

Automated Generation of Masked Hardware

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Abstract. Masking has been recognized as a sound and secure countermeasure for cryptographic implementations, protecting against physical side-channel attacks. Even though many different masking schemes have been presented over time, design and implementation of protected cryptographic Integrated Circuits (ICs) remains a challenging task. More specifically, correct and efficient implementation usually requires manual interactions accompanied by longstanding experience in hardware design and physical security. To this end, design and implementation of masked hardware often proves to be an error-prone task for engineers and practitioners. As a result, our novel tool for *automated generation of masked hardware* (AGEMA) allows even inexperienced engineers and hardware designers to create secure and efficient masked cryptographic circuits originating from an unprotected design. More precisely, exploiting the concepts of *Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI)* for secure composition of masked circuits, our tool provides various processing techniques to transform an unprotected design into a secure one, eventually accelerating and safeguarding the process of masking cryptographic hardware. Ultimately, we evaluate our tool in several case studies, emphasizing different trade-offs for the transformation techniques with respect to common performance metrics, such as *latency*, *area*, and *randomness*.

Keywords: Side-Channel Analysis · Masking · Hardware · Composable Gadget

1 Introduction

Side-Channel Analysis (SCA) has not lost any of its topicality and remains a major threat to security-critical implementations, even after more than two decades of intensive research since its seminal description. In the wake of this lasting discovery [Koc96, KJJ99], it has been admittedly recognized that secure implementation of cryptographic algorithms is a challenging task, given that an adversary can observe and measure physical effects in order to infer sensitive information during execution. Examples include timing [Koc96], power consumption [Koc96, KJJ99], electromagnetic (EM) radiations [GMO01], or temperature and heat dissipation [HS13]. However, in the course of time, different classes of counteractive measures have emerged amongst which *masking* [CJRR99], based on concepts of *secret sharing*, prevails due to its formal and sound security foundation.

Over the last years, many different hardware masking variants and schemes have been proposed [ISW03, NRR06, RBN⁺15, GMK17, GM18], constantly improving efficiency and security. Unfortunately, experience has shown that new schemes often have a short retention time, mostly due to inaccuracies and design flaws [MMSS19]. However, even for schemes that stand the test of time, correct and secure implementation remains an enormous engineering challenge. As a matter of fact, even with longstanding experience

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and expertise in hardware security and design of masked hardware, correct physical instantiation of masking schemes is a delicate and error-prone task. Evidently, unconsidered and unintentional physical effects, e.g., *glitches* [MPG05], *transitions* [CGP⁺12, BGG⁺14], or *coupling* [CBG⁺17], and implementation defects due to architectural conditions, e.g., *parallelism* [BDF⁺17] or *pipelining* [CGD18], can render a theoretically secure scheme practically insecure.

As a consequence, a new line of research emerged, investigating the masking of atomic and reusable components, often considered as *gadgets* in literature, to limit the engineering complexity and error susceptibility [RBN⁺15, GMK16, GM18, GIB18, BBD⁺15, BBD⁺16, CS20]. In this regard, a great deal of attention has been devoted to the construction of secure gadgets for basic non-linear operations (e.g., AND), allowing to efficiently mask any digital logic circuit given its AND-XOR representation. However, the continuous progress in this domain is inevitably associated with fundamental research and advancements in the realm of formal security definitions and adversary models. More specifically, the formal and abstract Ishai-Sahai-Wagner (ISW) d -probing model [ISW03] is consulted prevalently to reason about security of masked circuits in the presence of side-channel adversaries.

Unfortunately, research has shown that security in this simple model does not imply secure composition of gadgets [CPRR13]. More precisely, composition of standalone-secure sub-circuits does not necessarily lead to a secure circuit. As a consequence, advanced security notions and properties are essential to reason about the *composability* of masked gadgets. In a first attempt, Barthe et al. [BBD⁺15] introduced the notion of Non-Interference (NI), allowing to verify the composability of gadgets based on the concept of *perfect simulation* of joint probability distributions. However, due to disregarded effects which later became known as *probe propagation* [CS20], the notion of NI is deficient and has been complemented by the notion of Strong Non-Interference (SNI) shortly afterwards [BBD⁺16]. Most recently, Cassiers and Standaert [CS20] introduced the notion of Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) enabling more efficient compositions with respect to *multi-input*, *multi-output* gadgets and *trivially secure* linear operations.

Now, provided with such sound and formal security and composability notions, hardware designers are able to construct secure circuits more easily. However, transforming an entirely unprotected design into a secure circuits remains a complicated and mostly manual process, even when endowed with an adequate set of secure and composable gadgets.

Contributions. In this work, we present our novel, and open-source, software tool for *automated generation of masked hardware* (AGEMA), enabling engineers and hardware designers of any level of expertise to easily generate masked hardware circuits starting from a simple but unprotected design. Utilizing different methods for processing the given netlist¹ of a design and supporting arbitrary masked gadgets, AGEMA offers high flexibility with respect to the security level (i.e., order of the underlying masking scheme), required fresh randomness, latency, and area overhead and consequently gives designers the ability to configure AGEMA to their particular needs. Exploiting the essential security notions for secure composability, the final designs are provably secure (under PINI notion) and hence are formally verified. They are further free of heuristics, and can mitigate implementation defects and design mistakes. As a consequence, our tool facilitates and accelerates the process of masking digital logic circuits while in the same vein, the quality and security of the resulting designs are increased.

We should highlight that, up to now, various tools have been developed to help generating masked software implementations. The examples include [BRB⁺11, BRN⁺15] and the recently-introduced ones Tornado [BDM⁺20] and Rosita [SSB⁺21]. Further, fullVerif [CGLS21] is a tool to analyze security of masked circuits at the composition level.

¹In digital circuit design, a netlist is a description of the connectivity of a circuit. In its simplest form, a netlist consists of a list of the cells in a circuit and a list of the nodes they are connected to.

It receives a masked implementation which is built by annotated e.g., PINI gadgets, and examines whether the connection between PINI gadgets is in compliance with the PINI definitions and requirements, i.e., checking if designers made any mistakes. In short, it does not build any secure circuit. To the best of our knowledge, AGEMA is the only tool which is dedicated to generation of masked hardware implementations, and security of its generated circuits are based on the PINI security notion which guarantees to maintain the security through composition.

Outline. We start by summarizing our notations and all necessary theoretical concepts in Section 2, before elaborating the fundamental methodology of AGEMA in Section 3. This includes a brief summary of existing types of Hardware Private Circuit (HPC) and a detailed explanation for the supported processing and transformation methods of the original netlist. In Section 4, we examine AGEMA with an extensive list of case studies on a broad variety of hardware implementations of different block ciphers and compare the generated masked designs with respect to common performance metrics such as required fresh randomness, latency degradation, and area overhead. Before we conclude our work, we provide reasoning behind the security of HPC circuits constructed by AGEMA in Section 5, and give result of experimental analyses, i.e., Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA), on some exemplary designs as the outcome of application of AGEMA.

2 Basics

2.1 Notations

We denote functions using sans-serif fonts, e.g., f for Boolean functions and F for vectorial Boolean functions. Next, we denote single-bit random variables in \mathbb{F}_2 by lower case letters like x , and vectors by uppercase letters X while sets of random variables are given in bold \mathbf{X} . Further, we use subscripts like x_i to indicate elements within a vector or a set while superscripts are used to denote (randomized) shares of random variables, e.g., X^j . As a special case, the set of all shares of each random variable in \mathbf{X} is denoted as $Sh(\mathbf{X})$.

2.2 Boolean Masking

Masking is based on secret sharing and has proven to be well suited for hardware implementations as a countermeasure against side-channel attacks. In *Boolean masking*, a sensitive variable $X \in \mathbb{F}_n$ is split into $s \geq 2$ randomized shares $(X^0, X^1, \dots, X^{s-1}) \in \mathbb{F}_n^s$, such that $X = \bigoplus_{i=0}^{s-1} X^i$. Usually this sharing is initially achieved by sampling $X^i \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{F}_n$ for all $0 \leq i < s-1$ and calculating $X^{s-1} = (\bigoplus_{i=0}^{s-2} X^i) \oplus X$. Eventually, instead of performing logic operations on the sensitive value X , they will be performed on the (randomized) shared representation of X , i.e., X^0, X^1, \dots , and X^{s-1} .

2.3 Probing Security

In order to abstract and formalize the behavior of a masked circuit and the adversarial capabilities to extract information from the underlying circuit, several models have been introduced over time, aiming to achieve different trade-offs between simplicity and accuracy. In the d -probing model, firstly introduced by Ishai et al. in [ISW03], the adversary is granted the ability to observe the distribution over up to d wires of a given circuit. To achieve d -probing security for a masked circuit, any adversary in conformity with this model should not be able to learn anything about the processed sensitive value X .

Definition 1. A masked circuit C is said to achieve d -probing security iff every (joint) distribution over up to d wires is statistically independent of any sensitive value X .

Definition 1 directly implies that splitting any sensitive variable into at least $d + 1$ shares is necessary to achieve d -probing security. In the context of masking, d is also referred to as the *security order* of a given masked circuit.

Robust Probing Model and Glitch-Extended Probes. Since the traditional probing model is limited to software implementations due to its inability to capture physical defaults occurring in hardware implementations, e.g., *transitions* (memory recombinations), *glitches* (combinational recombinations), or *coupling* (routing recombinations), the *robust* probing model was introduced in [FGP⁺18], aiming to consider and model these defaults accurately while being sufficiently simple in order to enable efficient verification of masked designs. In contrast to the traditional probing model, where the value of a wire is always assumed stable during evaluation and where no dedicated synchronization elements, i.e., registers, exist, the robust probing model loosens this assumption by introducing registers and so-called extended probes. Here, a single probe can be extended to additionally capture leakage caused by physical defaults like data transitions at registers, glitches in combinational logic, and coupling of adjacent wires.

In particular, *glitches* are switching activities of wires caused by different delays of signals contributing to their intended values. These glitches enable a probe on a single wire to observe not only the field element of its driving gate, but possibly a recombination of signals contributing to its combinatorial value. Hence, in order to capture these effects, *glitch-extended* probes were introduced. Here, a single probe on a wire is assumed to capture the leakage of the joint distribution over every stable signal contributing to the calculation of the probed wire. As a result, given the glitch-extended probing model, every probe on a wire is replaced by the set of probes placed on the register outputs and primary inputs that contribute to the observed wire, i.e., there exists a path from a stable source to the current probe position.

2.4 Composable Masking Schemes

Especially for higher security orders d and more complex functions, it is hard to find efficient masked representations for circuits to become provably d -probing secure, as the number of possible probe combinations increases with the security order and the complexity of a circuit. Following a divide-and-conquer approach, composable gadgets were introduced as a remedy to directly derive masked representations of large functions. Composable gadgets are masked circuits realizing small and atomic logic functions, like a simple AND or OR gate. Fundamentally, these gadgets fulfill certain properties that imply probing security when composed to construct a larger circuit. This way, the problem of finding secure masked realizations of large functions is reduced to the task of finding composable gadgets realizing small functions with certain properties. In other words, in contrary to what has been observed in [MMSS19], the gadgets should be designed in such a way that their composition does not lead to any security degradation.

