_{\text{saPAKE}}$ as \mathcal{F} .

Below we use i^* to denote the function pointer used by \mathcal{A} in (RCVCOMPLETE, sid, ssid, C, i^* , \cdot) for C’s rOPRF session, and c^* to denote the ciphertext in the message which \mathcal{A} passes to C after rOPRF evaluation; also recall that we use pw to denote S’s password, and pw’ to denote C’s password.

For concrete security parameters we let q_C and q_S be the number of resp. C and S sub-sessions started by \mathcal{Z} via the USRSESSION and SVRSESSION commands; we let ϵ_{SEC} , ϵ_{AUTH} and ϵ_{RBST} be the maximum advantages of an adversary, with computational resources comparable to that of \mathcal{A} , in the security games of the semantic security, authenticity, and random-key robustness of AE, respectively; we let ϵ_{AKE} be the maximum distinguishing advantage of an environment, with computational resources comparable to that of \mathcal{Z} , between the real interaction of Π and the simulation of SIM_{AKE} ; and we let q_F be the number of EVAL and OFFLINEEVAL messages aimed at $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ from \mathcal{A} .

Password Registration

- On (STOREPWDFILE, sid, C, pw) from S, if this is the first such message, record $\langle \text{FILE}, C, S, \text{pw} \rangle$, mark it UNCOMPROMISED, set $\text{flag} \leftarrow \text{UNCOMPROMISED}$.

Stealing Password Data

- On (STEALPWDFILE, sid) from \mathcal{A}^* , if there is no record $\langle \text{FILE}, C, S, \text{pw} \rangle$, return “no password file” to \mathcal{A}^* . Otherwise, if the record is marked UNCOMPROMISED, mark it COMPROMISED; regardless, return “password file stolen” to \mathcal{A}^* .
- On (OFFLINETESTPWD, sid, pw*) from \mathcal{A}^* , if there is a record $\langle \text{FILE}, C, S, \text{pw} \rangle$ marked COMPROMISED, do: if $\text{pw}^* = \text{pw}$, return “correct guess” to \mathcal{A}^* ; otherwise return “wrong guess.”

Password Authentication

- On (USRSESSION, sid, ssid, S, pw') from C, send (USRSESSION, sid, ssid, C, S) to \mathcal{A}^* . Also, if this is the first USRSESSION message for ssid, record $\langle \text{ssid}, C, S, \text{pw}' \rangle$ and mark it FRESH.
- On (SVRSESSION, sid, ssid) from S, retrieve $\langle \text{FILE}, C, S, \text{pw} \rangle$, and send (SVRSESSION, sid, ssid, C, S) to \mathcal{A}^* . Also, if this is the first SVRSESSION message for ssid, record $\langle \text{ssid}, S, C, \text{pw} \rangle$ and mark it FRESH.

Active Session Attacks

- On (INTERRUPT, sid, ssid, S) from \mathcal{A}^* , if there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}, S, C, \text{pw} \rangle$ marked FRESH, mark it INTERRUPTED and set $\text{PTx}(\text{ssid}) \leftarrow 1$.
- On (TESTPWD, sid, ssid, P, pw*) from \mathcal{A}^* , retrieve record $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}' \rangle$ and:
 - If the record is FRESH then do the following: If $\text{pw}^* = \text{pw}'$ return “correct guess” to \mathcal{A}^* and mark $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}' \rangle$ COMPROMISED, otherwise return “wrong guess” and mark $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}' \rangle$ INTERRUPTED.
 - If $P = S$ and $\text{PTx}(\text{ssid}) = 1$ then set $\text{PTx}(\text{ssid}) \leftarrow 0$ and if $\text{pw}^* = \text{pw}'$ then return “correct guess” to \mathcal{A}^* else return “wrong guess.”In either case, if $P = S$ and $\text{pw}^* = \text{pw}'$ then set $\text{flag} \leftarrow \text{COMPROMISED}$.
- On (IMPERSONATE, sid, ssid) from \mathcal{A}^* , if there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}, C, S, \text{pw}' \rangle$ marked FRESH, do: If there is a record $\langle \text{FILE}, C, S, \text{pw} \rangle$ marked COMPROMISED and $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$, mark $\langle \text{ssid}, C, S, \text{pw}' \rangle$ COMPROMISED and return “correct guess” to \mathcal{A}^* ; otherwise mark it INTERRUPTED and return “wrong guess.”

Key Generation and Authentication

- On (NEWKEY, sid, ssid, P, SK*) from \mathcal{A}^* where $|SK^*| = \ell$, if there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}' \rangle$ not marked COMPLETED, do:
 - If the record is COMPROMISED, or ($P = S$, the record is INTERRUPTED and $\text{flag} = \text{COMPROMISED}$), or either P or P' is corrupted, set $SK \leftarrow SK^*$.
 - Else, if the record is FRESH and $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, SK')$ was sent to P' at the time there was a record $\langle \text{ssid}, P', P, \text{pw}' \rangle$ marked FRESH, set $SK \leftarrow SK'$.
 - Else pick $SK \leftarrow_{\mathcal{R}} \{0, 1\}^{\ell}$.Finally, mark $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}' \rangle$ COMPLETED and send $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, SK)$ to P.
- On (TESTABORT, sid, ssid, P) from \mathcal{A}^* , if there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}' \rangle$ not marked COMPLETED, do:
 - If it is FRESH and there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}, P', P, \text{pw}' \rangle$, send SUCC to \mathcal{A}^* .
 - Otherwise send FAIL to \mathcal{A}^* and (ABORT, sid, ssid) to P, and mark $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}' \rangle$ COMPLETED.

Fig. 13. Functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{SaPAKE}}$

Initialization

Set $tx \leftarrow 0$, $\mathcal{N} \leftarrow [S]$, $\mathcal{E} \leftarrow \{\}$, $\mathcal{G} \leftarrow (\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{E})$. Initialize simulator SIM_{AKE} and function family $\{F_i\}$ s.t. for every (i, x) , including $i = S$, value $F_i(x)$ is undefined. Whenever SIM references undefined value $F_i(x)$ below, set $F_i(x) \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^\ell$. Set $c \leftarrow \text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(\text{sid}, (k_{pr} + 2k_p))$, and record $\text{file}[\text{sid}] \leftarrow (\perp, \perp, \perp, c)$, where k_{pr}, k_{pb} are the lengths of resp. private and public AKE keys.

Stealing Password Data and Offline Queries

1. If \mathcal{A} sends $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid})$ aimed at $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ and $(\text{STEALPWF}, \text{sid})$ aimed at S (we assume \mathcal{A} sends these commands together), send $(\text{STEALPWF}, \text{sid})$ to \mathcal{F} .
If \mathcal{F} returns “no password file,” pass this message to \mathcal{A} on behalf of S .
If \mathcal{F} returns “password file stolen,” declare S **COMPROMISED**, send $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid}, S)$ to SIM_{AKE} , and on response (p_s, P_s, P_u) reset $\text{file}[\text{sid}]$ from (\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, c) to (p_s, P_s, P_c, c) and send it to \mathcal{A} on behalf of S .
2. On $(\text{OFFLINEEVAL}, \text{sid}, i^*, x, L)$ from \mathcal{A} aimed at $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$, do:
 - If $i^* \notin \mathcal{N}$, then add i^* to \mathcal{N} and run $\text{CORRELATE}(i^*, L)$.
 - If S is not **COMPROMISED** and $(i^*, S, x) \in \mathcal{E}$, ignore this message.
 - If $i^* = S$ and S is **COMPROMISED**, send $(\text{OFFLINETESTPWD}, \text{sid}, x)$ to \mathcal{F} .
If \mathcal{F} returns “correct guess,” send $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid}, C)$ to SIM_{AKE} , and on response (p_u, P_u, P_s) set $\text{rw} \leftarrow \text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(\text{sid}, (p_u, P_u, P_s))$ and $F_S(x) \leftarrow \text{rw}$, record (FILE, C, S, x) , and declare C **COMPROMISED**.
Finally, send $(\text{OFFLINEEVAL}, \text{sid}, F_{i^*}(x))$ to \mathcal{A} on behalf of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$.

