

## Erratum:

An anonymous reviewer from Eurocrypt 2023 pointed out to us that Theorem 1 is incorrect, since there is a distinguisher making  $q_C = \mathcal{O}(2^{n/2})$  queries having constant advantage. We describe the attack using the notation from our paper. Consider the tweakable FX construction  $\text{TFX}_{k,k'}^{f_1,f_2}[E]$  with any proper tweak functions  $f_1, f_2 : \mathcal{T} \times \{0,1\}^\kappa \rightarrow \{0,1\}^n$ . Fix two distinct tweak inputs  $t_1 \neq t_2$  and any  $k, k'$ . Note that  $P = \text{TFX}_{k,k'}^{f_1,f_2}[E](t_1, \cdot)$  is a uniform permutation, and we can regard

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TFX}_{k,k'}^{f_1,f_2}[E](t_2, \cdot) &= E_k(x \oplus f_1(t_2, k')) \oplus f_2(t_2, k') \\ &= P(x \oplus \underbrace{f_1(t_1, k') \oplus f_1(t_2, k')}_{k_1}) \oplus \underbrace{f_2(t_1, k') \oplus f_2(t_2, k')}_{k_2} \end{aligned}$$

as an Even-Mansour cipher constructed from  $P$ . (The keys  $k_1, k_2$  have uniform marginal distribution by the XOR-uniformity of the tweak functions.) A standard (classical) attack on Even-Mansour can thus distinguish  $\text{TFX}_{k,k'}^{f_1,f_2}[E](t_1, \cdot)$ ,  $\text{TFX}_{k,k'}^{f_1,f_2}[E](t_2, \cdot)$  from a pair of independent random permutations, and thus distinguish  $\text{TFX}_{k,k'}^{f_1,f_2}[E]$  from an ideal tweakable cipher, using  $q_C = \mathcal{O}(2^{n/2})$  classical queries to  $\text{TFX}_{k,k'}^{f_1,f_2}[E]$  (and zero queries to  $E$ ).

The status of Theorem 2 is thus open, and the best available post-quantum security result for FX is currently [9].

**Source of the mistake.** The proof of Theorem 1 is correct up to Equation (2). However, our subsequent claim that “an easy argument finishes the proof...” is wrong when  $m > 0$ . While we could use Equation (2) as a bound in a revised version of Theorem 1, this gives a poor bound for the security of the FX construction in Theorem 2.

**Unaffected parts.** Our results about Elephant, Chaskey, and Minalpher (Theorems 3–5) are not affected since in those cases  $m = 0$ .

# Post-Quantum Security of the (Tweakable) FX Construction, and Applications

**Abstract.** The FX construction provides a way to increase the effective key length of a block cipher  $E$ . We prove security of a tweakable version of the FX construction in the post-quantum setting, i.e., against a quantum attacker given *quantum* access to  $E$  (but only *classical* access to the secretly keyed construction). We then use our results to prove post-quantum security—in the same model—of the (plain) FX construction, **Elephant** (a finalist of NIST’s lightweight cryptography standardization effort), **Chaskey** (an ISO-standardized lightweight MAC), and **Minalpher** (a second-round candidate of the CAESAR competition).

## 1 Introduction

The development of large-scale quantum computers would have a significant impact on cryptography. For symmetric-key cryptosystems—even ideal ciphers—one must at least double the key length in order to achieve the same security against quantum attackers as is enjoyed against classical adversaries, due to the possibility of using Grover’s search algorithm [7] to carry out a key-recovery attack. In general, however, doubling the key length may not be sufficient [12,13,4], and it is therefore critical to understand the security of various symmetric-key constructions against quantum attackers.

One can consider two models of quantum attacks [3]. In the so-called Q2 model, the attacker is given quantum access to any underlying public primitives (e.g., a block cipher) as well as the secretly keyed construction itself. In contrast, the Q1 model assumes the adversary has quantum access to all *public* primitives but only classical access to the secretly keyed construction. The distinction between Q1 and Q2 is significant: for many symmetric-key constructions, polynomial-query attacks are known in the Q2 model [12,13,10] but not in the Q1 model. At the same time, however, the Q2 model appears to be highly unrealistic, particularly for real-world applications where the honest parties only run the construction on classical inputs, and do not expose any quantum interface to an attacker (which is necessarily the case whenever the honest devices implementing the construction are entirely classical). The Q1 model is thus a much better fit for realistic quantum attacks, and several recent works [9,1,4] have focused on that model. From here on, by “post-quantum security” we will mean the Q1 model by default.

Proving security in the Q1 model is challenging since it requires reasoning about a combination of classical and quantum oracles. Indeed, there are at present only a limited number of positive results about security in this model. Jaeger et al. [9] showed partial positive results for the FX construction (a mechanism for key-length extension that we define in the next section); their results imply security either for non-adaptive adversaries or for a variant of the FX

construction using a public keyed *function* in place of a public keyed *permutation*. The FX construction degenerates to the Even-Mansour scheme [5] when the public primitive is unkeyed, and so their work also implies security for the Even-Mansour construction either for non-adaptive adversaries or for a variant of the construction based on a public random function. Subsequent work by Alagic et al. [1] showed post-quantum security of the full Even-Mansour construction (i.e., using a random permutation) against adaptive adversaries.

### 1.1 Our Results

Let  $E : \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a block cipher that we will treat in our analysis as ideal. We consider a tweakable version of the FX construction  $\text{TFX}^{f_1, f_2}[E] : (\{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa) \times (\mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ , defined as

$$\text{TFX}_{k, k'}^{f_1, f_2}[E](t, x) = E_k(x \oplus f_1(t, k')) \oplus f_2(t, k'),$$

where  $\mathcal{T}$  is a tweak space and  $f_1, f_2$  are functions satisfying some technical conditions we omit here.

As our main result, we prove that the above is a secure (post-quantum) tweakable block cipher. Concretely (cf. [Theorem 1](#)), we show that an adaptive adversary making  $q_C$  classical queries to  $\text{TFX}_{k, k'}^{f_1, f_2}[E]$  and  $q_Q$  quantum queries to  $E$  (where we allow queries in both the forward and inverse directions) can distinguish the former from an ideal tweakable cipher only with probability  $\mathcal{O}(2^{-(m+n)/2} \cdot (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}))$ . The result shows that any attack in this setting requires  $q_C^2 \cdot q_C + q_Q^2 \cdot q_C \approx 2^{m+n}$ ; this means that  $\Omega(2^{(m+n)/3})$  queries are necessary for constant success probability, matching the best previous attack in the Q1 model [8, 3].<sup>1</sup> A key building block of our result is a generalization of existing “resampling lemmas” [6, 1] to cover ideal ciphers (cf. [Lemma 2](#)), something that may be of independent interest.

We use our result to derive corollaries regarding the post-quantum security of various symmetric-key constructions:

1. By taking  $\kappa = 2n$ ,  $\mathcal{T} = \emptyset$ ,  $f_1(\perp, (k_1, k_2)) = k_1$ , and  $f_2(\perp, (k_1, k_2)) = k_2$ , the TFX construction degenerates to the FX construction. Our result thus implies post-quantum security of the full FX construction against adaptive adversaries, answering the open question from Jaeger et al. [9].
2. If we take  $m = 0$  (so  $E$  is now a public random permutation) and choose the tweak space  $\mathcal{T}$  and the functions  $f_1, f_2$  appropriately, TFX becomes the tweakable block cipher at the core of (a slightly simplified variant of) [Elephant](#) [2], a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme currently under consideration for standardization by NIST [17]. Our main result implies post-quantum security for this variant of [Elephant](#).
3. Taking  $m = 0$  again, we can set  $\mathcal{T}, f_1, f_2$  such that TFX captures the three pseudorandom permutations used in [Chaskey](#) [15], a lightweight MAC that is an ISO standard. We thus prove post-quantum security of [Chaskey](#).

<sup>1</sup> We note that Leander and May [14] showed an attack on FX in the Q2 model using  $\mathcal{O}(n2^{m/2})$  queries.

4. Continuing to take  $m = 0$ , we can set  $\mathcal{T}, f_1, f_2$  such that TFX becomes the tweakable block cipher at the core of (a slightly simplified variant of) Minalpher [16], an authenticated encryption scheme that was a second-round candidate of the CAESAR competition (<http://competitions.cr.yp.to>). Our main result implies post-quantum security for this variant of Minalpher.

To our knowledge, these are the first proofs of security for any versions of Elephant, Chaskey, and Minalpher against quantum adversaries.

**Paper organization.** In Section 2, we establish some notation, recall a “reprogramming lemma” from prior work [1], and establish a “resampling lemma” for the ideal-cipher model that will be useful for proving our main result. We prove security of TFX in the post-quantum setting in Section 3. Finally, in Section 4 we describe the applications of our main result to the post-quantum security of FX, Elephant, Chaskey, and Minalpher.

## 2 Preliminaries

**Notation and basic definitions.** We let  $\mathcal{P}(n)$  denote the set of all permutations on  $\{0, 1\}^n$ . In the *public permutation model*, a permutation  $P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)$  is sampled uniformly and then provided as an oracle (in both the forward and inverse directions) to all parties. A block cipher  $E : \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is a keyed permutation, i.e.,  $E_k(\cdot) = E(k, \cdot)$  is a permutation of  $\{0, 1\}^n$  for all  $k \in \{0, 1\}^m$ . We say  $E$  is a *pseudorandom permutation* if  $E_k$  (for uniform  $k \in \{0, 1\}^m$ ) is indistinguishable from a uniform permutation in  $\mathcal{P}(n)$ , where indistinguishability is required to hold even against adversaries who may query their oracle in both the forward and inverse directions.

For a set  $\mathcal{T}$ , let  $\mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n)$  be the set of all functions  $E : \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  such that  $E(t, \cdot)$  is a permutation on  $\{0, 1\}^n$  for all  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ . When  $\mathcal{T} = \{0, 1\}^m$  we also write  $\mathcal{E}(m, n)$ . In the *ideal-cipher model* a cipher  $E \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(m, n)$  is sampled uniformly and then provided as an oracle, in both the forward and inverse directions, to all parties. (When  $m = 0$  this defaults to the public permutation model.) A tweakable block cipher  $\tilde{E} : \{0, 1\}^m \times \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is a family of permutations indexed by both a key  $k \in \{0, 1\}^m$  and a tweak  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , i.e., we now require that  $\tilde{E}_k(t, \cdot) = \tilde{E}(k, t, \cdot)$  is a permutation of  $\{0, 1\}^n$  for all  $k \in \{0, 1\}^m$  and  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ . A tweakable block cipher  $\tilde{E}$  is *secure* if  $\tilde{E}_k$  (for uniform choice of  $k \in \{0, 1\}^m$ ) is indistinguishable from a uniform  $\tilde{E} \in \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n)$ .

