

Lattice-Based Linkable Ring Signature in the Standard Model

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Abstract. Ring signatures enable a user to sign messages on behalf of an arbitrary set of users, called the ring. The anonymity of the scheme guarantees that the signature does not reveal which member of the ring signed the message. The notion of linkable ring signatures (LRS) is an extension of the concept of ring signatures such that there is a public way of determining whether two signatures have been produced by the same signer. Lattice-based LRS is an important and active research line, since lattice-based cryptography has attracted more attention due to its distinctive features especially the quantum resistant. However, *all the existing lattice-based LRS relied on random oracle heuristics*, i.e., no lattice-based LRS in the standard model has been introduced so far.

In this paper, we present a lattice-based LRS scheme based on the well-studied standard lattice assumptions (SIS and LWE) in the standard model.

Keywords: Lattice-based · Linkable ring signature · Standard model.

1 Introduction

Ring signatures, introduced by Rivest et al. [43], allow a signer to hide in a *ring* of potential signers of which the user is a member, without revealing which member actually produced the signature. However, the signer-anonymous that ring signatures provide may be too strong in some scenarios. For example, regular ring signatures cannot be used for anonymous e-voting since any double votes remain undetectable, which means no one is able to find out whether any two signatures (with two votes) are submitted by the same voter or not. Similar concerns should be aroused in cryptocurrency where a double-spent payment should be discarded. Linkable ring signatures (LRS) [35] provide the remedy to this problem by allowing the public to detect any signer who has produced two or more signatures (i.e., votes, payments). Thereafter, LRS has been studied extensively [1,2,3,9,22,23,29,44,45,49,50,51] especially in recent years, driven by the rapid development of cryptocurrencies.

Another important line of research is constructing LRS schemes from lattices [11,12,30,46,52,34,48,7,47,15], since lattice-based cryptography has attracted more attention due to its distinctive features such as efficient, simple, highly parallelizable and the potentially quantum resistant. However, these works have so

far required the random oracle (ROM) model [16] (or similar heuristics) for their security analysis. Katz (Sect. 6.2.1 of [28]) mentioned that existing some negative results concerning the relying on ROM. Canetti et al. [18] and Dodis et al. [20] shown that a proof in ROM can only serve as a heuristic argument and, admittedly using quite contrived constructions, has been shown to possibly lead to insecure schemes when the ROM are implemented in the practical scenarios. Furthermore, Leurent and Nguyen [33] presented the attacks extracting the secret keys on several hash-then-sign type signature schemes (includes the lattice based signature [25]) and identity-based encryption schemes if the underlying hash functions are modeled as random oracle. Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) is a generalized notion of ROM [8]. Though a proof of security in the QROM is stronger than one in the ROM, it does not means the security in the QROM implies standard-model security [21]. Furthermore, Grilo et al. [24] shown that the proofs in QROM lacking of conceptual simplicity and tightness.

1.1 Our Results

To address the above concerns, we present a lattice-based LRS scheme provably secure from the well-studied standard lattice assumptions (SIS and LWE) in the standard model. It is worth to mention that we employ the strongest security model that is strong unforgeability w.r.t. insider corruption (An important realistic attack presented by Bender et al. [10]). In other words, our construction provides strong confidence on security in threefold: provably secure without relying on any random oracle heuristics, and instantiated under standard lattice assumptions make our work being quantum-resistant, and satisfies the strongest security model that capture the realistic attacks i.e., strongly unforgeable w.r.t. insider corruption that make our system more applicable in practical scenarios.

Moreover, we present two new lattice basis extending algorithms that may be of independent interest. The algorithms are the key ingredients in our construction, which break the obstacle in building the ‘key image’ of LRS without the help of cryptographic hash functions that are modeled as random oracles.

2 Definitions

In this section, we review the definitions of linkable ring signatures: syntax, correctness, unforgeability, anonymity, linkability, and non-slanderability.

Definition 1 (Linkable Ring Signature). *A linkable ring signature LRS consists of the following algorithms:*

- $\text{Setup}(1^n) \rightarrow \text{PP}$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. On input the security parameter n , outputs the public parameter PP.*

The public parameters PP are common parameters used by all ring members in the system, for example, the message space \mathcal{M} , the modulo, etc. In the following, PP is implicit input parameter to every algorithm.

- $\text{KeyGen}() \rightarrow (\text{vk}, \text{sk})$. This is a probabilistic algorithm. The algorithm outputs a verification key vk and a signing key sk .

Any ring member can run this algorithm to generate a pair of verification key and signing key.

- $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}, \mu, \mathbf{R}) \rightarrow \Sigma$. This is a probabilistic algorithm. On input a signing key sk , a message $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, and a ring of verification keys $\mathbf{R} = (\text{vk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{(N)})$ ¹. Assume that (1) the input signing key sk and the corresponding verification key vk is a valid key pair output by KeyGen and $\text{vk} \in \mathbf{R}$, (2) the ring size $|\mathbf{R}| \geq 2$, (3) each verification key in ring \mathbf{R} is distinct. This algorithm outputs a signature Σ .
- $\text{Ver}(\mathbf{R}, \mu, \Sigma) \rightarrow 1/0$. This is a deterministic algorithm. On input a ring of verification keys $\mathbf{R} = (\text{vk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{(N)})$, a message μ , and a signature Σ , outputs 1 if the signature is valid, or 0 if the signature is invalid.
- $\text{Link}(\mathbf{R}_0, \mu_0, \Sigma_0, \mathbf{R}_1, \mu_1, \Sigma_1) \rightarrow 1/0$. This is a deterministic algorithm. On input two valid signature tuples $(\mathbf{R}_0, \mu_0, \Sigma_0)$, $(\mathbf{R}_1, \mu_1, \Sigma_1)$, the algorithm outputs a bit 1 if the two signatures linked, or 0 if unlinked.

Remark: Note that it is open on whether the Sign algorithm is probabilistic or deterministic, which may depend on the concrete constructions.

Correctness. A LRS scheme is correct, if for all $n \in \mathbb{N}$, any $N = \text{poly}(n)$, any $\text{PP} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n)$ as implicit input parameter to every algorithm, any N pairs $(\text{vk}^{(1)}, \text{sk}^{(1)}), \dots, (\text{vk}^{(N)}, \text{sk}^{(N)}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$, let $\mathbf{R} = (\text{vk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{(N)})$, it holds that

- For any messages $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, and any $s \in [N]$, it holds that

$$\Pr[\text{Ver}(\mathbf{R}, \mu, \text{Sign}(\text{sk}^{(s)}, \mu, \mathbf{R})) = 1] = 1 - \text{negl}(n)$$

- For any messages $\mu_0, \mu_1 \in \mathcal{M}$, any $N_0, N_1 = \text{poly}(n)$, any ring of well-formed verification keys $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1$ with ring size $|\mathbf{R}_0| = N_0, |\mathbf{R}_1| = N_1$ respectively, and any $\text{vk}^{(s_0)} \in \mathbf{R}_0, \text{vk}^{(s_1)} \in \mathbf{R}_1$ for any $s_0 \in [N_0], s_1 \in [N_1]$, let $\Sigma_0 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}^{(s_0)}, \mu_0, \mathbf{R}_0)$, $\Sigma_1 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}^{(s_1)}, \mu_1, \mathbf{R}_1)$. It holds that

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Link}(\mathbf{R}_0, \mu_0, \Sigma_0, \mathbf{R}_1, \mu_1, \Sigma_1) = 1] &= 1 \quad \text{if } \text{sk}^{(s_0)} = \text{sk}^{(s_1)}, \\ \Pr[\text{Link}(\mathbf{R}_0, \mu_0, \Sigma_0, \mathbf{R}_1, \mu_1, \Sigma_1) = 0] &\geq 1 - \text{negl}(n) \quad \text{if } \text{sk}^{(s_0)} \neq \text{sk}^{(s_1)} \end{aligned}$$

The above probability is taken over the random coins used by Setup , KeyGen , and Sign .

Strong Unforgeability. A LRS scheme is strongly unforgeable w.r.t. insider corruption (sUnflnsCor), if for any PPT forger \mathcal{A} , it holds that \mathcal{A} has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger \mathcal{C} .

¹ Below we regard the verification key ring as an ordered set, namely, it consists of a set of verification keys, and when it is used in Sign and Ver algorithms, the verification keys are ordered and each one has an index.

- **Setup.** \mathcal{C} generates $\text{PP} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\text{st}})$ and $(\text{vk}^{(i)}, \text{sk}^{(i)}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\gamma_{\text{kg}}^{(i)})$ for all $i \in [N]$, where $N = \text{poly}(n)$ and $(\gamma_{\text{st}}, \gamma_{\text{kg}}^{(i)})$ are the randomnesses used in Setup and KeyGen, respectively. \mathcal{C} sets $\mathcal{S} = (\text{vk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{(N)})$ and initializes two empty sets \mathcal{L} and \mathcal{C} . Finally, \mathcal{C} sends $(\text{PP}, \mathcal{S}, \gamma_{\text{st}})$ to \mathcal{A} .

Note that we give to \mathcal{A} the randomness γ_{st} that used for the Setup algorithm, which implies the algorithm is public, does not rely on a trusted setup that may incur concerns on the existing of trapdoors hidden in the output parameters.

