G+G: A Fiat-Shamir Lattice Signature Based on Convolved Gaussians

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Abstract. We describe an adaptation of Schnorr's signature to the lattice setting, which relies on Gaussian convolution rather than flooding or rejection sampling as previous approaches. It does not involve any abort, can be proved secure in the ROM and QROM using existing analyses of the Fiat-Shamir transform, and enjoys smaller signature sizes (both asymptotically and for concrete security levels).

1 Introduction

Schnorr's identification protocol [Sch91] allows secure authentication between a prover and a verifier based on the hardness on the discrete logarithm problem in a cyclic group of order p, generated by an element g. The prover's public verification key is simply a group element g^s , whose discrete logarithm s forms the prover's signing key. The identification protocol proceeds as follows: the prover first commits to some uniform $y \leftrightarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_p)$ by sending g^y to a verifier. The latter returns some challenge $c \in \mathbb{Z}_p$, to which the prover replies with a response z, namely $z = y + cs \mod p$. Here, no information about s is revealed as z is still uniform modulo p. However, a verifier is convinced that the prover knows s as it can verify $g^z = g^y (g^s)^c$. This can be compiled into a signature scheme by using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic [FS86].

Adapting this protocol to the lattice setting has proved challenging. At a high-level, the approach adopted in [Lyu09,Lyu12] and subsequent works proceeds as follows. The discrete logarithms s is replaced with a short, tall matrix **S** in $\mathbb{Z}^{k \times m}$, whereas y and z are replaced with elements \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{z} of \mathbb{Z}^k and the generator g is replaced with a uniform matrix $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times k}$. The challenge vector \mathbf{c} belongs to a finite subset of \mathbb{Z}^m , typically designed to have the shortest possible vectors under the constraint that the challenge has sufficiently high min-entropy to prevent guessing. For security, one needs \mathbf{z} and hence \mathbf{y} to be short. Leaving things as they are described so far would make signatures leak the secret matrix \mathbf{S} , as \mathbf{z} is centered around $\mathbb{E}[\mathbf{y}] + \mathbf{Sc}$ (see [ASY22] for a detailed key recovery). A solution could be to take a large enough standard deviation to

"flood" this center (this is considered for example in [DPSZ12, Appendix A.1] in the context of zero-knowledge proofs), but this results in very large signatures as the modulus then needs to grow exponentially with the security parameter λ (see the discussion in [ASY22]). The most efficient approach so far, introduced by Lyubashevsky [Lyu09,Lyu12] and notably leading to Dilithium [DKL⁺18], relies on rejection sampling to erase the center from **z**. This comes at the cost of restarting the protocol multiple times before finally outputting an appropriately distributed response **z**. This strategy still allows the identification protocol to be compiled into a signature, using a variant of the Fiat-Shamir heuristic called Fiat-Shamir with Aborts. To obtain shorter signatures, Ducas *et al.* [DDLL13] suggested to reject a bimodal Gaussian distribution against a Gaussian distribution. This was later argued in [DFPS22] to be essentially optimal among pairs of source and target distributions. Finally, we note that Fiat-Shamir with Aborts turns out to be complex to analyze, and flaws in many analyses have been recently discovered [DFPS23,BBD⁺23].

Removing rejection sampling while keeping similar signature sizes has been a long-standing open problem. Steps in this direction were made in [BCM21] for instance. The authors noticed that in the setting where \mathbf{y} is sampled uniformly in a hypercube and one uses signature truncation [BG14], one rejection condition out of two is superfluous. They however argue that removing the second one is difficult.

Contribution. We introduce a new paradigm for adapting Schnorr's identification protocol to the lattice setting. It relies on Gaussian convolution, rather than flooding or rejection sampling. Our G + G (Gaussian Plus Gaussian) identification protocol can be compiled into a signature using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic (without aborts), in the Quantum Random Oracle Model (QROM). The resulting signature is asymptotically more compact than those based on rejection sampling and its analysis relies on the well-understood properties of the standard Fiat-Shamir transform. Finally, we provide concrete parameters which show that G + G is competitive with the state-of-the-art optimizations of Lyubashevsky's signature.

Technical Overview. G + G involves two Gaussians that are being summed. The first one is **y** and the second one corresponds to **Sc**. The first difficulty that we face is that **S** is fixed and **c** is publicly known as part of the resulting signature and hence cannot be assumed random for the sake of studying the distribution of **z**.

To introduce the required new randomness, we start from BLISS [DDLL13]. The verification key $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_{2q}^{m \times k}$ and the signing key $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k \times m}$ satisfy the relation $\mathbf{AS} = q\mathbf{I}_m \mod 2q$. Among the variants of Lyubashesvky's signature, it is a specificity of BLISS to work modulo 2q, which is particularly useful in our case. The commitment of the prover is $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{Ay} \mod 2q$, and upon receiving $\mathbf{c} \in \{0, 1\}^m$, the prover replies with either $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{Sc}$ or $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y} - \mathbf{Sc}$ with probability 1/2 each. The verifier checks that \mathbf{z} is short and $\mathbf{Az} = \mathbf{w} + q\mathbf{c} \mod 2q$. This check works for both values of \mathbf{z} that the prover chose from. This can be explained by observing that the verification views $\mathbf{c} \mod 2$, i.e., as a coset

of $\mathbb{Z}^m/2\mathbb{Z}^m$, and negating it does not change the coset. This observation was used in [Duc14] to take negations of individual coordinates of **c** to minimize the Euclidean norm of **Sc** and hence decrease the standard deviation of **y** necessary to hide **Sc** via rejection sampling. We go further and let the prover extend the coset **c** sent by the verifier to a Gaussian sample with support $2\mathbb{Z}^m + \mathbf{c}$ and center **0**. The verification equation above still holds, and we now have our second Gaussian.

At this stage, the prover samples a Gaussian \mathbf{y} over \mathbb{Z}^k , receives a uniform coset $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}^m/2\mathbb{Z}^m$ from the verifier, produces a Gaussian sample \mathbf{x} with support $2\mathbb{Z}^m + \mathbf{c}$ and computes $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{S}\mathbf{x}$. Equivalently, it samples \mathbf{k} Gaussian with support $2\mathbf{S}\mathbb{Z}^m$ and center $-\mathbf{S}\mathbf{c}$, which will be used to cancel the center $\mathbf{S}\mathbf{c}$, and returns $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{k} + \mathbf{S}\mathbf{c}$. In order to obtain the zero-knowledge property (i.e., be able to simulate signatures without knowing the signing key), we aim to prove that the distribution of the Gaussian convolution \mathbf{z} can be sampled from publicly. If \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{k} were continuous Gaussians, we would set their covariance matrices $\Sigma_{\mathbf{y}}$ and $\Sigma_{\mathbf{k}}$ such that $\Sigma_{\mathbf{y}} + \Sigma_{\mathbf{k}} = \Sigma_{\mathbf{z}}$ for a known covariance matrix $\Sigma_{\mathbf{z}}$ for \mathbf{z} . To fix the ideas, we could set $\Sigma_{\mathbf{z}} = \sigma^2 \mathbf{I}$ for some $\sigma > 0$, i.e., the distribution of \mathbf{z} is a spherical Gaussian, and set $\Sigma_{\mathbf{y}} = \sigma^2 \mathbf{I} - \Sigma_{\mathbf{k}}$. If we sample \mathbf{x} from a spherical Gaussian with standard deviation s > 0, then $\Sigma_{\mathbf{k}} = s^2 \mathbf{SS}^{\top}$ and $\Sigma_{\mathbf{y}} = \sigma^2 \mathbf{I} - s^2 \mathbf{SS}^{\top}$ (by taking σ sufficiently large, the latter is indeed definite positive). This is the choice we actually make for $\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{G}$, but there is flexibility.

The above over-simplifies the situation as the Gaussians we manipulate are discrete rather than continuous. Further, their supports do not have the same dimensions. Indeed, the support of \mathbf{y} is \mathbb{Z}^k whereas the support of \mathbf{k} is exactly $2\mathbf{S}\mathbb{Z}^m + \mathbf{Sc}$ whose span has dimension m < k: the second Gaussian lives in a smaller dimension and its support is sparser. This is illustrated in Figure 1.




Fig. 1. The sum of two Gaussians with compensating covariance matrices is a spherical Gaussian, even when the second Gaussian is rank-deficient. In the G + G identification protocol and signature, the first Gaussian corresponds to \mathbf{y} , the second Gaussian is associated to \mathbf{Sc} and the resulting one corresponds to \mathbf{z} .

Thanks to the above, if the covariance matrices are set appropriately, then G + G is honest-verifier zero-knowledge (HVZK). The proofs of completeness and soundness are adapted from [DDLL13].

Our final goal is to apply the Fiat-Shamir heuristic on this protocol to get a signature scheme. This heuristic replaces the uniform challenge with one derived from a hash function called on input the commitment and the message to be signed. The signature is then the whole transcript. As the commitment of G + G can be recomputed from the challenge and its response, we actually exclude it from the signature for compactness. Then, as long as G + G is complete, the resulting signature is correct. Moreover, the security reduction proceeds in two steps. First, it is shown that the EU-CMA security of the signature query can be made. To do so, one shows that signatures queries can be answered with simulated ones (up to reprogramming the random oracle) from the HVZK property, as long as the commitment Ay has sufficiently high min-entropy. This is technically more complex than for Lyubashevsky's signatures as y is distributed from a skewed Gaussian. Second, computational soundness (resp. lossy-soundness) implies security against no-message attacks for different parametrizations.

Comparison with BLISS. Among variants of Lyubashevsky's signatures, BLISS provides the smallest z: its expected norm can be as small as $\sigma_1(\mathbf{S})m/\sqrt{\log M}$ (up to a constant factor), where $\sigma_1(\mathbf{S})$ is the largest singular value of \mathbf{S} and Mis the expected number of repetitions (see [DFPS22, Appendix C]). Further, an argument is made in [DFPS22] that this is essentially optimal for Lyubashevsky's signatures, even if we allow to optimize over the choice of source and target distributions. In the case of G + G, the strongest constraint on parameters is essentially that the standard deviation σ of z be sufficiently large to "smooth out" the lattice $2\mathbf{S}\mathbb{Z}^m$. By using a variant of the HVZK property based on the Rényi divergence rather than the statistical distance, which suffices for the signature application, it suffices that σ be above $\sigma_1(\mathbf{S})\sqrt{\log Q_S}$, up to a constant factor, where Q_S is the maximum number of signature queries that the adversary is allowed to make. As a result, the expected norm of \mathbf{z} in $\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{G}$ is $\sigma_1(\mathbf{S})\sqrt{m \log Q_S}$. We conclude by observing that $\log Q_S$ is typically much smaller than m, and that the $\sqrt{\log M}$ term from BLISS cannot grow sufficiently to compensate for the difference. More concretely, if we set $M = \lambda^{\Theta(1)}$, $Q_S = \lambda^{\Theta(1)}$ and $m = \Theta(\lambda)$, where λ is the security parameter, then the expected norms of z in BLISS and $\mathsf{G} + \mathsf{G}$ respectively grow as $\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \cdot \lambda / \sqrt{\log \lambda}$ and $\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \cdot \sqrt{\lambda \log \lambda}$.

