

The Boneh-Katz Transformation, Revisited: Pseudorandom/Obliviously-Samplable PKE from Lattices and Codes and Its Application

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Abstract. The Boneh-Katz transformation (CT-RSA 2005) converts a selectively-secure identity/tag-based encryption scheme into a public-key encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. We show that if the underlying primitives are pseudorandom, then the public-key encryption scheme obtained by the Boneh-Katz transformation is also pseudorandom. A similar result holds for oblivious sampleability (Canetti and Fischlin (CRYPTO 2001)). As applications, we can construct

- pseudorandom and obliviously-samplable public-key encryption schemes from lattices and codes,
- universally-composable non-interactive bit-commitment from lattices,
- public-key steganography which is steganographically secure against adaptive chosen-coverttext attacks and steganographic key-exchange from lattices and codes,
- anonymous authenticated key exchange from lattices and codes,
- public-key encryption secure against simulation-based, selective-opening chosen-ciphertext attacks from lattices and codes.

Keywords: Public-Key Encryption, Tag-Based Encryption, Post-Quantum Cryptography, the Boneh-Katz Transformation, Selective-Opening Security, Anonymity

1 Introduction

Public-key encryption (PKE) is the most basic primitive in asymmetric-key cryptography since it allows us to transmit data over the public channel securely if the receiver’s encryption key is available. There are several security notions and properties of PKE and the researchers exploited those to construct interesting primitives and protocols. One of the most basic security notions is indistinguishability (IND-security) which means that any efficient adversary cannot distinguish a ciphertext of a plaintext with another ciphertext of another plaintext [GM84].

Anonymity and pseudorandomness: Although indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attacks (IND-CPA/CCA security) ensures the confidentiality of contents [GM84, NY89, RS92], it does not imply anonymity and privacy of the receiver. Bellare, Boldyreva, Desai, and Pointcheval [BBDP01] defined indistinguishability of keys under chosen-plaintext/ciphertext attacks (IK-CPA/CCA security) to capture anonymity; in the security game, the adversary is, given two encryption keys, asked to determine which encryption key is used to encrypt a plaintext. This security notion has several applications: anonymous communication, anonymous authentication [CLO1], auction [Sak00], and so on.

We also note that pseudorandom PKE is related to anonymity. We say a PKE scheme is pseudorandom (PR-secure) if its ciphertext is indistinguishable from a random string from a set specified by the security parameter, encryption key, and the length of the message. We also say a PKE scheme is strongly-pseudorandom (SPR-secure) if the set is independent of an encryption key. It is easy to see that SPR-secure PKE scheme is anonymous. Pseudorandom PKE also has applications for public-key steganography and steganographic key exchange [vHo4], and backdoored pseudorandom generators (PRG) [DGG⁺15]. We also note that we have subliminal communication based on pseudorandom key-exchange [HPRV19], which can be constructed from PR-CPA-secure PKE if its encryption key is pseudorandom.

The constructions of SPR-CCA-secure PKE schemes from elliptic curves [Mölo4] and the DDH group [Hop05] are known. To the authors’ best knowledge, we have no *explicit* construction of post-quantum (S)PR-CCA-secure ones *in the standard model* except one from puncturable pseudorandom function (PRF) and indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) [SW14, LP15].

Oblivious sampleability: Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] introduced *oblivious sampleability* (*OS-security*), which is an enhancement of PR-security; oblivious sampleability requires (1) a ciphertext is indistinguishable from a random string generated by a sampling algorithm on input the encryption key and (2) an explanation algorithm to explain how one samples the random string, e.g., if a ciphertext consists of group elements, then the randomness used to make the group elements are required. Combining OS-CCA-secure PKE with trapdoor commitments, they obtain UC-secure non-interactive bit commitment against adaptive corruption without erasure [CF01]. We do not know whether every IND-CCA-secure PKE scheme is OS-CCA-secure or not¹.

This security notion is strongly related to efficiently-samplable and explainable (ESE) ciphertext space. See [FHKW10, LP15] for its application to simulation-based, sender selective-opening security against chosen-ciphertext attacks (SIM-SSO-CCA security) of PKE.

Although there are several OS-CCA-secure PKE/KEM schemes from number-theoretic assumptions (see [CF01, FHKW10, LP15]), we have no *explicit* construction of post-quantum OS-CCA-secure ones *in the standard model* except one from puncturable pseudo-random function PRF and iO [SW14, LP15].

1.1 Our Contribution

The Boneh-Katz transformation, revisited: We revisit the Boneh-Katz (BK) transformation [BK05, BCHK07], which obtains IND-CCA-secure PKE from selectively-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) (or tag-based encryption (TBE)), weakly-secure commitment, and secure message authentication code (MAC). We show that the BK transformation *preserves* pseudorandomness and oblivious sampleability: If the underlying primitives are pseudorandom and obliviously-samplable, then the PKE scheme obtained by the transformations is also pseudorandom and obliviously-samplable, respectively.

SPR-CCA/SOS-CCA-secure PKEs: Using the above theorem, we obtain SPR-CCA-secure and SOS-CCA-secure PKEs from lattices and codes with various parameter settings upon existing IBE/TBE schemes [CHKP12, ABB10, MP12, BBDQ18, DMN09, DMN12, KMP14, YZ16]. As a byproduct, we show the Kiltz-Masny-Pietrzak TBE scheme [KMP14] and the Yu-Zhang TBE scheme [YZ16] based on the LPN problems are indeed pseudorandom and obliviously-samplable without changing the assumptions.

Applications: Employing them, we then obtain

- non-interactive bit commitment that is adaptively UC-secure in the non-erasure model under a re-usable common reference string from lattices through [CF01],
- public-key steganography which is steganographically secure against adaptive chosen-coverttext attacks and steganographic key-exchange from lattice and codes through [Hop05, BL18]
- anonymous authenticated key exchange from lattices and codes through [FSXY15], and
- public-key encryption secure against simulation-based, selective-opening chosen-ciphertext attacks from lattices and codes through [LP15].

Note on the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) transformation: The Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK) transformation [BCHK07] allows us to obtain IND-CCA-secure PKE from selectively-secure identity-based encryption (IBE) (or tag-based encryption (TBE)) and one-time signature. Moreover, the CHK transformation preserves anonymity: See Paterson and Srinivasan [PS08] and Yoshida, Morozov, and Tanaka [YMT17].

Unfortunately, a PKE scheme obtained by the CHK transformation cannot be obliviously-samplable even if the underlying IBE/TBE is obliviously-samplable, since we can verify the one-time signature in the ciphertext of PKE. The random string should contain the verification key of one-time signature and signature on the ciphertext of IBE/TBE. Roughly speaking, we cannot explain the randomness of the key generation of one-time signature, because once this randomness is leaked, then we can forge any message under the verification key and may be able to mount chosen-ciphertext attacks.²

1.2 Related Works

Anonymous PKE: Bellare et al. [BBDP01] put forth the notion of anonymity of PKE and introduced indistinguishability of keys (IK-security). (See also Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL01] and Sako [Sak00].)

¹ Ishai et al. [IKOS10] refuted the hypothesis that every efficiently-samplable distribution has an invertible-sampling algorithm assuming the strong version of extractable OWF and NIWI proofs for all NP (or assuming non-interactively extractable OWF and NIZK proofs for all NP). Although this is not applicable to PKE, this is supporting evidence.

² If the underlying IBE/TBE is malleable, we modify the ciphertext of the IBE/TBE, sign it with the signing key of the one-time signature, and obtain a new valid ciphertext related to the challenge ciphertext.

Paterson and Srinivasan [PS08] defined Trusted Authority’s anonymity (TA anonymity) of IBE. They showed that if the underlying IBE scheme satisfies TA anonymity, then the PKE scheme obtained by the CHK transformation is also key-private. As we explained, this is not pseudorandom. They refer to the BK transformation but omit the detail. This work can be considered as the follow-up of the case of the BK transformation. We note that the anonymity of PKE is insufficient for UC-secure commitment and SIM-SSO-CCA-secure PKE.

Yoshida et al. [YMT17] proposed two anonymous code-based PKE schemes in the standard model through the CHK-like transformation, which are not pseudorandom.

Concurrently, Grubbs, Maram, and Paterson [GMP21] and Xagawa [Xag21] showed some KEMs of NIST PQC Round-3 candidates lead to anonymous (and robust) PKE. We note that their works are shown secure in the (quantum) random oracle model, while ours are in the standard model.

Obliviously-samplable PKE/KEM: Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] introduced the notion of *oblivious samplability* (OS-security) and its application to UC-secure commitment. They showed that the Cramer-Shoup PKE [CS98] over the subgroup $\mathbb{G} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_p^*$ of prime order $q \mid p - 1$ satisfies their requirements because we can *explain* how to generate a random element in \mathbb{G} . As far as we know, there is no explicit construction of post-quantum PKE scheme satisfying OS-CCA security in the standard model except one from puncturable PRF and iO [SW14, LP15]. Thus, this paper first gives a post-quantum OS-CCA-secure PKE scheme without iO.

Public-key steganography: Public-key steganography is formalized by von Ahn and Hopper [vHo4]. See Berndt and Liśkiewicz [BL18] for the survey. Backes and Cachin [BC05] studied public-key steganography against active attacks. Hopper [Hop05] also studied it and gave a construction of public-key steganography secure against adaptive chosen-coverttext attacks (SS-CCA-security) against a single channel from SPR-CCA-secure PKE. Berndt and Liśkiewicz [BL18] improved the constructions to achieve SS-CCA-secure public-key steganography against every memoryless channel from SPR-CCA-secure PKE, pseudorandom permutations (PRPs), and collision-resistant hash functions (CRHFs).

Since there are no explicit constructions of post-quantum SPR-CCA-secure PKE in the standard model, our result is the first construction of such public-key steganography in the standard model.

Anonymous AKE: We next consider anonymity of authenticated key exchange (AKE), that is, the anonymity of the participants from the outsider: The outsider obtains public keys of the participants and a transcript and try to determine whether the transcript is the results of the communications between the participants or not. In general, the signature-based AKE (e.g., the signed DH [DvW92, HC98, PQR21]), in which the messages are signed by the sender, is not anonymous from the outsider. This is because the outsider can verify the signatures in the transcripts with the participants’ public keys. So, one might need to encrypt signatures to get anonymity.

On the other hand, KEM-based AKEs [BCGNP09, FSXY13, FSXY15, SSW20] could achieve anonymity from the outsider. Roughly speaking, in the KEM-based AKEs, the first message consists of pk_{tmp} and $ct_{A \rightarrow B}$ and the second message consists of ct_{tmp} and $ct_{B \rightarrow A}$, where pk_{tmp} is the encapsulation key of KEM, $ct_{A \rightarrow B}$ is a ciphertext of KEM under Bob’s encapsulation key, ct_{tmp} is a ciphertext of KEM under pk_{tmp} , and $ct_{B \rightarrow A}$ is a ciphertext of KEM under Alice’s encapsulation key. Thus, it achieves anonymity if the underlying KEMs are key-private or pseudorandom. Moreover, such KEM-based AKE can achieve *weak* offline deniability.³

Recently, a new AKE is proposed by Hashimoto, Katsumata, Kwiatkowski, and Prest [HKKP21], which is a hybrid of signature-based AKE and KEM-based AKE.⁴ If the underlying PKEs are key-private and pseudorandom, then it achieves anonymity and weak offline deniability. They discuss how to achieve ‘weak deniability’ using stronger primitives [HKKP21, Section 6].

SIM-SSO-CCA PKE: We review PKE schemes satisfying simulation-based, sender-selective-opening security against chosen-ciphertext attack (SIM-SSO-CCA security in short). We omit the constructions in the (quantum) random oracle model or (quantum) ideal cipher model [HJKS15, HP16, SS19].

³ The offline deniability [DGK06] requires any PPT judge cannot distinguish simulated transcripts from transcripts where one of the parties may be malicious. Here, ‘weak’ means that any PPT judge cannot distinguish simulated transcripts from *honestly-generated transcripts*.

⁴ Very roughly speaking, the first message consists of pk_{tmp} and the second message consists of $ct_{B \rightarrow A}$, ct_{tmp} , and c , where pk_{tmp} is the encapsulation key of KEM, ct_{tmp} is a ciphertext of KEM under pk_{tmp} , $ct_{B \rightarrow A}$ is a ciphertext of KEM under Alice’s encapsulation key, and c is a masked ciphertext of the signature signed by Bob.

Constructions from lossy primitives: Hemenway, Libert, Ostrovsky, and Vergnaud [HLOV11] proposed lossy encryption and showed that PKE scheme satisfying indistinguishability-based, sender-selective-opening security against chosen-ciphertext attack (IND-SSO-CCA security in short) can be constructed from a ‘separable’ TBE scheme satisfying a weak variant of IND-SSO-CCA security (IND-SSO-st-wCCA security) with chameleon hash following Zhang’s T1 [Zha07] and commented that the CHK conversion fails because it uses one-time signature. They constructed a ‘separable’ IND-SSO-st-wCCA-secure TBE scheme from lossy trapdoor function (LTF) and all-but- N function. Hofheinz [Hof12] proposed all-but-many lossy trapdoor functions (ABM LTFs) based on DCR or pairing and use them to construct SIM-SSO-CCA-secure PKE schemes with compactness or tighter security, respectively. Boyen and Li [BL17] proposed ABM LTF from LWE and constructed an IND-SSO-CCA-secure PKE scheme by using their ABM LTFs. Libert, Sakzad, Stehlé, Steinfeld [LSSS17] also proposed ABM LTF from LWE, constructed an IND-SSO-CCA-secure PKE scheme by using their ABM LTFs, and then enhanced it into a SIM-SSO-CCA-secure PKE scheme. Lyu, Liu, Han, and Gu [LLHG18] gave a SIM-SSO-CCA-secure PKE scheme based on the matrix DDH assumption with a tighter security reduction. Lai, Liu, and Wang [LLW20] improved ABM LTFs with polynomial modulus from LWE.

Constructions with cross-authentication codes (XACs): Fehr, Hofheinz, Kiltz, and Wee [FHKW10] constructed a SIM-SSO-CCA-secure PKE by using extended hash proof systems with collision-resistant hash functions and cross-authentication codes (XAC). As pointed out in [HLQ13, HLQC13], a stronger property of XAC is required to make this proof rigorous. Liu and Paterson [LP15] constructed a SIM-SSO-CCA secure PKE scheme using a special KEM scheme and strengthened XAC. They constructed special KEM schemes from hash proof systems, from n -linear assumption, and from indistinguishability obfuscation (iO) and a special puncturable PRF. Libert et al. [LSSS17] wrote “So far, the only known method [LP15] to attain the same security notion under quantum-resistant assumptions was to apply a generic construction where each bit of plaintext requires a full key encapsulation (KEM) using a CCA2-secure KEM.” However, there is a gap between the special KEM in [LP15] and known post-quantum IND-CCA-secure KEM schemes, which we fill in this paper. Moreover, as far as we know, there is no explicit SIM-SSO-CCA construction from LPN and codes. a

1.3 Organization

We review notations and cryptographic schemes in [section 2](#). We review the Boneh-Katz transformation and prove its pseudorandomness and oblivious sampleability in [section 3](#). We discuss how to instantiate applications through PR-CCA-secure/OS-CCA-secure PKE in [section 4](#). In appendix, we review the LPN-related assumptions [section B](#), review the Kiltz-Masny-Pietrzak TBE scheme and the Yu-Zhang TBE scheme and prove their PR-CCA-security in [section C](#) and [section D](#), respectively.

