

Network-Agnostic Security Comes (Almost) for Free in DKG and MPC

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Abstract. Distributed key generation (DKG) protocols are an essential building block for threshold cryptosystems. Many DKG protocols tolerate up to $t_s < n/2$ corruptions assuming a well-behaved synchronous network, but become insecure as soon as the network delay becomes unstable. On the other hand, solutions in the asynchronous model operate under arbitrary network conditions, but only tolerate $t_a < n/3$ corruptions, even when the network is well-behaved.

In this work, we ask whether one can design a protocol that achieves security guarantees in either scenario. We show a complete characterization of *network-agnostic* DKG protocols, showing that the tight bound is $t_a + 2t_s < n$. As a second contribution, we provide an optimized version of the network-agnostic multi-party computation (MPC) protocol by Blum, Liu-Zhang and Loss [CRYPTO'20] which improves over the communication complexity of their protocol by a linear factor. Moreover, using our DKG protocol, we can instantiate our MPC protocol in the *plain PKI model*, i.e., without the need to assume an expensive trusted setup.

Our protocols incur comparable communication complexity as state-of-the-art DKG and MPC protocols with optimal resilience in their respective purely synchronous and asynchronous settings, thereby showing that network-agnostic security comes (*almost*) for free.

1 Introduction

The problem of *distributed key generation* (DKG) has been extensively studied in the cryptographic literature and is a fundamental building block for threshold

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cryptosystems. It allows a set of n parties to compute a uniform sharing of a secret key such that a sufficiently large threshold of $t + 1 < n$ parties must cooperate to reconstruct the secret or compute some function of it. As such, DKG has met several applications, including key escrow services, password-based authentication, threshold signing and encrypting, and many more.

Many existing protocols solve DKG for up to $t < n/2$ malicious corruptions, assuming that the network is *synchronous* [Ped91,GJKR99,SBKN21]. In the synchronous model, message delays are upper bounded by some known finite delay Δ and parties are assumed to have synchronized clocks. These protocols, however, provide no security guarantees when the network is *asynchronous*. Therefore, a more recent line of work has aimed at solving DKG in the asynchronous network model [KG09,AJM⁺21,DYX⁺22]. However, asynchronous protocols inherently tolerate at most $t < n/3$ malicious parties, even when the network is synchronous. This poses a vexing dilemma for a protocol designer who can not predict the behaviour of the network. On the one hand, she can choose a synchronous protocol that tolerates the maximum number of $t < n/2$ malicious parties. However, such a protocol might lose all security guarantees if the network ever becomes asynchronous. On the other hand, she can opt for an asynchronous protocol. While this type of protocol remains secure under arbitrary network conditions, it tolerates only $t < n/3$ corrupted parties *even if the network behaves synchronously*.

Motivated by the above discussion, we ask the following question: Is it possible to design a *network-agnostic* DKG protocol that achieves security guarantees in either scenario? Moreover, can we achieve network-agnostic security with no efficiency overhead, i.e., with the same efficiency as state-of-the-art purely synchronous and asynchronous DKG protocols?

We answer these questions in the affirmative. Our contributions are motivated by a series of recent works on network-agnostic protocols for various types of consensus [BKL19,BKL21] and multi-party computation [BLL20,ABKL22a,ACC22a] (MPC). Existing protocols, however, strongly rely on trusted setup, particularly in the form of threshold cryptosystems [BLL20,DHLZ21]. Thus, the import of our work lies within replacing this setup at essentially no cost. In more detail, we show the following results:

- We propose the first network-agnostic DKG protocol. Our protocol tolerates $n/3 < t_s < n/2$ corrupted parties in the synchronous model and $t_a < n/3$ parties in the asynchronous model where t_a and t_s can be chosen arbitrarily subject to $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Our protocol is resilience-optimal since we also prove $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$ is *necessary* for network-agnostic DKG. It works in the plain PKI model⁵ and allows parties to agree on a *field element* x for public key $y = g^x$ with only $O(\lambda n^3)$ communication complexity. This matches the best known results in synchrony [SBKN21] and asynchrony [DYX⁺22]. Thus, our DKG protocol can be used to efficiently bootstrap trusted key generation for network-agnostic consensus and MPC protocols.

⁵In this model, the public keys of corrupted parties can be generated arbitrarily.

- As a second contribution, we show an optimized version of network-agnostic MPC with communication complexity of $O(|C|n^2)$ field elements to evaluate a circuit C , that improves a linear factor over the state of the art (in the setting without the use of multiplicative-homomorphic encryption, see Section 1.4 for details). This protocol matches the most efficient purely asynchronous MPC protocol assuming the same setup in this setting, consisting of threshold linear-homomorphic encryption keys and a common reference string (CRS) for non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs. As an application of our DKG protocol, we also obtain the first network-agnostic MPC protocol with optimal resilience $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$ in the plain PKI model, with communication complexity comparable to the previous most communication-efficient network-agnostic with this resilience (which required the usage of a trusted setup for linear-homomorphic threshold encryption keys and a CRS for NIZKs).

In summary, our protocols incur no additional setup assumptions or asymptotic overhead over state-of-the-art communication-efficient protocols for the synchronous and asynchronous network models. This shows that network-agnostic DKG and MPC essentially come ‘for free’.

1.1 Background and Starting Point

We consider n parties P_1, \dots, P_n that communicate over pairwise authenticated channels. Moreover, we assume that parties share a public key infrastructure (PKI), and denote P_i ’s secret and public key as sk_i and pk_i , respectively. We do not make any assumption on the distributions of corrupted parties’ keys and assume that they can be maliciously generated. Throughout, we fix thresholds $0 < t_a < \frac{n}{3} \leq t_s < \frac{n}{2}$ such that $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Our model assumptions can now be characterized as follows:

- If the model is synchronous, parties are assumed to have synchronized clocks and messages sent by parties are delivered within some known finite upper bound Δ . At most t_s parties can be maliciously corrupted.
- Otherwise, if the network is asynchronous, messages can be arbitrarily delayed, as long as they are never dropped and are delivered within finite time. Moreover, parties’ clocks can be arbitrarily out of synch. In this case, at most t_a parties may be maliciously corrupted. Note that the network can never become asynchronous once t_a or more parties have been corrupted.
- Parties do not know a priori how the network might behave.

Our goal is to design a distributed key generation (DKG) protocol for parties to securely distribute a uniform *field* element x corresponding to some public key $y = g^x$. Since parties cannot be sure whether the network is synchronous or not in general, we require that the secret reconstruction threshold be $\ell = t_s + 1$. With the aim of matching the best known DKG protocols for the synchronous and asynchronous model, we aim for our DKG to run in $O(\lambda n^3)$ communication

DKG Protocol	Network	Adv.	Comm.	Rounds	Setup
Shrestha et al. [SBKN21]	sync	Static	$O(\lambda n^3)$	$O(n)/O(1)$	PKI, RO, CRS
Das et al. [DYX ⁺ 22]	async	Static	$O(\lambda n^3)$	$O(\log n)$	PKI, RO
Abraham et al. [AJM ⁺ 21]	async	Static	$\tilde{O}(\lambda n^3)$	$O(1)$	PKI, CRS
Zhang et al. [ZDL ⁺ 22]	async	Static	$O(\lambda n^4)$	$O(1)$	-
Abraham et al. [AJM ⁺ 22]	async	Adaptive	$\tilde{O}(\lambda n^3)$	$O(1)$	PKI, CRS
This work (Section 5)	fallback	Static	$O(\lambda n^3)$	$O(n)$	PKI, RO, CRS

Table 1: Comparison table of state-of-the-art DKG protocols. **Network** denotes the network model, which is synchronous (**sync**), asynchronous (**async**) or either synchronous or asynchronous (**fallback**). **Adv.** denotes the adversarial model, which is either static or adaptive. **Comm.** denotes communication complexity in bits. **Rounds** denotes the (expected) round complexity, where Shrestha et al. [SBKN21] provide a deterministic and a randomized protocol (deterministic/randomized). **Setup** denotes the setup assumptions, which include a bulletin board PKI (PKI), a random oracle (RO) or a common reference string (CRS). We note that [AJM⁺21] constructs a shared *group* element (rather than a *field* element), and [AJM⁺22] requires a powers-of-tau setup.

complexity and be statically secure. In Table 1, we compare the existing state-of-the-art with our proposed DKG which, as we show, satisfies these aims.

We stress that this goal cannot be achieved by simply running a generic, network-agnostic MPC protocol [BLL20,DHLZ21], since these protocols require trusted setup in the form of shared keys (which is exactly the goal we are trying to achieve).

Network-Agnostic Protocols: A Blueprint. To design an efficient network-agnostic DKG protocol, a natural approach is to follow the template of previous works [BKL19,BLL20,BKL21]. Here, the protocol is divided into two components, a synchronous component Π_s and an asynchronous component Π_a . Parties begin by running Π_s which performs securely, given that up to t_s parties are corrupted. In this case, parties pass the output v_s obtained from Π_s to Π_a . The final output of the protocol is the value v_a output by Π_a . Note, however, that Π_a achieves security only against t_a corruptions, as it is asynchronous. Thus, the key challenge is to prevent Π_a from simply overwriting the output v_s in a synchronous network, as this would degrade the overall corruption threshold of the protocol to t_a .

To prevent this outcome, the idea is to design Π_s and Π_a with two special properties. First, suppose that the network is synchronous and parties agree on the intermediate value v_s passed to the asynchronous component Π_a . In this case, Π_a should simply relay the correct output v_s (rather than recomputing it), *even if t_s parties are corrupted*. Second, if the network is asynchronous, Π_a should be able to compute the correct output v_a on its own in the presence of t_a corruptions. In addition to this, Π_s must prevent parties from computing a catastrophically

incorrect intermediate output v_s that might violate the overall security properties of the protocol, given an asynchronous network with t_a corrupted parties.

Background: Synchronous DKG. The above discussion shows why naively running a synchronous DKG and then an asynchronous agreement protocol back-to-back would not produce a network-agnostic protocol. For the setting of DKG, this might lead to the resulting secret key not having enough ‘contributions’ from honest parties. Our starting point is the synchronous **New-DKG** protocol of Gennaro et al. [GJKR07], which we make amenable to our network model. Loosely speaking, **New-DKG** is divided into two phases as follows:

- **Sharing Phase.** In the first phase, each party performs verifiable secret sharing (VSS) using Pedersen’s VSS scheme [Ped92] to share two random polynomials f and f' of the same degree. Parties then execute a public complaint management protocol, since some parties may try to misbehave and, e.g., not send (correct) shares to some parties. As a result, they agree on a set of parties Q that honestly executed Pedersen’s VSS.
- **Reconstruction Phase.** In the second phase, parties then reconstruct their share of the final secret. To do so, they perform the reconstruction phase of Feldman’s VSS [Fel87] from the sharing phase with respect to the polynomial f . The shares of misbehaving parties are reconstructed publicly to ensure termination.

By committing to a second polynomial f' , Pedersen’s VSS ensures that shared secrets are unconditionally hiding and parties can efficiently blindly evaluate f in the exponent to verify their shares. Then, Q is sufficiently large to ensure that at least one party must have honestly performed VSS. Thus, the adversary has no information about the secret when Q is decided.

One may be tempted to design a simpler and more efficient DKG protocol where parties, as in the so-called Joint-Feldman DKG [GJKR07], run Feldman’s VSS in parallel. However, Gennaro et al. [GJKR07] highlighted that the adversary can bias the distribution of the public key by manipulating the set Q , thus precluding security. In general, a rushing adversary can choose to include or exclude the contributions of parties in the final secret which thus precludes any ‘one-round’ DKG protocol from outputting a uniformly random secret.⁶

In any case, it is not hard to see that the complaint management protocols in **New-DKG** fail in asynchrony. This is because the complaints of honest parties may be arbitrarily delayed on the network, precluding either correctness or liveness. Dealing with this issue creates additional challenges which we address in the following section.

1.2 Technical Overview: DKG

A natural idea is to replace Pedersen’s VSS in the first phase with publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) [CGMA85,Sta96]. The key property of PVSS is

⁶Note that a possibly biased secret can still be sufficient for applications like threshold signatures, as highlighted in [GJKR07,BL22].

that all parties can *non-interactively* verify whether a given sharing is correct. We begin by presenting a secure, but excessively expensive strawman solution which will serve as our starting point.

A Strawman Solution. To ensure that parties agree on PVSS sharings, each party (acting as the dealer) would first synchronously broadcast their PVSS sharing. In the second phase, parties could then use the asynchronous common subset (ACS) protocol of Blum et al. [BKL21] to agree on a common subset of such sharings. In their protocol, each party provides an input v and the protocol lets them agree on a common subset of $n - t_a$ outputs, given t_a corruptions in an asynchronous network. In addition, their protocol guarantees that if all honest parties start with the *same* input v , then the protocol will remain secure for up to t_s corruptions and the output will be the singleton set $\{v\}$. These properties have made their protocol a staple building block in many network-agnostic protocols.

In our scenario, parties would input their common view of all sharings after the broadcast phase to ACS. Given that the synchronous phase succeeded (i.e., the network is synchronous), all parties would input the *same view* and hence ACS would allow them to (re-)agree on this view, given at most t_s corrupted parties. If parties have not obtained any output from the synchronous phase, they would simply input their PVSS dealing as an input to ACS directly. Even in case the network is asynchronous, parties would still be able to agree on a subset of $n - t_a$ dealings in this manner. From this, they could securely derive a common secret key⁷.

Unfortunately, existing network-agnostic ACS protocols [BKL21, ABKL22b] execute n instances of binary consensus and consequently require $O(n)$ distributed coin flips, and adapting ACS to the network-agnostic setting without this requirement is an open problem. As the best known protocol to flip coins without trusted setup requires $O(\lambda n^3)$ communication complexity [GLL⁺21], this step alone incurs at least $O(\lambda n^4)$ overhead. In addition, the above solution requires all parties to broadcast $O(\lambda n)$ -sized sets of ciphertexts containing the parties PVSS dealings. Using existing broadcast protocols, this step would incur an additional communication overhead of $O(\lambda^2 n^4)$. Towards building a network-agnostic DKG with $O(\lambda n^3)$ communication complexity, we introduce novel techniques to overcome the above challenges.

From ACS to Intrusion-Tolerant Consensus. Recall that under synchrony, all parties are guaranteed to output at least $n - t_s$ values from the parallel broadcast in our above strawman protocol. However, if the network is asynchronous, parties are not guaranteed agreement or termination of sufficiently many broadcast instances. To cope, our idea is to let parties execute an asynchronous agreement protocol with an *intrusion tolerance* validity property [MR10]. Intrusion tolerance guarantees that a decided value is either one that is proposed by an honest party or a default value \perp . In addition, we will require that our agree-

⁷This discussion omits a minor technical detail: the adversary must not be able to broadcast incorrect messages on behalf of honest parties, even in asynchrony. Ensuring this, however, is easy using digital signatures.

ment protocol satisfies a special *validity with termination property* for up to t_s corruptions. This property ensures that if all parties input the *same value* v to the protocol, they all terminate with this value. (This property was first formalized by Blum et al. [BKL19].) Given this building block, our high-level strategy (from the view of a party P) is as follows.

- If P correctly outputs in at least $n - t_s$ broadcasts, it inputs its set of values to the intrusion-tolerant consensus protocol Π_{IT} . Otherwise, it inputs a default value \perp' .
- If a set of values is decided upon by Π_{IT} , P continues with the protocol. Otherwise, P participates in an execution of an asynchronous DKG protocol with $O(\lambda n^3)$ complexity and reconstruction threshold of $t_s + 1$; the protocol of Das et al. [DYX⁺22] satisfies these requirements.

In synchrony, by the security of broadcast, all parties will propose the same set to Π_{IT} and, by the validity of consensus Π_{IT} under t_s corruptions, this set will be decided. In this case, parties do not fall back to the asynchronous path and can cheaply agree on a t_s -sharing of a field element x .

In asynchrony, the synchronous path might fail. In this case, however, agreement and intrusion tolerance of Π_{IT} ensure that all parties securely continue execution of the synchronous path with the same view or collectively fall back to asynchronous DKG. In case parties do not fall back, their common view on the protocol state allows them to securely emulate the synchronous protocol path. In either scenario, parties agree on a t_s -sharing of a field element x , *even if the network behaves asynchronously*. The following paragraphs describe how, for each phase of our protocol, we manage to keep communication below $O(\lambda n^3)$.

An Efficient Broadcast Protocol. The first ingredient we propose is an efficient multivalued synchronous broadcast protocol assuming $t < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$ corruptions for any constant $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$. Tsimos, Loss and Papamanthou [TLP22] propose an efficient *binary* broadcast protocol, **BulletinBC**, that is statically secure. **BulletinBC** requires $O(\lambda^2 n^2)$ communication, and is very similar to the classic Dolev-Strong broadcast protocol [DS83] except to reduce communication complexity, parties *gossip* instead of *multicast* sets of signatures during the protocol. We modify this protocol and an extension protocol from Nayak et al. [NRS⁺20] in Section 3 to build a multivalued synchronous broadcast protocol with $O(n\ell + \lambda n^2)$ communication complexity where ℓ is the length of the input message. The best prior known protocol had a communication cost of $O(n\ell + n^3)$ and so this construction may be of independent interest. In Table 2, we compare our protocol to other synchronous broadcast protocols from the literature. We note that the extension protocol from Nayak et al. in combination with the Byzantine agreement protocol from Momose and Ren [MR21b] yields a synchronous broadcast protocol with quadratic communication complexity in the honest majority setting, but assumes trusted setup in the form of threshold signatures. In their paper, Momose and Ren also present a second efficient Byzantine agreement protocol that does not require trusted setup. However, that protocol only works with sub-optimal resilience $t < (\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon) \cdot n$.

Protocol	Resil.	Adaptive	Comm.	Rounds	Len.	Setup
Abraham et al. [ACD ⁺ 19]	1/2	Yes	$\tilde{O}(\lambda n + \ell n)$	$O(1)$	MV	Trusted
Momose-Ren [MR21b]	1/2	Yes	$O(\lambda n^2)$	$O(n)$	Bin.	Trusted
Chan et al. [CPS20]	$1 - \epsilon$	Yes	$O(\lambda^2 n^2)$	$O(\lambda)$	Bin.	Trusted
Dolev-Strong [DS83]	1	Yes	$O(\lambda n^3 + \ell n)$	$O(n)$	MV	Plain
Momose-Ren [MR21b]	$1/2 - \epsilon$	Yes	$O(\lambda n^2)$	$O(n)$	Bin.	Plain
Tsimos et al. [TLP22]	$1 - \epsilon$	No	$O(\lambda^2 n^2)$	$O(n)$	Bin.	Plain
Our Protocol	$1 - \epsilon$	No	$O(n\ell + \lambda n^2)$	$O(n)$	MV	Plain

Table 2: Comparison table of existing synchronous broadcast protocols. **Resil.** denotes the Byzantine corruption threshold as a fraction of the total number of parties, where $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$ is a constant. **Adaptive** denotes whether the adversary is adaptive or not. **Comm.** denotes communication complexity in bits for messages of length ℓ when relevant. **Rounds** denotes the round complexity. **Length** denotes whether the protocol supports binary (Bin) input or is more general (MV, or multivalued). **Setup** denotes the setup assumption regarding the keys, either trusted or plain PKI.

We use our extension protocol for the first phase of DKG. More precisely, each party P_i broadcasts (1) n Pedersen commitments corresponding to random polynomials f_i and f'_i , (2) n ciphertexts corresponding to each party P_j 's share of P_i 's secret, namely $f_i(j)$ and $f'_i(j)$, and (3) n NIZK proofs that proves ciphertext j , for each $j \in [1, n]$, contains encryptions of values $f_i(j)$ and $f'_i(j)$. This obviates the need for a complaint management protocol as each party can determine the well-formedness of each message broadcast themselves. With $O(\lambda)$ -sized NIZKs [PHGR13, CGG⁺20], each party invokes broadcast with an $O(\lambda n)$ -sized message, and consequently this step incurs $O(\lambda n^3)$ communication.

Our Intrusion-Tolerant Consensus Protocol. We adapt a multivalued Byzantine agreement protocol from Mostéfaoui and Raynal [MR17] to ensure intrusion tolerance and validity under t_s corruptions in synchrony. We show in Section 4 that the protocol has $O((\ell + \lambda)n^3 + \lambda n^3)$ communication complexity. As such, parties cannot simply propose their $O(\lambda n^2)$ -sized set of sharings (recall that such a set contains $n - t_s$ sharings each of size $O(\lambda n)$) to consensus within DKG without incurring super-cubic complexity.

Efficiently Reconstructing the Final Output. To keep the communication complexity below $O(\lambda n^3)$, we observe that each party does not require the entire contents of the $O(\lambda n^2)$ -sized set to reconstruct their share and the public key of the final secret. To this end, a party accumulates n ‘personalised’ values, one per party and each of size $O(\lambda n)$, into an accumulation value z that they propose to consensus. An accumulation value for party P_i contains a description of the qualified parties Q , the $|Q|$ ciphertexts P_i needs to reconstruct their share of the secret $\sum_{q \in Q} f_q(i)$ (alongside $\sum_{q \in Q} f'_q(i)$), and a Pedersen commitment corresponding to these two summations. By intrusion tolerance, if a non-trivial value is decided by consensus, the honest party (or parties) who proposed such a z can send the relevant part and proof of membership in z to each party. By using an accumulator with accumulation value z of size at most $O(\lambda)$ [BP97, Lip12],

we thus achieve $O(\lambda n^3)$ complexity for this step. We emphasize that without the intrusion tolerance property it would be possible for parties to decide a value from consensus that does not correspond to an ‘honest’ accumulation value z . One could bypass intrusion tolerance using a consensus protocol with $O(n\ell + \lambda n^3)$ complexity that ensures *external validity* on decided values [CKPS01]. However, it appears difficult to design such a protocol using erasure codes (as is typical) as parties cannot feasibly evaluate an external validity function on a message until it is reconstructed.

