# Key Committing Security Analysis of AEGIS

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**Abstract.** Recently, there has been a surge of interest in the security of authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) within the context of key commitment frameworks. Security within this framework ensures that a ciphertext chosen by an adversary does not decrypt to two different sets of key, nonce, and associated data. Despite this increasing interest, the security of several widely deployed AEAD schemes has not been thoroughly examined within this framework. In this work, we assess the key committing security of AEGIS, which emerged as a winner in the Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR). A recent assertion has been made suggesting that there are no known attacks on AEGIS in the key committing settings and AEGIS qualifies as a fully committing AEAD scheme in IETF document. However, contrary to this claim, we propose a novel O(1) attack applicable to all variants of AEGIS. This demonstrates the ability to execute a key committing attack within the FROB game setting, which is known to be one of the most stringent key committing frameworks. This implies that our attacks also hold validity in other, more relaxed frameworks, such as CMT-1, CMT-4, and so forth.

Keywords: AEGIS  $\cdot$  Key Commitment

### 1 Introduction

Authenticated Encryption (AE) is a cryptographic technique that combines encryption and message authentication codes (MACs) to provide both confidentiality and integrity for data. It ensures that not only is the information kept secret from unauthorized parties, but also that it has not been tampered with during transit. AEGIS, proposed by Wu and Preneel [WP13a], is one such scheme and its variant AEGIS-128 emerged as one of the winning candidate of Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness (CAESAR) [cae19] for high performance computing applications.

The traditional focus of designers in authenticated encryption with associated data (AEAD) has been on ensuring the security aspects of confidentiality and ciphertext integrity. However, in recent years it is witnessed that the previously established notions of confidentiality and integrity may not suffice in various contexts. Among the additional properties explored is the concept of authenticated encryption (AE) key commitment, an area that has received relatively less attention.

Key commitment assures that a ciphertext C can only be decrypted using the same key that was originally used to derive C from some plaintext. Schemes that allow finding a ciphertext that decrypts to valid plaintexts under two different keys do not adhere to the principle of key commitment. The issue of non-key-committing AEAD was initially highlighted in scenarios such as moderation within encrypted messaging [DGRW18, GLR17]. Subsequently, it surfaced in various applications including password-based encryption [LGR21], password-based key exchange [LGR21], key rotation schemes [ADG<sup>+</sup>22], and envelope encryption [ADG<sup>+</sup>22]. In even more recent times, there have been new propositions [CR22, BH22] introducing definitions that focus on committing to not only the key, but also the associated data and nonce. Although there have been suggestions for novel schemes [CR22, ADG<sup>+</sup>22] that align with these diverse definitions, uncertainties persist regarding which existing AEAD schemes actually implement this commitment, and in what manner. Furthermore, several crucial and widely-used AEAD schemes lack demonstrated commitment results. Recently, commitment attacks are mounted on several widely deployed AEAD schemes, like CCM, GCM, OCB3, etc [MLGR23].

In this work, we assess the key committing security of AEGIS. A recent assertion has been made suggesting that there are no known attacks on AEGIS in the key committing settings [DL23a] and AEGIS qualifies as a fully committing AEAD scheme [MST23]. The challenge of attacking the key committing security of AEGIS is also acknowledged as an open problem in [Kö22]. In [DL23a], it is claimed that finding a collision on a 128-bit tag for variants of AEGIS requires  $O(2^{64})$  computations, while for a 256-bit tag, it requires  $O(2^{128})$  computations. These claims are made under the assumption that AEGIS is fully committing. However, contrary to all these claims, we demonstrate the ability to execute a key committing attack within the FROB game setting [FOR17], which is known to be one of the most stringent key committing frameworks. Thus, we are able to find collisions on tags with a complexity of O(1). This implies that our attacks also hold validity in other, more relaxed frameworks, such as CMT-1, CMT-4, and so forth.