Probe Propagation and Composability Notions. To understand favorable properties for gadgets in order to achieve secure composability, we explain the concept of *probe propagation*, which was firstly introduced in [CS20] and defines the information a probe can access and how this access to information is propagated throughout the circuit. Generally, a (glitch-extended) probe is said to *propagate* into a wire if this wire is needed to perfectly simulate each observation of the probe, i.e., in order to compute the underlying probability distribution. Now, to achieve composability of a gadget, propagation of internal probes and output probes needs to be restricted to a subset of the input wires of the gadgets. These constraints on gadget level have to guarantee that all possible probes in a composed circuit only propagate in a subset of the initial sharing of an input value and

not into all of them. After Non-Interference (NI) [BBD⁺15] was proven to be insufficient to offer composability, Strong Non-Interference (SNI) [BBD⁺16] was proposed which further restricts probe propagation and was originally restricted to single-output gadgets. In [CS20], Cassiers and Standaert showed that the scope of the original definition of SNI can be extended to cover multiple-output gadgets as well, but at the same time unveiled issues of SNI with respect to the extent of required entropy and circuit area. Eventually, Probe-Isolating Non-Interference (PINI) was introduced in the same work as an elegant way to guarantee composability at any security order. Similar to Domain Oriented Masking (DOM) [GMK16], share domains were introduced and any probe was restricted to only propagate within its own share domain, enabling trivial implementation of linear functions on the one hand and direct composition of gadgets on the other.

2.5 Formal Verification

Several tools have been published for the purpose of formally verifying the security and composability characteristics of masked hardware circuits [BGI⁺18a, BGI⁺18b, CGLS21, BBC⁺19, KSM20]. They all support different varieties of security and composability notions while working on different abstraction levels. We choose SILVER [KSM20] for performing all verification in this work, due to its unique support of checking composability under the PINI notion in the glitch-extended probing model.

2.6 Combinational and Sequential Circuits

Combinational circuits are digital circuits where the output is a pure function of the primary inputs and where no synchronization elements and clock signal exist. In contrast, in a *sequential circuit*, a sequence of data, synchronized by a clock signal, is processed. A sequential circuit may contain a feedback loop through registers, such that the output at any given time is not only a function of the primary input but of previous outputs as well.

In this work, we model a sequential circuit by the schematic depicted in Figure 1. Note that this structure offers a unique representation of any given logical circuit without combinational loops that possibly contains multiple register stages. More precisely, every given circuit (without a combinational loop) can be represented as a *sequential circuit* that follows the structure shown in Figure 1, where all synchronization elements are packed into the main register stage, the combinational circuit receives the primary input and the outputs of the main register while the primary output is taken from the combinational circuit. As a side note, this illustrates a Mealy machine, which covers Moore machines as well [Mea55].

As it is explained in detail later in Section 3, we model the given unprotected circuit by the structure shown in Figure 1, hence extracting and processing the combinational part and the register stage individually to build the masked counterparts.

3 Technique

In this section, we gradually present the technical details of the procedure which AGEMA follows to generate a secure masked implementation from the given unprotected implementation. To this end, we first review the masking schemes which are currently supported by AGEMA.

3.1 PINI Hardware Gadgets

As PINI offers trivial composition of hardware gadgets in the robust probing model, we restrict our examples to known gadgets fulfilling this security notion. However, we would




Figure 1: General schematic of a sequential circuit.

like to stress that AGEMA offers a generic framework to dynamically substitute circuit parts with masked gadgets and is not restricted to any specific type of gadgets. Recently, several gadgets have been proposed that fulfill the PINI notion in the robust probing model. As they differ with respect to the logic function they realize, the fresh randomness they require and their latency, we describe and compare them in the following, where the number of required fresh randomness is denoted by r and the number of added register stages (i.e., the latency) by l .

3.1.1 HPC1

HPCs – proposed by Cassiers et al. in [CGLS21] – realize 2-input AND gadgets composable under the PINI notion in the robust probing model and are generic for arbitrary security orders. The authors introduced HPC1, which simply consists of a DOM-AND where the sharing of one input is refreshed. Hence, the added number of register stages is $l = 2$. The DOM-AND needs $d(d + 1)/2$ bits of fresh masks for any given security order d . However, since the mask refreshing is expected to be SNI, the required number of additional fresh masks is identified through the table [1, 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 15, 17] for security order $d \leq 10$.

3.1.2 HPC2

Cassiers et al. further proposed another construction for an AND gadget, HPC2, requiring $r = d(d + 1)/2$ fresh randomness and $l = 2$ added register stages for any security order d .

3.1.3 GHPC

Generic Hardware Private Circuits (GHPCs), introduced in [KSM22], allow the construction of gadgets realizing any (vectorial) Boolean function but are limited to first-order security. Here, $l = 2$ is the number of added register stages, and the required number of fresh masks is $r = 1$ per output bit, regardless of the Boolean function the gadget realizes.

The concept of GHPC is depicted in Figure 2. Every input is split into two shares while the result of the gadget is simply the coordinate function f_i blinded by fresh randomness r_i for every $0 \leq i < m$, with m being the function’s output bit size.

3.1.4 GHPC_{LL}

In [KSM22], the authors further introduced GHPC_{LL}, a low-latency variant of GHPC, which requires only one register stage ($l = 1$) to compute any vectorial Boolean function but needs 2^n fresh random bits per output bit for a Boolean function with n inputs, i.e., in total $m \times 2^n$ bits.




Figure 2: The GHPC concept of transforming any vectorial Boolean function into a first-order secure and composable gadget.




Figure 3: First-order GHPC_{LL}-AND realizing $o = ab$. Dashed registers are optional but necessary to make a pipelined design.

A simple 2-input AND gadget realized as a GHPC_{LL} is shown in Figure 3. This is the only known composable AND gadget with a latency of a single clock cycle.

3.1.5 HPC-MUX

Having an HPC-AND gadget, other 2-input non-linear gates can be easily constructed. By inverting one output share, the HPC-NAND is built, and by additionally inverting one share of both inputs the HPC-OR is constructed as $\overline{a} \wedge \overline{b} = a \vee b$. HPC-NOR can also be made this way. Note that XOR is trivial under PINI notion. In other words, if all non-linear sub-circuits fulfill the PINI requirements, XOR can be realized with no fresh randomness and no additional register stage by XORing the corresponding shares of the given inputs. XNOR can also be made by XOR while inverting one output share.

2-input multiplexers (MUXes) are commonly used in digital circuits as a building block (available in almost every standard logic library). Designing an efficient shared version of a 2-input MUX offering security under the PINI notion is straightforward as it can be directly derived using a single HPC-AND gadget. The Boolean function f , describing a MUX, where one of two inputs $a \in \mathbb{F}_2$, $b \in \mathbb{F}_2$ is selected by $s \in \mathbb{F}_2$ can be rewritten as

$f = sa \oplus \bar{s}b = s(a \oplus b) \oplus b$. Realizing a composable, shared multiplexer for arbitrary security orders is hence possible by means of two trivial XOR operations and a single HPC-AND gadget. As a result, the randomness requirements and the latency is inherited from the instantiated HPC-AND gadget, i.e., whether an HPC1-, HPC2-, GHPC-, or GHPC_{LL}-AND is employed, where the two latter cases are restricted to constructing first-order secure designs only.

3.2 Procedure

Since the main goal is the conversion of an unprotected implementation to a masked one, we first have to analyze the netlist of the unprotected implementation. In other words, the unprotected (behavioral) implementation should be first synthesized by a synthesizer, e.g., Design Compiler [Inc] or Yosys [Wol]. The resulting Verilog netlist² is then given to AGEMA. Note that AGEMA has a custom library file, where the designer should specify the details of each cell, e.g., their input and output ports. Therefore, the synthesizer should also be set to just use a restricted list of cells to generate the Verilog netlist, typically only NOT, 2-input AND, NAND, OR, NOR, XOR, XNOR, MUX, and D flip-flops.

Then, as a first step, AGEMA builds a graph based on the given Verilog netlist, and represents the circuit following the concept given in Section 2.6 and shown in Figure 1, i.e., a combinational circuit and a single main register stage. Naturally, not necessarily all parts of the given design should be masked, e.g., the control logic. Further, the designer may desire to not mask the key, for example if protection against profiling attacks targeting the key schedule is excluded (for such cases, see [MS16, PMK⁺11, UHA17, SM20], where no key masking is applied). In tweakable block ciphers, e.g., CRAFT [BLMR19], the tweak is supposed to be public knowledge. Hence, in a corresponding encryption/decryption implementation, there is no need to mask the tweak. In AGEMA, this is supported by setting the attribute of the primary input signals. If a signal is annotated as *secure*, it will be converted to a masked form with $d + 1$ shares in the resulting masked circuit, while d (the order of masking) is also defined by the designer.

Hence, the next step of the process is to identify which parts of the given circuit should be masked based on the attribute of the primary inputs defined by the designer. If any input of a cell is marked secure, its output should also be marked secure. Therefore, we propagate the secure signals through all cells of the circuit until no new signal is marked as secure. Note that this includes the main registers and their role as the input to the combinational circuit.

In order to formalize this process, we model the given logic circuit as a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ with nodes in \mathcal{V} and edges in \mathcal{E} . More precisely, any Boolean function $\mathbb{F}_2^n \mapsto \mathbb{F}_2^m$, over inputs $\mathcal{X} = \{x_i | 1 \leq i \leq n\}$ and outputs $\mathcal{Y} = \{y_i | 1 \leq i \leq m\}$, can be modeled as DAG which is defined as follows.

Definition 2 (Syntax of DAG). Given a finite DAG $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y})$ with vertices \mathcal{V} , edges \mathcal{E} , primary inputs \mathcal{X} , and primary outputs \mathcal{Y} , an m -rooted DAG is defined as follows:

- (1) Each vertex $v \in \mathcal{V}$ represents a single combinational or sequential gate in the netlist.
- (2) Each edge $e \in \mathcal{E}$ represents a single wire carrying an element from the finite field \mathbb{F}_2 .
- (3) There are exactly n terminal nodes v , each labeled with a unique $x_i \in \mathcal{X}$.
- (4) There are exactly m root nodes v , each labeled with a unique $y_i \in \mathcal{Y}$.

Based on this, Algorithm 1 shows the procedure to propagate the secure signals into the circuit and how we split the circuit into two parts: the *secure zone* and the *normal zone*.

²This can be set in a script executed by the synthesizer to generate a Verilog netlist as the result of the synthesis.