Fig. 14. Simulator SIM for Protocol OPAQUE^+ : Initialization and Offline Attack

rOPRF Evaluation

1. On (USRSESSION, sid, ssid, C, S) from \mathcal{F} , send (EVAL, sid, ssid, C, S) to \mathcal{A} on behalf of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$. On prfx from \mathcal{A} , record $\langle \text{ssid}, C, \text{prfx} \rangle$ if prfx is new, else reject.
2. On (SVRSESSION, sid, ssid', C, S) from \mathcal{F} , retrieve $\text{file}[\text{sid}] = (\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, c)$, send (SNDRCOMPLETE, sid, ssid', S) and c to \mathcal{A} on behalf of, respectively $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ and S, and given \mathcal{A} 's response prfx' do the following in order:
 - (a) If there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}, C, \text{prfx} \rangle$ for $\text{prfx} = \text{prfx}'$ then record $\langle \text{ssid}, C, \text{ssid}', S, \text{OK} \rangle$; Else record $\langle \text{ssid}', S, \text{ACT} \rangle$, set $\text{tx}++$, and send (INTERRUPT, sid, ssid', S) to \mathcal{F} .
 - (b) Record $\langle \text{ssid}_H, \text{ssid}', S, C \rangle$ marked FRESH for $\text{ssid}_H = [\text{ssid}' || \text{prfx}']$ and send (SVRSESSION, sid, ssid_H, C, S) to SIM_{AKE} .
3. On (RCVCOMPLETE, sid, ssid, C, i^* , L) from \mathcal{A} aimed at $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$, retrieve $\langle \text{ssid}, C, \text{prfx} \rangle$ (ignore the message if such record not found) and do in order:
 - (a) If $i^* \notin \mathcal{N}$, then add i^* to \mathcal{N} and run $\text{CORRELATE}(i^*, L)$.
 - (b) If S is not COMPROMISED, there is no record $\langle \text{ssid}, C, \text{ssid}', S, \text{OK} \rangle$ for some ssid', and $i^* = S$, then do: Ignore this message (and do not do (c) below) if $\text{tx} = 0$, else set $\text{tx}--$ and add x to \mathcal{X} .
 - (c) Augment record $\langle \text{ssid}, C, \text{prfx} \rangle$ to $\langle \text{ssid}, C, \text{prfx}, i^* \rangle$.
4. On (EVAL, sid, ssid, S, x) followed by (RCVCOMPLETE, sid, ssid, \mathcal{A} , i^* , L) from \mathcal{A} to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ (string prfx chosen by \mathcal{A} for this EVAL can be ignored), send (EVAL, sid, ssid, \mathcal{A} , S) to \mathcal{A} on behalf of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{OPRF}}$ and do in order:
 - (a) If $i^* \notin \mathcal{N}$, then add i^* to \mathcal{N} and run $\text{CORRELATE}(i^*, L)$.
 - (b) If $i^* \neq S$ and $(i^*, S, x) \notin \mathcal{E}$, then send (EVAL, sid, ssid, $F_{i^*}(x)$) to \mathcal{A} .
 - (c) If $i^* = S$ or $(i^*, S, x) \in \mathcal{E}$, and there is no record $\langle \text{ssid}', S, \text{ACT} \rangle$, then output HALT and abort.
 - (d) If $i^* = S$ or $(i^*, S, x) \in \mathcal{E}$, and there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}', S, \text{ACT} \rangle$ then do in order:
 - i. If there exists record $\langle \text{ssid}', S, \text{ACT} \rangle$ *not* marked COMPLETED then choose ssid' of any such reord. If all records $\langle \text{ssid}', S, \text{ACT} \rangle$ are COMPLETED then choose ssid' of any of those.
 - ii. If $i^* = S$, then ignore the message (and do not do the steps below) if $\text{tx} = 0$; else set $\text{tx}--$.
 - iii. Send (TESTPWD, sid, ssid', S, x) to \mathcal{F} . If \mathcal{F} returns "correct guess," send (COMPROMISE, sid, C) to SIM_{AKE} , and on response (p_u, P_u, P_s) set $\text{rw} \leftarrow \text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(\text{sid}, (p_u, P_u, P_s))$ and $F_S(x) \leftarrow \text{rw}$, record $\langle \text{FILE}, C, S, x \rangle$, and declare C COMPROMISED.
 - iv. Send (EVAL, sid, ssid, $F_S(x)$) to \mathcal{A} , and modify the chosen record $\langle \text{ssid}', S, \text{ACT} \rangle$ into $\langle \text{ssid}', S, \text{USED} \rangle$.

Fig. 15. Simulator SIM for Protocol OPAQUE+: OPRF Evaluation

AKE Simulation

1. For any ssid , as soon as $\langle \text{ssid}, C, \text{prfx} \rangle$ is augmented to $\langle \text{ssid}, C, \text{prfx}, i^* \rangle$ and \mathcal{A} sends (ssid, c^*) to \mathcal{C} , retrieve $\text{file}[\text{sid}] = (\cdot, \cdot, \cdot, c)$ and do *one* of the following:
 - (a) If $c^* = c$ and $i^* = S$, send $(\text{TESTABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C)$ to \mathcal{F} . If \mathcal{F} replies SUCC , record $\langle \text{ssid}_H, \text{ssid}, C, S \rangle$ marked FRESH , and send $(\text{USRSESSION}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_H, C, S)$ to SIM_{AKE} for $\text{ssid}_H = [\text{ssid}||\text{prfx}]$. Mark this case (*).
 - (b) If $c^* = c$, $i^* \neq S$, and there exists x s.t. $(i^*, S, x) \in \mathcal{E}$, then send $(\text{TESTABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C)$ to \mathcal{F} , and if \mathcal{F} returns SUCC then send $(\text{TESTPWD}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C, x)$ to \mathcal{F} and:
 - If \mathcal{F} returns “correct guess,” send $(\text{TESTPWD}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, S, x)$ to \mathcal{F} (who returns “correct guess”), record $\langle \text{ssid}_H, \text{ssid}, C, S \rangle$ marked FRESH for $\text{ssid}_H = [\text{ssid}||\text{prfx}]$, send $(\text{USRSESSION}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_H, C, S)$ to SIM_{AKE} , and record $\langle \text{FILE}, C, S, x \rangle$. Also mark this case (*).
 - If \mathcal{F} returns “wrong guess,” send $(\text{TESTABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C)$ to \mathcal{F} .
 - (c) Otherwise, for every x s.t. $y = F_{i^*}(x)$ is defined, check if $\text{AuthDec}_y(c^*)$ output parses as (p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) , and do *one* of the following:
 - If there is no such x , send $(\text{TESTPWD}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C, \perp)$ followed by $(\text{TESTABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C)$ to \mathcal{F} .
 - If there are more than one such x 's, output HALT and abort.
 - If there is a unique such x , send $(\text{TESTPWD}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C, x)$ to \mathcal{F} . If \mathcal{F} replies “wrong guess,” send $(\text{TESTABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C)$ to \mathcal{F} , else do:
 - (1) set $(p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) \leftarrow \text{AuthDec}_y(c^*)$,
 - (2) run Π_c on (p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) and $\text{ssid}_H = [\text{ssid}||\text{prfx}]$,
 - (3) when Π_c outputs SK^* , send $(\text{NEWKEY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C, SK^*)$ to \mathcal{F} .
- Mark this case (**).
2. On all AKE-related interactions of \mathcal{A} with all AKE sessions started in case (*) above (note that there are two places marked case (*)), pass all messages between \mathcal{A} and SIM_{AKE} , and react to messages sent by SIM_{AKE} 's interface with $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI+}}$ as follows:
 - On $(\text{IMPERSONATE}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_H, S)$, if S is declared COMPROMISED and there is record $\langle \text{ssid}_H, \text{ssid}, C, S \rangle$ marked FRESH , then mark it COMPROMISED and send $(\text{IMPERSONATE}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ to \mathcal{F} .
 - On $(\text{IMPERSONATE}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_H, C)$, if C is declared COMPROMISED and there is record $\langle \text{ssid}_H, \text{ssid}, S, C \rangle$ marked FRESH , then mark it COMPROMISED , retrieve $\langle \text{FILE}, C, S, \text{pw} \rangle$ and send $(\text{TESTPWD}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, S, \text{pw})$ to \mathcal{F} .
 - On $(\text{NEWKEY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_H, P, SK^*)$, if there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}_H, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$ not marked COMPLETED , do:
 - If the record is COMPROMISED , or P or P' is corrupted, set $SK \leftarrow SK^*$.
 - If the record is FRESH , and SIM sent $(\text{NEWKEY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P', SK')$ to \mathcal{F} while record $\langle \text{ssid}_H, \text{ssid}, P', P \rangle$ was marked FRESH , set $SK \leftarrow SK'$.
 - Otherwise pick $SK \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^\tau$.
- Finally, mark $\langle \text{ssid}_H, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$ COMPLETED and send $(\text{NEWKEY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P, SK)$ to \mathcal{F} .