In all the security notions mentioned above we consider algorithms having only classical access to secretly keyed primitives. When we consider constructions of keyed primitives (e.g., a tweakable block cipher) from ideal public primitives (e.g., an ideal cipher), however, we provide the distinguisher with *quantum* oracle access to the public primitive. Thus, for example, a distinguisher in the ideal-cipher model has the ability to apply the unitary operators

$$\begin{aligned} |k\rangle|x\rangle|y\rangle &\mapsto |k\rangle|x\rangle|E_k(x) \oplus y\rangle \\ |k\rangle|x\rangle|y\rangle &\mapsto |k\rangle|x\rangle|E_k^{-1}(x) \oplus y\rangle \end{aligned}$$

to quantum registers of the adversary's choice. (We emphasize that this includes evaluating  $E/E^{-1}$  on arbitrary superpositions of both keys and inputs.) This is well-motivated, as in practice  $E$  would be instantiated by a public block cipher; adversaries with quantum computers would thus be able to coherently execute the reversible circuit for computing  $E$ . On the other hand, as discussed in the introduction, secretly keyed primitives would be implemented by honest parties; if honest parties only evaluate the primitive on classical inputs then the attacker has no way to obtain quantum access to that primitive.

**A reprogramming lemma.** For a function  $F : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  and a set  $B \subset \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n$  such that each  $x \in \{0, 1\}^m$  is the first element of at most one tuple in  $B$ , define

$$F^{(B)}(x) := \begin{cases} y & \text{if } (x, y) \in B \\ F(x) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

We rely on the following lemma, taken verbatim from [1]:

**Lemma 1.** *Let  $\mathcal{D}$  be a quantum distinguisher in the following experiment:*

**Phase 1:**  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs descriptions of a function  $F_0 = F : \{0, 1\}^m \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  and a randomized algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  whose output is a set  $B \subset \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n$  where each  $x \in \{0, 1\}^m$  is the first element of at most one tuple in  $B$ . Let  $B_1 = \{x \mid \exists y : (x, y) \in B\}$  and  $\varepsilon = \max_{x \in \{0, 1\}^m} \{\Pr_{B \leftarrow \mathcal{B}}[x \in B_1]\}$ .

**Phase 2:**  $\mathcal{B}$  is run to obtain  $B$ . Let  $F_1 = F^{(B)}$ . A uniform bit  $b$  is chosen, and  $\mathcal{D}$  is given quantum access to  $F_b$ .

**Phase 3:**  $\mathcal{D}$  loses access to  $F_b$ , and receives the randomness  $r$  used to invoke  $\mathcal{B}$  in phase 2. Then  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs a guess  $b'$ .

For any  $\mathcal{D}$  making  $q$  queries in expectation when its oracle is  $F_0$ , it holds that

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{D} \text{ outputs } 1 \mid b = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D} \text{ outputs } 1 \mid b = 0]| \leq 2q \cdot \sqrt{\varepsilon}.$$

**A resampling lemma for ideal ciphers.** As a building block for our main result, we prove a resampling lemma for ideal ciphers that generalizes earlier results for random functions [6] and permutations [1]. We consider the experiment in which a distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  is first given quantum access to an ideal cipher  $E : \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ . Then, a key  $k_0 \in \{0, 1\}^m$  and two points  $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^n$  are chosen according to some distribution, and in a second phase  $\mathcal{D}$  is given access either to the original function  $E^{(0)} = E$  or a modified function  $E^{(1)}$  that is the same as  $E$  except that the values of  $E_{k_0}(s_0)$  and  $E_{k_0}(s_1)$  are swapped. (See below for details.) We show, roughly speaking, that so long as the distribution of  $k_0, s_0, s_1$  has high min-entropy and  $\mathcal{D}$  makes only a bounded number of queries in the first phase of its execution,  $\mathcal{D}$  cannot distinguish these two possibilities. Compared to prior work of Alagic et al. [1], our proof handles the case  $m > 0$  (i.e., ideal ciphers and not just random permutations) and also allows for distributions over  $k_0, s_0, s_1$  other than the uniform distribution.

For  $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , define  $\text{swap}_{s_0, s_1} \in \mathcal{P}(n)$  as

$$\text{swap}_{s_0, s_1}(x) = \begin{cases} s_1 & \text{if } x = s_0 \\ s_0 & \text{if } x = s_1 \\ x & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

**Lemma 2 (Ideal-cipher resampling).** *Fix a probability distribution  $D$  on  $\{0, 1\}^{m+2n}$ , and let*

$$\varepsilon = \max_{\substack{k^* \in \{0, 1\}^m \\ s^* \in \{0, 1\}^n}} \Pr_{(k, s_0, s_1) \leftarrow D} [(k^*, s^*) \in \{(k, s_0), (k, s_1)\}].$$

Consider the following experiment involving a quantum distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$ :

**Phase 1:** Choose uniform  $E \in \mathcal{E}(m, n)$ , and give  $\mathcal{D}$  quantum access to  $E$ .

**Phase 2:** Choose  $k \in \{0, 1\}^m$  and  $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^n$  according to  $D$ . Let  $E^{(0)} = E$  and define  $E^{(1)} : \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  by

$$E_{k^*}^{(1)}(x) = \begin{cases} E_{k^*}(x) & \text{if } k^* \neq k \\ E_{k^*} \circ \text{swap}_{s_0, s_1}(x) & \text{if } k^* = k. \end{cases}$$

A uniform bit  $b \in \{0, 1\}$  is chosen, and  $\mathcal{D}$  is given  $k, s_0, s_1$ , and quantum access to  $E^{(b)}$ . Then  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs a guess  $b'$ .

For any  $\mathcal{D}$  making at most  $q$  queries to  $E$  in phase 1,

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{D} \text{ outputs } 1 \mid b = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{D} \text{ outputs } 1 \mid b = 0]| \leq 2\sqrt{2q\varepsilon}.$$

The proof is given in [Appendix A](#).

### 3 Post-Quantum Security of Tweakable FX

Let  $E : \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be a block cipher and  $\mathcal{T}$  a finite set, and fix two functions  $f_1, f_2 : \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ . We consider a tweakable version of the FX construction  $\text{TFX}^{f_1, f_2}[E] : (\{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa) \times (\mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n) \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  defined as

$$\text{TFX}_{k, k'}^{f_1, f_2}[E](t, x) = E_k(x \oplus f_1(t, k')) \oplus f_2(t, k').$$

We consider tweak functions  $f_1, f_2$  satisfying some structural properties:

**Definition 1.** *A function  $f : \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is **proper** (with respect to  $\mathcal{T}$ ) if it satisfies the following two properties:*

**Uniformity:** *For all  $t \in \mathcal{T}$  and all  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,*

$$\Pr_{k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa} [f(t, k) = y] = 2^{-n}.$$

**XOR-uniformity:** For all distinct  $t, t' \in \mathcal{T}$  and all  $y \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,

$$\Pr_{k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa} [f(t, k) \oplus f(t', k) = y] = 2^{-n}.$$

Note uniformity implies  $f(t, \cdot)$  is surjective for any  $t \in \mathcal{T}$ , and  $\kappa \geq n$ .

**Theorem 1.** Let TFX be as above and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary making  $q_C$  classical queries to its first oracle and  $q_Q \geq 1$  quantum queries to its second oracle. Then if  $f_1, f_2$  are proper with respect to  $\mathcal{T}$ , it holds that

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^m; k' \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^\kappa; \\ E \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(m, n)}} \left[ \mathcal{A}^{\text{TFX}_{k, k'}^{f_1, f_2}[E], E} = 1 \right] - \Pr_{\substack{\tilde{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n); \\ E \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(m, n)}} \left[ \mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E}, E} = 1 \right] \right| \leq (3 + 2\sqrt{2}) \cdot 2^{-(m+n)/2} \cdot (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}).$$

Our high-level proof is similar to the proof of security for the Even-Mansour construction by Alagic et al. [1]. However, our proof of Lemma 4 differs substantially from the proof of the corresponding lemma in their work. In particular, by modifying the sequence of hybrid experiments, we are able to avoid a certain “bad event” whose probability is difficult to compute in our setting.

*Proof.* As noted, the high-level structure of our proof is similar to the proof of security for the Even-Mansour construction by Alagic et al. [1]; for that reason, we copy some portions of their proof (with appropriate updates for our setting).

Without loss of generality, we assume  $\mathcal{A}$  never makes a redundant classical query; that is, once it learns an input/output pair  $(x, y)$  associated with some tweak  $t$  by making a query to its classical oracle, it never again submits the query  $(t, x)$  (resp.,  $(t, y)$ ) to the forward (resp., inverse) direction of that oracle. We divide an execution of  $\mathcal{A}$  into  $q_C + 1$  stages  $0, \dots, q_C$ , where the  $j$ th stage corresponds to the time between the  $j$ th and  $(j+1)$ st classical queries of  $\mathcal{A}$ . (The 0th stage is the period of time before  $\mathcal{A}$  makes its first classical query, and the  $q_C$ th stage is the period of time after  $\mathcal{A}$  makes its last classical query.)  $\mathcal{A}$  may adaptively distribute its  $q_Q$  quantum queries between these stages arbitrarily, and we let  $q_{Q,j}$  be the expected number of quantum queries that  $\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E}, E}$  makes in the  $j$ th stage, where the expectation is taken over  $\tilde{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n)$  and  $E \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(m, n)$  and any internal randomness/measurements of  $\mathcal{A}$ . Note that  $\sum_{j=0}^{q_C} q_{Q,j} = q_Q$ .