Algorithm 1 Propagation of secure signals

Input: $G : \{\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{Y}\}$	▷ given circuit
Input: $\mathcal{X}_s : \{x \in \mathcal{X} \mid \text{attribute}(x) = \text{secure}\}$	▷ secure primary inputs
Output: $\{\mathcal{V}_s, \mathcal{E}_s, \mathcal{X}_s, \mathcal{Y}_s\}$	▷ <i>secure zone</i>
Output: $\{\mathcal{V}_n, \mathcal{E}_n, \mathcal{X}_n, \mathcal{Y}_n\}$	▷ <i>normal zone</i>

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1:  $\mathcal{V}_s \leftarrow \emptyset, \mathcal{E}_s \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
2: for  $\forall x \in \mathcal{X}_s$  do
3:    $\mathcal{E}_s \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_s \cup \text{output}(x)$ 
4: end for

5: repeat
6:    $\mathcal{V}'_s \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
7:   for  $\forall v \in \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}_s$  do
8:     if  $\exists \text{input}(v) \in \mathcal{E}_s$  then
9:        $\mathcal{V}'_s \leftarrow \mathcal{V}'_s \cup v$ 
10:       $\mathcal{E}_s \leftarrow \mathcal{E}_s \cup \text{output}(v)$ 
11:     end if
12:   end for
13:    $\mathcal{V}_s \leftarrow \mathcal{V}_s \cup \mathcal{V}'_s$ 
14: until  $\mathcal{V}'_s = \emptyset$ 
15:  $\mathcal{Y}_s \leftarrow \mathcal{Y} \cap \mathcal{V}_s$ 

16:  $\mathcal{V}_n \leftarrow \mathcal{V} \setminus \mathcal{V}_s, \mathcal{E}_n \leftarrow \mathcal{E} \setminus \mathcal{E}_s, \mathcal{X}_n \leftarrow \mathcal{X} \setminus \mathcal{X}_s, \mathcal{Y}_n \leftarrow \mathcal{Y} \setminus \mathcal{Y}_s$ 

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Figure 4 shows a simple example after the application of this algorithm, where the signals and cells which should be masked are highlighted in red. In this example, i_1 is the only primary input which is marked as *secure* by the designer, i.e., this primary input should be masked ($\mathcal{X}_s = \{i_1\}$). Then, the algorithm adds cell #1 and its output t_1 to the secure zone. Next, cell #2 and its output o are added, and then the register cell #3 and its output x . In the next round, cell #0 and its output t_0 are marked as secure, and the algorithm terminates since no other cells can be added to the secure zone. At the end, as shown in Figure 4, by selecting just i_1 as the secure primary input, cells #0 to #3 and signals t_i, t_0, t_1, o , and x are identified to be masked. Note that other cells and intermediate signals including y and the primary input i_0 (which are inputs to the secure zone) are not masked. We deal with such a combination in Section 3.3.1. It is noteworthy that we re-use this exemplary circuit in the next sections to illustrate different processing methods.

3.3 Processing Methods

The next step is to construct the masked variant of the secure zone. Apart from the fact that different masking schemes are supported (see Section 3.1), we can process the secure zone and build a more optimized netlist in favor of the selected masking scheme. To this end, AGEMA supports four different processing methods explained below with an example for each method in Figure 5 which is based on the secure zone identified in Figure 4. Such different processing methods – explained in the following – do not necessary require the Verilog netlist of the given unprotected circuit. However, in order to keep a constant form for the input of AGEMA, we developed the processing algorithms to just deal with such a representation of the given circuit. As a side note, we like to mention that all processing methods can be freely combined with all supported masking schemes, except ANF which is dedicated to GHPC and GHPC_{LL}. An overview of the possible combinations is given in Table 1.




Figure 4: Exemplary circuit after the propagation of secure signals. i_1 is the only primary input marked as secure. The red signals and cells indicate the extracted parts which should be masked.

Table 1: Supported masking schemes and processing methods.

Processing Method	Masking Scheme		
	HPC1/HPC2 ($d \geq 1$)	GHPC ($d = 1$)	GHPC _{LL} ($d = 1$)
Naive	✓	✓	✓
BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	✓	✓
BDD _{CUDD}	✓	✓	✓
ANF		✓	✓

3.3.1 Naive

Every cell in the netlist of the secure zone can be naturally exchanged with its masked variant depending on the selected masking scheme. This also necessitates to replace every signal of the secure zone with its masked form with $d + 1$ shares. Since this is just a translation of one netlist into another while keeping the original structure (i.e., the number of cells and how they are connected), the efficiency of the resulting masked circuit depends on how the original circuit has been synthesized. For example, the non-linear gadgets need fresh randomness and introduce register stages into the gates (see Section 3.1). Therefore, the number of non-linear gates and how they are composed (i.e., the logical depth of the circuit) has a direct effect on the number of required fresh masks and latency overhead of the resulting masked circuit.

We should also highlight that every signal which is not marked as secure but is involved in the secure zone is padded with 0 to form $d + 1$ shares. Examples include the primary input i_0 and the internal signal y in the example shown in Figure 4. Note that it should be carefully evaluated whether this may pose any security issue in the used gadgets. For example, cell #1 (NAND gate) in Figure 4 receives the masked i_1 and unmasked y (i.e., y padded with 0). Depending on the used gadget, this does not necessarily lead to a secure design. However, we have examined this in all our employed gadgets HPC1, HPC2, GHPC, and GHPC_{LL}, and verified that this does not degrade their security.




Figure 5: Different processing methods for the combinational port of the secure zone of the exemplary circuit in Figure 4.

3.3.2 BDD

In discrete mathematics and computer science, Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) are often used as basic data structures to represent and manipulate Boolean functions. The seminal concept of BDDs has been introduced by Akers [Ake78] and refined by Bryant [Bry86], improving efficiency and conciseness through variable ordering. Nowadays, many applications in logic synthesis and formal verification of digital Integrated Circuits (ICs) rely on (reduced and ordered) BDDs³. This also holds for SILVER [KSM20] introduced in Section 2.5.

Representation. Multi-root BDDs provide a unique, concise, and canonical representation of Boolean functions $\mathbb{F}_2^n \mapsto \mathbb{F}_2^m$. In particular, any multi-root BDD can be represented as a DAG with m root nodes and two terminal nodes $\{\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}\}$. More precisely, BDDs can be defined syntactically and semantically as follows.

Definition 3 (Syntax of BDDs). Given a pair (π, \mathcal{G}) , where π denotes a variable ordering

³For the sake of simplicity, we refer to Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagrams as BDDs.

and $G = (\mathcal{V}, \mathcal{E})$ is a finite DAG with vertices \mathcal{V} and edges \mathcal{E} , the syntax of an m -rooted Reduced Ordered Binary Decision Diagram is defined as follows:

- (1) There are exactly m root nodes and each node $v \in \mathcal{V}$ is either a non-terminal or one of the two terminal nodes $\{\mathbf{0}, \mathbf{1}\}$.
- (2) Each non-terminal node $v \in \mathcal{V}$ is labeled with a variable, denoted as $\text{var}(v)$ and has exactly two distinct child nodes in \mathcal{V} , which are denoted as $\text{then}(v)$ and $\text{else}(v)$. More precisely, there is no non-terminal node v such that $\text{then}(v) = \text{else}(v)$.
- (3) There are no duplicate nodes, i.e., for each pair of nodes $\{v, v'\} \in \mathcal{V}^2$ at least one of the following conditions holds:
 - (i) The variable label is different, i.e., $\text{var}(v) \neq \text{var}(v')$.
 - (ii) The child nodes are different, i.e., $\text{then}(v) \neq \text{then}(v')$ or $\text{else}(v) \neq \text{else}(v')$.
- (4) For each path from root nodes to terminal nodes, the variable labels are encountered at most once and in the same order, defined by the variable ordering π .

Using the principle of *Shannon decompositions*, each multi-rooted BDD recursively defines a Boolean function $\mathbb{F}_2^n \mapsto \mathbb{F}_2^m$ and arbitrary Boolean operations.

Definition 4 (Semantic of BDDs). The representation of a Boolean function $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \mapsto \mathbb{F}_2^m$, defined over the input variables $\mathcal{X} = \{x_i | 1 \leq i \leq n\}$, is defined recursively according to the following specification:

- (1) Given a terminal node v , then $f_v|_x = 0$ if v is the terminal node $\mathbf{0}$, and $f_v|_x = 1$ otherwise.
- (2) Given a non-terminal node v and $\text{var}(v) = x_i$, then f_v is defined recursively by the Shannon decomposition: $f_v = x_i \cdot f_{\text{then}(v)}|_{x_i=1} + \bar{x}_i \cdot f_{\text{else}(v)}|_{x_i=0}$.
- (3) Given two root nodes v_1 and v_2 and any binary Boolean operation \circ , such that $f = f_{v_1} \circ f_{v_2}$, then f can be derived recursively as:

$$\begin{aligned} f &= x_i \cdot f|_{x_i=1} + \bar{x}_i \cdot f|_{x_i=0} \\ &= x_i \cdot (f_{v_1} \circ f_{v_2})|_{x_i=1} + \bar{x}_i \cdot (f_{v_1} \circ f_{v_2})|_{x_i=0} \\ &= x_i \cdot (f_{v_1}|_{x_i=1} \circ f_{v_2}|_{x_i=1}) + \bar{x}_i \cdot (f_{v_1}|_{x_i=0} \circ f_{v_2}|_{x_i=0}) \end{aligned}$$

Transformation. The purpose of the BDD processing method is to create a BDD for the secure zone netlist. More precisely, the Boolean function of the secure zone netlist is transformed into a multi-root BDD, whereas each node in the BDD corresponds to a MUX. Note, however, that in the context of BDDs, each select signal is connected to a primary input, while the data signals are connected to the constants $\mathbf{0}$ or $\mathbf{1}$ or any other MUX corresponding to a BDD node. Therefore, AGEMA extracts an equivalent netlist of the secure zone, purely based on 2-input MUXes, which afterwards are exchanged and replaced by their masked counterpart (see an example in Figure 5(b) and Figure 5(c)).

AGEMA employs two different C/C++ libraries for the construction and manipulation of BDDs, explained as follows.

SYLVAN⁴ is a state-of-the-art BDD high-performance, multi-core decision diagram package implemented in C/C++. In particular, manipulation and processing of BDDs and binary operations has been extensively optimized and implemented for multi-core support, outperforming existing, but single-core BDD packages.

⁴<https://github.com/utwente-fmt/sylvan.git>

CUDD⁵ (Colorado University Decision Diagram) is a package for manipulation and processing of BDDs, Algebraic Decision Diagrams (ADDs), and Zero-suppressed Binary Decision Diagrams (ZDDs) implemented in C. In contrast to SYLVAN, CUDD provides an extensive set of features and operations that can be performed on BDDs, including automatic and dynamic reordering of the variables. Hence, although CUDD has been mostly designed for single-core processors, it can outperform SYLVAN in certain applications, mostly due to reduced memory requirements and BDD sizes (due to more optimal variable orderings).

Limitations. In contrast to the Naive processing method, the BDD transformation results in a unique representation (under a given variable ordering). As a result, the BDD representation is independent of the original netlist representation but solely depends on the underlying Boolean function, hence reducing the effort of optimizing the original and unprotected design. Further, since each BDD can be represented as a multiplexer cascade in digital logic, creation and optimization of a single masked MUX-gadget is sufficient to convert unprotected designs into protected designs (see Section 3.1.5). However, in contrast to common approaches, the primary inputs of the secure zone serve as selection signals of the multiplexers (instead of being connected to the multiplexer data inputs). As a consequence, the logical depth of the multiplexer cascade is solely limited by the number of primary inputs of the secure zone, hence, determining the resulting latency of the masked circuit.

