A Note on Constructing SIDH-PoK-based Signatures after Castryck-Decru Attack

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Abstract. This paper centers on the SIDH proof of knowledge work by De Feo, Dobson, Galbraith, and Zobernig, which points out that the Castryck-Decru attack does not apply to their first 3-special soundness construction. This work analyzes and explicitly describes an optimized recoverable Sigma protocol based on that 3-special soundness SIDH-PoK construction. We also discuss the impact of moving to B-SIDH and G2SIDH setups in terms of sizes.

Due to the Castryck-Decru attack, we decided to write this paper relying on a theoretical analysis to list expected optimized signature sizes instead of updating eprint 2022/475. We point out that this work is a theoretical analysis extension of eprint 2022/475.

1 Introduction

"If someone is able to show me that what I think or do is not right, I will happily change, for I seek the truth, by which no one was ever truly harmed..."

Marcus Aurelius

In 2014, De Feo, Jao, and Plût proposed a post-quantum Diffie-Hellman protocol relying on the hardness of finding an isogeny between two supersingular curves, the SIDH protocol [31,19]. Their work was not only limited to key-exchange procedures; they also presented a Zero-Knowledge protocol based on the SIDH construction. In 2018, Yoo, Azarderakhsh, Jalali, Jao, and Soukharev combined that Zero-Knowledge SIDH with the Fiat-Shamir transformation to get a signature scheme [43]. Independently, Galbraith, Petit, Shani, and Ti improved in [29] the signature sizes of [43], and proposed a signature-scheme based on the problem of computing the endomorphism ring of a supersingular elliptic curve.

In 2021, Ghantous, Katsumata, Pintore, and Veroni revisited the proofs for the special soundness property in the SIDH-based identification protocol [30]. Their analysis relies on collisions in the supersingular isogeny graph; assuming evenly distributed cycles over the vertex set, their existence does not affect the security of the SIDH-based signatures. Subsequently, De Feo, Dobson, Galbraith, and Zobernig [17] found an issue and provided a counterexample, with the soundness proof for the Zero-Knowledge SIDH construction. Such an issue applies to the constructions from [43] and [29], but the authors stressed that SIDH signature schemes are still secure, a reasonable computational assumption, and no known attack exists yet. Additionally, [17] presents an isogeny-based Proof of Knowledge (PoK) that relies on a new hardness assumption, and is immune to previously presented adaptive attacks [28,2,23,27]. The main result from [17] proposes an efficient non-interactive SIDH-key validation. The principal difference between [19,29] and [17] constructions is that they have 2-special and 3-special soundness, respectively.

Sadly, the recent work by Castryck and Decru [9] presented a (heuristically) polynomial SIDH key-recovery attack that breaks SIDH (and SIKE) in hours. The three vital ingredients for the applicability of the Castryck-Decru attack are

- The public and fixed isogeny degree;
- The image of the auxiliary torsion points under the secret isogeny; and
- The endomorphism ring of the isogeny domain curve.

The followed-up work by Maino and Martindale in [37] provided an algorithm that does not require the knowledge of the endomorphism ring of the domain curve. Subsequently, Robert demonstrated the existence of a polynomial key-recovery attack on SIDH [40]. Even the works from [37] and [40] remain theoretical; Castryck and Decru gave a public Magma code implementation of their attack, which was improved by Oudompheng and Pope in Sagemath code [38]. It is worth mentioning that Castryck-Decru's family attacks apply to [31,19,43] but do not extend to the construction from [17, §5.3] and the quaternion-based proposal of [29].

As the primary motivation of this work, it is of interest to determine the efficiency (in sizes) for the 3-special soundness construction in [17, §5.3] and analyze the impact of using B-SIDH [14] and G2SIDH [33] in such a 3-special soundness protocol, hoping to reduce sizes.

Related work. In 2019, De Feo and Galbraith proposed a signature scheme named SeaSign by combining the Commutative SIDH (CSIDH) [11] and Fiat-Shamir transformation with aborts [18]. SeaSign aims to have shorter keys than lattice signatures, but signing and verification are currently costly. Later, Decru, Panny, and Vercauteren improved SeaSign performance by allowing the prover not to answer a limited number of said parallel executions to decrease the rejection probability [22]. Subsequently, Beullens, Kleinjung, and Vercauteren introduced a promising signature scheme labeled as CSI-FiSh [6] by integrating similar optimizations of SeaSign on Stolbunov's signature scheme [41]. They showed that including quadratic twists cuts the public key size in half, being 300 times faster and about three times smaller than any optimized version of SeaSign. In 2020, Kaafarani, Katsumata, and Pintore suggested a Lossy variant of CSI-FiSh with smaller signature sizes but two times slower than the original CSI-FiSh [24].

A disadvantage of SeaSign, CSI-FiSh and its lossy variant, and the new scheme from [5], is that their current proposals and implementations use CSIDH-512, which seems to bring lower quantum security than NIST Level 1 [8,39,7,12]. In particular, such state-of-the-art works hint CSIDH instances with 2048 bits are good choices to close NIST Level 1 of security. Nevertheless, using large CSIDH instantiations (with about 2048 bits) would considerably slowdown on the performance and increase public-key sizes for these CSIDH-based schemes, negatively impacting higher security levels compared to NIST Levels 3 and 5. The signature sizes remain the same, which makes CSIDH-based signature attractive.

Lastly, De Feo, Kohel, Leroux, Petit, and Wesolowski introduced the current shortest isogeny-based signature scheme SQIsign [20]. They only target NIST level 1 of security, with signatures of 204 bytes, secret keys of 16 bytes, and public keys of 64 bytes; their C-code implementation claims 0.6 seconds for key generation, 2.5 seconds for signing, and 50 milliseconds for verification.

Contributions. We provide a detailed description to construct a Signature scheme based on [17, Section 5.3]. We explicitly describe a non-interactive recoverable Sigma protocol over isogenies. Such sigma protocols prove the knowledge of an isogeny under the Fixed degree relation given in [17,4]. We also estimate the expected signature sizes by using built-in blocks SIDH, B-SIDH, and G2SIDH; we applied (as far as we know) all possible tricks to reduce signature sizes as much as possible.