We have informed our results to the authors of IETF document, Denis and Lucas. They have confirmed our results and will update the IETF document accordingly [DL23b].

### 2 Preliminaries

#### 2.1 Committing Authenticated Encryption (AE) Framework

Consider a symmetric encryption scheme  $\Sigma$  consisting of encryption and decryption algorithms denoted by  $\Sigma_{Enc}$  and  $\Sigma_{Enc}$ , respectively where

$$\Sigma_{Enc}: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{M} \to \mathcal{C},$$

and

$$\Sigma_{Dec}: \mathcal{K} \times \mathcal{N} \times \mathcal{A} \times \mathcal{C} \to \mathcal{M} \cup \{\bot\}$$

Here,  $\mathcal{K}$ ,  $\mathcal{N}$ ,  $\mathcal{A}$ ,  $\mathcal{M}$  and  $\mathcal{C}$  refer to the key, nonce, associated data, message and ciphertext spaces, respectively. Formally, the above scheme is called as a *nonce based authenticated encryption scheme supporting associated data*, or an nAE scheme.

A committing authenticated encryption (cAE) scheme guarantees the definitive determination of the values of its constituent elements, including the key, nonce, associated data, or message, which are utilized to produce the ciphertext. In the committing AE framework, the adversary tries to construct a ciphertext which can be obtained from two different sets of keys, nonces, associated data and messages. Let,  $C_i \leftarrow \Sigma_{Enc}(K_i, N_i, A_i, M_i)$  where  $K_i \in \mathcal{K}, N_i \in \mathcal{N}, A_i \in \mathcal{A}, M_i \in \mathcal{M}$  and  $C_i \in \mathcal{C}$  for  $i \in \{1, 2\}$ . The adversary aims to find  $C_1, C_2$  such that  $C_1 = C_2$  and  $(K_1, N_1, A_1, M_1) \neq (K_2, N_2, A_2, M_2)$ .

Various notions of committing security framework have been introduced [FOR17, CR22, BH22]. In the context of this work, we discuss here some of them. In CMT-1, the ciphertext commits exclusively to the key. In the attack scenario, the adversary must produce  $((K_1, N_1, A_1, M_1), (K_2, N_2, A_2, M_2))$  such that  $K_1 \neq K_2$  and  $\Sigma_{Enc}(K_1, N_1, A_1, M_1) = \Sigma_{Enc}(K_2, N_2, A_2, M_2)$ . CMT-4 relaxes the constraints and allows that the commitment can encompass to any of the inputs of  $\Sigma_{Enc}$ , not just the key. The adversary can breach CMT-4 security by constructing a set  $((K_1, N_1, A_1, M_1), (K_2, N_2, A_2, M_2))$  such that,  $(K_1, N_1, A_1, M_1) = (K_2, N_2, A_2, M_2)$  and  $\Sigma_{Enc}(K_1, N_1, A_1, M_1) = \Sigma_{Enc}(K_2, N_2, A_2, M_2)$ .

#### **FROB** $(\mathcal{A})$

- 1.  $(C, (K_1, N_1, A_1), (K_2, N_2, A_2)) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}$
- 2.  $M_1 \leftarrow \Sigma_{Dec}(K_1, N_1, A_1, C)$
- 3.  $M_2 \leftarrow \Sigma_{Dec}(K_2, N_2, A_2, C)$
- 4. If  $M_1 = \bot$  or  $M_2 = \bot$  then Return false
- 5. If  $K_1 = K_2$  or  $N_1 \neq N_2$  then Return false
- 6. Return true

#### (a) FROB Game

#### $CMT-3(\mathcal{A})$

- 1.  $(C, (K_1, N_1, A_1), (K_2, N_2, A_2)) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}$
- 2.  $M_1 \leftarrow \Sigma_{Dec}(K_1, N_1, A_1, C)$
- 3.  $M_2 \leftarrow \Sigma_{Dec}(K_2, N_2, A_2, C)$
- 4. If  $M_1 = \bot$  or  $M_2 = \bot$  then Return false
- 5. If  $(K_1, N_1, A_1) = (K_2, N_2, A_2)$ then Return false
- 6. Return true