2 Definitions

Notations: A security parameter is denoted by κ . We use the standard O -notations. DPT and PPT stand for deterministic polynomial time and probabilistic polynomial time. A function $f(\kappa)$ is said to be *negligible* if $f(\kappa) = \kappa^{-\omega(1)}$. We denote a set of negligible functions by $\text{negl}(\kappa)$. For a distribution χ , we often write “ $x \leftarrow \chi$,” which indicates that we take a sample x according to χ . For a finite set S , $U(S)$ denotes the uniform distribution over S . We often write “ $x \leftarrow S$ ” instead of “ $x \leftarrow U(S)$.” For a set S and a deterministic algorithm A , $A(S)$ denotes the set $\{A(x) \mid x \in S\}$. If inp is a string, then “ $\text{out} \leftarrow A(\text{inp})$ ” denotes the output of algorithm A when run on input inp . If A is deterministic, then out is a fixed value and we write “ $\text{out} := A(\text{inp})$.” We also use the notation “ $\text{out} := A(\text{inp}; r)$ ” to make the randomness r explicit.

For a statement P (e.g., $r \in [0, 1]$), we define $\text{bool}(P) = 1$ if P is satisfied and 0 otherwise.

Efficiently-samplable and explainable domain: A domain \mathcal{D} is said to be *efficiently samplable and explainable (ESE)* [FHKW10] if there are two PPT algorithms defined as follows:

- $\text{Sample}(\mathcal{D}; \rho)$: On input domain \mathcal{D} and random coins $\rho \leftarrow \mathcal{R}$, this algorithm outputs an element x according to the uniform distribution over \mathcal{D} .
- $\text{Sample}^{-1}(\mathcal{D}, x)$: On input domain \mathcal{D} and any $x \in \mathcal{D}$, this algorithm outputs ρ that is uniformly distributed over the set $\{\rho \in \mathcal{R} \mid \text{Sample}(\mathcal{D}; \rho) = x\}$.

For example, $\mathcal{D} = \{0, 1\}^k$ is ESE with $\rho = \text{Sample}(\mathcal{D}; \rho) = \text{Sample}^{-1}(\mathcal{D}, \rho)$. Damgård and Nielsen [DN00] showed that any dense subset of an efficiently samplable domain is ESE if the dense subset allows an efficient membership test.

2.1 Public-Key Encryption (PKE)

The model for PKE schemes is summarized as follows:

- Definition 2.1.** A PKE scheme PKE consists of the following triple of PPT algorithms $(\text{Gen}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}})$.
- $\text{Gen}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow (ek, dk)$: a key-generation algorithm that on input 1^κ , where κ is the security parameter, outputs a pair of keys (ek, dk) . ek and dk are called the encryption key and decryption key, respectively.
 - $\text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(ek, m) \rightarrow c$: an encryption algorithm that takes as input encryption key ek and message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and outputs ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
 - $\text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}}(dk, c) \rightarrow m/\perp$: a decryption algorithm that takes as input decryption key dk and ciphertext c and outputs message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ or a rejection symbol $\perp \notin \mathcal{M}$.

Definition 2.2 (Correctness). We say $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}})$ has perfect correctness if for any (ek, dk) generated by Gen_{PKE} and for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, we have

$$\Pr[c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(ek, m) : \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}}(dk, c) = m] = 1.$$

Security Notions: We review indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) [RS92, BDPR98], pseudorandom under chosen-ciphertext attacks (PR-CCA) (as known as IND\\$-CCA) [vHo4, Hop05], oblivious sampleability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (OS-CCA) [CF01] and their strong versions (SPR-CCA and SOS-CCA) for PKE.

In order to define oblivious sampleability, we introduce two additional algorithms, Rnd_{PKE} and Expl_{PKE} : Rnd_{PKE} takes an encryption key ek , a length of message 0^ℓ , and randomness $\rho \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{Rnd}_{\text{PKE}}, ek, \ell}$ and outputs $c \in \mathcal{C}$; Expl_{PKE} takes ek and $c \in \mathcal{C}$ and outputs a randomness ρ . Roughly speaking, we say a PKE scheme is obviously samplable if there exist Rnd_{PKE} and Expl_{PKE} that a dummy ciphertext c generated by Rnd_{PKE} with randomness ρ and a real ciphertext c^* of m^* and corresponding fake randomness ρ^* generated by Expl_{PKE} are indistinguishable.

Definition 2.3 (Security notions for PKE). Let $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{M}}$ be a distribution over the message space \mathcal{M} . For any adversary \mathcal{A} , we define its IND-CCA, PR-CCA, and OS-CCA advantages against a PKE scheme $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}})$ and two additional PPT algorithms Rnd_{PKE} and Expl_{PKE} as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa) &:= \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right|, \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-cca}}(\kappa) &:= \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-cca}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-cca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right|, \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}}(\kappa) &:= \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right|, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}, b}(\kappa)$, $\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-cca}, b}(\kappa)$, and $\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}, b}(\kappa)$ are experiments described in Figure 1. We say that PKE is IND-CCA-secure, PR-CCA-secure, and OS-CCA-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}}(\kappa)$, $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-cca}}(\kappa)$, and $\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , respectively.

We also say that PKE is SPR-CCA-secure if it is PR-CCA-secure and its ciphertext space \mathcal{C} depends on only κ and is independent from ek . We also say that PKE is SOS-CCA-secure if it is OS-CCA-secure and its additional algorithms take 1^κ instead of ek as a part of input.

Remark 2.1. We note that if a PKE scheme is PR-CCA-secure and its ciphertext space \mathcal{C} is ESE, then the PKE scheme is OS-CCA-secure.

2.2 Tag-Based Encryption (TBE)

MacKenzie, Reiter, and Yang [MRY04] introduced a notion of *tag-based encryption* (TBE). They show that applying the CHK transformation to TBE results in IND-CCA-secure PKE independently.

The model for TBE schemes is summarized as follows:

- Definition 2.4.** A TBE scheme TBE consists of the following triple of PPT algorithms $(\text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}})$.
- $\text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow (ek, dk)$: a key-generation algorithm that on input 1^κ , where κ is the security parameter, outputs a pair of keys (ek, dk) . ek and dk are called the encryption key and decryption key, respectively.
 - $\text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek, \tau, m) \rightarrow c$: an encryption algorithm that takes as input encryption key ek , tag $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$, and message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ and outputs ciphertext $c \in \mathcal{C}$.
 - $\text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk, \tau, c) \rightarrow m/\perp$: a decryption algorithm that takes as input decryption key dk , tag τ , and ciphertext c and outputs message $m \in \mathcal{M}$ or a rejection symbol $\perp \notin \mathcal{M}$.

Definition 2.5 (Correctness). We say $\text{TBE} = (\text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}})$ has perfect correctness if for any (ek, dk) generated by Gen_{TBE} , for any tag $\tau \in \mathcal{T}$ and for any $m \in \mathcal{M}$, we have

$$\Pr[c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek, \tau, m) : \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk, \tau, c) = m] = 1.$$

$\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-cca}, b}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-cca}, b}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}, b}(\kappa)$
$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\kappa)$	$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\kappa)$	$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{PKE}}(1^\kappa)$
$(m_0, m_1, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{DEC}_\perp(\cdot)}(ek)$	$(m, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{DEC}_\perp(\cdot)}(ek)$	$(m, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{DEC}_\perp(\cdot)}(ek)$
$c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(ek, m_b)$	$c_0^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(ek, m)$	$c_0^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(ek, m)$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\text{DEC}_{c^*}(\cdot)}(c^*, st)$	$c_1^* \leftarrow C_{ek}$	$\rho_0^* \leftarrow \text{Expl}_{\text{PKE}}(ek, c_0^*)$
return b'	$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\text{DEC}_{c_b^*}(\cdot)}(c_b^*, st)$	$\rho_1^* \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\text{Rnd}_{\text{PKE}}, ek, m }$
<hr/>	return b'	$c_1^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{PKE}}(ek, 0^{ m }; \rho_1^*)$
$\text{DEC}_a(c)$		$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\text{DEC}_{c_b^*}(\cdot)}(c_b^*, \rho_b^*, st)$
if $c = a$, return \perp		return b'
$m := \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}}(dk, c)$		
return m		

Fig. 1. Games for PKE schemes

Security Notions: We review indistinguishability under selective-tag and weak chosen-ciphertext attacks IND-ST-WCCA [Kil06]. In addition, we define PR-ST-WCCA and OS-ST-WCCA by using Rnd_{TBE} and Expl_{TBE} . In order to define oblivious sampleability, we introduce two additional algorithms, Rnd_{TBE} and Expl_{TBE} : Rnd_{TBE} takes an encryption key ek , a length of message 0^ℓ , and randomness $\rho \in \mathcal{R}_{\text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}, ek, \ell}$ and outputs $c \in C$; Expl_{TBE} takes ek and $c \in C$ and outputs a randomness ρ .

Definition 2.6 (Security notion for TBE). For any adversary \mathcal{A} , we define its IND-ST-WCCA and OS-ST-WCCA advantages against a TBE scheme $\text{TBE} = (\text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}})$ with additional PPT algorithms Rnd_{TBE} and Expl_{TBE} as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-st-wcca}}(\kappa) &:= \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-st-wcca}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-st-wcca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right|, \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}}(\kappa) &:= \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right|, \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}}(\kappa) &:= \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right|, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-st-wcca}, b}(\kappa)$, $\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}, b}(\kappa)$, and $\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}, b}(\kappa)$ are experiments described in Figure 2.

We say that TBE is IND-ST-WCCA-secure, PR-ST-WCCA-secure, and OS-ST-WCCA-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-st-wcca}}(\kappa)$, $\text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}}(\kappa)$, and $\text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}}(\kappa)$ are negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , respectively.

We also say that TBE is SPR-ST-WCCA-secure if it is PR-ST-WCCA-secure and its ciphertext space C depends on only κ and is independent from ek . We also say that TBE is SOS-ST-WCCA-secure if it is OS-ST-WCCA-secure and its additional algorithms take 1^κ instead of ek .

Remark 2.2. Again, we note that if a TBE scheme is PR-ST-WCCA-secure and its ciphertext space C is ESE, then the TBE scheme is OS-ST-WCCA-secure.

2.3 Weak Commitment also known as Encapsulation

Boneh et al. introduced the concept of encapsulation [BCHKo7], which is a weak variant of commitment [Blu81] and we here call it *weak commitment*. Weak commitment is summarized as follows:

Definition 2.7. A weak commitment scheme wCom consists of the following triple of PPT algorithms (Init, S, R) :

- $\text{Init}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow pp$: an initialization algorithm that takes on input 1^κ , where κ is the security parameter, and outputs a string pp .
- $S(1^\kappa, pp) \rightarrow (r, com, dec)$: a sender algorithm that takes as input 1^κ and pp and outputs (r, com, dec) with $r \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$, where we refer to com as the commitment string and dec as the decommitment string.
- $R(pp, com, dec) \rightarrow r/\perp$: a receiver algorithm that takes as input (pp, com, dec) and outputs $r \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ or a rejection symbol $\perp \notin \{0, 1\}^\kappa$.

Definition 2.8 (Correctness). We say $\text{wCom} = (\text{Init}, S, R)$ has perfect correctness if for any pp generated by Init , we have

$$\Pr[(r, com, dec) \leftarrow S(1^\kappa, pp) : R(pp, com, dec) = r] = 1.$$

$\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{ind-st-wcca}, b}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}, b}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}, b}(\kappa)$
$(\tau^*, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(1^\kappa)$	$(\tau^*, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(1^\kappa)$	$(\tau^*, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(1^\kappa)$
$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^\kappa)$	$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^\kappa)$	$(ek, dk) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^\kappa)$
$(m_0, m_1, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{Dec}_{\tau^*}(\cdot)}(ek, st)$	$(m, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{Dec}_{\tau^*}(\cdot)}(ek, st)$	$(m, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1^{\text{Dec}_{\tau^*}(\cdot)}(ek, st)$
$c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek, \tau^*, m_b)$	$c_0^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek, \tau^*, m)$	$c_0^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek, \tau^*, m)$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\text{Dec}_{\tau^*}(\cdot)}(c^*, st)$	$c_1^* \leftarrow C$	$\rho_0^* \leftarrow \text{Expl}_{\text{TBE}}(ek, c_0^*)$
return b'	$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\text{Dec}_{\tau^*}(\cdot)}(c_b^*, st)$	$\rho_1^* \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}, ek, m }$
$\text{Dec}_{\tau^*}(\tau, c)$	return b'	$c_1^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek, 0^{ m }; \rho_1^*)$
if $\tau = \tau^*$, return \perp		$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2^{\text{Dec}_{\tau^*}(\cdot)}(c_b^*, \rho_b^*, st)$
$m := \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk, \tau, c)$		return b'
return m		

Fig. 2. Games for TBE schemes

We review the definitions of hiding property and binding property [BCHKo7]. We here only require binding for *honestly generated commitments*. In addition, we define oblivious sampleability of weak commitment by using Rnd_{wCom} and $\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}$. We also define non-invertibility, which states it is hard to generate meaningful decommitment for obliviously-sampled com and ρ .

Definition 2.9. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , we define its four advantages against an encapsulation scheme $\text{wCom} = (\text{Init}, S, R)$ and two PPT algorithms $(\text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}, \text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}})$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{hiding}}(\kappa) &:= \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{hiding}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{hiding}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right|, \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa) &:= \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa) = 1], \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa) &:= \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right|, \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{non-inv}}(\kappa) &:= \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{non-inv}}(\kappa) = 1], \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{hiding}, b}(\kappa)$, $\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa)$, $\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}, b}(\kappa)$, and $\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{non-inv}}(\kappa)$ are experiments described in Figure 3.

We say that wCom is secure if $\text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{hiding}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa)$ are negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} . We also say that wCom is OS-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} . We also say that wCom is non-invertible if $\text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{non-inv}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} .

Concrete construction: Let $\mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}} = \{H_s : \{0, 1\}^{k_1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k\}$ be a family of universal one-way hash function (UOWHF) and let $\mathcal{H} = \{h : \{0, 1\}^{k_1} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k\}$ be a family of pairwise-independent hash function. Let $k_1 = 2k + \delta$. Boneh and Katz [BKo5] gave a concrete construction of weak commitments from them as follows:

- $\text{Init}(1^\kappa)$: choose H_s and h and output $pp = (h, s)$.
- $S(pp)$: take $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$ and output $(r, com, dec) = (h(x), H_s(x), x)$.
- $R(pp, com, dec)$: output $h(dec)$ if $H_s(dec) = com$ and \perp otherwise.

We require the following properties:

- H_s is universal one-way for the binding property. (See [BCHKo7, Theorem 4].)
- $2 \cdot 2^{\frac{2k-k_1}{3}} = 2^{-\delta/3+1}$ is negligible in the security parameter for the hiding property. (See [BCHKo7, Theorem 4].)
- $H_s(U(\{0, 1\}^{k_1}))$ is pseudorandom for the OS property. See Lemma 2.1 below.
- $H_s(U(\{0, 1\}^{k_1}))$ is pseudorandom and one-way for the non-invertible property. See Lemma 2.2 below.

We have several instantiating way of H_s .

- The easiest way is employing the standard hash functions, say, $H_s(x) = \text{SHA3-256}(s, x)$. This keyed function is collision-resistant; and it is reasonable to assume that $(s, H_s(u))$ with $u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$ is close to uniform.

