

YOLO YOSO: Fast and Simple Encryption and Secret Sharing in the YOSO Model

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Abstract. Achieving adaptive (or proactive) security in cryptographic protocols is notoriously difficult due to the adversary’s power to dynamically corrupt parties as the execution progresses. Inspired by the work of Benhamouda *et al.* in TCC 2020, Gentry *et al.* in CRYPTO 2021 introduced the YOSO (You Only Speak Once) model for constructing adaptively (or proactively) secure protocols in massively distributed settings (*e.g.* blockchains). In this model, instead of having all parties execute an entire protocol, smaller *anonymous committees* are randomly chosen to execute each individual round of the protocol. After playing their role, parties encrypt protocol messages towards the next anonymous committee and erase their internal state before publishing their ciphertexts. However, a big challenge remains in realizing YOSO protocols: *efficiently* encrypting messages towards anonymous parties selected at random without learning their identities, while proving the encrypted messages are valid with respect to the protocol. In particular, the protocols of Benhamouda *et al.* and of Gentry *et al.* require showing ciphertexts contain valid shares of secret states. We propose concretely efficient methods for encrypting a protocol’s secret state towards a random anonymous committee. We start by proposing a very simple and efficient scheme for encrypting messages towards randomly and anonymously selected parties. We then show constructions of publicly verifiable secret (re-)sharing (PVSS) schemes with concretely efficient proofs of (re-)share validity that can be generically instantiated from encryption schemes with certain linear homomorphic properties. In addition, we introduce a new PVSS with proof of sharing consisting of just two field elements, which as far as we know is the first achieving this, and may be of independent interest. Finally, we show that our PVSS schemes can be efficiently realized from our encryption scheme.

1 Introduction

Cryptographic protocols traditionally rely on secure channels among parties whose identities are publicly known. However, while knowing parties’ identities makes it easy to construct secure channels, it also makes it easy for an adaptive (or mobile) adversary to corrupt parties as a protocol execution proceeds. Recently, an elegant solution for this problem has been suggested [2,16]: instead of keeping secret state throughout the execution, parties periodically transfer their state to randomly selected anonymous parties, potentially after computing on this state (as is the case of MPC).

YOSO model: We say protocols with the aforementioned property are in the YOSO (*i.e.* You Only Speak Once) model, since parties are only required to act in a protocol execution when selected

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at random, which potentially only happens once. The YOSO model is especially interesting in massively distributed settings (*e.g.* blockchains), where a huge number of parties are potentially involved but it is desirable to have only smaller committees execute a protocol for the sake of efficiency. Using small committees saves computation and communication, and since the identity of parties in the committee currently holding secret states is not known, an adversary cannot do better than corrupt random parties. Recent work [21] improves the work of [16] by achieving guaranteed output delivery in a constant number of rounds without relying on trusted setup.

Role Assignment: At the core of protocols in the YOSO model is a scheme for encrypting messages towards *roles* rather than parties. A party randomly selected to perform a role can decrypt the messages sent to that role. This allows for executing traditional secret sharing [2] or MPC [16] protocols among roles that are performed by different parties as the execution proceeds. Besides passing confidential messages among parties assigned to certain roles, it is also paramount to allow parties to authenticate outgoing messages on behalf of the role they have just performed. This task has been modeled [16] and realized [2,18] as a functionality that outputs public keys for a random subset of anonymous parties in such a way that these parties can both decrypt messages encrypted under these keys and prove they were the rightful receivers. However, existing methods for role assignment [2,18,7] are still based on powerful primitives (*e.g.* FHE), incur too high costs and, most importantly, are incompatible with efficient techniques for publicly proving that encrypted secret shares are valid.

In this work we design schemes for role assignment that are not only efficient in sending messages to parties selected in the future but also amenable to the currently best techniques for publicly proving that encrypted messages are valid shares of a secret state, which is central to protocols in the YOSO model.

1.1 Related Works

Keeping Secrets: The seminal solution of [2] starts by selecting an auxiliary committee via an anonymous lottery (*e.g.* based on a VRF). Each party in this committee generates an ephemeral key pair and publishes the ephemeral public key and an encryption of the ephemeral secret key under the long-term public key of a party they choose at random. Encrypting towards an anonymous party can be done by encrypting under its ephemeral public key. However, since corrupted parties in the auxiliary committee will always choose other corrupted parties while the honest parties choose at random, this method needs a corruption ratio of $1/4$ of the parties in order to arrive at an honest majority committee.

RPIR: The constraint on corruption ratio of [2] was subsequently solved in [18] via random-index private information retrieval (RPIR). RPIR allows a client to retrieve a random index from a database in such a way that the servers holding the database do not learn what index was retrieved. The solution of [18] consists in running a RPIR protocol with a database holding the public keys of all parties and having parties in a committee execute the client using MPC, outputting re-randomized versions of the public keys output by RPIR. While this solution allows for working in an honest majority scenario and achieves better asymptotic efficiency than [2], the concrete complexity is still quite high.

Encryption to the Future: A different approach is taken in [7], which constructs a primitive called Encryption to the Future (ETF). Instead of having committees actively participate in selecting future committees and help them receive their messages, ETF allows for non-interactively

encrypting towards the winner of a lottery that is executed as part of an underlying blockchain ledger. Also, it allows for a party to prove it was the winner of this lottery (*i.e.* the receiver of a ciphertext) without exposing whether it won future lotteries. Although this solution can be constructed from simple tools like garbled circuits and oblivious transfer (after a setup phase), each encryption still requires communication and computational complexities linear in the total number of parties.

The ETF construction of [7] relies on a relaxation of Witness Encryption called Witness Encryption over Commitments (cWE), where one can encrypt a message towards the holder of an opening of a commitment to a valid witness of an NP relation. More specifically, we are interested in the case of Encryption to the Current Winner (ECW), where the data needed to determine the party selected to perform a role is already in the underlying blockchain (but still does not reveal who the party is). In order to realize ECW, each party commits to a witness of a predicate showing they win a lottery for the current parameter. A party encrypting towards a role simply encrypts the message towards the party who has such a committed witness to winning the lottery for a current parameter. A party who wins can decrypt the message encrypted towards the role using their witness. They can perform *Authentication from the Past* (AfP) on a message by doing a signature of knowledge on that message using their lottery winning witness.

The ETF constructions of [7] suffer from a major drawback: every encryption towards an anonymously selected party has communication complexity $O(n\kappa)$ where n is the *total* number of parties and κ is the security parameter. Even if preprocessing is allowed, these constructions still require the sender to publish n cWE ciphertexts or to have the eligible receivers perform a round of anonymous broadcast that is only usable for a single encryption. On the other hand, the AfP constructions only have $O(\kappa)$ communication complexity.

PVSS Compatibility: A drawback in current role assignment [2,18,7] is that they are not amenable to publicly verifiable secret (re)sharing. Both in YOSO proactive secret sharing [2] and YOSO MPC [16], the committees executing each round of the protocol do not simply send unstructured messages but shares of a secret that must be verified. While this can be done via generic non-interactive zero knowledge proofs of encrypted shares validity, such a solution incurs very high computational and communication costs.

Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing (PVSS): An integral part of YOSO protocols is having each committee perform PVSS towards the next committee. A PVSS scheme allows for any party to check that an encrypted share vector is valid. A number of PVSS constructions are known [29,12,28,3,26,20] that different techniques for proving that a vector of encrypted shares are valid shares of a given secret. Recently, the SCRAPE [8] and ALBATROSS [9] PVSS schemes have significantly improved on the complexity of such schemes by making the share validity check and reconstructions procedures cheaper than previous works. While these works are based on number theoretical assumptions, a recent work has shown how to efficiently build PVSS from lattice based assumptions [17]. These works are not fit for the YOSO model because they require the parties to know the identities (or rather the public keys) of the parties receiving the shares when checking share validity, precluding (re)sharing towards anonymous parties. A key part of this work is that we explore the fact that the share validity check of SCRAPE can be modified to work regardless of the public keys used to encrypt the shares.

1.2 Our Contributions

In this work we address the issue of constructing simple ECW schemes amenable to efficient publicly verifiable secret (re)sharing (PVSS) protocols. Our contributions are summarized as follows:

Simple Encryption to Future (ECW): We construct a simple ECW scheme based on a mixnet and an additively homomorphic public key encryption scheme. Our scheme requires a setup phase where a mixnet is used but this setup can be either done once and reused for multiple times (using our reusable AFP) or preprocessed so that future encryptions can be done non-interactively. Our ECW ciphertexts have size linear *only in the number of parties who open them*.

Reusable Private Authentication from the Past (AFP): We show how to reuse our ECW setup even when a party performs multiple rounds of AFP, *i.e.* proving that it was selected to decrypt a given ECW ciphertext. This scheme guarantees that the adversary cannot predict which parties can decrypt future ECW ciphertexts while keeping the setup constant size.

Generic Efficient PVSS: We construct a generic PVSS protocol with efficient proofs of encrypted shares validity from any IND-CPA additively homomorphic encryption scheme with an efficient proof of decryption correctness without any generic zero knowledge proofs, which we call HEPVSS. This general result sheds new light on the construction on efficient PVSS schemes.

New PVSS with Minimal Overhead: Moreover, we introduce a new PVSS construction named DHPVSS with *constant-size proof of sharing correctness* which, as far as we know, is the first PVSS to achieve this. More precisely, the PVSS communicates only the n encrypted shares (which are one group element each) and two field elements for the proof. This may be of independent interest for other applications, such as randomness beacons.

Efficient PVSS for Anonymous Committees based on ECW: We instantiate our PVSS constructions based on our ECW and AFP schemes along with a protocol for resharing a secret towards a future random anonymous committee. This allows for parties to keep a secret alive, which is a core component of YOSO MPC.

1.3 Our Techniques

In this section we highlight the main technical components of our contributions. We remark that our main goal is providing simple constructions that yield efficient instantiations of PVSS towards anonymous committees along with efficient AFP schemes allowing parties to prove they received shares sent to a given role.

Encryption to the Future We introduce a simple ECW protocol where each party chooses a key pair in the system and then a mixnet is used to anonymize them. We can then define a simple lottery predicate that selects one of these keys. The winner of the lottery can trivially know that they have won this lottery. By combining this with an IND-CPA encryption scheme that encrypts a message under that key, we can obtain IND-CPA ECW. Using a homomorphic encryption scheme we can also encrypt to multiple lottery winners and prove that the same message is received by all of them.

Authentication from the Past

The Easy Way: An easy way of obtaining reusable ECW setup is to repeat the lottery setup and obtain multiple anonymized keys for each party. Then, any party can use a new anonymized public key for each AFP tag. This ensures that the AFP scheme can be executed a bounded number of times before lottery winners can be linked to specific public keys in the setup and ciphertexts start betraying their receivers.

The Reusable Way: In Appendix J, we show that a party can prove membership in a given committee without needing to reveal its role in this committee. This is done by signing a message with a ring signature [25] where the secret key corresponds to a public key in the committee. These signatures hide the identity of the party. Moreover, we require the signature to be linkable [22], so that no two parties can claim the same secret key. Using this and an anonymous channel, we can construct an AFP that can be used multiple times without linking a party P_i to its setup public key. More interestingly, we also present a protocol that leverages the presence of a dealer (which could be a party that encrypted the message to that committee) to reduce the size of these proofs of membership to constant (for the parties making the claims). This uses Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures [6], where the dealer signs the public keys of the committee, and the parties can then “complete” one of these signatures without revealing which one. We introduce a simple linkable version of these signatures.

PVSS We introduce two constructions for PVSS. The first, HEPVSS, is based on a generic encryption scheme which enjoys certain linearity properties with respect to encryption and decryption, and has the advantage that the security of the PVSS can be based on IND-CPA security of the scheme. The homomorphic properties of the scheme allow for simple proofs of sharing correctness and reconstruction. While we are only aware of El Gamal scheme satisfying the notion of the homomorphic properties we need, we hope that a relaxed version of this abstraction allows to capture other encryption schemes with homomorphic properties such as latticed-based assumptions or Paillier in future work. In our second scheme DHPVSS, we introduce the idea of providing the dealer with an additional key pair for share distribution. This idea is powerful in combination with a technique used in SCRAPE to prove that encrypted shares lie on a polynomial of the right degree. The novelty is that, while in SCRAPE this needed an additional discrete logarithm equality (DLEQ) proof *for each share*, our new scheme requires *a single DLEQ proof*. This reduces the sharing correctness proof to only $2 \mathbb{Z}_p$ -elements while each encrypted share is still one group element.

We also introduce PVSS resharing protocols for both constructions, where a committee, among which a secret is PVSSed, can create shares of the same secret for the next committee, in a publicly verifiable way.

PVSS Towards Anonymous Committees Finally, we show that we can replace standard encryption and authentication in our PVSS protocols by ECW and AFP and thereby obtain PVSS toward anonymous committees.

2 Preliminaries

2.1 Sigma-protocols

At several points of this paper we will require non-interactive zero knowledge arguments of knowledge, where most of our statements are instances of a general structure where we want to prove

knowledge of preimage of some element via a *vector-space homomorphism* f : that is, let \mathbb{F} be a finite field, \mathcal{W} and \mathcal{X} be \mathbb{F} -vector spaces, and $f : \mathcal{W} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ be a vector space homomorphism. Let

$$R_{\text{Pre}} = \{(w, x) \in \mathcal{W} \times \mathcal{X} : x = f(w)\}.$$

The standard (Schnorr-like) Σ -protocol π_{Pre} for this relation is as in Figure 1. It is well known that Π_{Pre} is a zero knowledge proof of knowledge with soundness error $1/|\mathbb{F}|$ (see Appendix E.1).




Fig. 1. Generic Σ -protocol for knowledge of homomorphism-preimage

A non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof of knowledge in the random oracle model is obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform (Figure 2).




Fig. 2. Generic non-interactive argument of knowledge of homomorphism-preimage

Cyclic Group Homomorphism Preimage, DL Knowledge and DLEQ Knowledge Proofs.

Some useful examples of homomorphism-preimage relations R_{Pre} are given by discrete logarithm and discrete logarithm equality. Indeed, a cyclic group \mathbb{G} of prime order p has a vector space structure over the field \mathbb{Z}_p , and a group homomorphism $f : \mathbb{G} \rightarrow \mathbb{G}'$ between groups of order p is also a \mathbb{Z}_p -vector homomorphism.³ Let G be a generator of \mathbb{G} . Given $X \in \mathbb{G}$, a discrete logarithm DL proof of knowledge $\text{DL}(w; G, X)$ asserts knowledge of $w \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ with $X = w \cdot G$ (we denote this as

³This extends to direct products of groups of order p , i.e. $\mathcal{W} = \mathbb{G}_1 \times \dots \times \mathbb{G}_m$, $\mathcal{X} = \mathbb{G}'_1 \times \dots \times \mathbb{G}'_n$ and $f = (f_1, \dots, f_m) : \mathcal{W} \rightarrow \mathcal{X}$ where $f_i : \mathbb{G}_i \rightarrow \mathbb{G}'_i$ are all group homomorphisms.

$w = \text{DL}_G(X)$). In the language above this is provided by $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}(w; (X), f_G)$ with $f_G(w) = w \cdot G$. This is the non-interactive version of the well known Schnorr proof.

Similarly, let G, H be elements in \mathbb{G} . Given $X, Y \in \mathbb{G}$ the discrete logarithm equality proof $\text{DLEQ}(w; G, X, H, Y)$ is a non-interactive proof of knowledge of $w \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ with $w = \text{DL}_G(X) = \text{DL}_H(Y)$, which can be obtained by using $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}(w; (X, Y), f_{(G,H)})$, where $f_{G,H}(w) := (w \cdot G, w \cdot H)$.

2.2 \mathbb{Z}_p -linear Homomorphic Encryption

The results in this paper require encryption schemes with certain homomorphic properties, that allow for simple proofs of plaintext knowledge. These properties are attained by El Gamal encryption scheme (described in Appendix A).

Definition 1 (\mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic encryption scheme). Let $\mathcal{E} = (\mathcal{E}.\text{Gen}, \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}, \mathcal{E}.\text{Dec})$ be a public key encryption scheme (see Appendix A for a definition), and let p be a prime number. We say \mathcal{E} is \mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic (\mathbb{Z}_p -LHE) if the plaintext space $(\mathfrak{P}, \boxplus_{\mathfrak{P}})$, randomness space $(\mathfrak{R}, \boxplus_{\mathfrak{R}})$, ciphertext space $(\mathfrak{C}, \boxplus_{\mathfrak{C}})$ each have a \mathbb{Z}_p -vector space structure and for all public keys pk output by $\mathcal{E}.\text{Gen}$, $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}} : \mathfrak{P} \times \mathfrak{R} \rightarrow \mathfrak{C}$ is a \mathbb{Z}_p -vector space homomorphism, i.e. for all $m_1, m_2 \in \mathfrak{C}$, $\rho_1, \rho_2 \in \mathfrak{R}$,

$$\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_1; \rho_1) \boxplus_{\mathfrak{C}} \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_2; \rho_2) = \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m_1 \boxplus_{\mathfrak{P}} m_2; \rho_1 \boxplus_{\mathfrak{R}} \rho_2).$$

Remark 1. \mathbb{Z}_p -linear homomorphic encryption schemes have simple (non-interactive) proofs of plaintext (and randomness) knowledge, given by Figure 2. More concretely, with notation as in that Figure, we take $\mathcal{W} = \mathfrak{P} \times \mathfrak{R}$, $\mathcal{X} = \mathfrak{C}$ and the proof $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}((m, \rho); c, \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}})$ for the relation $R_{\text{Enc}} = \{(m, \rho), c \in \mathcal{W} \times \mathcal{X} : c = \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m; \rho)\}$.

Proofs of Decryption Correctness We will also need proofs of decryption correctness, where of course the prover wants to keep their secret key hidden, i.e. proofs for the relation

$$R_{\mathcal{E}, \text{Dec}} = \{(\text{sk}; (\text{pk}, m, c)) : (\text{pk}, \text{sk}) \text{ is a valid key-pair for } \mathcal{E} \text{ and } m = \mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(c)\}.$$

If the prover knows the randomness under which the message was encrypted, the proving algorithm $\mathcal{E}.\text{ProveDec}(\text{sk}; (\text{pk}, m, c))$ can simply output that randomness $\pi \in \mathfrak{R}$; the verification $\mathcal{E}.\text{VerifyDec}(\text{pk}, m, c, \pi)$ accepts if $\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(m; \pi) = c$.

Unfortunately El Gamal encryption scheme does not allow a decryptor to retrieve the randomness under which a message has been encrypted. Instead, a proof of correctness of decryption for El Gamal can be constructed from the following property of this scheme, which we call \mathbb{Z}_p -linear decryption.

Definition 2. Let $\mathcal{E} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a \mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic encryption scheme and denote \mathcal{PK} and \mathcal{SK} the sets of public and secret keys respectively. \mathcal{E} has \mathbb{Z}_p -linear decryption if:

- \mathcal{PK} and \mathcal{SK} are \mathbb{Z}_p -vector spaces.
- There exists a \mathbb{Z}_p -linear homomorphism $F : \mathcal{SK} \rightarrow \mathcal{PK}$ such that $\text{pk} = F(\text{sk})$ for all (pk, sk) outputted by Gen .
- For all $c \in \mathfrak{C}$, the function $D_c(\text{sk}) := \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(c)$ is \mathbb{Z}_p -linear in sk , i.e. for all $\text{sk}_1, \text{sk}_2 \in \mathcal{SK}$, it holds that $D_c(\text{sk}_1 \boxplus_{\mathcal{SK}} \text{sk}_2) = D_c(\text{sk}_1) \boxplus_{\mathfrak{P}} D_c(\text{sk}_2)$.

In this case we have the algorithms ($\mathcal{E}.\text{ProveDec}$, $\mathcal{E}.\text{VerifyDec}$) that constitute a NIZK proof for $R_{\mathcal{E},\text{Dec}}$:

<hr/> Algorithm 3 $\mathcal{E}.\text{ProveDec}(\text{sk}, (\text{pk}, m, c))$ <hr/> $\mathcal{W} \leftarrow \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{X} \leftarrow \mathcal{PK} \times \mathfrak{P} \times \mathfrak{C},$ $pp \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{H})$ $w \leftarrow \text{sk}, x \leftarrow (\text{pk}, m), f(\cdot) \leftarrow (F(\cdot), D_c(\cdot))$ return $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}.\text{Prove}(w; pp, x, f)$ <hr/>	<hr/> Algorithm 4 $\mathcal{E}.\text{VerifyDec}(\text{pk}, m, c, \pi)$ <hr/> $\mathcal{W} \leftarrow \mathcal{SK}, \mathcal{X} \leftarrow \mathcal{PK} \times \mathfrak{P} \times \mathfrak{C}$ $pp \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{H})$ $x \leftarrow (\text{pk}, m), f(\cdot) \leftarrow (F(\cdot), D_c(\cdot))$ return $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}.\text{Verify}(pp, x, f)$ <hr/>
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The El Gamal decryption function as usually described is not linear but affine, but we can easily fix this by e.g. defining $\text{sk}^* = (\text{sk}_1^*, \text{sk}_2^*) = (1, \text{sk}) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$ and letting $\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}^*}(C_1, C_2) := C_2 \cdot \text{sk}_1^* - C_1 \cdot \text{sk}_2^*$. Then $D_C(\text{sk}^*)$ is clearly a \mathbb{Z}_p -linear function.

2.3 Shamir Secret Sharing on Groups of Order p

The well known degree- t Shamir scheme allows to split a secret $s \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ in n shares (where $0 \leq t < n < p$) in such a way that any set of $t + 1$ shares give full information about the secret s while any set of t give no information on s .