We write  $K$  for  $(k, k')$ , and write  $\text{TFX}_K$  for  $\text{TFX}_{k, k'}^{f_1, f_2}$ . In a given execution of  $\mathcal{A}$ , we denote its  $j$ th classical query by  $(t_j, x_j, y_j, b_j)$ , where  $t_j \in \mathcal{T}$  is a tweak,  $(x_j, y_j) \in \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n$  is an input/output pair, and  $b_j \in \{0, 1\}$  indicates the query direction, i.e.,  $b_j = 0$  (resp.,  $b_j = 1$ ) means that the  $j$ th classical query was in the forward (resp., inverse) direction. We let  $T_j = ((t_1, x_1, y_1, b_1), \dots, (t_j, x_j, y_j, b_j))$  be the ordered list of the first  $j$  queries of  $\mathcal{A}$ .

Our proof involves a sequence of experiments in which  $\mathcal{A}$ 's oracles are modified based on the classical queries made by  $\mathcal{A}$  thus far, and so we first establish the appropriate notation. We use the product symbol  $\prod$  to denote sequential composition of operations, i.e.,  $\prod_{i=1}^n f_i = f_1 \circ \dots \circ f_n$ . (Note that order matters,

since function composition is not commutative in general.) For an ideal cipher  $E$ , a key  $K = (k, k')$ , and a list  $T_j = ((t_1, x_1, y_1, b_1), \dots, (t_j, x_j, y_j, b_j))$  as above, define the operators

$$\begin{aligned}\vec{S}_{T_j, E, K} &= \prod_{i=1}^j \text{swap}_{E_k(x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k')), y_i \oplus f_2(t_i, k')}^{1-b_i} \\ \vec{Q}_{T_j, E, K} &= \prod_{i=1}^j \text{swap}_{x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k'), E_k^{-1}(y_i \oplus f_2(t_i, k'))}^{1-b_i} \\ \overleftarrow{S}_{T_j, E, K} &= \prod_{i=j}^1 \text{swap}_{E_k(x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k')), y_i \oplus f_2(t_i, k')}^{b_i} \\ \overleftarrow{Q}_{T_j, E, K} &= \prod_{i=j}^1 \text{swap}_{x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k'), E_k^{-1}(y_i \oplus f_2(t_i, k'))}^{b_i}\end{aligned}$$

where, as usual,  $f^0$  is the identity map and  $f^1 = f$  for any function  $f$ . We define the modified cipher  $E^{T_j, K}$  as

$$E_{k^*}^{T_j, K}(x) = \begin{cases} E_{k^*}(x) & k^* \neq k \\ \overleftarrow{S}_{T_j, E, K} \circ \vec{S}_{T_j, E, K} \circ E_k(x) & k^* = k. \end{cases} \quad (1)$$

Since  $E_k \circ \text{swap}_{x, y} = \text{swap}_{E_k(x), E_k(y)} \circ E_k$  for all  $k, x, y$ , we have

$$\overleftarrow{S}_{j, E, K} \circ \vec{S}_{T_j, E, K} \circ E_k = \overleftarrow{S}_{T_j, E, K} \circ E_k \circ \vec{Q}_{T_j, E, K} = E_k \circ \overleftarrow{Q}_{T_j, E, K} \circ \vec{Q}_{T_j, E, K}.$$

Roughly speaking,  $E^{T_j, K}$  is the minimal modification of  $E$  that is consistent with the forward ( $\rightarrow$ ) and inverse ( $\leftarrow$ ) queries from the transcript  $T_j$  when post-composed ( $S$ ) or pre-composed ( $Q$ ) with  $E$ . For compactness we occasionally write  $E^j$  in place of  $E^{T_j, K}$  when  $T_j$  and  $K$  are understood from the context.

We now define a sequence of hybrid experiments  $\mathbf{H}_j$ , for  $j = 0, \dots, q_C$ .

**Experiment  $\mathbf{H}_j$ .** Sample uniform ciphers  $\tilde{E} \in \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n)$  and  $E \in \mathcal{E}(m, n)$ , and a uniform key  $K \in \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n$ . Then:

1. Run  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering its classical queries using  $\tilde{E}$  and its quantum queries using  $E$ , stopping immediately *before* its  $(j+1)$ st classical query. Let  $T_j = ((t_1, x_1, y_1, b_1), \dots, (t_j, x_j, y_j, b_j))$  be the list of classical queries so far.
2. For the remainder of the execution of  $\mathcal{A}$ , answer its classical queries using  $\text{TFX}_K[E^{T_j, K}]$  and its quantum queries using  $E^{T_j, K}$ .

We can compactly represent  $\mathbf{H}_j$  as the experiment in which  $\mathcal{A}$ 's queries are answered using the oracle sequence

$$\underbrace{E, \tilde{E}, E, \dots, \tilde{E}, E}_{j \text{ classical queries}}, \underbrace{\text{TFX}_K[E^j], E^j, \dots, \text{TFX}_K[E^j], E^j}_{q_C - j \text{ classical queries}}.$$



Each instance of  $\tilde{E}$  or  $\text{TFX}_K[E^j]$  represents a single classical query, while each instance of  $E$  or  $E^j$  represents a stage during which  $\mathcal{A}$  makes multiple quantum queries to that oracle but no queries to its classical oracle. Observe that  $\mathbf{H}_0$  corresponds to the execution of  $\mathcal{A}$  in the real world, i.e.,  $\mathcal{A}^{\text{TFX}_K[E],E}$ , and  $\mathbf{H}_{q_C}$  is the execution of  $\mathcal{A}$  in the ideal world, i.e.,  $\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E},E}$ .

For  $j = 0, \dots, q_C - 1$ , we introduce additional experiments  $\mathbf{H}'_j$ :

**Experiment  $\mathbf{H}'_j$ .** Sample uniform ciphers  $\tilde{E} \in \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n)$  and  $E \in \mathcal{E}(m, n)$ , and uniform  $K \in \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ . Then:

1. Run  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering its classical queries using  $\tilde{E}$  and its quantum queries using  $E$ , stopping immediately *after* its  $(j+1)$ st classical query. Let  $T_{j+1} = ((t_1, x_1, y_1, b_1), \dots, (t_{j+1}, x_{j+1}, y_{j+1}, b_{j+1}))$  be the classical queries so far.
2. For the remainder of the execution of  $\mathcal{A}$ , answer its classical queries using  $\text{TFX}_K[E^{T_{j+1}, K}]$  and its quantum queries using  $E^{T_{j+1}, K}$ .

Thus,  $\mathbf{H}'_j$  corresponds to running  $\mathcal{A}$  using the oracle sequence

$$\underbrace{E, \tilde{E}, E, \dots, \tilde{E}, E}_{j \text{ classical queries}}, \underbrace{\tilde{E}, E^{j+1}, \text{TFX}_K[E^{j+1}], E^{j+1}, \dots, \text{TFX}_K[E^{j+1}], E^{j+1}}_{q_C - j - 1 \text{ classical queries}}.$$

In Lemmas 3 and 4, we establish the following bounds on the distinguishability of  $\mathbf{H}'_j$  and  $\mathbf{H}_{j+1}$ , as well as  $\mathbf{H}_j$  and  $\mathbf{H}'_j$ , for  $0 \leq j < q_C$ :

$$\begin{aligned} |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}'_j) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_{j+1}) = 1]| &\leq 2 \cdot q_{Q,j+1} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{2 \cdot (j+1)}{2^{m+n}}}. \\ |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}'_j) = 1]| &\leq 2\sqrt{2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q_Q}{2^{m+n}}} + 3j \cdot 2^{-n}. \end{aligned}$$

Using the above, we have

$$\begin{aligned} &|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_{q_C}) = 1]| \\ &\leq \sum_{j=0}^{q_C-1} \left( 2\sqrt{2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q_Q}{2^{m+n}}} + 3j \cdot 2^{-n} + 2 \cdot q_{Q,j+1} \sqrt{\frac{2 \cdot (j+1)}{2^{m+n}}} \right) \\ &\leq 3q_C^2 \cdot 2^{-n} + \sum_{j=0}^{q_C-1} \left( 2\sqrt{2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q_Q}{2^{m+n}}} + 2 \cdot q_{Q,j+1} \sqrt{\frac{2q_C}{2^{m+n}}} \right) \\ &\leq 3q_C^2 \cdot 2^{-n} + 2^{-(m+n)/2} \cdot \left( 2\sqrt{2}q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + 2\sqrt{2} \cdot q_Q \sqrt{q_C} \right). \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

An easy argument finishes the proof (see [1] for details).  $\square$

We now prove Lemmas 3 and 4.

**Lemma 3.** For  $j = 0, \dots, q_C - 1$ ,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}'_j) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_{j+1}) = 1] \leq 2 \cdot q_{Q,j+1} \sqrt{2 \cdot (j+1)/2^{m+n}},$$

where  $q_{Q,j+1}$  is the expected number of queries  $\mathcal{A}$  makes to  $E$  in the  $(j+1)$ st stage in the ideal world (i.e., in  $\mathbf{H}_{q_C}$ ).

*Proof.* Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a distinguisher between  $\mathbf{H}'_j$  and  $\mathbf{H}_{j+1}$ . We construct from  $\mathcal{A}$  a distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  for the experiment from [Lemma 1](#):

**Phase 1:**  $\mathcal{D}$  samples uniform  $\tilde{E} \in \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n)$  and  $E \in \mathcal{E}(m, n)$ . It then runs  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering its quantum queries using  $E$  and its classical queries using  $\tilde{E}$ , until after it responds to  $\mathcal{A}$ 's  $(j+1)$ st classical query. Let  $T_{j+1} = ((t_1, x_1, y_1, b_1), \dots, (t_{j+1}, x_{j+1}, y_{j+1}, b_{j+1}))$  be the list of input/output pairs  $\mathcal{A}$  received from its classical oracle thus far.  $\mathcal{D}$  defines  $F(a, k^*, x) := E_{k^*}^a(x)$  for  $a \in \{1, -1\}$ . It also defines the following randomized algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$ : sample  $K \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa$  and then compute the set  $B$  of input/output pairs to be reprogrammed so that  $F^{(B)}(a, k^*, x) = (E_{k^*}^{T_{j+1}, K})^a(x)$  for all  $a, k^*, x$ .