- **Probing Phase.** \mathcal{A} can adaptively query the following oracles:
 - **Signing oracle** $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$:
On input a message $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, a ring of verification keys \mathcal{R} and an index $s \in [N]$ such that $\text{vk}^{(s)} \in \mathcal{R} \cap \mathcal{S}$, this oracle returns $\Sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}^{(s)}, \mu, \mathcal{R})$ and adds the tuple $(\mu, \mathcal{R}, \Sigma)$ to \mathcal{L} .
 - **Corrupting oracle** $\text{OCorrupt}(\cdot)$:
On input an index $s \in [N]$ such that $\text{vk}^{(s)} \in \mathcal{S}$, this oracle returns $\gamma_{\text{kg}}^{(s)}$ and adds $\text{vk}^{(s)}$ to \mathcal{C} .
- **Forge.** \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery $(\mu^*, \mathcal{R}^*, \Sigma^*)$ and succeeds if (1) $\text{Ver}(\mu^*, \mathcal{R}^*, \Sigma^*) = 1$, (2) $\mathcal{R}^* \subseteq \mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{C}$, and (3) $(\mu^*, \mathcal{R}^*, \Sigma^*) \notin \mathcal{L}$.

Anonymity. A LRS scheme is signer-anonymous, if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that \mathcal{A} has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger \mathcal{C} .

- **Setup.** \mathcal{C} generates $\text{PP} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\text{st}})$ and $(\text{vk}^{(i)}, \text{sk}^{(i)}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$ for all $i \in [N]$, where $N = \text{poly}(n)$ and γ_{st} is the randomness used in Setup. \mathcal{C} sets $\mathcal{S} = (\text{vk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{(N)})$. Finally, \mathcal{C} sends $(\text{PP}, \mathcal{S}, \gamma_{\text{st}})$ to \mathcal{A} .
- **Probing Phase 1.** \mathcal{A} adaptively queries the signing oracle $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$: On input a ring of verification keys \mathcal{R} , a message $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, and an index $s \in [N]$, where requires that $\text{vk}^{(s)} \in \mathcal{R} \cap \mathcal{S}$, this oracle returns $\Sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}^{(s)}, \mu, \mathcal{R})$.
- **Challenge.** \mathcal{A} provides a challenge $(\mathcal{R}^*, \mu^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$ to the challenger such that $s_0^*, s_1^* \in [N]$, $s_0^* \neq s_1^*$, $\text{vk}^{(s_0^*)}, \text{vk}^{(s_1^*)} \in \mathcal{S} \cap \mathcal{R}^*$ and none of $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, s_0^*)$, $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, s_1^*)$ was queried. \mathcal{C} chooses a random bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and \mathcal{A} is given the signature $\Sigma^* \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}^{(s_b^*)}, \mu^*, \mathcal{R}^*)$.
- **Probing Phase 2.** Same as the **Probing Phase 1**, but with the restriction that none of $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \pi_0^*)$ and $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, s_1^*)$ is queried.
- **Guess.** \mathcal{A} outputs a guess b' . If $b' = b$, \mathcal{C} outputs 1, otherwise 0.

Linkability. A LRS scheme is signer-linkable, if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that \mathcal{A} has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger \mathcal{C} .

- **Setup.** \mathcal{C} generates $\text{PP} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\text{st}})$, where γ_{st} is the randomness used in Setup. Finally, \mathcal{C} sends $(\text{PP}, \gamma_{\text{st}})$ to \mathcal{A} .
- **Output Phase.** \mathcal{A} outputs l ($l \geq 2$) (ring of well-formed verification keys, messages, signature) tuples $(\mathbf{R}_i^*, \mu_i^*, \Sigma_i^*)$ where $i \in [l]$.

\mathcal{A} succeeds if (1) $\text{Ver}(\mathbf{R}_i^*, \mu_i^*, \Sigma_i^*) = 1$ for $i \in [l]$, (2) $\text{Link}(\mathbf{R}_i^*, \mu_i^*, \Sigma_i^*, \mathbf{R}_j^*, \mu_j^*, \Sigma_j^*) = 0$ for any $i, j \in [l]$ s.t. $i \neq j$, and (3) $|\cup_{i=1}^l \mathbf{R}_i^*| < l$.

Non-Slanderability. A LRS scheme is signer-non-slanderable, if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , it holds that \mathcal{A} has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger \mathcal{C} .

- **Setup.** As same as the setup phase of **Strong Unforgeability**.
- **Probing Phase.** As same as the probing phase of **Strong Unforgeability**.
- **Output Phase.** \mathcal{A} outputs two (ring of verification keys, message, signature) tuples $(\mathbf{R}^*, \mu^*, \Sigma^*)$ and $(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{\Sigma})$.

Let \mathbf{L} be the list that stores the query-answer tuples for $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$. \mathcal{A} succeeds if (1) $\text{Ver}(\mathbf{R}^*, \mu^*, \Sigma^*) = 1$, (2) $(\hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{\Sigma}) \in \mathbf{L}$, (3) $(\mathbf{R}^*, \mu^*, \Sigma^*) \notin \mathbf{L}$, (4) $\mathbf{R}^* \subseteq \mathbf{S} \setminus \mathbf{C}$, (5) $\text{Link}(\mathbf{R}^*, \mu^*, \Sigma^*, \hat{\mathbf{R}}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{\Sigma}) = 1$.

3 Preliminaries

In this section, we first review the definition of strongly unforgeable one-time signature in Sect. 3.1, key-homomorphic evaluation algorithm in Sect. 3.2, non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof systems in Sect. 3.3, and some lattice-based backgrounds.

Notation. We write $[l]$ for a positive integer l to denote the set $\{1, \dots, l\}$. We denote vectors as lower-case bold letters (e.g. \mathbf{x}), and matrices by upper-case bold letters (e.g. \mathbf{A}). We say that a function in n is *negligible*, written $\text{negl}(n)$, if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in n . We say that a probability $p(n)$ is *overwhelming* if $1 - p(n)$ is negligible. We denote the horizontal concatenation of two matrices \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{B} as $\mathbf{A}|\mathbf{B}$. We denote the vertical concatenation of two matrices \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{B} as $\mathbf{A};\mathbf{B}$. We denote $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [l]}$ or $\{\mathbf{B}_j\}_{j \in [l]}$ as the set that consists of l matrices.

3.1 Strongly Unforgeable One-Time Signature

Our construction will use one-time signature with strong unforgeability as a building block. A one-time signature scheme is a signature scheme that is meant to be used to sign only a single message, and is only required to satisfy unforgeability under properly restricted adversaries that receive only one signature/message pair.

Syntax. To capture the practice better, we augment the usual formalization of general one-time signature scheme to cover the cases that users may share some fixed public parameters.

Definition 2 (One-Time Signature Scheme). *A one-time signature (OTS) scheme consists of the following algorithms:*

- $\text{Setup}(1^n) \rightarrow \text{PP}_{\text{OTS}}$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. On input the security parameter 1^n , the algorithm outputs the system public parameter PP_{OTS} .*
The public parameters PP_{OTS} are common parameters used by all participants in the system, which may be just the security parameter, or include some additional information such as the message space \mathcal{M} , the modulo, etc. In the following, PP_{OTS} are implicit input parameters to every algorithm.
- $\text{KeyGen}() \rightarrow (\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \text{sk}_{\text{OTS}})$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. The algorithm outputs a verification key vk_{OTS} and a signing key sk_{OTS} .*
- $\text{Sign}(\text{sk}_{\text{OTS}}, \mu) \rightarrow \Sigma_{\text{OTS}}$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. On input a signing key sk_{OTS} and a message $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, the algorithm outputs a signature Σ_{OTS} .*
- $\text{Ver}(\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \mu, \Sigma_{\text{OTS}}) \rightarrow 1/0$. *This is a deterministic algorithm. On input a verification key vk_{OTS} , a message μ , and a signature Σ_{OTS} , the algorithm outputs 1 if the signature is valid, or 0 if the signature is invalid.*

Correctness. *A OTS scheme is correct, if for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, all messages $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, and any $\text{PP}_{\text{OTS}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n)$ as implicit input parameter to every algorithm, it holds that*

$$\Pr[\text{Ver}(\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \mu, \text{Sign}(\text{sk}_{\text{OTS}}, \mu)) = 1] = 1 - \text{negl}(n),$$

the probability is taken over the random coins used by Setup, KeyGen, and Sign.

Strong Unforgeability. *A OTS scheme is strongly unforgeable, if for any PPT forger \mathcal{A} , it holds that \mathcal{A} has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger \mathcal{C} .*

- **Setup.** \mathcal{C} generates $\text{PP}_{\text{OTS}} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\text{st}})$ and $(\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \text{sk}_{\text{OTS}}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}()$, where γ_{st} is randomness used in Setup. Finally, \mathcal{C} sends $(\text{PP}_{\text{OTS}}, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \gamma_{\text{st}})$ to \mathcal{A} .
Note that we give to \mathcal{A} the randomness γ_{st} that used for the Setup algorithm, which implies the algorithm is public, does not rely on a trusted setup that may incur concerns on the existing of trapdoors hidden in the output parameters.
- **Probing Phase.** \mathcal{A} issues a query on message μ . \mathcal{C} responds the query by running $\Sigma_{\text{OTS}} \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}_{\text{OTS}}, \mu)$. Finally, the experiment returns the signature Σ_{OTS} to \mathcal{A} .

- **Forge.** \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery $(\mu^*, \Sigma_{\text{OTS}}^*)$. \mathcal{A} succeeds if $(\mu^*, \Sigma_{\text{OTS}}^*) \neq (\mu, \Sigma_{\text{OTS}})$ and $\text{Ver}(\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \mu^*, \Sigma_{\text{OTS}}^*) = 1$.

