A toolbox for verifiable tally-hiding e-voting systems

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ABSTRACT

In most verifiable electronic voting schemes, one key step is the tally phase, where the election result is computed from the encrypted ballots. A generic technique consists in first applying a verifiable mixnet to the ballots and then revealing all the votes in the clear. This however discloses more information than the result of the election itself (that is, the winners) and may offer the possibility to coerce voters.

In this paper, we present a collection of building blocks for creating tally-hiding schemes based on multi-party computations. As an application, we propose the first efficient tally-hiding schemes with no leakage for four important counting functions: D'Hondt, Condorcet, STV, and Majority Judgment. We prove that they can be used to design a private and verifiable voting scheme. We also unveil unknown flaws or leakage in several previously proposed tally-hiding schemes.

1 INTRODUCTION

Electronic voting is used in many countries and various contexts, from major politically binding elections to small elections among scientific councils. It allows voters to vote from any place and is often used as a replacement of postal voting. Moreover, it makes easier complex tally processes where voters express their preference by ranking their candidates (preferential voting). In such cases, the votes are counted using the prescribed procedure (*e.g.*, Single Transferable Vote or Condorcet), which can be tedious to conduct by hand but can be easily handled by a computer.

Numerous electronic voting protocols have been proposed such as Helios [5], Civitas [17], or CHVote [23]. They all intend to guarantee at least two security properties: *vote secrecy* (no one should know how I voted) and *verifiability*. Vote secrecy is typically achieved through asymmetric encryption: election trustees jointly compute an election public key that is used to encrypt the votes. The trustees take part in the tally, to compute the election result. Only a coalition of dishonest trustees (set to some threshold) can decrypt a ballot and violate vote secrecy. Verifiability typically guarantees that a voter can check that her vote has been properly recorded and that an external auditor can check that the result corresponds to the received votes. Then, depending on the protocol, additional properties can be achieved such as coercion-resistance or cast-as-intended. Various techniques are used to achieve such properties but one common key step is the tally: from the set of encrypted ballots, it is necessary to compute the result of the election, in a verifiable manner.

There are two main approaches for tallying an election in the context of electronic voting. The first one is the *homomorphic tally*. Thanks to the homomorphic property of the encryption scheme (typically ElGamal), the ballots are combined to compute the (encrypted) sum of the votes. Then only the resulting ciphertext needs to be decrypted to reveal the election result, without leaking the individual votes. For verifiability, each trustee produces a zero-knowledge proof of correct (partial) decryption so that anyone can check that the result indeed corresponds to the encrypted ballots. The second main approach is based on *verifiable mixnets*. The encrypted ballots are shuffled and re-randomized such that the resulting ballots cannot be linked to the original ones [23, 47]. A zero-knowledge proof of correct mixing is produced to guarantee that no ballot has been removed nor added. Several mixers are successively used and then each (rerandomized) ballot is decrypted, yielding the original votes in clear, in a random order.

Homomorphic tally can only be applied to simple vote counting functions, where voters select one or several candidates among a list and the result of the election is the sum of the votes, for each candidate. We note that even in this simple case, the tally reveals more information than just the winner(s) of the election. Mixnet-based tally can be used for any vote counting function since it reveals the (multi)set of the initial votes. On the other hand, they reveal much more information than the result itself and can be subject to so-called Italian attacks. Indeed, when voters rank their candidates by order of preference, the number of possible choices can be higher than the number of voters. Hence a voter can be coerced to vote in a certain way by first selecting the first candidates as desired by the coercer and then "signing" her ballot with some very particular order of candidates, as prescribed by the coercer. The coercer will check at the end of the election that such a ballot appears.

Recent work have explored the possibility to design tally-hiding schemes, that compute the result of the election from a set of encrypted ballots, without leaking any other information. This can be seen as an instance of Multi-Party Computation (MPC), but the context of voting adds some constraints. First, a voter should only produce one encrypted ballot that should remain of reasonable size and be computed with low resources (*e.g.*, in JavaScript). The trustees can be assumed to have more resources. Yet, it is important to minimize the number of communications and the computation cost, whenever possible. In particular, voters should not wait for weeks before obtaining the result. Moreover, all proofs produced by the authorities need to be downloaded and verified by external, independent auditors. Therefore, it is important that verifying an election remains affordable.

Related work. Even when the winner(s) of the election is the one(s) that received the most votes, leaking the scores of each candidate can be embarrassing and even lower vote privacy. This is discussed in [28] where the authors propose a protocol called Ordinos that computes the candidate who received the most votes, without any extra information. In case of preferential voting, where voters rank candidates, several methods can be applied to determine the winner(s). Two popular methods are Single Transferable Vote (STV) and Condorcet. STV is used in politically binding elections

in several countries like Australia, Ireland, or UK. Condorcet has several variants and the Schulze variant is popular among several associations like Ubuntu or GnuGP. These are the counting methods offered by the voting platform CIVS [1] and used in many elections. Literature for tally-hiding schemes includes [24] which shows how to compute the result in Condorcet, while [45] and [10] provide several methods for STV. They all leak some partial information, but much less than the complete set of votes. Ordinos has been extended [26] to cover various counting functions that include Borda, Hare-Niemeyer, Condorcet, and Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV, a particular case of STV, where there is only one seat). This shows the flexibility of Ordinos, yet at a cost: ballots are of size cubic in the number of candidates for Condorcet-Schulze and even super-exponential for IRV. The last system we study, Majority Judgment (MJ) is a vote system where voters give a grade to each candidate (typically between 1 and 6). The winner is, roughly, the candidate with the highest median rating. Since typically several candidates have the same median, the winner is determined by a complex algorithm that iteratively compares the highest median, then the second one and so on (see [6] for the full details). In [14], the authors show how to compute Majority Judgment in MPC. All these approaches except [24] rely on Paillier encryption since it is better suited than ElGamal for the arithmetic comparison of the content of two ciphertexts.

Our contribution. First, we revisit the existing work, exhibiting weaknesses and even flaws for some of them. Second, we provide new algorithms for computing vote counting functions, decreasing both the complexity and the leakage or proposing other trade-offs regarding the load for the voters and the trustees. In particular, we propose the first tally-hiding schemes with no leakage for three major counting functions: D'Hondt, Majority Judgment, and STV. For Condorcet-Schulze, we propose the first tally-hiding scheme that allows candidates to be ranked at equality. We summarize our main contributions in the following table.

Single vote	- Fix shortcoming in [28] in case of equality - Adaptation to D'Hondt method
Majority Judgment	- Fix the fact that [14] fails in not-so-rare cases - Complete leakage-free algorithm, based on ElGamal
Condorcet - Schulze	- Fix privacy issue in [24] - Candidates can be ranked at equality (unlike [26]) - Quasi-linear complexity for voters (vs cubic in [26]) - Several efficiency/leakage compromises - Complete leakage-free algorithm
STV	- Ideal STV has exponential worst-case complexity - Complete leakage-free algorithm, with fast arithmetic

One of our first findings is that even for complex counting functions, it is possible to use ElGamal encryption instead of Paillier. This offers several advantages. ElGamal encryption can be implemented on elliptic curves, yielding building blocks of much lower complexity than Paillier's encryption for the same security level. Moreover, in the context of voting, it is important to split the decryption key among several trustees so that no single authority can break vote privacy. It is easy to set up threshold decryption in ElGamal, with an arbitrary threshold of trustees needed for decryption [18]. The situation is more complex in Paillier. The general threshold key distribution scheme [25] is of high complexity. A more efficient scheme exists [34], but only with a honest majority.

Another reason for preferring ElGamal could be that the underlying security assumption (Decisional Diffie Hellman) can be considered as more standard than the one for Paillier (Decisional n-Residuosity). Finally, from a practical point of view, it is also easier to find standard software libraries that include support for ElGamal encryption.

We have considered several families of counting methods, that include complex ones (e.g. STV, MJ), to demonstrate that it is possible to build efficient MPC schemes for such vote counting functions, using standard ElGamal encryption.

Single vote. A first class of counting functions applies to the case where voters select one (or several) candidate(s). The typical way to determine the s winners is to count the number of votes for each candidate and select the s candidates with the most votes. This is exactly the case covered by Ordinos [28]. There is however a shortcoming in case of equalities: the function implemented in Ordinos may return more winners than the number of seats. We correct this by providing an algorithm that computes exactly the winners according to the election rule, without leaking any extra information. Moreover, we show that it is possible to rely on ElGamal with the associated benefits discussed earlier, thanks to an adapted algorithm. This lowers the size of a ballot for voters at a higher cost for the authorities, which can be preferred in practice.

Things get more complex when voters select a candidate list instead of a candidate. The seats need to be shared among the candidates of the different lists, according to number of votes received. One popular technique is the D'Hondt method, that can be adapted to several variants depending on whether the election system wishes to favor big or small parties. We extend the approach initiated by Ordinos to the case of D'Hondt, building on two main ideas, and we propose two additional solutions that leads to different trade-offs in terms of computation and communication cost. We study the cost of relying on either Paillier and ElGamal and in this case, ElGamal is a key ingredient for designing a practical tally-hiding scheme.

Majority Judgment. The idea of Majority Judgment [6] is that candidates should not be ranked but instead should each be judged independently. We found out that [14] actually only implements a simplified version of the Majority Judgment method, called majority gauge. When the majority gauge returns a winner, then it is indeed a MJ winner. Unfortunately, in small elections, there is a rather high probability that the simplified algorithm does not provide any result. For example, in an election with 100 voters, [14] would fail with probability 20%, which not only is inconvenient (imagine an election that must be canceled because no winner is declared!) but also leaks some information (there is no winner according to the majority gauge).

To repair the approach, one issue is that the complexity of the MJ algorithm depends (linearly) in the number of voters, which may be large. Hence, [6] devises an alternative (complex) algorithm that no longer depends on the number of voters. We propose a variant of this algorithm and use it as a basis to derive a tally-hiding procedure for MJ. Our resulting algorithm remains of a complexity similar to [14] while they implement a much simpler algorithm. Then we show that it is actually possible to adapt our algorithm to ElGamal encryption. Interestingly, the format remains unchanged

for the voter (hence the resulting ballot is even easier to compute). A key idea is to work in the bit-encoding of integers, which allows to perform all the needed operations (additions, comparisons) on ElGamal encryptions. The load for the trustees increases (since comparisons are more complex) but our study shows that it remains reasonable since the extra operations are more or less compensated by the fact that computations are faster in ElGamal.

Condorcet. A Condorcet winner is a candidate that would win against each of her opponents. In some cases, there is no Condorcet winner, and several variants exist to further determine a winner in such a case. In [24] a tally-hiding algorithm is proposed for the Condorcet-Schultze variant. However, we found out that [24] is subject to a major privacy flaw. Indeed, everyone learns, for each voter, how many candidates have been placed at equality. Hence Alice completely loses her vote privacy if she votes blank. This flaw has been acknowledged by the authors. In [26], placing two candidates at equality is forbidden, which is too restrictive sibce it is widely used in Condorcet elections. Moreover, the authors propose a ballot format whose size is cubic in the number of candidates.

To cover the fact that candidates can be ranked equal, we had to solve a difficult question: voters need to prove, at a reasonable cost, that they encrypted a meaningful ballot, that is, a ballot that corresponds to a ranking. We considered two main ingredients here. First, we devised a new encoding for ballots. Second, we used mixnet in an original way: a voter proves that her ballot is valid by showing that her ballot can be obtained as a permutation of a valid (public) ballot. Here, the permutation encodes the voter's choice and the voter is her own mixer. We then devise several algorithms (all based on ElGamal) with different compromises in terms of load balance between the voters and the trustees and in terms of leakage.

STV. In a first round of STV, if a candidate has been ranked in the first place sufficiently often (more than a quota), then the candidate obtains a seat. However, if she obtained more votes than the quota, the exceeding votes should not be lost. Instead, they should be transferred to the next candidate. Hence a fraction of votes (which corresponds to the exceeding votes) is transferred to the second preferred candidate of each voter. The process is repeated until all the seats are filled. Since it is not easy to compute by hand the fractions that need to be transferred, many variants of STV exist where the fractions can be rounded or where the votes can be transferred to randomly selected ballots.

Our first goal was to implement a tally-hiding algorithm for the ideal STV. However, we discovered that even without any cryptography, the pure STV algorithm is exponential with respect to the number of selection, and unpractical in some cases. This theoritical finding was confirmed by an experimentation made on the real data elections from the South New Wales election in Australia [3].

Given that ideal STV cannot be efficiently computed even in the clear, we considered a variant with rounding. In [10, 45], there are in total three techniques to compute the STV winners, all with some leakage (for example, the current score of the selected candidate). Note that [45] computes the ideal STV (with no rounding) but probably because the authors did not realize that it was impractical. [26, 38] cover a particular case of STV where only one candidate is elected (IRV). Note that [26] uses a naive encoding of the possible choices: if there are c candidates, they view the $c!$ possible orders as $c!$ possible "candidates" from which a voter makes a selection, yielding a ballot of super-exponential size, while the ballot size is $O(c^2)$ in [38]. We propose a fully tally-hiding algorithm for STV, with no leakage, at a cost similar to [10, 45]. To keep the cost reasonable, we re-used techniques of hardware circuits (*e.g.*, to reduce the length of the carry-chains in additions).

Security proof and implementation. The Paillier setting of our toolbox builds upon the same low-level primitive as previous works. However, in the ElGamal setting that we found to be highly relevant, the core ingredient is a different primitive called `CGate` (that conditionally sets a component to 0). An important contribution of our work is to formally prove that it is UC-secure and verifiable. Concentrating on this ElGamal setting, this allows us to prove vote secrecy and verifiability of a voting scheme that embeds our tally-hiding protocol.

With the same goal of validating our ElGamal approach, we have implemented our building blocks in a library in this setting. As a proof of concept, we have combined them to form the tally-hiding scheme that corresponds to Condorcet-Schulze. Our experiments show a reasonable execution time. Authorities need a couple of minutes to perform the tally for 5 candidates, and about 9 hours for 20 candidates (and 1024 voters). In contrast, the code [26] developed in the Paillier setting, needed more than 9 days for 20 candidates (and was almost insensitive to the number of voters).

Finally, we emphasize that our toolbox should be suitable to implement any realistic counting method, in addition to the ones we have explicitly studied. For completeness, a rather long Appendix gives fully detailed algorithms and security proofs, and our source code for the implementation is available [4].

2 BUILDING BLOCKS

We focus on the tally phase, common to most voting schemes. We assume a public ballot box that contains the list of encrypted ballots where all the traditional issues up to here have been handled: eligibility, validity of ballots, revoting policy if applicable, and so on. We concentrate on the counted-as-recorded property. We do not assume that the encrypted ballots are anonymous: for example, they could be signed by voters.

Our goal is to compute the winners of the election, while preserving the privacy of the voters, namely with no additional leakage of information about the tally. The decryption key is assumed to be shared among a trustees, with a threshold scheme, and we wish the procedure to produce a transcript such that: 1) if at least a threshold of t trustees is honest, the result will be obtained and only the result is known (no side-information); 2) even if all the a trustees are dishonest, the result is guaranteed to be correct.

This does not come for free and usually involve heavy computations and communications between trustees.

2.1 MPC toolbox

The MPC implementation of counting functions relies on several common building blocks that we define below, such as addition, multiplication, comparison. For each of them, we study their cost. All these costs are summarized in Figure 5 in Appendix. Regarding the computation cost, we count the number of exponentiations. For the communications, sometimes all the trustees need to broadcast

their share of the computations, and sometimes they need to perform a round of communications, where one trustee contributes to the data they receive from the previous one in the loop. We will count these two types of communications separately. An important information is also the size of the transcript that is created during the process and that should be checked, for example by auditors, to guarantee that the result is correct.

Beyond defining our needed building blocks, we believe that this study is of independent interest since it could be used in other contexts than voting. It has required to study a rich literature, first on zero-knowledge proofs [13, 30, 37, 47] and MPC [7, 31, 40–42] but also on hardware circuits [12]. Interestingly, we distinguish between the functionality (*e.g.* addition) and the algorithm that realizes it since different algorithms may be considered, leading to different trade-offs in terms of communications and computations. For a few building blocks, we even propose our own algorithms, that improve existing propositions.

Homomorphic property. Both Paillier and ElGamal are homomorphic encryption schemes. This means that multiplication or division of ciphertexts correspond to addition or subtraction of the corresponding cleartexts. We denote these functions $\mathtt{Add}$ and $\mathtt{Sub}$; they cost no communications nor exponentiations. This allows re-randomization, by multiplying with $\mathtt{Enc}(0)$. If the encrypted value is a bit, by dividing $\mathtt{Enc}(1)$ by it, this allows to flip the encrypted bit. We denote $\mathtt{Not}(B)$ this function that is essentially for free.

Encoding of encrypted integers. An integer can be directly encrypted. This is simple and we call this *natural encoding* in this paper. It allows to directly add and subtract encrypted values. However, in the ElGamal setting, most of the other operations (comparison, multiplication, …) are more difficult, or even impossible.

The alternative is to encrypt each bit of the integer separately; we call this the *bit-encoding* of an encrypted integer and we denote it $X^{\text{bits}} = (X_0, \ldots, X_{m-1})$, where 2^m is a bound on the integer represented by X, and X_i is the encryption of the i-th bit of the binary expansion (index 0 for the least significant bit). Converting an integer in bit-encoding to natural encoding is easily done using the homomorphic property and the Horner scheme. The other direction is harder (in the Paillier setting) or impossible (in the ElGamal setting).

Branch-free tools. In MPC, the algorithms must be implemented in a branch-free setting, because the result of a test cannot be revealed (unless we allow a partial leakage). The classical building-blocks for this are conditional operations.

- $\mathtt{CondSetZero}(X, B)$, $\mathtt{CondSetZero}^{\text{bits}}(X^{\text{bits}}, B)$: conditionally set to zero. This function returns (a re-encryption of) X if B is an encryption of 1, or $\mathtt{Enc}(0)$ if B is an encryption of 0. In the bit-encoding setting, each bit of X is re-encrypted or set to zero.
- $\mathtt{If}(B, X, Y)$, $\mathtt{If}(B, X^{\text{bits}}, Y^{\text{bits}})$: returns (a re-encryption of) X if B is an encryption of 1 and of Y if B is an encryption of 0.
- $\mathtt{Select}([X_i], [B_i])$: select in array according to bits. This function returns (a re-encryption of) X_i such that B_i is an encryption of 1. This requires that the encrypted bit array $[B_i]$ is such that that there is only one index i for which B_i is 1.

The $\mathtt{CondSetZero}$ function is the main primitive from which all the others can be easily derived using the homomorphic property. For instance, $\mathtt{Select}(X, Y, B)$ can be implemented as $\mathtt{Add}(\mathtt{CondSetZero}(\mathtt{Sub}(Y, X), B), X)$. In the context of ElGamal encryption, it costs one round of communication at each use.

Arithmetic. As already said, by homomorphy, addition and subtraction of encrypted values are built-in functionalities when the natural encoding is used. However the same operations with the bit-encoding become more involved. Several variants can be considered, the most classical being to have all the operations defined modulo 2^m where m is the number of encrypted bits. Sometimes it is useful to return the final carry / borrow bits. Comparison of two integers is denoted by $\mathtt{LT}$. In bit-encoding, it can be seen as a subtraction where only the final borrow is needed, but in the natural-encoding, the borrow is not available, and a dedicated algorithm must be designed, only available in the Paillier scheme. Similarly we define the $\mathtt{Mul}$ function that can be applied to integers in both encoding, with the exception that the natural-encoding multiplication is available only in the Paillier scheme. Finally, a frequent operation is to compute the sum of many encrypted values each containing a bit, typically to get the total number of votes for a given option. We call this operation $\mathtt{Aggreg}$. Again with homomorphic encryption, this is very cheap. However, especially in the ElGamal setting, it could be that the result is wanted in the bit-encoding format. Then a dedicated tree-based algorithm, with variable bit-precision can be designed to improve the complexity compared to naively using the $\mathtt{Add}$ function with the maximum precision.

- $\mathtt{Add}(X, Y)$, $\mathtt{Add}^{\text{bits}}(X^{\text{bits}}, Y^{\text{bits}})$: addition of X and Y, in any encoding. In the bit-encoding, the result is taken modulo 2^m.
  $\mathtt{Sub}(X, Y)$, $\mathtt{Sub}^{\text{bits}}(X^{\text{bits}}, Y^{\text{bits}})$: subtraction of X and Y.
- $\mathtt{Aggreg}([X_i])$, $\mathtt{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}([X_i])$: sum of n binary values X_i. In the bit-encoding, the output contains $\log n$ encrypted bits.
- $\mathtt{LT}(X, Y)$, $\mathtt{LT}^{\text{bits}}(X^{\text{bits}}, Y^{\text{bits}})$: comparison of X and Y in any encoding. Only in the Paillier setting for the natural-encoding.
- $\mathtt{EQ}(X, Y)$, $\mathtt{EQ}^{\text{bits}}(X^{\text{bits}}, Y^{\text{bits}})$: equality test of X and Y in any encoding. Only in the Paillier setting for the natural-encoding.
- $\mathtt{BinExpand}(X)$: binary expansion of X. This function returns X^{bits}. This is available only in the Paillier setting.
- $\mathtt{Mul}(X, Y)$, $\mathtt{Mul}^{\text{bits}}(X^{\text{bits}}, Y^{\text{bits}})$: multiplication of X and Y. Only in the Paillier setting for the natural-encoding.

Since $\mathtt{CondSetZero}(X, B)$ can be seen as an And gate when X is just a bit, with the additional homomorphic operations (Add and Not), this allows to build any arithmetic circuit with bits as input and output. Building all the arithmetic functions with the bit-encoding is therefore a matter of optimizing the circuit design with respect to the number of exponentiations and communications. We discuss more thoroughly these optimizations in Section 6.

In the ElGamal setting, we use the $\mathtt{CGate}$ protocol (adapted from [40]) to achieve the $\mathtt{CondSetZero}$ functionality. During this protocol, each authority produces a Zero Knowledge Proof (ZKP) that guarantees that the correct computations were performed. The ZKP of all authorities can later form a transcript which can be used to verify the output of the protocol. Since all our arithmetic and

logic protocols are based on CondSetZero, a transcript for verifiability can be obtained for all our MPC protocols. The Appendix C.1 contains more detains on the CGate protocol.

Algorithm 1: CGate

Require: G, a group of prime order q and public coin generator g
pk of the form (g, h), an exponential ElGamal public key,
whose shares are distributed among the a participants
$\tilde{h} \in G$, a public element independent from pk
X, an encryption of some $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
Y, an encryption of $y \in \{0, 1\}$

Ensure: Z, a random encryption of xy

$Y_0 \longleftarrow E_{-1}Y^2$; $X_0 \longleftarrow X$
for $i = 1$ *to a, for the authority i,* **do**
  $(u, v) \longleftarrow X_{i-1}$
  $r_1, r_2 \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$; $s \in_r \{-1, 1\}$
  $X_i \longleftarrow (u^s g^{r_1}, v^s h^{r_1})$; $e \longleftarrow \tilde{h}^{r_1}$
  $Y_i \longleftarrow \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Y_{i-1}^s, r_2)$
  Broadcast X_i, e, Y_i and a ZKP π_i that they are well formed
Each authority verifies the proof of the other authorities
They collectively rerandomize X_a and Y_a into X' and Y'
They collectively decrypt Y' into y_a
They output $Z = (XX'^{y_a})^{\frac{1}{2}}$

In the natural-encoding, the strategy is different and available only in the Paillier setting, where it is possible to extract the bits of naturally-encoded integers with an MPC procedure based on masking [41]. This gives an algorithm for BinExpand. Hence, using this conversion, it is possible to compute all the arithmetic operations even if the input are in natural-encoding.

Shuffle and mixnet. A tool that is of great use in our context is verifiable shuffling, leading to mixnets. In electronic voting, the typical use of a verifiable mixnet is during the tally phase, just before decrypting all the ballots, one by one. However, we also consider the use of verifiable shuffles on the voter's side, as shown in Section 5.

The first building block is $\mathtt{Shuffle}([X_i])$. It takes as input an array of encrypted values and output the same (re-encrypted) values in another order that remains secret, together with a zero-knowledge proof that everything was done correctly. As such, this is not an MPC primitive: this is an operation done by just one entity. Chaining a sequence of applications of this procedure by all the trustees, in turn, leads to the $\mathtt{Mixnet}([X_i])$ protocol, that outputs an array of the same re-encrypted values in an order that is secret as soon as at least one trustee is honest.

A variant is to shuffle ballots containing a pairwise comparison matrix. Then, the (secret) permutation used to shuffle the columns should be the same as the one used to shuffle the rows. This leads to the $\mathtt{ShuffleMatrix}([M_{i,j}])$ and the $\mathtt{MixnetMatrix}([M_{i,j}])$ procedures, and their variants in the bit-encoding.

2.2 UC security

We consider the well-known UC-framework [15] to prove security. A composable framework is particularly suitable to analyze the security of our MPC protocols since we provide building blocks that we combine together. We actually use the composition framework from [16], which is a Simpler version of the Universally Composable framework (SUC), shown to imply UC-security. Participants of a protocol P are modeled as Polynomial Probabilistic Turing Machines (PPT). Each of the a participants has a single input and output communication tape, and interacts with a router, which in turn interacts with an adversary $\mathbb{A}$. The adversary interacts with the router and the environment $\mathcal{Z}$. The adversary can corrupt a subset C of participants of size at most t, where $t \leq a$ is some threshold. Non-corrupted participants are honest and follow the protocol, while corrupted participants are fully impersonated by the adversary and give away any secret they have. The process terminates when $\mathcal{Z}$ writes on its output tape. We denote $\mathtt{REAL}_{P,\mathbb{A},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z)$ the output, where κ is a security parameter and z is an arbitrary auxiliary input.

The security of the process is guaranteed by a comparison with an ideal process, in which each party hands over their inputs to a trusted party T which honestly performs the desired computation. Corrupted parties may send arbitrary inputs as instructed by the adversary, and the adversary can block or delay communications with the trusted party. Intuitively, T computes some ideal function f, such as the addition. However, T additionally takes care of failure cases (for example, when too many parties return inconsistent data). We denote $\mathtt{IDEAL}_{T,\mathcal{S},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z)$ the output of the environment in the ideal process, when it interacts with the adversary $\mathcal{S}$. Intuitively, a protocol is SUC-secure if, for all adversary $\mathbb{A}$ in the real process, there exists a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ in the ideal process such that no PPT environment $\mathcal{Z}$ can tell whether they are interacting with the adversary in the real process or with the simulator in the ideal process.

Definition 2.1 (Secure computation [16]). Let P be a protocol, T some trusted party. We say that P *securely computes* T if, for all PPT $\mathbb{A}$, there exists a PPT $\mathcal{S}$ such that, for all PPT $\mathcal{Z}$, there exists a negligible function μ such that for all κ and all z polynomial in κ,

$$|\Pr(\mathtt{IDEAL}_{T,\mathcal{S},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z) = 1) - \Pr(\mathtt{REAL}_{P,\mathbb{A},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z) = 1)| \leq \mu(\kappa).$$

All our building blocks (except shuffle and mixnets, that are handled separately) rely on a single primitive, namely CondSetZero in the sense that they can all be derived as composition of this protocol, possibly with intermediate operations that do not require any interaction between the participants. To compute CondSetZero, we consider an MPC protocol CGate [40] based on ElGamal, and we adapt it in order to prove, in the SUC framework, that CGate securely computes the trusted party $T_{\mathtt{CGate}}$, that behaves as CondSetZero except when parties do not answer, in which case it returns an error. The CGate protocol also produces a transcript which acts as a proof that the protocol was performed correctly. The SUC security of the other building blocks then follows by composition. As detailed in [16], this composability requires to use some intermediary hybrid models, where the participants have an access to some ideal trusted parties.

Using the SUC framework, we were able to prove the security of our tally-hiding schemes in the context of electronic voting (*i.e.* to prove verifiability and privacy). All the precise definitions and proofs are provided in appendix (Part II).

2.3 Paillier vs elliptic ElGamal

As discussed in introduction, when ElGamal encryption can be used, it offers several avantages over Paillier. First, popular elliptic curves like NIST P-256 or Curve25519 are now ubiquitous in cryptographic libraries, while there is in general no support for Paillier. Moreover, threshold key generation is much simpler in ElGamal. Also, ElGamal relies on a well understood security assumption (DDH). In general, an algorithm based on the Paillier scheme requires less exponentiations that when based on ElGamal; however, exponentiations are more costly. In this paper, we will provide the complexity of our algorithm measured by the number of exponentiations. These figures should be compared having in mind the respective cost in ElGamal and in Paillier, that we estimate in this section.

Parameter sizes and cost of operations. For a voting system, a 128-bit level of security seems to be a reasonable choice. While 112-bit level is probably acceptable for the next decade, many certification bodies will ask for 128 bits or more. In the case of an elliptic ElGamal this translates readily into a curve over a base field of 256 bits. Furthermore, base fields that are prime finite fields are usually preferred.

For the Paillier scheme, the security relies on a supposedly hard problem that it not harder than integer factorization of an RSA number n. The complexity of the best known factoring algorithm, the Number Field Sieve, being hard to evaluate, there is no strict consensus about the size of n giving a 128-bit security level, but generally this goes around 3072 bits. We provide below estimates based on a medium level of optimization, for a native implementation on a modern processor (based on OpenSSL and using RSA for Paillier emulation), and for a Javascript implementation running in a modern web browser (based on `libsodium.js` and JS BigInt).

	Paillier	Elliptic ElGamal	Ratio
Native (server-side)	200	10,000	50
In browser (voter-side)	2	5,000	2,500

3 SINGLE-CHOICE VOTING

Context. Voters give their choice among a list of k possibilities. The choices that get the more votes get the seats. Sometimes voters can select more than one choice, specially when the number s of seats is large. The basic situation is when choices are precisely the candidates. Another frequent situation is when the voter's choices are lists of candidates. Then one needs a rule to decide how to assign the seats according to the number of votes obtained by each list. For this later case, we studied the D'Hondt method since it is widely used in practice for politically binding elections.

Basic counting. The s winners are the s candidates who obtained the most votes. This is the situation covered by Ordinos [28], but in case of equality between several candidates, more than s candidates can be elected by Ordinos. Assume for example that there are 10 seats but that the 10th and 11th candidates have received exactly the same number of votes. The toolkit of Ordinos will either outputs all the 11 candidates, with no information on who are the two last ones, or outputs the ordered list of the candidates, which leaks more information than needed.

Breaking ties. To force the scores of the candidates to be distinct, even if two candidates received the same number of voices, the election administrators must agree on an arbitrary ordering of the candidates, which allows to break ties. For instance, it can be decided that, in case of a tie, candidate i wins over candidates j if $i > j$. To put this into act, we can modify the scores s_i of each candidate to turn it into $s'_i = 2^\ell s_i + i$, where $\ell = \lceil \log(k+1) \rceil$, assuming the candidates are labeled from 0 to $k-1$. This can be done with a very limitted extra cost, which comes from the fact that the number of bits increased in every procedure. Therefore, if m is the number of bits required to encode the scores (typically, m is logarithmic in the number of voters), the overall process is $\frac{m+\log k}{m}$ more expensive in terms of computations, while the impact on communication is smaller. In general, the impact is less than a factor 2 as the number of candidates is smaller than the number of voters. Note that the modification of the scores itself is free, and can be performed as follows.

- In natural encoding, $S'_i = (S_i)^{2^\ell}\mathsf{Enc}(i)$.
- In bit-encoding, $S'_i = i^{\text{bits}}||S_i$, where i^{bits} is a bit-encoding of i and $||$ stands for the concatenation.

Note that if the agreed ordering of the candidates has to be kept secret, the authorities can first run a reencryption mixnet to shuffle $\mathsf{Enc}(0), \cdots, \mathsf{Enc}(k-1)$ (in either bit- or natural encoding) to obtain $(p_0, \cdots, p_{k-1})$. Afterwards, p_i can be used instead of E_i in natural encoding (resp. i^{bits} in bit-encoding).

List-voting. The method of D'Hondt, parametrized by a sequence of distinct weights, $w_1, \ldots, w_s$ proceeds as follows. Each voter votes for one list among k lists. At the end of the election, for each list i, let c_i be the number of votes received. Then the coefficients (c_i/w_j) for $1 \le i \le k$ and $1 \le j \le s$ are computed and the s largest values are selected so that the seats can be assigned accordingly: a list i gets one seat for each selected coefficient of the form (c_i/w_j). A ballot contains an encrypted bit for each choice (and a proof that the number of set bits follows the rules of the election). Then the ballots are aggregated to get the encrypted values of $c_1, \ldots, c_k$.

The question of how to handle fractions in the D'Hondt method must be addressed. A textbook approach using pairs of integers to store the numerators and the denominators would require to compute products each time we want to make a comparison. One option to avoid this additional cost is to compute the $(s'_{i,j} = c_i w_j)$'s instead of $(s_{i,j} = c_i/w_j)$'s. Then, the boolean $s_{i_i,j_i} < s_{i_2,j_2}$ is exactly $s'_{i_i,j_2} < s'_{i_2,j_1}$. In a quadratic setting where all the comparisons are made, this is a nice solution. Otherwise, this would require to keep track of the indexes to be compared and would leak information. To design a sub-quadratic algorithm, we multiply all the $s_{i,j}$ by the least common multiple (lcm) of the weights w_j, to have only integers. In the case where the weights are just $1, 2, 3, \ldots, s$, this lcm grows like $\exp(s(1+o(1)))$, so this adds $O(s)$ bits to the integers to manipulate. If s is of a size comparable to the logarithm of the number of voters, this is probably faster than to deal with the numerators and denominators separately.

Various MPC algorithms. Comparing two encrypted integers can be done with various algorithms, depending on the ElGamal or Paillier setting, and whether the inputs are in the bit-encoding format or not. In Appendix D, we present several solutions with different computation and communication trade-offs.

Summary. The choices of the algorithms to use depend on many practical questions and it is impossible to propose a universally best solution. A first element to consider is the choice between ElGamal and Paillier. If many voters are involved, then, with ElGamal, the aggregation of the ballots become very costly for the trustees both in computations and in communications, and Paillier might be the only realistic solution. Otherwise, ElGamal is very attractive for the reasons mentioned in Section 2.3 and the much easier key generation step (DKG).

In Table 1 we present the cost of three solutions for basic counting, all based on ElGamal: the first one is an adaptation of the solution from Ordinos [28], the second one relies on an approach based on selection-sort and the last one relies on the OddEven merge sort algorithm [8]. (see Appendix D for more details). In order to compare the efficiency of our solutions compared to that of [28], we also include its cost at the first line. Recall that the solution of Ordinos relies on the Paillier setting, where the operations are more expensive. Similarly, we present the cost of three different solutions for the D'Hondt method, all based on ElGamal, in Table 2. In any case, the cost of the DKG is not included (even if it can be expensive in the Paillier setting), and we assume that the number of candidates is small enough, so that the quadratic algorithm for selecting the s best is appropriate. For this table as well as all the following ones, we only count the *leading terms of the cost*. For example, we neglect ak^2 if there is a term of the form a^2k^2. The unit of the *transcript size* is the key length, typically 3072 bits in Paillier and 256 bits in ElGamal.

Next, we propose three options for computing a D'Hondt tally with weights $1, 2, \ldots, s$. The first option is an adaptation of the solution of Ordinos and uses the Paillier encryption, with the objective of reducing the amount of communications. The second option is a simple adaptation to the ElGamal setting, which use a communication-efficient integer-comparison primitive. Finally, the third option also uses ElGamal, but uses a less naive algorithm to compute the winners. For comparing the fractions, we use the idea of crossing the indexes for the first two options, while in the third we multiply by the lcm.

4 MAJORITY JUDGMENT

In the Majority Judgment (MJ) approach [6], voters give a grade to each candidate, such as Excellent, Very Good, Poor, *etc.* Each grade is translated into a numerical value, typically from 1 to 6, where 1 is the highest grade. At the end of the election, each candidate c has received a list L_c of grades. The *list of medians* $\mathsf{med}(c)$ associated to candidate c is the sequence formed by first the median grade m of L_c, *i.e.* the highest grade m such that at least half of the grades are greater or equal to m, then the median of $L_c \backslash \{m\}$ and so on. For example, if Alice received $1, 2, 2, 4, 4, 5$, her list of medians is $2, 4, 2, 4, 1, 5$. Then candidate c_1 is ranked above candidate c_2 if $\mathsf{med}(c_1) < \mathsf{med}(c_2)$ in the lexicographical order. Intuitively, c_1 wins over c_2 if she has a lower median, or, in case of a draw, a lower second median, *etc.* This defines a strict order, and therefore a winner: two candidates are ranked equal only if they received exactly the same grades.

A simplified algorithm. While the algorithm to determine the MJ winner(s) is simple, its naive implementation yields a complexity that depends on the number of voters, which could be very costly when done in MPC. Hence, the authors of [14] propose an MPC implementation of a simplification of the MJ algorithm, where whenever two candidates have the same median, only their number of grades higher and smaller than the median are compared. It has been shown that this technique is sound [6]: if a winner can be determined with this approach, it is indeed a MJ winner. However, it may also fail to conclude. In case the number of candidates is small and if the distribution of votes is uniform, then the probability of failure raises up to 22%, as shown in the table below. In any case, the approach of [14] leaks more information about the ballots than just the result, with non negligible probability, since it reveals whether the result can be determined with the simplified algorithm.

Number of voters	10	100	1000
uniform distribution over 5 candidates	0.384	0.220	0.080
political distribution [6]	N/A	0.001	N/A

Failure probabilities in [14].

MPC with Paillier. Our first contribution is an algorithm that computes MJ winner(s) on the clear votes, with a complexity that does not depend on the number of voters. Another algorithm was also proposed in [6] but our algorithm is easier to adapt in MPC and we prove it to correctly implement the MJ definition.

We assume that each voter produces a ballot formed of a matrix of encrypted 0 and 1, that encodes her choice, together with a zero-knowledge proof that each line contains exactly one 1. Thanks to the homomorphic property of Paillier encryption, the (encrypted) aggregated matrix, that is the sum of all the votes, can easily be obtained from the encrypted ballots. Then our algorithm essentially consists of comparisons, selections, additions or subtractions, and has been written in order to ease the conversion to an MPC algorithm, using the building blocks described in Section 2. Interestingly, the cost is similar to the (leaky) MPC implementation of [14], except for the number of communications that increases (see Figure 1).

MPC with ElGamal. The encoding of ballots remains unchanged for voters: each voter produces the matrix of her encrypted choices. Hence the cost is even lower for the voter since ElGamal encryption is cheaper. Then we compute the bit-encoding of the aggregated matrix using $\mathsf{Add}^{\mathsf{bits}}$. This part is linear in the number of voters but could be done on-the-fly during the election. Then the same algorithm can be used, on the bit-encoding, yielding a similar complexity than the Paillier's version, with the advantages of ElGamal as discussed in Section 2.3. Hence not only it remains practical to implement the full MJ function in MPC but surprisingly, the simple ElGamal encryption is well suited in this case.

5 CONDORCET-SCHULZE

The Condorcet approach is one popular technique to determine a winner when voters rank candidates by order of preference, possibly with equalities. A Condorcet winner is a candidate that is preferred

Table 1: Leading terms of the cost of different MPC solutions for single choice voting; n is the number of voters, k the number of candidates, s the number of seats, a the number of talliers

Version	# exp.	# synch. steps	transcript
[28] (fixed)	**precomp.** $41k^2\log(nk)a$ **comp.** $4nk+$ $25k^2\log(nk)a$	**precomp.** $O(a)$ **comp.** $14\log\log(nk)$	$9nk+$ $79.5k^2\log(nk)a$
EG (adaptation)	$99nka+$ $33k^2\log(nk)a$	$\frac{1}{2}(\log(n)^2+\log(k)^2)a$	$102nka+$ $34k^2\log(nk)a$
EG (*s*Select)	$99nka+$ $33ks(3\log n+\log k)a$	$\frac{1}{2}\log(n)^2a+$ $2s\log n\log ka$	$102nka+$ $34ks(3\log n+\log k)a$
EG (OddEven)	$99nka+$ $25k\log(k)^2\log na$	$\frac{1}{2}\log(n)^2a+$ $\log n\log(k)^2a$	$102nka+$ $25.5k\log(k)^2\log na$

Table 2: Leading terms of the cost of the different MPC solutions for the D'Hondt method; n is the number of voters, k is the number of lists of candidates, s is the number of seats, $m=\mathrm{lcm}(1,\cdots,s)$, a is the number of talliers and all the logarithms are in base 2

Version	# exp.	# synch. steps	transcript
Adaptation of [28]	$99nka+$ $+33k^2s^2\log(nks)a$	$\frac{1}{2}(\log(n)^2+\log(k)^2)a$ $+2\log s\log na$	$102nka$ $+34k^2s^2\log(nks)a$
*s*Select	$99nka+$ $33ks^2\log(m^3n^6ks)a$	$\frac{1}{2}\log(n)^2a+$ $2s\log(mn)\log(ks)a$	$102nka+$ $34ks^2\log(m^3n^6ks)a$
OddEven	$99nka+$ $99ks^2\log na+$ $25ks\log(ks)^2\log(mn)a$	$\frac{1}{2}\log(n)^2a+$ $2\log n\log m$ $\log(mn)\log(ks)^2a$	$102nka+$ $102ks^2\log na+$ $25.5ks\log(ks)^2\log(mn)a$

Version	Leak-age	Voters # exp.	Authorities # exp.	Authorities # comm.	Transcript size
[14]	[i]	$5kd$	$4nkd+kma(224k+58d)$	$(4m+d)R$	$6nkd+kma(280k+62d)$
ours (P)	∅	$5kd$	$4nkd+kda(75m+146\log m+20d)$	$d(2R+13B)\log m\log k$	$6nkd+kda(78m+50\log m+22d)$
ours (EG)	∅	$6kd$	$99nkda+66kmda(10+d)$	$m^2+d(6m+2\log k\log m)$	$34kda(3n+(20+2d)m)$

[i] [14] leaks whether the winner can be determined with the simplified algorithm.