Outline. We organize the paper as follows. We present all mathematical tools required to describe the 3-special soundness construction from [17, §5.3] in Section 2. Since the Sigma protocol proves the knowledge of an isogeny by using SIDH as a built-in block, we explain SIDH in Section 2.1 and the Sigma protocol in Section 2.2. To understand how the Sigma protocol works, we proceed in Section 3.1 to detail tricks to reduce its commitment and response sizes. After that, we present in Section 3.2 a recoverable Sigma protocol to construct a signature protocol. Subsequently, we mention in Section 3.3 that replacing SIDH with B-SIDH reduces the sizes. We show in Section 3.4 how G2SIDH can help to reduce the sizes even more ¹. In Section 3.5, we list (to the best of our knowledge) all isogeny-based signatures still secure against the Castryck-Decru attack. Finally, we conclude with some open problems and remarks in Section 4.

2 Preliminaries

In this section, we introduce all mathematical tools required in the SIDH constructions from [31,19]. Let $p = 2^a 3^b - 1$ be a prime number satisfying $p \equiv$

¹ We highlight that we did not dig into the mathematical tools required for G2SIDH; we took it as a black box. However, we mention the main differences between SIDH and G2SIDH and take essential properties to describe how the recoverable Sigma protocol will impact.

3 mod 4 for some $a, b \in \mathbb{Z}^+$. Let \mathbb{F}_p be a prime field with p elements and \mathbb{F}_{p^2} a quadratic field extension of \mathbb{F}_p . We let E be a supersingular curve determined by Equation 1 and assume E has exactly $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = (p+1)^2$ points over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} .

$$E: y^{2} = x^{3} + Ax^{2} + x, \quad A \in \mathbb{F}_{p^{2}} \setminus \{\pm 2\}.$$
 (1)

The point at infinity \mathcal{O} of E plays the role of the neutral element. We say $P \in E$ is an order-d point if d is the smallest positive integer such that

$$[d]P = \underbrace{P + \dots + P}_{d \text{ times}} = \mathcal{O},$$

and write E[d] to denote the *d*-torsion subgroup $\{P \in E(\overline{\mathbb{F}}_{p^2}) \mid [d]P = \mathcal{O}\}$. The j-invariant of the curve E is $\frac{256(A^2-3)^3}{A^2-4}$

Isogenies From Kernel. We only consider separable isogenies. An isogeny $\phi \colon E \to E'$ over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} is a non-zero rational map fixing the point at infinity, $\phi(\mathcal{O})\,=\,\mathcal{O}$. If such isogeny exists, we say E and E' are isogenous over $\mathbb{F}_{p^2},$ which happens if and only if $\#E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) = \#E'(\mathbb{F}_{p^2})$. The kernel ker ϕ of ϕ is the subgroup $\{P \in E(\mathbb{F}_{p^2}) \mid \phi(P) = \mathcal{O}\}$. We refer to ϕ as d-isogeny when $\# \ker \phi = d$ holds. The dual d-isogeny $\widehat{\phi} \colon E' \to E$ of ϕ is the isogeny satisfying

$$\widehat{\phi} \circ \phi \colon P \mapsto [d]P \quad \text{and} \quad \phi \circ \widehat{\phi} \colon P \mapsto [d]P.$$

$\mathbf{2.1}$ SIDH protocol

The core idea of [17, §5.3] relies on the SIDH-square construction. So, let us list the SIDH setup as follows:

- the quadratic field extension \mathbb{F}_{p^2} of \mathbb{F}_p along with $p = 2^a 3^b 1$; the starting supersingular curve $E_0: y^2 = x^3 + 6x^2 + x^2$;
- the order- 2^a basis $\{P_0, Q_0\}$ satisfying $\langle P_0, Q_0 \rangle = E_0[2^a]$; and the order- 3^b basis $\{P'_0, Q'_0\}$ satisfying $\langle P'_0, Q'_0 \rangle = E_0[3^b]$.

The SIDH key generation is slightly different for each entity. Alice generates public keys according to order- 3^{b} points, and her private keys determine secret 2^{a} -isogenies. In contrast, Bob's public keys are concerning order- 2^{a} points and his private keys to 3^{b} -isogenies. We sketch as follows Alice and Bob's key generations and derivations.

Alice key generation.

1. Alice samples a random integer sk $\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \llbracket 0 \dots 2^a - 1 \rrbracket$ as her private key;

² We choose the same E_0 as in SIKE proposal [1], but it can be a different curve.

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2. She then computes the 2^a -isogeny $\phi: E_0 \to E_1$ with kernel generated by $K_{\phi} = P_0 + [\mathsf{sk}]Q_0$; and

3. She sets as her public key $\mathsf{pk} = (E_1, \phi(P'_0), \phi(Q'_0))$, and send it to Bob.

Bob key generation.

- 1. Bob samples a random integer $\mathsf{sk}' \xleftarrow{\$} [0 \dots 3^b 1]$ as his private key;
- 2. He then computes the 3^b-isogeny $\psi: E_0 \to E_2$ with kernel generated by $K_{\psi} = P'_0 + [\mathsf{sk}']Q'_0$; and
- 3. He sets as his public key $\mathsf{pk}' = (E_2, \psi(P_0), \psi(Q_0))$, and send it to Alice.

Alice key derivation.

- 1. Alice computes the 2^a -isogeny $\phi' \colon E_2 \to E_3$ with kernel generated by $K_{\phi'} \coloneqq \psi(K_{\phi}) = \psi(P_0) + [\mathsf{sk}]\psi(Q_0)$; and
- 2. She finally sets as her secret shared the j-invariant $j(E_3)$ of E_3 .

Bob key derivation.

- 1. Bob computes the 3^b-isogeny $\psi' \colon E_1 \to E'_3$ with kernel generated by $K_{\psi'} := \phi(K_{\psi}) = \phi(P'_0) + [\mathsf{sk}']\phi(Q'_0)$; and
- 2. He finally sets as his secret shared the j-invariant $j(E'_3)$ of E'_3 .