From each party’s personalized value, they can reconstruct their share of the secret key but not yet the public key. To reconstruct the public key, it is tempting to replace the reconstruction phase of New-DKG with another round of broadcast and agreement. However, this would allow an adversary to bias the distribution of the shared secret by deciding to fallback to asynchronous DKG depending on, e.g., the first bit of the reconstructed public key. We therefore avoid this by publicly reconstructing the public key using the approach of Shrestha et al. in [SBKN21]. More precisely, each party P_i computes and multicasts the value $G = g^{\sum_{q \in Q} f_q^{(i)}}$ and their accumulation value that they prove is consistent with their Pedersen commitment via an efficient Fiat-Shamir based NIZK [CGJ⁺99, SBKN21]. Parties can thus collect $t_s + 1$ valid points in the exponent of g and then reconstruct the public key by Lagrange interpolation in the exponent and terminate.

1.3 Technical Overview: MPC

Our starting point is the protocol by Blum, Liu-Zhang and Loss [BLL20], which gave a network-agnostic MPC given an initial setup for threshold additive-homomorphic encryption. The protocol is composed of two parts. First, a synchronous MPC with t_s -full security when the network is synchronous, and achieves t_a -agreement on output (where the output can either be correct or \perp) when the network is asynchronous. Second, a purely asynchronous MPC with full security resilient to up to t_a corruptions. The bottleneck for the communication complexity lies in the first protocol, since it requires the usage of n network-agnostic Byzantine agreement (BA) protocols per multiplication gate. Given that the most efficient network-agnostic BA protocol [DHLZ21] incurs quadratic communication, the total communication amounts to $O(n^3|C|\lambda + \text{poly}(n, \lambda))$ bits. However, the most communication-efficient MPC in the purely asynchronous setting (in the same setting, from additive-homomorphic encryption) incurs $O(n^2|C|\lambda + \text{poly}(n, \lambda))$ communication.

In order to decrease a linear factor in the communication, we optimize the protocol using the well-known offline-online paradigm [Bea92]. The offline phase generates ℓ Beaver triples with network-agnostic security, where ℓ is the number of multiplication gates in the circuit: if the network is synchronous and there are up to t_s corruptions, all parties output the same ℓ encrypted random multiplication triples, with plaintexts unknown to the adversary; and if the network is asynchronous and there are up to t_a corruptions, each party outputs either ℓ triples as above, or \perp . With these triples, one can use standard techniques to

achieve an online phase with quadratic communication, where each multiplication gate is reduced to two public reconstructions [Bea92]. The protocol makes use of a number of primitives, including 1) an efficient synchronous broadcast protocol for long messages with weak-validity and 2) a network-agnostic Byzantine agreement protocol. In a simplified form⁸, the protocol works as follows:

- Each party P_i generates ℓ random encryptions A_i^1, \dots, A_i^ℓ , and broadcasts them using the broadcast for long messages.
- Parties agree on a subset S of parties that received the encryptions using n instances of network-agnostic BA. If the set has size less than $n - t_s$, output \perp and terminate.
- The parties compute ℓ ciphertexts, where each ciphertext is the sum of all ciphertexts coming from parties in S , i.e. $A^j = \sum_{k \in S} A_k^j$.
- Each party P_i generates ℓ random encryptions B_i^1, \dots, B_i^ℓ , and ciphertexts C_i^1, \dots, C_i^ℓ where $C_i^j = b_i^j \cdot A_i^j$ and b_i^j is the plaintext of B_i^j , and broadcasts all these values using the broadcast for long messages.
- Again, parties agree on a subset S' of parties that received the encryptions, as in Step 2.
- Compute $B^j = \sum_{k \in S'} B_k^j$ and $C^j = \sum_{k \in S'} C_k^j$.
- Output the triples (A^j, B^j, C^j) for $j = 1, \dots, \ell$.

The communication complexity amounts to n instances of broadcast (note that the cost of the BA instances is independent of the number of multiplication gates). Since each broadcast incurs $O(n\ell + \lambda n^2)$ bits of communication, the total communication is $O(n^2\ell + \lambda n^3)$, or $O(n^2)$ per generated triple (ignoring additive terms). Intuitively, the protocol generates random triples because each component contains the contribution of at least an honest party. If the network is synchronous, all honest parties output the generated triples. However, if the network is asynchronous, some of the honest parties may not obtain the triples and output \perp . This will be enough in the online phase and is handled similarly as the protocol in [BLL20]. Finally, using the DKG protocol from above, and the observation that the NIZK proofs can be generated with no setup using the multi-string honest majority proof system by Groth and Ostrovsky [GO07], we can base our MPC protocol from plain PKI. This, however, incurs a blowup in the communication complexity, resulting in a communication complexity that is comparable to the state of the art of network-agnostic MPC.

1.4 Related Work

In [MR21a], Momose and Ren initiate the study of the network-agnostic setting where the thresholds for safety and liveness properties are considered separately, and construct corresponding state machine replication protocols.

⁸The simplified description tolerates only fail-stop corruptions. To achieve security against active adversaries, one needs NIZKs at appropriate steps of the protocol. See Section 6 for details.

Distributed Key Generation. Many synchronous DKG protocols assume the existence of broadcast channels, i.e., that essentially abstract away secure broadcast and consensus, including the seminal protocol of Gennaro et al. [GJKR07]. In a recent work, Shrestha et al. [SBKN21] consider when broadcast is no longer assumed (as in our work), and propose a protocol with $O(\lambda n^3)$ complexity which is the state-of-the-art. Canetti et al. [CGJ⁺99] propose an adaptively-secure DKG protocol, but almost all other work, including ours, consider static security.

Das et al. [DYX⁺22] propose an asynchronous DKG protocol with $O(\lambda n^3)$ communication complexity. In order to bypass the need for direct coin flipping (which incurs $O(\lambda n^3)$ overhead), they perform a clever reduction to n instances of binary consensus which uses $O(\lambda n^2)$ for coin flips from honest parties. Abraham et al. use a so-called aggregatable DKG protocol [GJM⁺21] to also build a protocol with $O(\lambda n^3)$ overhead that only requires an efficient Byzantine agreement primitive like [GLL⁺22]. However, the only efficient construction of aggregatable DKG we are aware of allows parties to agree on a shared *group* element as a secret which can thus be applied only to less standard cryptosystems. The DKG of Zhang et al. [ZDL⁺22] does not require a PKI, CRS or the ROM, but incurs $O(\lambda n^4)$ overhead. Recently, Abraham et al. construct asynchronous DKG with an adaptive security proof [AJM⁺22], although they require a powers-of-tau trusted setup which, using the best known asynchronous protocol [DXR22], implies $\tilde{O}(\lambda n^3)$ communication overhead overall.

Communication complexity in MPC. The literature in communication complexity is extensive, so we are only able to cover a part of it. In the synchronous model, solutions with linear communication, i.e. $O(\lambda n)$ bits per multiplication gate, have been known for a while (see e.g. [HN06,DI06,BTH08,BFO12,GLS19,GSZ20]), for several settings: $t < n/3$ without setup and $t < n/2$ with setup, as well as cryptographic and information-theoretic.

In the asynchronous model, information-theoretic solutions with optimal resilience $t < n/3$ were provided by Ben-Or et al. [BKR94], and later improved by Patra et al. [PCR10,PCR08] to $O(\lambda n^5)$ per multiplication, and by Choudhury [Cho20] to $O(\lambda n^4)$ per multiplication. Solutions with sub-optimal resilience $t < n/4$ were achieved with linear communication $O(\lambda n)$ [SR00,PSR02,CHP13,PCR15]. For cryptographic security and optimal resilience $t < n/3$, current solutions require trusted setup, typically in the form of threshold cryptosystems. The works by [HNP05,HNP08,CHLZ21] make use of additive threshold homomorphic encryption, with the protocols [HNP08,CHLZ21] communicating $O(\lambda n^2)$ per multiplication. The work by Choudhury and Patra [CP15] achieves $O(\lambda n)$ per multiplication at the cost of using somewhat-homomorphic encryption, and the work by Cohen [Coh16] achieves communication independent of the circuit size using fully-homomorphic encryption.

In the setting with network-agnostic security, the protocols [BLL20,DHLZ21] achieve optimal resilience $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$ and cryptographic security, with the first being more communication-efficient with $O(\lambda n^3)$ bits per multiplication gate (using the network-agnostic BA [DHLZ21]). These protocols make use of an additive threshold homomorphic encryption scheme, which is generally regarded

as a more efficient primitive in practice than those that allow for multiplicative homomorphism. Further note that if one assumes for example threshold FHE, it is straightforward to achieve MPC in the network-agnostic setting with communication independent of the circuit size. [ACC22a] considers perfect security and achieves resilience $t_a + 3 \cdot t_s < n$ and communication complexity $O(\lambda n^4 |C|)$. Using the network-agnostic perfectly-secure message transmission protocol of [DLZ23], one can build network-agnostic MPC over a network with connectivity ℓ given $2 \cdot t_a + t_s < \ell$ also holds. Finally, [ACC22b] considers perfectly-secure MPC with respect to general adversary structures ($\mathcal{Q}^{(3)}$ and $\mathcal{Q}^{(4)}$ in synchrony and asynchrony, respectively) with complexity $\tilde{O}(\lambda n^5 |\mathcal{Z}_s|^3 c_m + n^6 |\mathcal{Z}_s|^2)$ bits for adversary structure \mathcal{Z}_s and multiplication gate count c_m , and [AC23] very recently considers statistical security.

1.5 Paper Organisation

In Section 2, we define our model and relevant cryptographic and distributed primitives. In Section 3, we present our efficient broadcast protocols. In Section 4, we describe our intrusion-tolerant consensus protocol. In Section 5, we present our DKG protocol and argue for its security. In Section 6, we present our MPC protocol. In Appendix A, we provide security notions for the cryptographic primitives we use. We then describe the building blocks we need for our intrusion-tolerant consensus protocol: MV-broadcast and graded consensus in Appendix B, and a binary consensus protocol in Appendix C. In Appendix D, we describe a discrete logarithm-based additively homomorphic threshold encryption scheme that can be used in our MPC protocol. Full proofs deferred from the main body are given in Appendix E. In Appendix F, we present our extension protocol and proofs. In Appendix G, we then present some figures deferred from the main body, including our broadcast extension protocol (Figures 11 and 12), Beaver triple generation protocol (Figure 13) and synchronous MPC protocol with unanimous output in asynchrony (Figures 14 and 15).

2 Preliminaries and Definitions

Throughout the paper, we consider a network of n parties P_1, \dots, P_n that communicate over point-to-point authenticated channels. Some fraction of these parties are controlled by an adversary and may deviate arbitrarily from the protocol. We call the uncorrupted parties *honest* and the corrupted parties *dishonest*. When we say that a party *multicasts* a message, we mean that it sends it to all n parties in the network. We denote the security parameter by λ and the random variable X output by some probabilistic experiment Π by $X \leftarrow \Pi$. We denote the set of integers from a to b by $[a, b]$. For an element x in a set S , $x \leftarrow S$ denotes x being sampled from S uniformly at random. We sometimes use *maps* or key-value stores, which are data structures of the form $\text{map}[k] = v$ for lookup key k which outputs value v .

We assume that global parameters $par = (\mathbb{G}, p, g, h)$ are fixed and known to all parties. Here, \mathbb{G} is a cyclic group of prime order p with independent generators g and h . Given (\mathbb{G}, p, g) , we can choose h appropriately as, e.g., $H(1)$ where H is a random oracle of the form $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{G}^* = \mathbb{G} \setminus \{1\}$.

Public Key Infrastructure. We assume that the parties have established a public key infrastructure before the protocol execution, which is a bulletin board or plain PKI. Namely, each party P_i has an encryption-decryption key pair (ek_i, dk_i) for a public-key encryption scheme and a signing-verification key pair (sk_i, vk_i) for a signature scheme, where ek_i and vk_i are known to all parties. We do not assume that these keys are computed in a trusted manner and instead we assume only that each party generates them locally and then makes the public components known to everybody using a public bulletin board. In particular, malicious parties may choose their keys arbitrarily, corrupt honest parties after seeing they generate their keys and choose keys maliciously based on keys registered by honest parties. We define the function $\mathcal{VK}(P')$ callable by each party which takes as input a sequence of parties $P' = (P_{i(1)}, \dots, P_{i(k)})$ and outputs the corresponding registered verification keys as a sequence $(vk_{i(1)}, \dots, vk_{i(k)})$.

Communication Model. Our network has two possible states, the synchronous and the asynchronous state. When the network is synchronous, all parties begin the protocol at the same time, the clocks of the parties progress at the same rate, and all messages are delivered within some known finite time $\Delta > 0$ (called the network delay) after being sent. In particular, messages of honest parties cannot be dropped from the network and are always delivered. Thus, we can consider protocols that execute in rounds of length Δ where parties start executing round r at time $(r - 1)\Delta$. When the network is asynchronous, the adversary can delay messages arbitrarily as long as the messages exchanged between honest parties are eventually delivered. In contrast to the synchronous model, parties may start the protocol at different times in an asynchronous network, since their clocks and processing speeds are not necessarily synchronized. Finally, honest parties do not know a priori in which type of network they are in.

Adversarial Model. We assume a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary that can corrupt up to t parties. The adversary may cause the corrupted parties to deviate from the protocol arbitrarily. Furthermore, we assume a rushing adversary who may obtain messages sent to it before choosing and sending messages of its own. Moreover, we assume a static adversary, who chooses which parties to corrupt before the execution of the protocol begins.

2.1 Cryptographic Primitives

Definitions and properties that we introduce hereafter are only required to hold with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$. We defer formal definitions of correctness and security alongside definitions of standard cryptographic primitives like public-key encryption to Appendix A.

We begin by defining non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs). NIZKs enable a prover to non-interactively (i.e., generate a message that is then verified) to prove to a verifier the validity of a statement without revealing anything else.

Definition 1 (Non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK) [Gro06]). *Let R be an NP relation. For pairs $(X, \omega) \in R$ we call X the statement and ω the witness. Let L be the language consisting of statements in R . A non-interactive zero-knowledge proof is a tuple of PPT algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ such that:*

- **Gen:** *This is a parameter generation algorithm that takes as input the security parameter λ . It outputs parameters par implicitly input to other algorithms.*
- **Prove:** *This is a probabilistic proving algorithm that takes as input a statement X to be proven and the corresponding witness ω where $(X, \omega) \in R$. It outputs a proof π , denoted as $\pi \leftarrow \text{Prove}(X, \omega)$.*
- **Verify:** *This is a deterministic verification algorithm that takes as input a statement X and a proof π . It outputs an acceptance bit b , denoted as $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(X, \pi)$.*

We assume that NIZKs are of size $O(\lambda)$. The NIZKs that we use in our DKG construction can be constructed using efficient, Fiat-Shamir style proofs in the random oracle model [SBKN21, CGG⁺20]. Alternatively, one can use SNARKs with a common reference string setup [PHGR13].

We now define accumulators, a primitive that enables a party to accumulate several values from some set D into an accumulated value z . At this point, the party can generate (compact) proofs that verify that a given value is in D . A secure accumulator is in particular one where ‘invalid’ proofs are hard to forge.

Definition 2 (Cryptographic accumulator). *A cryptographic accumulator is a tuple of PPT algorithms $(\text{Gen}, \text{Eval}, \text{CreateWit}, \text{Verify})$ such that:*

- **Gen:** *This is an accumulator key generation algorithm that takes as input the security parameter λ and an accumulation threshold n . It outputs a (public) accumulator key ak .*
- **Eval:** *This is a deterministic evaluation algorithm that takes as input an accumulator key ak and a set $D = \{d_1, \dots, d_n\}$ to be accumulated. It outputs an accumulation value z for D , denoted as $z \leftarrow \text{Eval}(ak, D)$.*
- **CreateWit:** *This is a probabilistic witness creation algorithm that takes as input an accumulator key ak , an accumulation value z for D , and a value d_i . It outputs \perp if $d_i \notin D$, and a witness w_i otherwise, denoted as $w_i \leftarrow \text{CreateWit}(ak, z, d_i)$.*
- **Verify:** *This takes as input an accumulator key ak , an accumulation value z for D , a witness w_i , and a value d_i . It outputs an acceptance bit b , denoted as $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(ak, z, w_i, d_i)$, where $b = 1$ when w_i proves that $d_i \in D$.*

The helper function **CreateWits**, denoted as $(w_1, \dots, w_n) \leftarrow \text{CreateWits}(ak, z, D)$ for set $D = \{d_1, \dots, d_n\}$, is shorthand for the n calls $(\text{CreateWit}(ak, z, d_1), \dots, \text{CreateWit}(ak, z, d_n))$.

Note that the above definition does not consider updates or removals of elements from the accumulated value z , and so our definition is weaker than that of much of the literature. We require an accumulator with witnesses w and accumulation values z of size $O(\lambda)$. We also require that operations after ak was generated are *deterministic*. The classic RSA accumulator satisfies these requirements with trusted setup in the standard model [BP97]; without trusted setup, one can use, for instance, the accumulator from Lipmaa in [Lip12]. Looking ahead, it can be seen that our protocols can use vector commitments instead of accumulators, which can also be built without trusted setup with constant-sized openings [CF13].

Definition 3 (Linear erasure codes). *We use standard (b, n) Reed-Solomon codes. A Reed-Solomon (RS) code [RS60] is a linear error correction code in the finite field \mathbb{F}_{2^a} , parameterized by n and b with $n \leq 2^a - 1$, given by the tuple of algorithms (Encode, Decode) such that:*

- **Encode:** *This is an encoding algorithm that takes as input b data symbols $(m_1, \dots, m_b) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^a}^b$ and outputs a codeword $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^a}^n$ of length n , denoted as $(s_1, \dots, s_n) \leftarrow \text{Encode}(m_1, \dots, m_b)$. Knowledge of any b elements of the codeword uniquely determines the input message and the rest of the codeword.*
- **Decode:** *This is a decoding algorithm that takes as input a codeword (s_1, \dots, s_n) of length n and outputs b symbols $(m_1, \dots, m_b) \in \mathbb{F}_{2^a}^b$, denoted as $(m_1, \dots, m_b) \leftarrow \text{Decode}(s_1, \dots, s_n)$. It can tolerate up to c errors and d erasures in codewords (s_1, \dots, s_n) if and only if $n - b \geq 2c + d$.*

Our protocol that uses erasure codes will have $b = n - t$. Finally, we assume that parties have a threshold additively homomorphic encryption setup available. That is, it provides to each party P_i a global public key ek and a private key share dk_i .

Definition 4 (Threshold homomorphic encryption). *A threshold homomorphic encryption scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Keygen, TEnc, TDec) such that:*

- **Keygen:** *This key generation algorithm takes as input integers (t, n) and outputs key pair (ek, dk) , where ek is the public key, and $dk = (dk_1, \dots, dk_n)$ is the list of private keys, denoted as $(ek, dk) = \text{Keygen}_{(t, n)}(1^\lambda)$.*
- **TEnc:** *This takes as input an encryption key ek and plaintext m and outputs an encryption $\text{TEnc}_{ek}(m)$ of m , which we denote explicitly.*
- **TDec:** *Given a ciphertext c and a secret key share dk_i , there is an algorithm that outputs $d_i = \text{TDec}_{dk_i}(c)$, such that (d_1, \dots, d_n) forms a t -out-of- n sharing of the plaintext $m = \text{Dec}_{dk}(c)$. Moreover, with $t + 1$ decryption shares $\{d_i\}$, one can reconstruct the plaintext $m = \text{TRec}(\{d_i\})$.*

It further satisfies the following properties:

- **Additively homomorphic:** *Given ek and two encryptions $\text{Enc}_{ek}(a)$ and $\text{Enc}_{ek}(b)$, one can efficiently compute an encryption $\text{Enc}_{ek}(a + b)$.*

- **Multiplication by constant:** Given ek , a plaintext α and an encryption $\text{Enc}_{ek}(a)$, one can efficiently compute a random encryption $\text{Enc}_{ek}(\alpha a)$.

In Appendix D, we design a discrete logarithm-based additively homomorphic threshold encryption scheme based on the ElGamal cryptosystem [ElG84] which essentially is exponential ElGamal encryption where the message is encrypted bitwise. Looking ahead, it is thus directly compatible with our DKG protocol. With trusted setup, a threshold encryption scheme can be based on, for example, the Paillier cryptosystem [Pai99].

2.2 Distributed Primitives

When relevant, our primitives take input from a value set V with $|V| \geq 2$; we assume that default value $\perp \notin V$. We distinguish between algorithms that *generate output* (generally called liveness), and algorithms that additionally *terminate*. In particular, an algorithm may be live but not terminating, since it may need to still remain online and send more messages to help other parties output. Our treatment of liveness and termination varies between the primitives we introduce below. Note that \perp is considered as a valid output in each protocol.

We first introduce intrusion-tolerant Byzantine agreement and secure broadcast, the two main building blocks we use to build DKG. Byzantine agreement is a classic primitive that allows parties which each input a value to agree on a common output value. We define liveness (generating output) and termination in two separate properties below. We emphasise that our definition captures the standard Byzantine agreement problem.

Definition 5 (Byzantine agreement). Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P_1, \dots, P_n , where each party P_i begins holding input $v_i \in V$.