Figure 1: Leading terms of the cost of MPC implementations of Majority Judgment. n: number of voters, $m=\lceil\log(n+1)\rceil$, k: number of candidates, d: number of grades, a: number of authorities.

to every other candidate by a majority of voters. More formally, we consider the *matrix of pairwise preferences* d where $d_{i,j}$ is the number of voters that prefer (strictly) candidate i over j. Then a Condorcet winner is a candidate i such that $d_{i,j} > d_{j,i}$ for all $j \neq i$. Such a Condorcet winner may not exist. In that case, several variants can be applied to compute the winner. We focus here on the Schulze method, used for example for Ubuntu elections [2]. It first considers by "how much" a candidate is preferred, which can be reflected into the *adjacency matrix* a defined as

$$a_{i,j} = \begin{cases} d_{i,j} - d_{j,i} & \text{if } d_{i,j} > d_{j,i}, \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Then a weighted directed graph is derived from the adjacency matrix, where each candidate i is associated to a node and there is an edge from i to j with weight $a_{i,j}$. This itself induces an order relation between the candidates by comparing the "strength" of the paths between i and j. The exact algorithm can be found in [43]. Note that there may be several winners according to Condorcet--Schulze. We denote by f_{Cond} the function that returns the winners.

We propose several MPC implementations of Condorcet-Schulze, depending on the accepted leakage and on the load balance between the voters and the authorities. The different approaches are summarized in Figure 2.

Version	Voters	Authorities		Transcript size
	# exp.	# exp.	# synch. locks	
[24]	$6k^2$[1]	$14nk^2a$	$2a$	$3nk^2a$
[26] (Paillier setting)	$5k^3$[2]	**precomp.** $78k^3a\log n$ **comp.** $6nk^3$[3] $+66k^3a$	**precomp.** $O(a)$ **comp.** $14k\log\log n$	$9nk^3+$ $178k^3a\log n$
Homomorphic solution[4]	$17.5k^2$	$15.5nk^2$	1	$8.5nk^2$
Partial MPC[4] (ours)	$6k\log k$	$49.5nk^2a\log k$	$2a\log k$	$50nk^2a\log k$
Full MPC (ours)	$6k\log k$	$49.5nk^2a\log k$ $+198k^3a\log n$	$4ka\log n$	$50nk^2a\log k$ $+204k^3a\log n$

[1] [24] leaks the adjacency matrix. In addition, for each ballot, the number of candidates ranked at equality is public. In particular, who voted blank is known to everyone.
[2] [26] does not allow voters to give the same rank to several candidates.
[3] [26] originally does not take into account the cost of verifying the ZKP provided by the voters.
[4] Leaks the adjacency matrix.

Figure 2: Leading terms of the cost of various solutions for Condorcet-Schulze. n is the number of voters, k is the number of candidates, a is the number of talliers. The unit of the transcript size is the key size, which is 256 bits in the ElGamal setting and 3072 bits in the Paillier setting.

Ballots as matrices. For each candidate i, let c_i be an integer that represents the order of preference, possibly with equality. A first approach is to encode the vote as a *preference matrix* m where

$$m_{i,j} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } c_i < c_j \\ 0 & \text{if } c_i = c_j \\ -1 & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

The voters then simply encode their ballot as an encrypted preference matrix M. Note that this requires k^2 encryptions (one encryption for each coefficient of the matrix). Voters also need to prove that their (encrypted) matrix is well-formed, that is, corresponds to a total order (with equalities). This requires *e.g.* to prove that if the voter prefers i over j and j over k then she prefers i over k:

$$(m_{i,j} = 1) \wedge (m_{j,k} = 1) \Rightarrow (m_{i,k} = 1)$$

and similar relations when $m_{i,j}$ and $m_{j,k}$ are equal to 0 or -1, yielding $O(k^3)$ statements.

Previous work. To discharge the voter from such a proof effort, in [24] the authorities shuffle each preference matrix in blocks (using `ShuffleMatrix`$([M_{i,j}])$) and then decrypt it to check that it was indeed well formed. However, this yields a privacy breach, unnoticed by the authors, as explained in introduction: for each voter, everyone learns the number of candidates placed at equality. In particular, everyone learns who voted blank since in that case all candidates are placed at equality. A costly way to repair [24] is to let the voters prove the relations with zero-knowledge proofs, yielding a cost of $O(k^3)$ exponentiations to build and to check a ballot. This is roughly the approach of [26], that also assumes that voters do not place candidates at equality (the case $c_i = c_j$ is forbidden).

Our approach. We propose an alternative approach in $O(k^2)$. Assume first that a voter prefers candidate 1 over candidate 2, that is preferred over candidate 3 and so on. Then the corresponding preference matrix is:

$$m^{\mathsf{init}} = \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 & \cdots & 1 \\ -1 & 0 & \ddots & \vdots \\ \vdots & \ddots & \ddots & 1 \\ -1 & \cdots & -1 & 0 \end{pmatrix}.$$

We consider a fixed encryption M^{init} of this matrix:

$$M^{\mathsf{init}}_{i,j} = \begin{cases} E_1 & \text{if } i < j \\ E_0 & \text{if } i = j \\ E_{-1} & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

where E_α is the ElGamal encryption of α with "randomness" 0. Everyone can check that M^{init} is formed as prescribed, at no cost, since we use a constant "randomness".

Assume now that a voter wishes to rank the candidates in some order, which is a permutation σ of $1, 2, \ldots, k$. Then our core idea is that the voter can simply shuffle M^{init} (using `ShuffleMatrix`) using permutation σ. The associated zero-knowledge proof guarantees that the resulting matrix is indeed a permutation of M^{init}, hence is well formed. Interestingly the secret vote σ is not encoded in the initial matrix but in the permutation used to shuffle it. Applying [47], this requires $O(k^2)$ exponentiations for the voter. To account for candidates that have an equal rank, the voter still shuffles M^{init} according to a permutation σ, consistent with her preference order, that is such that $\sigma(i) < \sigma(j)$ implies that $c_i \leq c_j$. But beforehand, she sends an additional vector B of encrypted bits (b_i), where $b_i = 1$ if candidates $\sigma^{-1}(i)$ and $\sigma^{-1}(i+1)$ have equal rank and $b_i = 0$ otherwise. The voter will then modify the matrix M^{init} into a transformed matrix M', using B, so that M' corresponds to her preference matrix. The resulting cost is still in $O(k^2)$ (since k^2

coefficients need to be updated) instead of $O(k^3)$ for [26] (that, yet, does not consider equalities).

Then the (encrypted) adjacency matrix can be computed by simply multiplying all ballots. This matrix is then (provably) decrypted by the authorities and Condorcet-Schulze as well as many variants can be applied. The main cost for the authorities lies in the verification of the proofs for each ballot. We could also avoid leaking the adjacency matrix by computing the Condorcet-Schulze winner(s) in MPC. However, the cost for the authorities would be in $O(k^3)$. If this is considered as affordable, then we can further alleviate the charge of the voters, as we shall explain now.

Ballots as list of integers. To minimize computations on the voter's side, we can ask them to simply encrypt the list of integers (c_i) representing their preference. To allow for ElGamal encryption, we will directly use the bit representation of each integer and encrypt each bit separately. If there are k candidates, we need $\log k$ bits to encode each candidate, hence a ballot will contain $k \log k$ ciphertexts, together with zero-knowledge proofs that the ciphertexts encrypt only 0 or 1. This is to be compared with the k^2 encryptions when ballots are encoded as a preference matrix.

Our first goal is to transform back each ballot into a preference matrix. We consider the *positive preference matrix*, obtained from the preference matrix by setting negative coefficients to 0. If C_i denotes the bitwise encryption of c_i then the encrypted positive preference matrix M can be computed by the authorities as:

$$M_{i,j} = \mathsf{LT}^{\text{bits}}(C_i, C_j).$$

Summing up the (encrypted) matrix M_v for each voter v, we immediately obtain the (encrypted) pairwise preferences matrix D. This matrix can be decrypted, or the authorities may apply the Schulze method in MPC from D. Despite the fact that the Schulze method is a complex algorithm on graphs, it can be implemented with an algorithm from Floyd-Warshall [22, 44], that mostly consists in computations of min/max. This can be translated into an MPC algorithm using the building blocks presented in Section 2. We denote by P_{Cond} the corresponding MPC protocol.

The advantage of this solution is that the load for voters remains very reasonable, with $O(k \log k)$ exponentiations in total. However, transforming each ballot into the (encrypted) preference matrix M_v is of cost $O(k^2 \log k)$ per voter, for each authority.

To summarize, when the number of candidates and voters remain reasonable, it is actually possible to compute the Condorcet winners with no leakage. Interestingly, the costly operations performed by the trustees can be done on-the-fly, while voters submit their ballots. Note that unless the number of candidates is really large w.r.t. the number of voters, a fully-hiding tally scheme is not really more expensive than schemes leaking the adjacency matrix.

6 SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE

Choosing one version of STV. Many flavors of STV election methods exist. In all of them, a ballot cast by a voter contains an ordered list of candidates, starting with the most preferred one. Along the counting process, if the candidate in the first line has been selected to get a seat or eliminated, then it should be erased from the ballot, so that the candidate on the second line becomes the most preferred at this stage. However, when a candidate gets a seat, this must "consume" some of the ballots who voted for him. From this comes the notion of quota and the transfer mechanism. In our case, we used the so-called Droop quota, which sets the value of a seat at $q = \lceil n/(s+1) \rceil + 1$. Here s is the number of seats, and n is the number of valid ballots. If a candidate is in the first line of a (weighted) number of ballots that is larger than q, then she gets elected. Otherwise, we take the candidate that gets the least votes and we eliminate her. In case of equality, we use a predefined arbitrary ordering (as in Section 3). The transfer is implemented as follows: each ballot starts with a weight set to one. When a candidate is elected, the surplus of votes is transferred to the next candidates. Namely, all the ballots where this candidate was listed first have their weight multiplied by a transfer coefficient $t = (c - q)/c$ where c is the sum of the weights of such ballots.

Fractions vs approximations. All along the STV algorithm, the weights of the ballots and the transfer coefficient are rational numbers that can be stored as pairs of integers. While this looks as the cleanest approach, we noticed that this leads to an exponential worse-case complexity. Indeed, the transfer coefficient t_i at a round i is a fraction whose height typically doubles at each round where a candidate is selected, and we get a complexity that is exponential in the number of seats.

This observation is a major problem in an MPC setting where the worst complexity must always be done, in order to hide every side-information. However, we realized that this is also a problem outside any cryptographic consideration. For instance, we ran the ideal STV algorithm on the publicly available ballots of the 2019 Legislative Council of New South Wales in Australia [3]. There are 21 seats, 346 candidates and 3.5 millions of ballots were cast. Our basic implementation using Sagemath shows that indeed, the size of the fractions roughly doubles at each selection, so that one would require about 30 GB of central memory for storing all of them. In real elections, and due to the fact that elections were initially counted by hand, approximations of fractions are used instead. We therefore represent fractions with a fix-point arithmetic, allowing r binary digits after the radix point. We denote by f_{STV} the corresponding function that returns the STV winners.

To leak or not to leak. The two main approaches toward a tally-hiding STV algorithm in the literature are [45] and [10]. In [45], mixnets are applied between each round of the algorithm, so that some information can be decrypted and revealed, without disclosing the list of the complete original ballots. The information that is leaked is whether the round was a selection or an elimination, and in the latter case, the score of the selected candidates. We remark also that their technique involves a very sequential first phase with a number of communications that is proportional to the number of ballots. In [10], some information is also revealed between each round of the STV algorithm, in particular the score of all the candidates, which is much more than in [45]. It is however highly efficient. The authors acknowledge that revealing the intermediates scores might be too much; in particular, they propose realistic scenarios where a coercer could successfully use this information. In [10], a variant is proposed where the most crucial information is leaked only to the trustees. For external observers, their approach leaks essentially the same information as [45], and also an approximation of the transfer coefficient at each round.

Version	Leakage	P/EG	Voters	Authorities		Transcript
			# exp.	# exp.	# comm.	size
[10, Sec. II]	[i]	EG	$10k^2$	$62nak^2$	$9kR$	$19nak^2$
[45]	[ii]	P	$5k^2$	$22nk^2am$	$2nkmR$	$11nak^2m$
[10, Sec. III.B]	[iii]	EG	$10k^2$	$62nak^2$	$9kR$	N/A
ours (naive arith.)	$\varnothing$	EG	$4k\log k$	$33nak^2(4\log k + 3m')$	$k(2m'(m+2r+\log k)$ $+k\log\log k))R$	$34nak^2(4\log k + 3m')$
ours (optimized arith.)	$\varnothing$	EG	$4k\log k$	$\frac{33}{2}nak^2(7\log k$ $+3m'\log m')$	$2k(m\log(m')$ $+(r+\log k)\log(r+\log k)$ $+r\log(r+m))R$	$\frac{34}{2}nak^2(7\log k$ $+3m'\log m')$

[i] Score of all candidates at each turn
[ii] Score of selected candidates at each turn
[iii] Selected or eliminated candidates and approximation of transfer coefficient at each turn. Trustees learn the score of all candidates at each turn

Figure 3: Leading terms of the cost of MPC implementations of STV. n: number of voters, k: number of candidates, $m = \lceil\log(n+1)\rceil$, a: number of authorities, r: precision in power of 2, $m' = m + r$, $k' = k + r$.

Thanks to our toolbox, we can simply follow the standard STV algorithm (with rounding) and derive a leakage-free tally scheme.

Arithmetic optimizations. To improve the complexity of the resulting scheme, we had to carefully implement bit-wise addition and multiplication. Let r be the number of binary digits after the radix point, so that all our computations are done with a fix-point precision of 2^{-r}. A bound on the real numbers manipulated during the algorithm is given by the number of voters n, so that we need $m = \lceil\log(n+1)\rceil$ bits for the mantissa. Hence, the operations reduce to integer arithmetic with $m' = m + r$ bits. While this looks small (a few dozens of bits), using textbook algorithms with a naive carry-propagation would lead to a number of rounds of communications that grow linearly with m' for additions and quadratically with m' for multiplications.

For carry-propagation during additions, this is a classical problem in hardware arithmetic circuits. The depth of the circuit translates more or less immediately into the number of communications in our MPC setting. An important difference with hardware considerations is that bounding the fan-in / fan-out of the gates is not relevant for us. The general idea is to rewrite the addition (or subtraction, or comparison) with the help of an associative operator acting on bits, so that a tree of height $\log(m')$ can be constructed.

The Appendix contains the details of how, following this strategy, we managed to strongly reduce the communication rounds at cost of a moderate increase in terms of exponentiations. This also yields big savings for multiplications and divisions, since they are built upon additions.

Efficiency considerations. In Figure 3, we give a summary of the various costs for our algorithm and the ones from the literature. Comparing the two last lines demonstrates the advantages of optimizing the arithmetic, since the last one is a very good compromise. While it is difficult to draw conclusions without knowing the context, we consider that with our algorithm, requiring a perfectly tally-hiding is not the criterion that will make the solution turns from practical to impractical. In fact, from the voter's side, our scheme is more efficient than existing solutions, with a quasi-linear number of exponentiations instead of quadratic. The costs for the authorities is certainly terribly high and is not yet realistic for a large scale election, but we consider that this is not much more than the previous solutions which leak partial information.

7 APPLICATION TO E-VOTING SECURITY

We show that our tally-hiding schemes can be used for e-voting, preserving vote secrecy and verifiability. We consider a mini-voting scheme, TH-voting, where we assume that voters have an authenticated channel with the voting server. Similarly to Ordinos [28], voters simply encrypt their vote following the expected format and the MPC protocol is used for tallying.

Definitions. A *voting scheme* consists of several algorithms and MPC protocols ($\texttt{Setup}, \texttt{Register}, \texttt{Vote}, \texttt{isValid}, \texttt{Check}, P_{\texttt{tally}}, \texttt{Verify}$), where:

- $\texttt{Setup}(\kappa, a, t)$ takes as input the security parameter κ, the number of authorities a and a threshold t. It returns $sk, pk, s_1, h_1, \cdots, s_a, h_a$ respectively a key pair sk, pk and the corresponding private and public shares s_i, h_i for the authorities.
- $\texttt{Register}(\texttt{pk}, n)$ takes a security parameter and the number of voters as input and give to each voter i a secret crendential c_i. For each credential, a public part π_i may be published in the public board.
- $\texttt{Vote}_{\texttt{pk}}(v, c)$ takes a public key pk, a vote v, and a credential c. It returns an encrypted ballot.
- $\texttt{isValid}(B, \texttt{PB})$ takes as input a ballot B and a ballot box PB and returns a boolean that states whether B is valid w.r.t. PB.
- $\texttt{Check}(B, \texttt{PB})$ is an algorithm that allows a voter to check that their ballot B was successfully added to the public board.
- $P_{\texttt{tally}}(\texttt{PB}, \{s_i\})$ is an MPC protocol run by the authorities to compute the tally from the public board PB and the shares $\{s_i\}$ of the secret key.
- $\texttt{Verify}(\texttt{PB}, r, \Pi)$ takes as input a result r, a transcript Π and a ballot box PB and returns a boolean that states whether r is correct w.r.t. PB and Π. This check is typically run by external auditors.

In [29], a quantitative definition of privacy is proposed, where a voting system is said δ-private for some δ. This definition can be turned into a qualitative one when δ is shown to be minimal, in a sense that an ideal protocol achieves δ'-privacy with a negligible $|\delta - \delta'|$. Hence, a natural definition of privacy is to compare the

probability of success of the adversary in a real and in an ideal protocol, and to show that the difference is negligible. Just as in [29], we consider a definition where the adversary tries to guess the vote of a single voter, the observed voter. For simplicity, we consider that this voter is the voter number 1. We consider a fixed set V of valid *voting options* and the games defined respectively in Algorithms 2 and 3. In both games, the honest voters other than the observed one vote independently from each other, according to a distribution $\mathcal{D}$ over V. In the real game, we use the notation $P^{\mathbb{A}}_{\mathtt{tally}}$ to express the fact that the adversary is active during the tally, since some talliers may be corrupted.

Definition 7.1 (vote privacy). We say that a voting protocol $(\mathtt{Setup}, \mathtt{Register}, \mathtt{Vote}, \mathtt{isValid}, P_{\mathtt{tally}}, \mathtt{Verify})$ guarantees *vote privacy* w.r.t a result function `tally` if, for all parameters t, a, n, n_c with $t < a$ and $n_c < n$, for all $C \subset [1, a]$ of size at most t, for all adversary $\mathbb{A}$, there exists an adversary $\mathbb{B}$ and a negligible function μ such that for all distribution $\mathcal{D}$,

$$|Pr(\mathtt{Real}^{\mathtt{Priv}}_{\mathbb{A},P_{\mathtt{tally}}}(\kappa, n, n_c, a, t, C, V, \mathcal{D}) = 1) - \Pr(\mathtt{Ideal}^{\mathtt{Priv}}_{\mathbb{B},\mathtt{tally}}(\kappa, n, n_c, a, t, C, V, \mathcal{D}) = 1)| \leq \mu(\kappa).$$

Algorithm 2: $\mathrm{Real}^{\mathtt{Priv}}_{\mathbb{A},P_{tally}}(\kappa, n, n_c, a, t, C, V, \mathcal{D})$

$sk, pk, s_1, h_1, \cdots, s_a, h_a := \mathtt{Setup}(\kappa, a, t)$
$c_1, \pi_1, \cdots, c_n, \pi_n := \mathtt{Register}(\mathsf{pk}, n)$
$par := \mathcal{D}, pk, h_1, \cdots, h_a, \pi_1, \cdots, \pi_n$
$a_1, \cdots, a_{n_c} := \mathbb{A}(\kappa, par, (s_i)_{i\in C})$; $A := \{a_1, \cdots, a_{n_c}\}$
if $1 \in A$ **then** Return 0
$v_0, v_1 := \mathbb{A}((c_i)_{i\in A})$
$b \in_r \{0, 1\}$
$BB := (\mathtt{Vote}_{\mathsf{pk}}(v_b, c_1))$
for $i \in [1, n]\backslash(A \bigcup \{1\})$ **do**
  $v_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$
  $BB := BB||\mathtt{Vote}_{\mathsf{pk}}(v_i, c_i)$
$\boldsymbol{M} := \mathbb{A}(BB)$
for $X \in \boldsymbol{M}$ **do**
  if $\mathtt{isValid}(X, BB)$ **then** $BB := BB||X$
$r, \Pi := P^{\mathbb{A}}_{\mathtt{tally}}(BB, \{s_i\})$
$b' := \mathbb{A}(r, \Pi)$
Return 1 if $(b == b') \wedge (v_0, v_1 \in V)$ and 0 otherwise

TH-voting. We define a voting protocol $V_{\mathtt{tally}}$ for each tally function `tally` covered in our paper (D'Hondt, Majority Judgment, Condorcet-Schulze, and STV), with $P_{\mathtt{tally}}$ the corresponding tally-hiding protocol, in the ElGamal setting. The algorithm $\mathtt{Vote}_{\mathtt{tally}}$ returns an encrypted ballot following the encoding devised in the corresponding section, and a ZKP that the ballot is correctly formed. The algorithm $\mathtt{isValid}_{\mathtt{tally}}$ checks the ZKP and additionally ensures that the ballot is not already on the board. As explained in Section 2, the `CGate` protocol produces a transcript which acts as a ZKP that the protocol was performed correctly. By concatenating

Algorithm 3: $\mathrm{Ideal}^{\mathtt{Priv}}_{\mathbb{B},\mathtt{tally}}(\kappa, n, n_c, a, t, C, V, \mathcal{D})$

$a_1, \cdots, a_{n_c} := \mathbb{B}(\kappa, \mathcal{D})$; $A := \{a_1, \cdots, a_{n_c}\}$
if $1 \in A$ **then** Return 0
$v_0, v_1 := \mathbb{B}(\kappa, par, (s_i)_{i\in C})$
$b \in_r \{0, 1\}$ $B := (v_b)$
for $i \in [1, n]\backslash(A \bigcup \{1\})$ **do**
  $v_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$
  $B := B||v_i$
$(v_i)_{i\in A} := \mathbb{B}()$
$B := B||(v_i)_{i\in A}$
$r := \mathtt{tally}(B)$
$b' := \mathbb{B}(r)$
Return 1 if $(b == b') \wedge (v_0, v_1 \in V)$ and 0 otherwise

the transcripts of all `CGate` and the transcript of the threshold decryption, the participants produce a ZKP Π that $P_{\mathtt{tally}}$ has been performed correctly. This also defines a $\mathtt{Verify}_{\mathtt{tally}}$ algorithm which consists of verifying all the ZKP. We consider an ideal $\mathtt{Setup}(\kappa, a, t)$ that picks a group G corresponding to the security parameter κ, picks randomly a generator g and returns $sk, pk, s_1, h_1, \cdots, s_a, h_a$ where the (s_i, h_i) are distributed following Shamir's scheme with a authorities and a threshold t; sk is the corresponding secret key and $pk = (g, g^{sk})$. The setup can be further refined with a UC-secure DKG (see e.g. [46]). Finally, we also consider an ideal registration where the credential c_i is a secret signature key while π_i is the public verification key.

Theorem 7.2. *Let* `tally` *be one of the previously defined tally functions (D'Hondt, Majority Judgment, Condorcet-Schulze, and STV). Under the DDH assumption, in the ROM and if the signature scheme is strongly unforgeable,* $V_{\mathtt{tally}}$ *is private w.r.t.* `tally`.

The proof can be found in Appendix J. We also prove that $V_{\mathtt{tally}}$ is verifiable for a notion of verifiability similar to [19]. Note that the key step is the fact that our tally-hiding schemes guarantees universal verifiability: auditors can check the result is valid. Individual verifiability is straightforward in our setting since we implicitly assume that all voters verify their vote. How to achieve individual verifiability in practice is beyond the scope of this work.

8 IMPLEMENTATION

In order to validate our approach, we have written a prototype implementation. In the literature, most of such prototypes are based on Paillier encryption. Here, we concentrate on the ElGamal-based setting, in order to evaluate its practical feasibility. The `libsodium` library is used for randomness and all elliptic curve and hashing operations. The rest is implemented as a standalone C++ program. It is available as a companion artefact of this paper [4] and is published as free software. Most of the primitives of our toolbox have been implemented, and as a proof of concept, we have written a fully tally-hiding protocol for Condorcet-Schulze (ballots as list of integers, and no leakage, in Figure 2).

We ran our software on various sets of parameters. In order to compare to [26], we also consider 3 trustees (and no threshold). Our experimental setting is a single server hosting two 16-core

voters	5 candidates	10 candidates	20 candidates
64	1m50s / 49 MB	8m30s / 0.30 GB	45m / 1.8 GB
128	2m40s / 87 MB	12m / 0.51 GB	1h27m / 2.9 GB
256	4m35s / 160 MB	20m / 0.88 GB	2h37m / 4.8 GB
512	8m10s / 305 MB	34m / 1.6 GB	4h43m / 8.6 GB
1024	15m / 595 MB	1h05m / 3.1 GB	8h50m / 16 GB

Figure 4: Benchmark (wall-clock time and transcript size) of fully tally-hiding Condorcet-Schulze MPC computation.

AMD EPYC 7282 processors and 128 GB or RAM. Each of the 3 trustees runs 4 computing threads and a few scheduling and I/O threads. The communication between the trustees is emulated via the loopback network interface. Thus, all the network system calls are indeed performed by the program, even though this is just a simulation. The verification of the validity of the ballots is a non-MPC computation that takes a negligible time, compared to the tally. In Figure 4, we summarize the cost in terms of wall-clock time and the size of the transcript, measured by the program.

This experiment demonstrates that the approach is sound and in the realm of practicability, for moderate-sized elections. With this choice of ballot representation, which is very cheap from the voter's point of view, the agglomeration of the preference matrices has to be done in MPC, and therefore the cost for the trustees grows quasi-linearly in the number of voters. Therefore, at some point, the approach of [26] using Paillier encryption becomes preferable, since the aggregation is for free, and the MPC cost is essentially independent of the number of voters. Still, their benchmark gives more than 9 days of MPC computation for tallying a 20-candidates Condorcet-Schulze election, which is more than what we provide for 1024 voters. This is mostly due to the efficiency of elliptic-curve based ElGamal encryption.

9 LESSONS LEARNED

Our study shows that it is possible to compute the result of an election without leaking any additional information on the original ballots, often at a realistic cost. This requires however to carefully design the corresponding algorithm for each different tally function. We have provided in this paper several techniques that can reduce the cost. This was applied to several well-known complex voting systems, and we developed a toolbox that can be re-used in other contexts. We list here the main questions that a designer should consider when implementing another counting function.

Think ElGamal. While Paillier is the Swiss-Army knife for MPC implementations, our study has shown that ElGamal can often suffice, even when encrypted integers need to be compared or multiplied. This can be a big advantage in terms of efficiency and availability of software libraries.

Rethink the encoding of ballots. The encoding of a ballot can have a huge impact on the cost of the rest of the procedure. For example, encoding integers in their bit representation adds an initial cost that can later save a lot of computation. It can allow to use ElGamal rather than Paillier. The encoding of ballots also typically offers different tradeoffs in terms of load balance between voters and authorities, as seen for example for the Condorcet voting function where a more complex ballot can alleviate the authorities task.

Verifiable mixnets are a versatile tool. The typical use of a mixnet is to mix and re-randomize encrypted ballots before decryption and application of a counting function on the cleartexts. However, verifiable mixnets are also useful to discharge some computations (*e.g.* verifications) on the cleartexts. More advanced mixing can be used to ensure for example that the same permutation is applied to several components. We have proposed an original usage of mixnet in the context of Condorcet, where each voter uses a verifiable shuffle to encode their vote as a (secret) permutation of a fixed public matrix, proving well-formedness.

Consider the full algorithmic toolbox. When designing an MPC algorithm, the constraints are rather non standard. The worst case always needs to be considered, and all branches need to be always visited, like in the circuit complexity model. In fact, this circuit point of view is highly relevant, and we borrowed some algorithms from the hardware literature. The depth of the circuit is related to the number of communication rounds; but limits on the fan-in or fan-out of a gate are irrelevant.

Some rather advanced algorithms like the MJ counting functions or the Floyd-Warshall shortest path algorithm can be translated rather easily. On the other hand, some basic tasks can be way too costly if one chooses the wrong algorithm for them. For instance, sorting a list of integers becomes quadratic for more than a few quasi-linear classical algorithms when converted to MPC. Indeed, many classical algorithms assume that accessing the i^{th} value of an array $T[i]$ takes constant time, even when i is a computed value, while in MPC this requires a linear time to pass through all the values and hide the value of i. Another typical example is addition of encrypted integers, where carry propagation can generate a chain of dependencies that translates into a linear number of communication rounds. Breaking the chain of carries as done in hardware circuits allows to reduce this to a logarithmic number of rounds.

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Appendices

Part I: Building blocks.

Functionality	Option	Algorithm	Exp per trustee	Comm. cost	Transcript size
Dec	P/EG	Dec	$5a$	B	$4a$
RandBit	P/EG	RandBit	$3a+2$	R	$6a$
CSZ	EG	CGate [40]	$33a$	$R+4B$	$34a$
	P	Mul [42]	$10a$	$2B$	$11a$
If	P/EG	If	CSZ	CSZ	CSZ
Select	P/EG	Select	nCSZ	CSZ	nCSZ
Neg^{bits}	P/EG	Neg^{bits}	$(m-1)$CSZ	$(m-1)$CSZ	$(m-1)$CSZ
Add^{bits}	P/EG	Add^{bits} [40]	$(2m-1)$CSZ	$(2m-1)$CSZ	$(2m-1)$CSZ
	Sublinear P/EG	$\text{UFCAdd}^{\text{bits}}$	$m(\frac{3}{2}\log m+2)$CSZ	$2(\log m+1)$CSZ	$m(\frac{3}{2}\log m+2)$CSZ
Sub^{bits}	P/EG	Sub^{bits}	$(2m-1)$CSZ	$(2m-1)$CSZ	$(2m-1)$CSZ
	LT P/EG	$\text{SubLT}^{\text{bits}}$	$(2m-1)$CSZ	$(2m-1)$CSZ	$(2m-1)$CSZ
	LT+EQ P/EG	$\text{SubLT}^{\text{bits}}$	$(3m-2)$CSZ	$(2m+\log m)$CSZ	$(3m-2)$CSZ
	Sublinear P/EG	$\text{UFCSub}^{\text{bits}}$	$m(\frac{3}{2}\log m+2)$CSZ	$2(\log m+1)$CSZ	$m(\frac{3}{2}\log m+2)$CSZ
LT^{bits}	LT P/EG	$\text{SubLT}^{\text{bits}}$	$(2m-1)$CSZ	$(2m-1)$CSZ	$(2m-1)$CSZ
	LT+EQ P/EG	$\text{SubLT}^{\text{bits}}$	$(3m-2)$CSZ	$(2m+\log m)$CSZ	$(3m-2)$CSZ
	Sublinear P/EG	CLT^{bits}	$(4m-3)$CSZ	$2(\log m+1)$CSZ	$(4m-3)$CSZ
	Sublinear+EQ P/EG	CLT^{bits}	$(5m-4)$CSZ	$2(\log m+1)$CSZ	$(5m-4)$CSZ
EQ^{bits}	P/EG	EQ^{bits}	$(2m-1)$CSZ	$(\log m+1)$CSZ	$(2m-1)$CSZ
EQ	Precomp P	EQH [31]	$21ma+75a$ $+4(m+1)$	$R+8B$	$(22m+28)a$
GT	Precomp P	GTH [31]	$(27m+146\log m)a$ $+8m+9a+5\log m$	$(2R+13B)\log m$	$(28m+50\log m)a$ $+6a$
BinExpand	P	BinExpand [41]	$12ma+53a+3m$	$R+2mB$	$(17m+21)a$
$\text{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}$	EG	$\text{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}$	$3n$CSZ	$(\log n+1)\log n$CSZ	$3n$CSZ
Mul^{bits}	P/EG	Mul^{bits}	$3m^2$CSZ	$2m^2$CSZ	$3m^2$CSZ
Div^{bits}	P/EG	Div^{bits}	$(3m-1)r$CSZ	$2mr$CSZ	$(3m-1)r$CSZ
$\text{MinMax}^{\text{bits}}$	naive P/EG	$\text{MinMax}^{\text{bits}}$	$(8m-2)n$CSZ	$2m\log n$CSZ	$(8m-2)n$CSZ
	sublinear P/EG	$\text{MinMax}^{\text{bits}}$	$(12m-6)n$CSZ	$2\log n(\log m+2)$CSZ	$(12m-6)n$CSZ
Mixnet	EG	[47]	$9na$	R	$5na$
	P	[47]	$8na$	R	$4na$

Figure 5: Cost of various MPC primitives: basic functionalities for logic, integer arithmetic, and a few advanced functions. The Option column includes whether this is available in Paillier (P) or ElGamal (EG). The notations are a for the number of authorities, m for the bit-length of the operands, n for the number of operands, r for the precision (in the division). All logarithms are in base 2. The communication costs are expressed in terms of broadcast (denoted B) and full-rounds (denoted R). The unit of the transcript size is the key length. This corresponds to half the size of a ciphertext in both Paillier (typically 3072 bits) and ElGamal (typically 256 bits) settings.

In this Appendix, we give details about our cryptographic primitives. This includes the MPC building blocks that we present in Appendix C and which are summed up in Figure 5, but also more basic recalls about the ElGamal and Paillier cryptosystems in Appendix A and the Zero Knowledge Proofs (ZKP) in Appendix B. Afterwards, we explain how we use our MPC toolbox to perform the tally for single choice voting (in Appendix D), Majority Judgment (in Appendix E), the Condorcet methods (in Appendix F) and Single Transferable Choice (in Appendix G). All the security aspects are addressed in the second part of the Appendix, which begins with Appendix J.

A ELGAMAL AND PAILLIER CRYPTOSYSTEMS

In this section, we recall the encryption and decryption algorithms in the Paillier and ElGamal cryptosystems. Both are additively homomorphic. This allows efficient addition, subtraction, negation (flipping an encrypted bit) and re-encryption, without resorting to MPC. These are extremely useful for various uses. We sum up their complexity in Figure 6.

A.1 ElGamal and Paillier encryptions

ElGamal encryption.

In the ElGamal setting, G is a group of prime order q and public generators g and h. The public encryption key is (g, h), while the discrete logarithm of h in base g is the corresponding decryption key. To encrypt a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ under h, one chooses $r \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$ and compute

$$\texttt{Enc}(m, r) = (g^r, g^m h^r).$$

Note that this is different from the textbook ElGamal cryptosystem, since we encrypt g^m instead of m. Therefore, decrypting will require to solve a discrete logarithm problem and only small values of m can be efficiently decrypted. Hence we assume that computing g^m has a negligible complexity compared to that of the two other exponentiations. This modification grants the ElGamal cryptosystem the desired homomorphic property.

Consequently, Add and Sub are simply point-wise multiplication and division of ciphertexts, and we will often just use the multiplication or division symbols in our algorithms, without explicitly mentioning that they encode Add or Sub. We also have an almost free Not operation (divide an encryption of 1 by the operand) and a cheap ReEnc primitive (multiply the operand by an encryption of 0). Note that Not can use a fixed (trivial) encryption of 1, while ReEnc needs a fresh encryption of 0. Therefore Add, Sub and Not are essentially for free, while ReEnc costs two exponentiations.

Paillier encryption.

In the Paillier setting, n is a RSA integer, coprime with it's Euler's totient value $\phi(n)$. In addition, $g \in \mathbb{Z}_{n^2}$ is an element of order n, for instance $g = 1 + n$. To encrypt a message $m \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ under the public key (n, g), one chooses $r \in \mathbb{Z}_n^\times$ and computes

$$\texttt{Enc}(m, r) = g^m r^n \bmod n^2.$$

This encryption scheme is naturally homomorphic, which allows to derive the Add, Sub, Not and ReEnc primitives as above. Note that when m is small, computing an encryption of m only costs 1 exponentiation, as the other is either negligible or precomputable.

Functionality	Option	Exponentiations
Enc	P	1 or 2
	EG	2
Not	P/EG	0
Add/Sub	P/EG	0
ReEnc	P	1
	EG	2

Figure 6: Cost of non-MPC homomorphic operations. In the first line, when the plaintext is a small integer, the cost is only 1 exponentiation as the other is either precomputable or negligible.

A.2 Threshold decryption

We recall the distributed algorithms for threshold decryption in the Paillier and ElGamal setting. While threshold ElGamal is standard, there are several algorithms for threshold decryption in Paillier, and it is not straightforward to decide which one is the best. In the following, we consider the work of [21]. In both cases, the overall cost of the Dec decryption function is $5a$ exponentiations per authority (where a is the number of authorities), and it requires a single broadcast per authority.

ElGamal decryption.

In the ElGamal setting, the secret s such that $h = g^s$ is shared between the authorities using a Shamir secret sharing scheme, such as Pedersen's distribution scheme [35]. More precisely, there exists a polynomial P of degree t (where t is the threshold) such that $P(0) = s$,

while authority i's share is $s_i = P(i)$. Each authority has a public commitment $h_i = g^{s_i}$ to their share, which allows to provide proofs of correct decryption.

In order to decrypt a ciphertext (x, y), each authority computes $w_i = x^{s_i}$ and provides a Zero Knowledge proof that $\log_x(w_i) = \log_g(h_i)$. The w_i are referred to as the *partial decryptions*. From any $t + 1$ valid partial decryptions, the value x^s can be recovered using Lagrange's interpolation. Finally, the plaintext is $m = log_g(y/x^s)$. The operations performed by authority i are described in Algorithm 4, which assumes that at least $t + 1$ valid partial decryptions are available after the for loop.

Algorithm 4: Decryption algorithm for authority i in the ElGamal setting

Require: (g, h), $(h_1, \cdots, h_a)$, hash, s_i, (x, y)
Ensure: m, a decryption of (x, y)

$w_i = x^{s_i}$
$\alpha_i \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$
$e_{1,i} = g^{\alpha_i}$, $e_{2,i} = x^{\alpha_i}$
$d_i = \mathsf{hash}(g||h||h_1||\cdots||h_a||x||y||w_i||e_{1,i}||e_{2,i})$
$r_i = \alpha_i + s_i d_i$
for $j = 1$ *to* a $(j \neq i)$ **do**
  $d_j = \mathsf{hash}(g, h, h_1, \cdots, h_a, x, y, w_j, e_{1,j}, e_{2,j})$
  $b_j = (g^{r_j} h_j^{-d_j} == e_{1,j})$
  $b_j = b_j \wedge (g^{r_j} w_j^{-d_j} == e_{2,j})$
$S = \{i\} \bigcup \{j \in [1, a] \mid b_j = 1\}$
Compute Lagrange coefficients κ_k for set $S = \{j_1, \cdots, j_{t+1}\}$ (* keep only the first elements of S if it's larger *)
Return $\log_g \left(y \left(\prod_{k=1}^{t+1} w_{j_k}^{-\kappa_k} \right) \right)$

Paillier decryption.

In the Paillier setting, we use the approach from [21] as it provides a decryption algorithm which is similar to that of the ElGamal setting. In what follows, $g = (1 + n)$. Recall that n and $\phi(n)$ are coprime, so there exists a unique integer s in $\mathbb{Z}_{n\phi(n)}$ such that s is congruent to 1 modulo n and 0 modulo $\phi(n)$. This integer s is shared among the authorities using a Shamir secret sharing scheme, for instance using the work of [25], which can be generalized for an arbitrary number of authorities. Finally, we assume that a public random group element $g' \in_r \mathbb{Z}_{n^2}$ has been chosen, and that each authority has a public commitment $h_i = (g')^{s_i}$ to their share.

To decrypt a ciphertext C, each authority computes $w_i = C^{s_i}$ and provides a Zero Knowledge proof that w_i is well-formed (using the proof from [37]). Let $\Delta = a!$, where a is the number of authorities. For any $t + 1$ valid partial tallies, the value $D = C^{\Delta s}$ can be recovered using Lagrange's interpolation. Note that the Lagrange coefficients are multiplied by Δ because inverting an integer is infeasible modulo $n\phi(n)$, as $\phi(n)$ is unknown. Since Δ and n are coprime, Δ is invertible modulo n and we denote $u = \Delta^{-1} \bmod n$. We compute $D' = D^u \bmod n^2$ and cast D' into $\mathbb{Z}$ in order to derive $m = (D' - 1)/n$. The resulting m is the desired plaintext.

Note that another threshold scheme for the Paillier cryptosystem can be found in [34]. It is less similar to the ElGamal threshold scheme, and it requires an honest majority of authorities.

B ZERO KNOWLEDGE PROOFS

Zero Knowledge proofs are ubiquitous in our algorithms. Already, the decryption algorithms we have just mentioned include proofs of correct decryption for the partial tallies. Not trying to be exhaustive, we recall two standard zero knowledge proofs, and give their complexity in terms of exponentiations for the prover, the verifier, as well as the size of the transcript. All our Zero Knowledge proofs are made non-interactive with the Fiat-Shamir transformation, which requires a hash function hash. We decided to incorporate this function as an argument of the algorithms as some specific prefixes should be incorporated into the hash depending on the context (typically any public parameter). The precise specification of how the hashes should be prefixed to provide the correct level of security is out of the scope of our work, but still needs to be mentioned.

Standard encryption of 0.

Proving that a ciphertext is an encryption of 0 is useful to prove that two ciphertexts encrypt the same plaintext and, ultimately, to prove that a ciphertext has been correctly reencrypted. We give Algorithm 5, which is a standard way to obtain such a ZKP. To verify a ZKP obtained with this algorithm, simply compute $d = \mathsf{hash}(X||e)$ and check that $e = \mathsf{Enc}(0, a)X^{-d}$.

Standard 0/1 encryption.

In all our algorithms, in particular on the voter side, it is extremely common to prove that some encryption is an encryption of either 0 or 1. We give Algorithm 6 which allows to produce such a proof given a bit b, a randomness r and an encryption $X = \mathsf{Enc}(b, r)$. This proof

Algorithm 5: ZKP0

Require: R, hash, X, r such that $X = \mathsf{Enc}(0, r)$
(* R is $\mathbb{Z}_q$ for ElGamal encryption, $\mathbb{Z}_n^\times$ for Paillier encryption *)
Ensure: π^0, a ZKP that X is a encryption of 0.