## $\underline{\text{CMT-1}(\mathcal{A})}$

- 1.  $(C, (K_1, N_1, A_1), (K_2, N_2, A_2)) \xleftarrow{\$} \mathcal{A}$
- 2.  $M_1 \leftarrow \Sigma_{Dec}(K_1, N_1, A_1, C)$
- 3.  $M_2 \leftarrow \Sigma_{Dec}(K_2, N_2, A_2, C)$
- 4. If  $M_1 = \bot$  or  $M_2 = \bot$  then Return false
- 5. If  $K_1 = K_2$  then Return false
- 6. Return true

#### (b) CMT-1 Game

#### $CMT-4(\mathcal{A})$

- 1.  $(C, (K_1, N_1, A_1), (K_2, N_2, A_2)) \stackrel{\$}{\leftarrow} \mathcal{A}$
- 2.  $M_1 \leftarrow \Sigma_{Dec}(K_1, N_1, A_1, C)$
- 3.  $M_2 \leftarrow \Sigma_{Dec}(K_2, N_2, A_2, C)$
- 4. If  $M_1 = \bot$  or  $M_2 = \bot$  then Return false
- 5. If  $(K_1, N_1, A_1, M_1) = (K_2, N_2, A_2, M_2)$ then Return false
- 6. Return true

(c) CMT-3 Game

(d) CMT-4 Game

Figure 1: Different Frameworks for Key Commiting Security.

Bellare and Hoang introduced CMT-3, which is slightly more restrictive than CMT-4. They replaced the constraint  $(K_1, N_1, A_1, M_1) = (K_2, N_2, A_2, M_2)$  with  $(K_1, N_1, A_1) = (K_2, N_2, A_2)$ . The FROB game, initially proposed by Farshim, Orlandi, and Rosie [FOR17] and later adapted to the AEAD setting by Grubbs, Lu, and Ristenpart [GLR17], is even more restrictive. It requires the condition  $N_1 \neq N_2$  in addition to  $K_1 = K_2$ . It has been demonstrated that CMT-3 security implies CMT-1, which in turn implies the FROB game [BH22, MLGR23]. In essence, the FROB game presents the most formidable challenge for an adversary to overcome. All the related games are outlined in Fig. 1.

#### 2.2 Description of AEGIS

The authenticated encryption scheme AEGIS was introduced in SAC 2013 [WP13a]. It encompasses three variants: AEGIS-128 (AEGIS-128 emerged as a finalist in the CAESAR competition [cae19]), AEGIS-256, and AEGIS-128L. Across all these variants, the state update function involves a single round of AES denoted as AR(X, Y), where X and Y represent 16-byte states. Specifically,  $AR(X, Y) = MC \circ SR \circ SB(X) \oplus Y$ , where MC, SR, and SB denote the mixcolumns, shiftrows, and subbytes operations, respectively. For

more details on these operations refer to [DR00, DR02].

The state update function of AEGIS-128 and AEGIS-256 involves updating the 16-byte state  $S_i$  with a 16-byte message block  $m_i$  to yield the state  $S_{i+1}$ . This operation is expressed as:

$$S_{i+1,0} = AR(S_{i,b-1}, S_{i,0} \oplus m_i)$$
  

$$S_{i+1,1} = AR(S_{i,0}, S_{i,1})$$
  

$$\vdots$$
  

$$S_{i+1,b-1} = AR(S_{i,b-2}, S_{i,b-1}).$$

For AEGIS-128 and AEGIS-256, the value of b is 5 and 6, respectively, resulting in state sizes of 80 bytes and 96 bytes, respectively.

