

# Quantum Search-to-Decision Reduction for the LWE Problem

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**Abstract.** The learning with errors (LWE) problem is one of the fundamental problems in cryptography and it has many applications in post-quantum cryptography. There are two variants of the problem, the decisional-LWE problem, and the search-LWE problem. LWE search-to-decision reduction shows that the hardness of the search-LWE problem can be reduced to the hardness of the decisional-LWE problem. The efficiency of the reduction can be regarded as the gap in difficulty between the problems.

We initiate a study of quantum search-to-decision reduction for the LWE problem and propose a reduction that satisfies sample-preserving. In sample-preserving reduction, it preserves all parameters even the number of instances. Especially, our quantum reduction invokes the distinguisher only 2 times to solve the search-LWE problem, while classical reductions require a polynomial number of invocations. Furthermore, we give a way to amplify the success probability of the reduction algorithm. Our amplified reduction works with fewer LWE samples compared to the classical reduction that has a high success probability. Our reduction algorithm supports a wide class of error distributions and also provides a search-to-decision reduction for the learning parity with noise problem.

In the process of constructing the search-to-decision reduction, we give a quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem over  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  where  $q$  is prime. In short, this theorem states that, if a hardcore predicate  $a \cdot s \pmod{q}$  can be predicted with probability distinctly greater than  $1/q$  with respect to a uniformly random  $a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ , then it is possible to determine  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ .

**Keywords:** Learning with errors · Learning parity with noise · Search-to-decision reduction · Goldreich-Levin theorem · Quantum reduction · Query complexity · Sample complexity.

## 1 Introduction

Quantum algorithms run on a quantum computer and they have the potential to solve some problems faster than classical computation, for example, Shor's algorithm has been shown to solve factorization efficiently. In the same way,

we can investigate a quantum reduction algorithm that could be more efficient than the known classical reduction algorithms. Reduction algorithms play an important role in cryptography to transform one problem into another problem. Intuitively, problem A is reducible to problem B, if an algorithm for solving problem B could also be used as a subroutine to solve problem A. In this sense, search-to-decision reduction for the learning with errors (LWE) problem is to show the decisional-LWE problem is as hard as the search-LWE problem.

The LWE problem introduced by Regev [27] is one of the fundamental computational problems in cryptography. The LWE samples consist of a pair  $(A, y)$  of a uniformly random matrix  $A \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$  together with  $y = A \cdot s + e$  for randomly chosen error term  $e \leftarrow \chi^m$  (small Gaussian noise is commonly used) where  $m$  is the number of samples. LWE has two main variations: The search-LWE problem asks to find a secret string  $s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ , given a system of noisy linear equations  $(A, y)$ , while the decisional-LWE problem asks to distinguish between the distribution of the LWE samples  $\{(A, y) | s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n, A \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, e \leftarrow \chi^m, y := A \cdot s + e\}$  and uniformly random distribution  $\{(A, r) | A \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^m\}$ .

There are two standard facts in LWE hardness. The first is more trivial, which says that there is a reduction from the decisional-LWE to the search-LWE: Whenever the pair  $(A, b)$  is randomly chosen  $A \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, b \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ , then with overwhelming probability the vector  $b$  is going to be far away from the lattice, thus there does not exist a coordinates vector  $s$  such that  $A \cdot s$  is close to  $b$ , thus if we can break search-LWE and find  $s$ , we can check whether  $b$  is close to  $A \cdot s$  or not, which constitutes an algorithm that breaks decisional-LWE. The second known fact is less trivial and says that the search-LWE can be reduced to the decisional-LWE. These previously known reductions use a distinguisher for the decisional-LWE to extract the secret string  $s$  and break the search-LWE. More delicately, the way that these reductions work is that the search-LWE adversary uses classical oracle access to the distinguisher.

There exist hardness proofs based on reductions from worst-case lattice problems (BDD/gapSVP), which are considered to be hard not only for classical computers but also for quantum computers. As a consequence, the hardness of the decisional-LWE problem serves as the security source of many post-quantum cryptographic primitives, such as oblivious transfer [26], identity-based encryption [4, 13, 17], fully homomorphic encryption [11], etc.

**Prior works.** There are various incomparable search-to-decision reductions for the LWE problem [27, 25, 7, 22, 23, 10]. Regev [27] who introduced the LWE problem showed search-to-decision reduction in [27]. It imposes constraints that modulus  $q$  must be prime and bounded by  $poly(n)$ . Research on search-to-decision reduction has been conducted in the direction of loosening the restriction on modulus  $q$ , but they incur some loss in the LWE parameters. Peikert [25] extends Regev's reduction for the case where  $q$  can be expressed as a product of distinct prime numbers in  $poly(n)$ , but it requires the error distribution to be Gaussian. Applebaum, Cash, Peikert, and Sahai [7] give a reduction for the case where the modulus can be a prime power  $q = p^e$ . The above algorithms have

the property that the run-time scales linearly with  $q$  in common. It could make the reductions meaningless for large  $q$ . Micciancio and Peikert [23] give a reduction that runs in  $\text{poly}(\log q)$ . Micciancio and Mol [22] give a search-to-decision reduction in another direction. They show a sample-preserving reduction, which shows that if the pseudorandomness of the LWE problem holds, the LWE problem with the same number of samples is invertible. The state-of-the-art results constitute an adversary that makes polynomially many such classical queries to the distinguisher in order to break search-LWE, and the extra computations that the search-LWE adversary makes on the side (between its queries to the decisional-LWE adversary) are also classical. What this work aims to do is to use quantum computations and quantum queries to the decisional-LWE adversary in order to speed up the reduction - use fewer queries and less computation time.

***Practical importance of quantum search-to-decision reduction.*** The LWE challenge [1] is the foundation for ensuring the difficulty of the LWE problem. In practice, the LWE challenge is intended to solve *search* LWE problems. Based on the results of the LWE challenge, the parameter size  $n$  is selected, at which we can trust that the search-LWE problem is hard enough.

Suppose that there is a cryptographic scheme whose security is reduced to the hardness of the decisional-LWE problem. Intuitively, if the security of the scheme is to be ensured based on the LWE challenge of size  $n$ , the size of the scheme should be  $\text{loss}_{s2d}(n)$  plus the security loss of the scheme itself, where  $\text{loss}_{s2d}(\cdot)$  is the reduction loss in a search-to-decision reduction.

When a quantum computer arises, a quantum version of the LWE challenge will be held and the parameter  $n_Q$  ( $\geq n$ ) will be determined for the LWE problem to be hard for the quantum computer. Then, should the size of the scheme be selected based on  $\text{loss}_{s2d}(n_Q)$ ? If we know the efficiency  $\text{loss}_{Qs2d}(\cdot)$  of quantum search-to-decision reduction, we know that we can actually implement the scheme with a size based on  $\text{loss}_{Qs2d}(n_Q)$ , which is expected to partially mitigate the effect of the increase of  $n_Q$  over  $n$ .

## 1.1 Our contribution

***Quantum search-to-decision reduction.*** In this work, we investigate a quantum search-to-decision reduction for the LWE problem and we discuss the efficiency of our algorithm and classical ones. We compare the efficiency of our reduction and the classical ones by three aspects, success probability, query complexity, and sample complexity. We treat the distinguisher as a blackbox and the query complexity of an algorithm is measured by the number of queries to the distinguisher in the algorithm while it finds the secret string  $s$  of the search-LWE problem. The sample complexity of an algorithm is measured by the number of LWE instances that it takes. In this paper, we propose three variations of the reduction algorithms.

