Lattice-Based Linkable Ring Signature in the Standard Model

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Abstract. Ring signatures enable a user to sign messages on behalf of an arbitrary set of users, called the ring. The anonymity of the scheme guarantees that the signature does not reveal which member of the ring signed the message. The notion of linkable ring signatures (LRS) is an extension of the concept of ring signatures such that there is a public way of determining whether two signatures have been produced by the same signer. Lattice-based LRS is an important and active research line since lattice-based cryptography has attracted more attention due to its distinctive features, especially the quantum-resistant. However, *all the existing lattice-based LRS relied on random oracle heuristics*, i.e., no lattice-based LRS in the standard model has been introduced so far.

In this paper, we present a lattice-based LRS scheme in the standard model. Toward our goal, we present new lattice basis extending algorithms which are the key ingredients in our construction, that may be of independent interest.

Keywords: Lattice-based · Linkable ring signature · Standard model.

1 Introduction

Ring signatures, introduced by Rivest et al. [45], allow a signer to hide in a *ring* of potential signers of which the user is a member, without revealing which member actually produced the signature. However, the signer-anonymity may be too strong in some scenarios. For example, regular ring signatures cannot be used for anonymous e-voting since any double votes remain undetectable, which means no one can find out whether any two signatures (with two votes) are submitted by the same voter or not. Similar concerns should be aroused in cryptocurrency where a double-spent payment should be discarded. Linkable ring signatures (LRS) [37] provide the remedy to this problem by allowing the public to detect any signer who has produced two or more signatures (i.e., votes, payments). Thereafter, LRS has been studied extensively [1,2,3,9,24,25,31,46,47,51,52,53] especially in recent years, driven by the rapid development of cryptocurrencies.

Another important line of research is constructing LRS schemes from lattices [7,11,12,15,20,21,32,36,48,49,50], since lattice-based cryptography has attracted more attention due to its distinctive features especially the quantum-resistant. However, these works have so far required the random oracle (ROM) model

[16] (or similar heuristics) for their security analysis. Katz (Sect. 6.2.1 of [30]) mentioned that existing some negative results about the cryptographic systems that rely on ROM. Canetti et al. [18] and Dodis et al. [22] showed that proof in ROM can only serve as a heuristic argument and, admittedly using quite contrived constructions, has been shown to possibly lead to insecure schemes when the ROM is implemented in the practical scenarios. Furthermore, Leurent and Nguyen [35] presented the attacks extracting the secret keys on several hash-then-sign type signature schemes (including the lattice-based signature [27]) and identity-based encryption schemes if the underlying hash functions are modeled as a random oracle. Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM) is a generalized notion of ROM [8]. Though a proof of security in the QROM is stronger than one in the ROM, it does not means the security in the QROM implies standard-model security [23]. Furthermore, Grilo et al. [26] showed that the proofs in QROM lack conceptual simplicity and tightness.

1.1 Our Results

To address the above concerns, we present a lattice-based LRS scheme provably secure in the standard model. It is worth mentioning that we employ the strongest security model that is strong unforgeability w.r.t. insider corruption (An important realistic attack presented by Bender et al. [10]). In other words, our construction provides strong confidence on security in threefold: provably secure without relying on any random oracle heuristics, and instantiated from the well-studied standard lattice assumptions (SIS and LWE) make our work being quantum-resistant, and satisfies the strongest security model that captures the realistic attacks i.e., strongly unforgeable w.r.t. insider corruption that make our system more applicable in practical scenarios. Furthermore, our signature size grows linearly in the ring size, it is competitive even compare with the related works [11,12,20,21,32,36,48,49,50] that based on random oracle. As for the majority of SIS/LWE-based cryptographic constructions in the standard model, the public key and signature sizes of our construction are still too large for practical use. We do not want to oversell our results, but take this as a stepping stone towards the goal of practical LRS, as this is the first lattice-based LRS scheme in the standard model.

Moreover, we present two lattice basis extending algorithms that may be of independent interest. The algorithms are the key ingredients in our construction, which break the obstacle in building the key image[1] without the help of cryptographic hash functions that are modeled as random oracles.

[1] In linkable ring signatures, 'key image' is a parameter in the output signature tuple. If two signature tuples have the same key image, we say these two signatures are linked.

1.2 Our Methods

Construction Outline. In our scheme, the key barrier is how to construct a suitable key image. We break the barrier by our lattice basis extending algorithms. Particularly, we use the verification key $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ of OTS as the key image. $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ is a common matrix for all ring members which generated by a specified function in setup phase. Each ring member takes three steps to prepare their verification key vk and signing key sk. Firstly, it selects a PRF key $\mathbf{k} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$. Then it selects $k+5$ uniformly random matrices $\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{B}, \{\mathbf{B}_j\}_{j\in[k]}, \mathbf{C}_0, \mathbf{C}_1$ from $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ where $\{\mathbf{B}_j\}_{j\in[k]}$ are "PRF secret key" matrices and $(\mathbf{C}_0, \mathbf{C}_1)$ are "message representation" matrices. Finally, it generates $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}})$ by a trapdoor generation algorithm, outputs $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}} = \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m\times m}$, $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$, $\mathsf{vk} = (\mathbf{A}, (\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1), \mathbf{B}, \{\mathbf{B}_j\}_{j\in[k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0, \mathbf{C}_1))$, and $\mathsf{sk} = (\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{k}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}})$.

The signer takes five steps to generate the signature of message $\boldsymbol{\mu} \in \{0,1\}^t$. Assuming the input ring contains N ring members, let s be the index of the signer in the ring. Firstly, for each ring member, it sets two "check" matrices $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2Nm}$ and $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2m}$. To prevent the adversary forging or tampering the key image $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}$, it uses $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}$ and $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}$ algorithms to compute the extended basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}}$ and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}$, then uses these extended basis sampling two short "check" vectors $\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}} \in \mathbb{Z}^{2Nm}$ and $\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \in \mathbb{Z}^{2m}$ such that $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$, respectively. Secondly, it computes a bit $d = \mathsf{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(s)}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$, then computes the evaluate matrix $\mathbf{A}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}$ by the "PRF secret key" and "message representation" matrices, and set $\mathbf{F}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d} = \left[\mathbf{A}^{(i)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i)}_{1-d} - \mathbf{A}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2m}$. Thirdly, it samples $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}$ for each ring member, and then samples a uniformly random $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i)}$ such that $\mathbf{F}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(i)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ for each ring member except the signer. For the index s, the signer computes the $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s)}$ such that $\mathbf{A}^{(s)} \cdot \mathbf{e}_0^{(s)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(s)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}} - \mathbf{A}^{(s)}_{1-d}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(s)}$. In this way, it also holds that $\mathbf{F}^{(s)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(s)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(s)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ for the signer. Fourthly, it selects a random vector $\mathbf{s}^{(i)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ then computes $\mathbf{z}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{s}^{(i)})^\top \mathbf{B}^{(i)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(i)}$, and then construct a NIWI proof π to prove there existing a short preimage vector $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s)}$ that was hidden in the set $\{\mathbf{z}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}$. Finally, it computes a one-time signature Σ_{OTS} and outputs $\Sigma = (\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}, \mathbf{z}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}, \pi)$ as the signature.

The verifier takes three steps to verify the signature. Firstly, it constructs the "check" matrices $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}$ and $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}$ as signing phase. Due to the verifier do not know signer's PRF key, therefore, it constructs $\mathbf{F}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},d} = \left[\mathbf{A}^{(i)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i)}_{d} - \mathbf{A}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}\right]$ for all $i \in [N]$ and $d \in \{0,1\}$. Secondly, it checks if the vector $\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}$, $\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}$, and each $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}$ is short enough, and checks if $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$, $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$, and each $\mathbf{F}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},d} \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ for $d = 0$ or 1 holds. Finally,

it checks if the proof π is correct and the one-time signature is valid. If all these conditions are satisfied, the signature is accepted.

The Link algorithm takes only one step to check if two signatures are linked i.e., check if two signatures have the same one-time verification key.

Proof Outline. The unforgeability proof assumes that there exists an efficient adversary can break the unforgeability, then there exists an algorithm can solve the SIS problem instance $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ i.e., can output a short non-zero vector $\mathbf{e}$ such that $\mathbf{Ae} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. The reduction embeds a randomly picked PRF secret key $\mathbf{k}^{(i)} = (k_1^{(i)}, k_2^{(i)}, \ldots, k_k^{(i)})$ in each ring member's verification key. Particularly, it first picks a random index $i^\diamond$ from $\{1, \ldots, N\}$ and let $\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} = \mathbf{A}$ i.e., embed the SIS problem instance into verification key. Then it takes the $\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)}$ as input in $\mathsf{SuperTrapGen}$ algorithm, outputs $(\mathbf{B}^{(i^\diamond)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}^{(i^\diamond)}})$. In this way, it prepared the signing key of the ring member with index $i^\diamond$ which used to response the corrupting query in the corrupting oracle probing phase. Secondly, for all the index $i \in [N] \setminus i^\diamond$, it uses $\mathsf{TrapGen}$ algorithm to generate $(\mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}})$ and then produce $(\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}})$ by taking $\mathbf{B}^{(i)}$ as input to $\mathsf{SuperTrapGen}$ algorithm. Finally, for all the index $i \in [N]$, $j \in [k]$, and $d \in \{0, 1\}$, it constructs the matrices $\mathbf{A}_d^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i)}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}}^{(i)} + d\mathbf{G}$, $\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i)}\mathbf{R}_j^{(i)} + k_j^{(i)}\mathbf{G}$, and $\mathbf{C}_d^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i)}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{C}}^{(i)} + d\mathbf{G}$ where all the $\mathbf{R}$ shape matrices are randomly chosen from $\{1, -1\}^{m \times m}$ and $\mathbf{G}$ is the gadget matrix. In this way, the reduction algorithm can response the signing query of all the ring members. For the ring members with index $i \in [N] \setminus i^\diamond$, it responses the signature by the basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}$. For the ring member with index $i^\diamond$, it responses the signature by the gadget trapdoor $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{G}}$. For a valid forgery with respect to message $\boldsymbol{\mu}^*$, since $d = \mathsf{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(i^\diamond)}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)$ is unpredictable to the adversary, therefore, the reduction algorithm outputs a valid SIS solution with essentially probability $1/2$.

The anonymity proof proceeds in a sequence of experiments E_0, H_0, H_1, E_1 such that each experiment is indistinguishable from the one before it. This implies that $\mathcal{A}$ has negligible advantage in distinguishing E_0 from E_1, as desired. The experiment E_0 (resp., E_1) corresponds to the experiment of $\mathsf{Anonymity}$ in Definition 1 with $b = 0$ (resp., $b = 1$). Let (s_0^*, s_1^*) be the indexes that adversary provides in $\mathsf{Challenge}$ phase. The experiment H_0 is as same as E_0 except that we sample $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ by a specified function rather than randomly select it from $\mathbb{Z}_q^m$. Suppose an adversary can distinguish E_0 and H_0 i.e., can distinguish the $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)} = (\mathbf{s}^{(s_1^*)})^\top \mathbf{B}^{(s_1^*)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ with $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ from the $\mathbf{z}'^{(s_1^*)} = (\mathbf{s}^{(s_1^*)})^\top \mathbf{B}^{(s_1^*)} + \mathbf{e}_0'^{(s_1^*)}$ with $\mathbf{e}_0'^{(s_1^*)} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \alpha q}$, then we can construct an reduction algorithm to solve the LWE assumption. The experiment H_1 is as same as H_0 except that we change the witness from s_0^*'s to s_1^*'s. By the witness indistinguishability of the proof system, H_0 and H_1 are indistinguishable. Finally, H_1 is indistinguishable from E_1 by exactly the same argument used to show the indistinguishability of H_0 and E_0.