The state update function of AEGIS-256 differs slightly from the other two, using two 16-byte message blocks  $m_{i,0}$  and  $m_{i,1}$  instead of one. The computation is as follows:

$$\begin{split} S_{i+1,0} &= AR(S_{i,7}, S_{i,0} \oplus m_{i,0}) \\ S_{i+1,1} &= AR(S_{i,0}, S_{i,1}) \\ S_{i+1,2} &= AR(S_{i,1}, S_{i,2}) \\ S_{i+1,3} &= AR(S_{i,2}, S_{i,3}) \\ S_{i+1,4} &= AR(S_{i,3}, S_{i,4} \oplus m_{i,1}) \\ S_{i+1,5} &= AR(S_{i,4}, S_{i,5}) \\ S_{i+1,6} &= AR(S_{i,5}, S_{i,6}) \\ S_{i+1,7} &= AR(S_{i,6}, S_{i,7}). \end{split}$$

In the initialization phase, the state of AEGIS is loaded with a 128-bit key K, a 128-bit initialization vector IV, and some constants. For AEGIS-128 and AEGIS-128L, the sizes of K and IV are 128 bits, while for AEGIS-256, they are 256 bits. The state update function is iterated 10 times for AEGIS-128 and AEGIS-128L, and 16 times for AEGIS-256.

Following this, based on the lengths of the associated data and plaintext, the states undergo further updates. The associated data and plaintext are encrypted concurrently with the state update function. After each step of the state update function, a 128-bit block of associated data/plaintext is encrypted for AEGIS-128 and AEGIS-256 (for AEGIS-128L, two 128-bit blocks are encrypted at each step).

Finally, during tag generation, the state update function is iterated for 7 rounds. The message bit depends on the lengths of the plaintext and associated data, encoded as 64-bit strings, along with a portion of the previous state. All the 128-bit substates of the final state are XOR-ed to obtain the tag. For more comprehensive details on AEGIS, please refer to [WP13a, WP13b, WP16].

## 3 Attacks

#### 3.1 Attack Overview

Initially, let's introduce an alternative perspective on the state updating process of AEGIS. Since the state update relies on the key, IV, associated data (AD), and plaintext at various stages, we can view the entire process as illustrated in Fig.2. As explained in Section2.2, the initialization phase is contingent on the key K and the initialization vector IV. Therefore, the complete state update process during this phase can be denoted as  $\mathcal{U}_{K,IV}$ , which

transforms the initial state  $IS_0$  into  $IS_1$ . Subsequently,  $\mathcal{U}_A$  and  $\mathcal{U}_P$  alter the internal states  $IS_1$  and  $IS_2$  into  $IS_2$  and  $IS_3$  respectively, based on the associated data A and plaintext P. Finally, contingent on the lengths of A and P,  $\mathcal{U}_{|P|,|A|}$  transforms  $IS_3$  into  $IS_4$ .




Figure 2: State updatation as a function of key, initialization vector, associated data and plaintext.

We are specifically interested in analyzing the FROB security of AEGIS. As outlined in Section 2.1, the adversary is required to generate a ciphertext (ciphertext and tag pair) which decrypts to valid plaintexts using two different sets of keys and same IV. Let's consider two sets of key, IV, AD, and plaintext, denoted as  $(K_1, IV_1, A_1, P_1)$  and  $(K_2, IV_2, A_2, P_2)$ . These sets are used to create ciphertext-tag pairs  $C_1||T_1$  and  $C_2||T_2$ respectively. Note that,  $K_1 \neq K_2$  and  $IV_1 = IV_2$ .




Figure 3: Overview of the attack in FROB framework

As depicted in Fig. 3, we need to find a  $A^*$  such that  $\mathcal{U}_{A^*}$  transforms  $IS_1^2$  to  $IS_2^1$ . If  $|A^*| = |A_1|$  (the plaintext is  $P_1$ ), the final state  $IS_4^1$  can be obtained which results in generating the ciphertext-tag pair  $C_1||T_1$ . Consequently, the tuples  $(K_1, IV_1, A_1, P_1)$  and  $(K_2, IV_2, A^*, P_1)$  yield the same ciphertext-tag pair, thereby compromising the FROB security of AEGIS. Hence, the adversary is required to find an  $A^*$  such that  $|A^*| = |A_1|$ .