- The first one is an algorithm that also serves as the basis for the other two. It finds  $s$  with probability at least  $\frac{4q^2\epsilon^3}{27m^3(q-1)^5}$  using distinguisher 2 times. And it

is also a sample-preserve reduction, i.e., it needs  $m$  sample of LWE instances to find  $s$  where  $m$  is the number of instances required by the distinguisher to solve the decisional-LWE problem.

- The second algorithm is an evolution of the sample-preserve one. It amplifies the probability of success of the first algorithm instead of increasing the complexities. It finds  $s$  with probability  $\Omega(\frac{\epsilon}{qm})$  using distinguisher  $\mathcal{O}(\frac{qm}{\epsilon})$  times.
- The third algorithm is a version of a higher probability of success through further iterations. It finds  $s$  with probability  $1 - o(1)$  using distinguisher  $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q^2 m^2 \log n}{\epsilon^2})$  times.

We remark that our reductions have some constraints on parameters. Our reductions require  $q$  to be prime. The second and third require that we can verify from the instances of the LWE problem whether it is the correct answer for the LWE problem given some input  $s' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ . We believe that this condition does not impose a strong limitation on the use of LWE as a basis for cryptographic primitives. The existence of more efficient or less restrictive classical/quantum search-to-decision reduction is an open problem.

	Success probability	Query complexity	Sample complexity	Classical/Quantum
Reg05*[27]	$1 - o(1)$	$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{nq}{\epsilon^2})$	$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{mq}{\epsilon^2})$	Classical
MM11**[22]	$\frac{1}{poly(n)}$	$poly(n)$	$m$	Classical
Th.2	$\frac{4q^2 \epsilon^3}{27(q-1)^5 m^3}$	2	$m$	Quantum
Th.3	$\Omega(\frac{\epsilon}{qm})$	$\mathcal{O}(\frac{qm}{\epsilon})$	$m + \mathcal{O}(n)$	Quantum
Cor.1	$1 - o(1)$	$\mathcal{O}(\frac{q^2 m^2 \log n}{\epsilon^2})$	$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{qm^2}{\epsilon})$	Quantum

**Table 1.** Comparison of the algorithms performance.  $n$  is a size of the LWE problem,  $m$  is the number of instances required by the distinguisher to solve the decisional LWE problem,  $\epsilon$  is the advantage of the distinguisher.

\* The numbers in this line are from a simplified version of the reduction by Regev. The specific construction of the algorithm is described in Appendix B.

\*\* The success probability and the query complexity of this algorithm are very complex. The specific values are given in Appendix B.

**Extension of quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem.** The Goldreich-Levin Theorem [18] is a cornerstone theorem in computer science and has been studied from various aspects [3, 18, 19, 21, 24]. This theorem states that any (strong) one-way function  $f$  can be easily transformed into a function of the required form  $g(a, r) := (f(a), r)$  where  $a, r \in \mathbb{Z}_2^n$  and it has a hard-core predicate  $a \cdot r \pmod{2}$ . Roughly speaking, a (strong)one-way function is a function that can be efficiently computed but is hard to compute in the reverse direction, and a hard-core predicate of a function is a bit that can be efficiently computed from the

input to the function and no efficient algorithm can guess it from the output of the function with probability distinctly higher than one-half. Adcock and Cleve investigate a quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem [3]. Roughly, they show that the reduction from quantum one-way functions to quantum hard-core predicates is quantitatively more efficient than the classical version.

In the process of constructing the quantum search-to-decision reduction, we give a further generalized theorem of the quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem by Adcock and Cleve. Namely, we show that if there exists a predictor that predicts  $a \cdot s \pmod{q}$  where  $a, s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  and  $q$  to be prime with probability  $\frac{1}{q} + \delta$  over the choice of  $a \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ , then we can find  $s$  with probability at least  $(\frac{q\delta}{q-1})^2$  while accessing the predictor 2 times.

**Concurrent work of quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem.** Recently, Ananth et al. [6] independently investigated a quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem for the field  $\mathbb{Z}_q$ . They obtain this result by converting the classical Goldreich-Levin theorem for the field  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  by Dodis et al. [15] into quantum reduction, by using the recent work of Bitansky et al. [9]. Specifically, they show that a distinguisher  $D$  that, given auxiliary input  $Aux$ , can distinguish between  $(a, a \cdot s)$  and  $(a, r)$  where  $s$  is randomly chosen from  $H \subset \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  can be converted into a quantum extractor that can extract  $s$  given  $Aux$ .

While their quantum algorithm relies on the classical Goldreich-Levin theorem for the field  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  by Dodis et al. [15], in which the distinguisher with advantage  $\epsilon$  is used  $\text{poly}(n, |H|, \frac{1}{\epsilon})$  times to extract  $s$  and its success probability is  $\frac{\epsilon^3}{512 \cdot n \cdot q^2}$ . On the other hand, our quantum algorithm can find  $s$  by accessing the distinguisher  $D$  2 times with probability  $\frac{4q^2\epsilon^3}{27(q-1)^5}$ , and there is no need to make the subset from which  $s$  is chosen small.

**Improvements from Previous Version** This paper is the full version of Africacrypt2023[2]. As a significant update, the Africacrypt version included the same method of a prediction-to-decision reduction as in [8, 16], but it was found that this method had incomplete proof. This approach may also work well using the proposition proposed by [14]. Therefore, a new reduction method was introduced(in Section 3, lemma 1 to lemma 3).

## 1.2 Technical overview

We describe our techniques for proving our results on quantum search-to-decision reduction for the LWE problem. Our construction of the search-to-decision reduction consists of two parts. For the first part, we construct a predictor from the distinguisher of the decisional-LWE problem, and for the second part, we construct an algorithm that finds  $s$  using the predictor. This reduction strategy can be interpreted as making a prediction-to-decision reduction and a search-to-prediction reduction. We note that the idea of the search-to-decision reduction via unpredictability is the same as that of classical reduction by Micciancio and

Mol [22], Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [8]. We found a quantum speed-up in the second part of the reduction and we call it as generalized quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem. Then we provide an overview of this theorem.

**Quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem.** We first review the quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem by Adcock and Cleve [3]. We call an unitary operation  $U_P$  is a quantum  $(s, q, \epsilon)$ -predictor, if the last register of  $U_P |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$  is measured in computational basis, yielding the value  $P(a)$ , then  $\Pr[P(a) = a \cdot s \pmod{q}] > \frac{1}{q} + \epsilon$  holds where  $a, s \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  and the probability depends on over choice of  $a \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ . We denote

$$U_P |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle = \alpha_{a,0} |\phi_{a,0}\rangle |a \cdot s\rangle + \alpha_{a,1} |\phi_{a,1}\rangle |a \cdot s + 1\rangle$$

where  $U_P$  is a  $(s, 2, \epsilon)$ -predictor,  $\alpha_{a,0}$  and  $\alpha_{a,1}$  are complex number. Since for a random uniformly distributed  $a \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n$ , measuring the last register of  $U_P |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$  yields  $a \cdot s \pmod{2}$  with probability at least  $\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon$ , it follows that

$$\frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{a \in \{0,1\}^n} |\alpha_{a,0}|^2 \geq \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon \quad (1)$$

and

$$\frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{a \in \{0,1\}^n} |\alpha_{a,1}|^2 < \frac{1}{2} + \epsilon. \quad (2)$$