Besides, since BDDs are only canonical under a given variable ordering, we employ two different state-of-the-art BDD libraries. While SYLVAN is a high-performance library captivating through multi-core algorithms and operations, in particular with respect to BDD generation and recombination, CUDD also supports automated and dynamic variable re-ordering. In fact, using some pre-defined and global thresholds, the library automatically performs variable re-orderings once the thresholds are exceeded, in order to find better (i.e., smaller) BDD representations through changing the ordering of the variables (i.e., primary inputs). As a smaller BDD directly translates to smaller masked circuits using fewer multiplexers, we decided to support and evaluate both BDD libraries for their various benefits and limitations.

3.3.3 ANF

As stated in Section 3.1, GHPC and its low-latency variant GHPC_{LL} allow to construct first-order secure composable gadgets from arbitrary functions. In other words, in addition to GHPC and GHPC_{LL} gadgets for 2-input non-linear gates (AND, NAND, OR, NOR) which can be used in other processing methods, GHPC and GHPC_{LL} gadgets can directly be made for larger Boolean functions with arbitrary number of variables. However, with increasing variable dependencies, area overhead of the gadgets gradually becomes more obstructive. To this end, the ANF processing method tries to find trade-offs between single gadget size and overall circuit size.

Representation. In general, any Boolean function can be expressed canonically using several normal forms, such as Conjunctive Normal Form (CNF), Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF), or Algebraic Normal Form (ANF). In particular, the ANF representation is often considered for masking purposes due to the trivial masking of XOR operations.

Definition 5 (Algebraic Normal Form). For any Boolean function $f : \mathbb{F}_2^n \mapsto \mathbb{F}_2$ there exists a unique AND-XOR representation, called the ANF of f :

$$f(\mathbf{x}) = \bigoplus_{u \in \mathbb{F}_2^n} a_u \prod_{u_i=1} x_i \text{ with } a_u \in \mathbb{F}_2,$$

⁵<https://github.com/ivmai/cudd.git>

where the summands of f are called *monomials*. Each monomial forms a conjunction of a unique subset of \mathbf{x} defined by its corresponding index u . The *degree* of a monomial is defined as the size of its input set. Furthermore, the *algebraic degree* of f is defined as the highest degree of all function's monomials.

Transformation. We first construct the ANF of the secure zone. The construction mechanism represents each gate (e.g., AND, OR, XOR) of the original netlist with its corresponding ANF. More precisely, our tool computes the ANF of any gate based on the primary inputs of the secure zone. To this end, the inputs of each gate are expressed in terms of an ANF given in the primary inputs.

However, for the construction of gadgets, we are only interested in the ANF of the outputs of the entire combinational part of the secure zone. Unfortunately, as stated above, constructing an individual gadget per secure zone output may lead to a very large circuit if the corresponding ANF depends on a very large number of primary inputs. As a consequence, to reduce the circuit size, we apply two optimization techniques introduced in the following. For the sake of simplicity and better understanding, we analyze an exemplary Boolean function $f : \mathbb{F}_2^4 \mapsto \mathbb{F}_2$ represented by the following ANF.

$$f = x_0x_2 \oplus x_0x_3 \oplus x_0x_2x_3 \oplus x_1x_2 \oplus x_1x_3 \oplus x_1x_2x_3 \quad (1)$$

Now, the trivial approach is to construct the entire function as a single gadget. As f depends on four different input values, the corresponding gadget also requires four inputs. Nevertheless, f can be rewritten in a way that the linear combination $x_0 \oplus x_1$ is processed instead of x_0 and x_1 , i.e.,

$$f = (x_0 \oplus x_1)(x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_2x_3). \quad (2)$$

Note that finding suited linear combinations is not trivial. We explain our methodology in the following. Providing the linear combination $(x_0 \oplus x_1)$ to the gadget instead of x_0 and x_1 reduces the input size of the gadget by one. In practice, such linear combinations occur in many modern block ciphers including a key addition operation. Hence, detection of such operations and extraction of linear combinations often allows to typically halve the number of inputs per gadget. However, the minimization of gadgets due to finding linear combinations is not only restricted to the gadgets inputs. For instance, considering $h : \mathbb{F}_2^4 \mapsto \mathbb{F}_2$ as

$$h = x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_0x_1 \oplus x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_2x_3,$$

and computing the entire function in a single gadget is inefficient since the algebraic degree of h is smaller than the number of inputs. In particular, only x_0 and x_1 as well as x_2 and x_3 are combined non-linearly. In addition, only two different monomials of degree two (x_0x_1 and x_2x_3) exist, i.e., not all inputs are combined in conjunctions. Hence, splitting h into two functions $h = h_0 \oplus h_1$ such that $h_0 = x_0 \oplus x_1 \oplus x_0x_1$ and $h_1 = x_2 \oplus x_3 \oplus x_2x_3$ results in two gadgets with only two inputs each. Compared to a single gadget with four inputs, the area footprint can be reduced. We also refer to Figure 5(d) and Figure 5(e), where two ANF gadgets for the exemplary circuit of Figure 4 are shown. As a result, linear output combinations, as described here, exist in many modern block ciphers where linear diffusion layers permute the outputs of multiple non-linear S-boxes which typically operate on a small set of inputs (e.g., 4 or 8 bits).

Now, given an arbitrary Boolean function representing a secure zone output in ANF, similar to the examples shown above, we can split the entire ANF into multiple sub-functions of independent inputs. For instance, considering a full round of a block cipher, this step is beneficial as different S-boxes are usually computed on non-colliding sets of input variables. Therefore, we should be able to construct gadgets that operate only on a small set of input values (depending on the S-box input size). More precisely, in order to

find suitable sub-functions, we first extract all monomials with maximal algebraic degree and place them into sub-functions. Specifically, all monomials that share no input are placed in different sub-functions, while monomials sharing at least one input are placed in the same sub-function. In the next step, we extract all smaller monomials of the ANF and place them in one of the existing sub-functions such that each monomial is placed in a sub-function if it shares inputs with the largest monomial of this sub-function. Eventually, we repeat this procedure for every output ANF while adding new outputs to the gadgets. Hence, each gadget may be used to compute sub-functions of multiple output ANFs if they depend on the same inputs. As a result, each output ANF can be computed as the sum of different sub-functions while each sub-function receives a different set of inputs. At this point, the gadgets are independent of each other and we can optimize them individually.

For some lightweight block ciphers, such as PRINCE [BCG⁺12], PRESENT [BKL⁺07], Midori [BBI⁺15], Skinny [BJK⁺16], and CRAFT [BLMR19], the diffusion layer only combines the output of different S-boxes. In other words, the diffusion layer never combines different output bits of the same S-box. As the gadgets will be optimized at most up to the S-box sizes, the sub-functions and the outputs of the S-boxes become equivalent. Prominent exceptions of this rule are the AES [DR02] and LED [GPPR11], where the MixColumns also linearly combines the outputs computed by the same S-box (through Galois-field multiplication with constants in the MixColumns matrix). Note that since we are analyzing the netlist of the secure zone, such a linear combination is not trivially visible in the output ANFs. This translates to gadgets with a large number of outputs as the gadgets compute all linear combined outputs separately and not the small set of S-box outputs resulting in a high area and fresh-randomness overhead.

In order to detect such linear combinations and reduce the number of gadget outputs (ideally) up to the number of S-box outputs, we search for a minimal set of different functions whose linear combinations compute all required sub-functions. We perform such a search with simulated annealing [KGV83], a discrete optimization technique that searches for a minimal solution by evaluating solutions that are similar to the current solution (so-called neighbors). The advantages of simulated annealing compared to other optimization techniques such as constraint programming [Apt03] are the great performance and the ability to escape local minima. This is achieved since the acceptance of a neighbor is partially probabilistic. Hence, sometimes also bad neighbors are accepted to escape local minima. We start with an input solution x (a set of functions) that computes all sub-functions separately. Therefore, each sub-function is given as a single output and with a single summand, what translates to a list with a single element. During the simulated annealing, we split our initial solution into multiple summands that compute the outputs with a minimal number of different summands. We show our method in Algorithm 2. For the neighboring function $\text{neighbor}(z)$, we randomly modify input solution z by selecting one summand from a random sub-function (at the beginning, each function is given as a single summand), XOR it to every occurrence of another randomly-chosen summand, and insert it to every modified sub-function. Moreover, we define our objective costs $\text{cost}(z)$ of the solution z as the number of different summands required to compute all sub-functions. It turns out that a very small number of iterations and a very low cooling factor are enough to recover the minimal set of gadget outputs. In our experiments, we used a cooling factor c of 0.9 and start with $n = 100$ iterations per cooling step which increases by 100 after every cooling step. The initial temperature is $t = 1$ and cooled down until it reaches $t' = 0.5$. Note that the set of gadget outputs not necessarily encompasses the outputs of the underlying S-boxes but linear combinations which also result in a minimal number of gadget outputs.

After optimizing the gadgets outputs we investigate each gadgets inputs. As shown above in Equation (2), a gadget can depend on a linear combination of its inputs. In order to detect such cases for a given gadget, for each input (e.g., x_0) we first make a set \mathcal{L}_{f,x_0} of

Algorithm 2 Search for optimal gadget outputs

Input: t, t', c, n, x \triangleright Simulated annealing parameters: Temperature t , minimum temperature t' , cooling factor c , iterations per cooling step n , initial solution x

Output: z \triangleright A local-optimum solution

```

1:  $z \leftarrow x$ 
2: while  $t > t'$  do
3:   for  $i = 1, \dots, n$  do
4:      $y \leftarrow \text{neighbor}(z)$ 
5:      $\delta \leftarrow \text{cost}(y) - \text{cost}(z)$ 
6:      $r \xleftarrow{\$} [0, 1] \subset \mathbb{R}$   $\triangleright$  Random value in range  $[0,1]$ 
7:     if  $\delta \leq 0$  or  $e^{-\delta/t} > r$  then
8:        $z \leftarrow y$ 
9:     end if
10:  end for
11:   $t \leftarrow t \cdot c$ 
12: end while

```

Algorithm 3 Search for linear input combinations

Input: $\mathcal{L}_{G_i}, \mathcal{L}_x$ \triangleright List of the gadgets output functions and inputs