3.2 Key-Homomorphic Evaluation Algorithm

In our construction, we borrow the idea from the standard signature work [14], that is employing the key-homomorphic evaluation algorithm $\text{Eval}(\cdot, \cdot)$ from [26,17,13] to evaluate circuits of a PRF. In particular, they used the evaluation algorithm of the work [17]. The inputs of $\text{Eval}(\cdot, \cdot)$ are C and a set of ℓ different matrices $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [\ell]}$, where $C : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is a fan-in-2 Boolean NAND circuit expression of some functions such as a PRF, and each $\mathbf{A}^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}^{(i)} + b^{(i)}\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ corresponds to each input wire of C , and where $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $\mathbf{R}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, -1\}^{m \times m}$, $b^{(i)} \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ is the gadget matrix. The algorithm deterministically output a matrix $\mathbf{A}_C = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_C + C(b^{(1)}, \dots, b^{(\ell)})\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. In the analysis of our unforgeability proof, we will use the following lemma to show \mathbf{R}_C is short enough.

Lemma 1 ([14]). *Let $C : \{0, 1\}^\ell \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a NAND Boolean circuit which has depth $d = c \log \ell$ for some constant c . Let $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}^{(i)} + b^{(i)}\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}\}_{i \in [\ell]}$ be ℓ different matrices correspond to each input wire of C where $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, $\mathbf{R}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, -1\}^{m \times m}$, $b^{(i)} \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ is the gadget matrix. There is an efficient deterministic evaluation algorithm $\text{Eval}(C, (\mathbf{A}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{A}^{(\ell)}))$ runs in time $\text{poly}(4^d, \ell, n, \log q)$, the output of the algorithm is a matrix*

$$\mathbf{A}_C = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_C + C(b^{(1)}, \dots, b^{(\ell)})\mathbf{G} = \text{Eval}(C, (\mathbf{A}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{A}^{(\ell)}))$$

where $C(b^{(1)}, \dots, b^{(\ell)})$ is the output bit of C on the arguments $(b^{(1)}, \dots, b^{(\ell)})$ and $\mathbf{R}_C \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ is a low norm matrix has $\|\mathbf{R}_C\| \leq O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2})$.

3.3 Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable Proof Systems

We review the NIWI proof system presented by Gordon et al. [27]. Let $\mathbf{B}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{B}^{(l)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $\mathbf{z}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{(l)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ for some $l = l(n)$, and fix some ε . Define the gap language $L_{\sigma, \varepsilon} = (L_{\text{YES}}, L_{\text{NO}})$ as follows:

$$L_{\text{YES}} = \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{B}^{(l)} \\ \mathbf{z}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{(l)} \end{pmatrix} \mid \exists \mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \text{ and } i \in [l] : \|\mathbf{z}^{(i)} - (\mathbf{B}^{(i)})^T \mathbf{s}\| \leq \sigma \sqrt{m} \right\}$$

$$L_{\text{NO}} = \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{B}^{(l)} \\ \mathbf{z}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{(l)} \end{pmatrix} \mid \forall \mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \text{ and } i \in [l] : \|\mathbf{z}^{(i)} - (\mathbf{B}^{(i)})^T \mathbf{s}\| > \varepsilon \cdot \sigma \sqrt{m} \right\}$$

There is an (interactive) statistically witness-indistinguishable proof system for $L_{\sigma, \varepsilon}$ when set $\varepsilon \geq O(\sqrt{m/\log m})$ by using the techniques of the work [39]. Then the resulting protocol can be made non-interactive in the standard model by applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation from the work [41].

Lemma 2. *Let $\varepsilon \geq O(\sqrt{m/\log m})$. There is an NIWI proof system for $L_{\sigma,\varepsilon}$ in the standard model.*

3.4 Lattice Backgrounds

Matrix Norms. For a vector \mathbf{x} , we let $\|\mathbf{x}\|$ denote its l_2 -norm. For a matrix \mathbf{A} we denote two matrix norms: $\|\mathbf{A}\|$ denotes the l_2 length of the longest column of \mathbf{A} . $\|\tilde{\mathbf{A}}\|$ denotes the result of applying Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization to the columns of \mathbf{A} .

We will need the following lemma to bound the norm of a random matrix in $\{1, -1\}^{m \times m}$.

Lemma 3 ([4]). *Let \mathbf{R} be a $k \times m$ matrix chosen at random from $\{1, -1\}^{k \times m}$. Then there is a universal constant c such that $\Pr[\|\mathbf{R}\| > c\sqrt{k+m}] < e^{-(k+m)}$.*

Lattices and Gaussian Distributions. Let $m \in \mathbb{Z}$ be a positive integer and $\Lambda \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ be an m -dimensional full-rank lattice formed by the set of all integral combinations of m linearly independent basis vectors $\mathbf{B} = (\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_m) \subset \mathbb{Z}^m$, i.e., $\Lambda = \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B}) = \{\mathbf{B}\mathbf{c} = \sum_{i=1}^m c_i \mathbf{b}_i : \mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}^m\}$. For positive integers n, m, q , a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, and a vector $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, the m -dimensional integer lattice $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ is defined as $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A}) = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}\}$. $\Lambda_q^\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{A})$ is defined as $\Lambda_q^\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{A}) = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{y} \pmod{q}\}$. For a vector $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and a positive parameter $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}$, define $\rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x}) = \exp(-\pi\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{c}\|^2/\sigma^2)$ and $\rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\Lambda) = \sum_{\mathbf{x} \in \Lambda} \rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})$. For any $\mathbf{y} \in \Lambda$, define the discrete Gaussian distribution over Λ with center \mathbf{c} and parameter σ as $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{y}) = \rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{y})/\rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\Lambda)$. For simplicity, $\rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{0}}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\mathbf{0}}$ are abbreviated as ρ_σ and $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda,\sigma}$, respectively.

The following Lemma 4 bounds the length of a discrete Gaussian vector with a sufficiently large Gaussian parameter.

Lemma 4 ([38]). *For any lattice Λ of integer dimension m with basis \mathbf{B} , $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and Gaussian parameter $\sigma > \|\tilde{\mathbf{B}}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$, we have $\Pr[\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{c}\| > \sigma\sqrt{m} : \mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\Lambda,\sigma,\mathbf{c}}] \leq \text{negl}(n)$.*

Micciancio and Goldwasser [36] showed that a full-rank set \mathbf{T} in a lattice Λ can be converted into a basis \mathbf{B} with an equally low Gram-Schmidt norm.

Lemma 5 ([36]). *Let Λ be an m -dimensional lattice. There is a deterministic algorithm that, given an arbitrary basis of Λ and a full-rank set \mathbf{T} in Λ , returns a basis \mathbf{B} of Λ such that $\|\tilde{\mathbf{B}}\| \leq \|\tilde{\mathbf{T}}\|$.*

The following generalization of leftover hash lemma is needed for our security proof.

Lemma 6 ([4]). *Suppose that $m > (n + 1)\log q + \omega(\log n)$ and that $q > 2$ is prime. Let \mathbf{R} be an $m \times k$ matrix chosen uniformly in $\{1, -1\}^{m \times k} \bmod q$ where $k = k(n)$ is polynomial in n . Let \mathbf{A} and \mathbf{B} be matrices chosen uniformly in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times k}$ respectively. Then, for all vectors \mathbf{w} in \mathbb{Z}_q^m , the distribution $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}, \mathbf{R}^\top \mathbf{w})$ is statistically close to the distribution $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{R}^\top \mathbf{w})$.*

The security of our LRS construction is based on the following small integer solution (SIS) assumption, learning with errors (LWE) assumption, and the security of PRF.

Definition 3 (SIS Assumption [38,25]). *Let q, m, β be functions of n . Define $\text{SIS}_{q,n,m,\beta}$ problem as: Given a matrix $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, find a non-zero vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ s.t. $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{x} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ and $\|\mathbf{x}\| \leq \beta$.*

For $m, \beta = \text{poly}(n)$, $q \geq \beta \cdot \omega(\sqrt{n \log n})$, no (quantum) algorithm can solve $\text{SIS}_{q,n,m,\beta}$ problem in polynomial time.

We use the LWE assumption proposed by Gordon et al. [27] and they proved it was implied by the standard LWE assumption [42]. The main difference is the error distribution χ choosing from different distribution. Gordon et al. consider the discrete Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \alpha q}$ where $\alpha q = \omega(\sqrt{\log q})$.

Definition 4 (LWE Assumption [42]). *Let q, m be functions of n , $q > 2$, χ be a discretized normal error distribution parameterized by some $\alpha \in (0, 1)$, which is obtained by drawing $x \in \mathbb{R}$ from the Gaussian distribution of width α . Define the LWE distribution $A_{\sigma, \chi}$ as: Choose a vector $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and an error $e \leftarrow \chi$, output $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}^\top \mathbf{s} + e)$. Defines the Search-LWE $_{q,n,m,\chi}$ as: Fix an $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, given at most m samples from $A_{\sigma, \chi}$, work out \mathbf{s} . Defines the Decision-LWE $_{q,n,m,\chi}$ as: For a uniformly chosen $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, given the oracle to be (1) $A_{\sigma, \chi}$ or (2) the uniform distribution over \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1} , decide which is the case with at most m oracle calls.*

For $q, m, \alpha = \text{poly}(n)$ such that $\alpha q = \omega(\sqrt{\log q})$, no (quantum) algorithm can solve the (Search/Decision)-LWE $_{q,n,m,\chi}$ in polynomial time.

Definition 5 (Pseudorandom Functions). *For a security parameter $n > 0$, let $k = k(n)$, $t = t(n)$ and $c = c(n)$. A pseudorandom function $\text{PRF} : \{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^t \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^c$ is an efficiently computable, deterministic two-input function where the first input, denoted by K , is the key. Let Ω be the set of all functions that map ℓ bits strings to c bits strings. There is a negligible function $\text{negl}(n)$ such that:*

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\text{PRF}(K, \cdot)}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{F(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(n)$$

where the probability is taken over a uniform choice of key $K \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k$ and $F \xleftarrow{\$} \Omega$, and the randomness of \mathcal{A} .

