

Disappearing Cryptography in the Bounded Storage Model

Jiaxin Guan* and Mark Zhandry**

Princeton University and NTT Research, USA

Abstract. In this work, we study *disappearing cryptography* in the bounded storage model. Here, a component of the transmission, say a ciphertext, a digital signature, or even a program, is streamed bit by bit. The stream is too large for anyone to store in its entirety, meaning the transmission effectively disappears once the stream stops.

We first propose the notion of online obfuscation, capturing the goal of disappearing programs in the bounded storage model. We give a negative result for VBB security in this model, but propose candidate constructions for a weaker security goal, namely VGB security. We then demonstrate the utility of VGB online obfuscation, showing that it can be used to generate disappearing ciphertexts and signatures. All of our applications are *not* possible in the standard model of cryptography, regardless of computational assumptions used.

1 Introduction

The bounded storage model [Mau92] leverages bounds on the adversary’s storage ability to enable secure applications. A typical bounded storage model scheme will involve transmitting more information than what the adversary can possibly store. One approach is then to use some small piece of the transmission to perform, say, a one-time pad or other tasks. Since the adversary cannot record the entire transmission, they most likely will not be able to recover the small piece that is used, preventing attacks. Other approaches, say those based on taking parities [Raz16, GZ19], are also possible. In any case, the honest users’ space requirements are always much less than the adversary’s storage bound; usually, if the honest parties have space N , the adversary is assumed to have space up to roughly $O(N^2)$.

The bounded storage model has mostly been used to achieve information-theoretic, unconditional, and everlasting security; in contrast, the usual time-bounded adversary model generally requires computational assumptions.

This Work: Disappearing Cryptography. A critical feature of the bounded storage model is that the large transmission cannot be entirely stored by the adversary. This large transmission is then subsequently used in such a way that whatever

* jiaxin@guan.io

** mzhandry@gmail.com

space-limited information the adversary managed to record about the transmission will become useless. In this way, the large transmission is ephemeral, effectively disappearing immediately after it is sent.

Most work in the bounded storage model uses this disappearing communication to achieve information-theoretic security for primitives such as key agreement, commitments, or oblivious transfer, for which computational assumptions are necessary in the standard model. However, apart from insisting on statistical security, the security goals are typically the same as standard-model schemes.

The goal of this work, in contrast, is to use such “disappearing” communication to realize never-before-possible security goals, especially those that are *impossible* in the standard model.

Remark 1. The usual bounded storage model as defined in [Mau92] envisions a trusted third party broadcasting a large stream of uniformly random bits, which is assumed to be too large to store. All other communication remains short. In this work, we operate in a slightly different setting where there is no trusted third party, but the large streams are instead generated by the users themselves. Additionally, we allow the stream of bits to be structured. However, we emphasize that we still require all parties to be low space.

1.1 Motivating Examples

Example 1: Deniable Encryption. Deniable encryption [CDNO97] concerns the following scenario: Alice has the secret key sk for a public key encryption scheme. At some point, Bob sends a ciphertext ct encrypting message m to Alice. Charlie observes the ciphertext ct .

Later, Charlie obtains the ability to force that Alice reveals sk (say, through a warrant), so that he can decrypt ct and learn the message m . Alice wants to maintain the privacy of the message m in this scenario, so she reveals a fake decryption key sk' , such that decrypting ct with sk' will result in a fake message m' . This version of deniable encryption is called *receiver* deniable encryption.

Unfortunately, as shown in [BNNO11], such receiver deniable encryption is impossible for “normal” encryption where the ciphertext is just a single (concise) transmission from Bob to Alice¹. Prior works [CDNO97, CPP20] therefore consider a more general notion of encryption that involves back-and-forth communication between the parties.

In this work, we consider a different solution: what if the ciphertext is so large that it cannot be recorded by Charlie? Alice also cannot store the ciphertext in its entirety, but she will be able to decrypt it live using her secret key. Charlie, who does not know the secret key, will be unable to decrypt during the transmission. Then we may hope that, even if Alice subsequently reveals the *true* secret key sk , that Charlie will not be able to learn the message m since he no longer has

¹ The deniable encryption literature often refers to such a scheme as having two-messages, as they consider the transmission of the public key from Alice to Bob as the first message.

access to ct . Such a scheme would immediately be deniable: Alice can claim that ct encrypted any arbitrary message m' , and Charlie would have no way to verify whether or not she was telling the truth. Relative to the solution in prior work, such a scheme would then require only one-way communication, but at the expense of greatly increased communication in order to ensure that Charlie cannot record all of ct . Such a scheme might make sense in a setting where Bob is unable to receive incoming communication, or Alice is unable to broadcast.

Example 2: Second-hand Secret Keys. Consider an encrypted broadcast service where a user may buy a decoder box which decrypts broadcasts. The content distributor wants to enforce that for each decoder box, only one individual at a time can decrypt broadcasts. Specifically, the content distributor is concerned about several users trying to share a single decoder box. During broadcast time, each user records the encrypted broadcast individually. Then they pass the decoder box around to the various users, allowing them to decrypt their locally-stored broadcast one at a time. Of course, once one user decrypts the broadcast, they can simply send the decrypted contents to the other users. We imagine, however, that the contents are very large, and it is easier to send the decoder box than to transmit the large decrypted contents.

Our solution, again, is to imagine the ciphertexts being so long that they cannot be stored. As such, Alice's decoder box will be completely useless to Bob after the broadcast occurs.

Example 3: Non-interactive Security Against Replay Attacks. Consider a scenario where instructions are being broadcast from a command center to a number of recipients. Suppose that the recipients are low-power embedded devices with limited capabilities; in particular, they cannot keep long-term state nor transmit outgoing messages. We are concerned that an attacker may try to issue malicious instructions to the recipients.

The natural solution is to authenticate the instructions, say by signing them. However, this still opens up the possibility of a replay attack, where the adversary eavesdrops on some signed instruction, and then later on sends the same instruction a second time, causing some adverse behavior.

In the classical model with stateless recipients, the only way to prevent replay attacks is with an interactive protocol, since a stateless recipient cannot distinguish the command center's original message and signature from the adversary's replay. In a broadcast scenario, interacting with each recipient may be impractical. Moreover, interaction requires the recipients themselves to send messages, which may be infeasible for weak devices.

As before, our idea is to have the signatures be so large that the adversary cannot record them in their entirety. The recipients can nonetheless validate the signatures, but an adversary will be unable to ever generate a valid signature, even after witnessing many authenticated instructions from the command center. The result is non-interactive security against replay attacks.

Example 4: Software Subscription. The traditional software model involves the software company sending the software to users, who then run the software for themselves. Software-as-a-Service, instead, hosts the software centrally and allows the users to run remotely. The centralized model allows for subscription-based software services—where the user can only have access to the program by making recurring payments—that are impossible with traditional software.

On the other hand, software-as-a-service requires the user to send their inputs to the software company. While many technologies exist to protect the user data, this model inherently requires interaction with the users.

We instead imagine the company sends its software to the users, but the transmissions are so large that the users cannot record the entire program. Nevertheless, the users have the ability to run the program entirely locally *during* the transmission, without sending any information to the software company. Then, once the transmission ends, the user will be unable to further run the program.

Example 5: Overcoming Impossibility Results for Obfuscation. Program obfuscation is a form of intellectual property protection whereby a program is transformed so that (1) all implementation details are hidden, but (2) the program can still be run by the recipient. Virtual Black Box (VBB) obfuscation, as defined by Barak et al. [BGI⁺01], is the ideal form of obfuscation: it informally says that having the obfuscated code is “no better than” having black box access to the functionality. Unfortunately, Barak et al. show that such VBB obfuscation is impossible. The counter-example works by essentially running the program on its own description, something that is not possible just given oracle access. As a consequence, other weaker notions have been used, including indistinguishability obfuscation (iO), differing inputs obfuscation [BGI⁺01], and virtual grey box obfuscation (VGBO) [BCKP14]. These notions have proven tremendously useful for cryptographic applications, where special-purpose programs are designed to be compatible with the weaker obfuscation notions. However, for securing intellectual property, these weaker notions offer only limited guarantees.

Our model for transmitting programs above may appear to give hope for circumventing this impossibility. Namely, if the obfuscated program is so large that it cannot be recorded in its entirety, then maybe it also becomes impossible to run the program on its own description.

1.2 Our Results

In this work, we explore the setting of disappearing cryptography, giving both negative and positive results.

Online Obfuscation. First, we propose a concrete notion of online obfuscation, which is streamed to the recipient. We then explore what kinds of security guarantees we can hope for, motivated by Examples 4 and 5 above.

We demonstrate that, under the Learning With Errors (LWE) assumption, VBB obfuscation is still impossible. The proof closely follows Barak et al.’s proof for circuits, adapting it for online obfuscation. This rules out Example 5.

This still leaves open the hope that online obfuscation can yield something interesting that is not possible classically. We next define a useful notion of online obfuscation, motivated by the goal of classically-impossible tasks. We note that differing inputs obfuscation is known to be a problematic definition [GGH⁺13b] in the standard model. We also observe that indistinguishability obfuscation appears to offer no advantages in the streaming setting over the classical setting. We therefore settle on a notion of virtual grey box (VGB) obfuscation for online obfuscation. We formulate a definition of VGB obfuscation which allows the recipient to evaluate the program while it is being transmitted, but then loses access to the program after the transmission completes.

We give two candidate VGB online obfuscators based on very different ideas, and leave a provable secure scheme as an interesting open question.

Applications of Online Obfuscation. Next we turn to applications, establishing VGB online obfuscation as a central tool in the study of disappearing cryptography, and providing techniques for its use. We show how to use VGB online obfuscation to realize each of the Examples 1-3.

Specifically, assuming VGB online obfuscation (and other comparatively mild computational assumptions), we define and construct the following:

- Public key encryption with *disappearing ciphertext security* in the bounded storage model. Here, ciphertexts are streamed to the recipient, and message secrecy holds against adversaries with bounded storage², *even if the adversary later learns the secret key*. This solves Examples 1 and 2.
- We generalize to functional encryption with disappearing ciphertext security, which combines the disappearing security notion above with the expressive functionality of functional encryption. This allows, for example, to combine the advantages of disappearing ciphertext security with traditional functional encryption security goals of fine-grained access control.
- Digital signatures with *disappearing signature security*, where signatures are streamed, and the recipient loses the ability to verify signatures after the stream is complete. This solves Example 3.

In the following, we expand and explain our results in more detail.

1.3 Defining Obfuscation in the Bounded Storage Model

We first study obfuscation in the bounded storage model. We specifically imagine that obfuscated programs are too large to store, but can be streamed and run in low space while receiving the stream.

Negative Result for VBB Obfuscation. We show that virtual black box (VBB) security remains impossible, even for this model. Recall that VBB security requires that anything which can be efficiently learned from the obfuscated code can be

² We also require the usual polynomial *time* constraint on the adversary.

efficiently learned given just oracle access. We follow the Barak et al. [BGI⁺01] impossibility, but take care to show that it still works for online obfuscation.

The idea is that, the version of Barak et al.’s impossibility that works for circuit obfuscation already has to contend with the fact that circuits cannot be evaluated on themselves, since a circuit is almost always larger than its input size. In order to get an impossibility result for online obfuscation, we show that their attack works in low storage. The full proof is given in Section 4.

One issue that comes up in the naive adaptation of Barak et al.’s attack is that it requires the obfuscation to be streamed multiple times. We explain how to make the attack work with just a single stream using Compute-and-Compare obfuscation [GKW17, WZ17], following ideas from [AP20].

Defining Online Obfuscation. Above, we only considered the standard notions of security, but for online obfuscation. We now seek to formulate a definition which captures the goal of having the obfuscated program “disappear” after the stream is complete. Concretely, we want that, after the stream is complete, it is impossible to evaluate the program on any “new” inputs.

Our formalization of this is roughly as follows: we imagine the attacker gets the program stream, and then later learns some additional information. We ask that any such attacker can be simulated by an oracle algorithm. This algorithm makes queries to the program, and then receives the same additional information the original adversary received. Importantly, after the additional information comes in, the simulator can no longer query the program any more.

Some care is needed with the definition. VBB security, which requires the simulator to be computationally bounded, is impossible for the reasons discussed above. Indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) allows for a computationally unbounded simulator, which avoids the impossibility. While iO is immensely useful in the standard model, we observe that there is little added utility to considering iO in the online model. Indeed, an unbounded simulator can query the entire function on all inputs during the query phase, and thus has no need to make additional queries after receiving the additional information³.

We therefore give a virtual *grey* box (VGB) notion of security [BCKP14], where the simulator is computationally unbounded, but can only make a polynomial number of queries. The computationally unbounded simulator then receives the additional information, but can make no more queries. Our full definition is in Section 3. We note that it may be possible to also consider a version of differing inputs obfuscation (diO) in our setting, but there is evidence that diO may be impossible [GGHW14]. So we therefore stick to VGB obfuscation.

³ The usual way indistinguishability approach to defining iO does not use a simulator, but is equivalent in the standard model to the simulation definition. In the online model, the indistinguishability and simulation models may not be equivalent. Nevertheless, the indistinguishability version of iO still appears to offer no advantages in the online setting, since in this version the adversary knows the programs in the clear from the very beginning.

1.4 Applications

Before giving our candidate online obfuscation schemes, we discuss applications.

Disappearing Ciphertext Security. We first demonstrate how to use online obfuscation to construct public key encryption where ciphertexts effectively disappear after being transmitted. Concretely, we say that a public key encryption scheme has *disappearing ciphertext security* if the contents of a ciphertext remain hidden, even if the attacker subsequently learns the secret key.

Our first attempt is to use an online obfuscator as a witness encryption scheme [GGSW13]: the public key \mathbf{pk} is set, say, to be the output of a one-way function f on the secret key \mathbf{sk} . To encrypt a message m to \mathbf{pk} , generate an online obfuscation of the program $P(\mathbf{sk}')$ which outputs m if and only if $f(\mathbf{sk}') = \mathbf{pk}$. Decryption just evaluates the program on the secret key.

For security, the key difficulty is that we cannot switch to a hybrid where the secret key does not exist, as would be used to prove the standard CPA security of the scheme using witness encryption. After all, the adversary eventually sees the secret key, so it must always exist!

Toward a proof, we note that, by the one-wayness of f , an attacker who just knows \mathbf{pk} and sees the ciphertext cannot evaluate the ciphertext program on any input that will reveal m . Hence, m presumably remains hidden. Moreover, even if the attacker learns \mathbf{sk} after seeing the ciphertext, it should not help the attacker learn m , since the attacker no longer has access to the program stream.