- **Validity:** Π is t -valid if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if every honest party's input is equal to the same value v , then every honest party outputs v .
- **Consistency:** Π is t -consistent if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, every honest party that outputs a value outputs the same value v .
- **Liveness:** Π is t -live if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, every honest party outputs a value $v \in V \cup \{\perp\}$.
- **Termination:** Π is t -terminating if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, every honest party terminates.
- **Intrusion tolerance:** Π is t -intrusion tolerant if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, every honest party that outputs a value either outputs an honest party's input v or \perp .
- **Validity with termination:** Π is t -valid with termination if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if every honest party's input is equal to the same value v , then every honest party outputs v and terminates.

If Π is t -valid, t -consistent, t -live, and t -terminating, we say it is t -secure.⁹ If Π is t -secure and is t -intrusion tolerant, we say it is t -secure with intrusion tolerance.

⁹We emphasise that t -security does not imply t -intrusion tolerance.

In secure broadcast (or just broadcast), parties aim to agree on a value which is either the value chosen by the designated sender or a default value (in case the sender is corrupted). Our definition handles termination directly, even in asynchrony (where we only guarantee weak validity). As for Byzantine agreement, the following captures the standard broadcast primitive.

Definition 6 (Secure broadcast (BC)). *Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P_1, \dots, P_n , where a designated party P begins holding input $v \in V$.*

- **Validity:** Π is t -valid if whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if party P is honest and inputs v , then all honest parties P_j output v .
- **Consistency:** Π is t -consistent if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, every honest party outputs the same value v' .
- **Liveness:** Π is t -live if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, every honest party outputs a value $v' \in V \cup \{\perp\}$.
- **Termination:** Π is t -terminating if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, every honest party terminates.
- **External validity:** Π is t -externally valid if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if honest party P_i outputs v' , then for validity predicate Q , $Q(v)$ is true.
- **Weak validity:** Π is t -weakly valid if whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if P is honest and inputs v , then all honest parties P_i output either v or \perp and terminate upon generating output.

If Π is t -valid, t -consistent, t -live and t -terminating, we say it is t -secure.

Note that weak validity was defined in [BKL19] and external validity was introduced in [CKPS01] for Byzantine agreement.

Following previous work, we introduce a property-based definition of distributed key generation (DKG) primitive. In DKG, a set of parties collaborates to share a uniformly random secret. Each party outputs the public key corresponding to the secret, their own secret share and a set of public shares that parties can use to prove ownership of their share. We restrict our definition to the case where parties share a uniform *field element* associated to some group generated by g , i.e., a public key $y = g^x$ and secret x ; one can generalise or vary the definition to capture other settings.

Definition 7 (Distributed key generation (DKG)). *Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P_1, \dots, P_n , where each party P_i outputs a secret key share ss_i , a vector of public key shares $(\text{ps}_1, \dots, \text{ps}_n)$, a public key pk and parties terminate upon generating output.*

- **Correctness:** Π is (t, d) -correct for $d > t$ if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, there exists a polynomial $f \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ of degree $d - 1$ such that for all $i \in [1, n]$, $\text{ss}_i = f(i)$ and $\text{ps}_i = g^{\text{ss}_i}$. Moreover, $\text{pk} = g^{f(0)}$.
- **Consistency:** Π is t -consistent if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, all honest parties output the same public key pk and the same vector of public key shares $(\text{ps}_1, \dots, \text{ps}_n)$.

- **Secrecy:** Π is t -secret if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: For every (PPT) adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a (PPT) simulator \mathcal{S} with the following property. On input an element $y \in \mathbb{G}$ and a set of corrupted parties B with $|B| \leq t$, \mathcal{S} generates a transcript whose distribution is computationally indistinguishable from \mathcal{A} 's view of a run of Π with corrupted set B in which all honest parties output y as their public key.
- **Uniformity:** Π is t -uniform if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: Fix $y \in \mathbb{G}$. Then, for every (PPT) adversary \mathcal{A} , for every honest party that outputs public key \mathbf{pk} , $\mathbf{pk} = y$ holds with probability negligibly close to $1/p$, where the probability is taken over \mathcal{A} 's randomness (and not the coins used in setup).

If Π is (t, d) -correct, t -consistent, t -secret, and t -uniform, we say it is (t, d) -secure.

Our definition is adapted from that of Bacho and Loss [BL22] except we only require a standard secrecy notion akin to that of Gennaro et al. [GJKR07]. As we consider static security, our simulator is parametrised by the set of corrupted parties B chosen by the adversary. Apart from our additional uniformity property, the main difference is that we allow the secret threshold to be a value d that exceeds the number of corruptions t by more than 1. Looking forward, our DKG protocol will satisfy (t_s, d) -security in synchrony and (t_a, d) -security in asynchrony for $d = t_s + 1$. In particular, our protocol achieves t_a -secrecy in asynchrony. The definition of secrecy is not well-defined in asynchrony when considering more than t_a corruptions, because in particular not all parties may output y (or worse yet they may output different keys). One could define a variant of secrecy that guarantees ‘secrecy with abort’ but its usefulness is less clear given only a subset of honest parties could output a secret share.

2.3 Multi-Party Computation

A multi-party computation (MPC) protocol allows n parties P_1, \dots, P_n , where each party P_i has a private input x_i , to jointly compute a function over the inputs $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ in such a way that nothing beyond the output is revealed.

Different levels of security guarantees have been considered in the MPC literature, such as guaranteed output delivery (a.k.a. full security), where honest parties are guaranteed to obtain the correct output, or security with selective abort [IOZ14, CL17], where the adversary can choose any subset of parties to receive \perp , instead of the correct output. In the case of *unanimous* abort [GMW87, FGH⁺02], the adversary can choose whether all honest parties receive the correct output or all honest parties receive \perp as output.

When the network is asynchronous, it is provably impossible that the computed function takes into account all inputs from honest parties [BCG93, BKR94], since one cannot distinguish between a dishonest party not sending its input, or an honest party’s input being delayed. Hence, we say that a protocol achieves L -output quality, if the output to be computed contains the

inputs from at least L parties. This is modeled in the ideal functionality as allowing the ideal adversary to choose a subset S of L parties. The functionality then computes $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$, where $x_i = v_i$ is the input of P_i in the case that $P_i \in S$, and otherwise $x_i = \perp$.

We describe the ideal functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sfe}}^{\text{sec},L}$ for MPC with full security and L -output quality below. In addition, we denote the functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sfe}}^{\text{sout},L}$ (resp.




Fig. 1: Secure Function Evaluation Functionality.

$\mathcal{F}_{\text{sfe}}^{\text{uout},L}$), the above functionality, where the adversary can selectively choose any subset of parties to obtain \perp as the output (resp. choose that either all honest parties receive $f(x_1, \dots, x_n)$ or \perp).

Definition 8. A protocol π achieves full security (resp. selective abort; unanimous abort) with L output-quality if it UC-realizes functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sfe}}^{\text{sec},L}$ ($\mathcal{F}_{\text{sfe}}^{\text{sout},L}$; $\mathcal{F}_{\text{sfe}}^{\text{uout},L}$).

Since protocols run in a synchronous network typically achieve n -output quality, we implicitly assume that all synchronous protocols we discuss achieve n -output quality (unless otherwise specified).

Weak termination. In this work, similar to that of [BLL20], we consider protocols with the following weaker termination property: we say that a protocol has weak termination, if parties are guaranteed to terminate upon receiving an output different than \perp , but do not necessarily terminate if the output is \perp .

3 Communication-Efficient Synchronous Broadcast

In this section, we construct a synchronous secure broadcast protocol with $O(\ell n + \lambda n^2)$ communication complexity that tolerates $t < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$ corruptions with $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$ for messages of length ℓ . To do so, we adapt the extension

protocol proposed by Nayak et al. [NRS⁺20]. Their protocol, however, relies on a λ -bit broadcast module with the same corruption tolerance and communication complexity $O(\lambda n^2)$. We therefore first construct such a protocol.

3.1 Short Message Broadcast Module

We present our protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t,\epsilon}$ in Figure 2 that allows λ -bit messages to be broadcast with $O(\lambda n^2)$ communication complexity. We assume the existence of an aggregate signature scheme **as**. Let $R = O(\log n)$ and $q = O(1/\epsilon)$ be two constants that we use in the protocol and the proof in Appendix E.




Fig. 2: Synchronous broadcast (BC) protocol with sender P^* for $t < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$ and $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$ from the perspective of party P_i .

Our protocol is similar to **BulletinBC** ([TLP22], Figure 2), which in turn is similar to the well-known Dolev-Strong broadcast protocol. Whereas in Dolev-Strong signatures are multicast to all parties, in **BulletinBC** signatures are sent

to each party only with probability q/n (the *gossiping* technique). We emphasise that gossiping does not require a common coin, but only a local source of randomness: parties each locally sample the set of parties to gossip messages to. To ensure security, BulletinBC thus requires an additional $R = O(\log n)$ rounds to ensure that the ‘gossiped’ message propagates to all parties except with negligible probability. Notably, we extend BulletinBC to support *multivalued* broadcast and improve upon the communication complexity by using an aggregate signature scheme as = (KeyGen, Sign, Combine, Verify) (Appendix A).

In $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t,\epsilon}$, each party P_i manages two local maps $\text{sent}, \text{detect} : M \rightarrow \{\text{false}, \text{true}\}$ with initialization $\text{sent}[m] = \text{detect}[m] = \text{false}$ for all $m \in M$ (where M denotes the message space). In the first step of the protocol, the sender P^* multicasts its signed input value m_i and sets $\text{sent}[m_i] = \text{detect}[m_i] = \text{true}$. The protocol then runs $t + R$ rounds as follows. In rounds $1 \leq r \leq t + R$, for each $m \in M$, if P_i has 1) received a signature on m signed by the sender P^* ; 2) can form a valid aggregate signature with $\min\{r - 1, t\}$ signers;¹⁰ and 3) they have previously gossiped/multicast at most one message $m' \neq m$ (i.e. $|\{m' \in M : \text{sent}[m'] = \text{true}\}| \leq 1$), P_i sets $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$, computes an aggregate signature on it and sends this plus P^* ’s signature to each party with probability q/n .

Note if we simply replace the (deterministic) multicast from Dolev-Strong with probabilistic sending, then consistency may not hold if P^* signs more than two messages above, since condition 3) above implies that honest parties do not relay all messages. To deal with this, parties keep track of P^* ’s signatures separately. In particular, when P_i receives a signature σ of P^* on m , if $\text{detect}[m] = \text{false}$ and $|\{m' : \text{detect}[m] = \text{true}\}| < 2$, P_i multicasts (not gossips) m and σ and then sets $\text{detect}[m] = \text{true}$ so all parties receive it.¹¹

Finally, in step 3 of the protocol in round $t + R + 1$, if the maps sent and detect are equal and there is only one value $m' \in M$ such that $\text{sent}[m'] = \text{true}$, then P_i outputs this value and terminates; otherwise it outputs \perp and terminates. Note if there are two or more messages m such that some honest party set $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$, then these honest parties will broadcast the signer’s signature on each m which all honest parties will process and thus terminate with $|\text{detect}| = 2$ and output \perp .

Communication Complexity. Each party gossips at most two messages of size $O(\lambda + n + \ell)$ and multicasts at most two messages of size $O(\lambda + \ell)$. Since $q = \Theta(\lambda)$, each party sends an expected $O(\lambda)$ messages in each gossip step. Thus, communication complexity is overall $O(\lambda n^2 + n\lambda^2 + \ell(\lambda + n^2))$ which, when $\ell = O(\lambda)$, is $O(\lambda n^2 + \lambda^2 n)$. For $n \geq \lambda$, we have $O(\lambda n^2 + \lambda^2 n) = O(\lambda n^2)$. For $n < \lambda$, there is a trivial solution to achieve $O(\lambda n^2)$ communication complexity. Namely, one can run standard Dolev-Strong broadcast [DS83] with multi-signatures which has communication complexity $O(n^3 + \lambda n^2 + \ell n^2)$.

¹⁰For rounds $r \geq t + 1$ we only require $t + 1$ signatures including the sender’s.

¹¹We conjecture that the protocol without these extra messages also satisfies consistency, but the protocol as written has the same asymptotic complexity and therefore we leave it as future work to prove it.

Since $n < \lambda$, we have $n^3 < \lambda n^2$, and since we have $\ell = O(\lambda)$, it follows that $O(n^3 + \lambda n^2 + \ell n^2) = O(\lambda n^2)$.

We defer proofs for results stated in the main body hereafter to Appendix E.

Theorem 1. *Let n, t be such that $t < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$ for some constant $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t, \epsilon}$ (Figure 2) is t -secure when run on a synchronous network and n -weakly valid when run on an asynchronous network.*

Proof. See Appendix E.1.

3.2 Broadcast Extension Protocol

In Appendix F, we present our broadcast extension protocol which we argue has communication complexity $O(n\ell/\epsilon + \lambda n^2)$ before proving its security.

4 Multivalued Intrusion-Tolerant Consensus

In this section, we construct an intrusion-tolerant Byzantine agreement protocol with $O((\ell + \lambda)n^3)$ communication complexity from intrusion-tolerant *graded consensus* and a binary Byzantine agreement protocol. Graded consensus is a relaxation of Byzantine agreement/consensus where parties input a value v and output a value/grade pair (v, g) where $g \in \{0, 1, 2\}$ (other choices of the grade set are possible). Apart from validity, liveness and intrusion tolerance, graded consensus satisfies *graded consistency* which ensures that 1) the grades of all honest parties never differs by more than 1; and 2) all honest parties output the same v given they output grade $g \geq 1$ (note parties may output $(\perp, 0)$). In Appendix B, we formally define and construct a graded consensus protocol with a high validity threshold and $O(\ell n^3)$ communication complexity. Our overall protocol is a modification Mostéfaoui and Raynal’s asynchronous protocol for $t < n/3$ [MR17] which is not framed in terms of graded consensus.

Let $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ be a Byzantine agreement protocol with input domain $\{0, 1\}$ that is t_a -secure and t_s -valid with termination. In Appendix C, we present a modified version of the protocol from [BKL19] with expected communication complexity $O(\lambda n^3)$ *without trusted setup* that satisfies these requirements. Let $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ be a t_a -secure and t_s -graded valid multivalued graded consensus protocol. We present intrusion-tolerant Byzantine agreement protocol $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ in Figure 3.

We describe the protocol from the perspective of a party P_i with initial value $v_i \in V$. First, P_i runs the multivalued graded consensus protocol $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ on input v_i and outputs (v, g) (step 2). Then, if $g = 2$, P_i proposes 1 to $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ and otherwise proposes 0 (step 3). In particular, if an honest party P_i proposes 1, then by graded consistency, all honest parties output (v, g) from Π_{GC} with $g \in \{1, 2\}$, and so if bit 1 is decided in $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ then all parties can safely output v . Given this occurs, P_i then signs and multicasts the value v (received previously from the output of the graded consensus protocol) along with the signature, otherwise it multicasts \perp together with a signature (step 4). In the final phase




Fig. 3: Intrusion-tolerant multivalued Byzantine agreement from the perspective of party P_i .

of the protocol, P_i outputs a value aux (and terminates) if it received that value with at least $t_s + 1$ valid signatures, ensuring that at least one signature on aux is from an honest party (step 5).

Communication Complexity. $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (step 2) has a communication complexity bounded by $O(\ell n^3)$ (note it is signature-free). $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (step 3) has an expected complexity of $O(\lambda n^3)$. The multicast of commit messages in steps 4 and 5 an additional complexity of $O(\lambda n^3 + \ell n^2)$ using regular signatures or $O(n^3 + (\lambda + \ell)n^2)$ using aggregate signatures. Thus, the overall expected complexity of $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ is $O((\lambda + \ell)n^3)$.

Theorem 2. *Let n, t_s, t_a be such that $0 \leq t_a < \frac{n}{3} \leq t_s < \frac{n}{2}$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then Byzantine agreement protocol $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (Figure 3) is t_s -valid and t_a -secure with intrusion tolerance.*

Proof. See Appendix E.2.

5 Communication-Efficient Network-Agnostic DKG

In this section, we construct our communication-efficient network-agnostic distributed key generation protocol $\Pi_{\text{DKG}}^{t_a, t_s}$ with threshold $d = t_s + 1$. We prove it t_s -secure when run over a synchronous network and t_a -secure when run over an asynchronous network. We present Π_{DKG} in Figure 4 which uses two helper functions that are defined in Figure 5. We recall public parameters $\text{par} = (\mathbb{G}, p, g, h)$ introduced in Section 2, where g and h are independent generators of the cyclic group \mathbb{G} of prime order p . Π_{DKG} relies on the following underlying protocols:

- Π_{ADKG} : an asynchronous DKG protocol. We assume that Π_{ADKG} is (t_a, d) -secure with threshold $d = t_s + 1$ and has $O(\lambda n^3)$ communication complexity. The protocol from Das et al. [DYX⁺22] satisfies these requirements.




Fig. 4: DKG protocol with threshold $d = t_s + 1$ from the perspective of party P_i . T denotes the time taken by $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t_s, \frac{1}{2}}$ to terminate when run in synchrony. Note under synchrony that each step will be executed in sequence.




Fig. 5: DKG helper functions from the perspective of party P_i .

- $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$: a broadcast protocol with default value \perp_{bc} . We assume that $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ is t_s -secure when run on a synchronous network, t_a -weakly valid on an asynchronous network, and t_s -externally valid. For a message of length ℓ , we require that $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ has communication complexity $O(\ell n + \lambda n^2)$. The protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ defined in Figure 11 satisfies these requirements.
- Π_{Γ} : a multivalued Byzantine agreement protocol with default value \perp_{it} . We assume that Π_{Γ} is t_a -secure with intrusion tolerance and t_s -valid with termination, and has $O(\lambda n^3)$ communication complexity. The protocol Π_{Γ} defined in Figure 3 satisfies these requirements.

We also assume the existence of a public-key encryption scheme $\text{pke} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ (Appendix A), an accumulator acc , and a linear erasure coding scheme rs . Finally, we require two NIZK proof systems nizk_1 and nizk_2 which define the following relations:

- nizk_1 : Statements X_1 and witnesses $(s_{ij}, u_{ij}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$, where X_1 is the statement that $\prod_{k=0}^{t_s} (C_{ik})^{j^k} = g^{s_{ij}} h^{u_{ij}}$ and c_{ij} is an encryption of (s_{ij}, u_{ij}) under ek_j , where variables C_{ik} and c_{ij} are as defined in step 1 of Π_{DKG} .
- nizk_2 : Statements X_2 and witnesses $(x_i, x'_i) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$, where X_2 is the statement, given (public) values A and B , that $A = g^{x_i}$ and $B = g^{x_i} h^{x'_i}$.

In the following, we give a step-by-step description of Π_{DKG} (Figure 4).

Step 1: Let P_i be an honest party executing Π_{DKG} . P_i chooses two random polynomials f_i, f'_i of degree t_s with coefficients a_{ik} and b_{ik} in \mathbb{Z}_p for $k \in [0, t_s]$. In this step, P_i will share points $(j, f_i(j))$ and $(j, f'_i(j))$ with each party $P_j, j \in [1, n]$, using public-key encryption scheme pke . As in Pedersen's verifiable secret sharing scheme [Ped92], P_i will also compute Pedersen commitments $C_{ik} = g^{a_{ik}} h^{b_{ik}}$ that allow parties to evaluate the polynomials in the exponents g and h together. In particular, the inclusion of polynomial f' blinds f such that values that contribute to the final secret are hidden from the adversary until after it has been decided, preventing the adversary from biasing the secret. In order for all parties to verify that all parties have received correct

sharings, P_i will further compute a NIZK π_{ij} via nizk_1 for each P_j that verifies that the encrypted values under P_j 's key are exactly $f_i(j)$ and $f'_i(j)$. All n parties then invoke $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ (secure broadcast), inputting a message to the i -th instance containing these Pedersen commitments, encryptions for all n parties and the corresponding NIZK proofs.

Steps 2 and 3: If the network is synchronous, then by t_s -security of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ and since at least $n - t_s$ honest parties broadcast, all parties will agree on the same set of values of size $\geq n - t_s$ once all instances of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ terminate at the same time T . By t_s -external validity of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$, only messages that are Valid (Figure 5) – namely, those which are well-formed and contain n valid NIZKs – can be output. Note in asynchrony that $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ does not satisfy consistency, so honest parties could output different messages. To resolve this, it would be natural for parties to execute consensus on the output of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ that ensures t_s -validity in synchrony and t_a -security in asynchrony. However, not all parties may output $n - t_s$ values from $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$, so parties require a mechanism to ‘abort’ if not enough values are obtained from consensus.

We use intrusion-tolerant consensus Π_{IT} to efficiently solve this problem. Rather than proposing the entire $O(\lambda n^2)$ -sized output of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ to consensus, P_i instead proposes an accumulated value z to Π_{IT} . Intuitively, z accumulates n values (one per party) each of size $O(\lambda n)$ corresponding to the information that each party ‘needs’ to eventually reconstruct their secret share and the common public key; we describe these values further below. If an honest party does not output enough values from $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$, they instead propose \perp_{dkg} to Π_{IT} . Π_{IT} guarantees that a decided value is either one proposed by an honest party or \perp . Consequently, if Π_{IT} outputs $v \in \{\perp, \perp_{\text{dkg}}\}$, all honest parties fallback to Π_{ADKG} . This will not occur in synchrony and may or may not occur in asynchrony. Otherwise, all honest parties output the same accumulated value z .

Steps 4 and 5: If $z \notin \{\perp, \perp_{\text{dkg}}\}$ is decided by Π_{IT} , then z must have been proposed by an honest party, say P_j . Assuming this is true, P_j (plus any other honest party that output z) sends each party their ‘value’ accumulated in z alongside a proof of membership. Party P_i obtains their value L_i this way, where L_i is computed using `Split` (Figure 5). More precisely, L_i contains:

- The same Q for all n parties, corresponding to the ‘qualified’ set of parties of size $\geq n - t_s$ from which P_j received values from $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$;
- $|Q|$ ciphertexts encrypting $f_q(i)$ and $f'_q(i)$ to P_i for all $q \in Q$; and
- Commitment $C_j^* = g^{\sum_{q \in Q} f_q(i)} h^{\sum_{q \in Q} f'_q(i)}$.