We explain their quantum reduction algorithm step by step. First, pass the superposition states  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{a \in \{0,1\}^n} |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$  through the  $(s, 2, \epsilon)$ -predictor  $U_P$ , multiply the phase by  $(-1)^y$  according to the value of the last register  $y$ , pass the states through conjugate transpose of the predictor  $U_P^\dagger$  and we get the states  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{a \in \{0,1\}^n} \left( \sum_{b \in \{0,1\}} (-1)^{a \cdot s + b} |\alpha_{a,b}|^2 \right) |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$ . By measuring the first register in Fourier basis, we could obtain  $s$ . The probability of yielding  $s$  when the first register is measured in the Fourier basis, is the square of the inner product of this state and  $QFT^{\otimes n} |s\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2^n}} \sum_{a \in \{0,1\}^n} (-1)^{a \cdot s} |a\rangle$ , which is  $|\frac{1}{2^n} \sum_{a \in \{0,1\}^n} (|\alpha_{a,0}|^2 - |\alpha_{a,1}|^2)|^2$ . Using the fact of (1) and (2), we can find  $s$  with probability at least  $|\left(\frac{1}{2} + \epsilon\right) - \left(\frac{1}{2} - \epsilon\right)|^2 = 4\epsilon^2$ .

**Difficulty.** Next, we show that naive expansion of the quantum Goldreich-Levin results in a  $(s, q, \epsilon)$ -predictor where  $q \neq 2$  does not work. As in the quantum Goldreich-Levin algorithm, pass the superposition states  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n}} \sum_{a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$  through the predictor  $U_P$ , multiply the phase by  $\omega_q^y$  according to the value of the last register  $y$ , pass the states through conjugate transpose of the predictor  $U_P^\dagger$  and we get the states  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n}} \sum_{a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} \left( \sum_{j \in \mathbb{Z}_q} \omega_q^{a \cdot s + j} |\alpha_{a,j}|^2 \right) |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$ . If we measure the first register in the Fourier basis, the probability of yielding  $s$  is the square of the inner product of this state and  $QFT^{\otimes n} |s\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n}} \sum_{a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} \omega_q^{a \cdot s} |a\rangle$ , which

is  $|\frac{1}{q^n} \sum_{a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} \sum_{j \in \mathbb{Z}_q} \omega_q^j |\alpha_{a,j}|^2|^2$ . Define  $\Pr(j) := \Pr[P(a) = a \cdot s + j \pmod{q}]$  as a probability of the gap between the predictor's prediction and inner product is  $j$ , then this probability can be written as  $|\sum_{j \in \mathbb{Z}_q} \omega_q^j \Pr(j)|^2$ . This value cannot be guaranteed some lower bound unless the advantage is very high such that  $\epsilon \geq \frac{1}{2} - \frac{1}{q} + \delta$ .

**Solution.** To get around this obstacle, our key idea is to use the property of cyclic group  $\mathbb{Z}_q^*$ . For all element  $j \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ ,  $j$  determines a bijection  $r \mapsto rj$  on  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  and it maps 0 to 0. Using this property, we can say that

$$\frac{1}{q-1} \sum_{r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*} \omega_q^{rj} \Pr(j) = \begin{cases} \Pr(0) & \text{if } j = 0 \\ \frac{-1}{q-1} \Pr(j) & \text{if } j \neq 0. \end{cases} \quad (3)$$

We will use this property to improve the algorithm. First, prepare the superposition states  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n(q-1)}} \sum_{a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} \sum_{r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*} |r\rangle |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$  through the predictor  $U_P$  (apply the second to the last register), multiply the last register by the first register  $r$ , multiply the phase by  $\omega_q^y$  according to the value of the last register  $y$ , divide the last register by the first register  $r$  (multiply  $r^{-1}$ ), pass the states through conjugate transpose of the predictor  $U_P^\dagger$  (apply the second to the last register), multiply the second register by the first register  $r$  and we get the states  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n(q-1)}} \sum_{a,r,j} \omega_q^{r(a \cdot s + j)} |\alpha_{a,j}|^2 |r\rangle |ra\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$ . If we measure the second register in Fourier basis, the probability of yielding  $s$  is the square of the inner product of this state and  $(I \otimes QFT^{\otimes n})(\frac{1}{\sqrt{q-1}} \sum_{r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*} |r\rangle) |s\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n(q-1)}} \sum_{b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} \sum_{r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*} \omega_q^{b \cdot s} |r\rangle |b\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n(q-1)}} \sum_{a,r} \omega_q^{r(a \cdot s)} |r\rangle |ra\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$ . Finally, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[s \text{ is measured}] &= \left| \frac{1}{q^n(q-1)} \sum_{a,r,j} \omega_q^{rj} |\alpha_{a,j}|^2 \right|^2 \\ &= \left| \Pr(0) - \frac{1}{q-1} \sum_{j \neq 0} \Pr(j) \right|^2 \\ &\geq \left( \frac{q\epsilon}{q-1} \right)^2. \end{aligned}$$

This result is consistent with quantum Goldreich-Levin results and is a successful generalization.

## 2 Preliminaries

### 2.1 Notation and definitions

In this paper, we use the following notations and definitions. For a finite set  $S$ ,  $s \xleftarrow{\$} S$  denotes choosing an element  $s$  from  $S$  uniformly at random. For a

distribution  $D$ ,  $d \leftarrow D$  denotes sampling an element  $d$  according to distribution  $D$ . We denote  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  for the cyclic group  $\{0, 1, \dots, q-1\}$  with addition modulo  $q$ . We also denote  $\mathbb{T}$  for  $\mathbb{R}/\mathbb{Z}$ , in other words, the segment  $[0, 1)$  with addition modulo 1. We use standard asymptotic notations  $\mathcal{O}(\cdot)$ ,  $o(\cdot)$ ,  $\Omega(\cdot)$ ,  $\Theta(\cdot)$ , etc. We use  $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}$  (resp.  $\tilde{\Theta}$ ) notation which overlooks quantities poly-logarithmic in appearing arguments, that is,  $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(x) := \mathcal{O}(x(\log x)^{\Theta(1)})$  (resp.  $\tilde{\Theta}(x) := \Theta(x(\log x)^{\Theta(1)})$ ). We denote by  $\omega_n$  the complex root of unity of order  $n$ :  $\omega_n := e^{\frac{2\pi i}{n}}$ . For  $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}^+$  the distribution  $\Psi_\alpha$  is the distribution on  $\mathbb{T}$  obtained by sampling from a normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation  $\frac{\alpha}{\sqrt{2\pi}}$  and reducing the result modulo 1 (i.e., a periodization of the normal distribution),

$$\forall r \in [0, 1), \Psi_\alpha(r) = \sum_{k=-\infty}^{\infty} \frac{1}{\alpha} \exp -\pi \left( \frac{r-k}{\alpha} \right)^2.$$

We define its discretization  $\overline{\Psi}_\alpha$  as the discrete probability distribution obtained by sampling from  $\Psi_\alpha$ , multiplying by  $q$ , and rounding to the closest integer modulo  $q$ . That is,

$$\overline{\Psi}_\alpha(i) = \int_{(i-\frac{1}{2})/q}^{(i+\frac{1}{2})/q} \Psi_\alpha(x) dx.$$

## 2.2 Quantum computing

Let  $I$  be the identity operator. We denote  $U^\dagger$  as the Hermitian conjugate of a unitary operation  $U$ . For operations that use auxiliary inputs  $|0^l\rangle$ , we often omit them for simplicity. Quantum Fourier transformation  $QFT$  over  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  is a map  $|x\rangle \mapsto \sum_{y \in \mathbb{Z}_q} \omega_q^{xy} |y\rangle$ . We use the fact  $QFT^{\otimes n} |\mathbf{x}\rangle = \sum_{\mathbf{y} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} \omega_q^{\mathbf{x} \cdot \mathbf{y}} |\mathbf{y}\rangle$  where  $\mathbf{x} \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ . We use the fact that there is a phase kickback algorithm and it maps  $|x\rangle |0^l\rangle \mapsto \omega_q^x |x\rangle |0^l\rangle$ . This algorithm can be achieved by controlled- $U$  where unitary  $U$  has eigenvalue  $\omega_q$ .