Optimization and concrete parameters. While all key generation techniques presented in [DDLL13] can be used with our $\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{G}$ protocol, we present alternative versions which offer more flexibility. A first improvement is that we can set $\mathbf{AS} = q\mathbf{J} \mod 2q$, where $\mathbf{J} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times \ell}$ is only rectangular and full column-rank rather than set to the identity. When instantiating $\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{G}$ with the MLWE and MSIS hardness assumptions [BGV12,LS15] over a ring $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$ with na power of 2, we take $\mathbf{j} = (x^{n/2} + 1, 0, \dots, 0)$. This allows us to replace the lattice $2\mathbf{s}\mathcal{R}$ with $(x^{n/2} - 1)\mathbf{s}\mathcal{R}$, and to decrease the standard deviation of \mathbf{z} by a factor $\sqrt{2}$. Overall, we obtain signature sizes that are between 20% and 30% smaller than those in [DFPS22], or 35% to 45% smaller than Dilithium [DKL⁺18].

Related Work. As pointed out in [CLMQ21], GPV signatures [GPV08] can be seen as a special case of the lattice-based Fiat-Shamir signatures by considering a

specific instance of the hash function and adapting parameters. This analysis can be extended to G + G, and we then recover the hash-and sign scheme described in [YJW23]. More details are provided in Appendix B.

2 Preliminaries

For any integers $k \geq m$, we let \mathbf{I}_k denote the $k \times k$ identity matrix as well as $\mathbf{J}_{k,m} = (\mathbf{I}_m | \mathbf{0}^{m \times (k-m)})^\top$ denote the $k \times m$ matrix whose first m diagonal elements are 1 and all others are 0. The notations log and ln respectively refer to the base-2 and natural logarithms. The notation $\|\cdot\|$ refers to the Euclidean norm, while $\|\cdot\|_{\infty}$ refers to the infinity norm.

2.1 Probabilities

Let P, Q be two discrete random variables. The min-entropy of P is defined as

$$H_{\infty}(P) = -\log \max_{x \in \operatorname{Supp}(P)} \Pr[P = x]$$
.

The conditional min-entropy of P on Q is defined as

$$H_{\infty}(P|Q) = -\log \sum_{y \in \operatorname{Supp}(Q)} \Pr[Q=y] \cdot \max_{x \in \operatorname{Supp}(P)} \Pr[P=x|Q=y]$$

Let $\Omega = \text{Supp}(P) \cup \text{Supp}(Q)$. The statistical distance between P and Q is defined as $\Delta(P,Q) = \sum_{x \in \Omega} |\Pr[P = x] - \Pr[Q = x]|/2$.

If $\operatorname{Supp}(P) \subseteq \operatorname{Supp}(\bar{Q})$, the Rényi divergence of infinite order between P and Q is defined as

$$R_{\infty}(P||Q) = \sup_{x \in \text{Supp}(P)} \frac{\Pr[P=x]}{\Pr[Q=x]} \in [1, +\infty] .$$

We will use the following properties of the Rényi divergence.

Lemma 1 ([vEH14]). Let P and Q be two discrete random variables such that $\operatorname{Supp}(P) \subseteq \operatorname{Supp}(Q)$. Let $f : \operatorname{Supp}(Q) \to \mathcal{X}$ be a (possibly probabilistic) function. Let $E \subseteq \operatorname{Supp}(P)$ be an event. The Rényi divergence satisfies the probability preservation property:

$$\Pr[P \in E] \le R_{\infty}(P \| Q) \cdot \Pr[Q \in E]$$
(1)

and the data processing inequality:

$$R_{\infty}(f(P)||f(Q)) \le R_{\infty}(P||Q) \quad . \tag{2}$$

We will also use the following result.

Lemma 2. Let $\varepsilon < 1$. Let P and Q be two random variables taking values in some countable set Ω . Let $c \in \mathbb{R}$ be a constant such that

$$\forall a \in \Omega : \operatorname{Pr}[Q = a] = c(1 - \delta(a)) \operatorname{Pr}[P = a] ,$$

for some function $\delta: \Omega \to [0, \varepsilon]$. Then it holds that:

$$R_{\infty}(P \| Q) \leq \frac{1}{1 - \varepsilon}$$
, $R_{\infty}(Q \| P) \leq \frac{1}{1 - \varepsilon}$ and $\Delta(P, Q) \leq \frac{\varepsilon}{1 - \varepsilon}$.

Proof. Let us first note that $(1 - \varepsilon)c \leq 1 \leq c$, by summing the above equality over all $a \in \Omega$ and applying the bounds on $\delta(a)$. Then we have

$$R_{\infty}(P||Q) = \sup_{a \in \Omega} \frac{\Pr[P=a]}{\Pr[Q=a]} = \sup_{a \in \Omega} \frac{1}{c(1-\delta(a))} \le \frac{1}{1-\varepsilon} .$$

We also have

$$R_{\infty}(Q||P) = \sup_{a \in \Omega} \frac{\Pr[Q=a]}{\Pr[P=a]} = \sup_{a \in \Omega} c(1-\delta(a)) \le c \le \frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}$$

Finally, we refer to [BF11, Lemma A.2] for the third bound.

2.2 Lattice Gaussian Distributions

Let $k > 0, \mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^k$ and $\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$ be a positive-definite symmetric matrix. The Gaussian function with covariance parameter Σ and center parameter \mathbf{c} is defined as

$$\rho_{\mathbf{\Sigma},\mathbf{c}}:\mathbf{x}\mapsto\exp\left(-\pi(\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{c})^{\top}\mathbf{\Sigma}^{-1}(\mathbf{x}-\mathbf{c})\right)$$

The Gaussian distribution over the lattice $\Lambda \subseteq \operatorname{span}(\Sigma)$ with covariance parameter Σ and center parameter \mathbf{c} is the distribution with support Λ and probability mass function

$$D_{\Lambda, \Sigma, \mathbf{c}} : \mathbf{x} \mapsto \frac{\rho_{\Sigma, \mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{x})}{\sum_{\mathbf{y} \in \Lambda} \rho_{\Sigma, \mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{y})}$$

If $\Sigma = \sigma^2 \mathbf{I}_k$, we write $\rho_{\sigma,\mathbf{c}}$ and $D_{\Lambda,\sigma,\mathbf{c}}$. We omit **c** when it is **0**. We also define $D_{\Lambda+\mathbf{c},\Sigma} = D_{\Lambda,\Sigma,-\mathbf{c}} + \mathbf{c}$. For convenience, we let $\rho_{\Sigma,\mathbf{c}}(S)$ denote the quantity $\sum_{\mathbf{y}\in S} \rho_{\Sigma,\mathbf{c}}(\mathbf{y})$ for any countable set S.

For spherical Gaussians, the upper and lower part of a vector are statistically independent. This is not the case anymore for general covariance matrices. The following lemma give the conditional distribution of the lower part of a Gaussian vector, given the upper part. The proof is adaptated from the continuous setting and relies on writing the covariance as a 2×2 block matrix and inverting it using the Schur complement of the upper left matrix.

Lemma 3 (Conditional distribution). Let $k \ge m > 0$, $\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$ be a symmetric positive-definite matrix and $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^k$. Write

$$\mathbf{c} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{c}_1 \\ \mathbf{c}_2 \end{pmatrix} \quad ext{and} \quad \mathbf{\Sigma} = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{\Sigma}_{11} \ \mathbf{\Sigma}_{12} \\ \mathbf{\Sigma}_{21} \ \mathbf{\Sigma}_{22} \end{pmatrix},$$

where $\mathbf{c}_1 \in \mathbb{R}^{k-m}$ and $\mathbf{\Sigma}_{11} \in \mathbb{R}^{(k-m) \times (k-m)}$. Let $(Y_1^\top | Y_2^\top) \leftrightarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^k, \mathbf{\Sigma}, \mathbf{c}}$, where Y_1 takes values in \mathbb{Z}^{k-m} . Given any $\mathbf{y}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}^{k-m}$, the conditional distribution of Y_2 conditioned on $Y_1 = \mathbf{y}_1$ is $D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \mathbf{\Sigma}, \mathbf{c}}$, where

$$\overline{\mathbf{c}} = \mathbf{c}_2 + \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{21} \, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{11}^{-1} (\mathbf{y}_1 \ -\mathbf{c}_1) \quad \text{and} \quad \overline{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}} = \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{22} \ -\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{21} \, \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{11}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{12}$$

Proof. As Σ is symmetric and positive-definite, both Σ_{11} and Σ_{22} are also symmetric and positive-definite and thus invertible. This is shown by considering vectors of the form $(\mathbf{x}^{\top}|(\mathbf{0}^m)^{\top})^{\top}$ or $((\mathbf{0}^{k-m})^{\top}|\mathbf{y}^{\top})^{\top}$. Let us write the block inverse of Σ as follows:

$$\boldsymbol{\Sigma}^{-1} = \left(\frac{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{11}^{-1} + \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{11}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{12}^{-1} \overline{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{21} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{11}^{-1} - \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{11}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{12}^{-1} \overline{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{-1}}{-\overline{\boldsymbol{\Sigma}}^{-1} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{21} \boldsymbol{\Sigma}_{11}^{-1}} \right) = \begin{pmatrix} \mathbf{S}_{11} \ \mathbf{S}_{12} \\ \mathbf{S}_{21} \ \mathbf{S}_{22} \end{pmatrix}$$

This formula also ensures that $\overline{\Sigma}$ is invertible, as it is a diagonal block of the positive definite symmetric matrix Σ^{-1} .

Let $\mathbf{y}_2 \in \mathbb{Z}^m$. The probability that $Y_2 = \mathbf{y}_2$ conditioned on $Y_1 = \mathbf{y}_1$ is

$$\rho_{\mathbf{\Sigma},\mathbf{c}}\begin{pmatrix}\mathbf{y}_1\\\mathbf{y}_2\end{pmatrix}\Big/\sum_{\mathbf{y}\in\mathbb{Z}^m}\rho_{\mathbf{\Sigma},\mathbf{c}}\begin{pmatrix}\mathbf{y}_1\\\mathbf{y}\end{pmatrix}.$$

Let us then study $\rho_{\Sigma,c}((\mathbf{y}_1^\top | \mathbf{y}^\top)^\top)$ by expanding it and completing the square.

$$\rho_{\mathbf{\Sigma},\mathbf{c}}\begin{pmatrix}\mathbf{y}_1\\\mathbf{y}\end{pmatrix}\sim\exp\left(-\pi\left((\mathbf{y}-\overline{\mathbf{c}})^{\top}\mathbf{S}_{22}(\mathbf{y}-\overline{\mathbf{c}})\right)\right)=\rho_{\overline{\mathbf{\Sigma}},\overline{\mathbf{c}}}(\mathbf{y}) \ ,$$

where the notation ~ hides terms that do not depend on \mathbf{y} . Using the fact that the probability mass sums to 1, we obtain that the distribution of Y_2 conditioned on $Y_1 = \mathbf{y}_1$ is $D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \overline{\Sigma}, \overline{\mathbf{c}}}$.

As showed in [GPV08], Gaussian distributions can be sampled from by using Klein's algorithm [Kle00]. We will rely on the following variant.