#### 3.2 Attacks on AEGIS

In this subsection, we primarily focus on the recovery of the associated data  $A^*$  in the case of AEGIS-128. The recovery of  $A^*$  for AEGIS-256 and AEGIS-128L follows a similar strategy.

Please refer to Fig. 4 for an overview of the attack. Corresponding to the discussion in Section 3.1 and Fig. 3, the states  $S_{i,0}||S_{i,1}||S_{i,2}||S_{i,3}||S_{i,4}$  and  $S_{i+5,0}||S_{i+5,1}||S_{i+5,2}||S_{i+5,3}||S_{i+5,4}|$  can be considered as  $IS_1^2$  and  $IS_2^1$ , respectively.

Let  $A^* = A_0^* ||A_1^*||A_2^*||A_3^*||A_4^*$ , where each  $A_j^*$  (for  $0 \le j \le 4$ ) is a 16-byte block. Based on the values of the substates  $Si, 0, \dots, Si, 4$ , some of the internal substates' values can be fixed (indicated by the red rectangles in Fig. 4).

Now, when the value of  $S_{i+5,4}$  is fixed, it deterministically establishes the internal substates  $S_{i+k+1,k}$  for  $0 \le k \le 3$  (indicated by the blue rectangles in Fig. 4). The values of  $S_{i,0}$ ,  $S_{i,4}$ , and  $S_{i+1,0}$  deterministically determine the value of  $A^0$ . In general, by fixing the value of  $S_{i+5,k}$ ,  $A_{4-k}^*$  can be determined. Hence, the complete  $A^*$  can be deterministically recovered.




Figure 4: Attack on AEGIS-128

By following the similar strategy,  $A^*$  can be recovered for both AEGIS-256 and AEGIS-128L. The attack strategy corresponding to AEGIS-256 and AEGIS-128L are outlined

in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6, respectively. The attack vectors corresponding to the attack on AEGIS-128, AEGIS-256 and AEGIS-128L are provided in Appendix A.1, A.2 and A.3, respectively.




Figure 5: Attack on AEGIS-256

# 4 Conclusion

The issue of key commitment security in AEGIS has been a significant and persisting question. This work addresses this gap by conducting a thorough analysis of AEGIS. Our analysis, considering various existing frameworks, culminated in the development of a O(1) attack applicable to all variants of AEGIS. However, in frameworks where an additional constraint of identical associated data is imposed (i. e.,  $A_1 = A_2$ ), the proposed attacks will not be effective. These findings underscore the need for continued research and evaluation in the domain of AEAD security, particularly in the context of key commitment frameworks.




Figure 6: Attack on AEGIS-128L

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## A Attack Vectors

Note that, in the attack vectors, we have provided a ciphertext/tag pair. However, the tuple  $((K_1, IV_1, A_1), (K_2, IV_2, A^*))$  (here  $IV_1 = IV_2$ ) works with any plaintext, i. e., if we encrypt a plaintext with both  $(K_1, IV_1, A_1)$  and  $(K_2, IV_2, A^*)$ , it generates same ciphertext/tag pair. In this way, numerous ciphertext/tag pair can be generated which can be decrypted to valid plaintexts.

In the vectors provided, the leftmost bit is the least significant bit (LSB). Consider a 16-bit string  $b_0 \cdots b_{15}$  wher  $b_0$  is the LSB and  $b_{15}$  is the most significant bit (MSB). Using the vectors, the above string is denoted as  $[b_0 \cdots b_7 \qquad b_8 \cdots b_{15}]$ .