$\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{hidng}, b}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa)$
$pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^\kappa)$	$pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^\kappa)$
$(r_0, \text{com}, \text{dec}) \leftarrow S(1^\kappa, pp)$	$(r, \text{com}, \text{dec}) \leftarrow S(1^\kappa, pp)$
$r_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$	$\text{dec}' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, pp, \text{com}, \text{dec})$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, pp, \text{com}, r_b)$	$r' \leftarrow R(pp, \text{com}, \text{dec}')$
return b'	return $\text{boole}(r' \notin \{\perp, r\})$
$\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}, b}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{non-inv}}(\kappa)$
$pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^\kappa)$	$pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^\kappa)$
$(r_0, \text{com}_0, \text{dec}_0) \leftarrow S(1^\kappa, pp)$	$\rho \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}, pp}$
$\rho_0 \leftarrow \text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(pp, \text{com}_0)$	$\text{com} \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}(pp; \rho)$
$\rho_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}, pp}$	$\text{dec} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, pp, (\text{com}, \rho))$
$\text{com}_1 \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}(pp; \rho_1)$	$r \leftarrow R(pp, \text{com}, \text{dec})$
$b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, pp, (\text{com}_b, \rho_b))$	return $\text{boole}(r \neq \perp)$
return b'	

Fig. 3. Games for weak commitment schemes

- (From lattices:) for example, Ajtai’s hash function from lattices is collision-resistant if SIS is hard [Ajt96, GGH96]. This hash function is strongly universal (see e.g., Regev [Rego9, Section 5]) and, thus, pseudorandom.
- (From codes:) for example, we can use the Expand-then-Shrink hash function as known as FSB [AFSo5, BLVW19, YZW⁺19]. Let $k_1 = k'_1 \cdot w$ and $m = k'_1 \cdot 2^w$ for some w . Let e_i is the i -th unit vector of dimension 2^w . The hash function is defined as $h_{\mathbf{M}}(x) = \mathbf{M} \cdot \text{Expand}(x)$, where $\mathbf{M} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_2^{k \times m}$ and $\text{Expand}(x) = e_{\text{int}(x_1)} \parallel \dots \parallel e_{\text{int}(x_{k'_1})} \in \mathbb{Z}_2^m$ with $x = x_1 \parallel \dots \parallel x_{k'_1}$ for each $x_i \in \mathbb{Z}_2^w$. Brakerski et al. [BLVW19] and Yu et al. [YZW⁺19] showed that their hash functions are collision-resistant assuming the extremely low-noise LPN. We can show its pseudorandomness by assuming the hash function is one-way by applying the result of Mol and Micciancio [MM11], which states pseudorandomness of $(g, \sum_i x_i \cdot g_i)$ with $g \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^m$ and $x \leftarrow \mathcal{X}$, where \mathcal{X} is an arbitrary distribution over $\{0, 1\}^m$, if $(g, f_g(x))$ is one-way.

Lemma 2.1. *Suppose that $(H_s, H_s(x))$ is computationally indistinguishable from (H_s, u) , where $H_s \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}, x} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$, and $u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$. Then, the scheme is obviously sampleable with $\mathcal{R}_{\text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}, pp} = \{0, 1\}^k$, $\text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}(pp, \cdot)$ and $\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(pp, \cdot)$ are the identity function over $\{0, 1\}^k$.*

Proof. We consider the following three games:

- Game 0: $H_s \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}}$, $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$, $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$, $\text{com}_0 \leftarrow H_s(x)$, and $\rho_0 \leftarrow \text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(pp, \text{com}_0) = \text{com}_0$. Output $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, (H_s, h), (\text{com}_0, \rho_0))$.
- Hybrid: $H_s \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}}$, $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$, $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$, $\text{com} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$, and $\rho \leftarrow \text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(pp, \text{com}) = \text{com}$. Output $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, (H_s, h), (\text{com}, \rho))$.
- Game 1: $H_s \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}}$, $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$, $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$, $\rho_1 \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$, and $\text{com}_1 \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}(pp, \rho_1) = \rho_1$. Output $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, (H_s, h), (\text{com}_1, \rho_1))$.

We suppose that $(H_s, H_s(x))$ is computationally indistinguishable from (H_s, u) , where $H_s \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}, x} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$, and $u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$. Thus, it is easy to see that Game 0 and Hybrid are computationally indistinguishable. It is obvious that Hybrid and Game 1 are equivalent. Hence, the lemma follows. \square

Lemma 2.2. *Suppose that $(H_s, H_s(x))$ is computationally indistinguishable from (H_s, u) , where $H_s \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}, x} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$, and $u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$. Moreover, suppose that H_s is one-way. Then, the scheme is non-invertible.*

Proof. We consider the following two games:

- Game 0: $H_s \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}}$, $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$, $\rho \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$, and $\text{com} \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}(pp, \rho) = \rho$. $\text{dec} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, (H_s, h), (\text{com}, \rho))$. Output 1 if $H_s(\text{dec}) = \text{com}$ and 0 otherwise.
- Game 1: $H_s \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}}$, $h \leftarrow \mathcal{H}$, $x \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$, $\text{com} \leftarrow H_s(x)$, and $\rho \leftarrow \text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(pp, \text{com}) = \text{com}$. $\text{dec} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa, (H_s, h), (\text{com}, \rho))$. Output 1 if $H_s(\text{dec}) = \text{com}$ and 0 otherwise.

Game 0 is $\text{Expt}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{non-inv}}(\kappa)$. In the hypothesis, we suppose that $(H_s, H_s(x))$ is computationally indistinguishable from (H_s, u) , where $H_s \leftarrow \mathcal{H}_{\text{uow}, x} \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{k_1}$, and $u \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$. Thus, it is easy to see that Game 0 and Game 1 are computationally indistinguishable. Moreover, it is easy to verify that there exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{ow} breaking one-wayness of H_s whose advantage is equivalent to $\Pr[\mathcal{A} \text{ wins Game 1}]$. Now, the lemma follows. \square

$\text{Expt}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{seuf-ot-cma}}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}, b}(\kappa)$
$r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa, (\mu, \sigma) \leftarrow (\perp, \perp)$ $(\mu^*, \sigma^*) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{TAG}(\cdot)}(1^\kappa)$ $d \leftarrow \text{V}(r, \mu^*, \sigma^*)$ $p \leftarrow \text{boole}((\mu, \sigma) \neq (\mu^*, \sigma^*))$ return $p \wedge d$	$r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ $(\mu^*, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_0(1^\kappa)$ $\sigma_0 \leftarrow \text{T}(r, \mu^*)$ $\rho_0 \leftarrow \text{Expl}_{\text{MAC}}(\sigma_0)$ $\rho_1 \leftarrow \mathcal{R}_{\text{Rnd}_{\text{MAC}}}$ $\sigma_1 \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{MAC}}(1^\kappa; \rho_1)$ $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\kappa, (\sigma_b, \rho_b), st)$ return b'
<hr/> $\text{TAG}(\mu)$ <hr/> if $\sigma \neq \perp$ then return \perp else $\sigma \leftarrow \text{T}(r, \mu)$ return σ	

Fig. 4. Games for MAC schemes

2.4 Message Authentication Code (MAC)

The model for MAC is summarized as follows:

Definition 2.10. A MAC scheme MAC consists of the following pair of polynomial-time algorithms (T, V) :

- $\text{T}(r, \mu) \rightarrow \sigma$: a tagging algorithm that takes on input $r \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and a message $\mu \in \{0, 1\}^*$, where κ is the security parameter, and outputs a tag σ .
- $\text{V}(r, \mu, \sigma) \rightarrow \top/\perp$: a verification algorithm that takes as input r, μ , and a tag σ , and outputs \top as “acceptance” or \perp as “rejection.”

Definition 2.11 (Correctness). We say $\text{MAC} = (\text{T}, \text{V})$ has perfect correctness if for any $r \in \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ and $\mu \in \{0, 1\}^*$, we have

$$\Pr[\sigma \leftarrow \text{T}(r, \mu) : \text{V}(r, \mu, \sigma) = \top] = 1.$$

We define strong existential-unforgeability against one-time chosen-message attack. In addition, we define oblivious sampleability by using Rnd_{MAC} and Expl_{MAC} .

Definition 2.12. For any adversary \mathcal{A} , we define its advantages against a MAC scheme $\text{MAC} = (\text{T}, \text{V})$ and two PPT algorithms $(\text{Rnd}_{\text{MAC}}, \text{Expl}_{\text{MAC}})$ as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{seuf-ot-cma}}(\kappa) &:= \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{seuf-ot-cma}}(\kappa) = 1], \\ \text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa) &:= \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right|, \end{aligned}$$

where $\text{Expt}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{seuf-ot-cma}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Expt}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}, b}(\kappa)$, are the experiments described in Figure 4.

We say that MAC is sEUF-OT-CMA-secure and OS-secure if $\text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{seuf-ot-cma}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa)$ is negligible for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , respectively.

Concrete construction: It is known that the standard universal hash function provides a one-time secure MAC as follows: Let us identify $\{0, 1\}^k$ with $\text{GF}(2^k)$. For $a, b \in \{0, 1\}^k$, we define $H_{a,b} : \{0, 1\}^k \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k : \mu \mapsto a\mu + b \in \{0, 1\}^k$. Thus, we have an sEUF-OT-CMA-secure MAC scheme unconditionally. Combining with collision-resistant hash function $h : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^k$, we can extend the domain of the MAC as we want. Moreover, this extended MAC is OS-secure since the distribution of $\sigma = H_{a,b}(h(\mu))$ is uniform over $\{0, 1\}^k$ if $a, b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^k$.

3 The Boneh-Katz transformation, Revisited

Let us review the Boneh-Katz transformation [BCHK07, Section 5] for IBE, but we here adapt it for TBE.

Let $\text{TBE} = (\text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}})$ be a TBE scheme whose plaintext space is $\mathcal{M}_{\text{TBE}} = \mathcal{M} \times \mathcal{D}$ and tag space is \mathcal{T} . Let $\text{wCom} = (\text{Init}, \text{S}, \text{R})$ be a weak commitment scheme whose commitment space is \mathcal{T} and decommitment space is \mathcal{D} . Let $\text{MAC} = (\text{T}, \text{V})$ be a MAC scheme. $\text{PKE} = (\text{Gen}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}}) = \text{BK}[\text{TBE}, \text{wCom}, \text{MAC}]$ is defined as in Figure 5.

$\text{Gen}_{\text{PKE}}(1^K) \rightarrow (ek, dk)$	$\text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(ek, m) \rightarrow ct$	$\text{Dec}_{\text{PKE}}(dk, ct) \rightarrow m/\perp$
$(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$	$(r, com, dec) \leftarrow S(1^K, pp)$	Parse $ct = (com, c, \sigma)$
$pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$	$c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, com, (m, dec))$	$(m, dec) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com, c)$
$ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$	$\sigma \leftarrow T(r, c)$	if $(m, dec) = \perp$ then return \perp
$dk := dk_{\text{TBE}}$	$ct := (com, c, \sigma)$	$r \leftarrow R(pp, com, dec)$
return (ek, dk)	return ct	if $r = \perp$ then return \perp
		if $\forall(r, c, \sigma) = \perp$ then return \perp
		return m

Fig. 5. The Boneh-Katz transformation.

Table 1. Summary of Games for the Proof of [Theorem 3.1](#): Expl implies ρ_X^* is generated by Expl_X . Rand implies ρ_X^* is chosen from $\mathcal{R}_{\text{Rand}_X}$ and a part of ct is generated by Rand_X .

Game	com^*	c^*	σ^*	ρ_{wCom}^*	ρ_{TBE}^*	ρ_{MAC}^*	DEC	When com^* is generated
Game ₀	Real	Real	$T(r^*, c^*)$	Expl	Expl	Expl	Original	Original
Game ₁	Real	Real	$T(r^*, c^*)$	Expl	Expl	Expl	Original	At the beginning
Game ₂	Real	Real	$T(r^*, c^*)$	Expl	Expl	Expl	Reject if $com = com^*$	At the beginning
Game ₃	Real	Rand	$T(r^*, c^*)$	Expl	Rand	Expl	Reject if $com = com^*$	At the beginning
Game ₄	Real	Rand	$T(r^+, c^*)$	Expl	Rand	Expl	Reject if $com = com^*$	At the beginning
Game ₅	Real	Rand	Rand	Expl	Rand	Rand	Reject if $com = com^*$	At the beginning
Game ₆	Rand	Rand	Rand	Rand	Rand	Rand	Reject if $com = com^*$	At the beginning
Game ₇	Rand	Rand	Rand	Rand	Rand	Rand	Original	Original

Adjusting the security proof in [\[BCHKo7\]](#), we can show that PKE is IND-CCA secure if TBE is IND-sID-CPA secure, wCom is secure, and MAC is sEUF-OT-CMA secure, as noted (but not proven) in Kiltz [\[Kilo6, Section 4\]](#).

We here show that PKE is OS-CCA-secure if the underlying primitives are OS-CCA-secure. The proof is easily adapted into the PR-CCA case.

Theorem 3.1. *If TBE is OS-ST-wCCA-secure, wCom is secure and OS-secure, and MAC is sEUF-OT-CMA-secure and OS-secure, then, PKE is OS-CCA-secure.*

We use the game-hopping proof. We will define eight games Game₀, . . . , Game₇. See [Table 2](#) for the summary of games. Let S_i denote the event that the adversary outputs $b' = 1$ in the i -th game Game _{i} for $i = 0, 1, \dots, 7$. Let Q denote the number of decryption queries the adversary makes. The proofs of lemmas 3.1–3.9 (the bound between Game₀ and Game₄) are straightforward adaption of those in Boneh and Katz [\[BKo5\]](#), which are in [section A](#) for completeness.

Game₀: This is the original game for $b = 0$. The challenge is

$$ct_0^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*) = \left(com^*, \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, com^*, (m^*, dec^*)), T(r^*, c^*) \right),$$

$$\rho_0^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*) = \left(\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(pp, com^*), \text{Expl}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, c^*), \text{Expl}_{\text{MAC}}(1^K, \sigma^*) \right),$$

where $(r^*, com^*, dec^*) \leftarrow S(1^K, pp)$. We have $\Pr[S_0] = \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}, 0} = 1]$.

Game₁: We modify the game as follows: In this game, the challenger generates $pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$, $(r^*, com^*, dec^*) \leftarrow S(pp)$, and $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$. It then runs the adversary on input $ek = (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$. Since, this change is just conceptual, the two games are equivalent.

Lemma 3.1. *We have $\Pr[S_0] = \Pr[S_1]$.*

Game₂: We modify Game₁ as follows: The decryption oracle always rejects a query $ct = (com, c, \sigma)$ if $com = com^*$.

We define Valid as the event that \mathcal{A} submits a query $ct = (com^*, c, \sigma) \neq ct^*$ which is valid, that is, the decryption result is not \perp . Since Game₁ and Game₂ are equivalent until Valid occurs, we have the following lemma.

Lemma 3.2. We have $|\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_2]| \leq \Pr[\text{Valid}_1] = \Pr[\text{Valid}_2]$.

Let us decompose Valid into two events:

- We define NoBind as the event that \mathcal{A} queries a ciphertext $ct = (com^*, c, \sigma)$ such that $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com^*, c)$, $r \leftarrow R(pp, com^*, dec')$, and $r \notin \{r^*, \perp\}$.
- We also define Forge as the event that \mathcal{A} queries $ct = (com^*, c, \sigma)$ such that $(c, \sigma) \neq (c^*, \sigma^*)$ and $V(r^*, c, \sigma) = \top$.

Clearly, we have the following lemma:

Lemma 3.3. We have $\Pr[\text{Valid}_2] \leq \Pr[\text{NoBind}_2] + \Pr[\text{Forge}_2]$.