The signer-linkable and signer-non-slanderable proofs mainly based on the $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}$ and $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}$ algorithms that we presented. As mentioned above, we use one-time verification key $\mathsf{vk_{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ as the key image where $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ is a random matrix can be shared by all users and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ is the trapdoor belongs to $\mathsf{sk_{OTS}}$. In this setting, there are two challenges. The first challenge is achieving signer-linkable i.e., how to restrict one ring member generating two signatures by generating the other $\mathsf{vk'_{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}'_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}{}'$ and thus breaking the signer-linkable. More specifically, recall the signature tuple includes the one-time signature Σ_{OTS} and one-time verification key $\mathsf{vk_{OTS}}$ which can prevent adversary to produce two signatures for one $\mathsf{vk_{OTS}}$, but the adversary still can break the signer-linkable by generating a $\mathbf{A}'_{\mathsf{com}} \neq \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ or $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}{}' \neq \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ such that $\mathsf{vk'_{OTS}} \neq \mathsf{vk_{OTS}}$. The second challenge is achieving signer-non-slanderable i.e., how to prevent the adversary to forge the $\mathsf{vk_{OTS}}$ which belongs to an honest signature tuple i.e., forge a $\mathsf{vk^*_{OTS}}$ such that $\mathsf{vk^*_{OTS}} = \mathsf{vk_{OTS}}$. For instance, an adversary can arbitrarily select a $\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}$ then compute a $\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}$ such that $\mathsf{vk^*_{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}} = \mathsf{vk_{OTS}}$, or corrupt the $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ then compute a $\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}$ such that $\mathsf{vk^*_{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}} = \mathsf{vk_{OTS}}$. Therefore, to address these two challenges, we need a method to bind $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ that can not be changed i.e., bind that in $\mathsf{vk_{OTS}}$. In the signing phase, we constructs two "check" matrices for each ring member, the one is $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}} = [\mathbf{F}^{(1)}|\dots|\mathbf{F}^{(N)}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2Nm}$ where each $\mathbf{F}^{(i)} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}|\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} + \mathbf{A}^{(i)}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2m}$, the other one is $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}|\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2m}$. Then, we extend the signer's trapdoor $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ to $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}$ and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}$ by $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}$ and $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}$, respectively. Finally, we use the extended trapdoor $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}$ and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}$ to sample the short and unforgeable preimages $\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}$ and $\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}$, respectively. In this way, the elements in the key image i.e., $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ can not be changed or forged when the preimages $\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}$ and $\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}$ pass the validation of the verify algorithm. By our design of the extended trapdoors $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}}$ and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}$, we can exploit the output of the adversary to produce a valid SIS solution.

2 Definitions

In this section, we review the definitions of linkable ring signatures: syntax, correctness, unforgeability, anonymity, linkability, and non-slanderability.

Definition 1 (Linkable Ring Signature). *A linkable ring signature LRS consists of the following algorithms:*

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^n) \to \mathsf{PP}$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. On input the security parameter n, outputs the public parameter* PP.

  The public parameters PP are common parameters used by all ring members in the system, for example, the message space $\mathcal{M}$, the modulo, etc. In the following, PP is implicit input parameter to every algorithm.

– $\mathsf{KeyGen}() \to (\mathsf{vk},\mathsf{sk})$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. The algorithm outputs a verification key* vk *and a signing key* sk.

  Any ring member can run this algorithm to generate a pair of verification key and signing key.

– $\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}, \mu, \mathsf{R}) \to \Sigma$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. On input a signing key* sk*, a message* $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$*, and a ring of verification keys* $\mathsf{R} = (\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{(N)})$[2]. *Assume that (1) the input signing key* sk *and the corresponding verification key* vk *is a valid key pair output by* KeyGen *and* $\mathsf{vk} \in \mathsf{R}$*, (2) the ring size* $|\mathsf{R}| \geq 2$*, (3) each verification key in ring* R *is distinct. This algorithm outputs a signature* Σ.

– $\mathsf{Ver}(\mathsf{R}, \mu, \Sigma) \to 1/0$. *This is a deterministic algorithm. On input a ring of verification keys* $\mathsf{R} = (\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{(N)})$*, a message* $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$*, and a signature* Σ*, outputs* 1 *if the signature is valid, or* 0 *if the signature is invalid.*

– $\mathsf{Link}(\mathsf{R}_0, \mu_0, \Sigma_0, \mathsf{R}_1, \mu_1, \Sigma_1) \to 1/0$. *This is a deterministic algorithm. On input two valid signature tuples* $(\mathsf{R}_0, \mu_0, \Sigma_0)$ and $(\mathsf{R}_1, \mu_1, \Sigma_1)$*, the algorithm outputs* 1 *if the two signatures* linked*, or* 0 *if* $\mathsf{unlinked}$.

Remark: Note that it is open on whether the Sign algorithm is probabilistic or deterministic, which may depend on the concrete constructions.

Correctness. *A LRS scheme is correct, if for all* $n \in \mathbb{N}$*, any* $N = \mathrm{poly}(n)$*, any* $\mathsf{PP} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n)$ *as implicit input parameter to every algorithm, any* N *pairs* $(\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \mathsf{sk}^{(1)}), \ldots, (\mathsf{vk}^{(N)}, \mathsf{sk}^{(N)}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}()$*, let* $\mathsf{R} = (\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{(N)})$*, it holds that*

– *For any messages* $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$*, and any* $s \in [N]$*, it holds that*

$$\Pr\big[\mathsf{Ver}(\mathsf{R}, \mu, \mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}^{(s)}, \mu, \mathsf{R})) = 1\big] = 1 - \mathrm{negl}(n)$$

– *For any messages* $\mu_0, \mu_1 \in \mathcal{M}$*, any* $N_0, N_1 = poly(n)$*, any ring of well-formed verification keys* $\mathsf{R}_0, \mathsf{R}_1$ *with ring size* $|\mathsf{R}_0| = N_0, |\mathsf{R}_1| = N_1$ *respectively, and any* $\mathsf{vk}^{(s_0)} \in \mathsf{R}_0, \mathsf{vk}^{(s_1)} \in \mathsf{R}_1$ *for any* $s_0 \in [N_0], s_1 \in [N_1]$*, let* $\Sigma_0 \leftarrow \mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}^{(s_0)}, \mu_0, \mathsf{R}_0)$*,* $\Sigma_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}^{(s_1)}, \mu_1, \mathsf{R}_1)$*. It holds that*

$$\Pr\big[\mathsf{Link}(\mathsf{R}_0, \mu_0, \Sigma_0, \mathsf{R}_1, \mu_1, \Sigma_1) = 1\big] = 1 \quad \text{if } \mathsf{sk}^{(s_0)} = \mathsf{sk}^{(s_1)},$$
$$\Pr\big[\mathsf{Link}(\mathsf{R}_0, \mu_0, \Sigma_0, \mathsf{R}_1, \mu_1, \Sigma_1) = 0\big] \geq 1 - \mathsf{negl}(n) \quad \text{if } \mathsf{sk}^{(s_0)} \neq \mathsf{sk}^{(s_1)}$$

The above probability is taken over the random coins used by Setup, KeyGen, *and* Sign.

Strong Unforgeability. *A LRS scheme is strongly unforgeable w.r.t. insider corruption* ($\mathsf{sUnfInsCor}$)*, if for any PPT forger* $\mathcal{A}$*, it holds that* $\mathcal{A}$ *has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger* $\mathcal{C}$.

[2] Below we regard the verification key ring as an ordered set, namely, it consists of a set of verification keys, and when it is used in Sign and Ver algorithms, the verification keys are ordered and each one has an index.

– **Setup.** $\mathcal{C}$ *generates* $\mathsf{PP} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ *and* $(\mathsf{vk}^{(i)}, \mathsf{sk}^{(i)}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(\gamma_{\mathsf{kg}}^{(i)})$ *for all* $i \in [N]$*, where* $N = \mathrm{poly}(n)$ *and* $(\gamma_{\mathsf{st}}, \gamma_{\mathsf{kg}}^{(i)})$ *are the randomnesses used in* Setup *and* KeyGen*, respectively.* $\mathcal{C}$ *sets* $\mathsf{S} = (\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{(N)})$ *and initializes two empty sets* L *and* C*. Finally,* $\mathcal{C}$ *sends* $(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{S}, \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ *to* $\mathcal{A}$*.*

  Note that we give to $\mathcal{A}$ the randomness γ_{st} that used for the Setup algorithm, which implies the algorithm is public, does not rely on a trusted setup that may incur concerns on the existing of trapdoors hidden in the output parameters.

– **Probing Phase.** $\mathcal{A}$ *can adaptively query the following oracles:*

  - *Signing oracle* $\mathsf{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$*:*
    On input a message $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$*, a ring of verification keys* R *and an index* $s \in [N]$ *such that* $\mathsf{vk}^{(s)} \in \mathsf{R} \bigcap \mathsf{S}$*, this oracle returns* $\Sigma \leftarrow \mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}^{(s)}, \mu, \mathsf{R})$ *and adds the tuple* $(\mu, \mathsf{R}, \Sigma)$ *to* L*.*
  - *Corrupting oracle* $\mathsf{OCorrupt}(\cdot)$*:*
    On input an index $s \in [N]$ *such that* $\mathsf{vk}^{(s)} \in \mathsf{S}$*, this oracle returns* $\gamma_{\mathsf{kg}}^{(s)}$ *and adds* $\mathsf{vk}^{(s)}$ *to* C*.*

– **Forge.** $\mathcal{A}$ *outputs a forgery* $(\mu^*, \mathsf{R}^*, \Sigma^*)$ *and succeeds if (1)* $\mathsf{Ver}(\mu^*, \mathsf{R}^*, \Sigma^*) = 1$*, (2)* $\mathsf{R}^* \subseteq \mathsf{S} \setminus \mathsf{C}$*, and (3)* $(\mu^*, \mathsf{R}^*, \Sigma^*) \notin \mathsf{L}$*.*

Anonymity. *A LRS scheme is signer-anonymity, if for any PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, it holds that* $\mathcal{A}$ *has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger* $\mathcal{C}$*.*

– **Setup**. $\mathcal{C}$ *generates* $\mathsf{PP} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ *and* $(\mathsf{vk}^{(i)}, \mathsf{sk}^{(i)}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}(\gamma_{\mathsf{kg}}^{(i)})$ *for all* $i \in [N]$*, where* $N = \mathrm{poly}(n)$ *and* $(\gamma_{\mathsf{st}}, \gamma_{\mathsf{kg}}^{(i)})$ *are the randomness used in* Setup *and* KeyGen*, respectively.* $\mathcal{C}$ *sets* $\mathsf{S} = (\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{(N)})$*. Finally,* $\mathcal{C}$ *sends* $(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{S}, \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ *to* $\mathcal{A}$*.*

– **Challenge**. $\mathcal{A}$ outputs a challenge $(\mathsf{R}^*, \mu^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$ where $s_0^*, s_1^* \in [N]$, $s_0^* \neq s_1^*$, and $\mathsf{vk}^{(s_0^*)}, \mathsf{vk}^{(s_1^*)} \in \mathsf{S} \bigcap \mathsf{R}^*$. $\mathcal{C}$ chooses a random bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and $\mathcal{A}$ is given the randomness set $\{\gamma_{\mathsf{kg}}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N] \setminus \{s_0^*, s_1^*\}}$ and the signature $\Sigma^* \leftarrow \mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}^{(s_b^*)}, \mu^*, \mathsf{R}^*)$.