Here we will consider situations where the secret is an element $S = sG$ of a group \mathbb{G} of order p with generator G , but the dealer does not know s (and hence cannot apply the usual Shamir sharing using s as secret). On the other hand, it is enough that the shares allow to reconstruct S and not s . We define Shamir secret sharing in a group of order p as shown in Figure 3. (Shamir secret sharing scheme over \mathbb{Z}_p is retrieved by setting $\mathbb{G} = (\mathbb{Z}_p, +)$, $G = 1$). We denote by $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq t}$ the set of polynomials in $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ of degree at most t .

Shamir secret sharing on a group \mathbb{G} of order p	
Public parameters: Let $pp = (\mathbb{G}, G, p, t, n, \{\alpha_i : i \in [0, n]\})$, where \mathbb{G} is a group of prime order p with generator G , $0 \leq t < n < p$ are integers, and $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ are pairwise distinct.	
<hr/> Algorithm 5 $\text{GShamir.Share}(pp, S)$ <hr/> Input: $S \in \mathbb{G}$ $m(X) \leftarrow \{m(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq t} :$ $\quad m(\alpha_0) = 0\}$ $A_i = S + m(\alpha_i) \cdot G, i \in [n]$ return (A_1, \dots, A_n) <hr/>	<hr/> Algorithm 6 $\text{GShamir.Rec}(pp, I, \{A_i\}_{i \in I})$ <hr/> Input: $I \subseteq [n], I = t + 1, \{A_i\}_{i \in I}$ $\forall i \in I, \lambda_{i,I} \leftarrow \prod_{j \in I, j \neq i} \frac{\alpha_0 - \alpha_j}{\alpha_i - \alpha_j}$ $S' \leftarrow \sum_{i \in I} \lambda_{i,I} A_i$ return S' <hr/>

Fig. 3. Shamir sharing on a group of order p

2.4 The SCRAPE Test

In SCRAPE [8], a technique for checking correctness of Shamir sharing in publicly verifiable secret sharing was introduced. Letting aside the details on how the technique works there, we are interested in the following fact, which in turn comes from well known results in coding theory ⁴.

⁴Specifically from the fact that the dual of a Reed-Solomon code is a generalized Reed-Solomon code of a certain form.

Theorem 1 (SCRAPE dual-code test). Let $1 \leq t < n$ be integers. Let p be a prime number with $p \geq n$. Let $\alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n$ be pairwise different points in \mathbb{Z}_p . Define the coefficients $v_i = \prod_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} (\alpha_i - \alpha_j)^{-1}$. Let

$$C = \{(m(\alpha_1), \dots, m(\alpha_n)) : m(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq t}\}.$$

Then for every vector $(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n)$ in \mathbb{Z}_p^n ,

$$(\sigma_1, \dots, \sigma_n) \in C \Leftrightarrow \sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot \sigma_i = 0, \quad \forall m^* \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq n-t-1}.$$

2.5 Mix Networks (Mixnets)

In this paper we use a mixnet to anonymize a set of public encryption keys, each generated (with their corresponding secret keys) by a party in the system. Let \mathcal{P} be the set of all parties generating these keys. In the coming sections we will assume such a mixnet and that the output is subsequently be written to a blockchain. The output is a set of shuffled keys $\text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j} : j \in [n]$, for which each party knows the index that corresponds to their public key, but nothing else about the permutation. Denote this permutation $\psi : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow [n]$, i.e. party ID_i knows $j = \psi(i)$ and the corresponding key-pair. We will use the fact that a party can encrypt a message under the public key $\text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j}$. It is clear that party $ID_{\psi^{-1}(j)}$ can decrypt the message, while the rest of the parties (even the sender) remain oblivious about the identity of the receiver. Notice that this setup can be instantiated via a verifiable mixnet (e.g. [4]).

2.6 Encryption to the Future

We use the model for Encryption to the Future (EtF) from [7], which defines this primitive with respect to a blockchain ledger that has an built-in lottery mechanism. Before presenting the definition of EtF and related concepts, we recall the model for blockchain ledgers from [19], which is used to state the definitions of [7] and that captures properties of natural Proof-of-Stake (PoS) based protocols such as [11]. We present a summary of the framework in Appendix B and discuss below the main properties we will use in the EtF definitions.

Blockchain Structure A genesis block

$B_0 = (\text{Sig.pk}_1, \text{aux}_1, \text{stake}_1), \dots, (\text{Sig.pk}_n, \text{aux}_n, \text{stake}_n)$, aux associates each party P_i to a signature scheme public key Sig.pk_i , an amount of stake stake_i and auxiliary information aux_i (i.e. any other relevant information required by the blockchain protocol). As in [11], we assume that the genesis block is generated by an initialization functionality $\mathcal{F}_{\text{INIT}}$ that registers all parties' $\text{Sig.pk}_i, \text{aux}_i$ when the execution starts and assigns stake_i for P_i . Within the execution model of [19], $\mathcal{F}_{\text{INIT}}$ is executed by the environment (as defined in Appendix B). A blockchain \mathbf{B} relative to a genesis block B_0 is a sequence of blocks B_1, \dots, B_n associated with a strictly increasing sequence of slots $\text{sl}_1, \dots, \text{sl}_m$ such that $B_i = (\text{sl}_j, H(B_{i-1}), \text{d}, \text{aux})$, where sl_j indicates the time slot that B_i occupies, $H(B_{i-1})$ is a collision resistant hash of the previous block, d is data and aux is auxiliary information required by the blockchain protocol (e.g. a proof that the block is valid for slot sl_j). We denote by \mathbf{B}^{ℓ} the chain (sequence of blocks) \mathbf{B} where the last ℓ blocks have been removed and if $\ell \geq |\mathbf{B}|$ then $\mathbf{B}^{\ell} = \epsilon$. Also, if \mathbf{B}_1 is a prefix of \mathbf{B}_2 we write $\mathbf{B}_1 \preceq \mathbf{B}_2$. For the sake of simplicity, we identify each party P_i participating in the protocol by its public key Sig.pk_i .

Evolving Blockchains In an EtF scheme, the future is defined with respect to a future state of the underlying blockchain. In particular, we want to make sure that the initial chain \mathbf{B} has “correctly” evolved into the final chain $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$. Otherwise, the adversary can easily simulate a blockchain where it wins a future lottery and finds itself with the ability to decrypt. Fortunately, the *Distinguishable Forking* property from [19] allows us to distinguish a sufficiently long chain in an honest execution from a fork generated by the adversary by looking at the combined amount of stake proven in such a sequence of blocks. This property is used to construct a predicate called $\text{evolved}(\cdot, \cdot)$. First, let $\Gamma^V = (\text{UpdateState}^V, \text{GetRecords}, \text{Broadcast})$ be a blockchain protocol with validity predicate V and where the $(\alpha, \beta, \ell_1, \ell_2)$ -*distinguishable forking* property holds. And let $\mathbf{B} \leftarrow \text{GetRecords}(1^\lambda, \text{st})$ and $\tilde{\mathbf{B}} \leftarrow \text{GetRecords}(1^\lambda, \tilde{\text{st}})$.

Definition 3 (Evolved Predicate). *An evolved predicate is a polynomial time function evolved that takes as input blockchains \mathbf{B} and $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$*

$$\text{evolved}(\mathbf{B}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}) \in \{0, 1\}.$$

It outputs 1 if and only if $\mathbf{B} = \tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ or the following holds (i) $V(\mathbf{B}) = V(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}) = 1$; (ii) \mathbf{B} and $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ are consistent i.e. $\mathbf{B}^{\lceil \kappa} \preceq \tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ where κ is the common prefix parameter; (iii) Let $\ell' = |\tilde{\mathbf{B}}| - |\mathbf{B}|$ then it holds that $\ell' \geq \ell_1 + \ell_2$ and $\text{u-stakefrac}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \ell' - \ell_1) > \beta$.

Blockchain Lotteries The vast majority of PoS-based blockchain protocols has an inbuilt lottery scheme for selecting parties to generate blocks. In this lottery any party can win the right to generate a block for a certain slot with a probability proportional to its relative stake in the system. In the model from [7], a party can decrypt an EtF ciphertext if it wins this lottery. It can be useful to conduct multiple independent lotteries for the same slot sl , which is associated to a set of roles P_1, \dots, P_n . Depending on the lottery mechanism, each pair (sl, P_i) may yield zero, one or multiple winners. A party with access to the blockchain can locally determine whether it is the lottery winner for a given role by executing a procedure using its lottery witness $\text{sk}_{L,i}$ related to $(\text{Sig.pk}_i, \text{aux}_i, \text{stake}_i)$, which may also give the party a proof of winning for others to verify. The definition below from [7] details what it means for a party to win a lottery.

Definition 4 (Lottery Predicate). *A lottery predicate is a polynomial time function lottery that takes as input a blockchain \mathbf{B} , a slot sl , a role P and a lottery witness $\text{sk}_{L,i}$ and outputs 1 if and only if the party owning $\text{sk}_{L,i}$ won the lottery for the role P in slot sl with respect to the blockchain \mathbf{B} .*

Formally, we write $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, P, \text{sk}_{L,i}) \in \{0, 1\}$.

It is natural to establish the set of lottery winning keys $\mathcal{W}_{\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, P}$ for parameters $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, P)$. This is the set of eligible keys satisfying the lottery predicate.

Modelling EtF. We are now ready to present the model of [7] for encryption to the future winner of a lottery (*i.e.* EtF). The blocks of an underlying blockchain ledger and their relative positions in the chain are used to specify points in time. Intuitively, this notion allows for creating ciphertexts that can only be decrypted by a party that is selected to perform a certain role R at a future slot sl according to a lottery scheme associated with a blockchain protocol (*i.e.* a party that has a lottery secret key $\text{sk}_{L,i}$ such that $\text{lottery}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{sl}, P, \text{sk}_{L,i}) = 1$).

Definition 5 (Encryption to the Future). A pair of PPT algorithms $\mathcal{E} = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ in the context of a blockchain Γ^V is an EtF-scheme with evolved predicate `evolved` and a lottery predicate `lottery`. The algorithms work as follows

Encryption. $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{P}, m)$ takes as input an initial blockchain \mathbf{B} , a slot `sl`, a role P and a message m . It outputs a ciphertext `ct` - an encryption to the future.

Decryption. $m/\perp \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{ct}, \text{sk})$ takes as input a blockchain state $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$, a ciphertext `ct` and a secret key `sk` and outputs the original message m or \perp .

Correctness. An EtF-scheme is said to be correct if for honest parties i and j , there exists a negligible function μ such that

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{view} \leftarrow \text{EXEC}^\Gamma(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda) \\ \mathbf{B} = \text{GetRecords}(\text{view}_i) \\ \tilde{\mathbf{B}} = \text{GetRecords}(\text{view}_j) \\ \text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{P}, m) \\ \text{evolved}(\mathbf{B}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}) = 1 \\ \text{lottery}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{sl}, \text{P}, \text{sk}) = 1 \end{array} : \text{Dec}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{ct}, \text{sk}) = m \right] - 1 \leq \mu(\lambda).$$

Security. Security is defined with a game $\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}$ described in Algorithm 7, where a challenger \mathcal{C} and an adversary \mathcal{A} execute an underlying blockchain protocol with an environment \mathcal{Z} as described in Appendix B. In this game, \mathcal{A} chooses a blockchain \mathbf{B} , a role P for the slot `sl` and two messages m_0 and m_1 and sends it all to \mathcal{C} , who chooses a random bit b and encrypts the message m_b with the parameters it received and sends `ct` to \mathcal{A} . \mathcal{A} continues to execute the blockchain until an evolved blockchain $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ is obtained and outputs a bit b' . If the adversary is a lottery winner for the challenge role P in slot `sl`, the game outputs a random bit. If the adversary is not a lottery winner for the challenge role P in slot `sl`, the game outputs $b \oplus b'$. The reason for outputting a random guess in the game when the challenge role is corrupted is as follows. Normally the output of the IND-CPA game is $b \oplus b'$ and we require it to be 1 with probability 1/2. This models that the guess b' is independent of b . This, of course, cannot be the case when the challenge role is corrupted. We therefore output a random guess in these cases. After this, any bias of the output away from 1/2 still comes from b' being dependent on b .

Algorithm 7 $\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}$

$\text{view}^r \leftarrow \text{EXEC}_r^\Gamma(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda)$ $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{P}, m_0, m_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{view}_\mathcal{A}^r)$ $b \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}$ $\text{ct} \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{P}, m_b)$ $\text{st} \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{view}_\mathcal{A}^r, \text{ct})$ $\text{view}^{\tilde{r}} \leftarrow \text{EXEC}_{(\text{view}^r, \tilde{r})}^\Gamma(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda)$ $(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, b') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\text{view}_\mathcal{A}^{\tilde{r}}, \text{st})$ if $\text{evolved}(\mathbf{B}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}) = 1$ then if $sk_{L,j}^{\mathcal{A}} \notin \mathcal{W}_{\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{sl}, \text{P}}$ then return $b \oplus b'$ end if end if return $\hat{b} \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}$	$\triangleright \mathcal{A}$ executes Γ with \mathcal{Z} until round r $\triangleright \mathcal{A}$ outputs challenge parameters $\triangleright \mathcal{A}$ receives challenge <code>ct</code> \triangleright Execute from view^r until round \tilde{r} $\triangleright \tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ is a valid evolution of \mathbf{B} $\triangleright \mathcal{A}$ does not win role P
--	---

Definition 6 (IND-CPA Secure EtF). An EtF-scheme $\mathcal{E} = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ in the context of a blockchain protocol Γ executed by PPT machines \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{Z} is said to be IND-CPA secure if, for any \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{Z} , there exists a negligible function μ such that for $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\left| 2 \cdot \Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{IND-CPA}} = 1 \right] - 1 \right| \leq \mu(\lambda).$$

ECW as a Special Case of EtF. In this work, we focus on a special class of EtF called ECW where the underlying lottery is always conducted with respect to the current blockchain state. This has the following consequences

1. $\mathbf{B} = \tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ means that $\text{evolved}(\mathbf{B}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}) = 1$ is trivially true.
2. The winner of role P in slot sl is already defined in \mathbf{B} .

Notice that in ECW there is no need for checking if the blockchain has 'correctly' evolved and all lottery parameters (*e.g.* stake distribution and randomness extracted from the blockchain) are static. Hence, when constructing an ECW scheme, the lottery winner is already decided at encryption time. While an ECW is simpler to realize than a more general EtF, it is shown in [7] that ECW can be used to instantiate YOSO MPC and then be transformed into EtF given an identity based encryption scheme.

Authentication from the Past (AfP) When the winner of a role S sends a message m to a future role R then it is typically also needed that R can be sure that the message m came from a party P which, indeed, won the role S. This concept is formalized as an AfP scheme as follows.

Definition 7 (Authentication from the Past). A pair of PPT algorithms $\mathcal{U} = (\text{Sign}, \text{Ver})$ is a scheme for authenticating messages as a winner of a lottery in the past in the context of blockchain Γ with lottery predicate lottery such that:

Authenticate. $\sigma \leftarrow \text{AfP.Sign}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{S}, \text{sk}, m)$ takes as input a blockchain \mathbf{B} , a slot sl, a role S and a message m . It outputs a signature σ that authenticates the message m .

Verify. $\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \text{AfP.Ver}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{sl}, \text{S}, \sigma, m)$ uses the blockchain $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ to ensure that σ is a signature on m produced by the secret key winning the lottery for slot sl and role S.

Furthermore, an AfP-scheme has the following properties:

Correctness.

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \text{view} \leftarrow \text{EXEC}^\Gamma(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda) \\ \mathbf{B} = \text{GetRecords}(\text{view}_i) \\ \tilde{\mathbf{B}} = \text{GetRecords}(\text{view}_j) \\ \sigma \leftarrow \text{AfP.Sign}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{S}, \text{sk}, m) \\ \text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{S}, \text{sk}) = 1 \\ \text{lottery}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{sl}, \text{S}, \text{sk}) = 1 \end{array} : \text{AfP.Ver}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{sl}, \text{S}, \sigma, m) = 1 \right] - 1 \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

In other words, an AfP on a message from an honest party with a view of the blockchain \mathbf{B} can attest to the fact that the sender won the role S in slot sl. If another party, with blockchain $\tilde{\mathbf{B}}$ agrees, then the verification algorithm will output 1.

Security. The EUF-CMA game detailed in 8 is used to define the security of an AfP scheme. In this game, the adversary has access to a signing oracle \mathcal{O}_{AfP} which it can query with a slot sl , a role S and a message m_i , obtaining AfP signatures $\sigma_i = \text{AfP.Sig}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, S, \text{sk}_j, m_i)$ where $\text{sk}_j \in \mathcal{W}_{\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, S}$ i.e. $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, S, \text{sk}_j) = 1$. The oracle maintains the list of queries \mathcal{Q}_{AfP} . Formally, an AfP-scheme \mathcal{U} is said to be EUF-CMA secure in the context of a blockchain protocol Γ executed by PPT machines \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{Z} if there exists a negligible function μ such that for $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$:

$$\Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{U}}^{\text{EUF-CMA}} = 1 \right] \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

Algorithm 8 $\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{U}}^{\text{EUF-CMA}}$

```

view  $\leftarrow$  EXEC $^{\Gamma}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^{\lambda})$   $\triangleright$   $\mathcal{A}$  executes  $\Gamma$  with  $\mathcal{Z}$ 
 $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, S, m', \sigma') \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{AfP}}}(\text{view}_{\mathcal{A}})$ 
if  $(m' \in \mathcal{Q}_{\text{AfP}}) \vee (\text{sk}_{L,j}^{\mathcal{A}} \in \mathcal{W}_{\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, S})$  then  $\triangleright$   $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{AfP}}}$  won or queried illegal  $m'$ 
  return 0
end if
view $^{\tilde{r}} \leftarrow$  EXEC $^{\Gamma}_{(\text{view}^r, \tilde{r})}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^{\lambda})$   $\triangleright$  Execute from view $^r$  until round  $\tilde{r}$ 
 $\tilde{\mathbf{B}} \leftarrow \text{GetRecords}(\text{view}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\tilde{r}})$ 
if evolved $(\mathbf{B}, \tilde{\mathbf{B}}) = 1$  then
  if Ver $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, S, \sigma', m') = 1$  then  $\triangleright$   $\mathcal{A}$  successfully forged an AfP
    return 1
  end if
end if
return 0

```

AfP Privacy The specific privacy property we seek is that an adversary, observing AfP tags from honest parties, cannot use this information to enhance its chances in predicting the winners of lotteries for roles for which an AfP tag has not been published.

Definition 8 (AfP Privacy). An AfP scheme \mathcal{U} with corresponding lottery predicate lottery is private if a PPT adversary is unable to distinguish between the scenarios defined in 9 and 10 with more than negligible probability in the security parameter.

Scenario 0 ($b = 0$) In this scenario (9) the adversary is first running the blockchain Γ together with the environment \mathcal{Z} . At round r the adversary is allowed to interact with the oracle \mathcal{O}_{AfP} as described in 7. The adversary then continues the execution until round \tilde{r} where it outputs a bit b' .

Scenario 1 ($b = 1$) This scenario (10) is identical to scenario 0 but instead of interacting with \mathcal{O}_{AfP} , the adversary interacts with a simulator \mathcal{S} .

Algorithm 9 $b = 0$

```

view $^r \leftarrow$  EXEC $^{\Gamma}_r(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^{\lambda})$ 
 $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{AfP}}}(\text{view}_{\mathcal{A}}^r)$ 
view $^{\tilde{r}} \leftarrow$  EXEC $^{\Gamma}_{(\text{view}^r, \tilde{r})}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^{\lambda})$ 
return  $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}_{\text{AfP}}}(\text{view}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\tilde{r}})$ 

```

Algorithm 10 $b = 1$

```

view $^r \leftarrow$  EXEC $^{\Gamma}_r(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^{\lambda})$ 
 $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{S}}(\text{view}_{\mathcal{A}}^r)$ 
view $^{\tilde{r}} \leftarrow$  EXEC $^{\Gamma}_{(\text{view}^r, \tilde{r})}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^{\lambda})$ 
return  $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{S}}(\text{view}_{\mathcal{A}}^{\tilde{r}})$ 

```

We let $\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{ID-PRIV}}$ denote the game where a coinflip decides whether the adversary is executed in scenario 0 or scenario 1. We say that the adversary wins the game (i.e. $\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{ID-PRIV}} = 1$) iff $b' = b$. Finally, an AfP scheme \mathcal{U} is called private in the context of the blockchain Γ and underlying lottery predicate lottery if the following holds for a negligible function μ .

$$\Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{ID-PRIV}} = 1 \right] \leq 1/2 + \mu(\lambda)$$

3 ECW based on \mathbb{Z}_p -Linearly Homomorphic Encryption

This section presents an ECW protocol based on a \mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic encryption scheme described in Section 2.2 and a mixnet (Section 2.5). Together with the ECW, we introduce an AfP scheme - a mechanism that allows a committee member to authenticate messages. The two schemes will be the backbone of the anonymous PVSS presented in Section 6. Before presenting the actual ECW and AfP protocols, we introduce the underlying lottery predicate that will be the cornerstone in our two schemes.

3.1 Lottery Predicate

We assume a running blockchain as described Section B and a function param that has access to the blockchain state. During the setup, each party samples an encryption key pair $(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{E}, i}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{E}, i})$ and inputs $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{E}, i}$ to the mixnet (Section 2.5). The output of the mixnet is a tuple $\{(j, \text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, j}) : j \in [n]\}$ which is written on the blockchain and accessible to every party through param function. The function param takes as input the blockchain \mathbf{B} and the slot sl and outputs a tuple $(\{(j, \text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, j})\}_{j \in [n]}, \eta) \leftarrow \text{param}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl})$. Here, $(j, \text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, j})$ is equal to $(\psi(i), \text{pk}_{\mathcal{E}, i})$ for the permutation ψ defined by the mixnet. Finally, η is the public randomness from the blockchain corresponding to \mathbf{B} and sl . Note, that only the owner of $\text{sk}_{\mathcal{E}, i}$ knows j such that $\text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, j} = \text{pk}_{\mathcal{E}, i}$. Let $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow [n]$ be a hash function that outputs a number that points to a specific index in the list of public keys. The lottery predicate lottery is detailed below.