We show that the adversary making NoBind₂ true breaks the binding property of wCom. See [subsection A.1](#) for the proof.

Lemma 3.4. There exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}$ satisfying $\Pr[\text{NoBind}_2] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa)$.

Game₃: We modify Game₂ as follows: In this game, the challenge ciphertext is

$$ct^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*) = \left(com^*, \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*), \text{T}(r^*, c^*) \right),$$

$$\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*) = \left(\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(com^*), \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \text{Expl}_{\text{MAC}}(\sigma^*) \right).$$

We have the following lemmas. See [subsection A.2](#) and [subsection A.3](#) for the proofs.

Lemma 3.5. There exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}_{TBE} satisfying $|\Pr[S_2] - \Pr[S_3]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{TBE}}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}}(\kappa)$.

Lemma 3.6. There exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ satisfying $|\Pr[\text{Forge}_2] - \Pr[\text{Forge}_3]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}}(\kappa)$.

Game₄: We modify Game₃ as follows: In this game, the challenge ciphertext is

$$ct^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*) = \left(com^*, \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*), \text{T}(r^+, c^*) \right),$$

$$\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*) = \left(\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(com^*), \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \text{Expl}_{\text{MAC}}(\sigma^*) \right),$$

where $r^+ \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^K$.

We define Forge₄ as the event that \mathcal{A} queries $ct = (com^*, c, \sigma)$ such that $(c, \sigma) \neq (c^*, \sigma^*)$ and $V(r^+, c, \sigma) = \top$ (instead of $V(r^*, c, \sigma) = \top$). We have the following lemmas. See [subsection A.4](#), [subsection A.5](#), [subsection A.6](#) for the security proofs.

Lemma 3.7. There exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ satisfying $|\Pr[S_3] - \Pr[S_4]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{hiding}}(\kappa)$.

Lemma 3.8. There exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ satisfying $|\Pr[\text{Forge}_3] - \Pr[\text{Forge}_4]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{hiding}}(\kappa)$.

Lemma 3.9. There exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} satisfying $\Pr[\text{Forge}_4] \leq Q \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{MAC}}}^{\text{seuf-ot-cma}}(\kappa)$.

Game₅: We modify Game₄ as follows: In this game, the challenge ciphertext is

$$ct^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*) = \left(com^*, \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*), \text{Rnd}_{\text{MAC}}(1^K; \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*) \right),$$

$$\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*) = \left(\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(com^*), \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^* \right)$$

We have the following lemma.

Lemma 3.10. There exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}$ satisfying $|\Pr[S_4] - \Pr[S_5]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa)$.

Proof. We construct a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}$ as follows:

1. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}$ is given 1^K . It then generates $pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$ and $(r^*, com^*, dec^*) \leftarrow S(pp)$. It then generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$ and runs \mathcal{A} on input $ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$.
2. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}$ simulates the decryption oracle on a query $ct = (com, c, \sigma)$ as follows: If $com = com^*$, then it returns \perp . If $com \neq com^*$, it decrypts c into $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com, c)$. If the result is \perp , then it return \perp ; otherwise, it computes $r' \leftarrow R(pp, com, dec')$. If $r' = \perp$, then it returns \perp ; otherwise, it computes $d \leftarrow V(r', c, \sigma)$. If $d = \perp$, then it returns \perp ; otherwise, it returns m' .
3. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}$ simulates the challenge ciphertext on input m from \mathcal{A} as follows: It computes $c^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*)$. It then query c^* to its tagging oracle and receives σ_γ and ρ_γ , where $\sigma_0 \leftarrow \text{T}(r^+, c^*)$ with random $r^+ \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^K$, $\rho_0 \leftarrow \text{Expl}_{\text{MAC}}(1^K, \sigma_0)$, and $\sigma_1 \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{MAC}}(1^K; \rho_1)$. It also generates randomness ρ_{wCom}^* by using $\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}$. It sends $ct^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma_\gamma)$ and $\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_\gamma^*, \rho_\gamma)$ to \mathcal{A} .
4. Eventually, \mathcal{A} outputs its guess b' and halts. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}$ outputs b' as a guess of γ and halts.

If $\gamma = 0$, then $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}$ perfectly simulates Game₄. If $\gamma = 1$, then $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}$ perfectly simulates Game₅. Thus, the lemma follows. \square

Game₆: We modify Game₅ as follows: In this game, the challenge ciphertext is

$$ct^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*) = \left(\text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}(pp; \rho_{\text{wCom}}^*), \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*), \text{Rnd}_{\text{MAC}}(1^K; \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*) \right),$$

$$\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*).$$

We have the following lemma.

Lemma 3.11. *There exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ satisfying $|\Pr[S_5] - \Pr[S_6]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa)$.*

Proof. We construct a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ as follows:

1. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ is given 1^K , pp , and $(com_\gamma, \rho_\gamma)$, where the challenger computes $pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$, $(r_0, com_0, dec_0) \leftarrow S(1^K, pp)$, $\rho_0 \leftarrow \text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}(1^K, com_0)$, and $com_1 \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}(pp; \rho_1)$. It then generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$ and runs \mathcal{A} on input $ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$.
2. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ simulates the challenge ciphertext on input m from \mathcal{A} as follows: It computes $c^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*)$ and $\sigma^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{MAC}}(1^K; \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*)$. It sends $ct^* = (com_\gamma, c^*, \sigma^*)$ and $\rho^* = (\rho_\gamma, \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .
3. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ simulates the decryption oracle on a query $ct = (com, c, \sigma)$ as follows: If $com = com^*$, then returns \perp . Otherwise, it decrypts c into $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com, c)$. If the result is \perp , then it return \perp ; Otherwise, it computes $r' \leftarrow R(pp, com, dec')$. If $r' = \perp$, then it returns \perp . Otherwise, it computes $d \leftarrow V(r', c, \sigma)$. If $d = \perp$, then it returns \perp ; Otherwise, it returns m' .
4. Eventually, \mathcal{A} outputs its guess b' and halts. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ outputs b' as a guess of γ and halts.

If $\gamma = 0$, then $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ perfectly simulates Game₅. If $\gamma = 1$, then $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ perfectly simulates Game₆. Thus, the lemma follows. \square

Game₇: We modify Game₆ as follows: In this game, the challenger generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$, $pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$ and runs the adversary with $ek = (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$. It generates $com^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}(pp)$ when it generates the challenge ciphertext as in Game₀. The decryption oracle decrypts a query $ct = (com^*, c, \sigma)$ if $(c, \sigma) \neq (c^*, \sigma^*)$ as in Game₀.

By the definition, we have $\Pr[S_7] = \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1]$.

We again recall the event Valid that the adversary queries a valid ciphertext $ct = (com^*, c, \sigma)$ with $(c, \sigma) \neq (c^*, \sigma^*)$. Since Game₆ and Game₇ are equivalent until Valid occurs, we have the following lemma:

Lemma 3.12. *We have $|\Pr[S_6] - \Pr[S_7]| \leq \Pr[\text{Valid}_6] = \Pr[\text{Valid}_7]$.*

Let us consider what is a valid ciphertext. If (com^*, c, σ) is valid, we have $(m, dec) \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com^*, c)$ with $(m, dec) \neq \perp$, $r \leftarrow R(pp, com^*, dec)$ with $r \neq \perp$, and $V(r, c, \sigma) = \top$ in decryption.

We define an event Inv as the event that we have $r \neq \perp$ in decryption. Notice that if Valid occurs, then Inv should occur internally. Thus, we have $\Pr[\text{Valid}_7] \leq \Pr[\text{Inv}_7]$. We also have the following lemma.

Lemma 3.13. *There exists a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ satisfying $\Pr[\text{Inv}_7] \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{non-inv}}(\kappa)$.*

Proof. We construct $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ as follows:

1. $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ is given $(1^K, pp, com^*, \rho^*)$ from its challenger, where $pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$ and $com^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{wCom}}(pp; \rho_{\text{wCom}}^*)$. It generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$, and runs \mathcal{A} on input $ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$.
2. $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ generates the challenge on a query m from \mathcal{A} as follows: It computes $c^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*)$ and $\sigma^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{MAC}}(1^K; \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*)$. sends $ct^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*)$ and $\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .
3. $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ simulates the decryption oracle in Game₇ by using its decryption key dk_{TBE} as follows: If $ct = ct^*$, then return \perp . Otherwise, it obtains $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com, c)$, $r \leftarrow R(pp, com, dec)$, and outputs m' if $(m', dec') \neq \perp$, $r \neq \perp$, and $V(r, c, \sigma) = \top$. Once $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ detects Inv, that is, on the query (com^*, c, σ) , it obtains $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com^*, c)$ and $r' \leftarrow R(pp, com^*, dec')$ with $r' \neq \perp$, then $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ outputs dec' and halts.

Since the simulation of Game₇ is perfect, \mathcal{A} correctly works. Once Inv occurs, $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ breaks the non-invertible property. Thus, the lemma holds. \square

Summary: Summing up the bounds in the previous lemmas, we obtain [Theorem 3.1](#):

$$\begin{aligned}
\text{Adv}_{\text{PKE}}^{\text{os-cca}}(\kappa) &= \left| \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}, 0}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Exp}_{\text{PKE}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{os-cca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1] \right| \\
&= \left| \Pr[S_0] - \Pr[S_7] \right| \leq \sum_{i=0}^6 \left| \Pr[S_i] - \Pr[S_{i+1}] \right| \\
&\leq 0 + \Pr[\text{Valid}_2] + \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{TBE}}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{hiding}}(\kappa) \\
&\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa) + \Pr[\text{Valid}_7] \\
&\leq \Pr[\text{NoBind}_2] + \Pr[\text{Forge}_2] \\
&\quad + \Pr[\text{Inv}_7] \\
&\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{TBE}}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{hiding}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa) \\
&\leq \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa) + \left| \Pr[\text{Forge}_2] - \Pr[\text{Forge}_3] \right| + \left| \Pr[\text{Forge}_3] - \Pr[\text{Forge}_4] \right| + \Pr[\text{Forge}_4] \\
&\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{non-inv}}(\kappa) \\
&\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{TBE}}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{hiding}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa) \\
&\leq \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{binding}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{TBE}}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{hiding}}(\kappa) + Q \cdot \text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{MAC}}}^{\text{seuf-ot-cma}}(\kappa) \\
&\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{non-inv}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{TBE}, \mathcal{A}_{\text{TBE}}}^{\text{os-st-wcca}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{hiding}}(\kappa) \\
&\quad + \text{Adv}_{\text{MAC}, \mathcal{A}'_{\text{MAC}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{wCom}, \mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}}^{\text{os}}(\kappa).
\end{aligned}$$

4 Instantiations and Applications

Instantiations: We have several lattice/code-based IBE/TBE schemes allowing us to construct OS-CCA/PR-CCA-secure PKE schemes by combining them with appropriate commitment scheme and MAC scheme from symmetric-key primitives.

From Lattices: The CHKP IBE scheme [CHKP12], the ABB IBE scheme [ABB10], and the MP TBE scheme [MP12] (and its variant the BBDQ TBE scheme [BBDQ18]) from lattices are PR-ST-WCCA-secure under the LWE assumptions with suitable parameter settings. Moreover, their ciphertext spaces are of the form \mathbb{Z}_q^k for positive integers q and k and, thus, the ciphertext spaces are ESE.

From Codes: The DMQN09 TBE scheme [DMN09] and the DMQN12 TBE scheme [DMN12] are also PR-ST-WCCA-secure under the assumption that their keys are pseudorandom and the LPN assumptions. Their ciphertext spaces are of the form \mathbb{F}_2^k for positive integer k and, thus, the ciphertext spaces are ESE. The KMP TBE scheme [KMP14] and the YZ TBE scheme [YZ16] are IND-ST-WCCA-secure under the assumption that the low-noise LPN problem is hard and the assumption that the constant-noise LPN problem is sub-exponentially hard, respectively. Fortunately, we can show that they are PR-ST-WCCA-secure under the same assumptions. See the full version for the details.

Fully-equipped, UC-secure bit commitment: Canetti and Fischlin [CF01] constructed a UC-secure non-interactive bit commitment for adaptive corruption without erasures in the re-usable CRS model from trapdoor commitment (as known as chameleon hash function [KR00]) and OS-CCA-secure PKE.

We have a trapdoor commitment scheme from lattices [CHKP12]. Combining it with OS-CCA-secure PKE scheme from lattice, we obtain fully-equipped, UC-secure bit commitment under the LWE assumption.

Unfortunately, we do not know any non-interactive trapdoor commitment scheme from codes/LPN and this is a long-standing open problem. The construction of fully-equipped UC-secure commitment from codes/LPN is still an open problem, although we have *interactive* UC-secure commitment from LPN, for example, one obtained by combining UC-secure commitment in the OT-hybrid model [CDD⁺16] and 2-round OT from LPN [DGH⁺20].

Public-key steganography: Hopper [Hop05] also studied it and gave a construction of public-key steganography secure against adaptive chosen-coverttext attacks (SS-CCA-security) against a single channel from SPR-CCA-secure PKE [Hop05]. Berndt and Liškiewicz [BL18] improved the constructions to achieve SS-CCA-secure public-key steganography against every memoryless channel from SPR-CCA-secure PKE, PRPs, and CRHFs.

Since we have SPR-CCA-secure PKE from lattices and codes, we obtain SS-CCA-secure public-key steganography from lattices and codes through [Hop05, BL18].

Anonymous AKE: KEM-based AKEs [BCGNP09, FSXY13, FSXY15, SSW20] have a chance to get anonymity of AKE. Such AKEs employ IND-CCA-secure KEM and IND-CPA-secure KEM. Roughly speaking, the first message from Alice is pk_{tmp} , $ct_{A \rightarrow B} = \text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}(pk_B)$ and the second message from Bob is $ct_{\text{tmp}} = \text{Enc}_{\text{cpa}}(pk_{\text{tmp}})$, $ct_{B \rightarrow A} = \text{Enc}_{\text{cca}}(pk_A)$. Thus, if the ciphertexts of IND-CCA-secure KEM are pseudorandom, then the AKE is anonymous from the outsider’s view.

SIM-SSO-CCA PKE: Following and repairing Fehr, Hofheinz, Kiltz, and Wee [FHKW10], Liu and Paterson [LP15] constructed a SIM-SSO-CCA secure PKE scheme using a special KEM scheme, which they call “tailored” KEM; roughly speaking, they required the following properties: 1) *ESE domains*: the key space and ciphertext space are efficiently samplable and explainable (ESE), 2) *tailored decapsulation*: the valid ciphertexts should be a small subset of ciphertext space, and 3) *tailored security*: it should satisfy tailored, constrained CCA security, which is weaker than IND-CCA security.

It is easy to convert OS-CCA-secure PKE scheme into OS-CCA-secure KEM scheme if the message space is ESE; choosing a key $K \leftarrow \mathcal{M}$ and encrypting it as $C = \text{Enc}_{\text{PKE}}(ek, K; \rho)$. We note that the OS-CCA-secure PKE scheme obtained by the BK transformation satisfies the tailored decapsulation since its ciphertext contains a MAC tag. Thus, following [LP15], OS-CCA-secure PKE (with an ESE key space) implies SIM-SSO-CCA secure PKE. Instantiating OS-CCA-secure from lattices and codes, we obtain SIM-SSO-CCA-secure PKEs in the standard model from lattice and codes, respectively.