**Phase 2:**  $\mathcal{B}$  is run to generate  $B$ , and  $\mathcal{D}$  is given quantum access to an oracle  $F_b$ .  $\mathcal{D}$  resumes running  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering its quantum queries using  $F_b$ . Phase 2 ends when  $\mathcal{A}$  makes its next (i.e.,  $(j+2)$ nd) classical query.

**Phase 3:**  $\mathcal{D}$  is given the randomness used by  $\mathcal{B}$  to generate  $K$ . It resumes running  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering its classical queries using  $\text{TFX}_K[E^{T_{j+1}, K}]$  and its quantum queries using  $E^{T_{j+1}, K}$ . Finally, it outputs whatever  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs.

It is immediate that if  $b = 0$  (i.e.,  $\mathcal{D}$ 's oracle in phase 2 is  $F_0 = F$ ), then  $\mathcal{A}$ 's output is identically distributed to its output in  $\mathbf{H}_{j+1}$ , whereas if  $b = 1$  (i.e.,  $\mathcal{D}$ 's oracle in phase 2 is  $F_1 = F^{(B)}$ ), then  $\mathcal{A}$ 's output is identically distributed to its output in  $\mathbf{H}'_j$ . It follows that  $|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}'_j) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_{j+1}) = 1]|$  is equal to the distinguishing advantage of  $\mathcal{D}$  in the reprogramming experiment of [Lemma 1](#). To bound this quantity, we bound the parameter  $\varepsilon$  and the expected number of queries made by  $\mathcal{D}$  in phase 2 (when  $F = F_0$ .)

The value of  $\varepsilon$  can be bounded using the definition of  $E^{T_{j+1}, K}$  and the fact that  $F^{(B)}(a, k^*, x) = (E_{k^*}^{T_{j+1}, K})^a(x)$ . Fixing  $E$  and  $T_{j+1}$ , the probability that any particular input  $(a, k^*, x)$  is reprogrammed is at most the probability (over  $K$ ) that it is in the set

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} (1, k, x_i \oplus f_1(t_i \oplus k')), (1, k, E_k^{-1}(y_i \oplus f_2(t_i \oplus k'))) \\ (-1, k, E_k(x_i \oplus f_1(t_i \oplus k')), (-1, k, y_i \oplus f_2(t_i \oplus k'))) \end{array} \right\}_{i=1}^{j+1}.$$

Since both  $f_1(t_i \oplus k')$  and  $f_2(t_i \oplus k')$  are uniform (by uniformity of  $f_1, f_2$ ), taking a union bound gives  $\varepsilon \leq 2(j+1)/2^{m+n}$ .

The expected number of queries made by  $\mathcal{D}$  in phase 2 when  $F = F_0$  is equal to the expected number of queries made by  $\mathcal{A}$  in its  $(j+1)$ st stage in  $\mathbf{H}_{j+1}$ . Since  $\mathbf{H}_{j+1}$  and  $\mathbf{H}_{q_E}$  are identical until after the  $(j+1)$ st stage is complete, this is precisely  $q_{Q, j+1}$ .  $\square$

**Lemma 4.** For  $j = 0, \dots, q_C$ ,

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}'_j) = 1]| \leq 2\sqrt{2} \cdot \sqrt{\frac{q_Q}{2^{(m+n)}}} + \frac{3j}{2^n}.$$

*Proof.* We first introduce additional experiments  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$  and  $\mathbf{H}_j^{**}$ .

**Experiment  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$ .** Sample uniform  $\tilde{E} \in \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n)$  and  $E \in \mathcal{E}(m, n)$ , and uniform  $K = (k, k') \in \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^\kappa$ . Then

1. Run  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering its classical queries using  $\tilde{E}$  and its quantum queries using  $E$ , until  $\mathcal{A}$  makes its  $(j+1)$ st classical query  $(t_{j+1}, x_{j+1}, b_{j+1} = 0)$ , which we assume for concreteness to be in the forward direction.<sup>2</sup>
2. Choose uniform  $s \in \{0, 1\}^n$ , and define  $E^{(1)}$  as

$$E_{k^*}^{(1)}(x) = \begin{cases} E_{k^*}(x) & \text{if } k^* \neq k \\ \left( E_k \circ \text{swap}_{f_1(t_{j+1}, k') \oplus x_{j+1}, s} \right)(x) & \text{if } k^* = k. \end{cases}$$

Continue running  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering its remaining classical queries (including the  $(j+1)$ st) using  $\text{TFX}_K[(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K}]$ , and its quantum queries using  $(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K}$ .

Experiment  $\mathbf{H}_j^{**}$  is the same as  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$ , except that the  $(j+1)$ st query is answered using  $\tilde{E}$ . Thus we can write  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$  and  $\mathbf{H}_j^{**}$  as the following oracle sequences:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{H}_j^* &: E, \tilde{E}, E, \dots, \tilde{E}, E, \quad \text{TFX}_K[(E^{(1)})^j], (E^{(1)})^j, \dots, \text{TFX}_K[(E^{(1)})^j], (E^{(1)})^j \\ \mathbf{H}_j^{**} &: \underbrace{E, \tilde{E}, E, \dots, \tilde{E}, E}_{j \text{ classical queries}}, \quad \underbrace{\tilde{E}, (E^{(1)})^j, \dots, \text{TFX}_K[(E^{(1)})^j], (E^{(1)})^j}_{q_C - j \text{ classical queries}} \end{aligned}$$

where, recall, we let  $(E^{(1)})^j$  denote  $(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K}$ . We have

$$\begin{aligned} |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}'_j) = 1]| &\leq |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j^*) = 1]| \\ &\quad + |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j^*) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j^{**}) = 1]| \\ &\quad + |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j^{**}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}'_j) = 1]|, \end{aligned}$$

and we now bound the three differences on the right-hand side.

Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a distinguisher between  $\mathbf{H}_j$  and  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$ . We construct from  $\mathcal{A}$  a distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  for the resampling experiment of [Lemma 2](#). Fix  $D$  to be the uniform distribution over  $\{0, 1\}^{m+n}$  (so  $\varepsilon = 2^{-(m+n)}$  in [Lemma 2](#)).  $\mathcal{D}$  does:

**Phase 1:**  $\mathcal{D}$  is given quantum access to an ideal cipher  $E$ . It samples a uniform  $\tilde{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n)$  and then runs  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering its quantum queries with  $E$  and its classical queries with  $\tilde{E}$  (in the appropriate directions), until  $\mathcal{A}$  submits its  $(j+1)$ st classical query  $(t_{j+1}, x_{j+1}, b_{j+1} = 0)$ . At that point,  $\mathcal{D}$  has a list  $T_j = ((t_1, x_1, y_1, b_1), \dots, (t_j, x_j, y_j, b_j))$  of the queries/answers  $\mathcal{A}$  has made to its classical oracle thus far.

**Phase 2:**  $\mathcal{D}$  is given uniform  $s_0, s_1 \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $k \in \{0, 1\}^m$ , and quantum oracle access to a cipher  $E^{(b)}$ .  $\mathcal{D}$  samples a uniform  $k' \in \{0, 1\}^n$  conditioned on  $f_1(t_{j+1}, k') = s_0 \oplus x_{j+1}$  (at least one such  $k'$  must exist since  $f_1$  is surjective) and sets  $K := (k, k')$ . It then continues running  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering its remaining classical queries (including the  $(j+1)$ st) using  $\text{TFX}_K[(E^{(b)})^{T_j, K}]$ , and its remaining quantum queries using  $(E^{(b)})^{T_j, K}$ .  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs whatever  $\mathcal{A}$  does.

Note that in phase 1, distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  perfectly simulates experiments  $\mathbf{H}_j$  and  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$  for  $\mathcal{A}$  until the point where  $\mathcal{A}$  makes its  $(j+1)$ st classical query. If  $b = 0$ ,

<sup>2</sup> As in [1], the case of an inverse query is entirely symmetric.

$\mathcal{D}$  gets access to  $E^{(0)} = E$  in phase 2. Since  $\mathcal{D}$  answers all quantum queries using  $(E^{(0)})^{T_j, K}$  and all classical queries using  $\text{TFX}_K[(E^{(0)})^{T_j, K}]$ , we see that  $\mathcal{D}$  perfectly simulates  $\mathbf{H}_j$  for  $\mathcal{A}$  in that case. If, on the other hand,  $b = 1$  in phase 2, then  $\mathcal{D}$  gets access to  $E^{(1)}$ , where

$$E_{k^*}^{(1)}(x) = \begin{cases} E_{k^*}(x) & \text{if } k^* \neq k \\ E_k \circ \text{swap}_{s_0, s_1}(x) & \text{if } k^* = k. \end{cases}$$

Since  $f_1(t_{j+1}, k') := s_0 \oplus x_{j+1}$ , it holds that

$$E_{k^*}^{(1)}(x) = \begin{cases} E_{k^*}(x) & \text{if } k^* \neq k \\ E_k \circ \text{swap}_{f_1(t_{j+1}, k') \oplus x_{j+1}, s_1}(x) & \text{if } k^* = k. \end{cases}$$

Moreover, the uniformity property of  $f_1$  and the fact that  $s_0$  (and hence  $s_0 \oplus x_{j+1}$ ) is uniform imply that the joint distribution of  $k'$  and  $s_0 \oplus x_{j+1}$  is equal to the joint distribution of  $\tilde{k}$  and  $f_1(t_{j+1}, \tilde{k})$  for a uniform  $\tilde{k}$ . Thus, in this case  $\mathcal{D}$  perfectly simulates  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$  for  $\mathcal{A}$ . Applying [Lemma 2](#) thus gives

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j^*) = 1]| \leq 2\sqrt{2q_Q \cdot \varepsilon} \leq 2\sqrt{\frac{2q_Q}{2^{n+m}}}. \quad (3)$$