These messages allow each party to reconstruct a sharing of a secret $\sum_{q \in Q} f_q(0)$. After deciding z from Π_{IT} , P_j sends the relevant `part` message to all parties, which parties verify is correct with `acc.Verify`.

Steps 6 and 7: At this point, P_i has received a valid message of the form $(\text{part}, L_i = (c_i^*, C_i^*, Q), w_i)$. By decrypting values in c_i^* , P_i can deduce its own

secret share $x_i = \sum_{j \in Q} f_j(i)$ but not necessarily the corresponding public shares $g^{F(1)}, \dots, g^{F(n)}$ and public key $g^{F(0)}$. Thus, parties will collaborate to compute g^x by reconstructing the polynomial $F(\cdot) = \sum_{j \in Q} f_j(\cdot)$ in the exponent of g . To this end, parties will reveal their share g^{x_i} and then compute a proof with nizk_2 that shows that it is consistent with the sharings of polynomials $f_j(\cdot)$ and $f'_j(\cdot)$ in step 1 of the protocol (which were previously hidden). More precisely, P_i computes $D_i = g^{x_i}$, $x'_i = \sum_{j \in Q} f'_j(i)$ (by decryption of c_i^*), $C_i'' = g^{x_i} h^{x'_i}$ and $\pi'_j = \text{nizk}_2.\text{Prove}(X_2, (x_i, x'_i))$. Then, P_i multicasts a reconstruction message recon containing D_i , the proof π'_j and P_i 's value L_i alongside w_i , the proof of inclusion in z .

On receipt of a recon message from P_j , P_i can verify that 1) L_j was accumulated in z (using acc.Verify), and 2) the NIZK π'_j is correct and, in particular, is consistent with the value $C_i^* = g^{x_i} h^{x'_i}$ contained in L_j . Because these checks pass, the value C_i^* must be of the form $g^{x_i} h^{x'_i}$ computed by a honest party that output z from Π_{Γ} , and thus the value D_j contained in the recon message must be of the form $g^{\sum_{k \in Q} f_k(j)}$, i.e. it must be a valid share. When P_i receives $t_s + 1$ such values, P_i evaluates $F(0)$ in the exponent of g to derive public key g^x and $F(j)$ for $j \in [1, n]$ to derive the n public shares. At this point, P_i terminates.

Communication Complexity. At step 1, each party invokes secure broadcast with $O(\lambda n)$ -sized input (assuming NIZKs are size $O(\lambda)$, each which costs $O(n\ell + \lambda n^2)$), so this step incurs $O(\lambda n^3)$ overhead. Apart from using generic NIZKs, one can instantiate nizk_1 with $O(\lambda)$ -sized proofs in a suitable Paillier group under the decisional composite residuosity assumption [CGG⁺20]. At step 2, Π_{Γ} takes $O(\lambda n^3)$ communication. If parties invoke Π_{ADKG} , then steps 4 to 7 are ignored, and Π_{ADKG} costs $O(\lambda n^3)$ itself. At step 4, $O(n)$ parties send n part messages, each of size $O(\lambda n)$, so this incurs $O(\lambda n^3)$ overhead. At step 5, $O(n)$ parties multicast a recon message of size $O(\lambda n)$, incurring $O(\lambda n^3)$ overhead, again assuming nizk_2 has $O(\lambda)$ -sized proofs. nizk_2 can be instantiated using the efficient NIZK used in [SBKN21] in the random oracle model in any cryptographic group \mathbb{G} . Thus, Π_{DKG} has a communication complexity of $O(\lambda n^3)$.

Theorem 3. *Let n, t_s, t_a be such that $0 \leq t_a < \frac{n}{3} \leq t_s < \frac{n}{2}$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$, and let $d = t_s + 1$. Assuming a plain PKI, ROM and a CRS, the distributed key generation protocol $\Pi_{\text{DKG}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (Figures 4 and 5) is (t_s, d) -secure when run on a synchronous network and (t_a, d) -secure when run on an asynchronous network.*

Proof. See Appendix E.3.

Corruption Thresholds. Our construction shows that $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$ corruptions are sufficient to ensure (t_s, d) -security in synchrony and (t_a, d) -security in asynchrony for $d = t_s + 1$. We note that it is also *necessary*:

Lemma 1. *Let n, t_a, t_s be such that $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s \geq n$. If DKG protocol Π is t_s -uniform in a synchronous network, then it cannot also be t_a -consistent in an asynchronous network.*

Proof. See Appendix E.4.

6 Multi-Party Computation with Asynchronous Fallback

In this section, we describe an optimized version of the MPC protocol with fallback by Blum, Liu-Zhang and Loss [BLL20], with communication complexity $O(n^2\lambda)$ bits per multiplication gate. This matches the asymptotic communication complexity of the current most efficient purely asynchronous MPC protocols [HNP08,CHLZ21] in the setting of optimal resilience $t < n/3$, without the use of multiplicative-homomorphic threshold encryption schemes.

The protocol makes use of a threshold additive homomorphic encryption scheme (Keygen, TEnc, TDec, TRec) (which may be generated with our DKG protocol), NIZKs, where we introduce the required relations in Appendix A.1, and a secure broadcast protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s, 1/2}$ that achieves t_s -security when the network is synchronous and t_a -weak validity when the network is asynchronous and with communication complexity $O(n\ell + \text{poly}(n, \lambda))$, where ℓ is the input size.

The protocol is divided into two phases: an offline and an online phase. The offline phase generates Beaver multiplication triples (in encrypted form) and can be executed without the knowledge of the inputs. In the online phase, parties distribute their inputs and process the circuit to evaluate in a gate-by-gate fashion, where addition gates are processed locally and multiplication gates are processed with the help of the Beaver triples, via two public reconstructions.

Triple Generation. In order to generate Beaver triples (Figure 13, Appendix G), we make use of a multi-valued broadcast protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s, 1/2}$ that is t_s -secure when run on a synchronous network and t_a -weakly valid that terminates after T_{bc} rounds.

Communication Complexity. The communication complexity amounts to n parallel instances of secure broadcast with input size ℓ encryptions and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs, and an additive term (independent of the number ℓ) corresponding to n parallel instances of BA. This incurs a total communication of $O(n^2\ell(|\mathbf{nizk}| + |\mathbf{ciph}|) + \text{poly}(n, \lambda))$ bits, where $|\mathbf{nizk}|$ and $|\mathbf{ciph}|$ are the size of the proofs and ciphertexts in the protocol.

Lemma 2. *Let n, t_s, t_a be such that $t_a, t_s < n$. $\Pi_{\text{triples}}^{t_a, t_s}(\ell)$ is an n -party protocol with communication complexity $O(n^2\ell(|\mathbf{nizk}| + |\mathbf{ciph}|) + \text{poly}(n, \lambda))$, where $|\mathbf{nizk}|$ and $|\mathbf{ciph}|$ are the size of the proofs and ciphertexts in the protocol, achieving the following guarantees:*

- *When the network is synchronous and there are up to t_s corruptions, all parties output the same ℓ encrypted random multiplication triples, with the plaintexts unknown to the adversary.*
- *When the network is asynchronous and there are up to t_a corruptions, the output of each party P_i is either ℓ encrypted random multiplication triples with the plaintexts unknown to the adversary or \perp .*

Proof. See Appendix E.5.

Synchronous Protocol with Unanimous Output. We present the synchronous MPC protocol that achieves full security when the network is synchronous and there are t_s corruptions, but also achieves unanimous output up to t_a corruptions under an asynchronous network. The protocol is an optimized version of the one in [BLL20], where the multiplication gates are executed using Beaver triples generated during an Offline Phase, and incurs a communication complexity of $O(n^2)$ field elements per multiplication gate. We defer the protocol description to the appendices (Figures 14 and 15), and only provide a high level description here.

The protocol closely follows the one by Blum, Liu-Zhang and Loss [BLL20], which uses a setup for threshold additive-homomorphic encryption. This approach was initially introduced by Cramer, Damgard and Nielsen [CDN01], and the idea is that parties keep threshold encryptions of the circuit wires and perform computations on a gate-by-gate fashion. First, the inputs are distributed in the form of a threshold encryption. Since the threshold encryption scheme is additively homomorphic, the addition gates can be performed locally by the parties. Multiplication gates are processed in a standard manner using Beaver triples. The only difference in the network-agnostic setting is that in some parts of the protocol (such as the input distribution, or the triples generation), in the case the network is asynchronous, there might be information missing (e.g. input ciphertexts or encrypted triples). For that, the protocol in [BLL20] makes use of an abort flag. As soon as a party detects that not enough information has arrived by a certain amount of time, it sets the flag to 1, and stops executing further steps of the protocol. This can only make the protocol stall, but will not compromise security. Before the output is decrypted, an agreement on a core-set sub-primitive also known as ACS (see [BLL20] for details on this primitive) is run to see whether parties must decrypt or not. This ensures that parties agree on whether the output was computed. If yes, they can jointly (and safely) decrypt the output ciphertext. If not, all parties output \perp .

Lemma 3. *Let n, t_s, t_a be such that $0 \leq t_a < n/3 \leq t_s < n/2$ and $t_a + 2t_s < n$. Protocol $\Pi_{\text{smpc}}^{t_s, t_a}$ has communication complexity $O(n^2|C|(|\text{nizk}| + |\text{ciph}|) + \text{poly}(n, \lambda))$ bits, where C is the circuit to evaluate, $|\text{nizk}|$ and $|\text{ciph}|$ are the size of the proofs and ciphertexts in the protocol, and satisfies:*

- *When run in a synchronous network, it achieves full security up to t_s corruptions.*
- *When run in an asynchronous network, it achieves unanimous output with weak termination up to t_a corruptions and has $n - t_s$ output quality.*

Proof. See Appendix E.6.

6.1 Protocol Compiler

In this section, we restate the protocol $\Pi_{\text{mpc}}^{t_s, t_a}$ for secure function evaluation presented in [BLL20] which tolerates up to t_s (resp. t_a) corruptions when the network is synchronous (resp. asynchronous), for any $0 \leq t_a < \frac{n}{3} \leq t_s < \frac{n}{2}$ satisfying $t_a + 2t_s < n$. The protocol is based on two sub-protocols:

- $\Pi_{\text{smpc}}^{t_s, t_a}$ is a secure function evaluation protocol which gives full security up to t_s corruptions when run in a synchronous network, and achieves unanimous output with weak termination up to t_a corruptions and has $n - t_s$ output quality when run in an asynchronous network.
- $\Pi_{\text{ampc}}^{t_a}$ is a secure function evaluation protocol which gives full security up to t_a corruptions and has $n - t_a$ output quality when run in an asynchronous network.

Theorem 4 ([BLL20]). *Let n, t_s, t_a be such that $0 \leq t_a < \frac{n}{3} \leq t_s < \frac{n}{2}$ and $t_a + 2t_s < n$. Given sub-protocols $\Pi_{\text{smpc}}^{t_s, t_a}$ and $\Pi_{\text{ampc}}^{t_a}$ with the guarantees described above, there is a protocol $\Pi_{\text{mpc}}^{t_s, t_a}$ with communication complexity the sum of the communication of the two sub-protocols, satisfying the following properties:*

1. *When run in a synchronous network, it achieves full security up to t_s corruptions.*
2. *When run in an asynchronous network, it achieves full security up to t_a corruptions and has $n - t_s$ output quality.*

Assuming a setup for linear-homomorphic threshold encryption and a CRS for NIZKs, the size of the proofs and ciphertexts in $\Pi_{\text{smpc}}^{t_s, t_a}$ are of size $O(\lambda)$. Using Lemma 3 and Theorem 4, and a quadratic asynchronous protocol (see e.g. [HNP08]) we obtain a protocol $\Pi_{\text{mpc}}^{t_s, t_a}$ with communication complexity $O(n^2)$ field elements per multiplication gate. This improves over the communication complexity of the best previous network-agnostic MPC protocol by a linear factor and matches the current state of the art on purely asynchronous MPC protocols with the same setup.

Corollary 1. *Assuming a setup for linear-homomorphic threshold encryption and a CRS, there is an MPC protocol $\Pi_{\text{mpc}}^{t_s, t_a}$ with communication complexity $O(n^2|C|\lambda + \text{poly}(n, \lambda))$ bits, satisfying the following properties:*

1. *When run in a synchronous network, it achieves full security up to t_s corruptions.*
2. *When run in an asynchronous network, it achieves full security up to t_a corruptions and has $n - t_s$ output quality.*

Using Theorem 3 and multi-string NIZKs [GO07], we can base our protocol on a plain public-key infrastructure, obtaining the first network-agnostic MPC protocol based on plain PKI, and with communication complexity comparable with previous state of the art network-agnostic MPC.

Corollary 2. *Assuming a plain PKI, there is an MPC protocol $\Pi_{\text{mpc}}^{t_s, t_a}$ with communication complexity $O(n^3|C|\text{poly}(\lambda) + \text{poly}(n, \lambda))$ bits, satisfying the following properties:*

1. *When run in a synchronous network, it achieves full security up to t_s corruptions.*
2. *When run in an asynchronous network, it achieves full security up to t_a corruptions and has $n - t_s$ output quality.*

Observe that our definition of DKG secrecy is simulation-based. Thus, when using our DKG protocol to replace the trusted setup to obtain the above results, in the proofs of the above results in Appendix E, the MPC simulator will execute the DKG simulator to simulate its messages.

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A Deferred Definitions and Security Notions

We first provide a standard definition for public-key encryption.

Definition 9 (Public-key encryption (PKE)). *A public key encryption scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ such that:*

- **KeyGen:** *This is a key generation protocol that takes as input the security parameter λ . It outputs a public-secret key pair (ek, dk) , denoted as $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\lambda)$.*
- **Enc:** *This is a probabilistic encryption algorithm that takes as input a public key ek and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ (a bit string). It outputs a ciphertext c , denoted as $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{ek}, m)$.*
- **Dec:** *This is a deterministic decryption algorithm that takes as input a decryption key dk and a ciphertext c . It outputs a message m , denoted as $m \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\text{dk}, c)$, where possibly $m = \perp$ denoting failure.*

Next, we define aggregate signatures. In an aggregate signature scheme, a party can use their signing key to sign a message individually. All parties can also call **Combine** to combine several (possibly already aggregated) signatures with respect to the same message to form a new signature on the same message. As usual, signatures can also be verified via **Verify**. We emphasise that **Combine** and **Verify** are non-interactive algorithms in this work.

Definition 10 (Aggregate signatures). *An aggregate signature scheme is a 4-tuple of PPT algorithms $(\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Combine}, \text{Verify})$ such that:*

- **KeyGen:** *This is a key generation protocol that takes as input the security parameter λ and outputs n independent public-secret key pairs $(\text{vk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$, $i \in [1, n]$.*
- **Sign:** *This is a probabilistic signing algorithm that takes as input a secret key sk_i and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$. It outputs a signature σ_i , denoted as $\sigma_i \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}_i, m)$.*
- **Combine:** *This is a deterministic signature combining algorithm that takes as input a sequence of signatures $\Sigma = (\sigma_{i(1)}, \dots, \sigma_{i(k)})$, the corresponding sequence of sets of verification keys $VK = (\text{vk}_{i(1)}, \dots, \text{vk}_{i(k)})$ and a message m . It outputs either an aggregate signature σ with respect to public keys $\cup_{j \in [1, k]} \text{vk}_{i(j)}$, denoted as $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Combine}(\Sigma, VK, m)$, or \perp .*
- **Verify:** *This is a deterministic signature verification algorithm that takes as input a message m , an aggregate signature σ , and the set of verification keys $VK = \{\text{vk}_1, \dots, \text{vk}_k\}$ corresponding to σ . It outputs an acceptance bit b , denoted as $b \leftarrow \text{Verify}(VK, \sigma, m)$, where 1 denotes acceptance.*

*Note that signatures can be iteratively combined, i.e., **Combine** can take signatures previously output from **Sign** or **Combine** as input. We sometimes write $\langle m \rangle_i$, which is defined as (m, σ) where $\sigma \leftarrow \text{Sign}(\text{sk}_i, m)$. For a single verification key vk (resp. signature σ), we sometimes write vk (resp. σ) instead of $\{\text{vk}\}$ (resp. $\{\sigma\}$) as input to **Combine** and **Verify**.*

One can instantiate aggregate signatures of size $O(\lambda) + P$ in the random oracle model, where P is the size of representing the signers (in our work $P = n$ using a bitmask and PKI for parties to map indices to public keys locally) [BGLS03]. Similarly, we require individual (non-aggregated) signatures of size $O(\lambda)$. We implicitly assume domain separation when signing messages in protocols we introduce.

We introduce relevant security definitions for a public key encryption scheme (PKE), an aggregate signature scheme, a cryptographic accumulator and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof (NIZK). We begin with the definition of CPA-security of a PKE scheme.

Definition 11 (CPA-Security of PKE). Let $\Pi_{\text{PKE}} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a public key encryption scheme. For $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and an algorithm A , define experiment $\text{CPA}_{\Pi_{\text{PKE}}}^A(\lambda, b)$ as follows:

1. Run the key generation algorithm and get $(\text{ek}, \text{dk}) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(\lambda)$.
2. Run A on input (ek, dk) and get a pair of same-length messages m_0, m_1 .
3. Compute the ciphertext $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\text{ek}, m_b)$ and run A on input c .
4. When A returns $b' \in \{0, 1\}$, the experiment returns b' .

We say that Π_{PKE} has indistinguishable encryptions against chosen plaintext attacks (CPA-security) if for all PPT algorithms A , we have

$$|\Pr[\text{CPA}_{\Pi_{\text{PKE}}}^A(\lambda, 1) = 1] - \Pr[\text{CPA}_{\Pi_{\text{PKE}}}^A(\lambda, 0) = 1]| \leq \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

We proceed with the definition of a collision-resistant accumulator, which we see as the notion of a secure accumulator.

Definition 12 (Collision-Resistant Accumulator). Let $\Pi_{\text{Acc}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Eval}, \text{CreateWit}, \text{Verify})$ be a cryptographic accumulator. For set size n and an algorithm A , define experiment $\text{CR}_{\Pi_{\text{Acc}}}^A(\lambda, n)$ as follows:

1. Run the generation algorithm and get $ak \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\lambda, n)$.
2. Run A on input (n, ak) and get $(\{d_1, \dots, d_n\}, d', w')$.
3. Compute the accumulation value $z \leftarrow \text{Eval}(ak, \{d_1, \dots, d_n\})$.
4. If $d' \notin \{d_1, \dots, d_n\}$ and $\text{Verify}(ak, z, w', d') = 1$, the experiment returns 1. Otherwise it returns 0.

We say that Π_{Acc} is collision-resistant or secure if for all PPT algorithms A and any n , we have $\Pr[\text{CR}_{\Pi_{\text{Acc}}}^A(\lambda, n) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

We proceed with the definition of the security of an aggregate signature scheme, which is given by the unforgeability (under chosen message attack) of aggregate signatures.

Definition 13 (Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack). Let $\Pi_{\text{AggSgn}} = (\text{KeyGen}, \text{Sign}, \text{Combine}, \text{Verify})$ be an aggregate signature scheme. For an algorithm A , define experiment $\text{UF-CMA}_{\Pi_{\text{AggSgn}}}^A(\lambda)$ as follows:

1. Run the key generation algorithm and get public-secret key pair (vk_i, sk_i) . A is given a public key vk_1 .
2. At any time of the experiment, A gets access to a signing oracle that answer queries of the following type: When A submits a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$ of its choice, return $\sigma_1 \leftarrow \text{Sign}(sk_1, m)$.
3. A outputs $k - 1$ additional public keys vk_2, \dots, vk_k for some $k \geq 1$ and a message m^* . A outputs an aggregate signature σ^* with respect to public keys $VK = \{vk_1, \dots, vk_k\}$ and message m^* .
4. If $\text{Verify}(VK, \sigma^*, m^*) = 1$ and m^* was not queried previously by A, the experiment returns 1. Otherwise it returns 0.

We say that Π_{AggSgn} is unforgeable under chosen message attack (UF-CMA) or just secure if for all PPT algorithms A, we have $\Pr[\text{UF-CMA}_{\Pi_{\text{AggSgn}}}^A(\lambda) = 1] \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

We end this section with some security notions for a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. For this, we require perfect completeness, zero-knowledge and simulation-sound extractability. Henceforth, we let R be an NP relation and L the corresponding language. Our definitions are the standard ones from [Gro06].

Definition 14 (Perfect Completeness of NIZK). Let $\Pi_{\text{NIZK}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ be a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. For an algorithm A, define experiment $\text{PerfComp}_{\Pi_{\text{NIZK}}}^A(\lambda)$ as follows:

1. Run the parameter generation algorithm and get $par \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\lambda)$.
2. Run A on input par and get $(X, w) \leftarrow A(par)$.
3. Compute the proof $\pi \leftarrow \text{Prove}(X, w)$.
4. If $(X, w) \in R$ and $\text{Verify}(X, \pi) = 1$, the experiment returns 1. Otherwise it returns 0.

We say that Π_{NIZK} has perfect completeness if for all algorithms A, we have $\Pr[\text{PerfComp}_{\Pi_{\text{NIZK}}}^A(\lambda) = 1] = 1$.