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A Missing Proofs

A.1 Proof of Lemma 3.4

Proof (Proof of Lemma 3.4). We construct $\mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}$ as follows:

1. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}$ is given $(1^K, pp, com^*, dec^*)$ from its challenger, where $pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$ and $(r^*, com^*, dec^*) \leftarrow S(1^K, pp)$. It obtains $r^* \leftarrow R(pp, com^*, dec^*)$. It generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$, and runs \mathcal{A} on input $ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$.
2. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}$ generates the challenge on a query m from \mathcal{A} as follows: it computes $ct_0^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*)$ with $c^* \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, com^*, (m, dec^*))$ and $\sigma^* \leftarrow T(r^*, c^*)$ and generates ρ_0^* by randomness sampling algorithms. It sends ct_0^* and ρ_0^* to \mathcal{A} .
3. $\mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}$ simulates the decryption oracle in Game₂ by using its decryption key dk_{TBE} as follows: it obtains $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com, c)$, $r \leftarrow R(pp, com, dec')$, and outputs m' if $(m', dec') \neq \perp$, $r \neq \perp$, and $V(r, c, \sigma) = \top$. Once $\mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}$ detects NoBind, that is, on the query (com^*, c, σ) , it obtains $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com^*, c)$ and $r' \leftarrow R(pp, com^*, dec')$ with $r' \notin \{r^*, \perp\}$, then $\mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}$ outputs dec' and halts.

Since the simulation of Game₂ is perfect, \mathcal{A} correctly works. Once NoBind occurs, $\mathcal{A}_{\text{wCom}}$ breaks the binding property. Thus, the lemma holds. \square

A.2 Proof of Lemma 3.5

Proof (Proof of Lemma 3.5). We construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}_{TBE} as follows:

1. \mathcal{A}_{TBE} on input 1^K , it generates $pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$ and $(r^*, com^*, dec^*) \leftarrow S(1^K, pp)$. It declares com^* as the challenge tag.
2. The challenger generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$ and \mathcal{A}_{TBE} receives ek_{TBE} .
3. \mathcal{A}_{TBE} runs \mathcal{A} on input $ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$.
4. \mathcal{A}_{TBE} simulates the challenge ciphertext on input m from \mathcal{A} as follows: It sends (m, dec^*) to its challenger and receives c_γ^* and ρ_γ^* , which is a real ciphertext $\text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, com^*, (m, dec^*))$ if $\gamma = 0$ and a random ciphertext if $\gamma = 1$. It generates a tag $\sigma^* \leftarrow T(r^*, c_\gamma^*)$. It also generates randomness ρ_{wCom}^* and ρ_{MAC}^* by using $\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}$ and Expl_{MAC} . It sends $ct^* = (com^*, c_\gamma^*, \sigma^*)$ and $\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_\gamma^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .
5. \mathcal{A}_{TBE} simulates the decryption oracle as follows: Upon receiving $ct = (com, c, \sigma)$, if $com = com^*$, then it returns \perp . Otherwise, it queries com and c to its decryption oracle. If it receives \perp , then return \perp ; Otherwise, that is, it receives (m', dec') . It computes $r' \leftarrow R(pp, com, dec')$. If $r' = \perp$, then it returns \perp . Otherwise, it computes $d \leftarrow V(r', c, \sigma)$. If $d = \perp$, then it returns \perp ; Otherwise, it returns m' .
6. Eventually, \mathcal{A} outputs its guess b' . \mathcal{A}_{TBE} also outputs b' as its guess γ' .

If $\gamma = 0$, then \mathcal{A}_{TBE} perfectly simulates Game₂. If $\gamma = 1$, then \mathcal{A}_{TBE} perfectly simulates Game₃. Thus, the lemma follows. \square

A.3 Proof of Lemma 3.6

Proof (Proof of Lemma 3.6). We construct a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ as follows:

1. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ on input 1^K , it generates $pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$ and $(r^*, com^*, dec^*) \leftarrow S(1^K, pp)$. It declares com^* as the challenge tag.
2. The challenger generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$ and $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ receives ek_{TBE} .
3. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ runs \mathcal{A} on input $ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$.
4. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ simulates the challenge ciphertext on input m from \mathcal{A} as follows: It sends (m, dec^*) to its challenger and receives c_γ^* and ρ_γ^* , which is a real ciphertext $\text{Enc}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, com^*, (m, dec^*))$ if $\gamma = 0$ and a random ciphertext if $\gamma = 1$. It generates a tag $\sigma^* \leftarrow T(r^*, c_\gamma^*)$. It also generates randomness ρ_{wCom}^* and ρ_{MAC}^* by using $\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}$ and Expl_{MAC} . It sends $ct^* = (com^*, c_\gamma^*, \sigma^*)$ and $\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_\gamma^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .
5. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ simulates the decryption oracle as follows: Upon receiving $ct = (com, c, \sigma)$, if $com = com^*$, then it returns \perp ; in addition, if $V(r^*, c, \sigma) = \top$ and $(c, \sigma) \neq (c_\gamma^*, \sigma^*)$, then it outputs 1 and halts. If $com \neq com^*$, it queries com and c to its decryption oracle. If it receives \perp , then return \perp ; Otherwise, that is, it receives (m', dec') . It computes $r' \leftarrow R(pp, com, dec')$. If $r' = \perp$, then it returns \perp . Otherwise, it computes $d \leftarrow V(r', c, \sigma)$. If $d = \perp$, then it returns \perp ; Otherwise, it returns m' .
6. Eventually, \mathcal{A} outputs its guess b' and halts. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ outputs 0 and halts.

If $\gamma = 0$, then $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ perfectly simulates Game₂. If $\gamma = 1$, then $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ perfectly simulates Game₃. Moreover, once \mathcal{A} makes Forge true, then $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{TBE}}$ outputs 1 and halts. Thus, the lemma follows. \square

A.4 Proof of Lemma 3.7

Proof (Proof of Lemma 3.7). We construct a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ as follows:

1. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ is given 1^K and (pp, com^*, r_γ) , where r_0 is real and r_1 is random. It then generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$ and runs \mathcal{A} on input $ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$.
2. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ simulates the challenge ciphertext on input m from \mathcal{A} as follows: It computes $c^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*)$. It also computes $\sigma^* \leftarrow \text{T}(r_\gamma, c^*)$. It also generates randomness ρ_{wCom}^* and ρ_{MAC}^* by using $\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}$ and Expl_{MAC} . It sends $ct^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*)$ and $\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_\gamma^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .
3. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ simulates the decryption oracle as follows: Upon receiving $ct = (com, c, \sigma)$, if $com = com^*$, then it returns \perp ; otherwise, that is, if $com \neq com^*$, it decrypts c into $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com, c)$. If the result is \perp , then it return \perp ; Otherwise, it computes $r' \leftarrow \text{R}(pp, com, dec')$. If $r' = \perp$, then it returns \perp . Otherwise, it computes $d \leftarrow \text{V}(r', c, \sigma)$. If $d = \perp$, then it returns \perp ; Otherwise, it returns m' .
4. Eventually, \mathcal{A} outputs its guess b' and halts. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ outputs b' as a guess of γ and halts.

If $\gamma = 0$, then $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ perfectly simulates Game₃. If $\gamma = 1$, then $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{wCom}}$ perfectly simulates Game₄. Thus, the lemma follows. \square

A.5 Proof of Lemma 3.8

Proof (Proof of Lemma 3.8). We construct a PPT adversary $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ as follows:

1. $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ is given 1^K and (pp, com^*, r_γ) , where r_0 is real and r_1 is random. It then generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$ and runs \mathcal{A} on input $ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$.
2. $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ simulates the challenge ciphertext on input m as follows: It first computes $c^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*)$. It also computes $\sigma^* \leftarrow \text{T}(r_\gamma, c^*)$. It also generates randomness ρ_{wCom}^* and ρ_{MAC}^* by using $\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}$ and Expl_{MAC} . It sends $ct^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*)$ and $\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .
3. $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ simulates the decryption oracle as follows: Upon receiving $ct = (com, c, \sigma)$, if $com = com^*$, then it returns \perp ; in addition, if $\text{V}(r_\gamma, c, \sigma) = \top$, then it outputs 1 and halts. If $com \neq com^*$, it decrypts c into $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com, c)$. If the result is \perp , then it return \perp ; Otherwise, it computes $r' \leftarrow \text{R}(pp, com, dec')$. If $r' = \perp$, then it returns \perp . Otherwise, it computes $d \leftarrow \text{V}(r', c, \sigma)$. If $d = \perp$, then it returns \perp ; Otherwise, it returns m' .
4. Eventually, \mathcal{A} outputs its guess b' and halts. $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ outputs 0 and halts.

If $\gamma = 0$, then $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ perfectly simulates Game₃. If $\gamma = 1$, then $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ perfectly simulates Game₄. Moreover, once \mathcal{A} makes Forge true, then $\mathcal{A}''_{\text{wCom}}$ outputs 1 and halts. Thus, the lemma follows. \square

A.6 Proof of Lemma 3.9

Proof (Proof of Lemma 3.9). We construct a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}_{MAC} as follows:

1. \mathcal{A}_{MAC} is given 1^K . It chooses a random index $i^* \leftarrow \{1, \dots, Q\}$. It then generates $pp \leftarrow \text{Init}(1^K)$ and $(r^*, com^*, dec^*) \leftarrow \text{S}(pp)$. It then generates $(ek_{\text{TBE}}, dk_{\text{TBE}}) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{TBE}}(1^K)$ and runs \mathcal{A} on input $ek := (ek_{\text{TBE}}, pp)$.
2. \mathcal{A}_{MAC} simulates the decryption oracle on a query $ct = (com, c, \sigma)$ as follows: If it receives the i^* -th decryption query, then it outputs (c, σ) as a forgery and halts. Otherwise, if $com = com^*$, then it returns \perp . If $com \neq com^*$, it decrypts c into $(m', dec') \leftarrow \text{Dec}_{\text{TBE}}(dk_{\text{TBE}}, com, c)$. If the result is \perp , then it return \perp ; Otherwise, it computes $r' \leftarrow \text{R}(pp, com, dec')$. If $r' = \perp$, then it returns \perp . Otherwise, it computes $d \leftarrow \text{V}(r', c, \sigma)$. If $d = \perp$, then it returns \perp ; Otherwise, it returns m' .
3. \mathcal{A}_{MAC} simulates the challenge ciphertext on input m from \mathcal{A} as follows: It computes $c^* \leftarrow \text{Rnd}_{\text{TBE}}(ek_{\text{TBE}}, 0^{|m|+|dec^*|}; \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*)$. It then query c^* to its tagging oracle and receives $\sigma^* \leftarrow \text{T}(r^+, c^*)$, where $r^+ \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^K$. It also generates randomness ρ_{wCom}^* and ρ_{MAC}^* by using $\text{Expl}_{\text{wCom}}$ and Expl_{MAC} . It sends $ct^* = (com^*, c^*, \sigma^*)$ and $\rho^* = (\rho_{\text{wCom}}^*, \rho_{\text{TBE}}^*, \rho_{\text{MAC}}^*)$ to \mathcal{A} .

\mathcal{A}_{MAC} perfectly simulates Game₄ until Forge₄ occurs. Since i^* is chosen uniformly at random, the success probability that \mathcal{A}_{MAC} forges is at least $\text{Pr}[\text{Forge}_4]/Q$. Thus, the lemma follows. \square

B Learning Parity with Noise

Ber_p denotes the Bernoulli distribution with parameter $p \in (0, 1/2)$, that is, $\text{Pr}[x = 1 \mid x \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p] = p$ and $\text{Pr}[x = 0 \mid x \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p] = 1 - p$.

Learning Parity with Noise: We review the LPN assumption [BFKL94] and its variations.

LPN: The $\text{LPN}[n, m, p]$ assumption states that for any efficient adversary \mathcal{A} its advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{LPN}[n, m, p], \mathcal{A}}(\kappa)$ is negligible in κ , where

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{LPN}[n, m, p], \mathcal{A}}(\kappa) := \left| \Pr[\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}, \mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n, \mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^m : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}\mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}, \mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{b}) = 1] \right|.$$

Knapsack LPN: The knapsack LPN distribution is considered in Micciancio and Mol [MM11] as the dual of the LPN distribution. The $\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^m$ assumption states that for any efficient adversary \mathcal{A} its advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa)$ is negligible in κ , where

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa) := \left| \Pr[\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{E} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m} : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{E}\mathbf{A}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)} : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}) = 1] \right|.$$

For any algorithm \mathcal{A} , there exists an algorithm \mathcal{A}' that runs in roughly the same time as \mathcal{A} and

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{LPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}'}(\kappa) \geq \frac{1}{m} \text{Adv}_{\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa)$$

See [MM11].

Extended Knapsack LPN: The extended knapsack LPN assumption states that for any efficient adversary \mathcal{A} its advantage $\text{Adv}_{\text{EKLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa)$ is negligible in κ , where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{\text{EKLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa) &:= |p_0 - p_1| \\ p_0 &:= \Pr[\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{E} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}, \mathbf{z} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^m : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{E}\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{E}\mathbf{z}) = 1] \\ p_1 &:= \Pr[\mathbf{A} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{B} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{E} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}, \mathbf{z} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^m : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{z}, \mathbf{E}\mathbf{z}) = 1]. \end{aligned}$$

For any algorithm \mathcal{A} , there exists an algorithm \mathcal{A}' that runs in roughly the same time as \mathcal{A} and

$$\text{Adv}_{\text{LPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}'}(\kappa) \geq \frac{1}{2m} \text{Adv}_{\text{EKLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa)$$

See [AP12, KMP14].

1-Knapsack LPN: We additionally introduce the 1-knapsack LPN assumption, in which we replace the last column of $\mathbf{E}\mathbf{A}$ of the KLPN distribution with a random one. The 1-knapsack LPN assumption states that for any efficient adversary \mathcal{A} its advantage $\text{Adv}_{1\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa)$ is negligible in κ , where

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{1\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa) &:= |p_0 - p_1| \\ p_0 &:= \Pr[[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}] \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{E} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}, \mathbf{u} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{E}\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u}) = 1] \\ p_1 &:= \Pr[[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}] \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{E} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m} : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{E}\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{E}\mathbf{c}) = 1]. \end{aligned}$$

We consider the following intermediate probability:

$$p_u := \Pr[[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}] \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{E} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}, \mathbf{U} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (n-1)}, \mathbf{u} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{U}, \mathbf{u}) = 1]$$

We have two adversaries \mathcal{A}_1 and \mathcal{A}_2 such that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv}_{1\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa) &= |p_0 - p_1| \leq |p_0 - p_u| + |p_u - p_1| \\ &\leq \text{Adv}_{1\text{KLPN}[n-1, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}_1}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{1\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}_2}(\kappa). \end{aligned}$$

It is easy to see that

$$\text{Adv}_{1\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^1, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa) = \left| \Pr[[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}] \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{1 \times m}, \mathbf{u} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^1 : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{e}\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{u}) = 1] - \Pr[[\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}] \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times (m-n)}, \mathbf{e} \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{1 \times m} : \mathcal{A}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{e}\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{e}\mathbf{c}) = 1] \right|$$

is related to $\text{Adv}_{1\text{KLPN}[n, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}}(\kappa)$ by the hybrid argument.