Algorithms on Lattices. Our work will use the following lattice algorithms.

Lemma 7 (TrapGen Algorithm [6]). *Let $n \geq 1, q \geq 2, m = O(n \log q)$ be integers. There is a probabilistic algorithm $\text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$ that outputs a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and a trapdoor matrix $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A} \subset \Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ i.e., $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}$ is a basis (full-rank subset) of $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$, the distribution of \mathbf{A} is statistically close to the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ has $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_\mathbf{A}\| \leq O(\sqrt{n \log q})$ and $\|\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}\| \leq O(n \log q)$ with all but negligible probability in n .*

Lemma 8 (SuperTrapGen Algorithm [6]). *Let $n \geq 1, q \geq 2, m = O(n \log q)$ be integers. There is a probabilistic algorithm $\text{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{B})$ that on input $1^n, 1^m, q$, and a matrix $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ whose columns generate \mathbb{Z}_q^n , this algorithm outputs a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and a trapdoor matrix $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A} \subset \Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ such that $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{B}^\top = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$, and the distribution of \mathbf{A} is statistically close to the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. Moreover, it holds that $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_\mathbf{A}\| = \log n \cdot O(\sqrt{mn \log q})$ with all but negligible probability in n .*

Lemma 9 (BasisExt Algorithm [19]). *For $i = 1, 2, 3$, let \mathbf{A}_i be a matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m_i}$ whose columns generate \mathbb{Z}_q^n and let $\mathbf{A}' = [\mathbf{A}_1 | \mathbf{A}_2 | \mathbf{A}_3]$. Let $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}_2}$ be a basis of $\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}_2})$. There is a deterministic algorithm $\text{BasisExt}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}_2}, \mathbf{A}')$ that outputs a basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}'}$ for $\Lambda^\perp(\mathbf{A}')$ such that $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}'}\| = \|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}_2}\|$.*

The following lattice basis extension algorithm also needed for our security proof, which presented by Agrawal, Boneh and Boyen [4], so we abbreviate that as BasisExtABB algorithm.

Lemma 10 (BasisExtABB Algorithm [4]). *Let q be a prime, n, m be integers with $m > n$. There is a probabilistic algorithm $\text{BasisExtABB}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{T}_\mathbf{B})$ which takes as input two matrices $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ whose columns generate \mathbb{Z}_q^n , a matrix $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$, and a basis $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{B} \in \Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{B})$, outputs a full-rank matrix $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{F}$ in $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{F})$ such that $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_\mathbf{F}\| < (\|\mathbf{R}\| + 1) \cdot \|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_\mathbf{B}\|$ where $\mathbf{F} = [\mathbf{A} | \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R} + \mathbf{B}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$.*

Lemma 11 (SamplePre Algorithm [25]). *Let $q > 2, m > n$ be integers. There is a probabilistic algorithm $\text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{y}, \sigma)$ which takes as input a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ whose columns generate \mathbb{Z}_q^n , and a basis $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}$ of $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$, a vector $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and a Gaussian parameter $\sigma \geq \|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_\mathbf{A}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$, outputs a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \Lambda_q^\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{A})$ sampled from a distribution which is statistically close to $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_q^\mathbf{y}(\mathbf{A}), \sigma}$.*

Lemma 12 (SampleR Algorithm [5]). *Let $q > 2$ be a prime, $m > n$ be integers. There is a probabilistic algorithm $\text{SampleR}(1^m)$ which outputs a \mathbb{Z}_q -invertible matrix \mathbf{R} in $\mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ from a distribution that is statistically close to $\mathcal{D}_{m \times m}$ with $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{R}}\| \leq O(\sqrt{m}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$.*

Gadget Matrix. The ‘‘gadget matrix’’ \mathbf{G} defined in [37]. We recall the following one fact of \mathbf{G} .

Lemma 13 ([37]). *Let q be a prime, and n, m be integers with $m = n \log q$. There is a fixed full-rank matrix such that the lattice $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{G})$ has a publicly known basis $\mathbf{T}_G \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ with $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_G\| \leq \sqrt{5}$.*

4 Our Construction

In our construction, the main obstacle is how to design a suitable ‘key image’.² We use the one-time verification key vk_{OTS} as the ‘key image’. In particular, we employ Lyubashevsky and Micciancio’s work [32] to instantiate the OTS scheme in which the $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}$ where \mathbf{A}_{com} is a random matrix which can be shared by all users and \mathbf{T} is the sk_{OTS} . In this setting, the first challenge is achieving signer-linkable i.e., how to restrict one ring member generating two signatures by generating the other $\text{vk}'_{\text{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}'_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}'$ and thus breaking the signer-linkable. For instance, an adversary can trivially break this by generating a $\mathbf{A}'_{\text{com}} \neq \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}$ or $\mathbf{T}' \neq \mathbf{T}$ such that $\text{vk}'_{\text{OTS}} \neq \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}$. The second challenge is achieving signer-non-slanderable i.e., how to prevent the adversary to forge the vk_{OTS} which belongs to an honest signature tuple i.e., forge a vk^*_{OTS} such that $\text{vk}^*_{\text{OTS}} = \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}$. For instance, an adversary can arbitrarily select a \mathbf{T}^* then compute a $\mathbf{A}^*_{\text{com}}$ such that $\text{vk}^*_{\text{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}^*_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}^* = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T} = \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}$, or corrupt the \mathbf{T} then compute a $\mathbf{A}^*_{\text{com}}$ such that $\text{vk}^*_{\text{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}^*_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T} = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T} = \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}$.

To address the above two challenges, we present two lattice basis extending algorithms `BasisExtBindAcom` and `BasisExtBindSK` which used to ‘bind’ the ‘ \mathbf{A}_{com} ’ and ‘ \mathbf{T} ’ in vk_{OTS} , respectively. Our signer-linkable and signer-non-slanderable proofs show that, when the ‘check vectors’ \mathbf{e}_{chk} and \mathbf{e}'_{chk} are validated, the adversary can not changed or forged the ‘ \mathbf{A}_{com} ’ or ‘ \mathbf{T} ’ in vk_{OTS} as above mentioned, otherwise the underlying hardness assumption SIS is broken.

4.1 Lattice Basis Extending Algorithms

Algorithm: `BasisExtBindAcom`($\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}_A, \mathbf{F}$)

Inputs: A matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ whose columns generate \mathbb{Z}_q^n , a basis \mathbf{T}_A of $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$, and a matrix $\mathbf{F} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_A | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} + \mathbf{A}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$ where \mathbf{A}_{com} is a uniformly random matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.

Outputs: A basis \mathbf{T}_F of $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{F})$.

The `BasisExtBindAcom` algorithm runs as follows:

1. Sample $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1 \leftarrow \text{SampleR}(1^m)$.
2. Construct $\mathbf{T}_F = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T}_A \mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T}_A \mathbf{R}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ such that $\mathbf{F} \cdot \mathbf{T}_F = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$.

² In our setting, ‘key image’ is a parameter in the output signature tuple. If two signature tuples have the same ‘key image’, we say these two signatures are linked.

Lemma 14. *The matrix \mathbf{T}_F output by BasisExtBindAcom is full-rank and satisfy $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_F\| \leq O(m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$.*

Proof. By Lemma 12, we know the matrices $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1$ are invertible. By Lemma 7, we know the basis \mathbf{T}_A of $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ is full-rank. Therefore, the matrix \mathbf{T}_F is full-rank. By Lemma 12, we know the Gram-Schmidt norm of $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1$ bounded by $O(\sqrt{m}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$. By Lemma 7, we know $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_A\| \leq O(\sqrt{n \log q})$. As analyzed in Sect. 4.3, it requires to set $m = O(n \log q)$. Therefore, we have $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_F\| \leq O(m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$.

Algorithm: BasisExtBindSK(\mathbf{T}_A, \mathbf{F})

Inputs: A matrix $\mathbf{F} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_A - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$ where \mathbf{A}_{com} is a uniformly random matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, and \mathbf{T}_A is a basis of $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ and \mathbf{A} is independent with \mathbf{A}_{com} .

Outputs: A basis \mathbf{T}_F of $\Lambda_q^\perp(\mathbf{F})$.

The BasisExtBindSK algorithm runs as follows:

1. Sample $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1 \leftarrow \text{SampleR}(1^m)$.
2. Construct $\mathbf{T}_F = [\begin{smallmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T}_A \mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T}_A \mathbf{R}_1 - \mathbf{R}_1 \end{smallmatrix}]$ such that $\mathbf{F} \cdot \mathbf{T}_F = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$.

Lemma 15. *The matrix \mathbf{T}_F output by BasisExtBindSK is full-rank and satisfy $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_F\| \leq O(m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$.*

Proof. The proof is as same as the proof of Lemma 14.

4.2 Construction

Setup($1^n; \gamma_{\text{st}}$)

1. On input the a security parameter n , sets the parameters q, m, k, σ as specified in Sect. 4.3 below.
2. Select a secure PRF : $\{0, 1\}^k \times \{0, 1\}^t \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$, express it as a NAND Boolean circuit C_{PRF} .
3. Let Π_{OTS} be a one-time signature scheme with strong unforgeability.
4. Compute $\text{PP}_{\text{OTS}} \leftarrow \Pi_{\text{OTS}}.\text{Setup}(1^n)$.
5. Select $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m3}$.
6. Output the public parameters $\text{PP} = (q, m, k, \sigma, \text{PRF}, (\Pi_{\text{OTS}}, \text{PP}_{\text{OTS}}), \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}, \gamma_{\text{st}})$.