## 3 Search-to-decision reduction for the learning with errors problem

The learning with errors (LWE) problem has two main variants, the search-LWE problem and the decisional-LWE problem. The search  $LWE_{n,m,q,\chi}$  problem asks to find  $s$  chosen uniformly random from  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$  given  $m$  LWE samples  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi} := \{(a, y) | a \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n, e \leftarrow \chi, y := a \cdot s + e\}$ . The decisional  $LWE_{n,m,q,\chi}$  problem asks to distinguish between  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}$  and a uniformly random distribution  $R := \{(a, r) | a \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n, r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q\}$  by using  $m$  samples. We often represented samples from  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m$  (resp.  $R^m$ ) in matrix form. For  $(A, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m$ , each row of the matrix  $A$  and each row of the vector  $y$  correspond to an LWE sample.

The learning parity with noise (LPN) problem is the special case of  $LWE_{n,m,q,\chi}$  problem for  $q = 2$  and the error distribution  $\chi$  is the Bernoulli distribution  $\text{Ber}_\mu$ .



In this section, we show a search-to-decision reduction using quantum computing. Our construction of the search-to-decision reduction consists of two parts. For the first part, we construct a predictor from the distinguisher of the decisional-LWE problem, and for the second part, we construct an algorithm that finds  $s$  using a predictor. This reduction strategy can be interpreted as making a search-to-prediction reduction and a prediction-to-decision reduction. We note that the idea of the search-to-decision reduction via prediction is the same as that of classical reduction by Micciancio and Mol [22], Applebaum, Ishai, and Kushilevitz [8] and Dottling [16].

We define a quantum distinguisher for the decisional-LWE problem.

**Definition 1.** *A quantum  $\epsilon$ -distinguisher for the decisional  $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$  problem is unitary operation  $\mathsf{U}_D$  such that, the last register of  $\mathsf{U}_D |A, y\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$  is measured in computational basis, yielding the value  $D(A, y) \in \{0, 1\}$ , then*

$$\Pr[D(A, y) = 0 | s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n, (A, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m] - \Pr[D(A, r) = 0 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathbb{R}^m] > \epsilon$$

holds.

As in the definition, the last register of  $\mathsf{U}_D |A, y\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$  is measured in the computational basis, in this paper, we denote this as  $D(A, y)$ .

Next, we define a quantum predictor for the LWE problem.

**Definition 2.** *A quantum  $(s, \delta)$ -predictor is unitary operation  $\mathsf{U}_P$  such that, the last register of  $\mathsf{U}_P |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$  is measured in computational basis, yielding the value  $P(a)$ , then*

$$\Pr[P(a) = a \cdot s \pmod{q}] > \frac{1}{q} + \delta$$

holds.

### 3.1 Sample-preserve reduction

In this section, we propose a quantum sample-preserve reduction between the search-LWE and the decisional-LWE.

The following Lemma states that there is a prediction-to-decision reduction for the LWE problem.

We define  $\mathsf{X}_{m,j}$  as an intermediate distribution between the LWE distribution  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m$  and  $\mathbb{R}^m$ . In other words,  $\mathsf{X}_{m,j} := \{(L_{m-j}, R_j) | L_{m-j} \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^{m-j}, R_j \leftarrow \mathbb{R}^j\}$ . We note that  $\mathsf{X}_{m,0}$  is equal to  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m$  and  $\mathsf{X}_{m,m}$  is equal to  $\mathbb{R}^m$ .

**Lemma 1.** *For  $j \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1, \dots, m-1\}$ ,*

$$\Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathsf{X}_{m,j}] - \Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathsf{X}_{m,j+1}] > \frac{\epsilon}{m}$$

holds.

*Proof.* From the definition of the distinguisher  $U_D$ ,

$$\Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m] - \Pr[D(A, r) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathbb{R}^m] > \epsilon$$

holds. From the triangular inequalities,

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m] - \Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathbb{R}^m] \\ & \leq \sum_{i=1}^m \Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathbb{X}_{m,i}] - \Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathbb{X}_{m,i+1}] \end{aligned}$$

holds. Therefore,

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[j = i] (\Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathbb{X}_{m,i}] - \Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathbb{X}_{m,i+1}]) \\ & \frac{1}{m} (\Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathbb{X}_{m,i}] - \Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow \mathbb{X}_{m,i+1}]) \\ & > \frac{\epsilon}{m} \end{aligned}$$

holds.  $\square$

**Lemma 2.** *There exists a unitary operation  $U_P$  using  $U_D$  once, it satisfies for  $j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ ,  $L_{m-j-1} \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^{m-j-1}$ ,  $R_j \leftarrow \mathbb{R}^j$ ,  $a \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ,  $c \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ ,  $e \leftarrow \chi$  and  $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ , the last qubit of  $U_P |L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j\rangle |0^{l+1}\rangle |0\rangle$  is measured in computational base, yielding the value  $P(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j)$ , then  $\Pr[P(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = a \cdot s] > \frac{1}{q} + \frac{\epsilon}{(q-1)m}$  holds.*

In the following, if the last qubit of  $U_P |L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j\rangle |0^{l+1}\rangle |0\rangle$  is measured in computational base, we denote this as  $P(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j)$ .

*Proof.*  $U_P |L_{m-j-1}, (x, c \oplus e), R_j\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle |0\rangle$  is a unitary operation of the following procedure.

1. Compute  $(U_D |L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle) |0\rangle$ .
2. Apply a control unitary operation as follows; if the second-to-last register is in state  $|1\rangle$ , output  $c$  to the last register, else if it is in state  $|0\rangle$ , output  $r \neq c$  to the last register.