Security would be trivial with online obfuscation with VBB security. However, difficulties arise with trying to formalize this intuition with our notion of VGB security. Suppose we have an adversary \mathcal{A} for the encryption scheme. We would like to use \mathcal{A} to reach a contradiction. To do so, we invoke the security of the online obfuscator to arrive at a simulator \mathcal{S} that can only query the ciphertext program, but does not have access to the program stream. Unfortunately, this simulator is computationally unbounded, meaning it can invert f to recover \mathbf{sk} at the beginning of the experiment, and then query the program on \mathbf{sk} .

Our solution is to replace f with a lossy function [PW08], which is a function with two modes: an injective mode (where f is injective) and a lossy mode (where the image of f is small). The security requirement is that the two modes are indistinguishable. Lossy functions can be built under various standard assumptions such as DDH or LWE.

We start with f being in the injective mode. In the proof, we first switch the ciphertext program to output m if and only if $\mathbf{sk}' = \mathbf{sk}$; by the injectivity of f this change does not affect the functionality of the program. Hence, the simulator cannot detect the change (even though it can invert f and learn \mathbf{sk} for itself), meaning the adversary cannot detect the change either.

In the next step, we switch f to being lossy, which cannot be detected by a computationally bounded attacker. We next change the ciphertext program again, this time to never output m . This only affects the program's behavior on a single point \mathbf{sk} . But notice that for lossy f , \mathbf{sk} is statistically hidden from the attacker, who only knows \mathbf{pk} when the ciphertext is streamed. This means the

simulator, despite being computationally unbounded, will be unable to query on sk , and thus cannot detect the change. This holds true even though the simulator later learns sk , since at this point it can no longer query the ciphertext program. Since indistinguishability holds relative to the simulator, it also holds for the original attacker. The result is the following, proved in Section 5:

Theorem 2 (Informal). *Assuming the existence of VGB online obfuscation and lossy functions, there exists a public key encryption scheme with disappearing ciphertext security.*

Extension to Functional Encryption. We can also extend disappearing ciphertext security to functional encryption. Functional encryption allows users to obtain secret keys for functions g , which allow them to learn $g(m)$ from a ciphertext encrypting m . The usual requirement for functional encryption is that an attacker, who has secret keys for functions g_i such that $g_i(m_0) = g_i(m_1)$ for all i , cannot distinguish encryptions of m_0 from encryptions of m_1 .

In Section 7, we consider a disappearing ciphertext security variant, where the requirement that $g_i(m_0) = g_i(m_1)$ only holds for secret keys in possession when the ciphertext is transmitted. Even if the attacker later obtains a secret key for a function g such that $g(m_0) \neq g(m_1)$, indistinguishability will still hold. Analogous to the case of plain public key encryption, this captures the intuition that the ciphertext disappears, becoming unavailable once the transmission ends.

We show how to combine standard-model functional encryption with online VGB obfuscation to obtain functional encryption with such disappearing ciphertext security. The basic idea is as follows. To encrypt a message m , first compute an encryption c of m under the standard-model functional encryption scheme. Then compute an online obfuscation of the program which takes as input the secret key sk_g for a function g , and decrypts c using sk_g , the result being $g(m)$.

This construction seems like it should work, but getting the proof to go through using computationally unbounded simulators is again non-trivial. In Section 7, we show how to modify the sketch above to get security to go through, yielding the following:

Theorem 5 (Informal). *Assuming the existence of VGB online obfuscation, NIZKs, non-uniform secure PRFs, and standard-model functional encryption, there exists a functional encryption scheme with disappearing ciphertext security.*

Disappearing Signatures. We next turn to constructing disappearing signatures, signatures that are large streams that can be verified online, but then the signature disappears after the transmission ends. We formalize this notion by modifying the usual chosen message security notion to give *disappearing signature security*, where the attacker (who does not know the signing key) cannot produce a signature on *any* message, even messages that it previously saw signatures for.

We show how to construct disappearing signatures in Section 6, using online obfuscation. An additional building block we need is a *prefix puncturable signature*. This is a scheme where, given the signing key sk , it is possible to produce

a “punctured” signing key sk_{x^*} which can sign any message of the form (x, m) such that $x \neq x^*$, but sk_{x^*} is incapable of signing messages of the form (x^*, m) . Such prefix puncturable signatures can be built from standard tools [BF14].

We construct a signature scheme with disappearing signatures by setting the signature on a message m to be an online obfuscation of the following program P . P has sk hardcoded, and on input x outputs a signature on (x, m) . To verify, simply run the streamed program on a random prefix to obtain a signature, and then verify the obtained signature.

We then prove that an attacker cannot produce a valid signature stream on any message, even messages for which it already received signature streams. For simplicity, consider the case where the attacker gets to see a signature on a single message m . Let x^* be the prefix that the verifier will use to test the adversary’s forgery. Note that x^* is information-theoretically hidden to the adversary at the time it produces its forgery. We will switch to having the signature program for m reject the prefix x^* . Since the program no longer needs to sign the prefix x^* , it can use the punctured key sk_{x^*} to sign instead. The only point where the program output changes is on x^* . The simulator will be unable to query on x^* (since it is information-theoretically hidden), meaning the simulator, and hence the original adversary, cannot detect this change.

Now we rely on the security of the puncturable signature to conclude that the adversary’s forgery program cannot output a signature on any message of the form (x^*, m) , since the entire view of the attacker is simulated with the punctured key sk_{x^*} . But such a signature is exactly what the verifier expects to see; hence the verifier will reject the adversary’s program. The result is the following theorem:

Theorem 4 (Informal). *Assuming the existence of VGB online obfuscation and one-way functions, there exists a disappearing signature scheme.*

1.5 Constructing Online Obfuscation

We finally turn to giving two candidate constructions of online obfuscation. We unfortunately do not know how to prove the security of either construction, which we leave as an interesting open problem. However, we discuss why the constructions are presumably resistant to attacks.

Construction 1: Large Matrix Branching Programs. Our first construction is based on standard-model obfuscation techniques, starting from [GGH⁺13a]. As in [GGH⁺13a], we first convert an NC^1 circuit into a matrix branching program using Barrington’s theorem [Bar86]. In [GGH⁺13a], the program is then “re-randomized” following Kilian [Kil88] by left and right multiplying the various branching program components with random matrices, such that the randomization cancels out when evaluating the program. We instead first pad the matrices to be very large, namely so large that honest users can record a single column, but the adversary cannot write down the entire matrix. We then re-randomize the large padded matrix.

We show that, if the matrix components are streamed in the correct order, honest users can evaluate the program in space proportional to N , the height of the matrices. However, recording even a single matrix from the program requires space N^2 , and so for adversaries with space somewhat less than N^2 , it may be reasonable to conjecture that the program “disappears” after the stream concludes.

We note that in the standard model, re-randomizing the branching program is not enough to guarantee security. Indeed, linear algebra attacks on the program matrices are possible, as well as “mixed-input” attacks where multiple reads of the same input bit are set to different values. Garg et al. [GGH⁺13a] and follow-up works block these attacks by placing the branching program matrices “in the exponent” of a cryptographic multilinear map.

In our setting, the large matrices presumably prevent linear algebra attacks, since an adversary with space somewhat less than N^2 will be unable to even record a single matrix from the program. Moreover, we show how to block mixed-input attacks by choosing the matrix padding to have a special structure, which is inspired by the classical obfuscation techniques. While we are unable to prove the security of our multilinear-map-less scheme, we conjecture that it nevertheless remains secure. The result is a plausible VGB online obfuscator for NC^1 circuits. Details are given in Section 8.

Remark 2. The re-randomization of $N \times N$ matrices samples random $N \times N$ matrices, and must compute their inverses. Inverting a random $N \times N$ matrix is impossible with space $o(N^2)$, a consequence of [Raz16]. Our basic construction thus has the sender use $O(N^2)$ space, while the receiver requires only $O(N)$ space. We show, however, how to reduce the space requirements of the sender to $O(N)$ by generating the re-randomization matrices and their inverses using PRFs. The resulting low-sender-space obfuscation scheme is secure, provided the basic construction is a secure (with large sender space) online obfuscation, and the PRF is secure. Details are given in Section 8.2.

Construction 2: Time-stamping. Our second construction is based on time-stamping [MST04] in the bounded storage model. Here, a large stream is sent. Anyone listening can use the stream to compute a time-stamp on any message. However, once the stream concludes, it will be impossible to time-stamp a “new” message. The concrete security notion guarantees a fixed (polynomial-sized) upper bound on the total number of stamped messages any adversary can produce.

Our construction uses time-stamping, together with standard-model obfuscation. To obfuscate a program P , first generate and send a random stream for time-stamping. Afterward, compute and send a standard-model obfuscation of the program P' , which takes as input x together with a time-stamp, verifies the time-stamp is valid for x , and then runs P if and only if the stamp is valid.

The intuition for security is that we can invoke the standard-model security of P' to get a simulator S' which just makes black box queries to P' . We then use the security of the time-stamping protocol to conclude that the accepting queries from the simulator, which are those containing valid time stamps, must

have been “known” when the time-stamping stream was sent. For any inputs derived from new information sent after the stream concludes, the adversary will not be able to produce a valid time stamp, and thus P' will reject any such inputs. The result is that S' should be simulatable just by making queries to P , and these queries are all made prior to receiving any additional post-stream information.

Unfortunately, turning the above intuition into a full proof appears challenging. One issue is that the obfuscation of P' serves as a verification oracle for checking the validity of time stamps. Existing time stamping security notions offer no guarantees in the presence of a verification oracle, and we do not know if the existing constructions are secure in this setting.

If we were to assume the time-stamping protocol secure even with verification queries, there are still potential problems, mostly revolving around formalizing that the simulator “knows” its input when the time-stamping stream is sent. Indeed, to prove security we need to convert our simulator S' into a simulator S which makes all of its queries by the time the stream concludes, before receiving any additional information. The above intuition would show that S' “knew” these inputs before the stream concludes, but perhaps the inputs (and their time stamps) were hidden inside of the code of S' and only revealed later, after more information is received.

We conjecture that such an S can nevertheless be constructed from S' . The idea is to have S run S' until the time-stamping stream concludes. Then S will try to extract the queries from the state of S' by simulating many possible executions of the remaining security experiment for S' and collecting the queries S' makes to P' . It then uses its assumed time-stamping verification oracle to check which queries have valid time stamps. Since S' can only know a polynomial number of valid time stamps, it seems S should eventually collect all of them. Then it can make these queries to its own oracle for P , and run S' one more time using the answers to P . Unfortunately, formalizing this idea appears tricky, and we leave it as a direction for future work.

1.6 Related Work, Discussion, and Future Directions

Never-before-possible results. The bounded storage model is most often used to eliminate computational assumptions. Time-stamping in the bounded storage model [MST04], as discussed above, is perhaps the first application of the bounded storage model beyond achieving information-theoretic security. We note, however, that non-interactive time-stamping was recently achieved in the standard model using appropriate computational assumptions [LSS19].

Our work shows that there is potentially a rich landscape of applications which leverage the bounded storage model to give results that are *impossible* in the standard model. Our particular applications can all be seen as achieving versions of *forward* security, where a key revealed does not affect the security of prior sessions. Forward security has been studied in numerous standard-model contexts (e.g. [DvW92]). However, standard-model constructions of forward secure (non-interactive) encryption such as [CHK03] always involve updating the

secret keys. Our constructions do not require the secret key to be updated. We note that Dziembowski [Dzi06] considers a notion of forward-secure storage, which is very similar to our notion of disappearing ciphertext security for encryption. A key difference is that their work only considers the secret key case, and it is unclear how to adapt their constructions to the public key setting. A natural direction for future work is to explore other potential areas besides forward security which may be impossible classically but are achievable in the bounded storage model.

Obfuscation in the bounded storage model. We also initiate the study of obfuscation in the bounded storage model. Just as standard-model obfuscation has proven to be a central tool in the study of standard-model cryptography, our work demonstrates online obfuscation is analogously a central tool in the study of disappearing cryptography. Just as standard-model obfuscation schemes started out as conjectures, with security gradually improved culminating with [JLS20], we hope that future work will improve the status of our candidates.

Besides achieving never-before-possible applications, one advantage of our setting is that we may be able to leverage the bounded storage model to achieve security under milder assumptions than is known for obfuscation in the standard model. Indeed, online obfuscation could plausibly exist *information-theoretically*, and our first construction could plausibly be an instantiation⁴. This gives hope that security can actually be proved unconditionally, without requiring the strong algebraic assumptions needed in the standard model. We leave exploring such information-theoretic security as a fascinating open question.

The quadratic gap. All prior information-theoretic results in the bounded storage model achieve at best an adversary storage that is quadratic in the honest users' storage. Our first candidate construction of an online obfuscator, being plausibly information-theoretic, inherits this quadratic gap. While some negative results are known [DM04], it remains open whether this quadratic "gap" is necessary. While our constructions are probably impractical due to the reliance on obfuscation techniques, such a quadratic gap may be meaningful in practice: for example, if the honest users' storage is 16GB, then security would be maintained against adversaries with $\sim 5ZB$, which is on the order of the total data center storage capacity world-wide in 2021 [Mli21]. On the other hand, using computational assumptions, it is possible to get an improved "gap" for time-stamping, and our second construction built from time-stamping can similarly be obtained with an arbitrarily-large polynomial gap.

Other Computational Models. It is possible to achieve classically-impossible results using either hardware assumptions (e.g. [GKR08]) or non-classical laws of physics such as quantum mechanics (e.g. [BB84]). However, as far as we are

⁴ The basic large-sender-space version would be purely information-theoretic, whereas the version with low sender space requires only the information-theoretic conjecture together with the existence of one-way functions.

aware, none of these models besides the bounded storage model allows for sending messages that effectively disappear after the transmission is over.

2 Preliminaries

Different sections of this paper rely on different cryptographic primitives. To minimize the page-turning effort of our reader, we will introduce the related notions and definitions separately in each section. Here we will just state the notations that are used throughout this paper.

We use capital bold letters to denote a matrix \mathbf{M} . Lowercase bold letters denote vectors \mathbf{v} . For $n \in \mathbb{N}$ we let $[n]$ denote the ordered set $\{1, 2, \dots, n\}$. For a bit-string $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, we let x_i denote the i -th bit of x . We use $\text{diag}(\mathbf{M}_1, \dots, \mathbf{M}_n)$ to denote a matrix with block diagonals $\mathbf{M}_1, \dots, \mathbf{M}_n$.