### A.1 Attack Vector for AEGIS-128

C  T=	[0xA5 0x71 0x28 0x32	0xA7 0x78 0x7B 0x4B]	0x7C 0xDA 0x96	0x8D 0x00 0xEE	0x8D 0x15 0x1E	OxB5 OxFF OxA0	OxEB OxBC OxF8	0x88 0x1D 0xEC	0x35 0xB4 0x0C	0x72 0xF6 0xFF
$K_1 =$	[0x62 0x39	0x1F 0x45	0x61 0x3D	OxFA OxAB	0x65 0x75	0x84 0x80]	0x70	0xCC	0x18	0x4B
$IV_1 =$	[0xCE 0x5F	0xD7 0xFC	0xE2 0xE4	0xF0 0x6F	0xB2 0xC7	OxAE OxCF]	OxOD	OxOD	0x3E	0x82
$A_1 =$	[0xBE 0x81 0xD6 0x86 0x68 0x35 0x44 0xA6	0x17 0x04 0x34 0xE2 0x70 0x7B 0x1D 0xB3	0x84 0x11 0x1C 0x89 0x27 0x8D 0xC3 0xD3	0xAA 0x57 0x15 0x94 0x71 0xFE 0x83 0x2C	0x3B 0x4F 0xB7 0x5D 0xF1 0x1F 0x31 0x15	0x98 0x43 0x07 0x69 0x0A 0x07 0x65 0x8C	0x29 0xFB 0x8E 0x85 0xF8 0xD1 0xAF 0x86	0xBC 0x86 0x2C 0x55 0x89 0x6F 0x74 0xA3	0xCC 0xA4 0x91 0xB0 0x30 0x39 0x55 0xFA	0xF3 0xE3 0x75 0xEE 0xF9 0xD2 0x03 0xCF]
$K_2 =$	[0xFC 0x58	0xF9 0xB9	0x24 0x01	OxED OxA8	0x84 0x08	0x21 0x82]	0x9B	0xD8	0x24	OxEB
$IV_2 =$	[0xCE 0x5F	0xD7 0xFC	0xE2 0xE4	0xF0 0x6F	0xB2 0xC7	OxAE OxCF]	0x0D	OxOD	0x3E	0x82
A*=	[0x15 0x56 0x76 0x22 0x28 0x44 0x61 0x93	0x7E 0x7D 0xC5 0x91 0xF7 0x14 0x84 0x74	0xC0 0x41 0xCC 0x3F 0x53 0xE7 0xBE 0xCB	0x40 0x6C 0xD1 0xA8 0xBB 0x37 0x03 0x70	0x64 0x5D 0x44 0xEC 0xE0 0x88 0x0F 0x57	0xDB 0x08 0xF0 0x97 0x5A 0x61 0xBB 0xFC	0x40 0x71 0x58 0x71 0xD1 0xB3 0x57 0x9D	0x47 0xB4 0x91 0xD5 0xBF 0x0E 0xF1 0xF9	0xDC 0xDB 0xF5 0xD2 0x34 0x5C 0x3B 0xE4	0xE2 0xD8 0xED 0x7C 0xF2 0x75 0x2D 0x2B]