Note that including the randomness γ_{st} in PP is to guarantee the public has no concerns on the existing of trapdoors for PP.

In the following, PP are implicit input parameters to every algorithm.

³ To guarantee the chosen \mathbf{A}_{com} without a planted trapdoor, it could be sampled by the extendable output function SHAKE [40].

KeyGen()

1. Select $\mathbf{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}) \leftarrow \text{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{B})$ where $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$.
2. Let $\text{sk}_{\text{OTS}} := \mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}$ and set $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}} := \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}$.
3. Select a PRF key $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, \dots, k_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k$.
4. For $j = 1$ to k , select $\mathbf{B}_j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.
5. Select $\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{C}_0, \mathbf{C}_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.
6. Output $\text{vk} = (\mathbf{A}, (\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1), \mathbf{B}, \{\mathbf{B}_j\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0, \mathbf{C}_1))$ and $\text{sk} = (\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{k}, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}})$.

Sign(sk, $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, R)

1. On input a signing key $\text{sk} := \text{sk}^{(s)} = (\mathbf{T}_\mathbf{A}^{(s)}, \mathbf{k}^{(s)}, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^{(s)})$ where $s \in [N]$ is the index of the signer in the ring R, a message $\boldsymbol{\mu} = (\mu_1, \dots, \mu_t) \in \{0, 1\}^t$, and a ring of verification keys $\mathbf{R} = (\text{vk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{(N)})$ where each $\text{vk}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)}))$.
2. For $i = 1$ to N , set $\mathbf{F}^{(i)} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} + \mathbf{A}^{(i)}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$. Let $\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}} = [\mathbf{F}^{(1)} | \dots | \mathbf{F}^{(N)}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2Nm}$.
3. For $i = s$, compute $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(s)}} \leftarrow \text{BasisExtBindAcom}(\mathbf{A}^{(s)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{F}^{(s)})$, $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}}} \leftarrow \text{BasisExt}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}})$, and $\mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}} \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}}}, \mathbf{0}, \sigma)$.
4. Let $\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$. Compute $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}} \leftarrow \text{BasisExtBindSK}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}})$ and $\mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}} \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}}, \mathbf{0}, \sigma)$.
5. Compute $d = \text{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(s)}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$.
6. For $i = 1$ to N , compute $\mathbf{A}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i)} = \text{Eval}(C_{\text{PRF}}, (\{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j \in [k]}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_1}^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_2}^{(i)}, \dots, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_t}^{(i)})) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, set $\mathbf{F}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i)} = [\mathbf{A}^{(i)} | \mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(i)} - \mathbf{A}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i)}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$.
7. For $i = 1$ to N , select $\mathbf{u}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, compute $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)} \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{A}^{(s)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{u}^{(i)}, \sigma)$.
8. For $i = s$, compute $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s)} \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{A}^{(s)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{u}^{(s)}, \sigma)$ where $\mathbf{u}^{(s)} = (\mathbf{A}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(s)} - \mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(s)}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(s)}$.
9. For $i = s + 1, \dots, N, 1, \dots, s - 1$, uniformly choose $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i)} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ subject to the condition that $\mathbf{F}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i)} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(i)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$.
10. For $i = 1$ to N , select $\mathbf{s}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, compute $\mathbf{z}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{s}^{(i)})^\top \mathbf{B}^{(i)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(i)}$.
11. Use the witness $\{\mathbf{s}^{(i)}, i\}_{i \in [N]}$ to construct an NIWI proof π for the gap language $L_{\sigma, \varepsilon}$.
12. Compute one-time signature $\Sigma_{\text{OTS}} \leftarrow \Pi_{\text{OTS}}.\text{Sign}(\text{sk}_{\text{OTS}}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$.
13. Output the signature $\Sigma = (\Sigma_{\text{OTS}}, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}, \mathbf{z}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]}, \pi)$.

Ver(R, $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, Σ)

1. On input a ring of verification keys $\mathbf{R} = (\text{vk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{(N)})$ where each $\text{vk}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)}))$, a message $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, and a signature $\Sigma = (\Sigma_{\text{OTS}}, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}, \mathbf{z}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]}, \pi)$ where $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}$.

2. Compute $(\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}})$ as in **Sign** algorithm. Check if $\|\mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{2Nm}$ and $\|\mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{2m}$ and $\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ and $\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds, otherwise return 0.
3. For $i = 1$ to N and $d \in \{0, 1\}$, compute $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, d}^{(i)} = [\mathbf{A}^{(i)} | \mathbf{A}_d^{(i)} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i)}]$ where $\mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i)}$ is computed as in **Sign** algorithm. Check if each $\|\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{m}$ and $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, d}^{(i)} \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds for $d = 0$ or 1 , otherwise return 0.
4. Check if the proof π is correct and $\Pi_{\text{OTS}}.Ver(\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, \Sigma_{\text{OTS}}) = 1$, return 1, otherwise return 0.

Link($\mathbf{R}_0, \boldsymbol{\mu}_0, \Sigma_0, \mathbf{R}_1, \boldsymbol{\mu}_1, \Sigma_1$)

1. On input two valid signature tuples $(\mathbf{R}_0, \boldsymbol{\mu}_0, \Sigma_0)$ and $(\mathbf{R}_1, \boldsymbol{\mu}_1, \Sigma_1)$. Let $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS},0}$ and $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS},1}$ be the one-time verification keys in Σ_0 and Σ_1 , respectively.
2. Check if $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS},0} = \text{vk}_{\text{OTS},1}$ holds, return 1, otherwise return 0.

4.3 Correctness and Parameters

We now show the correctness of LRS. By Lemma 11, each $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}$ in Σ follows the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_q^{u^{(i)}}(\mathbf{A}^{(s)}), \sigma}$, then by the construction of $\mathbf{z}^{(i)}$ and Lemma 8, it holds that $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, d}^{(i)} \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ for $d = 0$ or 1 . By Lemma 11, the \mathbf{e}_{chk} and \mathbf{e}'_{chk} in Σ respectively follow the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}}), \sigma}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}), \sigma}$, therefore, it holds that $\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ and $\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$. By Lemma 11, $\|\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{m}$, $\|\mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{2Nm}$, and $\|\mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{2m}$ hold with overwhelming probability. Therefore, the signature is accepted by the **Ver** algorithm with overwhelming probability. For the correctness of algorithm **Link**, the signer-linkable proof in Sect. 4.4 shows the correctness holds with overwhelming probability.

We then explain the parameters choosing. We employ the work [31] to instantiate our PRF, which based on standard LWE assumption with polynomial modulus $q = n^{\omega(1)}$. We employ the work [32] to instantiate our OTS, which requires $\|\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}\|_{\infty} \leq p$ and $q \geq 2tp\sqrt{mn}^{\Omega(1)}$ where $p = \lceil \frac{q^{n/m} 2^{n/m} - 1}{2} \rceil$. To guarantee the hardness of the based $\text{LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}$ assumption, we need to set $\alpha = \omega(\sqrt{\log q})/q$ as defined in Definition 4. Let n be the security parameter, let the message length be $t = t(n)$ and the secret key length of PRF be $k = k(n)$. Let $\ell = t + k$ be the input length of PRF. To ensure that hard lattices with good short bases can be generated by **TrapGen** and **SuperTrapGen**, we need to set $m = 6n^{1+\delta}$ where $\delta > 0$ is a constant such that $n^{\delta} > O(\log n)$. To ensure that the distribution on the output of **SamplePre** statistically close to the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\Lambda_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{F}'), \sigma}$, we need to set σ sufficiently large that is $\sigma = O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ (see the signer-non-slanderable proof below). To ensure that vectors sampled using a trapdoor are difficult SIS solutions, we need to set $\beta = O(\ell^{4c} \cdot m^{7/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ such that $\beta \geq O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^2) \cdot \sigma$ for some constant c (see the signer-non-slanderable proof below). To ensure our construction based on SIS has a worst-case lattice reduction

as defined in Definition 3, we need to set $q = O(\ell^{4c} \cdot m^4) \cdot (\omega(\sqrt{\log m}))^2$ such that $q \geq \beta \cdot \omega(\sqrt{n \log n})$.

4.4 Proofs of Security and Privacy

Theorem 1 (Unforgeability). *Let $m, q, \beta, \alpha, \sigma$ be some polynomials in the security parameter n . For large enough $\sigma = O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ and $\beta = O(\ell^{4c} \cdot m^{7/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$, the LRS scheme is sUnflnsCor secure in the standard model.*

Proof. Consider the following security game between an adversary \mathcal{A} and a simulator \mathcal{S} . Upon receiving a challenge $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ that is formed by m uniformly random and independent samples from \mathbb{Z}_q^n and the $(\text{PP}_{\text{OTS}}, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}})$, \mathcal{S} simulates as follows.

Setup. \mathcal{S} takes as input a security parameter n and a randomness γ_{st} to invoke $\text{PP} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n; \text{PP}_{\text{OTS}}, \gamma_{\text{st}})$ algorithm. \mathcal{S} simulates as follows.