3 Defining Obfuscation in the Bounded Storage Model

In this section we will formally define online obfuscation ($o\mathcal{O}$) and its corresponding security notions, but before we start, we will first introduce an idea called a *stream*. It is similar to the publicly-accessible random string as in [Mau92], but now it is created and sent by one of the parties, and it does not need to be random.

A *stream* s_{\gg} is a long sequence of bits sent sequentially from one party to another. Generally, we require that the length of the stream, denoted as $|s_{\gg}|$, to be greater than the memory bound of the users and adversaries⁵. This means that a properly constructed stream can *not* be stored in its entirety. However, algorithms or programs can still take a stream as an input, reading the bits one-by-one. This means that the algorithm or program would operate in an online manner - as the streaming happens, it actively reads the stream bit by bit, performs the computation simultaneously, and produces the output in one pass. Since the outputs of such algorithms or programs could have significantly smaller sizes than the stream, while s_{\gg} itself is too large to write down, the short outputs can be reasonably stored. We denote a variable as a stream by putting a " \gg " in the subscript.

Definition 1 (Online Obfuscator). *Let λ, n be security parameters. An online obfuscator $o\mathcal{O}$ for a circuit class $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$ consists of a pair of uniform PPT machines $(\text{Obf}, \text{Eval})$ that satisfy the following conditions:*

- *Obf takes as input a circuit $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, uses up to $O(n)$ memory bits, and produces a stream $s_{\gg} \leftarrow \text{Obf}(C)$.*
- *Eval takes as input a stream s_{\gg} and an input x , uses up to $O(n)$ memory bits, and outputs $y \leftarrow \text{Eval}(s_{\gg}, x)$.*
- *For all $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$, for all inputs x , we have that*

$$\Pr [C(x) = y : s_{\gg} \leftarrow \text{Obf}(C), y \leftarrow \text{Eval}(s_{\gg}, x)] = 1.$$

⁵ Notice that generating such a stream could still be done using a low memory bound.

To define security for an online obfuscator $o\mathcal{O} = (\text{Obf}, \text{Eval})$, consider the following two experiments:

1. $\text{ExpAdv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ch}, o\mathcal{O}}(C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda, k)$:
 - The experiment consists of an arbitrary number of rounds. At each round, one of the following two scenarios happens:
 - At an *interaction round*, the adversary \mathcal{A} interacts arbitrarily with the challenger ch .
 - At a *stream round*, the adversary \mathcal{A} receives a fresh stream⁶ of the obfuscated circuit $s_{\gg} \leftarrow \text{Obf}(C)$. The challenger ch will receive a special tag notifying it that a streaming has happened.
 - The challenger ch may choose to terminate the experiment at any time by outputting a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and b will be the output of the program.
 - Whenever the number of stream rounds is greater than k , the challenger ch immediately outputs 0 and terminates the experiment.
2. $\text{ExpSim}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{ch}, o\mathcal{O}}(C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda, k, q)$:
 - The experiment consists of an arbitrary number of rounds:
 - At an *interaction round*, the simulator \mathcal{S} interacts arbitrarily with the challenger ch .
 - At a *stream round*, the simulator \mathcal{S} may send up to q adaptive oracle queries to the circuit C and receive corresponding responses. The challenger ch will receive a special tag notifying it that a streaming has happened.
 - The challenger ch may choose to terminate the experiment at any time by outputting a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$, and b will be the output of the program.
 - Whenever the number of stream rounds is greater than k , the challenger ch immediately outputs 0 and terminates the experiment.

The purpose of the interaction round is to allow the challenger to obtain auxiliary information about the circuit C , such as an accepting input. The key feature is that this auxiliary information can be obtained *after* seeing the obfuscated stream, at which point the stream effectively disappears and the adversary can no longer query the program.

We note that in the stream round, we allow the simulator to make adaptive queries. One could also imagine a stronger variant where the simulator can only send a single round of *non-adaptive* queries to the circuit in the stream round. We focus on the weaker version since it suffices for our applications and our VBB impossibility already applies in this setting.

⁶ Notice that a fresh stream is sampled every time, so that no single stream is sent repeatedly. One could also imagine a stronger version where the same stream is sent repeatedly, but to achieve that the randomness used must be small. It has also been shown that for learning parities, even just two-pass learning, where the same stream is repeated only once more, has a weaker time-space lower bound than the one-pass one [GRT19] ($\Omega(n^{1.5})$ vs. $\Omega(n^2)$). Therefore, applications are far less plausible in the setting where the same stream is repeated many more times.

Definition 2 (k -time Virtual Grey-Box (VGB) Security). Let λ, n be security parameters. Let k be a fixed positive integer. For an online obfuscator \mathcal{O} to satisfy k -time Virtual Grey-Box security under memory bound $S(n)$, we require that for any challenger ch , and any adversary \mathcal{A} that uses up to $S(n)$ memory bits, there exists a computationally unbounded simulator \mathcal{S} s.t. for all circuits $C \in \mathcal{C}_\lambda$:

$$|\Pr[\text{ExpAdv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ch}, \mathcal{O}}(C, k) = 1] - \Pr[\text{ExpSim}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{ch}, \mathcal{O}}(C, k, q) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda),$$

where $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ ⁷.

The definitions for Indistinguishability Obfuscation (iO) security and Virtual Black-Box (VBB) security are obtained analogously by applying minor changes to the VGB security definition.

Remark 3 (k -time iO Security). We modify Definition 2 to allow $q = \text{superpoly}(\lambda)$ to obtain the definition for k -time iO Security.

Remark 4 (k -time VBB Security). We modify Definition 2 to restrict \mathcal{S} to be a PPT simulator to obtain the definition for k -time VBB Security. We show in Section 4 that online obfuscators with VBB security do not exist.

Remark 5 (1-time VBB/VGB/iO Security). Under the special case where $k = 1$, we obtain the definitions for 1-time VBB/VGB/iO security correspondingly.

Remark 6 (Unbounded VBB/VGB/iO Security). Under the special case where $k = \text{superpoly}(\lambda)$, we obtain the definitions for unbounded VBB/VGB/iO security correspondingly.

4 Impossibility of VBB Online Obfuscation

In this section, we show that online obfuscation with VBB security does not exist in the Bounded Storage Model if fully homomorphic encryptions and obfuscation of multi-bit compute-and-compare programs exist. Note that both of these primitives can be built from the assumption that the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem is hard [BV11, GKW17, WZ17].

⁷ A space $S(n)$ attacker can always run the honest evaluation procedure $S(n)/O(n)$ times in parallel on different inputs, thereby evaluating the program on $S(n)/O(n)$ different points. Thus, the number of queries q the simulator makes must be at least this quantity. One could imagine an alternative definition that sets q to be *exactly* this value. We instead opt for a weaker notion where the simulator is allowed to make an arbitrarily large polynomial number of queries in order to simulate, potentially much larger than S .

4.1 Fully Homomorphic Encryption

A Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) scheme is a public key encryption scheme with an additional Eval procedure that allows arbitrary computations on the ciphertexts.

Definition 3 (Fully Homomorphic Encryption). *Let λ be the security parameter. A fully homomorphic encryption scheme for circuit class $\{C_\lambda\}$ is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$ with the following syntax.*

- $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\text{pk}, \text{sk})$ takes as input the security parameter λ , and outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk .
- $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m) \rightarrow \text{ct}$ takes as input the public key pk and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and outputs a ciphertext ct .
- $\text{Eval}(C, \text{ct}) \rightarrow \text{ct}'$ takes as input a circuit $C \in C_\lambda$ and a ciphertext ct , and outputs an evaluated ciphertext ct' .
- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct}) \rightarrow m$ takes as input a private key sk and a ciphertext ct , and outputs a decrypted message m .

In addition to the usual PKE correctness and security requirements (which don't involve Eval at all), we require correctness of homomorphic evaluations.

Definition 4 (Correctness of Homomorphic Evaluations). *A fully homomorphic encryption scheme $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Eval}, \text{Dec})$ is correct for homomorphic evaluations if for all messages m and circuits $C \in C_\lambda$,*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m) \\ \text{ct}' \leftarrow \text{Eval}(C, \text{ct}) \\ y \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct}') \end{array} \middle| y = C(m) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Gentry, Sahai and Waters [GSW13] have shown how to construct such an FHE scheme assuming the hardness of the LWE problem.

4.2 Obfuscation of Compute-and-Compare Programs

The idea of compute-and-compare programs was first raised by Wichs and Zirdelis [WZ17] in 2017. Around the same time, the work of Goyal, Koppula and Waters [GKW17] essentially shows the same result which they named “lockable obfuscation”, with some slight differences in presentation and focus. Here, we will use the notion of multi-bit compute-and-compare programs from Wichs and Zirdelis [WZ17].

Definition 5 (Multi-Bit Compute-and-Compare Program). *Given a function $f : \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{in}} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{out}}$, a target value $y \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{out}}$, and a message $z \in \{0, 1\}^{\ell_{msg}}$, a multi-bit compute-and-compare program P is defined as follows:*

$$P_{f,y,z}(x) = \begin{cases} z & \text{if } f(x) = y \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Wicks and Zirdelis [WZ17] have shown that obfuscation of multi-bit compute-and-compare programs exists, assuming the hardness of the LWE problem.

Lemma 1 ([WZ17]). *If the LWE problem is hard, then there exists an obfuscator $(\text{Obf}, \text{Eval})$ for multi-bit compute-and-compare programs such that:*

- For any multi-bit compute-and-compare program P and input x ,

$$\Pr [P(x) = w : \mathcal{P} \leftarrow \text{Obf}(P), w \leftarrow \text{Eval}(\mathcal{P}, x)] = 1.$$

- For any multi-bit compute-and-compare program P with size parameters ℓ_{in}, ℓ_{out} , and ℓ_{msg} , if the target value y for P is chosen uniformly at random, then there exists a (non-uniform) PPT simulator \mathcal{S} , such that

$$\text{Obf}(P) \stackrel{c}{\approx} \mathcal{S}(\ell_{in}, \ell_{out}, \ell_{msg}).$$

4.3 Proof of VBB Impossibility

Theorem 1. *If fully homomorphic encryptions and obfuscation of multi-bit compute-and-compare programs exist, then online obfuscators with VBB security do not exist.*

Proof. Let $\text{FHE} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec}, \text{Eval})$ be a secure FHE scheme. First, we run $\text{FHE.Gen}(1^\lambda)$ to obtain (pk, sk) , and sample uniformly at random $\alpha, \beta, \gamma \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$. Let Q be a multi-bit compute-and-compare program where f is the FHE decryption function FHE.Dec with the secret key sk hardcoded in, and $y = \beta$ and $z = \gamma$. Notice that we have:

$$Q_{\beta, \gamma}(x) = \begin{cases} \gamma & \text{if } \text{FHE.Dec}_{\text{sk}}(x) = \beta \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Let \mathcal{Q} be the obfuscated version of Q and define the program P as follows:

$$P_{\alpha, \beta}(x) = \begin{cases} \text{FHE.Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\alpha), \mathcal{Q} & \text{if } x = 0 \\ \beta & \text{if } x = \alpha \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

We assume that there exists an online obfuscator $o\mathcal{O}$ with 2-time VBB security, and consider the following adversary \mathcal{A} for the experiment $\text{ExpAdv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ch}, o\mathcal{O}}(P, k = 2)$:

- In the first stream round, \mathcal{A} receives a stream $s_{\gg} \leftarrow o\mathcal{O}.\text{Obf}(P)$. \mathcal{A} computes $o\mathcal{O}.\text{Eval}(s_{\gg}, 0)$, obtaining $\text{FHE.Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\alpha)$ and \mathcal{Q} ⁸.

⁸ If there is an interaction round before the first stream round, during which the challenger sends $\text{FHE.Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\alpha)$ and \mathcal{Q} to \mathcal{A} as auxiliary input, then we can build a similar \mathcal{A} for the experiment with $k = 1$, breaking the 1-time VBB security with auxiliary input.

- In the second stream round, \mathcal{A} receives another stream $s'_{\gg} \leftarrow o\mathcal{O}.\text{Obf}(P)$. \mathcal{A} homomorphically evaluates P on ciphertext $\text{FHE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\alpha)$ by computing

$$\begin{aligned} \text{FHE}.\text{Eval}(o\mathcal{O}.\text{Eval}(s'_{\gg}, \cdot), \text{FHE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\alpha)) &= \text{FHE}.\text{Eval}(P, \text{FHE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\alpha)) \\ &= \text{FHE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(P(\alpha)) \\ &= \text{FHE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\beta). \end{aligned}$$

- In the next interaction round, \mathcal{A} runs the program \mathcal{Q} on input $\text{FHE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\beta)$ to obtain γ . Then \mathcal{A} sends γ to the challenger.

VBB security of the online obfuscator requires that there exists a computationally bounded simulator \mathcal{S} for the experiment $\text{ExpSim}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{ch}, o\mathcal{O}}(P, k = 2, q = \text{poly}(\lambda))$. Given the security of the FHE scheme and that \mathcal{S} is only allowed $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ number of oracle queries to the program P , with overwhelming probability \mathcal{S} can obtain only $\text{FHE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\alpha)$ and \mathcal{Q} in the stream rounds. Notice that $\text{FHE}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(\alpha)$ does not depend on γ at all, and for the computationally bounded \mathcal{S} , by lemma 1, \mathcal{Q} is indistinguishable from a simulator that has no knowledge of γ . Hence, the probability that \mathcal{S} can send γ to the challenger is negligible, as opposed to \mathcal{A} , who always sends γ successfully. Therefore, a challenger can easily distinguish between the two experiments, thus breaking the 2-time VBB security of the online obfuscator. \square

5 Public Key Encryption with Disappearing Ciphertext Security

5.1 Definition

We will start by defining a security notion for public key encryption that we name *Disappearing Ciphertext Security*.

Essentially, it captures the security game where the adversary is given the private key after all of its queries but before it outputs a guess for the bit b . In traditional models, this definition does not make much sense, as the adversary can simply store the query responses, and then later use the received private key to decrypt. However, in the bounded storage model, the adversary cannot possibly store the ciphertexts, so even if the adversary is handed the private key afterwards, it cannot possibly use it to decrypt anything.