Next, we bound the distinguishability of  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$  and  $\mathbf{H}_j^{**}$ . Recall they differ in that in  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$  the  $(j+1)$ st query is answered with  $\text{TFX}_K[(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K}](x_{j+1})$ , whereas in  $\mathbf{H}_j^{**}$  that query is answered with  $\tilde{E}_{t_{j+1}}(x_{j+1})$ . In  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$  we have

$$\begin{aligned} y_{j+1} &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{TFX}_K[(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K}](t_{j+1}, x_{j+1}) \\ &= (E_k^{(1)})^{T_j, K}(x_{j+1} \oplus f_1(t_{j+1}, k')) \oplus f_2(t_{j+1}, k') \\ &= E_k^{T_j, K}(s) \oplus f_2(t_{j+1}, k'); \end{aligned}$$

uniformity of  $f_2$  implies that  $y_{j+1}$  is uniform. This is not identical to the distribution of  $y_{j+1}$  in  $\mathbf{H}_j^{**}$ , which is uniform subject to the constraint that  $\tilde{E}_{t_{j+1}}$  is a permutation. Define the set  $\mathcal{Y}_{j+1} = \{y_i \mid t_i = t_{j+1}\}$ , i.e., these are the outputs of  $\tilde{E}$  that  $\mathcal{A}$  received for the same tweak  $t_{j+1}$  used in the  $(j+1)$ st query. Bounding the probability that  $y_{j+1} \in \mathcal{Y}_{j+1}$  when  $y_{j+1}$  is uniform gives an upper bound on the probability with which  $\mathcal{A}$  can distinguish  $\mathbf{H}_j^*$  and  $\mathbf{H}_j^{**}$ . Thus,

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j^*) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j^{**}) = 1]| \leq \frac{|\mathcal{Y}_{j+1}|}{2^n} \leq \frac{j}{2^n}. \quad (4)$$

Finally, we bound the distinguishability of  $\mathbf{H}_j^{**}$  and  $\mathbf{H}_j'$ . Recall that the difference between these experiments is that from the  $(j+1)$ st query onward the former uses  $(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K}$  while the latter uses  $E^{T_{j+1}, K}$  (both for the quantum queries of  $\mathcal{A}$  and to instantiate  $\text{TFX}$  for the classical queries of  $\mathcal{A}$ ). It follows that the two experiments are identical if  $(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K}$  and  $E^{T_{j+1}, K}$  are equal. In what follows we bound the probability that they are not equal.

Both  $(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K}$  and  $E^{T_{j+1}, K}$  involve  $j+1$  swaps:  $(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K}$  involves  $j$  swaps from the first  $j$  queries plus the extra swap by the definition of  $E^{(1)}$  (i.e.,  $f_1(t_{j+1}, k') \oplus x_{j+1}$  and  $s$  are swapped), whereas  $E^{T_{j+1}, K}$  induces  $j+1$  swaps from the first  $j+1$  queries. Since the  $(j+1)$ st query is a forward query, we have

$$(E_{k^*}^{(1)})^{T_j, K}(x) = \begin{cases} E_{k^*}(x) & k^* \neq k \\ \overleftarrow{S}_{T_j, E^{(1)}, K} \circ \overrightarrow{S}_{T_j, E^{(1)}, K} \circ E_k^{(1)}(x) & k^* = k. \end{cases} \quad (5)$$

Comparing Equations (1) and (5), we see that  $(E^{(1)})^{T_j, K} = E^{T_{j+1}, K}$  for all  $k^* \neq k$ . So we only need to consider  $k^* = k$ , in which case

$$(E_k^{(1)})^{T_j, K}(x) = \overleftarrow{S}_{T_j, E^{(1)}, K} \circ \overrightarrow{S}_{T_j, E^{(1)}, K} \circ E_k^{(1)}(x)$$

and

$$(E_k)^{T_{j+1}, K}(x) = \overleftarrow{S}_{T_{j+1}, E, K} \circ \overrightarrow{S}_{T_{j+1}, E, K} \circ E_k(x).$$

Set  $\mathcal{X} = \{x_1 \oplus f_1(t_1, k'), \dots, x_j \oplus f_1(t_j, k')\}$ , and let  $\mathbf{Bad}_0$  be the event that  $x_{j+1} \oplus f_1(t_{j+1}, k') \in \mathcal{X}$  and  $\mathbf{Bad}_1$  be the event that  $s \in \mathcal{X}$ . We first bound the probabilities of these events, and then show that  $(E_k^{(1)})^{T_j, K} = E_k^{T_{j+1}, K}$  when neither  $\mathbf{Bad}_0$  nor  $\mathbf{Bad}_1$  occurs.

Since  $s$  is uniform and independent of everything else, it is immediate that  $\Pr[\mathbf{Bad}_1] \leq j/2^n$ . We continue with bounding the probability of  $\mathbf{Bad}_0$ , which is more complex since we have to consider the tweaks from the first  $j+1$  queries of  $\mathcal{A}$ . Intuitively, when considering a query whose tweak was the same as  $t_{j+1}$ , we rely on the assumption that  $\mathcal{A}$  does not repeat queries; for queries where the tweaks are different, we use the XOR-uniformity property of  $f_1, f_2$ . We start by introducing the two sets

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{X}^= &= \{x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k') \mid 1 \leq i \leq j, t_i = t_{j+1}\} \\ \mathcal{X}^\neq &= \{x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k') \mid 1 \leq i \leq j, t_i \neq t_{j+1}\}. \end{aligned}$$

These partition  $\mathcal{X}$  into inputs using the same tweak as the  $(j+1)$ st query ( $\mathcal{X}^=$ ) and those using a different tweak ( $\mathcal{X}^\neq$ ). Hence,

$$\Pr[\mathbf{Bad}_0] = \Pr[\mathbf{Bad}_0^=] + \Pr[\mathbf{Bad}_0^\neq],$$

where  $\mathbf{Bad}_0^=$  is the event that  $x_{j+1} \oplus f_1(t_{j+1}, k') \in \mathcal{X}^=$  and  $\mathbf{Bad}_0^\neq$  is the event that  $x_{j+1} \oplus f_1(t_{j+1}, k') \in \mathcal{X}^\neq$ . For  $\mathbf{Bad}_0^=$ , we have

$$\begin{aligned} x_{j+1} \oplus f_1(t_{j+1}, k') &\in \{x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k') \mid t_i = t_{j+1}\} \\ \Leftrightarrow x_{j+1} &\in \{x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k') \oplus f_1(t_{j+1}, k') \mid t_i = t_{j+1}\} \\ \Leftrightarrow x_{j+1} &\in \{x_i \mid t_i = t_{j+1}\}, \end{aligned}$$

i.e., event  $\mathbf{Bad}_0^=$  is equivalent to  $x_{j+1} \in \{x_i \mid t_i = t_{j+1}\}$ . Since  $\mathcal{A}$  does not repeat queries, this means  $\Pr[\mathbf{Bad}_0^=] = 0$ . For  $\mathbf{Bad}_0^\neq$ , rewriting yields

$$\begin{aligned} x_{j+1} \oplus f_1(t_{j+1}, k') &\in \{x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k') \mid t_i \neq t_{j+1}\} \\ \Leftrightarrow x_{j+1} &\in \{x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k') \oplus f_1(t_{j+1}, k') \mid t_i \neq t_{j+1}\}. \end{aligned}$$

XOR-uniformity property of  $f_1$  implies that every element in the set above is uniformly distributed, hence  $\Pr[\text{Bad}_0^\neq] \leq |\mathcal{X}^\neq|/2^n \leq j/2^n$ . Summarizing,

$$\Pr[\text{Bad}_0] = \Pr[\text{Bad}_0^\bar{=}] + \Pr[\text{Bad}_0^\neq] \leq 0 + \frac{|\mathcal{X}^\neq|}{2^n} \leq \frac{j}{2^n}.$$

If neither  $\text{Bad}_0$  or  $\text{Bad}_1$  happens, then  $E_k^{(1)}(x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k')) = E_k(x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k'))$  for every  $1 \leq i \leq j$ . Given that, we have

$$\begin{aligned} \vec{S}_{T_j, E^{(1)}, K} &= \prod_{i=1}^j \text{swap}_{E_k^{(1)}(x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k')), y_i \oplus f_2(t_i, k')}^{1-b_i} \\ &= \prod_{i=1}^j \text{swap}_{E_k(x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k')), y_i \oplus f_2(t_i, k')}^{1-b_i} = \vec{S}_{T_j, E, K} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \overleftarrow{S}_{T_j, E^{(1)}, K} &= \prod_{i=j}^1 \text{swap}_{E_k^{(1)}(x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k')), y_i \oplus f_2(t_i, k')}^{b_i} \\ &= \prod_{i=j}^1 \text{swap}_{E_k(x_i \oplus f_1(t_i, k')), y_i \oplus f_2(t_i, k')}^{b_i} = \overleftarrow{S}_{T_j, E, K}. \end{aligned}$$

Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} (E_k^{(1)})^{T_j, K}(x) &= \overleftarrow{S}_{j, E^{(1)}, K} \circ \vec{S}_{j, E^{(1)}, K} \circ E_k^{(1)}(x) \\ &= \overleftarrow{S}_{j, E, K} \circ \vec{S}_{j, E, K} \circ \text{swap}_{E_k(f_1(t_{j+1}, k') \oplus x_{j+1}), y_{j+1} \oplus f_2(t_{j+1}, k')} \circ E_k(x) \\ &= \overleftarrow{S}_{j+1, E, K} \circ \vec{S}_{j+1, E, K} \circ E_k(x) = E_k^{T_{j+1}, K}. \end{aligned}$$

Putting everything together, we conclude that

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j^{**}) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_j) = 1]| \leq \Pr[\text{Bad}_0] + \Pr[\text{Bad}_1] \leq \frac{2j}{2^n}. \quad (6)$$

Combining Equations (3), (4), and (6) concludes the proof.  $\square$

## 4 Applications of Our Result

In this section we show how [Theorem 1](#) can be used to prove post-quantum security of the FX construction, the message authentication code Chaskey, and variants of the authenticated encryption schemes Elephant and Minalpher.