$w \in_r R$
$e = \mathsf{Enc}(0, w)$
$d = \mathsf{hash}(X||e)$
$a = w + rd$
Return $\pi^0 = (e, a)$

ZKP	P/EG	Exp. for Prover	Exp. for Verifier	Transcript size
π^0	EG	2	4	3
	P	1	2	3
$\pi^{0/1}$	EG	6	8	8
	P	4	4	8
π^{Shuffle}	EG	$10n + 5$	$9n + 11$	$10n + 10$
	P	$8n + 4$	$8n + 10$	$10n + 10$

Figure 7: Cost of the Zero Knowledge Proofs for $0/1$ encryptions and shuffles.

has the form $\pi^{0/1} = (e_1, e_2, \sigma_1, \rho_1, \sigma_2, \rho_2)$. To verify such a proof, one can simply compute $d = \mathsf{hash}(X||e_1||e_2)$ and check that the following equations are verified:

$$\sigma_1 + \sigma_2 = d$$
$$\mathsf{Enc}(0, \rho_1)(X/E_1)^{-\sigma_1} = e_1$$
$$\mathsf{Enc}(0, \rho_0)(X/E_0)^{-\sigma_0} = e_0.$$

Algorithm 6: ZKP01

Require: $R, \mathsf{hash}, X, r, b \in \{0, 1\}$ such that $X = \mathsf{Enc}(b, r)$
(* R is $\mathbb{Z}_q$ for ElGamal encryption, $\mathbb{Z}_n^\times$ for Paillier encryption *)
Ensure: $\pi^{0/1}$, a Zero Knowledge proof that X is an encryption of 0 or 1

$w \in_r R$
$e_b = \mathsf{Enc}(0, w)$
$\sigma_{1-b}, \rho_{1-b} \in_r R$
$e_{1-b} = \mathsf{Enc}(0, \rho_{1-b})(X/E_{1-b})^{-\sigma_{1-b}}$
$d = \mathsf{hash}(X||e_1||e_2)$
$\sigma_b = d - \sigma_{1-b}$
$\rho_b = w + r\sigma_b$
Return $\pi^{0/1} = (e_1, e_2, \sigma_1, \rho_1, \sigma_2, \rho_2)$

Proof of a shuffle.

We consider a prover P which is given a list of ciphertexts $C_1, \cdots, C_n$. The prover wants to shuffle the ciphertexts and output $C'_1, \cdots, C'_n$, while providing a proof π^{Shuffle} that there exists a permutation σ such that for all i, $C'_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}(C_{\sigma(i)})$. To do so, one can for instance apply the protocol from [47], which is a very standard approach in the ElGamal setting. This approach can be adapted in the Paillier setting. Note that a mixnet procedure can be derived from a proof of a shuffle, using a round of communication.

C OUR MPC TOOLBOX FOR EFFICIENT TALLY-HIDING

From now, we go on with proper MPC primitives and sum up their complexities in Figure 5. We will explain thoroughly how they can be obtained.

We stress that each functionality can be implemented in several manners, depending on the context. Choosing the implementation that best suits their need is left to the readers, and may imply implementations which are not presented in this section, as a more efficient replacement

could exist in some specific context. For instance, we give a generic algorithm for adding two bit-wise encrypted integers (Algorithm 21). But when one of the operand is known in the clear, another implementation is available, which is twice as efficient (Algorithm 34). Such an optimisation is often possible for a very specific use, but we cannot anticipate every single specific situation.

A fundamental choice is however to decide how to encode integers. As explained in the main body of the article, in the ElGamal setting it is not possible to perform advanced arithmetic (in particular multiplication or comparison) if the integer is encrypted in the natural way (m is directly the integer to be dealt with). The *bitwise encryption* means that each bit of the integer m is encrypted individually. We recall that everything with an exponent $^{\text{bits}}$ means that this method is used. In the Paillier setting, the `BinExpand` function allows to convert an encrypted integer into its bitwise encryption. We postpone the description of this conversion; we will discuss it with other Paillier-specific algorithms (see Appendix C.6).

C.1 `CondSetZero` (abbreviated as `CSZ`)

The `CondSetZero` functionality is the basis of many other MPC primitives. Given two ciphertexts X and Y which encrypt x and y respectively, where $y \in \{0, 1\}$, it returns an encryption of xy. This algorithm is the basis of virtually all of our MPC algorithm in the ElGamal setting, but could be used in the Paillier setting as well. We present two algorithms for it. Algorithm 1, that is presented in Section 2.1 and reproduced below for convenience, is adapted from [40], where it is referred to as the *conditional gate*. In the Paillier case, there exists a more efficient and more general algorithm [42], that we present as Algorithm 11: this is a general multiplication algorithm that does not require y to be a bit. The costs of these two variants are given in Figure 5.

We remark that the `CGate` algorithm requires raising the ciphertext to the power $1/2$. This can be done by raising to the power $(q+1)/2$ in ElGamal, or $(n+1)/2$ in Paillier. In the latter case, this works because while the full-group order is unknown, the cleartexts belong to $\mathbb{Z}_n$. Therefore, even though `Mul` is a faster implementation of `CSZ` in the Paillier setting, `CGate` could be used as well.

Algorithm 7: `CSZ`

Require: G, a group of prime order q and public generator g
$\mathsf{pk} = (g, h)$, an exponential ElGamal public key,
whose shares are distributed among the a participants
$\tilde{h} \in G$, a public element independent from pk
X, an encryption of some $x \in \mathbb{Z}_q$
Y, an encryption of $y \in \{0, 1\}$
Ensure: Z, a random encryption of xy

1 $Y_0 \longleftarrow E_{-1}Y^2$; $X_0 \longleftarrow X$;
2 **for** $i = 1$ *to* a, *for the authority* i, **do**
3 $(u, v) \longleftarrow X_{i-1}$;
4 $r_1, r_2 \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$; $s \in_r \{-1, 1\}$;
5 $X_i \longleftarrow (u^s g^{r_1}, v^s h^{r_1})$; $e \longleftarrow \tilde{h}^{r_1}$;
6 $Y_i \longleftarrow \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Y_{i-1}^s, r_2)$;
7 Broadcast X_i, e, Y_i and a ZKP π_i that they are well formed (see Algorithm 9) ;
8 Each authority verifies the proof of the other authorities (see Algorithm 10) ;
9 They collectively rerandomize X_a and Y_a into X' and Y' (see Algorithm 8) ;
10 They collectively decrypt Y' into y_a;
11 They output $Z = (XX'^{y_a})^{\frac{1}{2}}$;

Algorithm 7 consists of three interactive steps. To begin with, as Y is supposed to be an encryption of $y \in \{0, 1\}$, we use the homomorphic property to turn it into an encryption Y_0 of $2y - 1 \in \{-1, 1\}$ at line 1. This operation is essentially *free*, and does not require any interaction. Then, the first real step is a round of communications (lines 1 to 8). During this step, the authorities collectively generate a random and implicit $s \in \{-1, 1\}$ and compute a reencryption X_a (resp. Y_a) of X^s (resp. Y_0^s). This way, Y_a is an encryption of a random $y' = s(2y - 1) \in \{-1, 1\}$, so that decrypting it does not reveal anything about the initial value of y. The second step is a rerandomization phase (line 9) which we added to obtain SUC-security. Finally, the last step is a threshold decryption protocol (line 10), during which the authorities decrypt Y' to obtain y'. Then, by computing $X'^{y'}$, they can form an encryption of $x(2y - 1)$ (indeed, X' is an encryption of sx so that the sign s is simplified in the exponent). To derive the desired encryption of xy, they can locally multiply by X (to obtain an encryption of $2xy$) then raise to the power of $(q+1)/2$, which cancels the factor 2 in the exponent. In what follows, we comment on the modifications that we made compared to the original version of [40].

Public coin g. For a technical reason, we require that g is obtained with a public coin protocol. For this purpose, we consider that g is derived from a hash of "Conditional gate". This is useful for an explicit reduction to DDH, since it prevents the environment of the SUC

framework to choose g freely. Note that there exists other versions of the DDH game, where the adversary is allowed to choose the generator g. If such a computational assumption is made, we no longer need g to be public coin.

Round of communications. Compared to the original conditional gate protocol, we added the following modifications:

(1) We use an ElGamal commitment $(u^s g^{r_1}, \tilde{h}^{r_1})$ instead of a Pedersen commitment $g^s \tilde{h}^r$;
(2) In addition, we require that the ElGamal commitment and the reencryption use the same randomness r_1;
(3) Finally, we also demand that the participants prove that $s \in \{-1, 1\}$, while it was originally only required to prove the knowledge of some $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q$.

The two first modifications were made to obtain the extractability of u^s *à la Shoup* (without rewinding). Combined with the third modification, they allow the simulator to extract the value $s_1 \in \{-1, 1\}$ used by the adversary, which is required in the proof of SUC-security. (Since u may be chosen by the adversary, this also requires to check that $u \neq 1$.) To prevent the adversary from exploiting the trapdoor $\log_{\tilde{h}}(g)$ (which allows to extract u^s) not the trapdoor $\log_{\tilde{h}}(h)$ (which allows to extract v^s), we can derive $\tilde{h}$ from a hash of pk. In addition to provide extractability, the third modification prevents the adversary from choosing $s_1 \notin \{-1, 1\}$. This means that, after the round of communications, Y_a is an encryption of $y' = s_1 s_2 (2y - 1) \in \{-1, 1\}$, where $s_2 \in \{-1, 1\}$ is a random element determined by the choices of the honest participants. Hence, by computing $X_a^{y'}$, the sign $s_1 s_2$ is simplified in the exponent, as expected. To obtain the PoK required at line 7, one can use a standard disjunctive PoK (see Algorithm 9).

Rerandomization. We also added a second step, which is a reencryption phase (see line 9). This is necessary for the SUC framework; indeed, consider an attacker that corrupts the last participant. Then it can choose many random s, r_1, r_2 until X_a meets a particular pattern that occurs with non-negligible probability (for instance, the 7 first bits in its bitwise representation are 0). The consequence of such an "attack" is that Z will not be an *uniformly* random encryption of xy as desired, so that SUC-security would be lost. To perform the rerandomization, we can use a synchronous broadcast of random encryptions of 0, along with the corresponding ZKP. For the rerandomization phase, we consider the protocol described in Algorithm 8.

Algorithm 8: Rerandomization

Require: G, a group of prime order q
pk, an ElGamal public key
X, a ciphertext
Ensure: X', a rerandomization of X

1 **for** $i = 1$ *to a, participant i* **do**
2 $r_i \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$;
3 $A_i \longleftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, r_i)$;
4 $\pi_i \longleftarrow \mathrm{PoK}^0(\mathsf{pk}, A_i, r_i)$;
5 (* ZKP that A_i is well-formed *)
6 $c_i \longleftarrow \mathsf{hash}(A_i, \pi_i)$;
7 Broadcast the commitment c_i;
8 Once a commitment has been received from all the other authorities, broadcast A_i, π_i;
9 Verify that the broadcast A_j, π_j are consistent with the corresponding commitments;
10 **return** $X \prod_{i=1}^{a} A_i$;

Computing the PoK. At line 7, we need a PoK that X_i, c_s, Y_i is well formed. This proof guarantees that there exists $s \in \{-1, 1\}$ and $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ such that $X_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(X_{i-1}, r_1)$, $e = \tilde{h}^{r_1}$ and $Y_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Y_{i-1}^s, r_2)$. We use the following standard disjunctive proof:

$$X_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(X_{i-1}, r_1) \textbf{ and } Y_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Y_{i-1}, r_2) \textbf{ and } e = \tilde{h}^{r_1}$$

or

$$X_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(X_{i-1}^{-1}, r_1) \textbf{ and } Y_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Y_{i-1}^{-1}, r_2) \textbf{ and } e = \tilde{h}^{r_1}.$$

To verify the proof, one can use Algorithm 10.

Since each authority has to check all the other authorities' proofs, this algorithm costs approximately $33a$ exponentiations per authority, where a is the number of authorities. The real value depends on the threshold, but $33a$ is a reasonable upper-bound. The communication cost is one round of communication and a few broadcasts.

In Algorithm 11, there is also a Zero Knowledge proof required for the well-formedness of Y_i, S_i. The authority i can proceed as follows.

- Choose $\alpha, \beta \in_r \mathbb{Z}_n$ and compute $e_1 = \mathsf{Enc}(\alpha, \beta)$ and $e_2 = Y^\alpha$
- Compute $d = \mathsf{hash}(g, n, Y, Y_i, S_i, e_1, e_2)$, $a_1 = \alpha + d s_i$ and $a_2 = \beta r_i^d$
- Return (e_1, e_2, a_1, a_2)

Algorithm 9: PoK-CSZ

Require: A group G of prime order q
An exponential ElGamal public key pk
Some ciphertexts $X_i, Y_i, X_{i-1}, Y_{i-1}$ and $e \in G$
$r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $s \in \{-1, 1\}$ such that
$X_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(X_{i-1}^s, r_1)$, $Y_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Y_{i-1}^s, r_2)$ and $e = \tilde{h}^{r_1}$

$\alpha, \beta \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$;
$c_{s,X} \longleftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, \alpha)$; $c_{s,Y} \longleftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, \beta)$; $c_{s,e} \longleftarrow \tilde{h}^{\alpha}$;
$d_{-s}, a_{-s,X}, a_{-s,Y} \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$;
$c_{-s,X} \longleftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, a_{-s,X})(X_i X_{i-1}^s)^{-d_{-s}}$;
$c_{-s,Y} \longleftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, a_{-s,Y})(Y_i Y_{i-1}^s)^{-d_{-s}}$;
$c_{-s,e} \longleftarrow \tilde{h}^{a_{-s,X}} e^{-d_{-s}}$;
$d \longleftarrow \mathsf{hash}(\mathsf{pk}||X_{i-1}||Y_{i-1}||X_i||Y_i||c_{1,X}||c_{1,Y}||c_{-1,X}||c_{-1,Y}||c_{1,e}||c_{-1,e})$;
$d_s \longleftarrow d - d_{-s}$;
$a_{s,X} \longleftarrow \alpha + r_1 d_s$; $a_{s,Y} \longleftarrow \beta + r_2 d_s$;
Return $(c_{1,X}, c_{1,Y}, c_{-1,X}, c_{-1,Y}, c_{1,e}, c_{-1,e}, d_1, d_{-1}, a_{1,X}, a_{1,Y}, a_{-1,X}, a_{-1,Y})$;

Algorithm 10: Ver-CSZ

Require: A group G of prime order q
An exponential ElGamal public key pk
Some ciphertexts $X_i, Y_i, X_{i-1}, Y_{i-1}$ and $e \in G$
$\pi = (c_{1,X}, c_{1,Y}, c_{-1,X}, c_{-1,Y}, c_{1,e}, c_{-1,e}, d_1, d_{-1}, a_{1,X}, a_{1,Y}, a_{-1,X}, a_{-1,Y})$

if X_i is of the form $(1_g, *)$ **then return** 0;
$d \longleftarrow \mathsf{hash}(\mathsf{pk}||X_{i-1}||Y_{i-1}||X_i||Y_i||c_{1,X}||c_{1,Y}||c_{-1,X}||c_{-1,Y}||c_{1,e}||c_{-1,e})$;
Check that the following equalities hold:
  $d_1 + d_{-1} \stackrel{?}{=} d$;
  $\mathsf{Enc}(0, a_{1,X})(X_i/X_{i-1})^{-d_1} \stackrel{?}{=} c_{1,X}$;
  $\mathsf{Enc}(0, a_{1,Y})(Y_i/Y_{i-1})^{-d_1} \stackrel{?}{=} c_{1,Y}$;
  $\tilde{h}^{a_{1,X}} e^{-d_1} \stackrel{?}{=} c_{1,e}$;
  $\tilde{h}^{a_{-1,X}} e^{-d_{-1}} \stackrel{?}{=} c_{-1,e}$;
  $\mathsf{Enc}(0, a_{-1,X})(X_i X_{i-1})^{-d_{-1}} \stackrel{?}{=} c_{-1,X}$;
  $\mathsf{Enc}(0, a_{-1,Y})(Y_i Y_{i-1})^{-d_{-1}} \stackrel{?}{=} c_{-1,Y}$;
if so **then return** 1 **else return** 0;

Algorithm 11: `Mul` (Paillier only)

Require: X, Y, Paillier encryptions of $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}_n$
Ensure: Z, an encryption of xy

Authority i chooses $s_i \in_r \mathbb{Z}_n$ and $r_i \in_r \mathbb{Z}_n$
The authorities simultaneously reveal $S_i = \mathsf{Enc}(s_i, r_i)$, $Y_i = Y^{s_i}$ as well as a Zero Knowledge proof that S_i and Y_i are well formed
Each authority check the proof of the other authorities
$x' = \mathsf{Dec}(X \prod_i S_i)$ (* $x' = x + \sum_i s_i$ *)
They compute $Z' = Y^{x'}$, then $Z = Z' / \prod_i Y_i$

To verify the proof, one can simply compute $d = \mathsf{hash}(g, n, Y, Y_i, S_i, e_1, e_2)$ and check that

$$\mathsf{Enc}(a_1, a_2) S_i^{-d} = e_1$$
$$Y^{a_1} Y_i^{-d} = e_2.$$

Since each authority has to check all the other authorities' proofs, the overall cost of the procedure is approximately $9a+3$ exponentiation, where a is the number of authorities. The communication is also lower than in Algorithm 1 since it only requires broadcasts.

Universal verifiability for the CSZ protocol

Both algorithms CGate and Mul have the nice property that the participants are able to produce a transcript T which can be verified by an external auditor. For instance, in CGate, $T = T_1||T_2||T_3$, where $T_1 = (X_i, Y_i, \pi_i)_{1\leq i\leq a}$, with π_i is a ZKP that X_i, Y_i are well-formed with respect to X_{i-1}, Y_{i-1}. For T_2, we have $T_2 = (A_i, B_i, \pi^0_{A_i}, \pi^0_{B_i})_i$, where, for all i, $\pi^0_{A_i}$ (resp. $\pi^0_{B_i}$) is a ZKP that A_i (resp. B_i) is an encryption of 0. Finally, $T_3 = (w_i, \pi_i^{\mathsf{Dec}})_i$ where, for all i, $\pi_{\mathsf{Dec},i}$ is a ZKP that w_i is a correct partial decryption of Y'. Note that since T only consists of ZKP, this transcript is Zero Knowledge (*i.e.* it does not leak any information about the initial inputs).

To verify a transcript T, an auditor first gets the public elements $pk, h_1, \cdots, h_a$, the input X, Y of the protocol and its output Z. Finally, the auditor computes $X_0 = X$, $Y_0 = E_{-1}Y^2$, verifies the ZKP π_i for all i, verify the ZKP $\pi^0_{A_i}$ and $\pi^0_{B_i}$ for all i, computes $X' = X_a \prod_i A_i$ and $Y' = Y_a \prod_i B_i$, verifies the ZKP π_i^{Dec} for all i, computes y_a from Y' and the w_i's, and checks that $Z = (XX'^{y_a})^{\frac{1}{2}}$.

If all the checks are successful, the auditor is guaranteed that, except with negligible probability, Z is an encryption of xy, where x (resp. y) is the plaintext for X (resp. Y). In this sense, the CGate protocol is universally verifiable. A similar result holds for the Mul protocol.

C.2 Logical operations on encrypted data

Thanks to the conditional gate protocol and the homomorphic property of the exponential ElGamal encryption scheme, it is possible to derive a protocol for the most common logical operations.

Basic boolean operations. Recall that the logical negation can be evaluated "for free" thanks to the homomorphic property: $\mathtt{Not}(B) = E_1/B$. In addition, remark that the CSZ protocol readily allows to compute the And algorithm, which is a specific case where X is also supposed to be an encryption of $x \in \{0, 1\}$. Thanks to the homomorphic property, it is easy to derive a protocol to evaluate the logical or and the logical xor.

Algorithm 12: Xor

Require: X, Y, encryptions of $x, y \in \{0, 1\}$
Outputs: Z, an encryption of $x \oplus y$
1 **return** $XY/\mathtt{CSZ}(X, Y)^2$;

Algorithm 13: Or

Require: X, Y, encryptions of $x, y \in \{0, 1\}$
Outputs: Z, an encryption of $x \vee y$
1 **return** $XY/\mathtt{CSZ}(X, Y)$;

Since the basic binary boolean operations (*i.e.* and, xor, or) are associative, it is possible to compute $\mathtt{And}(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$ (resp. $\mathtt{Or}(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$ and $\mathtt{Xor}(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$) using a logarithmic number of synchronization steps, thanks to a boolean circuit that has a tree structure. See for instance Algorithm 14 for the case of the logical and.

Algorithm 14: And

Require: $(X_1, \cdots, X_N)$, encryptions of $x_1, \cdots, x_N \in \{0, 1\}$
Outputs: Z, an encryption of $x_1 \wedge \cdots \wedge x_N$
1 $m \longleftarrow \lceil \log N \rceil$;
2 **for** $j = 0$ to $N-1$ **do** $X_{1,j} \longleftarrow X_{j+1}$;
3 **for** $i = 1$ *to* m **do**
4 **for** $j = 0$ *to* $\lfloor N/2 \rfloor - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
5 $X_{i+1,j} \longleftarrow \mathtt{And}(X_{i,2j}, X_{i,2j+1})$;
6 **if** N is odd **then** $X_{i+1,\lfloor N/2 \rfloor} \longleftarrow X_{i,N-1}$;
7 $N \longleftarrow \lceil N/2 \rceil$;
8 **return** $X_{m+1,0}$;

Conditional branching. In addition to providing a way to realize the basic boolean operations, the conditionally set to zero functionality can also be used to evaluate a branching condition. In generic MPC, we want to avoid branching as much as possible since we do not want to reveal which branch is being evaluated: this could constitute a side-channel information. Therefore, the main strategy is to evaluate both branches and use a protocol to (obliviously) keep the relevant one. A classical solution is to use the ternary operator If, which takes as input a boolean b, two expressions x and y and returns either x when $b = 1$ or y when $b = 0$. This operator can be evaluated with a single call to CSZ; the same goes for the conditional swap. Note that in some cases, such as in Algorithm 14 (line 6), the branching condition depends on a public parameter, so that there is no need to hide which branch is computed.

Note that those operators can be used for many bits in parallel. For instance, assume that $\boldsymbol{X} = X_0, \cdots, X_{\ell-1}$, that $\boldsymbol{Y} = X_0, \cdots, Y_{\ell-1}$, and that B is an encryption of a bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$. Then we can define $\mathtt{If}(B, \boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{Y})$ as $\mathtt{If}(B, X_0, Y_0), \cdots, \mathtt{If}(B, X_{\ell-1}, Y_{\ell-1})$. Similarly, if $(X'_i, Y'_i) = \mathtt{CSwap}(B, X_i, Y_i)$ for all i, $\mathtt{CSwap}(B, \boldsymbol{X}, \boldsymbol{Y})$ can also be defined as $(X'_0, \cdots, X'_{\ell-1}), (Y'_0, \cdots, Y'_{\ell-1})$.

Algorithm 15: CSwap

Require: B, a cipher of $b \in \{0,1\}$
X, Y, encryptions of x, y
Outputs: X', Y', s.t. X' (resp. Y') is a reenc. of Y (X) if $b = 1$, of X (resp. Y) otherwise

$Z \longleftarrow \texttt{If}(B, Y, X)$;
return $Z, XY/Z$;

Algorithm 16: If

Require: B, a cipher of $b \in \{0,1\}$
X, Y, encryptions of x, y
Outputs: Z, an encryption of x if $b = 1$, of y otherwise

return $Y\texttt{CSZ}(X/Y, B)$;

Selection of an element in a list. The CSZ protocol can also be used to *select* an element inside a list. For this purpose, we suppose that $[X_i]$ (resp. $[\boldsymbol{X_i}]$) is a list of m ciphertexts (resp. of m lists of ℓ encryptions of bits) and that $[B_i]$ is a list of m encryptions of the bits b_i, such that one of them is 1 while the others are 0. Then we can recover a reencryption of X_i (resp. ℓ reencryptions of $\boldsymbol{X_i}$) where i is the index such that $b_i = 1$. By abuse of notation, we denote this procedure Select in both cases.

Algorithm 17: Select

Require: $[(X_{i,0}, \cdots, X_{i,\ell-1})], [B_i]$
Outputs: $\boldsymbol{Z}$, a rencryption of $\boldsymbol{X_i}$ s.t. B_i is an encryption of 1

for all i, j **do** $A_{i,j} \longleftarrow \texttt{CSZ}(X_{i,j}, B_i)$;
for all j **do** $Z_j \longleftarrow \prod_i A_{i,j}$;
return $(Z_0, \cdots, Z_{\ell-1})$

Algorithm 18: Select

Require: $[X_i], [B_i]$
Outputs: Z, a rencryption of X_i s.t. B_i is an encryption of 1

return $\prod_i \texttt{CSZ}(X_i, B_i)$;

Integer shift. Finally, consider an integer x and its binary representation $x_0, \cdots, x_{\ell-1}$, such that $x = \sum_{i=0}^{\ell-1} x_i 2^i$. A common operation is to *shift* the binary representation: the right shift corresponds to $0, x_0, \cdots, x_{\ell-2}$ and the left shift corresponds to $x_1, \cdots, x_{\ell-1}, 0$. In an MPC setting where x is encrypted bit-by-bit, we can perform the shift operations on the encrypted data for free, by using a trivial encryption E_0 of 0. We denoted the corresponding processes RS and LS. However, it may be useful to perform those operations *conditionally* to an encrypted boolean b. For this purpose, we can use the If protocol in parallel, which gives the conditional left shift and conditional right shift protocols.

Algorithm 19: CLS

Require: $(V_0, \cdots, V_{\ell-1})$, ciphertexts
B, an encryption of 0 or 1
Outputs: $\boldsymbol{V'}$, a reencrypted left shift of $\boldsymbol{V}$ if $b = 1$, a reencryption of $\boldsymbol{V}$ otherwise.

$V_\ell \longleftarrow E_0$;
for $j = 0$ *to* $\ell - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
  $V'_j \longleftarrow \texttt{If}(B, V_{j+1}, V_j)$;
Return $\boldsymbol{V'}$;

Algorithm 20: CRS

Require: $(V_0, \cdots, V_{\ell-1})$, ciphertexts
B, an encryption of 0 or 1
Outputs: $\boldsymbol{V'}$, a reencrypted right shift of $\boldsymbol{V}$ if $b = 1$, a reencryption of $\boldsymbol{V}$ otherwise.

$V_{-1} \longleftarrow E_0$;
for $j = 0$ *to* $\ell - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
  $V'_j \longleftarrow \texttt{If}(B, V_{j-1}, V_j)$;
Return $\boldsymbol{V'}$;

C.3 Basic integer arithmetic: addition, subtraction, comparison

Due to the homomorphic property, Add and Sub can be simply implemented by multiplication and division of the ciphertexts, when we want to work in the natural encoding. In bit-encoding, however, we need to build appropriate algorithms for these. We remark readily that comparing integers can be done with a subtraction, where we return the final borrow bit.

Linear addition and subtraction.

Suppose that we have as input the (encrypted) bits X^{bits} and Y^{bits} of x and y, where x and y are the m-bit plaintexts associated with X^{bits} and Y^{bits} respectively. For addition, *i.e.* computing Z^{bits}, an encryption of $x + y$ modulo 2^m, we reproduce in Algorithm 21 the method found in [40]. The idea is to reproduce the schoolbook algorithm for the addition, with four variables X_i, Y_i, Z_i and R which represent (encryptions of) the i^{th} bit of X and Y, the i^{th} bit of the sum and the current value of the carry. The value of z_i, the plaintext associated with Z_i, is $x_i \oplus y_i \oplus r_i$, and the new value of R can be obtained with a truth table from the three other variables.

A first approach for writing a subtraction algorithm that returns an encryption of $x - y \bmod 2^m$ is to modify Algorithm 21 as follows. Computing $x - y \bmod 2^m$ is the same as computing $x + (-y) \bmod 2^m$. Turning y to $-y \bmod 2^m$ is performed by flipping each bit (replacing y_i by $1 - y_i$) then adding 1. This gives Algorithm 22.

Algorithm 22 is interesting for its similarity with Algorithm 21, but another way to perform the subtraction is also to use the schoolbook algorithm, just as for Algorithm 21. The advantage is that the carry is then the classical borrow of the subtraction, and not an artificial carry

Algorithm 21: $\mathsf{Add}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$, $(Y_0, \cdots, Y_{m-1})$ bit-wise encryptions of x and y
Ensure: $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1}$, bitwise encryption of $x + y$ modulo 2^m

$R = \mathsf{CSZ}(X_0, Y_0)$
$Z_0 = X_0 Y_0 / R^2$ (* $x_0 \oplus y_0$ *)
for $i = 1$ *to* $m - 1$ **do**
  $A = X_i Y_i / \mathsf{CSZ}(X_i, Y_i)^2$ (* $x_i \oplus y_i$ *)
  $Z_i = AR / \mathsf{CSZ}(A, R)^2$ (* $x_i \oplus y_i \oplus r$ *)
  $R = (X_i Y_i R / Z_i)^{\frac{1}{2}}$
Return $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1}$

Algorithm 22: $\mathsf{Sub}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$, $(Y_0, \cdots, Y_{m-1})$, bit-wise encryptions of x and y.
Ensure: $(Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1})$, bit-wise encryption of $x - y$ modulo 2^m.

$A = \mathsf{CSZ}(X_0, Y_0)$
$Z_0 = (X_0 Y_0) / A^2$ (* $x_0 \oplus (1 - y_0) \oplus 1$ *)
$R = A\,\mathsf{Not}(Y_0)$ (* $x_0 \vee \neg y_0$ *)
for $k = 1$ *to* $m - 1$ **do**
  $A = X_k\,\mathsf{Not}(Y_k) / \mathsf{CSZ}(X_k, \mathsf{Not}(Y_k))^2$
  $Z_k = AR / \mathsf{CSZ}(A, R)^2$
  $R = (X_k \mathsf{Not}(Y_i) R / Z_k)^{\frac{1}{2}}$
Return $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1}$

in an equivalent addition modulo 2^m. Hence, if the last borrow bit is required in order to get a comparison algorithm from the subtraction, Algorithm 23 must be preferred.

Algorithm 23: $\mathsf{SubLT}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$, $(Y_0, \cdots, Y_{m-1})$, bit-wise encryption of x and y.
Ensure: $(Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1}), R$ where Z_i are bit-wise encryption of $x - y$ modulo 2^m and $R = \mathsf{Enc}(x < y)$.

$A = \mathsf{CSZ}(X_0, Y_0)$
$Z_0 = X_0 Y_0 / A^2$ (* $x_0 \oplus y_0$ *)
$R = Y_0 / A$ (* $y_0 \wedge \neg x_0$ *)
for $k = 1$ *to* $m - 1$ **do**
  $A = \mathsf{CSZ}(Y_k, R)$
  $B = Y_k R / A^2$ (* $y_k \oplus r$ *)
  $C = \mathsf{CSZ}(X_k, B)$
  $Z_k = X_k B / C^2$ (* $x_k \oplus y_k \oplus r$ *)
  $R = Y_k R / (AC)$ (* $(y_k \wedge r) \vee [(y_k \vee r) \wedge \neg x_k]$ *)
Return $(Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1}), R$

When the required comparison is an equality test, there is a simpler approach, which leads to a better communication complexity. Indeed, testing whether two integers are equal is the same as testing whether all of their bits are equal, therefore the associativity of the logical $\wedge$ operator can be exploited to parallelize the procedure. This gives Algorithm 24, the cost of which is $(2m - 1)\mathsf{CSZ}$ in term of transcript size and exponentiations per authority, but only $(1 + \log m)\mathsf{CSZ}$ in term of communication cost, using a tree structure.

Therefore, adding, subtracting or comparing two m-bit integers have roughly the same cost of $(2m - 1)\mathsf{CSZ}$. The similarity between these algorithms can be exploited to build specialized algorithms which do several operations altogether.

For instance, if one needs to compute both the subtraction and the full comparison as a ternary value (1 if $x > y$, 0 if $x = y$ or -1 if $x < y$), we can combine these operations by first calling Algorithm 23, then using a $\vee$ composition to test whether all the bits of the output are 0. This leads to a cost of about $3m\mathsf{CSZ}$ instead of $4m\mathsf{CSZ}$ if done separately.

Algorithm 24: $\mathtt{EQ}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $X_0, \cdots, X_m$, $Y_0, \cdots, Y_m$ bit-wise encryptions of x and y.
Ensure: $Z = \mathtt{Enc}(x == y)$, an encryption of 1 if $x = y$, of 0 otherwise.
1 For all i (in parallel), compute $A_i = \mathtt{CSZ}(X_i, Y_i)$.
2 For all i (in parallel), compute $B_i = E_1 A_i^2/(X_i Y_i)$ (* $1 - x_i \oplus y_i$ *)
3 Return $Z = \mathtt{CSZ}(B_0, \cdots, B_{m-1})$

Finally, we remark that computing the opposite $-x$ of an integer x modulo 2^m can be done faster than using the subtraction algorithm between 0 and x. Algorithm 25 flips all bits and then add 1; this is a special case of Algorithm 34 which be introduced later on.

Algorithm 25: $\mathtt{Neg}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$, a bit-wise encryption of x
Ensure: $(Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1})$, a bit-wise encryption of $-x \bmod 2^m$
1 $Z_0 = X_0$
2 $R_0 = \mathtt{Not}(X_0)$
3 **for** $i = 1$ *to* $m - 1$ **do**
4 $\quad R_i = \mathtt{CSZ}(\mathtt{Not}(X_i), R_{i-1})$
5 $\quad Z_i = \mathtt{Not}(X_i) R_{i-1}/R_i^2$
6 Return $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1}$

C.4 Arithmetic with sublinear communication complexity

Apart from the equality test, all the previous arithmetic algorithms in the bit-encoding require a number of communication rounds that is proportional to the bit-size of the input integers. This is mostly due to carry and borrow propagations. In order to reduce the number of communication rounds, our idea is to use more sophisticated adder circuits, following the (now classical) approach of Brent and Kung [12]. We do not reproduce their full algorithm here but we sketch the key idea and give the resulting algorithms and their complexity (summarized in Figure 5).

Recall that the i^{th} bit of $x + y$ is simply $z_i = x_i \oplus y_i \oplus r_i$, where r_i is the i^{th} carry bit. The idea is to first compute all the $x_i \oplus y_i$ in parallel, then to compute all the r_i in parallel, so as to deduce the result. To perform the second step efficiently, Brent and Kung's approach consists of computing the variables (p_i, g_i) where $p_i = x_i \vee y_i$ and $g_i = x_i \wedge y_i$. Those variable are used to encode elements of a set $\Sigma = \{P, G, K\}$, where P is encoded by $(1, 0)$, K by $(0, 0)$ and G by $(0, 1)$ and $(1, 1)$. They represent the fact that the carry bit will be propagated, generated of killed in the i^{th} position. They define an operation $\circ$ as follows (which we slightly modify into an equivalent operation for the sake of presentation).

$$\begin{aligned} P \circ P &= P \\ G \circ P &= G \\ K \circ P &= K \\ x \circ G &= G \\ x \circ K &= K. \end{aligned}$$

In the boolean representation, the $\circ$ law can be computed with the following formula:

$$(p, g) \circ (p', g') = (p \wedge p', g' \vee (p' \wedge g)).$$

It is easy to show that $\circ$ is associative [12], which enables tree-based parallelism for computing all the prefixes of $(p_0, g_0) \circ \cdots \circ (p_{m-1}, g_{m-1})$, which gives essentially the i^{th} carry bit for all i. From here onward, we diverge from [12]'s work since we are not interested in designing hardware, so the unbounded fan-in is not an issue. We deduce the Unbounded Fan-in Composition algorithm, which can be instantiated to compute the addition (Algorithm 26). Algorithm 26 is highly efficient in term of communication since it only requires about $\log(m)$ times more round communications than the one required for $\circ$. However, this comes with an increase in term of computation as the number of calls to $\circ$ is about $\frac{1}{2} m \log(m)$, so the linear approach could be preferable in some cases. To evaluate the complexity, note that the worst-case scenario in term of computational cost is when m is a power of 2, in which case the number of calls to CSZ is easy to derive.

The same algorithm can be used for computing subtraction; it only requires to change the initialization of the p_i and g_i. Indeed, we have initially $p_i = x_i \oplus y_i$ and $g_i = y_i \wedge \neg x_i$, so to obtain $\mathtt{UFCSub}^{\text{bits}}$, one can just replace line 4 by $P_i = B_i$ and line 5 by $G_i = Y_i/A_i$ in Algorithm 26.

Algorithm 26: $\mathtt{UFCAdd}^{\mathrm{bits}}$

Require: $(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$, $(Y_0, \cdots, Y_{m-1})$, bit-wise encryptions of x and y.
Ensure: $(Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1})$, bit-wise encryption of $x + y \bmod 2^m$

1 **for** $i = 0$ *to* $m - 1$ *(* in parallel *)* **do**
2 $A_i = \mathtt{CSZ}(X_i, Y_i)$
3 $B_i = X_i Y_i / A_i^2$ (* $x_i \oplus y_i$ *)
4 $P_i = X_i Y_i / A_i$ (* $x_i \vee y_i$ *)
5 $G_i = A_i$ (* $x_i \wedge y_i$ *)
6 $C_{i,j} = (P_j, G_j)$ for all $1 \le i \le \lceil \log m \rceil$ and $0 \le j \le m - 1$
7 **for** $i = 1$ *to* $\lceil \log m \rceil$ **do**
8 **for** $j = 0$ *to* $\lceil m/2^i \rceil - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
9 **for** $k = 1$ *to* 2^{i-1} *(in parallel)* **do**
10 $(P, G) = C_{i-1, j2^i + 2^{i-1}}$
11 $(P', G') = C_{i-1, j2^i + 2^{i-1} + k}$ (* do not proceed for this k if $j2^i + 2^{i-1} + k \ge m$ *)
12 $T = \mathtt{CSZ}(P', G)$
13 $C_{i, j2^i + 2^{i-1} + k} = (\mathtt{CSZ}(P, P'), TG'/\mathtt{CSZ}(T, G'))$
14 $Z_0 = B_0$
15 **for** $i = 1$ *to* $m - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
16 $(\_, G_i) = C_{\lceil \log(i+1) \rceil, i+1}$
17 $Z_i = B_i G_i / \mathtt{CSZ}(B_i, G_i)^2$
18 Return $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1}$

When it comes to comparing two integers, only the last carry bit is of interest so we do not need to compute all the prefixes. In this case, a much simpler algorithm exists and allows to compute the comparison with $m - 1$ calls to $\circ$ but a communication cost which remains of the order of $\log(m)$. We call this algorithm Chained Lesser-Than (see Algorithm 27). Note that this algorithm returns an additional bit R which tells whether the two inputs are equal. If this bit is not needed, some computations can be saved (remove lines 11 and 20).

C.5 Solving ordering related problems

Voting consists of finding the "most preferred" option. Consequently, it is common to encounter an algorithmic problem related to ordering. This subsection is reproduced from the third author's thesis.

Maximum and minimum. The most obvious problem is to find the largest or the smallest element of a list. A natural solution would be to linearly scan the list, using a comparison algorithm. However, the min and max operators are associative and as such, allow tree-based parallelization as we did in Algorithm 14. This gives Algorithm 28, which finds the maximum, the minimum and their respective position, using a logarithmic number of rounds of communications. In this algorithm, we denote j^{bits} the trivial bitwise encryption of the integer j, with a fixed number of bits. We denote `Min` (resp. `Max`) the protocol that only returns a bitwise encryption of the minimum (resp. the maximum) as well as its position in the list.

Finding the s largest elements. A related problem is to find the s largest values of a list. For this purpose, we propose two different approaches: the selection approach and the insertion approach, base on insertion sort and selection sort. The insertion approach consists of first sorting the s first elements of the list so that we have the list of the s largest elements of the s first elements of the list. Then, we iteratively update this small list by inserting the remaining elements of the large list, so that at the kth iteration, the small list consists of the s largest elements of the $s + k$ first elements of the list. This approach imitates what the selection sort would do, but avoids the quadratic cost by maintaining a small list of size s. However, the drawback is that it is expensive communication-wise, since the process is mostly iterative. For this reason, we propose another approach, based on selection sort. It consists of using the `Max` protocol to get the maximum value in a logarithmic number of rounds, as well as its respective index in the list. Then, using the index, the equality test and the `CSZ` protocol, we can "remove" this maximum from the list (actually, we replace it by a 0 value) without leaking its position. This way, we can iteratively get the s largest elements, using only s iterations.

Sorting. Finally, another recurrent problem is to sort a list. Using `LT` and `CSwap`, it is possible to sort encrypted data without revealing any side information. For this purpose, we need a *data-oblivious* sorting algorithm, that is an algorithm whose control flow does not depend on the result of the comparisons. The popular fast sorting algorithms, such as Quicksort, Mergesort or Heapsort, do not verify this property. Consequently, we use the OddEvenMergeSort by Batcher [8], which has a quasi-linear complexity and is used in practice for sorting networks in GPU. This gives Algorithm 31, adapted from [27, Section 5.2.2, Algorithm M]). This sorting algorithm requires approximately $\frac{1}{4} N \log(N)^2$ comparisons and conditional swaps, in approximately $\frac{1}{2} \log(N)^2$ rounds of communications, where N is the number of elements to be sorted.

Algorithm 27: $\mathtt{CLT}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$, $(Y_0, \cdots, Y_{m-1})$ bit-wise encryption of x and y.
Ensure: Z, R such that $Z = \mathtt{Enc}(x < y)$ and $R = \mathtt{Enc}(x = y)$

Let $(m_j)_{j=0}^{l-1}$ be the binary representation of m, such that $m = \sum_{j=0}^{l-1} m_j 2^j$
for $i = 0$ *to* $m - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
  $A_i = \mathtt{CSZ}(X_i, Y_i)$
  $P_i = X_i Y_i / A_i^2$
  $G_i = Y_i / A_i$
  $B_{i,0} = (P_i, G_i)$, $A_{i,0} = P_i$.
$r = 0$ (* A boolean which tells whether there is a remainder *)
$R_B = (E_1, E_0)$, $R_A = E_1$ (* initialize the remainders as neutral element *)
for $j = 1$ *to* l **do**
  for $i = 0$ *to* $\lfloor l/2^j \rfloor - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
    $A_{i,j} = \mathtt{CSZ}(A_{2i,j-1}, A_{2i+1,j-1})$
    $(P, G) = B_{2i,j-1}$
    $(P', G') = B_{2i+1,j-1}$
    $T = \mathtt{CSZ}(P', G)$
    $B_{i,j} = (\mathtt{CSZ}(P, P'), TG'/\mathtt{CSZ}(T, G'))$
  if $m_{j-1} \wedge \neg r$ *(in parallel)* **then**
    $R_B = B_{2\lfloor l/2^j \rfloor, j-1}$, $R_A = A_{2\lfloor l/2^j \rfloor, j-1}$
    $r = 1$
  if $m_{j-1} \wedge r$ *(in parallel)* **then**
    $A_{2\lfloor l/2^j \rfloor, j-1} = \mathtt{CSZ}(A_{2\lfloor l/2^j \rfloor, j-1}, R_A)$
    $(P, G) = B_{2\lfloor l/2^j \rfloor, j-1}$
    $(P', G') = R_B$
    $T = \mathtt{CSZ}(P', G)$
    $B_{2\lfloor l/2^j \rfloor, j} = (\mathtt{CSZ}(P, P'), TG'/\mathtt{CSZ}(T, G'))$
    $r = 0$, $R_B = (\mathtt{Enc}(1), \mathtt{Enc}(0))$, $R_A = \mathtt{Enc}(1)$
$(\_, G) = B_{0,l}$
Return $G, A_{0,l}$

Remark that in Algorithm 31, we consider that we want to sort some values (for instance, the index of the candidate) with respect to a corresponding key. It is possible to adapt this algorithm for a setting where we just want to sort bitwise encrypted integers, which are not linked to a specific value, or to have the values be bitwise encrypted.