– **Guess**. $\mathcal{A}$ *outputs a guess* b'*. If* $b' = b$*,* $\mathcal{C}$ *outputs 1, otherwise 0.*

Linkability. *A LRS scheme is signer-linkable, if for any PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, it holds that* $\mathcal{A}$ *has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger* $\mathcal{C}$*.*

– **Setup**. $\mathcal{C}$ *generates* $\mathsf{PP} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$*, where* γ_{st} *is the randomness used in* Setup*. Finally,* $\mathcal{C}$ *sends* $(\mathsf{PP}, \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ to $\mathcal{A}$*.*

– **Output Phase**. $\mathcal{A}$ *outputs* l $(l \geq 2)$ *(ring of well-formed verification keys, messages, signature) tuples* $(\mathsf{R}_i^*, \mu_i^*, \Sigma_i^*)$ *where* $i \in [l]$*.*

$\mathcal{A}$ *succeeds if (1)* $\mathsf{Ver}(\mathsf{R}_i^*, \mu_i^*, \Sigma_i^*) = 1$ *for* $i \in [l]$*, (2)* $\mathsf{Link}(\mathsf{R}_i^*, \mu_i^*, \Sigma_i^*, \mathsf{R}_j^*, \mu_j^*, \Sigma_j^*) = 0$ *for any* $i, j \in [l]$ *s.t.* $i \neq j$*, and (3)* $|\cup_{i=1} \mathsf{R}_i^*| < l$*.*

Non-Slanderability. *A LRS scheme is signer-non-slanderable, if for any PPT adversary* $\mathcal{A}$*, it holds that* $\mathcal{A}$ *has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger* $\mathcal{C}$*.*

- **Setup.** *As same as the setup phase of* **Strong Unforgeability**.
- **Probing Phase.** *As same as the probing phase of* **Strong Unforgeability**.
- **Output Phase**. $\mathcal{A}$ *outputs two (ring of verification keys, message, signature) tuples* $(\mathsf{R}^*, \mu^*, \Sigma^*)$ *and* $(\hat{\mathsf{R}}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{\Sigma})$*.*

Let L *be the list that stores the query-answer tuples for* $\mathsf{OSign}(\cdot, \cdot, \cdot)$*.* $\mathcal{A}$ *succeeds if (1)* $\mathsf{Ver}(\mathsf{R}^*, \mu^*, \Sigma^*) = 1$*, (2)* $(\hat{\mathsf{R}}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{\Sigma}) \in \mathsf{L}$*, (3)* $(\mathsf{R}^*, \mu^*, \Sigma^*) \notin \mathsf{L}$*, (4)* $\mathsf{R}^* \subseteq \mathsf{S} \setminus \mathsf{C}$*, (5)* $\mathsf{Link}(\mathsf{R}^*, \mu^*, \Sigma^*, \hat{\mathsf{R}}, \hat{\mu}, \hat{\Sigma}) = 1$*.*

3 Preliminaries

In this section, we first review the definition of a strongly unforgeable one-time signature in Sect. 3.1, key-homomorphic evaluation algorithm in Sect. 3.2, non-interactive witness-indistinguishable proof systems in Sect. 3.3, and some lattice-based backgrounds.

Notation. We write $[l]$ for a positive integer l to denote the set $\{1, \ldots, l\}$. We denote vectors as lower-case bold letters (e.g. $\mathbf{x}$), and matrices by upper-case bold letters (e.g. $\mathbf{A}$). We say that a function in n is *negligible*, written $\mathrm{negl}(n)$, if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial in n. We say probability $p(n)$ is *overwhelming* if $1 - p(n)$ is negligible. We denote the horizontal concatenation of two matrices $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{B}$ as $\mathbf{A}|\mathbf{B}$. We denote the vertical concatenation of two matrices $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{B}$ as $\mathbf{A};\mathbf{B}$. We denote $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[l]}$ or $\{\mathbf{B}_j\}_{j\in[l]}$ as the set that consists of l matrices. For a matrix $\mathbf{A}$ we denote two matrix norms: $\|\mathbf{A}\|$ denotes the l_2 length of the longest column of $\mathbf{A}$. $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{A}}\|$ denotes the result of applying Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization to the columns of $\mathbf{A}$.

3.1 Strongly Unforgeable One-Time Signature

Our construction will use the one-time signature with strong unforgeability as a building block. A one-time signature scheme is a signature scheme that is meant to be used to sign only a single message, and is only required to satisfy unforgeability under properly restricted adversaries that receive only one signature/message pair.

Syntax. To capture the practice better, we augment the usual formalization of a general one-time signature scheme to cover the cases that users may share some fixed public parameters.

Definition 2 (One-Time Signature Scheme). *A one-time signature scheme consists of the following algorithms:*

- $\mathsf{Setup}(1^n) \to \mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. On input the security parameter n, the algorithm outputs the system public parameter* $\mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$.

  The public parameters $\mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$ are common parameters used by all participants in the system, which may be just the security parameter, or include some additional information such as the message space $\mathcal{M}$, the modulo, etc. In the following, $\mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$ are implicit input parameters to every algorithm.

- $\mathsf{KeyGen}() \to (\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}})$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. The algorithm outputs a verification key* $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$ *and a signing key* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$.

- $\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mu) \to \Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}}$. *This is a probabilistic algorithm. On input a signing key* $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$ *and a message $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, the algorithm outputs a signature* Σ_{OTS}.

- $\mathsf{Ver}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mu, \Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}}) \to 1/0$. *This is a deterministic algorithm. On input a verification key* $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$*, a message μ, and a signature* Σ_{OTS}*, the algorithm outputs 1 if the signature is valid, or 0 if the signature is invalid.*

Correctness. *A one-time signature scheme is correct, if for any $n \in \mathbb{N}$, all messages $\mu \in \mathcal{M}$, and any* $\mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n)$ *as implicit input parameter to every algorithm, it holds that*

$$\Pr[\mathsf{Ver}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mu, \mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mu)) = 1] = 1 - \mathsf{negl}(n),$$

the probability is taken over the random coins used by Setup, KeyGen*, and* Sign.

Strong Unforgeability. *A one-time signature scheme is strongly unforgeable, if for any PPT forger $\mathcal{A}$, it holds that $\mathcal{A}$ has at most negligible advantage in the following experiment with a challenger $\mathcal{C}$.*

- **Setup.** *$\mathcal{C}$ generates* $\mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ *and* $(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{KeyGen}()$*, where γ_{st} is randomness used in* Setup*. Finally, $\mathcal{C}$ sends* $(\mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ *to $\mathcal{A}$.*
  Note that we give to $\mathcal{A}$ the randomness γ_{st} that used for the Setup algorithm, which implies the algorithm is public, does not rely on a trusted setup that may incur concerns on the existing of trapdoors hidden in the output parameters.

- **Probing Phase.** *$\mathcal{A}$ issues a query on message μ. $\mathcal{C}$ responses the query by running* $\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}} \leftarrow \mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mu)$*. Finally, $\mathcal{C}$ returns the signature* Σ_{OTS} *to $\mathcal{A}$.*

- **Forge.** *$\mathcal{A}$ outputs a forgery* $(\mu^*, \Sigma^*_{\mathsf{OTS}})$*. $\mathcal{A}$ succeeds if* $(\mu^*, \Sigma^*_{\mathsf{OTS}}) \neq (\mu, \Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}})$ *and* $\mathsf{Ver}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mu^*, \Sigma^*_{\mathsf{OTS}}) = 1$.

3.2 Key-Homomorphic Evaluation Algorithm

In our construction, we borrow the idea from the standard signature work [14], that is employing the key-homomorphic evaluation algorithm $\mathsf{Eval}(\cdot,\cdot)$ from [28,17,13] to evaluate circuits of a PRF. In particular, they used the evaluation algorithm of the work [17]. The inputs of $\mathsf{Eval}(\cdot,\cdot)$ are C and a set of ℓ different matrices $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[\ell]}$, where $C : \{0,1\}^{\ell} \to \{0,1\}$ is a fan-in-2 Boolean NAND circuit expression of some functions such as a PRF, and each $\mathbf{A}^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}^{(i)} + b^{(i)}\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ corresponds to each input wire of C, and where $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$, $\mathbf{R}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1,-1\}^{m\times m}$, $b^{(i)} \in \{0,1\}$ and $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ is the gadget matrix [39]. The algorithm deterministically output a matrix $\mathbf{A}_C = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_C + C(b^{(1)},\ldots,b^{(\ell)})\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$. In the analyzation of our unforgeability proof, we will use the following lemma to show $\mathbf{R}_C$ is short enough.

Lemma 1 ([14]). *Let $C : \{0,1\}^{\ell} \to \{0,1\}$ be a NAND Boolean circuit which has depth $d = c\log\ell$ for some constant c. Let $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}^{(i)} + b^{(i)}\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}\}_{i\in[\ell]}$ be ℓ different matrices correspond to each input wire of C where $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$, $\mathbf{R}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1,-1\}^{m\times m}$, $b^{(i)} \in \{0,1\}$ and $\mathbf{G} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ is the gadget matrix. There is an efficient deterministic evaluation algorithm $\mathsf{Eval}(C,(\mathbf{A}^{(1)},\ldots,\mathbf{A}^{(\ell)}))$ runs in time $\mathrm{poly}(4^d,\ell,n,\log q)$, the output of the algorithm is a matrix*

$$\mathbf{A}_C = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{R}_C + C(b^{(1)},\ldots,b^{(\ell)})\mathbf{G} = \mathsf{Eval}(C,(\mathbf{A}^{(1)},\ldots,\mathbf{A}^{(\ell)}))$$

where $C(b^{(1)},\ldots,b^{(\ell)})$ is the output bit of C on the arguments $(b^{(1)},\ldots,b^{(\ell)})$ and $\mathbf{R}_C \in \mathbb{Z}^{m\times m}$ is a low norm matrix has $\|\mathbf{R}_C\| \le O(\ell^{2c}\cdot m^{3/2})$.

3.3 Non-Interactive Witness-Indistinguishable Proof Systems

We first review the NIWI proof system presented by Gordon et al. [29]. Let $\mathbf{B}^{(1)},\ldots,\mathbf{B}^{(l)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ and $\mathbf{z}^{(1)},\ldots,\mathbf{z}^{(l)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n}$ for some $l = l(n)$, and fix some ε. Define the gap language $L_{\sigma,\varepsilon} = (L_{\mathsf{YES}}, L_{\mathsf{NO}})$ as follows:

$$L_{\mathsf{YES}} = \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B}^{(1)},\ldots,\mathbf{B}^{(l)} \\ \mathbf{z}^{(1)},\ldots,\mathbf{z}^{(l)} \end{pmatrix} \middle| \exists \mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \text{ and } i \in [l] : \left\|\mathbf{z}^{(i)} - (\mathbf{B}^{(i)})^{\top}\mathbf{s}\right\| \le \sigma\sqrt{m} \right\}$$

$$L_{\mathsf{NO}} = \left\{ \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{B}^{(1)},\ldots,\mathbf{B}^{(l)} \\ \mathbf{z}^{(1)},\ldots,\mathbf{z}^{(l)} \end{pmatrix} \middle| \forall \mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n \text{ and } i \in [l] : \left\|\mathbf{z}^{(i)} - (\mathbf{B}^{(i)})^{\top}\mathbf{s}\right\| > \varepsilon\cdot\sigma\sqrt{m} \right\}$$

By the methodology of Gordon et al. [29], there is an interactive witness-indistinguishable proof system for $L_{\sigma,\varepsilon}$ when set $\varepsilon \ge O(\sqrt{m/\log m})$ by using the techniques of the work [41], then the resulting protocol can be made non-interactive in the standard model by applying the Fiat-Shamir transformation from the work [43].