Fig. 16. Simulator SIM for Protocol OPAQUE+: AKE Simulation

GAME 1: (*Real world*) This is the real-world interaction, i.e., the interaction of environment \mathcal{Z} and its subroutine \mathcal{A} with honest entities \mathbf{C} and \mathbf{S} executing protocol OPAQUE+.

Note that in **GAME 1**, \mathbf{C} outputs $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ if and only if $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c^*) = \perp$ (where $\text{rw}' = F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$). In the following six games we gradually change this condition.

GAME 2: (*Client aborts if \mathcal{A} is passive before Π starts but passwords do not match*) In the case that $c^* = c \wedge i^* = \mathbf{S}$ and $\text{pw}' \neq \text{pw}$, \mathbf{C} outputs $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$.

\mathcal{Z} 's views in **GAME 2** and **GAME 1** are identical unless on some \mathbf{C} sub-session $c^* = c \wedge i^* = \mathbf{S} \wedge \text{pw}' \neq \text{pw}$ but $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c) \neq \perp$: In this case \mathbf{C} outputs $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, SK)$ in **GAME 1** and $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ in **GAME 2**.

Since $c \leftarrow \text{AuthEnc}_{\text{rw}}(p_u, P_u, P_s)$, we have that $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c) \neq \perp$. But rw' and rw are independent random strings in $\{0, 1\}^{2\tau}$; therefore, we can construct a reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RBST1}}$ to the random-key robustness of AE where rw' and rw are the challenge AE keys: $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RBST1}}$ runs the code of **GAME 1** except that it uses its input as rw' and rw . In every sub-session $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RBST1}}$ checks if $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c) \neq \perp$ and $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c) \neq \perp$, and if so, it outputs c (and breaks the game). We have that

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_2] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_1]| \leq q_C \cdot \epsilon_{\text{RBST}}$$

GAME 3: (*Client aborts if \mathcal{A} passes c but changes the function index on which \mathbf{C} evaluates $r\text{OPRF}$, passwords do not match or \mathcal{A} does not correlate to F_S)* In the case that $c^* = c \wedge i^* \neq \mathbf{S}$, and either (i) $\text{pw}' \neq \text{pw}$ or (ii) $(i^*, \mathbf{S}, \text{pw}') \notin \mathcal{E}$, \mathbf{C} outputs $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$.

\mathcal{Z} 's views in **GAME 2** and **GAME 3** are identical unless on some \mathbf{C} sub-session $c^* = c \wedge i^* \neq \mathbf{S} \wedge (\text{pw}' \neq \text{pw} \vee (i^*, \mathbf{S}, \text{pw}') \notin \mathcal{E})$ but $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c) \neq \perp$: In which case \mathbf{C} outputs $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, SK)$ in **GAME 2** and $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ in **GAME 3**.

Since $c \leftarrow \text{AuthEnc}_{\text{rw}}(p_c, P_c, P_s)$, we have that $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c) \neq \perp$. But since either (i) $\text{pw}' \neq \text{pw}$ or (ii) F_{i^*} and F_S are different random functions which are also not correlated on pw' , $\text{rw}' = F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$ and $\text{rw} = F_S(\text{pw})$ are independent random strings in $\{0, 1\}^{2\tau}$; therefore, we can construct a reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RBST2}}$ to the random-key robustness, which works exactly as $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RBST1}}$ (except that it runs the code of **GAME 2** instead of **GAME 1**). We have that

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_3] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_2]| \leq q_C \cdot \epsilon_{\text{RBST}}$$

GAME 4: (*Abort the entire game if c^* is valid under two different keys*) In the case that $c^* \neq c$, the game outputs **HALT** and aborts if there are $x_1 \neq x_2$ such that \mathcal{A} queries both $y_1 = F_{i^*}(x_1)$ and $y_2 = F_{i^*}(x_2)$, and $\text{AuthDec}_{y_1}(c^*) \neq \perp$ and $\text{AuthDec}_{y_2}(c^*) \neq \perp$.

Here and throughout the proof below we say that “ \mathcal{A} queries $F_{i^*}(x)$,” where index i^* may or may not be \mathbf{S} , if (i) \mathcal{A} sends $(\text{EVAL}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, x)$ and then $(\text{RCVCOMPLETE}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \mathcal{A}, i^*, L)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ and if $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ replies to this query with $F_{i^*}(x)$ (note that if $i^* = \mathbf{S}$ then $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ replies with $F_S(x)$ if and only if $\text{tx} > 0$, because $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$'s record $(\text{ssid}, \mathcal{A}, x, \text{prfx})$ corresponding to \mathcal{A} 's

evaluation query can never satisfy $\text{prfx} = \text{OK}$), or (ii) if \mathcal{A} sends $(\text{OFFLINEEVAL}, \text{sid}, i^*, x, L)$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ and if $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ replies to this query with $F_{i^*}(x)$ (note that if $i^* = \text{S}$ then $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ replies with $F_{\text{S}}(x)$ if and only if S is corrupted or COMPROMISED). Note that \mathcal{A} may “force a correlation,” i.e., choose another function index j^* and set $F_{i^*}(x) \leftarrow F_{j^*}(x)$ if $(j^*, x) \in L$, as $\text{CORRELATE}(i^*, L)$ specifies; but this can be done only if $i^* \neq \text{S}$. These are the only cases in which \mathcal{Z} learn any information about $F_{i^*}(x)$; in other words, if \mathcal{A} does not query $F_{i^*}(x)$, then $F_{i^*}(x)$ is a random string in $\{0, 1\}^{2\tau}$ in \mathcal{Z} 's view. Moreover, we refer to case (i) as “ \mathcal{A} queries $F_{i^*}(x)$ online,” and to case (ii) as “ \mathcal{A} queries $F_{i^*}(x)$ offline.”