- Select a random index $i^\diamond \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, \dots, N\}$ and sets $\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} = \mathbf{A}$, then sample $(\mathbf{B}^{(i^\diamond)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}^{(i^\diamond)}}) \leftarrow \text{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)})$.
- For $i = i^\diamond + 1, \dots, N, 1, \dots, i^\diamond - 1$:
 - Compute $(\mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}}) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$.
 - Compute $(\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}) \leftarrow \text{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{B}^{(i)})$.
 - Let $\text{sk}_{\text{OTS}}^{(i)} = \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}$ and $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}$.
- For $i = i^\diamond$, set $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^{(i^\diamond)} = \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}$.
- For $i = 1$ to N and $d \in \{0, 1\}$:
 - Choose $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i)}}, \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{C}_d^{(i)}} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, -1\}^{m \times m}$.
 - Construct $\mathbf{A}_d^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i)} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i)}} + d\mathbf{G}$ and $\mathbf{C}_d^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i)} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{C}_d^{(i)}} + d\mathbf{G}$ where \mathbf{G} is the gadget matrix.
- For $i = 1$ to N :
 - Select a PRF key $\mathbf{k}^{(i)} = (k_1^{(i)}, k_2^{(i)}, \dots, k_k^{(i)}) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k$.
- For $i = 1$ to N and $j = 1$ to k :
 - Choose $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, -1\}^{m \times m}$ and construct $\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i)} \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}} + k_j^{(i)} \mathbf{G}$.
- Let $\mathbf{S} = (\text{vk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{(N)})$ where each $\text{vk}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)}))$, then sends $(\text{PP}, \mathbf{S}, \gamma_{\text{st}})$ to \mathcal{A} .

Probing Signing Oracle. \mathcal{A} adaptively issues tuples for querying the signing oracle $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$. For simplicity, here consider only one tuple $(\boldsymbol{\mu}, \mathbf{R}, s)$ where $s \in [N]$, and requires that $\text{vk}^{(s)} \in \mathbf{S} \cap \mathbf{R}$. Let $N' = |\mathbf{R}|$. Assume the ring $\mathbf{R} = (\text{vk}^{(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{(N')})$, parse $\text{vk}^{(s)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(s)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(s)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(s)}), \mathbf{B}^{(s)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(s)}\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(s)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(s)}))$. \mathcal{S} does the following to response the signature.

- For $i' = 1$ to N' , set $\mathbf{F}^{(i')} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i')}} | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} + \mathbf{A}^{(i')}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$. Let $\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}} = [\mathbf{F}^{(1)} | \dots | \mathbf{F}^{(N)}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2Nm}$.
- Select $\hat{s} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, 2, \dots, N'\} \setminus i^\diamond$. Compute $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(\hat{s})}} \leftarrow \text{BasisExtBindAcom}(\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}}, \mathbf{F}^{(\hat{s})})$, $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}}} \leftarrow \text{BasisExt}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(\hat{s})}}, \mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}})$, and $\mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}} \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}}}, \mathbf{0}, \sigma)$.
- Let $\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}} - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$. Compute $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}} \leftarrow \text{BasisExtBindSK}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}}, \mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}})$ and $\mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}} \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}}, \mathbf{0}, \sigma)$.
- Compute $d = \text{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(\hat{s})}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$.
- For $i' = 1$ to N' :
 - Compute $\mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i')} = \text{Eval}(C_{\text{PRF}}, (\{\mathbf{B}_j\}_{j \in [k]}^{(i')}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_1}^{(i')}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_2}^{(i')}, \dots, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_t}^{(i')}))$
 - Set $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i')} = [\mathbf{A}^{(i')} | \mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(i')} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i')}]$.
 - Select $\mathbf{u}^{(i')} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.
- For $i' = i^\diamond + 1, \dots, N', 1, \dots, i^\diamond - 1$:
 - Compute $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i')} \leftarrow \text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}}, \mathbf{u}^{(i')}, \sigma)$.
 - Uniformly choose $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i')} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ subject to the condition that $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i')}$ $(\mathbf{e}_0^{(i')}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i')}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$.
- For $i' = i^\diamond$, note that $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i^\diamond)}$ can be transformed to

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i^\diamond)} &= [\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} | \mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(i^\diamond)} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i^\diamond)}] \\ &= [\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i^\diamond)}) + (1 - 2d)\mathbf{G}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m} \end{aligned}$$

then we can extend $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{G}}$ to $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i^\diamond)}}$ by BasisExtABB , then compute $(\mathbf{e}_0^{i^\diamond}; \mathbf{e}_1^{i^\diamond})$ by $\text{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i^\diamond)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i^\diamond)}}^{(i^\diamond)}, \sigma, \mathbf{0})$.

- For $i' = 1$ to N' , sample $\mathbf{s}^{(i')} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $\mathbf{z}^{(i')} = (\mathbf{B}^{(i')})^\top \mathbf{s}^{(i')} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(i')}$.
- Construct an NIWI proof π for the gap language $L_{\sigma, \varepsilon}$ by using the witness $\{\mathbf{s}^{(i')}, i'\}_{i' \in [N']}$.
- If $i' \neq i^\diamond$, compute one-time signature $\Sigma_{\text{OTS}} \leftarrow \Pi_{\text{OTS}}.\text{Sign}(\text{sk}_{\text{OTS}}^{(s)}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$. If $i' = i^\diamond$, send $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ to one-time signature challenger and then receive the response Σ_{OTS} .
- Return the signature $\Sigma = (\Sigma_{\text{OTS}}, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^{(s)}, \mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i')}, \mathbf{z}^{(i')}\}_{i' \in [N]}, \pi)$ to \mathcal{A} and adds $(\boldsymbol{\mu}, \mathbf{R}, \Sigma)$ to a list \mathbf{L} which \mathcal{S} initialized in prior.

Probing Corrupting Oracle. \mathcal{A} adaptively issues index i for querying the corrupting oracle $\text{OCorrupt}(\cdot)$, \mathcal{S} returns $\text{sk}^{(i)}$ to \mathcal{A} and adds $\text{vk}^{(i)}$ to a set \mathbf{C} which \mathcal{S} initialized in prior, while if $i = i^\diamond$ then \mathcal{S} aborts.

Exploiting the Forgery. \mathcal{A} outputs one forgery $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathbf{R}^*, \Sigma^*)$. Let $N^* = |\mathbf{R}^*|$. Parse $\boldsymbol{\mu}^* = (\mu_1^*, \dots, \mu_t^*)$ and $\mathbf{R}^* = (\text{vk}^{*(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}^{*(N^*)})$ where each $\text{vk}^{(i^*)} =$

- $(\mathbf{A}^{(i^*)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i^*)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i^*)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i^*)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i^*)}\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i^*)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i^*)}))$. Parse $\Sigma^* = (\Sigma_{\text{OTS}}^*, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^*, \mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}^*, \mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}}^*, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^*)}, \mathbf{z}^{(i^*)}\}_{i^* \in [N^*]}, \pi^*)$. \mathcal{S} does the following to exploit the forgery.
- Check if $\text{Ver}(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathbf{R}^*, \Sigma^*) = 1$ and $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathbf{R}^*, \Sigma^*) \notin \mathbf{L}$ and $\mathbf{R}^* \subseteq S \setminus \mathbf{C}$, otherwise \mathcal{S} aborts.
 - Compute $d = \text{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(i^\circ)}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)$.
 - For $i^* = i^\circ$:
 - Compute $\mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)} \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)} + \text{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(i^\circ)}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*) \mathbf{G}$ by invoking the $\text{Eval}(C_{\text{PRF}}, (\{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i^\circ)}\}_{j \in [k]}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_1^*}^{(i^\circ)}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_2^*}^{(i^\circ)}, \dots, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_t^*}^{(i^\circ)}))$.
 - Set $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, d}^{(i^\circ)} = [\mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)} | \mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)}]$.
 - Use $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}^{(i^\circ)}}$ to recover $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)}$. Then check if $\|\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{m}$ and $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, d}^{(i^\circ)} \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i^\circ)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds, otherwise \mathcal{S} aborts.
 - Note that the equation $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, d}^{(i^\circ)} \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i^\circ)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ can be transformed to the following

$$[\mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)} | \mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)}] \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i^\circ)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$$

$$[\mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)} (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)}) + (d - \text{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(i^\circ)}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*))] \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i^\circ)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$$

$$[\mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)} (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)})] \cdot ((\mathbf{B}^{(i^\circ)})^\top \mathbf{s}^{(i^\circ)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$$

$$\mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$$

- Return $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}$ as a $\text{SIS}_{q, n, m, \beta}$ solution, and return $(\Sigma_{\text{OTS}}^*, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)$ as the forged one-time signature.

Claim 1. *The public parameters PP and the set of verifications keys S that simulated by \mathcal{S} is statistically close to those in the real attack.*

Proof. In the real scheme and the simulation, the matrix \mathbf{A}_{com} is chosen in random or sampled by the extendable output function [40]. Therefore, the distribution of \mathbf{A}_{com} and PP in the simulation is statistically indistinguishable with real attack. The matrices $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]}$ in the real scheme and the matrices $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N] \setminus i^\circ}$ in the simulation were generated by SuperTrapGen while the matrix $\mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)}$ is formed by m uniformly random and independent samples from \mathbb{Z}_q^n from the SIS challenger. By Lemma 8, we know the $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]}$ in both real and simulated world have distribution that is statistically indistinguishable with real attack. For the matrices $\{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]}$, it were uniformly random selected in the real scheme, in the simulation, the matrices $\{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N] \setminus i^\circ}$ were generated by TrapGen while the matrix $\mathbf{B}^{(i^\circ)}$ was generated by SuperTrapGen. By Lemma

7 and 8, we know the $\{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]}$ in both real and simulated world have distribution that is statistically indistinguishable with real attack. For the matrices $\{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]}$, both real and simulated world select that in uniformly random, so it is immediate. For the matrices $(\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)})$, $\{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j \in [k]}$, and $(\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)})$ for all $i \in [N]$ generated in the simulation have distribution that is statistically indistinguishable with real attack by Lemma 6. Therefore, the set of verifications keys \mathbf{S} given to \mathcal{A} is statistically close to those in the real attack.