Lemma 2. *Let $\varepsilon \ge O(\sqrt{m/\log m})$. There is an NIWI proof system for $L_{\sigma,\varepsilon}$ in the standard model.*

3.4 Lattice Backgrounds

We will need the following lemma to bound the norm of a random matrix in $\{1,-1\}^{m\times m}$.

Lemma 3 ([4]). *Let $\mathbf{R}$ be a $k \times m$ matrix chosen at random from $\{1,-1\}^{k\times m}$. Then there is a universal constant c such that $\Pr\left[\|\mathbf{R}\| > c\sqrt{k+m}\right] < e^{-(k+m)}$.*

Lattices and Gaussian Distributions. Let $m \in \mathbb{Z}$ be a positive integer and $\mathbf{\Lambda} \subset \mathbb{R}^m$ be an m-dimensional full-rank lattice formed by the set of all integral combinations of m linearly independent basis vectors $\mathbf{B} = (\mathbf{b}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_m) \subset \mathbb{Z}^m$, i.e., $\mathbf{\Lambda} = \mathcal{L}(\mathbf{B}) = \left\{\mathbf{Bc} = \sum_{i=1}^m c_i\mathbf{b}_i : \mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}^m\right\}$. For positive integers n, m, q, a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$, and a vector $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, the m-dimensional integer lattice $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{A})$ is defined as $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{A}) = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{Ax} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q\}$. $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\mathbf{y}}(\mathbf{A})$ is defined as $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\mathbf{y}}(\mathbf{A}) = \{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m : \mathbf{Ax} = \mathbf{y} \pmod q\}$. For a vector $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and a positive parameter $\sigma \in \mathbb{R}$, define $\rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x}) = \exp(-\pi\|\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{c}\|/\sigma^2)$ and $\rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{\Lambda}) = \sum_{\mathbf{x}\in\mathbf{\Lambda}} \rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})$. For any $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbf{\Lambda}$, define the discrete Gaussian distribution over $\mathbf{\Lambda}$ with center $\mathbf{c}$ and parameter σ as $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{\Lambda},\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{y}) = \rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{y})/\rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{\Lambda})$. For simplicity, $\rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{0}}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{\Lambda},\sigma,\mathbf{0}}$ are abbreviated as ρ_σ and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{\Lambda},\sigma}$, respectively.

The following Lemma 4 bounds the length of a discrete Gaussian vector with a sufficiently large Gaussian parameter.

Lemma 4 ([40]). *For any lattice $\mathbf{\Lambda}$ of integer dimension m with basis $\mathbf{B}$, $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^m$ and Gaussian parameter $\sigma > \|\widetilde{\mathbf{B}}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$, we have $\Pr[\|\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{c}\| > \sigma\sqrt{m} : \mathbf{x} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{\Lambda},\sigma,\mathbf{c}}] \le \mathrm{negl}(n)$.*

The following generalization of leftover hash lemma is needed for our security proof.

Lemma 5 ([4]). *Suppose that $m > (n+1)\log q + \omega(\log n)$ and that $q > 2$ is prime. Let $\mathbf{R}$ be an $m \times k$ matrix chosen uniformly in $\{1,-1\}^{m\times k} \bmod q$ where $k = k(n)$ is polynomial in n. Let $\mathbf{A}$ and $\mathbf{B}$ be matrices chosen uniformly in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ and $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times k}$ respectively. Then, for all vectors $\mathbf{w}$ in $\mathbb{Z}_q^m$, the distribution $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{AR}, \mathbf{R}^\top\mathbf{w})$ is statistically close to the distribution $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{R}^\top\mathbf{w})$.*

The proofs of our LRS construction is based on the following small integer solution (SIS) assumption, learning with errors (LWE) assumption, and the security of PRF.

Definition 3 (SIS Assumption [27,40]). *Let q and β be functions of n. An instance of the $\mathsf{SIS}_{q,\beta}$ problem is a uniformly random matrix $\mathbf{A} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ for any desired $m = \mathrm{poly}(n)$. The goal is to find a nonzero integer vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ such that $\mathbf{Ax} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\|\mathbf{x}\| \le \beta$.*

For $\beta = \mathrm{poly}(n)$, $q \ge \beta \cdot \omega(\sqrt{n\log n})$, no (quantum) algorithm can solve $\mathsf{SIS}_{q,\beta}$ problem in polynomial time.

We use the LWE assumption proposed by Gordon et al. [29] and they proved it was implied by the standard LWE assumption [44]. The main difference is the error distribution χ choosing from different distribution. Gordon et al. consider the discrete Gaussian distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m,\alpha q}$ where $\alpha q = \omega(\sqrt{\log q})$.

Definition 4 (LWE Assumption [44]). *Let q, m be functions of n, $q > 2$, χ be a discretized normal error distribution parameterized by some $\alpha \in (0,1)$, which is obtained by drawing $x \in \mathbb{R}$ from the Gaussian distribution of width α. Define the LWE distribution $A_{\sigma,\chi}$ as: Choose a vector $\mathbf{a} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and an error $e \leftarrow \chi$, output $(\mathbf{a}, \mathbf{a}^\top \mathbf{s} + e)$. Defines the Search-$\mathsf{LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}$ as: Fix an $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, given at most m samples from $A_{\sigma,\chi}$, work out $\mathbf{s}$. Defines the Decision-$\mathsf{LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}$ as: For a uniformly chosen $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, given the oracle to be (1) $A_{\sigma,\chi}$ or (2) the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$, decide which is the case with at most m oracle calls.*

For $q, m, \alpha = poly(n)$ such that $\alpha q = \omega(\sqrt{\log q})$, no (quantum) algorithm can solve the (Search/Decision)-$\mathsf{LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}$ in polynomial time.

Definition 5 (Pseudorandom Functions). *For a security parameter $n > 0$, let $k = k(n)$, $t = t(n)$ and $c = c(n)$. A pseudorandom function $\mathsf{PRF} : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^t \to \{0,1\}^c$ is an efficiently computable, deterministic two-input function where the first input, denoted by K, is the key. Let Ω be the set of all functions that map ℓ bits strings to c bits strings. There is a negligible function $\mathsf{negl}(n)$ such that:*

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}^{\mathsf{PRF}(K,\cdot)}(1^n) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}^{F(\cdot)}(1^n) = 1]| \leq \mathsf{negl}(n)$$

where the probability is taken over a uniform choice of key $K \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$ and $F \xleftarrow{\$} \Omega$, and the randomness of $\mathcal{A}$.

Algorithms on Lattices. Our work will use the following lattice algorithms.

Lemma 6 ($\mathsf{TrapGen}$ Algorithm [6]). *Let $n \geq 1, q \geq 2, m = O(n \log q)$ be integers. There is a probabilistic algorithm $\mathsf{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$ that outputs a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and a trapdoor matrix $\mathbf{T_A} \subset \mathbf{\Lambda}_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ i.e., $\mathbf{T_A}$ is a basis (full-rank subset) of $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$, the distribution of $\mathbf{A}$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ has $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T_A}}\| \leq O(\sqrt{n \log q})$ and $\|\mathbf{T_A}\| \leq O(n \log q)$ with all but negligible probability in n.*

Lemma 7 ($\mathsf{SuperTrapGen}$ Algorithm [29]). *Let $n \geq 1, q \geq 2, m = O(n \log q)$ be integers. There is a probabilistic algorithm $\mathsf{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{B})$ that on input 1^n, 1^m, q, and a matrix $\mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ whose columns generate $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, this algorithm outputs a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and a trapdoor matrix $\mathbf{T_A} \subset \mathbf{\Lambda}_q^\perp(\mathbf{A})$ such that $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{B}^\top = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$, and the distribution of $\mathbf{A}$ is statistically close to the uniform distribution over $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$. Moreover, it holds that $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T_A}}\| = \log n \cdot O(\sqrt{mn \log q})$ with all but negligible probability in n.*

Lemma 8 (BasisExt **Algorithm** [19]). *For $i = 1, 2, 3$, let $\mathbf{A}_i$ be a matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m_i}$ whose columns generate $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and let $\mathbf{A}' = [\mathbf{A}_1|\mathbf{A}_2|\mathbf{A}_3]$. Let $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}_2}$ be a basis of $\mathbf{\Lambda}^{\perp}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}_2})$. There is a deterministic algorithm* $\mathsf{BasisExt}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}_2}, \mathbf{A}')$ *that outputs a basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}'}$ for $\mathbf{\Lambda}^{\perp}(\mathbf{A}')$ such that $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}'}}\| = \|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}_2}}\|$.*

The following lattice basis extension algorithm also needed for our security proof, which presented by Agrawal, Boneh and Boyen [4], so we abbreviate that as BasisExtABB algorithm.

Lemma 9 (BasisExtABB **Algorithm** [4]). *Let q be a prime, n, m be integers with $m > n$. There is a probabilistic algorithm* $\mathsf{BasisExtABB}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B}, \mathbf{R}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}})$ *which takes as input two matrices $\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{B} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ whose columns generate $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, a matrix $\mathbf{R} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$, and a basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}} \in \mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{B})$, outputs a full-rank matrix $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}}$ in $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{F})$ such that $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}}}\| < (\|\mathbf{R}\| + 1) \cdot \|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}}}\|$ where $\mathbf{F} = [\mathbf{A}|\mathbf{A}\mathbf{R} + \mathbf{B}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$.*

Lemma 10 (SamplePre **Algorithm** [27]). *Let $q > 2$, $m > n$ be integers. There is a probabilistic algorithm* $\mathsf{SamplePre}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{y}, \sigma)$ *which takes as input a matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ whose columns generate $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and a basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ of $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{A})$, a vector $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, and a Gaussian parameter $\sigma \geq \|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}}\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$, outputs a vector $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\mathbf{y}}(\mathbf{A})$ sampled from a distribution which is statistically close to $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\mathbf{y}}(\mathbf{A}),\sigma}$.*

Lemma 11 (SampleR **Algorithm** [5]). *Let $q > 2$ be a prime, $m > n$ be integers. There is a probabilistic algorithm* $\mathsf{SampleR}(1^m)$ *which outputs a $\mathbb{Z}_q$-invertible matrix $\mathbf{R}$ in $\mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ from a distribution that is statistically close to $\mathcal{D}_{m \times m}$ with $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{R}}\| \leq O(\sqrt{m}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$.*

Gadget Matrix. The "gadget matrix" $\mathbf{G}$ defined in [39]. We recall the following one fact of $\mathbf{G}$.

Lemma 12 ([39]). *Let q be a prime, and n, m be integers with $m = n \log q$. There is a fixed full-rank matrix such that the lattice $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{G})$ has a publicly known basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{G}} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$ with $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{G}}}\| \leq \sqrt{5}$.*

4 Our Construction

In this section, we first give the new lattice basis extension algorithms BasisExtBindAcom and BasisExtBindSK in Sect. 4.1, based on that we present the construction of LRS in Sect. 4.2, and then we give the concrete parameters in Sect. 4.3.

4.1 Lattice Basis Extending Algorithms

Algorithm: $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{F})$

Inputs: A matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$ whose columns generate $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$, a basis $\mathbf{T_A}$ of $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{A})$, and a matrix $\mathbf{F} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T_A}|\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} + \mathbf{A}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2m}$ where $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ is a uniformly random matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$.

Outputs: A basis $\mathbf{T_F}$ of $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{F})$.