Definition 15 (Zero-Knowledge of NIZK). Let $\Pi_{\text{NIZK}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ be a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. Let $S = (S_1, S_2)$ be a pair of PPT algorithms (called the simulator). Furthermore, let $S'(par, \tau, X, w) = S_2(par, \tau, X)$ if $(X, w) \in R$ and $S'(par, \tau, X, w) = 0$ if $(X, w) \notin R$. For an algorithm A, we define the advantage of A as

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Adv-ZK}_{\Pi_{\text{NIZK}}}^{\text{A}, S}(\lambda) &= |\Pr[par \leftarrow \text{Gen}(\lambda) : \text{A}^{\text{Prove}(par, \cdot, \cdot)}(par) = 1] \\ &\quad - \Pr[(par, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(\lambda) : \text{A}^{S'(par, \tau, \cdot, \cdot)}(par) = 1]|. \end{aligned}$$

We say that Π_{NIZK} has zero-knowledge if there exists a simulator S as above such that for all non-uniform PPT algorithms A, we have $\text{Adv-ZK}_{\Pi_{\text{NIZK}}}^{\text{A}, S}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Definition 16 (Simulation-Soundness of NIZK). Let $\Pi_{\text{NIZK}} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Prove}, \text{Verify})$ be a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. Let $S = (S_1, S_2)$ be

a pair of PPT algorithms (called the simulator). For an algorithm A , we define the advantage of A , where Q is the list of simulation queries and responses, as

$$\mathbf{Adv}\text{-ss}_{\Pi_{\text{NIZK}}}^{\text{A,S}}(\lambda) = \Pr[(par, \tau) \leftarrow S_1(\lambda), (X, \pi) \leftarrow A^{\text{S}_2(par, \tau, \cdot)}(par) : \\ w \leftarrow \text{Verify}(par, X, \pi) = 1, (X, \pi) \notin Q, X \notin L].$$

We say that Π_{NIZK} has simulation soundness if there exists a simulator S as above such that for all non-uniform PPT algorithms A , we have $\mathbf{Adv}\text{-ss}_{\Pi_{\text{NIZK}}}^{\text{A,S}}(\lambda) \leq \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

A.1 Multi-Party Zero-Knowledge Protocols

Let us assume a binary relation R , consisting of pairs (x, w) , where x is the statement, and w is a witness to the statement. A zero-knowledge proof allows a prover P to prove to a verifier V knowledge of w such that $R(x, w) = 1$. We are interested in zero-knowledge proofs for three types of relations, parameterized by a threshold encryption scheme with public encryption key ek :

1. *Proof of Plaintext Knowledge:* The statement consists of ek , and a ciphertext c . The witness consists of a plaintext m and randomness r such that $c = \text{TEnc}_{ek}(m, r)$.
2. *Proof of Correct Multiplication:* The statement consists of ek , and ciphertexts c_1, c_2 and c_3 . The witness consists of a plaintext m_1 and randomness r_1, r_3 such that $c_1 = \text{TEnc}_{ek}(m_1, r_1)$ and $c_3 = m_1 \cdot c_2 + \text{TEnc}_{ek}(0; r_3)$.
3. *Proof of Correct Decryption:* The statement consists of ek , a ciphertext c , and a decryption share d . The witness consists of a decryption key share dk_i , such that $d = \text{TDec}_{dk_i}(c)$.

Assuming a PKI infrastructure and honest majority, one can realize a Non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof (NIZK) system (without the need to assume a trusted CRS setup) using the multi-string honest majority NIZK by Groth and Ostrovsky [GO07]. This, however, comes with a blowup of $n \cdot \text{poly}(\lambda)$ in the size of the proof. A formal specification of a multi-string zero-knowledge functionality appropriate for our use can be found in [BLL20]. By distributing the NIZK proof with a (multivalued) secure broadcast protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ that is t_s -secure in synchrony and t_a -weak-validity when the network is asynchronous, we obtain the following lemma:

Lemma 4. *Let R be a relation. Let n, t_s, t_a be such that $t_a, t_s < n/2$. Assuming honest majority, there is a protocol that realizes the multi-party zero-knowledge functionality for P as prover with the following guarantees:*

1. *When run in a synchronous network, it achieves full security up to t_s corruptions.*
2. *When run in an asynchronous network, it achieves security with selective abort up to t_a corruptions.*

B Graded Consensus from MV-Broadcast

We introduce two primitives that we use to build intrusion-tolerant Byzantine agreement in Section 4, both of which are weaker primitives and thus do not require additional assumptions in asynchrony to solve (i.e. coin flipping). Looking forward, neither primitive guarantees termination itself but will terminate when used in our Byzantine agreement protocol. We note that for our MV-broadcast and graded consensus protocols in this section we assume that at most one message per ‘type’ is accepted by a party (which is trivial to implement). This step is taken in order to ensure security of the protocols and bound their communication complexity.

B.1 Towards Intrusion Tolerance: MV-Broadcast

The first primitive is MV-broadcast which was defined in [MR17] for the asynchronous setting. The goal of MV-broadcast is to ‘filter’ messages for consensus: parties input a value v and output a set S such that each value inside was either MV-broadcasted by an honest party (validity 1) or is a default value. It guarantees a limited form of agreement on values (validity 2 and inclusion). For MV-broadcast, we consider default value $\perp_{mv} \notin V$.

Definition 17 (Multivalued broadcast (MV-broadcast) [MR17]). *Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P_1, \dots, P_n , where each party P_i begins holding input $v_i \in V$.*

- **Validity 1:** *Π achieves t -validity 1 if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, if an honest party outputs a set S such that $v \in S$ and $v \neq \perp_{mv}$, then v was input by an honest party.*
- **Validity 2:** *Π achieves t -validity 2 if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if every honest party’s input is equal to the same value v , then no honest party outputs a set containing \perp_{mv} .*
- **Inclusion:** *Π achieves t -inclusion if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if honest P_i and P_j output sets S_i and S_j respectively, then $S_i = \{w\} \Rightarrow w \in S_j$ (note $w = \perp_{mv}$ is possible).*
- **Liveness:** *Π achieves t -liveness if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, every honest party outputs a set S where each $v \in S$ is such that $v \in V \cup \{\perp_{mv}\}$.*
- **Validity with liveness:** *Π achieves t -validity with liveness if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if every honest party’s input is equal to the same value v , every honest party outputs the set $S = \{v\}$.*

In [MR17], validity 1 and validity 2 are denoted as justification and obligation, respectively. We additionally define validity with liveness which our protocol will satisfy with t_s corruptions in synchrony. We present our MV-broadcast construction in Figure 6.

$\Pi_{MV}^{t_a, t_s}$ works as follows. Consider honest P_i with input value $v_i \in V$. For each $v \in V$, P_i manages tracks two local initially empty sets $M_1(v)$ and $M_2(v)$. There




Fig. 6: MV-broadcast from the perspective of party P_i .

are two types of messages multicast by P_i , $(mv1, v)$ and $(mv2, v)$ for $v \in V$. The distinction between $mv1$ and $mv2$ is simply to multicast $(mv2, v)$ as soon as enough $(mv1, v)$ messages (on the same value v) were received, which is tracked via the set $M_1(v)$. By definition, $M_1(v)$ is the set of parties from which P_i has received a $(mv1, v)$ message. On the other hand, $M_2(v)$ keeps track of whether value v is validated (was input by an honest party) or not.

After variable initialisation, P_i multicasts $(mv1, v_i)$ (step 3). For a given v , on first receipt of $(mv1, v)$ from $t_s + 1$ parties, P_i multicasts it (step 5). On first receipt of $(mv1, v)$ from $n - t_s$ parties for *any* v (step 4), P_i sets **ready** = **true** and multicasts $(mv2, v)$ i.e. P_i champions v for output. At this time, $M_2(v)$ is also updated (step (i)). If too many values were received, i.e. $|\cup_{v' \in V} M_1(v')| - |M_1(v_{max})| \geq t_s + 1$ where $v_{max} = \arg \max_{v' \in V} |M_1(v')|$, then P_i signals this by multicasting $(mv1, \perp_{mv})$ (step 6). At any time, P_i updates the set $M_2(v)$ as $M_2(v) = M_2(v) \cup \{j\}$ after it receives proposal $(mv2, v)$ by party P_j whenever P_i has received the message $(mv1, v)$ from $\geq n - t_s$ distinct parties. Finally, when P_i first receives $n - t_s$ $(mv2, w)$ messages where $n - t_s$ $(mv1, w)$ messages were also received (on possibly different values w), captured by the predicate $|\cup_{v \in V} M_2(v)| \geq n - t_s$ in step 7, P_i outputs $\{v : |M_2(v)| > 0\}$.

Communication Complexity. We argue in the following that the communication complexity of our MV-broadcast protocol Π_{MV} is bounded by $O(n^3)$.

Having a look at Figure 6, we see that every honest party multicasts at most one message of the form $(\text{mv}2, -)$ (line 4). Furthermore, a message of the form $(\text{mv}1, v)$ for some $v \neq \perp_{mv}$ is multicast if it was received from at least $t_s + 1$ distinct parties, ensuring that the message had to come from at least one honest party (line 5). In particular, an honest party only $\text{mv}1$ -multicasts at most $n - t_s$ times. Moreover, every honest party multicasts at most one message of the form $(\text{mv}1, \perp_{mv})$ (line 6). As a result, the overall communication complexity of Π_{MV} is bounded by $O(n^3)$.

Theorem 5. *Let n, t_s, t_a be such that $0 \leq t_a < \frac{n}{3} \leq t_s < \frac{n}{2}$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then MV -broadcast protocol $\Pi_{MV}^{t_a, t_s}$ (Figure 6) satisfies t_s -validity 1, t_s -validity 2, t_s -valid with liveness, t_a -inclusion and t_a -liveness.*

We prove this by proving the following lemmas.

Lemma 5. *Let $t_s < n/2$. Then $\Pi_{MV}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_s -validity 1.*

Proof. Recall that a party P_i only outputs values v such that $|M_2(v)| > 0$ (line 7, Figure 6). In order to prove t_s -validity 1, we show that no honest party P_i adds a value $v \in V$ to $M_2(v)$ such that $(\text{mv}1, v)$ was multicast only by dishonest parties. For this, let there be t_s dishonest parties that multicast $(\text{mv}1, v)$ such that $(\text{mv}1, v)$ is not multicast by any honest party. Since $t_s + 1 > t_s$, no honest party echoes the value v and thus v can be received only from the dishonest parties (line 5). As a consequence, no honest party P_i receives $(\text{mv}1, v)$ from $n - t_s > t_s$ distinct parties and so $M_2(v)$ is never populated by P_i (line 'Updating $M_2(v)$ ' (i) and (ii)). \square

Lemma 6. *Let $t_s < n/2$. Then $\Pi_{MV}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_s -validity with liveness.*

Proof. In order to prove t_s -validity with liveness, we show that if every honest party's input is equal to the same value $v \in V$, then every honest party outputs the set $S = \{v\}$.

Let every honest party multicast $(\text{mv}1, v)$ on the same value $v \in V$ (line 3, Figure 6). As argued in the previous proof, no honest party echoes a value w different from v (line 5) Therefore, at most t_s values different from v are multicast as $(\text{mv}1, -)$ messages. Now we consider an honest party P_i in the worst case execution, in which the t_s dishonest parties multicast $(\text{mv}1, w)$ on the same value $w \neq v$. In that case, $|M_1(v)|$ increases monotonically from 0 to $n - t_s$ and $|M_1(w)|$ increases monotonically from 0 to t_s . There are the following two cases.

- (i) Suppose that $|M_1(w)| \geq |M_1(v)|$. In this case, the predicate $|\bigcup_{v' \in V} M_1(v')| - |M_1(v_{max})| \geq t_s + 1$ in line 6 reduces to $|M_1(v)| \geq t_s + 1$ and returns **false**, since $|M_1(v)| \leq |M_1(w)| \leq t_s$. Hence, P_i never multicasts $(\text{mv}1, \perp_{mv})$ (line 6).
- (ii) Suppose that $|M_1(v)| \geq |M_1(w)|$. In this case, the predicate $|\bigcup_{v' \in V} M_1(v')| - |M_1(v_{max})| \geq t_s + 1$ in line 6 reduces to $|M_1(w)| \geq t_s + 1$ and returns **false**, since $|M_1(w)| \leq t_s$. Hence, P_i never multicasts $(\text{mv}1, \perp_{mv})$ (line 6).

As a result, no honest party multicasts $(\text{mv1}, \perp_{mv})$. Therefore, no honest party P_i receives $(\text{mv1}, \perp_{mv})$ from $n - t_s > t_s$ distinct parties and $M_2(\perp_{mv})$ is never populated by P_i (line 'Updating $M_2(v)$ ' (i) and (ii)). The same is true for the value w . Consequently, every honest party outputs the same set $S = \{v\}$ (line 7). \square

Lemma 7. *Let $t_s < n/2$. Then $\Pi_{\text{MV}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_s -validity 2.*

Proof. This follows directly from t_s -validity with liveness. \square

Lemma 8. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{MV}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_a -inclusion.*

Proof. In order to prove t_a -inclusion, we show that if honest parties P_i and P_j output sets S_i and S_j respectively, then $S_i = \{w\}$ implies $w \in S_j$ (note that $w = \perp_{mv}$ is possible).

Let honest party P_i output the set $S_i = \{w\}$ (line 7, Figure 6). This is conditioned on $|\cup_{v \in V} M_2(v)| \geq n - t_s$ by line 7 and implies that P_i has received $(\text{mv2}, w)$ from at least $n - t_s$ distinct parties by definition of the set $M_2(-)$ in line 'Updating $M_2(v)$ ' (i) and (ii). Now consider an honest party $P_j \neq P_i$. Before P_j outputs the set S_j , it has received messages $(\text{mv2}, -)$ from $n - t_s$ distinct parties, that is from at least $n - t_s - t_a > t_s$ honest parties. Since $(n - t_s) + (t_s + 1) > n$, it follows that there is an honest party P_k that sent the same message $(\text{mv2}, v)$ to both P_i and P_j . But since P_i has received only messages $(\text{mv2}, w)$ from $n - t_s$ parties, it follows that $v = w$ and thus $w \in S_j$. \square

Lemma 9. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{MV}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_a -liveness.*

Proof. In order to prove t_a -liveness, we show that every honest party outputs some set. For this, we first show that every honest party eventually multicasts some $(\text{mv2}, -)$ message (line 4, Figure 6). We consider the following predicate P : There is a value $v \in V$ such that after some finite time at least $t_s + 1$ honest parties have multicast $(\text{mv1}, v)$. Consider the following two cases.

- (i) The predicate P is satisfied. In this case, every honest party eventually multicasts $(\text{mv1}, v)$ by construction of $\Pi_{\text{MV}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (line 5). Since there are at least $n - t_a \geq n - t_s$ honest parties, ready eventually is set to true by every honest party due to delivering $(\text{mv1}, v)$ from $n - t_s$ distinct parties (line 4).
- (ii) The predicate P is not satisfied. We consider an honest party P_i . Let $v_{max} = \max_{v' \in V} |M_1(v')|$, i.e. the most frequent mv1 value received, and let r be the number of honest parties that multicast $(\text{mv1}, v_{max})$. Since P is not satisfied, $r \leq t_s$. Since there are at least $n - t_a$ honest parties, P_i receives at least $n - t_a + k$ messages $(\text{mv1}, -)$ with some $k \in [0, t_a]$. At most $r + k$ of these parties sent message $(\text{mv1}, v_{max})$ to P_i , and therefore at least $(n - t_a + k) - (r + k) = n - t_a - r$ of them sent values different from v_{max} to P_i . But since $n - t_a - r \geq n - t_a - t_s > t_s$, the predicate $|\cup_{v' \in V} M_1(v')| - |M_1(v_{max})| \geq t_s + 1$ in line 6 is satisfied and P_i multicasts $(\text{mv1}, \perp_{mv})$ (line 6). Analogously, this applies to all honest parties. And thus, every honest party receives messages $(\text{mv1}, \perp_{mv})$ from at least $n - t_a \geq n - t_s$ distinct parties. As a result, ready becomes eventually true for every honest party (line 4).

This concludes our initial assertion that every honest party eventually multicasts some message $(\text{mv2}, -)$ (by setting `ready` to `true`) by line 4.

For the final step, we show that every honest party eventually receives *validated* messages $(\text{mv2}, -)$ from at least $n - t_s$ distinct parties and thus outputs a set (namely $\{v : M_2(v) \neq \emptyset\}$) by line 7. Here, by a *validated* message $(\text{mv2}, w)$ we mean one such that the party has also received messages $(\text{mv1}, w)$ on the same value w from at least $n - t_s$ distinct parties (as is declared in line 4). By the previous assertion, each honest party P_i multicasts some message $(\text{mv2}, v_i)$ where v_i is such that $|M_1(v_i)| \geq n - t_s$. Since $(n - t_s) - t_a > t_s$, at least $t_s + 1$ honest parties have multicast $(\text{mv1}, v_i)$. Thus, every honest party eventually multicasts $(\text{mv1}, v_i)$ and for every honest party P_j we have $|M_1(v_i)| \geq n - t_a \geq n - t_s$. As a consequence, every honest party P_j adds $\{j\}$ to its set $M_2(v_i)$. Since this proof hitherto also applies to every honest party P_j (in place of P_i), eventually every honest party receives validated messages $(\text{mv2}, -)$ from at least $n - t_a \geq n - t_s$ distinct parties and thus outputs the set $\{v : M_2(v) \neq \emptyset\}$ (line 7). \square

B.2 Validity-Optimized Graded Consensus

Next, we define a graded consensus primitive. In graded consensus, each party inputs a value but outputs both a value $v \in V \cup \{\perp\}$ and a corresponding grade $g \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. *Binary* graded consensus (i.e., where $V = \{0, 1\}$) was previously considered for building network-agnostic binary agreement in [BKL19]. Our primitive will also require an intrusion tolerance property that we define below.

Definition 18 (Graded consensus). *Let Π be a protocol executed by parties P_1, \dots, P_n , where each party P_i begins holding input $v_i \in V$.*

- **Graded validity:** *Π achieves t -graded validity if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: if every honest party's input is equal to the same value v , then all honest parties output $(v, 2)$.*
- **Graded consistency:** *Π achieves t -graded consistency if the following holds whenever at most t parties are corrupted: (1) If two honest parties output grades g, g' , then $|g - g'| \leq 1$. (2) If two honest parties output (v, g) and (v', g') with $g, g' \geq 1$, then $v = v'$.*
- **Liveness:** *Π achieves t -liveness if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, every honest party outputs (v, g) with either $v \in V$ and $g \geq 1$, or $v = \perp$ and $g = 0$.*
- **Intrusion tolerance:** *Π achieves t -intrusion tolerance if whenever at most t parties are corrupted, if (v, g) is output by an honest party and $g \geq 1$, then v was input by an honest party.*

We construct a multivalued graded consensus protocol $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (Figure 7) Our protocol requires two (implicitly domain separated) instances of $\Pi_{\text{MV}}^{t_a, t_s}$ which we denote by MV_1 and MV_2 with default values \perp_{mv1} and \perp_{mv2} respectively.

$\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ works as follows. Suppose (honest) P_i inputs v_i . In addition to messages from MV-broadcast, Π_{GC} uses two message types, namely (init, v) and




Fig. 7: Multivalued graded consensus from the perspective of party P_i .

(echo, v) for some $v \in V$. After initialising variables, P_i multicasts (init, v_i) (and doesn't send init messages hereafter). On receipt of messages (msg, v) (where $\text{msg} \in \{\text{init}, \text{echo}\}$ from $t_s + 1$ parties (and thus an honest party input v), P_i multicasts (echo, v) if not yet done. Except for these steps, communication takes place through MV_1 and MV_2 .

Let $R(v)$ be the set of parties from which P_i has received a message of the form (init, v) or (echo, v) (step 2). Then, whenever P_i receives a message (msg, v) , P_i checks some conditions to determine whether it can input a value to MV_1 (after which the conditions are ignored). If $|R(v)| \geq t_s + 1$ and $v \neq v_i$, P_i inputs \perp_{rd} to MV_1 , indicating disagreement between two honest parties. Similarly, if $|\cup_{v' \in V} R(v')| - \max_{v' \in V} |R(v')| \geq t_s + 1$, P_i inputs \perp_{rd} to MV_1 . If $|R(v)| \geq n - t_s$, indicating enough parties received v , P_i inputs v to MV_1 .

Then, P_i eventually outputs a set S_1 from MV_1 . If $|S_1| = \{v\}$, P_i runs MV_2 with that input; otherwise P_i runs MV_2 on input \perp (step 6). On outputting S_2 from MV_2 (step 2), if $S_2 = \{v\}$ and not a default value, then it outputs $(v, 2)$. Otherwise, if S_2 contains a non-default value, P_i outputs that value and $g = 1$; else, P_i outputs $(\perp, 0)$.

Communication Complexity. We argue in Lemma 14 that the communication complexity of our graded consensus protocol $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ is bounded by $O(n^3)$.

Theorem 6. *Let n, t_s, t_a be such that $0 \leq t_a < \frac{n}{3} \leq t_s < \frac{n}{2}$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then graded consensus protocol $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (Figure 7) satisfies t_s -graded validity, t_s -intrusion tolerance, t_a -graded consistency and t_a -liveness.*

We prove this by proving the following lemmas.