Put formally, for security parameters λ and n , a public key encryption scheme in the bounded storage model is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ that each uses up to $O(n)$ memory bits. The syntax is identical to that of a classical PKE, except that now the ciphertexts are streams ct_{\gg} . For the security definition, consider the following experiment:

Disappearing Ciphertext Security Experiment $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{DisCt}}(\lambda, n)$:

- Run $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ to obtain keys (pk, sk) .
- Sample a uniform bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
- The adversary \mathcal{A} is given the public key pk .
- The adversary \mathcal{A} submits two messages m_0 and m_1 , and receives $\text{ct}_{\gg} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_b)$, which is a stream.
- The adversary \mathcal{A} is given the private key sk .
- The adversary \mathcal{A} outputs a guess b' for b . If $b' = b$, we say that the adversary succeeds and the output of the experiment is 1. Otherwise, the experiment outputs 0.

Using this experiment, we are now able to formally define disappearing ciphertext security.

Definition 6 (Disappearing Ciphertext Security). *Let λ, n be security parameters. A public key encryption scheme $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ has disappearing ciphertext security under memory bound $S(n)$ if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} that use at most $S(n)$ memory bits:*

$$\Pr \left[\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{DisCt}}(\lambda, n) = 1 \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Now we will show how to use online obfuscation to construct a public key encryption scheme with disappearing ciphertext security. One important tool that we will take advantage of is lossy functions, which we will introduce in the following.

5.2 Lossy Function

Lossy functions are a subset of Lossy Trapdoor Functions due to Peikert and Waters [PW08] that do not require the existence of a trapdoor for the injective mode. To put formally:

Definition 7 (Lossy Function). *Let λ be the security parameter. For $\ell(\lambda) = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $k(\lambda) \leq \ell(\lambda)$ (k is referred to as the “lossiness”), a collection of (ℓ, k) -lossy functions is given by a tuple of PPT algorithms (S, F) with the following properties. As short-hands, we have $S_{\text{inj}}(\cdot)$ denote $S(\cdot, 1)$ and $S_{\text{lossy}}(\cdot)$ denote $S(\cdot, 0)$.*

- **Easy to sample an injective function:** S_{inj} outputs a function index s , and $F(s, \cdot)$ computes an injective (deterministic) function $f_s(\cdot)$ over the domain $\{0, 1\}^\ell$.
- **Easy to sample a lossy function:** S_{lossy} outputs a function index s , and $F(s, \cdot)$ computes a (deterministic) function $f_s(\cdot)$ over the domain $\{0, 1\}^\ell$ whose image has size at most $2^{\ell-k}$.
- **Hard to distinguish injective mode from lossy mode:** Let X_λ be the distribution of s sampled from S_{inj} , and let Y_λ be the distribution of s sampled from S_{lossy} , the two distributions should be computationally indistinguishable, i.e. $\{X_\lambda\} \stackrel{c}{\approx} \{Y_\lambda\}$.

5.3 Construction

Here we present our construction of a PKE scheme with disappearing ciphertext security, using online obfuscation and lossy function as building blocks.

Construction 1. Let λ, n be the security parameters. Let $\text{LF} = (S, F)$ be a collection of (ℓ, k) -lossy functions, and $\text{oO} = (\text{Obf}, \text{Eval})$ an online obfuscator with 1-time VGB security under $S(n)$ memory bound. The construction $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ works as follows:

- $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$: Sample an injective function index f_s from S_{inj} , and a uniform $\text{sk} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\ell$. Compute $y = F(s, \text{sk}) = f_s(\text{sk})$, and set $\text{pk} = (s, y)$. Output (pk, sk) .
- $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m)$: Construct the program $P_{f_s, y, m}$ as follows:

$$P_{f_s, y, m}(x) = \begin{cases} m & \text{if } f_s(x) = y \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Obfuscate the above program to obtain a stream $\text{ct}_{\gg} \leftarrow \text{Obf}(P_{f_s, y, m})$. The ciphertext is simply the stream ct_{\gg} .

- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}, \text{ct}_{\gg})$: Simply evaluate the streamed obfuscation using sk as input. An honest execution yields $\text{Eval}(\text{ct}_{\gg}, \text{sk}) = P_{f_s, y, m}(\text{sk}) = m$ as desired.

5.4 Proof of Security

Now we show that if LF is a collection of (ℓ, k) -lossy functions with a lossiness $k = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, and oO is an online obfuscator with 1-time VGB security under $S(n)$ memory bound, then the above construction has disappearing ciphertext security under $S(n)$ memory bound.

We organize our proof into a sequence of hybrids. In the very first hybrid, the adversary plays the disappearing ciphertext security game $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{DisCt}}(\lambda, n)$ where b is fixed to be 0. Then we gradually modify the hybrids to reach the case where $b = 1$. We show that all pairs of adjacent hybrids are indistinguishable from each other, and therefore by a hybrid argument the adversary cannot distinguish between $b = 0$ and $b = 1$. This then directly shows disappearing ciphertext security.

Sequence of Hybrids

- H_0 : The adversary plays the original disappearing ciphertext security game $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{DisCt}}(\lambda, n)$ where $b = 0$, i.e. it always receives $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_0)$.
- H_1 : The same as H_0 , except that in $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_b)$, we replace P_{f_s, y, m_b} with P'_{sk, m_b} such that

$$P'_{\text{sk}, m_b}(x) = \begin{cases} m_b & \text{if } x = \text{sk} \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

So now instead of checking the secret key by checking its image in the injective function, the program now directly checks for sk .

- H_2 : The same as H_1 , except that instead of sampling f_s from S_{inj} , we now use $f_{s'}$ sampled from S_{lossy} .
- H_3 : The same as H_2 , except that now we set $b = 1$ instead of 0.
- H_4 : Switch back to using injective f_s instead of the lossy $f_{s'}$.
- H_5 : Switch back to using the original program P_{f_s, y, m_b} instead of P'_{sk, m_b} .

Proof of Hybrid Arguments

Lemma 2. *If the online obfuscator oO has 1-time VGB security under memory bound $S(n)$, then no (potentially computationally unbounded) adversary that uses up to $S(n)$ memory bits can distinguish between H_0 and H_1 with non-negligible probability.*

Proof. This step actually only relies on *indistinguishability obfuscation* security of the obfuscator oO , which is implied by its online VGB security. Notice that the only difference between H_0 and H_1 is the program P_{f_s, y, m_b} and P'_{sk, m_b} being obfuscated. Now notice that if f_s is injective, and that $y = f_s(\text{sk})$, then $f_s(x) = y$ is equivalent to $x = \text{sk}$. Hence, P_{f_s, y, m_b} and P'_{sk, m_b} have the exact same functionality, i.e. on the same input x , their outputs $P_{f_s, y, m_b}(x)$ and $P'_{\text{sk}, m_b}(x)$ are always the same. Then by the VGB (or even iO) security under memory bound $S(n)$, no adversary under memory bound $S(n)$ should not be able to distinguish between the obfuscations of these two programs with non-negligible probability. \square

Lemma 3. *If LF is a collection of (ℓ, k) -lossy functions, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between H_1 and H_2 with non-negligible probability.*

Proof. This step is quite straightforward. Notice that the only difference between H_1 and H_2 is that an injective f_s is sampled in H_1 while a lossy $f_{s'}$ is sampled in H_2 . Therefore, the only way an adversary can distinguish between H_1 and H_2 is by directly distinguishing f_s from $f_{s'}$, which contradicts with the security of the lossy function that it is hard to distinguish injective mode from lossy mode.

Put formally, we show how one can use an adversary \mathcal{A} that distinguishes H_1 from H_2 to construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' that distinguishes between the injective mode and the lossy mode of the lossy function.

\mathcal{A}' receives a distribution X of function indices s sampled from either S_{inj} or S_{lossy} and it needs to tell which mode the distribution is sampled from. \mathcal{A}' would run $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$, except that now sample s directly from the distribution X . Then \mathcal{A}' simulates the rest of the disappearing ciphertext security game for \mathcal{A} by playing the role of the challenger with fixed $b = 0$. At the end of the game, \mathcal{A} should be able to tell if it is in H_1 or H_2 . If \mathcal{A} says it is in H_1 , \mathcal{A}' claims that X is sampled from S_{inj} , and if \mathcal{A} says it is in H_2 , \mathcal{A}' claims that X is sampled from S_{lossy} .

Notice that if X is sampled from S_{inj} , then the view of \mathcal{A} is identical to the one in H_1 , and if X is sampled from S_{lossy} , the view of \mathcal{A} is identical to the one in H_2 . Therefore, if \mathcal{A} succeeds in distinguishing H_1 from H_2 , \mathcal{A}' succeeds in distinguishing between the injective mode and the lossy mode. \square

Lemma 4. *If the online obfuscator oO has 1-time VGB security under memory bound $S(n)$, and the lossiness k of LF is $\text{poly}(\lambda)$, then no (potentially computationally unbounded) adversary under memory bound $S(n)$ can distinguish between H_2 and H_3 with non-negligible probability.*

Proof. First, we show that if the lossiness $k = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, the secret key sk is information theoretically hidden from the adversary before it is sent. Recall that $y = F(s', \text{sk}) = f_{s'}(\text{sk})$ where $f_{s'}$ is a lossy function. For $f_{s'}$, the size of the domain is 2^ℓ , while the size of the range is only $2^{\ell-k}$. This implies that for an image y of a random input, the number of possible pre-images is at least $2^{k/2}$, except with probability at most $2^{-k/2}$. Now if the lossiness k is $\text{poly}(\lambda)$, the number of possible pre-images is exponential, except with negligible probability. Given that the only constraint on sk is uniformly random conditioned on being a pre-image of y , it is information theoretically unpredictable from the adversary.

Now since sk is information theoretically hidden, the program P' is essentially a point function on a random point. And the only difference between H_2 and H_3 is the output of the point function. If an adversary is able to distinguish between H_2 and H_3 , this means that the adversary is able to distinguish the output of an obfuscated point function without even knowing the point. This directly presents an adversary \mathcal{A} for the 1-time VGB security game. In experiment $\text{ExpAdv}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{ch}, \text{oO}}$, the adversary \mathcal{A} is always able to obtain the output of an obfuscated point function. However, in game $\text{ExpSim}_{\mathcal{S}, \text{ch}, \text{oO}}$, the simulator \mathcal{S} is only allowed to make $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ number of oracle queries to the point function. The probability that the simulator is able to obtain the output is only $q/2^{k/2} = \text{poly}(\lambda)/2^{\text{poly}(\lambda)} = \text{negl}(\lambda)$. Therefore, the challenger can easily tell if it is interacting with the adversary \mathcal{A} or the simulator \mathcal{S} , which contradicts with the 1-time VGB security of the online obfuscator. \square

Lemma 5. *If LF is a collection of (ℓ, k) -lossy functions, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between H_3 and H_4 with non-negligible probability.*

The proof of this lemma follows analogously from the one of Lemma 3.

Lemma 6. *If the online obfuscator oO has 1-time VGB security under memory bound $S(n)$, then no (potentially computationally unbounded) adversary that uses up to $S(n)$ memory bits can distinguish between H_4 and H_5 with non-negligible probability.*

The proof of this lemma follows analogously from the one of Lemma 2.

Theorem 2. *If LF is a collection of (ℓ, k) -lossy functions with lossiness $k = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, and oO is an online obfuscation with 1-time VGB security under $S(n)$ memory bound, then Construction 1 has disappearing ciphertext security under $S(n)$ memory bound.*

Proof. The lemmas above show a sequence of a polynomial number of hybrid experiments where no PPT adversary with $S(n)$ memory bound can distinguish one from the next with non-negligible probability. Notice that the first hybrid

H_0 corresponds to the disappearing ciphertext security game where $b = 0$, and the last hybrid H_5 corresponds to one where $b = 1$. The security of the indistinguishability game follows. \square

6 Disappearing Signature Scheme

6.1 Definition

In this section, we define a public-key signature scheme in the bounded storage model which we call *Disappearing Signatures*. The idea is that we make the signatures be streams such that one can only verify them on the fly, and cannot possibly store them. The security game requirement is also different. Traditionally, for an adversary to win the signature forgery game, the adversary would need to produce a signature on a fresh new message. However, in the disappearing signature scheme, the adversary can win even by producing a signature on a message that it has previously queried. The catch here is that even though the message might have been queried by the adversary before, the adversary has no way to store the valid signature on the message due to its sheer size.

Put formally, for security parameters λ and n , a disappearing signature scheme consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver})$ that each uses up to $O(n)$ memory bits. The syntax is identical to that of a classical public key signature scheme, except that now the signatures are streams σ_{\gg} . In addition to the standard model signature security (where the adversary has unbounded space), we also require *disappearing signature security* that utilizes the following experiment:

Signature Forgery Experiment $\text{SigForge}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(\lambda, n)$:

- Run $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$ to obtain keys (pk, sk) .
- The adversary \mathcal{A} is given the public key pk .
- For $q = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ rounds, the adversary \mathcal{A} submits a message m , and receives $\sigma_{\gg} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m)$, which is a stream.
- The adversary \mathcal{A} outputs m' and streams a signature σ'_{\gg} . The output of the experiment is $\text{Ver}(\text{pk}, m', \sigma'_{\gg})$.

Notice that traditionally, we would require m' to be distinct from the messages m 's queried before, but here we have no such requirement. With this experiment in mind, we now define the additional security requirement for a disappearing signature scheme.

Definition 8 (Disappearing Signature Security). *Let λ, n be security parameters. A disappearing signature scheme $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver})$ has disappearing signature security under memory bound $S(n)$, if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} that use up to $S(n)$ memory bits,*

$$\Pr [\text{SigForge}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}(\lambda, n) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

To construct such a disappearing signature scheme, one tool that we will use alongside online obfuscation is a *prefix puncturable signature*.

6.2 Prefix Puncturable Signature

A *prefix puncturable signature* is similar to a regular public key signature scheme that works for messages of the form (x, m) , where x is called the *prefix*. Additionally, it has a puncturing procedure Punc that takes as input the secret key sk and a prefix x^* , and outputs a punctured secret key sk_{x^*} . sk_{x^*} allows one to sign any message of the form (x, m) with $x \neq x^*$. The security requirement is that, given sk_{x^*} , one cannot produce a signature on any message of the form (x^*, m) .

To put formally, in addition to the usual correctness and security requirements of a signature scheme, we also have a correctness requirement and a security requirement for the punctured key.