Algorithm 11 $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{P}, \text{sk}_{L, i})$

$(\{(j, \text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, j})\}_{j \in [n]}, \eta) \leftarrow \text{param}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl})$
 $(\text{pk}_{\mathcal{E}, i}, \text{sk}_{\mathcal{E}, i}) \leftarrow \text{sk}_{L, i}$
 $k \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\text{sl} || \text{P} || \eta)$
return 1 iff $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{E}, i} = \text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, k}$

It is easy to see that the lottery described above associates a *single* party (from the set of eligible parties) with the role P . Furthermore, the party can locally check if it won the lottery by checking that the output of the hash function points to its own public key in the permuted set. Crucially, the party winning the lottery can stay covert since no other party can link the winning lottery key to the owner of the corresponding secret key. These properties will be useful when we want to encrypt shares towards an anonymous committee.

3.2 ECW Protocol

This section introduces a ECW protocol (Figure 4) based on the lottery predicate presented in Section 3.1. We note that ECW is just a restricted version of EtF where the lottery is conducted wrt. the *current* blockchain \mathbf{B} and slot sl . Thus, all definitions in Section 2.6 applies to ECW schemes too.

ECW Protocol

Public parameters: A prime p , a \mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic encryption scheme $\mathcal{E} = (\mathcal{E}.\text{Gen}, \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}, \mathcal{E}.\text{Dec})$ with notation as in Section 2.2 and a lottery as described in Section 3.1.

Set-up:

1. Every party runs $\mathcal{E}.\text{Gen}()$ obtaining a key pair $(\text{sk}_{\mathcal{E},i}, \text{pk}_{\mathcal{E},i})$.
2. Each party inputs $\text{pk}_{\mathcal{E},i}$ to the mixnet. The output of the mixnet is a tuple $\{(j, \text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j}) : j \in [n]\}$ which is written on the blockchain and accessible to every party when using the `param` function.

Encryption protocol: Input $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P})$ and $m \in \mathfrak{M}$.

1. Run `param` (\mathbf{B}, sl) and obtain $(\{(l, \text{pk}_{\text{Anon},l})\}_{l \in [n]}, \eta)$.
2. Obtain random index by $k \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\text{sl} \parallel \mathbf{P} \parallel \eta)$.
3. Choose ρ in \mathfrak{R} and set $c = \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\text{Anon},k}}(m, \rho)$.
4. Sender outputs c .

Decryption protocol: Input for party i is $\mathbf{B}, \text{sk}_{L,i}$ and c .

1. Checks that `lottery` $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P}, \text{sk}_{L,i}) = 1$.
2. Outputs $m = \mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}_{\text{Anon},i}}(c)$.

Fig. 4. ECW Protocol

Theorem 2 (IND-CPA ECW). *Let \mathcal{E} be an IND-CPA secure \mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic encryption scheme. The construction in Figure 4 with lottery predicate as in Section 3.1 is an IND-CPA secure ECW (as in Definition 6).*

(See proof sketch in Section C)

3.3 AfP Protocol

In this section we present our AfP protocol. It is described in Figure 5 and is based on a Signature of Knowledge (SoK) [10]. A SoK scheme is a pair of algorithms $(\text{SoK}.\text{sign}, \text{SoK}.\text{verify})$ and is defined in context of a relation R . We consider statements of the form $x = (\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P})$ and witnesses $w = \text{sk}$. We say that $R(x = (\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P}), w = \text{sk}) = 1$ iff `lottery` $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P}, \text{sk}) = 1$. A signature is produced by running $\sigma \leftarrow \text{SoK}.\text{sign}(x, w, m)$. And it can be verified by checking that the output of `SoK.verify` (x, σ, m) is 1. Our AfP uses the SoK to sign m under the knowledge of $\text{sk}_{L,i}$ such that `lottery` $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P}, \text{sk}_{L,i}) = 1$. This will exactly attest that the message m was sent by the winner of the lottery for \mathbf{P} . An instantiation of this AfP protocol could use DL proofs (Section 2.1).

Theorem 3 (EUF-CMA AfP). *Let \mathcal{E} be an IND-CPA secure and \mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic encryption scheme and let SoK be a simulatable and extractable SoK scheme. The construction in Figure 5 with lottery predicate as in Section 3.1 is EUF-CMA AfP as defined in Definition 7.*

(See proof sketch in Section C)

AfP Privacy The privacy property of an AfP scheme says that no adversary can distinguish between interacting with an AfP oracle \mathcal{O}_{AfP} and a simulator \mathcal{S} during a blockchain execution. Intuitively, this provides the guarantee that observing other AfP tags does not enhance an adversary's chance of guessing future lottery winners.

Theorem 4 (AfP Privacy). *Assume \mathcal{E} , lottery and SoK scheme as in 6. The construction in Figure 5 has AfP privacy as in Definition 8.*




Fig. 5. AfP Protocol

(See proof sketch in Section C).

An AfP based on the setup presented in Figure 4 will not provide a good foundation for YOSO-MPC or even just a proactive secret sharing scheme. The reason is, that as soon as a party ID_i publishes an AfP tag, any other party can verify that ID_i won the lottery and, thus, link the identity of ID_i to the public key $\text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, \psi(i)}$ from the output of the mixnet. This will ruin the setup for this party when future lotteries are conducted. More importantly, a powerful adversary is able to identify any subsequent ECW ciphertexts towards this party and can design its corruption strategy accordingly. What we want is a new ephemeral public key $\text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, \psi(i)}$ for each party and for each slot sl in the blockchain execution where an AfP is produced. Note that a new lottery setup is necessary for each slot sl even though different parties are producing AfP tags in different slots. The reason is that observing *any* AfP tag, inadvertently, skews the probability distribution and helps the adversary in guessing future lottery winner.

A simple way to solve the above issue is to repeat the lottery setup and obtain multiple vectors of the format $\{(j, \text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, j}) : j \in [n]\}$. Then, any party can use a new anonymized public key for each AfP tag. We describe this property as *bounded AfP privacy*. Bounded AfP privacy ensures that the AfP scheme can be executed a bounded number of times before lottery winners can be linked to specific public keys in the setup and ECW ciphertexts start betraying their receivers. Note that the idea of generating multiple lottery setups in batches (preprocessing) can result in more efficient protocols. But it has the downside that, while using the preprocessed public keys, the number of parties in the system is static.

In Section 6 we look at how to use the ECW and AfP in an anonymous PVSS protocol where we want to encrypt towards multiple parties. In such a setting we can use linkable ring signatures (Section J) to prove membership in a committee without directly revealing our public key in the setup.

3.4 AfP with Reusable Setup

In Appendix J, we describe an efficient NIZK that allows for a party ID_i to prove knowledge of a lottery secret key $\text{sk}_{L,i}$ such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P}_j, \text{sk}_{L,i}) = 1$ for $\mathbf{P}_j \in \{\mathbf{P}_1, \dots, \mathbf{P}_n\}$ without revealing \mathbf{P}_j . Using this NIZK and an anonymous channel, we can construct an AfP that can be used multiple times without linking a party P_i to its setup public key. In order to generate an AfP on message

m on behalf of role P in slot sl , P_i with $sk_{L,i}$ such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, sl, P, sk_{L,i}) = 1$ first generates a NIZK π proving knowledge of $sk_{L,i}$ such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, sl, P_j, sk_{L,i}) = 1$ for $P_j \in \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$. Now P_i generates an SoK σ on the message m of knowledge of a valid proof π for the aforementioned statement. ID_i publishes σ through an anonymous channel, avoiding its identity to be linked to the set $\{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$. The security and privacy guarantees for this AfP follow in a straightforward way from our previous analysis. While using this construction has a clear extra cost in relation to our simple AfP, we show in Appendix J.2 how to efficiently perform such a reusable setup AfP on a set of ciphertexts, which is useful for our resharing application.

4 Publicly Verifiable Secret Sharing

4.1 Model

We define a publicly verifiable secret sharing (PVSS) scheme with t privacy and $t+1$ -reconstruction, based on the models provided in [28,26,20,8]. The goal is for a dealer to share a secret $S \in \mathbb{G}$ to a set of n parties $\mathcal{P} = \{P_1, \dots, P_n\}$, so that $t+1$ shares will be needed to reconstruct the secret and no information will be revealed from t shares. We require public verifiability for correctness of sharing by the dealer, and for reconstruction of the secret by a set of $t+1$ parties. Due to this requirement, the protocol is entirely carried out using a public ledger.

We provide the syntax below. A modification we introduce with respect to the usual model is that we include asymmetric key pairs for dealers and an additional initial round where the parties can broadcast an ephemeral public key. This will allow for more efficient constructions as we will see in Section 4.3.

Setup

- $\text{Setup}(1^\lambda)$ outputs public parameters pp
- $\text{DKeyGen}(pp)$, performed by the dealer, outputs a key pair (pk_D, sk_D)
- $\text{KeyGen}(pp, id_i)$, performed by i -th share receiver, outputs a key-pair (pk_i, sk_i)
- $\text{VerifyKey}(pp, id, pk)$, performed by a public verifier, outputs 0/1 (as a verdict on whether pk is valid)

Distribution

- $\text{Dist}(pp, pk_D, sk_D, \{pk_i : i \in [n]\}, S)$ performed by the dealer, and where $S \in \mathbb{G}$ is a secret, outputs encrypted shares $C_i : i \in [n]$ and a proof Pf_{Sh} of sharing correctness.

Verification

- $\text{Verify}(pp, pk_D, \{(pk_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}})$ performed by the public verifier outputs 0/1 (as a verdict on whether the sharing is valid)

Reconstruction

- $\text{DecShare}(pp, pk_D, pk_i, sk_i, C_i)$, performed by a share receiver, outputs a decrypted share A_i and a proof Pf_{Deci} of correct decryption.
- $\text{VerifyDec}(pp, pk_D, C_i, A_i, \text{Pf}_{\text{Deci}})$ outputs 0/1 (as a verdict on whether A_i is a valid decryption of C_i)

- $\text{Rec}(pp, \{A_i : i \in \mathcal{T}\})$ for some $\mathcal{T} \subseteq [n]$ of size $t + 1$ outputs a secret S . We will only apply this algorithm to inputs where \mathcal{T} is of size $t + 1$ and such that all A_i have passed the verification check.

We let \mathcal{PK}_D and \mathcal{PK} contain all key pairs output by DKeyGen and KeyGen respectively. For non-deterministic algorithms we sometimes explicitly reference the randomness r input. For example, $\text{Dist}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{sk}_D, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n]\}, S; r)$. One of our constructions will not require pk_D, sk_D and consequently DKeyGen . In that case we omit these arguments from the inputs to the other algorithms.

We require a PVSS to satisfy correctness, verifiability and IND1-secrecy.

Definition 9 (Correctness). A PVSS satisfies correctness if for each secret $S \in \mathbb{G}$ and for any set of identifiers $\{id_i : i \in [n]\}$

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, t, n); \\ (\text{pk}_D, \text{sk}_D) \leftarrow \text{DKeyGen}(pp); \\ \forall i \in [n] \quad (\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp, id_i); \\ (\{C_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}) \leftarrow \\ \text{Dist}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{sk}_D, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n]\}, S); \\ \forall i \in [n] \quad (A_i, \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}i}) \leftarrow \\ \text{DecShare}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i, C_i); \\ S' \leftarrow \text{Rec}(pp, \{A_i : i \in [n]\}); \end{array} \begin{array}{l} \forall i \in [n] \text{VerifyKey}(pp, id_i, \text{pk}_i) = 1 \\ \wedge \text{Verify}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \\ \{\text{pk}_i, C_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}) = 1 \\ \wedge \forall i \in [n] \text{VerifyDec}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \\ \text{pk}_i, C_i, A_i, \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}i}) = 1 \\ \wedge S' = S \end{array} \right] = 1.$$

Verifiability The verifiability requirement ensures that an adversary must honestly follow the protocol. This means that it can be verified that parties honestly generate their ephemeral public keys (key generation), the dealer outputs encrypted shares for a secret (distribution), and that the parties honestly decrypt their shares in reconstruction (decryption).

Definition 10 (Verifiability of Key Generation). A PVSS satisfies verifiability of key generation if there exists a negligible function $\mu(\lambda)$ such that

$$\left| \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, t, n); \\ (\text{pk}_D, id, \text{pk}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp); \end{array} \begin{array}{l} \text{VerifyKey}(pp, id, \text{pk}) = 1 \\ \wedge \nexists \text{sk s.t. } (\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \in \mathcal{PK} \end{array} \right] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda).$$

Definition 11 (Verifiability of Distribution). A PVSS satisfies verifiability of distribution if there exists a negligible function $\mu(\lambda)$ such that

$$\left| \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, t, n); \\ (\text{pk}_D, \{\text{pk}_i, C_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp); \end{array} \begin{array}{l} \text{Verify}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \{\text{pk}_i, C_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}) \\ = 1 \\ \wedge \nexists S, \text{sk}_D, r \text{ s.t.} \\ ((\text{sk}_D, \text{pk}_D) \in \mathcal{PK}_D \wedge \\ \text{Dist}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{sk}_D, t, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n]\}, S; r) \\ = (\{C_i : i \in [n]\}, \cdot)) \end{array} \right] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda).$$

Definition 12 (Verifiability of Decryption). A PVSS satisfies verifiability of decryption if there exists a negligible function $\mu(\lambda)$ such that

$$\left| \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, t, n); \\ (\text{pk}_D, \text{pk}, C, A, \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp); \end{array} : \begin{array}{l} \text{VerifyDec}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{pk}, C, A, \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}}) = 1 \\ \wedge \nexists (\text{sk}, r) \text{ s.t. } ((\text{sk}, \text{pk}) \in \mathcal{PK} \wedge \\ \text{DecShare}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{pk}, \text{sk}, C; r) = (A, \cdot)) \end{array} \right] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda).$$

Indistinguishability of Secrets (IND-1 Secrecy) We now present the IND-1 Secrecy definition from [8]. We have modified this definition to fit the adjusted syntax because Dist can no longer be performed by the adversary (as it takes sk_D as input). We now provide a DIST oracle that will return the outputs of the Dist algorithm. To capture that the public keys of the parties should be ephemeral, we do not allow the public keys of parties that are used in the challenge to be input to this oracle. We therefore allow the adversary to output an extra $n - k$ keys.

Algorithm 12 $\text{Game}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PVSS}}^{\text{ind-secrecy}, b}$

```

procedure  $\text{DIST}(\mathcal{U}, S')$ 
  if  $\mathcal{U} \not\subseteq [n+1, k]$  or  $|\mathcal{U}| \neq n$  then
    return  $\perp$ 
  end if
   $(\{C'_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}) \leftarrow \text{Dist}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{sk}_D, t, n, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in \mathcal{U}\}, S')$ 
  return  $(\{C'_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}})$ 
end procedure
procedure  $\text{Game}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PVSS}}^{\text{ind-secrecy}, b}(\lambda)$ 
   $pp \leftarrow \text{Setup}(1^\lambda, t, n), (\text{pk}_D, \text{sk}_D) \leftarrow \text{DKeyGen}(pp)$ 
   $\forall i \in [n-t] \quad (\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \text{KeyGen}(pp, i)$ 
   $(\{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n-t+1, n]\}, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n+1, k]\}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n-t]\})$ 
  if  $\exists i \in [n-t+1, k]$  such that  $\text{VerifyKey}(pp, i, \text{pk}_i) = 0$  then
    return 0
  end if
   $S_0, S_1 \leftarrow \mathbb{G}, (\{C_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}) \leftarrow \text{Dist}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{sk}_D, t, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n]\}, S_0)$ 
   $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{DIST}}(S_b, \{C_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}})$ 
  return  $b'$ 
end procedure

```

Definition 13 (IND-1 Secrecy). A PVSS satisfies indistinguishability of secrets if, for any PPT adversary \mathcal{A} , there exists a negligible function $\mu(\lambda)$ such that

$$\left| \Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PVSS}}^{\text{ind-secrecy}, 0}(\lambda) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PVSS}}^{\text{ind-secrecy}, 1}(\lambda) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda).$$

4.2 HEPVSS: Generic PVSS from \mathbb{Z}_p -LHE Scheme

We present in Figure 6 our construction for a PVSS scheme HEPVSS based on a \mathbb{Z}_p -LHE scheme with proof of correct decryption. This construction does not require the dealer to hold a key pair or parties to prove honest generation of keys and therefore we remove this from the syntax. Moreover, because the dealer does not have a key pair, here we do not require the public keys pk_i to be

ephemeral.

The construction is relatively straightforward: the dealer constructs the (group) Shamir sharing of the secret, and encrypts the shares using the \mathbb{Z}_p -LHE scheme, resulting in ciphertexts C_i . The sharing correctness proof needs to assert, not only that each C_i is individually a correct encryption, but also that the underlying plaintext messages are evaluations of a polynomial of degree at most t . Here we use the fact that the set of polynomials of degree at most t is a vector space, and the map that sends a polynomial to its evaluation in some point is linear, so we can capture the above statement in terms of knowledge of preimage of a certain linear map.

Security We prove that HEPVSS satisfies correctness, indistinguishability of secrets and verifiability in Appendix E.2.

4.3 DHPVSS: A PVSS with Constant-Size Sharing Correctness Proof

We now give an optimized construction of a PVSS with a proof of sharing correctness consisting of just two field elements. The PVSS scheme, which we call DHPVSS, has IND1-secrecy under the DDH assumption.

We explain the idea of the construction next: Let $A_i = a_i \cdot G$ be (purportedly) group Shamir shares for a secret $S \in \mathbb{G}$. A SCRAPE check (Theorem 1) consists on the verification $\sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot a_i \stackrel{?}{=} 0$, or alternatively

$$\sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot A_i \stackrel{?}{=} O,$$

for O the identity element of \mathbb{G} . Here v_i are fixed coefficients dependent on the α_i and $m^*(X)$ is sampled uniformly at random from $\mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq n-t-1}$. If it is not true that all a_i are of the form $m(\alpha_i)$ for some polynomial $m(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq t}$, then the check succeeds with probability at most $1/p$.

In [8], the encrypted shares were $C_i = a_i \cdot \text{pk}_i$. Because these are in different bases the check above cannot be directly applied on the C_i , and then the strategy consisted on sending additional elements $a_i \cdot H$ (for some group generator H), proving that the underlying a_i 's are the same, and carrying out the check on these $a_i \cdot H$. All this introduces overhead which is linear in n .

Instead, in DHPVSS, the dealer has a key-pair $(\text{sk}_D, \text{pk}_D)$, with $\text{pk}_D = \text{sk}_D \cdot G$, and encrypts A_i as $C_i = A_i + \text{sk}_D \cdot E_i$, where $E_i = \text{sk}_i \cdot G$ is an ephemeral public key of the i -th party. Note that $\text{sk}_D \cdot E_i$ can be seen as a shared Diffie-Hellman key between dealer and the i -th party or, alternatively, C_i can be seen as an El-Gamal encryption of A_i under E_i with randomness sk_D .

The advantage is that now $\sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot A_i \stackrel{?}{=} O$ is equivalent to

$$\sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot C_i \stackrel{?}{=} \text{sk}_D \cdot \left(\sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot E_i \right),$$

which is *one single* DLEQ proof $\text{DLEQ}(\text{sk}_D; G, \text{pk}_D, U, V)$ for *publicly computable*

$$U = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot E_i, \quad V = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot C_i.$$

One detail is that, as opposed to the PVSS in [8] (where $m^*(X)$ was locally sampled by the verifier), the prover needs to know $m^*(X)$ so this is sampled via a random oracle. The algorithms can be found in Figure 7 and Figure 8.

Algorithms for Public Verifiable Secret Sharing Scheme HEPVSS	
Algorithm 13 HEPVSS.Setup($1^\lambda, t, n$) $(\mathbb{G}, G, p, \mathcal{E}) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^\lambda)$ Choose pairwise distinct $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ return $pp = (\mathbb{G}, G, p, t, n, \{\alpha_i : i \in [0, n]\}, \mathcal{E})$	Algorithm 14 HEPVSS.KeyGen(pp, id) $(sk, pk) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.Gen(1^\lambda)$ return (sk, pk)
<hr/>	
Algorithm 15 HEPVSS.Dist($pp, \{pk_i : i \in [n]\}, S$) Parse pp as $(\mathbb{G}, G, p, n, \{\alpha_i : i \in [0, n]\}, \mathcal{E}) := (pp_{Sh}, \mathcal{E})$ $(\{A_i : i \in [n]\}, m(X)) \leftarrow \text{GShamir}(pp_{Sh}, S)$ for $i \in [n]$ do $\rho_i \leftarrow \mathfrak{R}, C_i \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.Enc_{pk_i}(A_i, \rho_i)$ end for $\mathcal{W} \leftarrow \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq t} \times \mathfrak{R}^n, \mathcal{X} \leftarrow \{0\} \times \mathfrak{C}^n, pp_\pi \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{H})$ $w \leftarrow (S, m(X), \rho_1, \dots, \rho_n), x \leftarrow (0, C_1, \dots, C_n)$ Let f given by $f(w) := (m(\alpha_0), \mathcal{E}.Enc_{pk_1}(S + m(\alpha_1) \cdot G; \rho_1), \dots, \mathcal{E}.Enc_{pk_n}(S + m(\alpha_n) \cdot G; \rho_n))$ $Pf_{Sh} \leftarrow \Pi_{NI-Pre}.Prove(w; pp_\pi, x, f)$ return $(\{C_i : i \in [n]\}, Pf_{Sh})$	
<hr/>	
Algorithm 16 HEPVSS.Verify($pp, \{(pk_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\}, Pf_{Sh}$) Define $\mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, pp_\pi, x, f$ as in HEPVSS.Dist return $\Pi_{NI-Pre}.Verify(pp_\pi, x, f, Pf_{Sh})$	
<hr/>	
Algorithm 17 HEPVSS.DecShare(pp, pk, sk, C) $A \leftarrow Dec_{sk}(C)$ $Pf_{Dec} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.ProveDec(A, C, pk)$ return (A, Pf_{Dec})	
<hr/>	
Algorithm 18 HEPVSS.VerifyDec($pp, pk_i, A_i, C_i, Pf_{Dec_i}$) return $\mathcal{E}.VerifyDec(A_i, C_i, pk_i, Pf_{Dec_i})$	
<hr/>	
Algorithm 19 HEPVSS.Rec($pp, \{A_i : i \in \mathcal{T}\}$) return $\text{GShamir}.Rec(pp, \{A_i : i \in \mathcal{T}\})$	

Fig. 6. Algorithms for HEPVSS

Security We prove that DHPVSS satisfies correctness, indistinguishability of secrets and verifiability in Appendix E.3.