Lemma 4 (Adapted from [BLP⁺13, Lemma 2.3]). There is a ppt algorithm that, given a basis $\mathbf{B} = (\mathbf{b}_1, \ldots, \mathbf{b}_\ell)$ of a full-rank ℓ -dimensional lattice Λ , a positive definite symmetric matrix Σ and $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^\ell$ returns a sample from $D_{\Lambda, \Sigma, \mathbf{c}}$, assuming that $\sqrt{\ln(2\ell + 4)/\pi} \cdot \max_i \|\Sigma^{-1/2}\mathbf{b}_i\| \leq 1$.

2.3 Smoothing Parameter

Given a k-dimensional lattice $\Lambda \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k$, its dual lattice Λ^* is defined as the set $\Lambda^* = \{ \mathbf{x} \in \operatorname{span}(\Lambda) \mid \mathbf{x}^\top \mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}, \forall \mathbf{y} \in \Lambda \}$. If **B** is a basis of Λ , then $(\mathbf{B}^{\dagger})^{\top}$ is a basis of Λ^* .

Given a lattice $\Lambda \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k$ and $\varepsilon > 0$, the smoothing parameter $\eta_{\varepsilon}(\Lambda)$ of the lattice Λ is defined as the smallest σ such that $\rho_{1/\sigma}(\Lambda^* \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}) \leq \varepsilon$. The smoothing parameter satisfies the following two properties.

Lemma 5 ([ZXZ18, Theorem 2]). Let k > 1 and $\varepsilon < 0.086k$. Let $\Lambda \subseteq \mathbb{R}^k$ be a full-rank lattice with basis $\mathbf{B} = (\mathbf{b}_1, \dots, \mathbf{b}_k)$. It holds that

$$\eta_{\varepsilon}(\Lambda) \leq \sqrt{\frac{\ln(k-1+2k/\varepsilon)}{\pi}} \cdot \max_{i \leq k} \|\mathbf{b}_i\|$$

Lemma 6 ([MR07]). Let Λ be a k-dimensional full-rank lattice. Let $\varepsilon > 0$ and $\Sigma \in \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$ be a definite positive symmetric matrix with all singular values larger than $\eta_{\varepsilon}(\Lambda)$ and $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{R}^{k}$. We have

$$\rho_{\mathbf{\Sigma},\mathbf{c}}(\Lambda) \in \frac{\sqrt{\det \mathbf{\Sigma}}}{\det \Lambda} \cdot [1-\varepsilon, 1+\varepsilon] \quad and \quad \frac{\rho_{\mathbf{\Sigma},\mathbf{c}}(\Lambda)}{\rho_{\mathbf{\Sigma}}(\Lambda)} \in \left[\frac{1-\varepsilon}{1+\varepsilon}, 1\right]$$

The last upper bound holds for all Σ .

The following lemma (adapted from [BMKMS22, Lemma 1]) is at the core of the completeness and zero-knowledge proofs. While [BMKMS22] does not give explicit statistical bounds, we note that Lemma 6 above, which is applied at the end of the proof from [BMKMS22], allows us to do so when combined with Lemma 2. A further adaptation is the use of the smoothing parameter bound from Lemma 5. Note that the dimension involved for this condition is ℓ rather than k, as this is the small-rank lattice that needs to be smoothed out (the corresponding condition from [BMKMS22, Lemma 1] is stronger than needed).

Lemma 7 (Gaussian decomposition, [BMKMS22, Lemma 1]). Let $k \ge \ell$, $\varepsilon \in (0,1)$ and $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k \times \ell}$. Let $s \ge \sqrt{2 \ln(\ell - 1 + 2\ell/\varepsilon)/\pi}$ and $\sigma \ge \sqrt{8\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \cdot s}$. Define

$$\boldsymbol{\Sigma}(\mathbf{S}) = \sigma^2 \mathbf{I}_k - s^2 \mathbf{S} \mathbf{S}^\top$$

and let $\mathbf{y} \leftrightarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^k, \mathbf{\Sigma}(\mathbf{S})}$ and $\mathbf{k} \leftrightarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^\ell, s, -\mathbf{c}/2}$ for any $\mathbf{c} \in \mathbb{Z}^\ell$. Then $\mathbf{\Sigma}(\mathbf{S})$ is positive definite and the distribution $P_{\mathbf{z}}$ of $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{S}(2\mathbf{k} + \mathbf{c})$ satisfies

$$R_{\infty}(P_{\mathbf{z}} \| D_{\mathbb{Z}^{k},\sigma}) \leq \frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon} \quad and \quad \Delta(P_{\mathbf{z}}, D_{\mathbb{Z}^{k},\sigma}) \leq \frac{2\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}$$

Note that the matrix $\Sigma(\mathbf{S})$ is positive definite since $\sigma \geq \sqrt{2}\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \cdot s$ ensures that all singular values of $\sigma^2 \mathbf{I}_k$ are larger than those of $s^2 \mathbf{S} \mathbf{S}^\top$.

2.4 Cryptographic Definitions

We recall the definition of an identification scheme and how such a scheme can be transformed into a digital signature via the Fiat-Shamir transform (see Figure 6, p.25). For an identification scheme ID and a hash function H (modeled as a random oracle in the analysis), we let $\mathsf{FS}[\mathsf{ID}, H]$ denote the resulting signature scheme. Details about correctness and security of $\mathsf{FS}[\mathsf{ID}, H]$ are provided in Appendix A.

Definition 1 (Identification Scheme). An identification scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms ID = (Igen, P, V) such that:

- Igen : On input the security parameter 1^{λ} , algorithm Igen outputs a verification key vk and a signing key sk. We assume that vk defines the challenge space C.
- P : The prover $\mathsf{P} = (\mathsf{P}_1, \mathsf{P}_2)$ is split into two algorithms: given sk, algorithm P_1 produces a commitment w (first message sent to the verifier) and a state st; algorithm P_2 , on input (sk, w, st) and a uniformly random challenge $c \in \mathcal{C}$ sent by the verifier in response to commitment w, outputs an answer z.
- V: On input (vk, w, c, z), the deterministic verifier V outputs 1 or 0.

We let $P(sk, vk) \leftrightarrow V(vk)$ denote the transcript (w, c, z) of an interaction between the prover and the verifier, as illustrated in Figure 2.




Fig. 2. Interaction Between P and V

We further define the following properties of identification schemes and recall their roles in the analysis of the signature obtained by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform to an identification protocol. We first recall *completeness* and *commitment-recoverability*, which allow to prove correctness of $\mathsf{FS}[\mathsf{ID}, H]$.

Definition 2 (Completeness and commitment-recoverability).

An identification scheme $\mathsf{ID} = (\mathsf{Igen}, \mathsf{P}, \mathsf{V})$ is ε -complete for some $\varepsilon > 0$ if for any $(\mathsf{vk}, \mathsf{sk}) \leftarrow \mathsf{Igen}(1^{\lambda})$, for any challenge $c \in \mathcal{C}$, we have:

$$\Pr \left| \mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk},(w,c,z)) = 0 \mid (w,c,z) \leftarrow (\mathsf{P}(\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{vk}) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk})) \right| \leq \varepsilon \ ,$$

where the randomness is taken over the random coins of P.

In addition, ID satisfies commitment-recoverability if for any public key vk, challenge $c \in C$, and answer z, there is at most one commitment w such that the transcript (w, c, z) is valid, and there exists a PPT algorithm Rec such that w = Rec(vk, c, z).

We then recall the definitions of *honest-verifier zero-knowledge* and *commitment min-entropy*, which allow to reduce EU-CMA security of FS[ID, H] to its EU-NMA security.

Definition 3 (HVZK and commitment min-entropy). An identification scheme ID = (Igen, P, V) is Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge if there exists a PPT simulator Sim such that one of the following holds:

- $\Delta((w, c, z) \leftarrow (\mathsf{P}(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{vk}) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk}))$, $\mathsf{Sim}(c, \mathsf{vk})) \leq \varepsilon$. In this case, we say that ID is ε -HVZK.
- $R_{\infty}((w, c, z) \leftarrow (\mathsf{P}(\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{vk}) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk})) \parallel \mathsf{Sim}(c, \mathsf{vk})) \leq 1 + \varepsilon$. In this case, we say that ID is $(1 + \varepsilon)$ -divergence HVZK.

Furthermore, we say that ID satisfies α -Min Entropy or has α bits of commitment min-entropy if for any (vk, sk) in the range of IGen:

$$H_{\infty}\Big(w|(w,c,z) \leftarrow (\mathsf{P}(\mathsf{sk},\mathsf{vk}) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk}))\Big) \geq lpha$$
 .

Finally, we recall the notions of *lossiness* and *lossy-soundness*, which allow to prove EU-NMA security of FS[ID, H] in the QROM.

Definition 4 (Lossiness and lossy-soundness). An identification scheme ID = (Igen, P, V) is lossy and ε_{Is} -lossy sound for some $\varepsilon_{Is} > 0$ if there exists a PPT lossy key generation algorithm LossyIGen that, on input a security parameter, outputs a verification key vk_{Is} such that vk_{Is} is indistinguishable from a verification key vk generated by IGen.

Moreover, for any (unbounded) P^* interacting with V, we have:

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{ls}},(w,c,z)) = 1 \mid (w,c,z) \leftarrow (\mathsf{P}^*(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{ls}}) \leftrightarrow \mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk}_{\mathsf{ls}}))\right] \leq \varepsilon_{\mathsf{ls}} \ .$$

If we only consider classical adversaries, EU-NMA security of FS[ID, H] can be argued by relying on the simpler notion of *special soundness*.

Definition 5 (Special soundness). Let ID = (Igen, P, V) be an identification scheme. It is special sound if for any PPT adversary A, the quantity

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk}, (w, c_0, z_0)) = 1 \land \mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk}, (w, c_1, z_1)) = 1 \mid (w, c_0, z_0, c_1, z_1) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{vk})\right]$$

is $negl(\lambda)$, where the probability is over the choice of vk and the coins of A.

We now briefly recall the formalism of digital signatures.

Definition 6. A signature scheme is a tuple (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) of PPT algorithms with the following specifications:

- KeyGen : 1^λ → (vk, sk) takes as input a security parameter λ and outputs a verification key vk and a signing key sk.
- Sign : $(sk, \mu) \rightarrow \sigma$ takes as inputs a signing key sk and a message μ and outputs a signature σ .
- Verify: (vk, μ, σ) → b ∈ {0,1} takes as inputs a verification key vk, a message μ and a signature σ and accepts (b = 1) or rejects (b = 0).

We say that it is ε -correct if for any pair (vk, sk) in the range of KeyGen and μ ,

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{vk},\mu,\mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{sk},\mu))=1\right] \geq 1-\mathsf{negl}(\lambda),$$

where the probability is taken over the random coins of Sign.

Finally, we recall the weak and strong Existential Unforgeability under Chosen Message Attack (EU-CMA and sEU-CMA) and the Existential Unforgeability under No Message Attack (EU-NMA) security game for digital signatures.

Definition 7. Let $\delta > 0$. A signature scheme (KeyGen, Sign, Verify) is said to be δ -EU-CMA (resp. δ -EU-NMA) secure if no ppt adversary \mathcal{A} given vk and access to a signing oracle (resp. without access to a signing oracle) has probability $\geq \delta$ over the choice of the signing and verification keys (vk, sk) \leftarrow KeyGen (1^{λ}) and its random coins of outputting (μ^*, σ^*) such that

- 1. μ^* was not queried to the signing oracle,
- 2. Verify $(vk, \mu^*, \sigma^*) = 1$, *i.e.*, the forged signature must be accepted.