Let us analyze the behavior of  $U_P$ . Since

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[P(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = a \cdot s \wedge c = a \cdot s] \\ & = \Pr[c = a \cdot s] \Pr[D(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = 1 | c = a \cdot s] \\ & = \frac{1}{q} \Pr[D(L_{m-j}, R_j) = 1] \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} & \Pr[P(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = a \cdot s \wedge c \neq a \cdot s] \\ & = \Pr[r = a \cdot s] (\Pr[D(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = 0] - \Pr[D(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = 0 \wedge c = a \cdot s]) \\ & = \frac{1}{q-1} \left( (1 - \Pr[D(L_{m-j-1}, R_{j+1}) = 1]) - \frac{1}{q} (1 - \Pr[D(L_{m-j}, R_j) = 1]) \right) \end{aligned}$$

holds,

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr[P(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = a \cdot s] \\
 &= \Pr[P(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = a \cdot s \wedge c = a \cdot s] + \Pr[P(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = a \cdot s \wedge c \neq a \cdot s] \\
 &= \frac{1}{q} \Pr[D(L_{m-j}, R_j) = 1] + \frac{1}{q-1} \left( (1 - \Pr[D(L_{m-j-1}, R_{j+1}) = 1]) - \frac{1}{q} (1 - \Pr[D(L_{m-j}, R_j) = 1]) \right) \\
 &= \frac{1}{q} + \frac{1}{q-1} (\Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow X_{m,j}] - \Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | (A, y) \leftarrow X_{m,j+1}]) \\
 &> \frac{1}{q} + \frac{\epsilon}{(q-1)m}
 \end{aligned}$$

holds. The last inequality follows from Lemma 1. In conclusion, we get

$$\Pr[P(L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j) = a \cdot s] > \frac{1}{q} + \frac{\epsilon}{(q-1)m}. \quad (4)$$

Next, let's consider the probability of outputting  $a \cdot s$  for a given input  $x$  when the random coins used in the prediction algorithm is fixed. Let  $U'_P |a\rangle$  is an unitary operation that performs  $U_P |L_{m-j-1}, (a, c \oplus e), R_j\rangle$ .

**Lemma 3.** *There exist a unitary operation  $U'_P$ , it holds that, for  $a \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ,*

$$\Pr[P'(a) = a \cdot s] > \frac{1}{q} + \frac{2\epsilon}{3(q-1)m} \quad (5)$$

with probability at least  $\frac{\epsilon}{3(q-1)m}$  over choice of  $s \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ,  $j \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ ,  $L \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^{m-j-1}$ ,  $R \leftarrow R^j$ ,  $c \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $e \leftarrow \chi$ ,  $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ .

*Proof.* Define the  $U'_P$  to be the same as the one construct in Lemma 2, except for some variables, such as  $j, L, R, c, e, r$ , are fixed. Define a set  $G = \{(s, j, L, R, c, e, r) | \text{Inequality (5) holds}\}$ . By the definition of  $G$ , when  $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ,  $j \xleftarrow{\$}$ ,  $L \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^{m-j-1}$ ,  $R \leftarrow R^j$  and  $x \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ,  $c \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$  and  $e \leftarrow \chi$ ,  $r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q$ , then

$$\begin{aligned}
 & \Pr[P(L, (a, c \oplus e), R) = a \cdot s] \\
 &= \Pr[P(L, (a, c \oplus e), R) = a \cdot s \wedge (s, j, L, R, c, e, r) \in G] \\
 &+ \Pr[P(L, (a, c \oplus e), R) = a \cdot s \wedge (s, j, L, R, c, e, r) \notin G] \\
 &\leq \Pr[(s, j, L, R, c, e, r) \in G] + \frac{1}{q} + \frac{2\epsilon}{3(q-1)m}
 \end{aligned}$$

holds. From Lemma 2,

$$\Pr[P(L, (a, c \oplus e), R) = a \cdot s] > \frac{1}{q} + \frac{\epsilon}{(q-1)m}$$

holds. Therefore  $\Pr[(s, j, L, R, c, e, r) \in G] \geq \frac{\epsilon}{3(q-1)m}$  holds.  $\square$

We next show a prediction-to-decision reduction, that is, the expansion version of the quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem.

**Theorem 1 (Expansion version of quantum Goldreich-Levin theorem).** *Let  $q$  be a prime. If there is a quantum  $(s, \delta)$ -predictor  $U_P$ , then there is a quantum algorithm that finds  $s$  with probability at least  $(\frac{q\delta}{q-1})^2$ . It invokes  $U_P$  and  $U_P^\dagger$  once each.*

*Proof of Theorem 1.* We construct a quantum algorithm that finds  $s$  using a quantum  $(s, \delta)$ -predictor  $U_P$ .

First, prepare the superposition states  $\frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n(q-1)}} \sum_{a \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} \sum_{r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*} |r\rangle |a\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$  through the predictor  $U_P$  (apply the second to the last register), multiply the last register by the first register  $r$ , multiply the phase by  $\omega_q^y$  according to the value of the last register  $y$ , divide the last register by the first register  $r$  (multiply  $r^{-1}$ ), pass the states through conjugate transpose of the predictor  $U_P^\dagger$  (apply the second to the last register), multiply the second register by the first register  $r$  and we get the states  $|\phi\rangle := \frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n(q-1)}} \sum_{a,r,j} \omega_q^{r(a \cdot s + j)} |\alpha_{a,j}|^2 |r\rangle |ra\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$ . If we measure the second register in Fourier basis, the probability of yielding  $s$  is the square of the inner product of this state and  $(I \otimes QFT^{\otimes n})(\frac{1}{\sqrt{q-1}} \sum_{r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*} |r\rangle) |s\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n(q-1)}} \sum_{b \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n} \sum_{r \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*} \omega_q^{b \cdot s} |r\rangle |b\rangle = \frac{1}{\sqrt{q^n(q-1)}} \sum_{a,r} \omega_q^{r(a \cdot s)} |r\rangle |ra\rangle |0^l\rangle |0\rangle$ . Finally, we get

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[s \text{ is measured}] &= \left| \frac{1}{q^n(q-1)} \sum_{a,r,j} \omega_q^{rj} |\alpha_{a,j}|^2 \right|^2 \\ &= \left| \frac{1}{q^n} |\alpha_{a,0}|^2 + \frac{1}{q^n(q-1)} \sum_{j \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*} (-|\alpha_{a,j}|^2) \right|^2 \\ &> \left| \left( \frac{1}{q} + \delta \right) - \frac{1}{q-1} \left( 1 - \left( \frac{1}{q} + \delta \right) \right) \right|^2 \\ &= \left( \frac{q\delta}{q-1} \right)^2. \end{aligned}$$

The second equality follows by the fact that for all elements  $j \in \mathbb{Z}_q^*$ ,  $j$  determines a bijection  $r \mapsto rj$  on  $\mathbb{Z}_q$  and it maps 0 to 0. This result is consistent with the quantum Goldreich-Levin result where  $q = 2$  and is a successful generalization.  $\square$

**Theorem 2.** *Let  $q$  be a prime. If there is a quantum  $\epsilon$ -distinguisher  $U_D$  for the decisional  $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$  problem, then there is a quantum algorithm that solves the search  $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$  problem with probability at least  $\frac{4q^2 \epsilon^3}{27(q-1)^5 m^3}$  using  $U_D$  and  $U_D^\dagger$  once each.*

*Proof of Theorem 2.* This theorem follows immediately from Lemma 1. and Theorem 1.  $\square$

We stress that Theorem 1 gives a quantum sample-preserving search-to-decision reduction for the LWE problem, i.e., we can find  $s$  with some polynomial probability with sample complexity  $m$ , where  $m$  is the number of instances required by the distinguisher to solve the decisional-LWE problem. Next, we consider the complexity of obtaining  $s$  with high probability using this algorithm in the following section. We use this algorithm as a basic building block of the amplified reduction algorithms.

### 3.2 Amplify the success probability

We show how to amplify the success probability of the reduction algorithm given in Section 3.1. However, this process increases query complexity and sample complexity.