Lemma 10. *Let $t_s < n/2$. Then $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_s -graded validity.*

Proof. In order to prove t_s -graded validity, we show that if every honest party's input is equal to the same value v , then all honest parties output $(v, 2)$. Let every honest party multicast (init, v) (line 3, Figure 7). Since there are at most $t_s < t_s + 1$ dishonest parties, no honest party echoes a value different from v (line 4). Therefore, from the perspective of every honest party P_i the set $R(w)$ is of size $\leq t_s$ for every $w \neq v$. In particular, conditions (a) and (c) of line 5 are not satisfied for the value v . On the other hand, since there are at least $n - t_s$ honest parties that multicast (init, v) , it is $|R(v)| \geq n - t_s$, and P_i sets $\text{output} = \text{true}$ and $\text{val} = v$ (line 5, condition (b)). As this applies to every honest party, each of them run MV_1 on the same input v (line 5 (d)). Now, t_s -validity with liveness from MV_1 ensures that every honest party outputs the set $S_1 = \{v\}$. As a result, each of them sets $\text{aux} = v$ and runs MV_2 again on input v (line 6). The same argument yields that every honest party outputs the set $S_2 = \{v\}$. Finally, as $v \notin \{\perp_{rd}, \perp_{mv1}, \perp_{mv2}, \perp\}$, every honest party outputs $(v, 2)$ (line 7 (a)). \square

Lemma 11. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_a -graded consistency.*

Proof. In order to prove t_a -graded consistency, we show that (1) if two honest parties output grades g, g' , then $|g - g'| \leq 1$, and (2) if two honest parties output (v, g) and (v', g') with $g, g' \geq 1$, then $v = v'$.

For the first clause, assume that there are two honest parties P_i and P_j where P_i outputs $(v, 2)$. This means P_i 's output S_2 from MV_2 is $S_2 = \{v\}$ with $v \notin \{\perp_{rd}, \perp_{mv1}, \perp_{mv2}, \perp\}$ (line 7 (a), Figure 7). By t_a -inclusion of MV_2 , every honest party P_j outputs a set S_2 such that $v \in S_2$ and therefore cannot output grade $g' = 0$ for its final decision (line 7 (c)). This proves the first clause.

For the second clause, consider two honest parties P_i and P_j that output (v, g) and (v', g') respectively with $g, g' \geq 1$. We write $S_2(P_k)$ for the output set S_2 from MV_2 of party P_k ; for the output set S_1 we likewise define $S_1(P_k)$. In particular, $v \in S_2(P_i)$ and $v' \in S_2(P_j)$ with $v, v' \notin \{\perp_{rd}, \perp_{mv1}, \perp_{mv2}, \perp\}$ (line 7 (a) and (b)). By t_a -inclusion of MV_2 , it follows that $v \in S_2(P_j)$ and thus $\{v, v'\} \subseteq S_2(P_j)$. By t_s -validity 1 of MV_2 , v' was input by some honest party P_k to MV_2 . In particular, $\text{aux} = v'$ for party P_k and thus $S_1(P_k) = \{v'\}$ (line 6). Analogously, there is some honest party P_l that input v to MV_2 and hence $S_1(P_l) = \{v\}$. But by t_a -inclusion of MV_1 , it follows that $v = v'$, which concludes the proof. \square

Lemma 12. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_a -liveness.*

Proof. In order to prove t_a -liveness, we show that every honest party outputs (v, g) with either $v \in V$ and $g \geq 1$, or $v = \perp$ and $g = 0$ (line 7, Figure 7). We consider the following predicate P : There is a value $v \in V$ such that after some finite time at least $t_s + 1$ honest parties have multicast (init, v) . Consider the following two cases.

- (i) The predicate P is satisfied. It follows that every honest party eventually multicasts (echo, v) (if not yet multicast (init, v)) (line 4). As there are at least $n - t_a \geq n - t_s$ honest parties, the predicate $|R(v)| \geq n - t_s$ in line 5 (b) becomes eventually true for every honest party and each of them sets $\text{output} = \text{true}$ and runs MV_1 (line 5 (d)). By t_a -liveness of MV_1 , every honest party outputs some set S_1 and runs MV_2 on input aux (line 6). And by t_a -liveness of MV_2 , every honest party outputs some set S_2 and finally outputs some graded value (v, g) (line 7). The requirement $[v \in V \text{ and } g \geq 1, \text{ or } v = \perp \text{ and } g = 0]$ is trivially satisfied by construction of $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ in its final step (line 7).
- (ii) The predicate P is not satisfied. This means there is no value v that is multicast (init, v) by at least $t_s + 1$ honest parties. We consider an honest party P_i . Let v_{\max} be its most often received value from distinct parties as defined in line 5 (c) and let r be the number of honest parties that multicast (init, v_{\max}) . By assumption, we have $r \leq t_s$. Let $k \in [0, t_a]$ be the number of distinct dishonest parties from which P_i has received the message (init, v_{\max}) . Clearly, at most $t_s + k \geq r + k$ distinct parties have sent the value v_{\max} to P_i . Now assume that the waiting predicates $[|R(v)| \geq n - t_s]$ and $[\text{for } w \neq v_i \text{ and } |R(w)| \geq t_s + 1]$ in line 5 (a) and (b) are never satisfied (otherwise P_i sets $\text{output} = \text{true}$ and proceeds with the execution of MV_1). Since P_i does not terminate at these predicates, it receives a message from each honest party, that is from at least $n - t_a$ parties. Hence, P_i receives messages from at least $n - t_a + k$ distinct parties. As a consequence, at least $(n - t_a + k) - (t_s + k) = n - t_a - t_s > t_s$ distinct parties have sent values different from v to P_i . As a result, the predicate $|\cup_{v' \in V} R(v')| - |R(v_{\max})| \geq t_s + 1$ in line 5 (c) is eventually satisfied and P_i runs MV_1 on input $\text{val} = \perp_{rd}$. Therefore, every honest party runs MV_1 on some input (line 5 (d)) and the remainder of the proof proceeds as in the previous case.

□

Lemma 13. *Let $t_s < n/2$. Then $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_s -intrusion tolerance.*

Proof. In order to prove t_s -intrusion tolerance, we show that no honest party P_i outputs a graded value (v, g) with $g \geq 1$ that was multicast (init, v) by dishonest parties only. For this, let there be t_s dishonest parties that multicast (init, v) such that (init, v) is not multicast by any honest party. Since $t_s + 1 > t_s$, no honest party echoes (echo, v) the value v and thus v can be received only from the t_s dishonest parties (line 4, Figure 7). As a consequence, for every honest party P_i it is $|R(v)| \leq t_s < n - t_s$ and thus no honest party sets val equal to v (line 5 (b)). The claim follows from t_s -validity 1 of MV_1 and MV_2 . □

Finally, we bound the complexity of the protocol.

Lemma 14. *Let $t_s < n/2$. The total communication complexity of the graded consensus protocol $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ is bounded by $O(n^3)$.*

Proof. First, we show that each honest party may echo at most one message (echo, $-$). For this, let $n = 2t_s + 1$. Consider an honest party P_i . Clearly, P_i receives at most one message (init, $-$) from any other party, as it otherwise would know that the sender is dishonest. In order to multicast message (echo, v) for some $v \neq v_i$, P_i needs to receive (init, v) from $t_s + 1$ distinct parties (line 4, Figure 7). Since $n = (t_s + 1) + (t_s)$, it follows that P_i can echo at most one message (echo, $-$). This gives a communication complexity of $O(n^2)$ up to line 5 (c).

Next, we show that the communication complexity of MV_1 is bounded by $O(n^3)$. Having a look at Figure 6, we see that every honest party multicasts at most one message of the form (mv2, $-$) (line 4). Furthermore, a message of the form (mv1, v) for some $v \neq \perp_{mv}$ is multicast if it was received from at least $t_s + 1$ distinct parties, ensuring that the message had to come from at least one honest party (line 5). In particular, an honest party only mv1-multicasts at most $n - t_s$ times. Moreover, every honest party multicasts at most one message of the form (mv1, \perp_{mv}) (line 6). As a result, the overall communication complexity of MV_1 is bounded by $O(n^3)$. Getting back to Figure 7, line 5 (d) and line 6 give two instances of the MV-broadcast protocol with communication complexity $O(n^3)$, so that the overall communication complexity of $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ is bounded by $O(n^3)$. \square

C Binary Agreement Protocol

We present a Byzantine binary agreement protocol $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$. Let $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_s}$ be a (binary) graded consensus protocol, i.e. takes as input a value in $\{0, 1\}$ where each party outputs a value $v \in \{0, 1, \perp\}$ and a grade $g \in \{0, 1, 2\}$. We require that $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_s}$ satisfies t_s -graded validity and is t_a -secure: the protocol from [BKL19] (Figure 4) satisfies these properties with $O(n^2)$ communication complexity. We also require a coin-flip mechanism CoinFlip which allows all parties to generate and know an unbiased binary value $\text{Coin}_r \in \{0, 1\}$ for $r \geq 2$. Upon receiving input $r \geq 2$ from $t_s + 1$ parties, the coin flip mechanism generates an unbiased coin $\text{Coin}_r \in \{0, 1\}$ and sends (r, Coin_r) to all parties. In particular, if at most t_s parties are corrupted, at least one honest party must send r to CoinFlip before the adversary can learn the coin Coin_r . We will rely on a \tilde{p} -weak coin flip with $\tilde{p} = 1/3$, where honest parties agree on the coin only with probability $\tilde{p} < 1$. This comes with an increase in the expected round complexity by a factor of $O(1/\tilde{p}) = O(1)$. Our coin flip mechanism is the one from [GLL⁺21] (Algorithm 4), which costs only $O(\lambda n^3)$ bits and has expected constant rounds (and ensures that with probability at least $1/3$, all honest parties output an unbiased common coin).

Our asynchronous Byzantine agreement protocol $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (Figure 8) works as follows. We describe it from the perspective of a party P_i with input value v_i .

In the protocol, we say message $(\text{commit}, b, \sigma)$ from party P_i (as in ‘Termination procedure’, steps (i) and (ii)) is valid if $b \in \{0, 1\}$ and σ is a valid signature from P_i on (commit, b) , i.e $\sigma \leftarrow \langle \text{commit}, b \rangle_i$. Also, we say that a set of signatures is a certificate for b (as in step (i) and (ii)) if the set contains valid signatures on (commit, b) from at least $t_s + 1$ distinct parties.

As usual, at the beginning helper variables are set (step 1). Afterwards, the protocol proceeds in round defined by the parameter r . In such a round, P_i first runs the graded consensus protocol $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_s}$ on input $b = v_i$ with (b, g) being the output (step 2). Note that for rounds $r < 3$ we set the coin to some deterministic default value (which does not affect the safety of the algorithm). We do this because we can then assume our coin flip mechanism only works in asynchrony (and thus use the algorithm from [GLL⁺21]) so that when we show t_s -validity with termination, it will also hold that the coin is never used. Otherwise, $\text{CoinFlip}(r)$ is invoked.

Then, if $g < 2$, P_i runs $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_s}$ on input Coin_r (step 4), otherwise on input b (steps 4 and 5), with (b', g) being the output. Now if $g > 0$, set $b = b'$ (step 5). In case $g = 2$, the next step is done only once (which is guaranteed by setting helper variable cm to true): compute the signature σ on (commit, b) and multicast the message $(\text{commit}, b, \sigma)$ (step 7). Finally, the next round starts by increasing r by one (step 8) with a small restriction: As soon as P_i computes a commit message, it only executes one additional round of the protocol and then stops (this is ensured by the variable stop in steps 7 and 8). Furthermore, party P_i terminates and ends the protocol as soon as (i) it receives valid commit messages on the same value b from at least $t_s + 1$ distinct parties (before termination, P_i combines the signatures into a certificate Σ , multicasts $(\text{notify}, b, \Sigma)$ and outputs b), or (ii) it receives $(\text{notify}, b, \Sigma)$ with Σ being a certificate on messages (commit, b) for the same value b (before termination, P_i multicasts $(\text{notify}, b, \Sigma)$ and outputs b).

The purpose of the stop variable is to ensure that the communication complexity of the protocol stays bounded. The protocol is well-defined and terminates, since we have the following: if one honest party set $\text{cm} = \text{true}$ in round r , then all parties set $\text{cm} = \text{true}$ in (at most) round $r + 1$. We sketch the argument for this claim in the following. We will say a party *committed* if it sets $\text{cm} = \text{true}$. Suppose an honest party committed in round r . By construction, it must have $g = 2$ and by graded consistency of $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_s}$, it is $|g - g'| \leq 1$ for all g' output by honest parties. Therefore, all honest parties output $g = 1$ or $g = 2$. Furthermore, graded consistency implies that if one honest party outputs $(v, g = 2)$, then all honest parties output the same v , and so all honest parties will input v in the next round. Again by graded validity, all honest parties will output $g = 2$ from the first execution of $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_s}$ and by similar arguments every honest party will have committed in that round (we will see this argumentation more thoroughly in the proof for t_s -graded validity below).

We have the following theorem.

Theorem 7. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then Π_{BA} achieves t_s -validity with termination and is t_a -secure.*




Fig. 8: Binary agreement protocol from the perspective of party P_i .

Proof. First, we prove the t_s -validity with termination. For this, assume all honest parties initially hold the same value $v \in \{0, 1\}$. All honest parties use v as input in the first execution of the graded consensus protocol $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_s}$ (step 2). By t_s -graded validity of $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_s}$, all honest parties output $(v, 2)$ from that execution. Thus, all honest parties run a second instance of $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_s}$ using input v (step 5), again receiving $(v, 2)$ as output. Therefore, all honest parties multicast a commit message on v (step 7). Additionally, by the stop variable, all honest parties will only execute one additional round of the protocol. Furthermore, the honest parties will receive at most $t_s < t_s + 1$ commit messages on some $w \neq v$. Therefore, all honest parties eventually receive valid commit messages on v from $n - t_s \geq t_s + 1$ distinct parties, output v , and terminate (step (i) and (ii) of 'Termination procedure').

The proof of the t_a -security follows the same argumentation as the proof of Lemma 11 in [BKL19] and therefore we skip it here.

D Threshold Additively Homomorphic Encryption Scheme

We provide a discrete logarithm-based threshold additively homomorphic encryption scheme for our MPC protocol in Section 6. For our scheme, we choose a bitwise procedure of the usual (threshold) Elgamal encryption in the exponent. To this end, the encryption of an ℓ -bit long message m with binary representation $m = m_1 \dots m_\ell$ is given by the string $c = c_1 \dots c_\ell$ where c_i is a regular Elgamal encryption of bit m_i for all $i \in [1, \ell]$. The decryption is also done bitwise. This approach allows us to get an additively homomorphic scheme. More formally, our (t, n) -threshold homomorphic encryption scheme $\Sigma = (\text{Keygen}, \text{TEnc}, \text{TDec}, \text{TRec})$ is defined as follows.

- **Keygen:** On input the security parameter λ and the pair (t, n) , sample a uniformly random polynomial $f(X) = d + a_1X + \dots + a_tX^t \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ of degree t and return the key pair (ek, dk) , where $\text{ek} = g^d$ is the public key and $\text{dk} = (\text{dk}_1, \dots, \text{dk}_n)$ with $\text{dk}_i = f(i)$ for $i \in [1, n]$ is the list of private keys.
- **TEnc:** On input the public key ek and a message $m = m_1 \dots m_\ell \in \{0, 1\}^*$, sample uniformly random integers $r_1, \dots, r_\ell \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ and return the encryption $\text{TEnc}_{\text{ek}}(m) = c_1 \dots c_\ell$ where $c_i = (c_{i,1}, c_{i,2}) = (g^{r_i}, g^{m_i} \cdot \text{ek}^{r_i})$ for $i \in [1, \ell]$.
- **TDec:** On input a secret key share dk_j and a ciphertext $c = c_1 \dots c_\ell$, return the j th decryption share $\text{TDec}_{\text{dk}_j}(c) = m_1^{(j)} \dots m_\ell^{(j)}$ where $m_i^{(j)} = (c_{i,1}^{\text{dk}_j}, c_{i,2})$ for $i \in [1, \ell]$.
- **TRec:** On input the public key ek and $t + 1$ decryption shares $\{\text{TDec}_{\text{dk}_j}(c)\}_{j \in S}$, reconstruct the plaintext m as follows. For $i \in [1, \ell]$, compute $c_{i,1}^d = g^{d r_i} = \text{ek}^{r_i}$ by Lagrange interpolation in the exponent and obtain $h_i = c_{i,2} \cdot (\text{ek}^{r_i})^{-1}$. By comparing h_i to $g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$, obtain $m_i = \text{DL}_g(h_i)$ (which might be non-binary) and return the plaintext $m = m_1 2^{\ell-1} + \dots + m_\ell 2^0 \in \{0, 1\}^*$.

Note that for the reconstruction algorithm, we explicitly allow the discrete logarithm $m_i = \text{DL}_g(h_i)$ of h_i to be a non-binary value, even though in the encryption procedure this value is binary. This extension gives the scheme its additively homomorphic property defined as follows.

- Additively homomorphic: On input the public key ek and two encryptions (w.l.o.g. of the same size ℓ -bit) $\text{TEnc}_{\text{ek}}(m) = c_1 \dots c_\ell$, $\text{TEnc}_{\text{ek}}(m') = c'_1 \dots c'_\ell$, compute $C_i = (c_{i,1}c'_{i,1}, c_{i,2}c'_{i,2})$ for $i \in [1, \ell]$ and return their encrypted sum $\text{TEnc}_{\text{ek}}(m + m') = C_1 \dots C_\ell$.

We emphasize the following crucial observation. By adding only polynomial many messages $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, the elements h_i (as explained in the TRec algorithm above) remain in the domain of $g^0, g^1, \dots, g^{\text{poly}(\lambda)}$, so that TRec is able to efficiently compute the discrete logarithms of the h_i 's by simple comparison. We note that security of our scheme directly follows from the security of (threshold) Elgamal encryption (applied to every bit).

E Deferred Security Proofs

E.1 Proof of Theorem 1

Towards this goal, we begin by modeling probabilistic dissemination by the procedure AddRandomEdges (Figure 9) and prove some results used to prove t_s -security of our BC protocol. The techniques that follow are from [TLP22], where however they use binary input instead of multivalued one.

- Input: Set of n nodes W , disjoint subsets $S_2, S_3 \subset W$, $S \subset W \setminus (S_2 \cup S_3)$, integer $q \leq n$.
- Output: The graph G .
- 1. Let G be the empty graph with node set W .
- 2. For every $u \in S$ and $v \in W$, add an edge $\{u, v\}$ to G with probability q/n .
- 3. Return graph G .

Fig. 9: $\text{AddRandomEdges}(W, S_2, S_3, S, q)$ procedure.

AddRandomEdges is defined over a set of nodes W that is partitioned into three disjoint subsets $S_1, S_2, S_3 \subset W$ with $S_1 = W \setminus (S_2 \cup S_3)$. The way AddRandomEdges works is as follows. At the beginning, we have an empty graph G with node set W . Now given $S \subset S_1$, AddRandomEdges adds the edge $\{u, v\}$ to the graph G with probability q/n for every pair of nodes $u \in S$ and $v \in W$. At the end, the resulting graph with all the added edges is output. In the context of our protocol, S will be the set of parties that send a message m at a specific

round r and S_2 will be the set of parties that have not received m in a previous round. An edge from $u \in S$ to $v \in W$ represents that party u sends m to party v in round r . Our goal is to determine how many parties in S_2 receive message m for the first time during round r . For this, we define the following indicator random variables.

Definition 19. Let $G \leftarrow \text{AddRandomEdges}(W, S_2, S_3, S, q)$. For all $u \in S_2$, let $Z_u \in \{0, 1\}$ with $Z_u = 1$ if and only if u has nonzero degree in G .

We find that the number of nodes in S_2 with nonzero degree in G is at least twice the number of nodes in S . This will allow us to show that messages propagate exponentially fast in our broadcast protocol. The proof of the following lemma can be found in the Appendix of [TLP22] (Proof of Lemma 1).

Lemma 15. Let (S_1, S_2, S_3) be a partition of n nodes into (disjoint) sets with $\tau = |S_1| \leq \epsilon n/3$, $|S_2| = \epsilon n - |S_1|$, $|S_3| = n - \epsilon n$, where $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$ is a constant. Let $S \subset S_1$ with $|S| \geq 2\tau/3$, and let $\{Z_u\}_{u \in S_2}$ be the random variables defined above. Then for $q \geq 15/\epsilon$, we have

$$\Pr \left[\sum_{u \in S_2} Z_u \geq 2\tau \right] = 1 - p, \quad \text{where } p = \max \left\{ \epsilon n \cdot e^{-\epsilon q/9}, \left(\frac{e}{2} \right)^{-\epsilon q/4} \right\}.$$

For our proof of t_s -security and t_a -weak validity, we define the following sets of parties w.r.t. a value $m \in V$ and a round r :

1. $S(m, r)$: honest parties P_i that set $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$ at round r .
2. $S_1(m, r)$: honest parties P_i that set $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$ by round r .
3. $S_2(m, r)$: honest parties P_i that still have $\text{sent}[m] = \text{false}$ in round r .

Additionally, we let S_3 be the set of malicious parties (in particular, $|S_3| = n - \epsilon n$). Before we start our proof of security for the Core BC Protocol, we show that the number of parties that receive a message at round \tilde{r} that was sent at round $r < \tilde{r}$ increases exponentially with $\tilde{r} - r$ (with overwhelming probability). The proof of the following theorem can be found in the Appendix of [TLP22] (Proof of Lemma 2) with the difference that their set V is of order 2. However, this difference does not have any impact on the proof itself and therefore the same proof applies for our case of V being of order ≥ 2 .