Communication Complexity Comparison. The communication complexity of DHPVSS.Dist is $(n+2) \log p$ bits. In contrast, HEPVSS.Dist instantiated with El Gamal is of $(3n+3) \log p$ bits. Secret

Algorithms for PVSS scheme DHPVSS, Setup and Distribution	
<hr/> Algorithm 20 DHPVSS.Setup($1^\lambda, t, n$) <hr/> $(\mathbb{G}, G, p) \leftarrow \mathcal{G}(1^\lambda)$ Choose pairwise distinct $\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ $\forall i \in [n] \quad v_i \leftarrow \prod_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} (\alpha_i - \alpha_j)^{-1}$ return $pp = (\mathbb{G}, G, p, t, n, \alpha_0, \{(\alpha_i, v_i) : i \in [n]\})$ <hr/>	<hr/> Algorithm 21 DHPVSS.DKeyGen(pp) <hr/> $sk_D \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*, pk_D \leftarrow sk_D \cdot G$ return (pk_D, sk_D) <hr/>
<hr/> Algorithm 22 DHPVSS.KeyGen(pp, id) <hr/> $sk \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^*, E \leftarrow sk \cdot G$ $\Omega \leftarrow \text{DL}(sk; G, E, id)$ $pk \leftarrow (E, \Omega)$ return (pk, sk) <hr/>	<hr/> Algorithm 23 DHPVSS.VerifyKey(pp, id, pk) <hr/> parse pk as (E, Ω) return accept iff Ω is valid w.r.t G, E, id <hr/>
<hr/> Algorithm 24 DHPVSS.Dist($pp, pk_D, sk_D, \{pk_i : i \in [n]\}, S$) <hr/> parse pk_i as (E_i, Ω_i) , pp as $(\mathbb{G}, G, p, t, n, \alpha_0, \{(\alpha_i, v_i) : i \in [n]\})$ $pp_{\text{Sh}} \leftarrow (\mathbb{G}, G, p, t, n, \{\alpha_i : i \in [0, n]\})$ $(\{A_i\}_{i \in [n]}, m(X)) \leftarrow \text{GShamir.Share}(pp_{\text{Sh}}, S)$ $\forall i \in [n], C_i \leftarrow sk_D \cdot E_i + A_i$ $m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(pk_D, \{(pk_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\})$ $V \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot C_i, U \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot E_i$ $Pf_{\text{Sh}} \leftarrow \text{DLEQ}(sk_D; G, pk_D, U, V)$ return $(\{C_i : i \in [n]\}, Pf_{\text{Sh}})$ <hr/>	

Fig. 7. Algorithms for PVSS scheme DHPVSS, Setup and Distribution

distribution in SCRAPE [8] requires $(3n + 1) \log p$ bits, which was reduced to $(n + t + 2) \log p$ bits in ALBATROSS [9]. Therefore DHPVSS.Dist obtains an additive saving of $t \log p$ bits with respect to the best previous alternative. The communication of both DHPVSS.DecShare and HEPVSS.DecShare is $3 \log p$ bits. The share decryption complexities in [8] and [9] are similar to ours. See Appendix I for more details.

5 PVSS Resharing

In this section we introduce protocols that allow a committee \mathcal{C}_r of size n_r , among which a secret has been PVSSed with an underlying t_r -threshold Shamir scheme, to create a PVSS of the same secret for the next committee \mathcal{C}_{r+1} of size n_{r+1} and with threshold t_{r+1} . By design, the protocols will keep the secret hidden from any adversary corrupting at most t_r parties from \mathcal{C}_r and t_{r+1} from \mathcal{C}_{r+1} , and will be correct as long as there are $t_r + 1$ honest parties in \mathcal{C}_r . In particular, this can be used by a party P to transmit a message to a committee in the future, by keeping this secret being reshared among successive committees and setting the last Shamir threshold to be 0.

Suppose for now that the secret sharing scheme were for secrets over \mathbb{Z}_p . Each party in \mathcal{C}_r would hold $\sigma_\ell = m_r(\alpha_\ell)$ where m_r is the sharing polynomial for that round, of degree t_r . A subcommittee L_r of $t_r + 1$ parties in \mathcal{C}_r can then reshare the secret by PVSSing their shares among \mathcal{C}_{r+1} with Shamir scheme of degree $t_r + 1$. The parties in \mathcal{C}_{r+1} then compute the sum of the received shares weighted by coefficients $\lambda_{\ell, L_r} := \prod_{j \in L_r, j \neq \ell} \frac{\alpha_0 - \alpha_j}{\alpha_\ell - \alpha_j}$. Indeed, if we denote $[\sigma_\ell]$ the vector of shares sent by P_ℓ in L_r , then $\sum_{\ell \in L_r} \lambda_{\ell, L_r} [\sigma_\ell] = \sum_{\ell \in L_r} \lambda_{\ell, L_r} [m(\alpha_\ell)] = [\sum_{\ell \in L_r} \lambda_{\ell, L_r} m(\alpha_\ell)] = [m(\alpha_0)]$.

Algorithms for PVSS scheme DHPVSS, Verification and Reconstruction
Algorithm 25 DHPVSS.Verify($pp, \text{pk}_D, \{(\text{pk}_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}$)
<p> parse pk_i as (E_i, Ω_i), pp as $(\mathbb{G}, G, p, t, n, \{(\alpha_i, v_i) : i \in [n]\})$ $m^* \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\text{pk}_D, \{(\text{pk}_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\})$ $V \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n v_i m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot C_i, U \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n v_i m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot E_i$ return accept iff Pf_{Sh} is valid w.r.t G, pk_D, U, V </p>
Algorithm 26 DHPVSS.DecShare($pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{pk}, \text{sk}, C$)
<p> parse pk as (E, Ω) $A' \leftarrow C - \text{sk} \cdot \text{pk}_D$ $\text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}} \leftarrow \text{DLEQ}(\text{sk}; G, E, \text{pk}_D, C - A')$ return $(A', \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}})$ </p>
Algorithm 27 DHPVSS.VerifyDec($pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{pk}_i, C_i, A_i, \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}i}$)
<p> parse pk_i as (E_i, Ω_i) return accept iff $\text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}i}$ is valid w.r.t $G, E_i, \text{pk}_D, C_i - A_i$ </p>
Algorithm 28 DHPVSS.Rec($pp, \{A_i : i \in \mathcal{T}\}$)
return $\text{GShamir.Rec}(pp, \{A_i : i \in \mathcal{T}\})$

Fig. 8. Algorithms for PVSS scheme DHPVSS, Verification and Reconstruction

In our situation, each party $P_{r,i}$ in \mathcal{C}_r has instead a group element as share, and needs to PVSS it among \mathcal{C}_{r+1} using the algorithm `Dist` from previous section. However, the proof in `Dist` only guarantees that the distributed shares are consistent with some secret. Here we require in addition that this secret is the shared that the party has received previously.

To be more precise, in round r , each party $P_{r,i}$ in committee \mathcal{C}_r has $A_{r,i}$ as share and in addition the encryption $C_{r,i} = \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{r,i}}(A_{r,i})$ of $A_{r,i}$ is public. $P_{r,i}$ now needs to create shares of $A_{r,i}$ for the committee \mathcal{C}_{r+1} . Let $A_{i \rightarrow j}$ be the share that will be sent to $P_{r+1,j}$. This will be encrypted as $C_{i \rightarrow j} = \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{r+1,j}}(A_{i \rightarrow j})$ and $P_{r,i}$ must prove that $C_{i \rightarrow j}$ are encryptions of a correct sharing whose secret is indeed the plaintext of $C_{r,i}$.

When a subset L_r of \mathcal{C}_r of $t_r + 1$ parties have correctly reshared, each $P_{r+1,j}$ sets $A_{r+1,j} = \sum_{\ell \in L_r} \lambda_{\ell, L_r} A_{\ell \rightarrow j}$ as their share and everyone sets $C_{r+1,j} = \sum_{\ell \in L_r} \lambda_{\ell, L_r} C_{\ell \rightarrow j}$ as the corresponding public ciphertext for that share.

5.1 Resharing for HEPVSS

In the case of HEPVSS, the additional proof that the reshared value is the one corresponding to the public ciphertext can be integrated easily in `HEPVSS.Dist` if the encryption scheme has \mathbb{Z}_p -linear decryption.

Let $\text{pk}_{[n]}$ denote the set $\{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n]\}$. Similarly $C_{[n]}$ denote a set of ciphertexts $\{C_i : i \in [n]\}$ and $\rho_{[n]}$ denote a set of elements from the randomness space $\{\rho_i : i \in [n]\}$. Recall $D_C(\text{sk}) := \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(C)$.

Define the relation

$$R_{\text{Reshare}} = \{(m(X), \text{sk}, \rho_{[n]}); (\text{pk}, \text{pk}_{[n]}, C, C_{[n]}) : \\ F(\text{sk}) = \text{pk}, m(\beta_0) = 0, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_i}(m(\beta_i) \cdot G + D_C(\text{sk}); \rho_i) = C_i \text{ for } i \in [n]\}$$

We therefore define the resharing proof in Figure 10. The protocol for PVSS resharing is then constructed as in Figure 11.

Proof system HEPVSS.Reshare for correct resharing of encrypted secret
<hr/> Algorithm 29 HEPVSS.Reshare.Prove($(m(X), \text{sk}, \rho_{[n]}); (pp, \text{pk}, \text{pk}_{[n]}, C, C_{[n]})$) <hr/> <p> parse $pp = (\mathbb{G}, G, p, t, n, \{\beta_i : i \in [n]\})$ $\mathcal{W} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq t} \times \mathcal{SK} \times \mathfrak{A}^n, \mathcal{X} \leftarrow \mathcal{PK} \times \mathfrak{C}^n,$ $pp' \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{H}), w \leftarrow (m(X), \text{sk}, \rho_1, \dots, \rho_n), x \leftarrow (0, \text{pk}, C_1, \dots, C_n),$ Set f_C given by $f_C(w) := (m(\beta_0), F(\text{sk}), \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_1}(A_1; \rho_1), \dots, \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_1}(A_n; \rho_n))$ where $A_i = m(\beta_i) \cdot G + D_C(\text{sk})$ return $\pi \leftarrow \Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}.\text{Prove}(w; pp', x, f_C)$ </p> <hr/>
<hr/> Algorithm 30 HEPVSS.Reshare.Verify($pp, \text{pk}, \text{pk}_{[n]}, C, C_{[n]}, \pi$) <hr/> <p> Set $\mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, pp', x, f_C$, as in Reshare.Prove return $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}.\text{Verify}(pp', x, f_C, \pi)$ </p> <hr/>

Fig. 9. Proof HEPVSS.Reshare of correct resharing of encrypted secret

5.2 Resharing for DHPVSS

In the case of DHPVSS, the situation is slightly more complicated due to the fact that the encryption of shares involves a key from the dealer. Here there are different dealers, i.e. the final share of each party in \mathcal{C}_{r+1} is a linear combination of shares sent by the parties in L_r . Thanks to the fact that the encryption is also a linear operation with respect to the public key of the sender, we can define a public key for committee L_r . Indeed, if we call pk_{D_ℓ} the public key of $P_{r,\ell}$ when acting as sender, then $\text{pk}_{D, L_r} := \sum_{\ell \in L_r} \lambda_{\ell, L_r} \cdot \text{pk}_{D_\ell}$. Then we want to make sure that the output encryption for $P_{r+1,j}$ is

$$C_{r+1,j} = \text{sk}_{r+1,j} \cdot \text{pk}_{D, L_r} + \sum_{\ell \in L_r} \lambda_{\ell, L_r} A_{\ell \rightarrow j}.$$

At the beginning of the resharing, each party $P_{r,i}$ in committee \mathcal{C}_r has as share $A_{r,i} = C_{r,i} - \text{sk}_i \cdot \text{pk}_{D, L_{r-1}}$ where sk_i is the secret key for decrypting shares, and needs to create shares $A_{i \rightarrow j}$ of $A_{r,i}$ and encrypt them using the public keys $\text{pk}_{[n_{r+1}]} = \{\text{pk}_j : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}$ of the parties of the next round and its own secret key sk_{D_i} (i.e. this party will create $C_{[n_{r+1}]} = \{C_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}$ with $C_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{sk}_{D_i} \cdot \text{pk}_j + A_{i \rightarrow j}$) and prove their validity. In conclusion we need a proof for the following

Protocol for HEPVSS resharing

Participants: Disjoint committees $\mathcal{C}_r = \{P_{r,1}, \dots, P_{r,n_r}\}$ and $\mathcal{C}_{r+1} = \{P_{r+1,1}, \dots, P_{r+1,n_{r+1}}\}$.

Public information: A group \mathbb{G} of prime order p , with generator G . A homomorphic encryption scheme \mathcal{E} with \mathbb{Z}_p -linear decryption, with plaintext space \mathbb{G} . Public keys $\mathbf{pk}_{j,i}$ for that encryption scheme corresponding to parties $P_{j,i}$ above ($j = r, r+1, 1 \leq i \leq n_r$), where $P_{j,i}$ knows the corresponding secret key $\mathbf{sk}_{j,i}$; thresholds t_r, t_{r+1} . Evaluation points $(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n_r}), (\beta_0, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_{n_{r+1}})$.

Input: Public ciphertexts $C_{r,i}$, where it is guaranteed that $C_{r,i} = \text{Enc}_{\mathbf{pk}_{r,i}}(A_{r,i})$ such that $A_{r,i} = f_r(\alpha_i) \cdot G$ for some polynomial f_r of degree $\leq t_r$.

Output: A public output $(C_{r+1,1}, \dots, C_{r+1,n_{r+1}})$ and a proof π that, for all $k = 1, \dots, n_{r+1}$, $C_{r+1,k} = \text{Enc}_{\mathbf{pk}_{r+1,i}}(A_{r+1,k})$ such that $A_{r+1,k} = f_{r+1}(\beta_k) \cdot G$ for some polynomial f_{r+1} of degree $\leq t_{r+1}$ and $f_{r+1}(\beta_0) = f_r(\alpha_0)$.

Protocol:

1. Let $pp_{r+1} = (\mathbb{G}, G, p, t_{r+1}, n_{r+1}, \{\beta_i : i \in [0, n_{r+1}]\})$.
2. Resharing: For $i = 1, \dots, n_r$, $P_{r,i}$ does the following
 - (a) Compute $A_{r,i} = \text{Dec}_{\mathbf{sk}_{r,i}}(C_{r,i})$.
 - (b) For $i = 1, \dots, n_r$, $P_{r,i}$ computes $(\{A_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, m(X)) \leftarrow \text{GShamir.Share}(pp_{r+1}, A_{r,i})$
 - (c) Sample $\rho_{i \rightarrow j} \in \mathfrak{R}$ for $j \in [n_{r+1}]$ and let $\rho_{i \rightarrow [n_{r+1}]} = \{\rho_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}$
 - (d) Compute $C_{i \rightarrow j} = \text{Enc}_{\mathbf{pk}_{j,i}}(A_{i \rightarrow j}; \rho_{i \rightarrow j})$ for $j \in [n_{r+1}]$.
 - (e) Compute
$$\pi_i \leftarrow \text{HEPVSS.Reshare.Prove}(m(X), \mathbf{sk}_{r,i}, \rho_{i \rightarrow [n_{r+1}]}; pp, \mathbf{pk}_{r,i}, \{\mathbf{pk}_{r+1,j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, C_{r,i}, \{C_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\})$$
 - (f) Output $\{C_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in \mathcal{C}_{r+1}\}, \pi_i$
3. Reconstruction of next share encryptions: each party in \mathcal{P} locally constructs the encryptions of the shares for the following round as follows:
 - (a) Define L containing the first $t+1$ indices i for which the following accepts:

$$\text{HEPVSS.Reshare.Verify}(pp, \mathbf{pk}_{r,i}, \{\mathbf{pk}_{r+1,j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, C_{r,i}, \{C_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, \pi_i)$$

- (b) For $j \in [n_{r+1}]$, set $C_{r+1,j} = \sum_{\ell \in L} \lambda_{\ell,L} C_{\ell \rightarrow j}$ ^a
- (c) Output $\{(C_{r+1,j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, (\pi_{r,\ell})_{\ell \in L}\}$.

^aHere \sum refers to the summatory with respect to the homomorphic operation on ciphertexts $\boxplus_{\mathcal{E}}$

Fig. 10. Protocol for HEPVSS PVSS resharing

relation

$$\begin{aligned} R_{\text{DHPVSS,Reshare}} = & \{(m(X), \mathbf{sk}_i, \mathbf{sk}_{D_i}); (pp, \mathbf{pk}_i, \mathbf{pk}_{D_i}, \mathbf{pk}_{D,L_{r-1}}, \mathbf{pk}_{[n_{r+1}]}, C_{r,i}, C_{[n_{r+1}]}) : \\ & \mathbf{pk}_i = \mathbf{sk}_i \cdot G, \mathbf{pk}_{D_i} = \mathbf{sk}_{D_i} \cdot G, m(X) \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq t}, m(\beta_0) = 0, \\ & \text{and } \forall j \in [n_{r+1}], C_{i \rightarrow j} = \mathbf{sk}_{D_i} \cdot \mathbf{pk}_j + A_{i \rightarrow j}, \\ & \text{where } A_{i \rightarrow j} = (C_{r,i} - \mathbf{sk}_i \cdot \mathbf{pk}_{D,L_{r-1}}) + m(\beta_j) \cdot G\} \end{aligned}$$

However, we also want to use the SCRAPE technique to reduce the size of the witness and hence of the proof. Note that if we set $U_j = C_{i \rightarrow j} - \mathbf{sk}_{D_i} \cdot \mathbf{pk}_j - C_{r,i} + \mathbf{sk}_i \cdot \mathbf{pk}_{D,L_{r-1}}$ for all $j \in [n_{r+1}]$ and $U_0 = O$, we want to make sure that for all $j \in [0, n_{r+1}]$, $U_j = m(\beta_j) \cdot G$ for a polynomial of

degree $\leq t$ (in addition to the conditions $\text{pk}_i = \text{sk}_i \cdot G$ and $\text{pk}_{D_i} = \text{sk}_{D_i} \cdot G$).

For $j \in [0, n]$, let

$$v'_j = \prod_{k \in [0, n] \setminus \{j\}} (\beta_j - \beta_k)^{-1}.$$

Observe these are not exactly the same coefficients as in the description of DHPVSS in Section 4.3 because they include the evaluation point β_0 . By Theorem 1, we want to prove $\sum_{j=0}^n v'_j \cdot m^*(\beta_j) \cdot U_j = O$, for a random polynomial m^* of degree $n - t$.

Observe $\sum_{j=0}^n v'_j \cdot m^*(\beta_j) \cdot U_j = U' - \text{sk}_{D_i} \cdot V' + \text{sk}_i \cdot W'$ for publicly computable

$$U' := \sum_{j=1}^n v'_j \cdot m^*(\beta_j) \cdot (C_{i \rightarrow j} - C_{r,i}), \quad V' := \sum_{j=1}^n v'_j \cdot m^*(\beta_j) \cdot \text{pk}_j, \quad W' := \sum_{j=1}^n v'_j \cdot m^*(\beta_j) \cdot \text{pk}_{D_i, L_{r-1}},$$

and therefore $P_{r,i}$ needs a proof of knowledge for

$$\begin{aligned} R'_{\text{DHPVSS, Reshare}, m^*} = & \{(\text{sk}_i, \text{sk}_{D_i}); (\text{pk}_i, \text{pk}_{D_i}, U', V', W') : \\ & \text{pk}_i = \text{sk}_i \cdot G, \quad \text{pk}_{D_i} = \text{sk}_{D_i} \cdot G, \quad U' = \text{sk}_{D_i} \cdot V' - \text{sk}_i \cdot W'\} \end{aligned}$$

where we remark that now the witness only contains two elements but on the other hand relation depends on a polynomial $m^*(X)$ that has been sampled uniformly at random among polynomials of degree at most $n - t$. This leads to the protocol for PVSS resharing in Figure 9

6 Anonymous PVSS via ECW and AfP

In this section, we show how to construct PVSS (and re-sharing) for anonymous committees by instantiating our previous PVSS constructions using our ECW and AfP schemes. We start by showing how our previous protocols can be adapted to work with ECW and AfP instead of standard encryption and authentication. We then show how the optimizations in the DDH based constructions via the SCRAPE trick carry over to our anonymous setting if we instantiate our ECW and AfP schemes from similar assumptions. The protocols we construct in this section work in the YOSO model supporting up to $t < n/2$ corrupted parties and can be used as efficient building blocks for the protocols of [2,16].