Output: \mathcal{L}_{G_o} \triangleright List of the gadgets substituted output functions

```

1:  $\mathcal{L}_{G_o} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_{G_i}$ 
2: for  $\forall (x_0, x_1) \in \mathcal{L}_x \times \mathcal{L}_x$  do
3:   if  $x_0 \neq x_1$  then  $\triangleright$  Get two different inputs of the gadget
4:     for  $\forall \mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{L}_{G_o}$  do  $\triangleright$  By  $\mathcal{F}$  we refer to all monomials of output function  $f$ 
5:        $\mathcal{L}_{f, x_0} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
6:        $\mathcal{L}_{f, x_1} \leftarrow \emptyset$ 
7:       for  $\forall \mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{F}$  do  $\triangleright$  Get a monomial of the output function
8:         if  $x_0 \in \mathcal{M}$  then  $\mathcal{L}_{f, x_0} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_{f, x_0} \cup \mathcal{M} \setminus \{x_0\}$ 
9:         end if
10:        if  $x_1 \in \mathcal{M}$  then  $\mathcal{L}_{f, x_1} \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_{f, x_1} \cup \mathcal{M} \setminus \{x_1\}$ 
11:        end if
12:      end for
13:    end for
14:    if  $\forall \mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{L}_{G_o}, \mathcal{L}_{f, x_0} = \mathcal{L}_{f, x_1}$  then
15:       $\mathcal{N} \leftarrow \{x_0, x_1\}$   $\triangleright$  Create the new linear combination
16:       $\mathcal{L}_x \leftarrow \mathcal{L}_x \setminus \{\{x_0\}, \{x_1\}\} \cup \mathcal{N}$   $\triangleright$  Update the gadgets inputs
17:      for  $\forall \mathcal{F} \in \mathcal{L}_{G_o}$  do
18:        for  $\forall \mathcal{M} \in \mathcal{F}$  do  $\triangleright$  Substitute the inputs with their linear combination
19:          if  $x_0 \in \mathcal{M}$  then  $\mathcal{M} \leftarrow \mathcal{M} \setminus \{x_0\} \cup \mathcal{N}$ 
20:          end if
21:          if  $x_1 \in \mathcal{M}$  then  $\mathcal{F} \leftarrow \mathcal{F} \setminus \mathcal{M}$ 
22:          end if
23:        end for
24:      end for
25:    end if
26:  end if
27: end for

```




Figure 6: Generic structure of a masked circuit after applying the ANF processing method. Dashed registers are optional but necessary to make a pipelined design.

all monomials that exist in output function f and include x_0 . As only monomials including x_0 are in \mathcal{L}_{f,x_0} , we erase x_0 from the monomial before storing it. Then, we search for input combinations by iterating over all pairs of inputs, e.g., (x_0, x_1) , and examining the corresponding sets \mathcal{L}_{f,x_0} and \mathcal{L}_{f,x_1} . Since we erase x_0 from all monomials in \mathcal{L}_{f,x_0} and x_1 from all monomials in \mathcal{L}_{f,x_1} both sets are exactly equivalent iff they differ only in (x_0, x_1) . Hence, equivalence shows that we can replace (x_0, x_1) by its linear combination. Naturally, two inputs x_i and x_j , such that $i \neq j$, can be replaced by their linear combination $x_i \oplus x_j$ in an ANF, if both x_i and x_j are similarly combined with other inputs in all monomials. This is given if both sets of monomials are equal and non-empty for every output function of the gadget. If both conditions are met, x_i and x_j can be replaced with their linear combination $x_i \oplus x_j$ in the entire gadget.

As a short example, we verify the linear combination in f given in Equation (1). For the input pair (x_0, x_1) it holds that $\mathcal{L}_{f,x_0} = \{x_2, x_3, x_2x_3\}$ and $\mathcal{L}_{f,x_1} = \{x_2, x_3, x_2x_3\}$. Since it holds that $\mathcal{L}_{f,x_0} = \mathcal{L}_{f,x_1}$, the linear input combination (x_0, x_1) can be applied. This reduces the number of inputs of the gadget and the complexity of the computed function. We formalize our technique in Algorithm 3. Internally, we represent each monomial as a set of its inputs and each function as a set of monomials. Hence, we can represent a gadget (\mathcal{L}_{G_i} and \mathcal{L}_{G_o} in the algorithm) as a set of its output functions.

Finally, the result of the ANF processing method is a combination of gadgets and linear layers. A general structure is depicted in Figure 6. Initially, input layer L_{in} computes all linear input combinations which are fed to the gadgets computing all non-linear components. Different outputs of the i -th gadget are then linearly combined (through L_i). Finally, the output layer L_{out} linearly combines different gadgets outputs.

Limitations. As already stated, although the other previously discussed processing methods can be combined with different masking schemes, ANF is purely dedicated to GHPC and GHPC_{LL}. Hence, ANF can only generate first-order secure circuits. Similar to BDD, ANF generates a unique ANF of the outputs independent of the optimization level of the given netlist. Nevertheless, the result of ANF is not unique due to the probabilistic characteristic of simulated annealing. Hence, improvements in terms of area are possible by multiple executions of the tool while always selecting ANF as the processing method. In particular, the algorithms generate inefficient gadgets if the complexity of the secure zone grows. The given parameters for simulated annealing are suited for the optimization of typical S-boxes (up to 8-bit input and output sizes). Adjusting the parameters of simulated annealing could be helpful for more complex secure zones but can increase the runtime in return. Up to now, all gadgets are instantiated in parallel, leading to a fixed latency of two clock cycles for GHPC (resp. one cycle for GHPC_{LL}). On the other hand, the largest gadget cannot be smaller than dictated by the highest algebraic degree of the output functions.

As stated before, BDD and ANF can be constructed from various representations of the given circuit. For the sake of having a unique form for the inputs to AGEMA, we only process Verilog netlist of the synthesized circuit.

3.4 Optimization

Up to this point, we have explained how the secure zone is extracted from the netlist and how it can be translated to a masked circuit. Depending on the chosen processing method and the masking scheme and more importantly the initial netlist of the secure zone, the resulting masked circuit introduces additional latency (more clock cycles) to the circuit and demands for a high or low number of fresh masks. Further, the performance of the resulting circuit is heavily affected by the multiplexers of the secure zone (if any). We have already given an efficient way to realize an HPC-MUX in Section 3.1.5. However, it is commonly seen that the secure zone contains multiplexers whose select signal is not marked as secure, i.e., not masked. For example, a plaintext which is given as the primary input is loaded under certain conditions, e.g., when the reset signal is high (or low). As another example, different computations are performed in different clock cycles, e.g., last round of the cipher is different to the other rounds (e.g., MixColumns is missing in the last round of AES), or in a serialized architecture during some clock cycles the output of the S-box is taken, and in some other clock cycles that of the diffusion layer. In such cases, there is no need to mask and translate the multiplexer with an HPC-MUX. Similar to the XOR, which is secure under PINI notion, an ordinary (unmasked) MUX can be straightforwardly instantiated $d + 1$ times (for security order d). Note that security under the PINI notion requires every signal to have an independent sharing [CS20]. Hence, connecting corresponding shares of two masked signal to an ordinary MUX controlled by an insecure signal would not violate any security requirements. This would greatly improve the efficiency of the resulting masked circuit. As a side note, the synthesizer should be directed to make use of MUXes in such cases. If the functionality of a MUX is realized by Boolean gates (AND, OR, XOR, etc.) and the netlist of the secure zone is optimized (e.g., for area, latency, or power through the synthesizer), it would not be straightforward to detect the MUXes in the secure zone, and most likely the resulting circuit would suffer from a high number of added register stages and a high demand for fresh randomness.

3.5 Synchronization

Since masked gadgets often have internal register stage(s), after applying the selected masking scheme, the combinational part of the secure zone is not fully combinational anymore. Therefore, the circuit would not necessarily work properly. Hence, the circuit

should be adjusted to keep its correct functionality. We achieve this by two different techniques explained below.

Pipelining. We can add extra registers to synchronize all inputs of every gadget as well as all inputs of the main register stage. An example is shown in Figure 7(a), which is based on the circuit depicted in Figure 4. Each HPC2 gadget introduces two register stages. Hence, in order to synchronize the inputs of the HPC2-OR gate in Figure 7(a) we need to place two cascaded registers at its first input (those which are marked by the gray color). This procedure is done by synchronizing all inputs of each gadget processed in order of their logic depth. At the end, all inputs of the main register stage are also synchronized. For the example shown in Figure 7(a), four registers are placed in the normal zone to synchronize it with the output of the secure zone. This way, the circuit keeps its correct functionality while realizing a pipeline design with $p + 1$ stages if p register stages are added to the circuit (in the shown example, $p = 4$ as two HPC2 gadgets are cascaded, each with 2 register stages). Hence, the circuit can process $p + 1$ consecutive and independent inputs. We should highlight that the area overhead of the resulting circuit is relatively high, but it constructs a circuit with a high throughput due to its underlying pipeline architecture.

We should highlight that AGEMA is not able and does not try to detect control logic of the given circuit. As explained above, it just synchronizes all inputs of every gadget by instantiating register(s) at one of the inputs. The same is performed on the inputs of the main register stage in both secure and normal zones. This is adequate to build a fully-pipeline circuit with the same functionality as in the given unprotected circuit, but with p times higher latency. In other words, if the unprotected circuit has a latency of l clock cycles while processing a given input, the constructed pipeline masked counterpart has a latency of $(p + 1)l$ clock cycles while consecutively processes $p + 1$ given inputs. Note that this is dedicated to neither a certain implementation architecture nor a special handshaking fashion. This is a valid construction when the circuit is modeled in accordance with Section 2.6.

Clock Gating. In order to mitigate the area overhead of the former technique, we can make use of clock gating. More precisely, we need to make sure that the main register stage keeps its value until the computation of the secure zone is terminated. The same holds for the primary inputs. Hence, we do not add any extra registers to the circuit, but change the clock of the main register stage. This way, all internal registers of the gadgets are controlled by the main clock, whereas the main register stage is controlled by an added gated clock enabled once per evaluation of the secure zone. A circuit which is equivalent to the former example is shown in Figure 7(b). In order to keep the generality, a **clock gating** module is added to the design which can be adjusted based on the latency of the masked secure zone, i.e., p . To this end, the **clock gating** module instantiates a rotating shift register with $p + 1$ bits initialized by $1\{0\}^p$ using an added control signal **rst**. Hence, every $p + 1$ cycles the main register stage is clocked to proceed with the next round of the calculation of the secure zone. As a result, the latency of the clock-gated circuit is the same as the pipeline one, but it has a lower throughput as well as lower area overhead. More precisely, if the unprotected circuit has a latency of l clock cycles while processing a given input, the constructed clock-gating masked counterpart needs $(p + 1)l$ clock cycles to accomplish the processing of a single given input.

Similar to the pipelining, AGEMA does not analyze the circuit to detect any part related to control logic. We have developed a generic HDL code for the **clock gating** module with p as its input parameter. AGEMA just instantiates this module, adjusts p , and changes the clock of the main register stage to be provided by the **clock gating** module. This way, the circuit becomes equivalent to the given unprotected circuit, but with p times




Figure 7: Different architectures: pipeline versus clock gating for the secure zone of the exemplary circuit in Figure 4 processed by the Naive method using HPC2 masking scheme.

higher latency.

Note that since the primary inputs as well as the fresh masks (used by the gadgets) are only allowed to change once per evaluation cycle right after the main register stage is clocked, the clock gating module generates an additional output signal **synch** to let the outer modules synchronize. More precisely, a positive edge is seen on the **synch** signal which can be used to trigger the clock of random-number generator(s) to update the fresh masks.




Figure 8: General procedure of AGEMA to generate a masked circuit.