Note that y_1 and y_2 are independent random strings in $\{0, 1\}^{2\tau}$ (while querying $F_{i^*}(x_1)$ and $F_{i^*}(x_2)$, \mathcal{A} may set $y_1 = F_{i^*}(x_1) \leftarrow F_{j_1^*}(x_1)$ and $y_2 = F_{i^*}(x_2) \leftarrow F_{j_2^*}(x_2)$ for any other j_1^*, j_2^* , but since $F_{j_1^*}$ and $F_{j_2^*}$ are also random functions and $x_1 \neq x_2$, y_1 and y_2 must still be independently random). Therefore, we can construct a reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RBST3}}$ to the random-key robustness of AE where y_1 and y_2 are the challenge AE keys: $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RBST3}}$ picks a uniformly random pair (j_1, j_2) where $j_1, j_2 \in \{1, \dots, q_{\text{F}}\}$ and $j_1 < j_2$ ¹³ (a guess that y_1 and y_2 are the results of \mathcal{A} 's j_1 -th and j_2 -th queries), and runs the code of GAME 3 except that it uses its input as the results of \mathcal{A} 's j_1 -th and j_2 -th queries. In every sub-session $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RBST1}}$ checks if $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c^*) \neq \perp$ and $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c^*) \neq \perp$, and if so, it outputs c^* (and breaks the game). We have that

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_4] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_3]| \leq \Pr[\text{HALT}] \leq \binom{q_{\text{F}}}{2} \cdot \epsilon_{\text{RBST}}$$

GAME 5: (*Client aborts if \mathcal{A} does not compute rw' , password match, and \mathcal{A} does not change the $r\text{OPRF}$ index but changes c*) In the case that $c^* \neq c \wedge i^* = \text{S}$ and $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$, C outputs $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ if \mathcal{A} does not query $F_{i^*}(\text{pw})$.

\mathcal{Z} 's views in GAME 4 and GAME 5 are identical unless \mathcal{A} does not query $\text{rw} = F_{\text{S}}(\text{pw})$ but on some C sub-session $c^* \neq c \wedge i^* = \text{S} \wedge \text{pw}' = \text{pw}$ but $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c^*) \neq \perp$: In this case C outputs $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \text{SK})$ in GAME 4 and $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ in GAME 5.

Since \mathcal{A} does not query $F_{\text{S}}(\text{pw})$, rw is a random string in $\{0, 1\}^{2\tau}$ in \mathcal{Z} 's view. \mathcal{Z} additionally learns $c \leftarrow \text{AuthEnc}_{\text{rw}}(p_c, P_c, P_s)$, but \mathcal{A} 's message is restricted to $c^* \neq c$. Therefore, we can construct a reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AUTH1}}$ to the authenticity of AE where rw is the challenge AE key: $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AUTH1}}$ runs the code of GAME 4, except that it uses its encryption oracle to compute $c \leftarrow \text{AuthEnc}_{\text{rw}}(p_u, P_u, P_s)$, and its decryption oracle to compute $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c^*)$ in every C sub-session (1) which runs on input $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$ and (2) where $i^* = \text{S}$. In each such sub-session $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AUTH1}}$ checks if $c^* \neq c$ and $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c^*) \neq \perp$, and if so, it outputs c^* (and breaks the game). We have that

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_5] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_4]| \leq \epsilon_{\text{AUTH}}$$

¹³ To be precise, $\mathcal{R}_{\text{RBST3}}$ picks $j_1' \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{1, \dots, q_{\text{F}}\}$, $j_2' \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{1, \dots, q_{\text{F}}\} \setminus \{j_1'\}$, and sets $j_1 \leftarrow \min\{j_1', j_2'\}$ and $j_2 \leftarrow \max\{j_1', j_2'\}$.

GAME 6: (*Client aborts if \mathcal{A} does not compute rw' , and either passwords do not match or \mathcal{A} changes the $r\text{OPRF}$ index*) In the case that $c^* \neq c$ and $\text{pw}' \neq \text{pw}$, C outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid) if \mathcal{A} does not query $F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$.

\mathcal{Z} 's views in GAME 5 and GAME 6 are identical unless on some C sub-session $c^* \neq c \wedge \text{pw}' \neq \text{pw}$, and \mathcal{A} does not query $\text{rw}' = F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$ but $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c^*) \neq \perp$: In this case C outputs (sid, ssid, SK) in GAME 5 and (ABORT, sid, ssid) in GAME 6.

Call the event that such C sub-session exists E . For each $i \in \{1, \dots, q_{\text{C}}\}$ define E_j as the event that on the j -th C sub-session, in the order determined by the initialization calls from \mathcal{Z} , it holds that (1) $(c^* \neq c \wedge \text{pw}' \neq \text{pw}) \vee i^* \neq S$, (2) \mathcal{A} does not query $F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$, (3) this is the first occurrence of pair (i^*, pw') on any C sub-session, and (4) $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c^*) \neq \perp$. Note that E is the union of events E_j for $j = 1, \dots, q_{\text{C}}$. Since for (i^*, pw') in the j -th C sub-session \mathcal{A} does not query $F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$, rw' is not used anywhere else (in particular, \mathcal{Z} learns $c \leftarrow \text{AuthEnc}_{\text{rw}}(p_c, P_c, P_s)$, but rw is independent of rw') and hence is a random string in $\{0, 1\}^{2\tau}$ in \mathcal{Z} 's view. Therefore, for each E_j we can construct a reduction $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AUTH2},j}$ to the authenticity of AE where rw' in the j -th C sub-session is the challenge AE key: $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AUTH2},j}$ runs the code of GAME 5. In the j -th C sub-session, $\mathcal{R}_{\text{AUTH2},j}$ uses the decryption oracle to check if E_j occurs, and if so, it outputs c^* (and breaks the game). We have that

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_6] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_5]| \leq \Pr[E] \leq \sum_{j=1}^{q_{\text{C}}} \Pr[E_j] \leq q_{\text{C}} \cdot \epsilon_{\text{AUTH}}$$

Note that the combined conditions introduced in GAME 5 and GAME 6 are equivalent to the following: In the case that $\neg(c^* = c \wedge i^* = S)$, C outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid) if \mathcal{A} does not query $F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$.

GAME 7: (*extract \mathcal{A} 's password guess on C interactions*) In GAME 6, after C computes $\text{rw}' = F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$ and receives (ssid, c^*) and (Prefix, ssid, prfx), it tests if $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c^*)$ can be parsed as (p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) , and either runs Π_c on these decrypted AKE keys and $\text{ssid}_{\Pi} \leftarrow [\text{ssid}|\text{prfx}]$, or outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid) if the parsing fails. Here we replace the above with the following (ssid_{Π} does not change from GAME 6 to GAME 7, so we omit it in the description of GAME 7 below):

1. If $c^* = c \wedge i^* = S$, then do: (I) if $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$ (which is case (*)), then C runs Π_c on inputs (p_c, P_c, P_s) ; (II) otherwise C outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid).
2. If $c^* = c \wedge i^* \neq S$, then do: (I) if $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$ and $(i^*, S, \text{pw}') \in \mathcal{E}$, C runs Π_c on inputs (p_c, P_c, P_s) ; (II) otherwise C outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid).
3. If $c^* \neq c$, and there are $x_1 \neq x_2$ such that \mathcal{A} queries both $y_1 = F_{i^*}(x_1)$ and $y_2 = F_{i^*}(x_2)$, and $\text{AuthDec}_{y_1}(c^*) \neq \perp$ and $\text{AuthDec}_{y_2}(c^*) \neq \perp$, output HALT and abort the entire game.
4. If $c^* \neq c$ and \mathcal{A} queries $\text{rw}' = F_{i^*}(x)$ for a *unique* x such that $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c^*)$ can be parsed as (p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) , then do: (I) if $x = \text{pw}'$ (which is case (**)), then C runs Π_u on inputs (p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) ; (II) otherwise C outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid).
5. Otherwise, i.e., $c^* \neq c$ but \mathcal{A} makes no $F_{i^*}(x)$ query as in case 3 or 4 above, C outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid).