Lemma 16. For a specific value $m \in V$, let r be the first round of the Core BC Protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t, \epsilon}$ where an honest party P_i sets $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$. Let $R = \lceil \log_3(\epsilon n) \rceil$, and let p be as in Lemma 15. Then we have the following bounds:

1. For all rounds ρ such that $r \leq \rho \leq r + R$ and $|S_1(m, \rho - 1)| \leq \epsilon n/3$, we have with probability at least $(1 - p)^{\rho - r}$ that

$$|S(m, \rho)| \geq 2/3 \cdot |S_1(m, \rho)| \quad \text{and} \quad |S_1(m, \rho)| \geq 3^{\rho - r}.$$

2. Let $\tilde{r} > r$ be a round such that $|S_1(m, \tilde{r} - 1)| > \epsilon n/3$. Then $|S_1(m, \tilde{r})| = \epsilon n$ with probability at least $(1 - \tilde{p})(1 - p)^{\tilde{r} - r - 1}$ where $\tilde{p} = \epsilon n \cdot e^{-2\epsilon q/9}$.

For the proofs hereafter, we let $R = \lceil \log_3(\epsilon n) \rceil$ and $q = \Theta(\lambda)$, where λ is the security parameter. Furthermore, all our statements hold with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Lemma 17. *Let $t_s < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$ achieves t_s -consistency when run in a synchronous network.*

Proof. Let $\mathcal{M} = \{m_1, \dots, m_k\}$ be the set of messages for which at least one honest party sets $\text{sent}[m_i] \leftarrow \text{true}$ during one run of the protocol. We consider three cases separately, namely when $|\mathcal{M}| = 0$, $|\mathcal{M}| = 1$ and $|\mathcal{M}| > 1$. Suppose first that $|\mathcal{M}| = 0$. Then all honest parties will never update v and consequently output \perp at step 3.

Suppose $|\mathcal{M}| = 1$. We show that if an honest party P_i sets $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$ for some value $m \in V$ at some round r , then by the end of the protocol all honest parties have set $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$ with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$. We consider the following two cases.

- (i) Suppose $r < t_s + 1$. For this, we distinguish the two cases $S_1(m, r) > \epsilon n/3$ and $S_1(m, r) \leq \epsilon n/3$. If $S_1(m, r) > \epsilon n/3$, then by item 2 of Lemma 16 all ϵn honest parties set $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$ by the next round with probability at least $(1 - \tilde{p})(1 - p)^{(r+1) - r - 1} = 1 - \epsilon n \cdot e^{-2\epsilon q/9}$. Since $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$, this probability is $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$. On the other hand, if $S_1(m, r) \leq \epsilon n/3$, let $r_0 := r + R - 1$. In case $S_1(m, r_0) > \epsilon n/3$, again the previous case applies. Otherwise, item 1 of Lemma 16 tells us that at round $r_0 + 1 = r + R$ we get $S_1(m, r + R) \geq 3^R = 3^{\lceil \log_3(\epsilon n) \rceil} \geq 3^{\log_3(\epsilon n)} = \epsilon n$ with probability at least $(1 - p)^R$. Since $-p \geq -1$ and $R \geq 1$, Bernoulli's inequality applies and gives $(1 - p)^R \geq 1 - pR$. Since $n = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ and $q = \Theta(\lambda)$, this probability is $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.
- (ii) Suppose $r \geq t_s + 1$. Suppose an honest party P_i sets $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$ at some round $r \geq t_s + 1$. Then, P_i has received a valid multisignature on m of degree at least $t_s + 1$ and $|\{m' \in M : \text{sent}[m'] = \text{true}\}| \leq 1$. In particular, an honest party P_j already set $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$ at some round $r' < t_s + 1$. Hence, former case (i) applies to honest party P_j . Ultimately, all honest parties set $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$ by the end of the protocol with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Finally, suppose that $|\mathcal{M}| \geq 2$. By the above logic, $\text{sent}[m]$ was set to true for an honest party P_i in round $r < t_s + 1$ for each $m \in M$. By construction of Π_{BC} , P_i will set $\text{detect}[m] \leftarrow \text{true}$ and multicast $(\sigma, (), (), m)$ if not already done, where σ is the signature of the designated sender P^* on message m . Thus, in the next round (given $R \geq 1$), all honest parties will receive $(\sigma, (), (), m)$, which correctly verifies. If $|\mathcal{M}| = 2$, then all honest parties will set $\text{detect}[m] = \text{true}$ for both messages, and consequently at step 3 all output \perp by construction of the protocol. If $|\mathcal{M}| > 2$, then it follows that for the first two messages that each honest party receives, they will set $\text{detect}[m] \leftarrow \text{true}$, and similarly output \perp . \square

Lemma 18. *Let $t_s < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$ achieves t_s -liveness and t_s -termination when run in a synchronous network.*

Proof. This follows trivially from the fact that all parties will terminate at step 3 after some finite amount of time regardless of whether or not they change the value v they output. \square

Lemma 19. *Let $t_s < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$ achieves t_s -validity when run in a synchronous network.*

Proof. In order to prove t_s -validity, we show that if the sender P^* is honest and inputs $m \in V$, then all honest parties output $v = m$. This directly follows from the proof of t_s -consistency and the fact that no honest party sets $\text{sent}[m] \leftarrow \text{true}$ on a message not signed by P^* . After $R = \lceil \log_3(\epsilon n) \rceil$ rounds, all honest parties have set $\text{sent}[m] = \text{true}$ with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ and will output $v = m$. \square

Lemma 20. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$ achieves t_a -weak validity even when run in an asynchronous network.¹²*

Proof. In order to prove t_a -weak validity, we show that if the sender P^* is honest and inputs $m = m_j \in V$, then all honest parties output either $v = m_j$ or $v = \perp$. This directly follows from the proof of t_s -validity in the synchronous case: in case an honest party does not receive a valid multisignature on m_j by the end of the protocol run, it just outputs $v = \perp$. \square

E.2 Proof of Theorem 2

Lemma 21. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_s -validity with termination. It follows that $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_a -validity.*

Proof. In order to prove t_s -validity with termination, we show that if every honest party's input is equal to the same value v , then every honest party outputs w and terminates. First, suppose that all honest parties receive output b from $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ and output v from $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ before terminating (line 3 and 4, Figure 3). Since all parties input v into $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$, by t_s -graded validity of $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ all parties eventually receive output $(v, 2)$ from $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (line 3). By construction of $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$, all honest parties then propose $\text{bp} = 1$ to $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (line 3). By the t_s -validity of $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$, all honest parties eventually output $b = 1$ from $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (line 4). All $n - t_s$ honest parties P_i then multicast $\langle \text{commit}, v \rangle_i$: since $n - t_s \geq t_s + 1$, all honest parties eventually deliver enough valid (commit, v) signatures (line 5). Moreover, since $t_s + 1 > t_s$, no honest party receives a valid commit message for any other $v' \neq v$.

Suppose now that some honest P_i terminates before both outputting from $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ and outputting b from $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$. That is, P_i delivered $t_s + 1$ valid $\langle \text{commit}, v \rangle_i$ messages from distinct parties before multicasting $t_s + 1$ signatures to all honest parties (line 5), since by the t_s -validity of $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$, bit $b = 0$ is never output by

¹²Note that n -weak validity trivially follows.

$\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$.¹³ Similarly, honest parties only multicast their individual commit message upon $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ outputting a value (which must be $(v, 2)$ as argued above). It follows that all honest parties output the same v and terminate either on receipt of P_i 's signatures or otherwise (line 5). \square

Lemma 22. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_a -consistency.*

Proof. Suppose that all honest parties that terminate receive output from $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ and $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ before terminating; we argue similarly to above Lemma 21 if this is not the case. Suppose that some honest party outputs $(v, 2)$ from graded consensus (line 3). Then, by t_a -graded consistency, all honest parties output (v, g) with the same v where $g \in \{1, 2\}$, which all honest parties eventually do by t_a -liveness. Consider the first honest party who outputs b from $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (line 4); by t_a -agreement and t_a -liveness all honest parties output the same b . Thus, all honest parties eventually multicast $\langle \text{commit}, v \rangle_i$ if $b = 1$ or $\langle \text{commit}, \perp \rangle_i$ if $b = 0$ (line 4). It follows that all honest parties who terminate output the same v by a similar argument to above.

Otherwise, if no party outputs $(v, 2)$, then by t_a -graded consistency no honest party proposes $\text{bp} = 1$ to $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$, and so by t_s -validity all parties output $b = 0$. Thus, as no honest party P_i multicasts $\langle \text{commit}, v \rangle_i$ for $v \neq \perp$ and $t_s + 1 > t_a$ (line 4), all parties who terminate agree on output \perp . \square

Lemma 23. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_a -liveness and t_a -termination.*

Proof. Note that, in $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$, t_a -liveness holds if and only if t_a -termination holds since all parties terminate directly after outputting.

Suppose that all honest parties that terminate receive output from $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ and $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ before terminating; we argue similarly to above Lemma 21 if this is not the case. By the t_a -liveness of $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$, all honest parties that output eventually output (v, g) (line 3), and by t_a -agreement and t_a -liveness of $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$, all honest parties output the same b (line 4). All honest parties then multicast the same signed (commit, v) pair (line 4), and then since $n - t_a > t_s + 1$ and similarly to before all honest parties eventually output a value and terminate (line 5). \square

Lemma 24. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ achieves t_s -intrusion tolerance.*

Proof. This follows similarly from the proof of t_s -validity with termination, Lemma 21. Suppose that some honest party P_i outputs $(v, 2)$ from the graded consensus, i.e. $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (line 3). By its t_s -intrusion tolerance, v must have been input to $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$, and thus $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$, by an honest party. Then by t_s -consistency of

¹³Note that this argument still holds even though not every party may actually input a value v to $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (thus precluding t_s -validity). This is because these executions where some parties terminate before inputting v are indistinguishable from executions where these same parties input v and then halt for an indefinite period of time. Thus, the safety property contained in t_s -validity holds.

$\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$, all honest parties who output will output (v, g) with $g \geq 1$ (line 3). Thus, if 1 is output by all honest parties in $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (by properties of $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$), it follows that $\text{aux}_i = v$ will be output by all honest parties; otherwise, \perp will be output. Thus, t_s -intrusion tolerance holds in this case.

Suppose now that no honest party outputs (v, g) from $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ such that $g = 2$. By construction of $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$, no honest party sets $\text{bp} = 1$ (note all parties output from $\Pi_{\text{GC}}^{t_a, t_s}$ by its t_s -liveness) and thus all honest parties propose $\text{bp} = 0$ to $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$. By t_s -validity of $\Pi_{\text{BA}}^{t_a, t_s}$, it follows that all honest parties decide 0, and thus by construction of $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ will eventually output \perp . That is, they will not output a value proposed by a dishonest party. \square

E.3 Proof of Theorem 3

Lemma 25. *Let $0 \leq t_a < n/3 \leq t_s < n/2$, $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$ and $d = t_s + 1$. Then distributed key generation protocol $\Pi_{\text{DKG}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (Figure 4) achieves (t_s, d) -correctness and t_s -consistency when run in a synchronous network and (t_a, d) -correctness and t_a -consistency when run in an asynchronous network.*

Proof. First, suppose that at most t_s parties are corrupted and that the network is synchronous.

Note that all parties terminate the n instances of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ at time T (t_s -liveness) with the same values (M'_1, \dots, M'_n) (t_s -consistency) at step 2. By t_s -validity and t_s -external validity of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ and since at least $n - t_s$ parties are honest, at least $n - t_s$ instances of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ terminate with valid input from honest parties. Thus, all honest parties satisfy the condition at step 2(a) and invoke Split with the same input. Since `acc.Eval` and `acc.CreateWits` are deterministic, all honest parties invoke $\Pi_{\text{IT}}^{t_a, t_s}$ with the same input z . Thus by t_s -validity of Π_{IT} all honest parties output z .

By n -external validity of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$, each value $M'_i \neq \perp_{bc}$ output by instance i is of the form $(C_i = (C_{i0}, \dots, C_{it_s}), c_i = (c_{i1}, \dots, c_{in}), \pi_i = (\pi_{i1}, \dots, \pi_{in}))$. By the completeness and soundness of `nizk1`, each c_{ij} is an encryption of $(s_{ij}, u_{ij}) = (f_i(j), f'_i(j))$ under `ekj` for polynomials f_i, f'_i defined by the values in C_i in the exponent of g, h . Note that Split is defined such that each message L_j contains:

- The same set of qualified parties Q ;
- c_j^* , i.e. encryptions of $f_q(j)$ under `pkj` for $q \in Q$; and
- $C_j^* = \prod_{q \in Q} C_{j,q}^*$ where $C_{j,q}^*$ is $f_q(j)$ and $f'_q(j)$ evaluated in the exponent of g and h respectively. Thus, C_j^* is $\sum_{q \in Q} f_q(j), \sum_{q \in Q} f'_q(j)$ evaluated in the exponent of g, h .

By construction of steps 4 and 5 and the security of `acc`, all honest parties eventually reach step 6 on receipt of their valid `part` message derived from the output of the n instances of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$ which all parties agree on. Each party then multicasts a `recon` message. Similarly to the above, by the security and correctness of `acc` and `nizk2`, all honest parties eventually reach step 7. By construction, each honest party performs Lagrange interpolation in the exponent of g with respect to $t_s + 1$ valid shares with respect to the polynomial $F(\cdot) = \sum_{q \in Q} f_q(\cdot)$.

Now, t_s -consistency follows since all honest parties evaluate $F(\cdot)$ at 0 in the exponent to derive the same y and at $[1, n]$ to derive the same sequence sequence $(\mathbf{ps}_1, \dots, \mathbf{ps}_n)$. (t_s, d) -correctness follows where the polynomial F in the definition of DKG (Definition 7) is as described above.

Suppose now that the network is asynchronous and at most t_a parties are corrupted. By n -external validity of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$, all non-bottom messages that honest parties output at the beginning of step 2 satisfy $\text{Valid}()$, and by construction all parties then invoke Π_{Γ} with some input.

- Suppose that honest party P_i outputs $v \in \{\perp_{it}, \perp_{dkg}\}$ from Π_{Γ} . Then all honest parties eventually (t_a -consistency) output the same value v (t_a -validity). It follows that no honest party sets $\text{ready} = \text{true}$. Since all honest parties thus invoke Π_{ADKG} , (t_a, d) -correctness and t_a -consistency follows from the (t_a, d) -security of Π_{ADKG} .
- Otherwise, by t_a -intrusion tolerance (and t_a -security) of Π_{Γ} , all parties eventually output the same value z_{it} which is such that z_{it} was proposed by an honest party, say P_i . Similarly to the synchronous case, P_i must have output at least $n - t_s$ well-formed values M'_i at step 2, and then at step 4 sent valid **part** messages to all parties. Thus, all honest parties eventually set $\text{ready} = \text{true}$. Since there are at least $t_s + 1$ honest parties and by similar arguments to the synchronous case, it follows that all parties eventually reach step 7, from which the two claimed properties similarly follow.

We note also that honest parties can terminate upon generating output since they do not send any new messages thereafter. \square

Lemma 26. *Let $0 \leq t_a < n/3 \leq t_s < n/2$, $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then distributed key generation protocol $\Pi_{\text{DKG}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (Figure 4) achieves t_s -secrecy and t_s -uniformity when run in a synchronous network and t_a -secrecy and t_a -uniformity when run on an asynchronous network.*

Proof. We first consider secrecy. We follow the same high-level strategy used in previous work [GJKR99, GJKR07, SBKN21]. We construct a simulator S which takes as input a public key y , and the set of initially corrupted parties by adversary \mathcal{A} (recall we consider static corruptions), which w.l.o.g. we write as $B = \{P_1, \dots, P_t\}$ with $t \leq t_s$. \mathcal{A} controls the network and co-ordinates the actions of parties in B . To prove t_s -secrecy, we show that S can simulate interaction with \mathcal{A} such that, conditioned on the output public key being y , the view of the run from \mathcal{A} 's perspective is indistinguishable from one where the specification of Π_{DKG} is exactly executed. We present the simulator S in Figure 10.

We first assume synchrony with at most t_s corruptions. Note, as argued in Lemma 25, that all honest parties in Π_{DKG} eventually output the same value z from Π_{Γ} , and thus no honest party invokes Π_{ADKG} . Then, since S is specified to perfectly simulate steps 1 to 5 of Π_{DKG} (step 1 of Figure 10), \mathcal{A} 's view is identically distributed to that of a run of Π_{DKG} until the condition at step 2 of Figure 10 is satisfied.

The simulation strategy after this point is essentially that of the simulator in Figure 10 of [SBKN21]. The goal is to ‘hit’ (in the language of [GJKR99])




Fig. 10: Simulator for $\Pi_{\text{DKG}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (Fig. 4) from the perspective of the simulator S interacting with adversary \mathcal{A} , where $B = \{P_1, \dots, P_t\}$ is the set of parties that \mathcal{A} initially corrupts, where $t \leq t_s$ (resp. $t \leq t_a$) in synchrony (resp. asynchrony), and $G = \{P_{t+1}, \dots, P_n\}$ (without loss of generality). We refer to a party P_i 's local variables from Figure 4 directly when clear from context.

the input public key y by modifying the contribution of one or more simulated parties to the final secret from the view of \mathcal{A} . Recall that at step 6 of Π_{DKG} , a party P_k 's share of the final secret is computed as $\sum_{j \in Q} s_{jk}$ where each value s_{jk} corresponds to (the y -coordinate of) a point on a polynomial $f_j(\cdot)$ and is derived by decryption using dk_k . In particular, \mathcal{A} knows, for each $j \in Q$, at most t_s points on $f_j(\cdot)$, since by the security of pke , except with negligible probability, the other encryptions give \mathcal{A} any information about their contents. Moreover, the simulator cannot 'lie' about these points since \mathcal{A} decrypted ciphertexts to learn this information. Thus, S 's strategy is to modify the values (recon, \dots) multicast by honest parties (the simulator) at line 6 of Π_{DKG} to force the public key to be exactly $y = g^x$.

Consider the first party P_i to reach step 6 of Π_{DKG} with **ready = true** (step 2 of Figure 10). By t_s -intrusion tolerance of Π_{IT} , there exists an honest party P_j that correctly executes step 4 of Π_{DKG} . Note that the simulator has the state of

the $\geq n - t_s$ honest parties and thus can reconstruct all polynomials $f_k(\cdot)$ where $k \in Q$ (in particular using information that P_j sent in `part` messages as written in Figure 10). To ‘hit’ $y = g^x$, the simulator needs to send `recon` messages consistent with a polynomial $F(\cdot)$ such that $F(0) = x$. To this end, S reconstructs such a polynomial $F(\cdot)$ in the exponent of g by interpolating t points from the ‘real’ secret plus the point $(0, y)$.

Note that at the end of step 6, each $P_j \in G$ sends a message of the form $M_j = (\text{recon}, D_j, \pi'_j, L_j = (c_j^*, C_j^*, Q), w_j)$, where L_j and w_j are contained in `part` messages sent at step 4 and (due to the security of accumulator `acc` and Π_{IT}) cannot be changed in the simulation. For each $P_j \in G$, we therefore set $D_j = g^{F(j)}$ and use the zero-knowledge property of `nizk2` to simulate a proof that is consistent with L_j . More precisely, S simulates a proof for `nizk2` that proves knowledge of $(F(j), x^*)$ such that $D_j = g^{F(j)}$ and $C_j^* = g^{F(j)} h^{x^*}$ for some x^* . By the same argument in [SBKN21], `recon` messages are correctly distributed and moreover verification passes at step 7 for \mathcal{A} ’s corrupted parties, from which secrecy follows.

We now consider t_s -uniformity, where the aim is to show, for an a priori fixed $y' \in \mathbb{G}$, the probability that the protocol run outputs y' is negligibly close to $1/p$. By t_s -correctness and t_s -consistency, all parties output a share of the secret $x = \sum_{j \in Q} x_j$, where $x_j = f_j(0)$ sampled uniformly in step 1. Note that the final secret is build from the sharings of $|Q| \geq n - t_s$ parties. Since $n - 2t_s \geq 1$, at least one honest party’s contribution is included in x , and as argued the adversary has no information except with negligible probability about the contributions of honest parties until after Q has been fixed. Uniformity then follows from the fact that $f_j(0)$ is uniformly sampled.

Suppose now that the network is asynchronous and there are at most t_a corruptions. Suppose that one honest party outputs $z_{it} \notin \{\perp_{dkg}, \perp_{it}\}$. Then, since Π_{IT} is t_a -secure with intrusion tolerance, all honest parties will eventually output z_{it} , where z_{it} was proposed by an honest party. Since we did not use the synchrony of the network in the proof follows from above in this case. Otherwise, by t_a -security, all honest parties will invoke Π_{ADKG} . The result then follows from the (t_a, d) -security of Π_{ADKG} . \square

E.4 Proof of Lemma 1

Our proof (sketch) is very similar to that of [BKL19] for Byzantine agreement, except that we rely on t_s -uniformity instead of t_s -validity to reach a contradiction. Let $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s = n$. Partition the n parties into sets S_0, S_1, S_a with $|S_0| = |S_1| = t_s$ and $|S_a| = t_a$. Consider an experiment E where communication between S_0 and S_1 is blocked by the adversary but all messages are otherwise delivered in Δ time, and two virtual copies of S_a , namely S_a^0 and S_a^1 , exist that interact only with parties in $S_0 \cup S_a^0$ and $S_1 \cup S_a^1$ respectively. We construct two executions:

1. In execution 1, the network is synchronous, and parties in S_1 are corrupted and abort immediately.

2. In execution 2, the network is asynchronous, parties in S_a are corrupted and execute two independent runs of the protocol as S_a^0 and S_a^1 , and all communication between S_0 and S_1 is delayed indefinitely.