In the previous sections, we have constructed both a PVSS scheme (Section 4.2) and a PVSS re-sharing scheme (Section 5.1) based on \mathbb{Z}_p -linear encryption schemes (as defined in Section 2.2). Despite being efficient, these constructions are not fit for the YOSO model because they require the dealer to know the public keys of the parties who will receive shares, consequently revealing their identities. In order to solve this issue, we show that these protocols can also be instantiated with the ECW scheme of Section 3 even though they were designed to be instantiated with a \mathbb{Z}_p -linear encryption scheme. The core idea is that our ECW preserves all the properties of the underlying \mathbb{Z}_p -linear encryption scheme while adding the ability to encrypt towards a role rather than towards a party who owns a public key.

Protocol for DHPVSS resharing

Participants: $\mathcal{C}_r = \{P_{r,1}, \dots, P_{r,n_r}\}$ and $\mathcal{C}_{r+1} = \{P_{r+1,1}, \dots, P_{r+1,n_{r+1}}\}$.

Public information: A group \mathbb{G} of prime order p , with generator G . “Sender” key pairs $(\text{sk}_{D_i}, \text{pk}_{D_i} = \text{sk}_{D_i} \cdot G)$ for every party $P_{r,i} \in \mathcal{C}_r$, a “sender committee” public key $\text{pk}_{D, L_{r-1}}$, and “receiver” key pairs $(\text{sk}_{r,i}, \text{pk}_{r,i} = \text{sk}_{r,i} \cdot G)$ for $P_{r,i}$, where $r = r, r+1$, and $1 \leq i \leq n_r$; thresholds t_r, t_{r+1} . Evaluation points $(\alpha_0, \alpha_1, \dots, \alpha_{n_r}), (\beta_0, \beta_1, \dots, \beta_{n_{r+1}})$. Random oracles $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq n-t}, \mathcal{H}' : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$. Let $\mathcal{W} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^2, \mathcal{X} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}^3$, and $pp_\pi \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{H}')$.

Input: Public ciphertexts $C_{r,i} = \text{sk}_{r,i} \cdot \text{pk}_{D, L_{r-1}} + A_{r,i}$ such that $A_{r,i} = h_r(\alpha_i) \cdot G$ for some polynomial h_r of degree $\leq t_r$.

Output: A public key pk_{D, L_r} for a subset L_r of \mathcal{C}_r , of size $t_r + 1$. Public output ciphertexts $(C_{r+1,1}, \dots, C_{r+1,n_{r+1}})$ and a proof π that, for all $j = 1, \dots, n_{r+1}$, $C_{r+1,j} = \text{sk}_{r+1,j} \cdot \text{pk}_{D, L_r} + A_{r+1,j}$ such that $A_{r+1,j} = h_{r+1}(\beta_j) \cdot G$ for some polynomial h_{r+1} of degree $\leq t_{r+1}$ and $h_{r+1}(\beta_0) = h_r(\alpha_0)$.

Protocol:

1. Let $pp_{\text{Sh}, r+1} = (\mathbb{G}, G, p, t_{r+1}, n_{r+1}, \{\beta_j : j \in [0, n_{r+1}]\})$.
2. Resharing: For $i = 1, \dots, n_r$, $P_{r,i}$ does the following:
 - (a) $A_{r,i} \leftarrow C_{r,i} - \text{sk}_{r,i} \cdot \text{pk}_{D, L_{r-1}}$.
 - (b) $(\{A_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, m_i(X)) \leftarrow \text{GShamir.Share}(pp_{\text{Sh}, r+1}, A_{r,i})$.
 - (c) For $j \in [n_{r+1}]$, $C_{i \rightarrow j} \leftarrow \text{sk}_{D_i} \cdot \text{pk}_{r+1,j} + A_{i \rightarrow j}$.
 - (d) $m_i^*(X) \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(\{C_{r,i} : i \in [n_r]\}, \text{pk}_{D, L_{r-1}})$.
 - (e) $U'_i \leftarrow \sum_{j=1}^n v'_j \cdot m_i^*(\beta_j) \cdot (C_{i \rightarrow j} - C_{r,i}), V'_i \leftarrow \sum_{j=1}^n v'_j \cdot m_i^*(\beta_j) \cdot \text{pk}_{r+1,j},$
 $W'_i \leftarrow (\sum_{j=1}^n v'_j \cdot m_i^*(\beta_j)) \cdot \text{pk}_{D, L_{r-1}}$.
 - (f) $\pi_{r,i} \leftarrow \Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}.\text{Prove}((\text{sk}_{r,i}, \text{sk}_{D_i}); pp_\pi, (\text{pk}_{r,i}, \text{pk}_{D_i}, U'_i), f_i)$,
where $f_i(\text{sk}_{r,i}, \text{sk}_{D_i}) := (\text{sk}_{r,i} \cdot G, \text{sk}_{D_i} \cdot G, \text{sk}_{D_i} \cdot V'_i - \text{sk}_{r,i} \cdot W'_i)$.
 - (g) Output $\{C_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, \pi_{r,i}$.
3. Reconstruction of next share encryptions: each party in \mathcal{P} locally constructs the encryptions of the shares for the following round as follows:
 - (a) For each $i \in \mathcal{C}_r$:
 - i. Compute U'_i and f_i as above (from public information and $P_{r,i}$'s output $\{C_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}$).
 - ii. Compute $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}.\text{Verify}(pp_\pi, (\text{pk}_{r,i}, \text{pk}_{D_i}, U'_i), f_i, \pi_{r,i})$.
 - (b) Define L_r the set of $t + 1$ first indices for which the above proofs accept.
 - (c) For $j \in [n_{r+1}]$, $C_{r+1,j} \leftarrow \sum_{\ell \in L_r} \lambda_{\ell, L} \cdot C_{\ell \rightarrow j}$.
 - (d) $\text{pk}_{D, L_r} \leftarrow \sum_{\ell \in L_r} \lambda_{\ell, L_r} \cdot \text{pk}_{D_\ell}$.
 - (e) Output $(\{C_{r+1,j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, (\pi_{r,\ell})_{\ell \in L_r}, \text{pk}_{D, L_r})$.

Fig. 11. Protocol for DHPVSS resharing

6.1 Constructing HEPVSS with ECW

We modify HEPVSS to use our ECW scheme $\mathcal{E} = (\text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ for lottery predicate $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P}, \text{sk}_{L,i})$ from Section 3 instead of a \mathbb{Z}_p -linear encryption scheme. Departing from the HEPVSS algorithms described in Figure 6, we make the following modifications:

- **Communication:** All messages are posted to the underlying blockchain ledger used by the ECW scheme \mathcal{E} .
- $\text{HEPVSS.Setup}(1^\lambda)$: Besides the original setup parameters, we assume that n distinct role identifiers P_1, \dots, P_n are available and that an underlying blockchain protocol Γ is executed.
- $\text{HEPVSS.KeyGen}(pp, id)$: Instead of publishing pk_i , each party P_i provides pk_i as input to the mixnet assumed as setup for $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P}, \text{sk}_{L,i})$ and associated ECW scheme \mathcal{E} . The mixnet

output $\{(j, \mathbf{pk}_{\text{Anon},j})\}_{j \in [n]}$ is assumed to be available on the underlying blockchain and accessible as

$$(\{(j, \mathbf{pk}_{\text{Anon},j})\}_{j \in [n]}, \eta) \leftarrow \text{param}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}).$$

Party P_i sets $\text{sk}_{L,i} \leftarrow (\mathbf{pk}_{\mathcal{E},i}, \text{sk}_{\mathcal{E},i})$.

- **HEPVSS.Dist**($pp, \{\mathbf{pk}_i : i \in [n]\}, S$): Instead of computing $C_i \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\mathbf{pk}_i}(A_i, \rho_i)$, the dealer computes $C_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, P_i, A_i)$ using randomness ρ_i . Notice that this is equivalent to computing $C_i \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\mathbf{pk}_{\text{Anon},j}}(A_i, \rho_i)$ for a j such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, P_i, \text{sk}_{L,j}) = 1$. Hence, Pf_{Sh} can still be computed via the same procedure. The dealer publishes

$$(\{C_i : i \in [n]\}, \{\mathbf{pk}_{\text{Anon},j} : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}).$$

Notice that the public key $\mathbf{pk}_{\text{Anon},j}$ used to generate each C_i is publicly known due to the structure of the lottery scheme.

- **HEPVSS.Verify**($pp, \{(\mathbf{pk}_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}$): No modification is needed, since $(\{C_i : i \in [n]\}, \{\mathbf{pk}_{\text{Anon},j} : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}})$ has the same structure as in the original protocol.
- **HEPVSS.DecShare**($pp, \mathbf{pk}_j, \text{sk}_{L,j}, C_i$): Party P_j checks that its lottery witness $\text{sk}_{L,j}$ is such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, P_i, \text{sk}_{L,j}) = 1$ and, if yes, computes $A_i \leftarrow \text{Dec}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, C_i, \text{sk}_{L,j})$. Proof Pf_{Dec} is generated as in the original protocol. Notice that this procedure is also equivalent to generating an AfP $\text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}} \leftarrow \text{AfP}.\text{Sign}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{sl}, P_i, \text{sk}_{L,j}, A_i)$.
- **HEPVSS.VerifyDec**($pp, \mathbf{pk}_i, A_i, C_i, \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec},i}$): Proof Pf_{Dec} is checked as in the original protocol. Notice that this procedure is also equivalent to generating an AfP $\{0, 1\} \leftarrow \text{AfP}.\text{Ver}(\tilde{\mathbf{B}}, \text{sl}, P_i, \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}}, A_i)$.
- **HEPVSS.Rec**($pp, \{A_i : i \in \mathcal{T}\}$): No modification is needed.

Due to the properties of the ECW scheme and the underlying lottery scheme, shares are encrypted towards parties randomly chosen to perform each role P_i whose identity remains unknown during the share distribution and verification phases. In case a reconstruction happens, parties executing each role reveal themselves by proving correctness of decrypted shares, which constitutes an AfP since it involved proving knowledge of $\text{sk}_{L,j}$ such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, P_i, \text{sk}_{L,j}) = 1$.

6.2 Constructing Resharing for HEPVSS with ECW

In the context of resharing, the parties selected to execute roles P_1, \dots, P_n in slot sl_r wish to publicly verifiable reshare the secret whose shares they received towards roles $P'_1, \dots, P'_{n'}$ in a future slot sl_{r+1} . In practice, this means that the resharing information will be received by a new randomly selected set of anonymous parties performing these roles in the future. Once again we explore the fact that our ECW inherits the properties of the underlying \mathbb{Z}_p -linear encryption scheme to modify the resharing protocol of Figure 11 to work with ECW.

We show how to modify the description of Figure 11 to obtain an ECW based resharing protocol:

- **Participants:** Parties executing roles P_1, \dots, P_n in slot sl_r and parties executing roles $P'_1, \dots, P'_{n'}$ in slot sl_{r+1} .
- **Input:** Public (*i.e.* published in the underlying blockchain) ECW ciphertexts $C_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}_r, P_i, A_{tr,i})$ such that $A_{r,i} = f_r(\alpha_i) \cdot G$ for some polynomial f_r of degree $\leq t_r$.
- **Output:** ECW ciphertexts $C_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}_{r+1}, P'_i, A_{r,i})$ published in the underlying blockchain such that $A_{r+1,k} = f_{r+1}(\beta_k) \cdot G$ for some polynomial f_{r+1} of degree $\leq t_{r+1}$ and $f_{r+1}(\beta_0) = f_r(\alpha_0)$.
- **Protocol:**

- *Encryption/Decryption*: When decrypting ciphertexts using key sk_i for $i \in [n_r]$, ECW decrypt using $sk_{L,j}$ such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, sl_r, P_i, sk_{L,j}) = 1$. When encrypting a message under public key pk_j for $j \in [n_{r+1}]$, ECW encrypt towards role P'_j in slot sl_{r+1} using randomness $\rho_{r+1,,j}$: $C_j \leftarrow \text{Enc}(\mathbf{B}, sl_{r+1}, P_{r+1,j}, A)$. Notice that this is equivalent to computing $C_j \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{pk_{\text{Anon},r+1,j}}(A, \rho_{r+1,,j})$ for a j such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, sl_{r+1}, P_j, sk_{L,j}) = 1$.
- *Proof HEPVSS.Reshare.Verify*($pp, pk_{r,i}, \{pk_{r+1,j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, C_{r,i}, \{C_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}, \pi_i$): Notice that the structure of the ECW ciphertexts is compatible with this proof, so that it can be generated as in the original protocol. Analogously, this proof can also be verified as in the original protocol. Moreover, notice that it also acts as an AfP for ciphertexts $\{C_{i \rightarrow j} : j \in [n_{r+1}]\}$ on behalf of role P_i of slot sl_r , since it requires knowledge of a $sk_{L,j}$ such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, sl, P_i, sk_{L,j}) = 1$.

As in the PVSS with ECW protocol, due to the properties of the ECW scheme and the underlying lottery scheme, resharing information is encrypted towards parties randomly chosen to perform each role $P_{r+1,j}$ whose identity remains unknown until they act (*e.g.* by reconstructing the secret).

6.3 Efficient DDH-based Instantiation via DHPVSS

The most efficient instantiations of our techniques are obtained when using a variant of the El Gamal encryption scheme together with the SCRAPE share validity check. In order to enjoy the efficiency improvement, we show that our ECW is also compatible with these optimizations .

- **Setup and Lottery Predicate** : We use the same setup, *i.e.* we assume the parties have access to an ideal mixnet and input their public keys E_i so that the output of a tuple $\{(j, E_{\text{Anon},j}) : j \in [n]\}$ which is written on the blockchain and accessible to every party through `param` function. The lottery predicate works the same way, having parties check whether $E_{\text{Anon},k} = E_i$ for $k \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(sl||P||\eta)$ in order to determine if they have been selected for role P in slot sl . Moreover, every party publishes on the underlying blockchain a public key $pk_{D,i}$ for which they know the corresponding secret key $sk_{D,i}$, which they will use when encrypting.
- **Encryption**: As in our original ECW a party P_i encrypting m towards role P in slot sl starts by running `param`(\mathbf{B}, sl) to obtain $(\{(l, E_{\text{Anon},l})\}_{l \in [n]}, \eta)$ and determine $E_{\text{Anon},k}$ such that $k \leftarrow \mathcal{H}(sl||P||\eta)$. P_i publishes ciphertext $C_{i,k} \leftarrow m + sk_{D,i} \cdot E_k$ revealing indices i, k . Notice that this ciphertext has exactly the same structure as the ciphertexts used in DHPVSS.
- **Decryption**: To decrypt a ciphertext $C_{i,k}$ for role P in slot sl , P_j checks that its $sk_{L,j}$ is such that $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, sl, P, sk_{L,j}) = 1$. If yes, it obtains the sender's public key $pk_{D,i}$ from the blockchain and computes $m \leftarrow C_{i,k} - sk_j \cdot pk_{D,i}$. Notice that a proof of correct decryption can be done exactly as in DHPVSS and that such a proof constitutes an AfP of m on behalf of role P in slot sl , since it requires proving knowledge of $sk_{L,j}$ s.t. $\text{lottery}(\mathbf{B}, sl, P, sk_{L,j}) = 1$.

Using this slight modification of our ECW, we can instantiate DHPVSS (Figures 7 and 8) and its resharing protocol (Figure 11). The ciphertexts output by ECW have the same structure as those used in DHPVSS, so the efficient proofs of encrypted (re)share validity can be performed exactly in the same way.

Privacy and Resharing: Notice, however, that since the dealer's identity must be known when decrypting ciphertexts, using these optimized techniques for resharing will be problematic, since it requires linking a party P_i to its key $sk_{D,i}$ and revealing its identity. In order to solve this issue,

we can resort to a similar setup used for the regular keys E_i , *i.e.* we can allow parties access to an ideal mixnet that is used to create a shuffled set of keys $\{(j, \text{sk}_{D, \text{Anon}, j}) : j \in [n]\}$. Now a sender can include the index to its key $\text{sk}_{D, \text{Anon}, j}$ in the ciphertext in order to allow for decryption. As it is the case with our simple AfP technique, this would require setting up multiple such vectors, which can potentially be solved by techniques similar to those we describe in Appendix J. We leave a concrete description of such a construction for future works.

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A Basic Notions on Public Key Encryption

In this section we introduce well-known concepts on public key encryption.

A.1 Definitions

Definition 14. A public key encryption scheme \mathcal{E} consists of three polynomial time algorithms ($\mathcal{E}.\text{Gen}, \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}, \mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}$) as follows:

- $\mathcal{E}.\text{Gen}(\lambda)$ is a probabilistic algorithm that outputs a pair (sk, pk) consisting of a secret key and a public key.
- $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(M)$ is a probabilistic algorithm that takes as input a public key pk and a plaintext message M in a plaintext message space \mathfrak{P} and outputs a ciphertexts C in a ciphertext space \mathfrak{C} . In addition, by abuse of notation, we define the function $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(M; \rho)$ that specifies the result of $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(M)$ when randomness ρ (in a randomness space \mathfrak{R}) is used.
- $\mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(C)$ is a deterministic function that takes secret key sk , and a ciphertext $C \in \mathfrak{C}$ and outputs a plaintext message $M' \in \mathfrak{P}$.

and which satisfy that for every (pk, sk) output by $\mathcal{E}.\text{Gen}$, and for every $M \in \mathfrak{P}$,

$$\Pr[\mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(M))] = 1$$

The most well known notion of security for a public key encryption scheme is IND-CPA security, which requires that the encryptions of two messages under any public key pk are computationally indistinguishable without the knowledge of the corresponding sk . Here we consider the notion of ℓ -multi-key IND-CPA security. This requires that the encryptions of two vectors of messages of the same length, where each coordinate is encrypted under a public key pk_i , are indistinguishable. The notions are equivalent as long as ℓ is polynomial in the security parameter.

Definition 15. A public key encryption scheme \mathcal{E} satisfies ℓ -multi-key IND-CPA security if for any PPT adversary \mathcal{B} , there exists a negligible function $\mu(\lambda)$ such that

$$\left| \Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{E}}^{\ell\text{-IND-CPA}, 0}(\lambda) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{E}}^{\ell\text{-IND-CPA}, 1}(\lambda) = 1 \right] \right| \leq \mu(\lambda)$$

Algorithm 31 $\text{Game}_{\mathcal{B}, \mathcal{E}}^{\ell\text{-IND-CPA}, b}(\lambda)$

$\forall i \in [\ell] \quad (\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i) \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{KeyGen}(pp, i)$
 $(m_1^{(0)}, \dots, m_\ell^{(0)}), (m_1^{(1)}, \dots, m_\ell^{(1)}) \in \mathfrak{P}^\ell \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(pp, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in [\ell]\})$
 $\forall i \in [\ell], c_i \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_i}(m_i^{(b)})$
 $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{B}(\{c_i : i \in [\ell]\})$
return b'

The case $\ell = 1$ is the usual IND-CPA definition and for $\ell = \text{poly}(\lambda)$ a standard hybrid argument shows that a scheme is ℓ -multi-key IND-CPA if and only if it is IND-CPA.

A.2 El Gamal Public Key Encryption Scheme

In this paper we use the well known El Gamal scheme, where the plaintext space is $\mathfrak{P} = \mathbb{G}$, a cyclic group of order p generated by G , the randomness space is $\mathfrak{R} = \mathbb{Z}_p$ and the ciphertext space is $\mathfrak{C} = \mathbb{G}^2$. The scheme \mathcal{E} is given by

- $\mathcal{E}.\text{Gen}(\lambda)$: Selects $\text{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ uniformly at random, sets $\text{pk} = \text{sk} \cdot G$, outputs (sk, pk) .
- $\mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(M)$ where $M \in \mathbb{G}$, selects $\rho \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ uniformly at random, outputs $C = (\rho \cdot G, M + \rho \cdot \text{pk})$ (as explained before we denote $C = \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}}(M; \rho)$).
- $\mathcal{E}.\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(C)$, where $C = (C_1, C_2) \in \mathbb{G}^2$, outputs $\text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(C) = C_2 - \text{sk} \cdot C_1$.

The El Gamal encryption scheme is well known to be IND-CPA secure under the DDH assumption.

B Execution Model for Proof-of-Stake (PoS) Blockchains

In this section, we give an overview of the framework from [19] for arguing about PoS blockchain protocol security as presented in [7].

Blockchain Protocol Execution Let the blockchain protocol

$$\Gamma^V = (\text{UpdateState}^V, \text{GetRecords}, \text{Broadcast})$$

be guarded by a validity predicate V . The algorithms can be described as follows:

- $\text{UpdateState}(1^\lambda) \rightarrow \text{bst}$ where bst is the local state of the blockchain along with metadata.
- $\text{GetRecords}(1^\lambda, \text{bst}) \rightarrow \mathbf{B}$ outputs the longest sequence \mathbf{B} of valid blocks (wrt. V).
- $\text{Broadcast}(1^\lambda, m)$ Broadcast the message m over the network to all parties executing the blockchain protocol.

An execution of a blockchain protocol Γ^V proceeds by participants running the algorithm UpdateState^V to get the latest blockchain state, GetRecords to extract the ledger data structure from a state and Broadcast to distribute messages which are added to the blockchain if accepted by V . An execution is orchestrated by an environment \mathcal{Z} which classifies parties as either honest or corrupt. All honest parties execute $\Gamma^V(1^\lambda)$ with empty local state bst and all corrupted parties are controlled by the adversary \mathcal{A} who also controls network including delivery of messages between all parties.