In the original SIDH construction from [31,19] and also in [1], the secret shared corresponds with the j-invariant of the curves E_3 and E'_3 . However, Leonardi showed that the ending curves E_3 and E'_3 are equal to each other [35]. We illustrate the diagram determined by the SIDH protocol in Figure 1.




Fig. 1: Dashed arrows are secret and all curves are public. Horizontal and vertical arrows denote 2^a -isogenies and 3^b -isogenies, respectively.

Next, we summarize the constructions from [17] in Section 2.2. In particular, we only focus on the constructions based on Definition 1. The idea behind [17, §5.3] is to randomly generate SIDH-squares, as illustrated in Figure 1, to prove the knowledge of the secret isogeny.

Definition 1 (Fixed degree relation). Given a public curve $pk = E_i$ generated by Alice or Bob without revealing any image of auxiliary points, we define the Fixed degree relation by Equation 2.

$$\mathcal{R}_{deg} \coloneqq \{ (E_0, E_i, d, \omega) \mid \omega \colon E_0 \to E_i \text{ is a } d\text{-isogeny} \}.$$
⁽²⁾

2.2 The still secure Sigma protocol 3-special sound

This section describes the construction from [17, §5.3]. The setup is the same as in Section 2.1. Given a public 2^a -isogenous curve E_1 to E_0 . The prover (Peggy) wants to convince the verifier (Victor) that she knows the secret 2^a -isogeny $\phi: E_0 \to E_1$, which implies knowing ker $\phi = \langle K_{\phi} \rangle$. Let $\lambda \in \{128, 192, 256\}$ a security parameter, and \mathcal{H} be a cryptographic hash function with output length 2λ .

Public and private keys. Here, the public key is $pk = E_1$, while $sk = \phi$ determines the private key.

Commitment. This block proceeds by constructing random SIDH-squares described in Figure 1 as follows.

- Peggy picks a random order- 3^b kernel generator K_{ψ} in E_0 ;
- She evaluates K_{ψ} under the secret isogeny ϕ to get $K_{\psi'} = \phi(K_{\psi})$;
- She constructs an SIDH-square as in Figure 1 determined by
 - the 3^b-isogeny $\psi \colon E_0 \to E_2$ with ker $\psi = \langle K_\psi \rangle$,
 - the 3^b-isogeny $\psi': E_1 \to E_3$ with ker $\psi' = \langle K_{\psi'} \rangle$, and
 - the 2^{*a*}-isogeny $\phi' \colon E_2 \to E_3$ with ker $\phi' = \langle K_{\phi'} \rangle$ where $K_{\phi'} = \psi(K_{\phi})$;
- She chooses a random basis $\{P_2, Q_2\}$ of $E_2[3^b]$;
- She evaluates P_2 and Q_2 under the secret isogeny ϕ' to get $P_3 = \phi'(P_2)$ and $Q_3 = \phi'(Q_2)$;
- She looks for two integers $c, d \in [0 \dots 3^b 1]$ such that
 - The dual isogeny $\widehat{\psi} : E_2 \to E_0$ of ψ has kernel generator $K_{\widehat{\psi}} = [c]P_2 + [d]Q_2$, and
 - The dual isogeny $\widehat{\psi}': E_3 \to E_1$ of ψ' has kernel generator $K_{\widehat{\psi}'} = [c]P_3 + [d]Q_3;$
- She selects three random numbers r_R , r_L , and r from $\{0,1\}^{\lambda}$.
- Next, She commits $\operatorname{com}_2 = (E_2, P_2, Q_2)$ and $\operatorname{com}_3 = (E_3, P_3, Q_3)$ as
 - $\operatorname{com}_L = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_2 || r_L),$
 - $\operatorname{com}_R = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_3 || r_R)$, and
 - $\operatorname{com}' = \mathcal{H}((c, d) || r);$
- Finally, She sends the commitment message $com \leftarrow (com_L, com_R, com')$ to Victor.

Challenge. Victor picks a uniformly random challenge chall $\stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \{-1, 0, 1\}$, and send it to Peggy.

Response. Once Peggy receives the challenge chall, she performs the following:

- If chall = 1, she sends resp \leftarrow (com₂, r_L , $K_{\phi'}$, com₃, r_R) to Victor.
- If chall = 0, she sends resp \leftarrow (com₃, r_R , c, d, r) to Victor.
- If chall = -1, she sends $resp \leftarrow (com_2, r_L, c, d, r)$ to Victor.

Verification. Depending on the challenge, Victor does the following calculations to validate the commitment and response:

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- $\ (\texttt{com}_L,\texttt{com}_R,\texttt{com}') \leftarrow \texttt{com}$
- If chall = 1,
 - He parses
 - * $(\operatorname{com}_2, r_L, K_{\phi'}, \operatorname{com}_3, r_R) \leftarrow \operatorname{resp},$
 - * $(E_2, P_2, Q_2) \leftarrow \operatorname{com}_2$, and
 - * $(E_3, P_3, Q_3) \leftarrow \texttt{com}_3;$
 - He rejects if $\mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_2 || r_L) \neq \operatorname{com}_L \text{ or } \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_3 || r_R) \neq \operatorname{com}_R$;
 - He rejects if $K_{\phi'} \notin E_2$ or $K_{\phi'}$ does not have order 2^a ;
 - He computes the 2^{*a*}-isogeny $\phi' \colon E_2 \to E'_3$ with kernel generator $K_{\phi'}$;
 - Finally, Victor accepts if and only if $E_3 = E'_3$, $P_3 = \phi'(P_2)$ and $Q_3 = \phi'(Q_2)$, otherwise rejects.
- If chall = 0,
 - He parses
 - * $(\operatorname{com}_3, r_R, c, d, r) \leftarrow \operatorname{resp}$, and
 - * $(E_3, P_3, Q_3) \leftarrow \operatorname{com}_3;$
 - Victor rejects if $\mathcal{H}((c,d) || r) \neq \operatorname{com}' \operatorname{or} \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_3 || r_R) \neq \operatorname{com}_R;$
 - He computes $K_{\widehat{\psi'}}$ as $[c]P_3 + [d]Q_3$;
 - He rejects if $K_{\psi'}$ does not have order 3^b ;
 - He computes the 3^b -isogeny $\psi': E_3 \to E'_1$ with kernel generator $K_{\psi'}$;
 - Finally, Victor **accepts** if and only if $E_1 = E'_1$, otherwise **rejects**.
- If chall = -1,
 - He parses
 - * $(\operatorname{com}_2, r_L, c, d, r) \leftarrow \operatorname{resp}$, and * $(E_2, P_2, Q_2) \leftarrow \operatorname{com}_2$;
 - Victor rejects if $\mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_2 || r_L) \neq \operatorname{com}_L$ or $\mathcal{H}((c,d) || r) \neq \operatorname{com}';$
 - He computes $K_{\widehat{\psi}}$ as $[c]P_2 + [d]Q_2$;
 - He rejects if K_{ψ} does not have order 3^b ;
 - He computes the 3^b -isogeny $\psi: E_2 \to E'_0$ with kernel generator K_{ψ} ;
 - Finally, Victor **accepts** if and only if $E_0 = E'_0$, otherwise **rejects**.