### 4.1 The FX Construction

The FX construction [11] provides a mechanism for extending the key length of a cipher. Given a block cipher  $E : \{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ , the FX construction yields a new block cipher  $\text{FX} : (\{0, 1\}^m \times \{0, 1\}^{2n}) \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  via

$$\text{FX}_{k, k_1, k_2}(x) = E_k(x \oplus k_1) \oplus k_2.$$

The FX construction is a special case of the TFX construction where  $\kappa = 2n$ ,  $\mathcal{T} = \emptyset$ ,  $f_1(k_1, k_2) = k_1$ , and  $f_2(k_1, k_2) = k_2$ . It is easy to verify that  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  are proper: they clearly satisfy uniformity, and XOR-uniformity is satisfied vacuously since  $\mathcal{T} = \emptyset$ . Specializing [Theorem 1](#) to this case thus yields the following:

**Theorem 2.** *Let FX be as above and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary making  $q_C$  classical queries to its first oracle and  $q_Q$  quantum queries to its second oracle. Then*

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m; k_1, k_2 \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n, \\ E \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(m,n)}} [\mathcal{A}^{\text{FX}_{k,k_1,k_2,E}} = 1] - \Pr_{\substack{P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n); \\ E \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(m,n)}} [\mathcal{A}^{P,E} = 1] \right| \leq (3 + 2\sqrt{2}) \cdot 2^{-(m+n)/2} (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}).$$

The above solves a problem left open by Jaeger et al. [9], who prove a similar result about security of the FX construction but only for non-adaptive attackers.

## 4.2 (A variant of) Elephant

Elephant is a lightweight authenticated encryption scheme (with associated data) under consideration for standardization by NIST [2]. It is based on a tweakable block cipher that we denote here by  $\tilde{E}$ , which is in turn constructed from a specified public permutation  $P$ . Prior work [2] proves—in the purely classical setting—that Elephant is a secure authenticated encryption scheme if  $\tilde{E}$  is a secure tweakable block cipher, and that  $\tilde{E}$  is a secure tweakable block cipher if  $P$  is modeled as a public random permutation. It is straightforward to verify that this proof carries over to the setting of quantum adversaries with classical access to Elephant, provided that  $\tilde{E}$  is post-quantum secure.

The tweakable block cipher  $\tilde{E} : \{0, 1\}^{n-s} \times \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  used by Elephant is defined as

$$\tilde{E}(t, x) = P(x \oplus f(t, P(k||0^{n-s}))) \oplus f(t, P(k||0^{n-s})),$$

where  $f : \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is a function that is proper with respect to  $\mathcal{T}$ . The particular structure of  $\mathcal{T}$  is not relevant for us. We are unable to analyze  $\tilde{E}$  directly with our main result, as it uses  $P$  both to define an Even-Mansour cipher as well as for expansion of  $k$ .<sup>3</sup> Instead, we consider the simplified tweakable block cipher  $\tilde{E}' : \{0, 1\}^n \times \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  defined as

$$\tilde{E}'_k(t, x) = P(x \oplus f(t, k)) \oplus f(t, k).$$

This amounts to replacing  $P(k||0^{n-m})$  with a uniform  $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ . Since a public random permutation is equivalent to a degenerate ideal cipher that takes no key, post-quantum security of  $\tilde{E}'$  follows directly from [Theorem 1](#):

<sup>3</sup> In [Section 4.5](#) we also consider a closer version using a key expansion mechanism.

**Theorem 3.** Let  $\tilde{E}'$  be as above and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary making  $q_C$  classical queries to its first oracle and  $q_Q \geq 1$  quantum queries to its second oracle. Then

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E}'_{k,P}} = 1] - \Pr_{\substack{\tilde{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T},n) \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E},P} = 1] \right| \leq (3 + 2\sqrt{2}) \cdot 2^{-n/2} (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}).$$

As discussed earlier, the above theorem in combination with [2, Theorem B.3] implies post-quantum security (in the public random permutation model) of the variant of Elephant which uses  $\tilde{E}'$  in place of  $\tilde{E}$ .

### 4.3 Chaskey

Chaskey [15], a lightweight MAC that is an ISO standard, is constructed from a specified permutation  $P : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ . Define  $F_{k,k'}(x) = P(x \oplus k) \oplus k'$ ; this is just an Even-Mansour cipher based on  $P$ . Evaluating Chaskey using key  $k$  involves evaluating  $F_{k,k}$ ,  $F_{k \oplus k_1, k_1}$ , and  $F_{k \oplus k_2, k_2}$ , where  $k_1 = 2k$ ,  $k_2 = 4k$ , and multiplication is in the field  $GF(2^n)$  with respect to a particular representation of field elements as  $n$ -bit strings. Prior work [15] shows that Chaskey is secure if these three instances of  $F$  are indistinguishable from three independent random permutations—a notion called *3PRP security*—and also proves 3PRP security of  $F$  when  $P$  is modeled as a public random permutation. Although this prior work considered classical adversaries only, it is not hard to verify that the proofs carry through to imply security of Chaskey against quantum adversaries making classical MAC queries so long as 3PRP security of  $F$  holds against adversaries making classical queries to the secretly keyed ciphers and quantum queries to  $P$ .

Theorem 1 readily implies 3PRP security of  $F$  in the post-quantum setting:

**Theorem 4.** Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a quantum algorithm making  $q_C$  classical queries to its first three oracles and  $q_Q \geq 1$  quantum queries to its fourth oracle. Then

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{F_{k,k}, F_{k \oplus k_1, k_1}, F_{k \oplus k_2, k_2}, P} = 1] - \Pr_{R_1, R_2, R_3, P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)} [\mathcal{A}^{R_1, R_2, R_3, P} = 1] \right| \leq (3 + 2\sqrt{2}) \cdot 2^{-n/2} (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}),$$

where  $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$  is uniform,  $k_1 = 2k$ , and  $k_2 = 4k$ .

*Proof.* A public random permutation  $P$  is equivalent to a degenerate ideal cipher that takes no key (i.e., with  $m = 0$ ). Letting  $\mathcal{T} = \{0, 1, 2\} \subset GF(2^n)$  and defining  $f_1(t, k) = k \oplus (2tk)$  and  $f_2(t, k) = 2^t \cdot k$ , we see that

$$\begin{aligned} \text{TFX}_k^{f_1, f_2}[P](0, x) &= P(x \oplus k) \oplus k = F_{k,k}(x) \\ \text{TFX}_k^{f_1, f_2}[P](1, x) &= P(x \oplus k \oplus 2k) \oplus 2k = F_{k \oplus k_1, k_1}(x) \\ \text{TFX}_k^{f_1, f_2}[P](2, x) &= P(x \oplus k \oplus 4k) \oplus 4k = F_{k \oplus k_2, k_2}(x). \end{aligned}$$



The theorem thus follows from [Theorem 1](#) once we verify that  $f_1, f_2$  satisfy the required properties. Uniformity of  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  follow readily from invertibility of non-zero elements in  $GF(2^n)$ . Finally, note that

$$f_1(t, k) \oplus f_1(t', k) = 2 \cdot (t \oplus t') \cdot k \text{ and } f_2(t, k) \oplus f_2(t', k) = (2^t \oplus 2^{t'}) \cdot k,$$

with  $t \oplus t'$  and  $2^t \oplus 2^{t'}$  non-zero for distinct  $t, t'$ ; XOR-uniformity follows. This concludes the proof of the theorem.  $\square$

As discussed earlier, the above theorem in combination with prior results [[15](#), [Theorem 1,2](#)] implies post-quantum security of Chaskey (in the public random permutation model).

#### 4.4 (A variant of) Minalpher

Minalpher is an authenticated encryption scheme with associated data (AEAD), which was a second-round candidate in the CAESAR competition [[16](#)]. The mode of Minalpher is a nonce-based encrypt-then-MAC construction based on a single-round tweakable Even-Mansour cipher  $\tilde{E}$ , which is constructed from a specified permutation  $P$ . Prior work in the purely classical setting [[16](#)] first proves that  $\tilde{E}$  is a secure tweakable block cipher when  $P$  is a public random permutation, and then proves that, as a consequence, Minalpher is a secure AEAD scheme. Just as with Elephant in [Section 4.2](#), the latter step easily translates to the post-quantum (i.e., Q1) setting. It thus remains to show that  $\tilde{E}$  is secure in this model.

We first recall the tweak function of Minalpher. Let  $n$  and  $s$  be positive integers such that  $n/2 - s \geq 1$ , and  $d_1$  and  $d_2$  be two integers. Define the tweak space  $\mathcal{T}$  as follows.

$$\mathcal{T} = \{t = (\text{flag}, N, i, j) \in \{0, 1\}^s \times \{0, 1\}^{n/2-s} \times \mathbb{Z}_{d_1} \times \mathbb{Z}_{d_2}\}. \quad (7)$$

The flags are specific bit strings of length  $s$  which specify whether the tweaked cipher will be used to process message blocks or associated data blocks.<sup>4</sup> Minalpher imposes some restrictions on the tweak space in order to prevent trivial attacks. Specifically, we require that the following conditions hold over  $GF(2^n)$ :

- $y^i(y+1)^j \neq 1$
- $y^i(y+1)^j \neq y^{i'}(y+1)^{j'}$  for any distinct  $(i, j)$  and  $(i', j')$ .

The tweak function  $L : \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is then defined as

$$L(t) = y^i(y+1)^j(k \parallel \text{flag} \parallel N) \oplus P(k \parallel \text{flag} \parallel N)$$

Then the tweakable block cipher  $\tilde{E} : \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \times \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  used by Minalpher is defined as

$$\tilde{E}_k(t, x) = P(x \oplus L(t, k)) \oplus L(t, k).$$

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<sup>4</sup> There is also a flag for the MAC mode for Minalpher, but we are mainly interested in the mode for authenticated encryption.

Note that **Minalpher** uses  $P$  both to define the tweakable block cipher as well as for expanding the key to match the block length, just as with **Elephant**. Therefore, we are also unable to analyze  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}$  using our main result.<sup>5</sup> Another problem is that **Minalpher** pads the key with a flag and the nonce—which are both part of the tweak—while **Elephant** pads the key with 0s. This prevents us from simply setting the key length to  $n$ , as the flag and nonce have to affect the tweaked keys.