$\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa)$
$(t, \tau_0, \tau_1, \tau', st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa)$	$(t, \tau_0, \tau_1, \tau', st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa)$
$(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^\kappa, \tau_0, \tau_1)$	$(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^\kappa, \tau'_0, \tau'_1)$
$z \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}; T \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}$	$z \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^m; T := T_{1-t}$
$d \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(T_t, (A, B_0, B_1), z, Tz, st)$	$d \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(T_t, (A, B_0, B_1), z, Tz, st)$
return d	return d

Fig. 6. Games for Trapdoor Generation Algorithm

C The Kiltz-Masny-Pieprzak TBE

Before introduce the KMP TBE itself, we first review the trapdoor generation algorithm in [KMP14, Section 3]. We have field injective homomorphism from $\text{GF}(2^n)$ into $\mathbb{F}_2^{n \times n}$. For finite field elements $\tau \in \text{GF}(2^n)$, we use its companion matrix $\mathbf{H}_\tau \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times n}$. Let $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}$ be a generator matrix for an efficiently decodable linear code. The trapdoor generation algorithm is defined as follows:

- $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^\kappa, \tau_0, \tau_1) \rightarrow (T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1))$: Sample $T_0, T_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}$ and $A \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}$. Compute $B_0 := T_0 A - \mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_{\tau_0}$ and $B_1 := T_1 A - \mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_{\tau_1}$. Output $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1))$.

Kiltz et al. [KMP14] showed the following lemma. We will use this lemma in the security proof.

Lemma C.1 ([KMP14, Lemma 4]). *For every adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists another adversary \mathcal{A}_{LPN} such that*

$$\left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right| \leq 3m \text{Adv}_{\text{LPN}[m-n, m, p], \mathcal{A}_{\text{LPN}}}(\kappa),$$

where $\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa)$ are defined in Figure 6.

C.1 The KMP TBE

Let us review the parameter setting:

- A dimension $n = \Theta(\kappa^2)$ and $m \geq 2n$.
- a constant $c \in (0, 1/4)$: We set $p = \sqrt{c/m}$ and $\beta = 2\sqrt{cm}$, and a binary linear error correcting code $\mathbf{G}: \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$, which corrects up to αm errors for some $\alpha \in (4c, 1)$.
- An efficient error correcting code with generator matrix $\mathbf{G}_2: \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$, where the parameter $\ell \geq m$ is adjusted as we can correct up to $2\ell\sqrt{c}/\sqrt{m} = 2\ell p$ errors.

We consider a tag space $\mathcal{T} = \text{GF}(2^n) \setminus \{0\}$. Now, we review the KMP TBE scheme $(\text{Gen}_{\text{KMP}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{KMP}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{KMP}})$:

- $\text{Gen}_{\text{KMP}}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow (ek, dk)$: Generate $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^\kappa, 0, 0)$ and choose $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. Output

$$\begin{aligned} dk &= (0, T_0) \in \text{GF}(2^n) \times \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times m}, \\ ek &= (A, B_0, B_1, C) \in (\mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n})^3 \times \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}. \end{aligned}$$

- $\text{Enc}_{\text{KMP}}(ek, \tau, \mu) \rightarrow ct = (c, c_0, c_1, c_2)$: Sample $e_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^m$, $e_2 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^\ell$, $T'_0, T'_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}$, and $s \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$. Compute

$$\begin{aligned} c &:= As + e_1 \\ c_0 &:= (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_\tau + B_0)s + T'_0 e_1 \\ c_1 &:= (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_\tau + B_1)s + T'_1 e_1 \\ c_2 &:= Cs + e_2 + \mathbf{G}_2(\mu) \end{aligned}$$

and output $ct = (c, c_0, c_1, c_2) \in \mathbb{F}_2^m \times \mathbb{F}_2^m \times \mathbb{F}_2^m \times \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.

- $\text{Dec}_{\text{KMP}}(dk, \tau, ct) \rightarrow \mu/\perp$: Parse $dk = (\tau_b, T_b)$ for $b = 0$ or 1 and compute

$$\tilde{c}_b := (T_b \mathbf{I}) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} -c \\ c_b \end{pmatrix} = (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_{\tau - \tau_b} s + (T'_b - T_b) e_1).$$

Reconstruct $\mathbf{H}_{\tau - \tau_b} s$ with error $(T'_b - T_b) e_1$ by using the decoding algorithm of \mathbf{G} . Compute $s = \mathbf{H}_{\tau - \tau_b}^{-1} \cdot \mathbf{H}_{\tau - \tau_b} s$. If

$$\text{HW}(c - As) \leq \beta \wedge \text{HW}(c_0 - (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_\tau + B_0)s) \leq \alpha m/2 \wedge \text{HW}(c_1 - (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_\tau + B_1)s) \leq \alpha m/2$$

hold, then compute $c_2 - Cs = \mathbf{G}_2(\mu) + e_2$ and reconstruct μ by using the decoding algorithm of \mathbf{G}_2 and output it. Otherwise, output \perp .

Table 2. Summary of Games for the Proof of [Theorem C.1](#):

Game	Gen _{td}	dk	c^*	c_0^*	c_1^*	c_2^*
Game ₀	(0, 0)	(0, T_0)	$As^* + e^*$	$(GH_{\tau^*} + B_0)s^* + T_0^*e^*$	$(GH_{\tau^*} + B_1)s^* + T_1^*e^*$	$Cs^* + e_2^*G_2(\mu)$
Game ₁	(0, τ^*)	(0, T_0)	$As^* + e^*$	$(GH_{\tau^*} + B_0)s^* + T_0^*e^*$	T_1c^*	$Cs^* + e_2^*G_2(\mu)$
Game ₂	(0, τ^*)	(τ^* , T_1)	$As^* + e^*$	$(GH_{\tau^*} + B_0)s^* + T_0^*e^*$	T_1c^*	$Cs^* + e_2^*G_2(\mu)$
Game ₃	(τ^* , τ^*)	(τ^* , T_1)	$As^* + e^*$	T_0c^*	T_1c^*	$Cs^* + e_2^*G_2(\mu)$
Game ₄	(τ^* , τ^*)	(τ^* , T_1)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	T_0c^*	T_1c^*	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₅	(τ^* , τ^*)	(τ^* , T_1)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	T_1c^*	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₆	(0, τ^*)	(τ^* , T_1)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	T_1c^*	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₇	(0, τ^*)	(0, T_0)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	T_1c^*	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₈	(0, τ^*)	(0, T_0)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₉	(0, 0)	(0, T_0)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^m)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$

This scheme is statistically correct. Kiltz et al. showed the next lemma, which states that we cannot distinguish the decryption oracles implemented with T_0 or T_1 .

Lemma C.2 ([KMP14, Lemma 5]). *s. Let $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^k, \tau_0, \tau_1)$, $dk_0 = (\tau_0, T_0)$, $dk_1 = (\tau_1, T_1)$, and $ek := (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ with $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. With overwhelming probability over the choice of the encryption and decryption keys, Dec_{KMP} with dk_0 and dk_1 and $\text{Dec}_{\text{KMP}_1}$ have the same output distribution; that is, we have*

$$\Pr_{ek, dk_0, dk_1} [\forall \tau_0, \tau_1, \tau \notin \{\tau_0, \tau_1\}, ct, [\text{Dec}_{\text{KMP}}(dk_0, \tau, ct) = \text{Dec}_{\text{KMP}}(dk_1, \tau, ct)]] \geq 1 - 2^{-\Theta(m)}.$$

Kiltz et al. showed that their TBE is IND-ST-WCCA-secure assuming LPN[$m - n, m, p$] and LPN[$n, m + \ell, p$] is hard [KMP14, Theorem 2]. In the final game of their proof, the key is generated as $(T_0^*, T_1^*, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n, \tau^*, \tau^*)$, the decryption key is (τ^*, T_1^*) , and the challenge ciphertext is generated as $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$, $c_0^* \leftarrow T_0^*c^*$, $c_1^* \leftarrow T_1^*c^*$ and $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$. We notice that c_0^* and c_1^* are still correlated to $B_0 = T_0^*A$ and $B_1 = T_1^*A$. Thus, we should continue to modify the security game in order to cut off the correlation between keys and ciphertexts. In order to do so, we have introduced 1KLPN assumption, which hold if KLPN holds.

Theorem C.1. *TBE_{KMP} is OS-ST-WCCA-secure if the LPN/KLPN/EKLPN/iKLPN assumptions hold.*

We mainly follow the definitions of games in the original paper. We summarize games in [Table 2](#).

Game₀: This is the original game with $b = 0$ expanded as follows:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^k .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, 0, 0)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (0, T_0, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $s^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$, $e^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^m$, $e_2^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^\ell$, $T_0^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}$, $T_1^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}$
 - $c^* := As^* + e^*$
 - $c_0^* := (GH_{\tau^*} + B_0)s^* + T_0^*e^*$
 - $c_1^* := (GH_{\tau^*} + B_1)s^* + T_1^*e^*$
 - $c_2^* := Cs^* + e_2^* + G_2(\mu)$
and returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

We have

$$\Pr[S_0] = \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}_{\text{KMP}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}, 0}(\kappa) = 1].$$

Game₁: We next change how to generate T_1^* and c_1^* :

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^k .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, 0, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (0, T_0, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $s^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$, $e^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^m$, $e_2^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^\ell$, $T_0^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}$

- $\mathbf{c}^* := \mathbf{A}s^* + \mathbf{e}^*$
- $\mathbf{c}_0^* := (\mathbf{G}\mathbf{H}_{\tau^*} + \mathbf{B}_0)s^* + \mathbf{T}_0^*\mathbf{e}^*$
- $\mathbf{c}_1^* := \mathbf{T}_1\mathbf{c}^* (= (\mathbf{G}\mathbf{H}_{\tau^*} + \mathbf{B}_1)s^* + \mathbf{T}_1\mathbf{e}^*)$
- $\mathbf{c}_2^* := \mathbf{C}s^* + \mathbf{e}_2^* + \mathbf{G}_2(\mu)$

and returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .

4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma C.3 ([KMP14, Lemma 6]). *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{01} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_0] - \Pr[S_1]| \leq \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}_{01}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}_{01}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right|.$$

The proof of lemma invokes **Lemma C.1**.

Game₂: We change how to generate \mathbf{T}_1^* and \mathbf{c}_1^* :

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^κ .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(\mathbf{T}_0, \mathbf{T}_1, (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, 0, \tau^*)$ and $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{C})$ and $dk = (\tau^*, \mathbf{T}_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $s^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n, \mathbf{e}^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^m, \mathbf{e}_2^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^\ell, \mathbf{T}_0^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}$
 - $\mathbf{c}^* := \mathbf{A}s^* + \mathbf{e}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_0^* := (\mathbf{G}\mathbf{H}_{\tau^*} + \mathbf{B}_0)s^* + \mathbf{T}_0^*\mathbf{e}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_1^* := \mathbf{T}_1\mathbf{c}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_2^* := \mathbf{C}s^* + \mathbf{e}_2^* + \mathbf{G}_2(\mu)$
 and returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma C.4 ([KMP14, Lemma 7]).

$$|\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_2]| \leq \text{negl}(\kappa).$$

This lemma follows from **Lemma C.2**.

Game₃: We change how to generate \mathbf{T}_0^* and \mathbf{c}_0^* :

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^κ .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(\mathbf{T}_0, \mathbf{T}_1, (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, \tau^*, \tau^*)$ and $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{C})$ and $dk = (\tau^*, \mathbf{T}_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $s^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n, \mathbf{e}^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^m, \mathbf{e}_2^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^\ell$
 - $\mathbf{c}^* := \mathbf{A}s^* + \mathbf{e}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_0^* := \mathbf{T}_0\mathbf{c}^* (= (\mathbf{G}\mathbf{H}_{\tau^*} + \mathbf{B}_0)s^* + \mathbf{T}_0\mathbf{e}^*)$
 - $\mathbf{c}_1^* := \mathbf{T}_1\mathbf{c}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_2^* := \mathbf{C}s^* + \mathbf{e}_2^* + \mathbf{G}_2(\mu)$
 and returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma C.5 ([KMP14, Lemma 8]). *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{23} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_2] - \Pr[S_3]| \leq \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}_{23}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}_{23}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right|.$$

This lemma invokes **Lemma C.1**.

Game₄: We change how to generate \mathbf{c}^* and \mathbf{c}_2^* :

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^κ .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, \tau^*, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (\tau^*, T_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $\mathbf{c}^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $\mathbf{c}_0^* := T_0 \mathbf{c}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_1^* := T_1 \mathbf{c}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$
 and returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma C.6 ([KMP14, Lemma 9]). *We have an adversary \mathcal{A}_{34} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_3] - \Pr[S_4]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{LPN}[n, m+\ell, p], \mathcal{A}_{34}}(\kappa).$$

In the original IND-security proof, this is the final game. We continue the modification of games, since we want to modify \mathbf{c}_0^* and \mathbf{c}_1^* further.

Game₅: We modify the game to make \mathbf{c}_0^* random.

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^κ .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, \tau^*, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (\tau^*, T_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $\mathbf{c}^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $\mathbf{c}_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $\mathbf{c}_1^* := T_1 \mathbf{c}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$
 and returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

In this game, the adversary is given

$$A, B_0 = T_0 A - GH_{\tau^*}, \mathbf{c}^*, \text{ and } \mathbf{c}_0^* = T_0 \mathbf{c}^* \text{ or random.}$$

We use the iKLPN assumption here.

Lemma C.7. *There exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}_{45} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_4] - \Pr[S_5]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{iKLPN}[n-1, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}_{45}}(\kappa).$$

Proof. We construct \mathcal{A}_{45} as follows:

1. \mathcal{A}_{45} is given $(A, \mathbf{c}^*, T_0 A, \mathbf{x})$, where \mathbf{x} is $T_0 \mathbf{c}^*$ or random \mathbf{u} .
2. \mathcal{A}_{45} runs \mathcal{A} on input 1^κ and receives τ^* .
3. \mathcal{A}_{45} generates keys as follows: $T_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}$, $B_0 := T_0 A - GH_{\tau^*}$, $B_1 := T_1 A - GH_{\tau^*}$, and $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $dk = (\tau^*, T_1)$ and $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$. It runs \mathcal{A} on input ek .
4. \mathcal{A}_{45} simulates the decryption oracle using dk .
5. \mathcal{A}_{45} generates the challenge on a query μ from \mathcal{A} as follows: It generates $\mathbf{c}_0^* := \mathbf{x}$ and $\mathbf{c}_1^* := T_1 \mathbf{c}^*$. It chooses $\mathbf{c}_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$ and returns $ct^* := (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$.
6. \mathcal{A}_{45} outputs b' if \mathcal{A} finally outputs b' .

If $\mathbf{x} = T_0 \mathbf{c}^*$, then \mathcal{A}_{45} perfectly simulates Game₄. On the other hand, if \mathbf{x} is uniformly at random, then \mathcal{A}_{45} perfectly simulates Game₅. Thus, the lemma holds. \square

Game₆: We change how to generate keys:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^K .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, 0, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (\tau^*, T_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $c_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $c_1^* := T_1 c^*$
 - $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$
 and returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma C.8. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{56} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_5] - \Pr[S_6]| \leq \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}_{56}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}_{56}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right|.$$

Proof. We construct \mathcal{A}_{56} that distinguishes real and corr games as follows:

1. Given 1^K , \mathcal{A}_{56} runs \mathcal{A} on input 1^K and receives τ^* .
2. It sends $(1, \tau^*, \tau^*, 0)$ to its challenger and receives $(T_1, A, B_0, B_1, z, Tz)$. It chooses $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (\tau^*, T_1, ek)$. It runs \mathcal{A} on input ek .
3. \mathcal{A}_{56} simulates the decryption oracle using dk .
4. \mathcal{A}_{56} generates the challenge on a query μ from \mathcal{A} as follows: It generates $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$, $c_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$, and $c_1^* := T_1 c^*$. It also chooses $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$ and returns $ct^* := (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$.
5. \mathcal{A}_{56} outputs b' if \mathcal{A} finally outputs b' .