Definition 9 (Correctness of the Punctured Key). *Let λ be the security parameter. We require that for all $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and $x, x^* \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ s.t. $x \neq x^*$:*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \\ \sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}, (x, m)) \\ \text{sk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \text{Punc}(\text{sk}, x^*) \\ \sigma' \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}_{x^*}, (x, m)) \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

Definition 10 (Security of the Punctured Key). *Let λ be the security parameter. We require that for all $x^* \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ and $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} , we have*

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{sk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \text{Punc}(\text{sk}, x^*) \\ \sigma \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{sk}_{x^*}, \text{pk}, (x^*, m)) \end{array} \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Constructing Puncturable Signatures. Bellare and Fuchsbauer [BF14] have shown that a puncturable signature can be built from any one-way function using certificates, though their basic construction does not satisfy the strong correctness we require: their punctured key yields valid signatures, but not necessarily identical signatures. Nevertheless, it is straightforward to modify the ideas to yield a scheme with the desired correctness. For completeness, we sketch the idea here.

Theorem 3 (Strengthening of [BF14]). *Assuming one-way functions exist, so do prefix puncturable signatures.*

We start from a one-time signature scheme $\text{Gen}_{OT}, \text{Sign}_{OT}, \text{Ver}_{OT}$ and a prefix puncturable pseudorandom function $\text{PRF}, \text{Punc}_{\text{PRF}}$. Such puncturable PRFs can be built from any one-way function [BW13, KPTZ13, BGI14], as can such signatures [Rom90].

We will assume without loss of generality that the one-time signature scheme $\text{Gen}_{OT}, \text{Sign}_{OT}, \text{Ver}_{OT}$ has deterministic signing. We now describe the prefix puncturable signature scheme.

$\text{Gen}(1^\lambda)$: Run $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}') \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{OT}(1^\lambda)$ and choose a random key k for PRF. Output $(\text{pk}, \text{sk} = (\text{sk}', k))$ as the public and secret key.

$\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m)$: Let n be the bit-length of m . Let $(\text{pk}_\emptyset, \text{sk}_\emptyset) = (\text{pk}, \text{sk})$. For $i = 0, \dots, n$, do the following:

- Let $m(i)$ denote the first i bits of m .
- For $b = 0, 1, \perp$, run $(\text{pk}_{m(i)||b}, \text{sk}_{m(i)||b}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{OT}(1^\lambda; \text{PRF}(k, m(i)))$. Here, $\text{Gen}_{OT}(1^\lambda; r)$ means to run Gen_{OT} using r as the random coins.
- Compute $\sigma_{m(i)} = \text{Sign}_{OT}(\text{sk}_{m(i)}, (\text{pk}_{m(i)||0}, \text{pk}_{m(i)||1}, \text{pk}_{m(i)||\perp}))$.

Compute $\tau_m = \text{Sign}_{OT}(\text{sk}_{m||\perp}, 0)$. Finally, output $\sigma = (\{\sigma_{m(i)}\}_{i \in [0, n]}, \{\text{pk}_{m(i)||b}\}_{i \in [0, n], b \in \{0, 1, \perp\}}, \tau_m)$.

$\text{Ver}(\text{pk}, m, \sigma)$: Parse the signature as $\sigma = (\{\sigma_{m(i)}\}_{i \in [0, n]}, \{\text{pk}_{m(i)||b}\}_{i \in [0, n], b \in \{0, 1, \perp\}}, \tau_m)$. Then for each $i = 0, \dots, n$, check that $\text{Ver}_{OT}(\text{pk}_{m(i)}, (\text{pk}_{m(i)||0}, \text{pk}_{m(i)||1}, \text{pk}_{m(i)||\perp}), \sigma_{m(i)})$ accepts. Then check that $\text{Ver}_{OT}(\text{pk}_{m||\perp}, 0, \tau_m)$ accepts. If all verifications accept, accept the signature. Otherwise reject.

$\text{Punc}(\text{sk}, x^*)$: First let $k_{x^*} \leftarrow \text{Punc}_{\text{PRF}}(k, x^*)$ be the PRF key k punctured at the prefix x^* . Then for $i = 0, \dots, |x^*|$, do the following:

- Let $x^*(i)$ denote the first i bits of x^* .
- For $b = 0, 1, \perp$, run $(\text{pk}_{x^*(i)||b}, \text{sk}_{x^*(i)||b}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{OT}(1^\lambda; \text{PRF}(k, x^*(i)))$.
- Compute $\sigma_{x^*(i)} = \text{Sign}_{OT}(\text{sk}_{x^*(i)}, (\text{pk}_{x^*(i)||0}, \text{pk}_{x^*(i)||1}, \text{pk}_{x^*(i)||\perp}))$.

The punctured secret key is $\text{sk}_{x^*} = (k_{x^*}, \{\text{pk}_{x^*(i)||b}\}_{i \in [0, |x^*|], b \in \{0, 1, \perp\}}, \{\sigma_{x^*(i)}\}_{i \in [0, |x^*|]})$.

Punctured signing is straightforward: simply simulate the unpunctured signing algorithm, either using the punctured key k_{x^*} to generate $(\text{pk}_{m(i)||b}, \text{sk}_{m(i)||b})$, or if those values cannot be computed due to the puncturing, use the values explicitly supplied in sk_{x^*} . Correctness is straightforward.

For security, we switch to having all signatures given out being generated with uniform randomness, as opposed to pseudorandomly generated by PRF. By punctured PRF security, this change is undetectable. Now, however, we observe that any signature with a prefix x^* must either (1) have as a prefix the chain of signatures present in the signature on x^* , or (2) diverge from the chain of signatures for x^* at some point. If the chain is different, then the security of Sign_{OT} is broken, since the instance where the two chains diverged gives two message/signature pairs, and the adversary doesn't have the corresponding secret key (since the coins for key generation were replaced with random). If the chain has as a prefix the chain for x^* , then the adversary managed to extend this chain, despite only given a chain terminating at x^* . At the point where the chain is extended, the adversary does not have the secret key (again, the coins for key generation were replaced with random), and did not see any signature, but managed to sign a message. Again, this is a forgery for Sign_{OT} .

6.3 Construction

We now present our construction of the disappearing signature scheme.

Construction 2. Let λ, n be the security parameters. Let $\text{PPS} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver}, \text{Punc})$ be a prefix puncturable signature scheme, and $o\mathcal{O} = (\text{Obf}, \text{Eval})$ be an online obfuscator with 1-time VGB security under $S(n)$ memory bound. The construction $\Pi = (\text{Gen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Ver})$ works as follows:

- $\text{Gen}(1^\lambda, 1^n)$: Run $(\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \leftarrow \text{PPS.Gen}(1^\lambda)$, and output (pk, sk) .
- $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, m)$: Construct the program P as follows:

$$P_{\text{sk}, m}(x) = \text{PPS.Sign}(\text{sk}, (x, m)).$$

Obfuscate the above program to obtain a stream $\sigma_{\gg} \leftarrow \text{Obf}(P)$. The signature is simply the stream σ_{\gg} .

- $\text{Ver}(\text{pk}, m, \sigma_{\gg})$: Sample a random prefix $x^* \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, and evaluate the streamed obfuscated program using x^* as input. This yields

$$\sigma^* = \text{Eval}(\sigma_{\gg}, x^*) = \text{PPS.Sign}(\text{sk}, (x^*, m)).$$

Then, output $\text{PPS.Ver}(\text{pk}, (x^*, m), \sigma^*)$ as the result.

The correctness of the construction comes directly from the correctness of the underlying prefix puncturable signature scheme.

6.4 Proof of Security

Theorem 4. *If PPS is a correct and secure prefix puncturable signature scheme, and $o\mathcal{O}$ is an online obfuscator with 1-time VGB security under $S(n)$ memory bound, then Construction 2 is secure under $S(n)$ memory bound.*

Proof. We prove the security of Construction 2 through a sequence of hybrids.

Recall what happens in the signature forgery game H_0 . At the end of the game, the adversary \mathcal{A} outputs a message m' and a signature σ'_{\gg} . We verify it by sampling a random $x^* \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$, obtain $\sigma^* = \text{Eval}(\sigma'_{\gg}, x^*) = \text{PPS.Sign}(\text{sk}, (x^*, m'))$, and then output $\text{PPS.Ver}(\text{pk}, (x^*, m'), \sigma^*)$.

Now imagine that in H_1 , we sample $x^* \in \{0, 1\}^\lambda$ at the very beginning of the game. We also obtain a punctured key $\text{sk}_{x^*} \leftarrow \text{PPS.Punc}(\text{sk}, x^*)$, which we don't use yet. H_1 should be indistinguishable from H_0 for any adversary, since x^* and sk_{x^*} are never sent to the adversary.

Then we move to H_2 , where we modify the way the signature is generated in response to the adversary's *last* query. Now instead of sending the obfuscation of the program P , we send the obfuscation of the following program P' :

$$P'_{\text{sk}_{x^*}, m, x^*}(x) = \begin{cases} \text{PPS.Sign}(\text{sk}_{x^*}, (x, m)) & \text{if } x \neq x^* \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Notice that this program rejects the input x^* , but produces a valid signature on all other inputs. The only point where P and P' differ is on input x^* .

Note that before the obfuscation of P' is streamed back to the adversary, x^* is information theoretically hidden (in fact, it is fine for x^* to be later learned

by the adversary, since *online* VGB obfuscation still guarantees indistinguishability). Therefore, to distinguish between H_1 and H_2 , the adversary needs to distinguish between two obfuscated programs which differ on a single input that is information theoretically hidden. By the same argument as in Lemma 3, this would break the 1-time VGB security of the underlying online obfuscator. Therefore, no adversary with up to $S(n)$ memory bits can distinguish between H_1 and H_2 with non-negligible probability.

Now we repeat the process to modify our response to the adversary's second-to-last query and obtain H_3 , all the way until we reach H_{q+1} , where now all the signatures streamed to the adversary use P' instead of P . Since here we have a sequence of a polynomial number of hybrids that no adversary with a $S(n)$ memory bound can distinguish one from the next with non-negligible probability, no adversary with a $S(n)$ memory bound can distinguish H_{q+1} from H_0 . Notice that in H_0 , the adversary plays the original security game. However, in H_{q+1} , all the responses to the queries use P' instead of P .

Now notice that the entire game H_{q+1} can be simulated using only the punctured secret key sk_{x^*} . This should be indistinguishable even if the adversary knows x^* , since what we are relying on here is the security of the obfuscator as an indistinguishability obfuscator, and the fact that the programs being obfuscated are identical. If an adversary is able to win this game, then we can use this adversary to obtain a signature on (x^*, m) for some m , even if we only have sk_{x^*} . This directly contradicts with the security of the underlying prefix puncturable signature scheme. Therefore, no PPT adversary \mathcal{A} with $S(n)$ memory bound can win any of H_0, H_1, \dots, H_{q+1} . Since H_0 is the original signature forgery experiment, we conclude that Construction 2 is secure. \square

7 Functional Encryption

7.1 Definition

The concept of Functional Encryption (FE) is first raised by Sahai and Waters [SW05] and later formalized by Boneh, Sahai, Waters [BSW11] and O'Neill [O'N10]. Here we review the syntax and security definition of functional encryption and how they would translate to the bounded storage model.

Syntax of Functional Encryption. Let λ be the security parameter. Let $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$ be a class of circuits with input space \mathcal{X}_λ and output space \mathcal{Y}_λ . A functional encryption scheme for the circuit class $\{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$ is a tuple of PPT algorithms $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ defined as follows:

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow (\text{pk}, \text{msk})$ takes as input the security parameter λ , and outputs the public key pk and the master secret key msk .
- $\text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C) \rightarrow \text{sk}_C$ takes as input the master secret key msk and a circuit $C \in \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$, and outputs a function key sk_C .
- $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m) \rightarrow \text{ct}$ takes as input the public key pk and a message $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$, and outputs the ciphertext ct .

- $\text{Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{ct}) \rightarrow y$ takes as input a function key sk_C and a ciphertext ct , and outputs a value $y \in \mathcal{Y}_\lambda$.

We require correctness and security of a functional encryption scheme.

Definition 11 (Correctness). A functional encryption scheme $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is said to be correct if for all $C \in \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$ and $m \in \mathcal{X}_\lambda$:

$$\Pr \left[y = C(m) : \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C) \\ \text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m) \\ y \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{sk}_C, \text{ct}) \end{array} \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

For the security definition, consider the following experiment:

Functional Encryption Security Experiment $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{FE}}(\lambda)$:

- Run $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ to obtain keys (pk, msk) and sample a uniform bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$.
- The adversary \mathcal{A} is given the public key pk .
- For a polynomial number of rounds, the adversary submits a circuit $C \in \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$, and receives $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$.
- The adversary \mathcal{A} submits the challenge query consisting of 2 messages m_0 and m_1 s.t. $C(m_0) = C(m_1)$ for any circuit C that has been queried before, and receives $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_b)$.
- For a polynomial number of rounds, the adversary submits a circuit $C \in \{\mathcal{C}_\lambda\}$ s.t. $C(m_0) = C(m_1)$, and receives $\text{sk}_C \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\text{msk}, C)$.
- The adversary \mathcal{A} outputs a guess b' for b . If $b' = b$, we say that the adversary succeeds and the output of the experiment is 1. Otherwise, the experiment outputs 0.

Definition 12 (Adaptive Security). A functional encryption scheme $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is said to be secure if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} :

$$\Pr \left[\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{FE}}(\lambda) = 1 \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Now we discuss how these definitions would need to be modified for defining functional encryption in the bounded storage model. As we have seen in the PKE with disappearing ciphertext security construction, the core idea here is similar: we now produce ciphertexts that are *streams*.

Concretely, for security parameters λ and n , a functional encryption scheme in the bounded storage model consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ that each uses up to $O(n)$ memory bits. The rest of the syntax is identical to that of the classical FE scheme, except that now the ciphertexts ct_\gg are streams. The correctness requirement remains unchanged apart from the syntax change, but the security definition would need to be supplemented with a memory bound for the adversary and a slightly different security experiment $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{FE-BSM}}$. $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{FE-BSM}}$ is identical (apart from syntax changes) to $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{FE}}$ except that for function key queries submitted after the challenge query, we no longer require that $C(m_0) = C(m_1)$.

Definition 13 (Adaptive Security in the Bounded Storage Model). A functional encryption scheme $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ is said to be secure under memory bound $S(n)$ if for all PPT adversaries \mathcal{A} that use at most $S(n)$ memory bits:

$$\Pr \left[\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{FE-BSM}}(\lambda, n) = 1 \right] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

With these definitions in mind, we now present how one can construct a secure functional encryption scheme in the bounded storage model using online obfuscation. The construction will also be based on three classical cryptographic primitives: a Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge (NIZK) proof system, a secure classical functional encryption scheme, and a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF).