To arrive at an (arguably nearby) variant of **Minalpher** for which we can prove quantum security, we modify the tweak function as follows. First, we increase the length of  $k$  to  $n$ . Second, we set  $\mathbf{flag}||N$  to be  $n$  bits and replace the permutation  $P$  with a multiplication over  $GF(2^n)$ . This requires a slight change to the restrictions that **Minalpher** imposes on  $i$  and  $j$ . More precisely, we consider a new tweak space  $\mathcal{T}' = \{t = (\mathbf{flag}, N, i, j) \in \{0, 1\}^s \times \{0, 1\}^{n-s} \times \mathbb{Z}_{d_1} \times \mathbb{Z}_{d_2}\}$ . Let  $y \in GF(2^n)$  such that

- $y^i(y+1)^j(\mathbf{flag}||N) \neq 1$
- $y^i(y+1)^j(\mathbf{flag}||N) \neq y^{i'}(y+1)^{j'}(\mathbf{flag}'||N')$  for  $(\mathbf{flag}, N, i, j) \neq (\mathbf{flag}', N', i', j')$ .

Let the new tweak function  $L' : \mathcal{T}' \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  be defined as

$$L'(t, k) = y^i(y+1)^j(\mathbf{flag}||N)k.$$

Let  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'$  be the simplified tweakable block cipher using tweak function  $L'$ , i.e.,

$$\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k(t, x) = P(x \oplus L'(t, k)) \oplus L'(t, k).$$

Note that  $y^i(y+1)^j(\mathbf{flag}||N)$  is the multiplications of points in  $GF(2^n)$  with an irreducible polynomial. Then we can prove the post-quantum security of  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'$ .

**Theorem 5.** *Let  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'$  be as above and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary making  $q_C$  classical queries to its first oracle and  $q_Q \geq 1$  quantum queries to its second oracle. Then*

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n; \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k, P} = 1] - \Pr_{\substack{\bar{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n); \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\bar{E}, P} = 1] \right| \leq (3 + 2\sqrt{2}) \cdot 2^{-n/2} (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}).$$

*Proof.* The proof follows from [Theorem 1](#) but we have to prove that the tweak function  $L'$  is proper according to [Definition 1](#). First, uniformity of  $L'$  follows from the invertibility of non-zero elements in  $GF(2^n)$ . Next, note that for any different tweaks  $t = (\mathbf{flag}, N, i, j)$  and  $t' = (\mathbf{flag}', N', i', j')$ , we have

$$L'(t, k) \oplus L'(t', k) = (y^i(y+1)^j(\mathbf{flag}||N)y^{i'}(y+1)^{j'}(\mathbf{flag}'||N')) \oplus k$$

Since  $y^i(y+1)^j(\mathbf{flag}||N) \neq y^{i'}(y+1)^{j'}(\mathbf{flag}'||N')$ , the XOR-uniformity follows. This concludes the proof of the theorem.  $\square$

As discussed earlier, the above theorem with [[16](#), Theorem 1-4] implies the post-quantum security of the variant of **Minalpher** which uses  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'$  (including the modified tweak function  $L'$ ) instead of  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}$ .

<sup>5</sup> In [Section 4.5](#) we consider a version deploying a key expansion mechanism.

## 4.5 Dealing with Key Expansion

In [Section 4.2](#) and [Section 4.4](#), we showed security for simplified variants of Elephant and Minalpher. Unlike the original schemes, these variants did not use any key expansion.

We now show that, if we use a slight variant of the key expansion mechanisms of the original schemes, we can still establish post-quantum security. To this end, we first prove that the function

$$F(k) = k||0^s + P(k||0^s) \quad (8)$$

is a pseudorandom generator against adversaries with quantum access to  $P$  and  $P^{-1}$ . We then use this result to update our results in , proving the post-quantum security of Elephant and Minalpher with  $F$  as the key expansion function.

**Lemma 5.** *For any quantum algorithm  $\mathcal{A}$  making at most  $q$  quantum queries, we have*

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{r \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}} [\mathcal{A}^P(r) = 1] - \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-s} \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}} [\mathcal{A}^P(k||0^s \oplus P(k||0^s)) = 1] \right| \leq 4q \cdot \sqrt{2^{s-n}}.$$

*Proof.* Given an adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  as above, we construct a distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  for the arbitrary reprogramming experiment from [Lemma 1](#):

**Phase 1:**  $\mathcal{D}$  samples a uniform permutation  $P \in \mathcal{P}_n$  and a uniform  $r \in \{0,1\}^n$ , and defines a randomized algorithm  $\mathcal{B}$  which proceeds as follows:

1. sample  $k \in \{0,1\}^{n-s}$ ;
2. output a set of reprogramming pairs  $B$  so that  $P$  blinded with  $B$  is  $P^{(B)}(x) = P \circ \text{swap}_{P^{-1}(k||0^s \oplus r), k||0^s}$ .

Then  $\mathcal{D}$  sends  $P$ ,  $r$ , and  $\mathcal{B}$  to the challenger.

**Phase 2:** The challenger samples  $k \in \{0,1\}^{n-s}$ , runs  $\mathcal{B}$  with  $k$  and  $r$  to compute  $B$ . Then the challenger samples a uniform bit  $b \in \{0,1\}$ , sets  $P_0 = P$  and  $P_1 = P^{(B)}$ , and gives  $\mathcal{D}$  access to  $P_b$  (as an oracle with a control bit that determines whether the query to  $P_b$  is in the forward or the inverse direction.)  $\mathcal{D}$  runs  $\mathcal{A}$  with input  $r$  and oracle  $P_b$ . This phase ends when  $\mathcal{A}$  has made its last query and outputs its guess.

**Phase 3:**  $\mathcal{D}$  outputs what  $\mathcal{A}$  outputs.

Note that there are four reprogramming points. By construction, for all triples  $(P, r, x)$ , it holds that  $\Pr_{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-s}} [x \in B_1] \leq 4 \cdot 2^{s-n}$ . By [Lemma 1](#),

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{D} \text{ outputs } 1 \mid b = 0] - \Pr[\mathcal{D} \text{ outputs } 1 \mid b = 1]| \leq 4q \cdot \sqrt{2^{s-n}}. \quad (9)$$

Now consider the distinguisher  $\mathcal{D}$  in the two cases  $b = 0$  and  $b = 1$ . When  $b = 0$ ,  $\mathcal{D}$  simply runs  $\mathcal{A}^P(r)$  for uniform  $r$ .

When  $b = 1$ ,  $\mathcal{D}$  runs  $\mathcal{A}^{P_1}(r)$  for uniform  $r$ . Since  $P$  is uniformly random, so is  $P_1$ . The relationship between the oracle and the input is given by

$$P_1(k||0^s) \oplus k||0^s = P(P^{-1}(k||0^s \oplus r)) \oplus k||0^s = k||0^s \oplus r \oplus k||0^s = r$$

for a uniformly random  $k \in \{0, 1\}^{n-s}$ .

Next, we'll prove that  $P_1$  is a random permutation conditioned on  $P_1(k||0^s) = r \oplus k||0^s$ . To prove this, given two unique sets  $X = \{x_1, \dots, x_l\}$  and  $Y = \{y_1, \dots, y_l\}$  in  $\{0, 1\}^n$  with the condition that  $x_i \neq k||0^s$  and  $y_i \neq r \oplus k||0^s$  for all  $i \in [1, l]$ . Let  $L = \{(x_1, y_1), \dots, (x_l, y_l)\}$  be the set of  $l$  input-output pairs in  $\{0, 1\}^n$ . Then we will prove the following

$$\Pr[P_1(x_i) = y_i, i = 1, \dots, l] = \frac{1}{(2^n - 1) \dots (2^n - l)}.$$

Let

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{A} &= \Pr[P^{-1}(k||0^s \oplus r) \notin X] \Pr[P_1(x_1) = y_1, i = 1, \dots, l | P^{-1}(k||0^s \oplus r) \notin X] \\ &= \frac{2^n - l}{2^n} \frac{1}{(2^n - 1) \dots (2^n - l)} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbf{B} &= \sum_{j=1}^l \Pr[P^{-1}(k||0^s \oplus r) = x_j] \Pr[P(k||0^s) = y_j, P_1(x_i) = y_i, i \neq j \\ &\quad | P^{-1}(k||0^s \oplus r) = x_j] \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^l \frac{1}{2^n} \frac{1}{(2^n - 1) \dots (2^n - l)} = \frac{l}{2^n} \frac{1}{(2^n - 1) \dots (2^n - l)}. \end{aligned}$$

Then we have

$$\Pr[P_1(x_i) = y_i, i = 1, \dots, l] = \mathbf{A} + \mathbf{B} = \frac{1}{(2^n - 1) \dots (2^n - l)}. \quad (10)$$

Equation (10) shows that the distribution of  $P_1$  is uniform, conditioned on  $P_1(k||0^s) = r \oplus k||0^s$ . It follows that the  $b = 1$  case is identical to an execution of  $\mathcal{A}^P(k||0^s \oplus P(k||0^s))$ . The result then follows directly from Equation (9).  $\square$

**Key Expansion Block Cipher.** Consider the following “key expansion” tweakable block cipher, where the key is constructed from a shorter key via the key expansion function  $F$  from Eq. (8).

$$\begin{aligned} \tilde{\mathbf{E}}' &: \{0, 1\}^{n-s} \times \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n \\ \tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k(t, x) &= P(x \oplus f(t, F(k))) \oplus f(t, F(k)) \end{aligned}$$

As before, it is important that the tweak function  $f$  is proper, as defined in [Definiton 1](#)). We now show that this cipher is secure in the post-quantum security model.