Notice that if the game is real and corr, then the keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, \tau^*, \tau^*)$ and $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, 0, \tau^*)$, respectively. Thus, if the game is real and the keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, \tau^*, \tau^*)$, then \mathcal{A}_{56} perfectly simulates Game₅. If the game is corr and keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, 0, \tau^*)$, then \mathcal{A}_{56} perfectly simulates Game₆. This completes the proof. \square

Game₇: We change the decryption key.

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^K .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, 0, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (0, T_0, dk)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $c_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $c_1^* := T_1 c^*$
 - $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$
 and returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Following [Lemma C.4](#), we can switch decryption key:

Lemma C.9. *We have*

$$|\Pr[S_6] - \Pr[S_7]| \leq \text{negl}(\kappa).$$

Game₈: We change how to generate c_2^* :

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^K .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(T_0, T_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, 0, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (0, T_0, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $c_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $c_1^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$
 and returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .

4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma C.10. *There exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A}_{78} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_7] - \Pr[S_8]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{IKLPN}[n-1, m, p]^m, \mathcal{A}_{78}}(\kappa).$$

Proof. We construct \mathcal{A}_{78} as follows:

1. \mathcal{A}_{78} is given $(A, \mathbf{c}^*, T_1 A, \mathbf{x})$, where \mathbf{x} is $T_1 \mathbf{c}^*$ or random \mathbf{u} .
2. \mathcal{A}_{78} runs \mathcal{A} on input 1^κ and receives τ^* .
3. \mathcal{A}_{78} generates keys as follows: $T_0 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{m \times m}$, $\mathbf{B}_0 := T_0 A - \mathbf{G}\mathbf{H}_{\tau^*}$, $\mathbf{B}_1 := T_1 A - \mathbf{G}\mathbf{H}_{\tau^*}$, and $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{C})$ and $dk = (0, T_0, ek)$. It runs \mathcal{A} on input ek .
4. \mathcal{A}_{78} simulates the decryption oracle using dk .
5. \mathcal{A}_{78} generates the challenge on a query μ from \mathcal{A} as follows: It generates $\mathbf{c}_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$ and $\mathbf{c}_1^* := \mathbf{x}$. It also chooses $\mathbf{c}_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$ and returns $ct^* := (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$.
6. \mathcal{A}_{78} outputs b' if \mathcal{A} finally outputs b' .

If $\mathbf{x} = T_1 \mathbf{c}^*$, then \mathcal{A}_{78} perfectly simulates Game₇. On the other hand, if \mathbf{x} is uniformly at random, then \mathcal{A}_{78} perfectly simulates Game₈. Thus, the lemma holds. \square

Game₉: We modify how to generate keys. This is the original game with $b = 1$:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^κ .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(T_0, T_1, (A, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^n, 0, 0)$ and $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{C})$ and $dk = (0, T_0, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It computes
 - $\mathbf{c}^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $\mathbf{c}_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $\mathbf{c}_1^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$
 - $\mathbf{c}_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$
 and returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma C.11. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{89} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_8] - \Pr[S_9]| \leq \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}_{89}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}, \mathcal{A}_{89}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right|.$$

Proof. We construct \mathcal{A}_{89} that distinguishes real and corr games as follows:

1. Given 1^κ , \mathcal{A}_{89} runs \mathcal{A} on input 1^κ and receives τ^* .
2. It sends $(0, 0, \tau^*, 0)$ to its challenger and receives $(T_0, A, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{z}, T\mathbf{z})$. It chooses $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $dk = (0, T_0)$ and $ek = (A, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{C})$. It runs \mathcal{A} on input ek .
3. \mathcal{A}_{89} simulates the decryption oracle using dk .
4. \mathcal{A}_{89} generates the challenge on a query μ from \mathcal{A} as follows: It generates $\mathbf{c}^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$, $\mathbf{c}_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$, $\mathbf{c}_1^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^m$. It chooses $\mathbf{c}_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$ and returns $ct^* := (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$.
5. \mathcal{A}_{89} outputs b' if \mathcal{A} finally outputs b' .

Notice that if the game is real and corr, then the keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^\kappa, 0, \tau^*)$ and $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^\kappa, 0, 0)$, respectively. Thus, if the game is real and the keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^\kappa, 0, \tau^*)$, then \mathcal{A}_{89} perfectly simulates Game₈. If the game is corr and keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^\kappa, 0, 0)$, then \mathcal{A}_{89} perfectly simulates Game₉. This completes the proof. \square

We have

$$\Pr[S_9] = \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}_{\text{KMP}}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1].$$

This completes the proof. \square

D The Yu-Zhang TBE

Yu and Zhang [YZ16] also proposed tag-based encryption whose IND-st-wCCA security is based on the sub-exponential hardness of constant-rate LPN. We here show its PR-st-wCCA security without changing the assumptions.

Preliminaries: $\mathcal{D}_\lambda^{n_1 \times n}$ denotes a matrix distribution induced by multiplying two random matrices chosen from $U(\mathbb{F}_2^{n_1 \times \lambda})$ and $U(\mathbb{F}_2^{\lambda \times n})$. $\widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n$ is a distribution $\text{Ber}_{\mu_1}^n$ conditioned on $(1 - \sqrt{6}/3)\mu_1 n \leq \text{HW}(\text{Ber}_{\mu_1}^n) \leq 2\mu_1 n$. This is efficiently samplable, because $\Pr[(1 - \sqrt{6}/3)\mu_1 n \leq \text{HW}(e) \leq 2\mu_1 n \mid e \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n]$ is noticeable. Yu and Zhang showed that for $\mu_1 = \Omega(\lg(n)/n)$, $\widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n$ has the min-entropy $\Omega(\lg^2(n))$. $\widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$ denotes a matrix distribution whose each row is chosen from $\widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n$.

Yu and Zhang showed the following lemma, which states that if constant-rate LPN is sub-exponentially hard, then ‘leaky’ LPN is computationally hard.

Lemma D.1 ([YZ16, Corollary 5.1]). *Let n be a security parameter and let $\mu \in (0, 1/2)$ be any constant. Suppose that $\text{LPN}_{\mu, n}$ problem is $2^{\omega(n^{1/2})}$ -hard (for any super-constant hidden by $\omega(\cdot)$). Then, for every $\mu_1 = \Omega(\lg n/n)$ and $\lambda = \Theta(\lg^2 n)$ such that $2\lambda \leq H_\infty(\widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n)$, and every $q = \text{poly}(n)$, we have*

$$((S_0 e, E_0 s), e, s, A, S_0 A + E_0) \approx_c ((S_0 e, E_0 s), e, s, A, B),$$

where the probability is take over $S_0 \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, $E_0 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{\mu}^{q \times n}$, $A \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{n \times n}$, $B \leftarrow U_{q \times n}$, $s \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n$, $e \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{\mu}^n$ and internal coins of the distinguisher.

As the iKLPN assumption in the KMP-TBE case, we need 1-leaky LPN version of the above lemma.

Lemma D.2. *Let n be a security parameter and let $\mu \in (0, 1/2)$ be any constant. Suppose that $\text{LPN}_{\mu, n}$ problem is $2^{\omega(n^{1/2})}$ -hard (for any super-constant hidden by $\omega(\cdot)$). Then, for every $\mu_1 = \Omega(\lg n/n)$ and $\lambda = \Theta(\lg^2 n)$ such that $2\lambda \leq H_\infty(\widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n)$, and every $q = \text{poly}(n)$, we have*

$$(S_0 c, c, A, S_0 A + E_0) \approx_c (r, c, A, S_0 A + E_0),$$

where the probability is take over $S_0 \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, $E_0 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{\mu}^{q \times n}$, $A \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{n \times n}$, $c \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$, $r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$ and internal coins of the distinguisher.

Proof. We have

$$\begin{aligned} (S_0 c, c, A, S_0 A + E_0) &\approx_c (S_0 c, c, A, B) \\ &\approx_c (r, c, A, B) \\ &\approx_c (r, c, A, S_0 A + E_0). \end{aligned}$$

The first transition follows from the proof of **Lemma D.1** (Please see the original proof.) The third transition is justified by ignoring leaky part $((S_0 e, E_0 s), e, s)$ in **Lemma D.1**. In order to show the second one, we consider $(S_0 c, c)$ and (r, c) . Recall that each row of S_0 is chosen from $\widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n$ whose minimum entropy is at least 2λ . Notice that $\mathcal{H} := \{h_c : \mathbb{F}_2^n \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_2 \mid c \in \mathbb{F}_2, h_c(x) = x \cdot c\}$ is universal. Thus, the leftover hash lemma shows that the statistical distance between $(h_c(s), c)$ and (u, c) is $2^{-\Omega(\lambda)}$, which is negligible in κ . Since the leftover hash lemma close the composition, the statistical distance between $(S_0 c, c)$ and (r, c) is still negligible in κ . This completes the proof. \square

D.1 The YZ TBE

Let us review the parameter setting:

- A dimension n and $m \geq 2n$.
- A constant $\mu \in (0, 1/10]$.
- A constant $\alpha > 0$.
- Let $\mu_1 = \alpha \lg(n)/n$, $\beta = 1/2 = 1/n^{3\alpha}$, and $\gamma = 1/2 - 1/(2n^{3\alpha/2})$ and choose $\lambda = \Theta(\lg^2 n)$ such that $2\lambda \leq H_\infty(\widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n)$.
- Two efficient error-correcting codes with generator matrices $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{q \times n}$ and $\mathbf{G}_2 \in \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n}$, where the parameters $q = O(n^{6\alpha+1})$ and $\ell = O(n)$ are adjusted as we can correct up to βq and $2\mu\ell$ errors, respectively.
- a tag space $\mathcal{T} = \text{GF}(2^n) \setminus \{0\}$.

Before giving the YZ TBE scheme, we review its trapdoor generation algorithm and discuss their property, which is similar to that of the KMP TBE scheme. We have field injective homomorphism from $\text{GF}(2^n)$ into $\mathbb{F}_2^{n \times n}$. For finite field elements $\tau \in \text{GF}(2^n)$, we use its companion matrix $\mathbf{H}_\tau \in \mathbb{F}_2^{n \times n}$. Let $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n}$ be a generator matrix for an efficiently decodable linear code. The trapdoor generation algorithm is defined as follows:

$\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa)$	$\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa)$
$(t, \tau_0, \tau_1, \tau', st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa)$	$(t, \tau_0, \tau_1, \tau', st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(1^\kappa)$
$(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}(1^\kappa, \tau_0, \tau_1)$	$(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}(1^\kappa, \tau'_0, \tau'_1)$
$e \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^n; S \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$	$e \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^n; S \leftarrow S_{1-t}$
$s \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n; E \leftarrow \text{Ber}_p^{q \times n}$	$s \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n; E \leftarrow E_{1-t}$
$d \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(S_t, E_t, (A, B_0, B_1), e, Se, s, Es, st)$	$d \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(S_t, E_t, (A, B_0, B_1), e, Se, s, Es, st)$
return d	return d

Fig. 7. Games for Trapdoor Generation Algorithm

- $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}(1^\kappa, \tau_0, \tau_1) \rightarrow (S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1, C))$: $A \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{n \times n}$, $S_0, S_1 \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, and $E_0, E_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^{q \times n}$. Compute $B_0 = S_0 A + E_0 - \mathbf{G} \mathbf{H} \tau_0 \in \mathbb{F}_2^{q \times n}$ and $B_1 = S_1 A + E_1 - \mathbf{G} \mathbf{H} \tau_1 \in \mathbb{F}_2^{q \times n}$. Output $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1))$

Yu and Zhang [YZ16] showed the following lemma which is similar to Lemma C.1 by invoking Lemma D.1 twice. We will use this lemma in the security proof.

Lemma D.3 (Adapted, [YZ16, Lemmas 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5]). *For every adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists two adversaries \mathcal{A}_0 and \mathcal{A}_1 such that*

$$\left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{leakyLPN}, \mathcal{A}_0}(\kappa) + \text{Adv}_{\text{leakyLPN}, \mathcal{A}_1}(\kappa),$$

where $\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa)$ and $\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa)$ are defined in Figure 7.

The YZ TBE scheme $(\text{Gen}_{\text{YZ}}, \text{Enc}_{\text{YZ}}, \text{Dec}_{\text{YZ}})$ is defined as follows:

- $\text{Gen}_{\text{YZ}}(1^\kappa) \rightarrow (ek, dk)$: $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}'}(1^\kappa, 0, 0)$. (We note that $B_i = S_i A + E_i \in \mathbb{F}_2^{q \times n}$.) $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. Output

$$ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C) \in (\mathbb{F}_2^{m \times n})^3 \times \mathbb{F}_2^{\ell \times n},$$

$$dk = (0, S_0, ek) \in \text{GF}(2^n) \times \mathbb{F}_2^{q \times n} \times \{0, 1\}^*.$$

- $\text{Enc}_{\text{YZ}}(ek, \tau, \mu) \rightarrow ct = (c, c_0, c_1, c_2)$: Generate $s \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n$, $e_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^n$, $e_2 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^\ell$, $S'_0, S'_1 \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, and $E'_0, E'_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^{q \times n}$. Compute

$$c := A s + e_1$$

$$c_0 := (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H} \tau + B_0) s + S'_0 e_1 - E'_0 s$$

$$c_1 := (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H} \tau + B_1) s + S'_1 e_1 - E'_1 s$$

$$c_2 := C s + e_2 + \mathbf{G}_2(\mu)$$

and output $ct = (c, c_0, c_1, c_2) \in \mathbb{F}_2^m \times \mathbb{F}_2^m \times \mathbb{F}_2^m \times \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.

- $\text{Dec}_{\text{YZ}}(dk, \tau, ct) \rightarrow \mu / \perp$: Parse $dk = (\tau_b, S_b, ek)$ and compute

$$\tilde{c}_b := c_b - S_b c,$$

which is $\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_{\tau - \tau_b} s + (S'_b - S_b) e_1 + (E_b - E'_b) s$ if the ciphertext is correctly computed. Reconstruct $b = \mathbf{H}_{\tau - \tau_b} s$ from \tilde{c}_b with error $(S'_b - S_b) e_1 + (E_b - E'_b) s$ by using the decoding algorithm of \mathbf{G} . Compute $s = \mathbf{H}_{\tau - \tau_b}^{-1} \cdot b$. If

$$\text{HW}(c - A s) \leq 2\mu n \wedge \text{HW}(c_0 - (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H} \tau + B_0) s) \leq \gamma q \wedge \text{HW}(c_1 - (\mathbf{G} \mathbf{H} \tau + B_1) s) \leq \gamma q$$

hold, then compute $c_2 - C s = \mathbf{G}_2(\mu) + e_2$ and reconstruct μ by using the decoding algorithm of \mathbf{G}_2 and output it. Otherwise, output \perp .