Another usual solution for sorting in an MPC setting is to first shuffle the data, then use a more efficient algorithm such as Mergesort, but which requires to leak the result of all the comparisons. This usually leads to a better computational efficiency, but a far worse communication efficiency (typically, Mergesort would require a linear number of synchronization steps compared to the number of elements to sort). In addition, the security of the resulting protocol would not be guaranteed by the SUC framework since there is currently no known SUC-secure reencryption mixnet.

C.6 Paillier-specific algorithms

Conversion from natural to bit-encoding (Paillier only)

We recall here the work from [41] which allows to get the bit-encoding representation from a Paillier-encrypted integer. While the homomorphic property of the Paillier cryptosystem allows extremely efficient solutions for the addition and the subtraction, the comparison is not so easy to perform. Therefore, it is important to provide an algorithm which converts to the bit-encoding.

The idea is to use the mask-and-decrypt paradigm, which consists of applying a random mask r to the encrypted value x, which gives an encryption of $x - r$, to decrypt $y = x - r$ then to perform the relevant operation (here, an addition with r) to deduce the (encrypted) result. The overall process that we call `BinExpand` is described by Algorithm 35. To create a mask, we use Algorithm 33 from [41] which requires Zero Knowledge Ranged proofs, such as the ones from [30] or more recently [13]. We do not dig too deep into the details as the security, correction and complexity is fully discussed in [41]. We emphasize that these Paillier-specific algorithms use a `RandBit` function

Algorithm 28: MinMax

Require: $(\boldsymbol{X_1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X_N})$ bitwise encryptions of $x_1, \cdots, x_N$
ℓ, the common bitsize of the x_i's
Outputs: $\boldsymbol{Z}$, a bitwise encryption of $\min_{i=1}^{N}(x_i)$
$\boldsymbol{I}$, a bitwise encryption of its index in the input list
$\boldsymbol{T}$, a bitwise encryption of $\max_{i=1}^{N}(x_i)$
$\boldsymbol{J}$, a bitwise encryption of its index in the input list

$m \longleftarrow \lceil \log N \rceil$;
for $j = 0$ *to* $N - 1$ **do**
  $\boldsymbol{Z_{1,j}} \longleftarrow \boldsymbol{X_{j+1}}$;
  $\boldsymbol{I_{1,j}} \longleftarrow j + 1^{\text{bits}}$;
  $\boldsymbol{T_{1,j}} \longleftarrow \boldsymbol{X_{j+1}}$;
  $\boldsymbol{J_{1,j}} \longleftarrow j + 1^{\text{bits}}$;
for $i = 1$ *to* m **do**
  for $j = 0$ *to* $\lfloor N/2 \rfloor - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
    (* The two following operations can be done in parallel *)
    $B_Z \longleftarrow \mathtt{LT}(\boldsymbol{Z_{i,2j}}, \boldsymbol{Z_{i,2j+1}})$;
    $B_T \longleftarrow \mathtt{LT}(\boldsymbol{T_{i,2j}}, \boldsymbol{T_{i,2j+1}})$;
    (* The four following operations can be done in parallel *)
    $\boldsymbol{Z_{i+1,j}} \longleftarrow \mathtt{If}(B_Z, \boldsymbol{Z_{i,2j}}, \boldsymbol{Z_{i,2j+1}})$;
    $\boldsymbol{I_{i+1,j}} \longleftarrow \mathtt{If}(B_Z, \boldsymbol{I_{i,2j}}, \boldsymbol{I_{i,2j+1}})$;
    $\boldsymbol{T_{i+1,j}} \longleftarrow \mathtt{If}(B_T, \boldsymbol{T_{i,2j+1}}, \boldsymbol{Z_{i,2j}})$;
    $\boldsymbol{J_{i+1,j}} \longleftarrow \mathtt{If}(B_T, \boldsymbol{J_{i,2j+1}}, \boldsymbol{J_{i,2j}})$;
  if N *is odd* **then**
    $\boldsymbol{Z_{i+1,\lfloor N/2 \rfloor}} \longleftarrow \boldsymbol{Z_{i,N-1}}$;
    $\boldsymbol{I_{i+1,\lfloor N/2 \rfloor}} \longleftarrow \boldsymbol{I_{i,N-1}}$;
    $\boldsymbol{T_{i+1,\lfloor N/2 \rfloor}} \longleftarrow \boldsymbol{T_{i,N-1}}$;
    $\boldsymbol{J_{i+1,\lfloor N/2 \rfloor}} \longleftarrow \boldsymbol{J_{i,N-1}}$;
  $N \longleftarrow \lceil N/2 \rceil$;
return $\boldsymbol{Z_{m+1,0}}, \boldsymbol{I_{m+1,0}}, \boldsymbol{T_{m+1,0}}, \boldsymbol{J_{m+1,0}}$;

Algorithm 31: OddEvenMergeSort

Require: $(V_i, \boldsymbol{K_i})_{i=0}^{N-1}$, where, for all i, V_i is a ciphertext and
$\boldsymbol{K_i}$ is a bitwise encryption of an integer k_i
Outputs: $(V'_i, \boldsymbol{K'_i})_{i=0}^{N-1}$, reencryptions of the same values, but sorted with increasing k_i

$t \longleftarrow \lceil \log N \rceil$; $p \longleftarrow 2^{t-1}$
while $p > 0$ **do**
  $q \longleftarrow 2^{t-1}$; $r \longleftarrow 0$; $d \longleftarrow p$
  while $d > 0$ **do**
    for $i = 0$ *to* $n - d - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
      if $\mathsf{BitwiseAnd}(i, p) = r$ **then**
        $B \longleftarrow \mathtt{LT}(\boldsymbol{K_{i+d}}, \boldsymbol{K_i})$
        $V_i, V_{i+d} \longleftarrow \mathtt{CSwap}(B, V_i, V_{i+d})$
        $\boldsymbol{K_i}, \boldsymbol{K_{i+d}} \longleftarrow \mathtt{CSwap}(B, \boldsymbol{K_i}, \boldsymbol{K_{i+d}})$
    $d \longleftarrow q - p$; $q \longleftarrow \lfloor q/2 \rfloor$; $r \longleftarrow p$
  $p \longleftarrow \lfloor p/2 \rfloor$
return $(V_i, \boldsymbol{K_i})_{i=0}^{n-1}$

Algorithm 29: sInsert

Require: $\boldsymbol{X_0}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X_{N-1}}$, bitwise encryptions of $x_0, \cdots, x_{N-1}$
s, a positive integer
Outputs: $\boldsymbol{Z_1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{Z_s}$, bitwise enc. of the s largest values
$\boldsymbol{I_1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{I_s}$, bitwise encryptions of their indexes

for $i = 1$ *to* s **do**
  $\boldsymbol{Z_i} \longleftarrow \boldsymbol{X_{i-1}}$;
  $\boldsymbol{I_i} \longleftarrow i - 1^{\text{bits}}$;
  for $j = i - 1$ *down to* 1 **do**
    $B \longleftarrow \mathtt{LT}(\boldsymbol{Z_j}, \boldsymbol{Z_{j+1}})$;
    $\boldsymbol{Z_j}, \boldsymbol{Z_{j+1}} \longleftarrow \mathtt{CSwap}(B, \boldsymbol{Z_j}, \boldsymbol{Z_{j+1}})$;
    $\boldsymbol{I_j}, \boldsymbol{I_{j+1}} \longleftarrow \mathtt{CSwap}(B, \boldsymbol{I_j}, \boldsymbol{I_{j+1}})$;
for $i = s + 1$ *to* N **do**
  $B \longleftarrow \mathtt{LT}(\boldsymbol{Z_s}, \boldsymbol{X_{i-1}})$;
  $\boldsymbol{Z_s} \longleftarrow \mathtt{If}(B, \boldsymbol{X_{i-1}}, \boldsymbol{Z_s})$;
  $\boldsymbol{I_s} \longleftarrow \mathtt{If}(B, \boldsymbol{i - 1}^{\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{I_s})$;
  for $j = s - 1$ *down to* 1 **do**
    $B \longleftarrow \mathtt{LT}(\boldsymbol{Z_j}, \boldsymbol{Z_{j+1}})$;
    $\boldsymbol{Z_j}, \boldsymbol{Z_{j+1}} \longleftarrow \mathtt{CSwap}(B, \boldsymbol{Z_j}, \boldsymbol{Z_{j+1}})$;
    $\boldsymbol{I_j}, \boldsymbol{I_{j+1}} \longleftarrow \mathtt{CSwap}(B, \boldsymbol{I_j}, \boldsymbol{I_{j+1}})$;
return $(\boldsymbol{Z_1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{Z_s}), (\boldsymbol{I_1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{I_s})$;

Algorithm 30: sSelect

Require: $\boldsymbol{X_0}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X_{N-1}}$, bitwise encryptions of $x_0, \cdots, x_{N-1}$
s, a positive integer
Outputs: $\boldsymbol{Z_1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{Z_s}$, bitwise enc. of the s largest values
$\boldsymbol{I_1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{I_s}$, bitwise encryptions of their indexes

for $i = 1$ *to* s **do**
  $\boldsymbol{Z_i}, \boldsymbol{I_i} \longleftarrow \mathtt{Max}(\boldsymbol{X_0}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{X_{N-1}})$;
  for $j = 0$ *to* $N - 1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
    Writes j in base 2:
    $j = \sum_{k=0}^{\ell} m_k 2^k$;
    for $k = 0$ *to* ℓ **do**
      $J_k \longleftarrow E_{1-m_k} I_{i,k}^{2m_k - 1}$;
      (* $\mathtt{EQ}(I_{i,k}, m_k)$ *)
    $B \longleftarrow \mathtt{And}(J_0, \cdots, J_\ell)$;
    $\boldsymbol{X_j} \longleftarrow \mathtt{CSZ}(\boldsymbol{X_j}, B)$;
return $(\boldsymbol{Z_1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{Z_s}), (\boldsymbol{I_1}, \cdots, \boldsymbol{I_s})$;

given by Algorithm 32 which is also available in ElGamal. The same holds for the $\mathtt{AddKnown}^{\text{bits}}$ function of Algorithm 34 which is a variant of $\mathtt{Add}^{\text{bits}}$ where one operand is a cleartext. While we did not need them for the tally function that we studied, they might prove useful in other contexts.

Algorithm 32: `RandBit`

Ensure: Z, an encryption of $b \in_r \{0, 1\}$
$Z_0 = \mathtt{Enc}(1)$
for $i = 1$ *to* a **do**
  Authority i chooses $s_i \in_r \{-1, 1\}$ and $r \in_r \mathbb{Z}_n$
  She reveals $Z_i = Z_{i-1}^{s_i} \mathtt{Enc}(0, r)$, as well as a Zero Knowledge proof of well-formedness
The authorities check each others' proofs
Return $(E_1 Z_a)^{\frac{1}{2}}$

Integer comparison with precomputation and sublinear online complexity (Paillier only)

We mention here a work from [31], which is only exploitable in the Paillier setting. They present some algorithms for the equality test and the comparison which are mostly precomputable. We do not go into all the details here and refer to [31] for a more complete description. To compare two m bits integers x and y, Lipmaa and Toft suggest to create the unique polynomial P_m such that $P_m(1) = 1$ and $P_m(k) = 0$ for $k \in \{2, \cdots, m + 1\}$. Their strategy is to first compute the Hamming weight h of $x - y$, then to evaluate P_m on $1 + h$, from which they derive the result. To do so, they use some classical primitives in MPC (Algorithms 32, 36 and 37). The overall process is presented in Algorithm 38.

The advantage of this approach is that the procedure can be precomputed so that only a small part has to be done *online*, after the operands are known. Compared to Algorithm 24, Algorithm 38 does not require the costly binary expansion as the inputs do not have to be bit-wise encrypted. The complexity of the procedure is less dependent in m, the bit size of the integers to compare, but is of the same order. When m is small, which might be the case in an e-voting setting, the complexity is much higher due to some constant overloads. However, since most of the procedure can be precomputed, the approach is of interest even when m is small.

The `RandInv` Algorithm 36 (adapted from [7]) allows to (collectively) generate two ciphertexts R, R', which encrypt respectively r and r'. The plaintext r is a random invertible integer (modulo n, the Paillier public key), while $r' = r^{-1}$.

The `Prefixes` Algorithm 37 (adapted from [7]) takes as input m ciphertexts $M_1, \cdots, M_m$ which are encryptions of $m_1, \cdots, m_m$. This algorithm returns ciphertexts $Z_1, \cdots, Z_m$ such that Z_i is an encryption of $\prod_{1 \le j \le i} m_j$.

Algorithm 33: `RandBits` (Paillier only)

Require: m, a number of bits
Ensure: $R, (R_0, \cdots, R_{m-1})$ such that R is an encryption of $r \in_r \mathbb{Z}_n$, while $(R_0, \cdots, R_{m-1})$ are encryptions of the m first (least significant) bits of r

1 **for** $i = 0$ *to* $m - 1$ **do**
2 $\quad R_i = \texttt{RandBit}()$
3 Each authority i chooses $r_{*,i} \in_r [0, 2^{m+\kappa-1} - 1]$ and publishes $R_{*,i} = \texttt{Enc}(r_{*,i})$, along with a Zero Knowledge Ranged Proof
4 $R = \prod_{i=1}^{a} R_{*,i}$
5 **for** $i = m - 1$ *to* 0 **do**
6 $\quad R = R^2$
7 $\quad R = RR_i$
8 Return $R, (R_0, \cdots, R_{m-1})$

Algorithm 34: $\texttt{AddKnown}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1})$ bit-wise encryptions of x and bits $(y_0, \cdots, y_{m-1})$
Ensure: $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1}$, bitwise encryption of $x + y$ modulo 2^m

1 $R = X_0^{y_0}$
2 $Z_0 = X_0\texttt{Enc}(y_0, 1)/R^2$ (* $x_0 \oplus y_0$ *)
3 **for** $i = 1$ *to* $m - 1$ **do**
4 $\quad A = X_i\texttt{Enc}(y_i, 1)/(X_i^{y_i})^2$ (* $x_i \oplus y_i$ *)
5 $\quad Z_i = AR/\texttt{CSZ}(A, R)^2$ (* $x_i \oplus y_i \oplus r$ *)
6 $\quad R = (X_i\texttt{Enc}(y_i, 1)R/Z_i)^{\frac{1}{2}}$
7 Return $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m-1}$

Algorithm 35: `BinExpand` (Paillier only)

Require: X, an encryption of $x < 2^m$
Ensure: $X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1}$, the bit-wise encryption of x

1 $R, (R_0, \cdots, R_{m-1}) = \texttt{RandBits}(m)$
2 $Y = X/R$
3 $y' = \texttt{Dec}(Y)$ (* $y' = x - r$ modulo n *)
4 Let $y = y' - n$ modulo 2^m and $(y_0, \cdots, y_{m-1})$ the bits of y
5 Return $\texttt{AddKnown}^{\text{bits}}((R_0, \cdots, R_{m-1}), (y_0, \cdots, y_{m-1}))$

Algorithm 36: `RandInv` (Paillier only)

Ensure: R, R', encryptions of $r \in_r \mathbb{Z}_n^x$ and $r' \in \mathbb{Z}_n$ such that $r' = r^{-1}$

1 The authorities (simultaneously) display two ciphertexts A_i, B_i
2 $A = \prod_i A_i$, $B = \prod_i B_i$, $C = \texttt{Mul}(A, B)$
3 $c = \texttt{Dec}(C)$
4 $R = A$, $R' = B^{c^{-1}}$.
5 Return R, R'.

From these, in [31], the authors present two algorithms for the inequality test in the Paillier setting, but we will only present one of them. The idea is to use a recursive algorithm which first tests the equality of the most significant halves of x and y, using Algorithm 38. If they are equals, we recursively compare the integers represented by the other halves. If not, we recursively compare the integers represented by the most significant halves. The main process is given in Algorithm 39. Note that at line 3, we took the liberty to denote $R_\top, R_\bot$ the result of `RandBits` while `RandBits` returns encryptions of the form $R, (R_0, \cdots, R_{l-1})$. We can derive $R_\bot$ as $\prod_{i<l/2}(R_i)^{2^i}$ and $R_\top$ in a similar manner.

Algorithm 37: `Prefixes` (Paillier only)

Require: $M_1, \cdots, M_m$ encryptions of $m_1, \cdots, m_m$, each coprime with n
Ensure: $Z_1, \cdots, Z_m$, encryptions of $m_1, m_1m_2, \cdots, \prod_i m_i$

for $i = 1$ *to* m *(in parallel)* **do**
  $R_i, R'_i = \texttt{RandInv}()$
  $S_i = \texttt{Mul}(R_{i-1}, M_i)$ (* with $R_0 = 1$ *)
  $S_i = \texttt{Mul}(S_i, R'_i)$ (* $s_i = r_{i-1}m_i r_i^{-1}$ *)
  The authority decrypt S_i to get s_i.
for $i = 2$ *to* m *(in parallel)* **do**
  $a_i = \prod_{j=1}^{i} s_j$
  $Z_i = R_i^{a_i}$
Return $Z_1, \cdots, Z_m$ (* with $Z_1 = M_1$ *)

Algorithm 38: `EQH` (Paillier only)

Require: X, m, P_m, where X is an encryption of an integer $x << n$ and P_m the unique polynomial of degree m such that $P_m(1) = 1$ and $P_m(k) = 0$ for $k \in \{2, \cdots, m+1\}$
Ensure: Z, an encryption of 1 if $x = 0 \bmod 2^m$, of 0 otherwise

$R, R_{m-1}, \cdots, R_0 = \texttt{RandBits}(m)$
$M, M' = \texttt{RandInv}()$
$M_1, \cdots, M_m = \texttt{Prefixes}(M, \cdots, M)$
$A = X/R$
$a = \texttt{Dec}(A)$
Let $a_0, \cdots, a_{m-1}$ be the bit representation of $a - n$ modulo 2^m
$H = \texttt{Enc}(1) \prod_{i=0}^{m-1} \texttt{Enc}(a_i) R_i^{1-2a_i}$ (* $h = 1 + \sum_{i=0}^{m-1} a_i \oplus r_i$ *)
$M_H = \texttt{Mul}(M', H)$
$m_H = \texttt{Dec}(M_H)$
for $i = 0$ *to* m *(in parallel)* **do**
  $H_i = M_i^{(m_H)^i}$
Return $Z = \prod_{i=0}^{m} H_i^{\alpha_i}$ (* where the α_i are the coefficients of P_m *)

Algorithm 39: `GTH` (Paillier only)

Require: X, Y, l, two encryptions of l-bit integers x and y
Ensure: Z, an encryption of $(x \geq y)$

if $l = 1$ **then**
  Return $E_1/Y\texttt{Mul}(X, Y)$
$R, R_\top, R_\bot = \texttt{RandBits}(l)$
$W = \texttt{Enc}(2^l)X/Y$
$M = WR$
$m = \texttt{Dec}(M)$
$m_\top = m \bmod 2^{l/2}$, $m_\bot = \lfloor m/2^{l/2} \rfloor \bmod 2^{l/2}$
$B = \texttt{EQH}(\texttt{Enc}(m_\top), R_\top)$ (* $x_\top = y_\top$ *)
$C = B^{m_\bot - m_\top}\texttt{Enc}(m_\top)$ (* $m_\bot$ if $b = 1$, $m_\top$ otherwise *)
$D = \texttt{Mul}(B, R_\bot/R\top)R_\top$ (* $r_\bot$ if $b = 1$, $r_\top$ otherwise *)
$F = \texttt{Enc}(1)/\texttt{GTH}(C, D)$
$W' = F^{2^l}\texttt{Enc}(m \bmod 2^l)/(R_\top^{2^{l/2}} R\bot)$ (* $w \bmod 2^l$ *)
Return $Z = (W/W')^{1/2^l}$

C.7 Advanced arithmetic: aggregation, multiplication and division

In the Paillier setting, integers can be represented in the natural encoding, and we already gave a multiplication algorithm $\texttt{Mul}$ as a way to implement the $\texttt{CSZ}$ functionality. We now come to the more difficult question of doing multiplication and other arithmetic operations in the bit-encoding, in order to have them available in the ElGamal setting.

Aggregation of several encrypted bits

This $\texttt{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}$ operation is ubiquitous in e-voting. More often than not, the ballots of the voters are encoded as a sequence of encrypted bits and the first step of the tally is to aggregate some of them, *i.e.* counting all the bits that are set at a given position. The resulting encrypted integers should be in the bit-encoding format, so as to be able to perform comparisons (for instance). The algorithm for that is pretty simple: we just use repeatedly the addition algorithm 21, each time with the minimal value of m, the bit length of the operands.

For simplicity in Algorithm 40, we give the process when the number of bits to aggregate (denoted n) is a power of 2. In this algorithm, we took the liberty to denote $\texttt{Add}^{\text{bits}}$ an addition algorithm which returns $m+1$ encrypted bits when the operands' bitsize is m (the last bit is the carry bit, so we just add $Z_m = R$ in Algorithm 21). Note that at line 4, the $n/2^i$ calls to $\texttt{Add}^{\text{bits}}$ are made with inputs of length i, so that the cost is exactly $(2i-1)\texttt{CSZ}$. Therefore the cost of the procedure is

$$\begin{aligned}\sum_{i=1}^{\log n} \frac{n}{2^i}(2i-1)\texttt{CSZ} &\leq \sum_{i=1}^{\infty} \frac{2i-1}{2^i} n\texttt{CSZ} \\ &\leq 3n\texttt{CSZ}\end{aligned}$$

As for the communication cost, the process can be parallelized with a classical tree-based approach, since the addition is an associative operation.

Algorithm 40: $\texttt{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $B_1, \cdots, B_n$ such that for all i, $B_i = E(b_i)$ with $b_i \in \{0,1\}$.
Ensure: $S_0, \cdots, S_{\log n - 1}$ such that for all i, $S_i = E(s_i)$ with $s_i \in \{0,1\}$ and $\sum_{i=0}^{\log n - 1} s_i 2^i = \sum_i b_i$

1 $B_{0,1}, \cdots, B_{0,n} = B_1, \cdots, B_n$
2 **for** $i = 1$ *to* $\log n$ **do**
3 **for** $k = 1$ *to* $n/2^i$ *(in parallel)* **do**
4 $B_{i,k} = \texttt{Add}^{\text{bits}}(B_{i-1,2k-1}, B_{i-1,2k})$
5 Return $B_{\log n,1}$

Multiplication of integers in the bit-encoding.

In Algorithm 41, we detail the schoolbook algorithm for multiplication. This procedure is quite costly, as it requires about $3m^2\texttt{CSZ}$ for the computation cost and transcript size, and $2m^2\texttt{CSZ}$ for the communication cost, where m is the bitsize of the input integers.

Algorithm 41: $\texttt{Mul}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $(X_0, \cdots, X_{m_x-1})$, $(Y_0, \cdots, Y_{m_y-1})$, bitwise encryptions of x and y
Ensure: $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m_x+m_y-1}$, bitwise encryption of xy

1 **for** $i \in [0, m_x - 1]$, $j \in [0, m_y - 1]$ *(in parallel)* **do**
2 $A_{i,j} = \texttt{CSZ}(X_i, Y_j)$
3 $Z_0 = A_{0,0}$
4 $(T_0, \cdots, T_{m_y-1}) = (A_{0,1}, \cdots, A_{0,m_y-1}, E_0)$
5 **for** $i = 1$ *to* $m_x - 1$ **do**
6 $(T_0, \cdots, T_{m_y}) = \texttt{Add}^{\text{bits}}((T_0, \cdots, T_{m_y-1}), (A_{i,0}, \cdots, A_{i,m_y-1}))$
7 $Z_i = T_0$
8 **for** $j = 0$ *to* $m_y - 1$ **do**
9 $T_j = T_{j+1}$
10 **for** $i = m_x$ *to* $m_x + m_y - 1$ **do**
11 $Z_i = T_{i-m_x}$
12 Return $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{m_x+m_y-1}$

Schoolbook division algorithm.

For the Single Transferable Vote (see Section 6), we chose to represent fractions with a fixed number of binary places so that a fraction is encoded and encrypted as an integer. This allows to re-use most of the primitives from this section, while providing a certain degree of precision and generality. From the schoolbook division algorithm, we derive Algorithm 42, which takes as inputs bit-wise encryptions of x and y with $y > x$ and return the r first binary places of x/y. This algorithm could be generalised for any pair (x, y) (*i.e.* the condition $y > x$ is not necessary), but the restriction is useful in the special case of STV, and gives a simpler description.

Algorithm 42: $\texttt{Div}^{\text{bits}}$

Require: $(X_0, \cdots, X_{m-1}), (Y_0, \cdots, Y_{m-1}), r$, bit-wise encryptions of integers $0 \leq x < y$, and a precision r
Ensure: $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{r-1}$, encryptions of the first r binary places of x/y (in reverse order: z_0 is the least significant bit)

$A^{\text{bits}} = X^{\text{bits}}$
for $i = 0$ *to* $r - 1$ **do**
  $B^{\text{bits}}, R_i = \texttt{SubLT}(A^{\text{bits}}, Y^{\text{bits}})$
  $A^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{If}(R_i, A^{\text{bits}}, B^{\text{bits}})$
  $Z_i = \texttt{Not}(R_i)$
Return $Z_0, \cdots, Z_{r-1}$

D SINGLE CHOICE VOTING

In single choice voting, the voters can only pick one choice between several possibilities. The choice can be a candidate (basic voting) or a list of candidates (list voting). In any case, single choice voting can be handled by a homomorphic tally: although the resulting voting system would leak more than just the result (*i.e.* the name of the winners), the risk for an Italian attack is arguably very low. Despite from that, the first iteration of [28] proposed a solution for single choice voting, which was designed to reveal the s choices (candidate or list of candidates) who received the most votes, where s is the number of seats. Unfortunately, their approach suffers from a shortcoming where more than s candidates may be output in case of a tie between two candidates. To solve this, it is possible to encode a tie-breaking mechanism in the least significant bits of the score of each candidate, as explained in Section 3.

The solution of Ordinos, once fixed, can be interesting when a choice corresponds to a single candidate. However, when it comes to list voting, revealing which lists received the most votes is not enough: often, a rule is applied to distribute the s seats among the different lists, depending on the number of votes they each received. One popular approach for this is the D'Hondt method, which is notably used in Belgium for politically binding elections.

If $c_1, \cdots, c_k$ is the number of votes received by each list and s the number of seats, the D'Hondt method defines the parameters $w_1, \cdots, w_s$ with $w_1 < w_2 < \cdots < w_s$, and constructs the values c_i/w_j for all i, j. The s greatest values from those coefficients each come from a list i (*i.e.*, they are of the form c_i/w_j for some j), and therefore grants a seat to the list i. The way that the list distributes the granted seats among its candidates is up to the political party (alternatively, it can be encoded in the ordering of the candidates in the list). Generally, it is common to take $w_j = j$ for all j, so that we only considered this possibility. In this thesis, we fix the shortcoming of Ordinos, where more than s candidates may be output in case of a tie, we propose an adaptation of Ordinos for the D'Hondt method and provide an equivalent in the ElGamal setting, using our toolbox. In addition, we propose two additional computation-communication trade-offs in the ElGamal setting.

D.1 Basic single choice voting

To find the s largest values in a list of N ciphertexts $c_1, \cdots, c_N$, the strategy of Ordinos consists of first building the (encrypted) matrix M_{rank} of the pairwise comparisons $c_i \geq c_j$ for all i, j. Then, to decide whether a candidate i is a winner, they compute an encryption of the sum $S_i = \sum_{j=1}^{N} \mathbb{1}_{c_i \geq c_j}$, using the homomorphic property of the Paillier encryption scheme. Finally, they produce an encryption of 1 if $S_i \geq N - s + 1$, of 0 otherwise, and decrypt the result of the test. Hence, the candidate i is a winner if there are at most $s - 1$ candidates which have strictly more votes than i. As mentioned above, this can lead to more than s candidates being elected in case of a tie. To fix this, we propose to encode the tie-beak function in the least significant bits of the score of each candidates. More precisely, if C_i is the encryption of the number of votes received by i and $r_i \in [1, N]$ is a number which encodes the tie break rule for i (*i.e.* if there is a tie between i and j, then the one with the largest r is preferred), then we replace C_i by $C_i^{2^\ell} E_{r_i}$, where $\ell = \lceil \log(N + 1) \rceil$ is the number of bits required to encode each r, and E_{r_i} is a trivial encryption of r_i. Hence, a tie can no longer occur and the strategy of Ordinos can be applied. The impact of this fix in the overall performances of Ordinos is low: we only increase the size of the integers to compare by ℓ, which means that we lose less than a factor 2.

Adaptation to the ElGamal setting. Thanks to our toolbox, it is easy to compute the winner of a basic single-choice voting election, using `Aggreg` and s`Select` or OddEvenMergeSort. However, we can also adapt Ordinos strategy using pairwise comparisons. This leads to different computation/communication trade-offs; each can be interesting depending on the ratio between s and k. In Table 1, we give the approximate costs of all approaches, which includes the fixed solution of Ordinos. Once again, we conclude that our toolbox is more efficient computation-wise, but less efficient communication-wise. However, in this particular case, the additional synchronization steps that are

Table 3: Leading terms of the cost of different MPC solutions for single choice voting; n is the number of voters, k the number of candidates, s the number of seats, a the number of talliers

Version	# exp.	# synch. steps	transcript
[28] (fixed)	**precomp.** $41k^2\log(nk)a$ **comp.** $4nk+$ $25k^2\log(nk)a$	**precomp.** $O(a)$ **comp.** $14\log\log(nk)$	$9nk+$ $79.5k^2\log(nk)a$
EG (adaptation)	$99nka+$ $33k^2\log(nk)a$	$\frac{1}{2}(\log(n)^2+\log(k)^2)a$	$102nka+$ $34k^2\log(nk)a$
EG (`sSelect`)	$99nka+$ $33ks(3\log n+\log k)a$	$\frac{1}{2}\log(n)^2a+$ $2s\log n\log ka$	$102nka+$ $34ks(3\log n+\log k)a$
EG (OddEven)	$99nka+$ $25k\log(k)^2\log na$	$\frac{1}{2}\log(n)^2a+$ $\log n\log(k)^2a$	$102nka+$ $25.5k\log(k)^2\log na$

Table 4: Leading terms of the cost of the different MPC solutions for the D'Hondt method; n is the number of voters, k is the number of lists of candidates, s is the number of seats, $m=\mathrm{lcm}(1,\cdots,s)$, a is the number of talliers and all the logarithms are in base 2

Version	# exp.	# synch. steps	transcript
Adaptation of [28]	$99nka+$ $+33k^2s^2\log(nks)a$	$\frac{1}{2}(\log(n)^2+\log(k)^2)a$ $+2\log s\log na$	$102nka$ $+34k^2s^2\log(nks)a$
`sSelect`	$99nka+$ $33ks^2\log(m^3n^6ks)a$	$\frac{1}{2}\log(n)^2a+$ $2s\log(mn)\log(ks)a$	$102nka+$ $34ks^2\log(m^3n^6ks)a$
OddEven	$99nka+$ $99ks^2\log na+$ $25ks\log(ks)^2\log(mn)a$	$\frac{1}{2}\log(n)^2a+$ $2\log n\log m$ $\log(mn)\log(ks)^2a$	$102nka+$ $102ks^2\log na+$ $25.5ks\log(ks)^2\log(mn)a$

required in the ElGamal setting are affordable, and it is still possible to switch to more communication-efficient protocols such as `CLT` ar UFCAdd if needed.

D.2 List voting: computing the D'Hondt method in MPC

We now explain how to adapt the strategies from the previous section to compute a D'Hondt tally in MPC. Although the D'Hondt method can be computed with a homomorphic tally, this is a good opportunity to evaluate the performances of our toolbox for a more complex counting function. First, the strategy of Ordinos can be adapted by computing the pairwise comparisons $c_i/w_j \geq c_{i'}/w_{j'}$. Sice comparing two fractions may be expensive, it is more efficient to precompute all the product $c_iw_{j'}$ beforehand. For this purpose, one can use the efficient UFC algorithm (see Algorithm 26), which, given s (dupicated) bitwise encryptions of c_i, returns the bitwise encryptions $\boldsymbol{S_{i,1}},\cdots,\boldsymbol{S_{i,s}}$ of $c_i, 2c_i,\cdots,sc_i$. The cost of this protocol is negligible compared to the remaining of the process. Then, we can add the tie-breaking mechanism in the least significant bits and apply Ordinos' strategy. This leads to a solution which is efficient communication-wise, but requires $\Omega(k^2s^2)$ operations, where k is the number of candidates and s is the number of voters. Hence, it may be preferable to also adapt the other solutions for computing the s largest values, namely `sSelect` and OddEvenMergeSort. For those solution, however, precomputing all the $\boldsymbol{S_{i,j}}$ does not help much. Indeed, while $c_i/w_j \geq c_{i'}/w_{j'}$ is indeed equivalent to $c_iw_{j'} \geq c_{i'}w_j$, `sSelect` and OddEvenMergeSort imply a lot of conditional swaps, which means that the index i, j and i', j' are not known. Consequently, we propose to multiply by the least common multiple $m=\mathrm{lcm}(1,\cdots,s)$ to get an encryption of the integers $d_{i,j}=c_i\frac{m}{j}$ for all i,j. Since one of the operands is known, a slightly optimized version of Mult can be use, where a third of the computation is saved. To simplify the complexity analysis, we consider $e=\exp(1)$ and we note that, by [39, Theorem 12], $\log m < 1.039s\log e$. Hence, the cost of computing the ks multiplications in parallel is approximately that of $2ks^2\log n\log e\mathtt{CSZ} < 3ks^2\log n\mathtt{CSZ}$, and this approximation is valid for all s. This means that the cost of the multiplications is reasonnable compared to the rest of the protocol. However, by multiplying the values to compare by m, we make the comparisons more expensive since there are $s\log e$ additional bits to process.

Number of voters	10	100	1000
uniform distribution over 5 candidates	0.384	0.220	0.080
political distribution [6]	N/A	0.001	N/A

Figure 8: Estimated probability that the algorithm of [14] fails to determine the MJ winner(s).

E MAJORITY JUDGEMENT

In this appendix, we will give the details of what is sketched in Section 4: we start with a precise definition of Majority Judgement (MJ), then we discuss the contribution of citeCPST-Esorics08 and explain why it is not acceptable. We then present our algorithm for computing the winners and give a complete proof of its correctness. Finally we explain how to adapt it for MPC for both Paillier and ElGamal settings.

E.1 Definition

In a MJ protocol, there are k candidates and a set of d grades, which is totally ordered. For instance, the set could be {Excellent, Good, Medium, Bad, Reject}. For the computations, we represent grades with integers and the tradition in MJ is to use a reversed ordering (*i.e.* 1 is a better / higher grade than 2). Each voter has to grade each candidate with a single grade. Hence, if n is the number of voters (who did not abstain or vote blank), each candidate has a list of n grades. For simplicity, we assume that the lists are sorted in decreasing order (highest grades first). Thus, we consider that each candidate has a sorted n-tuple. Note that two n-tuples are equal if and only if the candidates received exactly the same number of each grade. Given a sorted n-tuple $u_1, \cdots, u_n$ the *median* of u is simply $\mathrm{med}(u) = u_{\lceil n/2 \rceil}$. We denote $\hat{u}$ the $(n-1)$-tuple $u_1, \cdots, u_{\lceil n/2 \rceil - 1}, u_{\lceil n/2 \rceil + 1}, \cdots, u_n$; that is, the tuple u in which the median element has been removed. Finally, we define the $\leq_{maj}$ relation as follows, where $<$ stands for the grade-wise comparison (which is the opposite of the natural comparison of integers).

Definition E.1 (The relation $\leq_{maj}$). Let u and v be grade n-tuples sorted in decreasing order. If $n = 1$, $u <_{maj} v$ if $u_1 < v_1$. Else, $u <_{maj} v$ if one of the following conditions holds:

- $\mathrm{med}(u) < \mathrm{med}(v)$,
- $\mathrm{med}(u) = \mathrm{med}(v)$ and $\hat{u} <_{maj} \hat{v}$.

Finally, $u \leq_{maj} v$ if $u = v$ or $u <_{maj} v$.

It is straightforward to show that $\leq_{maj}$ is a total order. The majority judgement declares as winner any candidate whose grades form a maximal n-tuple (once sorted) according to $\leq_{maj}$.

E.2 The approach of [14]

While the algorithm to determine the MJ winner(s) is simple, its naive implementation yields a complexity that depends on the number of voters, which could be very costly when done in MPC. Hence, the authors of [14] propose an MPC implementation of a simplification of the MJ algorithm, where whenever two candidates have the same median, only their number of grades higher and smaller than the median are compared. It has been shown that this technique is sound [6]: if a winner can be determined with this approach, it is indeed a MJ winner. However, it may also fail to conclude.

An experiment run in [6] on real ballots of a political election with 12 candidates is reassuring: the simplified approach fails only with probability 0,001 for an election of 100 voters. However, this is due to the fact that in this political election, there was a high correlation between candidates (if a voter likes a candidate, he is likely to also like other candidates from similar political parties).

In case the number of candidates is smaller and if the distribution of votes is uniform, then the probability of failure raises up to 22%, as shown in Figure 8. In any case, the approach of [14] leaks more information about the ballots than just the result, with non negligible probability, since it reveals whether the result can be determined with the simplified algorithm.

E.3 Our simplified algorithm for MJ

First, we give Algorithm 43, our simplified algorithm for Majority Judgment. It takes as input the *aggregated matrix* a such that, for all candidate i and grade j, $a_{i,j}$ is the number of j received by i. It outputs the set of the winners according to the Majority Judgement. To prove its correctness, we first give Definition E.2. From this definition and Definition E.1, it is straightforward to show that $\leq_{maj}$ is the lexicographic order for the median sequences. Hence, it is important to describe the behavior of the median sequence, which is done in Lemma E.3.

Definition E.2 (The median sequence). The median sequence of a sorted n-tuple u, denoted $m(u)$ is the sequence formed by $\mathrm{med}(u)$ followed by $m(\hat{u})$.

Lemma E.3. *Let u a sorted n-tuple. The k^{th} element of the median sequence of u is the element of index $m + (-1)^{k+n}\lfloor k/2 \rfloor$, where $m = \left\lceil \frac{n}{2} \right\rceil$.*

Proof. We distinguish the cases where n is even or odd and give a recurrence in k.

Algorithm 43: Majority Judgement

Require: a the aggregated matrix, d the number of grades, n the number of voters
Ensure: C the set of MJ winner(s)

Let $m = \max\{m_i \mid m_i \text{ is the median of candidate } i\}$
Let C be the set of candidates with m as median grade.
Let $I^- = 1$ and $I^+ = 1$ be counters.
Let $s = 1$.
for $i \in C$ **do**
    $p_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m-1} a_{i,j}$, $q_i = \sum_{j=m+1}^{d} a_{i,j}$,
    $m_i^- = \left\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \right\rfloor - p_i$, $m_i^+ = \left\lfloor \frac{n}{2} \right\rfloor - q_i$
while $(|\ C\ | > 1) \wedge (s \neq 0)$ **do**
    for $i \in C$ **do**
        if $m_i^- \leq m_i^+$ **then**
            $s_i = p_i$
        else
            $s_i = -q_i$
    $s = \max\{s_i \mid i \in C\}$
    $C = \{i \in C \mid s_i = s\}$.
    if $s \geq 0$ **then**
        for $i \in C$ **do**
            $m_i^+ = m_i^+ - m_i^-$, $m_i^- = a_{i,m-I^-}$
            $p_i = p_i - a_{i,m-I^-}$
        $I^- = I^- + 1$
    else
        for $i \in C$ **do**
            $m_i^- = m_i^- - m_i^+$, $m_i^+ = a_{i,m+I^+}$
            $q_i = q_i - a_{i,m+I^+}$
        $I^+ = I^+ + 1$
Return C.

Case 1: n is even. The first element of the median sequence is u_m by definition. Let $k \geq 1$. Suppose that for $i \in [1, k]$, the i^{th} element of the median sequence is $u_{m+(-1)^i\lfloor i/2 \rfloor}$. By definition, the $(k+1)^{th}$ element of the median sequence is the element of index $\left\lceil \frac{n-k}{2} \right\rceil$ of some $(n-k)$-tuple, obtained by removing the first k elements of the median sequence of u.

If k is even, by recurrence hypothesis, the removed elements have indexes $m, m+1, m-1, \cdots, m-(k/2-1), m+k/2$ thus the remaining elements are

$$(u_1, \cdots, u_{m-k/2}, u_{m+k/2+1}, \cdots, u_n).$$

As n and k are even, $\left\lceil \frac{n-k}{2} \right\rceil = m - k/2$. Therefore, the $(k+1)^{th}$ element of the median sequence is $u_{m-k/2}$, and since k is even, $m - k/2 = m + (-1)^{k+1}\left\lfloor \frac{k+1}{2} \right\rfloor$.

If k is odd, by recurrence hypothesis, the removed elements have indexes $m, m+1, m-1, \cdots, m+(k-1)/2, m-(k-1)/2$ so the remaining elements are

$$(u_1, \cdots, u_{m-(k+1)/2}, u_{m+(k+1)/2}, \cdots, u_n).$$

Since n is even while k odd, $\left\lceil \frac{n-k}{2} \right\rceil = m - (k-1)/2$, so the $(k+1)^{th}$ element of the median sequence is the one following $u_{m-(k+1)/2}$ in the above list, namely $u_{m+(k+1)/2}$, with $m + (k+1)/2 = m + (-1)^{k+1}\left\lfloor \frac{k+1}{2} \right\rfloor$.

Case 2: n is odd. The first element of the median sequence is u_m by definition. Let $k \geq 1$. Suppose that for $i \in [1, k]$, the i^{th} element of the median sequence is $u_{m-(-1)^i\lfloor i/2 \rfloor}$. By definition, the $(k+1)^{th}$ element of the median sequence is the element of index $\left\lceil \frac{n-k}{2} \right\rceil$ of some $(n-k)$-tuple, obtained by removing the first k elements of the median sequence of u.