Remark 1. The computations in the **Response** and **Verification** concerning the case chall = 1 correspond with the horizontal arrows of Figure 1. While chall = 0 and chall = -1 determines the right-vertical and left-vertical arrows, respectively.

The current wave of attacks by Castryck-Decru [9], Maino-Martindale [37], and Robert [40] do not extend to the Sigma protocol from [17, §5.3], which is described above in Section 2.2. Given that the public keys do not include images of any auxiliary point the current Castryck-Decru family attacks do not help to find (either in a polynomial or subexponential time) the secret isogeny ϕ . Additionally,

- If chall = 1. The kernel generator $K_{\phi'}$ of $\phi': E_2 \to E_3$ is revealed, along with the points P_2 , Q_2 and their respectively image $P_3 = \phi'(P_2)$ and $Q_3 = \phi'(Q_2)$. Therefore, any key-recovery attack from [9,37,40] recovers a kernel generator for the 2^a -isogeny ϕ' , which is already public.

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- If chall = 0. The kernel generator $K_{\widehat{\psi}'}$ of the (expected) dual 3^b -isogeny $\widehat{\psi}': E_3 \to E_1$ is public, along with the image points $P_3 = \phi'(P_2)$ and $Q_3 = \phi'(Q_2)$. Now, the curve E_2 and the points $P_2, Q_2 \in E_2$ are not revealed, and thus the points P_3 and Q_3 looks like random points. Furthermore, there are no image of auxiliary points under ϕ' (or its dual). So, the current Castryck-Decru family attacks do not help to find the secret 2^a -isogeny ϕ' .
- If chall = -1. The kernel generator $K_{\widehat{\psi}}$ of the (expected) dual 3^b -isogeny $\widehat{\psi}: E_2 \to E_0$ is public, along with two random points P_2 and Q_2 . Now, the curve E_3 and the random points $P_3, Q_3 \in E_2$ are not revealed. In fact, there are no image of auxiliary points under ϕ (or its dual). So, the current Castryck-Decru family attacks do not help to find the secret 2^a -isogeny ϕ .

2.3 Sigma protocol & the Fiat-Shamir transform

As a way to describe the security assumption, Figure 2 illustrates the hard problem of the Sigma protocol from Section 2.2, and assumes the cases from Figure 2a, Figure 2b, and Figure 2c do not simultaneously occur for a fixed instance. Essentially, the hardness assumption relies on distinguishing between well-formed and altered instances (E_2, E_3, ϕ') , that is on the Decisional Supersingular Product Problem (DSPP) [17].


Definition 2 (Decisional Supersingular Product Problem (DSPP): Alice's case). Let E_0 be a Montgomery curve as in the SIDH setting (see Sec*tion 2.1). Given a* 2^a *-isogeny* $\phi: E_0 \to E_1$ with kernel $\langle K_{\phi} \rangle$, the Decisional Su*persingular Product Problem (DSPP) asks to distinguish between the following two distributions:*

- (E_2, E_3, ϕ') is the bottom of a random SIDH-square as in Figure 1. That is, for a randomly chosen order- 3^b kernel $\langle K_{\psi} \rangle$, we have E_2 is the codomain curve of the 3^b -isogeny ψ with kernel $\langle K_{\psi} \rangle$, E_3 is the codomain curve of the 3^b -isogeny ψ' with kernel $\langle \phi(K_{\psi}) \rangle$, and $\phi': E_2 \to E_3$ is the 2^a -isogeny with kernel $\langle \psi(K_{\phi}) \rangle$.
- (E_2, E_3, ϕ') such that E_2 is a randomly chosen elliptic curve with same cardinality as E_0 , and $\phi': E_2 \to E_3$ is a random 2^a -isogeny with cyclic kernel.


The sigma protocol described in Section 2.2 is 3-special soundness under the relation given by Definition 1. Furthermore, when repeated λ times, it becomes a Special Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge (SHVZK) PoK with soundness $(2/3)^{\kappa}$, assuming the DSPP is computationally hard and the commitment scheme determined by \mathcal{H} is computationally binding and statistically hiding [17, Theorem 4].

Signature scheme using the strong Fiat-Shamir transform [25,3]. The main idea is to avoid the interaction between Peggy and Victor by allowing Peggy to generate the challenge as the hash of the statement and the commitment. In our case, Peggy would first generate κ commitments com_i and then obtains the

challenge $(chall_1, \ldots, chall_{\kappa-1}) = \mathcal{RO}(\mathsf{pk}, m, \mathsf{com}_0, \ldots, \mathsf{com}_{\kappa-1})$, where *m* is the message to be signed. We denote by \mathcal{RO} a random oracle that outputs strings in $\{-1, 0, 1\}^{\kappa}$. Each challenge $chall_i$ determines the response values for com_i . This transformation is secure [42] in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM).