7.2 Construction

Construction 3. Let λ, n be the security parameters. Let $\text{NIZK} = (\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{V})$ be a non-interactive zero knowledge proof system, $\text{FE} = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ a functional encryption scheme, $\text{PRF} : \{0, 1\}^w \times \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^w$ a pseudorandom function for $w = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, and $\text{oObf} = (\text{Obf}, \text{Eval})$ an online obfuscator with 1-time VGB security under memory bound $S(n)$. We construct the functional encryption scheme $\Pi = (\text{Setup}, \text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ as follows:

- **Setup**($1^\lambda, 1^n$): Sample $(\text{pk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda)$. Sample the common reference string crs for the NIZK system. Output (pk, crs) as the overall public key. Output msk as the master secret key.
- **KeyGen**(msk, C): Sample random $x, y \in \{0, 1\}^w$. Consider the following function:

$$F_{C,x,y}(m, k) = \begin{cases} C(m) & \text{if } k = \perp \text{ or } \text{PRF}(k, (C, y)) \neq x \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Compute $\text{sk}_F \leftarrow \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, F_{C,x,y})$. Also, produce a NIZK proof π that sk_F is correctly generated, i.e. the tuple $(\text{pk}, C, x, y, \text{sk}_F)$ is in the language

$$\mathcal{L}_{\text{pk}, C, x, y, \text{sk}_F} := \left\{ (\text{pk}, C, x, y, \text{sk}_F) \mid \begin{array}{l} (\text{pk}, \text{msk}) \leftarrow \text{FE.Setup}(1^\lambda) \\ \text{sk}_F \leftarrow \text{FE.KeyGen}(\text{msk}, F_{C,x,y}) \end{array} \right\}.$$

Output the function key as $\text{sk}_C = (C, x, y, \text{sk}_F, \pi)$.

- **Enc**($(\text{pk}, \text{crs}), m$): Compute $c \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{pk}, (m, \perp))$. Then consider the following program that takes as input a function key $\text{sk}_C = (C, x, y, \text{sk}_F, \pi)$:

$$P_{c, \text{pk}, \text{crs}}(\text{sk}_C) = \begin{cases} \text{FE.Dec}(\text{sk}_F, c) & \text{if } \text{NIZK.V}(\text{crs}, (\text{pk}, C, x, y, \text{sk}_F), \pi) = 1 \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Obfuscate the above program to obtain a stream $\text{ct}_{\gg} \leftarrow \text{Obf}(P)$. The ciphertext is simply the stream ct_{\gg} .

- **Dec**($\text{sk}_C, \text{ct}_{\gg}$): Simply output $\text{Eval}(\text{ct}_{\gg}, \text{sk}_C)$.

It should be easy to verify that an honest execution yields

$$P_{c, \text{pk}, \text{crs}}(C, x, y, \text{sk}_F, \pi) = \text{FE.Dec}(\text{sk}_F, c) = F_{C,x,y}(m, \perp) = C(m)$$

as desired.

7.3 Proof of Security

We prove the security of Construction 3 via a sequence of hybrid experiments.

Sequence of Hybrids

- H_0 : The adversary plays the functional encryption game $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{FE-BSM}}(\lambda, n)$ where $b = 0$, i.e. it always receives $\text{Enc}(\text{pk}, m_0)$.
- H_1 : The same as H_0 , except that when answering the challenge query by the adversary, we sample a random key $k \in \{0, 1\}^w$. Notice that we don't change anything in the response to the challenge query yet. For any function key query that happens after the challenge query, instead of sampling $x \in \{0, 1\}^w$ randomly, we set $x = \text{PRF}(k, (C, y))$, where C is the circuit being queried on by the adversary.
- H_2 : The same as H_1 , except that when answering the challenge query, we compute $c' \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{pk}, (m_b, k))$ instead of $c \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{pk}, (m_b, \perp))$.
- H_3 : The same as H_2 , except that now the crs and the proof π of the NIZK system are generated by the NIZK simulator.
- H_4 : The same as H_3 , except that now we set $b = 1$ instead of 0.
- H_5 : Switch back to the original method of generating crs and the proof π for the NIZK system.
- H_6 : Switch back to use c instead of c' .
- H_7 : Switch back to sampling random x for the function key queries that happen after the challenge query.

Proof of Hybrid Arguments

Lemma 7. *If PRF is a secure pseudorandom function, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between H_0 and H_1 with non-negligible probability.*

Proof. Notice that only difference between H_0 and H_1 is that instead of sampling a random x , x is computed as $\text{PRF}(k, (C, y))$ where k is unknown to the adversary. The indistinguishability between H_0 and H_1 comes directly from the pseudorandomness of the underlying PRF.

Concretely, we show how one can use an adversary \mathcal{A} that distinguishes H_0 from H_1 to construct an adversary \mathcal{A}' that distinguishes the underlying PRF from a truly random function. When \mathcal{A}' is given a function f in question, \mathcal{A}' would simulate for \mathcal{A} the functional encryption security game $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}, \Pi}^{\text{FE-BSM}}$ with $b = 0$. The only difference is that once after \mathcal{A} has sent the challenge query, in the following function key queries, \mathcal{A}' would sample a random y , and compute the x 's as $x = f(C, y)$. Notice that in the case where f is a PRF, we would have $x = \text{PRF}(k, (C, y))$, whereas if f is a truly random function, we would end up having a uniformly random x . Notice that these two cases exactly correspond to H_1 and H_0 , respectively. If \mathcal{A} determines that it is in H_0 , \mathcal{A}' outputs that the function f is a truly random function. Otherwise, \mathcal{A}' claims that the function f is a pseudorandom function. If \mathcal{A} succeeds with a non-negligible probability, \mathcal{A}' succeeds with non-negligible probability as well. \square

Lemma 8. *If the NIZK system is statistically sound, PRF is a secure pseudo-random function against non-uniform attackers, and the online obfuscator \mathcal{O} has 1-time VGB security under memory bound $S(n)$, then no PPT adversary with memory bound $S(n)$ can distinguish between H_1 and H_2 with non-negligible probability.*

Proof. The difference between H_1 and H_2 is that we now use c' instead of c . However, notice that c and c' are never used directly, but only hardcoded into the program P . Therefore, the only way that an adversary can distinguish between H_1 and H_2 is by distinguishing the two obfuscated programs. Let P be the program obfuscated in H_1 that has c hardcoded and P' be the program obfuscated in H_2 with c' hardcoded. Let us consider how P and P' differ in functionality.

Notice that $\text{NIZK.V}(\text{crs}, (\text{pk}, C, x, y, \text{sk}_F), \pi)$ does not depend on c or c' , so P and P' will always fall into the same branch. Without loss of generality, here we consider the non-trivial branch, where the NIZK proof verifies correctly and the program outputs $\text{FE.Dec}(\text{sk}_F, c)$. Since the NIZK proof checks out and that the NIZK system has statistical soundness, we have that sk_F is a correctly generated function key. Therefore, the program P outputs $\text{FE.Dec}(\text{sk}_F, c) = F_{C,x,y}(m, \perp)$, and the program P' outputs $F_{C,x,y}(m, k)$. Notice that $F_{C,x,y}(m, \perp)$ always yields $C(m)$, and that $F_{C,x,y}(m, k)$ yields $C(m)$ unless $\text{PRF}(k, (C, y)) = x$. In other words, P and P' always have the same output except for on inputs where $\text{PRF}(k, (C, y)) = x$.

Now recall that as the obfuscated program is being streamed, k has just been freshly sampled and not used anywhere else. Therefore, k is information theoretically hidden from the adversary. Since PRF is a pseudorandom function against non-uniform attackers, the value of $\text{PRF}(k, (C, y))$ should also be information theoretically hidden from the adversary. Now that we have P and P' differing only on inputs that are information theoretically hidden, by a similar argument as in Lemma 3, by the 1-time VGB security of the online obfuscator, any PPT adversary under memory bound $S(n)$ should not be able to distinguish between the obfuscations of P and P' with non-negligible probability. Consequently, no PPT adversary with memory bound $S(n)$ can distinguish between H_1 and H_2 with non-negligible probability. \square

Lemma 9. *If the NIZK system is zero-knowledge, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between H_2 and H_3 with non-negligible probability.*

This lemma follows directly from the definition of zero-knowledgeness for NIZK.

Lemma 10. *If the underlying functional encryption scheme FE is secure, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between H_3 and H_4 with non-negligible probability.*

Proof. The only difference between H_3 and H_4 is that a different value of c is computed. In H_3 , $c \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{pk}, (m_0, k))$, while in H_4 , $c \leftarrow \text{FE.Enc}(\text{pk}, (m_1, k))$.

We show that if an adversary \mathcal{A} can distinguish between H_3 and H_4 , then there is an adversary \mathcal{A}' for the $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}', \Pi}^{\text{FE}}$ game that uses \mathcal{A} as a subroutine:

- When \mathcal{A}' receives the public key pk from the challenger, use the NIZK simulator to sample the crs , and send (pk, crs) to \mathcal{A} .
- Whenever \mathcal{A} submits a function key query for circuit C before the challenge query, \mathcal{A}' samples random x, y , and sends $F_{C,x,y}$ to the challenger. In response, \mathcal{A}' receives sk_F . \mathcal{A}' then runs the NIZK simulator to produce the proof π . \mathcal{A}' sends $(C, x, y, \text{sk}_F, \pi)$ back to \mathcal{A} .
- When \mathcal{A} submits a challenge query with m_0 and m_1 , \mathcal{A}' samples k and sends (m_0, k) and (m_1, k) as its own challenge query to the challenger. When \mathcal{A}' receives the ciphertext c , \mathcal{A}' constructs $P_{c,\text{pk},\text{crs}}$ and sends the obfuscation of P back to \mathcal{A} .
- For function key queries received after the challenge query, follow the same procedure as above, except that now use $x = \text{PRF}(k, (C, y))$.
- If \mathcal{A} says that it is in H_3 , output 0. Otherwise, output 1.

We verify that the $\text{Dist}_{\mathcal{A}', \Pi}^{\text{FE}}$ game that \mathcal{A}' plays is valid: (1) For all the function key queries F that are sent before the challenge query, either $F_{C,x,y}(m_0, k) = C(m_0) = C(m_1) = F_{C,x,y}(m_1, k)$, or $F_{C,x,y}(m_0, k) = F_{C,x,y}(m_1, k) = \perp$. (2) For all function key queries F that are sent after the challenge query, $F_{C,x,y}(m_0, k) = F_{C,x,y}(m_1, k) = \perp$.

Notice that \mathcal{A}' simulates the exact game for \mathcal{A} where it needs to distinguish between H_3 and H_4 . So if \mathcal{A} succeeds with non-negligible probability, \mathcal{A}' also succeeds with non-negligible probability, which contradicts with the security of the underlying FE scheme.

Thus, by the security of the underlying FE scheme, no PPT adversary can distinguish between H_3 and H_4 with non-negligible probability. \square

Lemma 11. *If the NIZK system is zero-knowledge, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between H_4 and H_5 with non-negligible probability.*

This lemma follows directly from the definition of zero-knowledgeness for NIZK.

Lemma 12. *If the NIZK system is statistically sound, PRF is a secure pseudorandom function against non-uniform attackers, and the online obfuscator \mathcal{O} has 1-time VGB security under memory bound $S(n)$, then no PPT adversary with memory bound $S(n)$ can distinguish between H_5 and H_6 with non-negligible probability.*

The proof of this lemma follows analogously from the one of lemma 8.

Lemma 13. *If PRF is a secure pseudorandom function, then no PPT adversary can distinguish between H_6 and H_7 with non-negligible probability.*

The proof of this lemma follows analogously from the one of lemma 7.

Theorem 5. *If NIZK is zero-knowledge and statistically sound, PRF is a secure pseudorandom function against non-uniform attackers, FE is a secure functional encryption scheme, and the online obfuscator \mathcal{O} has 1-time VGB security under $S(n)$ memory bound, then Construction 3 is secure under $S(n)$ memory bound.*

Proof. The lemmas above show a sequence of a polynomial number of hybrid experiments where no PPT adversary with $S(n)$ memory bound can distinguish one from the next with non-negligible probability. Notice that the first hybrid H_0 corresponds to the functional encryption security game where $b = 0$, and the last hybrid H_7 corresponds to one where $b = 1$. The security of the construction follows. \square

8 Candidate Construction 1

Here, we give a candidate online obfuscation scheme, for NC^1 circuits. This suffices for our applications, provided the underlying building blocks can be computed in NC^1 . Note that we might heuristically be able to bootstrap our scheme to all circuits using FHE, but such bootstrapping (e.g. [GGH⁺13a]) is not known to provably apply to VGB obfuscation. In Section 9, we give a very different construction that directly yields VGB obfuscation.

8.1 Matrix Branching Programs

A *matrix branching program* BP of length h , width w , and input length ℓ consists of an input selection function $\text{inp} : [h] \rightarrow [\ell]$, $2h$ matrices $\{\mathbf{M}_{i,b} \in \{0,1\}^{w \times w}\}_{i \in [h]; b \in \{0,1\}}$, a left bookend that is a row matrix $\mathbf{s} \in \{0,1\}^{1 \times w}$, and a right bookend that is a column matrix $\mathbf{t} \in \{0,1\}^{w \times 1}$. BP is evaluated on input $x \in \{0,1\}^\ell$ by computing $\text{BP}(x) = \mathbf{s} \left(\prod_{i \in [h]} \mathbf{M}_{i, x_{\text{inp}(i)}} \right) \mathbf{t}$.

We say that a family of matrix branching programs are *input-oblivious* if all programs in the family share the same parameters h , w , ℓ , and the input selection function inp .

Lemma 14 (Barrington’s Theorem [Bar86]). *For a circuit C of depth d where each gate takes at most 2 inputs, we can construct a corresponding matrix branching program BP with width 5 and $h = 4^d$.*

8.2 The Basic Framework

Here we present the basic framework of an online obfuscator based on matrix branching programs. Our framework will be parameterized by a randomized procedure **Convert**, which takes as input a log-depth circuit C and width w , and produces a branching program of length $h = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and width w . w will be chosen so that the honest parties only need $O(w)$ space to evaluate the program as it is streamed, while security is maintained even if the adversary has up to γw^2 space, for some small constant γ .

Since the branching program BP will be too large for a space bounded obfuscator to write down, we will need to provide a local, space-efficient way to compute each entry of the branching program, given the circuit C and the random coins of **Convert**.