If k is even, by recurrence hypothesis, the removed elements have indexes $m, m-1, m+1, \cdots, m+(k/2-1), m-k/2$ so the remaining elements are

$$(u_1, \cdots, u_{m-k/2-1}, u_{m+k/2}, \cdots, u_n).$$

As n is odd and k even, $\left\lceil \frac{n-k}{2} \right\rceil = m - k/2$. Therefore the $(k+1)^{th}$ element of the median sequence is the one following $u_{m-k/2-1}$ in the above list, namely $u_{m+k/2}$ with $m + k/2 = m - (-1)^{k+1} \left\lfloor \frac{k+1}{2} \right\rfloor$.

If k is odd, by recurrence hypothesis, the removed elements have indexes $m, m-1, m+1, \cdots, m-(k-1)/2, m+(k-1)/2$ so the remaining elements are

$$(u_1, \cdots, u_{m-(k+1)/2}, u_{m+(k+1)/2}, \cdots, u_n).$$

As n and k are odds, $\left\lceil \frac{n-k}{2} \right\rceil = m - (k+1)/2$. Hence the $(k+1)^{th}$ element of the median sequence is $u_{m-(k+1)/2}$, with $m - (k+1)/2 = m - (-1)^{k+1} \left\lfloor \frac{k+1}{2} \right\rfloor$.

□

In order to prove the correctness of Algorithm 43, we exhibit the following loop invariants, where a sum indexed with the empty set is 0 and $g_{i,1}, \cdots, g_{i,n}$ denote the list of grades received by candidate i, sorted in decreasing order. Note that m is used to denote the best median (line 1), and not $\lceil \frac{n}{2} \rceil$ as in the previous lemma.

Lemma E.4. *In Algorithm 43, the following loop invariants hold at the beginning of the loop (line 8) and at the end of the loop (line 25).*

(1) For all $i \in C$, $p_i + m_i^- = m_i^+ + q_i$, and this value is the same for all i.
(2) For all $i \in C$, $m_i^+ \geq 0$ and $m_i^- \geq 0$.
(3) For all $i \in C$, $p_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m-I^-} a_{i,j}$. Hence $p_i \geq 0$.
(4) For all $i \in C$, $q_i = \sum_{j=m+I^+}^{d} a_{i,j}$. Hence, $q_i \geq 0$.
(5) Let $L + p_i + m_i^- + m_i^+ + q_i$. The $n - L$ first elements of the median sequence are identical for all $i \in C$.
(6) For all $i \in C$, for all $j \in [1, m_i^-]$, $g_{i,p_i+j} = m - I^- + 1$ and, for all $j \in [1, m_i^+]$, $g_{i,n-q_i-j+1} = m + I^+ - 1$.
(7) C contains all the MJ winners.

Proof. **Initialization.** First of all, we verify that the loop invariants are true after line 7.

Invariants 1 to 4:

We have $p_i + m_i^- = \lfloor n/2 \rfloor = m_i^+ + q_i$.

Moreover p_i is the number of grades strictly greater than the median, so by definition of the median, $p_i \leq \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ hence $m_i^- = \lfloor n/2 \rfloor - p_i \geq 0$. Similarly, q_i is the number of grades strictly worse than the median, so by definition of the median, $q_i \leq \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ hence $m_i^+ = \lfloor n/2 \rfloor - q_i \geq 0$.

Finally, Equalities 3 and 4 are true with $I^- = I^+ = 1$.

Invariant 5:

Initially, $L = p_i + m_i^- + m_i^+ + q_i = 2\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ so if n is even, $n - L = 0$. Else, $n - L = 1$. As the first element of the median sequence is the median, the $n - L$ first elements are the same for all candidates in C after line 7.

Invariant 6:

After line 7, p_i is the number of grades strictly greater than the median for candidate i so, for all $j \geq 1$, $g_{i,p_i+j} \geq m$. Moreover m_i^- is lower than the number of grades equal to the median received by i. So for all $j \leq m_i^-$, $g_{i,p_i+j} \leq m$. Hence, for all $j \in [1, m_i^-]$, $g_{i,p_i+j} = m$. Similarly, for all $j \in [1, m_i^+]$, $g_{i,n-q_i-j+1} = m$.

Invariant 7:

After line 7, C contains the candidates who have the best median, thus contains the winners.

Heredity. Assume that the loop invariants are verified at the beginning of the loop, we show that they are preserved at the end of the loop.

We first show the following result, which is a consequence of loop invariants 1 to 4.

Sub-lemma. For all candidates i, $s_i \geq 0$ if and only if $m_i^- \leq m_i^+$.

Let i be a candidate. Suppose $s_i \geq 0$ and $m_i^- > m_i^+$. Then $0 \leq s_i = -q_i \leq 0$ so $q_i = 0$ and as $p_i + m_i^- = m_i^+ + q_i$, we have $p_i + m_i^- = m_i^+$, which contradicts $p_i \geq 0$. Conversely, if $m_i^- \leq m_i^+$, $s_i = p_i \geq 0$.

To show that the loop invariants are preserved, we denote C_1 the set C at the beginning of the loop and C_2 the set C at the end of the loop. Let $i \in C_2$. Let $i \in C_2$, then $i \in C_1$ so the loop invariants hold at the beginning of the loop, for all $i \in C_2$. We denote p_1 the value of p_i at the beginning of the loop and p_2 at the end, and the same for all other variable m_i^-, m_i^+, q_i, I^-, I^+ and L.

Invariants 1 to 4: Let $s = \max\{s_i \mid i \in C\}$. $C_2 = \{i \mid s_i = s\}$.

If $s \geq 0$, then $s_i = s \geq 0$ so $m_1^- \leq m_1^+$ by the sub-lemma. Hence $m_2^+ = m_1^+ - m_1^- \geq 0$, $m_2^- = a_{i,m-I_1^-} \geq 0$.

In addition, $p_2 = p_1 - a_{i,m-I_1^-}$ and $q_2 = q_1$. Therefore $p_2 + m_2^- = p_1 = s_i = s$, which is the same for all i. Moreover $m_2^+ + q_2 = m_1^+ - m_1^- + q_1 = p_1 + m_1^- - m_1^- = p_1 = S$.

Finally, line 20 together with line 21 and loop invariant 3 give $p_2 = \sum_{j=1}^{m-I_2^-} a_{i,j}$, which shows that invariant 3 is preserved. (Invariant 4 is also preserved because $q_2 = q_1$ and $I_2^+ = I_1^+$.)

If $s < 0$, then $s_i = s < 0$ so $m_1^- > m_1^+$ by the sub-lemma. Hence $m_2^- = m_1^- - m_1^+ \geq 0$, $m_2^+ = a_{i,m+I_1^+} \geq 0$, $q_2 = q_1 - a_{i,m+I_1^+}$ et $p_2 = p_1$. So $m_2^+ + q_2 = q_1 = -S_i = -S$, which is the same for all i. In addition $p_2 + m_2^- = p_1 + m_1^- - m_1^+ = m_1^+ + q_1 - m_1^+ = q_1 = -S$. Finally line 26 together with line 27 and loop invariant 4 give $q_2 = \sum_{j=m+I_2^+}^{c} a_{i,j}$, so that invariant 4 is preserved. (Invariant 3 is also preserved because $p_2 = p_1$ and $I_2^- = I_1^-$.)

Invariant 5:

If $s \geq 0$, $m_1^- \leq m_1^+$. Consequently, $p_1 = s_i = s$ and since $p_1 + m_1^-$ is the same for all i, we deduce that m_1^- is the same for all i. In addition we have $p_2 + m_2^- = p_1$ (lines 19 and 20), $m_2^+ = m_1^+ - m_1^-$ (line 18) and $q_2 = q_1$, so

$$\begin{aligned} L_2 &= p_2 + m_2^- + m_2^+ + q_2 \\ &= p_1 + m_1^+ - m_1^- + q_1 \\ &= p_1 + m_1^- + m_1^+ + q_1 - 2m_1^- = L_1 - 2m_1^-, \end{aligned}$$

and since the $n - L_1$ first elements of the median sequence are the same for all candidates in C_1, we only have to show that the $2m_1^-$ next elements are the same for all candidates in C_2. For this purpose, we remark that loop invariant 1 implies that L_1 is even and we suppose $m_1^- > 0$. (If $m_1^- = 0$, our job is already done.)

By Lemma E.3, the elements of indexes $n - L_1 + 1, \cdots, n - L_1 + 2m_1^-$ of the median sequence are the elements

$$g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + (-1)^{2n-L_1+1}\lfloor (n-L_1+1)/2\rfloor}, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + (-1)^{2n-L_1+2}\lfloor (n-L_1+2)/2\rfloor}, \cdots, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + (-1)^{2n-L_1+2m_1^-}\lfloor (n-L_1+2m_1^-)/2\rfloor};$$

which are also

$$g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil - \lfloor (n+1)/2\rfloor + L_1/2}, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + \lfloor n/2\rfloor - L_1/2+1}, \cdots, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil - \lfloor (n-1)/2\rfloor + L_1/2 - m_1^-}, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + \lfloor n/2\rfloor - L_1/2 + m_1^-}.$$

But $L_1 = p_1 + m_1^- + m_1^+ + q_1$ so, by invariant 1, $L_1/2 = p_1 + m_1^- = m_1^+ + q_1$. Since $\lceil n/2\rceil = \lfloor (n+1)/2\rfloor$ and $\lceil n/2\rceil + \lfloor n/2\rfloor = n$ for all n, we can rewrite them as

$$g_{i,p_1+m_1^-}, g_{i,n-q_1-m_1^++1}, \cdots, g_{i,p_1+1}, g_{i,n-q_1-m_1^++m_1^-}.$$

In what follow, we prove that for all $j \in [1, m_i^-]$, $g_{i,n-q_1-m_1^++j} = m + I_1^+ - 1$. Indeed, $n - q_1 - m_1^+ + j = n - q_1 - (m_1^+ - j + 1) + 1$ and since $m_1^+ \geq m_1^- > 0$, $m_1^+ - j + 1 \in [1, m_1^+]$ for all $j \in [1, m_1^-]$, which allows to prove our claim by invariant 6.

In addition, $g_{i,p_1+j} = m - I_1^- + 1$ for all $j \in [1, m_1^-]$ by invariant 6, so the elements listed above are equal to $m - I_1^- + 1, m + I_1^+ - 1, \cdots, m - I_1^- + 1, m + I_1^+ - 1$ and therefore are the same for all $i \in C_2$, which shows that invariant 5 is preserved.

If $s < 0$, $m_1^- > m_1^+$. Consequently, $q_1 = -s_i = -s$ and since $m_1^+ + q_1$ is the same for all i, so is m_1^+. Moreover $m_2^+ + q_2 = q_1$ (lines 25 and 26), $m_2^- = m_1^- - m_1^+$ (line 24) and $p_2 = p_1$ so

$$\begin{aligned} L_2 &= p_2 + m_2^- + m_2^+ + q_2 \\ &= p_1 + m_1^- - m_1^+ + q_1 \\ &= p_1 + m_1^- + m_1^+ + q_1 - 2m_1^+ = L_1 - 2m_1^+, \end{aligned}$$

and since the $n - L_1$ first elements of the median sequence are the same for all candidates in C_1, we only have to show that the $2m_1^+$ next elements are the same for all candidates in C_2. For this purpose, we remark that invariant 1 implies that L_1 is even and we suppose that $m_1^+ > 0$. (If $m_1^+ = 0$, our job is done.)

By Lemma E.3, the elements of indexes $n - L_1 + 1, \cdots, n - L_1 + 2m_1^+$ of the median sequence are

$$g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + (-1)^{2n-L_1+1}\lfloor (n-L_1+1)/2\rfloor}, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + (-1)^{2n-L_1+2}\lfloor (n-L_1+2)/2\rfloor}, \cdots, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + (-1)^{2n-L_1+2m_1^+}\lfloor (n-L_1+2m_1^+)/2\rfloor};$$

which are also

$$g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil - \lfloor (n+1)/2\rfloor + L_1/2}, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + \lfloor n/2\rfloor - L_1/2+1}, \cdots, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil - \lfloor (n-1)/2\rfloor + L_1/2 - m_1^+}, g_{i,\lceil n/2\rceil + \lfloor n/2\rfloor - L_1/2 + m_1^+}.$$

But $L_1 = p_1 + m_1^- + m_1^+ + q_1$ so, by invariant 1, $L_1/2 = p_1 + m_1^- = m_1^+ + q_1$. Since $\lceil n/2\rceil = \lfloor (n+1)/2\rfloor$ et $\lceil n/2\rceil + \lfloor n/2\rfloor = n$ for all n, we can rewrite them as

$$g_{i,p_1+m_1^-}, g_{n-q_1-m_1^++1}, \cdots, g_{i,p_1+m_1^- - m_1^++1}, g_{i,n-q_1}.$$

We now show that for all $j \in [1, m_i^+]$, $g_{i,p_1+m_1^- - j+1} = m - I_1^- + 1$. Indeed, $p_1 + m_1^- - j + 1 = p_1 + (m_1^- - j + 1)$ and since $m_1^- > m_1^+ > 0$, $(m_1^- - j + 1) \in [1, m_1^-]$ for all $j \in [1, m_1^+]$, which allows to prove our claim by invariant 6.

In addition, $g_{i,n-q_1-j+1} = m + I_1^+ - 1$ for all $j \in [1, m_1^+]$ by invariant 6, so the elements listed above are equal to $m - I_1^- + 1, m + I_1^+ - 1, \cdots, m - I_1^- + 1, m + I_1^+ - 1$ and therefore are the same for all $i \in C_2$, which shows that invariant 5 is preserved.

Invariant 6:

If $s \geq 0$, $m_1^- \leq m_1^+$ so $p_2 = p_1 - a_{i,m-I_1^-}$ and $m_2^- = a_{i,m-I_1^-}$. But $p_1 = \sum_{j=1}^{m-I_1^-} a_{i,j}$, which is exactly the number of grades strictly greater than $m - I_1^- + 1$ received by i so by definition of $a_{i,m-I_1^-}$, p_2 is the number of grades strictly greater than $m - I_1^-$. Therefore g_{i,p_2+1} is lower than $m - I_1^-$ and as there are $a_{i,m-I_1^-} = m_2^-$ grades equal to $m - I_1^-$, we deduce that $g_{i,p_2+j} = m - I_1^- = m - (I^- + 1) + 1 = m - I_2^- + 1$ for all $j \in [1, m_2^-]$. In addition, for all $j \in [1, m_1^+]$, $g_{i,n-q_1-j+1} = m + I_1^+ - 1$ so, *a fortiori*, for all $j \in [1, m_1^+ - m_1^-]$, $g_{i,n-q_1-j+1} = m + I_2^+ - 1$.

If $s < 0$, $m_1^- > m_1^+$ so $q_2 = q_1 - a_{i,m+I_1^+}$ and $m_2^+ = a_{i,m+I_1^+}$. But $q_1 = \sum_{j=m+I_1^+}^{c} a_{i,j}$, which is exactly the number of grades strictly worse than $m + I_1^+ - 1$ so by definition of $a_{i,m+I_1^+}$, q_2 is the number of grades strictly worse than $m + I_1^+$. Therefore $g_{i,n-q_2}$ is greater than $m + I_1^+$ and as there are $a_{i,m+I_1^+} = m_2^+$ grades equal to $m + I_1^+$, we deduce that $g_{i,n-q_2-j+1} = m + I_1^+ = m + (I^+ + 1) - 1 = m + I_2^+ - 1$ for all $j \in [1, m_2^+]$. In addition, for all $j \in [1, m_1^-]$, $g_{i,p_1+j} = m - I_1^- + 1$ so, *a fortiori*, for all $j \in [1, m_1^+ - m_1^-]$, $g_{i,p_1+j} = m - I_2^- + 1$.

Invariant 7:

Let $b \in C_2$, (namely $b \in C_1$ such that $s_b = s$). We show that for all $a \in C_1 \backslash C_2$, (namely for all $a \in C_1$ such that $s_a < s$), $a <_{maj} b$.

Positive case. Suppose that $s \geq 0$. Let $a \in C_1$ such that $s_a < s$.

Positive-negative case. We first assume that $s_a < 0$. Therefore $s_a < 0 \leq s = s_b$. By the sub-lemma, we have $m_a^- > m_a^+$ and $m_b^- \leq m_b^+$.

Suppose that $m_a^+ < m_b^-$. With the same reasoning as in the proof of invariant 6, we show that the elements of indexes 1 to $n - L + 2m_a^+$ of the median sequence of a and b are the same. Since $m_a^- > m_a^+$, by Lemma E.3 and loop invariant 1 and 6, the $n - L + 2m_a^+ + 1$ th elements of the median sequence of a and b are respectively

$$g_{a,p_a+m_a^- - m_a^+} = m - I^- + 1 \text{ and}$$
$$g_{b,p_a+m_a^- - m_a^+} = g_{b,p_b+m_b^- - m_a^+} = m - I^- + 1.$$

However, the $n - L + 2m_a^+ + 2$ th element of the median sequence of a is

$$g_{a,n-q_a+1} < g_{a,n-q_a} = m + I^+ - 1,$$

while b's is

$$g_{b,n-q_a-m_a^++m_a^++1} = g_{b,n-q_b-(m_b^+-m_a^+)+1} = m + I^+ - 1.$$

Therefore $b >_{maj} a$.

Now suppose that $m_a^+ \geq m_b^-$. As above, the $n - L + 2m_b^-$ first elements of the median sequence of a and b are the same. The elements of index $n - L + 2m_b^- + 1$ are respectively

$$g_{a,p_a+m_a^- - m_b^-} = g_{a,p_a+(m_a^- - m_a^+)+(m_a^+ - m_b^-)} = m - I^- + 1^- \text{ and}$$
$$g_{b,p_a+m_a^- - m_b^-} = g_{b,p_b} > m - I^- + 1.$$

Therefore $b >_{maj} a$.

Positive-positive case. Now suppose that $0 \leq s_a$. By the sub-lemma, $m_b^- \leq m_b^+$, $m_a^- \leq m_a^+$. Consequently $s_a = p_a$ and $s_b = p_b$ and since $s_a < s_b$, by invariant 1, we have $m_a^- > m_b^-$. Then again, we deduce that the $n - L + 2m_b^-$ first elements of the median sequence are the same and that b wins over a thanks to the next element.

Negative case. Finally, suppose that $s < 0$. Then $s_a < s_b = s < 0$ so, by the sub-lemma, $m_a^- > m_a^+$ and $m_b^- > m_b^+$. Consequently $s_a = -q_a$ and $s_b = -q_b$ and since $s_a < s_b$, by invariant 1, we have $m_b^+ > m_a^+$. Then again, we deduce that the $n - L + 2m_a^+$ first elements of the median sequence are the same. In addition $m_a^- > m_a^+$, so by Lemma E.3 and invariants 1 and 6, the $n - L + 2m_a^+ + 1$ th elements of the median sequence of a and b are

$$g_{a,p_a+m_a^- - m_a^+} = m - I^- + 1 \text{ and}$$
$$g_{b,p_a+m_a^- - m_a^+} = g_{b,p_b+m_b^- - m_a^+} = m - I^- + 1.$$

However, the $n - L + 2m_a^+ + 2$ th element for a is

$$g_{a,n-q_a+1} > g_{a,n-q_a} = m + I^+ - 1,$$

while b's is

$$g_{b,n-q_a-m_a^++m_a^++1} = g_{b,n-q_b-(m_b^+-m_a^+)+1} = m + I^+ - 1.$$

Therefore $b >_{maj} a$. □

Once the loop invariants are established, it is straightforward to show the correctness of our algorithm (Theorem E.5).

Theorem E.5. *Algorithm 43 returns the set of maxima according to $\leq_{maj}$ in $O(kd)$ comparisons between grades.*

Proof. **Complexity.** By Lemma E.4, $p_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m-I^-} a_{i,j}$ and $q_i = \sum_{j=m+I^+}^{c} a_{i,j}$. But at each iteration, we subtract $a_{i,m-I^-}$ to p_i or $a_{i,m+I^+}$ to q_i so there cannot be more than d iterations before both are equal to 0. When $p_i = q_i = 0$ for all i, $s = 0$, which terminates the loop. Hence the Algorithm terminates en $O(kd)$ comparisons.

Correctness. If the algorithm terminates because $|\ C\ | = 1$, C contains only one element and since C contains the winners, C is the set of winners. Otherwise, $s = 0$. Recall that s is the maximum of s_i and let i such that $s_i = s$. If $m_i^- > m_i^+$, we have $s_i = -q_i$ thus $q_i = 0$, which contradicts $p_i + m_i^- = m_i^+ + q_i$ and $p_i \geq 0$ so $m_i^- \leq m_i^+$ and $p_i = s_i = s = 0$. But $m_i^- \leq m_i^+$ and $p_i + m_i^- = m_i^+ + q_i$. Since $q_i \geq 0$, $q_i = 0$ thus $m_i^- = m_i^+$. Hence, by invariants 6 and 7, each candidate in C are equal with respect to $\leq_{maj}$. Since C contains the winners, C is the set of winners. □

E.4 An adaptation in MPC in the Paillier setting

In this section, we show how to adapt Algorithm 43 in MPC in the Paillier setting. Since we only focus on the tallying phase and since obtaining (an element-wise encryption of) the aggregated matrix from the ballots is easy in the Paillier setting, we consider that (an element-wise encryption of) the aggregated matrix is available. We first rewrite the algorithm into Algorithm 46 and prove that the new algorithm is equivalent to Algorithm 43. Using the building blocks from Section 2.1, it is easy to implement Algorithm 46 in MPC (see Algorithm 50).

We first provide Algorithm 44 which returns the grade vector as defined in [14]. The grade vector is a (term-by-term) encryption of g such that $g_j = 1$ if j is strictly greater than the best median m, and $g_j = 0$ otherwise. It will be useful to initialize p_i, m_i^-, m_i^+, q_i, $m - I^-$ and $m + I^+$.

Algorithm 44: Grade (Paillier setting)

Require: A such that, for all (i, j), $A_{i,j}$ is an encryption of the number of grades j given to candidate i
Ensure: G, such that for all j, G_j is an encryption of 1 if j is strictly greater than the best median, of 0 otherwise.

1 $V = \prod_{j=1}^{d} A_{1j}$
2 **for** $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
3 **for** $j = 1$ *to* d *(in parallel)* **do**
4 $B = \left(\prod_{l=1}^{j} A_{il}\right)^2$
5 $C_{ij} = \texttt{Not}(\texttt{GTH}(B, V))$
6 **for** $j = 1$ *to* d *(in parallel)* **do**
7 $G_j = C_{1j}$
8 **for** $i = 2$ *to* k *(tree-based parallelisation is possible)* **do**
9 $G_j = \texttt{Mul}(G_j, C_{ij})$
10 Return G

The idea of this algorithm is that, for all candidate i and grade j, j is strictly greater than the best median if and only if the number of grades greater than j is strictly lower than half the number of grades. This translates into the formula $2\sum_{l=1}^{j} a_{i,l} < n = \sum_{l=1}^{d} a_{i,l}$, which allows to compute $c_{i,j}$ for all (i, j), where $c_{i,j} = 1$ if j is strictly greater than i's median. To deduce the grade vector, we compute the logical conjunction column by column.

Once the grade vector is computed, we can initialize p_i, m_i^-, m_i^+ and q_i with Algorithm 45, which is adapted from [14].

The idea is that p_i can be obtained from G thanks to $p_i = \sum_{j=1}^{d} a_{i,j} g_j$ while q_i can be obtained similarly with a right shift of G's negation. Indeed, $\texttt{Not}(G)$ is the vector of encryptions of 1 if j is worse than the best median, of 0 otherwise. Its right shift is therefore encryptions of 1 if j is strictly worse than the best median, of 0 otherwise.

At this point, we remark that we can replace C as defined in line 2 of Algorithm 43 by the whole set of candidates, this without affecting the result, (see Lemma E.6). In what follows, we call Algorithm 43.E.6 the Algorithm 43 in which this transformation has been done.

Lemma E.6. *In Algorithm 43, replacing line 2 by "Let C be the set of all candidates" will not alter the output.*

Proof. We show that after the first iteration of the loop, the C sets of both algorithms are the same, which shows that invariants from Lemma E.4 are verified at the beginning of the second iteration of the loop, if any (if not the output is correct as well since the sets are the same).

Let m be the best median, and a and b be two candidates such that $\text{med}(b) < \text{med}(a) = m$. For all i, after line 7 in both algorithms, p_i is the number of grades strictly better than m received by candidate i while q_i is the number of grades strictly worse than m received by candidate

Algorithm 45: InitD (Paillier setting)

Require: $(A_{ij}), G, n$ such that $A_{i,j}$ is an encryption of the number of j grades given to candidate i, while G is the grade vector and n the number of voters.

Ensure: P, M^-, M^+, Q where, for all i,

- P_i is an encryption of p_i, the number of grades received by i which are strictly greater than the best median,
- M_i^- is an encryption of $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor - p_i$,
- Q_i is an encryption of the number q_i of grades received by i which are strictly worse than the best median,
- M_i^+ is an encryption of $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor - q_i$.

1 **for** $i = 1$ *to* k **do**

2 $\quad P_i = \prod_{j=1}^{d} \texttt{Mul}(A_{ij}, Gj)$

3 $\quad M_i^- = \texttt{Enc}(\lfloor n/2 \rfloor)/P_i$

4 $\quad Q_i = \prod_{j=2}^{d} \texttt{Mul}(A_{ij}, \texttt{Not}(G_{j-1}))$

5 $\quad M_i^+ = \texttt{Enc}(\lfloor n/2 \rfloor)/Q_i$

i. By definition of the median, we have $q_a \leq \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$. On the other hand, $p_b \leq \lfloor n/2 \rfloor < q_b$. But after line 7, we have $m_i^- + p_i = m_i^+ + q_i = \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ for all i so $m_b^- > m_b^+$ and $S_b = -q_b$ after line 13. As $S_a \in \{p_a, -q_a\}$ with $p_a \geq -q_a \geq -\lfloor n/2 \rfloor > -q_b$, we have $S_b < S_a$. Therefore b is discarded from C at line 15. □

Lemma E.6 allows to initialize p_i, m_i^-, m_i^+ and q_i for all candidate i with no care of whether i's median is m or not. Now we explain how to run the while loop in MPC without revealing the number of iterations, nor the number of candidates which remain at any given point (see Lemma E.7).

Lemma E.7. *In Algorithm 43.E.6, we can replace line* 8 *by a for loop on d iterations, without affecting the result. Moreover, invariants from Lemma E.4 are still preserved.*

Proof. Following the proof of Lemma E.4, we remark that the proof does not depend on the number of iterations, so the loop invariants are preserved even if additional iterations are performed. Since the number of iterations is at most d as explained in the proof of Theorem E.5, this concludes the proof. □

In what follows, we denote Algorithm 43.E.7 the Algorithm 43.E.6 in which line 8 is replaced by "for $j = 1$ to d do".

To encode C, we use its indicator (which we also denote C). To show the implied modification, we explicitly give Algorithm 46, where the transformations induced by Lemmas E.6 and E.7 have been made. To prove its correctness, we give the following lemma.

Lemma E.8. *In Algorithm 46, c is the indicator of C from Algorithm 43.E.7.*

Proof. We verify that this property holds as a loop invariant.

Initialisation. Before the first loop iteration, we have $c_i = 1$ for all $i \in [1, k]$ and $C = [1, k]$ so c is C's indicator.

Heredity. Suppose that before the j^{th} iteration in Algorithm 46, c is the indicator of the set C such as before the j^{th} iteration in Algorithm 43.E.7. Then for $i \in C$, $c_i = 1$ so s_i is the same in both algorithms. On the other hand, for $i \notin C$, $c_i = 0$ so $s_i = -n$ in Algorithm 46. By Lemma E.6, after the first loop iteration in Algorithm 43.E.6, C only contains candidates of median m. They therefore have at least a grade equal to m, so for all $i \in C$, $q_i \leq n - 1 < n$ after the first iteration. Since q_i can only decrease, we always have $p_i \geq -q_i > -n$ for $i \in C$, hence $s_i > -n$. Therefore, for $i \in C$ and $j \notin C$, $s_i > s_j$. This is also true in Algorithm 43.E.7, so s is the same in both algorithms after line 15. □

Now we explain how to get $a_{i,m-I^-}$ and $a_{i,m+I^+}$ without revealing $m - I^-$ et $m + I^+$. We use two vectors L and R of size d such that L_j is an encryption of 1 if $j = m - I^-$, of 0 otherwise, while R_j is an encryption of 1 if $j = m + I^+$, of 0 otherwise. This way $a_{i,m-I^-}$ and $a_{i,m+I^+}$ can be obtained with `Select`. To initialize L and R, we use Algorithm 47 which uses the grade matrix g such that $g_j = 1$ if $j < m$, where m is the best median, and $g_j = 0$ otherwise. The idea is that $m - 1$ is the last index for which $g_j = 1$, so that $l_j = g_j - g_{j+1}$. Note that an initialization of R is obtained from L, with two right shifts. The only difficulty is when the best median is equal to the best possible grade, in which case g and l are null, while $r_2 = 1$. In any other case, $g_0 = 1$ and $r_2 = 0$, so we have $r_2 = 1 - g_0$.

In order to increment I^- and I^+, we use the simple Algorithms 48 and 49. Note that we always have $L_d = \texttt{Enc}(0)$ while $R_d = \texttt{Enc}(0)$, so L and R can be processed as vectors of $d - 1$ ciphertexts.

The complete procedure is given in Algorithm 50, whose correctness is the claim of Theorem E.9. In this Algorithm, we add the constant n (the number of voters) to the candidates' scores at line 15, so that each integers to be compared are non-negative. The comparison requires therefore one additional bit but only for the first loop iteration. In the remaining iterations, we have $q_i \leq \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ so that we can add $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ instead of n. Since $p_i \leq \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$, we no longer need an extra bit. For simplicity, we did not explicitly write this optimization in Algorithm 50.

Algorithm 46: MJ; version with a fixed number of loops, and an array of bits (indicator) instead of a set.

Require: a, the aggregated matrix.
Ensure: c, the indicator of the set of MJ winners.

Let m be the best median among all candidates
Let c such that for $i \in [1,k]$, $c_i = 1$
Let $I^- = 1$ and $I^+ = 1$ be counters
for $i = 1$ *to* k **do**
    $p_i = \sum_{j=1}^{m-1} a_{i,j}$, $q_i = \sum_{j=m+1}^{d} a_{i,j}$
    $m_i^- = \lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor - p_i$, $m_i^+ = \lfloor \frac{n}{2} \rfloor - q_i$
for $j = 1$ *to* d **do**
    for $i = 1$ *to* k **do**
        if $m_i^- \leq m_i^+$ **then**
            $s_i = p_i$
        else
            $s_i = -q_i$
    if $c_i = 0$ **then**
        $s_i = -n$ (* Already eliminated candidates are given a fake score *)
    Let $s = \max\{s_i \mid i \in [1,k]\}$
    for $i = 1$ *to* k **do**
        $c_i = c_i \wedge (s_i == s)$
    if $s \geq 0$ **then**
        for $i = 1$ *to* k **do**
            $m_i^+ = m_i^+ - m_i^-$
            $m_i^- = a_{i,m-I^-}$
            $p_i = p_i - a_{i,m-I^-}$
        $I^- = I^- + 1$
    else
        for $i = 1$ *to* k **do**
            $m_i^- = m_i^- - m_i^+$
            $m_i^+ = a_{i,m+I^+}$
            $q_i = q_i - a_{i,m+I^+}$
        $I^+ = I^+ + 1$
Return c.

Algorithm 47: InitP (Paillier setting)

Require: G, the grade matrix
Ensure: L, R, two vectors such that, for all i,
- L_i is an encryption of $i == m - 1$,
- R_i is an encryption of $i == m + 1$.

for $i = 1$ *to* $d - 1$ **do**
    $L_i = G_i / G_{i+1}$
$L_d = \mathtt{Enc}(0)$
for $i = 3$ *to* d **do**
    $R_i = L_{i-2}$
$R_1 = \mathtt{Enc}(0)$, $R_2 = \mathtt{Not}(G_0)$
Return L, R

Algorithm 48: ConditionalLeftShift (CLS)

Require: V, B where V is a vector of $n-1$ ciphertexts and B an encryption of a bit b.
Ensure: Return a (reencrypted) left shift of V if $b = 1$, a reencryption of V otherwise.

for $j = 1$ *to* $n-1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
  $V'_j = \texttt{If}(B, V_{j+1}, V_j)$ (* $V_n = \texttt{Enc}(0)$ *)
Return V'

Algorithm 49: ConditionalRightShift (CRS)

Require: V, B where V is a vector of $n-1$ ciphertexts and B an encryption of a bit b.
Ensure: Return a (reencrypted) right shift of V if $b = 1$, a reencryption of V otherwise.

for $j = 2$ *to* $n-1$ *(in parallel)* **do**
  $V_j = \texttt{If}(B, V_{j-1}, V_j)$ (* $V_1 = \texttt{Enc}(0)$ *)
Return V

Algorithm 50: MJ: MPC version (Paillier setting)

Require: A, n, the (encrypted) aggregated matrix and the number of voters.
Ensure: c, the indicator of the set of winners.

for $i = 1$ *to* k **do**
  $C_i = \texttt{Enc}(1)$
$G = \texttt{Grade}(A)$
$P, M^-, M^+, Q = \texttt{InitD}(A, G, n)$
$L, R = \texttt{InitP}(G)$
for $j = 1$ *to* d **do**
  (* scores computation *)
  for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    $B_1 = \texttt{GTH}(P_i, Q_i)$ (* $p_i \geq q_i$ *)
    $S_i = \texttt{If}(B_1, P_i, 1/Q_i)$ (* p_i if $p_i \geq q_i$, $-q_i$ otherwise *)
    $S_i = \texttt{If}(C_i, S_i, \texttt{Enc}(-n))$ (* eliminated candidates get the fake $-n$ score*)
    $S_i = \texttt{Enc}(n)S_i$ (* $s_i = s_i + n$ *)
  $S = S_1$ (* research of the best score *)
  for $i = 2$ *to* k *(tree-based parallelisation is possible)* **do**
    $B_2 = \texttt{GTH}(S_i, S)$
    $S = \texttt{If}(B_2, S_i, S)$ (* s_i is $s_i \geq s$, s otherwise *)
  for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    $B_3 = \texttt{EQH}(S, S_i)$
    $C_i = \texttt{Mul}(C_i, B_3)$ (* elimination of candidates who do not have the best score*)
  $B_4 = \texttt{GTH}(S, \texttt{Enc}(n))$
  for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    $A'_{i,m-I^-} = \texttt{Select}((A_{i,1}, \cdots, A_{i,d-1}), L)$
    $A'_{i,m+I^+} = \texttt{Select}((A_{i,2}, \cdots, A_{i,d}), R)$
    $T^+ = \texttt{If}(B_4, M_i^+/M_i^-, A'_{i,m+I^+})$ (* $m_i^+ - m_i^-$ if $b_4 = 1$, $a_{i,m+I^+}$ otherwise *)
    $T^- = \texttt{If}(B_4, A'_{i,m-I^-}, M_i^-/M_i^+)$ (* $a_{i,m+-I^-}$ if $b_4 = 1$, $m_i^- - m_i^+$ otherwise *)
    $P_i = \texttt{If}(B_4, P_i/A'_{i,m-I^-}, P_i)$ (* $p_i - a_{i,m-I^-}$ if $b_4 = 1$, p_i otherwise *)
    $M_i^- = T^-$
    $M_i^+ = T^+$
    $Q_i = \texttt{If}(B_4, Q_i, Q_i/A'_{i,m+I^+})$ (* q_i if $b_4 = 1$, $q_i - a_{i,m+I^+}$ otherwise *)
  $L = \texttt{CLS}(L, B_4)$, $R = \texttt{CRS}(R, \texttt{Not}(B_4))$
$c = \texttt{Dec}(C)$ (* bit-wise decryption *)
Return c

Another notable difference compared to Algorithm 46 is that instead of computing $m_i^- \leq m_i^+$, we compute $p_i \geq q_i$ (which is equivalent by invariant 1 from Lemma E.4) since p_i and q_i are non-negative, while m_i^+ and m_i^- could be negative during the first loop iteration.

Theorem E.9. *Algorithm 50 is correct.*

Proof. See Lemmas E.6, E.7, E.8 and E.4, as well as Lemma E.10 below. □

Lemma E.10. *In Algorithm 50, after the i^{th} loop iteration, L and R are such that L_j is an encryption of $j == m - I^-$, while R_j is an encryption $j == m + I^+$.*

Algorithm 51: InitALL (ElGamal setting)

Require: $\boldsymbol{A}^{\text{bits}}$, such that, for all (i, j), ${A_{i,j}}^{\text{bits}}$ is a bit-encdoded encryption of $a_{i,j}$ from the aggregated matrix.

Ensure: $\boldsymbol{P}^{\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{M^-}^{\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{M^+}^{\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{Q}^{\text{bits}}, L, R, C$ where, for all $i \in [1, k]$,

- ${P_i}^{\text{bits}}$ is a bit-wise encryption of p_i, the number of grades received by candidate i which are strictly greater than the best median,
- ${M_i^-}^{\text{bits}}$ is a bit-wise encryption of $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor - p_i$,
- ${Q_i}^{\text{bits}}$ is a bit-wise encryption of q_i, the number of grades received by candidate i which are strictly worse than the best median,
- ${M_i^+}^{\text{bits}}$ is a bit-wise encryption of $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor - q_i$,
- L_j is an encryption of $j == N - 1$ for all j, where N is the best median,
- R_j is an encryption of $j == N + 1$ for all j, where N is the best median,
- C_i is an encryption of 1 if i's median is N, of 0 otherwise.

for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  ${S_{i,1}}^{\text{bits}} = {A_{i,1}}^{\text{bits}}$
  for $j = 1$ *to* $d - 2$ **do**
    $D_{i,j} = \texttt{LT}({S_{i,j}}^{\text{bits}}, \lceil n/2 \rceil)$
    ${S_{i,j+1}}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{Add}^{\text{bits}}({S_{i,j}}^{\text{bits}}, {A_{i,j+1}}^{\text{bits}})$ (* $s_{i,j} = \sum_{k=1}^{j} a_{i,j}$ *)
  $D_{i,d-1} = \texttt{LT}({S_{i,d-1}}^{\text{bits}}, \lceil n/2 \rceil)$
  ${S_i, d}^{\text{bits}} = n$
for $j = 1$ *to* $d - 1$*(in parallel)* **do**
  $G_j = D_{1,j}$
  for $i = 2$ *to* k *(tree-based parallelisation is possible)* **do**
    $G_j = \texttt{CGate}(G_j, D_{i,j})$
for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  $X = G_1 D_{i,1} / \texttt{CGate}(G_1, D_{i,1})^2$ (* $g_1 \oplus d_{i,1}$ *)
  $C_i = \texttt{Not}(X)$ (* $g_1 == d_{i,1}$ *)
  for $j = 2$ *to* $d - 1$ *(tree-based parallelisation is possible)* **do**
    $X = G_j D_{i,j} / \texttt{CGate}(G_j, D_{i,j})^2$, $C_i = \texttt{CGate}(C_i, \texttt{Not}(X))$ (* $g_j = d_{i,j}$ for all j *)
$L, R = \texttt{InitP}(G)$
for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  ${P_i}^{\text{bits}} = \prod_{j=1}^{d-1} \texttt{CGate}({S_{i,j}}^{\text{bits}}, L_j)$ (* Bit-wise product and CGate, as in $\texttt{Select}^{\text{bits}}$ *)
  ${Q_i}^{\text{bits}} = \prod_{j=2}^{d} \texttt{CGate}({S_{i,j}}^{\text{bits}}, L_{j-1})$ (* same as above *)
  ${Q_i}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{Sub}^{\text{bits}}(n, {Q_i}^{\text{bits}})$
  ${M_i^-}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{Sub}^{\text{bits}}(\lfloor n/2 \rfloor, {P_i}^{\text{bits}})$, ${M_i^+}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{Sub}^{\text{bits}}(\lfloor n/2 \rfloor, {Q_i}^{\text{bits}})$
Return $(\boldsymbol{P}^{\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{M^-}^{\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{M^+}^{\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{Q}^{\text{bits}}, L, R, C)$

E.5 An adaptation in MPC in the ElGamal setting

In the previous section, we gave an adaptation in MPC of the MJ tally function in the Paillier setting. As explained in Section 2.3, it is interesting to consider ElGamal encryptions to obtain a better computational complexity, especially at the voter-side. Note that most of

Algorithm 50 is easy to adapt in the ElGamal setting thanks to the toolbox we provide. In this setting, the (encrypted) aggregated matrix must be encrypted in bit-encoding, so that obtaining the aggregated matrix from the list of encrypted ballots is no longer straightforward, but requires kd parallel calls to $\texttt{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}$, which is the main drawback of this approach. Even if those computations can be made on the fly while the voters submit their ballot, if nkd is too large, the Paillier setting might be preferable as this phase would be too expensive.