- In each round all honest parties receive a message m from \mathcal{Z} and potentially receive incoming network messages delivered by \mathcal{A} . The honest parties may do computation, broadcast messages and/or update their local states.
- \mathcal{A} is responsible for delivering all messages sent by honest parties to all other parties. \mathcal{A} cannot modify messages from honest parties but may delay and reorder messages on the network.
- At any point \mathcal{Z} can communicate with adversary \mathcal{A} or use GetRecords to retrieve a view of the local state of any party participating in the protocol.

The result is a random variable $\text{EXEC}^{\Gamma^V}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda)$ denoting the joint view of all parties (i.e. all inputs, random coins and messages received) in the above execution. Note that the joint view of all parties fully determines the execution. We define the view of the adversary as $\text{view}_{\mathcal{A}}(\text{EXEC}^{\Gamma^V}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda))$

and the view of the party P_i as $\text{view}_{P_i}(\text{EXEC}^{\Gamma^V}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda))$. If it is clear from the context which execution the argument is referring to, then we just write view_i . We assume that it is possible to take a snapshot i.e. a view of the protocol after the first r rounds have been executed. We denote that by $\text{view}^r \leftarrow \text{EXEC}_r^{\Gamma^V}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda)$. Furthermore, we can resume the execution departing from this view and continue until round \tilde{r} resulting in the full view including round \tilde{r} denoted by $\text{view}^{\tilde{r}} \leftarrow \text{EXEC}_{(\text{view}^r, \tilde{r})}^{\Gamma^V}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda)$.

We let the function $\text{stake}_i = \text{stake}(\mathbf{B}, i)$ take as input a local blockchain \mathbf{B} and a party P_i and output a number representing the stake of party P_i wrt. to blockchain \mathbf{B} . Let the sum of stake controlled by the adversary be $\text{stake}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{B})$, the total stake held by all parties $\text{stake}_{\text{total}}(\mathbf{B})$ and the adversaries relative stake is $\text{stake-ratio}_{\mathcal{A}}(\mathbf{B})$. We also consider the PoS-fraction $\text{u-stakefrac}(\mathbf{B}, \ell)$ as the amount of unique stake whose proof is provided in the last ℓ mined blocks. More precisely, let \mathcal{M} be the index i corresponding to miners P_i of the last ℓ blocks in \mathbf{B} then

$$\text{u-stakefrac}(\mathbf{B}, \ell) = \frac{\sum_{i \in \mathcal{M}} \text{stake}(\mathbf{B}, i)}{\text{stake}_{\text{total}}}$$

A note on corruption For simplicity in the above execution we restrict the environment to only allow static corruption while the execution described in [24] supports adaptive corruption with erasures.

A note on admissible environments [24] specifies a set of restrictions on \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{Z} such that only compliant executions are considered and argues that certain security properties holds with overwhelming probability for these executions. An example of such a restriction is that \mathcal{A} should deliver network messages to honest parties within Δ rounds.

Blockchain Properties In coming sections we will define what it means to encrypt to a future state of the blockchain. First, we need to ensure what it means for a blockchain execution to have evolved from one state to another. We recall that running a protocol Γ^V with appropriate restrictions on \mathcal{A} and \mathcal{Z} will yield certain compliant executions $\text{EXEC}^{\Gamma^V}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^\lambda)$ where some security properties will hold with overwhelming probability. An array of prior works, including [14,24], have converged towards a few security properties that characterizes blockchain protocols. These include *Common Prefix* or *Chain Consistency*, *Chain Quality* and *Chain Growth*. From these basic properties, a number of stronger properties were derived in [19]. Among them, is the *Distinguishable Forking* property which will be the main requirement when introducing the EtF scheme.

Definition 16 (Common Prefix). *Let $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$ be the common prefix parameter. The chains $\mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{B}_2$ possessed by two honest parties P_1 and P_2 in slots $\text{sl}_1 < \text{sl}_2$ satisfy $\mathbf{B}_1^{\lceil \kappa} \preceq \mathbf{B}_2$.*

Definition 17 (Chain Growth). *Let $\tau \in (0, 1]$, $s \in \mathbb{N}$ and let $\mathbf{B}_1, \mathbf{B}_2$ be as above with the additional restriction that $\text{sl}_1 + s \leq \text{sl}_2$. Then $\text{len}(\mathbf{B}_2) - \text{len}(\mathbf{B}_1) \geq \tau s$ where τ is the speed coefficient.*

Definition 18 (Chain Quality). *Let $\mu \in (0, 1]$ and $\kappa \in \mathbb{N}$. Consider any set of consecutive blocks of length at least κ from an honest party's chain \mathbf{B}_1 . The ratio of adversarial blocks in the set is $1 - \mu$ where μ is the quality coefficient.*

Definition 19 (Distinguishable Forking). A blockchain protocol Γ satisfies $(\alpha(\cdot), \beta(\cdot), \ell_1(\cdot), \ell_2(\cdot))$ -distinguishable forking property with adversary \mathcal{A} in environment \mathcal{Z} , if there exists negligible functions, $\text{negl}(\cdot)$, $\delta(\cdot)$ such that for every $\lambda \in \mathbb{N}$, $\ell \geq \ell_1(\lambda)$, $\tilde{\ell} \geq \ell_2(\lambda)$ it holds that

$$\Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} \alpha(\lambda) + \delta(\lambda) < \beta(\lambda) \wedge \\ \text{suf-stake-contr}^{\tilde{\ell}}(\text{view}, \beta(\lambda)) = 1 \wedge \\ \text{bd-stake-fork}^{(\ell, \tilde{\ell})}(\text{view}, \alpha(\lambda) + \delta(\lambda)) = 1 \end{array} \middle| \text{view} \leftarrow \text{EXEC}^{\Gamma}(\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, 1^{\lambda}) \right] \geq 1 - \text{negl}(\lambda).$$

C Proofs for ECW

In this section we list the proofs related to theorems stated in Section 3. We re-state the theorems for convenience.

Theorem 5 (IND-CPA ECW). Let \mathcal{E} be an IND-CPA secure \mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic encryption scheme. The construction in Figure 4 with lottery predicate as in Section 3.1 is an IND-CPA secure ECW (as in Definition 6).

Proof (Sketch). An adversary with a noticeable advantage in $\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{IND-CPA}}$ described in Definition 6 can distinguish between ECW encryptions of two different messages without winning the lottery for that specific sl and P . This adversary can, in turn, distinguish between corresponding encryptions from the underlying \mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic encryption scheme \mathcal{E} , which contradicts IND-CPA security of \mathcal{E} . Thus, the protocol in Figure 4 yields an IND-CPA secure ECW.

IND-CCA security for the ECW scheme can be obtained by using standard transformations ([13,27]) as argued in [7].

Theorem 6 (EUF-CMA AfP). Let \mathcal{E} be an IND-CPA secure and \mathbb{Z}_p -linearly homomorphic encryption scheme and let SoK be a simulatable and extractable SoK scheme. The construction in Figure 5 with lottery predicate as in Section 3.1 is EUF-CMA AfP as defined in Definition 7.

Proof (Sketch). We argue that an adversary who forges a signature (AfP tag) on a message m is able to construct a valid SoK on a message without knowing the witness. More precisely, assume that the adversary can make the verifier output $b = 1$ on input $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{P}, \sigma, m)$ while not having won the lottery for parameters $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{P})$. The underlying SoK σ_{SoK} must be a convincing SoK on m such that $\text{SoK.verify}((\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \text{P}), \sigma_{\text{SoK}}, m) = 1$. Thus, the adversary has successfully created a SoK signature where the verification algorithm accepts but without the adversary knowing a witness. This breaks existential unforgeability of the SoK scheme contradicting our assumption.⁵

Theorem 7 (AfP Privacy). Assume \mathcal{E} , lottery and SoK scheme as in 6. The construction in Figure 5 has AfP privacy as in Definition 8.

⁵In fact, forging a signature in the EUF-CMA game of SoK reduces to either breaking the corresponding simulatability or the extractability of the SoK scheme (see [10])

Proof (Sketch). We construct a simulator \mathcal{S} for the game $\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{ID-PRIV}}$ as follows. When \mathcal{S} gets a request for given tuple $(\mathbf{B}, \text{sl}, \mathbf{P}, m)$ it forwards the request to the simulator for the SoK scheme. The SoK simulator can forge a signature and, in particular, it can simulate an SoK on m without knowing the lottery winning secret key. Then, \mathcal{S} obtains the response of the SoK simulator forwards it to the adversary. We claim that any adversary who can successfully distinguish between interacting with the simulator \mathcal{S} and the oracle \mathcal{O}_{Aff} in $\text{Game}_{\Gamma, \mathcal{A}, \mathcal{Z}, \mathcal{U}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{ID-PRIV}}$ breaks the simulatability of the SoK scheme.

D Other Security Proofs

D.1 Security of Π_{Pre}

The Σ -protocol Π_{Pre} is obviously complete. It has special soundness because given two accepting transcripts $(a, e, z), (a, e', z')$ with $e \neq e'$, one can extract w as $(e - e')^{-1}(z - z')$. It is therefore a proof of knowledge of w with soundness error $1/|\mathbb{F}|$. Finally it is honest-verifier zero-knowledge: a simulator can produce a transcript that is indistinguishable from a real one by choosing z uniformly at random in \mathcal{X} , and e uniformly at random in \mathbb{F} , and then computing $a = f(z) - e \cdot x$, which is uniformly random in \mathcal{W} .

D.2 Correctness and Security of HEPVSS

Lemma 1 (Correctness of HEPVSS). *If \mathcal{E} is correct then construction HEPVSS satisfies correctness.*

Proof. Recall correctness means in this case that if keys $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)$ have been created honestly with HEPVSS.KeyGen , a secret $S \in \mathbb{G}$ has been distributed according to HEPVSS.Dist resulting in encrypted shares C_i and a proof Pf_{Sh} , these shares C_i have been correctly decrypted resulting in A'_i and proofs Pf_{Dec_i} , and a secret S' is reconstructed from these A'_i , then the verification of Pf_{Sh} and the Pf_{Dec_i} accept and $S' = S$.

Note that by definition of GShamir , the dealer creates $A_i = S + m(\alpha_i) \cdot G$ for a polynomial $m(X)$ of degree at most t with $m(\alpha_0) = 0$ and $C_i = \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}(A_i, \rho_i)$. Pf_{Sh} asserts precisely this. Clearly f as defined in the proof is a linear map and $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}$ is correct, so Pf_{Sh} will be accepted. By correctness of \mathcal{E} , the decrypted A'_i will equal A_i . By correctness of $\mathcal{E}.\text{ProveDec}$ the proofs Pf_{Dec_i} are accepted. By definition of the reconstruction in GShamir outputs S when applied to any subset $A_i, i \in \mathcal{T}$ where \mathcal{T} is of size $t + 1$.

Theorem 8 (IND-1 Secrecy). *If \mathcal{E} is IND-CPA then construction HEPVSS for a PVSS satisfies indistinguishability of secrets*

Proof. Let \mathcal{A} be an adversary that can win the IND-1 Secrecy Game for HEPVSS with non-negligible advantage ϵ . Note that as a dealer secret key is not needed to perform HEPVSS.Dist , we do not need to consider the DIST oracle. We construct an adversary \mathcal{B} that uses \mathcal{A} to break $(n - t)$ -multi-key IND-CPA security, which is equivalent to IND-CPA security (see Appendix A).

Firstly, \mathcal{B} passes the keys $\text{pk}_i, i \in [n - t]$ to \mathcal{A} and observes its constructed $\text{pk}_i, i \in [n - t + 1, n]$. Then \mathcal{B} chooses random polynomials $m^{(0)}$, and $m^{(1)}$ of degree at most t under the restriction that $m^{(0)}(\alpha_i) = m^{(1)}(\alpha_i)$ for i in $[n - t + 1, n]$.⁶

⁶Which can be done by choosing first $m^{(0)}(X)$ and then taking $m^{(1)}(X) = m^{(0)}(X) + \gamma \cdot \prod_{i=n-t+1}^n (X - \alpha_i)$ for uniformly random γ .

\mathcal{B} sets $S_0 = m^{(0)}(\alpha_0) \cdot G$, $S_1 = m^{(1)}(\alpha_0) \cdot G$, $A_i^{(0)} = m(\alpha_i) \cdot G$, $A_i^{(1)} = m(\alpha'_i) \cdot G$ for $i \in [n]$ and sends message vectors $\mathbf{m}^{(j)} = (A_1^{(j)}, A_2^{(j)}, \dots, A_{n-t}^{(j)})$ for $j \in \{0, 1\}$ to the IND-CPA challenger, and receives (C_1, \dots, C_{n-t}) in return where $C_i = \text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_i}(A_i^{(b)})$.

Now \mathcal{B} computes $C_i = \text{Enc}(m^{(0)}(\alpha_i) \cdot G)$ for $i \in [n-t+1, n]$ and note that for these values of i , $m^{(0)}(\alpha_i) = m^{(1)}(\alpha_i)$ so $C_i = \text{Enc}(m^{(1)}(\alpha_i) \cdot G)$ too. Finally given C_i , $i \in [n]$, \mathcal{B} constructs a simulated proof Pf_{Sh}^* . Now \mathcal{B} sends C_i , $i = 1, \dots, n$, and Pf_{Sh}^* to \mathcal{A} as well as the candidate secret S_0 . \mathcal{B} then outputs the same guess as \mathcal{A} .

It is clear that \mathcal{A} receives from \mathcal{B} encrypted shares of S_0 (if the challenger's bit is $b = 0$) or S_1 (if $b = 1$) distributed identically as in the protocol: indeed the ciphertexts C_1, \dots, C_{n-t} are the encryptions of either the set $\{A_i^{(0)}\}_{i \in [n-t]}$ or $\{A_i^{(1)}\}_{i \in [n-t]}$ of the first $n-t$ shares constructed by \mathcal{B} for the secrets, and the last t ciphertexts created by \mathcal{B} are encryptions of $A_i^{(0)} = A_i^{(1)}$, $i \in [n-t+1, n]$. Finally Pf_{Sh}^* is computationally indistinguishable from a real proof of correct sharing by the zero knowledge property of the proof. Therefore the guessing advantage of \mathcal{B} for the multi-key IND-CPA game is the same as that of \mathcal{A} .

Lemma 2 (Verifiability of HEPVSS). *Construction HEPVSS for a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme satisfies verifiability.*

Proof. Verifiability of Key Generation. Our construction clearly satisfies verifiability of key generation because public keys simply consist of one group element, and so it is easy to verify public keys are correctly formed.

Verifiability of Distribution. Our construction satisfies verifiability of distribution because if $\text{HEPVSS.Verify}(pp, \{\text{pk}_i, C_i\}_{i \in [n]}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}) = 1$ then Pf_{Sh} is a valid proof of witness $w = (S, m(X), \rho_1, \dots, \rho_n)$ such that $m(\alpha_0) = 0$, for all $i \in [n]$ $C_i = \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_i}(S + m(\alpha_i) \cdot G, \rho_i)$ and m has degree $\leq t$. Therefore, clearly HEPVSS.Dist on input $pp, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n]\}, S$ and with randomness $m(X), \rho_1, \dots, \rho_n$ will output $\{C_i : i \in [n]\}$.

Verifiability of Decryption. Our construction clearly satisfies verifiability of decryption because if $\text{HEPVSS.VerifyDec}(pp, \text{pk}, A, C, \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}}) = 1$ then Pf_{Dec} is a valid proof of witness sk such that $A = \text{Dec}_{\text{sk}}(C)$ and sk is the secret key corresponding to pk . Therefore, $\text{DecShare}(pp, \text{pk}, \text{sk}, C) = (A, \cdot)$ for any randomness input to this algorithm.

D.3 Correctness and Security of DHPVSS

Lemma 3 (Correctness of DHPVSS). *Our construction DHPVSS for a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme satisfies correctness.*

Proof. Consider a set of encrypted shares $\{C_i : i \in [n]\}$ and a proof Pf_{Sh} output by DHPVSS.Dist with respect to parameters $pp = (\mathbb{G}, G, p, \{\alpha_i, v_i : i \in [n]\})$ output by DHPVSS.Setup , a secret $S \in \mathbb{G}$, a public and secret key $(\text{pk}_D, \text{sk}_D)$ generated by DHPVSS.DKeyGen , and a set of public keys $\{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n]\} = \{(E_i = \text{sk}_i \cdot G, \Omega_i) : i \in [n]\}$ generated by DHPVSS.KeyGen with respect to $\{id_i : i \in [n]\}$.

Clearly for all $i \in [n]$, $\text{VerifyKey}(pp, id_i, \text{pk}_i) = 1$, as because of the correctness of the proofs of discrete logarithms, Ω_i will be valid.

For all $i \in [n]$, $\text{DecShare}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i, C_i)$ outputs $A_i = C_i - \text{sk}_i \cdot \text{pk}_D$ and $\text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}i}$. Then, by definition of correctness, DHPVSS is correct if

$$\text{DHPVSS.Verify}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \{(\text{pk}_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}) = 1,$$

for all $i \in [n]$

$$\text{VerifyDec}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \text{pk}_i, C_i, A_i, \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}i}) = 1,$$

and finally DHPVSS.Rec outputs the secret S .

Consider the proof Pf_{Sh} where

$$V = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i f^*(\alpha_i) \cdot C_i, \quad U = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i f^*(\alpha_i) \cdot E_i,$$

where $f^* = H(\text{pk}_D, \{(\text{pk}_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\})$ and $\forall i \in [n]$

$$v_i = \prod_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} (\alpha_i - \alpha_j)^{-1}.$$

By assumption, the proofs of discrete logarithm equality are correct. As $C_i = \text{sk}_D \cdot E_i + A_i$ where $A_i = S + m(\alpha_i) \cdot G$ for polynomial m of degree $\leq t$ such that $m(\alpha_0) = 0$, then

$$\begin{aligned} V &= \sum_{i=1}^n v_i f^*(\alpha_i) \cdot C_i = \text{sk}_D \sum_{i=1}^n v_i f^*(\alpha_i) \cdot E_i + \sum_{i=1}^n v_i f^*(\alpha_i) \cdot (S + m(\alpha_i) \cdot G) \\ &= \text{sk}_D \cdot U + \sum_{i=1}^n v_i f^*(\alpha_i) (S + m(\alpha_i) \cdot G). \end{aligned}$$

As m is a polynomial of degree t such that $m(\alpha_0) = 0$ and due to Theorem 1, $V = \text{sk}_D \cdot U$. As $\text{pk}_D = \text{sk}_D \cdot G$, then the proof Pf_{Sh} will be valid. Therefore, algorithm DHPVSS.Verify returns 1.

We consider now $\text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}i}$. By assumption, the proofs of discrete logarithm equality are correct. Because $C_i - A_i = \text{sk}_i \cdot \text{pk}_D$ and $E_i = \text{sk}_i \cdot G$, then the proof $\text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}i}$ will be valid. Therefore, $\forall i \in [n]$ algorithm DHPVSS.VerifyDec returns 1.

Finally, clearly DHPVSS.Rec will output $\text{GShamir.Rec}(pp, \{A_i : i \in \mathcal{T}\})$ which in turn equals S since A_i are all correct.

Lemma 4 (IND-1 Secrecy of DHPVSS). *Our construction DHPVSS for a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme satisfies indistinguishability of secrets if the DDH assumption holds.*

Proof. Suppose there is an adversary \mathcal{A} such that

$$\Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PVSS}}^{\text{ind-secrecy}, 0}(\lambda) = 1 \right] - \Pr \left[\text{Game}_{\mathcal{A}, \text{PVSS}}^{\text{ind-secrecy}, 1}(\lambda) = 1 \right] = \epsilon,$$

where ϵ is non-negligible, then we can construct \mathcal{B} that distinguishes DDH tuples with non-negligible probability. We give the detailed description of \mathcal{B} in Algorithm 30, and then explain how \mathcal{B} works.

We now explain why, when a DDH tuple is input to \mathcal{B} , the view of \mathcal{A} , when $j = 1$ and $\tilde{b} = 1$, is as in the real experiment when $b = 1$ and the view of \mathcal{A} , when $j = n - t$ and $\tilde{b} = 0$, is as in the real experiment when $b = 0$. Note that \tilde{b} and j are the values randomly chosen by \mathcal{B} .