We propose an algorithm, `Verify`, that tests a candidate solution for the LWE problem. We first sample  $(a_i, y_i)_{i \in [\mathcal{O}(n)]} \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^{\mathcal{O}(n)}$  and construct `Verify` to test a candidate  $s'$  by simply checking that  $a_i \cdot s' \approx y_i$ . Here, we present the case where the error distribution is the discrete Gaussian distribution  $\overline{\Psi}_\alpha$  where  $\alpha < \frac{1}{8}$ .

**Lemma 4.** *Let  $\chi = \overline{\Psi}_\alpha$  where  $\alpha < \frac{1}{8}$ , we can construct an algorithm `Verify` using  $\mathcal{O}(n)$  samples, and it satisfies the following functionality (6) with probability  $1 - \text{negl}(n)$  (resp. any desired constant  $0 < p < 1$ )*

$$\text{Verify}(s') = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } s' = s \\ 0 & \text{if } s' \neq s. \end{cases} \quad (6)$$

*The description of the algorithm `Verify` that satisfies the conditions of (6) can be given as follows:*

*Initially, sample  $(a_i, y_i)_{i \in [cn]} \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^{cn}$ . Upon receiving input  $s' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ , `Verify` works as follows.*

---

`Verify`( $s'$ ):

---

count = 0

for  $i \in \{1, 2, \dots, cn\}$

if  $|a_i \cdot s' - y_i| > \frac{q}{8}$ , add 1 to count

if count  $< \frac{n}{2}$  output 1.

---

*Proof of Lemma 4.* Let us analyze the probability that the `Verify` satisfies the condition (6).

Let  $\beta = \Pr[|\chi| \geq \frac{q}{8}] (< \frac{1}{2})$ ,  $\delta = \frac{1}{2\beta} - 1$ .

$$\begin{aligned}
\Pr[\text{Verify satisfies (6)}] &= \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1 \wedge \forall s' \neq s, \text{Verify}(s') = 0] \\
&\geq \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) = 1] \cdot \Pr[\forall s' \neq s, \text{Verify}(s') = 0] \\
&\geq (1 - \Pr[\text{Verify}(s) \neq 1]) \cdot \left(1 - \sum_{s' \neq s} \Pr[\text{Verify}(s') = 1]\right) \\
&\geq (1 - e^{-\frac{\delta^2 \beta cn}{2+\delta}}) \cdot (1 - (q^n - 1)e^{-\frac{cn}{24}}) \\
&= 1 - \text{negl}(cn)
\end{aligned}$$

The third inequality follows from Chernoff bound. Therefore, `Verify` satisfies (6) with probability  $1 - \text{negl}(n)$  for sufficiently large constant  $c$ . In addition, by choosing  $c$  to be sufficiently large, the success probability of the algorithm can be increased to any desired constant level regardless of  $n$ .  $\square$

We can use this `Verify` to amplify the success probability of the sample-preserving reduction algorithm by repetition. However, the success probability of our reduction can be increased more efficiently by the quantum-specific repetition technique "amplitude amplification [12]" than by simply judging the answer each time. We define a quantum version of the verification algorithm  $U_{\text{Verify}}$  as follows.

**Definition 3.** A quantum verification algorithm is a unitary operation  $U_{\text{Verify}}$  such that the following functionality (7)

$$U_{\text{Verify}} |s'\rangle = \begin{cases} -|s'\rangle & \text{if } s' = s \\ |s'\rangle & \text{if } s' \neq s \end{cases} \quad (7)$$

holds.

**Lemma 5.** We can construct a quantum algorithm  $U_{\text{Verify}}$  from `Verify` that satisfies the condition (6).

*Proof of Lemma 5.* This lemma can be achieved by phase kickback. From Lemma 4 there exists a verification algorithm satisfying (6), then there exist an unitary operation such that

$$U_{\text{Verify}} |s'\rangle |0\rangle = \begin{cases} |s'\rangle |1\rangle & \text{if } s' = s \\ |s'\rangle |0\rangle & \text{if } s' \neq s \end{cases} \quad (8)$$

holds.

Consider the following quantum operation. When given  $|s'\rangle |0\rangle$ , apply  $U_{\text{Verify}}$ , multiply the phase by  $(-1)^y$  according to the value of the second register  $y$  and apply  $U_{\text{Verify}}^\dagger$ . We get  $-|s'\rangle |0\rangle$  when  $s' = s$  otherwise we get  $|s'\rangle |0\rangle$ .  $\square$

**Theorem 3.** *Let  $q$  be a prime and  $\chi = \overline{\Psi_\alpha}$  where  $\alpha < \frac{1}{8}$ . If there is a quantum  $\epsilon$ -distinguisher  $U_D$  for the decisional  $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$  problem, then there is a quantum algorithm that solves the search  $\text{LWE}_{n,m',q,\chi}$  problem with probability  $\Omega(\frac{\epsilon}{qm})$  using  $U_D$  and  $U_D^\dagger$   $\mathcal{O}(\frac{qm}{\epsilon})$  times, where  $m' = m + \mathcal{O}(n)$ .*

*Proof of Theorem 3.* Initially,  $s$  is chosen uniform random from  $\mathbb{Z}_q^n$ , we get  $(A, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m$  and samples random coins. From Lemma 1 and Theorem 2 we can construct a quantum algorithm  $U_S$  using  $U_D$  and  $U_D^\dagger$  once each, and that satisfies

$$|\langle s | U_S | 0^n \rangle|^2 > \frac{4q^2 \epsilon^2}{9(q-1)^4 m^2} \quad (9)$$

with probability  $\frac{\epsilon}{3m(q-1)}$  over choice of  $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ ,  $(A, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m$  and random coins. From Lemma 4 and Lemma 5 we can construct a verification algorithm  $\text{Verify}$  (resp. a quantum algorithm  $U_{\text{Verify}}$ ) that satisfies (6) (resp. (7)) with constant probability using  $\mathcal{O}(n)$  samples of  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}$ .

Assuming that  $U_S$  satisfies (9),  $\text{Verify}$  satisfies (6), and  $U_{\text{Verify}}$  satisfies (7), consider the following procedure. The procedure is to compute

$$(-U_S(I - |0^n\rangle\langle 0^n|)U_S^\dagger U_{\text{Verify}})^k U_S |0^n\rangle,$$

measures states in the computational basis, test it by  $\text{Verify}$ . As shown in [12], if this is carried out for a suitably generated sequence of values of  $k$ , we can find  $s$  with the expected total number of executions of  $U_S$  and  $U_S^\dagger$  until a successful verification occurs is  $\mathcal{O}(\frac{qm}{\epsilon})$ . From the construction of  $U_S$ , we get the following conclusions. We can find  $s$  with probability  $\Omega(\frac{\epsilon}{qm})$  using  $U_D$  and  $U_D^\dagger$   $\mathcal{O}(\frac{qm}{\epsilon})$  times, and with sample complexity  $m + \mathcal{O}(n)$ .  $\square$

We remark that our reduction holds for a variety of other error distributions. It simply requires that we can verify from the samples whether it is the correct answer or not given some input  $s' \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ . For example, the verification algorithm for the case where  $q = 2$  and the error distributed from the Bernoulli distribution is given in Appendix A.

Next, we consider how we can raise the success probability of our reduction algorithm to  $1 - o(1)$ . Simply repeating the algorithm does not efficiently increase the success probability. There are two reasons why we cannot simply repeat the algorithm given in Section 3.1.

- Whether the predictor  $U_P$  has desired property depends on the choice of  $s \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  (see Lemma 1).
- And the amplitude amplification algorithm would keep running until it finds  $s$  in time inversely proportional to the advantage of  $U_P$ .