The scheme is said δ -EU-CMA secure in the ROM if the above holds when the adversary can also make queries to a random oracle that models some hash function used in the scheme. The probability of forging a signature is also called the advantage of \mathcal{A} . If condition 1 is replaced with σ^* is not an answer of a signature query for μ^* , the scheme is instead said δ -sEU-CMA.

2.5 Hardness Assumptions

The security of our constructions relies on the hardness of two lattice problems, namely the decisional Learning with Errors problem and the Short Integer Solution problem.

Definition 8 (Learning With Errors). Let m, k > 0 and $q \ge 2$. Let χ be a distribution over \mathbb{Z} . The LWE_{m,k,ℓ,q,χ} assumption states that no (quantum) adversary has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing $(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{AS} + \mathbf{E})$ from (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{U}) , where $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times k})$, $\mathbf{U} \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times \ell})$ and $(\mathbf{S}^\top | \mathbf{E}^\top)^\top \leftarrow \chi^{k+m \times \ell}$.

Definition 9 (Short Integer Solution). Let $m, k, \gamma > 0$ and $q \ge 2$ be a modulus. The $SIS_{m,k,q,\gamma}$ assumption states that no (quantum) adversary has non-negligible probability of finding $\mathbf{s} \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ such that

 $\mathbf{As} = \mathbf{0} \bmod q \quad and \quad 0 < \|\mathbf{s}\| \le \gamma \ ,$

when given $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times k})$ as input.

3 The **G** + **G** Identification Protocol

In this section, we first describe the G + G identification protocol, then prove the required properties to compile it into a signature using the Fiat-Shamir heuristic, and then discuss asymptotic parameters.

3.1 Description of the Scheme

Let us first introduce the parameters of the scheme as well as some notations. Let $m \geq \ell > 0$, $k > m + \ell$ and $\mathbf{J} = \mathbf{J}_{m,\ell}$. Let χ be a distribution over \mathbb{Z} . Let $\mathcal{C} \subseteq \mathbb{Z}_2^{\ell}$ be the challenge space, which we assume to be finite. Let $\sigma, s \geq 0$ and define $\mathbf{\Sigma} : \mathbb{Z}^{k \times \ell} \to \mathbb{R}^{k \times k}$ as

$$\boldsymbol{\Sigma}: \mathbf{S} \mapsto \sigma^2 \mathbf{I}_k - s^2 \mathbf{S} \mathbf{S}^\top.$$

The scheme is also parametrized by an odd modulus q and an acceptance bound γ .

The $\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{G}$ identification protocol is described in Figure 3. The instance generation algorithm samples a verification key $\mathbf{A} \in \mathbb{Z}_{2q}^{m \times k}$ and a signing key $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k \times \ell}$ with small-magnitude coefficients such that $\mathbf{A} \cdot \mathbf{S} = q\mathbf{J} \mod 2q$. In the first phase of the interaction, the prover samples a vector \mathbf{y} with well-crafted covariance matrix, and sends the commitment $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{y} \mod 2q$ to the verifier. The protocol is public-coin, i.e., the verifier just samples \mathbf{c} uniformly in the challenge space and sends it to the prover. After receiving \mathbf{c} , the prover samples a Gaussian vector \mathbf{k} over the lattice coset $2\mathbf{S}\mathbb{Z}^{\ell} + \mathbf{c}$. The covariance matrices of \mathbf{y} and \mathbf{k} are set so that the Gaussian plus Gaussian sum is statistically close to a spherical Gaussian distribution.

The first sampling that the prover has to perform is well-defined only if $\Sigma(\mathbf{S})$ is definite positive, which we show thanks to Lemma 7. The first sampling is implemented using Lemma 4, which requires $\sigma^2 - s^2 \sigma_1(\mathbf{S})^2 \geq \sqrt{\ln(2\ell+4)/\pi}$, where we let $\sigma_1(\mathbf{S})$ denote the largest singular value of \mathbf{S} . The protocol can then be executed in polynomial time.

$$\begin{split} &|\mathsf{Gen}(1^{\lambda}):\\ &1: \ \mathbf{A}_{1} \hookleftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_{q}^{m \times (k-m-\ell)})\\ &2: \ (\mathbf{S}_{1}, \mathbf{S}_{2}) \hookleftarrow \chi^{(k-m-\ell) \times \ell} \times \chi^{m \times \ell}\\ &3: \ \mathbf{B} \leftarrow \mathbf{A}_{1} \mathbf{S}_{1} + \mathbf{S}_{2} \bmod q\\ &4: \ \mathbf{A} \leftarrow (q \mathbf{J} - 2 \mathbf{B} | 2 \mathbf{A}_{1} | 2 \mathbf{I}_{m}) \in \mathbb{Z}_{2q}^{m \times k}\\ &5: \ \mathbf{S} \leftarrow (\mathbf{I}_{\ell} | \mathbf{S}_{1}^{\top} | \mathbf{S}_{2}^{\top})^{\top} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k \times \ell}\\ &6: \ \mathsf{vk} \leftarrow \mathbf{A}, \mathsf{sk} \leftarrow \mathbf{S}\\ &7: \ \mathbf{return} \ (\mathsf{vk}, \mathsf{sk}) \\ \hline \hline \begin{array}{c} \mathbf{P}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{S}) & \mathbf{V}(\mathbf{A})\\ &\mathbf{y} \hookleftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^{k}, \mathbf{\Sigma}(\mathbf{S})}\\ &\mathbf{w} \leftarrow \mathbf{A}\mathbf{y} \bmod 2q & \xrightarrow{\mathbf{w}}\\ & \xleftarrow{\mathbf{c}} & \mathbf{c} \leftarrow U(\mathcal{C})\\ &\mathbf{k} \hookleftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^{\ell}, \mathbf{s}, -\mathbf{c}/2}\\ &\mathbf{z} \leftarrow \mathbf{y} + 2 \mathbf{S} \mathbf{k} + \mathbf{S} \mathbf{c} & \xrightarrow{\mathbf{z}} & \operatorname{Accept} \text{ if}\\ & \mathbf{A} \mathbf{z} = \mathbf{w} + q \mathbf{J} \mathbf{c} \ \mathrm{mod} \ 2q\\ & \operatorname{and} \|\mathbf{z}\| \leq \gamma \end{split}$$

Fig. 3. The $\mathsf{G}+\mathsf{G}$ Identification Protocol.

Combining this identification protocol with the Fiat-Shamir (without aborts) paradigm, we then obtain a lattice-based signature FS[G + G, H], as stated in the following Theorem. The correctness and security of the scheme are inherited from the properties of the underlying identification protocol.

Theorem 1. Let $m \ge \ell > 0$, $k > m + \ell$, $\varepsilon \in (0, 1/2]$, $s \ge \sqrt{2\ln(\ell - 1 + 2\ell/\varepsilon)/\pi}$ and $\sigma \ge \sqrt{8}\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \cdot s$ for all $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k \times \ell}$ in the range of IGen. Let γ and ε_c be such that $\Pr_{\mathbf{z} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^k,\sigma}}[\|\mathbf{z}\| > \gamma] \le \varepsilon_c/3$. Let $q > \max(2\gamma, \sigma \cdot \eta_{\varepsilon}(\mathbb{Z}^m))$ be an odd modulus. Then the signature scheme $\mathsf{FS}[\mathsf{G} + \mathsf{G}, H]$ is ε_c -correct and:

 EU-CMA-secure in the ROM under the SIS_{m,k,q,2γ} assumption. Namely, for any adversary A against the EU-CMA security of FS[G + G, H] making at most Q_S sign queries and at most Q_H hash queries, there exists an adversary B against the SIS_{m,k,q,2γ} assumption such that:

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{Q_S} \left[Q_H \cdot \left(\sqrt{\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SIS}_{m,k,q,2\gamma}}(\mathcal{B})} + \frac{2}{|\mathcal{C}|}\right) \right] \\ &+ 3Q_S/2 \cdot \sqrt{(Q_H + Q_S + 1) \cdot s^{-m}} \end{split};$$

• EU-CMA-secure in the QROM under the LWE_{k-m-ℓ,m,ℓ,\chi,q} assumption, assuming that $1/|\mathcal{C}| + (|\mathcal{C}|^2(2\gamma + 1)^{2k})/q^m$ is negligible. Namely, for any quantum adversary \mathcal{A} against the EU-CMA security of FS[G + G, H] making at most Q_S classical sign queries and at most Q_H quantum hash queries, there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} against the LWE_{k-m-ℓ,m,ℓ,\chi,q} assumption such that:

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{Q_S} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{LWE}_{k-m-\ell,m,\ell,\chi,q}}(\mathcal{B}) \\ &+ \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{Q_S} 8(Q_H+1)^2 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|} + \frac{|\mathcal{C}|^2(2\gamma+1)^{2k}}{q^m}\right) \\ &+ 3Q_S/2 \cdot \sqrt{(Q_H+Q_S+1) \cdot s^{-m}} \end{split}$$

Moreover, these two bounds holds when \mathcal{A} is an adversary against the sEU-CMA security of the scheme by adding an extra $+Q_S \cdot s^{-m}$ term on the right hand side.

The proof of Theorem 1 follows from Corollaries 1, 2, 3, and 4, which are derived from the properties of the underlying identification protocol proved in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4, by applying the Fiat-Shamir transform. The Fiat-Shamir transform results are reminded in Appendix A.

3.2 Completeness and Commitment Recoverability

We first show that the G + G protocol is complete and commitment recoverable. As a corollary, we obtain that the resulting Fiat-Shamir signature scheme FS[G + G, H] is correct.

Theorem 2. Let $m \ge \ell > 0$, $k > m + \ell$, $\varepsilon \in (0, 1/2]$, $s \ge \sqrt{2 \ln(\ell - 1 + 2\ell/\varepsilon)/\pi}$ and $\sigma \ge \sqrt{8}\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \cdot s$ for all $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k \times \ell}$ in the range of IGen. Let γ and ε_c be such that $\Pr_{\mathbf{z} \leftrightarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^k,\sigma}}[\|\mathbf{z}\| > \gamma] \le \varepsilon_c/3$. Let $q > 2\gamma$ be an odd modulus. Then the $\mathsf{G} + \mathsf{G}$ identification protocol is ε_c -complete and achieves commitment-recoverability.

Proof. First, we note that $\mathbf{AS} = q\mathbf{J} \mod 2q$ holds for any matrix pair output by IGen. Then, in order to pass the first verification step, a transcript $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z})$ must satisfy:

$$\mathbf{Az} = \mathbf{A}(\mathbf{y} + 2\mathbf{Sk} + \mathbf{Sc}) = \mathbf{w} + \mathbf{0} + q\mathbf{Jc} \mod 2q \quad . \tag{3}$$

In particular, this defines a unique commitment $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{A}\mathbf{z} - q\mathbf{J}\mathbf{c} \mod 2q$ such that $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z})$ can be a valid transcript, and \mathbf{w} is efficiently recoverable, by defining Rec as $\operatorname{Rec}(\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z}) := \mathbf{A}\mathbf{z} - q\mathbf{J}\mathbf{c} \mod 2q$.