Algorithm 32 \mathcal{B}

procedure DIST((\mathcal{U}, S')) **if** $\mathcal{U} \not\subseteq [n+1, k]$ or $|\mathcal{U}| \neq n$ **then return** \perp **end if** Let $\{(\alpha_i, v_i) : i \in \mathcal{U}\}$ be the set $\{(\alpha_i, v_i) : i \in [n]\}$ $(\{A'_i\}_{i \in [n]}, m'(X)) \leftarrow \text{GShamir.Share}((\mathbb{G}, G, p, t, n, \{\alpha_i : i \in \mathcal{U}\}), S')$ $\forall i \in \mathcal{U} \quad C'_i \leftarrow \text{sk}_i \cdot \text{pk}_D + A'_i$ $f^* \leftarrow H(\text{pk}_D, \{(\text{pk}_i, C'_i) : i \in \mathcal{U}\})$ $V \leftarrow \sum_{i \in \mathcal{U}} v_i f^*(\alpha_i) \cdot C'_i$ $U \leftarrow \sum_{i \in \mathcal{U}} v_i f^*(\alpha_i) \cdot E_i$ Simulate proof Pf_{Sh} for G, pk_D, U, V **return** $(\{C'_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}})$ **end procedure****procedure** $\mathcal{B}(\mathbb{G}, p, X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4)$ $\tilde{b} \leftarrow \$_[0, 1], j \leftarrow \$_[1, n-t]$ $G \leftarrow X_1, x_0, x_1 \leftarrow \$_{\mathbb{Z}_p}, S_0 \leftarrow x_0 \cdot G, S_1 \leftarrow x_1 \cdot G$ Choose pairwise distinct $\alpha_1 \in \mathbb{Z}_p, \dots, \alpha_n \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ $\forall i \in [n] \quad v_i \leftarrow \prod_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} (\alpha_i - \alpha_j)^{-1}$ Randomly sample degree t polynomials $f, f' \in \mathbb{Z}_p[X]$ with $f(0) = x_0, f'(0) = x_1$, and $f(\alpha_i) = f'(\alpha_i)$ for $i \in [n-t+1, n]$ $pp \leftarrow (\mathbb{G}, G, p, \{(\alpha_i, v_i) : i \in [n]\}); \text{pk}_D \leftarrow X_2$ $E_j \leftarrow X_3$; simulate the proof Ω_j for G, E_j, j ; $\text{pk}_j \leftarrow (E_j, \Omega_j)$ $\forall i \in [n-t] \setminus \{j\} \quad \text{sk}_i \leftarrow \$_{\mathbb{Z}_p}, E_i \leftarrow \text{sk}_i \cdot G, \Omega_i \leftarrow \text{DL}(\text{sk}_i; G, E_i, i); \text{pk}_i \leftarrow (E_i, \Omega_i)$ $(\{\text{pk}_i = (E_i, \Omega_i) : i \in [n-t+1, k]\}) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(pp, \text{pk}_D, \{\text{pk}_i : i \in [n-t]\})$ $\forall i \in [n-t+1, k]$ extract sk_i from Ω_i $\forall i \in [1, j-1] \quad C_i \leftarrow \text{sk}_i \cdot \text{pk}_D + f(\alpha_i) \cdot G$ $\forall i \in [j+1, n-t] \quad C_i \leftarrow \text{sk}_i \cdot \text{pk}_D + f'(\alpha_i) \cdot G$ $\forall i \in [n-t+1, n] \quad C_i \leftarrow \text{sk}_i \cdot \text{pk}_D + f(\alpha_i) \cdot G$ **if** $\tilde{b} = 0$ **then** $C_j \leftarrow X_4 + f(\alpha_j) \cdot G$ **end if** **if** $\tilde{b} = 1$ **then** $C_j \leftarrow X_4 + f'(\alpha_j) \cdot G$ **end if** $f^* \leftarrow H(\text{pk}_D, \{(\text{pk}_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\})$ $V \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n v_i f^*(\alpha_i) \cdot C_i, U \leftarrow \sum_{i=1}^n v_i f^*(\alpha_i) \cdot E_i$ Simulate proof Pf_{Sh} for G, pk_D, U, V $b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}^{\text{DIST}}(S_0, \{C_i : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}})$ **if** $b' = \tilde{b}$ **then return** 1 **else return** 0 **end if****end procedure**

G and pk_D are set to be X_1, X_2 respectively and so are distributed correctly. All E_i for $i \in [n-t]$ are chosen identically to the experiment, except for E_j which is X_3 a random element of \mathbb{G} and so distributed correctly. We can simulate the proof Ω_j due to the zero knowledge property of the proof of discrete logarithms. When computing the encrypted shares, although the secret key sk_D is not known to \mathcal{B} , we can instead use sk_i such that $\text{sk}_i \cdot G = E_i$ for all $i \in [n]$. We have that $\text{sk}_D \cdot E_i = \text{sk}_i \cdot \text{pk}_D$. In the case of corrupted parties, although we do not know these sk_i values, we can extract them from the proofs of knowledge Ω_i . In the case of the j th honest party, although again we do not know sk_j , as a DDH tuple is input, then $X_4 = \text{sk}_D \cdot E_j$ where $\text{sk}_D \cdot G = \text{pk}_D$. The proof Pf_{Sh} can be simulated without knowledge of sk_D , due to the zero knowledge property. The oracle DIST can be simulated without knowledge of sk_D in the same way. The sk_i values that were extracted from the public keys E_i can be used to generate $\{C'_i : i \in [n]\}$. The proof Pf_{Sh} can again be simulated.

For all corrupted parties, it does not matter whether the polynomial f or f' is used to generate their encrypted share, because they have the same outputs on input α_i where $i \in [n-t+1, n]$. When $j = 1$, and $\tilde{b} = 1$, the polynomial f' is used to generate all of the encrypted shares for the honest parties. Therefore, the adversary is input S_0 and a correctly distributed sharing for S_1 and so the view is identically distributed to when $b = 1$. When $j = n-t$ and $\tilde{b} = 0$, the polynomial f is used to generate all of the encrypted shares for the honest parties. The adversary is input S_0 and a correctly distributed sharing for S_0 and so the view to \mathcal{A} is identically distributed to when $b = 0$.

Let $W_{j,d}$ be respectively the event that \mathcal{A} outputs d when j is chosen at the beginning and a DDH tuple is input to \mathcal{B} . Where ϵ is the advantage of \mathcal{A} defined above which is non-negligible, we have that

$$|\Pr[W_{n-t,1}|\tilde{b} = 0] - \Pr[W_{1,1}|\tilde{b} = 1]| = \epsilon.$$

Note that for $j^* = 1, \dots, n-t-1$, the view of the adversary when $j = j^* + 1$ and $\tilde{b} = 1$ and the view of the adversary when $j = j^*$ and $\tilde{b} = 0$ is identically distributed so $\Pr[W_{j^*+1,1}|\tilde{b} = 1] = \Pr[W_{j^*,1}|\tilde{b} = 0]$. Then

$$\begin{aligned} & |\Pr[W_{n-t,1}|\tilde{b} = 0] - \Pr[W_{1,1}|\tilde{b} = 1]| = \\ & \left| \sum_{j=1}^{n-t} \left(\Pr[W_{j,1}|\tilde{b} = 0] - \Pr[W_{j,1}|\tilde{b} = 1] \right) \right|. \end{aligned}$$

When a DDH tuple is input to \mathcal{B} , the probability \mathcal{B} outputs 1 is

$$\begin{aligned} & \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n-t} 1/2 \Pr[W_{j,1}|\tilde{b} = 1] + 1/2(1 - \Pr[W_{j,1}|\tilde{b} = 0])}{n-t} \\ & = 1/2 + \frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n-t} \Pr[W_{j,1}|\tilde{b} = 1] - \Pr[W_{j,1}|\tilde{b} = 0]}{2(n-t)}. \end{aligned}$$

Now consider the probability that \mathcal{B} outputs 1 when a random tuple was input to \mathcal{B} . Because X_4 is now a uniform and independent variable, all inputs to \mathcal{B} are independent of \tilde{b} . Therefore, \mathcal{B} outputs 1 with probability $1/2$.

As $|\frac{\sum_{j=1}^{n-t} \Pr[W_{j,1}|\tilde{b}=1] - \Pr[W_{j,1}|\tilde{b}=0]}{2(n-t)}| = \frac{\epsilon}{2(n-t)}$, which is non-negligible, then \mathcal{B} has a non-negligible advantage in distinguishing DDH tuples.

Lemma 5 (Verifiability). *Our construction DHPVSS for a publicly verifiable secret sharing scheme satisfies verifiability if the hash function H is a random oracle.*

Proof. Verifiability of Key Generation. Our construction clearly satisfies verifiability of key generation because if $\text{VerifyKey}(pp, id, \mathbf{pk} = (E, \Omega)) = 1$ then Ω is a valid proof of knowledge of the discrete logarithm for E . Therefore, \mathbf{sk} such that $E = \mathbf{sk} \cdot G$ can be extracted from Ω .

Verifiability of Distribution. Our construction satisfies verifiability of distribution because if

$$\text{Verify}(pp, \mathbf{pk}_D, \{(\mathbf{pk}_i = (E_i, \Omega_i), C_i) : i \in [n]\}, \text{Pf}_{\text{Sh}}) = 1$$

then Pf_{Sh} is a valid proof for the fact that the discrete logarithm of \mathbf{pk}_D with respect to G , is the same as that of V with respect to U , where

$$V = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot C_i, \quad U = \sum_{i=1}^n v_i m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot E_i$$

and

$$m^* = \mathcal{H}(\mathbf{pk}_D, \{(\mathbf{pk}_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\}), \quad v_i = \prod_{j \in [n] \setminus \{i\}} (\alpha_i - \alpha_j)^{-1} \quad \forall i \in [n].$$

Therefore, \mathbf{sk}_D such that $\mathbf{pk}_D = \mathbf{sk}_D \cdot G$ and $V = \mathbf{sk}_D \cdot U$ can be extracted from Pf_{Sh} . As $V = \mathbf{sk}_D \cdot U$, then

$$\sum_{i=1}^n v_i \cdot m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot (C_i - \mathbf{sk}_D \cdot E_i) = 0.$$

Let Φ denote the event

$$(C_1 - \mathbf{sk}_D \cdot E_1, \dots, C_n - \mathbf{sk}_D \cdot E_n) \neq (f(\alpha_1) \cdot G, \dots, f(\alpha_n) \cdot G)$$

for every polynomial f of degree $\leq t$. Say r queries were made to the random oracle by the adversary. For event Φ to have occurred, some $\mathbf{pk}_D, \{(\mathbf{pk}_i, C_i) : i \in [n]\}$ was submitted to the random oracle and some polynomial m^* of degree $\leq n-t-1$ was returned such that $\sum_{i=1}^n v_i m^*(\alpha_i) \cdot (C_i - \mathbf{sk}_D \cdot E_i) = 0$. As E_1, \dots, E_n are included in the input to the hash function and \mathbf{sk}_D is defined by the input to the hash function, the probability of this is at most r/p , due to Theorem 1. Now assume Φ did not happen. Then there has to be a polynomial f satisfying the conditions above. Then, letting $S = f(\alpha_0) \cdot G$, and $(\{C_i : i \in [n]\}, \cdot) = \text{DHPVSS.Dist}(pp, \mathbf{pk}_D, \mathbf{sk}_D, \{\mathbf{pk}_i : i \in [n]\}, S)$ where the randomness r is the one that makes GShamir.Share select polynomial $m(X) = f(X) - S$ ⁷. Therefore, clearly a correctly formed \mathbf{sk}_D, S and randomness for Dist exist.

Verifiability of Decryption. Our construction clearly satisfies verifiability of decryption because if $\text{VerifyDec}(pp, \mathbf{pk}_D, \mathbf{pk} = (E, \Omega), C, A', \text{Pf}_{\text{Dec}}) = 1$ then Pf_{Dec} is a valid proof of knowledge of discrete logarithm equality for $G, E, \mathbf{pk}_D, C - A'$. Therefore, \mathbf{sk} such that $E = \mathbf{sk} \cdot G$ and $C - A' = \mathbf{sk} \cdot \mathbf{pk}_D$ can be extracted from Pf_{Dec} . Therefore $A' = C - \mathbf{sk} \cdot \mathbf{pk}_D$, and so $\text{DecShare}(pp, \mathbf{pk}_D, \mathbf{pk}, \mathbf{sk}, C) = (A', \cdot)$ for any randomness input to this algorithm.

⁷recall that GShamir.Share constructs the shares as $A_i = S + m(\alpha_i)G$ for m of degree $\leq t$ with $m(\alpha_0) = 0$; the above selection of m satisfies the conditions and yields $A_i = f(\alpha_i)$

E Communication Complexity of PVSS

First note that any $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}$ communicates an element in \mathcal{W} and one in \mathbb{Z}_p .

Communication Complexity of HEPVSS. The communication of the algorithm HEPVSS.Dist consists of n ciphertexts in \mathfrak{C} (the encryptions of the shares) and a proof Pf_{Sh} , which is a $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}$ proof where $\mathcal{W} = \mathbb{G} \times \mathbb{Z}_p[X]_{\leq t} \times \mathfrak{R}^n$. When El Gamal encryption is used as \mathcal{E} , since $\mathfrak{R} = \mathbb{Z}_p$, $\mathfrak{C} = \mathbb{G}^2$ this amounts to a total of $(n + t + 2)$ elements of \mathbb{Z}_p and $2n + 1$ in \mathbb{G} which is roughly ⁸ equivalent to a total of $(3n + t + 3) \log p$ bits.

On the other hand HEPVSS.DecShare communicates a decrypted message in \mathbb{G} and the proof Pf_{Dec} where $\mathcal{W} = \mathcal{SK}$. In the case where we use El Gamal, the latter is 1 element in \mathbb{G} ⁹ and a challenge in \mathbb{Z}_p . Hence the communication is roughly $3 \log p$ bits.

Communication Complexity of DHPVSS. DHPVSS.Dist has smaller ciphertexts (1 group element each) and a smaller proof Pf_{Sh} consisting only of 2 elements in \mathbb{Z}_p . Hence the communication is in total roughly $(n + 2) \log p$ bits, which is $3 \sim 3.5 \times$ less than HEPVSS.Dist (depending on t).

We remark that this is quite close to the minimum possible, at least if one uses an information-theoretical secret sharing scheme, where the public communication is made through encryption of the shares, as we do. Indeed, well known bounds imply that, in this case, the total joint size of the shares must be n times the secret, therefore $n \log p$ bits in our situation.

The communication of DHPVSS.DecShare is as in HEPVSS.DecShare, hence it communicates $3 \log p$ bits.

Comparison with SCRAPE and ALBATROSS. In SCRAPE and ALBATROSS, the encrypted shares of a secret $S = m(\alpha_0)G$ are given by $C_i = m(\alpha_i)\text{pk}_i$ (where again $\text{pk}_i = \text{sk}_i G$). SCRAPE requires the dealer to commit to $m(\alpha_i)$ in a common base H by publishing $M_i = m(\alpha_i)H$ (n additional group elements), so that the SCRAPE trick can be used on the M_i 's. Moreover the dealer needs to post non-interactive DLEQ($m(\alpha_i), \text{pk}_i, C_i, H, M_i$) for all i , which amounts to $n + 1$ new \mathbb{Z}_p -elements. In total this means $(3n + 1) \log p$ bits for the whole distribution. Instead ALBATROSS uses a standard homomorphic preimage proof of knowledge of the $m(X)$ underlying C_i . That is the dealer posts $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}(m(X), \{C_i\}_{i=1,n}, f)$ with $f(m(X)) = m(\alpha_i) \cdot \text{pk}_i$. This requires $t + 2$ \mathbb{Z}_p -elements, and so the communication complexity of the distribution phase is of $(n + t + 2) \log p$ bits. Therefore, our DHPVSS scheme is the most communication efficient of all these alternatives.

Communication Complexity of Resharing. Resharing a secret among a committee of n_{r+1} parties requires, per party that is resharing their share, $(3n_{r+1} + t_{r+1} + 3) \log p$ bits, i.e. the same communication as to execute HEPVSS.Dist among the same set of parties. This means that we need a total communication of $(t_r + 1)(3n_{r+1} + t_{r+1} + 3) \log p$ bits in order for \mathcal{C}_r to reshare a secret to \mathcal{C}_{r+1} .

The same happens with DHPVSS: the communication complexity per party who is resharing is $(n_{r+1} + 2) \log p$ bits, which is the same as for distributing a share in the first place. This means \mathcal{C}_r needs to communicate in total $t_r(n_{r+1} + 2) \log p$ bits to reshare a secret to \mathcal{C}_{r+1} .

⁸In practice, describing an element of an elliptic-curve group of order p requires slightly more information

⁹While it is true that, in order to force linearity of decryption, we have artificially set $\text{sk}^* = (1, \text{sk})$, and hence the keys are technically in \mathbb{G}^2 , it is very easy to see that one only needs to send information related to the second coordinate.

F Zero Knowledge Proofs of Membership to an Anonymous Committee

When encryption towards a committee \mathcal{R} is used as part of a protocol, identities ID_i such that $\psi(i) \in \mathcal{R}$ will typically need to act upon having received an encrypted message. This will reveal the fact that they are a receiver.

In this section we present strategies that allow ID_i to prove that it belongs to the receiver set, $\psi(i) \in \mathcal{R}$, without revealing anything else about $\psi(i)$.

At first, it could appear that having ID_i prove knowledge of a message received by \mathcal{R} is enough, but note this is not the case when there are collusions between corrupted parties in \mathcal{R} and others outside. In general, we want to avoid that a set of t colluding parties of which only $t' < t$ belong to \mathcal{R} can claim that $t' + 1$ or more of them are in \mathcal{R} .

We present two solutions for the problem above. The first solution (Section J.1) is generic but less efficient: each party in \mathcal{R} signs a message using a linkable ring signature [22]. Ring signatures [25] guarantee that the signer belongs to a given set of parties without revealing their identity within that set. Linkability ensures that, despite this anonymity, two signatures using the same key can be linked. This means colluding parties cannot use the same secret key to claim that both belong to \mathcal{R} , when only one of them does.

However, linkable rings signatures become larger as the size of the committee grows. In Section J.2, we present an optimized solution where we leverage the fact that, in our situation, there is already a sender broadcasting ciphertexts, and we can use this party to send auxiliary information that allows to reduce the amount of communication by each receiver to be constant-size (while the information sent by the sender is still linear in the size of the receiver committee). Our solution is based on a linkable version of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures.

F.1 Generic Proofs of Membership based on Linkable Ring Signatures

Ring signatures, also called sometimes Spontaneous Anonymous Group signatures, are signature schemes in which each member of a universe of parties has a secret key, and can use that key to sign a message on behalf of any subset of that universe to which it belongs, in such a way that the signature does not reveal which of the parties in that subset has signed.

Ring signatures can be constructed as non-interactive zero knowledge proofs of knowledge of a secret key corresponding to a set of public keys (which is in turn an OR statement), via a Fiat-Shamir transformation where the message is included as an argument to the random oracle. In fact it is this proof of knowledge what we really need in our problem, but we present the solution in terms of ring signatures because the notion of linkability is commonly used in this context. A linkable ring signature is one that guarantees that if two signatures (even of different messages) for the same set of users are produced using the same secret key, this fact is detected, even though the identity of the signer is kept anonymous.

Definition 20 (Linkable Ring Signature). *A Linkable Ring Signature scheme for a set $[n]$ is given by the following tuple of algorithms:*

- $\text{KeyGen}(n, 1^\lambda)$: *Outputs n key pairs $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)_{i \in [n]}$.*
- $\text{LinkSig}(\text{sk}_i, m, \mathcal{R})$: *Takes a secret key, a message m , and a set $\mathcal{R} \subseteq [n]$, outputs a signature σ .*
- $\text{LinkVer}(\{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{R}}, m, \sigma, \mathcal{R})$: *Takes a set $\mathcal{R} \subseteq [n]$, a set of associated public keys pk_i , $i \in \mathcal{R}$, a message m and a signature σ and outputs **accept** or **reject**.*

- $\text{Link}((m, \sigma, \mathcal{R}), (m', \sigma', \mathcal{R}'))$: Takes two tuples consisting of a message, a signature and a subset of $[n]$ and outputs a bit b (meant to represent whether these two signatures have been created with the same secret key).

In addition, these algorithm must satisfy the following properties: for all messages m, m_0, m_1 , all sets $\mathcal{R}, \mathcal{R}_0, \mathcal{R}_1 \subseteq [n]$, all $(\text{pk}_i, \text{sk}_i)_{i \in [n]}$ output by $\text{KeyGen}(n, 1^\lambda)$ and any $\text{sk}, \text{sk}^{(0)}, \text{sk}^{(1)} \in (\text{sk}_i)_{i \in [n]}$

$$\Pr[\text{LinkVer}(\{\text{pk}_i\}_{i \in \mathcal{R}}, m, \sigma, \mathcal{R}) = \text{accept} \mid \sigma = \text{LinkSig}(\text{sk}_i, m, \mathcal{R}) \wedge i \in \mathcal{R}] = 1$$

$$\Pr[\text{Link}((m_0, \sigma_0, \mathcal{R}_0), (m_1, \sigma_1, \mathcal{R}_1)) = 1 \mid \sigma_b = \text{LinkSig}(\text{sk}, m_b, \mathcal{R}_b), b \in \{0, 1\}] = 1$$

$$\Pr[\text{Link}((m_0, \sigma_0, \mathcal{R}_0), (m_1, \sigma_1, \mathcal{R}_1)) = 1 \mid \sigma_b = \text{LinkSig}(\text{sk}^{(b)}, m_b, \mathcal{R}_b), b \in \{0, 1\} \\ \wedge \text{sk}^{(0)} \neq \text{sk}^{(1)}] = 0$$

The first equation ensures that a signature σ of a message m is always accepted by a verifier that takes as additional input a set \mathcal{R} and the public keys corresponding to that set, if the signature has been created with a secret key belonging to \mathcal{R} . The second and third equations guarantee that two signatures of two possibly different messages (and with respect to possibly different sets) will be linked if and only if they have been created with the same key.

Typically several security properties are required from linkable ring signatures, which we describe informally. These are based on the model in [1].

- **Linkability** This requirement ensures that signatures from the same secret key will always be linked. In the security game, the adversary must output k public keys for corrupted parties, and $k + 1$ valid signatures, each on a message and a ring. They win if all rings are subsets of the set of the k corrupted public keys, and none of the signatures are linked. The requirement is that the adversary wins with negligible probability
- **Linkable Anonymity** While linkable ring signatures are publicly linkable, a signature still should not be able to be traced to the signer’s public key. In the game, the adversary is given access to an oracle to create honest users and receive their public keys. The adversary returns two honest users (their challenged users), as well as a set of the adversary’s own corrupted public keys. They are then given access to an oracle, where they can submit a challenged user, a message and a ring that must contain the public keys of both challenged users. The challenger returns a signature signed with the secret key of one of the users and the adversary must guess the signer correctly to win. The adversary must have negligible advantage in guessing correctly.
- **Non-Frameability** This requirement ensures that an adversary cannot frame an honest user by forging a signature which links to this user’s signature. In the game we give the adversary access to oracles to create honest users, obtain their signatures and corrupt them. The adversary must output a valid signature that was not output by the signing oracle. They then must output another valid signature that was output by the signing oracle for an honest user that has not been corrupted. For the adversary to win, the two signatures must be valid and linked. This should happen with negligible probability.