We can overcome the first problem by re-randomize the secret  $s$ . By sampling  $s^* \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^n$  and using  $(A, y') := (A, y + A \cdot s^*)$ , easily follows that, the distribution

$\{(A, y')\}$  is equal to the samples of  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}$ . The second problem can be overcome by parallel computing. For example, if we produce  $\lceil \frac{3qm \log n}{\epsilon} \rceil$  of predictors then there exist a predictor  $U_{P,i}$  that has advantage  $\frac{2\epsilon}{3(q-1)m}$  with probability at least  $1 - \frac{1}{n}$ . If any part of the parallel computation has an output that passes the verification algorithm, it is the answer. Hence we can find  $s$  with probability  $1 - o(1)$  by computing in parallel. This algorithm is described below.

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### Reduction Algorithm with high success probability

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Choose  $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$  samples from  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}$ , and construct **Verify**.

for  $i = 1, \dots, \lceil \frac{3q \log n}{\epsilon} \rceil$  :

    Choose  $m$  samples of LWE instances  $(A_i, y_i)$ .

    Sample a random vector  $s_i^* \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^n$ , set  $(A_i, y_i) := (A_i, y_i + A_i \cdot s_i^*)$ , and construct  $U_{P,i}$

    Construct  $\text{Verify}_i(x) := \text{Verify}(x - s_i^*)$  and  $U_{\text{Verify},i}$ .

Run the second reduction algorithm in parallel.

If there is a  $s_j$  that passes the  $j$ -th verification test  $\text{Verify}_j$ , then output  $s = s_j - s_j^*$ .

---

From Lemma 4, we can construct a verification algorithm **Verify** that satisfies (6) with probability  $1 - o(1)$  using  $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(n)$  samples of  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}$ . Hence, The above algorithm has success probability  $1 - o(1)$ , invokes  $U_D$   $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q^2 m^2 \log n}{\epsilon^2})$  times, and using  $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{qm^2}{\epsilon}) = \mathcal{O}(\frac{qm^2 \log n}{\epsilon}) + \mathcal{O}(n)$  samples of  $\mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}$ . We get the following corollary.

**Corollary 1.** *Let  $q$  be a prime and  $\chi = \overline{\Psi}_\alpha$  where  $\alpha < \frac{1}{8}$ . If there is a quantum  $\epsilon$ -distinguisher  $U_D$  for the decisional  $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$  problem, then there is a quantum algorithm that solves the search  $\text{LWE}_{n,m',q,\chi}$  problem with probability  $1 - o(1)$  using  $U_D$  and  $U_D^\dagger$   $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q^2 m^2 \log n}{\epsilon^2})$  times, where  $m' = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{qm^2}{\epsilon})$ .*

## 4 Conclusion

In this section, we display the efficiency of our reduction algorithms. We also give the comparisons listed in Table 1. The sample-preserve one shows that we can find  $s$  with a probability at least  $\frac{4q^2 \epsilon^3}{27(q-1)^5 m^3}$  and query complexity 2. Compared to the previous sample-preserve reduction by [22], it dramatically reduces query complexity. The second algorithm give by Theorem 3 performs amplitude amplification and has  $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q^2 m^2}{\epsilon^2})$  times higher success probability than the sample-preserve one, but the query complexity is  $\mathcal{O}(\frac{qm}{\epsilon})$  times higher and the sample complexity increases by  $\mathcal{O}(n)$ . We stress that this trade-off is specific to quantum computation. Additionally, we get the reduction algorithm that has success probability  $1 - o(1)$  with query complexity  $\mathcal{O}(\frac{q^2 m^2 \log n}{\epsilon^2})$  and sample



complexity  $\tilde{O}(\frac{qm^2}{\epsilon})$ . It is characterized by a lower sample complexity than the classical one, which also has a high success probability. It is interesting to note that, while our quantum reduction shows an advantage in query complexity in the comparison of sample preserve reductions, it has an advantage in sample complexity in the comparison of reductions with a high probability of success.

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## A Search-to-decision reduction for the LPN problem

We show that there is a quantum search-to-decision reduction for the learning parity with noise problem. First, from Theorem 2 we immediately obtain the following corollary.

**Corollary 2.** *If there is a quantum  $\epsilon$ -distinguisher  $U_D$  for the decisional  $\text{LWE}_{n,m,2,\text{Ber}_\mu}$  problem, then there is a quantum algorithm that solves the search  $\text{LWE}_{n,m,2,\text{Ber}_\mu}$  problem with probability at least  $\frac{16\epsilon^3}{27m^3}$  using  $U_D$  and  $U_D^\dagger$  once each.*

As in the case of the LWE problem, we can amplify the success probability by constructing an algorithm `Verify` that judges the solution.

**Lemma 6.** *We can construct an algorithm  $\text{Verify}_{LPN}$ , and it satisfies the following functionality (10) with desired probability  $0 < c < \frac{2^n - 1}{2^n}$ .*

For all  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,

$$\text{Verify}_{LPN}(x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = s \\ 0 & \text{if } x \neq s. \end{cases} \quad (10)$$

*Proof of Lemma 6.* Initially, sample  $(A, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{LPN}_{s, \mu}^l$ , where  $A \in \{0, 1\}^{l \times n}$  is a random Boolean matrix,  $l = \left\lceil - \left( \frac{6}{(\frac{1}{2} - \mu)^2} \log_e \left( \frac{1}{2} \left( \frac{1}{2^n} - \frac{c}{2^n - 1} \right) \right) \right) \right\rceil = \mathcal{O}(n)$  and  $y = A \cdot s \oplus e$  is a noisy inner products, note that  $e \in \{0, 1\}^l$  is errors distributed from  $\text{Ber}_{\mu}^l$ . Upon receiving input  $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ ,  $\text{Verify}_{LPN}$  works as follows.

$\text{Verify}_{LPN}(x)$  :

if  $|\text{weight}(A \cdot x \oplus y) - \mu l| < \frac{1}{2}(\frac{1}{2} - \mu)l$

then output 1

else output 0.

Note that the function  $\text{weight}(\cdot)$  outputs the Hamming distance. If  $x = s$ , since  $A \cdot x \oplus e = y$ ,  $A \cdot x \oplus y = e$ . Since  $e$  is distributed from the Bernoulli distribution  $\text{Ber}_{\mu}^l$ ,  $\mathbb{E}(\text{weight}(A \cdot x \oplus y)) = \mathbb{E}(\text{weight}(e)) = \mu l$ . If  $x \neq s$ ,  $A \cdot x \oplus y$  is uniformly random, since  $A$  is sampled uniformly random. Therefore  $\mathbb{E}(\text{weight}(A \cdot x \oplus y)) = \frac{1}{2}l$ . Let us analyze the probability that the  $\text{Verify}_{LPN}$  satisfies the condition (10).