Algorithm 52: MJ: MPC version (ElGamal setting)

Require: $\boldsymbol{B}$, the n encrypted ballots
Ensure: c, the indicator of the set of winners.

for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  for $j = 1$ *to* d *(in parallel)* **do**
    $A_{i,j}{}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}(B_{i,j,1}, \cdots, B_{i,j,n})$
$\boldsymbol{P}^{\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{M}^{-\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{M}^{+\text{bits}}, \boldsymbol{Q}^{\text{bits}}, L, R, C = \texttt{InitALL}(\boldsymbol{A}^{\text{bits}})$
for $j = 1$ *to* d **do**
  for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    $B_1 = \texttt{Not}(\texttt{LT}(P_i{}^{\text{bits}}, Q_i{}^{\text{bits}}))$
    $P^{+\text{bits}} = P_{i,0}, \cdots, P_{i,m-2}, E(1)$ (* $2^{m-1} + p_i$ *)
    $Q^{+\text{bits}} = \texttt{Neg}(Q_i{}^{\text{bits}})$ (* $2^{m-1} - q_i$ *)
    $S_i{}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{If}(B_1, P^{+\text{bits}}, Q^{+\text{bits}})$
    $S_i{}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{CGate}(S_{i,0}, C_i), \cdots, \texttt{CGate}(S_{i,m-1}, C_i)$ (* give the fake score 0 to already eliminated candidates *)
  $S^{\text{bits}} = S_1{}^{\text{bits}}$
  for $i = 2$ *to* k *(tree-base parallelisation is possible)* **do**
    $B_2 = \texttt{LT}(S^{\text{bits}}, S_i{}^{\text{bits}})$
    $S^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{If}(B_2, S_i{}^{\text{bits}}, S^{\text{bits}})$
  for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    $B_3 = \texttt{EQ}^{\text{bits}}(S^{\text{bits}}, S_i{}^{\text{bits}})$
    $C_i = \texttt{CGate}(C_i, B_3)$
  $B_4 = S_{m-1}$ (* the most significant bit of s tells whether $s \geq 2^{m-1}$ *)
  for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    ${A'_{i,m-I^-}}^{\text{bits}} = \prod_{j=1}^{d-1} \texttt{CGate}(A_{i,j}{}^{\text{bits}}, L_j)$ (* bit-wise product and CGate *)
    ${A'_{i,m+I^+}}^{\text{bits}} = \prod_{j=2}^{d} \texttt{CGate}(A_{i,j}{}^{\text{bits}}, R_j)$ (* same as above *)
    ${M_{+-}}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{Sub}^{\text{bits}}(M_i^{+\text{bits}}, M_i^{-\text{bits}})$
    ${M_{-+}}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{Neg}({M_{+-}}^{\text{bits}})$
    $T^{+\text{bits}} = \texttt{If}(B_4, {M_{+-}}^{\text{bits}}, {A'_{i,m+I^+}}^{\text{bits}})$
    $T^{-\text{bits}} = \texttt{If}(B_4, {A'_{i,m-I^-}}^{\text{bits}}, {M_{-+}}^{\text{bits}})$
    $P_i{}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{If}(B_4, \texttt{Sub}^{\text{bits}}(P_i{}^{\text{bits}}, {A'_{i,m-I^-}}^{\text{bits}}{}^{\text{bits}}), P_i{}^{\text{bits}})$
    $M_i^{-\text{bits}} = T^{-\text{bits}}$
    $M_i^{+\text{bits}} = T^{+\text{bits}}$
    $Q_i{}^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{If}(B_4, Q_i{}^{\text{bits}}, \texttt{Sub}^{\text{bits}}(Q_i{}^{\text{bits}}, {A'_{i,m+I^+}}^{\text{bits}}))$
  $\texttt{CLS}(L, B_4), \texttt{CRS}(R, \texttt{Not}(B_4))$
$c = \texttt{Dec}(C)$ (* bit-wise decryption *) Return c

Another difference is that in the Paillier setting, some procedures were performed thanks to the homomorphic property while they need the $\texttt{Add}^{\text{bits}}$ algorithm in the ElGamal setting. As replacing each multiplication of two ciphertexts in Algorithm 50 by a call to Algorithm 21 might deteriorate the complexity too much, we made a few modifications listed below.

First, we give Algorithm 51 which allows to initialize p_i, m_i^-, m_i^+ and q_i, just as Algorithm 45, but also initialize L and R as in Algorithm 47. Finally Algorithm 51 also initializes C as the indicator of the candidates whose median is the best median. In what follows, we use bold

- Let pk be the public encryption key and v the chosen voting option.
- Encode v as a matrix a of kd bits, where k is the number of candidates and d is the number of grades. The bit $a_{i,j}$ is set if and only if the grade j is given to candidate i.
- Encrypt the matrix into $(A_{i,j})_{i,j}$, using pk.
- For all i, j, produce a ZKP $\pi_{i,j}^{0/1}$ that $A_{i,j}$ is an encryption of 0 or 1.
- For all i, produce a ZKP $\pi_i^{0/1}$ that the product $A_{i,1} \cdots A_{i,d}$ is an encryption of 0 or 1.
- Produce a ZKP $\pi^{0/k}$ that the product $\prod_{i,j} A_{i,j}$ is an encryption of 0 or k.
- Return $A, (\pi_{i,j}^{0/1})_{i,j}, (\pi_i^{0/1})_i, \pi^{0/k}$.

Figure 9: `vote` procedure for the Majority Judgment

characters to denote a matrix of elements. For instance, $\boldsymbol{A}^{\text{bits}}$ stands for a matrix of size kd, whose elements are bit-encoded encrypted integers. By abuse of notation, we use $\lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ or n instead of bit-encoded encryption of the said integer.

Algorithm 51 is a merger of Algorithms 44, 45 and 47. Merging all three algorithms together allows to exploit common intermediate computations. Note that at line 4, we compute $\lceil n/2 \rceil > s_{i,j}$ instead of $n > 2s_{i,j}$, so as to use one bit fewer. (See Lemma E.11 which states that the two comparisons are equivalent.)

Lemma E.11. *For all $n, s \in \mathbb{Z}$, we have $n > 2s$ if and only if $\lceil n/2 \rceil > s$.*

Proof. Let n, s be integers. If $n > 2s$, $\lceil n/2 \rceil \geq n/2 > s$. Conversely, suppose that $\lceil n/2 \rceil > s$. We first consider the case where n is even. Then $n/2 = \lceil n/2 \rceil$ so $n = 2\lceil n/2 \rceil > 2s$. If n is odd, we have $\lceil n/2 \rceil = (n+1)/2$ so $n + 1 > 2s$, therefore $n + 1 \geq 2s + 1$, hence $n \geq 2s$. Since n is odd, $n \neq 2s$, thus $n > 2s$. □

In Algorithm 50, we did not have to initialize C (see Lemma E.6). However, as the variables could be negative, we decided to add a constant. This would not be that easy in the ElGamal setting since adding a constant to a bit-encoded encrypted integers would require a non-trivial operations. In this case, eliminating the candidates who do not have the best median right away so as to initialize C consistently with Algorithm 43 has approximately the same computational cost. Afterwards, for all i, we have $|\, s_i \,| \leq \lfloor n/2 \rfloor$ so we can add the constant 2^{m-1} instead, where m is the bit length of the integers. Indeed, $2^{m-1} > \lfloor n/2 \rfloor \geq q_i$ and $2^{m-1} + p_i \leq 2^{m-1} + \lfloor n/2 \rfloor < 2^m$. This is of interest because computing $2^{m-1} + p_i$ is completely free (just add $\mathsf{Enc}(1)$ as the most significant bit); so we just have to call Neg once (to compute $2^{m-1} - q_i$) instead of calling twice $\mathsf{Add}^{\text{bits}}$.

Finally, we obtain Algorithm 52 for our ElGamal version of a fully-hiding tallying of MJ.

E.6 Majority Judgment, the bottom-line

To improve readability, we give again the details that are necessary to use our tally-hiding protocol inside of a voting protocol. First, to submit a ballot, a voter can simply use the `vote` procedure, which is summed up in Figure 9. This allows the voter to either give a grade to each candidate, either vote blank. Finally, to proceed with the tally, the authorities use the protocol P_{MJ}, defined in Algorithm 52.

F CONDORCET METHODS, SCHULZE AND RANKED-PAIRS VARIANTS

In this Section, we give details about our approach to handle the Condorcet tally function that was only sketched in Section 5. While only the Condorcet-Schulze variant is mentioned in the main body of the article, we also cover here the ranked-pairs method. We refer to [1] for a discussion and a comparison of the many Condorcet variants, Schulze and ranked pairs being only two of them.

After recalling the notion of adjacency matrix, we define with more details the Schulze and ranked pairs variants and explain how they can be processed in MPC once the adjacency matrix is known. We then focus on how to compute this matrix from the encrypted ballots.

F.1 Schulze and ranked pairs from the adjacency matrix

In the Condorcet methods, voters are asked to rank each candidate, potentially with ties (several candidates may have the same rank). The Condorcet winner is the candidate which is preferred to every other candidate by a majority of voters. Schulze and ranked pairs differ when there is no Condorcet winner. Like in many versions of Condorcet, only the adjacency matrix, which is defined in Definition F.1, is needed to compute the winners. In all what follows, we denote $d_{i,j}$ the number of voters who prefers (strictly) candidate i over candidate j.

Definition F.1 (Adjacency matrix). The adjacency matrix is the matrix $(a_{i,j})$ defined by

$$a_{i,j} = \begin{cases} d_{i,j} - d_{j,i} & \text{if } d_{i,j} \geq d_{j,i} \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The Schulze variant.

The Schulze variant consists of several steps. First, compute $d_{i,j}$ for all (i,j). Second, compute $b_{i,j} = d_{i,j} - d_{j,i}$ for all (i,j). For all pair of candidates (u,v), a path p of length l from u to v is a finite sequence of $l+1$ candidates such that $u = p_0$ and $v = p_l$. We say that $(i,j) \in p$ if there exists an index $0 \leq k < l$ such that $i = p_k$ and $j = p_{k+1}$. The strength of a path p is defined as $s(p) = \min_{(i,j)\in p} b_{i,j}$. The third step of the Schulze method is to compute $f_{i,j} = \max_{\sigma \in [i \rightsquigarrow j]} s(\sigma)$, where $[i \rightsquigarrow j]$ denotes the set of all paths from i to j. Finally, i is a winner by the Schulze method if $f_{i,j} \geq f_{j,i}$ for all j.

If a is the adjacency matrix, a Schulze tally can be derived from a (see Lemma F.2). When a is seen as the adjacency matrix of a graph, the Schulze method is well known to be equivalent to the shortest path problem [36], that can be solved with standard algorithms [22, 44].

Lemma F.2. *A Schulze tally can be performed from the adjacency matrix, by using $a_{i,j} = \max\{0, b_{i,j}\}$ instead of $b_{i,j} = d_{i,j} - d_{j,i}$, where $d_{i,j}$ is the number of voters who prefers i over j.*

Proof. For all path p, we denote $s(p) = \min_{(i,j)\in p} b_{i,j}$ and $s'(p) = \min_{(i,j)\in p} a_{i,j}$. For all (i,j), we denote

$$f_{i,j} = \max_{\sigma \in [i \rightsquigarrow j]} \min_{(u,v)\in\sigma} b_{i,j}$$
$$f'_{i,j} = \max_{\sigma \in [i \rightsquigarrow j]} \min_{(u,v)\in\sigma} a_{i,j}.$$

With these notations, the statement of the lemma becomes

$$\forall i, (\forall j, f_{i,j} \geq f_{j,i}) \iff (\forall j, f'_{i,j} \geq f'_{j,i}).$$

Let i be a candidate, suppose that for all j, $f_{i,j} \geq f_{j,i}$ (*i.e.* i is a Schulze winner). Let j be any candidate. If $j = i$, clearly $f'_{i,j} \geq f'_{j,i}$, so we assume that $j \neq i$. Since $j \neq i$, there is no path from i to j (nor from j to i) of length 0. As $f_{i,j} \geq f_{j,i}$, there exists a path p from i to j (of length $n > 0$) such that for all path p' from j to i (of length $n' > 0$), there exists $k' < n'$ such that for all $k < n$, $b_{p'_{k'},p'_{k'+1}} \leq b_{p_k,p_{k+1}}$. We consider two cases.

First, if $b_{p_k,p_{k+1}} < 0$ for some k, then for all p', $b_{p'_{k'},p'_{k'+1}} < 0$ for all k', hence $a_{p'_{k'},p'_{k'+1}} = 0$ for all k', thus $s'(p') = 0 \leq s'(p)$. Since this is holds for all p', $f'_{j,i} = 0 \leq f'_{i,j}$.

Second, if $b_{p_k,p_{k+1}} \geq 0$ for all k, then for all k, $a_{p_k,p_{k+1}} = b_{p_k,p_{k+1}}$. Now consider any path p' (of length $n' > 0$) from j to i. If $b_{p'_{k'},p'_{k'+1}} \geq 0$ for all k', then $s'(p') = s(p') \leq f_{j,i} \leq f_{i,j} = s(p) = s'(p) \leq f'_{i,j}$. If there exists k' such that $b_{p'_{k'},p'_{k'+1}} < 0$, then $s'(p') = 0 \leq f'_{i,j}$. Therefore $f'_{j,i} \leq f'_{i,j}$.

Conversely, let i such that $f'_{j,i} \leq f'_{i,j}$ for all j. Let j be any candidate (as above, w.l.o.g. we assume that $i \neq j$). We consider three cases.

First, suppose that $f_{i,j} < 0$. Then for all path p from i to j, there exists $(u,v) \in p$ such that $b_{u,v} < 0$ (we call this proposition $*$). In particular, $b_{i,j} < 0$, so $b_{j,i} = -b_{i,j} > 0$, hence $b_{j,i} = a_{j,i}$ and $f'_{j,i} \geq s'_{j,i} = a_{j,i} = b_{j,i}$. In addition, $s_{j,i} = b_{j,i} > 0$, so $f'_{j,i} \geq s_{j,i} > 0$. On the other hand, by $*$ we have $f'_{i,j} = 0$, which contradicts $f'_{j,i} \leq f'_{i,j} < 0$. Therefore $f_{i,j} \geq 0$.

Second, suppose that $f_{i,j} = 0$. Then for all path p from i to j, there exists $(u,v) \in p$ such that $b_{u,v} \leq 0$, hence $f'_{i,j} = 0$. Let p' be a path from j to i (of length $n' > 0$). Suppose that for all $(u,v) \in p'$, $b_{u,v} > 0$. Then $0 < s'(p) \leq f'_{j,i}$, which contradicts $f'_{j,i} \leq f'_{i,j}$. Consequently, there exists $(u,v) \in p'$ such that $b_{u,v} \leq 0$, therefore $s(p') \leq 0 = f_{i,j}$. This holds for all p' so $f j, i \leq f_{i,j}$.

Finally, suppose that $f_{i,j} > 0$. Let p' be a path from j to i. If there exists $(u,v) \in p'$ such that $b_{u,v} \leq 0$, then $s(p') \leq 0 < f_{i,j}$. Otherwise, for all $(u,v) \in p'$, $b_{u,v} > 0$ so $s(p') = s'(p') \leq f'_{j,i} \leq f'_{i,j}$, so we just have to show that $f_{i,j} \geq f'_{i,j}$.

Let p be a path from i to j. If there exists $(u,v) \in p$ such that $b_{u,v} \leq 0$, $s'(p) = 0 < f_{i,j}$. Otherwise, for all $(u,v) \in p$, $b_{u,v} > 0$ so $s'(p) = s(p) \leq f_{i,j}$, which concludes the proof. □

From this lemma, the Schulze tally can be derived by a simple Floyd-Warshall algorithm and we give it in Algorithm 54 for completeness. This has a cost that is cubic in the number of candidates (here, this number is denoted n).

The ranked pairs variant.

The ranked pairs is another algorithm which allows to break ties when there is no Condorcet winner. In this method, the adjacency matrix is seen as the adjacency matrix of a graph G. The Ranked Pairs protocol consists of three steps. First, sort the edges of G in decreasing order of weights. Let G' be the graph which consists of k vertices (where k is the number of candidates) and no edge. Second, for all edge of G taken in decreasing order, if this edge does not create a cycle in G', add this edge in G'. Finally, as G' is an oriented graph without cycle, G' is the graph of a partial order over the candidates. The sources of the graph are the winners according to the Ranked Pairs protocol.

Assuming the adjacency matrix is known, an MPC version of the ranked pairs method goes as follows. First, to shuffle the edges, we can use the bubble-sort algorithm. The edges can be encoded with three ciphertexts, one for the source, one for the destination and one for the weight. Then, the main procedure is to update a matrix $B_{i,j} = \mathsf{Enc}(b_{i,j})$, where $b_{i,j} = 1$ if there is a path from i to j, and 0 otherwise. Initially, B is simply an encryption of the identity matrix. To add the edge (i,j) simply compute $b'_{s,t}$ for all (s,t), as follows:

$$b'_{s,t} = b_{s,t} \vee (b_{s,i} \wedge b_{j,t}).$$

The edge will create a cycle if and only $b'_{s,t} = b'_{t,s} = 1$ for some (s,t), hence we compute the encryption of the boolean

$$c = \vee_{s \neq t}(b'_{s,t} \wedge b'_{t,s}).$$

Algorithm 53: FW (Floyd-Warshall algorithm)

Require: P, the encrypted adjacency matrix
Ensure: S, such that $S_{i,j}$ is an encryption of the strength of the strongest path from i to j
(* n is the number of candidates *)

$S = P$
for $k = 1$ *to* n **do**
  for $i = 1$ *to* n *(in parallel)* **do**
    for $j = 1$ *to* n *(in parallel)* **do**
      (* proceed only if $(i \neq j)$ *)
      $A_{i,j} = \texttt{If}(\texttt{LT}(S_{i,k}, S_{k,j}), S_{i,k}, S_{k,j})$
      $B_{i,j} = \texttt{If}(\texttt{LT}(S_{i,j}, A_{i,j}), S_{i,j}, A_{i,j})$
  $S_{i,j} = B_{i,j}$ for all $(i \neq j)$
Return S

Algorithm 54: Schulze (from adjacency matrix)

Require: A, the encrypted adjacency matrix
Ensure: c, the indicator of the Schulze winners
(* n is the number of candidates *)

$S = \texttt{FW}(A)$
for $i = 1$ *to* n *(in parallel)* **do**
  for $j \neq i$ *(in parallel)* **do**
    $b_j = \texttt{Not}(\texttt{LT}(S_{i,j}, S_{j,i}))$
  $C_i = \texttt{CSZ}_{j \neq i}(b_j)$ (* use tree-based parallelization to compute the conjunction of all b_j *)
Return $c = \texttt{Dec}(C)$

Finally, we can update $b_{i,j}$ using If and c.

The problem that remains is that (i, j) is unknown, since the edges are encrypted. A simple solution is to perform the test $u == i$ and $v == j$ for all (u, v), using the known (u, v) and the encryptions of (i, j), and to update each $b_{u,v}$ using If, so as to hide the results of both tests (only one $b_{u,v}$ will be modified, while the others will be re-encrypted). This leads to an additional $O(k^2 \log k)$CGate, as EQ requires $O(\log k)$CSZ. Finally, finding the source of the graph can be done by exhaustive search on the final B, which cost $O(k^2$CSZ$)$. The whole process can be performed in $O(k^4 \log k)$CSZ in terms of computation, communication and transcript size.

F.2 How to obtain the adjacency matrix from the voters' ballots

The preference matrices.

The choice of a voter can be modelled by a preference matrix. We consider two types of such matrices (see Figure 10). The m_a preference matrix format is antisymmetric, therefore only $k(k-1)/2$ elements need to be considered. The m_p preference matrix has only non-negative integers, which can also be an advantage.

$$m_a[i,j] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i \text{ is preferred over } j \\ -1 & \text{if } j \text{ is preferred over } i \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases} \qquad m_p[i,j] = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i \text{ is preferred over } j \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Figure 10: Two types of preference matrix

Deducing the adjacency matrix from the set of preference matrices of each voter boils down to aggregating with a bit more details as explained below. Using the homomorphic property, this is straightforward from the m_a type, but this requires either to be in the Paillier setting or to reveal the adjacency matrix. Otherwise, the bitwise encryption is required, and then the m_p matrix format is better suited.

Ballots encoded as list of integers.

We assume here that each ballot consists of $k\lceil \log(k+1) \rceil$ ciphertexts, along with zero knowledge proofs that they are encryptions of 0 or 1. Those ciphertexts are interpreted as k bit-encoded integers, which encrypt integers in $[0, 2^L - 1]$, where 2^L is the first power of 2 greater than k. This way the voter can give each candidate a rank (which is not necessarily between 0 and $k-1$), and can give the same rank to several candidates without any restriction.

First, we consider the easy case where only the m_a preference matrix in the natural encoding is needed, because the adjacency matrix will be revealed. In that case, we simply use a variant of LT which returns an additional bit for the equality test (see Section C.3). Let ${C_i}^{\text{bits}}$ and ${C_j}^{\text{bits}}$ be the bitwise encrypted rank of candidates i and j for some ballot. Let $Z, T = \mathtt{LT}({C_i}^{\text{bits}}, {C_j}^{\text{bits}})$. Then $M_a[i,j] = Z^2 T/\mathtt{Enc}(-1)$, and $M_a[j,i] = 1/M_a[i,j]$. Therefore the preference matrix m_a can be obtained in $k(k-1)/2$ calls of LT, which accounts for $\frac{3}{2}k(k-1)\log k\,\mathtt{CSZ}$ in computation and transcript size, and $2\log k\,\mathtt{CSZ}$ in communication since all $m_a[i,j]$ can be computed in parallel.

For a full tally-hiding procedure, we need the result to be bitwise encrypted and the m_p preference matrix is better suited. Similarly, we use a variant of LT which returns an additional bit. This additional bit allows to derive $m_p[j,i]$ from $m_p[i,j]$ using Not and CSZ. Hence the preference matrix is obtained with $\frac{3}{2}k(k-1)\log k\,\mathtt{CSZ}$ in computation and transcript size, and $2\log k\,\mathtt{CSZ}$ in communication just as in the previous case. The aggregation requires to call $\mathtt{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}$ to obtain a matrix D. By construction, $D_{i,j}$ is a bit-wise encryption of the number $d_{i,j}$ of voters who prefers i over j. For all $i < j$, we can then use SubLT to compute (bit-encoded encryptions of) $b_{i,j} = d_{i,j} - d_{j,i}$, as well as an additional bit ($b_{i,j} < 0$). This bit allows to derive the adjacency matrix by setting all negative values to zero using CSZ, and by computing $b_{j,i}$ from $b_{i,j}$ using Neg and CSZ.

Ballots encoded as preference matrices (quadratic algorithm).

We explain now how the voters can directly encode their choice as a preference matrix of the m_a type. The difficulty is for the voter to prove in zero-knowledge that the matrix encoded in their ballot is indeed a preference matrix, *i.e.* that it corresponds to an ordering of the candidates. This is of great interest if one is ready to leak the adjacency matrix, because then the tally can be done by the authorities without any MPC protocol apart from the decryption.

We start by explaining our method in the cleartexts. Suppose that Alice wants to vote the ordering $(1, \cdots, k)$ (*i.e.* the candidate number i is ranked i^{th}). Then her preference matrix would be as follows.

$$m_{\text{init}}[i,j] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } i = j \\ 1 & \text{if } i < j \\ -1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Now assume that Alice wants to rank $\sigma(i)^{th}$ the candidate number i, for some permutation σ that encodes her choice. If the candidate number i were numbered $\sigma(i)$ instead, Alice could have voted with m_{init} as above. This means that the preference matrix of Alice m_a is such that $m_a[\sigma^{-1}(i), \sigma^{-1}(j)] = m_{\text{init}}[i,j]$ for all (i,j). Therefore m_a can be obtained by using the permutation σ to shuffle m_{init} (using the permutation on the rows, then on the columns, with the ShuffleMatrix function).

So far, Alice can only choose a strict ordering of the candidates. Assume that she wants to give the same rank to several candidates and let r_i be the rank of candidate i according to her. Alice first sorts the candidates according to their rank, in increasing order. Let σ be the permutation used for sorting. At this point, σ is an arbitrary permutation such that $\sigma(i) < \sigma(j) \implies r_i \leq r_j$. To obtain her preference matrix m_a from m_{init}, Alice will first transform m_{init} into m_σ, such that $m_\sigma[i,j] = m_a[\sigma^{-1}(i), \sigma^{-1}(j)]$. For this purpose, she computes a vector b of size $k-1$ such that for all i, $b_i = 1$ if $r_{\sigma^{-1}(i)} = r_{\sigma^{-1}(i+1)}$, and 0 otherwise. Afterwards, Alice modifies m_{init} diagonal by diagonal, so as to indicate that some candidates are ranked equal. For the first diagonal, we have $m_{\text{init}}[i, i+1] = 1$ while we would like $m_\sigma[i, i+1] = 1 - b_i$. This can be done easily using the homomorphic property.

For the $(j+1)^{th}$ diagonal $(i, i+j+1)_i$, assume that the previous diagonal is correct. Then, as the candidates are sorted in order of preference, we have

$$m_\sigma[i, i+j+1] = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } (m_\sigma[i,i+j] = 0) \wedge (m_\sigma[i+1, i+j+1] = 0), \\ 1 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Therefore, Alice can apply an iterative algorithm, using the following formula:

$$\begin{aligned} m_\sigma[i, i+j+1] &= 1 - (1 - m_\sigma[i,i+j])(1 - m_\sigma[i+1, i+j+1]) \\ &= m_\sigma[i,i+j] + m_\sigma[i+1, i+j+1] - m_\sigma[i,i+j] m_\sigma[i+1, i+j+1]. \end{aligned}$$

Once m_σ is obtained, Alice can finally derive m_a by shuffling the rows and the columns, using the permutation σ and the ShuffleMatrix function.

The algorithm that we sketched above is interesting because it requires only a quadratic number of steps and it only uses transformations for which there is a standard zero knowledge proof. Indeed, a public and canonical encryption of m_{init} is available so Alice does not have to prove that m_{init} is well-formed. For the first diagonal, Alice simply has to provide $(k-1)$ ciphertexts and 0/1 zero knowledge proofs. For the remaining diagonals, Alice has to provide an encryption Z of $m_\sigma[i,i+j] m_\sigma[i+1, i+j+1]$, as well as zero knowledge proof of well-formedness. For this purpose, Alice uses Algorithm 55 which produces a transcript π_{mul} of the form $(e_1, e_2, a_1, a_2, a_3)$. To verify the proof, one computes $d = \mathtt{hash}(X||Y||Z||e_1||e_2)$ where X is the encryption of $m_\sigma[i,i+j]$ and Y the encryption of $m_\sigma[i+1, i+j+1]$, and checks that the following equations are verified:

$$\begin{aligned} Y^{a_3}\mathtt{Enc}(0, a_1) Z^{-d} &= e_1 \\ \mathtt{Enc}(a_3, a_2) X^{-d} &= e_2. \end{aligned}$$

Finally, the shuffle can be performed with a standard proof of a shuffle.

Algorithm 55: ZKmult

Require: hash, X, Y, x, r_x, such that $X = \mathsf{Enc}(x, r_x)$ and Y is any ciphertext
Ensure: Z, π_{mul}, such that $Z = \mathsf{ReEnc}(Y^x)$ and π_{mul} is a zero knowledge proof of well-formedness

$\alpha, r_1, r_2, w \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$, $Z = Y^x\mathsf{Enc}(0, \alpha)$
$e_1 = Y^w\mathsf{Enc}(0, r_1)$, $e_2 = \mathsf{Enc}(w, r_2)$
$d = \mathsf{hash}(X||Y||Z||e_1||e_2)$
$a_1 = r_1 + \alpha d$, $a_2 = r_2 + r_x d$, $a_3 = w + xd$
$\pi_{mul} = (e_1, e_2, a_1, a_2, a_3)$
Return Z, π_{mul}

- Let σ be (any) permutation such that $\sigma(i) < \sigma(j)$ $r_i \leq r_j$.
- For all $1 \leq i < k$, let $b_i = 1$ if $r_{\sigma^{-1}(i)} = r_{\sigma^{-1}(i+1)}$, 0 otherwise.
- For all $1 \leq i < k$, compute B_i, an encryption of b_i, and $\pi_i^{0/1}$, a ZKP that B_i is an encryption of either 0 or 1.
- Let $M_\sigma[i, i] = E_0$ and $M_\sigma[i, i+1] = E_1/B_i$ for all $1 \leq i \leq k$.
- For all $1 \leq j < k$,
  - For all $1 \leq i \leq k - j - 1$,
    - Obtain $Z_{i,i+j+1}, \pi^{mul}_{i,i+j+1}$ with algorithm ZKmult,
    - Compute $M_\sigma[i, i+j+1] = M_\sigma[i, i+j]M_\sigma[i+1, i+j+1]/Z_{i,i+j+1}$.
- Let $M_\sigma[j, i] = 1/M_\sigma[i, j]$ for all $i < j$.
- Use ShuffleMatrix to shuffle M_σ into M_a, and produce the ZKP of a shuffle π^{Shuffle}.
- Return M_a, π^{Shuffle}, $Z_{i,i+j+1}, \pi^{mul}_{i,i+j+1}$ for $1 \leq j < k$ and $1 \leq i \leq k - j - 1$, as well as $B_i, \pi_i^{0/1}$ for $1 \leq i < k$.

Figure 11: Voter's procedure to vote with the ranks $r_1, \cdots, r_k$

To summarize our construction, we recap the procedure to provide a ballot and prove its well-formedness in Figure 11. The proof can be verified by first verifying all the ZKP $\pi_i^{0/1}$. Then, using the B_i's, $M_i nit$ and the $Z_{i,i+j+1}$'s, the verifier computes the matrix M_σ. She checks that it is well-formed by verifying all the ZKP $\pi^{mul}_{i,i+j+1}$ using M_σ and the $Z_{i,i+j+1}$'s. Finally, she verifies the proof of a shuffle using π^{Shuffle} and M_a. We denote Verify this verification algorithm.

Claim 1. *Let* Prove *be the algorithm defined in Figure 11 and* Verify *the above verification process. Then* Prove, $Verify$ *is a Non-Interactive Zero Knowledge Proof system for the set of valid encrypted ballots M which verifies the following proposition.*

$$\exists r_1, \cdots, r_k \ s.t. \ \forall (i,j), \mathsf{Dec}(M[i,j]) = \begin{cases} 1 & if\, r_i < r_j \\ 0 & if\, r_i = r_j \\ -1 & otherwise. \end{cases}$$

Proof sketch. **Completness.** Clearly, an honest voter will always have her ballot accepted by the verifier.

Zero Knowledge. Apart from the encrypted ballot M_a, only the B_i's, the $Z_{i,i+j+1}$'s and ZKP are published, hence the proof is Zero Knowledge.

Soundness. The soundness comes directly from the soundness of the ZKP used. Indeed, the soundness of the 0/1 ZKP guarantees that all the B_i's are encryption of 0 or 1, and the soundness of the private multiplication ZKP (see Algorithm 55) guarantees that the $Z_{i,i+j+1}$ are well-formed, and therefore that M_σ is a valid encrypted ballot. Finally, the soundness of the proof of a shuffle π^{Shuffle} guarantees that M_a is obtained from M_σ using some permutation σ'. Since any of these transformations preserve the set of the valid ballots, it follows that M_a is a valid encrypted ballot, even if $\sigma' \neq \sigma$. □

Ballots encoded as preference matrices (cubic algorithm).

For comparison, we present a naive approach to prove that an encrypted m_a preference matrix is well-formed. To do so, the voter can provide two proofs:

- A proof that each element is an encryption of either 0, 1 or -1,
- A proof of transitivity.

The proof of transitivity must prove the following statements, for all (i, j, k) and $u \in \{-1, 0, 1\}$

$$(m_a[i,k] = u) \wedge (m_a[k,j] = u) \implies m_a[i,j] = u.$$

- Let pk be the public encryption key and v the chosen voting option.
- Encode v as a vector of k integers, where k is the number of candidates. The ith integer is the desired rank for candidate i.
- Encrypt the vector into $B_1, \cdots, B_k$, using pk and a bitwise encryption for each integer (hence each B_i is in fact $\lceil \log k \rceil$ encryptions of either 0 or 1).
- For all i, produce $\lceil \log k \rceil$ ZKP $(\pi_{i,j}^{0/1})_{1 \leq j \leq \lceil \log k \rceil}$ that $B_{i,j}$ is an encryption of 0 or 1.
- Return $(B_i)_{1 \leq i \leq k}, (\pi_{i,j}^{0/1})_{i,j}$.

Figure 12: `vote` procedure for the D'Hondt method

Since the voter also provides a proof that each $m_a[i,j]$ is in $\{-1,0,1\}$, this is equivalent to proving that, for all (i,j,k), $m_a[i,k] = m_a[k,j] \implies m_a[i,j] = m_a[i,k]$, which is equivalent to proving that the following statement is true:

$$(m_a[i,k] \neq m_a[k,j]) \vee (m_a[i,j] = m_a[i,k]).$$

To prove that $m_a[i,k] \neq m_a[k,j]$, one can prove that $m_a[i,k] - m_a[k,j] \in \{-2,-1,1,2\}$ and to prove that $m_a[i,j] = m_a[i,k]$, we prove that the difference is 0. Overall, the voter has to prove that, for all (i,j,k),

$$(m_a[i,k] - m_a[k,j] = -2) \vee (m_a[i,k] - m_a[k,j] = -1) \vee (m_a[i,k] - m_a[k,j] = 1) \vee (m_a[i,k] - m_a[k,j] = 2) \vee (m_a[i,j] - m_a[i,k] = 0).$$

The proof of the disjunction can be obtained with the process of [20] (see Algorithm 56 below). To verify such a proof, simply compute $d = \mathsf{hash}(A_1 || \cdots || A_5 || e_1 || \cdots || e_5)$ and check that $e_j = \mathsf{Enc}(0, \rho_j)(A_j / \mathsf{Enc}(b_j, 0))^{-\sigma_j}$ for all j. Overall, the zero knowledge proof requires about $18k^3$ for the prover and $20k^3$ for the verifier.

In [26], the authors use a similar approach, but for the m_p preference matrix. We stress that while their approach is more efficient than the above naive approach, it does not apply to the case where some candidates have the same rank.

Algorithm 56: ZKP of a 5-disjunction

Require: $\mathsf{hash}, A_1, \cdots, A_5, a_1, \cdots, a_5, r_1, \cdots, r_5, b_1, \cdots, b_5$, such that
- for all i, $A_i = \mathsf{Enc}(a_i, r_i)$
- there exists i such that $a_i = b_i$

Ensure: $(e_1, \cdots, e_5, \sigma_1, \cdots, \sigma_5, \rho_1, \cdots, \rho_5)$, a Zero Knowledge proof that there exists i such that $a_i = b_i$.

Let i such that $a_i = b_i$
$w \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$, $e_i = \mathsf{Enc}(0, w)$
for $j \neq i$ **do**
    $\sigma_j, \rho_j \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$
    $e_j = \mathsf{Enc}(0, \rho_j)(A_j / \mathsf{Enc}(b_j, 0))^{-\sigma_j}$
$d = \mathsf{hash}(A_1 || \cdots || A_5 || e_1 || \cdots || e_5)$
$\sigma_i = d - \sum_{j \neq i} \sigma_i$
$\rho_i = w + \sigma_i r_i$
Return $(e_1, \cdots, e_5, \sigma_1, \cdots, \sigma_5, \rho_1, \cdots, \rho_5)$

F.3 Condorcet-Schulze method, the bottom-line

To improve readability, we give again the details that are necessary to use our tally-hiding protocol inside of a voting protocol. First, to submit a ballot, a voter can simply use the `vote` procedure, which is summed up in Figure 12. This allows the voter to freely give a rank to each candidate, among the $2^{\lceil \log k \rceil}$ possible ranks, where k is the number of candidates. Note that only the ordering of the candidate with the given rank is of interest, so ranking three candidates 1, 1 and 2 is the same as ranking them 0, 0 and 3. Finally, to proceeds with the tally, the authorities use the protocol P_{Cond}, defined in Algorithm 57.

G SINGLE TRANSFERABLE VOTE

Section 6 contains a sketch of our results on Single Transferable Vote (STV). We give here more material about this: we recall the general idea of STV and some variants, then explain in details the algorithms to use for each step of an MPC implementation, and finally explain how the costs given in table 3 were obtained.

Algorithm 57: Condorcet-Schulze

Require: B, the n encrypted ballots
Ensure: c, the indicator of the set of winners

for $p = 1$ *to* n *(in parallel)* **do**
  for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    for $j = i + 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
      $\_, T, C := \mathtt{SubLT}(B_i, B_j)$ (* use a variant that returns an additional bit for the equality test *);
      $M_p[i, j] := T$ (* the candidate with the lowest rank is preferred *);
      $M_p[j, i] := \mathtt{CSZ}(\mathtt{Not}(T), \mathtt{Not}(C))$
    $M_p[i, i] := E_0$ (* trivial encryption of 0 *)
for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  for $j = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    ${M_{i,j}}^{\text{bits}} := \mathtt{Aggreg}(M_1[i, j], \cdots, M_n[i, j])$
for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  for $j = i + 1$ *to* k, *(in parallel)* **do**
    $D^{\text{bits}}, N := \mathtt{SubLT}(M_{i,j}, M_{j,i})$;
    $F^{\text{bits}} := \mathtt{Neg}(D)$;
    ${A_{i,j}}^{\text{bits}} := \mathtt{CSZ}(D, \mathtt{Not}(N))$;
    ${A_{j,i}}^{\text{bits}} := \mathtt{CSZ}(F, N)$
  $A_{i,i} := {E_0}^{\text{bits}}$
$S := \mathtt{FW}(A)$;
for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  for $j = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    $W_{i,j} := \mathtt{Not}(\mathtt{LT}(S_{i,j}, S_{j,i}))$
  $C_i := \mathtt{CSZ}_j(W_{i,j})$ (* use tree-base parallelization to compute the conjunction of all w_j *);
  $c_i := \mathtt{Dec}(C_i)$
Return c

G.1 Overview of STV

STV consists of the following algorithm, where s is the number of seats to be attributed. First, each voter chooses a subset of candidates (any other candidate is not deemed of interest by the voter) and rank them in a strict order. For instance, if there are four candidates, Alice can vote $(1, 3)$ while Bob can vote $(4, 1, 2)$. Each ballot is attributed a weight, which is initially 1. Once all the ballots are cast, the tallying process consists of several rounds. During each round, each ballot grants a number of votes (equal to the ballot's weight) to the first candidate mentioned in the ballot. If some candidates meet a certain quota q (which is fixed during the whole process), the one with the greatest number of votes is selected. The selected candidates keep q votes for themselves and transfer each of their ballot to the next candidate on the ballot, with a transfer coefficient $t = (v - q)/v$, where v is the number of votes of the selected candidate (note that v might not be an integer). In other words, the name of the selected candidate is removed from the ballot and the weight is multiplied by t. The eliminated candidates transfer their ballot to the next candidate in the ballot, but with the same weight. The process terminates when s candidates are elected, or when the number of candidates that remain is equal to the number of (still) available seats.

There are several versions of STV. In the version that we chose to consider, the tallying process consists of several rounds, and in each round, exactly one candidate is either selected or eliminated. In some other versions, several candidates can be selected or eliminated simultaneously, if some conditions are met. This comes with two problems. First, for an MPC tally, revealing no more than the result also means not to reveal the number of candidates which were selected or eliminated in any round, so having a non-constant number of eliminations or selections is quite difficult. Second, if several candidates are selected simultaneously, the exact way in which the transfer should occur is not clear. Indeed, suppose that candidates a and b are selected. For each ballot possessed by a, a has to transfer a certain proportion t of the ballot to the second candidate mentioned in the ballot, but t depends on the number of votes possessed by a. So what if a must transfer some votes to b while b must transfer some votes to a? Which transfer coefficient should be used? While some variants of STV choose to ignore the selected candidates in the transfer process (don't transfer to b but to the next candidate that is not already selected), some other variants require to solve a system of c equations of degree c, where c is the number of candidates selected simultaneously [32].

G.2 A tally-hiding algorithm for STV

In what follows, we will only consider the ElGamal setting with bit-encoding, but a similar approach could be used in the Paillier setting as well (some procedures would become easier). Each ballot consists of $(k+1)$ bit-wise encrypted integers, which are obtained by shuffling a public vector which contains bit-encoded encryptions of $(0, \cdots, k)$, where k is the number of candidates. The candidate 0 is an artificial candidate: any candidate ranked after 0 should be ignored. Also, we represent rational numbers with an approximation in the first r binary places, where r is fixed by the election administrator.

First, we initialize a data structure as follows (recall that q is the quota, s the number of seats, k the number of candidates and n the number of voters).

- H is the *hopeful* vector. It contains k encryptions of bits (initially E_1, the public encryption of 1).
- W is the *winner* vector. It contains k encryptions of bits (initially E_0, the public encryption of 0).
- S is the *score* vector. It contains k bit-encoded encrypted integers of size $m+r$, where $m = \lceil \log(n+1) \rceil$.
- B is the *ballots* matrix. For all $i \in [1, n]$, B_i consists of a weight V_i (a bit-encoded encrypted integer of size $r+1$, initially $(E_0, \cdots, E_1)$, which stands for the bit-encoded encryption of 1; the r less significant bits represent the r binary places) and $k+1$ candidates $B_i[0], \cdots, B_i[k]$ (candidates are represented as bit-encoded encrypted integers, of size $\lceil \log(k+1) \rceil$ bits).

In what follows, if P is a MPC procedure that requires two (bit-encoded) inputs, we denote P_k the procedure P in which the second input is known in the clear. If m is the bitsize of the inputs, P_k costs generally m CSZ less than P, which often leads to a good improvement (a third or a half of the computations is saved, see Algorithm 34 for an example). Our P_{STV} protocol consists of $k-1$ rounds, which themselves consists of the following procedures.

(1) **Finished?** (Algorithm 58.) From the candidate data structure, compute the number of candidates (apart from candidate 0) that got a seat or are still in the running. If this is equal to the number of available seats s, then mark as selected all the candidates that were still in the running.
(2) **Count votes.** (Algorithm 59.) For each ballot B, take the candidate in the first rank, and add the weight of the ballot to the number of votes S_i of this candidate. In MPC, this is done with a loop on all candidates i, and conditionally adding the weight of the ballot to S_i, depending on whether B_0 is equal to i.
(3) **Search for min and max.** (Algorithm 60.) Compute i and j the indexes such that $S_i = \max(s_k)$ and $S_j = \min(s_k)$. If the candidate i gets a seat, *i.e.* $S_i \geq q$, set e to 1, c to i and the transfer ratio t to $(S_i - q)/S_i$. Otherwise, the candidate j will be eliminated and set e to 0, c to j, and t to 1.
(4) **Select, delete, transfer.** (Algorithm 61.) Mark the candidate number c as selected or eliminated: set $H_c = 0$, and if e is 1, then set $W_c = 1$. Also, for all ballots, remove the candidate c. This is done in one pass over the list of preferences of each ballot. At the time, remember for each ballot if c was in first position. For each ballot for which c was in first position, multiply its weight by the transfer value t.

At the very end, the vector W is decrypted into w, and the elected candidates i are such that $w_i = 1$.