Claim 2. *The replies of the signing oracle $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ simulated by \mathcal{S} is statistically close to those in the real attack when set $\sigma = O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$.*

Proof. By Definition 4, in our parameters setting, the entries $\mathbf{z}^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{z}^{(N')}$ in the signature tuples output from the oracle $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ are statistically close to those in the real attack. By the witness indistinguishability of the proof system, the proof π in the signature tuples output from the oracle $\text{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$ is statistically close to those in the real attack. For the vk_{OTS} , there is no change in the simulation and real attack. For the Σ_{OTS} , it is immediate since we directly invoke the one-time signature signing algorithm in both simulated and real world. Therefore, we focus on the entries $(\mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}}, (\mathbf{e}_1^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{e}_1^{(N')}))$.

By Lemma 11, for sufficient large Gaussian parameter σ , the distribution of the entries $(\mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}}, (\mathbf{e}_1^{(1)}, \dots, \mathbf{e}_1^{(N')}))$ generated by SamplePre are statistically close to the distribution of signatures generated in the real scheme. So we next analyze how to set the parameter σ . In the simulating signing oracle phase, we constructed $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i^\circ)} = [\mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i^\circ)}(\mathbf{R}_{1-d}^{(i^\circ)} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i^\circ)}) + (1-2d)\mathbf{G}]$. Let $\widetilde{\mathbf{R}}^{(i^\circ)} = \mathbf{R}_{1-d}^{(i^\circ)} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i^\circ)}$. By Lemma 1, we know $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{R}}^{(i^\circ)}\| \leq O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2})$ for some constant c . By Lemma 10, we know $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i^\circ)}}\| < (\|\widetilde{\mathbf{R}}^{(i^\circ)}\| + 1) \cdot \|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{G}}\|$. By Lemma 13, we know $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{G}}\| \leq \sqrt{5}$. By Lemma 11, it requires to set $\sigma > \|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i^\circ)}}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$. Therefore, to satisfy these requirements, set $\sigma = O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ is sufficient.

Claim 3. *\mathcal{A} can produce a valid $\text{SIS}_{q,n,m,\beta}$ solution with overwhelming probability.*

Proof. We argue that $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}$ that \mathcal{S} finally output in the simulation is a valid $\text{SIS}_{q,n,m,\beta}$ solution in two steps. We first explain it is sufficiently short, note that $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)}$ and $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}$ follow the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma}$. By Lemma 4, $\|\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)}\|, \|\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{m}$. By Lemma 1, $\|\mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i^\circ)}\| \leq O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2})$. By Lemma 3, the norm of $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}}$ is bounded by \sqrt{m} . By Lemma 13, $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{G}}\| \leq \sqrt{5}$. Therefore, it requires to set $\beta \geq O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{2/3}) \cdot \sigma\sqrt{m}$.

Then we prove $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*}^{(i^\circ)}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}$ is non-zero with overwhelming probability. Suppose that the $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)} = \mathbf{0}$, then for a valid forgery we must have

at least one $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)} \neq \mathbf{0}$ and thus $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\circ)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \mu^*}^{(i^\circ)}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}$ is non-zero. Suppose on the contrary, there exists one $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)} \neq \mathbf{0}$, then we need to argue $(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \mu^*}^{(i^\circ)}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}$ is non-zero with overwhelming probability. Due to we assume $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)} = (e_1, \dots, e_m) \neq \mathbf{0}$ which means at least one coordinate of $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)}$, denote as e_o where $o \in [m]$, such that $e_o \neq 0$. Let $\bar{\mathbf{R}} = (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\circ)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \mu^*}^{(i^\circ)})$ and write $\bar{\mathbf{R}} = (\bar{\mathbf{r}}_1, \dots, \bar{\mathbf{r}}_m)$ and so $\bar{\mathbf{R}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\circ)} = \bar{\mathbf{r}}_o e_o + \sum_{\bar{o} \in [m] \setminus o} \bar{\mathbf{r}}_{\bar{o}} e_{\bar{o}}$. Note that for the fixed message μ^* on which \mathcal{A} made the forgery, $\bar{\mathbf{R}}$ (therefore $\bar{\mathbf{r}}_o$) depends on the low-norm matrices $(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_0^{(i^\circ)}}, \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_1^{(i^\circ)}}), \{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i^\circ)}}\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{C}_0^{(i^\circ)}}, \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{C}_1^{(i^\circ)}})$ and PRF key \mathbf{k} . The information about e_o for \mathcal{A} is from the public matrices in the verification set \mathcal{S} that given to the \mathcal{A} , and note that the PRF keys \mathbf{k} which is not included in \mathcal{S} . Therefore, by the pigeonhole principle there is an exponentially large freedom to pick a value to $\bar{\mathbf{r}}_o$ which is compatible with \mathcal{A} 's view. This completes the proof.

Theorem 2 (Anonymity). *Set the parameters as Sect. 4.3, the LRS scheme is signer-anonymous in the standard model.*

Proof. The proof proceeds in a sequence of experiments $\mathbf{E}_0, \mathbf{H}_0, \mathbf{H}_1, \mathbf{E}_1$ such that \mathbf{E}_0 (resp., \mathbf{E}_1) corresponds to the experiment of Anonymity in Definition 1 with $b = 0$ (resp., $b = 1$), and such that each experiment is indistinguishable from the one before it. This implies that \mathcal{A} has negligible advantage in distinguishing \mathbf{E}_0 from \mathbf{E}_1 , as desired.

\mathbf{E}_0 : This experiment first generate $\text{PP} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\text{st}})$, and $\{\text{vk}^{(i)}, \text{sk}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]}$ by repeatedly invoking $\text{KeyGen}()$, and \mathcal{A} is given $(\text{PP}, \mathcal{S} = \{\text{vk}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]})$ and the randomness γ_{st} . Then \mathcal{A} provides a challenge $(\mu^*, \mathbf{R}^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$ to the challenger, and requires that $\mu^* \in \mathcal{M}$, $s_0^* \neq s_1^*$ and $\text{vk}^{(s_0^*)}, \text{vk}^{(s_1^*)} \in \mathcal{S} \cap \mathbf{R}^*$. For each tuple $(\mu^*, \mathbf{R}^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$ in the challenge, the experiment uses $\text{sk}^{(s_0^*)}$ to compute the signature tuple Σ^* and responses to \mathcal{A} .

\mathbf{H}_0 : This experiment is as same as experiment \mathbf{E}_0 except that we change how the signature Σ^* is generated: we sample $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ by SamplePre rather than randomly select it from \mathbb{Z}_q^m .

Then we show that \mathbf{E}_0 and \mathbf{H}_0 are indistinguishable for \mathcal{A} , which we do by giving a reduction from the hardness assumption $\text{LWE}_{m, q, \alpha q \sqrt{2}}$.

Reduction. Suppose \mathcal{A} has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing \mathbf{E}_0 and \mathbf{H}_0 . We use \mathcal{A} to construct an algorithm \mathcal{S} for breaking the hardness assumption $\text{LWE}_{m, q, \alpha q \sqrt{2}}$. \mathcal{S} is given as input $(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{z}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, where \mathbf{B} is uniform and \mathbf{z} is either uniform or equal to $\mathbf{B}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ for $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \alpha q \sqrt{2}}$.

Setup Phase. \mathcal{S} takes as input a security parameter n and a randomness γ to invoke $\text{PP} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\text{st}})$ algorithm. \mathcal{S} simulates as follows.

- Choose a random index $\bar{i}^* \xleftarrow{\mathcal{S}} \{1, \dots, N\}$, sets $\mathbf{B}^{(\bar{i}^*)} = \mathbf{B}$.

- For $i = \bar{i}^*+1, \dots, N, 1, \dots, \bar{i}^*-1$, compute $(\mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}}) \leftarrow \text{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$.
- For $i = 1$ to N , compute $(\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}) \leftarrow \text{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{B}^{(i)})$. Set $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}$ and $\text{sk}_{\text{OTS}}^{(i)} = \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}$.
- For $i = 1$ to N and $d \in \{0, 1\}$, select $\mathbf{A}_d^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_d^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.
- For $i = 1$ to N , select a PRF key $\mathbf{k}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k$.
- For $j = 1$ to k , select $\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.
- Set $\mathcal{S} = \{\text{vk}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]}$, $\text{vk}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)}))$, then sends $(\text{PP}, \mathcal{S}, \gamma_{\text{st}})$ to \mathcal{A} .

Challenge. \mathcal{A} provides a challenge $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathbf{R}^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$ to the challenger. \mathcal{S} chooses a random bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and fixes it throughout the response phase for the challenge. For each tuple $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathbf{R}^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$ in the challenge, \mathcal{S} does as following:

- Let $N^* = |\mathbf{R}^*|$. Check if $s_0^* \neq s_1^*$, $\text{vk}^{(s_0^*)}, \text{vk}^{(s_1^*)} \in \mathcal{S} \cap \mathbf{R}^*$ and $\bar{i}^* = s_1^*$, otherwise \mathcal{S} aborts the simulation.
- Compute $d = \text{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(s_1^*)}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)$.
- Compute $\mathbf{F}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}$, and \mathbf{e}'_{chk} as in Sign algorithm.
- For $i^* = s_0^*$, select $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_0^*)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ and computes $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_0^*)}$ by SamplePre such that $\mathbf{F}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, 1-d}^{(s_0^*)}(\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_0^*)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(s_0^*)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds as in Sign algorithm.
- For $i^* = s_1^*$, let $\mathbf{z}^{(i^*)} = \mathbf{z}$, uniformly choose $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ such that $\mathbf{F}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, 1-d}^{(s_1^*)}(\mathbf{z}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds.
- For all $i^* \in [N^*]$ and $i^* \neq s_0^*, s_1^*$, select $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^*)} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \sigma}$ and compute $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^*)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ uniformly subject to the condition that $\mathbf{F}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, 1-d}^{(i^*)}(\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^*)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^*)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds as in Sign algorithm.
- For $i^* = s_1^* + 1, \dots, N^*, 1, \dots, s_1^* - 1$, compute the ciphertext $\mathbf{z}^{(i^*)}$ as in E_0 and H_0 . Then construct an NIWI proof π for the gap language $L_{\sigma, \varepsilon}$ as in Sign algorithm.
- Compute one-time signature $\Sigma_{\text{OTS}} \leftarrow \Pi_{\text{OTS}}.\text{Sign}(\text{sk}_{\text{OTS}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)$.
- Return the signature $\Sigma = (\Sigma_{\text{OTS}}, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \mathbf{e}_{\text{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\text{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^*)}, \mathbf{z}^{(i^*)}\}_{i^* \in [N^*]}, \pi)$ to \mathcal{A} .