The $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}$ algorithm runs as follows:

1. Sample $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{SampleR}(1^m)$.
2. Construct $\mathbf{T_F} = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T_A}\mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T_A}\mathbf{R}_1 \end{smallmatrix}\right]$ such that $\mathbf{F}\cdot\mathbf{T_F} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$.

Lemma 13. *The matrix* $\mathbf{T_F}$ *output by* $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}$ *is full-rank and satisfy* $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T_F}}\| \le O(m^2)\cdot\omega(\sqrt{\log m})$.

Proof. By Lemma 11, we know the matrices $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1$ are invertible. By Lemma 7, we know the basis $\mathbf{T_A}$ of $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{A})$ is full-rank. Therefore, the matrix $\mathbf{T_F}$ is full-rank. By Lemma 11, we know the Gram-Schmidt norm of $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1$ bounded by $O(\sqrt{m})\cdot\omega(\sqrt{\log m})$. By Lemma 7, we know $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T_A}}\| \le O(\log n \cdot \sqrt{mn\log q})$. As analyzed in Sect. 4.3, it requires to set $m = O(n\log q)$. Therefore, we have $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T_F}}\| \le O(m^2)\cdot\omega(\sqrt{\log m})$.

Algorithm: $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}(\mathbf{T_A}, \mathbf{F})$

Inputs: A matrix $\mathbf{F} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T_A} - \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}|\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2m}$ where $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ is a uniformly random matrix in $\mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$, and $\mathbf{T_A}$ is a basis of $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{A})$ and $\mathbf{A}$ is independent with $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$.

Outputs: A basis $\mathbf{T_F}$ of $\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{F})$.

The $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}$ algorithm runs as follows:

1. Sample $\mathbf{R}_0, \mathbf{R}_1 \leftarrow \mathsf{SampleR}(1^m)$.
2. Construct $\mathbf{T_F} = \left[\begin{smallmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T_A}\mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T_A}\mathbf{R}_1 - \mathbf{R}_1 \end{smallmatrix}\right]$ such that $\mathbf{F}\cdot\mathbf{T_F} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$.

Lemma 14. *The matrix* $\mathbf{T_F}$ *output by* $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}$ *is full-rank and satisfy* $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T_F}}\| \le O(m^2)\cdot\omega(\sqrt{\log m})$.

Proof. The proof is as same as the proof of Lemma 13.

4.2 Construction

$\mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$

1. On input a security parameter n, sets the parameters q, m, k, σ as specified in Sect. 4.3 below.
2. Select a secure $\mathsf{PRF} : \{0,1\}^k \times \{0,1\}^t \to \{0,1\}$, express it as a NAND Boolean circuit C_{PRF}.

3. Let Π_{OTS} be a one-time signature scheme with strong unforgeability.
4. Compute $\mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}} \leftarrow \Pi_{\mathsf{OTS}}.\mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$.
5. Sample $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} \leftarrow \mathsf{XOF}(\gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ where $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.
6. Output the public parameters $\mathsf{PP} = (q, m, k, \sigma, \mathsf{PRF}, (\Pi_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}}), \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}, \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$.

Note that including the randomness γ_{st} in PP and sample the $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ by the extendable output function XOF [42] is to guarantee the public has no concerns on the existing of trapdoors for PP.
In the following, PP are implicit input parameters to every algorithm.

$\mathsf{KeyGen}()$

1. Select $\mathbf{B} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{B})$ where $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}} \in \mathbb{Z}^{m \times m}$.
2. Let $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}} = \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$ and $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}$.
3. Select a PRF key $\mathbf{k} = (k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_k) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$.
4. For $j = 1$ to k, select $\mathbf{B}_j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.
5. Select $\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1, \mathbf{C}_0, \mathbf{C}_1 \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$.
6. Output $\mathsf{vk} = (\mathbf{A}, (\mathbf{A}_0, \mathbf{A}_1), \mathbf{B}, \{\mathbf{B}_j\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0, \mathbf{C}_1))$ and $\mathsf{sk} = (\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}, \mathbf{k}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}})$.

$\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, \mathsf{R})$

1. On input a signing key $\mathsf{sk} := \mathsf{sk}^{(s)} = (\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^{(s)}, \mathbf{k}^{(s)}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^{(s)})$ where $s \in [N]$ is the index of the signer in the ring R, a message $\boldsymbol{\mu} = (\mu_1, \ldots, \mu_t) \in \{0,1\}^t$, and a ring of verification keys $\mathsf{R} = (\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{(N)})$ where each $\mathsf{vk}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)}))$.
2. For $i = 1$ to N, set $\mathbf{F}^{(i)} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} | \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} + \mathbf{A}^{(i)}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$.
3. Compute $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(s)}} \leftarrow \mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}(\mathbf{A}^{(s)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{F}^{(s)})$.
4. Let $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}} = [\mathbf{F}^{(1)} | \ldots | \mathbf{F}^{(N)}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2Nm}$, compute $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}} \leftarrow \mathsf{BasisExt}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}})$.
5. Let $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} | \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$, compute $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}} \leftarrow \mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}})$.
6. Sample $\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}} \leftarrow \mathsf{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}}, \mathbf{0}, \sigma)$, $\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \leftarrow \mathsf{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}, \mathbf{0}, \sigma)$.
7. Compute $d = \mathsf{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(s)}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$.
8. For $i = 1$ to N, compute $\mathbf{A}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i)} = \mathsf{Eval}(C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, (\{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j \in [k]}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_1}^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_2}^{(i)}, \ldots, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_t}^{(i)}))$ $\in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$, set $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i)} = \left[\mathbf{A}^{(i)} | \mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(i)} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i)}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times 2m}$.
9. For $i = 1$ to N, select $\mathbf{u}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, compute $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathsf{SamplePre}(\mathbf{A}^{(s)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{u}^{(i)}, \sigma)$.
10. For $i = s$, compute $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s)} \leftarrow \mathsf{SamplePre}(\mathbf{A}^{(s)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}, \mathbf{u}'^{(s)}, \sigma)$ where $\mathbf{u}'^{(s)} = (\mathbf{A}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(s)} - \mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(s)}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(s)}$.
11. For $i = s+1, \ldots, N, 1, \ldots, s-1$, uniformly choose $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i)} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ subject to the condition that $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, 1-d}^{(i)} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(i)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$.
12. For $i = 1$ to N, select $\mathbf{s}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, compute $\mathbf{z}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{s}^{(i)})^\top \mathbf{B}^{(i)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(i)}$.

13. Use the witness $\{\mathbf{s}^{(i)}, i\}_{i\in[N]}$ to construct an NIWI proof π for the gap language $L_{\sigma,\varepsilon}$ as Sect. 3.3.
14. Compute one-time signature $\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}} \leftarrow \Pi_{\mathsf{OTS}}.\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$.
15. Output the signature $\Sigma = (\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}, \mathbf{z}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}, \pi)$.

$\mathsf{Ver}(\mathsf{R}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, \Sigma)$

1. On input a ring of verification keys $\mathsf{R} = (\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{(N)})$ where each $\mathsf{vk}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j\in[k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)}))$, a message $\boldsymbol{\mu}$, and a signature $\Sigma = (\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}, \mathbf{z}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}, \pi)$.
2. Compute $(\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}})$ as in Sign algorithm. Check if $\|\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{2Nm}$ and $\|\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{2m}$ and $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds, otherwise return 0.
3. For $i = 1$ to N and $d \in \{0, 1\}$, compute $\mathbf{F}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},d} = \left[\mathbf{A}^{(i)} | \mathbf{A}_d^{(i)} - \mathbf{A}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}\right]$ where $\mathbf{A}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}$ is computed as in Sign algorithm. Check if $\|\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{m}$ and $\mathbf{F}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},d} \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds for $d = 0$ or 1, otherwise return 0.
4. Check if the proof π is correct and $\Pi_{\mathsf{OTS}}.\mathsf{Ver}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}, \Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}}) = 1$, return 1, otherwise return 0.

$\mathsf{Link}(\mathsf{R}_0, \boldsymbol{\mu}_0, \Sigma_0, \mathsf{R}_1, \boldsymbol{\mu}_1, \Sigma_1)$

1. On input two valid signature tuples $(\mathsf{R}_0, \boldsymbol{\mu}_0, \Sigma_0)$ and $(\mathsf{R}_1, \boldsymbol{\mu}_1, \Sigma_1)$.
2. Let $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},0}$ and $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},1}$ be the one-time verification keys in Σ_0 and Σ_1, respectively.
3. Check if $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},0} = \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},1}$ holds, return 1, otherwise return 0.

4.3 Correctness and Parameters

We now show the correctness of LRS. By Lemma 10, each $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}$ in Σ follows the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\mathbf{u}^{(i)}}(\mathbf{A}^{(s)}),\sigma}$, then by the construction of $\mathbf{z}^{(i)}$ and Lemma 7, it holds that $\mathbf{F}^{(i)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},d} \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ for $d = 0$ or 1. By Lemma 10, the $\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}$ and $\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}$ in Σ respectively follow the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}),\sigma}$ and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^{\perp}(\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}),\sigma}$, therefore, it holds that $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. By Lemma 4, $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)} \leq \sigma\sqrt{m}$, $\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}} \leq \sigma\sqrt{2Nm}$, and $\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \leq \sigma\sqrt{2m}$ holds with overwhelming probability. Therefore, the signature is accepted by the Ver algorithm with overwhelming probability.

For the correctness of Link, let $\Sigma_0 = (\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS},0}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},0} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(0)}}, \ldots)$ and $\Sigma_1 = (\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS},1}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},1} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(1)}}, \ldots)$ be generated by $\mathsf{sk}_0 = \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(0)}}$ and $\mathsf{sk}_1 = \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(1)}}$, respectively. In the case $\mathsf{sk}_0 = \mathsf{sk}_1$ i.e., $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(0)}} = \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(1)}}$, the signer-linkable proof in Sect. 5 shows that it is infeasible to change $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ to a $\mathbf{A}'_{\mathsf{com}}$ such that $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},0} \neq \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},1}$ i.e., $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},0} = \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},1}$ holds with overwhelming probability in this case. In the case $\mathsf{sk}_0 \neq \mathsf{sk}_1$ i.e., $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(0)}} \neq \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(1)}}$, the signer-non-slanderable proof in Sect. 5 shows that it is infeasible to compute a $\mathbf{A}'_{\mathsf{com}}$

such that $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},0} = \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},1}$ i.e., $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},0} \neq \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS},1}$ holds with overwhelming probability in this case.

We then explain the parameters choosing. We employ the work [33] to instantiate our PRF, which based on standard LWE assumption with polynomial modulus $q = n^{\omega(1)}$. We employ the work [34] to instantiate our OTS, which requires $\|\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}\|_\infty \leq p$ and $q \geq 2tp\sqrt{m}n^{\Omega(1)}$ where $p = \lceil \frac{q^{n/m}2^{n/m}-1}{2} \rceil$. To guarantee the hardness of the based $\mathsf{LWE}_{q,n,m,\chi}$ assumption, we need to set $\alpha = \omega(\sqrt{\log q})/q$ as defined in Definition 4. Let n be the security parameter, let the message length be $t = t(n)$ and the secret key length of PRF be $k = k(n)$. Let $\ell = t + k$ be the input length of PRF. To ensure that hard lattices with good short bases can be generated by $\mathsf{SuperTrapGen}$, we need to set $m = 6n^{1+\delta}$ where $\delta > 0$ is a constant such that $n^\delta > O(\log n)$. To ensure that the distribution on the output of $\mathsf{SamplePre}$ statistically close to the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbf{\Lambda}_q^\perp(\mathbf{F}'),\sigma}$, we need to set the Gaussian parameter σ sufficiently large that is $\sigma = O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ (see the unforgeability proof). To ensure that vectors sampled using a trapdoor are difficult SIS solutions, we need to set $\beta = O(\ell^{4c} \cdot m^{7/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ such that $\beta \geq O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^2) \cdot \sigma$ for some constant c (see the unforgeability proof). To ensure our construction based on SIS has a worst-case lattice reduction as defined in Definition 3, we need to set the modulus $q = O(\ell^{4c} \cdot m^4) \cdot (\omega(\sqrt{\log m}))^2$ such that $q \geq \beta \cdot \omega(\sqrt{n \log n})$.