Note that Barrington’s theorem implies, for log-depth circuits, that $h = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and that w can be taken as small as 5. **Convert** can be thought of as some procedure to expand the width to match the desired space requirements, and also enforce other security properties, as discussed in Section 8.3, where we discuss our particular instantiation of the framework.

Our basic framework actually consists of three schemes. As we will demonstrate, the three schemes have equivalent security, under the assumed existence of a pseudorandom function. The first scheme is much simpler, highlights the main idea of our construction, and allows us to more easily explore security. The downside of the first scheme is that the obfuscator requires significant space, namely more than the adversary. We therefore present two additional schemes with equivalent security, where the final scheme allows the obfuscator to run in space $O(w)$, while having equivalent security to the original scheme.

Construction with Kilian Randomization. We start with the first and simpler scheme, denoted \mathcal{O}_{Kil} , that uses randomization due to Kilian [Kil88] to construct a matrix branching program BP' as follows.

Sample random invertible matrices $\mathbf{R}_i \in \{0, 1\}^{w \times w}$ for $i = 0, 1, \dots, h$. Compute $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b} = \mathbf{R}_{i-1}^{-1} \mathbf{M}_{i,b} \mathbf{R}_i$ for $i \in [h]$ and $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Additionally, compute new bookends $\mathbf{s}' = \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{R}_0$, and $\mathbf{t}' = \mathbf{R}_h^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{t}$. The new randomized matrix branching program is now $\text{BP}' = (\text{inp}, \{\mathbf{M}'_{i,b}\}_{i \in [h]; b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{s}', \mathbf{t}')$. Notice that when we compute $\text{BP}'(x)$, these random matrices will cancel each other out and hence the output of the program should be unchanged.

Now to turn BP' into an online obfuscator, all we need to do is to properly stream the branching program. Here we specify the order that the matrices will be streamed:

$$\mathbf{s}', \mathbf{M}'_{1,0}, \mathbf{M}'_{1,1}, \mathbf{M}'_{2,0}, \mathbf{M}'_{2,1}, \dots, \mathbf{M}'_{h,0}, \mathbf{M}'_{h,1}, \mathbf{t}'.$$

When streaming a matrix \mathbf{M} , we require that the matrix \mathbf{M} is streamed column by column, i.e. we start by sending the first column of \mathbf{M} , followed by the second column, then the third, so on and so forth.

Now let’s take a look at how to evaluate the obfuscated program, i.e. the matrix branching program sent over the stream. Notice that we would need to do this using only space linear to w .

To evaluate the program, we will keep a row matrix $\mathbf{v} \in \{0, 1\}^{1 \times w}$ as our partial result. When the streaming begins, we will set $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{s}'$ received over the stream.

For $i \in [h]$, we will compute $b = x_{\text{inp}(i)}$ and listen to the stream of $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b}$. Let the columns of $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b}$ be $\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2, \dots, \mathbf{c}_w$. Since $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b}$ is streamed column by column, we will receive on the stream $\mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{c}_2, \dots, \mathbf{c}_w$. As the columns are being streamed,

we will compute an updated partial result $\mathbf{v}' = (v_1, v_2, \dots, v_w)$ on the fly. As we receive \mathbf{c}_j for $j \in [w]$, we would compute $v_j = \mathbf{v} \cdot \mathbf{c}_j$. After all the columns of $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b}$ have been streamed and that \mathbf{v}' has been fully computed, we set $\mathbf{v} = \mathbf{v}'$.

In the end after we receive \mathbf{t}' , we output $\mathbf{BP}'(x) = \mathbf{v} \cdot \mathbf{t}'$.

Notice that throughout the evaluation process, we use at most $2w$ memory bits, which is linear to w .

However, one issue with this construction is that running the obfuscator requires computing products of matrices of size $w \times w$, and this inherently requires $O(w^2)$ space. Next up, we will show how we can use pseudorandom functions (PRFs) to help us carry out the randomization process using only space linear to w .

Construction with Elementary Random Row and Column Operations.

We will now give an alternate construction based on elementary row operations \mathcal{O}_{ER} , which will improve on the space requirements of the obfuscator. Namely, the obfuscator will still have a large source of randomness, which we will assume can be queried many times. However, other than the randomness, the only additional space that is required will be $O(w)$.

Since we are working mod 2, there is no scaling, so the only elementary row operations are (1) $\mathbf{B}_{i,j}$ which adds row j to row i , and (2) $\mathbf{C}_{i,j}$ which swaps rows i, j . $\mathbf{B}_{i,j}, \mathbf{C}_{i,j}$ are also represented as matrices, obtained by performing the relevant row operation to the identity matrix. Notice that $\mathbf{C}_{i,j} = \mathbf{B}_{i,j} \cdot \mathbf{B}_{j,i} \cdot \mathbf{B}_{i,j}$. Therefore, we consider just the $\mathbf{B}_{i,j}$. Also notice that $\mathbf{B}_{i,j}^{-1} = \mathbf{B}_{i,j}$ since we are working mod 2. Finally, note that $\mathbf{B}_{i,j}$ corresponds to the *column* operation which adds column i into column j (notice the swapped order of i and j here). It will be convenient to let $\mathbf{B}_{i,i}$ denote the identity matrix.

\mathcal{O}_{ER} will sample the Kilian randomizing matrices \mathbf{R} from \mathcal{O}_{Kil} by sampling a sequence $\mathbf{B}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{B}^{(\tau)}$ of row operations, and setting $\mathbf{R} = \prod_{t=1}^{\tau} \mathbf{B}^{(t)}$ and $\mathbf{R}^{-1} = \prod_{t=\tau}^1 \mathbf{B}^{(t)}$. Note that each \mathbf{B} matrix is specified by a pair $(i, j) \in [w], i \neq j$, and hence only needs space $O(w)$ to store. For each matrix \mathbf{R}_i , we generate such a sequence. We will explain how to sample the row operations shortly. First, we explain, given query access to the \mathbf{B} 's (or really, the (i, j) pairs), how to compute the obfuscated program stream.

We need to explain how to construct and stream \mathbf{BP}' . To generate the bookend vector $\mathbf{s}' = \mathbf{s} \cdot \mathbf{R}_0$, start with $\mathbf{s}' = \mathbf{s}$, write \mathbf{R}_0 as $\prod_{t=1}^{\tau} \mathbf{B}^{(0,t)}$, interpret each of the $\mathbf{B}^{(0,t)}$ as a column operation, and apply the appropriate column operation to \mathbf{s}' in order from $t = 1, \dots, \tau$. To generate the other bookend vector $\mathbf{t}' = \mathbf{R}_h \cdot \mathbf{t}$, we start with $\mathbf{t}' = \mathbf{t}$, write \mathbf{R}_h^{-1} as $\prod_{t=\tau}^1 \mathbf{B}^{(h,t)}$, interpret each of the $\mathbf{B}^{(h,t)}$ as a row operation, and apply the appropriate row operation to \mathbf{t}' . Both operations clearly take only space $O(w)$, in addition to the storage requirements for the \mathbf{B} matrices.

For the $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b} = \mathbf{R}_{i-1}^{-1} \mathbf{M}_{i,b} \mathbf{R}_i$, more care is needed. First, we need a subroutine which, for input α , computes \mathbf{r}_α , the α -th row of $\mathbf{M}_{i,b} \cdot \mathbf{R}_i$. This subroutine works almost exactly the same as our computation of \mathbf{s}' above. The β -th

entry of \mathbf{r}_α gives the entry (α, β) of $\mathbf{M}_{i,b} \cdot \mathbf{R}_i$. We can thus compute \mathbf{c}_β , the β -th column of $\mathbf{M}_{i,b} \cdot \mathbf{R}_i$, element by element.

To compute an entry (α, β) of $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b}$, we first compute the corresponding column \mathbf{c}_β . We then compute $\mathbf{c}'_\beta = \mathbf{R}_{i-1}^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{c}_\beta$, analogous to how we computed \mathbf{t}' . Then we output entry α of \mathbf{c}'_β .

Now we explain how to sample the sequence $\mathbf{B}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{B}^{(\tau)}$. We will use the following lemma:

Lemma 15. *There exist constants γ_0, γ_1 such that the following is true. For every w , there exists a sequence of integers d_1, \dots, d_τ and distributions D_1, \dots, D_τ , $\tau \leq \gamma_0 w, d_t \leq \gamma_1 w$, where each D_t is a distribution over a sequence of d_t of the \mathbf{B} matrices. The guarantee is that if the sequences $\mathbf{B}^{(t,1)}, \dots, \mathbf{B}^{(t,d_t)}$ are sampled from D_t (each sequence independently), then $\mathbf{R} = \prod_{t=1}^\tau \prod_{i=1}^{d_t} \mathbf{B}^{(t,i)}$ is distributed identically to a uniform random $\mathbf{R} \bmod 2$, conditioned on \mathbf{R} being invertible.*

Proof. The proof follows ideas from Randall [Ran93].

The base case $w = 1$ is trivial: the only invertible matrix mod 2 is 1. So we set $\tau = 0$ in this case.

We now assume the lemma holds true for $w - 1$. Thus, there is a sequence of $\gamma_0(w - 1)$ distributions over sequences of $\gamma_1(w - 1)$ row operations generating a random $(w - 1) \times (w - 1)$ matrix \mathbf{R}' . We will construct \mathbf{R} from \mathbf{R}' as follows.

- First let

$$\mathbf{R}_0 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & 0 \\ 0 & \mathbf{R}' \end{pmatrix}.$$

- Next, construct \mathbf{R}_1 , which fills in the zeros of the first row with uniform random bits:

$$\mathbf{R}_1 = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \mathbf{x} \\ 0 & \mathbf{R}' \end{pmatrix} = \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \mathbf{x} \\ 0 & \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix} \cdot \mathbf{R}_0$$

for a random row vector \mathbf{x} . Note that the matrix $\begin{pmatrix} 1 & \mathbf{x} \\ 0 & \mathbf{I} \end{pmatrix}$ can be constructed from a sequence of $w - 1$ row operations. Also note that \mathbf{R}_1 is a uniformly random matrix, conditioned on the first column being 10^{w-1} and the matrix being invertible. This follows from the fact that, for matrices with the given first column, having determinant 1 (the only invertible possibility mod 2) is equivalent to having $\det(\mathbf{R}_0) = 1$. Thus, a random invertible matrix with the given first column is identical to choosing a random \mathbf{x} , and then choosing a random invertible \mathbf{R}_0 .

- Next, sample a random non-zero column vector $\mathbf{y} \in \{0, 1\}^w \setminus 0^w$. Let \mathbf{C} be any invertible matrix such that $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{C} \cdot 10^{w-1}$. As explained by [Ran93], \mathbf{C} is actually a bijection between the set of invertible matrices whose first column is \mathbf{y} and the set of invertible matrices whose first column is 10^{w-1} . Thus, setting $\mathbf{R}_2 = \mathbf{C} \cdot \mathbf{R}_1$ will result in a uniformly random matrix \mathbf{R}_2 . Note that \mathbf{C} can be taken to be constructed from a sequence of $w + 2$ of the \mathbf{B} matrices: 3 to swap the first column with some non-zero position of \mathbf{y} , and then $w - 1$ additional ones to fill in the remaining positions of \mathbf{y} .

Thus, we can take $d_t \leq w + 2$, and we have that $\gamma_0 w = \tau \leq 2 + \gamma_0(w - 1)$. We can take $\tau = 2w$ to solve the recurrence. This completes the proof. \square

Thus, we will use Lemma 15 to construct the distributions D_t , and then sample the matrices $\mathbf{B}^{(t,i)}$ from D_t . Lemma 15 shows that the \mathbf{R} matrices, and hence the view of the adversary, are indistinguishable.

Eliminating Space with PRFs. We now turn to the final construction, which eliminates all but $O(w)$ from the obfuscator’s space requirements.

\mathcal{O}_{PRF} will work exactly as \mathcal{O}_{ER} , except that instead of sampling truly random samples from D_t , it will do the following. For each \mathbf{R} matrix, it will sample a uniformly random key k for a pseudorandom function PRF. Then matrix sequence $\mathbf{B}^{(t,i)}$ will be computed as $D_t(\cdot; \text{PRF}(k, t))$. That is, it will use $\text{PRF}(k, t)$ as the random coins needed by D_t . In this way, it can generate the $\mathbf{B}^{(t,i)}$ matrices on the fly, without having to store them. Since each sequence of \mathbf{B} matrices requires space at most $O(w)$ (recall that each \mathbf{B} matrix can be represented by a pair $(i, j) \in [w]$), it can generate the matrices space efficiently. By the security of the PRF, the following is immediate:

Lemma 16. *For any choice of Convert, assuming PRF is a secure PRF and \mathcal{O}_{Kil} is k -time VGB secure when using Convert, then \mathcal{O}_{PRF} is k -time VGB secure when using Convert.*

Thus, it suffices to analyze \mathcal{O}_{Kil} for a given choice of algorithm Convert; then we can instantiate \mathcal{O}_{PRF} with Convert, and be guaranteed that security will carry over.

8.3 Instantiating Convert

Now we will discuss how we specifically instantiate Convert, constructing the branching program BP for a circuit C that we plug into our framework.

To motivate our construction, we recall that Barrington’s theorem [Bar86] plus Kilian randomization [Kil88] already provides *some* very mild security: given the matrices corresponding to an evaluation on any chosen input x (which selects one matrix from each matrix pair), the set of matrices information-theoretically hides the entire program, save for the output of the program on x .

This one-time security, however, is clearly not sufficient for full security. For starters, the adversary can perform *mixed-input* attacks, where it selects a single matrix from each pair, but for multiple reads of the same input, it chooses different matrices. This allows the attacker to treat the branching program as a read-once branching program. It may be that, by evaluating on such inputs, the adversary learns useful information about the program.

Another problem is linear-algebraic attacks. The rank of each matrix is preserved under Kilian randomization. Assuming all matrices are full-rank (which is true of Barrington’s construction), the eigenvalues of $\mathbf{M}_{i,0} \cdot \mathbf{M}_{i,1}^{-1}$ are preserved under Kilian randomization.

In branching program obfuscation starting from [GGH⁺13a], multi-linear maps are used to block these attacks. In our setting, we will instead use the storage bounds on the attacker. First, we observe that Raz [Raz16] essentially shows that linear-algebraic attacks are impossible if the attacker cannot even record the matrices being streamed. While we do not know how to apply Raz’s result to analyze our scheme, we conjecture that for appropriately chosen matrices, it will be impossible to do linear-algebraic attacks.