Now, we note that an honestly generated transcript $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z})$ always satisfies Equation (3). The probability preservation property of the Rényi divergence (Equation (1)) and Lemma 7 give the following bound:

$$\begin{split} \Pr_{(\mathbf{w},\mathbf{c},\mathbf{z})}[\|\mathbf{z}\| > \gamma] &\leq R_{\infty}(P_{\mathbf{z}}\|D_{\mathbb{Z}^{k},\sigma}) \cdot \Pr_{\mathbf{z} \leftrightarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^{k},\sigma}}[\|\mathbf{z}\| > \gamma] \\ &\leq \frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon} \cdot \Pr_{\mathbf{z} \leftrightarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^{k},\sigma}}[\|\mathbf{z}\| > \gamma] \\ &\leq \frac{1+1/2}{1-1/2} \cdot \Pr_{\mathbf{z} \leftrightarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^{k},\sigma}}[\|\mathbf{z}\| > \gamma]. \end{split}$$

Then the probability that an honest transcript $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z})$ be rejected at most $\leq 3 \cdot \Pr_{\mathbf{z} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^k, \sigma}}[\|\mathbf{z}\| > \gamma].$

We then obtain the following corollary.

Corollary 1. Using the same assumptions as in Theorem 2, the resulting signature scheme FS[G + G, H] is ε_c -correct.

Note that correctness of FS[G + G, H] does not require to assume that H is modeled as a random oracle, as Lemma 7 holds without relying on the randomness of **c**. This is in contrast to Lemma 8 that generically considers completeness of signatures obtained using the Fiat-Shamir transform.

3.3 Honest-Verifier Zero-Knowledge and Commitment Min-Entropy

We now show that the G + G protocol is HVZK and has large commitment minentropy. As a corollary, we obtain that the signature scheme FS[G + G, H] is EU-CMA-secure provided it is EU-NMA-secure.

Theorem 3. Let $m \ge \ell > 0$, $k > m + \ell$, $\varepsilon \in (0, 1/2]$, $s \ge \sqrt{2\ln(\ell - 1 + 2\ell/\varepsilon)/\pi}$ and $\sigma \ge \sqrt{8}\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \cdot s$ for all $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k \times \ell}$ in the range of IGen. Let $q > \sigma \cdot \eta_{\varepsilon}(\mathbb{Z}^m)$ be an odd modulus. Then the $\mathsf{G} + \mathsf{G}$ identification protocol satisfies:

- $(1 + \varepsilon)/(1 \varepsilon)$ -divergence HVZK,
- $2\varepsilon/(1-\varepsilon)$ -HVZK.

In addition, its commitment min-entropy is $\geq m \cdot \log(s/3)$.

Proof. We prove both properties separately. We start by proving HVZK, which is inherited from Lemma 7 and then focus on commitment min-entropy.

HVZK. The simulator on input a challenge $\mathbf{c} \in \mathcal{C}$ and a public matrix \mathbf{A} samples $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^k,\sqrt{2\sigma}}$, sets $\mathbf{w} = \mathbf{Az} - q\mathbf{Jc}$ and returns $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z})$ as a transcript. As everything here is a function of \mathbf{z} and \mathbf{c} , we can rely on Lemma 7. The bounds from the above claim are immediately inherited from the latter lemma by applying the data processing inequalities (which we recall in Equation (2) for the Rényi divergence – the same inequality holds replacing the Rényi divergence by the statistical distance). This completes the zero-knowledge analysis.

Commitment Min-Entropy. Let $\mathbf{w} \in \mathbb{Z}_{2q}^m$ and $(Y_1^{\top}, Y_2^{\top})^{\top} \leftarrow D_{\mathbb{Z}^k, \mathbf{\Sigma}(\mathbf{S})}$, where Y_1 takes values in \mathbb{Z}^{k-m} . Given a matrix $\mathbf{A} = (\mathbf{A}_0 | 2\mathbf{I}_m) \in \mathbb{Z}_{2q}^{m \times k}$, it holds that

$$\Pr_{(Y_1, Y_2)} [\mathbf{A}_0 Y_1 + 2Y_2 = \mathbf{w} \mod 2q] = \Pr_{(Y_1, Y_2)} [2Y_2 = \mathbf{w} - \mathbf{A}_0 Y_1 \mod 2q]$$
$$\leq \Pr_{(Y_1, Y_2)} [Y_2 = (\mathbf{w} - \mathbf{A}_0 Y_1)\zeta \mod q] ,$$

where ζ is the modular inverse of 2 mod q. Hence, the min-entropy of the commitment is $\geq H_{\infty}(Y_2 \mod q|Y_1)$ and we move on to bounding the latter quantity from below. Note that there exist $\sigma \geq \sigma_1 \geq \cdots \geq \sigma_m \geq (\sigma^2 - s^2 \sigma_1(\mathbf{S})^2)^{1/2}$ and $\mathbf{Q} \in \mathbb{R}^{m \times m}$ orthogonal such that

$$\mathbf{\Sigma}(\mathbf{S}) = \mathbf{Q} \begin{pmatrix} \sigma_1^2 & \\ & \ddots & \\ & & \sigma_m^2 \end{pmatrix} \mathbf{Q}^\top$$

Let $\mathbf{y}_1 \in \mathbb{Z}^{k-m}$ be fixed. The distribution of Y_2 conditioned on $Y_1 = \mathbf{y}_1$ is exactly $D_{\mathbb{Z}^m, \overline{\Sigma}, \overline{\mathbf{c}}}$, as defined in Lemma 3 (with $\mathbf{c} = \mathbf{0}$). Let $\overline{\sigma}_1^2$ (resp. $\overline{\sigma}_m^2$) be the largest (resp. smallest) eigenvalue of $\overline{\Sigma}$ and $\overline{\mathbf{c}} = (\overline{c}_1, \ldots, \overline{c}_m)^\top$. We are interested in obtaining an upper bound on $\rho_{\overline{\Sigma}, \overline{\mathbf{c}}}(\mathbf{z} + q\mathbb{Z}^m)/\rho_{\overline{\Sigma}, \overline{\mathbf{c}}}(\mathbb{Z}^m)$ for all $\mathbf{z} \in (-q/2, q/2]^m$. Indeed, this quantity corresponds to all values taken by the probability mass function of the random variable $Y_2 \mod q$ conditioned on $Y_1 = \mathbf{y}_1$, namely $\operatorname{Pr}_{Y_2|Y_1=\mathbf{y}_1}(Y_2 = \mathbf{z} \mod q) = \sum_{\mathbf{u} \in q\mathbb{Z}^m} \rho_{\overline{\Sigma}, \overline{\mathbf{c}}}(\mathbf{z} + \mathbf{u})/\rho_{\overline{\Sigma}, \overline{\mathbf{c}}}(\mathbb{Z}^m)$.

As $\overline{\Sigma}^{-1}$ is the bottom right submatrix of Σ^{-1} of size $m \times m$, it holds that for any $\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{R}^m$, we have $\mathbf{y}^\top \overline{\Sigma}^{-1} \mathbf{y} \in ||\mathbf{y}||^2 \cdot [1/\sigma_1^2, 1/\sigma_m^2]$. Hence all singular values $\overline{\sigma}_i$ of $\overline{\Sigma}$ lie in $[(\sigma^2 - s^2 \sigma_1(\mathbf{S})^2)^{1/2}, \sigma]$. Thanks to the theorem assumptions, we obtain that all $\overline{\sigma}_i$'s are above $\eta_{\varepsilon}(\mathbb{Z}^m)$. Using Lemma 6, it holds that

$$\rho_{\overline{\mathbf{\Sigma}},\overline{\mathbf{c}}}(\mathbb{Z}^m) \ge (1-\varepsilon) \cdot \sqrt{\det \overline{\mathbf{\Sigma}}} \ge (1-\varepsilon) \cdot \left(\sigma^2 - s^2 \sigma_1(\mathbf{S})^2\right)^{m/2}$$

The latter is $\geq (1 - \varepsilon) \cdot (s\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}))^m$, by assumption on σ . For the numerator, we first use Lemma 6 once more, to obtain:

$$\rho_{\overline{\mathbf{\Sigma}},\overline{\mathbf{c}}}(\mathbf{z}+q\mathbb{Z}^m) \leq \rho_{\overline{\mathbf{\Sigma}}}(q\mathbb{Z}^m) = 1 + \rho_{\overline{\mathbf{\Sigma}}}(q\mathbb{Z}^m \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}) \leq 1 + \rho_{\sigma}(q\mathbb{Z}^m \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}) \ .$$

Rewriting the assumption on q we have $1/\sigma > \eta_{\varepsilon}((1/q)\mathbb{Z}^m)$. Note that the dual lattice of $(1/q)\mathbb{Z}^m$ is $q\mathbb{Z}^m$. Hence, we have $\rho_{\sigma}(q\mathbb{Z}^m \setminus \{\mathbf{0}\}) \leq \varepsilon$ by definition of the smoothing parameter. The result follows by noting that for any \mathbf{S} in the range of IGen, we have $\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \geq 1$ as \mathbf{S} includes an identity matrix. \Box

We then obtain the following corollary as an application of Theorem 6.

Corollary 2. Using the same assumptions as in Theorem 3 the resulting signature scheme FS[G + G, H] is EU-CMA-secure (and sEU-CMA-secure) in the QROM, provided it is EU-NMA-secure. Namely, for any (possibly quantum) adversary A against the EU-CMA security of FS[G + G, H] making at most Q_S (classical) sign queries and at most Q_H (possibly quantum) hash queries, there exists an adversary B against the EU-NMA security of FS[G + G, H] such that:

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \left(1 + \frac{2\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{Q_S} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{NMA}}(\mathcal{B}) \\ &+ 3Q_S/2 \cdot \sqrt{(Q_H + Q_S + 1) \cdot (s\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}))^{-m}} \end{split}$$

The bound holds with an extra $Q_S \cdot (s\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}))^{-m}$ term when \mathcal{A} is an adversary against the sEU-CMA security of $\mathsf{FS}[\mathsf{G} + \mathsf{G}, H]$.

3.4 Special Soundness and Lossy Soundness

To complete the analysis, we show that (i) G + G is special-sound, and that (ii) G + G is a lossy identification scheme with lossy-soundness. As a corollary, we obtain that the signature scheme FS[G + G, H] is EU-NMA-secure in the ROM, and in the QROM under some parameters constraint.

Theorem 4. Let $m \ge \ell > 0$, $k > m + \ell$, $\varepsilon \in (0, 1/2]$, $s \ge \sqrt{2\ln(\ell - 1 + 2\ell/\varepsilon)/\pi}$ and $\sigma \ge \sqrt{8}\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \cdot s$ for all $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{k \times \ell}$ in the range of IGen. Let $\gamma > 0$ and $q > 2\gamma$ be an odd modulus. Then the $\mathsf{G} + \mathsf{G}$ identification protocol is:

- special-sound, under the $SIS_{m,k,q,2\gamma}$ assumption,
- lossy, under the LWE_{k-m- ℓ,m,ℓ,χ,q} assumption,
- ε_{ls} -lossy sound for

$$\varepsilon_{\mathsf{ls}} = \frac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|} + \frac{|\mathcal{C}|^2 (2\gamma + 1)^{2k}}{q^m}$$

Proof. We first prove G + G achieves special soundness, and then explain how to set our identification scheme in lossy mode.