We argue that this modification does not change \mathcal{Z} 's view. There are three cases:

- $c^* = c \wedge i^* = \text{S}$: In GAME 6, if $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$, then $\text{rw}' = F_{i^*}(\text{pw}') = F_{\text{S}}(\text{pw}) = \text{rw}$, so C runs Π_c on $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c^*) = \text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c) = (p_c, P_c, P_s)$, which is replicated in case 1(I) of GAME 7; otherwise C outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid) by the condition introduced in GAME 2, which is replicated in case 1(II) of GAME 7.
- $c^* = c \wedge i^* \neq \text{S}$: In GAME 6, if $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$ and $(i^*, \text{S}, \text{pw}') \in \mathcal{E}$, then $\text{rw}' = F_{i^*}(\text{pw}') = F_{\text{S}}(\text{pw}') = F_{\text{S}}(\text{pw}) = \text{rw}$, so C runs Π_c on $\text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}'}(c^*) = \text{AuthDec}_{\text{rw}}(c) = (p_c, P_c, P_s) = (p_c, P_c, P_s)$, which is replicated in case 2(I) of GAME 7; otherwise C outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid) by the condition introduced in GAME 3, which is replicated in case 2(II) of GAME 7.
- $c^* \neq c$: In GAME 6, if \mathcal{A} queries two distinct F_{i^*} outputs which both decrypt c^* , then GAME 6 outputs HALT by the condition introduced in GAME 4, which is replicated in case 3 of GAME 7. If \mathcal{A} makes no $F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$ query, then C outputs (ABORT, sid, ssid) by the conditions introduced in GAME 5 and GAME 6, which is replicated in cases 4(II) and 5 of GAME 7. The only remaining case is that \mathcal{A} queries $F_{i^*}(\text{pw}')$ and this is the unique query such that $\text{AuthDec}'_{\text{rw}}(c^*)$ can be parsed as (p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) , in which case in GAME 6 C runs Π_c on (p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) , which is replicated in case 4(I) in GAME 7.

It follows that

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_7] = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_6]$$

Comparison of Game 7 and the Ideal World. We argue that in GAME 7, when \mathcal{A} sends (ssid, c^*) aimed at C and decides on the index i^* for which C computes F_{i^*} , the way that the game emulates C's response to (c^*, i^*) is the same as in the ideal world, except that GAME 7 runs the AKE protocol Π_c on behalf of C in case this user instance encounters either case (*) or (**), while the simulator SIM executes Π_c only in case (**), while in case (*) the execution of Π_c is replaced by a simulation by SIM_{AKE} .

Disregarding the differences due to Π_c execution vs. Π_c simulation, the simulation of C instances acts based on the following three cases:

- (i) $c^* = c \wedge i^* = \text{S}$: SIM sends (TESTABORT, sid, ssid, C) to \mathcal{F} .
 - If \mathcal{F} returns SUCC, i.e., $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$, then SIM proceeds to simulate Π_c . This is case (*), and it corresponds to case 1(I) in GAME 7.
 - If \mathcal{F} returns FAIL, i.e., $\text{pw}' \neq \text{pw}$, then \mathcal{F} sends (ABORT, sid, ssid) to C (who outputs this message). This corresponds to case 1(II) in GAME 7.
- (ii) $c^* = c \wedge i^* \neq \text{S}$: If there is an x such that $(i^*, \text{S}, x) \in \mathcal{E}$, i.e., \mathcal{A} sets $F_{i^*}(x) \leftarrow F_{\text{S}}(x)$, then SIM first sends (TESTABORT, sid, ssid, C) to \mathcal{F} , and if \mathcal{F} returns SUCC, SIM then sends (TESTPWD, sid, ssid, C, x) to \mathcal{F} .
 - If \mathcal{F} returns SUCC and then “correct guess,” i.e., $x = \text{pw}' = \text{pw}$, then SIM proceeds to simulate Π_c . This is case (*), and it corresponds to case 2(I) in GAME 7.

- If \mathcal{F} returns SUCC and then “wrong guess,” i.e., $x \neq \text{pw}' = \text{pw}$, then SIM sends (another) (TESTABORT, sid, ssid, C) to \mathcal{F} , and \mathcal{F} sends (ABORT, sid, ssid) to C (who outputs this message). (Note that when SIM sends the second TESTABORT message, C’s saPAKE-layer sub-session record is already INTERRUPTED, so this TESTABORT must result in aborting.) This corresponds to case 2(II) in GAME 7.
 - If \mathcal{F} returns FAIL on SIM’s first message, then \mathcal{F} sends (ABORT, sid, ssid) to C (who outputs this message). This also corresponds to case 2(II) in GAME 7.
- (iii) $c^* \neq c$: for every x such that $y = F_{i^*}(x)$ was queried by \mathcal{A} , SIM checks if $\text{AuthDec}_y(c^*)$ can be parsed as (p_u^*, P_u^*, P_s^*) .
- If there are two or more such x ’s, i.e., $x_1 \neq x_2$ s.t. \mathcal{A} queries both $y_1 = F_{i^*}(x_1)$ and $y_2 = F_{i^*}(x_2)$, and $\text{AuthDec}_{y_1}(c^*) \neq \perp$ and $\text{AuthDec}_{y_2}(c^*) \neq \perp$, then SIM outputs HALT and aborts. This corresponds to case 3 in GAME 7.
 - If there is a unique such x , then SIM sends (TESTPWD, sid, ssid, C, x) to \mathcal{F} .
If \mathcal{F} returns “correct guess,” i.e., $x = \text{pw}'$, SIM runs Π on the decrypted values $(p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) \leftarrow \text{AuthDec}_y(c^*)$. This is case (**), and corresponds to case 4(I) in GAME 7.
If \mathcal{F} returns “wrong guess,” i.e., $x \neq \text{pw}'$, then SIM sends (TESTABORT, sid, ssid, C) to \mathcal{F} , and \mathcal{F} sends (ABORT, sid, ssid) to C (who outputs this message). This corresponds to case 4(II) in GAME 7, and SIM handles it in the same step as above.
 - If there is no such x , then SIM sends (TESTPWD, sid, ssid, C, \perp) and then (TESTABORT, sid, ssid, C) to \mathcal{F} , and \mathcal{F} sends (ABORT, sid, ssid) to C (who outputs this message). This corresponds to case 5 in GAME 7.

We can see that if we omit the interaction between SIM and \mathcal{F} above, and view SIM and \mathcal{F} combined as the game challenger who interacts with \mathcal{Z} and \mathcal{A} , then the behavior of this game challenger when \mathcal{A} sends (ssid, c^*) aimed at C is exactly the same with the behavior of GAME 7, except for Π_c execution replaced by Π_c simulation in case (*).

In the next four games we replace AKE credential generation and login protocol execution with the simulation by SIM_{AKE} .

GAME 8: (*Outsourcing the generation of c and rw to SIM_{EQV}*) At the beginning of the game, let SIM_{EQV} simulate c and leave rw undefined, and let SIM_{EQV} “open” rw when \mathcal{A} computes it. Concretely,

- (1) At the beginning of the game, set $c \leftarrow \text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(k_{pr} + 2k_{pb})$;
- (2) When \mathcal{A} queries $F_5(\text{pw})$, set $\text{rw} \leftarrow \text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(p_u, P_u, P_s)$.