Algorithm 58: Finished

Require: s, t, H, W, where t the round index (initially 0)
Ensure: Modify W

$N^{\text{bits}} = \texttt{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}(W_1, \cdots, W_k)$ (* bit-wise encryption of the number of selected candidates *)
$F = \texttt{EQ}_k(N, s-k+t)$ (* when one of the operand is known in the clear, the procedure is cheaper *)
for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  $H_i = \texttt{CSZ}(H_i, F)$
  $W_i = \texttt{If}(F, H_i, W_i)$

In STV, the procedure should stop when s candidates have been selected or when the number of candidates that remain is equal to the number of seats that remain. If s candidates are selected, adding some additional rounds will not modify the result as it is not possible for $(s+1)$ or more candidates to reach the quota (*i.e.* no subsequent selection would occur, therefore W will no longer be modified). However, if the number of candidates that remain is equal to the number of seats that remain, adding an additional round may lead to an elimination if no candidate reach the quota, so it is important to select all candidates right away. Since a candidate is either selected or eliminated each round, the round index t is such that the number of candidates that remain is equal to $k-t$. Moreover, the number of seats that remain is simply s minus the number of selected candidates. So we compute the latter (say n') and we test if $n' = s-k+t$, which is equivalent to $n' = s-k+t$. Rewriting the test this way allows a slightly more efficient equality test as one operand is known.

Note that we do not want to reveal *when* the procedure stop so, in MPC, the procedure should actually continue. In what follows, we explain why the result (the decryption of W) will not be modified if subsequent iterations are run. First, once this test returns true, n' becomes s and since $t < k$ (there are $k-1$ rounds), the test can no longer return true, so this modification will occur only once. Afterwards, only selection and elimination would occur and since selecting a candidate which is already selected does not change anything, the outcome is not altered by the subsequent rounds.

Algorithm 59: CountVotes

Require: B, S
Ensure: Modify S

for $i = 1$ *to* n *(in parallel)* **do**
  for $j = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
    $C_{i,j} = \mathtt{EQ}_k(B_i[0], j)$
for $j = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  ${S_j}^{\text{bits}} = 0$
  for $i = 1$ *to* n *(tree-based parallelisation is possible)* **do**
    ${S_j}^{\text{bits}} = \mathtt{If}(C_{i,j}, \mathtt{Add}^{\text{bits}}(S_j, V_i), S_j)$

In the procedure CountVotes, we mention that tree-based parallelisation is possible. Indeed, it is possible to compute all $\mathtt{CSZ}(C_{i,j}, V_i)$ in parallel, then to add them together using a tree-based algorithm. Hence the communication cost of this step is $O(\log(n)\mathtt{Add})$, where $\mathtt{Add}$ is the communication cost of an addition.

The last two procedures, namely SearchMinMax, and SelectDeleteTransfer are self-explanatory.

Algorithm 60: SearchMinMax

Require: S, q
Ensure: $D, C^{\text{bits}}, T^{\text{bits}}$, where

- D is an encryption of a bit d ($d = 1$ for a selection, 0 for an elimination)
- C^{bits} is a bit-wise encryption of the index of some candidate (with $\lceil \log(k+1) \rceil$ bits)
- T^{bits}, is a bit-wise encryption of the transfer coefficient (with $r + 1$ bits)

$\_, M^{\text{bits}}, I^{\text{bits}}, J^{\text{bits}} = \mathtt{MinMax}^{\text{bits}}({S_1}^{\text{bits}}, \cdots, {S_k}^{\text{bits}})$
$\Delta^{\text{bits}}, D = \mathtt{SubLT}_k(M^{\text{bits}}, q)$, D=Not (D)
$T^{\text{bits}} = \mathtt{Div}(\Delta^{\text{bits}}, M^{\text{bits}})$
$T^{\text{bits}} = \mathtt{If}(D, T^{\text{bits}}, 1)$ (* use a bit-wise encryption of 1 *)
$C^{\text{bits}} = \mathtt{If}(D, J^{\text{bits}}, I^{\text{bits}})$
Return $D, C^{\text{bits}}, T^{\text{bits}}$

Algorithm 61: SelectDeleteTransfer

Require: $D, C^{\text{bits}}, T^{\text{bits}}, W, H, B$
Ensure: Modify W, H, B

for $i = 1$ *to* k *(in parallel)* **do**
  $Z = \mathtt{EQ}_k(C^{\text{bits}}, i)$
  $H_k = \mathtt{CSZ}(H_k, Z)$
  $W_k = \mathtt{If}(Z, \mathtt{Enc}(1), W_k)$
for $i = 1$ *to* n *(in parallel)* **do**
  $A = \mathtt{EQ}(B_i[0], C^{\text{bits}})$
  $F = A$
  for $j = 0$ *to* $k - 1$ **do**
    $B_i[j] = \mathtt{If}(F, B_i[j+1], B_i[j])$
    $Z = \mathtt{EQ}(B_i[j+1], C^{\text{bits}})$
    $F = FZ/\mathtt{CSZ}(F, Z)$ (* $f = 1$ iff the candidate c has been found in the list *)
  $B_i[k] = \mathtt{If}(F, 0, B_i[k])$ (* use a bit-wise encryption of 0 *)
  $V_i = \mathtt{If}(A, \mathtt{Mul}^{\text{bits}}(V_i, T^{\text{bits}}), V_i)$

G.3 Complexity analysis

Naive approach

Recall that k is the number of candidates, n the number of voters, s the number of seats, $m = \lceil \log(m+1) \rceil$ and r the precision in terms of binary places. First, assume that we use the naive version for each algorithm.

The complexity of `Finished` can be derived directly from Figure 5. Since we use $\texttt{Aggreg}^{\text{bits}}$ with k operands, one `EQ` for two operands of size $\log k$ and $2k\texttt{CSZ}$, the complexity of this step is $(5k + \log k)\texttt{CSZ}$ in terms of computation and transcript size, and $((\log k)^2 + \log\log k + 2)$ rounds in terms of communications. (For simplicity we will only keep the leading terms, here $5k$ and $(\log k)^2$.)

The complexity of `CountVotes` can also be derived from Figure 5. There are nk calls to `EQ` for inputs of size $\log k$ and nk calls of $\texttt{Add}^{\text{bits}}$ and `If` for inputs of size $(m+r)$. Therefore the cost is $nk(\log k + 3(m+r))\texttt{CSZ}$ in terms of computation and transcript size. However, as a tree-based parallelisation is possible, the communication cost is about $2(m+r)m$ rounds, as $m \approx \log n$.

The complexity of `SearchMinMax` is also obtained from Figure 5. As there are k operands of size $m+r$, `MinMax` costs $8k(m+r)\texttt{CSZ}$ in terms of computation and transcript size, and $2(m+r)\log k$ rounds of communication. The remaining of the procedure consists (mainly) of a call to `Div` and `SubLT` (the two `If` cost $O(\log k)$ and $O(r)$ in computations, and 1 round each). Overall, the cost of this step is about $(m+r)(3r+8k)\texttt{CSZ}$ in terms of computation and transcript size and $2(m+r)(r+\log k)$ rounds of communication.

In `SelectDeleteTransfer`, there are k calls to $\texttt{EQ}_k$ which costs $\log k\texttt{CSZ}$ each (the subsequent `CSZ` and `If` use $1\texttt{CSZ}$ each. This part is negligible in terms of both computations and communications ($O(\log\log k)$ rounds). Afterwards, there are nk calls to `EQ` and `If` for inputs of size $\log k$, which accounts to $3nk\log k\texttt{CSZ}$ in terms of computation, and $k\log\log k$ rounds of communication. Finally, we multiply two inputs of size r and $m+r$ and use `If` for inputs of size $(m+r)$, which accounts to $3nr(m+r)\texttt{CSZ}$ in terms of computation and transcript size and $2r(m+r)$ rounds. Overall, the complexity is about $3n(k\log k + r(m+r))\texttt{CSZ}$ in terms of computation and transcript size, and $(k\log\log k + 2r(m+r))$ rounds.

Overall, since there are $k-1$ rounds, the leading terms of the complexity are

- $nk^2(4\log k + 3(m+r)(r+1))\texttt{CSZ}$ in terms of computation and transcript size,
- $k(2(m+r)(m+2r+\log k) + k\log\log k)$ rounds of communications.

Advanced approach

The complexity of our algorithm is satisfying in terms of computations: recall from Section 6 that we aim for $O(nk^2)$ operations; and the $\log k$ and $(m+r)$ terms seems unavoidable as they are the bitsize of some operands. However, the number of rounds is quadratic in m, r and k. While m, as the logarithm of n, is not expected to grow too much, the strong dependency in k and r can be problematic. In what follows, we use the arithmetic of Section C.4 to explain how to avoid this quadratic number of rounds. For this purpose, it is crucial to identify which processes need a quadratic number of rounds. From the analysis above, we identify four terms which contribute to this.

- In `CountVotes`, we use the associativity of the addition to sketch a tree-based parallelisation of the loop which leads to $2(m+r)m$ rounds of communications. To mitigate this quadratic cost, we can use Algorithm 26 for the addition instead of Algorithm 21. This allows to perform the same step in $2m\log(m+r)$ rounds instead, but requires $\frac{3}{2}nk^2(m+r)\log(m+r)\texttt{CSZ}$ instead of $2nk^2(m+r)\texttt{CSZ}$.
- In `SearchMinMax`, the computation of the transfer coefficient implies a division, which leads to a quadratic number of rounds $2(m+r)r$. By replacing `SubLT` calls by the equivalent Unbounded Fan-in composition (the subtraction can be obtained similarly with the same complexity), the division can be performed in $2r\log(m+r)$ rounds, but the complexity increases slightly (it becomes $\frac{3}{2}r(m+r)\log(m+r)\texttt{CSZ}$ instead of $3r(m+r)\texttt{CSZ}$). Note that the complexity of this phase in terms of computation is still negligible compared to the rest of the algorithm.
- In `SelectDeleteTransfer`, the multiplications can all be computed in parallel, but each still requires a quadratic number $2r(m+r)$ of rounds. Just as above, using Algorithm 26 instead of the naive $\texttt{Add}^{\text{bits}}$ allows to reduce the number of rounds to $2r\log(m+r)$, but the computation costs increases from $3nr(m+r)\texttt{CSZ}$ to $\frac{3}{2}nr(m+r)\log(m+r)\texttt{CSZ}$.
- In `SelectDeleteTransfer` again, there is a for loop in k which imposes a round complexity of $O(k\log\log k)$ (testing the equality of two integers of $\log k$ bits takes $\log\log k$ rounds). As the procedure is repeated $k-1$ times, this leads to a quadratic number of rounds in k. Once again, we can use the strategy from Section C.4 to solve this problem. First, compute all equality tests in parallel (denote the result $b_0, b_1, \cdots, b_k$. Then use an Unbounded Fan-in circuit to compute all the prefixes $b_0, b_0 \vee b_1, \cdots, b_0 \vee \cdots \vee b_k$. (Since the operation $\vee$ is associative, the same technique can be applied.) Finally for all i in parallel, compute the updated $B_i[j]$ as $\texttt{If}(b_0 \vee \cdots \vee b_j, B_i[j+1], B_i[j])$, where $B_i[k+1]$ is a bit-wise encryption of 0 for all i. This time the number of rounds decreases to $k\log k\log\log k$ (from $k^2\log\log k$), while the computation cost increases slightly (from $3nk^2\log k\texttt{CSZ}$ to $\frac{7}{2}nk^2\log k\texttt{CSZ}$). Note that interestingly, the communication cost of this step becomes negligible before the aggregation process in the `Finished` procedure, which was negligible in the naive approach.

Using the modifications sketched above, we arrive to a good communication / computation trade-off: the impact on the computation is minimal, but the number of rounds is no longer quadratic in any variable.

- Let k be the number of candidates and $c_0, \cdots, c_k$ be the $k+1$ trivial bitwise encryptions of $0, \cdots, k$ with $\lceil \log(k+1) \rceil$ bits.
- Let $u_1, \cdots, u_b$ be the $b \leq k$ candidates selected by the voter, in this order.
- The voter chooses a permutation σ so that $\sigma(i) = u_{i+1}$ for all $0 \leq i < b$, and $\sigma(b) = 0$.
- She shuffles $c_0, \cdots, c_k$ with σ to obtain $c'_0, \cdots, c'_k$ and produces a proof of a shuffle $\pi^{\texttt{Shuffle}}$.
- The ballot is $(c'_0, \cdots, c'_k), \pi^{\texttt{Shuffle}}$.

Figure 13: The vote procedure in STV

G.4 STV, the bottom-line

Finally, we recap all that is necessary to use our tally-hiding protocol for STV. First, to submit a ballot, a voter can use the `vote` procedure that is detailed in Figure 13. It simply consists of shuffling a public representation of the k candidates to obtain the desired ordering. Since the voter may not rank all candidate, a dummy candidate 0 is added and means that the subsequent candidates should not be taken into account. This way all ballots have the same size, even if they do not rank the same number of candidates.

To verify a ballot, an auditor can simply check the zero knowledge proof of a shuffle. To tally a list of ballots B, the authorities use the protocol P_{STV} described in Section G.2.

Part II: Security in the SUC-framework.

In this appendix, we give all the notions that are necessary to establish the security of our MPC toolbox as well as our tally-hiding protocols. This begins with the SUC security framework that we introduce in Appendix H. In Appendix I, we prove that our toolbox is SUC-secure. In Appendix J, we deduce that the resulting electronic voting system is private and we address verifiability.

H A SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR OUR MPC PROTOCOLS

H.1 Introduction to the framework

To analyze the security of our MPC protocols, we use the composition framework from [16], which is a Simpler version of the Universally Composable framework (SUC). Although less expressive than the more general UC framework [15], it is sufficient to analyze standard MPC protocols, and it is shown that protocols secure in the SUC framework are also secure in the UC framework. In the SUC framework, the participants of a protocol are modeled as Interactive Turing Machines (ITM) which have input / output tapes, a random tape, a working tape and some input / output communication tapes. Two ITM A and B can interact with each other if A (resp. B) has an output communication tape which share the same name as an input communication tape of B (reps. A). A *process* is simply a concurrent execution of several connected participants. It can invoke several sub-processes in parallel, in order to execute some sub-protocols. In the SUC framework, the participants of the sub-processes are the same as the participants of the main process. To invoke a sub-process, they simply allocate enough space in their memory and run the corresponding algorithm. They may run several sub-protocols in parallel, using time-sharing.

We analyze the security of such a process against a malicious and static adversary, which can corrupt some parties, but only before the execution of the process. Corrupted parties can be impersonated by the adversary and give away any secret that they have. In addition, the adversary has a full control over the communication network. It can read, block and deliver messages at will. However, we consider ideally authenticated messages, meaning that the adversary cannot forge, change or replay a message sent by an honest party. To model this, we consider that the participants can interact with a router in a star network. In addition of the adversary, the SUC framework considers another adversarial PPT, the environment $\mathcal{Z}$. It serves as an "interactive distinguisher" and interacts with the adversary.

The security of the process is guaranteed by a comparison with an ideal process, in which each party hands over their inputs to a trusted party which honestly performs the desired computation. However, the corrupted parties may send a different input (resp. output) than their real input (resp. output), and the adversary can block or delay the communication with the trusted party. Intuitively, a protocol is SUC-secure if, for all adversary in the real process, there exists a simulator in the ideal process such that no PPT environment can tell whether they are interacting with the adversary in the real process or with the simulator in the ideal process.

H.2 Secure functionality computation

We now give a more formal description of the framework. For this purpose, we suppose that there is a fixed number a of participants defined by a set of ITM P. Each participants has a single input and output communication tape, and interacts with a router, which in turn interacts with the adversary. The adversary interacts with the router and the environment. The adversary can corrupt a subset C of participants of size at most t, where $t < a$ is some threshold. Non-corrupted participants are honest and follow the protocol, while corrupted participants are fully impersonated by the adversary and give away any secret that they have. In the real process, the participants, the environment, the adversary and the router interact as follows.

The environment. Upon activation, the environment $\mathcal{Z}$ can write on the input tapes of each participant, read their outputs and send a message to the adversary, which is activated next.

Participants. Upon activation, an honest participant reads its input and input communication tapes. It runs an algorithm which is specified by the protocol and may write on its output tape. It then submits any number of queries $\texttt{send}(i, j, m)$ to the router, where i is the sender, j the receiver and m the message. The router is activated next.

The adversary. Upon activation, the adversary can read the memory of the router, write a message to the environment, read the tapes of a corrupted participant or write on their output tape. Finally, it can choose one of the following.

- Send a query $\texttt{deliver}(i, j, m)$ to the router, which is activated next.
- Activate the environment.
- Activate a participant.

The router. Upon activation, the router look for send queries. For each send query $\texttt{send}(i, j, m)$, it checks that i is consistent with the sender of the query and that j is another participant. If so, it stores (i, j, m) in memory and the adversary is activated next. If there is no valid send query, the router looks for a deliver query (i, j, m) and checks that either i is corrupted (in which case the message is delivered to j) or (i, j, m) is stored in memory (in which case the message is delivered to j and one copy of (i, j, m) is erased from memory. If a message is delivered this way, the receiver is activated next). Otherwise, the adversary is activated.

The process terminates when $\mathcal{Z}$ writes an output on its output tape. We denote $\texttt{REAL}_{P,\mathbb{A},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z)$ this output, where κ is a security parameter and z is an arbitrary auxiliary input. For the ideal process, we consider a trusted party T which is also modeled as an ITM, and can interact with the router and the adversary. The trusted party performs an algorithm which is specified by the protocol and which aims to realize some ideal functionality. The participants, the environment, the adversary, the router and the trusted party interact as follows.

Participants. Upon activation, an honest participant i looks for any new input from T on its communication tape and copies it on its output tape. It also reads any new input I on its input tape and sends a query $\texttt{send}(i, T, s_{id}||I)$ to the router, where s_{id} is the number of send query that the honest participant sent before. It serves as a session identifier, so that different queries made by the same participant are handled independently by T. The router is activated next.

The trusted party. The trusted party interacts with both the router and the adversary and hence has two input (and output) communication tapes. Upon activation, the trusted party looks for a new message (i, T, I) in its router (resp. adversary) input communication tape, perform some local computations and may send any query $\texttt{send}(T, j, O)$ to the router or answer directly to the adversary. The router is activated next.

The router. The router behaves the same as in the real process, except that is dos not let the adversary read the messages exchanged between a participant and the trusted party. (The adversary still knows that a message was sent, knows the sender and the receiver, and can still decide when to deliver it.)

The adversary. Same as in the real process, except that it can write directly on the communication tape of the trusted party.

The environment. Same as in the real process.

We denote $\texttt{IDEAL}_{T,\mathcal{S},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z)$ the output of the environment in the ideal process, when it interacts with the adversary $\mathcal{S}$.

Definition H.1 (Secure computation [16]). Let P be a protocol, T some trusted party. We say that P *securely computes* T if, for all PPT $\mathbb{A}$, there exists a PPT $\mathcal{S}$ such that, for all PPT $\mathcal{Z}$, there exists a negligible function μ such that for all κ and all z polynomial in κ,

$$|\Pr(\texttt{IDEAL}_{T,\mathcal{S},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z) = 1) - \Pr(\texttt{REAL}_{P,\mathbb{A},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z) = 1)| \leq \mu(\kappa).$$

Note that in [15], Canetti defines the hardest adversary to simulate, which is the *dummy* adversary $\mathcal{D}$. When activated, the dummy adversary simply forwards its view to the environment and activates it. The dummy adversary can also handle requests of the form $\texttt{deliver}(i, j, m)$ from the environment. On such requests, it forwards them to the router. Similarly, it can handle requests of the form $\texttt{write}(i, m)$ by writing message m in the output tape of corrupted party i. Finally, it can handle $\texttt{activate}(i)$ requests by activating participant i. It is shown that if there exists a simulator for the dummy adversary, then there exists a simulator for all adversary.

H.3 The composition theorem

In the previous section, we explained the notion of security from [16]. This notion is very convenient when it comes to MPC protocols because of its modularity. For example, suppose that we want to evaluate an algorithm g which can be expressed as the composition of m algorithms $f_1, \cdots, f_m$. Suppose that, for each algorithm f_i, we have an MPC protocol ρ_i that securely computes f_i. Then it is natural to construct a protocol $P^{\rho_1,\cdots,\rho_m}$ which will in turn invoke the sub-protocols $\rho_1, \cdots, \rho_m$ so as to evaluate g. For convenience, we denote $f = f_1, \cdots, f_m$ and $\rho = \rho_1, \cdots, \rho_m$. We restrict ourselves to a fixed number m of functions and protocols, with a polynomial number of sub-protocol invocations. Compared to the real protocol, the composed protocol is similar, except that participants can invoke the sub-protocols in addition to the other actions.

We also define a f-hybrid process in which the sub-protocols are replaced by calls to the appropriate trusted party: just as in the ideal process, the participants can query a trusted party to evaluate a function in f, but the query does not necessarily consists of the inputs of the participant. In addition, the participant proceeds with the output of the trusted party according to the protocol and does not simply copy it on its output tape. For more details, see [16]. In the hybrid process, the output of the environment $\mathcal{Z}$ interacting with an adversary $\mathbb{A}$ for a protocol P with ideal calls to the functions f is denoted $\texttt{HYBRID}^{f}_{P,\mathbb{A},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z)$.

Definition H.2 (Secure hybrid computation). Let $m \geq 1$, g and $f = f_1, \cdots, f_m$ be some functions and P be a protocol in the f-hybrid model. We say that P securely computes g in the f-hybrid model if, for all PPT $\mathbb{A}$, there exists a PPT $\mathcal{S}$ such that, for all PPT $\mathcal{Z}$, there exists a negligible function μ such that for all κ and all $z \in \{0,1\}^*$ of polynomial length,

$$|\Pr(\texttt{IDEAL}_{g,\mathcal{S},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z) = 1) - \Pr(\texttt{HYBRID}^{f}_{P,\mathbb{A},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z) = 1)| \leq \mu(\kappa).$$

We now formulate the composition theorem as Theorem H.3.

Theorem H.3 (The composition theorem [16]). *Let $m \geq 1$ be some fixed integer, $\rho = \rho_1, \cdots, \rho_m$ be protocols and $f = f_1, \cdots, f_m$ and $g_1, \cdots, g_m$ be some functions. Suppose that for all i, ρ_i securely computes f_i in the g-hybrid model. Then, for all protocol P in the f-hybrid model, the composed protocol P^{ρ} obtained by replacing calls to f by an invocation of ρ is such that for all PPT $\mathbb{A}$, there exists a PPT $\mathcal{S}$ such that for every PPT environment $\mathcal{Z}$, there exists a negligible function μ such that for all κ and $z \in \{0,1\}^*$ of polynomial length,*

$$|\Pr(\texttt{HYBRID}^{g}_{P^{\rho},\mathcal{S},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z) = 1) - \Pr(\texttt{HYBRID}^{f}_{P,\mathbb{A},\mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, z) = 1)| \leq \mu(\kappa).$$

H.4 Restricted I/O behavior

In the SUC framework, security is assured against an environment which can choose the inputs of the participants and read the outputs. Such an adversary is too strong in the context of electronic voting, where the inputs of the MPC protocols do not come from the wild but are rather given as the output of another protocol or with a ZKP that they have the correct format. For instance, the CGate protocol expects the inputs to be encryptions of 0 or 1, so that the SUC-security of the protocol is extremely difficult to prove against an environment which is able to give inputs which are not encryptions of 0 or 1. In [33] (Section 3.5), Nielsen considers a slightly weakened framework where

we quantify over environments which respect some I/O restrictions. It is shown that we can restrict our analysis to environments which chooses the inputs of the party from any decidable language (in our case, the ciphertexts provided as input must be encryptions of 0 or 1), and proved that the composition theorem still holds for such restricted environments (see Theorem 3.5 of [33]). In what follows, we only consider environments which choose encryptions of 0 or 1 as inputs, and which give the same inputs to all participants. Such environements are said *restricted*.

I THE SUC-SECURITY OF OUR BUILDING BLOCKS

The conditional gate is our main building block for our toolbox. In order to build confidence on the resulting protocols, we use an universally composable security framework. In this section, we prove the SUC-security of the conditional gate protocol, which is stated in Theorem I.4. To make the proof as easy to follow as possible, we use a comprehensible proof strategy and use the composition theorem.

I.1 Proof strategy for the conditional gate

To assess the security of any protocol in the SUC framework, a natural strategy is to use the following steps.

1 Definition of the ideal functionality. First, we give $\mathcal{F}_{CSZ}$, the description of the trusted party that realizes the *conditional set to zero* functionality in the ideal process. A SUC-secure protocol is not necessarily secure; rather, it is *as secure* as the ideal protocol. For this reason, it is important to provide an easy to analyze ideal functionality. We give Algorithm 62, in which the command abort causes the ideal functionality to erase any local data and send $\perp$ to all the participants as well as the adversary. This ideal functionality works as closely as possible as a trusted party: it collects the inputs of the participants, check their consistency and return the desired output. However, pk is supposed to be the public key, $(h_i)_{i=1}^a$ the public commitments of the shares of the participants and X and Y the two ciphertexts to operate on. Therefore, whenever a participant communicates with $\mathcal{F}_{CSZ}$, we consider that this part of the message can be read by the adversary (recall that the adversary can read a public part of the message when a participant communicates with the ideal functionality, but not the totality of the message). Remark that the ideal functionality can abort even if there is a majority of honest participants, which means that we do not guarantee fairness. In addition, the abortion message $\perp$ does not allow to blame anyone, which means that we do not provide accountability.

Algorithm 62: $\mathcal{F}_{CSZ}$

Require: G, a group of prime order q

1 **On** *message* $(g,h),(h_j)_{j=1}^a,s,X,Y$ *from participant* i**:**
2 Send $(g,h),(h_j)_{j=1}^a,X,Y$ to $\mathcal{S}$;
3 **if** $g^s \neq h_i$ **then** abort;
4 $X_i \longleftarrow X$; $Y_i \longleftarrow Y$; $s_i \longleftarrow s$;
5 **if** $X_j \neq \perp$ *for all* j **then**
6 Check that the received $(g,h),(h_j)_{j=1}^a$ are all the same (if not, abort);
7 **if** there exists j_1, j_2 s.t. $X_{j_1} \neq X_{j_2}$ or $Y_{j_1} \neq Y_{j_2}$ **then** abort;
8 Using the shares, decrypt X_1 and Y_1 into x and y;
9 $r \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$; $Z \longleftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(xy,r)$;
10 Send Z to all participants and $\mathcal{S}$;
11 **else** wait;

2 Definition of the hybrid process. The second step is to define the hybrid process; which allows to model the protocol in the SUC-framework. For this purpose, we need to define all the ideal functionalities that we are going to use: they define the main abstractions of the proof. In our case, we use the $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$-hybrid model, which models the ROM,as well as the $\mathcal{F}_{SB}$-hybrid model, which models the synchronous broadcast (the broadcast functionality is denoted $\mathcal{F}_B$).

In general, describing the hybrid process also requires to give the exact algorithm of the honest participants in the hybrid model. Since the conditional gate protocol is rather complex, we are going to decompose it into several sub-protocols and use the composition theorem.

3 Decomposition into several sub-protocols. The conditional gate protocol is divided into three parts: the round of communications (lines 1 to 8), the rerandomization (line 9) and the threshold decryption (line 10). Then, a natural way to decompose the protocol is to analyze the three parts separately, which will be done in the remaining on this chapter. Each part has its dedicated sub-section but, for the purpose of the proof, we do not treat them in the chronological order.

4 Restrictions on the environment. Finally, as we mentioned in Section H.4, it is sometimes necessary to impose a restriction on the environment. For the conditional gate, the condition is that $y \in \{0,1\}$. Therefore, we demand that the input of the participants is of the form $(g,h),(h_j)_{j=1}^a,s_i,X,Y$ such that Y is an exponential ElGamal encryption of 0 or 1 obtained with the public key (g,h) (*i.e.* an ElGamal encryption of either 1_G or g). In addition, we require that $(g,h),(h_j)_{j=1}^a,X,Y$, which is supposed to be a public input, is the same for all the

Algorithm 63: RR (algorithm of i)

Require: G, a group of prime order q
Inputs: pk, an exp. ElGamal key
A ciphertext X

1 **On** *input* $(g, h), X$**:**
2 Start a new independent session;
3 $r_1 \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$; $\alpha \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$;
4 $U_i \longleftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, r_1)$;
5 $c_u \longleftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, \alpha)$;
6 Query $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ with $(\mathsf{pk}||X||U_i||c_u)$;
7 Wait for the answer d;
8 $a_u \longleftarrow \alpha + r_1 d$;
9 Query $\mathcal{F}_{SB}$ with U_i, c_u, a_u;
10 **On** *message* $(U_j, \pi_j)_{j=1}^a$ *from* $\mathcal{F}_{SB}$**:**
11 **for** $j = 1$ *to* a **do**
12 $c_{uj}, a_{uj} \longleftarrow \pi_j$;
13 Verify the PoK:
14 Query $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ with $(\mathsf{pk}||X||U_j||c_{uj})$;
15 Wait for the answer d;
16 **if** $c_{uj} \neq \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, a_{uj}) U_j^{-d}$
17 **then** Output $\perp$;
18 Output $X \prod_{i=1}^a U_i$;

Algorithm 64: $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$

Require: G, a group of prime order q
1 **On** *message* pk, X *from* i**:**
2 $\mathsf{pk}_i \longleftarrow \mathsf{pk}$; $X_i \longleftarrow X$;
3 **if** $X_j \neq \perp$ *for all* j **then**
4 **if** $X_j = X_1$ **and** $\mathsf{pk}_j = \mathsf{pk}_1$ $\forall j$ **then**
5 $\alpha \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$;
6 $X' \longleftarrow \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}_1}(X_1, \alpha)$;
7 Send X' to all j and to $\mathcal{S}$;
8 **else** abort;
9 **else** wait;
10 **On** *message* i *from* $\mathcal{S}$**:**
11 Send pk_i, X_i to $\mathcal{S}$;

participants. To simplify the presentation, we also demand that $(g, h), (h_j)_{j=1}^a, s_i$ is the output of a DKG, *i.e.* that there exists a polynomial f of degree t such that $g^{f(j)} = h_j$ for all j, with $g^{f(0)} = h_0$ and $f(i) = s_i$. This additional condition is not only decidable, but also efficiently so; therefore the participants can check it themselves and abort if it is not met. However, those additional checks may distract the reader from the important ones.

I.2 The rerandomization

We start with the easiest phase, which is the rerandomization phase. We show in Lemma I.1 that it SUC-securely computes the $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$ ideal functionality, defined in Algorithm 64. This ideal functionality outputs $\perp$ if the participants do not agree on a common public key pk and a common ciphertexts X (since the participants need to rerandomize two ciphertexts, they will need to call the ideal functionality twice). If they do, it outputs a random rerandomization X' of X. Also, since the inputs of the participants are supposed to be a common public pk, X, this ideal functionality allows the adversary to learn the input of each participant.

Lemma I.1. *Assuming that there is at least one honest participant, the rerandomization sub-protocol described in Algorithm 63 SUC-securely computes the $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$ ideal functionality (given in Algorithm 64) in the $\mathcal{F}_{RO}, \mathcal{F}_{SB}$-hybrid model, where $\mathcal{F}_{SB}$ is the synchronous broadcast ideal functionality.*

Proof. We construct the simulator $\mathcal{S}$ which interacts with the environment in the ideal process, and simulates the hybrid process.

First, the simulator acts in the ideal process and forwards the messages of all the honest participants, which allows it to learn their inputs from $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$. With this knowledge, it runs a perfect simulation of the RR protocol, up until when it has to reveal the answer of $\mathcal{F}_{SB}$ to a corrupted participant at line 10. At this moment, the simulator checks that the honest participants all had the same input pk, X. To begin with, suppose that this is not the case, which is **Case 1**. Then the simulator continues the perfect simulation and, whenever a simulated honest participant outputs something in the simulated hybrid process, $\mathcal{S}$ forwards the answer of $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$ (which is necessarily $\perp$) to the same participant in the ideal process. This way, the said participant outputs $\perp$ in the ideal process. Since the simulator runs a perfect simulation of the hybrid process, it remains to show that when two participants do not have the same input in the hybrid process, then the output of any honest participant (if any) is $\perp$ with overwhelming probability.

Case 1: no consensus. If two honest participants, say i and j, have two different inputs pk_i, X_i and pk_j, X_j then, for all honest participant k, either the PoK π_i or the PoK π_j will appear invalid (except with negligible probability). Indeed, pk_k, X_k cannot be simultaneously equal to pk_i, X_i and pk_j, X_j. Without a loss of generality, assume that $(\mathsf{pk}_k, X_k) \neq (\mathsf{pk}_i, X_i)$. Then $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$, when queried with $(\mathsf{pk}_k||X_k||U_i||c_{ui})$

outputs a different answer than when queried with $(\mathsf{pk}_i||X_i||U_i||c_{ui})$, except with a negligible probability. Let d_k and d_i be the two different answers. Since the proofs are generated honestly, we have $c_{ui} = \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_i}(0, a_{ui})U_i^{-d_i}$. Except with negligible probability, this is different from $\mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}_k}(0, a_{ui})U_i^{-d_k}$, therefore k rejects the proof as invalid and outputs $\perp$, except with a negligible probability.

Case 2. Now, suppose that all the honest participants have the same input pk, X. Then, for all corrupted participant j, the simulator looks for a query to $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ of the form $(\mathsf{pk}||X||U_j||c_{uj})$, which was answered by some d_j such that $c_{uj} = \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, a_{uj})U_j^{-d_j}$ (*i.e.* the PoK π_j is valid). If there is no such query for some j, then the corresponding proof will look invalid to all the honest participants, except with negligible probability. In this case, all the honest participants will output $\perp$ in the hybrid process. To have the same output in the ideal process, the simulator makes a query from all the corrupted participants, but with an input $(\mathsf{pk}', X') \neq (\mathsf{pk}, X)$. This way, the ideal process answers $\perp$ to all the participants as desired.

If there is such a query for all j, the proof will appear valid to all the honest participants, which will therefore output $X\prod_{i=1}^{a} U_i$ in the hybrid process. To have this match the output of the ideal process, the simulator first sends the query (pk, X) to $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$ with all the corrupted participants, so that $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$ answers with some X'. However, the simulator blocks all the answers towards a honest participant: it will deliver them one by one, when it will need a honest participant to output X' in the ideal process. Then, the simulator changes the contribution of a single honest participant i in the simulation, and sets $U_i = X'/(X\prod_{j\neq i} U_i)$. Also, using the control over the random oracle, it simulates the PoK π_i so that it appears valid to the adversary. For this purpose, it chooses a challenge d at random and the answer $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ at random as well. Then, it computes $c_u = \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(0, a)U_i^{-d}$. Since d was chosen at random, then (except with a negligible probability) no query was made to $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ with the input $\mathsf{pk}||X||U_i||c_u$, so that the simulator can answer every subsequent such query with d. The simulated proof is then $\pi = (c_u, a)$. Remark that since π_j is valid for all j, then, by the computational soundness of the PoK, U_j is encryptions of 0 for all j, except with a negligible probability. Consequently, $\prod_{j\neq i} U_j$ is an encryption of 0. Also, since X' is a random reencryption of X, X'/X is a random encryption of 0. Therefore, U_i is also a random encryption of 0. Hence, by the zero knowledge property of the PoK, U_i, π follows the same distribution as in the real hybrid process (except with a negligible probability).

Conclusion. The above simulator gives a perfect simulation of the hybrid process, except with a negligible probability. In addition, the outputs of the honest participants are the same in the simulated hybrid and in the ideal process. Therefore, the view of the environment is the same in both the hybrid and the ideal processes, except with a negligible probability. □

I.3 The threshold decryption

We now address the threshold decryption part, whose goal is to evaluate the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$ given in Algorithm 66. Compared to the "ideal" ideal functionality, this one lives in a setting where each participant i has the result $\mathsf{pk}, (h_j)_{j=1}^{a}, s_i$ of a DKG as an input, as well as a ciphertext Y to decrypt. In this input, only the secret share s_i is private so that the ideal functionality allows the adversary to learn the remaining (public) part. Apart from that, $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$ is similar to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{CSZ}}$: it collects the inputs of the participants, checks their consistency and returns the desired output, which is the decryption of the common ciphertext Y.

A subtle difficulty is that the threshold decryption protocol in the ElGamal setting is not universally composable. This is when our rerandomization phase comes to the rescue. In Lemma I.2, we show that if the decryption protocol is preceded by a (perfect) rerandomization phase, then it achieves SUC-security.

Lemma I.2. *The threshold decryption protocol described in Algorithm 65 SUC-securely computes $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$ (defined in Algorithm 66) in the $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}, \mathcal{F}_{RO}$-hybrid model.*

Proof. We construct a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ which interacts with the environment in the ideal process and simulates the hybrid process by simulating the honest participants and the $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}, \mathcal{F}_{RO}$ ideal functionalities. First, the simulator acts in the ideal process and forwards all the messages of the honest participants to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$ in order to get $(g, h), (h_j)_{j=1}^{a}, Y$. If the data of the honest participants are not consistent, the simulators can run a perfect simulation of the hybrid process, since $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$ will output $\perp$ which will cause all the honest participants to output $\perp$ as in the ideal process. Consequently, we suppose that all the honest participants have the same $(g, h), (h_j)_{j=1}^{a}, Y$. Then the simulator uses the corrupted participants of the ideal process and forwards their inputs to the ideal functionality, which causes it to send the plaintext y to everyone. However, $\mathcal{S}$ blocks this answer to everyone, except for itself: it will deliver the answers one by one, when it will need a honest participant to output y in the ideal process.

Now that $\mathcal{S}$ knows the plaintext y that corresponds to Y, it picks $r \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ at random and compute $u = g^r$ as well as $v = yh^r$, so that $Y' = (u, v)$ is a random reencryption of Y. Using this Y', $\mathcal{S}$ can run a perfect simulation of $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$.

After the rerandomization phase, $\mathcal{S}$ has to simulate the actual threshold decryption protocol, except that it does not know the secret share of the honest participants. Let i be a honest participant. When i receives Y' from $\mathcal{F}_{reerand}$ in the simulated hybrid process, $\mathcal{S}$ computes $w_i = h_i^r$, chooses $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ at random as well as the challenge d. Then, $\mathcal{S}$ computes $c_g = g^a h_i^{-d}$ and $c_u = u^a w_i^{-d}$. Since those two are random, no query to $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ was made with the input $(g, h)||Y'||w_i||c_g||c_u$ (except with a negligible probability) so that the simulator can answer all subsequent such queries with d. Now, since (g, u, h_i, w_i) is a DDH tuple, (c_g, c_u, d, a) follows the same distribution as in the real hybrid process (this is the zero knowledge property of the ZKP), therefore the simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from the real process.

Finally, when a (simulated) honest participant i receives (w, c_g, c_u, a) from some j, the simulator runs the algorithm of the participant to decide whether it should output $\perp$, output some value y' computed from the received shares or wait. If the participant has to output

Algorithm 65: TD (algorithm of i)

Require: G, a group of prime order q
Inputs: (g, h), an ElGamal public key
$(h_j)_{j=1}^a$, the commitments on the shares of the participants
s_i, the secret share of participant i
Y, a ciphertext

1 **On** *input*:
2 Start a new independent session;
3 Send (g, h), Y to $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$;
4 **On** $\perp$ from $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$: Output $\perp$;
5 **On** *message* Y' *from* $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$:
6 Parse Y' as (u, v);
7 $w_i \longleftarrow u^{s_i}$;
8 Compute the PoK:
9 $\alpha \in_r \mathbb{Z}_q$;
10 $c_g \longleftarrow g^\alpha$; $c_u \longleftarrow u^\alpha$;
11 Query $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ with $((g, h)||Y'||w_i||c_g||c_u)$;
12 Wait for the answer d;
13 $a \longleftarrow \alpha + ds_i$;
14 Send (w_i, c_g, c_u, a) to all j;
15 **On** *message* (w, c_g, c_u, a) *from* j:
16 Query $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ with $((g, h)||Y'||w||c_g||c_u)$;
17 Wait for the answer d;
18 **if** $c_g \neq g^a h_j^{-d}$ **or** $c_u \neq u^a w^{-d}$
19 **then** Output $\perp$ **else** $w_j \longleftarrow w$;
20 **if** $\exists S \subset [1, a]$ *s.t.* $|S| = t + 1$ ***and*** $\forall j \in S, w_j \neq \perp$ **then**
21 **for** $j \in S$ **do** $\kappa_j \longleftarrow \prod_{k \in S \setminus \{j\}} \frac{k}{j-k}$;
22 $y \longleftarrow v \prod_{j \in S} w_j^{\kappa_j}$;
23 Output y;
24 **else** wait;

Algorithm 66: $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$

Require: G, a group of prime order q
1 **On** (g, h), $(h_j)_{j=1}^a$, s, Y *from* i:
2 Send (g, h), $(h_j)_{j=1}^a$, Y to $\mathcal{S}$;
3 **if** $g^s \neq h_i$ **then** abort;
4 $Y_i \longleftarrow Y$; $s_i \longleftarrow s$;
5 **if** $Y_j \neq \perp$ *for all* j **then**
6 Check that the received (g, h),
7 $(h_j)_{j=1}^a$ are all the same
8 **if** not **then** abort;
9 **if** there exists j_1, j_2 s.t.
10 $Y_{j_1} \neq Y_{j_2}$ **then** abort;
11 Decrypt Y_1 into y;
12 Send y to all participants and $\mathcal{S}$;
13 **else** wait;

$\perp$, it means that j was corrupted. Then $\mathcal{S}$ uses j in the ideal process to send a query to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$, but with an inconsistent s_j. This way $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$ sends $\perp$ to all participants and $\mathcal{S}$ can block every answer, except for i which will therefore output $\perp$ in the ideal process. If i has to wait, then $\mathcal{S}$ makes it wait. However, if i has to output something, it outputs $y' = v \prod_{j \in S} w_j^{\kappa_j}$ while it can only output y in the ideal process. Fortunately, for all j in S, the PoK of correct partial decryption is valid. Therefore, by the soundness of the ZKP, (except with a negligible probability) there exists $s_j \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ such that $g^{s_j} = h_i$ and $u^{s_j} = w_j$. Hence, except with a negligible probability, $y' = y$ (this comes from the Lagrange interpolation of $f(0)$). □

I.4 The round of communications

The final part is the round of communication. Since we could not find a smart ideal functionality that is realized by this part, we conclude the proof by giving Lemma I.3, which states the SUC-security of Algorithm 67, which is the conditional gate protocol in the $\mathcal{F}_{RO}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$-hybrid process. In this Algorithm, Rnd can be derived from Algorithm 7 (lines 3 to 6) and Algorithm 9, and Ver-CSZ can be derived from Algorithm 10. Rnd allows a participant to produce X_i, Y_i, e and to prove that they are well-formed; Ver-CSZ allows to verify the ZKP.

Compared to the protocol presented in Algorithm 7, we can see that the participants broadcast $(X_{i-1}, Y_{i-1}, X_i, Y_i, e, \pi)$ instead of just (X_i, Y_i, e, π). This allows them to synchronize their view "on the fly", without adding too many synchronization steps at each broadcast. The price to cost is that at the end of the round of communications, all the participants may not agree on the same X_a, Y_a.