Special soundness. Assume there exists a PPT adversary \mathcal{A} which, given the verification key $\forall k = \mathbf{A}$, produces two valid transcripts $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{z}_0), (\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{z}_1)$

with $\mathbf{c}_0 \neq \mathbf{c}_1$. It can be turned into an $\mathsf{SIS}_{m,k,q,2\gamma}$ solver. Indeed, by definition, such transcripts satisfy $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{z}_0 - \mathbf{z}_1) = q \mathbf{J}(\mathbf{c}_1 - \mathbf{c}_0) \mod 2q$.

Notice that we have $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{z}_0 - \mathbf{z}_1) = \mathbf{0} \mod q$, which implies that $\mathbf{z}_0 - \mathbf{z}_1$ is a solution to the SIS instance defined by \mathbf{A} . In addition, when reducing modulo 2, we also have $\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{z}_0 - \mathbf{z}_1) = \mathbf{J}(\mathbf{c}_1 - \mathbf{c}_0) \mod 2$, which implies that $\mathbf{z}_0 \neq \mathbf{z}_1$. Finally, note that the condition on γ implies that $\|\mathbf{z}_0 - \mathbf{z}_1\| \leq 2\gamma$ (as transcript validity implies $\|\mathbf{z}\| \leq \gamma$), and that $\mathbf{z}_0 - \mathbf{z}_1 \neq \mathbf{0} \mod q$.

Hence, there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} against the $\mathsf{SIS}_{m,k,q,2\gamma}$ problem such that:

$$\mathsf{Adv}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SIS}_{m,k,q,2\gamma}}(\mathcal{B})$$
 .

Let us now focus on lossy-soundness. We first define a lossy key generation algorithm, and then argue about lossy-soundness.

Lossiness. The lossy key generation algorithm **LossylGen** only modifies the generation of **B**. Recall that in IGen, the latter is defined as $\mathbf{B} \leftarrow \mathbf{A_1S_1} + \mathbf{S_2}$, with $\mathbf{A_1} \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times (k-m-\ell)})$ and $(\mathbf{S_1}, \mathbf{S_2}) \leftarrow \chi_{\eta}^{(k-m-\ell) \times \ell} \times \chi_{\eta}^{m \times \ell}$. The lossy key generation algorithm **LossylGen** samples it as $\mathbf{B} \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times \ell})$. Lossy verification keys are computationally indistinguishable from non-lossy ones, under the LWE_{k-m-\ell,m,\ell,\eta,q} assumption.

 ε_{ls} -lossy Soundness. First note that, if the lossy verification key A is such that, for all commitment w, there exists at most one challenge c such that there exists z with $(\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}, \mathbf{z})$ passing verification, then, as the challenge is sampled uniformly and independently of w, an (unbounded) prover cannot pass verification, except with probability at most $1/|\mathcal{C}|$.

We then focus on proving that the above holds with overwhelming probability over the choice of the lossy key **A**. By contradiction, assume there exists $\mathbf{w}, \mathbf{c}_0, \mathbf{c}_1, \mathbf{z}_0, \mathbf{z}_1$ with $\|\mathbf{z}_0\|, \|\mathbf{z}_1\| \leq \gamma$ and $\mathbf{c}_0 \neq \mathbf{c}_1 \in C$, such that we have both $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{z}_0 = \mathbf{w} + q\mathbf{J}\mathbf{c}_0 \mod 2q$ and $\mathbf{A}\mathbf{z}_1 = \mathbf{w} + q\mathbf{J}\mathbf{c}_1 \mod 2q$. Then, we have:

$$\mathbf{A}(\mathbf{z}_0 - \mathbf{z}_1) = q \mathbf{J}(\mathbf{c}_1 - \mathbf{c}_0) \mod 2q$$

Recall that **A** is of the form $(q\mathbf{J} - 2\mathbf{B}|2\mathbf{A}_1|2\mathbf{I}_m)$, with \mathbf{A}_1 , **B** uniform over \mathbb{Z}_q . Hence, the matrix **A** mod q is of the form $(\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{A}_1|\mathbf{I}_m)$, since q is odd. Then the above implies that $(\mathbf{B}|\mathbf{A}_1|\mathbf{I}_m)(\mathbf{z}_0 - \mathbf{z}_1) = \mathbf{0} \mod q$ with $\mathbf{z}_0 - \mathbf{z}_1 \neq \mathbf{0} \mod q$. This happens with probability at most $1/q^m$.

To conclude, note that there are at most $(2\gamma + 1)^{2k} \cdot |\mathcal{C}|^2$ choices for $\mathbf{z}_0, \mathbf{z}_1, \mathbf{c}_0$ and \mathbf{c}_1 . A union bound therefore implies that the probability over **A** that there is a commitment with at least two challenges permitting valid transcripts is at most $|\mathcal{C}|^2(2\gamma + 1)^{2k}/q^m$. Our lossy identification scheme is then ε_{ls} -lossy-sound, with

$$arepsilon_{\mathsf{ls}} \leq rac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|} + rac{|\mathcal{C}|^2 (2\gamma+1)^{2k}}{q^m}$$
 .

which completes the proof of the theorem.

We then obtain the following corollary as an application of Lemma 10.

Corollary 3. Using the same assumptions as in Theorem 4, the resulting signature scheme FS[G + G, H] is EU-NMA-secure, in the ROM. Namely, for any adversary \mathcal{A} against the EU-NMA security of FS[G + G, H], there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} against the SIS_{m,k,q,2\gamma} assumption such that:

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{NMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq Q_H \cdot \left(\sqrt{\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{SIS}_{m,k,q,2\gamma}}(\mathcal{B})} + \frac{2}{|\mathcal{C}|}\right) \ .$$

We also obtain the following corollary as an application of Theorem 7.

Corollary 4. Using the same assumptions as in Theorem 4, and if ε_{ls} is negligible, the signature scheme FS[G + G, H] is EU-NMA-secure, in the QROM. Namely, for any (possibly quantum) adversary \mathcal{A} against the EU-NMA security of FS[G + G, H] making at most Q_H (possibly quantum) hash queries, there exists a quantum adversary \mathcal{B} against the LWE_{k-m-l,m,l,\chi,q} assumption such that:

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{NMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{LWE}_{k-m-\ell,m,\ell,\chi,q}}(\mathcal{B}) + 8(Q_H+1)^2 \cdot \left(\frac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|} + \frac{|\mathcal{C}|^2(2\gamma+1)^{2k}}{q^m}\right) \quad .$$

To conclude this section, we introduce an additional assumption of a similar flavour as the SelfTargetMSIS assumption [KLS18], which allows to directly prove EU-NMA-security of FS[G + G, H] in the QROM as it is (up to LWE) the EU-NMA security game of the resulting signature. As for SelfTargetMSIS, this problem can be related in the ROM to SIS, using the special soundness property of the scheme.

Definition 10 (GpGSelfTargetSIS). Let $m \geq \ell > 0$, $k > m + \ell$. Let $\gamma > 0$ and $q > 2\gamma$ be an odd modulus. The GpGTargetSIS_{m,k,ℓ,γ,q} states that given a matrix $\mathbf{A} := (q\mathbf{J} - 2\mathbf{B}|2\mathbf{A}_1|2\mathbf{I}_m) \in \mathbb{Z}_{2q}^{m \times k}$, where $\mathbf{A}_1 \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times (k-m-\ell)})$ and $\mathbf{B} \leftarrow U(\mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times \ell})$, and oracle access to a hash function H, it is computationally hard to find $\mathbf{c} \in C$, $\mathbf{z} \in \mathbb{Z}^k$ and $\mu \in \{0,1\}^*$ such that $H(\mathbf{Az} - q\mathbf{Jc}, \mu) = \mathbf{c}$ and $\|\mathbf{z}\| \leq \gamma$.

3.5 Asymptotic Parameters Analysis

Our analysis above is applicable to the following instantiation of parameters, as a function of the security parameter λ and the number of signature queries Q_S . We assume Q_S to be a large polynomial in λ . We consider k, ℓ, m linear in λ . We set χ as $D_{\mathbb{Z},\sqrt{k}}$ with tailcutting to get samples in $\{-k,\ldots,0,\ldots,k\}$ with overwhelming probability. We let $\varepsilon = 1/Q_S$.

We make the security of the $\mathsf{G} + \mathsf{G}$ scheme rely on the following two assumptions. First, the $\mathsf{LWE}_{k-m-\ell,k,\ell,q,\chi}$ assumption, where $\sqrt{k} = \alpha q$. This LWE parametrization is compatible with the reduction from worst-case lattice problems from [Reg09]. Second, the $\mathsf{SIS}_{m,k,\beta}$ assumption, where $\beta = O(\sqrt{k\sigma})$. The SIS parametrization is compatible with the reductions from worst-case lattice problems from [MR07,GPV08] when $q \geq \Omega(\sqrt{k\beta})$. The hardness of both problems is balanced out when $\alpha \approx 1/\beta$. Further, the distribution of \mathbf{z} is centered Gaussian with standard deviation $\sigma = 4\sigma_1(\mathbf{S})\sqrt{\ln(\ell - 1 + 2\ell/\varepsilon)/\pi}$, which is $O(\sigma_1(\mathbf{S})\sqrt{\log(Q_S\lambda)})$. Moreover as $\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) = O(\lambda)$, the norm of \mathbf{z} is at most $\beta = O(\lambda^{3/2}\log^{1/2}Q_S)$. Finally, we set $q = \Theta(\lambda^2 \log^{1/2}Q_S)$.

The verification key and a signature respectively have bit-sizes $O(\lambda^2 \log \lambda)$ and $O(\lambda \log \lambda)$.

4 Optimizations and Concrete Parameters

In order to decrease the sizes of a lattice-based scheme, a common approach is to replace \mathbb{Z} with a cyclotomic polynomial ring of the form $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(1+x^n)$, where *n* is a power of 2, and to rely on the intractability of the module versions of SIS and LWE [BGV12,LS15]. Gaussian distributions are extended by considering the coefficients of the polynomials.

4.1 Description of the Module-Based Scheme

In this section, we propose parameters for an optimized, module version of the G + G signature, that we present in Figure 4.

As in Section 3, let m > 0, k > m + 1 and $\ell = 1$. Let $\mathbf{j} = (\zeta^*, 0, \dots, 0) \in \mathcal{R}^m$, where $\zeta = 1 + x^{n/2}$ and $\zeta^* = 1 - x^{n/2}$ satisfy $\zeta^* \zeta = 2 \mod 1 + x^n$. The challenge space is $\mathcal{R}/\zeta^*\mathcal{R}$. We let $\eta > 0$ and $\chi_{\eta} = U(\{y \in \mathcal{R} | \|y\|_{\infty} \le \eta\})$. Given $s \in \mathcal{R}$, we define $\operatorname{rot}(s)$ as the $n \times n$ matrix whose (i, j)-th entry is the coefficient of degree n - 1 - j of $x^i \cdot s \mod 1 + x^n$. This matrix maps the coefficient embedding of a polynomial c to the coefficient embedding of sc. We extend this definition to vectors coordinate-wise and we define $\Sigma(\mathbf{s}) = \Sigma(\operatorname{rot}(\mathbf{s}))$, where Σ is borrowed from Section 3. This gives rise to the signature scheme presented in Figure 4.