5 Proofs of Security and Privacy

Theorem 1 (Unforgeability). *Let $m, q, \beta, \alpha, \sigma$ be some polynomials in the security parameter n. For large enough $\sigma = O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ and $\beta = O(\ell^{4c} \cdot m^{7/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$, the LRS scheme is* $\mathsf{sUnfInsCor}$ *secure in the standard model.*

Proof. Consider the following security game between an adversary $\mathcal{A}$ and a simulator $\mathcal{S}$. Upon receiving a challenge $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n \times m}$ that is formed by m uniformly random and independent samples from $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and the $(\mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}})$, $\mathcal{S}$ simulates as follows.

Setup. $\mathcal{S}$ takes as input a security parameter n and a randomness γ_{st} to invoke $\mathsf{PP} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \mathsf{PP}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ algorithm. $\mathcal{S}$ simulates as follows.

- Select a random index $i^\diamond \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, \ldots, N\}$ and sets $\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} = \mathbf{A}$, then sample $(\mathbf{B}^{(i^\diamond)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}^{(i^\diamond)}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)})$.
- For $i = i^\diamond + 1, \ldots, N, 1, \ldots, i^\diamond - 1$:
  - Compute $(\mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{TrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q)$.
  - Compute $(\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{B}^{(i)})$.
  - Let $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^{(i)} = \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}$ and $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}$.
- For $i = i^\diamond$, set $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^{(i^\diamond)} = \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$.
- For $i = 1$ to N and $d \in \{0, 1\}$:

- Choose $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i)}}, \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{C}_d^{(i)}} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1,-1\}^{m\times m}$.
- Construct $\mathbf{A}_d^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i)}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i)}} + d\mathbf{G}$ and $\mathbf{C}_d^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i)}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{C}_d^{(i)}} + d\mathbf{G}$ where $\mathbf{G}$ is the gadget matrix.

– For $i = 1$ to N:
- Select a PRF key $\mathbf{k}^{(i)} = (k_1^{(i)}, k_2^{(i)}, \ldots, k_k^{(i)}) \xleftarrow{\$} \{0,1\}^k$.

– For $i = 1$ to N and $j = 1$ to k:
- Choose $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1,-1\}^{m\times m}$ and construct $\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}^{(i)}\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}} + k_j^{(i)}\mathbf{G}$.

– Let $\mathsf{S} = (\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{(N)})$ where each $\mathsf{vk}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j\in[k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)}))$, then sends $(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{S}, \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

Probing Signing Oracle. $\mathcal{A}$ adaptively issues tuples for querying the signing oracle $\mathsf{OSign}(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)$. For simplicity, here consider only one tuple $(\boldsymbol{\mu}, \mathsf{R}, s)$ where $s \in [N]$, and requires that $\mathsf{vk}^{(s)} \in \mathsf{S} \bigcap \mathsf{R}$. Let $N' = |\mathsf{R}|$. Assume the ring $\mathsf{R} = (\mathsf{vk}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{(N')})$, parse $\mathsf{vk}^{(s)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(s)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(s)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(s)}), \mathbf{B}^{(s)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(s)}\}_{j\in[k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(s)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(s)}))$. $\mathcal{S}$ does the following to response the signature.

– For $i' = 1$ to N', set $\mathbf{F}^{(i')} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i')}} | \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} + \mathbf{A}^{(i')}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2m}$. Let $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}} = [\mathbf{F}^{(1)}| \ldots |\mathbf{F}^{(N)}] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2Nm}$.

– Select $\hat{s} \xleftarrow{\$} \{1,2,\ldots,N'\}\backslash i^\diamond$. Compute $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(\hat{s})}} \leftarrow \mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}(\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}}, \mathbf{F}^{(\hat{s})}), \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}} \leftarrow \mathsf{BasisExt}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(\hat{s})}}, \mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}})$, and $\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}} \leftarrow \mathsf{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}}, \mathbf{0}, \sigma)$.

– Let $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}} - \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} | \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2m}$. Compute $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}} \leftarrow \mathsf{BasisExtBind}$ $\mathsf{SK}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}}, \mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}})$ and $\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \leftarrow \mathsf{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}, \mathbf{0}, \sigma)$.

– Compute $d = \mathsf{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(\hat{s})}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$.

– For $i' = 1$ to N':
- Compute $\mathbf{A}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i')} = \mathsf{Eval}(C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, (\{\mathbf{B}_j\}_{j\in[k]}^{(i')}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_1}^{(i')}, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_2}^{(i')}, \ldots, \mathbf{C}_{\mu_t}^{(i')}))$
- Set $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d}^{(i')} = \left[\mathbf{A}^{(i')} | \mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(i')} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i')}\right]$.
- Select $\mathbf{u}^{(i')} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$.

– For $i' = i^\diamond + 1, \ldots, N', 1, \ldots, i^\diamond - 1$:
- Compute $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i)} \leftarrow \mathsf{SamplePre}(\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(\hat{s})}}, \mathbf{u}^{(i')}, \sigma)$.
- Uniformly choose $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i')} \in \mathbb{Z}^m$ subject to the condition that $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d}^{(i')} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(i')}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i')}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$.

– For $i' = i^\diamond$, note that $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d}^{(i^\diamond)}$ can be transformed to

$$\begin{aligned}\mathbf{F}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d}^{(i^\diamond)} &= \left[\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} | \mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(i^\diamond)} - \mathbf{A}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i^\diamond)}\right] \\ &= \left[\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_{1-d}^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}^{(i^\diamond)}) + (1-2d)\mathbf{G}\right] \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times 2m}\end{aligned}$$

then we can extend $\mathbf{T_G}$ to $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(i\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d}}$ by $\mathsf{BasisExtABB}$, then compute $(\mathbf{e}_0^{i\diamond};\mathbf{e}_1^{i\diamond})$ by $\mathsf{SamplePre}(\mathbf{F}^{(i\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(i\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d}}, \sigma, \mathbf{0})$.

- For $i'=1$ to N', sample $\mathbf{s}^{(i')} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ and $\mathbf{z}^{(i')} = (\mathbf{B}^{(i')})^\top \mathbf{s}^{(i')} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(i')}$.
- Construct an NIWI proof π for the gap language $L_{\sigma,\varepsilon}$ by using the witness $\{\mathbf{s}^{(i')}, i'\}_{i'\in[N']}$.
- If $i' \neq i^\diamond$, compute one-time signature $\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}} \leftarrow \Pi_{\mathsf{OTS}}.\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}^{(s)}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \boldsymbol{\mu})$. If $i' = i^\diamond$, send $\boldsymbol{\mu}$ to one-time signature challenger and then receive the response Σ_{OTS}.
- Return the signature $\Sigma = (\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{vk}^{(s)}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i')}, \mathbf{z}^{(i')}\}_{i'\in[N']}, \pi)$ to $\mathcal{A}$ and adds $(\boldsymbol{\mu}, \mathsf{R}, \Sigma)$ to a list L which $\mathcal{S}$ initialized in prior.

Probing Corrupting Oracle. $\mathcal{A}$ adaptively issues index i for querying the corrupting oracle $\mathsf{OCorrupt}(\cdot)$, $\mathcal{S}$ returns $\mathsf{sk}^{(i)}$ to $\mathcal{A}$ and adds $\mathsf{vk}^{(i)}$ to a set C which $\mathcal{S}$ initialized in prior, while if $i = i^\diamond$ then $\mathcal{S}$ aborts.

Exploiting the Forgery. $\mathcal{A}$ outputs one forgery $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathsf{R}^*, \Sigma^*)$. Let $N^* = |\mathsf{R}^*|$. Parse $\boldsymbol{\mu}^* = (\mu_1^*, \ldots, \mu_t^*)$ and $\mathsf{R}^* = (\mathsf{vk}^{*(1)}, \ldots, \mathsf{vk}^{*(N^*)})$ where each $\mathsf{vk}^{(i^*)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(i^*)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i^*)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i^*)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i^*)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i^*)}\}_{j\in[k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i^*)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i^*)}))$. Parse $\Sigma^* = (\Sigma^*_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{vk}^*_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathbf{e}^*_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'^*_{\mathsf{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^*)}, \mathbf{z}^{(i^*)}\}_{i^*\in[N^*]}, \pi^*)$. $\mathcal{S}$ does the following to exploit the forgery.

- Check if $\mathsf{Ver}(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathsf{R}^*, \Sigma^*) = 1$ and $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathsf{R}^*, \Sigma^*) \notin \mathsf{L}$ and $\mathsf{R}^* \subseteq \mathsf{S} \setminus \mathsf{C}$, otherwise $\mathcal{S}$ aborts.
- Compute $d = \mathsf{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(i^\diamond)}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)$.
- For $i^* = i^\diamond$:
  - Compute $\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*} = \mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)}\mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*} + \mathsf{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(i^\diamond)}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)\mathbf{G}$ by invoking the $\mathsf{Eval}(C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, (\{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i^\diamond)}\}_{j\in[k]}, \mathbf{C}^{(i^\diamond)}_{\mu_1^*}, \mathbf{C}^{(i^\diamond)}_{\mu_2^*}, \ldots, \mathbf{C}^{(i^\diamond)}_{\mu_t^*}))$.
  - Set $\mathbf{F}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*,d} = \left[\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} | \mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)} - \mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*}\right]$.
- Use $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{B}^{(i^\diamond)}}$ to recover $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)}$. Then check if $\|\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{m}$ and $\mathbf{F}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*,d} \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i^\diamond)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds, otherwise $\mathcal{S}$ aborts.
- Note that the equation $\mathbf{F}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*,d} \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i^\diamond)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ can be transformed to the following

$$\left[\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} | \mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)} - \mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*}\right] \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i^\diamond)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$$

$$\left[\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*}) + (d - \mathsf{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(i^\diamond)}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*))\right] \cdot (\mathbf{z}^{(i^\diamond)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$$

$$\left[\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)}(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*})\right] \cdot ((\mathbf{B}^{(i^\diamond)})^\top \mathbf{s}^{(i^\diamond)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$$

$$\mathbf{A}^{(i^\diamond)} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$$

- Return $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}$ as a $\mathsf{SIS}_{q,n,m,\beta}$ solution, and return $(\Sigma^*_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)$ as the forged one-time signature.