Note that linkability implies the usual existential unforgeability security property, in the sense that, if the adversary knows no secret key $\text{sk}_j, j \in \mathcal{R}$ (i.e. $|\mathcal{C} \cap \mathcal{R}| = 0$) then the adversary cannot create a valid signature for \mathcal{R} .

Linkable ring signatures almost automatically gives a solution to our problem. Each party includes a public key $\text{pk}_{\text{LinkSig}, i}$ for a linkable signature in the public key to be shuffled. To prove

membership to \mathcal{R} , ID_i signs a message with $\text{pk}_{\text{LinkSig},i}$ and publishes the message and signature. This signature can be verified by any public verifier. The security properties of the linkable signature guarantee both that the proof only reveals membership to \mathcal{R} but nothing else, and that if two identities use the same secret key to claim membership to \mathcal{R} , this is detected by any public verifier.

One (easily fixable) caveat is that the properties above do not prevent replay attacks, where an adversary attempts to copy an honest party's signature and claim it as theirs, or at least invalidate the honest party's signature. We fix this by including the public identity of the signer as a part of the message signed. We describe the construction in Figure 12.




Fig. 12. Proof of membership to an anonymous committee

We require that if a set I of users have all generated proofs of membership to an anonymous committee honestly, then verification will pass. This is clearly true, due to the correctness of linkable ring signatures. We require three security requirements for our proof of membership to an anonymous committee:

- **Unforgeability** This requirement ensures that proofs of membership from the same party in an anonymous committee can be linked. In the game, the adversary has corrupted t parties in a anonymous committee \mathcal{R} of size R . They can see proofs of membership from honest parties and must output $t + 1$ proofs of memberships on the corrupted identities, i.e. for ID_i such that i has been corrupted. They win if these proofs of memberships pass verification.

Clearly this is true for our construction in Figure 12, due to the linkability requirement for linkable ring signatures. We now provide a proof sketch. We show that given an adversary that can win in the unforgeability game for proofs of membership to an anonymous committee, we can win in the linkability game for linkable ring signatures. The adversary in our unforgeability game provides us with t public keys corresponding to corrupted users and we generate ourselves $R - t$ secret/ public keypairs corresponding to honest users. We can then honestly generate $R - t$ proofs of membership on behalf of honest users to provide to the adversary. They return

$t + 1$ proofs of membership on behalf of corrupted users. In the linkability game we output all R public keys of all honest and corrupted members of the anonymous committee, and all $R + 1$ proofs of memberships on behalf of corrupted and honest members of the anonymous committee. As all proofs of membership pass verification, we have output $R + 1$ valid ring signatures that are all unlinked. Therefore, we have broken the linkability of linkable ring signatures.

- **Anonymity** Although a proof of membership of an anonymous committee reveals that the prover is a member of \mathcal{R} , we need to ensure that it does not reveal which member of \mathcal{R} . In the game, the adversary chooses two honest users in \mathcal{R} and has corrupted all other users. They then receive a proof of membership on behalf of one of the honest users, and must guess which user correctly to win.

Clearly this is true for our construction in Figure 12, due to the linkable anonymity requirement for linkable ring signatures. We now provide a proof sketch. We show that given an adversary that can win in the anonymity game for proofs of membership to an anonymous committee, we can win in the linkable anonymity game for linkable ring signatures. We first of all create two honest users in the linkable anonymity game. We can set the public keys of the two honest users, chosen by the adversary in the anonymity game for proofs of membership, to be these two public keys. We then submit to the challenge oracle one of these honest users, along with a ring containing all public keys in the anonymous committee and a message set to be $H(ID, ssid)$. We return the resulting ring signature as our proof of membership in the anonymity game, and finally return the resulting bit b output by the adversary. If the adversary wins in the anonymity game, we clearly win in the linkable anonymity game, which is a contradiction.

- **Non-Frameability** This requirement ensures that an adversary cannot frame an honest user by forging a proof of membership which links to this user’s proof of membership, therefore implying unfairly that they cheated. In the game, we give the adversary access to the public keys of honest users, and oracles to obtain their proofs of membership. The adversary must output a proof of membership that was not output by the oracle. They then must output another proof of membership that was output by the signing oracle for an honest user. For the adversary to win, the two signatures must not pass verification together, but should pass verification individually.

Clearly this is true for our construction in Figure 12, due to the non-frameability requirement for linkable ring signatures. We now provide a proof sketch. We show that given an adversary that can win in the non-frameability game for proofs of membership to an anonymous committee, we can win in the non-frameability game for linkable ring signatures. We will provide the adversary in the non-frameability game for proofs of membership with the public keys of honest users, using the corresponding oracle in the non-frameability game for linkable ring signatures. When the adversary in the non-frameability game for proofs of membership attempts to obtain the proofs of memberships for honest users, we will use the signing oracle in the non-frameability game for linkable ring signatures. The adversary in the non-frameability game for proofs of membership will output two proofs of membership that individually pass verification, but fail together: one output from the signing oracle for an honest user and one that was not output by the signing oracle. We can then output these two proofs of membership in the linkable ring signature game. They will both be valid and linked signatures, so we will win in the non-frameability game for linkable ring signatures.

F.2 Efficient Instantiation using Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures

In this section, we propose a solution where the size of a membership proof is constant (independent from the size of \mathcal{R}). For this we leverage the fact that the sender can send auxiliary information together with the ciphertexts. Our strategy is based on a “linkable version” of a signature scheme by Camenisch-Lysyanskaya.

We focus on one version of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures which has been used for anonymous credentials and where we want to construct a signature of a group element $sG \in \mathbb{G}$. A crucial feature of this proof is that it can be divided in two parts: the first part uses the signing key and does not require knowledge of s and outputs σ ; meanwhile, the second part is a proof of knowledge of s and does not require to know the secret signing key.

This means that the two parts of the proof can be carried out by two different parties. Moreover the signature has a second important property: if the owner of the signature key has carried out the first part of the signing for different s_iG , with outputs σ_i , then the second part of the signature (the proof of knowledge) does not reveal which σ_i is being completed.

Our strategy is then the following. The sender carries out the first part of the CL signature of each of the public keys of the parties in \mathcal{R} , thereby creating messages σ_i . Now, because of what we mentioned above, any receiver can prove the knowledge of the discrete logarithm of one of these secret keys, without revealing which.

As before, this has the problem that, if a party ID_i in \mathcal{R} is colluding with other parties outside the set, then they could all use the secret key known by ID_i and claim to be in \mathcal{R} . In order to prevent that we turn the signature into a linkable one by including another generator H in the common reference string, and having each receiver publish $I_j = \text{sk}_{\text{Anon},j}H$. We extend the proof of knowledge of $\text{sk}_{\text{Anon},j}$ into one that ensures $\text{sk}_{\text{Anon},j}$ is the same as the discrete log of I_j in base H . Since I_j is deterministically computed from H and $\text{sk}_{\text{Anon},j}$, a verifier can easily check if two parties have claimed the same key.

Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signatures The precise signature we will use is the one called Signature A in [6], but with the difference that while that paper assumed a type I bilinear pairing (which would not allow for using the DDH assumption), we will replace it by a Type III bilinear pairing as has been done in other works such as [5,15].

We recall this signature scheme: Let $\mathbb{G}_1, \mathbb{G}_2$ (with additive notation) and \mathbb{G}_T (with multiplicative notation) be groups of prime order p . Let \mathbb{G}_1 be generated by G_1 and \mathbb{G}_2 be generated by G_2 . The signing secret key is of the form $\text{sk}_{\text{CL}} = (x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2$ and the public key $\text{pk}_{\text{CL}} = (X, Y) = (xG_2, yG_2)$ in \mathbb{G}_2^2 .

The signature scheme can be used to either sign messages $m \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ or $M = mG_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1$. We are interested in the latter case. As mentioned above, this case can be separated in two algorithms, where CL.Sig^1 uses M and sk_{CL} but does not require knowledge of m , and CL.Sig^2 is applied to the output of CL.Sig^1 and requires knowledge of m , but not of the secret key. These protocols are defined in Figure 13.

A crucial point is that the verification step depends only on the output of CL.Sig^2 . Moreover, given $(M_1, \sigma_1^1), \dots, (M_n, \sigma_n^1)$ where $M_i = m_iG_1$ and $\sigma_i^1 = \text{CL.Sig}^1_{(x,y)}(M_i)$, the signature $\text{CL.Sig}^2(m_i, \sigma_i^1)$ gives no information about i

This means that, once CL.Sig^1 has been carried out on the messages M_i , the second step of the signature can be seen as a ring signature scheme of sorts: if we interpret (m_i, M_i) as a secret key/public key pair belonging to the i -th party in a given set of parties, as it will be our case, then




Fig. 13. Camensich-Lysyanskaya signature

by executing CL.Sig^2 on the output of $\text{CL.Sig}^1_{(x,y)}(M_i)$ the i -th party is creating a signature (for an “empty” message) that guarantees this party belongs to the set, without revealing their identity.

Adding linkability To ensure linkability in the scenario we just described, namely that any verifier can detect when CL.Sig^2 has been applied twice on the same input, we do the following:

First, as part of the setup we fix H , a generator of group \mathbb{G}_1 , as part of the set up. Then $\text{CL.LinkSig}^2(m, \sigma^1)$ works as follows:

Algorithm 36 $\text{CL.LinkSig}^2(m, \sigma^1)$

$I \leftarrow mH$
Compute $(\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}, \tilde{C}, \pi')$ as in $\text{CL.Sig}^2(m, \sigma^1)$ except now
 $\pi' \leftarrow \Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}(\rho, m; pp_\pi, (z_A, I), f'_{(z_B, z_C, H)})$,
where $f'_{(z_B, z_C, H)}(\rho, m) := (z_B^{-m} z_C^\rho, mH)$.
and $pp_\pi = (\mathbb{Z}_p, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}', \mathcal{H})$ where $\mathcal{X}' = \mathbb{G}_T \times \mathbb{G}_1$
return $\sigma^2 \leftarrow (\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}, \tilde{C}, I, \pi')$

Now I depends deterministically on m and public information, and therefore a verifier can detect if the same m is used twice, as it will yield the same I .

Final instantiation Our final instantiation, described formally in Figure 14 is as follows: The sender will encrypt the message with the El Gamal encryption scheme under the anonymous public keys in \mathcal{R} and include a proof of correctness of encryption. Moreover, the sender will compute $\sigma_j^1 = \text{CL.Sig}_{\text{sk}_{\text{CL}}}^1(\text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j})$ for $j \in \mathcal{R}$, where sk_{CL} is the secret key for the sender. Finally, we observe that in the description of CL signatures above there is no guarantee that σ_j^1 has been computed correctly until Ver^2 is executed, so we need the sender to additionally prove that σ_j^1 is indeed computed correctly from $\text{CL.Sig}^1(\text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j})$. To claim membership to \mathcal{R} , and therefore ownership of some $\text{sk}_{\text{Anon},j}$, a party can then compute $\sigma^2 = \text{CL.Sig}^2(\text{sk}_{\text{Anon},j}, \sigma_j^1)$. As in the generic construction, to avoid replay attacks we add the public identity of the prover in the argument of the Fiat-Shamir random oracle for the proof of knowledge π .

The correctness of the EncAMC scheme is satisfied, due to the correctness of the Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures. Clearly the proofs π_{EC} and π_{CLSC} guarantee that the sender has behaved honestly. We again require three security requirements for our proof of membership to an anonymous committee as defined previously:

– **Unforgeability**

Clearly this is true for our construction in Figure 14, due to the LRSW assumption [23], which ensures the security of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signatures. We now provide a proof sketch. For an adversary to have output $k + 1$ proofs of memberships that pass verification and that were not honestly generated, after having corrupted t of the public keys, they must have returned $t + 1$ signatures that are valid according to Ver^2 , containing elements I_1, \dots, I_{t+1} with for all $(i, j) \in [t + 1]$ $I_i \neq I_j$. Say $\exists i \in [t + 1]$ such that $I_i = \text{sk}H$, where sk is the secret key of an honest user. Then we can build an adversary that can break the discrete logarithm, by extracting sk due to the proof of knowledge property. Say $\exists i \in [k + 1]$ such that $I_i = \text{sk}H$, where sk is not the secret key of any user (corrupt or honest). Then we can build an adversary that can break the unforgeability of CL signatures, because the adversary has forged a signature on a new message $\text{sk}G$. Now it is not possible for all I_1, \dots, I_{t+1} to be distinct, as there are only t corrupted users, and so we have a contradiction.

– **Anonymity**

Clearly this is true for our construction in Figure 14, due to the DDH assumption. We now provide a proof sketch. We show that given an adversary that can win in the anonymity game for proofs of membership to an anonymous committee, we can distinguish DDH tuples. We are input $X_1, X_2, X_3, X_4 \in \mathbb{G}_1^4$. In setup we set $G = X_1$, $H = X_2$. We choose bit $b \leftarrow_{\$} \{0, 1\}$ and set the public key of the b th honest user to be X_3 . We then generate a proof of membership as follows. We set $I = X_4$, and choose $\tilde{A}, \tilde{B}, \tilde{C}$ as normal based on the signature $\sigma^1 = (A, B, C)$

Encryption to a committee with anonymous membership claim

Setup: Groups $(\mathbb{G}_1, +), (\mathbb{G}_2, +), (\mathbb{G}_T, \cdot)$ of order p . Generators G_1, H for \mathbb{G}_1 , generator G_2 for \mathbb{G}_2 , bilinear pairing $e : \mathbb{G}_1 \times \mathbb{G}_2 \rightarrow \mathbb{G}_T$.

Parties and keys: A sender has a CL keypair $(\text{sk}_{\text{CL}} = (x, y) \in \mathbb{Z}_p^2, \text{pk}_{\text{CL}} = (X, Y))$ where $X = xG_2, Y = yG_2$. In addition, there is a set \mathcal{P} of potential receivers. In the setup phase, every party chooses a keypair (sk, pk) where $\text{sk} \in \mathbb{Z}_p, \text{pk} = \text{sk}G_1 \in \mathbb{G}_1$ and then inputs it to a mix-net, resulting in a public list $\{(j, \text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j}) : j \in [n]\}$.

Algorithm 37 $\text{EncAMC.Enc}(M, \text{sk}_{\text{CL}}; \mathcal{R}, (\text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j})_{j \in \mathcal{R}})$ where $M \in \mathbb{G}_1, \mathcal{R} \subseteq [n]$

```

 $\forall j \in \mathcal{R}, r_j \leftarrow \$_{\mathbb{Z}_p}$ 
 $\forall j \in \mathcal{R}, c_j \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{Enc}_{\text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j}}(M; r_j)$ 
 $\pi_{\text{EC}} \leftarrow \mathcal{E}.\text{ProveEnc}(M, (r_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}; (c_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}),$ 
 $\forall j \in \mathcal{R}, \sigma_j^1 \leftarrow \text{CL}.\text{Sig}_{\text{sk}_{\text{CL}}}^1(\text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j})$  with randomness  $a_j \in \mathbb{Z}_p$ 
 $\pi_{\text{CLSC}} \leftarrow \text{CLSC}.\text{Prove}(x, y, (a_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}; X, Y, (\text{pk}_{\text{Anon},j})_{j \in \mathcal{R}}, (\sigma_j^1)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}),$ 
  as in Figure 15 below (this proves that  $\sigma_j^1$  are correct CLSC signatures)
return  $((c_j, \sigma_j^1)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}, \pi_{\text{EC}}, \pi_{\text{CLSC}})$ 

```

Algorithm 38 $\text{EncAMC.Ver}((c_j, \sigma_j^1)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}, \pi_{\text{EC}}, \pi_{\text{CLSC}})$

```

return accept iff
  both  $\mathcal{E}.\text{VerifyEnc}((c_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}, \pi_{\text{EC}})$  and  $\text{CLSC}.\text{Verify}((\sigma_j^1)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}, \pi_{\text{CLSC}})$  accept.

```

Algorithm 39 $\text{EncAMC.Claim}(\text{sk}_{\text{Anon},j}; (\sigma_j^1)_{j \in \mathcal{R}})$

```

return  $\sigma^2 \leftarrow \text{CL}.\text{LinkSig}^2(\text{sk}_{\text{Anon},j}, \sigma_j^1)$ 

```

Algorithm 40 $\text{EncAMC.ClaimVer}(\{(\sigma_i^2)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}\}, \text{pk}_{\text{CL}})$

```

Receive as input a set  $(\sigma_i^2)_{i \in \mathcal{I}}$  of verification claims
For all  $i \in \mathcal{I}$ , parse  $\sigma_i^2 = (\tilde{A}_i, \tilde{B}_i, \tilde{C}_i, I_i, \pi_i')$ .
for each  $I \in \mathbb{G}_T$  such that there are more than one  $i \in \mathcal{I}$  with  $I_i = I$  do
  Let  $\mathcal{I}_I$  the set of such  $i$ .
  if there is exactly one  $i$  in  $\mathcal{I}_I$  such that  $\text{Ver}^2(\text{pk}_{\text{CL}}, \sigma_i^2)$  accepts then
    Accept this claim and reject all other claims from parties in  $\mathcal{I}_I$ 
  else
    Reject all membership claims from parties in  $\mathcal{I}_I$ 
  end if
end for
for each  $I$  such that there is one  $i \in \mathcal{I}$  with  $I_i = I$  do
  Accept the claim if and only if  $\text{Ver}^2(\text{pk}_{\text{CL}}, \sigma_i^2)$  accepts
end for

```

Fig. 14. Encryption to an anonymous committee via CL signatures

of the b th honest user. We then simulate the attached proof, which is possible to the zero knowledge property. If the adversary guesses correctly, we output 1, and otherwise we output 0. If a DDH tuple is input, then the inputs to the adversary in the proof of membership game are distributed correctly and we output 1 with the same probability that the adversary is successful.

Proof of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya Signature Correctness CLSC

Proof for relation

$$R_{\text{CLSC}} = \{((x, y, (a_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}); (X, Y, (\text{pk}_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}, (\sigma_j^1)_{j \in \mathcal{R}})) : \\ \sigma_j^1 = (a_j \cdot G_1, a_j \cdot y \cdot G_1, a_j \cdot x \cdot G_1 + a_j \cdot x \cdot y \cdot \text{pk}_{\text{Anon}, j}), \\ X = x \cdot G_1, \\ Y = y \cdot G_1\}$$

Algorithm 41 $\text{CLSC.Prove}(x, y, (a_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}; X, Y, (\text{pk}_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}, (\sigma_j^1)_{j \in \mathcal{R}})$

Let $\mathcal{H} : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_p$ random oracle.

for j in \mathcal{R} **do**

parse $\sigma_j^1 \leftarrow (\sigma_{j1}^1, \sigma_{j2}^1, \sigma_{j3}^1)$.

$b_j \leftarrow a_j y, c_j \leftarrow a_j x, d_j \leftarrow a_j xy$.

▷ Introducing these new variables
“linearizes” the problem

end for

$\mathcal{W} \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_p^{4|\mathcal{R}|}, \mathcal{X} \leftarrow \mathbb{G}_1^{6|\mathcal{R}|}, pp \leftarrow (\mathbb{Z}_p, \mathcal{W}, \mathcal{X}, \mathcal{H})$

return $\pi_{\text{CLSC}} \leftarrow \Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}.\text{Prove}(w; pp, x, f)$ where

$w = (a_j, b_j, c_j, d_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}$

$x = (\sigma_{j1}^1, \sigma_{j2}^1, \sigma_{j3}^1, O, O, O)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}$

$f(w) := (a_j G_1, b_j G_1, c_j G_1 + d_j \text{pk}_j, a_j Y_D - b_j G_1, a_j X - c_j G_1, c_j Y - d_j G_1)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}$

(Note that, for each $j \in \mathcal{R}$, the first 3 conditions in f check the target statement using the introduced variables, while the three last ensure these variables are correctly defined)

Algorithm 42 $\text{CLSC.Verify}(X, Y, (\text{pk}_j)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}, (\sigma_j^1)_{j \in \mathcal{R}}, \pi_{\text{CLSC}})$

return $\Pi_{\text{NI-Pre}}.\text{Verify}(x, f, \pi_{\text{CLSC}})$ where x, f are defined from the σ_j^1 as above.

Fig. 15. Proof of Camenisch-Lysyanskaya signature correctness

If a DDH tuple is not input, then the inputs to the adversary are independent of b , and we output 1 with probability $1/2$.

– **Non-Frameability**

Clearly this is true for our construction in Figure 14, due to the non-frameability requirement for linkable ring signatures. We now provide a proof sketch. We show that given an adversary that can win in the non-frameability game for proofs of membership to an anonymous committee, we can break the discrete logarithm assumption. We are input $X_1, X_2 \in \mathbb{G}_1^2$. In setup we set $G = X_1, H = aG$, where $a \leftarrow_s \mathbb{Z}_p$. When the adversary in the non-frameability game for proofs of membership attempts to create an honest user, we will behave normally, except for one honest user i^* where we will set $\text{pk} = X_2$. When the adversary queries the oracle for proofs of memberships for this user i^* , we will set $I = a\text{pk}$, which is distributed correctly, generate \tilde{A}, \tilde{B} and \tilde{C} as normal for $\sigma^1 = (A, B, C)$ and simulate the proof, which is possible due to the zero knowledge property. The adversary in the non-frameability game for proofs of membership will output two proofs of membership that individually pass verification, but fail together: one generated honestly by the oracle and one that was not output by the oracle. Assume that the proof of membership output from the oracle, was that of the honest user i^* , which occurs with probability $1/k$, where k is the number of honest users. Then for both signatures output $I = aX_2$. We can then extract the discrete logarithm of I base H from the attached proof, due to the proof of knowledge property, which will provide the discrete logarithm of X_2 base X_1 .