$KeyGen(1^{\lambda}):$	$Sign(\mathbf{A},\mathbf{s},\mu)$:	$Verify(\mathbf{A},\mu,\mathbf{z},c):$
1: $\mathbf{A}_0 \leftarrow U(\mathcal{R}_q^{m \times k - m - 1})$	1: $\mathbf{y} \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R}^k, \mathbf{\Sigma}(\mathbf{s})}$	1: $\mathbf{w} \leftarrow \mathbf{Az} - qc\mathbf{j} \mod 2q$
2: do $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2) \xleftarrow{q} \chi_{\eta}^{k-m-1} \times \chi_{\eta}^m$	^{<i>p</i>} 2: $\mathbf{w} \leftarrow \mathbf{Ay} \mod 2q$	2: if $c = H(w, \mu)$
3: $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow (1 \mathbf{s}_1^\top \mathbf{s}_2^\top)^\top \in \mathcal{R}_{2q}^k$	3: $c \leftarrow H(\mathbf{w}, \mu)$	3: and $\ \mathbf{z}\ \leq \gamma$ then
4: while $\ \zeta \mathbf{s}\ \ge S$	4: $u \leftrightarrow D_{\mathcal{R},s,-c/2}$	4: return 1
5: $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathbf{A}_0 \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{s}_2 \mod q$	5: $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow \mathbf{y} + (\zeta u + c)\mathbf{s}$	5: end if
6: $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow (-2\mathbf{b} + q\mathbf{j} 2\mathbf{A}_0 2\mathbf{I}_m)$	6: return (\mathbf{z}, c)	6: return 0
7: return $(vk, sk) = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{s})$		

Fig. 4. The Module G + G Signature Scheme.

Beyond relying on polynomial rings, we consider various improvements and optimizations, which we discuss now.

- **KeyGen:** The key generation step includes a rejection sampling step. The threshold S will be set such that about 50% of the keys will be rejected. This helps controlling the upper bound on the smoothing parameter of the secret lattice.
- Sign: Instead of computing $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y} + (2u + c)\mathbf{s}$, we compute $\mathbf{z} = \mathbf{y} + (\zeta u + c)\mathbf{s}$. As $\mathbf{As} = \mathbf{j} \mod 2q$, we have $\zeta \mathbf{As} = \mathbf{0} \mod 2q$ by definition of \mathbf{j} . Thus, the identity $\mathbf{Az} - qc\mathbf{j} = \mathbf{Ay} \mod 2q$ still holds. The main advantage of this modification is that the secret lattice is now $\zeta \mathbf{sR}$ instead of $2\mathbf{sR}$, whose smoothing parameter is a factor $\sqrt{2}$ smaller.
- **Verify:** The verification bound is set to $\gamma = 1.01 \cdot \sqrt{nk\sigma}$, and the signer may verify that its signature is accepted before outputting it, up to restarting in the somewhat rare event that it is not.

An analysis similar to the one from the previous section would bring the following result. We omit the QROM analysis relying on the lossy-soundness, as the concrete parameters we propose in the next section are outside of the parameters range required for this analysis to hold.

Theorem 5. Let n > 0 be a power of two defining a polynomial ring $\mathcal{R} = \mathbb{Z}[x]/(x^n + 1)$. Let m > 0, k > m + 1, $\varepsilon \in (0, 1/2]$, $s \ge \sqrt{2\ln(n - 1 + 2n/\varepsilon)/\pi}$ and $\sigma \ge \sqrt{2}\sigma_1(\mathbf{S}) \cdot s$ for all $\mathbf{S} \in \mathbb{Z}^{kn \times n}$ in the range of $\operatorname{rot}(\mathsf{IGen})$. Let γ and ε_c be such that $\operatorname{Pr}_{\mathbf{z} \leftrightarrow D_{\mathcal{R}^k,\sigma}}[\|\mathbf{z}\| > \gamma] \le \varepsilon_c/3$. Let $q > \max(2\gamma, \sigma \cdot \eta_{\varepsilon}(\mathbb{Z}^{mn}))$ be an odd modulus.

Then the signature scheme from Figure 4 is ε_c -correct and EU-CMA-secure in the ROM under the $\mathsf{MSIS}_{n,m,k,q,2\gamma}$ assumption. Namely, for any adversary \mathcal{A} against the EU-CMA security of $\mathsf{FS}[\mathsf{G} + \mathsf{G}, H]$ making at most Q_S sign queries and at most Q_H hash queries, there is an adversary \mathcal{B} against the $\mathsf{MSIS}_{n,m,k,q,2\gamma}$ assumption such that:

$$\begin{split} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) &\leq \left(\frac{1+\varepsilon}{1-\varepsilon}\right)^{Q_S} \left[Q_H \cdot \left(\sqrt{\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{MSIS}_{n,m,k,q,2\gamma}}(\mathcal{B})} + \frac{2}{|\mathcal{C}|}\right) \right] \\ &+ 3Q_S/2 \cdot \sqrt{(Q_H + Q_S + 1) \cdot s^{-mn}} \ . \end{split}$$

This bound holds when \mathcal{A} is an adversary against the sEU-CMA security of the scheme by adding an extra " $+Q_S \cdot s^{-m}$ " term on the right hand side.

4.2 Concrete Parameters

We now give concrete parameters and estimates of the public key and signature sizes resulting from these optimizations in Table 1. This gives rise to the following estimates. The script we used is derived from the one provided with Dilithium [DKL⁺18] and is available as supplementary material. We made the following additional assumptions:

• We use the compression technique from [BG14] to get rid of the lower $\log \alpha$ bits of the signature, except the lowest.⁴ The hint resulting from the compression technique is assumed to follow a Gaussian distribution whose standard

⁴ As our key generation algorithm outputs a **A** with $2\mathbf{I}_m$, what we cut is cyclically bit-shifted.

deviation is $\sqrt{2\sigma/\alpha}$. The technique presented in [DKL⁺18] can be readily adapted to the mod 2q setting. This comes at the cost of increasing the verification bound to $\gamma = 1.01 \cdot \sqrt{nk\sigma} + \sqrt{nm}(1 + \alpha/4)$ to take into account the inaccuracy of the commitment recovered by the verifier.

• The final signature is compressed using range Asymmetric Numeral System, as explained in [ETWY22]. For simplicity, we assume that this gives expected bitsizes equal to the entropy of the compressed vector.

120	180	260
256	256	256
95233	50177	202753
23.33	27.59	32.97
14.22	14.22	14.22
331.91	392.57	469.12
13885.1830	18857.9404	33367.4202
(2,4)	(3,5)	(4,7)
1	1	1
128	128	1024
415 (338)	619(512)	924 (777)
121 (98)	181(149)	270(227)
106 (86)	159(131)	237(199)
411	615	895
120	179	261
105	158	230
1542	2033	2518
1120	1568	2336
2662	3601	4854
1903	2473	3461
800	1056	1760
2703	3529	5221
1463	2337	2908
992	1472	2080
	$\begin{array}{c} 256\\ 95233\\ 23.33\\ 14.22\\ 331.91\\ 13885.1830\\ (2,4)\\ 1\\ 128\\ 415\ (338)\\ 121\ (98)\\ 106\ (86)\\ 411\\ 120\\ 105\\ 1542\\ 1120\\ 2662\\ 1903\\ 800\\ 2703\\ 1463\\ \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{ c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c c$

Table 1. Parameter sets for the Module G + G signature scheme. Numbers in parentheses for SIS security are for strong unforgeability.

For comparison, we include in Table 1 a reminder on estimated sizes of optimized Lyubashevsky signatures from [DFPS22], in the hyperball setting, as well as the experimental sizes of Haetae [CCD⁺23], which implements the bimodal hyperball. As far as we are aware of, these are the lowest signatures and key sizes provided in the literature for Lyubashevsky's signatures (when using the core-SVP hardness methodology to estimate security). We note that the resulting signature sizes are 20% to 30% smaller than those from [DFPS22]. The asymptotic gain of our signature is observable when comparing the signature sizes with Haetae, as the tradeoff is first in their favor but ends up in our favor for the higher security level, up to 16% of savings. However, the sum of the public key and the signature sizes is somewhat similar across the three signatures. This is due to the fact that in the non-bimodal setting, a practical optimization due to $[DKL^+18]$ consists in truncating the low bits of the public key, at the cost of increasing the verification bound. While such a technique is also implemented in Haetae, its efficiency is relative in this setting, and we chose not to incorporate it in G + G for the sake of simplicity.

4.3 Optimized NTRU Key Generation Algorithm

We can alternatively use the NTRU-based key generation algorithm described in [DDLL13]. In our setting, it is possible to improve it, by relying on the aforementioned technique based on the divisibility of 2 by $(1 + x^{n/2})$. This leads to the key generation algorithm presented in Figure 5.

 $\begin{array}{l} \displaystyle \frac{\mathsf{KeyGen}(1^{\lambda}):}{1: \ \mathbf{do} \ (f,g)} \leftarrow U(\{\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{R}^2[\|\mathbf{x}\|_{\infty} \leq \eta\})\\ 2: \ \mathbf{while} \ \|(\zeta f|2x^{n/2}g + \zeta)\| \geq S \ \mathrm{or} \ f \ \mathrm{non-invertible} \ \mathrm{mod} \ q\\ 3: \ \mathbf{h} \leftarrow [\zeta g + 1]/f \ \mathrm{mod} \ q\\ 4: \ \mathbf{A} \leftarrow (\zeta^*(q-1)h \mid \zeta^*) \ \mathrm{mod} \ 2q\\ 5: \ \mathbf{s} \leftarrow (f \mid \zeta g + 1)^{\top}\\ 6: \ \mathbf{return} \ \mathsf{vk} = \mathbf{A} \ \mathrm{and} \ \mathsf{sk} = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{s}) \end{array}$

Fig. 5. NTRU KeyGen for G + G

The algorithm outputs keys **A** and (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{s}) satisfying $\mathbf{As} = \zeta^* q \mod 2q$ as it holds that $(q-1)hf = (q-1)(\zeta g+1) \mod 2q$ since (q-1) is even. This implies that $\zeta \mathbf{As} = 0 \mod 2q$, and the lattice that needs to be smoothed out is $\zeta \mathbf{s} \mathcal{R}$ where $\zeta \mathbf{s}^\top = (\zeta f | 2x^{n/2}g + \zeta)$. We then propose two sets of parameters in Table 2, for ring dimensions 512 and 1024. The former leads to only around 90 bits of security, but the latter allows to reach NIST security level III. While the sum $|\mathbf{vk}| + |\mathbf{sig}|$ is similar to those of the other schemes, we note that the signature size is further decreased, compared to module $\mathbf{G} + \mathbf{G}$. The resulting signature is 40% smaller than [DFPS22] and 55% smaller than Dilithium.

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Target Security	90	180	
n	512	1024	
q	32257	45569	
S	43.73	36.11	
KeyGen acceptance rate	0.25	0.5	
S	14.32	14.42	
σ	626.49	520.75	
В	21719.152	40218.387	
η	2	1	
α	256	2048	
BKZ block-size b to break SIS	314 (238)	740 (622)	
Best Known Classical bit-cost	91 (69)	216 (181)	
Best Known Quantum bit-cost	80 (61)	190 (159)	
BKZ block-size b to break LWE	305	616	
Best Known Classical bit-cost	89	180	
Best Known Quantum bit-cost	78	158	
Signature size with rANS	974	1497	
Expected public key size	992	2080	
Sum	1966	3577	
Table 2 Parameter Sets for NTRU $G + G$			

Table 2. Parameter Sets for NTRU G + G.