**Theorem 6.** Let  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'$  be the cipher above, and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary making  $q_C$  classical queries to its first oracle and  $q_Q$  quantum queries to its second oracle. Then

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-s}; \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k, P} = 1] - \Pr_{\substack{\tilde{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n); \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E}, P} = 1] \right| \leq 4(q_Q + q_C) \cdot \sqrt{2^{s-n}} + (3 + 2\sqrt{2}) \cdot 2^{-n/2} (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}).$$

*Proof.* The proof proceeds via a sequence of three hybrids  $\mathbf{H}_0$ ,  $\mathbf{H}_1$ , and  $\mathbf{H}_2$ . In hybrid  $\mathbf{H}_0$  the adversary  $\mathcal{A}$  gets access to  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k, P$ , where  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'$  is the cipher described above (using  $F$  for key expansion), with  $k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-s}$ , and  $P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)$ . This yields

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_0) = 1] = \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-s}; \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k, P} = 1]. \quad (11)$$

Hybrid  $\mathbf{H}_1$  is the same, except that  $k$  is chosen uniformly at random from  $\{0,1\}^n$ , instead of choosing it from  $\{0,1\}^{n-s}$  and expanding it via the expansion function  $F$ . In this case we have the tweakable block cipher  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}''_k$ , where  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}''_k(t, x) = P(x \oplus f(t, k)) \oplus f(t, k)$  with  $k \in \{0,1\}^n$ , and

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_1) = 1] = \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^n; \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{\mathbf{E}}''_k, P} = 1],$$

Hybrid  $\mathbf{H}_2$  is equal to hybrid  $\mathbf{H}_1$ , except that we replace  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}''$  with an ideal tweakable cipher  $\tilde{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n)$ . It holds that

$$\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_2) = 1] = \Pr_{\substack{\tilde{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n); \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E}, P} = 1].$$

In particular, we get

$$\begin{aligned} & \left| \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n-s}; \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k, P} = 1] - \Pr_{\substack{\tilde{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n); \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E}, P} = 1] \right| \\ &= |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_2) = 1]| \\ &\leq |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_1) = 1]| \\ &\quad + |\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_1) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_2) = 1]| \end{aligned}$$

To bound the difference between  $\mathbf{H}_0$  and  $\mathbf{H}_1$ , we construct an adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{prg}$  against [Lemma 5](#) using  $\mathcal{A}$ . Adversary  $\mathcal{A}_{prg}$  receives oracle access to a random permutation  $P$  and an input  $k'$  which is either a uniformly random value from  $\{0,1\}^n$  or  $k||0^s \oplus P(k||0^s)$  for  $k \leftarrow_s \{0,1\}^{n-s}$ . It runs  $\mathcal{A}$ , answering any queries

to  $P$  using its own oracle. For any cipher query by  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}_{prg}$  uses its input  $z$  as the (possibly expanded) key for the tweak function  $f$  and simulates the cipher by making one classical query to  $P$ . Thus  $\mathcal{A}_{prg}$  simulates  $\mathcal{A}$  in either hybrid  $\mathbf{H}_0$  or  $\mathbf{H}_1$ , depending on its own challenge. By [Lemma 5](#),

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_0) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_1) = 1]| = 4(q_Q + q_C) \cdot \sqrt{2^{s-n}}.$$

The sum  $q_Q + q_C$  deals with the fact that every query by  $\mathcal{A}$  (whether it is made to the cipher or to the permutation) leads to a permutation query by  $\mathcal{A}_{prg}$ .

The difference between  $\mathbf{H}_1$  and  $\mathbf{H}_2$  is exactly the difference between  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}_k''$  and an ideal tweakable cipher  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}$ . By [Theorem 1](#), we thus get

$$|\Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_1) = 1] - \Pr[\mathcal{A}(\mathbf{H}_2) = 1]| = (3 + 2\sqrt{2}) \cdot 2^{-n/2} (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}).$$

Collecting the above bounds proves the claim.  $\square$

We can apply [Theorem 6](#) to prove the post-quantum security of versions of Elephant and Minalpher, which deploy a key expansion mechanism in form of function  $F$ . This is an update of our results in [Section 4.2](#) and [Section 4.4](#), which achieves better bounds at the cost of larger keys.

**Elephant.** We can prove the post-quantum security of Elephant which uses the tweakable block cipher  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}' : \{0, 1\}^{n-s} \times \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ :

$$\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k(t, x) = P(x \oplus f(t, P(k||0^{n-s}) \oplus k||0^{n-s})) \oplus f(t, P(k||0^{n-s}) \oplus k||0^{n-s}),$$

Comparing with the original Elephant, we keep the key expansion part exactly the same and only change the tweak key by XORing the key expansion itself, i.e., from  $P(k||0^{n-s})$  to  $P(k||0^{n-s}) \oplus k||0^{n-s}$ . By directly applying [Theorem 6](#), we have

**Theorem 7.** *Let  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'$  be as above and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary making  $q_C$  classical queries to its first oracle and  $q_Q$  quantum queries to its second oracle. Then*

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^m; \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k, P} = 1] - \Pr_{\substack{\tilde{\mathbf{E}} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T}, n); \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{\mathbf{E}}, P} = 1] \right| \leq 2(q_Q + q_C) \cdot \sqrt{2/2^{n-s}} + (3 + 2\sqrt{2}) \cdot 2^{-n/2} (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}).$$

**Minalpher.** We can prove the post-quantum security of Minalpher which uses the tweakable block cipher  $\tilde{\mathbf{E}}' : \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \times \mathcal{T} \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$

$$\tilde{\mathbf{E}}'_k(t, x) = P(x \oplus L(k, t)) \oplus L(k, t),$$

the tweak function  $L : \{0, 1\}^{n/2} \times \mathcal{T} \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$  is

$$L(k, t) = y^i (y + 1)^j (\text{flag} || N)(k||0^{n/2}) \oplus P(k||0^{n/2}).$$

The tweak space  $\mathcal{T}'$  is same as defined in [Section 4.4](#). Comparing with the original `Minalpher`, instead of expanding the key using the nonce, we only expand by appending 0s (as done in `Elephant`) and move the nonce part entirely to the tweak function. More precisely, instead of expanding the key via the mapping  $k \mapsto (k \parallel \text{flag} \parallel N) \oplus P(k \parallel \text{flag} \parallel N)$ , we expand the key via the mapping  $k \mapsto (k \parallel 0^{n/2}) \oplus P(k \parallel 0^{n/2})$ . To ensure that  $\text{flag} \parallel N$  still affect the key, we also make them part of the tweak function.

By directly applying [Theorem 6](#), We have

**Theorem 8.** *Let  $\tilde{E}'$  be as above and let  $\mathcal{A}$  be an adversary making  $q_C$  classical queries to its first oracle and  $q_Q$  quantum queries to its second oracle. Then*

$$\left| \Pr_{\substack{k \leftarrow \{0,1\}^{n/2}; \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E}'_{k,P}} = 1] - \Pr_{\substack{\tilde{E} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}(\mathcal{T},n); \\ P \leftarrow \mathcal{P}(n)}}} [\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{E},P} = 1] \right| \\ \leq 2(q_Q + q_C) \cdot \sqrt{2/2^{n/2}} + (3 + 2\sqrt{2}) \cdot 2^{-n/2} (q_C \sqrt{q_Q} + q_Q \sqrt{q_C}).$$

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## A Proof of Lemma 2

*Proof.* The proof of this lemma is similar to the proof of the resampling lemma for random permutations. Here, we detail the parts of the proof that are different. Let  $F$  be the internal register of a superposition oracle for an ideal cipher, i.e.,  $F = F_{0^m} F_{0^{m-1}1} \dots F_{1^m}$  where each  $F_k = F_{k,0^n}, \dots, F_{k,1^n}$  is a database register for a random permutation. [Jon’s note: I’m a bit confused by the notation, actually. My understanding is that we want a random permutation for each  $F_k$ . So I am not sure what the notation  $F_k = F_{k,0^n}, \dots, F_{k,1^n}$  represents.] Each  $F_k$  is initialized in the initial state  $|\phi_0\rangle$  for a random permutation, namely,

$$|\phi_0\rangle = (2^n!)^{-1/2} \sum_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}(n)} |\pi\rangle.$$

By analogy to the proof of [1, Lemma 5], define the projectors

$$(P_{k_0 s_0 s_1})_{KX} = \begin{cases} \mathbb{1} & s_0 = s_1 \\ \mathbb{1} - |k_0\rangle\langle k_0| \otimes (|s_0\rangle\langle s_0| + |s_0\rangle\langle s_0|)_X & s_0 \neq s_2 \end{cases}$$



and

$$(P_{k_0 s_0 s_1}^{\text{inv}})_{KYF} = \begin{cases} \mathbf{1} & s_0 = s_1 \\ |k_0\rangle\langle k_0|_K \otimes \sum_{y \in \{0,1\}^n} |y\rangle\langle y|_Y \otimes (\mathbf{1} - |y\rangle\langle y|)_{F_{k_0, s_0} F_{k_0, s_1}}^{\otimes 2} & s_0 \neq s_1. \end{cases}$$

With this generalized definition of  $P$  and  $P^{\text{inv}}$ , it is straightforward to see that Equations (11) and (12) from [1] still hold, i.e.,

$$\left[ \text{Swap}_{F_{k, s_0} F_{k, s_1}}, O_{KXYF}(P_{k, s_0 s_1})_{KX} \right] = 0$$

and

$$\left[ \text{Swap}_{F_{k, s_0} F_{k, s_1}}, O_{KXYF}^{\text{inv}}(P_{k, s_0 s_1}^{\text{inv}})_{KYF} \right] = 0.$$

For an arbitrary state  $|\psi\rangle_{KXE}$ , let

$$|\psi\rangle_{KXE} = \sum_{\substack{k \in \{0,1\}^m \\ x \in \{0,1\}^m}} |k\rangle_K |x\rangle_X \otimes |\psi_{kx}\rangle_E$$

be its expansion in the computational basis on  $X$ . By the definition of  $\varepsilon$ , we obtain generalizations of Equations (13) and (15) from [1], namely,

$$\begin{aligned} & \mathbb{E}_{(k_0, s_0, s_1) \sim D} \left[ \left\| (P_{k_0 s_0 s_1})_{KX} |\psi\rangle_{KXE} \right\|_2^2 \right] \\ &= \sum_{\substack{k \in \{0,1\}^m \\ x \in \{0,1\}^m}} \left\| |\psi_{kx}\rangle \right\|_2^2 \mathbb{E}_{B \sim D} \left[ \left\| (I_B)_{KX} |k\rangle_K |x\rangle_X \right\|_2^2 \right] \\ &= \sum_{\substack{k \in \{0,1\}^m \\ x \in \{0,1\}^m}} \left\| |\psi_{kx}\rangle \right\|_2^2 \Pr_{(k_0, s_0, s_1) \sim D} [(k, x) \in \{(k_0, s_0), (k_0, s_1)\}] \\ &\leq \varepsilon \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\mathbb{E}_{s_0, s_1} \left[ \left\| (\bar{P}_{k_0 s_0 s_1}^{\text{inv}})_{KYF} |\psi\rangle_{KYE} \right\|_2^2 \right] \leq \varepsilon.$$

The remainder of the proof is analogous to the proof of [1, Lemma 5].  $\square$