As Kiltz et al. showed the key-switching lemma, Yu and Zhang also showed their key-switching lemma as follows:

Lemma D.4 ([YZ16, Section 5.2.1]). *Let $\text{Dec}_{\text{YZ}0}$ be Dec_{YZ} that uses c_0 to extract s and let $\text{Dec}_{\text{YZ}1}$ be Dec_{YZ} that uses c_1 to extract s . Then, with overwhelming probability over the choice of the encryption and decryption keys, $\text{Dec}_{\text{YZ}0}$ and $\text{Dec}_{\text{YZ}1}$ have the same output distribution.*

Now, we are ready to show that TBE_{YZ} is OS-ST-WCCA-secure as follows:

Theorem D.1. *TBE_{YZ} is OS-ST-WCCA-secure if $\text{LPN}_{\mu, n}$ is $2^{\omega(2^{1/2})}$ -hard.*

We mainly follow the definitions of games in the original paper but we adopt the notions in KMP. We summarize the games in Table 3

Table 3. Summary of Games for the Proof of [Theorem D.1](#):

Game	Gen _{td}	dk	c^*	c_0^*	c_1^*	c_2^*
Game ₀	(0, 0)	(0, S_0)	$As^* + e^* (GH_{\tau^*} + B_0)s^* + S_0^*e_1^* - E_0^*s^*$	$(GH_{\tau^*} + B_1)s^* + S_1^*e_1^* - E_1^*s^*$	$Cs^* + e_2^*G_2(\mu)$	
Game ₁	(0, τ^*)	(0, S_0)	$As^* + e^* (GH_{\tau^*} + B_0)s^* + S_0^*e_1^* - E_0^*s^*$	S_1c^*	$Cs^* + e_2^*G_2(\mu)$	
Game ₂	(0, τ^*)	(τ^* , S_1)	$As^* + e^* (GH_{\tau^*} + B_0)s^* + S_0^*e_1^* - E_0^*s^*$	S_1c^*	$Cs^* + e_2^*G_2(\mu)$	
Game ₃	(τ^* , τ^*)	(τ^* , S_1)	$As^* + e^*$	S_0c^*	S_1c^*	$Cs^* + e_2^*G_2(\mu)$
Game ₄	(τ^* , τ^*)	(τ^* , S_1)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^n)$	S_0c^*	S_1c^*	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₅	(τ^* , τ^*)	(τ^* , S_1)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^n)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^q)$	S_1c^*	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₆	(0, τ^*)	(τ^* , S_1)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^n)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^q)$	S_1c^*	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₇	(0, τ^*)	(0, S_0)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^n)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^q)$	S_1c^*	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₈	(0, τ^*)	(0, S_0)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^n)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^q)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^q)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$
Game ₉	(0, 0)	(0, S_0)	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^n)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^q)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^q)$	$U(\mathbb{F}_2^\ell)$

Game₀: This is the original game with $b = 0$ expanded as follows:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^K .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^K, 0, 0)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (0, S_0, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $s^* \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n$, $e_1^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^n$, $e_2^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^\ell$, $S_0^* \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, $E_0^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^{q \times n}$, $S_1^* \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, $E_1^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^{q \times n}$
 - $c^* := As^* + e_1^*$
 - $c_0^* := (GH_{\tau^*} + B_0)s^* + S_0^*e_1^* - E_0^*s^*$
 - $c_1^* := (GH_{\tau^*} + B_1)s^* + S_1^*e_1^* - E_1^*s^*$
 - $c_2^* := Cs^* + e_2^* + G_2(\mu)$.
 It returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

We have

$$\Pr[S_0] = \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBE}_{YZ}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}, 0}(\kappa) = 1].$$

Game₁: This is the original game with $b = 0$ expanded as follows:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^K .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^K, 0, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (0, S_0, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $s^* \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n$, $e_1^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^n$, $e_2^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^\ell$, $S_0^* \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, $E_0^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^{q \times n}$
 - $c^* := As^* + e_1^*$
 - $c_0^* := (GH_{\tau^*} + B_0)s^* + S_0^*e_1^* - E_0^*s^*$
 - $c_1^* := S_1c^* = (GH_{\tau^*} + B_1)s^* + S_1^*e_1^* - E_1s^*$
 - $c_2^* := Cs^* + e_2^* + G_2(\mu)$.
 It returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

We can use [Lemma D.3](#) to bound the distance between Game₀ and Game₁.

Lemma D.5 (Adapted, [[YZ16](#), Lemmas 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5]). *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{01} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_0] - \Pr[S_1]| \leq \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}', \mathcal{A}_{01}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}', \mathcal{A}_{01}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right|.$$

Game₂: We next switch the decryption key from $(0, S_0)$ to (τ^*, S_1) .

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^K .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^K, 0, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (\tau^*, S_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $s^* \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n$, $e_1^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^n$, $e_2^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^\ell$, $S_0^* \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, $E_0^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^{q \times n}$

- $\mathbf{c}^* := \mathbf{A}s^* + \mathbf{e}_1^*$
- $\mathbf{c}_0^* := (\mathbf{GH}_{\tau^*} + \mathbf{B}_0)s^* + \mathbf{S}_0^*e_1^* - \mathbf{E}_0^*s^*$
- $\mathbf{c}_1^* := \mathbf{S}_1\mathbf{c}^*$
- $\mathbf{c}_2^* := \mathbf{C}s^* + \mathbf{e}_2^* + \mathbf{G}_2(\mu)$.

It returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .

4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Yu and Zhang showed the following lemma by using the key-switching lemma [Lemma D.4](#):

Lemma D.6 (Adapted, [[YZ16](#), Lemma 5.6]). *We have*

$$|\Pr[S_1] - \Pr[S_2]| \leq \text{negl}(\kappa).$$

Game₃: We next modify \mathbf{c}_0^* :

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^κ .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(\mathbf{S}_0, \mathbf{E}_0, \mathbf{S}_1, \mathbf{E}_1, (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^\kappa, \tau^*, \tau^*)$ and $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{C})$ and $dk = (\tau^*, \mathbf{S}_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $s^* \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^n, e_1^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{\mu_1}^n, e_2^* \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{\mu_2}^\ell$
 - $\mathbf{c}^* := \mathbf{A}s^* + \mathbf{e}_1^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_0^* := \mathbf{S}_0\mathbf{c}^* = (\mathbf{GH}_{\tau^*} + \mathbf{B}_0)s^* + \mathbf{S}_0^*e_1^* - \mathbf{E}_0^*s^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_1^* := \mathbf{S}_1\mathbf{c}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_2^* := \mathbf{C}s^* + \mathbf{e}_2^* + \mathbf{G}_2(\mu)$.

It returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .

4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

We can use [Lemma D.3](#) to bound the distance between Game₂ and Game₃.

Lemma D.7 (Adapted, [[YZ16](#), Lemma 5.7]). *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{23} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_2] - \Pr[S_3]| \leq \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}', \mathcal{A}_{23}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}', \mathcal{A}_{23}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right|.$$

Game₄: We next replace two components \mathbf{c}^* and \mathbf{c}_2^* of the challenge ciphertext with random ones:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^κ .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(\mathbf{S}_0, \mathbf{E}_0, \mathbf{S}_1, \mathbf{E}_1, (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^\kappa, \tau^*, \tau^*)$ and $\mathbf{C} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}_0, \mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{C})$ and $dk = (\tau^*, \mathbf{S}_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $\mathbf{c}^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$
 - $\mathbf{c}_0^* := \mathbf{S}_0\mathbf{c}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_1^* := \mathbf{S}_1\mathbf{c}^*$
 - $\mathbf{c}_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.

It returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .

4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Using [Lemma D.1](#), Yu and Zhang showed the following lemma.

Lemma D.8 (Adapted, [[YZ16](#), Lemma 5.8]). *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{34} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_3] - \Pr[S_4]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{leakyLPN}, \mathcal{A}_{34}}(\kappa).$$

This is the final game of the original proof. We continue modifying the games in order to make \mathbf{c}_0^* and \mathbf{c}_1^* random.

Game₅: We next replace c_0^* with random one:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^K .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^K, \tau^*, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (\tau^*, S_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$
 - $c_0 \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$
 - $c_1^* := S_1 c^*$
 - $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.
 It returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using $dk = (\tau^*, S_1, ek)$.
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma D.9. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{45} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_4] - \Pr[S_5]| \leq \text{Adv}_{\text{leakyLPN}, \mathcal{A}_{45}}(\kappa).$$

The proof is very similar to [Lemma C.8](#).

Proof. We construct \mathcal{A}_{45} as follows:

1. \mathcal{A}_{45} is given $(z, c, A, S_0 A + E_0)$, where $z = S_0 c$ or $r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$. It then invokes \mathcal{A} on input 1^K and receives τ^* . It generates
 - $B_0 := S_0 A + E_0 - \mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_{\tau^*}$
 - $S_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, $E_1 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_{\mu}^{q \times n}$, $B_1 := S_1 A + E_1 - \mathbf{G} \mathbf{H}_{\tau^*}$
 - $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$.
 It sets $dk = (\tau^*, S_1, ek)$ and $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
2. The adversary outputs μ . \mathcal{A}_{45} generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $c^* := c$, $c_0^* := z$, $c_1^* := S_1 c^*$, and $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.
 It returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using $dk = (\tau^*, S_1, ek)$.
3. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and \mathcal{A}_{45} outputs b' .

If $z = S_0 c$, then \mathcal{A}_{45} perfectly simulates Game₄. If $z = r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$, then \mathcal{A}_{45} perfectly simulates Game₅. Thus, the lemma follows. \square

Game₆: We next change how to generate trapdoor:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^K .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^K, 0, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (\tau^*, S_1, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$
 - $c_0 \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$
 - $c_1^* := S_1 c^*$
 - $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.
 It returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma D.10. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{56} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_5] - \Pr[S_6]| \leq \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}', \mathcal{A}_{56}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}', \mathcal{A}_{56}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right|.$$

Proof. We construct \mathcal{A}_{56} that distinguishes real and corr games as follows:

1. Given 1^K , \mathcal{A}_{56} runs \mathcal{A} on input 1^K and receives τ^* .
2. It sends $(1, \tau^*, \tau^*, 0)$ to its challenger and receives $(S_1, E_1, A, B_0, B_1, e, S_e, s, E_s)$. It chooses $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $dk = (\tau^*, S_1)$ and $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$. It runs \mathcal{A} on input ek .
3. \mathcal{A}_{56} simulates the decryption oracle using dk .
4. \mathcal{A}_{56} generates the challenge on a query μ from \mathcal{A} as follows: It generates $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$, $c_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$, and $c_1^* := S_1 c^*$. It chooses $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$ and returns $ct^* := (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$.
5. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}}$ outputs b' if \mathcal{A} finally outputs b' .

Notice that if the game is real and corr, then the keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, \tau^*, \tau^*)$ and $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, 0, \tau^*)$, respectively. Thus, if the game is real and the keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, \tau^*, \tau^*)$, then \mathcal{A}_{56} perfectly simulates Game₅. If the game is corr and keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, 0, \tau^*)$, then \mathcal{A}_{56} perfectly simulates Game₆. This completes the proof. \square

Game₇: We then switch the decapsulation key.

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^κ .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^\kappa, 0, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (0, S_0, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$
 - $c_0 \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$
 - $c_1^* := S_1 c^*$
 - $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.
 It returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Following the key-switching lemma [Lemma D.4](#), we have the following lemma as [Lemma D.6](#):

Lemma D.11. *We have*

$$|\Pr[S_6] - \Pr[S_7]| \leq \text{negl}(\kappa).$$

Game₈: We then replace $c_1^* := S_1 c^*$ with $c_1^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^κ .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^\kappa, 0, \tau^*)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (0, S_0, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $c^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$
 - $c_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$
 - $c_1^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$
 - $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.
 It returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

Lemma D.12. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{78} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_7] - \Pr[S_8]| \leq \text{Adv}_{1\text{leakyLPN}, \mathcal{A}_{78}}(\kappa).$$

The proof is similar to [Lemma D.9](#).

Proof. We construct \mathcal{A}_{78} as follows:

1. \mathcal{A}_{78} is given $(z, c, A, S_1 A + E_1)$, where $z = S_1 c$ or $r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$. It then invokes \mathcal{A} on input 1^κ and receives τ^* . It generates
 - $S_0 \leftarrow \widetilde{\text{Ber}}_{\mu_1}^{q \times n}$, $E_0 \leftarrow \text{Ber}_\mu^{q \times n}$, $B_0 := S_0 A + E_0$
 - $B_1 := S_1 A + E_1 - G H_{\tau^*}$
 - $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$.
 It sets $dk = (0, S_0, ek)$ and $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
2. The adversary outputs μ . \mathcal{A}_{45} generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $c^* := c$, $c_0^* := c_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$, $c_1^* := z$, and $c_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.
 It returns $ct^* = (c^*, c_0^*, c_1^*, c_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using $dk = (0, S_0, ek)$.
3. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and \mathcal{A}_{78} outputs b' .

If $z = S_1 c$, then \mathcal{A}_{78} perfectly simulates Game₇. If $z = r \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$, then \mathcal{A}_{78} perfectly simulates Game₈. Thus, the lemma follows. \square

Game₉: We again modify how to generate key:

1. The challenger runs the adversary on input 1^K .
2. The adversary outputs τ^* . The challenger generates keys by $(S_0, E_0, S_1, E_1, (A, B_0, B_1)) \leftarrow \text{Gen}_{\text{td}}'(1^K, 0, 0)$ and $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$ and $dk = (0, S_0, ek)$. It runs the adversary on input ek and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
3. The adversary outputs μ . The challenger generates the challenge ciphertext as follows: It generates
 - $\mathbf{c}^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$
 - $\mathbf{c}_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$
 - $\mathbf{c}_1^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$
 - $\mathbf{c}_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$.
 It returns $ct^* = (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$. It runs the adversary on input ct^* and simulates the decryption oracle by using dk .
4. Finally, the adversary outputs its guess b' and the challenger outputs b' .

We have

$$\Pr[S_9] = \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{TBEVZ}, \mathcal{A}}^{\text{pr-st-wcca}, 1}(\kappa) = 1].$$

Lemma D.13. *There exists an adversary \mathcal{A}_{89} satisfying*

$$|\Pr[S_8] - \Pr[S_9]| \leq \left| \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}', \mathcal{A}_{89}}^{\text{real}}(\kappa) = 1] - \Pr[\text{Expt}_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}', \mathcal{A}_{89}}^{\text{corr}}(\kappa) = 1] \right|.$$

Proof. We construct \mathcal{A}_{89} that distinguishes real and corr games as follows:

1. Given 1^K , \mathcal{A}_{89} runs \mathcal{A} on input 1^K and receives τ^* .
2. It sends $(0, 0, \tau^*, 0)$ to its challenger and receives $(S_0, E_0, A, B_0, B_1, e, Se, s, Es)$. It chooses $C \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_\lambda^{\ell \times n}$. It sets $dk = (0, S_0)$ and $ek = (A, B_0, B_1, C)$. It runs \mathcal{A} on input ek .
3. \mathcal{A}_{89} simulates the decryption oracle using dk .
4. \mathcal{A}_{89} generates the challenge on a query μ from \mathcal{A} as follows: It generates $\mathbf{c}^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^n$, $\mathbf{c}_0^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$, and $\mathbf{c}_1^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^q$. It chooses $\mathbf{c}_2^* \leftarrow \mathbb{F}_2^\ell$ and returns $ct^* := (\mathbf{c}^*, \mathbf{c}_0^*, \mathbf{c}_1^*, \mathbf{c}_2^*)$.
5. $\mathcal{A}'_{\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}}$ outputs b' if \mathcal{A} finally outputs b' .

Notice that if the game is real and corr, then the keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, 0, \tau^*)$ and $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, 0, 0)$, respectively. Thus, if the game is real and the keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, 0, \tau^*)$, then \mathcal{A}_{89} perfectly simulates Game₈. If the game is corr and keys are generated by $\text{Gen}_{\text{td}}(1^K, 0, 0)$, then \mathcal{A}_{89} perfectly simulates Game₉. This completes the proof. \square