Claim 1. *The public parameters* PP *and the set of verifications keys* S *that simulated by* $\mathcal{S}$ *is statistically close to those in the real attack.*

Proof. In the real scheme and the simulation, the matrix $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ is chosen in random or sampled by the extendable output function [42]. Therefore, the distribution of $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$ and PP in the simulation is statistically indistinguishable with real attack. The matrices $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}$ in the real scheme and the matrices $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]\setminus i^{\diamond}}$ in the simulation were generated by $\mathsf{SuperTrapGen}$ while the matrix $\mathbf{A}^{(i^{\diamond})}$ is formed by m uniformly random and independent samples from $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ from the SIS challenger. By Lemma 7, we know the $\{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}$ in both real and simulated world have distribution that is statistically indistinguishable with real attack. For the matrices $\{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}$, it were uniformly random selected in the real scheme, in the simulation, the matrices $\{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]\setminus i^{\diamond})}$ were generated by $\mathsf{TrapGen}$ while the matrix $\mathbf{B}^{(i^{\diamond})}$ was generated by $\mathsf{SuperTrapGen}$. By Lemma 6 and 7, we know the $\{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}$ in both real and simulated world have distribution that is statistically indistinguishable with real attack. For the matrices $\{\mathbf{B}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}$, both real and simulated world select that in uniformly random, so it is immediate. For the matrices $(\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)})$, $\{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j\in[k]}$, and $(\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)})$ for all $i \in [N]$ generated in the simulation have distribution that is statistically indistinguishable with real attack by Lemma 5. Therefore, the set of verifications keys S given to $\mathcal{A}$ is statistically close to those in the real attack.

Claim 2. *The replies of the signing oracle* $\mathsf{OSign}(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)$ *simulated by* $\mathcal{S}$ *is statistically close to those in the real attack when set* $\sigma = O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log\, m})$.

Proof. By Definition 4, in our parameters setting, the entries $\mathbf{z}^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathbf{z}^{(N')}$ in the signature tuples output from the oracle $\mathsf{OSign}(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)$ are statistically close to those in the real attack. By the witness indistinguishability of the proof system, the proof π in the signature tuples output from the oracle $\mathsf{OSign}(\cdot,\cdot,\cdot)$ is statistically close to those in the real attack. For the $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$, there is no change in the simulation and real attack. For the Σ_{OTS}, it is immediate since we directly invoke the one-time signature signing algorithm in both simulated and real world. Therefore, we focus on the entries $(\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}, (\mathbf{e}_1^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathbf{e}_1^{(N')}))$.

By Lemma 10, for sufficient large Gaussian parameter σ, the distribution of the entries $(\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}, (\mathbf{e}_1^{(1)}, \ldots, \mathbf{e}_1^{(N')}))$ generated by $\mathsf{SamplePre}$ are statistically close to the distribution of signatures generated in the real scheme. So we next analyze how to set the parameter σ. In the simulating signing oracle phase, we constructed $\mathbf{F}^{(i^{\diamond})}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d} = \left[\mathbf{A}^{(i\diamond)} | \mathbf{A}^{(i\diamond)}(\mathbf{R}^{(i\diamond)}_{1-d} - \mathbf{R}^{(i\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}) + (1-2d)\mathbf{G}\right]$. Let $\bar{\mathbf{R}}^{(i\diamond)} = \mathbf{R}^{(i\diamond)}_{1-d} - \mathbf{R}^{(i\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}$. By Lemma 1, we know $\|\widetilde{\bar{\mathbf{R}}^{(i\diamond)}}\| \leq O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2})$ for some constant c. By Lemma 9, we know $\left\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(i\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d}}}\right\| < (\|\bar{\mathbf{R}}^{(i\diamond)}+1\|) \cdot \|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{G}}}\|$. By Lemma 12, we know $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{G}}}\| \leq \sqrt{5}$. By Lemma 10, it requires to set $\sigma >$

$\left\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu},1-d}}}\right\| \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$. Therefore, to satisfy these requirements, set $\sigma = O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2}) \cdot \omega(\sqrt{\log m})$ is sufficient.

Claim 3. *$\mathcal{A}$ can produce a valid $\mathsf{SIS}_{q,n,m,\beta}$ solution with overwhelming probability.*

Proof. We argue that $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}$ that $\mathcal{S}$ finally output in the simulation is a valid $\mathsf{SIS}_{q,n,m,\beta}$ solution in two steps. We first explain it is sufficiently short, note that $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)}$ and $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}$ follow the distribution $\mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m,\sigma}$. By Lemma 4, $\|\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)}\|, \|\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}\| \leq \sigma\sqrt{m}$. By Lemma 1, $\left\|\mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}\right\| \leq O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{3/2})$. By Lemma 3, the norm of $\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}}$ is bounded by $\sqrt{m}$. By Lemma 12, $\|\widetilde{\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{G}}}\| \leq \sqrt{5}$. Therefore, it requires to set $\beta \geq O(\ell^{2c} \cdot m^{2/3}) \cdot \sigma\sqrt{m}$.

Then we prove $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}$ is non-zero with overwhelming probability. Suppose that the $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)} = \mathbf{0}$, then for a valid forgery we must have at least one $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)} \neq \mathbf{0}$ and thus $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^\diamond)} + (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}$ is non-zero. Suppose on the contrary, there exists one $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)} \neq \mathbf{0}$, then we need to argue $(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}$ is non-zero with overwhelming probability. Due to we assume $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)} = (e_1, \ldots, e_m) \neq \mathbf{0}$ which means at least one coordinate of $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)}$, denote as e_o where $o \in [m]$, such that $e_o \neq 0$. Let $\bar{\mathbf{R}} = (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_d^{(i^\diamond)}} - \mathbf{R}^{(i^\diamond)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*})$ and write $\bar{\mathbf{R}} = (\bar{\mathbf{r}}_1, \ldots, \bar{\mathbf{r}}_m)$ and so $\bar{\mathbf{R}} \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^\diamond)} = \bar{\mathbf{r}}_o e_o + \sum_{\bar{o} \in [m] \setminus o} \bar{\mathbf{r}}_{\bar{o}} e_{\bar{o}}$. Note that for the fixed message μ^* on which $\mathcal{A}$ made the forgery, $\bar{\mathbf{R}}$ (therefore $\bar{\mathbf{r}}_o$) depends on the low-norm matrices $(\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_0^{(i^\diamond)}}, \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{A}_1^{(i^\diamond)}}), \left\{\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i^\diamond)}}\right\}_{j \in [k]}, (\mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{C}_0^{(i^\diamond)}}, \mathbf{R}_{\mathbf{C}_1^{(i^\diamond)}})$ and PRF key $\mathbf{k}$. The information about e_o for $\mathcal{A}$ is from the public matrices in the verification set S that given to the $\mathcal{A}$, and note that the PRF keys $\mathbf{k}$ which is not included in S. Therefore, by the pigeonhole principle there is an exponentially large freedom to pick a value to $\bar{\mathbf{r}}_o$ which is compatible with $\mathcal{A}$'s view. This completes the proof.

Theorem 2 (Anonymity). *Set the parameters as Sect. 4.3, the LRS scheme is signer-anonymous in the standard model.*

Proof. The proof proceeds in a sequence of experiments E_0, H_0, H_1, E_1 such that E_0 (resp., E_1) corresponds to the experiment of $\mathsf{Anonymity}$ in Definition 1 with $b = 0$ (resp., $b = 1$), and such that each experiment is indistinguishable from the one before it. This implies that $\mathcal{A}$ has negligible advantage in distinguishing E_0 from E_1, as desired.

E_0 :This experiment first generate $\mathsf{PP} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$, and $\left\{\mathsf{vk}^{(i)}, \mathsf{sk}^{(i)}\right\}_{i \in [N]}$ by repeatedly invoking $\mathsf{KeyGen}(\gamma_{\mathsf{kg}}^{(i)})$, and $\mathcal{A}$ is given $(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{S} = \{\mathsf{vk}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N]})$ and the randomness γ_{st}. Then $\mathcal{A}$ provides a challenge $(\mathsf{R}^*, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$ to the

challenger, and requires that $\boldsymbol{\mu}^* \in \mathcal{M}$, $s_0^* \neq s_1^*$ and $\mathsf{vk}^{(s_0^*)}, \mathsf{vk}^{(s_1^*)} \in \mathsf{S} \bigcap \mathsf{R}^*$. For the challenge $(\mathsf{R}^*, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$, the experiment uses $\mathsf{sk}^{(s_0^*)}$ to compute the signature tuple Σ^* and responses to $\mathcal{A}$.

H_0 :This experiment is as same as experiment E_0 except that we change how the signature Σ^* is generated: we sample $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ by $\mathsf{SamplePre}$ rather than randomly select it from $\mathbb{Z}_q^m$.

Then we show that E_0 and H_0 are indistinguishable for $\mathcal{A}$, which we do by giving a reduction from the hardness assumption $\mathsf{LWE}_{m,q,\alpha q\sqrt{2}}$.

Reduction. Suppose $\mathcal{A}$ has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing E_0 and H_0. We use $\mathcal{A}$ to construct an algorithm $\mathcal{S}$ for breaking the hardness assumption $\mathsf{LWE}_{m,q,\alpha q\sqrt{2}}$. $\mathcal{S}$ is given as input $(\mathbf{B}, \mathbf{z}) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^m$, where $\mathbf{B}$ is uniform and $\mathbf{z}$ is either uniform or equal to $\mathbf{B}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ for $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \alpha q\sqrt{2}}$.

Setup Phase. $\mathcal{S}$ takes as input a security parameter n and a randomness γ to invoke $\mathsf{PP} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ algorithm. $\mathcal{S}$ simulates as follows.

- Choose a random index $\bar{i}^* \xleftarrow{\$} \{1, \ldots, N\}$, sets $\mathbf{B}^{(\bar{i}^*)} = \mathbf{B}$.
- For $i = \bar{i}^* + 1, \ldots, N, 1, \ldots, \bar{i}^* - 1$, select $\mathbf{B}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$.
- For $i = 1$ to N, compute $(\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}) \leftarrow \mathsf{SuperTrapGen}(1^n, 1^m, q, \mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \gamma_{\mathsf{kg}}^{(i)})$. Set $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^{(i)} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}$ and $\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^{(i)} = \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(i)}}$.
- For $i = 1$ to N and $d \in \{0, 1\}$, select $\mathbf{A}_d^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_d^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$.
- For $i = 1$ to N, select a PRF key $\mathbf{k}^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^k$.
- For $j = 1$ to k, select $\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{n\times m}$.
- Set $\mathsf{S} = \{\mathsf{vk}^{(i)}\}_{i\in[N]}$, $\mathsf{vk}^{(i)} = (\mathbf{A}^{(i)}, (\mathbf{A}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{A}_1^{(i)}), \mathbf{B}^{(i)}, \{\mathbf{B}_j^{(i)}\}_{j\in[k]}, (\mathbf{C}_0^{(i)}, \mathbf{C}_1^{(i)}))$, then sends $(\mathsf{PP}, \mathsf{S}, \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

Challenge. $\mathcal{A}$ provides a challenge $(\mathsf{R}^*, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$ to the challenger. $\mathcal{S}$ chooses a random bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and fixes it throughout the response phase for the challenge. For each tuple $(\mathsf{R}^*, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, s_0^*, s_1^*)$ in the challenge, $\mathcal{S}$ does as following:

- Let $N^* = |\mathsf{R}^*|$. Check if $s_0^* \neq s_1^*$, $\mathsf{vk}^{(s_0^*)}, \mathsf{vk}^{(s_1^*)} \in \mathsf{S} \bigcap \mathsf{R}^*$ and $\bar{i}^* = s_1^*$, otherwise $\mathcal{S}$ aborts the simulation.
- Compute $d = \mathsf{PRF}(\mathbf{k}^{(s_1^*)}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)$.
- Compute $\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}$, $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}$, $\mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}$, and $\mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}$ as in Sign algorithm.
- For $i^* = s_0^*$, select $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_0^*)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ and computes $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_0^*)}$ by $\mathsf{SamplePre}$ such that $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, 1-d}^{(s_0^*)} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_0^*)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(s_0^*)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds as in Sign algorithm.
- For $i^* = s_1^*$, let $\mathbf{z}^{(i^*)} = \mathbf{z}$, uniformly choose $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ such that $\mathbf{F}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, 1-d}^{(s_1^*)} \cdot (\mathbf{z}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i_1^*)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds.