Observe that in GAME 7, \mathcal{Z} sees $c \leftarrow \text{AuthEnc}_{\text{rw}}(p_u, P_u, P_s)$, and unless and until \mathcal{A} queries $F_5(\text{pw})$ (and thus learns rw), rw is not used by any party except in generating c , hence is a random string in $\{0, 1\}^{2\tau}$ independent of everything else (except for c) in \mathcal{Z} ’s view. In particular, in GAME 7 C does not evaluate F

on any input, and all processing is based on whether $c^* = c$, whether $i^* = S$, whether $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$, and on \mathcal{A} 's queries to F_{i^*} , which in the case $i^* = S$ are \mathcal{A} 's queries to F_S . Therefore, in GAME 7 c followed by rw in case \mathcal{A} queries $F_S(\text{pw})$, are formed as in the “real game” in the encryption equivocability experiment for AE, where \mathcal{A} sees the encryption c of (p_u, P_u, P_s) under key rw followed by the key rw (in case of \mathcal{A} 's query to $F_S(\text{pw})$). On the other hand, in GAME 8 ciphertext c followed by key rw are formed as in the “ideal game” in the encryption equivocability experiment for AE. Therefore, we can construct a reduction \mathcal{R}_{EQV} to the equivocability of AE: \mathcal{R}_{EQV} runs the code of GAME 7 except that it uses its input as c and rw , and copies \mathcal{Z} 's output. We have that

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_8] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_7]| \leq \epsilon_{\text{EQV}}$$

GAME 9: (*Outsourcing the generation of p_c, P_c, p_s, P_s to SIM_{AKE}*) Let SIM_{AKE} generate the two parties' key pairs in the AKE protocol Π , p_c, P_c, p_s, P_s , instead of generating them on its own. Concretely, *at the beginning of the game*, send $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid}, S)$ and $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid}, C)$ to SIM_{AKE} and obtain p_c, P_c, p_s, P_s ; *ignore all subsequent messages from SIM_{AKE} .*

Clearly, an environment distinguishing between GAME 8 and GAME 9 can be turned into an environment $\mathcal{Z}_{\text{AKE1}}$ distinguishing between the real execution of Π and the simulation of Π by SIM_{AKE} . Therefore,

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_9] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_8]| \leq \epsilon_{\text{AKE}}$$

GAME 10: (*Leaving p_c, P_c, p_s, P_s undefined until they are used*) At the beginning of the game, do not send $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid}, S)$ or $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid}, C)$ to SIM_{AKE} , and leave p_u, P_u, p_s, P_s undefined. However,

(1) When \mathcal{A} sends $(\text{STEALPWDFILE}, \text{sid})$ to S , send $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid}, S)$ to SIM_{AKE} to obtain (p_s, P_s, P_c) ;

(2) When \mathcal{A} queries $F_S(\text{pw})$, send $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid}, C)$ to SIM_{AKE} to obtain (p_c, P_c, P_s) .

Observe that in GAME 9, p_s is not used unless and until \mathcal{A} sends $(\text{STEALPWDFILE}, \text{sid})$ to S (at which time the game challenger must send p_s at part of its response $\text{file}[\text{sid}]$); therefore, postponing generating p_s to the time when \mathcal{A} sends $(\text{STEALPWDFILE}, \text{sid})$ to S does not change the game. Similarly, p_c is not used unless and until \mathcal{A} queries $F_S(\text{pw})$ (at which time the game challenger must invoke $\text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(p_c, P_c, P_s)$ to generate rw as the response to \mathcal{A}); therefore, postponing generating p_c to the time when \mathcal{A} queries $F_S(\text{pw})$ does not change the game. We have that

$$\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{10}] = \Pr[\mathbf{G}_9]$$

Comparison of Game 10 and the Ideal World. We argue that in GAME 10, $p_c, P_c, p_s, P_s, \text{rw}$ and c are generated in the same way as in the ideal world.

In the ideal world SIM sets $c \leftarrow \text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(k_{pr} + 2k_{pb})$ and p_c, P_c, p_s, P_s and rw are undefined until one of the following two cases happens:

- When the adversary compromises the server, i.e., when \mathcal{A} sends (STEALPWFDFILE, sid) to \mathcal{S} (step 1 of “Stealing Password Data and Offline Queries”), SIM sends (COMPROMISE, sid, \mathcal{S}) to SIM_{AKE} to obtain (p_s, P_s, P_c) .
- When the adversary makes either a successful password test attack. This can happen in one of the following two ways:
 - If \mathcal{A} queries $F_{\mathcal{S}}(\text{pw})$ *offline* (step 2 of “Stealing Password Data and Offline Queries”); note that \mathcal{A} can query $F_{\mathcal{S}}(\text{pw})$ offline only after compromising \mathcal{S} , SIM sends (OFFLINETESTPWD, sid, pw) to \mathcal{F} , which replies “correct guess.”
 - If \mathcal{A} queries $F_{\mathcal{S}}(\text{pw})$ *online* (step 4 of “rOPRF Evaluation”), SIM checks if the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ ticket counter tx is non-zero (recall that SIM emulates $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$), and if so then SIM sends (TESTPWD, sid, ssid', pw) to \mathcal{F} where ssid' is a sub-session ID of some \mathcal{S} session for which SIM holds record $\langle \text{ssid}', \text{ACT} \rangle$, and \mathcal{F} will reply “correct guess” if \mathcal{F} holds a server session record $\langle \text{ssid}', \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{C}, \text{pw} \rangle$ s.t. $\text{PTtx}(\text{ssid}') = 1$.

In either case, given \mathcal{F} 's response “correct guess”, SIM declares \mathcal{C} COMPROMISED, sends (COMPROMISE, sid, \mathcal{C}) to SIM_{AKE} , and on SIM_{AKE} 's response (p_c, P_c, P_s) , SIM gets $\text{rw} \leftarrow \text{SIM}_{\text{EQV}}(p_c, P_c, P_s)$ and sets $F_{\mathcal{S}}(\text{pw}) \leftarrow \text{rw}$.

Observe that this interaction creates the same view to \mathcal{Z} and \mathcal{A} as GAME 10 does, at least with regards to \mathcal{A} 's view in case \mathcal{A} evaluates $F_{\mathcal{S}}(\text{pw})$, *assuming* that in the online query case SIM never encounters the case that \mathcal{A} queries $F_{\mathcal{S}}(\text{pw})$ online but either (1) tx = 0 or (2) tx > 0 but SIM holds no record $\langle \text{ssid}', \text{ACT} \rangle$ or (3) SIM holds a record $\langle \text{ssid}', \text{ACT} \rangle$ but \mathcal{F} does not hold a record $\langle \text{ssid}', \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{C}, \text{pw} \rangle$ s.t. $\text{PTtx}(\text{ssid}') = 1$. Below we argue that none of these three events can happen, and consequently the simulator SIM interacting with functionality \mathcal{F} creates exactly the view that GAME 10 does in the case \mathcal{A} evaluates $F_{\mathcal{S}}(\text{pw})$.