In execution 1, the view of honest parties $S_0 \cup S_a^0$ is distributed identically to the views of $S_0 \cup S_a^0$ in E . Then t_s -uniformity guarantees that all parties in S_0 output a uniformly random secret. Similarly, all parties in S_1 output a secret which is uniform, and since S_0 and S_1 are disjoint, they must be independent. In execution 2, the view of honest parties $S_0 \cup S_1$ is distributed identically to $S_0 \cup S_1$ in E . But this violates t_a -consistency because, except with negligible probability, the keys output by S_0 and S_1 are different (since they are independent and uniform). \square

E.5 Proof of Lemma 2

Assume the network is synchronous and there are up to t_s corruptions. The sub-protocols $\Pi_{BC}^{t_s, 1/2}$ and $\Pi_{BA}^{t_a, t_s}$ are secure, and therefore all parties agree on the same set S . Moreover, the set has size at least $n - t_s$, since each tuple from an honest party P_i is correctly distributed via $\Pi_{BC}^{t_s, 1/2}$ due to validity, and by validity of $\Pi_{BA}^{t_a, t_s}$, all honest parties include P_i in the set S . This implies that each A^i is an encryption of a sum of values that includes at least an honest party's value (since $n - t_s > t_s$). Moreover, the ciphertexts from the adversary are chosen independently of the ciphertext from honest parties due to the zero-knowledge proofs of plaintext knowledge, and therefore all parties compute the same tuple of encryptions of random values A^1, \dots, A^ℓ , with plaintexts unknown to the adversary.

Each tuple (A^i, B^i, C^i) then encodes a correct multiplication triple. This is because all parties agree on the same set S' , and each B^i is an encryption of a sum of values that include an honest value, and C^i contains the product of the plaintexts from A^i and B^i due to the proof of correct multiplication.

Now assume the network is asynchronous and there are up to t_a corruptions. The only difference is that the sub-protocol $\Pi_{BC}^{t_s, 1/2}$ only provides weak validity. This means that the sets S or S' are not guaranteed to have size $n - t_s$, given that after time T_{bc} many of the honest parties may have obtained \perp . Moreover, even if any of the sets do contain $n - t_s$ parties, it is not guaranteed that all honest parties received their broadcasted values. However, any party that receives all the broadcasted values will output ℓ encrypted random multiplication triples with the plaintexts unknown to the adversary. In any other case, the output is \perp . \square

E.6 Proof of Lemma 3

We prove each of the cases individually. We simulate in the hybrid where parties have access to a PKI infrastructure. [If a setup for threshold additive homomorphic encryption is given, skip the first step where the key generation keys are simulated.]

Case 1: Synchronous network. We describe the simulator Sim for the case where the network is synchronous and there are up to t_s corruptions.

- *Threshold Encryption Key Generation:* The simulator Sim uniformly samples public key y and then runs internally the simulator for the DKG $S(y, B)$, where B is the set of corrupted parties.
- *Triple Generation:* Emulate the triples protocol. For that, the simulator emulates an execution of the protocol generating all the intermediate values on behalf of the honest parties. That is, for each honest party P_j , it generates random values a_j^i , $i \in [1, \ell]$ and encrypts these values and emulates all broadcasted messages (for the zero-knowledge proofs, it emulates accepted proofs). Then, it emulates the n instances of BA to agree on a set S . If the size of the set is less than $n - t_s$, then it emulates the party outputting \perp in the triple generation protocol. Otherwise, it computes the values A^i for each $i \in [1, \ell]$. Similarly, the execution is emulated to possibly obtain the values B^i and C^i . If no triples have been computed for P_j , set the local variable $\text{abort}_j = 1$.
- *Input Distribution:* Emulate the messages of the broadcast protocol. This means that, on behalf of each honest party, emulate the broadcast protocol using an encryption of 0 as the input. Also, emulate the \mathcal{F}_{mzk} functionality by outputting 1 on behalf of each honest parties, and from each corrupted party, on input $(c, (x, r))$ check that $c = \text{Enc}_{\text{ek}}(x, r)$ and output 1 to the adversary and 0 otherwise. The simulator waits for $\max\{T_{bc}, T_{zk}\}$. For each honest party P_j , it keeps track of the correct encrypted inputs I_j that P_j received. If the number of correct ciphertexts is less than $n - t_s$, the simulator does not compute on its ciphertexts on his behalf and sets a local variable $\text{abort}_j = 1$.
- *Addition Gates:* Sim simply adds the corresponding ciphertexts locally.
- *Multiplication Gates:* Sim locally computes the ciphertexts $X \boxplus A$ and $Y \boxplus B$, and The simulator emulates the threshold decryption sub-protocol for each of these values: it sends threshold decryption shares of both ciphertexts to all parties, and outputs 1 when emulating \mathcal{F}_{mzk} on behalf of them. After waiting for T_{dec} , it locally computes the output ciphertext of the multiplication gate as in the protocol.
- *Output Determination:* For each party P_j , emulate the messages in the asynchronous common subset protocol with the corresponding input (either a ciphertext, which is the result of the computation, or \perp in the case $\text{abort}_j = 1$). If the output is a single ciphertext c , emulate the threshold decryption sub-protocol.
- *Threshold Decryption:* In a multiplication gate, simply compute the decryption shares and emulate the sending messages. In the Output Determination stage, Sim obtains the output y of the computation, and adjusts the shares such that the shares decrypt to y . In both cases, the simulator always outputs 1 on behalf of the honest parties indicating that the proofs of correct decryptions are correct.

Case 2: Asynchronous network. The only difference with respect to the case where the network is synchronous, is that the protocol BC^{t_s, t_a} only provides weak-validity. In the simulation, it implies that the simulator will also need to simulate the \perp messages from the broadcast protocols, and not simulate on behalf of the honest parties which stop participating in the protocol after they aborted.

We define a series of hybrids to argue that no environment can distinguish between the real world and the ideal world.

Hybrids and security proof.

Hybrid 1. This corresponds to the real world execution. Here, the simulator knows the inputs and keys of all honest parties.

Hybrid 2. We modify the real-world execution in the zero-knowledge proofs. In the case of a synchronous network, when a corrupted party requests a proof of any kind from an honest party, the simulator simply gives a valid response without checking the witness from the honest party. In the case of an asynchronous network, the simulator is allowed to set outputs to \perp as the real-world adversary.

Hybrid 3. This is similar to Hybrid 2, but the computation of the decryption shares is different. Here, the simulator obtains the output y from the ideal functionality, and if it is not \perp , it computes the decryption shares of corrupted parties, and then adjusts the decryption shares of honest parties such that the decryption shares (d_1, \dots, d_n) form a secret sharing of the output value y .

Hybrid 4. We modify the previous hybrid in the Input Stage. Here, the honest parties, instead of sending an encryption of the actual input, they send an encryption of 0.

Hybrid 5. We modify the previous hybrid so that the keys generated from the DKG protocol are generated according to the simulator of the DKG protocol.

Hybrid 6. This corresponds to the ideal world execution.

In order to prove that no environment can distinguish between the real world and the ideal world, we prove that no environment can distinguish between any two consecutive hybrids.

Claim 1. No efficient environment can distinguish between Hybrid 1 and Hybrid 2.

Proof. This follows trivially, since the honest parties always send a valid witness to \mathcal{F}_{mzk} in the case of a synchronous network. In the case of an asynchronous network, the simulator chooses the set of parties that get \perp as the real-world adversary.

Claim 2. No efficient environment can distinguish between Hybrid 2 and Hybrid 3.

Proof. This follows from properties of a secret sharing scheme and the security of the threshold encryption scheme. Given that the threshold is $t_s + 1$, any number corrupted decryption shares below $t_s + 1$ does not reveal anything about the output y . Moreover, one can find shares for honest parties such that (d_1, \dots, d_n) is a sharing of y .

Claim 4. No efficient environment can distinguish between Hybrid 3 and Hybrid 4.

Proof. This follows from the semantic security of the used threshold encryption scheme.

Claim 5. No efficient environment can distinguish between Hybrid 4 and Hybrid 5.

Proof. This follows from the secrecy property of the distributed key generation protocol.

Claim 6. No efficient environment can distinguish between Hybrid 4 and Hybrid 5.

Proof. The simulator in the ideal world and the simulator in Hybrid 5 emulate the joint behavior of the ideal functionalities exactly in the same way.

We conclude that the real world and the ideal world are indistinguishable. Finally, let us argue why the protocol has weak termination. Observe that when the protocol outputs \perp , parties do not terminate. This is because the protocol $\Pi_{\text{acs}}^{t_s, t_a}$ does not guarantee termination, i.e. might need to run forever (see [BKL21]). However, when parties have agreement on a ciphertext to decrypt (in particular, this is the case when the network is synchronous), the threshold decryption sub-protocol ensures that honest parties can jointly collect $t_s + 1 \leq n - t_s \leq n - t_a$ decryption shares, decrypt the ciphertext and terminate. \square

F Broadcast Extension Protocol and Proofs

F.1 Broadcast Extension Protocol for Dishonest Majority

We construct our broadcast extension protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t, \epsilon}$ which, for $t < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$, allows for broadcast with $O(nl/\epsilon + \lambda n^2)$ communication complexity. This implies a $O(nl + \lambda n^2)$ honest majority broadcast algorithm by setting $\epsilon = \frac{1}{2}$. Let $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t, \epsilon}$ be a broadcast protocol (e.g. the one in Section 3) that terminates after T time with default value \perp_{bc} . we explicitly specify the core protocol in Figure 11 which makes use of several helper functions defined in Figure 12. Our protocol is very




Fig. 11: BC extension protocol with sender P^* for $t < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$ and $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$ from the perspective of party P_i with respect to external validity predicate Valid .

close to the dishonest majority broadcast protocol of Nayak et al. [NRS⁺20] (Figure 3 there). The only notable difference (modulo presentation differences) is that parties gossip signatures similar to Π_{BC} rather than multicasting.

$\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t,\epsilon}$ works as follows. In the first step, the sender P^* splits up its input message m^* into n blocks $D = \{D_1, \dots, D_n\}$ using the erasure coding scheme rs ($t + 1$ blocks suffice to reconstruct message m^*), where block D_j corresponds to party P_j . Then P^* accumulates D into an accumulation value z using acc except that D_j is accumulated as (j, D_j) . P^* then invokes the broadcast protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t,\epsilon}$




Fig. 12: BC extension protocol (Fig. 11) helper functions from the perspective of party P_i .

on input z ; note that z is of size $O(\lambda)$. Suppose that value $z \neq \perp$ is output by each honest party; if $z = \perp$, all honest parties output \perp .

Similar to Π_{BC} from the previous subsection, the protocol proceeds in $t + R$ rounds. Let $z \neq \perp$ be the output from Π_{BC} . Supposing that P^* is honest, once Π_{BC} terminates, P^* first multicasts a signature on message **HAPPY** (after setting their own variable **happy** to **true**). Then, P^* computes witnesses w_j corresponding to block D_j for $j \in [1, n]$, and sends each party their respective block and the witness w_j (step 2(a)). On receipt of their witness (which they can verify is valid), P_i multicasts their block and share (step 2(b)). Note that P_i multicasts a block at most once. P_i then waits Δ time and collects blocks from all parties. On receipt of the first message (wit, s_j, w_j) from P_j , P_i can determine whether it is valid (and was accumulated in z) via $\text{acc.Verify}(ak, z, w_j, (j, s_j))$. Finally, after Δ time, if P_i has received enough valid blocks, P_i can reconstruct a message m (step 2(c)). Then, by splitting up m , re-accumulating the blocks and comparing the output with z (output by Π_{BC}), P_i can determine whether they reconstructed a message that all other parties are able to or not. If so, they set variable **happy** = 1.

Suppose an honest party sets **happy** = 1. Then, that party splits up the message it learnt (or input to $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}$, if it is the sender P^*) into blocks, propagates signatures via gossip, and propagates blocks and their corresponding

witnesses to each party individually. Our proofs show in particular that all parties will eventually output the message, even when using gossip in step 2(a).

Communication Complexity. Each party participates in Π_{BC} where the sender's input is of size $O(\lambda)$ ¹⁴, which, using $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t,\epsilon}$ from Figure 2, requires $O(\lambda n^2)$ communication. Each party sends at most one wit message to each party at step 2(b), which costs $O(n(\ell/b + \lambda)) = O(\ell/\epsilon + \lambda n)$ for each party (recall $b = n - t$). The sender multicasts an $O(\lambda)$ -sized message, and all parties gossip at most one message of size $O(\lambda + n)$, which costs an expected $O(\lambda^2 + \lambda n)$ per party. Thus the protocol incurs $O(n\ell/\epsilon + \lambda n^2 + \lambda^2 n) = O(n\ell/\epsilon + \lambda n^2)$ communication.

Theorem 8. *Let n, t be such that $t < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$ for constant $\epsilon \in (0, 1)$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t,\epsilon}$ (Figures 11 and 12) is t -secure when run on a synchronous network and n -weakly valid when run on an asynchronous network.*

F.2 Proof of Theorem 8

Hereafter, we let $R = \lceil \log_3(\epsilon n) \rceil$ and $q = \Theta(\lambda)$, where λ is the security parameter. Furthermore, all our statements hold with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$.

Lemma 27. *Let $t_s < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t_s,\epsilon}$ achieves t_s -liveness when run in a synchronous network.*

Proof. In order to prove t_s -liveness, we show that every honest party outputs a value v' and terminates. But this is clear from the protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t_s,\epsilon}$, especially step 3. \square

Lemma 28. *If an honest party P_i reaches item (i) of step 2 of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t_s,\epsilon}$ by setting $\text{happy} = 1$ and $\text{dist} = \text{false}$ and invokes the instructions of this step with input message $m \in V$, then every honest party P_j outputs $\sigma_j = m$.*

Proof. By t_s -consistency of the Core BC Protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s,\epsilon}$, the output z_i of $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s,\epsilon}$ is the same at every honest party. If an honest party executes item (i) of step 2 with message m , then by definition $z_i = \text{acc.Eval}(ak, \text{EncodeBlocks}(m, n - t))$. If another honest party P_j sets $\sigma_j = m'$ after initialization, then it has to satisfy $\text{acc.Eval}(ak, \text{EncodeBlocks}(m', n - t)) = z_j = z_i$. By the properties of the Reed-Solomon code, the same codewords correspond to the same message. So if $m \neq m'$, then $\vec{D} \neq \vec{D}'$. In particular, there exists a component $D_i = (i, s_i) \in \vec{D}$ such that $D_i \notin \vec{D}'$. But a witness for $D_i \notin \vec{D}'$ with respect to the accumulation value $z_i = \text{acc.Eval}(ak, \vec{D}) = \text{acc.Eval}(ak, \vec{D}')$ exists, which happens only with probability $\text{negl}(\lambda)$ by security of the cryptographic accumulator. Therefore, we may assume $m = m'$ and only need to show that every other honest party P_j sets σ_j to a value.

Suppose that P_i executes item (i) of step 2 in some round r . In that case, P_i computes witnesses $(w_1, \dots, w_n) = \text{acc.CreateWits}(ak, z, \vec{D})$ and sends

¹⁴To tame the communication complexity, that parties should disregard messages signed by a (dishonest) sender in Π_{BC} that are larger than the prescribed size $O(\lambda)$.

(wit, s_j, w_j) to each party P_j (where the j -th element of \vec{D} is (j, s_j)). In item (ii) of step 2 of the same round r , every honest party can verify and multicast the valid (wit, s_j, w_j) to all the other parties if it has not done that already in a previous round. Note that verification of the tuples (wit, s_j, w_j) can be done safely because of the security of the accumulator. In item (iii) of step 2, every honest party gets at least $n - t_s$ correct coded values, since there are at least $n - t_s$ honest parties. In particular, every party P_j can identify the corrupted values and remove them, of which there are at most t_s . By the properties of the Reed-Solomon code, P_j with $\text{happy} = 0$ is able to recover the message m . Now, the exact same analysis as in the proof of t_s -consistency of the Core BC Protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$ shows that with probability $1 - \text{negl}(\lambda)$ after sufficiently many rounds in the domain $[1, t + R]$, every honest parties P_j has set its value $\text{happy} = 1$ and $\sigma_j = m$. Note that an honest party does not set its output again in future rounds, since the multisignature already contains its signature. Once P_j sets σ_j , it will skip item (ii) of step 2 in all future round and the value of σ_j will not be changed. Therefore, in step 3 all honest parties output m and terminate. \square

Lemma 29. *Let $t_s < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$ achieves t_s -validity when run in a synchronous network.*

Proof. In order to prove t_s -validity, we show that if the sender P_j is honest and inputs $m = m_j \in V$, then all honest parties output $v = m_j$. In round $r = 1$, the sender executes item (i) of step 2 with message m_j . By the previous lemma, every honest party P_i outputs $\sigma_i = m_j$ by the end of the protocol and terminates. \square

Lemma 30. *Let $t_s < (1 - \epsilon) \cdot n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$ achieves t_s -consistency when run in a synchronous network.*

Proof. In order to prove t_s -consistency, we show that every honest party outputs the same value σ' . If all honest parties output \perp , then they trivially output the same value $\sigma' = \perp$. Therefore, assume some honest party P_i outputs $\sigma_i = m \neq \perp$. In case P_i is the sender, t_s -validity of $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$ tells us that all honest parties output m . So assume that P_i is not the sender. If P_i sets $\sigma_i = m \neq \perp$ in item (iii) of step 2 of round $1 \leq r \leq t_s$, then P_i will execute the distribution item (i) of step 2 with message m in the next round $r + 1$. By Lemma 28, all honest parties output the same value $\sigma' = m$. On the other hand, if P_i sets $\sigma_i = m \neq \perp$ in round $r \geq t_s + 1$, then it receives a multisignature of degree at least $t_s + 1$. In particular, one of these signatures comes from an honest party $P_j \neq P_i$ that has sent its signature (with probability q/n) and executed item (i) of step 2 in some previous round $1 \leq r' \leq t_s$. Again by Lemma 28, all honest parties (including P_i) output m' and therefore $m' = m$. So every honest party outputs the same value $\sigma' = m$. \square

Lemma 31. *Let $t_a \leq t_s$ and $t_a + 2 \cdot t_s < n$. Then $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$ achieves t_a -weak validity even when run in an asynchronous network.*

Proof. In order to prove t_a -weak validity, we show that if the sender P_j is honest and inputs $m = m_j \in V$, then all honest parties output either $v = m_j$ or

$v = \perp$. This is clear from the proof of t_s -validity in the synchronous case and the construction of the protocol $\Pi_{\text{BC-Ext}}^{t_s, \epsilon}$. \square

G Deferred Figures

We provide some deferred figures from the main body. In particular, we provide both our Beaver triple generation protocol (Figure 13) and synchronous MPC protocol with unanimous output in asynchrony (Figures 14 and 15) from Section 6.




Fig. 13: Beaver Triple Generation.

$$\Pi_{\text{smpc}}^{t_s, t_a}(P_i)$$

Let c_M be the number of multiplication gates in the circuit.

Key Generation. The protocol generates threshold additive homomorphic encryption keys, using the protocol $\Pi_{\text{DKG}}^{t_a, t_s}$ (see Section 5). [Of course, if a setup for threshold additive homomorphic encryption is given, skip this step.]

Offline Phase.

- Parties jointly run the protocol $\Pi_{\text{triples}}^{t_a, t_s}(\ell)$ to generate $\ell = c_M$ Beaver multiplication triples.

Let x_i denote the input value of party P_i . Let **abort** = 0 if a sequence of triples is received from the offline phase. Otherwise, set **abort** = 1.

Input Distribution.

- P_i computes $\text{TEnc}(x_i)$ and broadcasts using $\Pi_{\text{BC}}^{t_s, 1/2}$ the ciphertext $\text{TEnc}(x_i)$ and uses the multi-party zero-knowledge functionality \mathcal{F}_{mzk} to prove knowledge of the plaintext of $\text{TEnc}(x_i)$ towards all parties. Wait until $\max\{T_{bc}, T_{zk}\}$ clock ticks passed.
- If there is a broadcast or zero-knowledge proof that has not terminated, or the number of correct encryptions received is less than $n - t_s$ inputs, set **abort** = 1. Continue participating in the sub-protocols, but do not compute any ciphertext.

Addition Gates. Input: $X = \text{TEnc}(x), Y = \text{TEnc}(y)$. Output: $Z = \text{TEnc}(z)$.

- P_i locally computes $Z = X \boxplus Y$.

Fig. 14: Synchronous MPC with unanimous output (part 1).

Multiplication Gates. Input: $X = \text{TEnc}(x), Y = \text{TEnc}(y)$, and a triple (A, B, C) .
Output: $Z = \text{TEnc}(z)$.

- P_i locally computes $X \boxplus A$ and $Y \boxplus B$, and sends threshold decryption shares of both ciphertexts to all parties. In addition, use the zero-knowledge functionality \mathcal{F}_{mzk} to prove correct decryption of the decryption shares with respect to the ciphertexts.
- Upon receiving $t_s + 1$ decryption shares with correct proofs of decryption for each of the two ciphertext, reconstruct the plaintexts $x - a$ and $y - b$.
- Compute $E = \text{TEnc}((x - a) \cdot (y - b); e)$, where e is the neutral element of the randomness space. Then compute $Z = E \boxplus [(x - a)B] \boxplus [(y - b)A] \boxplus C$.
- Output Z .

Output Determination. Input x , where $x = c_i$ is the output ciphertext of the circuit if `abort` = 0, and otherwise $x = \perp$.

- P_i executes the protocol $\Pi_{\text{acs}}^{t_s, t_a}$ with x as input. Let S_i be the output of the protocol.
- If $S_i = \{c\}$, execute the Threshold Decryption sub-protocol on c , and after an output is given, terminate. Else, output \perp .

Threshold Decryption. Input: ciphertext c .

- P_i computes its decryption share s_i and sends it to every other party.
- P_i proves that the value s_i is a correct decryption share of c bilaterally.
- Once $t_s + 1$ correct decryption shares are collected, send the list to every party and output the corresponding plaintext.

Fig. 15: Synchronous MPC with unanimous output (part 2).