3.6 Finalize

Based on the explanations given above, the procedure that AGEMA follows to generate a masked design can be summarized in Figure 8. At the end, based on the settings defined by the designer (i.e., selected processing method, masking scheme, security order d , pipeline or clock-gated design) AGEMA generates a new netlist for the masked design, where – in addition to the unmasked cells of the unprotected design – gadgets are instantiated. However, the RTL of the gadgets (which support different security orders and pipelining feature as well) should be provided separately, which are indeed global and the same for every design. We already provided the HPC1, HPC2, GHPC, and GHPC_{LL} gadgets for the NOT, 2-input gates (AND, NAND, OR, NOR, XOR, XNOR), MUX and D flip-flop (can be found in the GitHub: <https://github.com/Chair-for-Security-Engineering/AGEMA>). If the designer wants to use any other gadget realizing any other gate, its specification should be defined in the AGEMA library (e.g., name and size of the ports, how many fresh masks are required, and how many cycles latency it has) and the RTL of the new corresponding gadget(s) should be provided. Hence, the generated netlist together with the RTL of the gadgets need to be synthesized for the target platform, e.g., any ASIC library or an FPGA.

4 Case Studies

In order to examine the efficiency and performance of circuits constructed by AGEMA, we evaluated several designs including different S-boxes and full cipher implementations under different settings, i.e., different security orders (up to 4th), various processing methods and different masking schemes.

4.1 S-boxes

We start with the 4-bit S-box of Skinny [BJK⁺16] and provide two different representations. In the first one, we straightforwardly implemented the S-box by a lookup table. The synthesizer translates such a behavior representation to a netlist, which is then given to AGEMA for further processing. For the second one, we followed the optimized representation provided in [CGLS21]. The corresponding results are given in Table 3 and Table 4 respectively. As the results are extensive and many tables are presented, all performance results are given in Appendix A. Note that all syntheses have been done using Synopsis Design Compiler and a NanGate 45 nm standard cell library. For these analyses, we covered all processing methods Naive, BDD_{SYLVAN}, and BDD_{CUDD} for masking scheme HPC2 at different security orders. For the sake of comparison, we covered HPC1 only for Naive method. ANF is also covered as a processing method where transformation into a secure design is only possible in combination with GHPC or GHPC_{LL} (see Table 1). The effect of the given netlist on the performance of the masked circuit can be easily seen in the results associated to Naive processing method. The (HPC2, Naive)-approach for the lookup table based S-box adds 10 clock cycles to the latency compared to 4 clock cycles for the

optimized S-box. ANF and BDD methods are actually not affected by the optimality of the given netlist as they reconstruct the netlist. Further, it can be seen that HPC1 leads to a lower area overhead while it certainly demands for more fresh randomness.

We repeated this procedure for the AES S-box. In addition to a lookup table based representation, we took the Canright version [Can05] and the optimized design presented in [BP12], which – in addition to the linear layers (isomorphisms) – has at most 4 cascaded 2-input AND gates, making it suitable for a masked design. Performance results are given in Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7. The effect of the optimality of the given netlist on the performance (area and latency) is even clearer compared to the former case study.

4.2 Full Ciphers

For the full cipher implementations, we cover the list given in Table 2. The performance results are shown in Tables 10-14 in Appendix A. For all such case studies, we considered the following facts.

- For all designs, we marked the plaintext/ciphertext and the key as secure for AGEMA. In other words, the resulting masked circuit receives all inputs (except the control signals, e.g., `clk` and `rst`) in a masked form with $d + 1$ shares and provides the output also with $d + 1$.
- If possible and available, we provided an optimized representation of the S-box. Above, we have given the source of such optimized designs for the Skinny and AES S-boxes. For PRESENT and LED, which share the same S-box, we took the optimized S-box representation from [CGLS21]. However, for Midori and CRAFT, which also share the same S-box, such representations are not available. Therefore, we represented the S-box by a lookup table. It can be seen in the performance results of CRAFT and Midori that the added latency (for Naive method) is higher compared to the other ciphers with an optimized 4-bit S-box.
- We hard-coded the multiplexers (controlled by Finite State Machine (FSM) or primary input control signals like `rst`) and directed the synthesizer to not optimize them (see Section 3.4). The same holds for XORs. If the XORs are also merged in other combinational circuits, the synthesizer may optimize in other directions, leading to a netlist with more (cascaded) non-linear gates.
- As explained in Section 3.3.2, BDD processing methods are not necessarily efficient for large combinational circuits when an optimized representation is available. This can be seen for Midori and CRAFT, where the S-box is based on a look-up table representation and BDD methods have the same latency overhead, while this does not hold true for the other ciphers, where an optimized representation of the S-box is given. Further, in AES round-based implementation, the round function, including 16 S-boxes followed by the MixColumns and 4 S-boxes of the KeySchedule, is too large to be processed by BDD methods.
- We reported two columns for the latency in Tables 10-14 in Appendix A. The “added latency” indicates the number of cycles which are added to each clock cycle of the unprotected implementation. The “full latency” is then calculated based on the added latency and the latency of the unprotected implementation. For example, the unprotected Skinny-64-64 round-based encryption needs 33 clock cycles to accomplish the encryption, and based on Table 10, the HPC2 Naive implementation adds 4 cycles latency. This results in the clock-gating implementation requiring $33 \times (1 + 4) = 165$ clock cycles for an encryption. The pipeline implementation has the same latency, but processes $4 + 1$ plaintexts consecutively in those 165 clock cycles. Hence, its throughput (ignoring the delay) stays the same as the unprotected implementation,

Table 2: Full cipher implementation case studies.

Cipher	Implementation	Reference
AES-128	Byte-serial and round-based encryption	[DR02]
Skinny64	Round-based encryption with 64-bit key	[BJK ⁺ 16]
CRAFT	Round-based encryption without tweak	[BLMR19]
PRESENT-80	Nibble-serial encryption	[BKL ⁺ 07]
LED-64	Round-based encryption	[GPPR11]
Midori-64	Round-based encryption/decryption	[BBI ⁺ 15]

but has certainly a considerably-higher area overhead compared to the clock-gating implementation.

4.3 Outcomes

Considering the shown case studies, the following conclusions can be made.

- It should be tried to provide an optimized unprotected implementation. Here, the optimization reflects the number of 2-input non-linear gates and how they are cascaded. A lower number of such gates would naturally reduce the number of required fresh mask bits, and a lower number of cascaded ones would lead to a lower number of added latency cycles. Note that area-optimized unprotected implementations, would not necessarily make optimized masked implementations (see Table 6).

For example, Canright’s design [Can05] has a lower area footprint compared to the design of Boyar and Peralta [BP12]. Although both designs have at most 4 cascaded 2-input non-linear gates, the construction of Canright instantiates more such gates. Hence, the masked implementations of both have the same number of added latency cycles, but the Canright construction demands for a higher number of fresh mask bits (Table 6 vs. Table 7).

- A suitable choice for the processing method depends on several factors mainly related to the designer’s goal(s). For instance, if the lowest latency is desired, ANF combined with GHPC and particularly GHPC_{LL} are the right choices, having in mind that such a low latency comes at the cost of a high area overhead and a high demand for fresh randomness while being restricted to only first-order security.

The benefit of the BDD processing methods lies on their independence to the optimality of the given unprotected implementation. Here, the amount of added latency cycles is defined by the number of primary inputs. For example, in the Skinny S-box, the primary input has 4 bits, hence 4 stages of MUXes are cascaded which results in 8 cycles of added latency when HPC2 gadgets are used. It can be seen that the number of added latency cycles shown in Tables 3-7 does not depend on the level of optimality of the unprotected implementation. There is still some differences between their required number of fresh mask bits which originates from the fact that by variable reordering in BDDs slightly different circuits are constructed.

When the number of required fresh masks is the key factor, our Naive method seems to be the best choice, given that the unprotected implementation is optimized with respect to the number of 2-input non-linear gates.

- With respect to the masking scheme, AGEMA currently supports HPC1, HPC2, GHPC and GHPC_{LL}⁶. Apart from the fact that the last two options just cover

⁶Any other customized gadget can be easily added to the library of AGEMA.

first-order security, HPC2 is preferred to HPC1 due to its lower number of required fresh mask bits. However, looking at the results shown in Tables 3-7, employing HPC1 in Naive method leads to lower area overhead, particularly for higher security orders.

- The effect of the latency overhead gets more obvious by considering the full cipher implementations since the number of added latency cycles are repeated at every evaluation cycle of the circuit. For a better understanding of this fact, we refer to Figure 1, where after application of AGEMA, the combinational part of the circuit (which is part of the sequential loop) requires the added latency cycles. Comparing the results of ANF (particularly when combined with GHPC_{LL}) with other processing methods in full cipher implementations highlights its extraordinary benefit with respect to the full latency.

In short, we should say that apart from the above observations, the designers can try different settings and examine which one fits the best to their needs. Having the netlist of the unprotected implementation in hand, generation of the masked design by AGEMA for each setting takes a couple of seconds. As explained in Section 3.6, the resulting design together with the RTL of the gadgets should be synthesized to obtain the final performance figures (area and delay). However, the number of added latency cycles and the amount of required fresh masks (which are known right after the generation of the masked circuit by AGEMA) already give an overview of the suitability of the constructed circuit.

The tool and all case studies are provided in the GitHub: <https://github.com/Chair-for-Security-Engineering/AGEMA>.

4.3.1 Comparison with Hand-Crafted Designs

As given in Section 1, manual construction of masked hardware is a time-consuming and error-prone process. Further, since such hand-crafted designs are usually not based on any composable security notion, the security of the final designs cannot be easily proven or even evaluated. It might be possible to examine the security of the constructed masked S-box using SILVER, but it is out of the feasibility bounds of such tools to examine the full cipher implementations. We can exemplarily refer to 2-share first-order masked AES S-box designs [GMK16, CRB⁺16], which can still be evaluated by SILVER, but not higher-order ones or those which make use of more than 2 shares [MPL⁺11, BGN⁺14, BGN⁺15, Sug19, GMK16, CRB⁺16]. Further, due to the aforementioned difficulty, to the best of our knowledge, no secure manually-crafted masked hardware design at third (or higher) order has been reported in literature. We are only aware of [GMK17] and [GSM17] which are based on DOM multiplier [GMK16], while its security at higher orders has been criticized in [MMSS19]. In contrast, the security of circuits constructed by AGEMA utilizing PINI gadgets is formally provable. More details are given in the next section.

Apart from such shortcomings and difficulties, manually-crafted designs are usually more efficient in terms of performance, i.e., area overhead, number of added latency cycles, and amount of required fresh masks. For example, several works have been published with the goal of minimizing the demand for fresh randomness in first-order masked AES S-box [BGN⁺14, BGN⁺15, Sug19, GMK16, CRB⁺16, SM20]. We have listed the performance figure of some manually-constructed full cipher implementations in the tables given in Appendix A.

5 Analyses

5.1 Theoretical

As explained in Section 2.4, the concept behind composable security implies that if standalone secure sub-circuits fulfill certain requirements, their composition would maintain the same level of security. Currently, PINI is known as the most efficient solution which defines such requirements. In other words, if sub-circuits, i.e., gadgets, are PINI secure under the (glitch-extended) probing model, and their interconnections do not intermix share domains, the composed circuit is also PINI secure under (glitch-extended) probing model. Note that not mixing the share domains predicates that output shares of a gadget are connected to the input shares of another gadget in the same order. For example, having (y^0, y^1, y^2) as the output shares of a gadget with 3 shares and (x^0, x^1, x^2) as the shares of an input of another gadget, the only valid interconnection is $(x^0, x^1, x^2) = (y^0, y^1, y^2)$.