# A.2 Attack Vector for AEGIS-256

C  T=	[0x5F 0x18 0x74 0x42	0x74 0xE2 0x9F 0xF0]	0x00 0x16 0x53	0x73 0x9B 0x80	0x1E 0x6E 0xF6	0x88 0x98 0xE0	0x1D 0xB0 0x9B	0x84 0x8D 0x0F	0xAE 0x5C 0x33	OxOA OxB1 Ox1D
$K_1 =$	[0x15 0xAC 0x7D 0x8C	0x86 0x8D 0x27 0x81]	0x32 0x7D 0x46	0x3E 0x37 0xFF	0x9C 0x1B 0x5C	0x71 0x9B 0x55	0xB4 0x7A 0x0E	0x9F 0x80 0x5A	0x13 0x0D 0xEC	0x36 0x63 0xE7
$IV_1 =$	[0xD9 0xEF 0x43 0x29	0x9D 0x8E 0xF7 0xF0]	0x22 0x88 0x8D	0x35 0xBE 0x61	0x4E 0xC0 0x5D	0xF7 0x1C 0x88	0x15 0x6A 0xB9	0xF8 0xD7 0x00	0x70 0xFE 0xCA	0x88 0xDF 0x62
$A_1 =$	[0x8E 0x28 0x07 0x97 0x36 0x83 0x79 0x8E 0x85 0x43	0x15 0xA6 0xB0 0xA2 0x19 0x06 0x61 0x84 0x6F	0x9D 0x49 0x19 0xCD 0x26 0xB2 0x61 0x8D 0x0D 0xE9	0xB0 0x58 0x8C 0x58 0xCB 0xFB 0x4D 0x74 0x09 0x11	0x18 0xC5 0x3C 0x06 0x2B 0x3C 0x67 0x8F 0xC2 0x37	0x2E 0x5E 0x1D 0x81 0xC5 0x39 0xFF 0x52 0xCA 0x00]	0x11 0xFE 0x1E 0x03 0xE6 0x3B 0xF0 0x7B 0xF1	0xFC 0x77 0xB7 0xD5 0x5E 0x8E 0xFB 0x0C 0xDB	0x46 0x01 0x63 0x64 0x16 0xCF 0x86 0x75 0x18	0xE0 0xBA 0x5E 0xDC 0xCB 0xF1 0xC5 0xC6 0xC2
$K_2 =$	[0x5C 0xCC 0x98 0x7C	0xD5 0xBD 0xDE 0x78]	0x0D 0xF0 0x8E	0xFB 0xA4 0x09	0x4F 0xD5 0x1F	0x8A 0x80 0x82	0x55 0x5D 0x04	Ox31 OxAA OxBA	0x1C 0x0B 0x39	0xF3 0x2E 0x29
$IV_2 =$	[0xD9 0xEF 0x43 0x29	0x9D 0x8E 0xF7 0xF0]	0x22 0x88 0x8D	0x35 0xBE 0x61	0x4E 0xC0 0x5D	0xF7 0x1C 0x88	0x15 0x6A 0xB9	0xF8 0xD7 0x00	0x70 0xFE 0xCA	0x88 0xDF 0x62
A*=	[0xB9 0x2A 0x69 0x8A 0x14 0xFD 0x7C 0x54 0xF1 0xA8	0x55 0x7D 0x44 0xD0 0x14 0xAE 0x7D 0xDF 0x41 0x2F	0xF7 0x7C 0x7F 0xA4 0x70 0xAA 0xBB 0x1F 0xE9 0xBC	0x5C 0x3A 0x20 0xA0 0xF3 0x2A 0x06 0x49 0x2A 0x67	0xB9 0xC8 0x6E 0x0C 0xD3 0xA1 0x5E 0x0A 0x11 0x2B	0x91 0x1E 0xFB 0x00 0x4E 0x98 0x56 0x1D 0x0E 0xEF]	0xC3 0x84 0xF3 0xA4 0x88 0xFC 0x1C 0x9B 0x91	0x17 0x62 0x0E 0x6B 0xD7 0x07 0x41 0xE0 0x87	0xD1 0xF4 0xD1 0x84 0xF8 0x87 0x67 0x67 0x7E 0xB7	0xC4 0x03 0x47 0x71 0xC3 0x74 0x54 0x05 0xBA