Note that SIM emulates $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$, and in particular it increments tx at each SNDRCOMPLETE with prfx' that does not match any \mathcal{C} 's evaluation record $\langle \text{ssid}', \mathcal{C}, x, \text{prfx} \rangle$, and it decrements it whenever tx > 0 and \mathcal{A} sends (RCVCOMPLETE, sid, ssid', \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{S}) where $\langle \text{ssid}', \mathcal{C}, x, \text{prfx} \rangle$ is one of such unmatched \mathcal{C} records, or \mathcal{A} sends (RCVCOMPLETE, sid, ssid', \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{S}) corresponding to some \mathcal{A} 's record $\langle \text{ssid}', \mathcal{A}, x, \text{prfx} \rangle$. This is the same as $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ does, so tx in SIM 's emulation of $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ has always the same value as in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$, and if $\mathcal{F}_{\text{corOPRF}}$ replies to \mathcal{A} 's online query $F_{\mathcal{S}}(x)$ then event (1) cannot happen in the simulation. Next, note that when SIM increments tx at some (SNDRCOMPLETE, sid, ssid', \mathcal{S}) query, it marks this \mathcal{S} session as actively attacked by recording $\langle \text{ssid}', \text{ACT} \rangle$, and the only way SIM can change this record to $\langle \text{ssid}', \text{USED} \rangle$, is when it sends $F_{\mathcal{S}}(x)$ and decrements tx. Therefore if tx > 0 then there must be some \mathcal{S} sessions whose status is ACT, thus event (2) cannot happen in the simulation. Finally, note that when SIM records $\langle \text{ssid}', \text{ACT} \rangle$ it sends (INTERRUPT, sid, ssid', \mathcal{S}) to \mathcal{F} , at which point \mathcal{F} sets $\text{PTtx}(\text{ssid}') \leftarrow 1$, and the only way \mathcal{F} sets $\text{PTtx}(\text{ssid}') \leftarrow 0$ is if SIM sends

$(\text{TESTPWD}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}', \text{S}, \cdot)$ to \mathcal{F} . Since SIM sends such TESTPWD query only if it holds record $\langle \text{ssid}', \text{ACT} \rangle$, event (3) also cannot happen.

GAME 11: (*Outsourcing to SIM_{AKE} the simulation of all Π_c instances of case (*) and all Π_s instances*) Replace each execution of Π_s with their simulation by SIM_{AKE}, and replace the executions of Π_c with their simulation by SIM_{AKE} for each all C sub-sessions which fall into case (*). Specifically, modify the game in case (*) as follows:

1. When C's rOPRF sub-session is completed and \mathcal{A} sends $c^*(=c)$ to C, send $(\text{USRSESSION}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{C}, \text{S})$ to SIM_{AKE} for $\text{ssid}_\Pi = [\text{ssid}||\text{prfx}]$ where prfx was determined by \mathcal{A} in the EVAL handling of this C sub-session, and record $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, \text{C}, \text{S} \rangle$ marked FRESH;
 2. When \mathcal{Z} inputs $(\text{SVRSESSION}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ to S, send $(\text{SVRSESSION}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{C}, \text{S})$ to SIM_{AKE} for $\text{ssid}_\Pi = [\text{ssid}||\text{prfx}]$ where prfx was determined by \mathcal{A} in the SDRCOMPLETE handling of this S sub-session, and record $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, \text{S}, \text{C} \rangle$ marked FRESH;
 3. On $(\text{IMPERSONATE}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{P})$ from SIM_{AKE}, if there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, \text{P}', \text{P} \rangle$ marked FRESH and GAME 11 sent $(\text{COMPROMISE}, \text{sid}, \text{P})$ to SIM_{AKE} before, mark this record COMPROMISED;
 4. While SIM_{AKE} simulates Π instances, pass messages between SIM_{AKE} and \mathcal{A} ;
 5. On $(\text{NEWKEY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{P}, \text{SK}^*)$ from SIM_{AKE}, if there is a record $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, \text{P}, \text{P}' \rangle$ not marked COMPLETED, do:
 - If the record is COMPROMISED, or P or P' is corrupted, set $\text{SK} \leftarrow \text{SK}^*$.
 - Else if the record is marked FRESH, a $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \text{SK}')$ tuple was sent to P' while record $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, \text{P}', \text{P} \rangle$ was FRESH, set $\text{SK} \leftarrow \text{SK}'$.
 - Else pick $\text{SK} \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^\tau$.
- Finally, mark $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, \text{P}, \text{P}' \rangle$ COMPLETED and send $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \text{SK})$ to P.

Clearly, an environment distinguishing between GAME 10 and GAME 11 can be turned into an environment $\mathcal{Z}_{\text{AKE2}}$ distinguishing between the real execution of Π and the simulation of Π by SIM_{AKE}. Therefore,

$$|\Pr[\mathbf{G}_{11}] - \Pr[\mathbf{G}_{10}]| \leq \epsilon_{\text{AKE}}$$

Comparison of Game 11 and the Ideal World. We argue that GAME 11 is identical to the ideal world, i.e., to the ideal world interaction where the game challenger is split into the simulator SIM and the saPAKE functionality \mathcal{F} .

Note that GAME 11 decides in the same way as GAME 7 whether a C sub-session results in C outputting $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ or falls into cases (*) and (**), and it generates the AKE keys p_c, P_c, p_s, P_s and the AE ciphertext c in the same way as in GAME 10, and we argued above that GAME 7 and GAME 10 execute these parts in the same way as the ideal world. Therefore, the only remaining part is to argue that GAME 11 is also identical to the ideal world with respect to the session keys SK output by C and S.¹⁴

¹⁴ Recall that S's output is always of the form $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \text{SK})$, while C's output is $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, \text{SK})$ in cases (*) and (**), and $(\text{ABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ otherwise; but we argued that these cases are handled in the ideal world in the same way as in game GAME 7.

The case that either C or S is corrupted is the easiest to see, because in that case \mathcal{F} passes the key received by SIM to the corresponding party. Below we assume that neither C nor S is corrupted. We split the argument into two parts:

C's output in case ():** In GAME 11, SK is determined by the output of protocol Π_c executed on behalf of C on inputs (p_c^*, P_c^*, P_s^*) , which are in turn determined by (c^*, i^*) and \mathcal{A} 's queries to F_{i^*} , as described in GAME 7. In the ideal world, as we argued in GAME 7, SIM runs Π_c on the same inputs, hence SK computed by SIM is identically distributed. At the end of Π_c , SIM sends $(\text{NEWKEY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C, SK)$ to \mathcal{F} , who will pass SK in message $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, SK)$ to C because case (**) happens only if SIM sends $(\text{TESTPWD}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C, x)$ to \mathcal{F} and \mathcal{F} replies "correct guess," at which point \mathcal{F} marked this saPAKE-layer sub-session record $\langle \text{ssid}, S, C, \text{pw} \rangle$ COMPROMISED.

C's output in case (*), and S's output in all cases: In GAME 11, SK output by party $P \in \{C, S\}$ is determined by (1) the status of record $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$ kept for this sub-session, (2) SIM_{AKE} 's message $(\text{NEWKEY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_\Pi, P, SK^*)$, and (3) whether $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, SK')$ was sent to P' at the time there was a FRESH record $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, P', P \rangle$. GAME 11 uses the same factors to decide on P's output by emulating functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$. In the ideal world, SK determined by SIM is identically distributed, because SIM also emulates $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$ and uses the same rules to determine the status of each AKE-layer session, hence factors (1)-(3) play exactly the same role in the ideal world. However, similarly to case (**) discussed above, SIM does not output message $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, SK)$ directly to P, but sends $(\text{NEWKEY}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, P, SK)$ to \mathcal{F} , who then "post-processes" these keys, using its own records for these sub-sessions, resp. $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}^\circ \rangle$ and $\langle \text{ssid}, P', P, \text{pw}^{\circ\circ} \rangle$.