Hence, as the first analysis step, we have examined our implementations of HPC1, HPC2, GHPC and GHPC_{LL} gadgets with SILVER [KSM20] and verified their PINI security under glitch-extended probing model. The gadgets include NOT, 2-input AND, NAND, OR, NOR, XOR, XNOR, and 2-to-1 MUX. We made VHDL/Verilog implementation of all gadgets parametric, i.e., the security order and whether a pipeline design is desired are easily set when instantiating such modules.

Further, since AGEMA makes use of deterministic algorithms to connect gadgets together, their accordance to PINI interconnections is guaranteed. Note that fullVerif [CGLS21] has been developed to examine this. More precisely, it receives a design where the PINI gadgets are annotated, and evaluates if their interconnections are valid, i.e., comply with the aforementioned no-mixing of share domains. For the sake of completeness, we verified the designs generated by AGEMA with fullVerif, indicating the compliance of their interconnections with that of PINI.

In addition to these analyses, by means of SILVER we confirmed the security of all masked Skinny S-boxes and some of the masked AES S-boxes given in Section 4.1 and listed in Tables 3-7 under the glitch-extended probing model. Note that since SILVER makes BDD of the given design to evaluate, it is restricted to small-size circuits. Therefore, we were not able to do the same for masked AES S-boxes at high security orders and also for full cipher implementations. Note that, analyzing the security of the constructed circuit using SILVER is a redundant step, since – as stated above – the security of such composed circuits is inherited from the employed PINI gadgets.

5.2 Experimental

As a common evaluation technique in the state of the art and for the sake of completeness, we additionally performed Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA)-based experimental analyses. Naturally, it is not possible to experimentally examine all designs reported as case study, and we contented ourselves with two exemplary designs of our masked Skinny round-based designs. As the first design, we selected the first-order GHPC ANF pipeline design, and as the second one the second-order HPC2 Naive pipeline design.

We made use of SAKURA-G [SAK] and implemented the selected designs on the target Spartan-6 FPGA to monitor the power consumption by a digital sampling oscilloscope at a sampling frequency of 500 MS/s. During the measurements the target design was driven by a stable 6 MHz clock. The fresh masks have also been generated internally (inside the target FPGA). For each required fresh mask bit we instantiated a 31-bit Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) with the feedback polynomial $x^{31} + x^{28} + 1$ initialized randomly⁷.

As the analysis scheme, we conducted the common and well-known TVLA [GJJR11], where the SCA leakages associated to a fixed input are compared to those associated to

⁷We have taken the FPGA-optimized LFSR design presented in [DMW18] which requires only three instances of 6-to-1 LUTs on Xilinx FPGAs.




Figure 9: FPGA-based fixed versus random t-test using 100 million traces, Skinny-64-64 round-based encryption, first-order GHPC ANF pipeline.




Figure 10: FPGA-based fixed versus random t-test using 100 million traces, Skinny-64-64 round-based encryption, second-order HPC2 Naive pipeline.

random inputs. In all our experiments, we kept the key constant and performed fixed-plaintext versus random-plaintext t-tests (at first, second, and third orders). Conducting such analyses using 100 million traces (for each design) led to the results shown in Figure 9 and Figure 10 for two aforementioned designs, respectively. As the first design expected to be only first-order secure (with 2 shares, $d = 1$), higher-order detected leakages are

expected, as it can also be seen in the corresponding figures. The second design should be secure up to the second order (with 3 shares, $d = 2$) and, as shown, no first- and no second-order leakage is detected, confirming the expected level of security.

6 Conclusions

In this work we introduced a comprehensive framework which we have developed for *automated generation of masked hardware* (AGEMA), allowing engineers and hardware designers of all levels of experience to easily create securely masked cryptographic hardware circuits. Based on the security and composability notion of PINI, our tool explores different processing techniques to transform any unprotected cryptographic design into a securely masked circuit using different masked gadgets as fundamental building blocks.

Demonstrating the benefits and limitations of our developed tool, we provide several case studies for well-established symmetric block ciphers, showing different performance trade-offs in terms of area overhead, latency increase, and fresh randomness demands based on our proposed transformation methodologies. Eventually, verifying the viability of our tool and the security of the resulting masked circuits, we perform practical experiments and evaluations that confirm our claims. For this, AGEMA is an important building block towards security-aware Electronic Design Automation (EDA), assisting in the automation process of creating secure ICs.

Apart from unique benefits and facilities that AGEMA offers, the intensive case studies, which we have provided in this article, highlight the importance of the employed gadgets with respect to their performance. The demands for fresh randomness and the latency of the constructed masked circuits heavily depend on the employed gadgets and their requirements. In terms of latency, GHPC_{LL} gadgets are the only known constructions with only a single additional register stage, but they are limited to only first-order security. In contrast, HPC2 gadgets, which can arbitrarily be adjusted to any security order, add two register stages to the circuit. This might be seen as just one more clock cycle, but as shown by our case studies, the latency of the resulting masked circuit is doubled compared to that with GHPC_{LL}. This difference is seen more clearly in implementation of ciphers which employ S-boxes with a high algebraic degree (i.e., a high number of cascaded non-linear gadgets). Naturally, more research in this area is required to fill the gap. More precisely, having HPC gadgets at arbitrary security orders with only one register stage even only for 2-input non-linear gates would greatly decrease the latency of the masked circuits and their area overheads.

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A Performance Results

Table 3: Synthesis results, Skinny S-box lookup-table representation.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	[cycle]
unprotected	–	–	0	42	0.20	0	0
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	962	0.39	64	1
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	1093	0.39	64	1
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	809	0.42	52	5
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	1172	0.41	52	5
GHPC	ANF		1	1270	0.53	4	2
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	1305	0.53	4	2
GHPC	Naive		1	1137	0.30	13	10
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	1870	0.29	13	10
HPC1	Naive		1	898	0.30	26	10
HPC1	Naive		2	1854	0.34	65	10
HPC1	Naive		3	3065	0.34	130	10
HPC1	Naive		4	4501	0.39	195	10
HPC1	Naive	✓	1	1488	0.29	26	10
HPC1	Naive	✓	2	2778	0.33	65	10
HPC1	Naive	✓	3	4323	0.33	130	10
HPC1	Naive	✓	4	6094	0.38	195	10
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	1083	0.34	17	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		2	2879	0.43	51	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		3	5535	0.52	102	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		4	9009	0.57	170	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	2306	0.34	17	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	2	5025	0.42	51	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	3	8792	0.51	102	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	4	13567	0.57	170	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	1307	0.36	21	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		2	3517	0.44	63	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		3	6789	0.52	126	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		4	11069	0.61	210	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	2748	0.35	21	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	2	6047	0.44	63	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	3	10650	0.51	126	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	4	16493	0.60	210	8
HPC2	Naive		1	847	0.35	13	10
HPC2	Naive		2	2236	0.42	39	10
HPC2	Naive		3	4287	0.47	78	10
HPC2	Naive		4	6968	0.56	130	10
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	1890	0.34	13	10
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	4055	0.41	39	10
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	7034	0.47	78	10
HPC2	Naive	✓	4	10790	0.55	130	10

Table 4: Synthesis results, Skinny S-box optimized representation.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	[cycle]
unprotected	–	–	0	40	0.20	0	0
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	962	0.39	64	1
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	1093	0.39	64	1
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	335	0.40	16	2
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	480	0.39	16	2
GHPC	ANF		1	1270	0.53	4	2
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	1305	0.53	4	2
GHPC	Naive		1	438	0.30	4	4
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	739	0.29	4	4
HPC1	Naive		1	365	0.26	8	4
HPC1	Naive		2	698	0.31	20	4
HPC1	Naive		3	1110	0.30	40	4
HPC1	Naive		4	1591	0.35	60	4
HPC1	Naive	✓	1	621	0.26	8	4
HPC1	Naive	✓	2	1101	0.30	20	4
HPC1	Naive	✓	3	1661	0.29	40	4
HPC1	Naive	✓	4	2289	0.34	60	4
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	1072	0.36	17	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		2	2862	0.43	51	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		3	5515	0.51	102	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		4	8979	0.59	170	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	2225	0.35	17	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	2	4906	0.42	51	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	3	8633	0.50	102	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	4	13366	0.59	170	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	1072	0.36	17	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		2	2862	0.42	51	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		3	5515	0.51	102	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		4	8979	0.60	170	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	2225	0.35	17	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	2	4906	0.42	51	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	3	8633	0.50	102	8
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	4	13366	0.59	170	8
HPC2	Naive		1	353	0.32	4	4
HPC2	Naive		2	818	0.39	12	4
HPC2	Naive		3	1489	0.44	24	4
HPC2	Naive		4	2351	0.52	40	4
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	747	0.31	4	4
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	1497	0.38	12	4
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	2498	0.43	24	4
HPC2	Naive	✓	4	3736	0.52	40	4

Table 5: Synthesis results, AES S-box lookup-table representation.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	[cycle]
unprotected	–	–	0	664	0.35	0	0
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	150409	0.57	2048	1
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	157377	1.11	2048	1
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	46476	0.50	3472	17
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	65708	0.49	3472	17
GHPC	ANF		1	135228	0.82	8	2
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	157808	0.92	8	2
GHPC	Naive		1	66226	0.40	868	34
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	104448	0.39	868	34
HPC1	Naive		1	50267	0.33	1736	34
HPC1	Naive		2	111763	0.37	4340	34
HPC1	Naive		3	190377	0.38	8680	34
HPC1	Naive		4	284043	0.42	13020	34
HPC1	Naive	✓	1	79087	0.32	1736	34
HPC1	Naive	✓	2	155064	0.36	4340	34
HPC1	Naive	✓	3	248114	0.36	8680	34
HPC1	Naive	✓	4	356210	0.41	13020	34
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	24841	0.55	406	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		2	68416	0.56	1218	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		3	132834	2.72	2436	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		4	216733	3.23	4060	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	53471	0.54	406	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	2	118318	0.55	1218	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	3	208765	0.69	2436	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	4	323122	0.78	4060	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	25077	0.52	410	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		2	69065	0.57	1230	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		3	134122	2.65	2460	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		4	218861	3.20	4100	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	53753	0.51	410	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	2	119134	0.55	1230	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	3	210328	0.69	2460	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	4	325669	0.79	4100	16
HPC2	Naive		1	46854	0.48	868	34
HPC2	Naive		2	137437	0.60	2604	34
HPC2	Naive		3	272327	0.82	5208	34
HPC2	Naive		4	449461	4.33	8680	34
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	105908	0.44	868	34
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	240470	0.58	2604	34
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	429483	0.67	5208	34
HPC2	Naive	✓	4	670365	0.76	8680	34