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A The Fiat-Shamir Transform

In this section, we recall the Fiat-Shamir transform, which allows to transform an identification scheme into a digital signature. It removes interaction by sampling the challenge as a hash function evaluation $H(w, \mu)$ with w being the prover's commitment and μ the signed message. The hash function is then modeled as a random oracle in the analysis. The signature is the pair (w, z), which is verified by checking validity of the transcript $(w, H(w, \mu), z)$.

As the challenge c being typically much shorter than w, it is desirable to replace w by c in the signature. This is possible if the underlying identification scheme is commitment-recoverable (see Definition 2). Verification simply starts by recovering $w \leftarrow \text{Rec}(vk, c, z)$. Our protocol satisfies this property, thus we describe the signature obtained applying this version of the Fiat-Shamir transform. See Figure 6.

$KeyGen(1^{\lambda}):$	$Sign(sk,\mu):$	$Verify(vk,(c,z),\mu):$
$1: \; (vk, sk) \leftarrow IGen(1^{\lambda})$	1: $(w, st) \leftarrow P_1(sk)$	1: $w \leftarrow Rec(vk, c, z)$
2: return vk and sk	2: $c \leftarrow H(w, \mu)$	2: if $c \neq H(w, \mu)$ then
	3: $z \leftarrow P_2(sk,st,w,c)$	3: return 0
	4: return (c, z)	4: end if
		5: return $V(vk, (w, c, z))$

Fig. 6. Fiat-Shamir Signature FS[ID, H].

For the sake of completeness, we state the following lemma arguing correctness of the signature scheme FS[ID, H], which immediately follows from the completeness and commitment-recoverability of the underlying identification scheme.

Lemma 8. Let ID = (IGen, P, V) denote an identification scheme. Further assume that ID is ε -complete and commitment-recoverable. Then the signature scheme FS[ID, H] described in Figure 6 is ε -correct in the ROM.

Security of FS[ID, H] can be proven by successive claims. First, one can reduce EU-CMA security of FS[ID, H] to its EU-NMA security assuming ID has large commitment min-entropy and is honest-verifier zero-knowledge (see Definition 3). This can be shown by relying on the following theorem.

Theorem 6 (Adapted from [GHHM21, Theorem 3]). Let ID be an identification scheme which has α -min-entropy and satisfies ε -statistical HVZK. Let H a hash function modeled as a random oracle. Then, for any (possibly quantum) adversary A against the EU-CMA security of FS[ID, H] making at most Q_S (classical) sign queries and at most Q_H (possibly quantum) hash queries, there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} against the EU-NMA security of FS[ID, H] such that:

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{NMA}}(\mathcal{B}) + Q_S \varepsilon + 3\frac{Q_S}{2} \cdot \sqrt{(Q_H + Q_S + 1) \cdot 2^{-\alpha}}$$

Furthermore, if ID is $(1 + \varepsilon)$ -divergence HVZK, the following bound applies:

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{CMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq (1+\varepsilon)^{Q_S} \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{NMA}}(\mathcal{B}) + 3Q_S/2 \cdot \sqrt{(Q_H+Q_S+1) \cdot 2^{-\alpha}} \ .$$

The result can be adapted to sEU-CMA security by adding $Q_S 2^{-\alpha}$ to the bounds.

It remains to prove EU-NMA-security to conclude the security analysis, which can be argued via the following statement for lossy identification schemes (see Definition 4).

Theorem 7 ([KLS18, Theorem 3.4]). Let ID be a lossy identification scheme satisfying ε_{ls} -lossy soundness for some $\varepsilon_{ls} > 0$. Let H a hash function modeled as a random oracle. For any (possibly quantum) adversary \mathcal{A} against the EU-NMA security of FS[ID, H] making at most Q_H (possibly quantum) hash queries, there exists a quantum adversary \mathcal{B} against the lossiness of ID such that

 $\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{NMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{lossiness}}(\mathcal{B}) + 8(Q_H + 1)^2 \cdot \varepsilon_{\mathsf{ls}} \ .$

Finally, we describe a reduction in the (classical) ROM which relies on weaker properties compared to the above QROM reduction. Various folklore reductions are known in this setting, and we consider a variant based on special soundness (see Definition 5), which is first reduced to the soundness as recalled below.

Definition 11 (Soundness). Let ID = (Igen, P, V) be an identification scheme. It is sound if for any PPT adversary A, the quantity

$$\Pr\left[\mathsf{V}(\mathsf{vk},(w,c,z))=1 \mid (w,c,z) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}(\mathsf{vk})\right]$$

is $negl(\lambda)$, where the probability is over the choice of vk and the coins of A.

We recall the Reset Lemma, which is a standard reduction between soundness and special soundness.

Lemma 9 (Reset Lemma [BP02]). Let ID = (Igen, P, V) be an identification scheme. Given any adversary A against the soundness of ID, there exists an adversary B against the special soundness of ID such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{special}-\mathsf{sound}}(\mathcal{B}) \geq \left(\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sound}}(\mathcal{A}) - rac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|}
ight)^2.$$

While this result is folklore, we finally show that special soundness implies EU-NMA security in the ROM.

Lemma 10. Let ID be an identification scheme and H a hash function modeled as a random oracle. For any adversary \mathcal{A} against the EU-NMA security of FS[ID, H] making Q_H classical hash queries, there exists an adversary \mathcal{B} against the special soundness of ID such that:

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{NMA}}(\mathcal{A}) \leq Q_H \cdot \left(\sqrt{\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{special}-\mathsf{sound}}(\mathcal{B})} + \frac{2}{|\mathcal{C}|}\right) \ .$$

Proof. We first reduce the soundness of ID to the EU-NMA security of FS[ID, H]. First, if \mathcal{A} outputs a forgery $(\mu^*, (c^*, z^*))$ such that $H(\text{Rec}(\mathsf{vk}, c^*, z^*), \mu^*)$ was never queried, it has probability at most $1/|\mathcal{C}|$ of outputting a valid forgery.

The reduction \mathcal{B}' guesses the hash query $H(w^*, \mu^*)$ made by \mathcal{A} which is used in \mathcal{A} 's forgery. When this query is made, \mathcal{B}' answers it by running sending w^* as commitments to its challenger. The latter replies with a challenge c^* and \mathcal{B}' programs $H(w^*, \mu^*)$ as c^* . With probability $1/Q_H$, \mathcal{B}' 's guess is correct and the adversary \mathcal{A} halts with a forgery $(\mu^*, (c^*, z^*))$ with $\operatorname{Rec}(\mathsf{vk}, c^*, z^*) = w^*$. We then have

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sound}}(\mathcal{B}') \geq rac{1}{Q_H} \cdot \mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{EU}-\mathsf{NMA}}(\mathcal{A}) - 1/|\mathcal{C}|$$
 .

Finally, Lemma 9 gives an adversary \mathcal{B} against the special soundness such that

$$\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{special}-\mathsf{sound}}(\mathcal{B}) \geq \left(\mathsf{Adv}^{\mathsf{sound}}(\mathcal{B}') - \frac{1}{|\mathcal{C}|}\right)^2,$$

which completes the proof.

B Related Work

In Figure 7, we give a simplified version of the Eagle signature scheme described in [YJW23] (with our notations from Section 4 and an extra parameter $\gamma' > 0$). Minor differences with the scheme from Figure 4 include the facts that Eagle works in the ring setting as opposed to the module setting, that a parameterizable integer p is considered while we work with p = 2, and that the RLWE sample from Eagle is computed modulo Q = pq, while we use MLWE samples computed modulo q. The exact signing algorithm from [YJW23] is omitting some elements of the final vector z to optimize compactness, but we do not consider this optimization to better illustrate the relationship with G + G. Moreover, as usual in hash-and-sign schemes, the message is padded using some salt, chosen as a uniform 320-bit long bitstring.

 $\mathsf{Verify}(\mathbf{A},\mu,\sigma)$ KeyGen (1^{λ}) : $\mathsf{Sign}(\mathbf{A},\mathbf{s},\mu){:}$ 1: $\mathbf{a}_0 \leftrightarrow U(\mathcal{R}_q)$ 1: salt $\leftrightarrow U(\{0,1\}^{320})$ 1: $\sigma = (\mathsf{salt}, \mathbf{z})$ 2: $(\mathbf{s}_1, \mathbf{s}_2) \leftarrow \chi_{\eta} \times \chi_{\eta}$ 2: $u \leftarrow H(\mu, \mathsf{salt})$ 2: $\mathbf{S} = \mathsf{rot}(\mathbf{s})$ 3: $\mathbf{s} \leftarrow (1|\mathbf{s}_1|\mathbf{s}_2)^\top \in \mathcal{R}^3_{2a}$ 3: $\mathbf{y} \leftrightarrow D_{\mathcal{R}^3, \sigma^2 \mathbf{I}_{3n} - 4s^2 \mathbf{SS}^\top}$ 3: $z' \leftarrow u - \mathbf{Az}$ 4: Accept if $\|\mathbf{z}\| \leq \gamma$ 4: $\mathbf{b} \leftarrow \mathbf{a}_0 \mathbf{s}_1 + \mathbf{s}_2 \mod Q$ $4:\ u \leftarrow H'(\mu, \mathsf{salt})$ 5: $\mathbf{A} \leftarrow (q - \mathbf{b} | \mathbf{a}_0 | 1)$ and $||z'|| \leq \gamma'$ 5: $u' \leftarrow u - \mathbf{Ay} \mod Q$ 6: return $(vk, sk) = (\mathbf{A}, \mathbf{s})$ 6: $c \leftarrow \lfloor u' \rceil_q$ 7: $k \leftarrow D_{\mathcal{R},s,-c/2}$ 8: $\mathbf{z} \leftarrow \mathbf{y} + \mathbf{S}c + p\mathbf{S}k$ 9: return (salt, z)

Fig. 7. Simplified Eagle Signature Scheme.

We now explain how to decompose Eagle as an instance of G + G with a specific hash function, as well as the differences that arise during verification due to this hash function, following the steps of [CLMQ21]. The instance of the hash function H that turns the signing algorithm of G + G into a simplified version of Eagle is described in Steps 3, 4 and 5 of the signing algorithm from Figure 7. It proceeds as follows. On input $w \in \mathcal{R}$, μ and salt, the function H computes a target $u = H'(\mu, \text{salt})$ using another hash function H' and sets u' = u - w. The challenge is then $\lfloor u' \rfloor_q$, i.e., a rounding of u' to the $q\mathcal{R}$ lattice.

The verification algorithm differs substantially due to the fact that Verify is aware of the inner workings of the hash function. It knows in particular that $\mathbf{Az} = \mathbf{Ay} + qc \mod Q \approx u$. However, the challenge c is omitted from the signature and instead of checking that $H(\mathbf{Az} - qc, \mu, \mathbf{salt}) = c$, it checks that $u - \mathbf{Az}$ is sufficiently short, i.e., has norm smaller than γ' . While this check is less accurate than recomputing the hash value, it allows one to omit c in the signature, hence reducing its size. Finally, the verification algorithm also checks that \mathbf{z} has norm $\leq \gamma$, as in Figure 4.