# A.3 Attack Vector for AEGIS-128L

C  T=	[0xE2 0x0A 0x2F 0x37	0xF5 0x09 0x08 0xA0]	0x27 0x0C 0xB8	0xF6 0x06 0xF6	0x7D 0x71 0x05	OxD5 Ox5A OxD4	0xC9 0x4F 0xED	0x77 0x78 0x86	0x5C 0x84 0x89	0x0C 0xF1 0x52
$K_1 =$	[0x09 0x8E	OxAA Ox9D	0x5D 0x17	Ox16 OxA9	0x70 0x71	0x62 0x18]	0x2E	OxED	OxFB	0x18
$IV_1 =$	[0x24 0x3B	0xF2 0x94	0xEA 0x36	0xAF 0x8C	OxAE OxD2	OxCA OxC1]	0x95	OxFF	0xC8	Ox4A
$A_1 =$	[0x92 0x1E 0x32 0x57 0xD1 0x8E 0x4A 0xF5 0xD0 0x30 0x3B 0xF0 0xCC	0x9D 0x0F 0x53 0xA9 0x10 0x14 0xAC 0x0E 0xC2 0x27 0x7C 0x98 0xDB	0xBF 0x82 0x7B 0xB5 0x7D 0xF5 0x7D 0x57 0xE3 0xAE 0x0B 0x54 0x91	0xD2 0x28 0xFC 0x38 0xE9 0x51 0x1D 0x8A 0xE6 0x13 0xB6 0xB5 0xCA	0x4E 0x1A 0x00 0xF6 0x11 0x21 0xF9 0x8B 0x76 0x94 0xAA 0x1A 0x36	0xAE 0x2D 0xDC 0x4E 0x35 0x0E 0xAE 0xB5 0x82 0xB8 0xB9 0xBA 0x65	0x0A 0x4B 0x98 0x0F 0x8C 0xEB 0xC5 0x64 0xE6 0x5D 0x98 0x37 0x45	0x2E 0x7F 0x08 0xD1 0x27 0x90 0xEA 0x3C 0xDF 0x16 0x2C 0xB6 0x08]	0xAC 0x15 0xA8 0x6F 0x24 0x95 0x99 0x15 0x63 0x6A 0x03 0x51	0xB1 0xF2 0xF7 0x88 0xDE 0xB6 0x06 0x4C 0x84 0x2E 0x44 0x70
$K_2 =$	[Ox1A Ox6A	0x69 0xF6	0x72 0x1E	OxD1 OxCB	0x60 0xEA	0x38 0x75]	0x0B	0xA9	0xD6	OxOD
$IV_2 =$	[0x24 0x3B	0xF2 0x94	0xEA 0x36	0xAF 0x8C	OxAE OxD2	OxCA OxC1]	0x95	OxFF	0xC8	Ox4A
A*=	[0xB6 0xF9 0xA1 0xED 0x75 0xF1 0x40 0xFB 0xE3 0xB7 0xD7 0x56 0xE3	0x58 0x9F 0x09 0x2A 0xD5 0x74 0xCF 0xA3 0x52 0xD8 0x0A 0x1A 0xF4	0x24 0x84 0x72 0x57 0xCA 0x80 0xFC 0xED 0xA4 0x77 0xA7 0xA9 0x11	0xE0 0x1D 0x02 0xF3 0xD0 0xF8 0xDD 0x44 0x49 0x84 0x06 0x42 0x14	0x6F 0xBA 0x85 0x7F 0x3A 0x79 0x11 0x81 0x21 0x62 0x4C 0x06 0xC4	0x0E 0x19 0x9A 0x00 0x8A 0x68 0x1B 0xFD 0x3D 0xD8 0xD2 0x30	0xA4 0x3A 0x58 0xBD 0x34 0x10 0xC2 0xDA 0x9C 0x79 0x14 0x6C 0x31	0x06 0xAA 0xA2 0xB0 0x30 0xA1 0x22 0xBC 0x9F 0x61 0xD8 0x70 0x72]	0x42 0x11 0xDA 0x31 0x51 0x16 0xF6 0xB4 0x41 0x69 0x9C 0x28	0x5A 0xA5 0x54 0x0B 0x89 0x89 0x85 0x2E 0xF0 0xF0 0xF1 0x04