Table 6: Synthesis results, AES S-box Canright representation.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	[cycle]
unprotected	–	–	0	246	0.39	0	0
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	150409	0.57	2048	1
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	157377	1.11	2048	1
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	2606	0.58	160	4
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	3664	0.57	160	4
GHPC	ANF		1	135228	0.82	8	2
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	157808	0.92	8	2
GHPC	Naive		1	3514	0.51	40	8
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	5691	0.50	40	8
HPC1	Naive		1	2779	0.47	80	8
HPC1	Naive		2	5815	0.52	200	8
HPC1	Naive		3	9640	0.53	400	8
HPC1	Naive		4	14193	0.56	600	8
HPC1	Naive	✓	1	4527	0.46	80	8
HPC1	Naive	✓	2	8469	0.51	200	8
HPC1	Naive	✓	3	13199	0.51	400	8
HPC1	Naive	✓	4	18621	0.55	600	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	25157	0.53	707	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		2	69250	0.61	2121	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		3	134438	0.69	4242	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		4	219369	0.74	7070	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	54066	0.52	707	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	2	119631	0.60	2121	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	3	211082	0.69	4242	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	4	326842	0.78	7070	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	43210	0.73	714	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		2	119554	0.75	2142	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		3	232505	2.55	4284	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		4	379760	3.09	7140	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	91512	0.72	714	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	2	204100	0.73	2142	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	3	361667	0.71	4284	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	4	561181	0.77	7140	16
HPC2	Naive		1	2629	0.52	40	8
HPC2	Naive		2	7035	0.61	120	8
HPC2	Naive		3	13521	0.66	240	8
HPC2	Naive		4	21896	0.77	400	8
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	5765	0.51	40	8
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	12401	0.60	120	8
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	21577	0.66	240	8
HPC2	Naive	✓	4	33159	0.75	400	8

Table 7: Synthesis results, AES S-box optimized representation.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	[cycle]
unprotected	–	–	0	299	150	0	0
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	150409	0.57	2048	1
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	157377	1.11	2048	1
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	2311	1.41	136	4
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	3382	0.64	136	4
GHPC	ANF		1	135228	0.82	8	2
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	157808	0.92	8	2
GHPC	Naive		1	3074	1.09	34	8
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	5271	0.52	34	8
HPC1	Naive		1	2448	0.92	68	8
HPC1	Naive		2	5084	1.02	170	8
HPC1	Naive		3	8388	1.07	340	8
HPC1	Naive		4	12307	1.17	510	8
HPC1	Naive	✓	1	4263	0.40	68	8
HPC1	Naive	✓	2	7839	0.44	170	8
HPC1	Naive	✓	3	12085	0.44	340	8
HPC1	Naive	✓	4	16919	0.51	510	8
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	25161	2.08	411	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		2	69291	2.48	1233	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		3	134490	2.70	2466	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		4	219462	3.24	4110	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	54076	0.57	411	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	2	119704	0.63	1233	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	3	211169	0.69	2466	16
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	4	326936	0.77	4110	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	25072	2.08	410	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		2	69081	2.55	1230	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		3	134122	2.65	2460	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		4	218861	3.20	4100	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	53764	0.54	410	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	2	119135	0.63	1230	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	3	210328	0.69	2460	16
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	4	325669	0.79	4100	16
HPC2	Naive		1	2346	1.32	34	8
HPC2	Naive		2	6126	1.61	102	8
HPC2	Naive		3	11716	1.68	204	8
HPC2	Naive		4	18894	1.99	340	8
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	5339	0.51	34	8
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	11205	0.61	102	8
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	19217	0.68	204	8
HPC2	Naive	✓	4	29267	0.74	340	8

Table 8: Synthesis results, AES byte-serial encryption function.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency	
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	added	full
							[cycle]	
unprotected	–	–	0	3263	0.83	0	0	227
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	143778	2.67	2048	1	454
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	161922	2.67	2048	1	454
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	10056	2.34	136	4	1135
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	25656	0.91	136	4	1135
GHPC	ANF		1	146894	2.67	8	2	681
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	176509	2.83	8	2	681
GHPC	Naive		1	10818	1.73	34	8	2043
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	42078	0.91	34	8	2043
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	33124	2.56	414	16	3859
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	120293	1.16	414	16	3859
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	34173	2.64	431	16	3859
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	122566	0.97	431	16	3859
HPC2	Naive		1	10090	2.11	34	8	2043
HPC2	Naive		2	17649	2.66	102	8	2043
HPC2	Naive		3	27026	2.71	204	8	2043
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	42146	0.98	34	8	2043
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	65583	1.41	102	8	2043
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	91149	1.01	204	8	2043
[MPL ⁺ 11]	–		1	11114		48		266
[BGN ⁺ 14]	–		1	9102		44		246
[BGN ⁺ 15]	–		1	11221		44		246
[BGN ⁺ 15]	–		1	8119		32		246
[Sug19]	–		1	17100		0		266
[GMK16]	–		1	7600		28		216
[GMK16]	–		1	7100		18		246
[CRB ⁺ 16]	–		1	6681		54		276
[SM20]	–		1	7136	6.25	1		246
[SM20]	–		1	7707	6.25	0		246
[CBR ⁺ 15]	–		2	18600		126		276
[CRB ⁺ 16]	–		2	10449		162		276
[GMK17]	–		2	10000		54		246

Table 9: Synthesis results, AES round-based encryption function.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency	
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	added	full
							[cycle]	
unprotected	–	–	0	9906	1.85	0	0	11
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	52450	2.28	2720	4	55
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	98448	0.84	2720	4	55
GHPC	Naive		1	67193	1.48	680	8	99
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	160080	0.83	680	8	99
HPC2	Naive		1	52597	2.04	680	8	99
HPC2	Naive		2	131631	2.39	2040	8	99
HPC2	Naive		3	246924	2.53	4080	8	99
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	161440	0.82	680	8	99
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	305274	0.89	2040	8	99
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	492077	0.93	4080	8	99

Table 10: Synthesis results, Skinny-64-64 round-based encryption function.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency	
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	added	full
unprotected	–	–	0	1494	0.52	0	0	33
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	18705	0.85	1024	1	66
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	18789	0.85	1024	1	66
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	6817	0.48	256	2	99
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	12725	0.46	256	2	99
GHPC	ANF		1	22850	0.80	64	2	99
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	28850	0.80	64	2	99
GHPC	Naive		1	8260	0.46	64	4	165
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	20082	0.45	64	4	165
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	18832	1.95	280	16	561
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	68410	0.52	280	16	561
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	17969	1.96	262	16	561
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	66933	0.52	262	16	561
HPC2	Naive		1	6895	0.55	64	4	165
HPC2	Naive		2	15193	0.61	192	4	165
HPC2	Naive		3	26777	0.65	384	4	165
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	20210	0.53	64	4	165
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	36147	0.59	192	4	165
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	56096	0.63	384	4	165
[BJK ⁺ 16]	–	✓	1	4200	0.95	0		66
[SM21]	–	✓	2	10600	1.22	128		128

Table 11: Synthesis results, CRAFT round-based encryption function.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency	
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	added	full
unprotected	–	–	0	1066	0.58	0	0	32
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	15748	0.81	1024	1	64
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	17605	0.63	1024	1	64
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	15568	1.01	1024	4	160
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	25852	0.54	1024	4	160
GHPC	ANF		1	22106	0.75	64	2	96
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	27214	0.66	64	2	96
GHPC	Naive		1	21365	0.63	256	8	288
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	41951	0.54	256	8	288
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	14927	1.13	229	8	288
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	42451	0.55	229	8	288
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	17509	1.16	272	8	288
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	47785	0.55	272	8	288
HPC2	Naive		1	15680	0.94	256	8	288
HPC2	Naive		2	43172	1.03	768	8	288
HPC2	Naive		3	84024	1.12	1536	8	288
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	42367	0.55	256	8	288
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	87291	0.57	768	8	288
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	148316	0.50	1536	8	288
[BLMR19]	–	✓	1	5106	4.05	0		64

Table 12: Synthesis results, PRESENT nibble-serial encryption function.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency	
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	added	full
							[cycle]	
unprotected	–	–	0	1613	0.59	0	0	543
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	4727	0.89	64	1	1086
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	6734	0.68	64	1	1086
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	4143	1.03	16	2	1629
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	8061	0.59	16	2	1629
GHPC	ANF		1	5177	1.04	4	2	1629
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	8945	0.70	4	2	1629
GHPC	Naive		1	4245	0.68	4	4	2715
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	12095	0.59	4	4	2715
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	5180	1.26	22	8	4887
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	21966	0.59	22	8	4887
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	5245	1.30	23	8	4887
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	22064	0.59	23	8	4887
HPC2	Naive		1	4160	0.99	4	4	2715
HPC2	Naive		2	6478	1.13	12	4	2715
HPC2	Naive		3	8977	1.18	24	4	2715
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	12103	0.59	4	4	2715
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	18270	0.55	12	4	2715
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	24692	0.67	24	4	2715
[PMK ⁺ 11]	–		1	2282	4.61	0		565
[SM20]	–		1	1819	4.59	0		565
[SM21]	–		2	3800	2.04	8		666

Table 13: Synthesis results, LED-64 round-based encryption function.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency	
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	added	full
							[cycle]	
unprotected	–	–	0	2056	1.22	0	0	33
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	17382	1.84	1024	1	66
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	19893	1.38	1024	1	66
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	7611	2.03	256	2	99
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	13383	1.09	256	2	99
GHPC	ANF		1	22904	1.58	64	2	99
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	27309	1.23	64	2	99
GHPC	Naive		1	9056	1.60	64	4	165
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	20615	1.08	64	4	165
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	31416	2.97	469	16	561
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	96238	0.89	469	16	561
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	38243	3.02	598	16	561
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	110725	0.89	598	16	561
HPC2	Naive		1	7691	1.98	64	4	165
HPC2	Naive		2	16375	2.07	192	4	165
HPC2	Naive		3	28322	2.33	384	4	165
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	20743	1.07	64	4	165
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	36890	1.14	192	4	165
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	57021	1.18	384	4	165

Table 14: Synthesis results, Midori-64 round-based encryption/decryption function.

Masking Scheme	Processing Method	Pipeline	Order	Area	Delay	Rand.	Latency	
				[GE]	[ns]	[bit]	added [cycle]	full
unprotected	–	–	0	2035	0.97	0	0	17
GHPC _{LL}	ANF		1	19493	1.08	1024	1	34
GHPC _{LL}	ANF	✓	1	21986	0.94	1024	1	34
GHPC _{LL}	Naive		1	17679	1.10	1024	4	85
GHPC _{LL}	Naive	✓	1	32898	0.95	1024	4	85
GHPC	ANF		1	23901	1.05	64	2	51
GHPC	ANF	✓	1	30539	0.85	64	2	51
GHPC	Naive		1	23508	0.96	256	8	153
GHPC	Naive	✓	1	53893	0.95	256	8	153
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}		1	17162	1.29	231	8	153
HPC2	BDD _{CUDD}	✓	1	53478	0.95	231	8	153
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}		1	21123	1.27	304	8	153
HPC2	BDD _{SYLVAN}	✓	1	61576	0.95	304	8	153
HPC2	Naive		1	17801	1.10	256	8	153
HPC2	Naive		2	46371	1.21	768	8	153
HPC2	Naive		3	88246	1.27	1536	8	153
HPC2	Naive	✓	1	54309	0.95	256	8	153
HPC2	Naive	✓	2	105198	0.67	768	8	153
HPC2	Naive	✓	3	172179	0.69	1536	8	153
[MS16]	–	✓	1	7297	4.00	0		32
[SM20]	–	✓	1	7560	4.99	0		32
[SM21]	–	✓	2	15500	2.86	128		64

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