The next main problem is to enforce input consistency to prevent mixed-input attacks. To accomplish this, we will do the following. We will first run Barrington’s theorem to get a branching program consisting of 5×5 matrices. We will then construct an “input consistency check” branching program, and glue the two programs together.

As a starting point, we will construct a *read-once* matrix branching program BP_1 (one that reads each input bit exactly once) that outputs 0 on an all-zero or all-one input string, and outputs 1 on all other inputs. Looking forward, we will insert this program into the various reads of a single input bit: any honest evaluation will cause the branching program to output 0, whereas an evaluation that mixes different reads of this bit will cause the program to output 1.

Matrix Branching Program BP_1 :

- The width, the length, and the input length of the branching program are all L .
- inp is the identity function, i.e. $\mathbf{M}_{i,b}$ reads x_i as input.
- For $i \in [L]$, $\mathbf{M}_{i,0} = \mathbf{I}_L$ where \mathbf{I}_L is the $L \times L$ identity matrix. $\mathbf{M}_{i,1}$ is the $L \times L$ permutation matrix representing shifting by 1. Specifically,

$$\mathbf{M}_{i,1} = \begin{pmatrix} 0^{(L-1) \times 1} & \mathbf{I}_{L-1} \\ 1 & 0^{1 \times (L-1)} \end{pmatrix}.$$

- The left bookend is $\mathbf{s} = (1\ 0\ 0 \cdots 0)$ and the right bookend is $\mathbf{t} = (0\ 1\ 1 \cdots 1)^T$.

We now briefly justify why BP_1 works as desired. Let $0 \leq w(x) \leq L$ be the Hamming weight of the input x . Notice that when evaluating $\text{BP}_1(x)$, the number of $\mathbf{M}_{i,1}$ matrices chosen is exactly $w(x)$, and the rest of the chosen matrices are all $\mathbf{M}_{i,0}$, the identity matrix. Therefore, the product of all the \mathbf{M} matrices is equivalent to a permutation matrix representing shifting by $w(x)$. When this product is left-multiplied by $\mathbf{s} = (1\ 0\ 0 \cdots 0)$, we get a resulting row matrix \mathbf{s}' that is equivalent to \mathbf{s} right-shifted by $w(x)$. Notice that \mathbf{s}' has a single 1 at position $(w(x) \bmod L) + 1$. When multiplying \mathbf{s}' by the right bookend \mathbf{t} , the result will always be 1, unless $(w(x) \bmod L) + 1 = 1$. The only $w(x)$ values that satisfy $(w(x) \bmod L) + 1 = 1$ are $w(x) = 0$ and $w(x) = L$, which correspond to $x = 0^L$ and $x = 1^L$ respectively. Hence BP_1 gives us the desired functionality.

Next up, we will expand BP_1 to a read-once matrix branching program BP_2 with the following functionality: for a set S of input bits, BP_2 outputs 0 if and only if all the input bits within S are identical (the input bits outside of S can be arbitrary). This is accomplished by simply setting the matrices for the inputs in S to be from BP_1 , while the matrices for all other inputs are just identity matrices.

Next, we describe a simple method of taking the “AND” of two matrix branching programs with the same length, input length and input function. Given matrix branching programs $\text{BP}^A = (\text{inp}, \{\mathbf{M}_{i,b}^A\}_{i \in [h]; b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{s}^A, \mathbf{t}^A)$ and $\text{BP}^B = (\text{inp}, \{\mathbf{M}_{i,b}^B\}_{i \in [h]; b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{s}^B, \mathbf{t}^B)$ with length h and input length ℓ , we construct a new branching program BP^C such that $\text{BP}^C = \text{BP}^A(x) \cdot \text{BP}^B(x)$ for all inputs x :

Constructing $\text{BP}^C = \text{AND}(\text{BP}^A, \text{BP}^B)$:

- The length, the input length, and the input function of BP^C are also h , ℓ and inp , respectively. The width of BP^C is $w_C = w_A \cdot w_B$, where w_A and w_B are the widths of BP^A and BP^B , respectively.
- For all $i \in [h]$ and $b \in \{0,1\}$, compute $\mathbf{M}_{i,b}^C = \mathbf{M}_{i,b}^A \otimes \mathbf{M}_{i,b}^B$ where \otimes denotes the matrix tensor product (Kronecker product). Notice that the widths of $\mathbf{M}_{i,b}^A$, $\mathbf{M}_{i,b}^B$, and $\mathbf{M}_{i,b}^C$ are w_A , w_B , and $w_A w_B$ as desired.
- The left bookend is $\mathbf{s}^C = \mathbf{s}^A \otimes \mathbf{s}^B$, and the right bookend is $\mathbf{t}^C = \mathbf{t}^A \otimes \mathbf{t}^B$.

Using the mixed-product property of matrix tensor products, it should be easy to verify that $\text{BP}^C(x) = \text{BP}^A(x) \cdot \text{BP}^B(x)$ as desired.

Next, let BP_* be a random read-once matrix branching program with input length L and width $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$. We can sample such a branching program by uniformly sampling each of its matrices and bookends.⁹

We will assume that the program computed by BP_* gives a pseudorandom function. This is, unfortunately not strictly possible: write $x = (x_1, x_2)$ for two contiguous chunks of input bits x_1, x_2 . Then the matrix $(\text{BP}_*(x_1, x_2))_{x_1 \in X_1, x_2 \in X_2}$ for any sets X_1, X_2 will have rank at most m . By setting X_1, X_2 to be larger than m , one can distinguish this matrix consisting of outputs of BP_* from a uniformly random one. The good news is that this attack requires a large amount of space, namely m^2 . If the attacker’s space is limited to be somewhat less than m^2 , this plausibly leads to a pseudorandom function. We leave justifying this conjecture as an interesting open question.

Now consider the branching program $\text{BP}_3 = \text{AND}(\text{BP}_2, \text{BP}_*)$. Notice that BP_3 has width nm and is equal to 0 on inputs x where $\forall i, j \in S, x_i = x_j$, and is equal to $\text{BP}_*(x)$ on all other x .

⁹ When this is later put through the basic framework, we would need to generate these random matrices using a PRF. This allows us to reconstruct it at a later point.

With these tools in hand, we are now ready to show how to enforce input consistency on an existing matrix branching program.

Given a matrix branching program $\text{BP} = (\text{inp}, \{\mathbf{M}_{i,b}\}_{i \in [h]; b \in \{0,1\}}, \mathbf{s}, \mathbf{t})$ with length h , width w and input length ℓ , we construct the branching program BP' as follow:

Input Consistent Branching Program BP' :

- BP' has the same length h , input length ℓ , and input function inp as BP . The width is now $w + mh$ where $m = \text{poly}(\lambda)$.
- For all $j \in [\ell]$, let S_j be the set of all reads of x_j , i.e. $S_j = \{i \mid i \in [h], \text{inp}(i) = j\}$. Construct the branching program $\text{BP}_2^{(j)}$ using the BP_2 construction with input length h and $S = S_j$. Overwrite the input function of $\text{BP}_2^{(j)}$ with inp so that it now takes $x \in \{0,1\}^\ell$ as input. Notice that $\text{BP}_2^{(j)}(x) = 0$ if and only if all reads of the j -th bit of x are identical. Sample a fresh random matrix branching program $\text{BP}_*^{(j)}$ with length h , width m , input length ℓ and input function inp . Compute $\text{BP}_3^{(j)} = \text{AND}(\text{BP}_2^{(j)}, \text{BP}_*^{(j)})$. Denote the matrices in $\text{BP}_3^{(j)}$ as $\{\mathbf{M}_{i,b}^{(j)}\}_{i \in [h]; b \in \{0,1\}}$, and the bookends as $\mathbf{s}^{(j)}, \mathbf{t}^{(j)}$.
- For all $i \in [h]$, and $b \in \{0,1\}$, construct the matrix $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b}$ by adding all the $\mathbf{M}_{i,b}^{(j)}$'s to the diagonal as $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b} = \text{diag}(\mathbf{M}_{i,b}, \mathbf{M}_{i,b}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{M}_{i,b}^{(\ell)})$. Notice that the width of $\mathbf{M}'_{i,b}$ is $w + \sum_{j \in [\ell]} m |S_j| = w + mh$.
- The left bookend is now $\mathbf{s}' = (\mathbf{s} \ \mathbf{s}^{(1)} \ \mathbf{s}^{(2)} \ \dots \ \mathbf{s}^{(\ell)})$ and the right bookend is now $\mathbf{t}' = \left(\mathbf{t}^T \ (\mathbf{t}^{(1)})^T \ (\mathbf{t}^{(2)})^T \ \dots \ (\mathbf{t}^{(\ell)})^T \right)^T$.

Notice that we have

$$\text{BP}'(x) = \text{BP}(x) + \sum_{j \in [\ell]} \text{BP}_3^{(j)}(x) = \text{BP}(x) + \sum_{j \in [\ell]} \text{BP}_2^{(j)}(x) \text{BP}_*^{(j)}(x).$$

If all reads of the input x are consistent, then we have $\text{BP}_2^{(j)}(x) = 0$ for all j , and the program outputs the original output $\text{BP}'(x) = \text{BP}(x)$.

If the reads of the input x are not consistent, then $\text{BP}_2^{(j)}(x) = 1$ for some j , and consequently $\text{BP}_*^{(j)}(x)$ will be added to the program output. By our conjecture that $\text{BP}_*^{(j)}(x)$ acts as a PRF to space-bounded attackers, we thus add a pseudorandom value to $\text{BP}(x)$, hiding its value. Thus, we presumably force input consistency. BP' will be the output of `Convert`, which we then plug into our framework.

9 Candidate Construction 2

Now we present the second candidate construction from digital time-stamping and standard-model obfuscation. The concept of a digital time-stamp was first introduced by Haber and Stornetta [HS91], and since then we have seen various instantiations of digital time-stamping systems. One construction of particular interest is by Moran, Shaltiel and Ta-Shma [MST04], where they construct a non-interactive time-stamping scheme in the bounded storage model using a randomness beacon. A slightly modified definition that uses a stream instead of a randomness beacon will be what we base our candidate construction on.

Definition 14 (Non-Interactive Digital Time-stamp in the Bounded Storage Model). *Let λ, n be the security parameters. A non-interactive digital time-stamp scheme in the bounded storage model with stamp length $\ell = O(n)$ consists of a tuple of PPT algorithms $\Pi = (\text{Stream}, \text{Stamp}, \text{Ver})$ that each uses up to $O(n)$ memory bits:*

- $\text{Stream}(1^\lambda, 1^n) \rightarrow (s_{\gg}, k)$ takes as input security parameters λ, n and outputs a stream s_{\gg} and a short sketch k of the stream.
- $\text{Stamp}(s_{\gg}, x) \rightarrow \sigma$ takes as input the stream s_{\gg} and an input $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, and outputs a stamp $\sigma \in \{0, 1\}^\ell$.
- $\text{Ver}(k, x, \sigma) \rightarrow 0/1$ takes as input the sketch k , an input $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$ and a stamp σ and outputs a single bit 0 or 1.

We require correctness and security of the digital time-stamp scheme.

Definition 15 (Correctness). *We require that for all $x \in \{0, 1\}^*$, we have*

$$\Pr [\text{Ver}(k, x, \sigma) = 1 : (s_{\gg}, k) \leftarrow \text{Stream}(1^\lambda, 1^n), \sigma \leftarrow \text{Stamp}(s_{\gg}, x)] = 1.$$

For security, we ideally want that an adversary cannot produce a valid time-stamp on an input x that the adversary did not run Stamp on. Instead, [MST04] notice that an adversary with $S(n)$ memory bits can store at most $S(n)/\ell$ time-stamps, and therefore define security as upper bounding the number of time-stamps an adversary can produce. While not the same as the ideal goal, it at least implies the adversary cannot produce arbitrary time-stamped messages.

Definition 16 (Security). *We require that for all adversary \mathcal{A} that uses up to $S(n)$ memory bits, we have*

$$\Pr \left[\forall (x, \sigma) \in M, \text{Ver}(k, x, \sigma) = 1 \left| \begin{array}{l} (s_{\gg}, k) \leftarrow \text{Stream}(1^\lambda) \\ M \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{Stamp}(\cdot)}(s_{\gg}) \\ |M| > \frac{S(n)}{\ell} \\ \forall (x_1, \sigma_1), (x_2, \sigma_2) \in M, x_1 \neq x_2 \end{array} \right. \right] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

Now we show how we can use such a digital time-stamping scheme to construct an online obfuscator.

Construction 4. Let λ, n be the security parameters. Let TSP be a digital time-stamping scheme in the bounded storage model. Let VGB = (Obf, Eval) be a classical VGB obfuscator for all circuits. We construct our online obfuscator for the circuit class $\{C_\lambda\}$ as follows:

- Obf(C): Run TSP.Stream($1^\lambda, 1^n$) to stream s_{\gg} and obtain the sketch k . Consider the following program $P_{C,k}$:

$$P_{C,k}(x, \sigma) = \begin{cases} C(x) & \text{if TSP.Ver}(k, x, \sigma) = 1 \\ \perp & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}.$$

Let $\mathcal{P} \leftarrow \text{VGB.Obf}(P_{C,k})$ be the *standard-model* VGB obfuscation of $P_{C,k}$. The obfuscated program is simply the stream s_{\gg} followed by \mathcal{P} .

- Eval($(s_{\gg}, \mathcal{P}), x$): To evaluate the obfuscated program, first compute $\sigma \leftarrow \text{TSP.Stamp}(s_{\gg}, x)$ when s_{\gg} is being streamed. Then the output is simply VGB.Eval($\mathcal{P}, (x, \sigma)$).

Correctness is straightforward. One detail is that, using the basic time-stamping protocol of [MST04], the sketch k , and thus $P_{C,k}$ will be of size $O(n)$ bits. Thus, we need to use an obfuscator such that VGB.Obf only expands the input circuit by a constant factor. While no such constructions are currently known, there are also no known impossibilities. Alternatively, one can use branching-program based obfuscation directly from multilinear maps, for example [GGH⁺13a] and follow-ups. [BCKP14] even gives evidence that these constructions may be VGB secure. The difficulty is that the constructions blow up the input program by a polynomial factor, and therefore cannot be written down. However, as they have the form of a branching program, they can be streamed much the same way as we stream Candidate Construction 1. Finally, another option is to use the computational time-stamping protocol from [MST04], which shrinks the size of the sketch and the proof, at the cost of relying on computational assumptions. We therefore conjecture that some instantiation of VGB.Obf will lead to a secure online VGB obfuscator that can also be streamed in low space. We leave proving or disproving this conjecture as an open question.

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