(a) Given ker $\widehat{\psi} = \langle K_{\widehat{\psi}} \rangle$. The prover **ac**- (b) Given ker $\widehat{\psi}' = \langle K_{\widehat{\psi}'} \rangle$. The prover **ac**cepts if the codomain curve E'_0 of $\widehat{\psi}$ is cepts if the codomain curve E'_1 of $\widehat{\psi}'$ is equal to E_0 ; otherwise **rejects**.



(c) Given ker $\phi' = \langle K'_{\phi} \rangle$. The verifier **accepts** if and only if the codomain curve E'_3 of ϕ' is equal to E_3 , $P_3 = \phi'(P_2)$ and $Q_3 = \phi'(Q_2)$; otherwise **rejects**.

Fig. 2: Dashed arrows and curves labeled with gray ink are secret and unknown by the adversary and distinguisher.

3 Efficient Sigma construction built-in functions

This section describes a way to optimize the Sigma construction described in Section 2.2 via recoverable Sigma protocols and applying the tricks from [29] and [4].

3.1 Reducing sizes according state-of-the-art tricks

A commitment $com = (com_L, com_R, com')$ has fixed bitlength equals 6λ . Recall

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- $\operatorname{com}_{L} = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_{2} || r_{L}) \text{ with } \operatorname{com}_{2} = (E_{2}, P_{2}, Q_{2});$
- $-\operatorname{com}_{R} = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_{3} || r_{R})$ with $\operatorname{com}_{3} = (E_{3}, P_{3}, Q_{3})$; and
- $\operatorname{com}' = \mathcal{H}((c,d) || r)$ where $K_{\psi} = [c]P_2 + [d]Q_2$ and $K_{\psi'} = [c]P_3 + [d]Q_3$ hold.;

The response resp has a different size depending on if chall = 1 holds; let us analyze the cases below:

Case chall \neq 1. The response includes $\log_2(p)$ bits that determines (c, d). Notice, we can do it better by computing either $\Delta = (cd^{-1} \mod 3^b)$ or $\Delta = (dc^{-1} \mod 3^b)$ plus one bit $b \in \{0, 1\}$ to decide which point is multiplied by Δ : either $P_j + [\Delta]Q_j$ or $[\Delta]P_j + Q_j$ as kernel point generator for j := 2, 3. In other words, we suggest to replace (c, d) by (b, Δ) , and update the commit com' as $\mathcal{H}((b, \Delta) || r)$. That trick reduces (c, d) of $\log_2(p)$ bits to (b, Δ) of $\frac{\log_2(p)}{2}$ bits. Now, let CanonicalBasis₃(E) denotes the procedure to find two order- 3^b points P' and Q' such that $\langle P', Q' \rangle = E[3^b]$, and set $j \in \{2, 3\}$. The commitment $\operatorname{com}_j = (E_j, P_j, Q_j)$ has $6 \log_2(p)$ bits. The idea is to compute $P', Q' \leftarrow \operatorname{CanonicalBasis}_3(E_j)$ and find integers $\alpha_{P_j}, \alpha_{Q_j}, \beta_{P_j}, \beta_{Q_j} \in [0 \dots 3^b - 1]$ such that $P_j = [\alpha_{P_j}]P' + [\beta_{P_j}]Q'$ and $Q_j = [\alpha_{Q_j}]P' + [\beta_{Q_j}]Q'$. Therefore, replace the commitment $\operatorname{com}_j = (E_j, P_j, Q_j)$ by $\operatorname{com}_j = (E_j, (\alpha_{P_j}, \beta_{P_j}), (d_{Q_j}, \beta_{Q_j}))$. That trick reduces the sizes from $6 \log_2(p)$ bits to about $4 \log_2(p)$ bits.

Case chall = 1. The response includes both com_2 and com_3 , along with the kernel order- 2^a point generator $K_{\phi'}$. Same trick as in the case $\operatorname{chall} \neq 1$ allows to reduce the commitment size of $(\operatorname{com}_2, \operatorname{com}_3)$ from $12 \log_2(p)$ to $6 \log_2(p)$. Let $\operatorname{CanonicalBasis}_2(E_2)$ denotes the procedure to find two order- 2^a points P and Q such that $\langle P, Q \rangle = E_2[2^a]$. Analogously to the 3^b -torsion basis case, we can reduce $K_{\phi'}$ by finding two integers $\alpha, \beta \in [0 \dots 2^a - 1]$ such that $K_{\phi'} = [\alpha]P + [\beta]Q$. Moreover, we suggest to represent $K_{\phi'}$ using $\frac{\log_2 p}{2}$ by computing either $\Delta_2 = (\alpha\beta^{-1} \mod 2^a)$ or $\Delta_2 = (\beta\alpha^{-1} \mod 2^a)$ plus one bit $b_2 \in \{0, 1\}$ to decide which point is multiplied by Δ_2 : either $P + [\Delta_2]Q$ or $[\Delta_2]P + Q$ as kernel point generator.

Reducing via recoverable Sigma protocol. Following the hints from [4, c.f. Remark 3], we transform the Sigma protocol into a recoverable Sigma protocol. That is, the signer can output (chall, resp) as signature instead of (com, resp). Given a signature (chall, resp), Victor then first recomputes com, and checks that chall = $\mathcal{H}(pk, m, com)$ before verifying the transcript.

3.2 Explicit description of an efficient recoverable Sigma protocol

Let us assume Peggy wants to convince Victor that she knows the secret 2^a isogeny $\phi: E_0 \to E_1$, which implies knowing ker $\phi = \langle K_{\phi} \rangle$. Let *m* be a message to be signed.