Algorithm 67: CSZ (algorithm of participant i)

Require: G, a group of prime order q
Inputs: $(g,h), (h_j)_{j=1}^a, s_i, X, Y$
Variables: Two ciphertexts pr_x^j and pr_y^j for all $j \neq i$ (initially, $\perp$)

On *input*:
  Start a new independent session;
  Query $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ with "Conditional Gate";
  Check that the answer is g
  (otherwise, Output $\perp$);
  $E_{-1} \longleftarrow (1_G, g^{-1})$;
  $X_0 \longleftarrow X$; $Y_0 \longleftarrow E_{-1}Y^2$;
  Query $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ with $(g||h)$;
  Wait for the answer $\tilde{h}$;
  if $i > 1$ **then** change to Waiting 1, wait;
  else
    $X_1, e, Y_1, \pi_1 \longleftarrow \mathrm{Rnd}(X_0, Y_0, \tilde{h})$;
    Change state to Waiting 2;
    Send $(X_0, Y_0, X_1, e, Y_1, \pi_1)$ to all j;

State *Waiting* 1:
  On (A, B, C, e, D, π) *from* $j < i$:
    if $X_j = \perp$ **then**
      $X_j \leftarrow C$, $e_j \leftarrow e$;
      $Y_j \leftarrow D$; $\pi_j \leftarrow \pi$;
      $\mathrm{pr}_x^j \leftarrow A$; $\mathrm{pr}_y^j \leftarrow B$;
      Ignore all future messages from j;
    if $X_k \neq \perp$ *for all* $k < i$ **then**
      for $j = 1$ *to* $i - 1$ **do**
        if $X_{j-1} \neq \mathrm{pr}_x^j$ **or** $Y_{j-1} \neq \mathrm{pr}_y^j$
        then Output $\perp$;
      $X_i, e, Y_i, \pi \leftarrow \mathrm{Rnd}(X_{i-1}, Y_{i-1}, \tilde{h})$;
      Change state to Waiting 2;
      Send $(X_{i-1}, Y_{i-1}, X_i, e, Y_i, \pi)$ to all;
    else wait;

State *Waiting* 2:
  On $A, B, C, e, D, \pi)$ *from* $j > i$:
    if $X_j = \perp$ **then**
      $X_j \leftarrow C$, $e_j \leftarrow e$;
      $Y_j \leftarrow D$; $\pi_j \leftarrow \pi$;
      $\mathrm{pr}_x^j \leftarrow A$; $\mathrm{pr}_y^j \leftarrow B$;
      Ignore all future messages from j;
    if $X_k \neq \perp$ *for all* $k > i$ **then**
      for $j = i + 1$ *to* a **do**
        if $X_{j-1} \neq \mathrm{pr}_x^j$ **or** $Y_{j-1} \neq \mathrm{pr}_y^j$
        then Output $\perp$;
      Check all the PoK:
       for $j = 1$ *to* a **do**
        if Ver-CSZ$(\mathsf{pk}, X_{i-1}, Y_{i-1}, X_i, Y_i, e, \pi_i) = 0$ **then**
          Output $\perp$;
      Change state to Decrypt;
      Send $(g,h), X$ to $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$;
    else wait;

State *Decrypt*:
  On $\perp$ from $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$ Output $\perp$;
  On *message* X' *from* $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$:
    Send $(g,h), (h_k)_k, s_i, Y_a$ to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$;
  On $\perp$ from $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$ Output $\perp$;
  On *message* g^y *from* $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$:
    Output $(XX'^y)^{1/2}$;

Another difference is that in Algorithm 7, the participants simultaneously rerandomize X_a and Y_a into X' and Y', while the two rerandomization got somehow separated in Algorithm 67: one is done right away and the other one is *consumed* by $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$ (see Section I.3). This is purely for the sake of the presentation: since the two rerandomizations are independent, they can actually be done simultaneously.

Finally, in the SUC framework, the environment is allowed to choose freely the inputs of the participants which, for convenience, include g. Yet, recall that g must be public coin (otherwise we would need another version of DDH, which would also be acceptable). Therefore, at the beginning of the protocol, the participants get g from the random oracle and check that it is consistent with their input. Note that, to be able to write g in the input of the participants, the environment must first query it to the random oracle, using the adversary or a corrupted participant.

Lemma I.3. *Assuming that there is at least one honest participant, and under the DDH assumption, the protocol depicted in Algorithm 67 SUC-securely computes $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{CSZ}}$ (defined in Algorithm 62) in the $\mathcal{F}_{RO}, \mathcal{F}_{rerand}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$-hybrid model.*

Proof. We construct a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ which interacts with the environment in the ideal process and simulates the hybrid process by simulating the honest participants and the $\mathcal{F}_{RO}, \mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{Dec}}$ ideal functionalities. First, the simulator chooses a random $g \in G$ and, whenever $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ is queried with "Conditional Gate", the simulator answers with g. Also, whenever $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ is queried with a new input of the form $(g||h)$, $\mathcal{S}$ chooses a random trapdoor τ, computes $\tilde{h} = g^{1/\tau}$ and answers with $\tilde{h}$. This way the simulation is perfectly indistinguishable from the real hybrid (if $\tau = 0$, $\mathcal{S}$ sets $\tilde{h}$ to 1_G). At some point, the environment must activate a honest participant by writing on its input tape, which fixes $(g,h), (h_i)_{i=1}^a, X, Y$ for the session. (If the same participant is activated several times, the simulator runs several independent sessions. This

assumes, for instance, that a different prefix is used for querying $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ in each session.) Now that the protocol has really began, we explain how to simulate the different states.

Simulation until Waiting 2. Let i be the last honest participant (*i.e.* for all $j > i$, participant j is corrupted). The simulator runs a perfect simulation of the round of communications, up until when i has to change to the state "Waiting 2". This can happen at line 13 or line 27. In any case, for all $j < i$, participant j revealed its contribution X_j, e_j, Y_j, π_j. Before revealing the contribution of i, the simulator checks all the ZKP. If one is invalid, then all the honest participants will output $\perp$ at line 25, 40 or 42, therefore the simulator will not have to simulate the decryption. Hence, the best course of action is to continue the perfect simulation without cheating, until every honest participant outputs $\perp$.

If all the proof are valid then the computational soundness guarantees that, except with a negligible probability, there exists $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $s \in \{-1, 1\}$ such that $X_{i-1} = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(X_0^s, r_1)$ and $Y_{i-1} = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Y_0^s, r_2)$. The simulator first acts in the ideal process and forwards all the messages of the honest participants to the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{CSZ}}$. Also, it instructs the corrupted participants to send their inputs to $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{CSZ}}$ as well, so that $\mathcal{F}_{CSZ}$ answers with some ciphertext Z_f. Note that due to the restrictions on the environment, $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{CSZ}}$ does not abort. As usual, the simulator blocks the answer towards all the participant except itself: it will deliver them when it will need a honest participant to output Z_f in the ideal process.

Since Z_f is the output of the ideal process, the couple $Z_f, (1_G, g)$ is such that Z_f is a reencryption of X_{i-1}^y and $(1_G, g)$ is a reencryption of Y_{i-1}^y, where $y = \mathsf{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}}(Y_{i-1})$ (except with a negligible probability since this comes from the soundness of the ZKP). However, this couple is not random enough and the environment might notice that a trivial encryption of 1 is used. Therefore the simulator rerandomizes it by choosing a random $s' \in \{-1, 1\}$, two random $\alpha, \beta \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computing $X_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Z_f^{s'}, \alpha)$ and $Y_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}((1_G, g^{s'}), \beta)$. This way, X_i and Y_i becomes independent from Z_f and y, and follow the correct distribution. We denote $X_i = (u_{x,i}, v_{x,i})$ and $X_{i-1} = (v_{x,i-1}, v_{x,i-1})$.

At this point, there is a single value of e_i for which X_i, e_i, Y_i is well-formed, but this value depends on y: $e_i = (u_{x,i}/u_{x,i-1}^{ys'})^\tau$. However, $\mathcal{S}$ has no way to know y. Therefore, it cannot produce a perfect simulation and will pick e as a uniformly random element instead.

Now, $\mathcal{S}$ has to forge a fake ZKP π_i, which is possible thanks to the control over $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$. However, since the statement to prove is most likely false, the forged ZKP does not follow the same distribution as the real one. Since the view of the environment is not the same as in the real hybrid process, we will need to prove that the simulated view is indistinguishable from the fake one.

Remark that the simulator created a situation where Y_i is an encrypiton of a known plaintext s', which will be useful in the remaining of the proof.

Simulation of Waiting 2. Since there are no honest participant left to simulate, the simulator can perform a perfect simulation of *Waiting 2*. Nevertheless, each time a participant $j > i$ sends a valid $X_{j-1}, Y_{j-1}, X_j, e_j, Y_j, \pi_j$, then the soundness of the ZKP assures the existence of $r_1, r_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $s \in \{-1, 1\}$ such that $(u_{x,j}, v_{x,j}) = X_j = (g^{r_1} u_{x,j-1}^s, h^{r_1} v_{x,j-1}^s)$, $Y_j = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Y_{j-1}^s, r_2)$ and $e_j = \tilde{h}^{r_1}$, where $(u_{x,j-1}, v_{x,j-1}) = X_{j-1}$. Hence, by computing $u_{x,j} e_j^{-\tau}$, $\mathcal{S}$ recovers either $u_{x,j-1}$ or $u_{x,j-1}^{-1}$ depending on s, which enables it to deduce the value of s used by j (recall that if the proof π_{j-1} is valid, then $u_{x,j-1} \neq 1$; $j - 1 > 0$ since $j > i \geq 1$). To avoid the confusion with j's secret share, we denote it σ_j.

Simulation of the rerandomization of X. When a honest participant reaches the *Rerandomize* state, the simulator knows the value $y = s' \prod_{j>i} \sigma_j$ which is encrypted into Y_a. At this point, except with a negligible probability (if the adversary managed to forge a fake ZKP), the ciphertext $X' = (Z_f^2/X)^y$ is a "random" reencryption of X_a. (Indeed, the environment had no information about Z_f yet, therefore X' follows the correct distribution and is independent from the remaining of its view.) Hence the simulator can use his value as the output of $\mathcal{F}_{rerand}$ instead of a honestly generated reencryption.

Simulation of the decryption. To simulate the decryption, the simulator uses the real plaintext y. This way the output $(XX'^y)^{1/2}$ is indeed equal to Z_f.

Indistinguishability. We now prove that the simulation is indistinguishable from the real hybrid game. Before giving the reduction to DDH, we propose to dream up a bit and construct an imaginary simulator $\mathcal{S}_i$, which can compute a discrete logarithm. This simulator uses the same simulation as $\mathcal{S}$, except that for the last honest participant i, e_i is not chosen as a random group element. Indeed, since $\mathcal{S}_i$ can decrypt Y_{i-1}, it can use the "correct" value of e_i for which X_i, e_i, Y_i is well-formed. In turn, by the zero knowledge property of the ZKP, the simulated proof π_i will be perfectly indistinguishable from the real one. In fact, the tuple X_i, e_i, Y_i, π_i computed by $\mathcal{S}_i$ follows the same distribution as in the real hybrid process. Since the remaining of the simulation is perfect (except with a negligible probability), $\mathcal{S}_i$ creates a perfect simulation of the real hybrid process (except with a negligible probability). Hence, the environment can distinguish $\mathcal{S}$'s simulation from the real hybrid process if and only if it can distinguish the simulation from $\mathcal{S}$'s from $\mathcal{S}_i$'s.

Now, let $\mathcal{Z}$ be an environment and $\mathbb{A}$ be an adversary for DDH. (Recall that the "adversary" in the SUC framework is just the dummy adversary, so that only the environment is relevant.) We denote p and p_i the probability that $\mathcal{Z}$ outputs 1 when interacting with $\mathcal{S}$ and $\mathcal{S}_i$. The adversary $\mathbb{A}$ receives a challenge tuple g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4 in the DDH game. To decide whether it is a DDH tuple or not, it interacts with $\mathcal{Z}$ by simulation $\mathcal{S}$ as well as the corrupted participants. However, when $\mathcal{Z}$ queries $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ with "Conditional Gate", $\mathbb{A}$ answers with $g = g_1$ (if $\mathcal{Z}$ creates several independent sessions, $\mathbb{A}$ can use a random $\alpha \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and answer with $g = g_1^\alpha$ instead; in this case, it will also use g_3^α instead of g_3). In addition, whenever the environment makes a new query of the form $(g||h)$, $\mathbb{A}$ chooses a random $\tau \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computes $\tilde{h} = g_2^\tau$. This way, except if $g_2 = 1_G$ or $g_1 = 1_G$ (in which case the DDH challenge is trivial), $g, h, \tilde{h}$ follows the exact same distribution as in $\mathcal{S}$'s simulation.

At some point, the environment must write on the input tape of a participant, which fixes $(g, h), (h_j)_{j=1}^{a}$ for the session. Due to the restrictions on the environment, $\mathcal{Z}$ must write an input of the form $(g, h), (h_j)_{j=1}^{a}, s_k$ in the input tape of all the participants, which allows $\mathbb{A}$ to learn $\mathsf{sk} = \log_g(h)$ by combining all the secret shares.

Afterwards, $\mathbb{A}$ continues the simulation until it must reveal the contribution (X_i, e_i, Y_i) of the last honest participant. For this purpose, $\mathbb{A}$ parses X_{i-1} as $(u_{x,i-1}, v_{x,i-1})$, chooses a random $s \in \{-1, 1\}$ and computes $u_{x,i} = u_{x,i-1}^{s} g_3$ as well as $v_{x,i} = v_{x,i-1}^{s} g_3^{\mathsf{sk}}$, which defines $X_i = (u_{x,i}, v_{x,i})$. As for Y_i, $\mathbb{A}$ chooses r_2 at random and compute $Y_i = \mathsf{ReEnc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(Y_{i-1}^{s}, r_2)$. Finally, it sets e_i as g_4^{τ}, so that X_i, e_i, Y_i is well-formed if and only if g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4 is a DDH tuple. Then $\mathbb{A}$ continues the simulation normally, except that it cannot use τ to extract s_j for $j > i$, since $\tilde{h}^{\tau} \neq g$. However, it can extract s_j by decrypting Y_j and Y_{j-1} using sk: if the plaintexts are equal, $s_j = 1$; otherwise, $s_j = -1$.

At the end of the simulation, the environment outputs a bit b. If $b = 1$, $\mathbb{A}$ states that g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4 was a DDH tuple; otherwise, it states that the challenge tuple was a random tuple. Remark that when the challenge is a DDH tuple, $\mathbb{A}$ runs the same simulation as $\mathcal{S}_i$ and hence wins with probability p_i; on the other hand, when the challenge is a random tuple, $\mathbb{A}$ runs $\mathcal{S}$'s simulation but must output 0 to win, therefore it wins with probability $1 - p$. Hence $\mathbb{A}$'s probability to win the DDH game is $\frac{1}{2}(p' + 1 - p)$, so that $\mathbb{A}$'s advantage is $\frac{1}{2}|p' - p|$. Under the DDH assumption, $\mathbb{A}$'s advantage is negligible, therefore $|p' - p|$ is negligible, which concludes the proof. □

I.5 The conditional gate protocol is SUC-secure

Now that we proved that all the components of the conditional gate protocol are SUC-secure, the SUC-security of the protocol is a direct consequence of the composition theorem. Indeed, by Lemma I.3, we have the SUC-security provided that the threshold decryption protocol and the rerandomization are SUC-secure. In Lemma I.2, we showed that the SUC-security of the threshold decryption can be derived from that of the rerandomization. Also, in Lemma I.1, we showed that the SUC-security of the rerandomization is a consequence of that of the synchronous broadcast. When we compile all those results together, this gives Theorem I.4, which is the desired result.

Theorem I.4. *Under the DDH assumption, and if at least one participant is honest, the conditional gate protocol given in Algorithm 7 SUC-securely computes the $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{CSZ}}$ ideal functionality given in Algorithm 62, in the $\mathcal{F}_{RO}, \mathcal{F}_B$-hybrid model, where $\mathcal{F}_{RO}$ is the programmable random oracle ideal functionality and $\mathcal{F}_B$ is the broadcast ideal functionality.*

Proof. This is a direct consequence of Lemma I.3, Lemma I.2, Lemma I.1 and Theorem H.3. □

J SECURITY OF THE TOOLBOX IN THE CONTEXT OF ELECTRONIC VOTING

In the previous section, we proved the SUC-security of the conditional gate. Since our toolbox is only composed of conditional gates, it means that for every combination of protocols of our toolbox, the resulting protocol is as secure as if it was performed by some honest third party. Finally, in the context of electronic voting, it is usual that we require the talliers to actually decrypt something at some point; for instance, in the STV protocol, we decrypt the vector W of the winners. Since the threshold decryption itself is not SUC-secure, a risk is that we might lose the SUC-security because of this last step. For this reason, we give Theorem J.1, which gives states that the SUC-security is not lost in our case. The intuition is that a conditional gate followed by a reencryption phase is the same as just a conditional gate. Hence, by Lemma I.2, it follows that if the only elements that we decrypt are some outputs of a conditional gate, then the SUC-security is preserved. Note that the same result apply if we replace the conditional gate by, for instance, `If`, `Or`, `Xor`, `And`, `EQ`, `LT` and their negations using `Not`. Indeed, since the `CSZ` protocol is SUC-secure, it is easy to show that they are also SUC-secure.

In Theorem J.1, we use the following notations:

- We denote CS the counting function defined by the Condorcet-Schulze method and P_{CS} the protocol that we provide in Appendix F to compute CS. We denote $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{CS}}$ the trusted party that honestly evaluates P_{CS} and returns the output of all the conditional gates as well as the result (*i.e.* the set of the winners).
- We denote STV the counting function defined by the STV method and P_{STV} any of the two protocols that we provide in Appendix G to compute STV. We denote $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{STV}}$ the trusted party that honestly evaluates P_{STV} and returns the output of all the conditional gates as well as the result (*i.e.* the set of the winners).
- We denote MJ the counting function defined by the Majority Judgment and P_{MJ} the protocol that we provide in Appendix E to compute MJ (see Algorithm 52). We denote $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{MJ}}$ the trusted party that honestly evaluates P_{MJ} and returns the output of all the conditional gates as well as the result (*i.e.* the set of the winners).
- We denote DH the counting function defined by the D'Hondt method and P_{DH} any of the protocols that we provide in Appendix D to compute DH. We denote $\mathcal{F}_{\mathrm{DH}}$ the trusted party that honestly evaluates P_{DH} and returns the output of all the conditional gates as well as the result (*i.e.* the set of the winners).

Theorem J.1. *Under the DDH assumption and if at least one participant is honest, for* $\mathtt{tally} \in \{\mathrm{CS}, \mathrm{STV}, \mathrm{MJ}, \mathrm{DH}\}$, *$P_{\mathtt{tally}}$ SUC-securely computes $\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{tally}}$ in the $\mathcal{F}_{RO}, \mathcal{F}_B$-hybrid model. (Recall that they model the ROM and the ideal broadcast channel.)*

Proof. Let $\mathtt{tally} \in \{\mathrm{CS}, \mathrm{STV}, \mathrm{MJ}, \mathrm{DH}\}$. First, by Theorem I.4, the conditional gate protocol SUC-securely realizes $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{CSZ}}$ in the $\mathcal{F}_{RO}, \mathcal{F}_B$-hybrid model. Therefore, we can replace every conditional subprotocol in $P_{\mathtt{tally}}$ by a call to the trusted party $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{CSZ}}$ and show that the resulting protocol SUC-securely computes $\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{tally}}$ in the $\mathcal{F}_{\mathsf{CSZ}}$-hybrid model. This is a consequence of the composition theorem, stated in Theorem H.3.

Now, we construct a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ which interacts with the environment in the ideal process and simulates the hybrid process by simulating the honest participants and the $\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{CSZ}}$ ideal functionality. First, by interacting with the ideal process, $\mathcal{S}$ gets the outputs of all the conditional gates, as well as the result r. Afterwards, $\mathcal{S}$ proceeds with the simulation of $P_{\mathtt{tally}}$.

Remark that for all of our MPC protocols, $P_{\mathtt{tally}}$ is divided into two phases. First, the MPC part feature no communication between the participants, except during a conditional gate subprotocol. Second, the final step is to decrypt a vector W of ciphertexts, using the threshold decryption protocol. Note, in addition, that those ciphertexts consist of outputs of a conditional gate protocol.

Hence, to simulate the hybrid process, $\mathcal{S}$ can also proceed into two phases. During the first phase, $\mathcal{S}$ only has to simulate the answers of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{CSZ}}$. For this purpose, $\mathcal{S}$ first look whether this answer is one of the ciphertexts of W or not (*i.e.* if the ciphertext will be decrypted in a subsequent threshold decryption protocol). If this is not the case, $\mathcal{S}$ uses the answer of the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{tally}}$, which includes the output of all the conditional gates. Otherwise, $\mathcal{S}$ uses a random encryption of the corresponding plaintext z, using a known randomness ρ. Note that $\mathcal{S}$ can deduce z from the result r output by $\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{tally}}$. This way, $\mathcal{S}$'s answers are perfectly indistinguishable from that of $\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{CSZ}}$.

Once the first phase has terminated, $\mathcal{S}$ must simulate the interactions during the threshold decryption protocols. First, the ZKP of correct partial decryption can be simulated in the ROM thanks to their zero knowledge property. Therefore, it only remains to explain how the simulator can generate the partial decryptions. For this purpose, suppose that $\mathcal{S}$ needs to simulate the decryption of a ciphertext $Z = (x, y)$, which is an output of a conditional gate protocol. Then, we have $x = g^\rho$ and $y = zh^\rho$, where (g, h) is the public encryption key, z is the corresponding plaintext and ρ the randomness chosen by $\mathcal{S}$. As seen in the proof of Lemma I.2, this allows the simulator to compute the partial decryptions of all the participants, and hence to perfectly simulate the threshold decryption protocol. Indeed, if h_i is the public commitment of the participant i, then the partial decryption of i is $w_i = h_i^\rho$.

With the above $\mathcal{S}$, the simulated hybrid process is perfectly indistinguishable from the real one. □

In what follows, we explain how this SUC-security can be used to prove the privacy and the verifiability of a voting system that uses our toolbox to compute the tally in MPC. For simplicity, we only give the proof in the case of Condorcet-Shulze. For this purpose, we define a minimal voting system that we call TH-voting; however, since we only considered the tally process, we do not detail how the other phases are taken care of. Hence, TH-voting is defined as follows:

Setup. We consider an ideal DKG that produces a public key pk, the public commitments $(h_i)_{i=1}^a$ and distributes their secret shares s_i to the talliers.

Register. We consider an ideal registration where each voter v received an ElGamal key pair pk_v, sk_v, and where the public key of each eligible voter is published on the board.

Vote. To vote, a voter produces $k \log k$ encryptions of 0 or 1, and give the corresponding PoK that they are all encryptions of 0 or 1. Finally, they sign the resulting ballot using sk_v. The ballot has the form $(\mathsf{pk}_v, B, \pi, s)$, where B is the matrix of the encrypted bits, π contains the corresponding PoK and s the signature of B.

Check. The voter checks that the last cast ballot B appears on the board PB, and that no subsequent ballot uses the same public signature key pk_v.

Valid. To verify the validity of a ballot, we verify the signature and the ZKP, and we also verify that no previously cast ballot uses the same matrix B.

Tally. To compute the tally, the talliers first keep, for each credential pk_v, the last valid ballot that uses pk_v as a verification key. Then they use the MPC protocol P_{CS}.

Verify. To verify the validity of the tally, first verify the valididy of the ballots on the board and, from the list of the valid ballots and the given transcript, compute the output of all the conditional gates. Then use the transcript of the treshold decryptions to deduce the result and verify that is it corresponds to te given result. Finally, verify that each conditional gate and each threshold decryption has a corresponding valid ZKP.

J.1 Universal verifiability

The universal verifiability of our tally process is a direct consequence of the computational soundness of the ZKP and the correctness of the tally protocol. More formally, we consider the definition of end-to-end verifiability of [19], which combines the individual and the universal verifiability. Since allowing revoting would require to adapt the definition and is independent from the tally process, we assume that the adversary can call Ovote at most once for all voter. (To improve readability, we describe the verifiability experiment below.) In what follows, we give a proof sketch that our minimal voting system has end-to-end verifiability.

Definition J.2. A voting scheme is end-to-end verifiable against a malicious server if, for all PPT adversary $\mathbb{A}$, for all a and $t < a$, the probability $\Pr(\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathsf{verb}}(\kappa, a, t, \mathbb{A}) = 1)$ is negligible in κ.

Theorem J.3. *In the ROM and assuming the strong unforgeability of the signature scheme, TH-voting has end-to-end verifiability as of Definition J.2.*

Proof sketch. To win the verifiability experiment, the adversary must give a transcript which contains valid ZKP. Yet, by the soundness of those ZKP, the result r must be the same as the one computed from PB using an instance of the tally protocol. Now, since all the happy voters verified that their ballot is in PB and that no subsequent ballot uses the same pk_v, it means that their ballots are included in the tally.

$\mathrm{Exp}^{\mathrm{verb}}(\kappa, a, t, \mathbb{A})$

1 $\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk}, (h_i, s_i)_{i=1}^{a}, \Pi^{\mathrm{S}} \leftarrow \mathtt{Setup}(\kappa, a, t)$;
2 $1^n \longleftarrow \mathbb{A}(\mathsf{pk}, \Pi^{\mathrm{S}})$;
3 $(c_i, \pi_i)_{i=1}^{n}, \Pi^{\mathrm{R}} \leftarrow \mathtt{Register}(\mathsf{pk}, n)$;
4 $\mathcal{CU} \longleftarrow \varnothing$;
5 **for** $i = 1$ *to* n **do**
6 $\quad \mathtt{HVote}_i \longleftarrow \perp$; $L_i \longleftarrow \perp$; $\mathtt{Checked}_i \longleftarrow 0$;
7 $(\mathsf{PB}, r, \Pi) \longleftarrow \mathbb{A}^{\mathcal{O}corrupt, \mathcal{O}vote}$;
8 $\mathbb{A}^{\mathcal{O}check}$;
9 **if** $\mathtt{Verify}(\mathsf{PB}, \Pi, r) = 0$ **then return** 0;
10 **if** $\exists\, \mathrm{L} \subset \{\!\{(i, \mathtt{HVote}_i) \mid i \notin \mathcal{CU}, \mathtt{Checked}_i \neq 1, \mathtt{HVote}_i \neq \perp\}\!\}$,
$\exists C$ such that $\mid |C| \leq |\mathcal{CU}|$ **and**
$r = \mathtt{tally}(\{\!\{(i, \mathtt{HVote}_i) \mid i \notin \mathcal{CU}, \mathtt{Checked}_i = 1\}\!\} \uplus \mathrm{L} \uplus \mathrm{C})$
11 **then return** 0 **else return** 1;

$\mathcal{O}corrupt(\mathrm{id})$

1 $\mathcal{CU} \longleftarrow \mathcal{CU} \bigcup \{\mathrm{id}\}$;
2 **return** c_{id};

$\mathcal{O}vote(\mathrm{id}, v)$

1 $B \longleftarrow \mathtt{Vote}_{\mathsf{pk}}(v, c_{\mathrm{id}})$;
2 $\mathtt{HVote}_{\mathrm{id}} \longleftarrow v$;
3 $L_i \longleftarrow B$;
4 $\mathtt{Checked}_{\mathrm{id}} \longleftarrow 0$;
5 **return** B;

$\mathcal{O}check(\mathrm{id})$

1 $\mathtt{Checked}_{\mathrm{id}} \leftarrow \mathtt{Check}(L_{\mathrm{id}}, \mathsf{PB})$

In addition, by the strong unforgeability of the signature, for all valid ballot in the board such that pk_v is not the credential of a honest voter, pk_v must be the credential of a corrupted voter. Hence, since we keep up to one ballot per credential, the condition $|C| \leq |\mathcal{CU}|$ is verified. Finally, the strong unforgeability also guarantees that if a ballot that uses the credential pk_v of a lazy voter is valid, then it must be a ballot output by $\mathcal{O}vote$. □

J.2 Privacy

Proving the privacy of our voting system is less straightforward than for the verifiability. A first difficulty is that there is no notion of privacy which is satisfactory for our specific case, where the counting function does not have the partial tally property and where we want to consider some fully corrupted talliers. For this reason, we introduced Definition 7.1 in Section 7. To improve readability, we reproduce the corresponding experiments in Fig. 14 and we recall that, to prove privacy, we need to prove that for all PPT adversary $\mathbb{A}_0$ for the real game, there exists an adversary $\mathbb{B}$ for the ideal game such that, when interacting with $\mathbb{A}_0$, $\mathbb{B}$ wins the ideal game with the same probability as $\mathbb{A}_0$ wins the real game (with up to a negligible difference). We conclude with a proof of Theorem 7.2.

Theorem 7.2. *Let* tally *be one of the previously defined tally functions (D'Hondt, Majority Judgment, Condorcet-Schulze, and STV). Under the DDH assumption, in the ROM and if the signature scheme is strongly unforgeable,* $V_{\mathtt{tally}}$ *is private w.r.t.* tally.

Proof. We proceed by game hops and construct a succession of games $G_1, \cdots, G_4$ where G_4 is the ideal game. For each of these games, we construct an adversary $\mathbb{A}_i$ and we denote S_i the probability that $\mathbb{A}_i$ wins G_i.

Game 1: In this game, the adversary $\mathbb{A}_1$ is no longer able to take part in the tally process. Instead, we consider a trusted party $\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{Tally}}$ which gets the shares of the participants and computes the result r of the tally as well as the output Π^Z of each conditional gate, by running the protocol Tally itself, when all the participants are honest. At line 16, $\mathbb{A}_1$ gets r, Π^Z and must output its guess b' from this.

To construct $\mathbb{A}_1$, we use Theorem J.1 which states that Tally SUC-securely computes $\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{Tally}}$ in the $\mathcal{F}$-hybrid model, with $\mathcal{F} = \mathcal{F}_{RO}, \mathcal{F}_B$. Hence, there exists a simulator $\mathcal{S}$ such that, for all environment $\mathcal{Z}$, $|\mathrm{Real}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\mathtt{Tally}, \mathbb{A}_0, \mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, 0) - \mathrm{Ideal}_{\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{Tally}}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, 0)|$ is negligible. In particular, we consider the environment $\mathrm{Real}^{\mathrm{Priv}}$, so that $\mathrm{Real}^{\mathcal{F}}_{\mathtt{Tally}, \mathbb{A}_0, \mathcal{Z}} = S_0$. Then, $\mathbb{A}_1$ can interact with $\mathbb{A}_0$ by simulating the real game using $\mathcal{S}$, so that $\mathrm{Ideal}_{\mathcal{F}_{\mathtt{Tally}}, \mathcal{S}, \mathcal{Z}}(\kappa, 0) = S_1$. Hence, $|S_1 - S_0|$ is negligible.

Game 2: In this game, $\mathbb{A}_2$ is no longer given Π^Z and is only given r.

We construct $\mathbb{A}_2$ that interacts with $\mathbb{A}_1$ by simulating Π^Z. For this purpose, $\mathbb{A}_2$ uses uniformly random ciphertexts.

To argue the validity of this transition, we construct an adversary $\mathbb{B}$ for DDH as follows. First, $\mathbb{B}$ gets the challenge tuple (g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4) from the DDH game and sets $\mathsf{pk} = (g_1, g_2)$. To run the setup, $\mathbb{B}$ recovers the set S of the corrupted participants from $\mathbb{A}_1$, and picks $s_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ at random for all $i \in S$. It the completes S into I by picking some additional $s_i \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ at random for all $i \in I \backslash S$, where $I \subset [1, a]$ is a set of size t that contains S, and a is the number of talliers. For $i \in I$, it computes $h_i = g_1^{s_i}$ and, for $i \in [1, a] \backslash I$, it deduces h_i with Lagrange interpolation.

It then runs the remaining of Game 2 honestly, but each time $\mathbb{A}_1$ casts a ballot, $\mathbb{B}$ extracts the corresponding voting option from $\mathbb{A}_1$'s proof of knowledge. In the ROM, this is possible in polynomial time, as a consequence of the forking lemma (see for instance Theorem [11, Theorem 1]). This way, $\mathbb{B}$ can compute the result r of the tally without knowing the secret key sk. Finally, since $\mathbb{B}$ knows the cleartexts of the ballots to tally, $\mathbb{B}$ can run the tally protocol "on the cleartexts", *i.e.* it can compute the cleartext of each of the outputs of each conditional gate, since it is the product of two cleartexts. To simulate the output of a conditional gate, $\mathbb{B}$ "encrypts" the corresponding cleartext z by choosing two random $\rho_1, \rho_2 \in \mathbb{Z}_q$ and computing $Z = (g_1^{\rho_1} g_3^{\rho_2}, g_1^z g_2^{\rho_1} g_4^{\rho_2})$. Finally, if $\mathbb{A}_1$ wins the game, $\mathbb{B}$ states that the challenge was a DDH tuple; otherwise, it states that is was a random tuple. Remark that if (g_1, g_2, g_3, g_4) is a DDH tuple, then $\mathbb{B}$ played a perfect simulation

Algorithm 68: $\text{Real}^{\text{Priv}}_{\mathbb{A},P_{tally}}(\kappa, n, n_c, a, t, C, V, \mathcal{D})$

$sk, pk, s_1, h_1, \cdots, s_a, h_a := \texttt{Setup}(\kappa, a, t)$
$c_1, \pi_1, \cdots, c_n, \pi_n := \texttt{Register}(\texttt{pk}, n)$
$par := \mathcal{D}, pk, h_1, \cdots, h_a, \pi_1, \cdots, \pi_n$
$a_1, \cdots, a_{n_c} := \mathbb{A}(\kappa, par, (s_i)_{i\in C})$; $A := \{a_1, \cdots, a_{n_c}\}$
if $1 \in A$ **then** Return 0
$v_0, v_1 := \mathbb{A}((c_i)_{i\in A})$
$b \in_r \{0,1\}$
$BB := (\texttt{Vote}_{\texttt{pk}}(v_b, c_1))$
for $i \in [1,n]\backslash(A \bigcup \{1\})$ **do**
  $v_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$
  $BB := BB||\texttt{Vote}_{\texttt{pk}}(v_i, c_i)$
$\boldsymbol{M} := \mathbb{A}(BB)$
for $X \in \boldsymbol{M}$ **do**
  if $\texttt{isValid}(X, BB)$ **then** $BB := BB||X$
$r, \Pi := P^{\mathbb{A}}_{\texttt{tally}}(BB, \{s_i\})$
$b' := \mathbb{A}(r, \Pi)$
Return 1 if $(b == b') \wedge (v_0, v_1 \in V)$ and 0 otherwise

Algorithm 69: $\text{Ideal}^{\text{Priv}}_{\mathbb{B},\texttt{tally}}(\kappa, n, n_c, a, t, C, V, \mathcal{D})$

$a_1, \cdots, a_{n_c} := \mathbb{B}(\kappa, \mathcal{D})$; $A := \{a_1, \cdots, a_{n_c}\}$
if $1 \in A$ **then** Return 0
$v_0, v_1 := \mathbb{B}(\kappa, par, (s_i)_{i\in C})$
$b \in_r \{0,1\}$
$B := (v_b)$
for $i \in [1,n]\backslash(A \bigcup \{1\})$ **do**
  $v_i \leftarrow \mathcal{D}$
  $B := B||v_i$
$(v_i)_{i\in A} := \mathbb{B}()$
for $i \in A$ **do**
  $B := B||v_i$
$r := \texttt{tally}(B)$
$b' := \mathbb{B}(r)$
Return 1 if $(b == b') \wedge (v_0, v_1 \in V)$ and 0 otherwise

Figure 14: Definition of privacy, κ is the security parameter, a the number of talliers, t the threshold, C the set of the corrupted talliers, n the number of voters, n_a the number of corrupted voters, k the number of voting options (excluding abstention) and $\mathcal{D}$ the distribution.

of Game 1 to $\mathbb{A}_1$ and hence wins with probability S_1. On the other hand, if the challenge tuple is a random tuple, $\mathbb{B}$ played $\mathbb{A}_2$'s simulation of Game 1 and wins with probability $1 - S_2$. Yet, under the DDH assumption, $\mathbb{B}$'s advantage in the DDH game must be negligible, hence $|S_1 - S_2|$ is negligible.

Game 3: In this game, whenever a honest voter cast a ballots, a random ballot is added to the board instead of a ballot that encrypts the chosen voting option.

To argue that $|S_3 - S_2|$ is negligible, we use a hybrid argument. Technically, this is not required since the number of voters is not chosen by the adversary but is a parameter fixed by the experiment. However, giving a hybrid argument shows that the difference in probability $|S_3 - S_2|$ scales linearly with respect to n, which is certainly reassuring. For this purpose, we denote Game 2 G_1 and Game 3 G_2. We construct a succession of games hop $(H_i)_{\mathbb{N}}$ such that, for all i, H_i is game G_2 except that for the first i honest voters, the real ballot is added to the board instead of a random ballot. This way, $G_2 = H_0$. In addition, for all adversary $\mathbb{A}$, there exists a polynomial $n_{\mathbb{A}} = n$ such that $H_{n_{\mathbb{A}}} = G_1$; hence, for all $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$, $\Pr(H_{n_{\mathbb{A}}}(\kappa, \mathbb{A}) = 1) = \Pr(G_1(\kappa, \mathbb{A}) = 1)$.

Now, we need a decisional game which is considered hard. For this purpose, we use the IND-PA0 game (see Algorithm 70 below). Indeed, by [11, Theorem 2], the encryption scheme $\texttt{Gen}, \texttt{Vote}, \texttt{Extract}$ is NM-CPA secure, where $\texttt{Gen}$ is the generation algorithm for the ElGamal encryption scheme, $\texttt{Vote}$ is the voting algorithm and $\texttt{Extract}$ is the algorithm that verifies the ZKP of the ballot, outputs $\perp$ if it is invalid, decrypts it and outputs the corresponding voting option if it is valid. Also, by [9], the IND-PA0 security is equivalent to the NM-CPA security.

To exhibit a reduction to IND-PA0. We construct the required PPT $\mathbb{B}$ for the IND-PA0 game as follows. First, $\mathbb{B}$ is given the public key $\texttt{pk}$ in the IND-PA0 game. Given i, it interacts with an adversary $\mathbb{A}'_{i+1}$ for H_{i+1} by simulating H_{i+1}. For this purpose, $\mathbb{B}$ gets the set of the corrupted talliers and generates their secret shares at random to simulate the setup as in Game 2. Then, it runs a perfect simulation of H_{i+1} by picking a random $b \in \{0,1\}$ and sampling the distribution B at random from $\mathcal{B}$. However, for the $i+1$th honest voter, instead of creating a ballot for the corresponding voting option v, it chooses a random voting option v' and plays the pair v, v' in the IND-PA0 game. Finally, when $\mathbb{B}$ needs to output the result of the tally to $\mathbb{A}'_{i+1}$, $\mathbb{B}$ decrypts the valid ballots cast by $\mathbb{A}'_{i+1}$ by querying them to the IND-PA0 game, which allows $\mathbb{B}$ to compute the result of the tally. If $\mathbb{A}'_{i+1}$ correctly guesses the bit b, $\mathbb{B}$ states that the IND-PA0 game encrypted v; otherwise, it states that it encrypted v'. Now, remark that when the IND-PA0 game encrypt v, $\mathbb{B}$ plays a perfect simulation of H_{i+1}. However, when the IND-PA0 game encrypts v', $\mathbb{B}$ plays a perfect simulation of H_i. By the hybrid lemma, there exists $\mathbb{A}_3$ such that $|S_2 - S_3|$ is negligible. In addition, since we took $\mathbb{A}'_{i+1} = \mathbb{A}'_i$ for all i, we have $\mathbb{A}_3 = \mathbb{A}_2$.

Game 4: This game is the ideal game.

Finally, we construct $\mathbb{A}_4$ that interacts with $\mathbb{A}_3$ by simulating Game 3. First, $\mathbb{A}_4$ runs the setup honestly by generating a random secret key $\texttt{sk}$ and acting as the trusted dealer. Then, it also runs the registration honestly and get the set of the corrupted voters A from $\mathbb{A}_3$, that it

Algorithm 70: $\mathrm{Exp}^{\text{ind-pa0}}(\kappa, \mathbb{A})$

$\mathsf{pk}, \mathsf{sk} \longleftarrow \mathsf{Gen}(\kappa)$;
$v_0, v_1 \longleftarrow \mathbb{A}(\mathsf{pk})$;
$b \in_r \{0, 1\}$;
$C \longleftarrow \mathsf{Enc}_{\mathsf{pk}}(m_b)$;
$\boldsymbol{C} \longleftarrow \mathbb{A}(C)$;
$\boldsymbol{m} \longleftarrow (\mathsf{Dec}_{\mathsf{sk}}(y))_{y \in \boldsymbol{C} \setminus \{C\}}$;
$b' \longleftarrow \mathbb{A}(\boldsymbol{m})$;
if $b = b'$ **then return** 1 **else return** 0;

plays in the ideal game. Then it gives to $\mathbb{A}_3$ the credentials of the corrupted voters and gets v_0, v_1 in return, that it plays in the ideal game. Afterwards, it simulates the voting phase by emulating the public board as follows. For $i \in [1, n] \setminus (A \bigcup \{1\})$, $\mathbb{A}_4$ adds a random encrypted ballot in PB. Then, when $\mathbb{A}_3$ outputs $\boldsymbol{M}$, by the strong unforgeability of the signature scheme, all the valid ballots must use the credential of a a corrupted voter $i \in A$. Also, by the computational soundness of the ZKP, the ballot must encrypt some valid voting option. Hence $\mathbb{A}_4$ can decrypt the ballot using sk and sets v_i as the corresponding voting option. Finally, $\mathbb{A}_4$ gets the result r in return, that it forwards to $\mathbb{A}_3$. Finally, it outputs $\mathbb{A}_3$'s guess.

Clearly, except if $\mathbb{A}_3$ forges a valid ZKP for an invalid ballot or forges a signature, $\mathbb{A}_4$ plays a perfect simulation of Game 3 to $\mathbb{A}_3$, so that $|S_3 - S_4|$ is negligible.

Conclusion. By the triangular inequality, this shows that for all PPT adversary $\mathbb{A}$ for the real game, there exists a PPT adversary $\mathbb{B}$ for the ideal game that wins with the same probability, with up to a negligible difference. □