– For all $i^* \in [N^*]$ and $i^* \neq s_0^*, s_1^*$, select $\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^*)} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m,\sigma}$ and compute $\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^*)} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ uniformly subject to the condition that $\mathbf{F}^{(i^*)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*,1-d} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(i^*)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(i^*)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds as in Sign algorithm.
– For $i^* = s_1^* + 1, \ldots, N^*, 1, \ldots, s_1^* - 1$, compute the ciphertext $\mathbf{z}^{(i^*)}$ as in E_0 and H_0. Then construct an NIWI proof π for the gap language $L_{\sigma,\varepsilon}$ as in Sign algorithm.
– Compute one-time signature $\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}} \leftarrow \Pi_{\mathsf{OTS}}.\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*)$.
– Return the signature $\Sigma^* = (\Sigma_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathbf{e}_{\mathsf{chk}}, \mathbf{e}'_{\mathsf{chk}}, \{\mathbf{e}_1^{(i^*)}, \mathbf{z}^{(i^*)}\}_{i^* \in [N^*]}, \pi)$ and the randomness set $\{\gamma_{\mathsf{kg}}^{(i)}\}_{i \in [N] \setminus \{s_0^*, s_1^*\}}$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

Guess. When $\mathcal{A}$ outputs the guess b', $\mathcal{S}$ outputs the guess b'.

Let $\mathcal{D}_{\$}$ denote the above experiment when $\mathcal{S}$'s input $\mathbf{z}$ is uniformly distributed. Let $\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{LWE}}$ denote the above experiment when $\mathcal{S}$'s input $\mathbf{z}$ is distributed according to $\mathbf{y} = \mathbf{B}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ for $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \alpha q \sqrt{2}}$.

Claim 4. *$\mathcal{A}$'s view in $\mathcal{D}_{\$}$ is statistically close to its view in E_0.*

Proof. In experiment E_0, we have $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)} = (\mathbf{B}^{(s_1^*)})^\top \mathbf{s}^{(s_1^*)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ where $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ is chosen uniformly subject to $\mathbf{F}^{(s_1^*)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*,1-d} \cdot (\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)} \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$. In $\mathcal{D}_{\$}$, we let $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)} = \mathbf{z}$ and recall that $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{B}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ for $\mathbf{e} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ is uniformly selected. And $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}$ is chosen uniformly subject to $\mathbf{F}^{(s_1^*)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*,1-d} \cdot (\mathbf{z}; \mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. Recall $\mathbf{F}^{(s_1^*)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}^*,1-d} = \mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)} \mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)} + (\mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)}_{1-d} - \mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}}) \cdot \mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. We can view $\mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)}$ and $(\mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)}_{1-d} - \mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)}_{C_{\mathsf{PRF}},\boldsymbol{\mu}})$ as regular function $\mathbb{Z}_q^m \to \mathbb{Z}_q^n$. By Lemma 5, the randomly chosen $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ is uniform over the images of $\mathbf{A}^{(s_1^*)}$. For a regular function, choosing a uniform element from the images, followed by a uniform element from its pre-images, is equivalent to choosing a uniform element from the domain, as is done in $\mathcal{D}_{\$}$. Therefore the choice of $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ in E_0 is statistically close to uniform over $\mathbb{Z}_q^m$, and hence $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)}$ is statistically indistinguishable between E_0 and $\mathcal{D}_{\$}$. Similarly, this proof also can show the $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}$ in $\mathcal{D}_{\$}$ statistically close to uniform over $\mathbb{Z}_q^m$.

Claim 5. *$\mathcal{A}$'s view in $\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{LWE}}$ is statistically close to its view in H_0.*

Proof. In experiment H_0, $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)} = (\mathbf{B}^{(s_1^*)})^\top \mathbf{s}^{(s_1^*)} + \mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ where $\mathbf{e}_0^{(s_1^*)}$ is sampled by $\mathsf{SamplePre}$ algorithm. In $\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{LWE}}$, we let $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)} = \mathbf{z}$ and recall that $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{B}^\top \mathbf{s} + \mathbf{e}$ for $\mathbf{e} \leftarrow \mathcal{D}_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \alpha q \sqrt{2}}$. The proof to show $\mathbf{e}_1^{(s_1^*)}$ in H_0 and $\mathcal{D}_{\mathsf{LWE}}$ indistinguishable is as same as the last claim. Under the setting of the parameters given in Sect. 4.3, and by Lemma 10, $\mathbf{z}^{(s_1^*)}$ is indistinguishable between H_0 and $\mathcal{D}_{\$}$.

H_1 : This experiment is the same as experiment E_1 except that the proof π is now computed using the witness $\{\mathbf{s}^{(i^*)}, i^*\}^{(s_1^*)}_{i^* \in [N^*]}$ rather than $\{\mathbf{s}^{(i^*)}, i^*\}^{(s_0^*)}_{i^* \in [N^*]}$.

The rest of the proof is straightforward. H_1 is indistinguishable from E_1 by exactly the same argument used to show the indistinguishability of H_0 and E_0. By the witness indistinguishability of the proof system, H_0 and H_1 are indistinguishable. This completes the proof.

Theorem 3 (Linkability). *Set the parameters as Sect. 4.3, the LRS scheme is signer-linkable in the standard model.*

Proof. The proof mainly based on the $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}$ and $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}$ algorithms, by our design of the extended trapdoors $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}}$ and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}$, we can exploit the output of the adversary to produce a valid SIS solution.

Setup Phase. $\mathcal{S}$ takes as input a security parameter n and a randomness γ_{st} to invoke $\mathsf{PP} \leftarrow \mathsf{Setup}(1^n; \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ algorithm, then send $(\mathsf{PP}, \gamma_{\mathsf{st}})$ to $\mathcal{A}$.

Output Phase. $\mathcal{A}$ outputs l ($l \geq 2$) (messages, ring of verification keys, signature) tuples $(\mathsf{R}_i^*, \boldsymbol{\mu}_i^*, \Sigma_i^*)$.

Infer that there must existing a ring member in the union set $\cup_{i=1}\mathsf{R}_i^*$ who generated at least two signature tuples. In other words, this ring member, assuming his index is s, had produced two valid one-time verification keys $(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}, \mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^*)$. Let $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}$ be the honest one-time verification key. Now we analyze $\mathcal{A}$ how to produce the $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^*$. There are two ways:

- The first way is $\mathcal{A}$ produces a $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}^* \neq \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}$. In this case, we have $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}^*\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} | \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\right]$. Recall the $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}$ algorithm, $\mathcal{A}$ needs to compute a low-norm basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}} = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{R}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ such that $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. It holds that $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}^*\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}\mathbf{R}_0 = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}} - \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}^*\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}\mathbf{R}_1 = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. Then we have $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}^*(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}\mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}\mathbf{R}_1) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds. As the parameters set in Sect. 4.3, $(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}\mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}\mathbf{R}_1)$ will be a valid SIS solution.
- The second way is $\mathcal{A}$ produces a $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* \neq \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}^{(s)}}$. Let $N^* = |\cup_{i=1}\mathsf{R}_i^*|$. In this case, existing an index $s \in [N^*]$ satisfy that, $\mathbf{F}^{(s)} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^* | \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} + \mathbf{A}^{(s)}\right]$, and $\mathbf{F}^{(s)}$ has the basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(s)}} = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*\mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*\mathbf{R}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ by the $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}$ algorithm. It holds that $\mathbf{A}^{(s)}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*\mathbf{R}_0 = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\mathbf{A}^{(s)}\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*\mathbf{R}_1 = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. Then we have $\mathbf{A}^{(s)}(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*\mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*\mathbf{R}_1) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds. As the parameters set in Sect. 4.3, $(\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*\mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*\mathbf{R}_1)$ will be a valid SIS solution.

This completes the proof.

Theorem 4 (Non-Slanderability). *Set the parameters as Sect. 4.3, the LRS scheme is signer-non-slanderable in the standard model.*

Proof. The proof mainly based on the $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}$ and $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}$ algorithms, by our design of the extended trapdoors $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}_{\mathsf{chk}}}$ and $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}}$, we can exploit the output of the adversary to produce a valid SIS solution.

Setup. As same as the Setup phase of unforgeability proof.

Probing. As same as the Probing phase of unforgeability proof.

Output. $\mathcal{A}$ outputs two signature tuples $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathsf{R}^*, \Sigma^*)$ and $(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}, \hat{\mathsf{R}}, \hat{\Sigma})$. Let $N^* = |\mathsf{R}^*|$. Check if $\mathsf{Ver}(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathsf{R}^*, \Sigma^*) = 1$ and $(\boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \mathsf{R}^*, \Sigma^*) \notin \mathsf{L}$ and $(\hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}, \hat{\mathsf{R}}, \hat{\Sigma}) \in \mathsf{L}$ and $\mathsf{R}^* \subseteq \mathsf{S} \setminus \mathsf{C}$ and the proof π^* is correct and $\mathsf{Link}(\mathsf{R}^*, \boldsymbol{\mu}^*, \Sigma^*, \hat{\mathsf{R}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\mu}}, \hat{\Sigma}) = 1$ i.e., $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^* = \hat{\mathsf{vk}}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$, otherwise aborts. Let $\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{OTS}}^* = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}^*\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{A}}^*$ and $\hat{\mathsf{vk}}_{\mathsf{OTS}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}$.

We analyze $\mathcal{A}$ how to produce $\mathsf{vk}^*_{\mathsf{OTS}}$ and make $\mathsf{vk}^*_{\mathsf{OTS}} = \hat{\mathsf{vk}}_{\mathsf{OTS}}$ holds. There are two ways:

- The first way is $\mathcal{A}$ selects a basis $\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}$ and then computes the $\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}$ such that $\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}$ holds. We have $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} = \left[\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}} - \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} | \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\right]$. By the $\mathsf{BasisExtBindSK}$ algorithm, $\mathcal{A}$ needs to generate a low-norm basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}} = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}} - \mathbf{R}_0 & \mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}} - \mathbf{R}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ such that $\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}} \cdot \mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}'_{\mathsf{chk}}} = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. It holds that $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}} - \mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0 = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}} - \mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1 = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. Then we have $\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}(\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds. As the parameters set in Sect. 4.3, $(\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1)$ will be a valid SIS solution.
- The second way is $\mathcal{A}$ corrupts the $\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}$ and then computes a $\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}$ such that $\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} = \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}$ holds. In this case, existing an index $s \in [N^*]$ satisfy that, $\mathbf{F}^{(s)} = \left[\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}} | \mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}} + \mathbf{A}^{(s)}\right]$, and $\mathbf{F}^{(s)}$ has the basis $\mathbf{T}_{\mathbf{F}^{(s)}} = \begin{bmatrix} -\mathbf{R}_0 & -\mathbf{R}_1 \\ \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0 & \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1 \end{bmatrix}$ by the $\mathsf{BasisExtBindAcom}$ algorithm. It holds that $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0 - \mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0 = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\mathbf{A}_{\mathsf{com}}\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1 - \mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}\hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1 = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$. Then we have $\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}(\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0 - \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ and $\mathbf{A}^*_{\mathsf{com}}(\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1 - \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1) = \mathbf{0} \pmod q$ holds. As the parameters set in Sect. 4.3, $(\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0 - \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_0)$ and $(\mathbf{T}^*_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1 - \hat{\mathbf{T}}_{\mathbf{A}}\mathbf{R}_1)$ will be valid SIS solutions.

This completes the proof.

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