Signing. Peggy proceeds as follows:

- She computes (com_2, r_L) , (com_3, r_R) , ((c, d), r), and $K_{\phi'}$ as in the commitment procedure from Section 2.2;

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- She evaluates
 - $\operatorname{com}_L = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_2 || r_L),$
 - $\operatorname{com}_R = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_3 || r_R)$, and
 - $\operatorname{com}' = \mathcal{H}((b, \Delta) || r)$ where (b, Δ) are computed as in Section 3.1;
- She calculates $\operatorname{com}_{\mathcal{H}} \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\mathsf{pk} \mid\mid m \mid\mid \mathsf{com})$ with $\operatorname{com} = (\operatorname{com}_L, \operatorname{com}_R, \operatorname{com}')$;
- She picks as random challenge as $chall \leftarrow PRNG(com_{\mathcal{H}}) \in \{-1, 0, 1\};$
 - If chall = 1, she gets (b_2, Δ_2) , $(\alpha_{P_j}, \beta_{P_j})$, and $(\alpha_{Q_j}, \beta_{Q_j})$ for $j \coloneqq 2, 3$ as in Section 3.1, and sets

$$\mathsf{resp} \leftarrow \big(\mathsf{com}', E_2, (\alpha_{P_2}, \beta_{P_2}), (\alpha_{Q_2}, \beta_{Q_2}), r_L, \\ (b_2, \Delta_2), E_3, (\alpha_{P_3}, \beta_{P_3}), (\alpha_{Q_3}, \beta_{Q_3}), r_R \big);$$

• If chall = 0, she obtains $(\alpha_{P_3}, \beta_{P_3})$ and $(\alpha_{Q_3}, \beta_{Q_3})$ as in Section 3.1, and sets

 $\texttt{resp} \leftarrow (\texttt{com}_L, E_3, (\alpha_{P_3}, \beta_{P_3}), (\alpha_{Q_3}, \beta_{Q_3}), r_R, (b, \Delta), r);$

 If chall = −1, she computes (α_{P2}, β_{P2}) and (α_{Q2}, β_{Q2}) as in Section 3.1, and sets

$$\mathsf{resp} \leftarrow (\mathsf{com}_R, E_2, (\alpha_{P_2}, \beta_{P_2}), (\alpha_{Q_2}, \beta_{Q_2}), r_L, (b, \Delta), r);$$

- Finally, Peggy sends $\sigma \leftarrow (\texttt{chall}_{\mathcal{H}}, \texttt{resp})$ to Victor.

Verifying. Victor does the below calculations to validate the signature $\sigma = (chall_{\mathcal{H}}, resp)$:

- He computes the challenge as $chall \leftarrow PRNG(com_{\mathcal{H}}) \in \{-1, 0, 1\};$
- If chall = 1,
 - He takes com', r_L , and r_R from resp;
 - He reconstructs $com_2 = (E_2, P_2, Q_2)$, $com_3 = (E_3, P_3, Q_3)$, and $K_{\phi'}$ from resp;
 - He calculates $\operatorname{com}_L = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_2 || r_L)$ and $\operatorname{com}_R = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_3 || r_R);$
 - He rejects if $\mathcal{H}(\mathsf{pk} \mid\mid m \mid\mid \mathsf{com}) \neq \mathsf{com}_{\mathcal{H}}$ where $\mathsf{com} = (\mathsf{com}_L, \mathsf{com}_R, \mathsf{com}')$;
 - He computes the 2^a -isogeny $\phi' \colon E_2 \to E'_3$ with kernel generator $K_{\phi'}$;
 - Finally, Victor accepts if and only if $E_3 = E'_3$, $P_3 = \phi'(P_2)$ and $Q_3 = \phi'(Q_2)$, otherwise rejects.
- If chall = 0,
 - He takes $((b, \Delta), r)$, com_L , and r_R from resp;
 - He reconstructs $com_3 = (E_3, P_3, Q_3)$ from resp;
 - He calculates $\operatorname{com}' = \mathcal{H}((b, \Delta) || r)$ and $\operatorname{com}_R = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_3 || r_R);$
 - He rejects if $\mathcal{H}(\mathsf{pk} \mid\mid m \mid\mid \mathsf{com}) \neq \mathsf{com}_{\mathcal{H}}$ where $\mathsf{com} = (\mathsf{com}_L, \mathsf{com}_R, \mathsf{com}')$;
 - He calculates $K_{\psi'}$ using P_3 , Q_3 , and (b, Δ) ;
 - He computes the 3^b-isogeny $\psi' \colon E_3 \to E'_1$ with kernel generator $K_{\psi'}$;
 - Finally, Victor **accepts** if and only if $E_1 = E'_1$, otherwise **rejects**.

- If chall = -1,
 - He takes $((b, \Delta), r)$, com_R , and r_L from resp;
 - He reconstructs $com_2 = (E_2, P_2, Q_2)$ from resp;
 - He calculates $\operatorname{com}' = \mathcal{H}((b, \Delta) || r)$ and $\operatorname{com}_L = \mathcal{H}(\operatorname{com}_2 || r_L);$
 - He rejects if $\mathcal{H}(\mathsf{pk} \mid\mid m \mid\mid \mathsf{com}) \neq \mathsf{com}_{\mathcal{H}}$ where $\mathsf{com} = (\mathsf{com}_L, \mathsf{com}_R, \mathsf{com}')$;
 - He calculates K_{ψ} using P_2 , Q_2 , and (b, Δ) ;
 - He computes the 3^b -isogeny $\psi: E_2 \to E'_0$ with kernel generator K_{ψ} ;
 - Finally, Victor **accepts** if and only if $E_0 = E'_0$, otherwise **rejects**.

Notice, if chall = 1 then the response resp in the above recoverable Sigma protocol has $\frac{8\lambda+17\log_2(p)}{2}$ bits; otherwise, it has $\frac{8\lambda+9\log_2(p)}{2}$ bits. Therefore, in average the response resp has $\frac{24\lambda+35\log_2(p)}{6} \approx (4\lambda+6\log_2(p))$ bits. As the last optimization, we suggest taking

$$(\texttt{chall}_0,\ldots,\texttt{chall}_{\kappa-1}) \leftarrow \mathcal{RO}\left(\mathcal{H}'(\texttt{com}_{\mathcal{H},0},\ldots,\texttt{com}_{\mathcal{H},\kappa-1})\right)$$

as κ challenges for κ repetitions of the above recoverable Sigma protocol, where \mathcal{H}' is a hash function return λ -bits and \mathcal{RO} is a random oracle that uniformly samples from $\{-1, 0, 1\}^{\kappa}$. After that, we get a signature

$$\sigma = (\mathcal{H}'(\mathsf{com}_{\mathcal{H}',0},\ldots,\mathsf{com}_{\mathcal{H},\kappa-1}),\mathsf{resp}_0,\ldots,\mathsf{resp}_{\kappa-1})$$

of $(\lambda + \kappa (4\lambda + 6 \log_2(p)))$ -bits. We list the expected sizes according to [1,36] in Table 1.