Guess. When \mathcal{A} outputs the guess b' , \mathcal{S} outputs the guess b' .

Let $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{S}}$ denote the above experiment when \mathcal{S} 's input \mathbf{z} is uniformly distributed. Let \mathcal{D}_{LWE} denote the above experiment when \mathcal{S} 's input \mathbf{z} is distributed according to $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{B}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ for $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \alpha q \sqrt{2}}$.

Claim 4. \mathcal{A} 's view in $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{S}}$ is statistically close to its view in E_0 .

Proof. In experiment E_0 , we have $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)} = (\mathbf{B}^{(s_1^*)})^\top \mathbf{s}^{(s_1^*)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ where $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ is chosen uniformly subject to $\mathbf{F}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, 1-d}^{(s_1^*)}(\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ and $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$. In $\mathcal{D}_{\mathcal{S}}$, we let $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)} = \mathbf{z}$ and recall that $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{B}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ for $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ is uniformly selected. And $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}$ is chosen uniformly subject to $\mathbf{F}_{\text{CPRF}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, 1-d}^{(s_1^*)}(\mathbf{z}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}) = \mathbf{0}$

(mod q). Recall $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, 1-d}^{(s_1^*)} = \mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)} \mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)} + (\mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(s_1^*)} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(s_1^*)}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$. We can view $\mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)}$ and $(\mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(s_1^*)} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\text{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(s_1^*)})$ as regular function $\mathbb{Z}_q^m \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. By Lemma 6, the randomly chosen $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ is uniform over the images of $\mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)}$. For a regular function, choosing a uniform element from the images, followed by a uniform element from its pre-images, is equivalent to choosing a uniform element from the domain, as is done in $\mathcal{D}_{\mathfrak{S}}$. Therefore the choice of $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ in \mathbf{E}_0 is statistically close to uniform over \mathbb{Z}_q^m , and hence $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)}$ is statistically indistinguishable between \mathbf{E}_0 and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathfrak{S}}$. Similarly, this proof also can show the $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}$ in $\mathcal{D}_{\mathfrak{S}}$ statistically close to uniform over \mathbb{Z}_q^m .

Claim 5. \mathcal{A} 's view in \mathcal{D}_{LWE} is statistically close to its view in \mathbf{H}_0 .

Proof. In experiment \mathbf{H}_0 , $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)} = (\mathbf{B}^{(s_1^*)})^\top \mathbf{s}^{(s_1^*)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ where $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ is sampled by SamplePre algorithm. In \mathcal{D}_{LWE} , we let $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)} = \mathbf{z}$ and recall that $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{B}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ for $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \alpha q \sqrt{2}}$. The proof to show $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}$ in \mathbf{H}_0 and \mathcal{D}_{LWE} indistinguishable is as same as the last claim. Under the setting of the parameters given in Sect. 4.3, and by Lemma 11, $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)}$ is indistinguishable between \mathbf{H}_0 and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathfrak{S}}$.

\mathbf{H}_1 : This experiment is the same as experiment \mathbf{E}_1 except that the proof π is now computed using the witness $\{\mathbf{s}^{(i^*)}, i^*\}_{i^* \in [N^*]}^{(s_1^*)}$ rather than $\{\mathbf{s}^{(i^*)}, i^*\}_{i^* \in [N^*]}^{(s_0^*)}$.

The rest of the proof is straightforward. \mathbf{H}_1 is indistinguishable from \mathbf{E}_1 by exactly the same argument used to show the indistinguishability of \mathbf{H}_0 and \mathbf{E}_0 . By the witness indistinguishability of the proof system, \mathbf{H}_0 and \mathbf{H}_1 are indistinguishable. This completes the proof.

Theorem 3 (Linkability). *Set the parameters as Sect. 4.3, the LRS scheme is signer-linkable in the standard model.*

Proof. Setup Phase. \mathcal{S} takes as input a security parameter n and a randomness γ_{st} to invoke $\text{PP} \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\text{st}})$ algorithm, then send $(\text{PP}, \gamma_{\text{st}})$ to \mathcal{A} .

Output Phase. \mathcal{A} outputs l ($l \geq 2$) (messages, ring of verification keys, signature) tuples $(\mathbf{R}_i^*, \boldsymbol{\mu}_i^*, \Sigma_i^*)$.

Infer that there must existing a ring member in the union set $\cup_{i=1} \mathbf{R}_i^*$ who generated at least two signature tuples. In other words, this ring member, assuming his index is s , had produced two valid one-time verification keys $(\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}, \text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^*)$. Let $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}$ be the honest one-time verification key. Now we analyze \mathcal{A} how to produce the vk_{OTS}^* . There are two ways:

- The first way is \mathcal{A} produces a $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \neq \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}$. In this case, we have $\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}]$. Recall the BasisExtBindSK algorithm, \mathcal{A} needs to compute a low-norm basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}} = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{R}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ such that $\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$. It holds that $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} \mathbf{R}_0 = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ and $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} \mathbf{R}_1 = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$. Then we have $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* (\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} \mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} \mathbf{R}_1) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds. As the parameters set in Sect. 4.3, $(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} \mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} \mathbf{R}_1)$ will be a valid SIS solution.

- The second way is \mathcal{A} produces a $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} \neq \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}$. Let $N^* = |\cup_{i=1} R_i^*|$. In this case, existing an index $s' \in [N^*]$ satisfy that, $\mathbf{F}^{(s')} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} + \mathbf{A}^{(s')}]$, and $\mathbf{F}^{(s')}$ has the basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(s')}} = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} \mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} \mathbf{R}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ by the BasisExtBindAcom algorithm. It holds that $\mathbf{A}^{(s')} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} \mathbf{R}_0 = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ and $\mathbf{A}^{(s')} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} \mathbf{R}_1 = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$. Then we have $\mathbf{A}^{(s')} (\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} \mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} \mathbf{R}_1) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds. As the parameters set in Sect. 4.3, $(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} \mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^*} \mathbf{R}_1)$ will be a valid SIS solution.

This completes the proof.

Theorem 4 (Non-Slanderability). *Set the parameters as Sect. 4.3, the LRS scheme is signer-non-slanderable in the standard model.*

Proof. Setup. As same as the Setup phase of unforgeability proof.

Probing. As same as the Probing phase of unforgeability proof.

Output. \mathcal{A} outputs two signature tuples (μ^*, R^*, Σ^*) and $(\hat{\mu}, \hat{R}, \hat{\Sigma})$. Let $N^* = |R^*|$. Check if $\text{Ver}(\mu^*, R^*, \Sigma^*) = 1$ and $(\mu^*, R^*, \Sigma^*) \notin \mathcal{L}$ and $(\hat{\mu}, \hat{R}, \hat{\Sigma}) \in \mathcal{L}$ and $R^* \subseteq S \setminus C$ and the proof π^* is correct and $\text{Link}(R^*, \mu^*, \Sigma^*, \hat{R}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{\Sigma}) = 1$ i.e., $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^* = \hat{\text{vk}}_{\text{OTS}}$, otherwise aborts. Let $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^* = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*$ and $\hat{\text{vk}}_{\text{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}$. We analyze \mathcal{A} how to produce vk_{OTS}^* and make $\text{vk}_{\text{OTS}}^* = \hat{\text{vk}}_{\text{OTS}}$ holds. There are two ways:

- The first way is \mathcal{A} selects a basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*$ and then computes the $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^*$ such that $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}$ holds. We have $\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}]$. By the BasisExtBindSK algorithm, \mathcal{A} needs to generate a low-norm basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}} = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ such that $\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\text{chk}}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$. It holds that $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_0 = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ and $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_1 = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$. Then we have $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* (\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_1) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds. As the parameters set in Sect. 4.3, $(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_1)$ will be a valid SIS solution.
- The second way is \mathcal{A} corrupts the $\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}$ and then computes a $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^*$ such that $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} = \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}$ holds. In this case, existing an index $s \in [N^*]$ satisfy that, $\mathbf{F}^{(s)} = [\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} | \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} + \mathbf{A}^{(s)}]$, and $\mathbf{F}^{(s)}$ has the basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(s)}} = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_0 & \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ by the BasisExtBindAcom algorithm. It holds that $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_0 = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ and $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}} \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_1 - \mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_1 = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$. Then we have $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* (\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_0 - \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_0) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ and $\mathbf{A}_{\text{com}}^* (\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_1 - \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_1) = \mathbf{0} \pmod{q}$ holds. As the parameters set in Sect. 4.3, $(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_0 - \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_0)$ and $(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \mathbf{R}_1 - \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} \mathbf{R}_1)$ will be valid SIS solutions.

This completes the proof.

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