We argue that this post-processing by \mathcal{F} always implements the same logic for determining SK on a given sub-session as SIM does. Specifically, we argue that the following three invariants hold:

1. If SIM passes SIM_{AKE} 's key SK^* to \mathcal{F} , i.e., if the AKE-layer sub-session record $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$ is COMPROMISED, then the saPAKE-layer sub-session record $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}^\circ \rangle$ is either COMPROMISED, or, if $P = S$, it is INTERRUPTED but $\text{flag} = \text{COMPROMISED}$.
2. If there are two AKE-layer sub-session records with matching AKE-layer sub-session ID's, i.e., $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$ and $\langle \text{ssid}'_\Pi, \text{ssid}', P', P \rangle$ such that $\text{ssid}_\Pi = \text{ssid}'_\Pi$, then it holds that (a) their saPAKE-layer sub-session ID's match as well, i.e., $\text{ssid} = \text{ssid}'$, and (b) the passwords in the corresponding saPAKE-layer sessions also match, i.e., \mathcal{F} records for these sub-sessions, $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}^\circ \rangle$ and $\langle \text{ssid}', P', P, \text{pw}^{\circ\circ} \rangle$, satisfy $\text{pw}^\circ = \text{pw}^{\circ\circ}$.
3. If two AKE-layer sub-sessions $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$ and $\langle \text{ssid}'_\Pi, \text{ssid}', P', P \rangle$ are "connected" by the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$ emulated by GAME 11 (and by SIM), in the sense that step 5 in $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$ emulation in GAME 11 output the same key SK to both sessions, then the corresponding saPAKE-layer sub-sessions $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}^\circ \rangle$ and $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}^\circ \rangle$ are FRESH.

Invariant (1) implies that if AKE-layer sub-session record $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$ is COMPROMISED then \mathcal{F} will pass SK^* output by SIM_{AKE} to P , hence key SK output by P in the ideal world is the same as in GAME 11. Invariants (2) and (3) together imply that if AKE-layer sub-session records $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$ and $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}', P', P \rangle$ (assume w.l.o.g. that the latter sub-session completes first) output the same key SK , chosen at random either by GAME 11 or by SIM in the $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$ emulation, then \mathcal{F} will replicate this behavior: First, when $\langle \text{ssid}, P', P, \text{pw}^{\circ\circ} \rangle$ completes, \mathcal{F} picks a random key $SK' \leftarrow_{\text{R}} \{0, 1\}^\tau$ as SK because, by invariant (3) this saPAKE-layer sub-session is FRESH. Second, when $\langle \text{ssid}, P, P', \text{pw}^\circ \rangle$ completes, \mathcal{F} will assign to it the same key SK' because, by invariant (3) that session will also be FRESH, and by invariant (2) since these two sub-sessions have the same AKE-layer ID's ssid_Π (otherwise they wouldn't be connected on the AKE-layer), then their saPAKE-layer ID's match too, i.e., $\text{ssid} = \text{ssid}'$, and so do their passwords, i.e., $\text{pw}^\circ = \text{pw}^{\circ\circ}$. In all other cases both GAME 11 and SIM pick a random key SK for session $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$, therefore in the ideal world regardless if \mathcal{F} passes that key to P , or it replaces it with a new choice SK' of a random key, party P outputs $(\text{sid}, \text{ssid}, SK')$ for a random key SK' , which matches the distribution of its outputs in GAME 11.

We argue that the three invariants indeed hold. We start from invariant (1). Note that a FRESH AKE-layer session $\langle \text{ssid}_\Pi, \text{ssid}, P, P' \rangle$ turns COMPROMISED if SIM_{AKE} sends $(\text{IMPERSONATE}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_\Pi, P')$ and P' is declared COMPROMISED. Consider case $P' = S$ first. S is declared COMPROMISED by SIM (and GAME 11) only if \mathcal{A} sends $(\text{STEALPWDFILE}, \text{sid})$, in which case \mathcal{F} marks the password file COMPROMISED. If SIM_{AKE} then sends $(\text{IMPERSONATE}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_\Pi, S)$ then SIM sends $(\text{IMPERSONATE}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid})$ to \mathcal{F} , at which point \mathcal{F} marks the saPAKE-layer session $\langle \text{ssid}, C, S, \text{pw}' \rangle$ as COMPROMISED if this saPAKE-layer session is FRESH. However, note that C session in case (*) does not start unless \mathcal{F} replies SUCC to SIM 's query $(\text{TESTABORT}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, C)$, which means that the saPAKE-layer C session remained FRESH after SIM 's TESTABORT query, and hence it became COMPROMISED after SIM 's IMPERSONATE query.

Consider now the case when $P' = C$. If C is declared COMPROMISED then \mathcal{A} queried $F_S(\text{pw})$, either offline or online, so SIM holds a record $(\text{FILE}, C, S, \text{pw})$, hence if SIM_{AKE} sends $(\text{IMPERSONATE}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}_\Pi, C)$ then SIM sends $(\text{TESTPWD}, \text{sid}, \text{ssid}, S, \text{pw})$ to \mathcal{F} , and since the tested password is correct, \mathcal{F} will process the saPAKE-layer session $\langle \text{ssid}, S, C, \text{pw} \rangle$ as follows: If this saPAKE-layer session was FRESH then it will become COMPROMISED, and if it was INTERRUPTED then it will remain INTERRUPTED. However, note that if \mathcal{A} queries $F_S(\text{pw})$ either offline or online, this means that either some OFFLINETESTPWD query to \mathcal{F} or some TESTPWD query to \mathcal{F} received \mathcal{F} 's response "correct guess", but at this point \mathcal{F} sets $\text{flag} \leftarrow \text{COMPROMISED}$. This means that saPAKE-layer S session is either COMPROMISED or it is INTERRUPTED but $\text{flag} = \text{COMPROMISED}$, as claimed.

As for invariant (2), part (a) is immediate because ssid_Π is formed as $[\text{ssid}||\text{prfx}]$ on each session, so equality of ssid_Π 's implies equality of ssid 's. As

for part (b), note that C session in case (*) runs only if TESTABORT does not make it abort, which means that $\text{pw}' = \text{pw}$.

We turn to invariant (3). Note that $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$ emulation, by either GAME 11 or SIM, connects these two AKE-layer session only if their AKE-layer ssid's match, i.e., $\text{ssid}_H = \text{ssid}'_H$. Note also that $\text{ssid}_H = [\text{ssid}||\text{prfx}]$ and $\text{ssid}'_H = [\text{ssid}'||\text{prfx}']$, which implies that $\text{ssid} = \text{ssid}'$ and that the OPRF transcript prefixes of this C and S sessions matched as well, i.e., $\text{prfx} = \text{prfx}'$. Note that C's AKE-layer session $\langle \text{ssid}_H, \text{ssid}, \text{C}, \text{S} \rangle$ starts FRESH in case (*), and if that session remains FRESH until NEWKEY message for it (as must be the case for $\mathcal{F}_{\text{AKE-KCI}}$ to “connect” it to the S session), then SIM does not send to \mathcal{F} any queries which would change the status of the saPAKE-layer session, i.e. the corresponding saPAKE-layer session stays FRESH. Regarding S's AKE-layer session $\langle \text{ssid}'_H, \text{ssid}', \text{S}, \text{C} \rangle$, note that when this session starts, if $\text{prfx} = \text{prfx}'$ then SIM does not write record $\langle \text{ssid}, \text{ACT} \rangle$. Consequently SIM does not send INTERRUPT for that session to \mathcal{F} , and also SIM will never choose that session, and hence will not send TESTPWD for that session to \mathcal{F} . (These are all consequences of the fact that if OPRF transcript prefixes match then SIM cannot, and does not, use this S session to evaluate S's random function F_S .) Consequently, the corresponding saPAKE-layer session stays FRESH as well, as we claimed.

Summing up all results above, we conclude that \mathcal{Z} 's distinguishing advantage between the real world and the ideal world is a negligible function of the security parameter τ , which completes the proof.