$\log_2(p)$	$ \lambda $	κ	Security Level	Private key	Public Key	Signature
377	128	219	NIST Level 1	24 B	96 B	75.955 KB
546	192	329	NIST Level 3	35 B	138 B	166.334 KB
697	256	438	NIST Level 5	44 B	$176 \mathrm{~B}$	285.061 KB
434	128	219	NIST Level 1	28 B	110 B	85.317 KB
503	160	274	NIST Level 2	32 B	126 B	125.307 KB
610	192	329	NIST Level 3	39 B	$154 \mathrm{~B}$	182.126 KB
751	256	438	NIST Level 5	47 B	188 B	302.800 KB

Table 1: Byte sizes. Signature sizes correspond with the average case. Private keys correspond to integer coefficients sk in \mathbb{Z}_{2^a} , while public keys are elliptic curves $E: y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$ described by the element A in \mathbb{F}_{p^2} . Since $2^a \approx \sqrt{p}$, public keys are 4x larger than private keys.

3.3 To the quadratic twist to reduce sizes

Following B-SIDH construction [14,15], we can still reduce the signature sizes using the quadratic twist curve. For instance, according the parameter sets from [15], we can use primes of 256-bits (NIST Level 1), 384-bits (NIST Level 3), and 512-bits (NIST Level 5). The idea is to choose a prime number p with $M \mid (p+1)$ and $N \mid (p-1)$ being smooth integer numbers close to p and

- replace order- 2^a points and 2^a -isogenies by order-M points and M-isogenies, and
- replace order- 3^b points and 3^b -isogenies with order-N points and N-isogenies.

On the other hand, [17, Theorem 4] also holds if we repeat κ times the Sigma protocol described in [17, §5.3] and replace 2^a and 3^b with M and N, respectively. It becomes an SHVZK PoK with soundness $(2/3)^{\kappa}$, assuming the DSPP is computationally hard. Table 2 illustrates the respective signature sizes based on Section 3.2 under the B-SIDH setup [15].

$\log_2(p)$	$ \lambda $	κ	Security Level	Private key	Public Key	Signature
256	128	219	NIST Level 1	32 B	64 B	56,080 KB
384	192	329	NIST Level 3	48 B	96 B	126.360 KB
512	256	438	NIST Level 5	64 B	$128 \mathrm{~B}$	224.288 KB

Table 2: Byte sizes. Signature sizes correspond with the average case. Private keys correspond to integer coefficients sk in \mathbb{Z}_M , while public keys are elliptic curves $E: y^2 = x^3 + Ax^2 + x$ described by the element A in \mathbb{F}_{p^2} . Since $M \approx p$, public keys are 2x larger than private keys.

3.4 To Jacobian of genus-two curves to keep reducing sizes

Following G2SIDH construction [26,33], we have another way to reduce sizes by working with Jacobian of genus two hyperelliptic curves ³. This time the idea is replace 2^a -isogenies and 3^b -isogenies with $(2^a, 2^a)$ -isogenies and $(3^b, 3^b)$ -isogenies. One crucial difference between SIDH and G2SIDH is that we do not have only two generators for the torsion subgroups; we have four generators instead, and the isogeny kernels are generated by two elements. For instance, given a public $(2^a, 2^a)$ -isogenous Jacobian J_1 to J_0 . This time Peggy wants to convince Victor that she knows the secret $(2^a, 2^a)$ -isogeny $\phi: J_0 \to J_1$, which implies knowing ker $\phi = \langle K_{\phi,0}, K_{\phi,1} \rangle$. Here, J_0 is a public and fixed Jacobian of a genus two curve H_0 , similarly J_1 (the public key) comes from a genus two hyperelliptic curve H_1 .

Similarly to Section 3.3, [17, Theorem 4] also extends if we repeat κ times the Sigma protocol described in [17, §5.3] and replace 2^a -isogenies and 3^b -isogenies with $(2^a, 2^a)$ -isogenies and $(3^b, 3^b)$ -isogenies, respectively. It becomes an SHVZK PoK with soundness $(2/3)^{\kappa}$, assuming the G2DSPP (described by Definition 3) is computationally hard.

Definition 3 (Genus two Decisional Supersingular Product Problem (G2DSPP): Alice's case). Let J_0 be a Jacobian of genus two curve H_0 as in the G2SIDH setting. Given a $(2^a, 2^a)$ -isogeny $\phi: J_0 \to J_1$ with kernel

³ For a deeper understanding of isogenies in the context of G2SIDH, we strongly suggest reading [26,10,33,32]

 $\langle K_{\phi,0}, K_{\phi,1} \rangle$, the Genus two Decisional Supersingular Product Problem, labeled as G2DSPP, asks to distinguish between the following two distributions:

- (J_2, J_3, ϕ') is the bottom of a random G2SIDH-square. That is, for a randomly chosen order- $(3^b, 3^b)$ kernel $\langle K_{\psi,0}, K_{\psi,1} \rangle$, we have J_2 is the codomain of the $(3^b, 3^b)$ -isogeny ψ with kernel $\langle K_{\psi,0}, K_{\psi,1} \rangle$, J_3 is the codomain of the $(3^b, 3^b)$ -isogeny ψ' with kernel $\langle \phi(K_{\psi,0}), \phi(K_{\psi,1}) \rangle$, and $\phi' \colon J_2 \to J_3$ is the $(2^a, 2^a)$ -isogeny with kernel $\langle \psi(K_{\phi,0}), \psi(K_{\phi,1}) \rangle$.
- (J_2, J_3, ϕ') such that J_2 is a randomly chosen Jacobian with same cardinality as J_0 , and $\phi': J_2 \to J_3$ is a random $(2^a, 2^a)$ -isogeny with kernel $\langle R_0, R_1 \rangle$ for some order- 2^a elements $R_0, R_1 \in J_2[2^a]$.