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr[\text{Verify}_{LPN} \text{ satisfies (10)}] &= \Pr[\text{Verify}_{LPN}(s) = 1 \wedge \forall s' \neq s, \text{Verify}_{LPN}(s') = 0] \\ &\geq \Pr[\text{Verify}_{LPN}(s) = 1] \cdot \Pr[\forall s' \neq s, \text{Verify}_{LPN}(s') = 0] \\ &\geq \Pr[\text{Verify}_{LPN}(s) = 1] \cdot \left( 1 - \sum_{s' \neq s} \Pr[\text{Verify}_{LPN}(s') = 1] \right) \\ &\geq \left( 1 - 2e^{-\frac{l}{12\mu}(\frac{1}{2} - \mu)^2} \right) \left( 1 - (2^n - 1) \left( 2e^{-\frac{l}{6}(\frac{1}{2} - \mu)^2} \right) \right) \\ &\geq \left( 1 - \left( \frac{1}{2^n} - \frac{c}{2^n - 1} \right)^{\frac{1}{2\mu}} \right) \left( 1 - (2^n - 1) \left( \frac{1}{2^n} - \frac{c}{2^n - 1} \right) \right) \\ &\geq \left( 1 - \left( \frac{1}{2^n} - \frac{c}{2^n - 1} \right) \right) \left( 1 - 2^n \left( \frac{1}{2^n} - \frac{c}{2^n - 1} \right) \right) \\ &\geq \left( 1 - \frac{1}{2^n} \right) \frac{2^n c}{2^n - 1} \\ &= c \end{aligned}$$

The second inequality follows from union bound, and the third inequality follows from Chernoff bound.  $\square$

**Corollary 3.** *If there is a quantum  $\epsilon$ -distinguisher  $\text{U}_D$  for the decisional  $\text{LWE}_{n, m, 2, \text{Ber}_{\mu}}$  problem, then there is a quantum algorithm that solves the search  $\text{LWE}_{n, m', 2, \text{Ber}_{\mu}}$*

problem with probability  $\Omega(\frac{\epsilon}{m})$  using  $U_D$  and  $U_D^\dagger$   $\mathcal{O}(m/\epsilon)$  times, where  $m' = m + \mathcal{O}(n)$ .

The proof of this corollary is given in the same way as in Theorem 3.

	Success probability (at least)	Query complexity	Sample complexity	Classical/Quantum
KS06[20]	$\frac{\epsilon}{4}$	$\mathcal{O}(\frac{n \log n}{\epsilon^2})$	$\mathcal{O}(\frac{mn \log n}{\epsilon^2})$	Classical
AIK07[8]	$\Omega(\frac{\epsilon^3}{n})$	$\mathcal{O}(\frac{n^2}{\epsilon^2})$	$m$	Classical
Cor.2	$\frac{16\epsilon^3}{27m^3}$	2	$m$	Quantum
Cor.3	$\Omega(\frac{\epsilon}{m})$	$\mathcal{O}(\frac{m}{\epsilon})$	$m + \mathcal{O}(n)$	Quantum

**Table 2.** Comparison of the algorithms performance.  $n$  is a size of the LPN problem,  $m$  is the number of instances required by the distinguisher to solve the decisional LPN problem,  $\epsilon$  is the advantage of the distinguisher.

## B Classical search-to-decision reduction for the LWE

### B.1 A simple reduction

In this section we give a simple classical search-to-decision reduction by [28]. It is based on the reduction given by Regev [27] and is useful for comparing efficiency.

**Definition 4.** A (classical) algorithm  $D$  said to be a  $\epsilon$ -distinguisher for the decisional  $\text{LWE}_{n,m,q,\chi}$  problem if  $|\Pr[D(A, y) = 1 | s \xleftarrow{\$} \{0, 1\}^n, (A, y) \leftarrow \mathcal{LWE}_{n,s,q,\chi}^m] - \Pr[D(A, r) = 1 | A \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}, r \xleftarrow{\$} \mathbb{Z}_q^m]| > \epsilon$  holds.

The algorithm below solves the search  $\text{LWE}_{n,m',q,\chi}$  problem with probability  $1 - o(1)$  using  $D$   $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{nq}{\epsilon^2})$  times where  $m' = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{nmq}{\epsilon^2})$ . For a detailed analysis, please refer to [28].

### B.2 Complexity of MM11 [22]

In this section, we give a brief analysis of the search-to-decision reduction by Micciancio and Mol [22]. Their search-to-decision reduction for LWE is shown via search-to-decision reduction for the knapsack functions. This induces a negligible fraction of loss in the success probability. Let  $\delta$  be an advantage of the distinguisher. From ([22], Proposition3.9 and Lemma3.4) the success probability of the search-to-decision reduction for the knapsack functions is  $\frac{\epsilon}{3}$  where  $\epsilon \geq \left(\frac{d^{*3}\tilde{\delta}}{d^3(d^*-1)}\right)(2 - \frac{\pi^2}{6})$  and  $\tilde{\delta}$  is some noticeable such that  $\tilde{\delta} \leq \delta$ . Using the

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**Classical reduction algorithm**


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for  $i = 1, \dots, n$  :

  for  $j = 0, \dots, q - 1$  :

    for  $l = 1, \dots, L = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{1}{\epsilon^2})$  :

      Choose a fresh block of LWE instances  $(A_l, y_l)$ .

      Sample a random vector  $c_l \leftarrow \mathbb{Z}_q^m$ , and let  $C_l \in \mathbb{Z}_q^{m \times n}$  be the matrix whose  $i$ -th row is  $c_l$ , and whose other entries are all zero.

      Let  $A'_l := A_l + C_l$ , and  $y'_l := y_l + j \cdot c_l$ .

      Run the distinguisher  $D(A'_l, b'_l)$  and let the output be called  $d_l$ .

      If  $\text{maj}(d_1, \dots, d_L) = 1$  (meaning that the distinguisher guesses LWE) then set  $s_i = j$ .

      Else, continue to the next iteration of the loop.

Output  $s = s_1 \dots s_n$ .

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fact that  $d^* \geq s$  and  $\tilde{d} \leq 2ms^2$ , we have  $\frac{\epsilon}{3} = \Omega(\frac{\tilde{\delta}}{m^{\frac{3}{4}}s^4})$ . Substituting  $q$  for  $s$ , we get the success probability of their search-to-decision reduction for LWE  $\Omega(\frac{\tilde{\delta}}{m^{\frac{3}{4}}q^4}) - \text{negl}(n)$ .

In ([22], Lemma3.4), they use Significant Fourier Transform [5] with  $\tau = \frac{\epsilon^2}{4}$ ,  $N = |\mathbb{Z}_{d^*}^l|$  and  $\|f\|_2 = \|f\|_\infty = 1$ . The running time of Significant Fourier Transform is at most  $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\log N (\frac{\|f\|_2^2}{\tau})^{1.5} (\frac{\|f\|_\infty^2}{\eta^2})^2 \lg \frac{1}{\mu})$  for  $\eta = \Theta(\min\{\tau, \sqrt{\tau}, \frac{\tau}{\|f\|_\infty}\})$  and  $\mu = 1/\mathcal{O}((\frac{\|f\|_\infty^2}{\tau})^{1.5} \log N)$ . Substituting  $\tau = \frac{\epsilon^2}{4}$ ,  $N = d^*m$  and  $\|f\|_2 = \|f\|_\infty = 1$ , we get  $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\log N (\frac{\|f\|_2^2}{\tau})^{1.5} (\frac{\|f\|_\infty^2}{\eta^2})^2 \lg \frac{1}{\mu}) = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{\log(d^*l)}{\epsilon^{11}})$ . Hence From ([22], Proposition3.9 and Lemma3.4), the query complexity of the search-to-decision reduction for LWE is  $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{\log(d^*m)}{\epsilon^{11}})\mathcal{O}(1) = \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\frac{\log(d^*m)}{\epsilon^{11}})$  where  $d^*$  is some polynomial such that  $d^* \geq q$ .