Essentially, the genus-two recoverable Sigma protocol remains the same flow as in Section 3.2, but we need to consider that it requires double generators and isogeny evaluations. Additionally, we have that the kernel generators of the $(2^a, 2^a)$ -isogenies and $(3^b, 3^b)$ -isogenies can be expressed by linear combinations determined with three integer coefficients c, d, and e of $\frac{\log_2(p)}{2}$ -bits. In summary, we need double of $\frac{\log_2(p)}{2}$ -bits integer coefficients to represent com_2 and com_3 , and three coefficients to represent the kernel generators of ϕ', ψ and ψ' . To be more precise, if $\operatorname{chall} = 1$, then resp has $\frac{8\lambda+25\log_2(p)}{2}$ -bits. Otherwise, we have resp of $\frac{8\lambda+13\log_2(p)}{2}$ -bits. Consequently, in average we get a response resp with $\frac{24\lambda+51\log_2(p)}{6} \approx (4\lambda + 9\log_2(p))$ -bits. Since the best algorithm to find an isogeny is $\widetilde{O}(p)$ (classically) and $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{p})$ (quantumly) [16], we can work with primes of 128 (NIST Level 1), 192 (NIST Leve 3), and 256 (NIST Level 5). Table 3 lists the expected sizes of the signature over Jacobian of genus two curves.

$\log_2(p)$	λ	κ	Security Level	Private key	Public Key	Signature
128	128	219	NIST Level 1	24 B		45.568 KB
192	192	329	NIST Level 3	36 B	288 B	102.672 KB
256	256	438	NIST Level 5	48 B	384 B	182.240 KB

Table 3: Byte sizes. Signature sizes correspond with the average case. Private keys correspond to 3-tuples of integer coefficients $(\mathsf{sk}_c, \mathsf{sk}_d, \mathsf{sk}_e)$ in $\mathbb{Z}_{2^a}^3$, while public keys are genus two hyperelliptic curves $H: y^2 = f(x)$ described by the degree-6 polynomial f(x) over \mathbb{F}_{p^2} . Since $2^a \approx \sqrt{p}$, public keys are 8x larger than private keys.

3.5 Size comparisons against isogeny-based signatures

As mentioned in Section 1, the short keys are the most significant selling point of isogeny-based signature construction. In contrast, isogeny construction has a high latency in practice, which seems to be much easier to improve. This section compares state-of-the-art isogeny-based signatures that remain secure against Castryck-Decru family attacks in terms of byte lengths. Currently, there are different families of isogeny-based sigma protocols, such as:

- CSIDH-based: Sea-sign [18,22], CSI-FiSh [6] and the Lossy CSI-FiSh [24];
- SIDH-based: [17, §5.3]; and
- Quaternion-based: SQI-sign [20,21] and [29].

Since all CSIDH-based proposals are initially based over a 512-bits prime field, we compare them by moving into a 2048-bits prime field (as suggested in [8,39,12])). Using a 2048-bits CSIDH-prime impacts public-key sizes and timing efficiency; signature sizes stay fixed as in CSIDH-512. Now, due to the extended variety of CSIDH-based configurations determined by

- the number n of different isogeny degrees,
- the number B of isogenies per isogeny degree, and
- the number S of multiple public-key curves as CSIDH-base public-keys.

We try to englobe a fair comparison assuming n = 74, B = 5, and $S = 2^6$, which gives a good trade-off between small signature sizes and timings. We used the script from [22] to get sizes concerning the improved Sea-sign over a 2048-bits prime field. Table 4 lists all analyzed isogeny-based signature sizes in bytes.

Scheme	Private key	Public Key	Signature
[29, §4] with Fiat-Shamir transform	32 B	96 B	11.264 KB
Original SQI-sign [20]	16 B	64 B	204 B
SQI-sign improvement from [21]	10 D	04 D	204 D
Sea-sign [18]	16 B	16.384 KB	720 B
Sea-sign improvement from [22]	16 B	16.128 KB	7.220 KB
Simple variant of CSI-FiSh [6]	16 B	16.384 KB	$560 \mathrm{B}$
Lossy CSI-FiSh [24]	16 B	16.896 KB	$560 \mathrm{B}$
Optimized [17, §5.3] according to Section 3.2	24 B	96 B	75.955 KB
Twist quadratic variant of [17, §5.3] according to Section 3.3	16 B	64 B	56,080 KB
Genus two variant of $[17, \S5.3]$ according to Section 3.4	24 B	192 B	45.568 KB

Table 4: Byte sizes concerning state-of-the-art isogeny-based signatures with close to NIST security Level 1. For a fair comparison, we set all CSIDH-based construction in [18,22,6,24] over a 2048-bits prime field (as suggested in [8,39,12]). Large CSIDH primes only impact public-key sizes and timing efficiency; signature sizes stay fixed as in CSIDH-512.

4 Concluding remarks

After the wave of Castryck-Decru attacks, it could be hard to stand for using some isogeny constructions. Therefore, we list all flavors of isogeny-based signatures for which the Castryck-Decru attack does not apply (see Section 3.5). We also estimate the expected optimized sizes for the 3-special soundness Sigma protocol from [17, §5.3] and discuss its extensions on the B-SIDH and G2SIDH context.

Open problems. As pointed out in [17], there is no 2-special soundness construction under the Fixed degree relation: can we construct it for SIDH-squares? A 2-special soundness protocol would considerably reduce sizes and, thus, the number of repetitions (e.g., $\kappa = 128$ instead of 219).

A recent new proposal by LeGrow, Ti, and Zobernig suggests using the supersingular non-superspecial abelian surface [34], where the Costello-Smith attack from [16] does not apply and allows working with 87-bit primes (concerning NIST Security Level 1). Is it possible to build a shorter Sigma protocol using the proposals from [34]?

> We learn more from failure than from success. Do not let it stop us. Failure could build new isogeny schemes.

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